



On Philosophers' Hallucinations

Naïve Realism and the Master Argument from Hallucination

Giorgio Mazzullo



Abstract

It is widely acknowledged that the Master Argument from Hallucination poses a significant challenge to Naïve Realism, i.e., the view that the phenomenal character of (at least) veridical conscious perceptions is constituted by the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and aspects of their mind-independent environment. Naïve Realists often attempt to resist the argument by maintaining that the possibility of the hallucinatory events invoked by the argument is compatible with their view. However, this approach has led to some views of visual experiences that many have considered implausible.

My work assesses the prospects for Naïve Realists to resist the Master Argument by rejecting the possibility of such hallucinatory events, i.e., Philosophers' Hallucinations construed as non-naïve realist experiences. This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part outlines Naïve Realism and presents the Master Argument from Hallucination, emphasising the crucial role that the possibility of such hallucinatory events plays in the argument. The second part assesses the Eliminativist strategy. I present four Eliminativist strategies to resist the argument: the Irreproducibility Strategy, the Non-Replicability Strategy, the Distinguishability Strategy, and the Monist Strategy. Based on extant proposals, I argue that none of them are viable in their current form.

In the final chapter, I present a more promising way to implement the Eliminativist Strategy. I propose that Philosophers' Hallucinations should be construed as naïve realist experiences. In undergoing such mental events, one would be perceptually aware of a region of space. This approach allows Naïve Realists to reject the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations construed as non-naïve realist experiences and, therefore, reject the Master Argument from Hallucination.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors Craig French, the late Penelope Mackie, Joe Cunningham, and Steve Barker. I am especially grateful to Craig for his invaluable guidance, support, and friendship throughout this journey, and to Penelope whose absence is deeply felt. Craig and Penelope's unwavering commitment to excellence and intellectual rigour has been a constant source of inspiration for me. Joe and Steve joined my supervisory team in the later stage of my research, but their contributions proved to be invaluable. I also wish to thank and express my gratitude to my examiners, Matthew Soteriou and Harold Noonan, for their insightful questions and comments.

I am grateful to Harold Langsam, Keith Allen, Alex Moran, Ivan Ivanov, Andrea Raimondi, Mark Jago, and Dominic Alford-Duguid for their insightful discussions and advice. I express my gratitude to the research community at the University of Nottingham, especially Lucia Ontiveros Llamas, Simon Thunder, Taylor Matthews, Fabio Saccoccio and Alice Monypenny, for their friendship and intellectual camaraderie.

I would also like to acknowledge the Philosophy Department of the University of Nottingham, particularly Stefano Predelli, Jon Robson, Ian Kidd, and Kasim Khorasane, as well as the University of L'Aquila, in particular Simone Gozzano, Marco Segala, Giorgio Lando, Alessio Santelli and Donatella Donati, for their support.

I also extend my heartfelt thanks to my friends Giacomo, Giulia and Damian for always being there for me during these years, and to Janet for all the incredible support over the past few years and for being the best *suç ortağı* I could have found. Finally, I am deeply grateful to my parents, Marcello and Tecla, and brother, Davide, for their unfailing love and support.

To everyone who contributed, guided, and supported me, I offer my sincere thanks.

Contents

Abstract	3
Acknowledgements	5
Introduction	10
Part I The Inconsistent Triad	15
Chapter 1 Naïve Realism	17
1.1 The Nature of Visual Experiences	17
1.2 Naïve Realism: Experience and Character	22
1.3 Naïve Realism	27
1.3.1 Perceptual Awareness	28
1.3.2 Constituents	30
1.3.3 The Naïve Realist Phenomenology of Visual Experiences	32
1.4 Naïve Realism: Constituency and Inheritance	34
1.5 Conclusion	38
Chapter 2 The Master Argument	40
2.1 The Inconsistent Triad	40
2.2 Character Monism and Naïve Realism	43
2.3 Experiential Naturalism and the Possibility of Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations	48
2.4 Character Monism	58
2.4.1 The Reverse Causal Argument	62
2.4.2 The Screening Off Step	63
2.5 The Master Argument from Hallucination	67
2.6 Conclusion	68

Part II On Philosophers' Hallucinations	70
Chapter 3 Eliminativism about Philosophers' Hallucinations	72
3.1 The Possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations	72
3.2 The Irreproducibility Strategy	76
3.3 The Non-Replicability Strategy	78
3.3.1 The Consciousness Way: Allen's Imagination Model	80
3.3.2 The Physical Implementation Way: The Phenomenal-Causal View and the Dual Processing View	84
3.4 The Distinguishability Strategy	89
3.5 Conclusion	93
Chapter 4 Monist Eliminativism	96
4.1 The Monist Strategy and the Character Question	96
4.2 The Constituency Question	100
4.3 The Inheritance Question: A Dilemma	106
4.3.1 First Horn	106
4.3.2 Second Horn	109
4.4 Tackling the Second Horn	112
4.5 Special Properties and the Virtual Way	114
4.6 The Failure of the Virtual Way	118
4.6.1 Screening Off	119
4.6.2 Circularity	123
4.6.3 Inappropriate Objects	126
4.6.4 The Argument from Nearly Chaotic Cases	128
4.7 Conclusion	131
Chapter 5 Spatial Monism	134
5.1 Spatial Monism	134
5.2 The Constituency Question	137
5.3 The Spatial Monist Strategy and Regions of Space	147
5.4 The Inheritance Question	154

5.4.1 The Austere Way and the Inheritance Question	155
5.4.2 The Ambitious Way and the Inheritance Question	162
5.5 Conclusion	175
Conclusion	178
References	180

Introduction

Naïve Realism is often praised for the elegant way in which it accommodates our pre-theoretical commitments about veridical conscious perceptions in the articulation of the subjects' conscious perspective in undergoing such mental events. When it comes to characterising the distinctive modification of consciousness that occurs in cases of perceptual success, the Naïve Realist's appeal to a distinctive relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and aspects of their mind-independent environment seems to nicely capture the way veridical conscious perceptions strike perceivers through introspection.

A venerable tradition, however, deems Naïve Realism as untenable. In turn, either the “slightest philosophy” (Hume 1748: §12.9) or, more recently, the most basic knowledge of the contemporary science of perception (Burge 2005) are taken to show that we should refrain from articulating the conscious character of sense perceptions in the way we would were we to rely just on how they strike us. The dictum of such – sometimes perfunctory – ways of dismissing Naïve Realism is: we should shape the way we articulate the conscious character of veridical conscious perceptions based on what must be true of misperceptions or cases of perceptual failure. The most perfected development of this traditional argumentative line against Naïve Realism combines elements of our knowledge of the functioning of the visual system and more perspicuous philosophical reasoning. I will call this argument the *Master Argument from Hallucination*.

The Master Argument has had a long gestation, but it appears in a form close to the one I am interested in almost two decades ago in a series of influential papers written by Martin (2004, 2006). The argument, Martin contends, is driven by the existence of an Inconsistent Triad. Naïve Realism is shown to be inconsistent with two further plausible assumptions. The first part of this thesis, titled *The Inconsistent Triad* and composed of two chapters, is mainly devoted to the articulation of the Master Argument from Hallucination. In the first chapter, I present and outline the core commitments of the view I will be concerned with: Naïve Realism. In the second chapter, I present the two further assumptions that constitute the Inconsistent Triad, and show how the triad can be seen as driving the Master Argument from Hallucination.

In the articulation of the Inconsistent Triad, I distance myself, at least nominally, from Martin's reconstruction. Martin can be read as suggesting that the triad is completed by Experiential Naturalism and Character Monism. Experiential Naturalism, the view that visual experiences are part of the natural causal order, plays a crucial role in the argument according to Martin. First, it sustains the possibility of the problematic sort of hallucinations: neurally matching hallucinations, i.e., hallucinations brought about by stimulating the brain as in a veridical conscious perception of an F, construed as philosophers usually do. For this reason, I will refer to neurally matching hallucinations so construed as Philosophers' Hallucinations. Second, Experiential Naturalism constrains the account of their introspectable properties. Whatever accounts for the subject's perspective in undergoing such mental events cannot be properties that obtain in virtue of the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness with aspects of the mind-independent environment.

The second assumption is Character Monism. In a nutshell, the view that the character properties of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations have a *single* nature. Now consider this: if neurally matching hallucinations construed as philosophers do are possible, and Character Monism is true, then veridical conscious perceptions have a character of the same nature as such hallucinatory events. This character is not naïve realist. So, Naïve Realism is false.

Naïve Realists have typically granted that Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible, and that they do not have a naïve realist phenomenal character. Traditionally, they have rejected Character Monism and endorsed a position I dub Character Disjunctivism: the properties that account for the subject's perspective in having a visual experience as of an apple are *either* naïve realist (in cases of veridical conscious perceptions) *or* non-naïve realist (in cases of neurally matching hallucinations). The Disjunctivist strategy provides the Naïve Realists with an elegant way to resist traditional arguments in favour of Character Monism (e.g., the argument from indistinguishability and the traditional causal argument). Things look different when it comes to the argument presented by Martin (2004, 2006) in favour of Character Monism.

Martin's argument, which I take as part of the Master Argument from Hallucination, is composed of two moves and relies on the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations. Elaborating on previous argumentative lines, Martin contends that whatever character properties philosophers' hallucinations have, they can be present in a corresponding veridical conscious perception. Since such properties have the explanatory power to account for the subject's perspective in undergoing a veridical conscious perception, whatever additional properties one might think as present in cases of veridical conscious

perceptions alone are made explanatorily idle when it comes to accounting for the subject's perspective in undergoing such experiential events. So, Character Monism is true.

Crucially, Martin suggests that since it is not open to Naïve Realists to reject the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations, as this would amount to taking an anti-naturalistic stance, Naïve Realists must find a way to block the move from the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations to the truth of Character Monism. Martin has famously argued that, once you accept the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations, the *only* viable Disjunctivist view capable of resisting the move to Character Monism is Evidential Disjunctivism, i.e., a view that characterises the introspectable properties of Philosophers' Hallucinations with the property of not being knowably not a veridical conscious perception of a certain sort.

Recent discussion about the viability of Naïve Realism has been almost entirely monopolised by a vivacious discussion of Martin's stance. In particular, the minimal, negative characterization recommended by proponents of Evidential Disjunctivism has come under fire from several different directions. If philosophers' hallucinations are possible, Martin's opponents have contended, then surely they must have a more *robust* nature. Although Martin's Evidential Disjunctivism deserves careful consideration, in this work I will proceed as if the argument for Character Monism would go through if the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations were accepted.

I do not share many of the worries that opponents of the view have manifested, but, as the recent literature shows, I suspect that Naïve Realists would be in a better dialectical position if they were able to provide a compelling alternative to Evidential Disjunctivism. As I will try to show, a careful assessment of the articulation of the Master Argument provides us with a more complex picture of the strategies available to Naïve Realists to resist the argument than the one sometimes envisaged by Martin. Indeed, as I will argue, the possibility of the problematic hallucinatory kind is supported not only by Experiential Naturalism, but a reinforced version of Experiential Naturalism.

The second element of the Inconsistent Triad that drives the possibility of non-naïve realist philosophers' hallucinations is constituted by Experiential Naturalism combined with the general knowledge we have of the functioning of the visual system and broadly armchair reasoning. I dub this body of knowledge and assumptions *Empirical Naturalism*. Once this is acknowledged, the rejection of the possibility of the problematic hallucinatory kind does not *ipso facto* push Naïve Realists outside of the naturalistic camp. There are ways of resisting the possibility of such events that are perfectly compatible with one's commitment to Experiential Naturalism.

In the second part of the thesis, titled *On Philosophers' Hallucinations*, I will be looking at strategies aimed at resisting the Master Argument from Hallucination that try to reject the possibility of non-naïve realist Philosophers' Hallucinations: *Eliminativist Strategies*. In Chapter 4, I assess extant Eliminativist strategies about Philosophers' Hallucinations. Proponents of the Eliminativist strategy I will consider hold that Naïve Realists have been too concessive so far. Neurally matching hallucinations as they are construed by philosophers are not possible. Eliminativism about Philosophers' Hallucinations has gained popularity among Naïve Realists in recent years (Allen 2015; Logue and Richardson 2021; Ivanov 2022; Moran 2019, 2022). I assess three Eliminativist strategies: the Irreproducibility Strategy, the Non-Replicability Strategy, and the Distinguishability Strategy. After a careful assessment, I contend that, as they stand, none of them is satisfactory. But with crucial differences. Whilst I am convinced that the Irreproducibility Strategy and the Distinguishability Strategy are non-starters, for they would leave the Naïve Realists in the precarious situation of hanging on (partly empirical) predictions that are against the odds, some room is left open for the Non-Replicability Strategy, albeit not in the forms it has so far been implemented.

In Chapter 4, I turn to consider a different Eliminativist strategy: the Monist Strategy. The Monist Strategy accepts the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations but rejects the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations construed as non-naïve realist. I suggest that the strategy faces a pressing question: the Character Question. How can the phenomenology of Philosophers' Hallucinations be grounded in the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness with mind-independent aspects of the world? I assess ways in which, based on the extant literature (Raleigh 2014; Ali 2018; Masrour 2020), proponents of the Monist Strategy have addressed this challenge and I elaborate on their proposals in order to set forth an apparently viable version of the Monist Strategy: the Virtual Way. I then raise some compelling objections against it and suggest that it is ultimately untenable.

In the fifth and final chapter, I sketch a novel solution to the challenge raised by the Master Argument from Hallucination to Naïve Realism. I develop a version of the Monist Way inspired by a view I dub Spatial Monism, i.e., the view that the character of visual experiences is constituted by properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of perceptual awareness with a *region of space*. In undergoing a Philosophers' Hallucination, according to this view, one would perceive a region of space that would strike the subject as having a configuration it does not (typically) have. By construing Philosophers' Hallucinations as naïve realist experiences, I contend that Naïve Realists can reject the Master Argument from Hallucination.

Part I The Inconsistent Triad

In this first part, composed of two chapters, I outline the Inconsistent Triad that drives the Master Argument from Hallucination. In the first chapter, I present the first element of the triad: Naïve Realism. I suggest that Naïve Realism should be seen, first and foremost, as a view about the conscious character of (at least) veridical conscious perceptions. According to it, veridical conscious perceptions are constituted by the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and aspects of their mind-independent environment, such that their phenomenal character is inherited from the actual character of the perceived entities. In the second chapter, I move to the characterisation of the additional elements of the Inconsistent Triad: Empirical Naturalism and Character Monism. I show how the Inconsistent Triad drives the Master Argument from Hallucination against Naïve Realism.

Chapter 1 Naïve Realism

In this chapter, I introduce the dispute about the nature of visual experiences and present the view I will be concerned with: Naïve Realism. First, I provide some remarks about how I frame the central dispute in the philosophy of perception about the nature of visual experiences and their character. I then present Naïve Realism as a view about the nature and character of at least a subset of visual experiences: veridical conscious perceptions. I proceed to clarify some of the core commitments of the view and discuss different ways in which Naïve Realism has been formulated. Finally, I present the specific version of the view I will work with, which I take to be the most representative naïve realist view in the literature. According to such a view, the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions is, at least in part, inherited from the actual character of its mind-independent constituents.

1.1 The Nature of Visual Experiences

Consider Mary, who sees a red apple before her for what it is. Mary undergoes a mental event of a distinctive sort: a visual experience. Visual experiences differ from other sorts of mental events at least in the following respect: the subject of a visual experience has a distinctive perspective on such mental events. Visual experiences are *introspectable* mental events, or, as I will sometimes put it, they have *a character*. By introspection, I mean, very roughly, the distinctive sort of access we have to some of our own mental events or states. Visual experiences, such as the one Mary undergoes when she sees a red apple before her, possess some properties that account for the subject's perspective in undergoing them. I will sometimes refer to such properties as *character properties* or *introspectable properties*.

Several mental events do not have any character: there is no perspective a subject has in undergoing them. Vision science theorises about many psychological events of a computational nature that a subject like Mary would undergo if she were to see a red apple before her. But there is no perspective on such goings-on for a subject like Mary. Such mental events do not possess character properties.

Many think – myself included – that the reason why visual experiences have a character is that they have a *phenomenal* character, or equivalently, that they are phenomenally conscious mental events.¹ There is, borrowing Nagel’s expression (1974), *something it is like* for a subject to undergo them. What it is like for a subject to undergo a phenomenally conscious event is what I will refer to as the phenomenology or phenomenal character of that event. In what follows, I will assume that the totality of the phenomenology of a visual experience can be seen as composed of different aspects, and I will often talk of *phenomenal properties* to refer to such aspects of the phenomenal character of visual experiences. Moreover, I will sometimes talk as if all visual experiences were phenomenally conscious events. Everything I say can be reframed so to accommodate the claim that at least some visual experiences are not.

Our mental life is populated by a variety of phenomenally conscious events or states. We feel emotions like sadness or fear. We experience sensations like pain. All these phenomenally conscious states or events can be typed according to what it is like for a subject to undergo them, or, equivalently, they can be typed according to their phenomenology. Visual experiences contribute to our overall phenomenally conscious life in a distinctive way: they are phenomenally conscious events of a *visual* kind, or, equivalently, they are phenomenally conscious events with a *visual* phenomenology.

Reflection on visual experiences and their character fosters a variety of philosophical questions.² Here I will be concerned with a philosophical inquiry into the *nature* or *essence* – I will use these terms interchangeably – of these mental events and their character. I understand this task in broadly Aristotelian terms. What I will be after here is a *real definition* of visual experiences and their character, i.e., a proposition that tells us “in the most perspicuous fashion” (Lowe 2012: 105) what such entities are.³ So the questions we will be concerned with are:

¹ In this thesis, I assume that visual experiences are mental *events* with distinctive character properties. I will also assume that in articulating the character of visual experiences – a property of a mental event – one also characterises how a subject is modified in certain ways. That is to say, one also specifies the occurrence of distinctive mental states. For a distinction between mental entities understood as events or states see Crane (2001: 39). For an insightful discussion of the relation between visual consciousness understood in terms of events or states, and a specific proposal of how we should think of their relation see Soteriou (2013: Ch. 2).

² See Crane (2005) for some of the philosophical and empirical questions related to visual experiences.

³ For the notion of *essence* I will work with, see Fine (1994a; 1994b; 2015). For the relation between essence and real definition see Lowe (2012: 104–5) and Fine (1994a: 13). Moreover, following Jago (2018), I will take the definiendum to be grounded in the ways the definiens is grounded.

- ❖ What is the nature of or, equivalently for my purposes, what is constitutive of an experience of a certain type, such as Mary's visual experience as of a red apple?
- ❖ What is the nature of the phenomenal character of an experience of a certain type, such as Mary's visual experience of a red apple?

At this stage, it is useful to remark that the real definition of visual experiences and their character will consist of the correct articulation of how experience and character are to be characterised at a *personal level*.⁴ So, the reader should expect an answer to such questions that resorts to *psychological* terms, and not, say, to the language of physics. As we will see, our efforts will be devoted to an assessment of whether the obtaining of a distinctive psychological relation of perceptual awareness is constitutive of at least some visual experiences and their character. This is quite compatible with the fact that there might be a more basic characterisation of visual experiences and their character in non-psychological terms.

Now, as self-conscious subjects, we are often in a position to know something about the distinctive sort of visual experience we are undergoing. Given the nature of the task, the philosophical dispute about the nature of visual experiences and their character typically assigns a significant role to *introspective* considerations. As Crane remarks (2000: 49), “[i]t is hardly to be expected that introspection could tell us, for example, whether our experiences are brain states, or supervene on brain states.” However, introspective considerations might play a role in articulating a personal-level characterisation of visual experiences and their character.⁵ But what does introspection suggest about the nature of visual experiences and their character?

In an insightful discussion of how philosophers have attempted to articulate the deliverances of introspection about visual experiences, Martin (2000) advances the following proposal: two principles have been in turn set forth as ways to capture what is obvious about visual experiences through introspection. Martin, it seems to me, thinks that there actually *is* introspective evidence for such principles, and that the history of the philosophy of perception can be read as an attempt to make sense, given the relevant intellectual context, of how to accommodate them in articulating the nature of visual experiences and their character. Since I am not entirely sure as to whether introspection

⁴ For the distinction between personal and sub-personal levels of explanation see Dennett (1969: 93). For discussion see Drayson (2012).

⁵ For a critical discussion about the use of introspective considerations in the philosophy of perception see Spener (2021).

is actually committal in the way such principles suggest – at least on an innocent reading of them – I tentatively concur only with Martin’s exegetical reconstruction.⁶ This is enough for our current introductory purposes, for it allows us to have a perspective on how the dispute on the nature of visual experiences has unfolded.

The first principle, which Martin refers to as *Transparency*, suggests that the character of visual experiences “involves in some sense, or is directed on, or of, the mind-independent objects and their features which we take to be around us in our environment” (Martin 2000: 217).⁷ When one introspects on visual experiences, “one seems to end up concentrating on what is outside again” (Tye 1995: 30).

The second principle, *Actualism*, holds that “whatever qualities one senses, some actual instance of those qualities and the object which bears them must exist and be sensed.” (Martin 2000: 218). Consider a visual experience of a lavender bush at the end of the street:

[I]t is evident to me that I am experiencing these things, and not merely thinking about them, or imagining or remembering them. The latter things I can do in the absence of the objects of perception, but it does not seem to me that I can be this way, actually experiencing, without the relevant objects or features present in my environment. (Martin 2000: 219)

In undergoing a visual experience, there seems to exist some entity that is being *given*, *present* to consciousness.⁸ Actualism, minimally construed, points to the *presentational nature* of visual experiences. As Sturgeon remarks (2000: 9), “[v]isual phenomenology makes it for a subject as if a scene is simply presented.”

Now, here is a crucial point: if one accepts both Transparency and Actualism as the correct way of characterising visual experiences based on introspection, one is committed to an error theory of visual experiences. For one is then forced to hold that

⁶ My reservations, roughly put, concern whether introspection is committal about what I will call in Chapter 4 (§4.6.1) the *absolute* mind-independence, i.e., the constitutive independence of the objects of awareness from experiences as opposed to their *particular* mind-independence, i.e., the constitutive independence of the objects of awareness from a particular experience. For an illuminating discussion on this issue see Mackie (2018).

⁷ Readers familiar with the Transparency thesis will notice that the thesis is usually formulated in terms of a positive and a negative claim. For typically philosophers set forth the additional claim, absent in Martin’s formulation, that introspection does not reveal any intrinsic features of experiences themselves. For influential presentations of the transparency of visual experiences see Tye (1995: 30) and Harman (1990: 667). For discussion see Crane (2000), Martin (2002a) and Soteriou (2013).

⁸ Cf. Price (1932: 3).

introspection misguides us about the nature of visual experiences. The puzzle arises once one acknowledges the apparent platitude that not all visual experiences are veridical perceptions of mind-independent objects and their features. At least total hallucinations seem to be genuine visual experiences involving no perception of such entities.

In light of this, philosophers have in turn either accepted that introspection misleads us about some aspects of visual experiences, or tried to contend that the deliverances of introspection are actually *silent* on at least one of the two principles: as Martin suggests (2000: 218), what seems obvious through introspection and reflection on one's visual experiences could perhaps be explained away without resorting to some feature that introspection tracks.⁹

Some, for instance, are convinced that Actualism holds true of visual experiences. However, given that one can have visual experiences that involve misperceptions or the absence of mind-independent physical entities, they contend that the entities one would be immediately aware of in undergoing visual events cannot be those familiar entities like chairs, mountains, and their properties that we take ourselves to be perceiving, but rather some non-physical sort of entities: *sense-data*. A commitment to Actualism for these philosophers comes with a rejection of Transparency.¹⁰

Others are sceptical about postulating any such odd entities. We should take seriously the Transparency of experiences, and deal with the existence of non-veridical or non-perceptual visual experiences by taking visual experiences as intentional, akin to belief. Visual experiences are about or represent mind-independent aspects of the environment around us.¹¹ By saying so, however, Intentionalists give up on the genuinely presentational nature of visual experiences. For if we take the presentational relation as a genuine relation, then for such a relation to obtain its relata must exist. But in so far as it is possible to represent what does not exist, intentionalism is not committed to the existence of a genuine presentational relation that is constitutive of visual experiences. Intentionalism, in other words, comes with a commitment to the rejection of Actualism.

From these brief remarks, it is already evident that the existence of illusory or hallucinatory experiences seems to constrain our theorising about visual experiences.

⁹ So, it is not so straightforward to hold that Sense-Datum Theories and Intentionalism are committed to an error theory of visual experiences.

¹⁰ For sense-datum views see Moore (1914), Russell (1912), Jackson (1977), and Robinson (1994).

¹¹ For intentionalist views see Crane (2001), Searle (1983), Siegel (2010), Harman (1990), Dretske (1995), Tye (2000), Byrne (2001), and Pautz (2010). Sometimes the view is called Representationalism. I take Representationalism as a version of the intentional view of perception: the version that holds that the phenomenal character of visual experiences is entirely determined by their content.

