The meta-ethics of normative ethics
Publication Date
2011
Creator
Abstract
This thesis is an attempt to answer the following question:
Do our moral commitments commit us to constraints on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive?
In order to answer this question, I first demonstrate that meta-ethical theories can be criticised on moral grounds. I then argue that correctness conditions for moral claims imply the thesis of explanatory moral realism. I do not claim that this is an argument for the truth of explanatory moral realism. Rather, I claim that this is an argument that moral realism is a moral commitment. I then look at two objections to the claim that moral claims can have built in commitments to a meta-ethical theory that takes a stand on the issue of moral realism. The first of these is a set of arguments that Simon Blackburn gives for quasi-realism. The second objection is a set of arguments given by Ronald Dworkin that attack the presuppositions of debates about realism in meta-ethics.
Item Type
ethesis
Thesis Type
PhD
Supervisors
Subjects (LC)
Associated Schools / Departments
School of Humanities
eprints ID
12091
UoN Repository URI
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The Meta-Ethics of Normative Ethics (Phd in Philosophy)
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