The modern problems for naïve realism
Publication Date
July 31, 2026
Creator
Abstract
Is naïve realism a plausible theory of perception? Naïve realism is often written off in the philosophy of perception, often due to The Problem of Perception, and the view that alternative theories, such as representationalism are better placed to solve the problem. I am more optimistic about the prospects for naïve realism.
Rather than looking at how naïve realists can respond to the traditional problem of perception, this thesis assesses naïve realism by bringing it into discourse with what I’ll call modern problems of perception. As such, I will examine how naïve realism can be adapted and developed in the light of these new problems.
I open with a deep analysis of the theory of naïve realism, explaining the core commitments of the theory. I outline the version of naïve realism that I find the most convincing and thus the most useful for the purposes of the thesis. This acts as a springboard for the rest of the thesis, as the version of naïve realism that I set out is the version that I will continue to come back to, and develop, as we explore the modern problems of perception.
I then outline the modern problems of perception, each of which containing an interesting perceptual phenomenon at its heart; those being unconscious perception, rich perception, cognitive penetration and the rationality of perception. I examine whether we ought to accept that these phenomena are real and legitimate, and then, having found them all to be real and legitimate, I address their compatibility with naïve realism. I also develop the theory of naïve realism based on my discussion.
This thesis is a compilation of different fields of study. The chapters on unconscious perception and cognitive penetration include more empirical work as they have a strong basis in cognitive science and neuroscience. The chapters that focus on rich perception and rationality of perception take a more psychological and philosophical approach. This approach lends support to the idea that naïve realism is not undermined by the sciences of the mind and perception, but, when developed in the right way, can work alongside them.
The thesis is unique in several ways: it brings together a multitude of phenomena to the table and constructs structurally similar challenges for naïve realism out of them (the ‘modern problems’), reflecting and unifying some of the disparate anti-naïve realist ideas we find in the literature. And it develops a distinctive brand of naïve realism, a version of naïve realism that has not yet been developed in the way I develop it, in response to some of these problems.
Item Type
ethesis
Thesis Type
PhD
Supervisors
Subjects (LC)
Associated Schools / Departments
School of Humanities
eprints ID
83123
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