But what happens if we bracket for a second the possibility of such mental events? Consider Mary’s veridical conscious perception of a red apple before her. If we accept that introspection gives equal support to Actualism and Transparency, then we will suppose that Mary’s experience involves the presentation of the very apple before her and some of its properties, i.e., some of those that are visible. Such objects and qualities will actually have to be there before her in order for her to have that kind of experience. By holding so, we will endorse a view we can dub *Naïve Realism*.¹²

1.2 Naïve Realism: Experience and Character

Naïve Realists think that at least some of our visual experiences, i.e., those that are veridical and perceptual, should be characterised in a way that carefully accommodates both Transparency and Actualism. In doing so, according to some Naïve Realists, we can take “our introspection of experience at face value, *thereby* avoiding the need to posit some kind of error in our naïve or common sense judgments about perception” (Martin 2002a: 420). Naïve Realism, it is often suggested, also “correctly captures the common-sense conception of perception” (Martin 2006: 356). If one takes introspective considerations as informing our pre-theoretical conception of visual experiences, this should not come as a surprise. For Naïve Realism, as we have said, is taken by many as the view that “best articulates how visual experience seems to us to be just through reflection” (Ibid, 354).¹³

In its recent developments, Naïve Realism can be traced back to the works of Paul Snowdon (1980), Mike Martin (1997, 2004, 2006), John Campbell (2002), Bill Brewer (2011), and Bill Fish (2009). Versions of Naïve Realism have been defended by Logue (2012a), Soteriou (2013), Kalderon (2015), and, more recently, French and Phillips (2020), Beck (2019), Moran (2019) and Sethi (2020). As I have suggested, Naïve Realism

¹² I follow Martin in labelling the view as ‘Naïve Realism’. Alternatives are Campbell’s ‘Relational View’ (2002), Brewer’s ‘Object View’ (2011), and Logue’s ‘Extended View’ (Logue 2018: 44).

¹³ For critical discussion see Raineri (2021). For the idea that Naïve Realism provides the best characterisation of the way veridical conscious perceptions naturally strikes ordinary subjects see also Kennedy (2009) and Nudds (2009: 334). For the idea that introspective judgments made by *experts* (i.e., judgments by philosophers of mind) are the ones supporting Naïve Realism, see Hellie (2007) and Fish (2009). Other arguments in support of Naïve Realism are Martin’s argument based on the phenomenology of sensory imaginings (2002a), Campbell’s (2002) argument from demonstrative reference, Logue’s argument (2012a) based on the epistemological powers of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions, and Fish’s contention (2009) that Naïve Realism has theoretical advantages over competing accounts when it comes to closing the explanatory gap.

is first and foremost a view about the nature of a sub-class of visual experiences and their character: veridical conscious perceptions. At this stage, it is useful to use different labels for each version of the view. I dub “Experiential Naïve Realism” the view about the nature of veridical conscious perceptions, and “Phenomenal Naïve Realism” the view about the nature of their character.¹⁴

Let us start by considering one of the ways in which Martin characterises Naïve Realism:

According to naïve realism, the actual objects of perception, the external things such as trees, tables, and rainbows, which one can perceive, and the properties which they can manifest to one when perceived, partly constitute one’s conscious experience, and hence determine the phenomenal character of one’s experience. This talk of constitution and determination should be taken literally; and a consequence of it is that one could not be having the very experience one has, were the objects perceived not to exist, or were they to lack the features they are perceived to have. (Martin 2009 [1997]: 93)

We can break Martin’s definitions down by putting to work our distinction between Experiential and Phenomenal Naïve Realism.

Let us start with Experiential Naïve Realism. Consider again Mary’s veridical conscious perception of a red apple before her. According to Experiential Naïve Realism, such a phenomenally conscious mental event has the actual apple and some of its properties – like the apple’s shape and colour – as literal *constituents*. The visual experience Mary undergoes in perceiving the red apple is one that Mary could not have undergone unless the very apple before her and some of its properties were constituting it. Experiential Naïve Realists hold that *it is not* a contingent fact that particular veridical conscious perceptions such as Mary’s are thus constituted.

Consider Martin again:

Furthermore, it is of the essence of such states of mind that they are partly constituted by such objects, and their phenomenal characters are determined by those objects and their qualities. So one could not have such a type of state of mind were one not perceiving some object and correctly perceiving it to have the features it manifests itself as having. (Martin 2009 [1997]: 93)

¹⁴ The same distinction is drawn by Fish (2009: 16-17) who distinguishes the “ontological characterisation” embedded in Experiential Naïve Realism from the view about the phenomenology of veridical conscious perceptions.

Let us ignore for the moment Martin's appeal to the veridicality of the experience, and stress that, as Martin puts it, Mary's veridical conscious perception belongs to a kind of mental event that is *by its very nature* constituted by mind-independent entities such as apples and some of their properties.¹⁵ To paraphrase Martin (2006: 357), no visual experience of the same nature as the one Mary undergoes when she perceives the red apple before her could occur were she not to perceive such a mind-independent object as this. Veridical conscious perceptions, by their very nature, "literally extend beyond the subject's head, to encompass what the experience is of" (Logue 2009: 25).

Let us turn to Phenomenal Naïve Realism now. Consider again Mary's veridical conscious perception of a red apple before her. Phenomenal Naïve Realists hold that the metaphysical articulation of the phenomenal character of an experience such as the one Mary undergoes, invokes the constituents of one's experience. In veridical conscious perceptions, such constituent elements determine or, to use a well-known metaphor used by Martin, "shape the contours" (Martin 2004: 64) of a subject's phenomenology. If we take the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions as constituted by phenomenal properties, then we can see the view as suggesting that *naïve realist phenomenal properties*, i.e., properties determined by the constituents of the experience, are constitutive of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions. In the next sections, I will say more about how to correctly capture the commitments of Phenomenal Naïve Realism.

So far, in our cursory discussion of Martin's definition, no talk of a relation of *perceptual awareness* or acquaintance has emerged. For our discussion has resorted exclusively to the notion of *constituency*. Yet, Naïve Realism is systematically presented as a view that characterises the nature of veridical conscious perceptions and their phenomenal character in terms of the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness or conscious acquaintance between a subject and aspects of her mind-independent environment. Brewer, for instance, claims that "perceptual presentation irreducibly consists in conscious acquaintance with mind-independent physical objects" (Brewer 2011: 94). Soteriou expresses the commitments of Naïve Realists thus:

¹⁵ Following Martin (2006: 361, 2004: 60), who seems to have in mind Wiggins' ultimate sortals (1980, 2001), some Naïve Realists take this talk of essence and nature in terms of *fundamental kinds*. See also Logue (2012b), Brewer (2011: 95; 2017). For discussion see Soteriou (2016: 199). Byrne and Logue (2008) suggest that a view like Naïve Realism could be formulated without any commitment to essences. For an attempt in this direction see Nanay (2015). For scepticism on the notion of fundamental kind see Hellie (2010, 2013), and Pautz (2007).

[T]he conscious perceptual experience that you have when you genuinely perceive the world is a relational phenomenon. The mind-independent entities in your environment that you perceive are constituents of that relation, and hence constituents of your experience, and when you genuinely perceive your environment, the *phenomenal, conscious character* of your experience is constituted, at least in part, by those mind-independent aspects of the environment that you perceive. (Soteriou 2016: 83)

It is worth briefly considering how we should understand the relation between constituency and perceptual awareness, especially considering the fact that Steenhagen (2019) has recently argued that Naïve Realism could dispense with mentioning a relation of perceptual awareness in articulating the nature of veridical conscious perceptions and their character.

According to Steenhagen, Naïve Realists should hold on to the idea that veridical conscious perceptions are constituted by mind-independent aspects of one's mind-independent environment, such that such aspects determine what it is like to have the experience. But the experience, so Steenhagen contends, should not be characterised as *essentially* involving a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and its environmental constituents. Steenhagen (2019: 1009) claims that we should rather think of experiences as *appearings*, i.e., events that by their very nature could be possibly sensed, but that can take place regardless of whether any conscious subject is actually around to register them. Such events would have their own visual character, regardless of any sort of sensory registration.

Now, I think that endorsing this picture would amount to mischaracterising the relation between visual experiences and their mind-independent constituents. For we should firmly distinguish physical objects, properties and events present in the perceivers' mind-independent environment from the mental events such perceivers undergo.¹⁶ The former could well *constitute* and determine the character of the latter, but visual experiences and their phenomenology are definitionally events or properties

¹⁶ It is not uncommon in the literature to see philosophers, implicitly or explicitly, taking the phenomenology of veridical conscious perceptions to be *identical* to aspects of the mind-independent environment. For an intentionalist perspective along these lines, see for instance Tye (2015). Steenhagen also cites Martin (1997) and Kalderon (2007: 598) as Naïve Realists who endorse this picture. Cf. also Langsam (1997: 53): "I define naïve realism as the view that phenomenal features are properties of material objects". It seems to me that phenomenal properties should be understood as potentially determined - also fully - by environmental aspects, without it being the case that they are identical to such aspects.

of conscious subjects. In other words, naïve realist phenomenal properties cannot be *identical* to aspects of the mind-independent environment! Therefore, it seems to me that a real definition of veridical conscious perceptions that appeals to the notion of constituency does require at least a *generic* relation of perceptual awareness.¹⁷

The last issue I want to address is how we should understand the relation between Experiential and Phenomenal Naïve Realism. There are reasons to think that endorsing Experiential Naïve Realism *does not* force one to endorse Phenomenal Naïve Realism. In the formulation provided above, Martin seems to suggest that Experiential Naïve Realism is sufficient for (“hence”) Phenomenal Naïve Realism.¹⁸ However, as Haddock and Macpherson (2008: 17) remark, “[i]t seems to be consistent with the fact that an experience [...] “intrinsically involves” public objects that these objects do not explain the phenomenology of the experience.” And this seems to hold even if one accepted that the essential characterisation of visual experiences provides ‘the ultimate *personal-level psychological* explanations’ (Logue 2012b: 174) of certain facts about them, among which we can include phenomenal facts. Why?

Well, it seems open to Experiential Naïve Realists to claim that the phenomenology of veridical conscious perceptions is entirely explained by *one* of the relata of the relation of perceptual awareness: the subjective component. Experiential Naïve Realists could reject the claim that naïve realist phenomenal properties are constitutive of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions.¹⁹

Consider an analogous case: suppose that we construe *being in love with* as a phenomenally conscious state of an essentially relational nature. Whilst there have to be some aspects of such a state that invoke the existence of the loved one, it seems open to one to suggest that its phenomenal character is entirely determined by features

¹⁷ As we will see, some might argue that the formulation in terms of constituency does not require the one in terms of the naïve realist relation of perceptual awareness, but one that appeals to a more generic relation of awareness. This is true insofar as Naïve Realists might want to say that the relation they invoke is not, say, one that sense-datum views could invoke.

¹⁸ Note, however, that Martin seems to accept the insufficiency of Experiential Naïve Realism for Phenomenal Naïve Realism in other parts of his work where he suggests that, for an Experiential Naïve Realist, “[i]t would be a *severe limitation* [...] if the Naïve realist aspects of perception could not themselves shape the contours of the subject’s conscious experience” (Martin 2004: 63, emphasis mine). Martin contends that it “would be inconsistent with the aim of naïve realism” as it “[...] seeks to give an account of phenomenal consciousness, and hence [...] is intended to have a direct bearing on one’s account of what it is like for the subject of perceiving.” (Martin 2009 [1997]: 89)

¹⁹ Cf. Fish (2009: 17) and Pautz (2007: 529).

independent of the loved one.²⁰ Analogously then, Experiential Naïve Realists might argue that the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions is determined by, say, sensational aspects of the experience, which are completely down to the subjective side of the relation of perceptual awareness.

On the other hand, given the framework I am assuming, Phenomenal Naïve Realism is sufficient for Experiential Naïve Realism.²¹ If naïve realist phenomenal properties are constitutive of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions, then it must be the case that a relation of perceptual awareness with a mind-independent subject matter is constitutive of veridical conscious perceptions.

In what follows, when I will refer to Naïve Realism, I will have in mind the phenomenal version of the theory. The main reason for this is that the core of the dispute I will consider is centred around the conscious aspects of visual experiences, and, as I have shown, there are reasons to think that endorsing Experiential Naïve Realism *does not* force one to endorse Phenomenal Naïve Realism. So, when I will refer to some visual experiences as being naïve realist, what I will mean is that they have a naïve realist phenomenal character, or, equivalently, that they have a phenomenal character constituted by naïve realist phenomenal properties.

1.3 Naïve Realism

In this section, I provide some clarifications about some of the key notions involved in the articulation of a naïve realist account of visual consciousness. I consider how Naïve Realists conceive of the relation of perceptual awareness (§1.3.1), what the constituents of a naïve realist experience are (§1.3.2) and what the scope of the naïve realist claims about veridical conscious perceptions is (§1.3.3).

²⁰ I tend to think that if the nature of visual experiences were exhausted by their phenomenal aspects, then the entailment from Experiential Naïve Realism to Phenomenal Naïve Realism would go through. For in such a case it seems to me that the mind-independent constituents of the experience should play *some* role in determining the phenomenology, on pain of being explanatorily redundant. But philosophers often disagree about what is essential to visual experiences. As we will see, some think that visual experiences possess essential properties that are not phenomenal (e.g., being caused in a certain way or having a certain justificatory power). The constituents of one's experience might play some crucial role, say, in explaining the justificatory power of experiences, and yet play no role in explaining what it is like for one to undergo them. So, there seems to be no straightforward route from Experiential Naïve Realism to Phenomenal Naïve Realism.

²¹ The qualification is required because someone might reject altogether the idea that there is any visual experience understood as a *mental event* that cries for a metaphysical characterisation.

1.3.1 Perceptual Awareness

Naïve Realism holds that the articulation of the real definition of some visual experiences and their phenomenal character requires mentioning the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness or conscious acquaintance – in what follows I will use these terms interchangeably – between a subject and aspects of their mind-independent environment. What sort of relation do Naïve Realists have in mind?

Let us start replying to this question by considering how Fish and Brewer characterise the relation that Naïve Realists have in mind:

‘[A]cquaintance’ names an irreducible mental relation that the subject can only stand in to objects that exist and features that are instantiated in the part of the environment at which the subject is looking (Fish 2009: 14).

Acquaintance is an unanalysable conscious relation that we are enabled to stand in with such things [i.e., particular concrete worldly objects] by the normal functioning of our brains and perceptual systems (Brewer 2017: 216).

There are at least a couple of points that are worth discussing.

First, Naïve Realists take the relation of perceptual awareness as a genuine *presentational relation*, that is, one that cannot obtain without the existence of its relata. In saying so, Naïve Realism contrasts with approaches to the phenomenology of veridical conscious perceptions that characterise it in terms of a mere modification of the experience.²² This feature also distinguishes Naïve Realism from intentional views. Indeed, as Crane rightly holds (2006: 135), we should accept that it is part of “the concept of intentionality—the mind’s directedness upon its objects—that the existence of an intentional state does not entail the existence of its object and that therefore intentionality is not a genuine relation”.

It is sometimes suggested in the literature on perception that Intentionalists are perfectly entitled to the claim that visual experiences are relational events. As Gow, among others, puts it: “relationalism is just as much a theoretical commitment of representationalism as it is of naïve realism” (Gow 2021: 136). It is indeed true that there is a sense in which Intentionalists construe visual experiences as relational phenomena.

²² Adverbialists, for instance, suggest that the phenomenology of visual experience is determined by the way in which the experience is modified, rather than by the obtaining of any distinctive relation. The phenomenology of Mary’s experience of a red apple is determined, according to Adverbialists, by the fact that Mary is experiencing red-ly and app-ly. See Ducasse (1942), Chisholm (1957), and Tye (1984).

For even if it is true that the object presented to one in undergoing a visual experience need not exist for an Intentionalist, all visual experiences are to be characterised at least in part in terms of a genuine relation with the way the experience represents the world as being, i.e., the intentional content of the experience.

But this characterisation in terms of a relation with an intentional content falls short of a genuine presentational relation. As Crane rightly remarks (2006: 136), the content of an experience is not *what* is presented to one in undergoing such an experience. Consider an Intentionalist committed to the idea that the contents of visual experiences are propositional: we do not experience propositional contents! What we experience are the (intentional) objects of the experience. And such objects, according to Intentionalists may not exist. This is why, in what follows, I will follow Martin (2009 [1997]) and Crane (2014: 84) in dubbing intentionalism as *quasi-relational* insofar as it holds that perceptual experiences have a character “such that it is as if the objects of perception are before the mind, but they are not required to be so in order for one to be in this state.” (Martin 2009[1997]: 94)

The second aspect that I want to highlight from the two quotes above is that the relation of perceptual awareness is characterised as ‘irreducible’, and ‘unanalysable’. This may seem concerning. For this seems to suggest that *nothing positive* can be said about the relation employed by Naïve Realists. Two considerations are in order. First, in this respect, Naïve Realists would not be worse placed than most of their competitors. For such views frequently appeal to primitive relations or quasi-relations in articulating the conscious character of visual experiences.²³

Second, as already suggested, what Naïve Realists typically mean here is that the relation of perceptual awareness is a *psychological* bedrock: it cannot be analysed further in *psychological* terms. To illustrate: at least some Intentionalists would accept the claim that when Mary perceives an apple, she is in some interesting perceptual relation with the apple before her. However, such philosophers would provide a deeper analysis of the perceptual relation in terms of, say, representing things as being a certain way combined with the obtaining of the right sort of causal connection. In saying that the relation of perceptual awareness is primitive or basic, Naïve Realists can be seen as contending that it is not the case that it can be further analysed, say, in terms of an intentional relation.

²³ For this point see Fish (2021: 105) who emphasises that sense-data theories appeal to a similar *primitive* relation of acquaintance. The same holds for *some* versions of the intentionalist view that appeal to a primitive representationalist relation (e.g., Pautz (2010) and Byrne (2001)). Cf. Hobson (2013: 557).

Finally, and as a consequence of what we have said, the naïve realist commitment to basicness is quite compatible with the fact that the relation of perceptual awareness might turn out to be *non-basic* in a more general sense. As Martin puts it, saying that the relation of perceptual awareness is psychologically basic is consistent with the fact that “there is a more fundamental level of reality out of which the mental is somehow constructed” (2006: 360, fn. 9).²⁴

1.3.2 Constituents

Naïve Realists think that properties determined by the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness with aspects of one’s environment are constitutive of the phenomenal character of (at least) veridical conscious perceptions. Such aspects of the mind-independent environment, according to Naïve Realists, are actual *constituents* of the experiential event. But how is this talk of constituency supposed to be cashed out? And what are the constituents of a naïve realist experience?

Let us start with the first issue. We can once again try to clarify what Naïve Realists have in mind when they talk of aspects of the environment as constituents of (some) visual experiences by making a comparison with some intentionalist views. Indeed, at least some intentionalist views might be thought to be equally entitled to the claim that in undergoing a veridical conscious perception, aspects of the mind-independent environment are *constituents* of the experiential events. For they hold that such experiences have representational contents which are *constituted* by particulars (Speaks 2009; Schellenberg 2018).

Now, the claim of constituency that such views might aspire to is at least different from the one that naïve realists set forth. True, at the token level, representational contents of some visual experiences are constituted by mind-independent particulars according to some intentional views. However, as Martin (2020: 735) remarks, this would not be a consequence of the type of content they possess. A subject could be having an experience with the very same content-type, even if she were hallucinating. When Naïve Realists claim that entities in one’s surroundings are constituents of veridical conscious perceptions, on the other hand, they want to convey the idea that no event of the same essential kind and character could have occurred in the absence of aspects of the mind-independent environment like the one experienced in the situation

²⁴ As Martin (2006: 361-262, fn. 12) remarks, this consideration does put some constraints on Naïve Realism, as the view is incompatible with any physicalist theory of consciousness which identifies kinds of mental events with kinds of physical events in the subject’s brain.

at issue. And this is a notion of constituency that intentionalists would not be willing to accept.

Let us now say a few words about what sort of entities Naïve Realists take as constituents of veridical conscious perceptions.²⁵ Naïve Realists typically hold that “the persisting mind-independent physical objects that we all know and love” (Brewer 2007: 93) enter as constituents of veridical conscious perceptions. The claim of independence from minds is to be read in a metaphysical sense: naïve realists have in mind objects whose *identity* does not depend on conscious subjects. Moreover, for our purposes, we can follow Markosian (2000) in taking physical objects as those objects which have spatial locations.²⁶

Naïve Realists think that visual properties of mind-independent physical objects are also part of the constituents of veridical conscious perceptions. There are different ways of developing the idea that we are perceptually aware of objects and some of the properties they possess. One way consists of understanding property instances as tropes, and suggest that such visual qualities are *particulars* (cf. Kalderon 2011b). A different approach is followed by Fish (2009). Fish contends that “our most fundamental mode of perceptual contact” with the world is with “things bearing properties – not directly with either properties or things *simpliciter*. (Fish 2009: 53). The constituents of veridical conscious perceptions, according to Fish, “are not properties and objects *simpliciter*, but rather object-property couples”: facts (*ibid.*).²⁷

There seems to be disagreement, or at the very least different points of emphasis, about how Naïve Realists should characterise the constituents of naïve realist experiences. For our purposes, it will be enough to highlight two points of agreement. First, perhaps Naïve Realism does not necessarily require that “unperceived objects are able to retain properties of all the types we perceive them as having” (Dancy 1985: 147), but it does seem to require a thesis in the vicinity, a sort of naïve construal of the structure of (at least part of) visible reality. Secondly, it seems that the mark of naïve

²⁵ An interesting question that I will not address here is the following: does the relation of perceptual awareness that Naïve Realists invoke impose, by its very nature, constraints on the kind of entities one can be perceptually aware of? It seems to me that the answer should be positive. But how fine-grained such constraints should be? Is, for instance, the relation of perceptual awareness that Naïve Realists have in mind the same relation invoked by sense-data theorists?

²⁶ As Markosian (2000) remarks, objects which fall under different ontological categories (e.g., physical objects, and non-physical objects such as propositions and universals) all exist in time. But not all of them exist in space. If numbers are abstract but real entities, then they cannot be constituents of one’s experience, for they do not exist in space.

²⁷ Some Naïve Realists (e.g., Martin 2004: 39 and Brewer 2011: 93, fn.1) also include events amongst the constituents of veridical conscious perceptions.

realist constituents is their mind-independence. I will return to the issue of what is the specific claim of mind-independence that Naïve Realists have in mind in Chapter 4 (§4.6.1). For now, let us just say that Naïve Realists take as constituents of the experience some of the entities that do not depend for their *identity* on conscious experiences.

1.3.3 The Naïve Realist Phenomenology of Visual Experiences

Naïve Realism, as I have been presenting it so far, is the view that naïve realist phenomenal properties are constitutive of the phenomenal character of (at least) veridical conscious perceptions. In this section, I want to briefly address the scope of the naïve realists' ambitions in providing a characterisation of the visual phenomenology of perceptual experiences.

To this extent, it is useful to outline that Naïve Realism, as I understand it, is first and foremost a theory about what we can call, strictly speaking, the *sensuous aspects* of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences. Consider again Mary's veridical conscious perception of a red apple. The apple Mary is perceptually aware of has, of course, many properties: on the one hand, the apple has a distinctive shape and colour, but it also possesses properties like being an apple, being ripe, and, say, containing a worm. Well, according to Naïve Realists, properties falling under the category of the first type, that is, those properties that are sometimes referred to as *Low-Level Properties*, or *Thin Properties* (see Siegel and Byrne 2017), are the sort of properties that can be constituents of the experience and thus shape the contours of the sensuous aspects of an experience such as Mary's.

Some are convinced that there are non-sensuous aspects of the phenomenology of visual experiences. One way to understand this claim is to allow for *High-Level Properties* or *Rich Properties* as contributing – at least in some cases – to the phenomenology of visual experiences. If so, in certain cases, Mary's phenomenology could be furnished not only by, say, the red colour and distinctive shape of the apple, but also by properties such as *being an apple*. Mary's experience would include aspects that are not, strictly speaking, *sensuous* in character.²⁸

It has been argued that such non-sensuous aspects of the phenomenology of visual experiences seem to resist a naïve realist explanation: the phenomenology of non-

²⁸ For the view that Rich Properties such as *being of kind K* are part of the content of visual experiences see Siegel (2010) and Masrour (2011).

sensuous aspects of perceptual experiences is better explained in intentionalist terms.²⁹ I tend to agree. But even assuming that the phenomenology of visual experiences has non-sensuous aspects, and that such non-sensuous aspects are not to be characterised in naïve realist terms, this would not pose any distinctive threat to Naïve Realism. For the claim that the phenomenology of veridical conscious perceptions *is not* intentional is not built into Naïve Realism.³⁰

Naïve Realists are interested in defending a view according to which naïve realist properties are constitutive of the phenomenal character of conscious perceptions. This is quite compatible with the fact that such experiential events might have a phenomenology that is at least in part to be characterised in non-naïve realist terms. Arguably, this claim is compatible with the fact that non-naïve realist phenomenal properties might have a significant role to play in the articulation of the nature of the character of veridical conscious perceptions. Indeed, in what follows I will assume that it is compatible with Naïve Realism that (I) non-naïve realist phenomenal properties might be necessarily involved in the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions, and that (II) non-naïve realist phenomenal properties might be essential to the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions.³¹³²

Naïve Realism is also compatible with there being *sensuous aspects* of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that are *not* naïve realist. As Martin remarks, “given that most perception involves a manifold of objects of awareness, one might suggest that we are related to some objects through acquaintance, but that our experience of others is to be understood in terms of representing” (Martin 2020: 733).

