Presentism as dynamic existence
Publication Date
December 10, 2024
Creator
Abstract
This thesis proposes and defends a novel version of presentism called Dynamic Existence Presentism (DEP). DEP is founded on two main principles: there are no (discrete) times and temporal existence is fundamentally dynamic. Rejecting the notion of time as a series of static slices, DEP builds on Merricks' (2007) and Tallant's (2014) arguments that presence equates to existence, thereby dissolving the need for a distinct present moment. DEP further distinguishes between the passage of time and temporal dynamism, accepting the latter as an irreducible aspect of reality. The mechanism of DEP's dynamism is rooted in a Neo-Aristotelian powers ontology, positing that all properties are dynamic and process-like. According to DEP, objects are bundles of powerful properties, intrinsically dynamic and inseparable from their properties.
Item Type
ethesis
Thesis Type
PhD
Supervisors
Subjects (LC)
Associated Schools / Departments
School of Humanities
eprints ID
78602
UoN Repository URI
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Name
Langsdale, Kerry, 14342697, Corrections.pdf
Type
Full-text
Description
Examined
Size
1.31 MB
Format
Adobe PDF
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