A model of norm change in polarised societies
Publication Date
December 11, 2025
Creator
Abstract
People are willing to abandon a social norm, as long as others do first. From this fact emerges the possibility of social tipping: a sudden, self-reinforcing shift in collective behaviour triggered by the actions of a few early-adopters. While this phenomenon has been shown to dismantle harmful norms, many real-world norms benefit one population group at the expense of another. Women benefit more than men from changing gender norms, just as Democrats and Republicans have conflicting preferences over various political norms. When willingness to change is grouped and polarised in this way, should we still expect to see tipping dynamics? This paper develops a game-theoretic threshold model with population groups that have opposing preferences over coordination equilibria. We find this conflict generates a bimodal distribution of adoption thresholds, giving rise to a false tipping point and an interior equilibrium of costly and persistent miscoordination. Consequently, we show that standard, well-meaning tipping interventions can backfire, leading the system into a ‘polarisation trap’. We derive conditions under which such traps emerge and show how targeted interventions must account for group resistance to
avoid these welfare-destroying outcomes.
Item Type
ethesis
Thesis Type
MRes
Supervisors
Subjects (LC)
Associated Schools / Departments
School of Economics (UK)
eprints ID
82326
UoN Repository URI
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