²⁹ See Cavedon-Taylor (2018) and Brogaard and Chomanski (2015). For attempts to explain the experience of (some) High-Level properties in Naïve Realist terms see Fish (2009: 70), and French and Phillips (2023).

³⁰ For this compatibilist position see Soteriou (2010: 225), Logue (2014), and French (2020). For discussion see Mazzullo and Raimondi (manuscript).

³¹ For an insightful discussion of how Kant could be read as committed to a Naïve Realist view of veridical conscious perceptions according to which intentional properties are necessarily involved in their phenomenal character see Gomes (2017).

³² Mehta (2022) in a recent paper reads Martin’s claim (2006: 361) that there is just *one* fundamental kind a visual experience falls under as at odds with the idea that veridical conscious perceptions can be characterised at the essential level in terms of two distinct kind of properties (e.g., naïve realist and intentionalist). I suspect that Mehta misconstrues the way Martin conceives of fundamental kinds, but I will not get into any exegetical dispute here. For my purposes, it is enough to remark that there seems to be nothing at odds with the Naïve Realist account of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions that its nature is to be articulated in part in terms of non-naïve realist properties.

Things being so, I will often talk of the naïve realist phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions to take into account the limited scope of the naïve realist views about (some) visual experiences.

1.4 Naïve Realism: Constituency and Inheritance

So far, I have presented Naïve Realism by outlining the commitments of the view that are shared by most of its proponents. In this section, I present the specific version of the view I will be concerned with. Such a view, it is my contention, is the most representative version of Naïve Realism: the one that best captures the *key insights* behind the naïve realist enterprise.

Consider again Mary’s veridical conscious perception of a red apple before her. According to Naïve Realism, as I have presented it so far, veridical conscious perceptions such as Mary’s are naïve realist, in that they have a naïve realist phenomenal character, or, equivalently, they have a phenomenal character constituted by naïve realist phenomenal properties. So far, I have characterised naïve realist phenomenal properties as properties grounded in the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and aspects of their mind-independent environment. Let us call this thesis the Constituency Thesis:

(The Constituency Thesis) Naïve realist phenomenal properties are properties grounded in the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and aspects of their mind-independent environment.

Now, the Constituency Thesis is silent on the *specific determinative* role that such mind-independent constituents play in determining the naïve realist phenomenology of perceptual experiences. Indeed, one might think that the contribution of the constituents of the experience in shaping the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions is quite limited. An interesting case in this regard is Beck’s identity version of his neuro-computational Naïve Realism (2019).

Beck contends that the phenomenology of veridical conscious perceptions consists of instantiations of a three-place relation: x perceptually appears W to S . Appearance properties, W , according to Beck, are identical to certain intrinsic neuro-computational properties, but they are *not enough* to fix a perception’s phenomenology. Conscious perceptions “are partially determined by the mind-independent items that the subject

perceives” (Beck 2019: 626). But Beck explicitly says that it is not the case that “your appearance property of being appeared to in a roundish way is inherited from the mind-independent quality of roundness (which round objects have)”. For again, “appearance properties are identical to certain intrinsic neuro-computational properties” (Ibid, 629).

Beck’s view seems to adhere to the Constituency Thesis. And yet it leaves no role for the actual character of the constituents to shape the phenomenal character of (at least) veridical conscious perceptions.³³ Consider Mary’s case again. When Mary has a visual experience of a red apple before her, she seems to be confronted with a red, apple-shaped object. Is, say, the *actual redness* of the apple that Mary is seeing that is determining the phenomenology of her experience?

Campbell argues that this is exactly how we should think of the determinative role of colours with respect to the character of some visual experiences. According to Campbell, “the qualitative character of the color experience is inherited from the qualitative character of the color” (1997: 189). As Kalderon (2011a: 241) underlines, this claim of inheritance is more than just a claim of covariation. Rather it is to be read as an *explanatory claim*: at least when it comes to how things are phenomenally with Mary with respect to the fact that she is perceiving the redness of the apple, Mary undergoes an experience with that distinctive phenomenology *because* of the actual redness of the apple before her.³⁴

Campbell’s metaphor of inheritance expresses the determinative role of a visual quality – colour – with respect to colour phenomenology. But the same model can be used to understand the determinative claim that Naïve Realists put forward when it comes to the naïve realist phenomenology of (at least) veridical conscious perceptions.³⁵ For instance, the same sort of considerations would apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the phenomenology related to the shape of the apple, and the actual shape of the apple. We can now generalise the claim of Inheritance as follows:

³³ Notice the difference between this position and the one of someone committed to Experiential Naïve Realism alone. Such a philosopher might invoke aspects of the subjective side of the relation to explain the phenomenal character of a conscious perception without invoking the obtaining of the perceptual relation more broadly.

³⁴ As Kalderon notes (2011a: 241), the explanatory claim entails the claim of covariation, but the converse entailment fails. Proponents of phenomenal intentionality such as Chalmers (2006) for instance, might accept that the phenomenology of visual experiences covaries with what the experience represents but maintain that the experience represents what it does *because* of its phenomenology.

³⁵ For discussion see Kalderon (2011a), Hilbert and Kalderon (2000), and Beck (2019). For criticisms against the idea of colour inheritance see Shoemaker (2003).

(**The Inheritance Thesis**) Naïve realist phenomenal properties are inherited from the actual character of the experience's mind-independent constituents.

Beck (2019: 628) claims that it is doubtful that “all prominent Naïve Realists would accept [the Inheritance Thesis]”. But I disagree. I rather think that the Inheritance Thesis nicely captures the core naïve realist's commitments about the phenomenology of (at least) veridical conscious perceptions. For instance, Martin seems to have this in mind when contrasting Naïve Realism with Intentionalism he claims that the Intentionalist would reject that mind-independent entities are constituents of experiences or “that their actual natures determine the phenomenal character of experience” (Martin 2009[1997]: 84-85). In what follows, whenever I will refer to Naïve Realism, I will have in mind a version of the view that can satisfy both the Constituency Thesis and the Inheritance Thesis.

There is a further issue to consider before concluding this outline of the naïve realist view about veridical conscious perceptions. For it might be thought that the Inheritance Thesis requires a commitment to Diaphaneity: sameness and difference in phenomenology just is sameness and difference in mind-independent constituents (Martin 1998: 175).³⁶ If so, then differences in phenomenology are explainable solely in terms of differences in the character of the constituents of one's experience. However, it might be contended that we should obviously allow for cases where there are differences in phenomenology without differences in presented elements.

Consider a golden coin with an oval shape. I have suggested that Naïve Realists take properties such as the objects' colours and shape as those properties that can shape the contours of a subject's experience. Let us call such properties *basic visual properties*. So, we should expect the phenomenal character of a veridical conscious perception of such a coin to be inherited from its basic visual properties (i.e., its oval shape and golden colour). But Mary could view the same coin head-on and then from a wide angle and have experiences with different phenomenology as a result.³⁷ Variations along several dimensions can yield experiences with different phenomenology even when the subject is perceptually aware of the same presented elements. As Brewer (2017: 216) puts it, there seems to be room to suggest that “a simple appeal to the object of acquaintance is inadequate to explain the nature of our various experiences of the same thing”.

³⁶ On the diaphaneity of visual experiences see also Martin (1998: 164). For an insightful discussion of ways of cashing out Diaphaneity see French (2018a).

³⁷ Cf. Brewer (2011: 95).

To overcome this problem, Naïve Realists have proposed a variety of factors that can either play a role in modifying the relation of perceptual awareness with an object, or in constituting a substantive third relatum, i.e., the ‘standpoint’ (Campbell 2009: 658). Following Christy (2019), let us call such factors *sophisticators*. Sophisticators can be either environmental (e.g., the relevant point of view of the subject and the lighting conditions) or mental (e.g., attention).³⁸

Naïve Realists might insist that the naïve realist phenomenology of veridical conscious perceptions is diaphanous in that it is entirely determined by the character of their constituents by allowing the standpoint a role in either merely selecting or partially determining perfectly mind-independent *complex visual qualities*. Naïve Realists usually understand complex visual qualities as either *situational properties*, i.e., non-basic visual properties that are determined partly by basic visual properties and partly by environmental sophisticators, or, at least when it comes to colours, as *aspects* of basic visual properties.³⁹

Consider again the conscious experience Mary undergoes when she sees the coin head-on and then from a wide angle. We have so far assumed that basic visual properties determine the phenomenology of Mary’s experience. Now that we have introduced complex visual properties, we can see how the Naïve Realists can preserve the Diaphanous character of veridical conscious perceptions and respect the Inheritance Thesis. Indeed, it is open to Naïve Realists to contend that in cases such as Mary’s, the standpoint either merely selects or also partly determines a complex visual property. As French (2018a: 160) puts it, “the coin *in so far as it has a head-on look*” shapes the character of Mary’s experience in the first case, and “the same coin *in so far as it has a wide-angle look*” shapes the character of Mary’s experience in the second case.

There are different views about what such complex visual properties might be. Genone and Fish appeal to situational properties. Fish (2009: 160) invokes *perspectival shapes*, and in cases of colour perception *shades* (2009: 158). Genone (2014) appeals to *relational appearances*, i.e., situational properties possessed by objects “in virtue of their intrinsic properties and various environmental conditions” (2014: 357). Kalderon, on the other hand, at least when it comes to colour perception, suggests that there is no need to invoke situational properties. Objects, according to Kalderon, possess *looks* (2008; 2011c). Looks are not situational properties, because they are not determined by

³⁸ Campbell (2014: Ch. 2) and Brewer (2011:116) hold that the phenomenology of a veridical conscious perceptions obtains in virtue of the entities perceived, the standpoint and features of the relation of acquaintance.

³⁹ I borrow the label ‘situational properties’ from Schellenberg (2008: 55).

environmental sophisticators. Such complex properties are rather qualitative aspects of basic visual qualities (Kalderon 2008: 960) that are merely *selected* by the standpoint.⁴⁰

Recently, French and Phillips (2020) have contended that there is no need for Naïve Realists to invoke complex visual properties. Naïve Realists should suggest that the *ways* in which we undergo veridical conscious perceptions *partly* determine the phenomenology of one's experience.⁴¹ This allows Naïve Realists to preserve the idea that it is the coin and its actual basic visual properties that are constituents of Mary's experience and shape its character. Such an account, of course, rejects Diaphaneity. Two visual experiences might differ in phenomenal character whilst being constituted by the same presented elements, given the contribution that the way in which such presented elements are perceived plays.

To sum up, I have characterised Naïve Realism as setting forth both the Constituency and Inheritance Thesis. Moreover, I have shown that, at least when it comes to veridical conscious perceptions, Naïve Realists seem to have different options to allow for apparent changes in the phenomenology without changes in the basic visual properties of the constituents of the experience. For now, we can remain silent on what alternative the naïve realists had better endorse. As we will see in the next chapters, however, rejecting Diaphaneity might turn out to be one of the key components of a Naïve Realist strategy to reject the Master Argument from Hallucination, which it is now time to introduce.

1.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have introduced the dispute about the nature of visual experiences and presented the view I will be concerned with: Naïve Realism. Naïve Realism, as I have characterised it, is first and foremost a view about a sub-class of visual experience: veridical conscious perceptions. I have suggested that the view should be understood as claiming that the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions is constituted by naïve realist phenomenal properties, i.e., properties that are inherited from the actual character of the experience's mind-independent constituents.

⁴⁰ For an illuminating discussion of how Naïve Realists conceive of complex visual properties see French and Phillips (2020).

⁴¹ French (2014) suggests that the relation of perceptual awareness can have features that account for the phenomenology of perceiving blurrily. For the idea that differences in phenomenal character might depend on the different ways in which one is perceptually aware of the presented elements see also Soteriou (2013: 114) and Martin (1998: 175).

Chapter 2 The Master Argument

In the previous chapter, I presented Naïve Realism as the view that naïve realist phenomenal properties are constitutive of the phenomenal character of (at least) veridical conscious perceptions. In this chapter, I introduce what I take to be the most challenging argument against Naïve Realism: the Master Argument from Hallucination. To this end, I present and critically discuss the way Martin proposes to reconstruct such an argument. Martin (2004, 2006, 2007) suggests that the argument is driven by an Inconsistent Triad. Naïve Realism is allegedly shown to be inconsistent with two further very plausible assumptions. As a lot of the details in Martin's discussion remain obscure and underdeveloped, part of my task in this chapter will be devoted to clarifying, expanding, and improving his reconstruction. I agree with the thrust of Martin's reconstruction, but I will try to show that the argument is actually driven by a different triad from the one Martin explicitly mentions.

2.1 The Inconsistent Triad

Naïve Realism is, first and foremost, a view about the phenomenal character of cases of veridical conscious perceptions, i.e., cases in which there is perceptual contact with the world and things look to the subject the way they are. But veridical conscious perceptions are not the only *visual events* we are familiar with or can conceive of. In illusory cases, for instance, perceptual contact falls short of veridicality. When Mary undergoes a visual experience of a red apple as green, perceptual contact with an object in her surroundings is met, but the object perceived – the red apple – is not the way it seems to her to be. Other visual experiences seem to suggest that perceptual contact is not even required for visual consciousness. In total hallucinations, a subject like Mary can undergo a visual experience as of an object, even if no such object is present in her surroundings.⁴²

A venerable tradition in the history of the philosophy of perception dictates the need to shape our understanding of cases of veridical conscious perception on the basis of

⁴² For a nuanced taxonomy of visual experiences, see Batty and Macpherson (2016).

what must be true of misperceptions or cases of perceptual failure. As Hume famously suggested, it is then easy to prove how Naïve Realism is “destroyed by the slightest philosophy” (1748: §12.9). Arguments from illusion against Naïve Realism have been highly regarded until quite recently. Ever since Naïve Realists have started to tackle them seriously, though, it has become evident that most of such arguments are innocuous.⁴³ But the same is not true of arguments from hallucination, or at least of what I take to be the strongest of such arguments. I will dub it the *Master Argument from Hallucination* against Naïve Realism.

In a series of influential papers (2004, 2006), Martin has proposed a way to reconstruct the Master Argument that has been largely neglected in recent discussions of the argument.⁴⁴ According to Martin, the argument is driven by the existence of an *Inconsistent Triad*. Naïve Realism is taken to be inconsistent with “two further assumptions that in themselves seem plausible and are quite widely accepted” (Martin 2007: 717). We have seen that Naïve Realism is the view that naïve realist phenomenal properties are constitutive of the phenomenal character of (at least) veridical conscious perceptions. What are the other assumptions Martin is gesturing at?

The first assumption, which Martin dubs *Experiential Naturalism*, expresses a naturalistic commitment about visual experience. It represents the idea that “our sense experiences are themselves part of the natural causal order, subject to broadly physical and psychological causes” (Martin 2006: 357). The second assumption holds that “whatever kind of mental, or more narrowly experiential, event occurs when one perceives, the very same kind of event could occur were one hallucinating.” (2006: 357). Martin calls this assumption the *Common Kind Assumption*.

Now, whilst the minimal naturalistic commitment expressed by Experiential Naturalism will be perhaps familiar to the reader, a little more care is necessary for the second assumption. After all, veridical conscious perceptions and hallucinations fall under several common kinds (e.g., they are both visual experiences). But the Common Kind Assumption is to be read as a claim about the *nature of* such visual experiences. Consider this passage:

For the Common Kind Assumption to be a genuine condition on the argument, and not simply a trivial falsehood, we need some conception of the privileged descriptions of experiences. For it to be a substantive matter that perceptions fail to be the same

⁴³ If not invalid as French and Walters (2018) have argued. I will say more about how Naïve Realists can account for illusory cases in Chapters 4 and 5.

⁴⁴ Notable exceptions are Conduct (2012) and Soteriou (2011: 183).

kind of mental episode as illusions or hallucinations, we need some characterizations of events that reflect their nature or what is most fundamentally true of them (Martin 2007: 721).⁴⁵

In what follows, mainly to avoid the ambiguity present in Martin's label – as it might superficially convey the idea that the dispute is over whether there is *any* kind shared between conscious perceptions and hallucinations, which turns out to be trivially true – and for reasons of simplicity, I will rather talk of *Experiential Monism*, which we can take for the moment as the view that veridical conscious perceptions and (some) hallucinations have a single nature.⁴⁶

Moreover, since my interest in this work lies in the character of visual experiences, and I have already provided some reasons to think that there is no straightforward connection between the nature of visual experiential events and their character (§1.2), in what follows I will depart, at least nominally, from Martin's original formulation of the Inconsistent Triad. Indeed, rather than Experiential Monism, I will take as part of the triad a thesis in the vicinity which has to do directly with the character of visual experiences: *Character Monism*. For now, we can take Character Monism as the view that the character of veridical conscious perceptions and (some) hallucinations have a single nature. We can let aside exegetical concerns. Nothing significant in the dialectic we are about to consider is going to be altered by this choice.⁴⁷

We are now in a position to state the Inconsistent Triad that according to Martin drives the Master Argument:

- Naïve Realism
- Experiential Naturalism
- Character Monism

As we shall see in what follows, according to Martin, Experiential Naturalism backs the possibility of certain hallucinatory events, and constrains what can be the case

⁴⁵ Cf. Martin (2006: 361).

⁴⁶ For this terminology see Snowdon (2008: 37) and Kalderon (2018: 222).

⁴⁷ Some passages in Martin's discussion of the Master Argument (2004: 64), suggest that he countenances the idea that Character Monism might not be sufficient for Experiential Monism. But, as far as I am aware, there is no explicit discussion of the converse. I do not see any incoherence in a view according to which veridical conscious perceptions and (some) hallucinations have a single nature, but their character properties do not.

concerning the properties that account for the subject's perspective in undergoing such mental events: naïve realist phenomenal properties cannot be constitutive of their character. By Character Monism, we get that this result must apply equally to the case of veridical conscious perception. And this falsifies Naïve Realism.

2.2 Character Monism and Naïve Realism

Consider the veridical conscious perception Mary undergoes when she sees a red apple before her. A Naïve Realist who accepts Character Monism should be ready to commit to the idea that naïve realist phenomenal properties could be constitutive of the phenomenal character of (some) hallucinations. This might strike the reader as a bizarre view: is there any inconsistency in holding on to both Naïve Realism and Character Monism?⁴⁸ In this section, I will try to contend, as Martin does, that we need a further assumption that delimits the relevant possibilities to set forth the alleged inconsistency with Naïve Realism.

Let us start our enquiry. By definition, we know that hallucinations are cases where a subject like Mary can undergo a visual experience as of an object, even if no such object is actually perceived. To show that Character Monism is inconsistent with Naïve Realism we would have to show that hallucinations *cannot* have the same sort of character that a naïve realist experience has. But what is it for two experiences to have characters of a single nature?

To answer this question, let us go back for a moment to the issue of what it is for two experiences to have a single nature. As we have seen in the last chapter (§1.2), Naïve Realists hold that no experience of the same essential kind as a veridical conscious perception of an F such as the one Mary undergoes in perceiving the apple before her could occur “were I not to perceive such a mind-independent object as this” (Martin 2006: 357). Similarly, we might think that, according to Naïve Realists, a visual experience could not have a character of the same nature as a veridical conscious perception of an F unless one were to perceive such a mind-independent object as an F.

⁴⁸ An alternative way of typing the phenomenology is proposed by Logue, and is based on the idea that different entities might possess the *same properties* in virtue of different facts. Consider a veridical conscious perception of an F and a hallucination as of an F. Logue (2013: 115) suggests that “[a]lthough the facts in virtue of which the experiences have this phenomenal character are different, the experiences are phenomenally the same.” Martin considers this alternative in his (2006: 372). I assume the (alternative) framework in which the dispute is usually set. I tend to think that everything that I will say in what follows could be recast in terms of grounds of (same) phenomenal character without any loss.

Now, this way of framing the sameness in nature between experiences and the sameness in nature between their characters is ambiguous between (at least) two readings. On the one hand, one might suggest that the restriction regards mind-independent visible entities in general: two experiences as of an F have a single naïve realist nature only if they are constituted by mind-independent visible entities. On the other hand, it might be contended that the restriction has to do with those mind-independent entities that naïve realists typically take as constituents of experiences: familiar mind-independent physical objects like chairs, tables, and their properties.

Drawing on these remarks, we can see how Experiential Monism and Character Monism could be both framed, intuitively, in terms of what we can call a *generic* nature and a *specific* nature. Character Monism can be understood as a claim about the generic nature of the characters of veridical conscious perceptions and hallucinations – in the case of naïve realism, for instance, as having a generic restriction about visible mind-independent entities in general –, or as a claim about the specific nature of the characters of veridical conscious perceptions and hallucinations – in the case of naïve realism as having a specific restriction concerning *familiar* mind-independent entities like apples, their visual properties and so on.

Although this might look like a tedious clarification, it will play a significant role in our discussion. It plays a role also in our current discussion as well. Suppose we hold that what is relevant for our discussion is the generic nature: two experiences as of an F have characters of a single naïve realist nature only if they are constituted by mind-independent visible entities. If we adopt this reading, Character Monism is inconsistent with Naïve Realism if (relevant) hallucinations *cannot* have a character of a naïve realist generic nature. But, as Martin remarks (2007: 718), it seems coherent to say that in hallucinatory cases one could be in a relation of perceptual awareness with mind-independent *non-physical* entities.

Proponents of the early sense-datum theory such as Moore (1914) and Russell (1912) held that all visual experiences consist in a relation of perceptual awareness with sense-data construed as non-physical entities that must be *independent* of our awareness of them.⁴⁹ A naïve realist could hold a view in the vicinity: both veridical conscious

⁴⁹ See also Broad (1923: Ch. 12) and Price (1932: 126) who states that the idea that sense-data depend for their existence upon our awareness of them is “a gross absurdity”. For discussion see Martin (2003) and Duncan (2022). Martin suggests that both Moore and Russell conceded that “sense-data may be dependent for their existence and for their character on the operation of each subject’s nervous system” (2015b: 165). This concession, as Martin notes, is nonetheless “entirely consistent with the hypothesis

perceptions and hallucinations have a character determined by the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness with mind-independent entities. As a matter of fact, in the perceptual case, such mind-independent entities would be the entities we all take ourselves to be perceiving: tables, chairs and so on. In the hallucinatory case, they would be mind-independent entities of a different sort: non-physical sense-data. Things being so, one might hold on to both Character Monism and Naïve Realism; for the hallucinatory events, being constituted by mind-independent entities, could possess a naïve realist phenomenology.

Now, this strikes me as a genuine possibility. And it seems enough to show that Character Monism is consistent with Naïve Realism when the relevant reading is in terms of generic nature. So, Martin is right. If the relevant reading is in terms of generic nature, it seems that we need additional assumptions if we are to challenge the Naïve Realist view of veridical conscious perceptions. Martin, however, does not discuss whether Character Monism and Naïve Realism are inconsistent with each other when the relevant reading is in terms of specific nature. Let us fill this gap.

Suppose we hold that what is relevant for our discussion is the specific nature. In order to show that Character Monism and Naïve Realism are inconsistent with each other, we would have to show that it cannot be the case that familiar mind-independent objects and their properties are constituents of (some) hallucinatory events. Now I think that there are strong reasons to think that even if this were the correct reading, the opponent of Naïve Realism would need an additional assumption.

First, it seems that an apparent tension arises only when we reflect on cases of total hallucinations. For consider cases of partial hallucinations. Suppose, for instance, that Mary is having a hallucination as of a red apple in her actual living room. Now, if we assume that perception is actually occurring for this latter aspect of Mary's experience, Mary will undergo an experience which is constituted, at least in part, by the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and familiar aspects of their mind-independent environment. Recall: it is not built into Naïve Realism that in order for an experience to be naïve realist all the phenomenal properties of the experience must be naïve realist phenomenal properties (see §1.3.2). So, Naïve Realism is, at least in principle, compatible with the claim that a naïve realist phenomenology could occur in some hallucinatory cases such as partial ones.

that the entities exist independently of [visual experiences], even if their existence is maintained by a causal process which coincides with that awareness" (Ibid.).

For all we have said, if there is a tension between Naïve Realism and Character Monism in the specific reading, it is one that must have to do with cases of total hallucinations. So we can ask: is it definitional of total hallucinations that they cannot have familiar mind-independent objects and their properties as constituents? Here is a way to contend that it is. When we think about perceptions of familiar mind-independent entities in one's surroundings one of the most salient features we have in mind is some form of *Causal Receptivity*: an appropriate causal chain going from external entities to the perceiver. And an appropriate causal chain presumably involves some sort of information transduction: "physical magnitudes, such as light, chemicals, and sound, are transduced into neural activity that carries information" (Prinz 2015: 373). But total hallucinations are cases where none of one's experience depends on information transduction. Then, the reasoning goes, if something is a total hallucination, it is, *by definition*, something that cannot have mind-independent constituents.

Now, it seems to me that it is far from clear whether this passage is secured: it is doubtful whether it is actually a conceptual truth that total hallucinations and perceptual awareness of familiar mind-independent constituents are exclusive in the way suggested by this line of reasoning. For it is doubtful whether it is a conceptual truth that a relation of perceptual awareness with familiar mind-independent entities of the sort invoked by Naïve Realists can occur only if Causal Receptivity understood in terms of information transduction occurs.

Consider, for instance, an Extramission Theory of the physical process underlying visual experiences of the perceptual kind.⁵⁰ According to such a view, which was popular in the early days of Western Philosophy, the sort of causal process underlying conscious perceptions goes from the subject to external entities: the eye sends out visual rays that range over the scene before one. Roughly put, the Extramission theory allows for perception, and so presumably a relation of perceptual awareness, and dispenses with information transduction. Other views that equally dispense with information transduction and seem perfectly compatible with the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness with familiar mind-independent entities in cases of total hallucinations are, just to mention a couple of examples, Chalmers' *Edenic Perception* (2006), according to which there is no causation at all mediating experiences, and

⁵⁰ Plato and Euclid are usually taken as proponents of such a view. Smith (2002: Ch. 2, fn. 13) also mentions al-Kindi, and Pautz (2021: 20) Ptolemy. Cf. Lindberg (1976: Ch. 1) and Sorensen (2004). As Allen reports (2019: 13), recent studies evidenced extramissionist intuitions about vision in children (e.g. Winer and Cottrell 1996) and university students (Winer et al. 2002).

Occasionalism, i.e., the view that the objects we see are not causes of visual experiences but rather occasions for God to produce visual experiences of them in us.⁵¹

Now, we have seen how the Naïve Realists think of veridical conscious perceptions as experiential events at least in part constituted by familiar mind-independent aspects of the perceiver's environment such that the phenomenology of such conscious events is at least in part determined by the actual character of such constituent elements. The views just sketched seem to be perfectly consistent with Naïve Realism and they dispense with information transduction. But if there is no contradiction in considering some total hallucinatory experiences in these terms, Naïve Realism and Character Monism are not straightforwardly inconsistent with each other even when the reading in terms of specific nature is assumed. For, if (I) it is not definitional of the relation of perceptual awareness that it requires a form of Causal Receptivity cashed out in terms of information transduction, and (II) the views highlighted above are genuine possibilities, then total hallucinations could well be constituted by a relation of perceptual awareness with perfectly familiar mind-independent entities.

True, even accepting (I) and (II), one might reasonably wonder which familiar entities in one's surroundings would be constituting the hallucinatory experience. After all, in most cases of total hallucinations, one would undergo a hallucinatory experience as of an object which is not present in the subject's surroundings. But we are also familiar with cases of illusions, and it is far from straightforward to claim, as I suggested in the previous section, that all illusory events prevent a relation of perceptual awareness from occurring. But then one might suggest that two different scenes which are generally visually discernible might look exactly the same given the circumstances of perception. In a nutshell, it might be suggested that total hallucinations are just cases of *total illusions*.⁵²

I will not say more about this issue at this stage, for as we will see, my strategy to preserve Naïve Realism from the threat of the Master Argument will rely precisely on

⁵¹ For a discussion of Occasionalism see Child (2011: 169). All of this is of course compatible with the fact that it might be a *fact* about acquaintance with mind-independent constituents that it requires information transduction. Note that Chalmers (2006: 78, fn. 10) holds that Edenic Perception is still causal, although he thinks that it involves a sort of "unmediated causal relation".

⁵² Although this category of visual experiences has been overlooked, it is easy to envisage a simple case of total illusion. Consider the following case. If Mary gets close enough to the Trajan's column, it is likely that the column is going to occupy the whole of her visual field given its width and height. If it is possible for her to undergo an illusory experience of, say, the column's colour or spatial properties we end up with a case of total illusion: a case where the totality of Mary's experience is illusory, and yet she is still perceiving the column.

similar considerations. For the moment, it seems that one could insist that there is nothing incoherent about considering total hallucinations as naïve realist in the specific sense, insofar as one accepts the possibility of drastic misperceptions. If so, there is no inconsistency in accepting both Naïve Realism and Character Monism also when this is understood in the specific reading.

To sum up, I suggested that Character Monism can be understood either as a claim about the generic nature of the characters of veridical conscious perceptions and hallucinations or as a claim about the specific nature of their characters. In both readings, I have argued, partially drawing on Martin's discussion, that Character Monism is not inconsistent with Naïve Realism even when the claim is restricted so as to include only veridical conscious perceptions and total hallucinations. It is now time to move to present the principle that is supposed to delimit the relevant possibilities we have considered in this section.

2.3 Experiential Naturalism and the Possibility of Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations

In the previous section, I suggested that there seems to be no incoherence in holding on to Naïve Realism and the claim that the character of veridical conscious perceptions and (some) hallucinations has a single nature (be it generic or specific). As Martin emphasises, we need "substantial empirical and methodological principles in delimiting the relevant possibilities" (manuscript, Ch. 3: 19) to raise a compelling challenge to Naïve Realism. Martin suggests that in delimiting the possibilities that we have considered in the previous sections, we need to bring in "a methodological or regulative assumption of both empirical work on sense experience and philosophical discussion of it" (Martin 2006: 360, fn. 8) which he dubs Experiential Naturalism.⁵³

Here is how Martin characterises it:

(Experiential Naturalism) "our sense experiences, like other events or states within the natural world, are subject to the causal order, and in this case are thereby subject just to broadly physical causes (i.e. including neurophysiological causes and

⁵³ Martin (2004: 43) notes that the assumption was rejected by the early sense-datum theorists, by some phenomenologists (e.g., Merleau-Ponty 1944: 351), and more recently by Valberg (1992). Allen (2019: 19, fn. 20) also mentions opponents of the Causal Theory of Perception with Wittgensteinian sympathies like White (1961). For further discussion, see Allen (2016: Ch. 5).

conditions) and psychological causes (if these are disjoint from physical causes)” (Martin 2004: 273).

Experiential Naturalism is general enough to be accepted by proponents of a vast range of different views in the philosophy of mind. We can see the principle as setting forth the claim that visual experiences are *natural* entities, and as such, they are embedded in the causal network. Since, in general, there is little reason to suppose that the causal powers of the natural realm include entities other than physical or psychological (if there are reasons to think that they are not themselves physical), then visual experiences, like other natural entities, are only subject to physical and psychological causes.

When it comes to the experiential, naturalism can be stated, as Martin does, in such a general way that it can be taken as a shared minimal constraint on any account of visual experiences.⁵⁴ Surely Naïve Realists would subscribe to the principle that visual events are part of the causal nexus in the way specified by Experiential Naturalism. But why should a commitment to Experiential Naturalism be so costly for the Naïve Realists?

Now, although Martin, in some passages, seems to suggest that it is a commitment to Experiential Naturalism alone that drives the possibility of the problematic sort of hallucinations, we can actually see the principle as playing a more minimal role. It is an important background assumption in delimiting the relevant possibility. Consider this fact: so far in our discussion we have considered the idea that a subject like Mary could undergo a hallucination without setting any restrictions for the causes of such mental events. Things change once a commitment to Experiential Naturalism is in the picture: as Martin puts it in this passage, we need to start thinking about how such hallucinations might be brought about:

If we do not think of our experience of the world as itself being a part of the world, then we need not conceive it as having causal antecedents within the world—we then need not think of how such events can otherwise be brought about. (Martin 2004: 43)

⁵⁴ As Papineau remarked, “nearly everybody nowadays wants to be a ‘naturalist’” (Papineau 1993: 1). True, Leibniz’s monads, given the form of naturalism suggested by Martin, would turn out to be supernatural entities. For being perfectly synchronized with each other in the pre-established harmony, monads do not engage in the causal commerce with physical entities or other monads. But this form of Naturalism seems compatible with the existence of immaterial Cartesian minds. For, as Kim remarks (2011: 115), Cartesian minds are usually conceived as causally interacting with physical entities.

If we employ the background assumption of Experiential Naturalism, we can get a grip on the circumstances in which it might be possible to induce a hallucination in a subject. Take a veridical conscious perception such as the one Mary undergoes when she sees the red apple before her. Our picture of the causal commerce at play in cases of conscious perceptions is the one propounded by the so-called *Intromission view*: the process goes from the external environment to our visual apparatus.⁵⁵ More specifically, as we have suggested in the previous section, the process seems to involve some form of Causal Receptivity involving information transduction. Consider this passage by Lewis:

Parts of the scene reflect or emit light in a certain pattern; this light travels to the eye by a more or less straight path, and is focused by the lens to form an image on the retina; the retinal cells are stimulated [...] and the stimulations comprise a signal which propagates up the optic nerve into the brain; and finally there is a pattern of stimulation in the brain cells which either is or else causes the subject's visual experience. (Lewis 1980: 83–4)

In this chain of events, we can distinguish events that are more or less proximate to the experiential event itself. At the final stage, as Lewis remarks, we find “a pattern of stimulation in the brain cells.” (Ibid.)

At least in creatures like us, the occurrence of veridical conscious perceptions seems to *require* such a pattern of activation in the brain. As Martin puts it, we have empirical grounds for acknowledging that “altering the pattern of activity in an agent's visual cortex has consequences for what they can or cannot see. So there does seem to be a causal dependency of our visual perceptions on the activity of parts of the brain, even if we do not yet know the full pattern of this dependency” (Martin 2004: 54). Naïve Realists can perfectly allow for such a role of the brain in the causal explanation of visual experiences.

Consider Mary's veridical conscious perception of a red apple before her. Surely we should recognise some role for the activity of the brain of a subject like Mary in bringing about the visual experience she undergoes. Naïve Realists would typically claim, as Fish (2009: 137) states, that “this brain activity is an *enabling condition* of my awareness of the instance of redness in the world— the right kinds of brain activity are required for me to become consciously acquainted with the worldly fact of an object's being red.”

Now, so far, we have focused on veridical conscious perceptions, and we have seen how Experiential Naturalism combined with the knowledge we have about the

⁵⁵ The Intromission View was already envisaged by Aristotle (*On sense and Sensible Objects*, 438a).

functioning of the visual system seems to set some important constraints on the way in which some visual events might be brought about. As Valberg remarks in this passage, it is once we take into account the “causal picture of experiences” that we can reflect “on certain possibilities implicit in the picture” (Valberg 1992: 11):

The present activity in my brain, I remind myself, is the causal outcome of a chain of events involving light rays being reflected from a certain object—the book on the table, say. In turn, the activity in my brain is causally responsible for my experience being as it now is. But, I reflect, in that case (here is where philosophy begins to creep in), if the activity in my brain could somehow be held constant, the earlier parts of the causal chain might be eliminated without this having any effect on my experience. If the activity in my brain were to continue as it is, my experience would continue as it is. (Valberg 1992: 11)

Now suppose that a subject like Mary has a veridical conscious perception of a red apple before them. Let us call *N* the neural state active in such a sort of mental event. If we were to reproduce *N* in a subject like Mary in a situation where no apple is before them, it seems sensible to suppose that they would undergo a mental event with a certain character. Let us call mental events of this sort *Neurally Matching Hallucinations*, i.e., mental events with introspectable or character properties that are brought about by the same neural activity as a veridical conscious perception of an *F*. By reproducing the brain state of a veridical conscious perception of an *F* a subject would have a distinctive perspective on their experiential situation.

Philosophers typically construe Neurally Matching Hallucinations in a distinctive way. They think that such mental events would possess a character with two distinctive features. Let us start with the first. Philosophers typically think that the character of neurally matching hallucinations would be brought about by, *plus or minus a bit*, mere activation of *N*. I will say more about the ‘plus or minus a bit’ clause shortly. Let us start with the claim of mere sufficiency. The idea that suitable manipulation of the brain would be sufficient to bring about the character properties of a neurally matching hallucination is widespread in the literature. Consider Robinson:

According to the hypothesis that there are such things as philosophers’ hallucinations, however, [the visual system/neural state *N* activated at or toward the end of this process] alone is both necessary and sufficient for the production of a veridical-seeming hallucination indiscriminable from the perception. (Robinson 2013: 316)

If the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations are brought about by *mere* stimulation of N , then there is a strong presumption for thinking that such properties have either no extra condition on their occurring, or they have what we can call *narrow conditions*, i.e., conditions that supervene on N . To illustrate this second point, let us consider a line of reasoning set forth by Martin (Martin 2007: 718-19).

Consider a version of the sense-datum view where it is held that N is sufficient for one to enjoy the character of a visual experience as of an F . Sense-datum theories of visual experiences of the sort I have in mind hold that there are constitutive conditions on the character properties of visual experiences: subjects must be related to appropriate mind-dependent sense-data.⁵⁶ But if some physical state in the brain, N , is sufficient to cause the character properties of a visual experience, then such a condition should also be sufficient to guarantee that all the necessary conditions for such properties obtain: the existence of appropriate mind-dependent sense-data. So, if the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations are brought about by mere activation of the brain, then if they have constitutive conditions on their occurring, there is a strong case for thinking that these should be narrow constitutive conditions, i.e., conditions that supervene on the neural state.

An interesting point to note here that will become extremely relevant in what follows is that if the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations have either no conditions on their occurring or narrow conditions, then such properties would be *Replicable Properties*, that is, properties that could occur in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well. The reason is simple: veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations share the neural state N . So if the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations have narrow conditions on their occurring, such conditions are to be understood as *Replicable Conditions*, that is, conditions that can occur in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well.

Now, the idea present in Robinson's quote that N should be sufficient to produce the character properties of a neurally matching hallucination is shared by many. Lowe (1992: 80) and Robinson (1994: 152) explicitly mention Penfield's studies on direct brain stimulation to support the sufficiency claim (1963). Robinson (2013: 315, fn. 2) also mentions ffychte's (2013) studies on visual hallucinations in patients with Charles

⁵⁶ Similar sense-datum theories of experiences are advocated by Robinson (1994) and Jackson (1977). Other views which plausibly envisage narrow constitutive conditions are the internalist version of the intentional view, e.g., Pautz (2010).

Bonnet syndrome as “empirical evidence for the sufficiency of brain stimulation for experience”. Note, however, that the fact that such properties are brought about by appropriate stimulation of a subject’s brain does not by itself tell us that such stimulation would be *sufficient* to cause the character properties of a neurally matching hallucination. And indeed, my take is that it would be hazardous to think that empirical evidence establishes the claim of sufficiency. One might suggest, compatibly with the evidence we possess, that there are further necessary conditions for the obtaining of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations that are not captured by the mere claim of sufficiency. There might be several ways to develop this idea. Here is one.

Consider the classic brain-in-a-vat hypothesis considered by Putnam (1981). It might be suggested that reflection on such a scenario rules out the sufficiency of the brain in bringing about the introspectable properties of any visual experience. It has been argued, for instance, that “the minimal biological requirements for consciousness include a living body, not just neuronal processes in the skull” (Thompson and Cosmelli 2011: 169). Assuming that the character properties of a neurally matching hallucination are phenomenal properties, one might contend that the brain and body are so deeply entangled that “we cannot understand consciousness by considering only the activity of neurons apart from the body” and that, therefore, we have “good explanatory grounds for supposing that the minimal realizing system for consciousness includes the body and not just the brain.” (Thompson and Cosmelli, *ibid*)⁵⁷

Suppose we want to hold that neurally matching hallucinations are to be characterised, say, in terms of the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and mind-dependent sense-data. In so doing, if we follow the reasoning just highlighted, one would invoke both narrow conditions – the existence of appropriate sense data – and *broad conditions*, that is, conditions that do not supervene on *N*. For presumably, what ‘subject’ stands for in the articulation of the character of neurally matching hallucinations is to be specified, at least in part, in terms of entities other than *N* (e.g., the subject’s body).

Now, note that even if the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations had broad conditions on their occurring, there is a strong case to take such conditions as conforming to the mould of narrow conditions in the following respect: they would be Replicable Conditions, that is, conditions that can occur in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well. Consider again the case we have just considered. If possession of a body is a requirement for visual experiences, then surely the character properties of

⁵⁷ Cf. Smith (2002: 202).

veridical conscious perceptions should meet this condition to occur. There are a number of broad conditions that we can envisage to behave in a similar way: they are *Broad Replicable Conditions*: conditions that do not supervene on *N* and that can be met in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well.

To sum up, there seems to be a strong case for holding that the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations, would be brought about by, *plus or minus a bit*, mere activation of *N*. As we have seen, the plus or minus a bit condition is meant to allow for the fact that such a psychological effect could occur not only in virtue of no further condition, or a further *narrow condition*, i.e. a condition that supervenes on *N*, but also in virtue of a *broad replicable condition*, that is, a condition that does not supervene on *N*, but that can be met in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well. If so, however, the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations, whatever they are, are *replicable character properties*. That is, properties that can occur in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well.

We can summarise all of this in the following way: philosophers typically construe neurally matching hallucinations as meeting the following Replicability Thesis:

(Replicability) Neurally matching hallucinations have a character constituted only by replicable properties.

Now, let us move to the second distinctive feature that philosophers typically attribute to neurally matching hallucinations. Philosophers also typically hold that the replicable properties of neurally matching hallucinations ground the indistinguishability *in principle* of a neurally matching hallucination from veridical conscious perceptions. There are at least two important elements to be briefly considered.

First, the idea is that in undergoing a neurally matching hallucination, it would be *impossible* for a subject like Mary to tell, through introspection alone, that she is not having a veridical conscious perception of a certain sort, i.e., the neurally matching veridical conscious perception.⁵⁸ The appeal to ‘introspection alone’ is introduced to rule out the possibility that a subject might come to know that their experience is not of a given type from sources other than introspection on her conscious situation (e.g., testimony or background beliefs). On a neutral reading, this seems to reflect Valberg’s

⁵⁸ Following Williamson (1990), I understand introspective indistinguishability in terms of the impossibility of activating knowledge that two things are distinct. For the ‘through introspection alone’ clause see Martin (2006: 364), and for discussion Sturgeon (2006). In what follows I will often omit this clause.

idea, in the passage quoted above, that “the earlier parts of the causal chain might be eliminated without this having any effect on my experience” (Valberg 1992: 11), and Robinson’s claim that *N* is necessary and sufficient for the production of “a veridical-seeming hallucination indiscriminable from the perception” (Robinson 1992: 11).

Second, what explains the indistinguishability in principle of a neurally matching hallucination from veridical conscious perceptions are the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations. This seems intuitive enough. If the neurally matching hallucination is not distinguishable in principle from a corresponding veridical conscious perception of a certain sort, presumably the explanation has to do with the qualitative nature or character of such a mental event.

To summarise, we can take the following Indistinguishability Thesis as reflecting the second commitment philosophers typically endorse about the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations:

(Indistinguishability) Neurally matching hallucinations have a replicable character that grounds their indistinguishability in principle from veridical conscious perceptions.

To sum up, philosophers typically hold that neurally matching hallucinations of a certain sort are possible. As we have seen, philosophers think that neurally matching hallucinations would have replicable character properties that ground their indistinguishability in principle from veridical conscious perceptions of a certain kind. In what follows, I will refer to neurally matching hallucinations so construed as *Philosophers’ Hallucinations*.

Now, it is worth pausing for a moment and considering the following fact: Experiential Naturalism *is not* sufficient to back the possibility of Philosophers’ Hallucinations. And indeed, Martin himself suggests the following: “granting Experiential Naturalism, we need simply add the common observation that it is possible to bring about an hallucinatory experience through suitable manipulation of brain and mind.” (2006: 358). Valberg, in the passage mentioned above, talks of the “causal picture of experience”, which, under careful reading, seems to consist of Experiential Naturalism combined with some specific causal laws concerning “the basic facts about the transmission and reflection of light, the nature of the eye, and the process in the nervous system and brain which results or culminates in visual experience” (Valberg 1992: 24). I propose to understand this additional element as some sort of evidence we get from empirical science. This interpretation seems to nicely fit with this passage where

Martin is scrutinising the motivations for holding that neurally matching hallucinations as we have construed them so far are possible:

So, to the extent that we are prepared to accept this claim – and I cannot imagine anyone working in the field of neuroscience or perceptual psychology who would sensibly deny it – the assumption is grounded much more in the general knowledge we have of the inter-relation between the psychological and the physical and certain aspects of methodological approach, than in conclusive experimental evidence. (Martin: manuscript, Ch. 3: 19)

But this is not all. There is a strong presumption for holding that the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations is supported by philosophical reasoning well. We have already encountered elements of broadly a priori reasoning in our discussion so far. Consider again the claim that philosophers' hallucinations are indistinguishable *in principle* from corresponding veridical conscious perceptions. Surely, we should not expect visual science to directly support the possibility of neurally matching hallucinations so construed. It is doubtful that the science of perception has any interesting commitment about introspective indistinguishability so construed. The distinctive contribution of armchair reasoning in motivating the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations will become even clearer in discussing the nature of the introspectable properties of Philosophers' Hallucinations.

Now philosophers typically hold that Philosophers' Hallucinations are *Inner Experiences*, i.e., the character properties of such mental events are non-naïve realist properties, or, otherwise put, they are *inner properties*.⁵⁹ In the previous section, I distinguished a generic and a specific sense of understanding the nature of the character properties of visual experiences. By the end of this chapter, I will clarify which sense is relevant to our discussion. For now, however, let us keep discussing both.

Let us start from the idea that Philosophers' Hallucinations are inner or non-naïve realist in the specific sense of not being constituted by familiar mind-independent entities. Edenic Perception and the Occasionalist view seem both at odds with Experiential Naturalism, for they both seem to expunge visual events from the causal nexus. The Extramission View, on the other hand, allows for a causal process of some

⁵⁹ I borrow this label from Snowdon (1990: 123-124; 2005a: 288). Snowdon seems to have in mind a conception built out of the specific reading. He says that the inner conception amounts to "the conception of an experience the intrinsic character and nature of which is not independent of the *spatially external world*, an experience into which an external item enters, in a sense, as an ingredient or constituent" (Snowdon 2005a: 288, emphasis mine).

sort but seems to conflict with the general knowledge we have of the functioning of the visual system and the causal laws governing perception. As we have seen, visual science seems to understand perception in terms of information transduction. And information transduction requires the Intromission View.

Note, however, that the idea that the relation of perceptual awareness that Naïve Realists have in mind requires a sort of Causal Receptivity to be specified in terms of information transduction does not merely follow from an implicit acceptance of the knowledge we have of the functioning of the visual system. There are substantive philosophical assumptions that are supposedly supporting such a claim. We will return to this point in due course.

What about the idea that Philosophers' Hallucinations are inner or non-naïve realist in the generic sense of not being constituted by visible mind-independent entities? Now, Martin thinks that the commitment to Experiential Naturalism imposes the following restriction on neurally matching hallucinations in general: they cannot have a character that is grounded in the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness with mind-independent *non-physical* sense-data:

If we hypothesize (as the early sense-datum theorists did) that the relevant relata must be mind-independent, then the conditions for bringing about an experience must involve not only suitable manipulation of a subject's body and mind but also a guarantee of correlation between the perceiver and candidate objects of awareness. Given that such entities would be non-physical (since this is a hallucination) and non-mental (being awareness-independent), causing someone to have a hallucination would require causal influence over something neither physical nor psychological: the non-physical object of awareness. Therefore, if one holds to experiential naturalism and countenances only physical and psychological causation, one must deny that any such influence could take place. (Martin 2007: 718)

Now, as we will see (§5.2), matters are not so straightforward. For now, however, let us accept Martin's assessment: there is a strong case for thinking that once Experiential Naturalism enters the picture, Philosophers' Hallucinations cannot be constituted by mind-independent non-physical sense-data.

For now, it seems that this initial scrutiny confirms Martin's presumption: "[e]xperiences which share the proximate causal conditions as veridical perceptions but which lack the further conditions for being perceptions cannot have Naïve phenomenal properties." (Martin 2004: 53). This seems true regardless of whether we take naïve realist phenomenal properties in the specific or general sense. Note also that from this

general overview, we can safely conclude that the Inconsistent Triad is formed not just by Experiential Naturalism, but a reinforced Experiential Naturalism. That is, a naturalistic claim about visual experiences, combined with the general knowledge we have of the relation between the physical and the psychological provided by empirical science, and distinctively philosophical reasoning and assumptions. In what follows, I will often refer to this reinforced version of Experiential Naturalism as *Empirical Naturalism*.

2.4 Character Monism

We are now in a position to state the general version of Character Monism that is relevant to our discussion:

(Character Monism) The character of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations has a single nature.

Before settling the issue of whether Character Monism is to be understood in the specific or generic reading, it is useful to briefly sketch two popular argumentative lines that have been in turn suggested to motivate views in the vicinity. This will facilitate the presentation of what I take to be the most compelling argument in favour of Character Monism, which I take to be part of the Master Argument from Hallucination.⁶⁰

The first argument appeals to the notion of *introspective indistinguishability*. Consider a case where Mary undergoes a neurally matching hallucination as of a red apple, that, without the aid of testimony or background beliefs, she could not distinguish, even in principle, from a veridical conscious perception of a red apple before her.⁶¹ Considerations that are familiar from Austin's influential discussion of the argument from illusion (Austin 1962: 52) suggest that one could maintain that neurally matching hallucinations and veridical conscious perceptions are in principle subjectively indistinguishable and yet experientially different. Indeed, from the mere fact that two things are qualitatively alike, it does not follow that they are *essentially* alike.

⁶⁰ Note that from this point on whenever I will refer to visual experiences I will have in mind those experiences which share the same neural underpinnings of veridical conscious perceptions.

⁶¹ Price takes the argument from introspective indistinguishability as being "by far the most important" (1932: 27). For discussion see Montague (2016: 132-133), Deutsch (2005: 9), Siegel (2010), Kriegel (2013), Farkas (2006). For discussion see Martin (2009[1997]) and Soteriou (2005).

Consider two visual duplicates, i.e., two objects that share all the visually discriminable surface-level properties, such as an apple and a bar of soap. It is natural to think that the fact that such objects cannot be distinguished in principle is grounded in some positive features of the objects: a visual appearance that they share. However, such objects, are essentially very different: one is an apple, the other a bar of soap. Similarly, one might suggest that despite being qualitatively identical, veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations differ in their experiential nature.

This argumentative line is typically advocated by some of the proponents of a pluralist view about visual experiences called *Experiential Disjunctivism*.⁶² Proponents of such a view deny that veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations have a single nature. They rather contend that veridical conscious perceptions have a nature, which invokes familiar mind-independent constituents, that neurally matching hallucinations cannot have.

Yet, as Soteriou (2016: 44) rightly remarks, this would still leave open the possibility that veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations are indistinguishable because, precisely as in the case of visual duplicates, they share their character: because they are *qualitatively* alike. This line of thought is usually resisted by proponents of Character Disjunctivism, which for the purpose of this work I will understand as setting forth the following thesis:

(Character Disjunctivism) The naïve realist phenomenology that occurs in cases of veridical conscious perceptions cannot occur in cases of neurally matching hallucinations.

Following Hinton (1967, 1973), proponents of Character Disjunctivism hold that the inference from introspective indistinguishability to sameness of character can be resisted once it is acknowledged that things might only *seem* to the subject as if the character of the experience they are undergoing was one shared with a certain class of visual experiences (Hinton 1967: 225). Sameness in introspective perspective, according to such philosophers, falls short of establishing sameness in character properties.

⁶² Although some might object to this construal, I will take Disjunctivism as “a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical experience” (Martin 2006: 354). Cf. Snowdon (2005b) and Fish (2005). For a classification of types of Disjunctivism see Haddock and Macpherson (2008). For a discussion of the origins of Disjunctivism see Snowdon (2008). For an illuminating presentation of the view see Soteriou (2016).

A second way to motivate Character Monism focuses on rather different considerations. It invokes a principle known as the same proximate cause-same immediate effect principle (henceforth, the *Causal Principle*), which can be found in an argument from hallucination against Naïve Realism that has a long tradition: the Causal Argument.⁶³ Drawing on Nudds (2013: 274), we can understand the Causal Principle as follows:

(The Causal Principle) A psychological effect e_1 has the same nature (Ψ) as a psychological effect e_2 if effect e_1 is produced by the same kind of proximate causal condition as e_2 .

One motivation for accepting the principle comes from the fact that rejecting it would seem to commit one to the idea that the brain can somehow “look back” and check what sort of causal antecedents have brought it about so that it can produce the correct sort of effect. As Johnston suggests, this would be extremely odd (2004: 116).⁶⁴

Now, consider the state of thinking that water is transparent. Externalists contend that the content of a thought such as this one is partly determined by one’s environment – typically in virtue of the obtaining of a causal relation that a concept bears to an environmental referent.⁶⁵ If so, two physical intrinsic duplicates could have different thoughts in virtue of living in different environments. But then, why could things not be similar when it comes to the character of visual experiences? Why can it not be the case that two experiences differ in character properties even if they are brought about by the same neural activity?

Robinson suggests that “[e]ven those who are externalists about perceptual content tend [...] to accept the sufficiency of the brain for the production of experience, phenomenally conceived” (1994: 152). That there is something peculiar about visual

⁶³ See Robinson’s “Revised -and Successful- Causal argument for Sense-Data” (1994:151). See also Robinson (1985; 2013; 2023), Pitcher’s Argument from the physiology of sense perception (1970: 43), Foster (1986, 2000: 24), O’Shaughnessy (1980: Ch. 5), and Valberg (1992).

⁶⁴ Snowdon (2005a: 293), who is himself sympathetic to the naïve realist conception of visual experiences, suggests that it would seem just “beyond explanation” how a brain state could produce different effects based on the broader causal context.

⁶⁵ See Putnam (1975).

⁶⁶ I will sidestep the issue of whether we should accept it for physical-physical relationships. Snowdon (2005a: 293) remarks that “even in ordinary physical-physical causation the principle is false. Sometimes an event of a certain type in given circumstances produces one outcome, sometimes another. This is the thesis expressed in the claim that causes need not be sufficient for their effects.” Foster makes a similar point with regard to quantum mechanics (Foster 2000: 27).

phenomenal consciousness that makes it apt to be subject to the Causal Principle is a thought that seems to be shared by Smith as well: “although it is debatable whether the previously discussed causal principle applies unrestrictedly to the psychological domain, it is surely not open to serious question that it does apply with respect to the merely sensory character of conscious states” (Smith 2002: 203).

In these passages, however, we find no motivation as to why we should think that visual consciousness has some distinctive feature that makes it apt to be subject to the Causal Principle. But then one might have the suspicion that the Causal Principle is set forth on the background of *substantive* assumptions about visual consciousness that are not in tune with the world-involving conception advocated by the Naïve Realists.⁶⁷ As Martin remarks:

[T]he principle so conceived rules out the possibility that relational states of affairs or events can form part of a causal nexus where relational states of affairs may differ purely in their distal elements (Martin 2006: 368).

Now, this concludes our brief overview of two popular argumentative lines outlined in support of principles in the vicinity of Character Monism, and ways in which Naïve Realist Disjunctivists have tried to resist them.

I suggested, however, that there is indeed a compelling argument for Character Monism. It combines the two driving ideas present in the two traditional arguments just discussed and relies on the possibility of Philosophers’ Hallucinations, i.e., on the possibility of neurally matching hallucinations construed as having character properties that meet the Replicability and Indistinguishability Thesis.

The argument, interestingly enough, has been presented by Martin (2004; 2006) in the context of providing an argument in support of his preferred Disjunctivist view

⁶⁷ Burge (2005) has suggested that a principle in the vicinity of the Causal Principle – the Proximity Principle – is assumed by the science of perception: “the methodology of all serious empirical theory of vision guarantees that given types of visual states can be veridical in some circumstances and non-veridical in others” (2005: 23). Thus, the arguer might also allow that the naïve realist conception of experiences is *not* incoherent but might still reject it on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the science. Now Naïve Realists are *not* committed to the claim that in cases of conscious perceptions psychological states or events that are not sufficient for the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness cannot obtain. Naïve Realists could happily accept that there are shared effects between neurally matching hallucinations and veridical conscious perceptions. But they will insist that no conclusive reason has been provided to justify the claim that the states that perceptual science refers to are the ones that are relevant when it comes to providing a characterisation of the nature of the character of visual experiences. For further discussion see Soteriou (2016: 200), Campbell (2011), Langsam (1997: 42–46), Martin (2004: 56–58; 2006: 268–371), and French and Phillips (2023).

about visual experiences. Martin's argument is formulated in terms of fundamental kinds, and it can be seen as an attempt to establish Experiential Monism rather than Character Monism. At any rate, as we will see, Martin seems to suggest that there are ways to resist the argument for Experiential Monism that are not available to Disjunctivists to reject the phenomenal version of the view. Things being so, in what follows, I will attempt a reconstruction of the argument, which focuses *only on* the character properties of veridical conscious perceptions and Philosophers' Hallucinations.⁶⁸

The argument is composed of two moves: the Reverse Causal Argument and the screening off problem. Let us start with the Reverse Causal Argument.

2.4.1 The Reverse Causal Argument

The Reverse Causal Argument attempts to show that whatever sort of character occurs in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations, the same sort of character occurs in cases of veridical conscious perceptions. This step is supported by the following Revised Causal Principle. Drawing again on Nudds (2013: 275), here is a way to present it:

(Revised Causal Principle) A psychological effect e_1 is of the same kind (Ψ) as a psychological effect e_2 if effect e_1 is produced by the same kind of proximate causal condition as e_2 in circumstances that do not differ in any non-causal conditions necessary for the occurrence of an effect of kind (Ψ).

The Revised Causal Principle takes into account the possibility of relationalist mental events of the sort Naïve Realists have in mind by acknowledging that there might be non-causal conditions necessary for the occurrence of the character properties of an experiential event of a certain sort.

Consider a veridical conscious perception of an F. The Naïve Realists think that there are constitutive conditions on the occurrence of the character properties of a mental event of this sort: (familiar) mind-independent entities must figure as constituents of the experiential event one undergoes. But now consider the character of a neurally matching hallucination as of an F as we have been construing it so far. Are there non-causal

⁶⁸ Another difference is that Martin assumes an indeterministic framework (2004: 55). For sake of exposition, I instead assume a deterministic one. Nothing of relevance will turn on this choice. For a thorough discussion of the argument as it is presented by Martin, see Nudds (2013) and Soteriou (2016: Ch. 6).

conditions on the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations that cannot be met in the perceptual case?

Now, given the way philosophers typically construe neurally matching hallucinations, such mental events have either no additional condition on their occurring, or just *replicable conditions* (be they narrow or broad). If *N* is sufficient for Mary to be in a mental state of a certain sort in the hallucinatory case, then *N* will be sufficient for producing such a state in the genuinely perceptual case as well – either because neurally matching hallucinations have no non-causal conditions on their occurring or because they have narrow conditions on their occurring. If *N* is *not* sufficient for Mary to be in a mental state of a certain sort in the hallucinatory case, then this is because neurally matching hallucinations have replicable broad conditions on their occurring. Since such conditions can also be met in cases of veridical conscious perceptions, then *N* and this further condition will be sufficient for producing the character properties of a neurally matching hallucination in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well.

So, it seems that whatever character properties would be constitutive of neurally matching hallucinations, the same properties would be present in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well. This conforms to the characterisation of neurally matching hallucinations as having only *replicable properties* typically offered by philosophers.

Note that the conclusion of the Reverse Causal Argument, that is, that whatever character occurs in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations, the same sort of character can occur in cases of veridical conscious perceptions is consistent with a view like Character Disjunctivism. After all, this claim does not rule out the presence of naïve realist properties in cases of veridical conscious perceptions. And Naïve Realism is consistent with the idea that there might be aspects of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions that are not naïve realist (§1.3.3). Unfortunately, the next step of the argument excludes such an option.

2.4.2 The Screening Off Step

The conclusion of the Reverse Causal Argument was that the kind of character that occurs in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations can occur in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well. Despite falling short of establishing Character Monism, the Reverse Causal Argument leads to the *screening off* problem: we can explain why a veridical conscious perception has its (apparent) phenomenal character just in terms of the

character properties it shares with Philosophers' Hallucinations.⁶⁹ Whatever additional character properties one might think are distinctive of the case of veridical conscious perception are screened off from explaining the introspective perspective of the subject in undergoing such mental events.

Suppose that the kind of character properties that are present in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations belong to the kind Ψ . Now, given the way we have characterised Philosophers' Hallucinations, their character properties ground their indistinguishability in principle from a veridical conscious perception of an F. From the Reverse Causal Argument, we know that such a kind of character property would be present in cases of veridical conscious perception of an F.

Now, presumably in cases of veridical conscious perception of an F the subject's perspective on their experience would be one that can be characterised in terms of a situation that is not distinguishable in principle from a veridical conscious perception of an F. But now it seems that the character properties that are present in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations and that belong to the kind Ψ are all we need to explain the subject's perspective on their experience in undergoing a veridical conscious perception of an F. Whatever additional kind of character Φ one might be tempted to think as occurring in cases of veridical conscious perceptions alone is screened off from explaining the subject's perspective on their experiential situation.

This step relies on acknowledging that there cannot be over-determination of the character of veridical conscious perceptions, such that it is both fully determined by, say, the character properties of kind Ψ and the character properties of kind Φ .⁷⁰ But surely, as Fish puts it, accepting the over-determination of the phenomenology of conscious perceptions should be taken as a last and somewhat desperate resort for Naïve Realists (2009: 85).⁷¹

⁶⁹ For discussion see Martin (2004, 2006), Nudds (2013), Hellie (2013), Soteriou (2016: Ch. 6), and Moran (2019).

⁷⁰ For views to the contrary see Pautz (2010: 298) and Logue (2013).

⁷¹ Martin remarks that while "there are aspects of psychological explanation where one can conceive of a division of explanatory spoils" – such as in the case of knowledge and belief – when it comes to the character properties of visual experiences things are rather different: "We can avoid the question of explanatory exclusion here if it makes sense to suppose that both perceptual episodes (peculiar only to perception) and sensory experiences (common to perception and hallucination) can occupy locations within this stream. Yet such does not seem to be the case: if we are intending to give the most determinate and specific account of how things are with a subject at a given time, thereby picking out their conscious state, either what we pick out is the perceptual episode, as the naïve realist supposes, or the common sensory experience, as defenders of [Monism] suppose. So allowing for explanatory independence of

Now the argument presented by Martin has sparked a vivacious discussion, and it is still central in the core dispute in the philosophy of perception about the nature of visual experiences. In this work, I will not directly enter this dispute, but it is worth pointing out that some Naïve Realists, Martin *in primis*, have suggested that it can be resisted.⁷²

Before concluding our discussion, it is worth emphasising two points. First, the Master Argument targets the *character properties* of veridical conscious perceptions. It is usually acknowledged, and this point is extremely relevant for what follows, that even if the Master Argument went through, one might still hold on to the idea that veridical conscious perceptions, construed as experiential events, belong to a different essential kind of event from neurally matching hallucinations. The argument falls short of establishing Experiential Monism. As Soteriou suggests, Experiential Disjunctivists could adopt the following strategy to resist a similar argument for Experiential Monism:

They could hold that neurally matching hallucination and veridical perception are introspectively indistinguishable because they are qualitatively alike (i.e. they share the same introspectable phenomenal properties), while also maintaining that veridical perception and neurally matching hallucination have different natures: they involve experiences of different metaphysical kinds that differ in significant psychological respects. And in defence of the conjunction of those claims they might invoke the following Austinian defensive manoeuvre: from the mere fact that two things are qualitatively alike, it doesn't follow that they are 'generically' alike, for example it doesn't follow that they have the same metaphysical nature. (Soteriou 2016: 168)

True, veridical conscious perceptions and Philosophers' Hallucinations might be qualitative alike in that they have the same kind of character properties. But there are significant psychological respects in which such mental events differ.

Experiential Disjunctivists might suggest, for instance, following Peacocke (1993) and Williamson (1995), that in the perceptual case only our beliefs about the

notions of perception and experience in other realms of the psychological would not settle this question where competition cannot be avoided". (Martin 2006: 371) In what follows, I will assume that it is not open to block the argument by suggesting a move like the one considered by Martin

⁷² Some of the strategies envisaged to block the argument that do not rely on accepting systematic overdetermination are: (I) accepting some sort of logical dependence of the introspectable properties of philosophers' hallucination on veridical conscious perceptions (Martin 2004; 2006); (II) accepting Multidisjunctivism, i.e. the view that the introspectable properties of philosophers' hallucinations have a disjunctive nature (Hellie 2013), and (III) accepting some form of metaphysical dependence of the introspectable properties of Philosophers' Hallucination on veridical conscious perceptions (Fish 2009, 2013; Logue 2012b).

environment and intentions to act are object-dependent.⁷³ The naïve realist characterization of veridical conscious perceptions would seem to have some explanatory advantages over the hallucinatory kind in the case of veridical conscious perceptions, at least when one focuses on these doxastic and behavioural aspects. The hallucinatory kind, the reasoning would go, would not have the resources to explain *everything* that needs to be explained about what is happening in the perceptual case.

What the argument shows if it succeeds is that even if veridical conscious perceptions belong to the essential kind Φ , their character properties belong to kind Ψ , the kind in common with neurally matching hallucinations. So, assessing the situation from the perspective of an Experiential Disjunctivist, even if veridical conscious perceptions are constituted by a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and aspects of their mind-independent environment, the character properties of such conscious events are constitutively insensitive to the character of the entities that constitute the scene before the perceiver.⁷⁴ As Pautz (2007: 529) remarks, an intentionalist could well accept that veridical conscious perceptions are essentially constituted by a non-representational relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and aspects of their mind-independent environment. What they would stress is that the character properties of such experiences are to be specified in terms of a representational relation.

Second, it seems that Martin's argument for Character Monism establishes that the character of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations has a single *specific* nature. Consider the mere possibility of endorsing a view whereby the character of veridical conscious perception is to be specified by appealing to a relation of perceptual awareness with familiar mind-independent physical entities, whilst the character of neurally matching hallucinations is to be specified by appealing to a relation of perceptual awareness with mind-independent *non-physical* sense-data. Consistently with what I have said so far, drawing on Martin's discussion, there are grounds for taking such a view as a version of Character Monism in the generic sense. For veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations, being constituted by mind-independent visible entities would have a character of a single generic naïve realist nature.

If the Reverse Causal Argument and the Screening Off problem go through, it turns out that the appeal to a relation of perceptual awareness with mind-independent *non-*

⁷³ A suggestion along these lines has been set forth by Byrne and Logue (2008: 87), and Kennedy (2013).

⁷⁴ For discussion see Byrne and Logue (2008: 87), Martin (2004: 63), Soteriou (2016: 168). A version of Experiential Disjunctivism that is Monist at the phenomenal level is discussed by Dorsch (2013).

physical entities, which in turn partially characterise the most specific kind of character properties that occur in cases of neurally matching hallucinations, is all we need to explain the subject's perspective on their experience in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well. The appeal to a relation of perceptual awareness with familiar mind-independent physical entities would turn out to be explanatorily redundant. So, Martin's Argument for Character Monism actually establishes more than the claim that the character of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucination has a single generic nature. For it seems to establish the thesis that the character of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations has a single *specific* nature.

As we will see in the next section, this feature of the argument presented by Martin will be extremely relevant in the formulation of the Master Argument. For now, let us conclude our discussion of how Character Monism is supported in the Master Argument and let us proceed to summarise the general structure of the argument itself.

2.5 The Master Argument from Hallucination

We are now in a position to introduce the structure of the Master Argument from Hallucination. Martin remarks that "[t]he argument moves first through considering what the nature of hallucination must be, given Experiential Naturalism, and then generalizing from that to the case of veridical perception, using [Character Monism] (2006: 358). In the last sections, we have made precise the more limited role that Experiential Naturalism plays in supporting the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations and the argument presented by Martin in favour of the version of Character Monism that appeals to specific natures: the character of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations has a single specific nature.

Since, as I have suggested, Martin's argument for Character Monism relies on the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations, we can now see the substantive role that Empirical Naturalism plays in supporting the structure of the argument. Here is how I propose to reconstruct the structure of the Master Argument:

- (1) Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible. [From Empirical Naturalism]
- (2) If Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible, then Character Monism is true.
[from the Reverse Causal Argument and Screening off problem]
- (C1) Character Monism is true. (from 1 and 2)
- (3) Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible. [From Empirical Naturalism]

(C2) Naïve Realism is false. (from C1 and 3)

The conditional in (2) is motivated by Martin's Reverse Causal Argument and the Screening Off Problem. From Empirical Naturalism we get that Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible. So Character Monism, in the specific reading I have suggested, must be true.

Now, Empirical Naturalism also seems to support that inner or non-naïve realist Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible. We can finally specify in which sense inner or non-naïve realist is to be understood for the purposes of our discussion. What is meant is non-naïve realist in the *specific* sense, i.e., not being constituted by familiar mind-independent entities such as chairs, tables, their properties and so on. From Character Monism, we know that the character of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations have a single specific nature. But being neurally matching hallucinations Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations (3) in the sense just specified, such a nature is to be specified without any appeal to a distinctive relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and aspects of their familiar mind-independent environment. So, (C2) Naïve Realism is false. Veridical conscious perceptions do not possess naïve realist phenomenal properties.

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented Martin's reconstruction of the Inconsistent Triad that drives the Master Argument from Hallucination. My critical assessment has brought to light the fact that the Master Argument can be seen as driven by the following Inconsistent Triad:

- ❖ Naïve Realism
- ❖ Empirical Naturalism
- ❖ Character Monism

Martin suggests that the only viable option for Naïve Realists is to reject Character Monism:

To defend Naïve Realism, we must reject one of the other assumptions. If we do not want to deny that experience is part of the natural order, rather than some external

condition on it, then we cannot abandon Experiential Naturalism. Naïve Realism can be preserved only at the expense of denying [Character Monism]. (Martin 2006: 360)

However, if my reconstruction is correct, things are not as straightforward as Martin puts it in this passage. Given the major role that the possibility of Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations plays in the Master Argument, it is worth assessing whether we should accept the possibility of such mental events. Moreover, our discussion highlighted a crucial point: rejecting the possibility of Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations is in principle compatible with acceptance of Experiential Naturalism.

Part II On Philosophers' Hallucinations

In our presentation of the Master Argument from Hallucination we have seen how the Argument is driven by the following Inconsistent Triad:

- ❖ Naïve Realism
- ❖ Character Monism
- ❖ Empirical Naturalism

As we have seen, Martin (2006: 360) seems to suggest in some passages that the only route available to Naïve Realists to resist the argument is to reject Character Monism. Here is a way to reconstruct the reasoning behind this contention. The possibility of Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations is supported by Experiential Naturalism. So, on the pain of understanding visual experiences as not part of the causal order, Naïve Realists must reject Character Monism to resist the Master Argument.

As we have seen, however, the possibility of Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations is supported by a reinforced Experiential Naturalism. That is, a naturalistic claim about visual experiences, combined with the general knowledge we have of the relation between the physical and the psychological provided by empirical science, and distinctively philosophical reasoning and assumptions. I have dubbed this reinforced version of Experiential Naturalism Empirical Naturalism

Now that we have clarified the structure of the argument, we can see a more complex picture of the strategies available to Naïve Realists. Consider again how I proposed to reconstruct the argument:

- (1) Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible. [From Empirical Naturalism]
- (2) If Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible, then Character Monism is true.
[from the Reverse Causal Argument and Screening off problem]
- (C1) Character Monism is true. (from 1 and 2)
- (3) Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible. [From Empirical Naturalism]
- (C2) Naïve Realism is false. (from C1 and 3)

Martin thinks that the only viable way to resist the argument is by rejecting Character Monism *by resisting* the conditional in (2). He contends that there is room to reject the screening off step of the argument for (2). In so doing, he ends up endorsing the view that Philosophers' Hallucinations' have a character that consists in the property of not being knowably not a veridical conscious perception of a certain sort (2004; 2006). But such a minimal, negative characterization has come under fire from several different directions. If philosophers' hallucinations are possible, Martin's opponents have contended, then surely they must have a more *robust* nature.

Martin's view about the phenomenal character of Philosophers' Hallucinations has been much debated, and several objections to his account have been raised.⁷⁵ In what follows, I will be interested in alternative ways to resist the Master Argument: *Eliminativist Strategies*, i.e., strategies aimed at resisting the view that Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible. Such ways are, in principle, consistent with both acceptance of the conditional in (2) and Experiential Naturalism.

The plan for this part is as follows. In Chapter 3, I assess, based on extant proposals, strategies aimed at rejecting the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations. In Chapter 4, I turn to consider strategies aimed at resisting the possibility of Philosophers' hallucinations construed as inner events, that is, non-naïve realist. In the final chapter, I present my Eliminativist proposal to reject the Master Argument.

⁷⁵ See Siegel (2004, 2008), Farkas (2006), Sturgeon (2008), Smith (2008), Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006), Pautz (2011; 2021), and Moran (2019). For defence of the view see Martin (2013), Nudds (2013), and Brewer (2011).

Chapter 3 Eliminativism about Philosophers' Hallucinations

In this chapter, I assess a cluster of Eliminativist Strategies to resist the Master Argument from Hallucination: *Eliminativism about Philosophers' Hallucinations*. Proponents of the Eliminativist strategy I am about to consider hold that Naïve Realists have been too concessive so far. Neurally matching hallucinations as they are construed by philosophers are not possible. Eliminativism about Philosophers' Hallucinations has gained popularity among Naïve Realists in recent years (Allen 2015; Logue and Richardson 2021; Ivanov 2022; Moran 2019, 2022). In this chapter, based on extant proposals, I assess three Eliminativist strategies: the Irreproducibility Strategy, the Non-Replicability Strategy, and the Distinguishability Strategy. I contend that, as they stand, none of them is satisfactory.

3.1 The Possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations

In the previous chapter, we have seen how proponents of the Master Argument from Hallucination contend that neurally matching hallucinations construed as having character properties that are replicable and that account for the indistinguishability *in principle* from a veridical conscious perception are possible. I referred to neurally matching hallucinations so construed as Philosophers' Hallucinations.

I suggested that, contrary to what Martin can be read as suggesting in some passages (2006: 360), the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations is not supported *only* by Experiential Naturalism, i.e., the idea that visual experiences are part of the causal nexus and therefore subject to only physical or psychological causes, but also by a mixed body of empirical evidence and armchair reasoning. I dubbed the body of naturalistic commitments, empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning that supposedly backs the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucination *Empirical Naturalism*.

These considerations pave the way for a way to resist the Master Argument that is consistent with one's commitment to Experiential Naturalism: *Eliminativism about Philosophers' Hallucinations*. Naïve Realists could try to reject the possibility of

Philosophers' Hallucinations whilst, at the same time, preserving the idea that visual experiences are part of the natural causal order by either rejecting altogether or in part what is reinforcing Experiential Naturalism, or by calling into question whether such reinforcement is actually doing the role that proponents of the argument think is doing.

Now, since the reinforcement of Experiential Naturalism includes the current body of knowledge we have of the functioning of the visual system, it is unlikely that one could convincingly resist the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations by, say, taking an anti-scientific stance. But, as we will see, there seems to be room to call into question the inference from Empirical Naturalism to the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations compatibly with the empirical evidence we possess.

Consider, for instance, the role that empirical evidence plays in motivating the possibility of neurally matching hallucinations construed as philosophers typically do. In the last chapter (§2.3), I have suggested that many think that empirical evidence already settles the issue of whether mere activation of a brain state should be sufficient for bringing the character properties of a neurally matching hallucination. However, I have argued that the general claim that mere activation of a brain state would be sufficient for bringing about the character properties of a neurally matching hallucination can be questioned compatibly with the empirical evidence we have.

I argued that a more modest claim regarding the relation between brain activity and the character of such events is to be set forth. Namely, that there might be additional broad replicable conditions, i.e., conditions that do not supervene on the brain state the subject would be in, but that can occur in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well, that are required for the occurrence of the character properties of a neurally matching hallucination. Nothing in our best science, it is my contention, speaks against or in favour of this.

Even if these considerations do not directly bear on the issue of whether Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible – for the way I construed Philosophers' Hallucinations is compatible with their having broad replicable conditions – they show how the empirical evidence we have is *prima facie* compatible with different ways of understanding the dependency of visual experiences on brain activity. And consider the fact that Naïve Realism itself can be seen as endorsing a cautious attitude with respect to the conclusions that can be drawn about visual consciousness starting from broadly empirical premises.⁷⁶ Naïve Realists themselves usually claim that brain activation is not

⁷⁶ Eliminativists might suggest, based on broadly *a priori* considerations, that the *same* sort of considerations should make us think that Philosophers' Hallucinations are not possible.

itself *sufficient* for one to undergo a veridical conscious perception based on introspective, epistemological and metaphysical considerations. The issue, again, does not revolve around calling into question the empirical evidence we have. It is rather about the import of the empirical evidence we have: in which way it can be seen as constraining our theorising about visual experiences.

In the remainder of this chapter, we will address whether extant Eliminativist proposals about Philosophers' Hallucinations are compelling. The first thing that we need to consider before embarking on the assessment of extant Eliminativist strategies is what sort of possibility is embedded in the Master Argument. Now, it is itself a matter of dispute what modality should be used in the debate about visual experiences.⁷⁷ But the Master Argument is typically formulated in terms of *nomological possibility*, i.e., possibility under our laws of nature. So it seems that we should restrict our enquiry in such a way. Some might reasonably argue, as Robinson does in the following passage, that rejecting the nomological possibility of philosophers' hallucinations might not be enough:

Perhaps he should also deny the *metaphysical* possibility of philosophers' hallucinations. Suppose there could be a world that included them, yet otherwise functioned like our world, so that it seemed to people that they perceived the world, and were as right about its perceptible nature as we are, and coped with it just as well. It would then be difficult to see what *philosophical* objection there could be to claiming that perception worked that way in our case. The direct realist needs *an objection in principle*, not just an empirical objection to representative realism. (Robinson 2013: 317, fn. 3)

However, notice that there seems to be room for Naïve Realists to claim that the real definition of the character properties of veridical conscious perceptions should appeal to a disjunctive property: either naïve realist phenomenal properties are constitutive of it (in our world), or, say, intentionalist properties are (in different worlds).

Some Naïve Realists will be perfectly content with accepting the idea that there might be worlds where veridical conscious perceptions are not naïve realist, for they take the dispute to concern “what perception is *actually* like” or “about what *our* perceptual access to the world in which we live consists in—as opposed to a claim about any possible form of perception.” (Fish 2009: 122).

⁷⁷ Cf. Drayson (2021). Martin's argument (2004: 53) appeals to the *nomological* possibility of philosophers' hallucinations.

In what follows, following the way the Master Argument is typically formulated, I will restrict our enquiry to the nomological possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations, and I will therefore ignore Robison's concern. Eliminativism about Philosophers' Hallucinations will be therefore understood as the view that Philosophers' Hallucinations are not possible under our laws of nature.

Recall (§2.3), philosophers hold that neurally matching hallucinations have character properties that are (b) replicable and (c) account for the indistinguishability *in principle* from a veridical conscious perception.⁷⁸ From the characterisation of philosophers' hallucinations just provided and based on extant proposals, there seem to be at least three ways to implement the Eliminativist strategy:

- ❖ **The Irreproducibility Strategy:** Reject the nomological possibility of neurally matching hallucinations;
- ❖ **The Non-Replicability Strategy:** Accept the nomological possibility of neurally matching hallucinations but reject the nomological possibility of neurally matching hallucinations construed as having *only* replicable character properties;
- ❖ **The Distinguishability Strategy:** Accept the nomological possibility of neurally matching hallucinations construed as having *only* replicable character properties but reject the nomological possibility of such events being indistinguishable in principle from veridical conscious perceptions.

Versions of each of these strategies have been either discussed or explicitly defended in recent philosophical discussions. I will start by briefly considering the Irreproducibility Strategy.

⁷⁸ Note that for all we have said, the character properties of Philosophers' Hallucinations might be ones of a mere *ersatz state*, i.e. a state that has the same functional role as some mental state with phenomenal character but that lacks phenomenal character, or they might be properties of a *phenomenally conscious state*, i.e. phenomenal properties.

3.2 The Irreproducibility Strategy

Philosophers' Hallucinations are neurally matching hallucinations, i.e., mental events with introspectable or character properties that are brought about by the same neural activity as a veridical conscious perception of an F. The Irreproducibility Strategy takes an Eliminativist stance on neurally matching hallucinations – and hence about philosophers' hallucinations:

- ❖ **The Irreproducibility Strategy:** Reject the nomological possibility of neurally matching hallucinations;

There are at least a couple of ways proponents of this strategy might go.

First, they might reject the nomological possibility of *reproducing* the neural activity of a veridical conscious perception of an F. This option is briefly considered by Smith:

Perhaps perceptual experiences of the same subjective character as genuine perceptions never actually occur in the absence of a normal object. Perhaps it would be fiendishly difficult, or practically impossible, for a neurophysiologist to replicate precisely the conditions for perceptual experience. Is it, though, *absolutely impossible* that such a thing should occur? If not, the Argument is up and running. (Smith 2002: 202)

There seems to be little hope for taking this strategy seriously. Activity in the brain is made up of electrochemical processes, and there is nothing in our best science that could even remotely suggest that such an electrochemical activity could not be reproduced. The fact that there has yet been no experimentation, or that perhaps there will never be, does not speak in favour of the fact that it is not a genuine possibility.

A (seemingly) more promising way to go might be the following: accept that it is nomologically possible to reproduce the neural activity involved in a veridical conscious perception of an F, but contend that no mental effect with character properties would be brought about.⁷⁹ Consider this passage from Martin:

The fact that visual perceptions depend causally on states of the visual cortex does not in itself show that the reproduction of those local causes in the absence of objects

⁷⁹ This might be what Byrne and Manzotti (2022) have in mind in a recent paper where they contend that hallucinations, by their nature, are relational events.

of perception would still produce experiences. Some sort of room is left open for a philosopher to claim that in the absence of conditions sufficient for perception, the causal preconditions of perception fail to produce any psychological effect at all. No one is yet in a position to falsify this hypothesis. (Martin 2004: 55)

It is true, as Martin suggests, that “[n]o one is yet in a position to falsify this hypothesis” (Ibid.): no empirical evidence *directly* validates that one could bring about a mental effect with character properties via stimulation of the neural activity, *N*, of a conscious perception of an *F*. We do have *indirect* evidence, though. For we have evidence of localised parts of the brain being stimulated and bringing about psychological effects with character properties (e.g., experimentally induced hallucinations). Nothing seems to suggest that a more global stimulation of the brain would preclude any psychological effect with character properties from happening.

This is not all. Suppose we endorse this version of the Irreproducibility Strategy. Given that this version allows for the reproducibility of the neural activity of a veridical conscious perception of an *F*, it seems that either a sub-personal mental event would be brought about or no mental event at all. But now consider the subject’s perspective during the stimulation. On the one hand, it might be suggested that the subject would remain in the experiential state they were in right before the stimulation. But this seems to violate the causal dependency of experiential states on brain states we have assumed in the previous chapter (§2.3), for it seems that no brain process would be in the business of sustaining such an experiential state. On the other hand, one might suppose that the subject would cease to be in any experiential state as a result of the stimulation. The subject would enter a sort of coma state. No *direct* evidence excludes this possibility.

At any rate, the point is not only, as Martin remarks, that Eliminativist strategies of this sort would commit Naïve Realists to “determinate empirical consequences which they have insufficient evidence to predict” (Martin 2004: 55). Crucially, the problem with the Irreproducibility Strategy is that it involves speculations that *clearly* go against the odds.⁸⁰ We should not get bogged down in a deeper assessment of the Irreproducibility Strategy. There are better ways to go for Eliminativists about Philosophers’ Hallucinations.

⁸⁰ For a similar point in a different context see Ivanov (2022: 7, fn. 5)

3.3 The Non-Replicability Strategy

The Non-Replicability Strategy is by far the most popular strategy that Naïve Realists have proposed to support the Eliminativist stance on Philosophers' Hallucinations. Versions of the Non-Replicability strategy have been recently developed by Moran (2019; 2022), Allen (2015), and Ivanov (2022). Recall: philosophers typically construe neurally matching hallucinations as meeting the following Replicability Thesis:

(Replicability) Neurally matching hallucinations have a character constituted only by replicable properties.

Proponents of the Non-Replicability Strategy suggest the following:

- ❖ **The Non-Replicability Strategy:** Accept the nomological possibility of neurally matching hallucinations but reject the nomological possibility of neurally matching hallucinations construed as having *only* replicable character properties;

What the strategy is *supposed* to do is to show that at least some of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations are *non-replicable*.⁸¹ That is, they have conditions on their occurrence that cannot be met in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well. Yet, proponents of such strategies typically do not frame their views in terms of non-replicable conditions on the *character properties* of neurally matching hallucinations, but rather in terms of non-replicable conditions on undergoing neurally matching hallucinations. In my view, this is a potential shortcoming of the strategy. Here is why.

Consider Moran's *Experiential Causal View*. Drawing on Snowdon (2005a), Moran (2019; 2022) suggests that to resist the Master Argument from Hallucination, Naïve Realists should reject what he calls the 'non-demanding' conception of neurally matching hallucinations (2022: 2).⁸² According to Moran, Naïve Realists should claim

⁸¹ For the charge that such views that rely on broad non-replicable conditions are *ad-hoc* see Fish (2009: 85). For critical discussion of Moran and Allen's view see Sethi (2020: 612).

⁸² Snowdon (2005a: 303) suggests that a naïve realist reply to the traditional causal argument against Experiential Naïve Realism might have to invoke the Experiential-Causal View: "Let us think instead that there being an inner experience is constituted by, that is, obtains in virtue of, the nature of the antecedents

that it lies in the nature of cases of veridical conscious perceptions to be generated by a process involving *standard causation*, while it lies in the nature of hallucinatory cases to be generated by deviant causation (Moran 2019: 376). If so, then neurally matching hallucinations have *causal* non-replicable broad conditions on their occurring.

Moran's view is explicitly framed in terms of experiential events. But the fact that neurally matching hallucinations have non-replicable conditions of this sort is perfectly compatible with the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations. Philosophers' Hallucinations are neurally matching hallucinations whose *character properties* have only replicable conditions on their occurring – if any. As we have seen in Chapter 1 (§1.2), just like it seems to be consistent with the view that the *nature* of veridical conscious perceptions is to be specified by appealing to a relation of perceptual awareness, that the *phenomenal character* of such events is to be essentially characterised in terms of properties that are insensitive to the mind-independent constituents of such experiences, so too it seems that one could consistently hold on to the idea that neurally matching hallucinations are essentially brought about via a deviant causal chain, that, say, *N* alone is sufficient for bringing about their distinctive character properties.

So, even if there was room to suggest that the kind of experiential event one would be in cases of neurally matching hallucinations could not occur in cases of veridical conscious perceptions, it could still be contended that the kind of character properties one would enjoy in cases of neurally matching hallucinations could occur in cases of veridical conscious perceptions. This, of course, is a problem. Indeed, construing neurally matching hallucinations as having non-replicable conditions would not do any work in rejecting the Master Argument.

To reject this, one should be committed to something along the lines of the following principle:

(Experiential Kind Dependency) The kind of character properties, *P*, of an experiential event of essential kind *E*, can occur only if they are instantiated by an event that falls under the essential kind *E*.

of [N] being the way they are. We say in other words that just having the physical successor of [N] is not to have an inner experience. To have an inner experience requires that we have those antecedents, or types of antecedents, as well.” The Experiential-Causal View is also explored for purposes of argument by Foster (2000: 41). Note that the Experiential-Causal View differs from the traditional Causal View of perception (see Grice 1961) because, contrary to the latter, it holds that causal considerations bear on the kind of conscious event one would be in.

But note that when we depart from experiential events, we are often prone to accept that a property that can be instantiated by a certain kind of event, K, could be exemplified by another event that does not belong to K (e.g. running a marathon could be exhausting, but so could writing a philosophical paper). So why should one find Experiential Kind Dependency compelling?

In what follows, I will assume that proponents of the Non-Replicability Strategy had better not be committed to Experiential Kind Dependency. They should rather develop their strategy by focussing on the *character properties* of neurally matching hallucinations. Accordingly, in what follows, I will assess extant proposals falling under the Non-Replicability Strategy by recasting all talk of experiential events in terms of character properties. Current proposals try to find a non-replicable condition that either follows from the real definition of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations – what I dub the *Consciousness Way* – or from the physical implementation of such properties – the *Physical-Implementation Way*. In the following sub-sections, I will consider views that fall under both ways.

3.3.1 The Consciousness Way: Allen’s Imagination Model

In a recent paper, Allen (2015) takes the Consciousness Way of the Non-Replicability Strategy to reject the possibility of Philosophers’ Hallucinations. According to Allen’s *Imagination Model* of neurally matching hallucinations, such mental events are sensory imaginings, and sensory imaginings constitutively involve the *absence* of objects:

Hallucination is a kind of imagination, and imagination is essentially a mode of consciousness of that which is absent. (Allen 2015: 301)

Assuming that such a condition is necessary for the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations, Allen’s Imagination Model might be thought to provide a non-replicable condition for the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations that can support the nomological impossibility of Philosophers’ Hallucinations.⁸³ After

⁸³ The view that neurally matching hallucinations might be construed as a kind of sensory imagination has been proposed by Nanay (2016) and Alston (1999: 191). The uniqueness of Allen’s proposal consists in the idea that sensory imaginings have non-replicable introspectable properties.

all, should it not be accepted that cases of veridical conscious perceptions are cases where objects need to be *present*?

The success of Allen's proposal crucially turns on whether there is room to understand neurally matching hallucinations as imaginings of the sensory sort, and whether such events can be plausibly construed as having a character that requires the absence condition. But both Moran (2019: 374 fn. 14; 2022: fn. 10) and Ivanov (2022: 14) suggest that the Imagination Model is clearly doomed to fail. Moran contends that the possibility of neurally matching *veridical* hallucinations constitutes a counterexample to the idea that neurally matching hallucinations require the absence of objects:

Obviously, if I perceive a clock, then the condition that a clock be absent from the scene before the eyes is not met. [...] The trouble here is that the absence of the appropriate external object is not in fact necessary for the occurrence of an hallucinatory experience. For one could well have an hallucinatory experience as of a clock even when there is a clock out in the scene before the eyes—as cases of veridical hallucination show. (Moran 2019: 374, fn. 14)

Ivanov suggests that there seems to be nothing at odds with the possibility of sensorily imagining an F, when F is just before you:

It is counterintuitive to maintain that I cannot visualize an object when it happens to be in my immediate surroundings. For instance, it seems that I can visualize my mother in the doorway to my room exactly at the moment she happens to peek in. Nothing in the nature of the objects of imagination or of the specific mode of directedness towards them appears to rule out the possibility of visualizing an object, which happens to be in one's vicinity. (Ivanov 2022: 15)

Moran and Ivanov are clearly on the right track, but only insofar as their reading of the absence condition is correct. For both seem to take the absence condition as something along the lines of *absence in one's perceivable environment*. But guided by Allen's remarks, there is room to provide an alternative construal of the absence condition.

Allen specifies that absence is not to be understood in the usual 'spatial' sense: an object can be spatially present without being *present* to a subject, as it happens, for instance, in cases of "veridical hallucination that exactly matches the very scene in front of them" (Allen 2015: 289). These considerations pave the way for an alternative reading of the absence condition. On this reading, the character properties of neurally matching

hallucinations constitutively require a lack of mind-independent *constituents*, that is, entities one is in a relation of perceptual awareness with. If this is the correct reading, then Allen's Imagination Model is not subject to the charges that Moran and Ivanov move.

An immediate worry with this alternative construal, however, is whether the absence of mind-independent constituents could be considered a genuine *non-replicable* condition. For two reasons: first, Naïve Realism is usually construed as the view that the phenomenal character of (at least) veridical conscious perceptions is constituted by naïve realist properties. And this is quite compatible with the fact that properties that are not grounded in the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and aspects of the mind-independent environment can be part of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions. Second, it seems quite sensible to suppose that, say, *N* alone should be *sufficient* for the obtaining of the condition invoked by Allen: the absence of mind-independent constituents.

Suppose that a proponent of the Imagination Model found a way to understand the absence condition as both broad – to say, for instance, that the failure of the conscious state to latch onto the mind-independent surrounding is a necessary condition on the character of neurally matching hallucinations not guaranteed to obtain merely by the presence of *N*, and not replicable. Regarding the latter, advocates of the view could suggest something along the lines of what we can call Extreme Naïve Realism: the entirety of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions is constituted by naïve realist properties. Would this be enough to secure the Imagination Model?

I suggest that the answer is negative. For I think that there are strong reasons to hold that the absence of mind-independent constituents is not even necessary for sensory imaginings. Consider a paradigm case of sensory imagination. If you are sensorily imagining an apple, then the apple imagined is *absent* in the sense specified above. However, we do seem to acknowledge other ways in which we can use sensory imagination.⁸⁴ Consider cases of superimposition for instance, i.e. sensory imaginings in which one sensorily imagines things as being in her actual environment. Some superimpositions are cases in which an actual object in one's environment prompts and arguably is part of the imagining. For instance, when one imagines the pair of yellow glasses before one as being red. The absence of objects does not seem to be constitutive of or necessary for sensory imaginings.

⁸⁴ There are some other objections Allen considers in his (2015) that I am not going to address in this paper. The main motivation for this is that I think Allen does a good job in resisting them.

Perhaps one might insist that there is still an absence involved in such a case. As a matter of fact, there is no instance of red presented to one. Note, however, that some sensory imaginings, over and above their sensory or quasi-sensory component, may include a cognitive one (Peacocke 1985; Gregory 2016). It seems that I could sensorily imagine that the building I am consciously perceiving is the very same building where the Paris Peace Treaties were signed. In such a case of sensory imagining, no sensory object or property would be absent in the sense relevant to our discussion.

Proponents of the Imagination Model might try to adopt a sort of disjunctive view of the phenomenal character of sensory imagination: it is not constitutive of the phenomenal character of sensory imagination that it involves absence. Nonetheless, it is constitutive of the phenomenal character of a specific kind of sensory imagination that does constitutively involve absence, thus making *absence* the mark of the essential difference. But what would motivate such a carving? Proponents of the Imagination Model owe us an explanation.

Perhaps they might contend that neurally matching hallucinations have *sui generis* character properties, similar in some respect to (some) sensory imaginings. Allen seems to suggest precisely such an alternative:

[I]f hallucination is not a kind of imagination, but instead a *sui generis* mental mode that is like it, then it is similar to imagination to the extent that it is a type of mental phenomenon that is essentially a mode of consciousness of that which is absent. (Allen 2015: 301)

But such a suggestion would amount to taking the absence condition as brute. Although some have suggested it as a viable option for Naïve Realists, it is obvious to me that the Naïve Realists would be subject to intolerable pressure if they were to rely on brute non-replicability to resist the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations. Surely Naïve Realists want to reject the Master Argument to preserve their view, but, as I have remarked, the envisaged solution needs to be a *plausible* one.⁸⁵

To sum up, if the absence condition is understood as Moran and Ivanov do, there seem to be obvious counterexamples to the Imagination Model. If the absence condition is understood in terms of absence of mind-independent constituents, then it is not clear why such a condition should not be replicable. But even if there were room to hold on

⁸⁵ For the idea that it is open to Naïve Realists to contend that the introspectable properties of neurally matching hallucinations have non-replicable conditions on their occurring and this is just a brute fact in need of no further explanation see Pautz (2010: 298).

to the non-replicability of the condition, the Imagination Model would still face a challenging burden. For the absence of mind-independent constituents does not seem to be necessary for the obtaining of the character properties of sensory imaginings.

3.3.2 The Physical Implementation Way: The Phenomenal-Causal View and the Dual Processing View

A different way to spell out the non-replicability of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations is the following. Proponents of the Non-Replicability Strategy might contend that the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations have broad conditions on their occurring that have to do with the way such psychological properties are physically implemented. Moreover, such conditions cannot pertain to the physical implementation of veridical perceptual cases, thus qualifying the broad conditions as non-replicable.

Two ways of implementing such a strategy are a Moran-inspired *Phenomenal-Causal View* and Ivanov's *Dual Processing View* (2022). The Phenomenal-Causal View holds that it lies in the essence of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations that they are brought about by a deviant causal chain, and it lies in the essence of the character properties of veridical conscious perceptions that they are brought about via a standard causal chain.⁸⁶ Ivanov's Dual Processing View suggests that the character properties of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations are underpinned by two mutually exclusive *extended cognitive processes*. In the veridical perceptual case, the cognitive process underlying the introspective properties consists of an extended cognitive process that incorporates external items. The cognitive process underpinning the introspective properties of neurally matching hallucinations would still be extended but would amount to "a secondary, defective mode of functioning of the perceptual system" (Ivanov 2022: 2).

To my mind, there is a powerful argument against the Physical Implementation Way. I call it the *No-Miracles Argument*. In order to state it, consider these remarks by Robinson.

Why should you believe that you can or could cause a veridical-seeming hallucination by directly activating the neural processes involved in the corresponding perception,

⁸⁶ In Moran's version of the Experiential-Causal view deviant causation "just is what you get when don't have standard causation" and "the limit case of deviant causation is the case wherein causation is entirely absent" (Moran 2019: 375, fn. 16).

except because you think that you would be managing to do “by the back door” as it were, what nature does for and to one in the ordinary case of perception? (Robinson 2013: 316)

Call *Sameness* the view that the character properties of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations are brought about by the same physical underpinnings. Robinson can be read as inviting Naïve Realists to accept the following conditional:

(A) If neurally matching hallucinations are possible, then Sameness holds.

If Naïve Realists think that Sameness does not hold, Robinson can be seen as contending, they should rather reject the possibility of neurally matching hallucinations altogether.

Now, typically Naïve Realists would reject Sameness. Suppose that the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations are brought about by mere activation of *N*. Consider the perceptual case now: how could *mere* activity in the brain bring about a state that latches on to the mind-independent reality? Note also that for the reasons outlined in the previous section (§3.2), Naïve Realists would also be wary of rejecting the antecedent of the conditional. So Naïve Realists seem forced to reject (A). I submit that Naïve Realists could do so by suggesting that there is an equally powerful intuition that drives the possibility of neurally matching hallucinations.

Consider the way Naïve Realist Disjunctivists typically block the inference from subjective match to sameness of phenomenal character. We have briefly mentioned this argumentative line in the previous chapter (§2.4). According to some, in conceiving of a hallucination that subjectively matches a veridical conscious perception of an *F* one thereby conceives of a situation in which the *same* phenomenal properties of the perceptual case are preserved. Naïve Realist Disjunctivists typically contend that what is driving the conceivability of the hallucinatory scenario in such cases is rather our transposition of the subject’s *introspective take* in the perceptual case to the hallucinatory situation. Our conception of subjectively matching hallucinations is built, as it were, out of *introspective perceptual blocks*. The subjective match between the two experiences, in short, is not to be explained in terms of sameness in the overall experiential situation, but rather in terms of the replicability of the subject’s introspective take. This, of course, leaves entirely open the nature of the character properties present in the two scenarios.

Similarly, in our case, Naïve Realists could contend that one could consistently reject (A) and suggest that the possibility of neurally matching hallucinations is driven by the idea that *some* of the physical underpinnings of veridical conscious perceptions are in themselves sufficient for the production of a psychological effect of a certain sort. Call *Replicability* the view that *some* of the physical underpinnings of veridical conscious perception are sufficient for bringing about the character properties of a neurally matching hallucination. The Naïve Realist's rejection of (A) can be motivated by acceptance of (B):

(B) If neurally matching hallucinations are possible, then Replicability holds.

Given the alleged unavailability of (A), there is in my view a *strong case* for Naïve Realists to accept (B). For if Naïve Realists were to reject (B), they would completely lose their grip on what is driving the acceptance of the possibility of neurally matching hallucinations. Indeed, they would be committed to what we can dub *miracle conditions: additional* physical conditions that are met *systemically* in cases of neurally matching hallucinations to bring about the character properties of such mental events.

The No-Miracles Argument seems to severely undermine the Physical Implementation Way of the Non-Replicability Strategy. And since rejecting the possibility of neurally matching hallucinations does not seem viable, there is an equally strong reason to take the Eliminativist strategy we are considering so far as *not viable*. On several occasions, however, it has been suggested to me that there is indeed a very good reason to believe in the existence of miracles. For believing in miracles allows Naïve Realists to resist the Master Argument. I must confess that I really struggle to see how this could be used as a motivation in our dialectical context. Why should the arguer be persuaded of the existence of miracles if the support that can be given to their existence is that it blocks the argument?

But perhaps I have been too pessimistic so far. Proponents of the Physical Implementation Way might suggest that we should draw a distinction between two kinds of miracle conditions. Some are brute, and Naïve Realists had better not invoke them to reject (B). Others, however, can be somehow *derived* from the real definition of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations.⁸⁷ It might be suggested that the rejection of (B) could stem from a deeper understanding of the kind of psychological properties in play in cases of neurally matching hallucinations. Compare: Naïve Realists

⁸⁷ Cf. Ivanov (2022: 12) and Martin (2004: 58).

presumably will contend that once one comes to appreciate the true nature of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions, a certain physical implementation would have to be invoked rather than one, say, adverbialists or sense-datum theorists might resort to.

Is there room for the Phenomenal-Causal View or Dual Processing View to derive the appropriate physical implementation from the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations? The good news is that there seems to be room to argue that the fact that veridical conscious perceptions are brought about by a process involving a standard causal chain (as the Phenomenal-Causal View holds) or by an extended cognitive process (as the Double Processing view prescribes) is a broad condition that can be thought to derive from the real definition of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions. How?

Consider again the claim that the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions is constituted by naïve realist phenomenal properties. Such properties are grounded in the obtaining of a relation of *perceptual awareness* between a subject and aspects of her familiar mind-independent environment. As we have seen in the first chapter (§1.3.1), even if Naïve Realists typically take the relation of perceptual awareness as non-analysable what they typically have in mind is a sort of personal-level analysis. What Naïve Realists say is perfectly compatible with the fact that “that there is a more fundamental level of reality out of which the mental is somehow constructed, or out of which it emerges” (Martin 2006: 360, fn. 9). At this point, one might suggest that the relation of perceptual awareness nomologically necessitates the sort of physical processes described by either the Phenomenal-Causal View or the Dual Processing view.

To illustrate: when Mary sees a red apple before her the phenomenal character of her experience is constituted by properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of perceptual awareness with the apple before Mary. Suppose we endorse some form of the Phenomenal-Causal View. The character properties of Mary’s experience have broad conditions on their occurring. For one could enjoy such phenomenal properties only if a standard causal chain including a red apple, or a similar familiar mind-independent object, obtains. Despite the fact that the causal aetiology might be quite heterogeneous – indeed we can imagine that Mary would possess the same kind of phenomenal properties were she to see a red apple-shaped soap⁸⁸ – there seems to be a clear link between the sort of phenomenology associated with seeing a red apple-shaped object and a *mildly* heterogeneous causal process of the standard sort.

⁸⁸ I will return to this point in Chapter 5 (§5.4.1).

The problem comes when we reflect on the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations. For on both the Phenomenal-Causal View and the Dual Processing View, it is obscure how the broad non-replicable condition is supposed to be derived from the real definition of the character properties of a neurally matching hallucination. Consider the Phenomenal Causal View. It is clear that the character properties of a neurally matching hallucination could be brought about by an indefinite number of different deviant causal chains. Mary could undergo a neurally matching hallucination as of a red apple before her in virtue of a neurosurgeon directly stimulating her brain, a bolt of lightning hitting her, or a computer sending electrical signals through electrodes, etc. Similarly, for Ivanov's Dual Processing View, we can envisage an indefinite number of equally different extended cognitive processes underpinning the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations. From what sort of psychological characterisation could such physical constraints be derived?

Suppose that, following Ivanov, we understand the character properties of neurally matching hallucination as conforming to the model of projective consciousness, or, equivalently, as non-naïve realist phenomenal properties (see Ivanov 2022: 20, fn. 23). More specifically, suppose that, as Moran seems to recommend (2019: 379), we endorse a sense-datum account of such character properties. When Mary undergoes a neurally matching hallucination as of a red apple, the character properties of her experience obtain in virtue of the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and a red, apple-shaped sense-datum. It is just unintelligible why such properties should necessitate the physical underpinnings invoked by the Phenomenal-Causal View or the Dual Processing View. The massive heterogeneity of the causal aetiology or of the extended cognitive process associated with cases of neurally matching hallucinations as of a red apple makes the prospects of deriving the broad non-replicable physical condition from the real definition of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations look grim.⁸⁹ But lacking this explanation, the Physical Implementation way turns out to be committed to brute miracle conditions. As I have suggested, the entire viability of Naïve Realism should not turn on conditions of this sort.

To sum up, I suggested that there is a powerful argument against the Physical Implementation Way of the Non-Replicability Strategy: the No-Miracles Argument. I have contended that advocates of the view might try to resist the argument by contending that the miracle conditions they invoke are not brute: they can be somehow

⁸⁹ In the next chapter (§4.6.1), I will propose a way in which the broad non-replication condition might be seen to derive from the real definition of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations.

derived from the real definition of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations. I have assessed the prospects of deriving the broad conditions invoked by proponents of the Phenomenal-Causal View or the Dual Processing View from the real definition of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations. I contended that it is unclear what sort of characterisation of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations might impose the broad non-replicable conditions required by the Phenomenal-Causal View or the Dual Processing View.

3.4 The Distinguishability Strategy

The final Eliminativist Strategy about Philosophers' Hallucinations I want to consider is the Distinguishability Strategy. As we have seen, philosophers typically construe neurally matching hallucinations as meeting the following Indistinguishability Thesis:

(Indistinguishability) Neurally matching hallucinations have a replicable character that grounds their indistinguishability in principle from veridical conscious perceptions.

The Distinguishability Strategy accepts the nomological possibility of neurally matching hallucinations construed as having *only* replicable character properties, but rejects the nomological possibility of neurally matching hallucinations as being indistinguishable in principle from veridical conscious perceptions:

❖ **The Distinguishability Strategy:** Accept the nomological possibility of neurally matching hallucinations construed as having *only* replicable character properties but reject the nomological possibility of such events being indistinguishable in principle from veridical conscious perceptions

Roughly, according to the Distinguishability Strategy, if Mary's brain were stimulated so as to reproduce the neural activity of a veridical conscious perception of an F, she would undergo a mental event that is in principle *distinguishable* from veridical conscious perceptions of that sort.

Recently, something along these lines has been suggested by Logue and Richardson (2021):

[O]ne could deny an analog of the Local Supervenience principle concerning the subjective indistinguishability of total hallucinations, namely: if the proximal neural conditions that occurred when one perceived an object were created in the absence of that object, the subject would have an experience *that is subjectively indistinguishable from* the original perceptual experience. [...] Plausibly, the neural activity is sufficient for *something* psychological, e.g., a disposition to believe a certain proposition about one's environment (Fish 2009, 143). But, if one has gone so far as to question whether the relevant sort of neural activity is sufficient for perceptual phenomenal character, it's no longer clear why that 'something' would be subjectively indistinguishable from a possible veridical perception. (Logue and Richardson 2021: 10-11)

Logue and Richardson seem to merely suggest the Distinguishability Strategy as an open dialectical move.⁹⁰ They seem to hold that once one accepts that the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations are not phenomenally conscious properties, it might be natural to suppose that they would ground the *distinguishability* in principle from veridical conscious perceptions.⁹¹

This way of motivating the Distinguishability Strategy relies on a construal of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations as not phenomenally conscious. But we can envisage a way to motivate the strategy that allows for the fact that neurally matching hallucinations have a character of the phenomenal sort. It might be suggested that, contrary to what Naïve Realist Disjunctivists typically hold, at least in the context of visual experiences, Naïve Realists should accept the claim that indistinguishability in principle entails sameness in phenomenal character.⁹² Plausibly neurally matching hallucinations cannot have a naïve realist phenomenal character. So

⁹⁰ Arguably, Campbell in the following passage could be also read as indirectly endorsing something along the lines of the Distinguishability Strategy: "The philosopher's idea of a hallucination (as opposed to the empirical phenomenon of hallucination) is the idea of a mental state that is intrinsically just like seeing something, but without the external world being there. [...] The implication of transparency, and the relational view of experience we have been developing, is that we do not have the conceptual materials even to formulate the idea of such a 'hallucinatory' state [...] The point about hallucination is this: you are asked to imagine a visual experience that is, for example, just like seeing an airport, only without the airport being there. But what is left of seeing the airport if the airport is not there? The philosopher's answer has been: 'the visual experience'. But the point about transparency is that your ordinary introspective knowledge of the experience of seeing an airport gives you no knowledge of any such internal state. Introspection of the experience of seeing an airport amounts merely to inspection of the airport itself. Subtract the airport and there is nothing left to introspect" (Campbell and Cassam 2014: 92).

⁹¹ As I remarked (§1.1), character properties are not definitionally phenomenal conscious properties.

⁹² For discussion of so-called New Wave Naïve Realists who accept the inference from indistinguishability to sameness of phenomenal character see Beck (2021).

neurally matching hallucinations should be distinguishable from the corresponding conscious perception.

Once we have such provisional motivations in place, it is worth exploring how the strategy might be implemented. We can envisage two general ways in which a neurally matching hallucination might be distinguishable in principle from a “possible veridical perception” (Logue and Richardson 2021: 10-11). First, it might be distinguishable in principle from a veridical conscious perception of an F by being indistinguishable in principle from a veridical conscious perception of a G. Second, it might be distinguishable in principle from a neurally matching perceptual experience of an F by being distinguishable in principle from a veridical conscious perception *simpliciter*.

Let us consider the first option. We are asked to reflect on the following scenario: Mary’s brain would be stimulated in the same way as if she were perceiving a red apple, but, by, plus or minus a bit, mere stimulation of *N*, in the hallucinatory context, she would undergo a mental event that is indistinguishable in principle from a conscious perception of, say, a rock. The obvious problem seems to be that since the Distinguishability Strategy is committed to the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations being replicable, we should expect such properties to be present in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well. If so, however, a veridical conscious perception of a red apple would turn out to be at once distinguishable *and* indistinguishable in principle from a veridical conscious perception of a red apple. But this is contradictory.

Let us turn to the second way of understanding the proposal: the neurally matching hallucination might be distinguishable in principle from a veridical conscious perception of an F by being distinguishable in principle from a veridical conscious perception *simpliciter*. Perhaps, in undergoing a mental event caused by (plus or minus a bit) mere stimulation of *N*, one might enter a quasi-sensory *conscious* state with a kind of (apparent) phenomenal character akin to some episodes of sensory imaginings. Typically, we *can* distinguish episodes of sensory imaginings of an F from veridical conscious perceptions of an F. If so, then presumably the hallucinator would undergo a mental event that is indeed *distinguishable* in principle from a veridical conscious perception.

However, given that the proposal is committed to the idea that the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations are replicable properties we should, again, expect such properties to be present in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well. The problem, however, is that we should have evidence for the presence of this

imagination state in our daily perceptions. And this is not the case. As Logue herself remarks in a previous paper:

Now, the Naïve Realist need not claim that hallucinations lack phenomenal character *entirely* in order for there to be something for the Naïve Realist state of affairs to explain. For she could claim that hallucinations have *nonperceptual* phenomenal character (perhaps the typically fainter but similar sort of phenomenal character associated with perceptual imagination). [...] It entails that *veridical* experiences have too many phenomenal characters — the phenomenal character associated with sensory imagination *in addition to* perceptual phenomenal character. This claim is in tension with the deliverances of introspection of veridical experience. (Logue 2012b: 182)

It might be suggested that problems for the strategy at issue stem just from taking neurally matching hallucinations to have (apparent) visual or quasi-visual character. But Logue and Richardson, in the passage above, suggest that *N*, in the hallucinatory context, might be sufficient for “a disposition to believe a certain proposition about one’s environment” (Logue and Richardson 2021: 10-11).

Consider Mary’s disposition to believe that there is a red apple before her in the genuinely perceptual case. Arguably, in the perceptual case, Mary *can* distinguish such a dispositional state from the veridical conscious perception she is having. Things being so, it might be suggested that, in having a neurally matching hallucination, Mary would be in a cognitive mental state, *C*, that is perfectly distinguishable from a veridical conscious perception of a red apple.⁹³

However, the fact that *C* is to be understood by invoking non-visual states of this sort does not, by itself, guarantee that one would be in a state that is distinguishable in principle from a veridical conscious perception: indistinguishability in principle from a veridical conscious perception of an *F* could be grounded in higher-order states.⁹⁴ Consider a typical case of real-life hallucination. In such cases, the hallucinator would sometimes be disposed to believe a certain proposition about their environment. However, they would also be disposed to believe that they are *having an experience* of a certain sort, with a certain character. This, even if we grant for the sake of the discussion that there is no such experiential state they are undergoing.⁹⁵ At this point, some would

⁹³ In what follows, I will keep talking about dispositional rather than occurrent states. There are some important differences between the two that are not going to be particularly relevant to our discussion.

⁹⁴ See, for instance, Fish (2009: 143), and Rosenthal (1997: 744).

⁹⁵ Cf. Armstrong (1961: 80-83).

stress that once *C* is construed as involving this sort of higher-order state about one's experiential situation, the neurally matching hallucination would count as indistinguishable in principle from a conscious perception. If we really grant that Mary, in having a neurally matching hallucination would take herself to be seeing an *F*, it is hard to see how the mental event she is undergoing could be distinguishable in principle from a veridical conscious perception of an *F*. If Mary is responding *rationally* to her mental situation and comes to believe or judge that a state of a certain kind is present then it seems sensible to think that it will be for her as if she is in that state, regardless of whether she is in that state or not.⁹⁶

Proponents of the Distinguishability Strategy had better deny that Mary would be even merely disposed to believe that she is having an experience. For instance, Mary would be, say, disposed to believe that there is a red apple before her, but not that she is having *any* experience. Since we have granted that a disposition to believe a certain proposition about one's environment is by itself distinguishable in principle from a veridical conscious perception, Mary's neurally matching hallucination would count as distinguishable in principle from the neurally matching perception. But how plausible is all of this? No experimentally derived evidence provides even minimal support for this hypothesis in cases of real-life hallucination. In such cases, the hallucinator would certainly be disposed to believe that they are having an experience of a certain sort – regardless of whether they actually are in any experiential state. So why neurally matching hallucinations should be any different?

Lacking any plausible way to reply, this way of implementing the Distinguishability Strategy involves speculations that *clearly* go against the odds. Since the previous alternatives we have considered are to be rejected, I submit that the Distinguishability Strategy fails.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have assessed whether there is room to block the Master Argument from hallucination against Naïve Realism by endorsing Eliminativism about

⁹⁶ Perhaps Mary, in having a neurally matching hallucination that is indistinguishable in principle from a conscious perception of a red apple, could still come to believe or judge that she is having an experience as of a rock even if, apparently, the only evidential base she is relying on is introspection. Why? Possibly because she is not *rationally* responding to her experience. Mary's judgement would not be constrained by any ground in such a case, and therefore it does not count as relevant for our discussion. For a similar point see Martin (2006: 389).

Philosophers' Hallucinations, i.e., the view that Philosophers' Hallucinations are not nomologically possible. I considered three ways, based on the extant literature, in which the strategy could be implemented: the Irreproducibility Strategy, the Non-Replicability Strategy and the Distinguishability Strategy. I have argued that they are all unsatisfactory, but with crucial differences. Whilst I am convinced that the Irreproducibility Strategy and the Distinguishability Strategy are non-starters, for they would both leave the Naïve Realists in the precarious situation of hanging on (partly empirical) predictions that are against the odds, some room is left open for the Non-Replicability strategy, albeit not in the current forms it has been implemented. In the next chapter, I will turn to consider a different Eliminativist strategy: the Monist Strategy.

Chapter 4 Monist Eliminativism

In this chapter, I assess a different Eliminativist Strategy to resist the Master Argument from Hallucination: the Monist Strategy. Monist Eliminativists accept the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations but reject the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations construed as inner events. The strategy faces a pressing question: The Character Question. How can the phenomenology of philosophers' hallucinations be constituted by a relation of perceptual awareness with mind-independent aspects of the world, such that what it is like to undergo such experiences is inherited from the qualitative nature of their constituents? In this chapter, I start assessing ways in which, based on the extant literature, proponents of the Monist Strategy could address this challenge, and I elaborate on their proposals in order to set forth an apparently viable version of the Monist Strategy: the Virtual Way. I then raise some compelling objections against it and suggest that it is ultimately untenable.

4.1 The Monist Strategy and the Character Question

Suppose that Mary's brain is hooked up to a supercomputer that is stimulating her brain in such a way as to reproduce the neural state she would be in if she were to see a red apple before her. In recent years, philosophers sympathetic to Naïve Realism have started to question the idea that neurally matching hallucinations are to be construed as inner states, i.e., not naïve realist. Such philosophers contend that there is room to hold the view that what it is like to undergo such mental events would be constituted, at least in part, by a non-analysable relation of perceptual awareness with mind-independent aspects of the world. Things being so, the phenomenology of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations would require the *same* sort of metaphysical characterisation.

Now, (at least some) proponents of Naïve Realist Monism can be seen as setting forth Monist Eliminativism, or as I will frequently refer to it, the *Monist Strategy*:

- ❖ **The Monist Strategy:** Accept the nomological possibility of neurally matching hallucinations construed as having *only* replicable character properties that

ground the indistinguishability in principle from veridical conscious perceptions, but reject that such character properties would be *inner properties*.

Proponents of the Monist Strategy suggest that Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations are not possible, because they are necessarily naïve realist.

Notice that given the way Character Monism and the Monist Strategy are defined, all proponents of the Monist Strategy can be seen as proponents of Character Monism, but not all Character Monists need to be committed to the Monist Strategy. For at least two reasons.

First, Naïve Realist Monism is the view that the character properties of veridical conscious perceptions and *neurally matching hallucinations* have a single naïve realist nature. So it is open to Naïve Realist Monists to accept the view that neurally matching hallucinations are naïve realist, and Philosophers' Hallucinations are not possible.

Second, the Monist Strategy requires one to reject the view that Philosophers' Hallucinations are inner in the specific sense of not having the sort of familiar mind-independent constituents that Naïve Realists think are present in cases of veridical conscious perceptions: physical mind-independent objects such as the ones we are familiar with from genuine perceptual intercourse with the world: chairs, table, their properties, and so on.⁹⁷ Thus, it is open to proponents of Naïve Realist Monism to accept the view that Philosophers' Hallucinations are naïve realist in the generic sense of being constituted by mind-independent constituents without endorsing the Monist Strategy.

Views in the vicinity of Naïve Realist Monism have been recently developed by Raleigh (2014), Ali (2018) and Masrour (2020). Such views all differ from one another in important respects.⁹⁸ These differences, though important, will not be relevant here. For here I will be interested in developing the Monist Strategy by drawing on views and ideas present in their works.

Naïve Realists, generally speaking, have not taken the Monist Strategy seriously. Martin, as we have seen, having in mind Philosophers' Hallucinations, contends that

⁹⁷ Recall: showing that philosophers' hallucinations are naïve realist in the generic sense of not having visible mind-independent constituents would not do any work when it comes to rejecting the Master Argument. See §2.4.2 and §2.5. I will return to this point in §4.6.1.

⁹⁸ Masrour (2020), for instance, suggests that the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations is an open empirical question and contends that, if Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible, they are constituted by mind-independent objects. However, Masrour's Relationalism does not seem to belong to the form of Naïve Realism I consider here. For Masrour seems to reject the Inheritance Thesis (2020: 741, fn. 9).

“[e]xperiences which share the proximate causal conditions as veridical perceptions, but which lack the further conditions for being perceptions cannot have Naïve phenomenal properties.” (Martin 2004: 53). Snowdon, who is at least sympathetic to the naïve realist enterprise, in considering the idea that Philosophers’ Hallucinations are inner events points out that “[t]here is [...] no need to present a case for this claim” (Snowdon 2005a: 287). Fish contends that the view that Philosophers’ Hallucinations are inner events is “undoubtedly correct” (Fish 2009: 145). Logue suggests that “total *hallucinations*—the sort of experience that would be had by a “brain in a vat”—by definition don’t involve perceiving things in one’s environment” (Logue 2017: 184), and so presumably do not involve any relation of perceptual awareness either.

Now, as we have seen, Naïve Realism is, first and foremost, a theory about the phenomenology of veridical conscious perceptions. Roughly, Naïve Realists hold that naïve realist phenomenal properties are constitutive of the phenomenal character of naïve realist experiences. From this follows the Character Question for all versions of Naïve Realist Monism and so for advocates of the Monist Strategy as well:

(The Character Question) How can the phenomenology of neurally matching hallucinations be constituted by a relation of perceptual awareness with familiar mind-independent aspects of the world, such that what it is like to undergo such experiences is inherited from the qualitative nature of such mind-independent aspects of the world?

In Chapter 1 (§1.4), we have seen that naïve realist phenomenal properties are characterised as meeting both the Constituency Thesis and the Inheritance Thesis. To develop a viable Monist Strategy, one should be able to provide an account of the introspectable properties of Philosophers’ Hallucinations that meets both theses. The Character Question for the Monist Strategy bifurcates into the Constituency Question and the Inheritance Question.

Let us start with the Constituency Question. Consider again how naïve realist phenomenal properties are characterised according to the Constituency Thesis:

(The Constituency Thesis) Naïve realist phenomenal properties are properties grounded in the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and aspects of their mind-independent environment.

As we have seen in Chapter 2 (§2.3), in the context of the articulation of the Inconsistent Triad, there seems to be a powerful argument to the effect that Philosophers' Hallucinations cannot have naïve realist phenomenal properties as construed by the Constituency Thesis.

The argument is driven by the idea that there is some sort of dependency, at least in our world and similar worlds, of perceptual awareness with mind-independent constituents on some form of Causal Receptivity. Guided by Empirical Naturalism, i.e., a mixed body of naturalistic constraints, empirical evidence and armchair reasoning, it seems natural to think that the relation of perceptual awareness requires a process we have dubbed *information transduction*: light gets transduced into neural signals that carry information. Arguably, however, Philosophers' Hallucinations could be brought about in the complete absence of such a process. So, the Monist Strategy faces a challenging question which I dub the *Constituency Question*.

(The Constituency Question): How can the phenomenology of neurally matching hallucinations be constituted by properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and familiar mind-independent aspects of the environment?

Now, the Constituency thesis is silent on the specific determinative role that the mind-independent constituents play in shaping the phenomenology of naïve realist experiences.

As I have suggested in Chapter 1 (§1.4), the Inheritance Thesis fills this gap in the following way:

(The Inheritance Thesis) Naïve realist phenomenal properties are inherited from the actual character of the experience's mind-independent constituents.

Consider Mary's veridical conscious perception of a red apple. In such a case, the version of Naïve Realism I am interested in has it that the phenomenology of Mary's experience is constituted by the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between Mary and the apple before her and some of its properties, such that the character of Mary's experience is inherited from the character of the constituents of her experience (e.g., the actual redness of the apple before her).

From the Naïve Realist commitments to the Inheritance thesis follows what I dub the *Inheritance Question* for the Monist Strategy.:

(The Inheritance Question) How can the phenomenology of neurally matching hallucinations be inherited from the actual character of their mind-independent constituents?

Note that given the considerations outlined in Chapter 1 (§1.4), a successful response to the Constituency Question does not, *ipso facto*, guarantee an equally successful one for the Inheritance Question.⁹⁹ And as we will see, there might indeed be cases in which a plausible answer to the Constituency Question would fall short of providing a satisfactory response to the Inheritance Question.

To sum up, for the Monist Strategy to be viable, proponents of the strategy must provide a satisfactory account of the naïve realist experience that allegedly occurs in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations. The Character Question for the Monist Strategy bifurcates into the Constituency Question and the Inheritance Question. How can the phenomenology of Philosophers' Hallucinations be constituted by properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and familiar mind-independent aspects of the environment? And how can the phenomenology of Philosophers' Hallucinations be inherited from the actual character of their mind-independent constituents? In the next section, I will start addressing the Constituency Question.

4.2 The Constituency Question

The Constituency Question arises once we try to make sense of how the character properties of Philosophers' Hallucinations could be properties grounded in the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and aspects of their familiar mind-independent environment. As I have suggested, the Monist Strategy has been quickly dismissed in recent discussions of the Master Argument. Accordingly, there is no thorough discussion in the literature of why it should be considered as clearly doomed to fail. Let us start filling this gap.

⁹⁹ Recall, Beck's neuro-computational naïve realism (2019) is a perfect example of how one might accept the Constituency Thesis without the Inheritance Thesis. Veridical conscious perceptions, according to Beck, "are partially determined by the mind-independent items that the subject perceives" (Beck 2019: 626). But the *actual character* of these mind-independent items seems to play no determinative role in Beck's view.

In the articulation of the Inconsistent Triad, I have sketched what seems to be a powerful argument in favour of the idea that Philosophers' Hallucinations cannot have character properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and familiar mind-independent aspects of the environment. Call it the *Argument for the Inner Status of Philosophers' Hallucinations*. I propose to cash out the principle that drives such an argument in the following way:

(Causal Receptivity Intuition) In the actual world, you are in a relation of perceptual awareness with aspects of the mind-independent environment only if some form of Causal Receptivity obtains.

Causal Receptivity requires that an appropriate causal chain occurs. And an appropriate causal chain is the one that empirical science construes in the following way:

In a typical case of seeing, light reflects off objects and enters our eyes, stimulating retinal cells. These cells are connected via the optic nerve to neurons in the brain that they in turn stimulate. Although neurons in many parts of the brain are stimulated in this way, a major neural pathway runs from the optic nerve, via the lateral geniculate nucleus, to the primary visual cortex, located toward the back of the head in the occipital lobe. The neurons in the visual cortex then go on to stimulate neurons in a large number of brain regions. During this process, arguably when the visual cortex is being stimulated, a visual experience occurs (Macpherson 2013: 9).

So Causal Receptivity seems to require an *external* entity causing the experience and information transduction: light gets transduced into neural signals that carry information.

Naïve Realists might subscribe to the Causal Receptivity Intuition even if they have quite different views about the relation of perceptual awareness. Naïve Realists do not need to subscribe to a reductive view according to which the relation of perceptual awareness *just is* a form of causal receptivity.¹⁰⁰ As Snowden (1990: 125) acknowledges, Naïve Realists might retreat from the attempt to provide a reductive account of perceptual awareness but still insist that cases of perceptual awareness with familiar

¹⁰⁰ Coupled, perhaps, with a certain functionalist story. After all, one might suggest that the sort of Causal Receptivity I have introduced could be shared with organisms that are not phenomenally conscious.

mind-independent objects and properties are necessarily caused in a certain way.¹⁰¹¹⁰² There might be logically possible worlds where the relation of perceptual awareness does not require any form of Causal Receptivity, but in our world, it does, and it requires the sort of process described by perceptual psychology. If so, then it seems that the argument for the Inner Status of Philosophers' Hallucinations goes through. For the fact that Philosophers' Hallucinations are brought about by, *plus or minus a bit*, mere stimulation of the brain prevents any form of Causal Receptivity so understood from occurring. When a neurosurgeon directly stimulates Mary's brain, and she undergoes a Philosophers' Hallucination, she undergoes an experience brought about by a process involving no information transduction.

In a recent paper, Barkasi (2020) proposes a way for proponents of the Monist Strategy to resist the argument based on what he thinks is a plausible account of (some) hallucinations. Barkasi suggests that at least some hallucinations are generated by sensory activities that are (in part) interactions with *past-perceived objects*: "(a)lthough hallucinations are experiences of what's not really there, their objects are indeed physical objects with which we interact through our sensory systems—physical objects located in the past." (2020: 478).

Some hallucinations, Barkasi contends, do not depend on an *occurring* case of information transduction, but they depend more generally on an instance of information transduction. External entities do figure as causes of such hallucinations, albeit such entities may not currently be in the perceiver's environment. Barkasi suggests that his view might be implemented to support the Monist Strategy:

An intriguing possibility raised by my work is that [...] [p]erhaps the argument goes wrong by misinterpreting what's implied by the nature of hallucination. In short, hallucination can be experience of what's not there while still being an experience of some sensed distal physical object. If, as I've argued, hallucination is experience of the

¹⁰¹ Snowdon (1990: 125), considers the idea that it might be a necessary truth that a world-involving experience involving O be causally produced by O – and suggests the following: "I see no incoherence in it. It may be that it is a necessary truth about a non-inner experience involving O that it be causally produced by O."

¹⁰² Note that the Causal Receptivity Intuition can be adopted also by those philosophers like Johnston who suggest that having a veridical conscious perception "is not the next event after the visual system operates" but "an event materially constituted by the long physical process connecting the object seen to the final state of the visual system." (Johnston 2004: 138-39) Indeed, as Child suggests (1994: 161-162), on this view we can retain the idea that an external object is a cause of the experience. Indeed, we can talk of a part causing the whole of which it is a part just like when we talk of the bombing of Pearl Harbour, for example, as the cause of the Pacific War of which it was a part.

past, then although hallucinations are experiences of what's not really there, their objects are indeed physical objects with which we interact through our sensory systems – physical objects located in the past. (Barkasi 2020: 478)

Although Barkasi's proposal could well be correct when it comes to understanding the nature of some hallucinations, there seems to be a strong case for thinking that it could not be used to support the Monist Strategy. As Barkasi himself seems to acknowledge (Ibid, 479), the case that provides a real challenge to this way of implementing the Monist Strategy is the one of a subject undergoing a Philosophers' Hallucination without having ever interacted through their sensory systems with any object. Since there seems to be nothing at odds with this possibility, proponents of the strategy had better find an alternative. For, after all, it seems that they should grant that Philosophers' Hallucinations can be brought about in the complete absence of information transduction.

Based on extant proposals, we can see an alternative way in which proponents of the Monist Strategy might try to resist the Argument for the Inner Status of Philosophers' Hallucinations: they can accept the Causal Receptivity Intuition, but call into question the necessary role of information transduction for Causal Receptivity. Information transduction seems to rely on the involvement of the normal perceptual apparatus. But, as Masrour suggests, proponents of the Monist Strategy might contend that "it is not clear why, when something gives rise to a perceptual experience, we can simply disqualify it from perceptually appearing just because its causal impact does not go through our normal perceptual apparatus" (2020: 753). Masrour sets out what seems to be a version of the Monist Strategy, which he dubs the Anchoring Strategy:

John is a brain in a vat, hooked up to a supercomputer, experiencing a pink elephant in what seems to be the corner of his room. One might argue that as there is no elephant in the room, John has an objectless experience. [...] On the Anchoring strategy, the object of John's experience is some part of the supercomputer whose activity is responsible for maintaining John's brain activity. (Masrour 2020: 752)

Albeit there is no information transduction in John's case, Masrour suggests that we should not disqualify the experience John undergoes from being one in which he is in a relation of perceptual awareness with a familiar entity in his environment: a part of the supercomputer.

On similar lines, Raleigh can be seen as suggesting that proponents of the Monist Strategy can accept the Causal Receptivity Intuition, but contend that Causal

Receptivity should be understood in a broader sense: we should not take it to involve only information transduction. Raleigh suggests that neurally matching hallucinations follow what he calls the constitutive environmental model (2014: 90). According to such a model, neurally matching hallucinations are constituted by the entire “right sort” of the causal process, including some external element in the subject’s environment. But the right sort of causal process does not necessarily involve the subject’s normal perceptual apparatus.

Based on such considerations, advocates of the Monist Strategy might contend that the Argument for the Inner Status of Philosophers’ Hallucinations goes wrong in the following way: the way in which Causal Receptivity is construed is too restrictive. What we can call *information transmission* might well be enough for Causal Receptivity: some informational link with the scene around one is preserved – be it information transduction or the like.

Against this, one might still insist that the relation of perceptual awareness is just a form of conscious perception, and perception *requires* information transduction. Here is how Raleigh suggests that proponents of the Monist Strategy could deal with this sort of objections:

Note: some might balk at using the term ‘seeing’ when there are no eyes, nor photons, involved. Likewise some might want to resist calling this ‘perception’. But these labels are unimportant—so long as it can be maintained that an experience with a genuinely relational structure occurs, where the mind-independent feature is a genuine constituent, ‘shaping’ the subjective phenomenology. (Raleigh 2014: 15)

True, what we observe is that, if the relation of perceptual awareness occurs at all, it occurs in cases where information transduction occurs. And if we do not want to be revisionary, we can well take ‘perception’ as necessarily involving information transduction. This is quite compatible with the fact that we should acknowledge another relation, which requires the less demanding information transmission, that can underwrite the relation of perceptual awareness.

To sum up, advocates of the Monist Strategy might try to reject the Argument for the Inner Status of Philosophers’ Hallucinations by contending that the Causal Receptivity Intuition is correct, but that proponents of the Master Argument have over-interpreted the prescriptions of Empirical Naturalism in cashing out Causal Receptivity. Perceptual science might have interesting things to say about what is necessary for

perception to occur.¹⁰³ But it seems evident, or so advocates of the Monist Strategy might contend, that the science of vision has no interesting views about a distinctive relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and familiar aspects of their mind-independent environment. How such a relation is construed seems to be based on broadly a priori reasoning, and such reasoning can be called into question if there is evidence that suggests otherwise.

What sort of evidence might proponents of the Monist Strategy appeal to? Well, there seem to be plenty of options. Drawing on some of Masrour's remarks quoted above, advocates of the strategy might contend that there is indeed introspective evidence for the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations. After all, in cases of Philosophers' Hallucination as of an F, things would be introspectively for a subject as if one were having a veridical conscious perception of an F.¹⁰⁴

Proponents of the Monist Strategy might also appeal to Martin's argument in favour of Character Monism: the Reverse Causal Argument and the Screening off problem (§2.4). After all, from the point of view of a Naïve Realist, the conclusion of the argument for Character Monism can also be naturally read as suggesting that Philosophers' Hallucinations, first impressions notwithstanding, are naïve realist as well.

Let us grant for the moment that Naïve Realist Monists could invoke a revision of the ordinary way in which Causal Receptivity is cashed out. Raleigh seems to suggest that once we have the broader notion of Causal Receptivity in the picture, that is, one which appeals to a broader form of information transmission rather than transduction, then it is open to proponents of the Monist Strategy to suggest the following:

[W]hatever external factor (evil neuroscientist, vat-machine, demon, etc.) is causing the 'perfect' hallucination, the relational theorist can simply insist that this item (or some part/aspect/feature of it) is the object in a *relational* experience. (Raleigh 2014: 95)

¹⁰³ As I remarked, some advocates of the Monist Strategy might contend that this is already a controversial point.

¹⁰⁴ Note that this way of motivating the Monist Strategy would commit advocates of the strategy to admit that also hallucinations that are indistinguishable in principle from a veridical conscious perception of an F, without sharing the same neural state, are naïve realist if they want to stick to the deliverances of introspective reflection.

In what follows, I will take Raleigh's suggestion as a working hypothesis to see whether the Monist Strategy we have been developing so far can respond to the second part of the Character Question: the Inheritance question.

4.3 The Inheritance Question: A Dilemma

Consider again a case where a super-computer is stimulating Mary's brain, and she undergoes a Philosophers' Hallucination as of a red apple before her. Suppose that, following Raleigh, proponents of the Monist Strategy were to suggest that in cases such as this, the external factor that is causing the Philosophers' Hallucination is to be considered as the constituent of the experience. In Mary's case, the super-computer or, to quote Raleigh (2014: 95), "some part/aspect/feature of it", *qua* object that is causing the experience, would be the object Mary is a relation of perceptual awareness with. As I have suggested, if the Monist Strategy is viable then we should find a way to show that the phenomenology of Mary's experience would be *inherited* from the super-computer or some part/aspect/feature of it. Here, I think, lies a dilemma for the Monist Strategy.

4.3.1 First Horn

Consider again the Philosophers' Hallucination as of a red apple that Mary undergoes when the super-computer is stimulating her brain. Proponents of the Monist Strategy might want to try to account for the phenomenology of Mary's experience by contending that Mary would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with the supercomputer or some part/aspect/feature of it, and by re-conceiving the relevant Philosophers' Hallucination as a case of illusion¹⁰⁵: Mary would be in a relation of perceptual awareness either with the super-computer or with some part/aspect/feature of it, but, plausibly, it would look to her to have properties it does not have. It would look to her more like an apple than a super-computer.

One might balk at this point for reasons independent of the Monist Strategy: how can Naïve Realism be true of illusions? Well, contrary to what is sometimes assumed by opponents of the view, Naïve Realists seem to have several options on the table: at least

¹⁰⁵ Or, similarly, as a *sui generis* kind of mental state similar to illusions in that the perceived object would perceptually appear other than it really is, for whatever reason. This second interpretation arises because someone might suggest that it is part of what it is to be an illusion that the relevant misperceived property appears to one to belong to the perceived object when in fact it does not. But in our case the misperceived property would (typically) not appear to one to belong to the object presented (e.g., the super-computer).

some illusory cases, they contend, are naïve realist.¹⁰⁶ In some cases where, say, a red apple appears green to one, the actual character of the apple is involved in the explanation of the phenomenology of one's experience as of a green object. To see why, however, we need to take into account the fact that, as we have seen in Chapter 1 (§1.4), Naïve Realists, even in cases of veridical conscious perceptions, do allow for a number of factors (e.g., the angle and distance of viewing and the lighting conditions) that can either modify the relation of perceptual awareness with an object or constitute a substantive third relatum: the so-called 'standpoint'. Following Christy (2019), I have called these factors sophisticators.

Consider an illusory case such as one where Mary has a conscious perception of a red apple as green. In the case at issue, the scene before Mary is constituted by the apple and its basic visual properties, i.e., properties such as the apple's shape and colour. Now, if the phenomenology of Mary's experience is entirely determined by the character of its constituents, then it does not seem open to Naïve Realists to say that the apple and its basic visual properties (such as the apple's redness) are constitutive of Mary's experience.

Naïve Realists typically insist that the phenomenology of illusory experiences is entirely determined by their constituents by invoking complex visual properties. Naïve Realists might suggest that the Standpoint either partially determines situational properties or, at least in the case of colours, selects perfectly mind-independent aspects of basic visual properties. Situational properties, as we have seen (§1.4) are those non-basic visual properties that are determined partly by basic visual properties and partly by perfectly mind-independent aspects of the scene before one (environmental sophisticators). According to Fish (2009: 158), for instance, Mary in the illusory case we have presented would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with the apple exhibiting a certain shade, i.e., a situational property determined partly by the apple's red colour and partly by the standpoint (in this case the relevant illumination conditions). Kalderon (2011a) would argue that in the illusory case at issue, the apple would also possess a green look, i.e., an aspect of the apple's redness, that, given the circumstances of perceptions, is merely selected by the standpoint.

¹⁰⁶ "Some" because Naïve Realists acknowledge that some illusions might resist a Naïve Realist treatment. Genone (2014: 368), for instance, acknowledges that some cases (e.g., related to clinical conditions such as schizophrenia and Balint's syndrome, perceptual impairment due to sleep deprivation or drugs) seem to resist a naïve realist treatment, and should be plausibly regarded as cases in which one is aware of properties of the experience itself. Some illusions might require a disjunctive treatment as Martin seems to suggest (2009[1997]: 95). Cf. Brewer (2011: 115ff.)

Alternatively, following French and Phillips (2020), Naïve Realists might suggest that the ways in which we consciously perceive objects partly constitute the phenomenology of one's experience in cases of conscious perceptions. In the illusory case we are discussing, Mary would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with the apple and its basic visual qualities (e.g., its redness). But given the circumstances of perceptions (e.g., the relevant illumination condition), Mary would experience the redness of the apple in a distinctive way. The redness of the apple, in the relevant circumstances of perception, would strike Mary as being more like greenness than anything else (Ibid, 12). This treatment would allow Naïve Realists to dispense with invoking complex visual properties of any sort.¹⁰⁷

Notice that in all these Naïve Realist accounts of illusions is perfectly clear how the actual character of the entities one perceives plays a role in determining the phenomenology of one's experience. Is it open to advocates of the Monist Strategy to apply one of the models just considered to the case at issue?

Raleigh seems to acknowledge that proponents of the strategy we are considering should rely on the particular circumstances of perception if they want to explain how the phenomenal character of a Philosophers' Hallucination can be inherited from its mind-independent constituents:

I suggest that relational theorists should think of the subject getting hooked up in the right way to the perfect-hallucination-machine as being [...] an instance of getting the visual system set up in a specific way so as to provide awareness of a specific mind independent feature looking a specific way. The lemon-looking aspect of the machine will only be seen when the subject's visual system is set up in the required manner — that is, say, having the device connected to the optic nerves in the right way. (Raleigh 2014: 102)

Let us suppose that the super-computer, a massive cylindrical grey machine, is the object that Mary is consciously perceiving. How are we supposed to fill the gap between the actual character of the supercomputer – a massive cylindrical grey machine – and the character of the experience Mary would undergo?

In undergoing a Philosophers' Hallucination as of a red apple before her, it would seem to Mary as if an apple-shaped, red object was before her. But the actual shape and colour of the super-computer seem completely *irrelevant* when it comes to

¹⁰⁷ I will present French and Phillip's account in detail in the next chapter (§5.4.1).

individuating those aspects of the mind-independent environment from which the character of the experience would be inherited.

The same concerns apply to aspects or features of the super-computer such as its internal components—motherboards and the like—or, as Masrour suggests, the part of the super-computer whose activity is responsible for maintaining Mary’s brain activity: oscillatory events (2020: 756).¹⁰⁸ Masrour suggests that the setup makes the oscillations in the super-computer visible. But, first, it is not clear whether such oscillations are visible at all (we will return to this issue shortly). Second, if they were, as in the case of the actual appearance of the super-computer, the character of the oscillations would be completely irrelevant when it comes to the determination of the phenomenology of Mary’s Philosophers’ Hallucination. We need an alternative option.

4.3.2 Second Horn

The previous option was not palatable. However, drawing on Raleigh, one might suggest that there might be another way to understand the object of perceptual awareness in a Philosophers’ Hallucination:

[T]here will be some internal feature or aspect of the machine, a ‘standing structure’, that must have been designed by the hypothetical brain-scientists *precisely so as to appear* just like a lemon when it is experienced from a very particular ‘viewpoint’—i.e., in the very specific manner and circumstances of awareness that obtains when the subject is hooked up to the machine in just the right way. But if this feature or structure in the machine is viewed from any other ‘perspective’, it will look nothing like a lemon. (Raleigh 2014: 100-101)

In this passage, Raleigh mentions a *standing structure* that “must have been designed [...] *precisely so as to appear* just like a lemon when it is experienced from a very particular ‘viewpoint’” (Ibid.).

This talk of standing structure is promising because it allows us to depart from the actual character of the supercomputer or its components and explore whether the object of perceptual awareness in a Philosophers’ Hallucination might be a less “concrete”

¹⁰⁸ It seems true to say, as Masrour (2020: 756) does, that Mary’s experience counterfactually depends on some features of the super-computer and perhaps precisely on the oscillations he invokes. But it is also clear that mere counterfactual dependence is not enough for inheritance, as I have explained in Chapter 1 (§1.4).

entity than the ones considered so far: one, for instance, that supervenes or is grounded in *the physical* processes in the super-computer.

We can get a grip on what this standing structure might be by considering Virtual Reality experiences. Virtual Reality is a computer-generated environment currently accessible via headsets. In having a virtual reality experience, one would seemingly explore a virtual environment that has been designed so as to appear as (or at least similar to) a real scene. There seems nothing at odds with our laws of nature that prevents a possible development of the virtual reality technology in the direction envisaged by the case we are considering.

If we follow this suggestion, it seems that the most plausible way of construing a standing structure/virtual environment is in terms of a *data-structure* “grounded in computational processes which are themselves grounded in physical processes on one or more computers” (Chalmers 2017: 317). Now, since presumably a data structure is also involved in the explanation of *current* virtual reality experiences, one might suggest that at this point, proponents of the Monist Strategy might just try to transpose whatever naïve realist explanation is available for current cases of Virtual Reality experience to the problematic case of Philosophers’ Hallucinations. But what would a naïve realist account of *current* virtual reality experiences look like?

A very intuitive way to go seems to be along the following lines: data structures, by themselves, are visually inert unless they are *embodied*, so to speak, in a physical support. In the current setting, virtual reality requires a headset equipped with a binocular head-mounted display. It might then be argued that it is an *image* on the display screen that is seen directly, and that the virtual environment/data structure is the indirect object of perceptual awareness. Plausibly, such an experience would involve the illusory presentation of some of the image’s features (e.g., one would undergo an illusion of three-dimensionality). But this might be accommodated by Naïve Realists by appealing to the standpoint or ways of perceiving as we have already seen.

Now, it seems clear that this way of accounting for current virtual reality experiences would be of no help to advocates of the Monist Strategy: what could the physical support be in a case of Philosophers’ Hallucination? Here is another alternative though: the image on the display screen, in the circumstances of perception typical of virtual reality experiences, acts as a mere *non-perceptible* medium: what is actually experienced

directly in current virtual reality is the standing structure/virtual environment itself.¹⁰⁹ Proponents of the Monist Strategy might suggest that philosophers' hallucinations should be understood as experiences in which one is in a relation of perceptual awareness with the standing structure/virtual environment itself. The absence of the display screen in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations is not relevant. We can well suppose that current technology requires a non-perceptible medium like a display screen just because we do not know what pattern of stimulation in the brain would allow one to access a virtual environment yet.

If so, the standing structure/virtual environment that is encoded in the super-computer might well appear *as it is* during a Philosophers' Hallucination. The explanation of the conscious character of the experience involved in Philosophers' Hallucinations might not require any naïve realist treatment of illusory cases. In traditional veridical conscious perceptions, a subject like Mary would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with familiar entities in the surroundings like tables, chairs and their properties, whilst in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations one would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with a *virtual scene*.

Suppose that advocates of the Monist Strategy take this route. They would still have to show that the virtual scene/standing structure is composed of elements that possess a character or qualitative nature. Now, the problem is that since there seems to be a strong case for thinking of standing structures/virtual scenes in terms of data structures, proponents of the Monist Strategy would end up suggesting that one can be perceptually aware of an entity that does not possess basic visual properties like colours or shapes. After all, even if there might be good reasons to accept data structures in our ontology, there seems to be an equally compelling case for thinking that data structures are not the sort of entities that, say, can be coloured.¹¹⁰

If so, however, also this alternative option for the Monist Strategy is not viable. For the phenomenal character of naïve realist experiences is inherited from the actual character of their constituents. But lacking any basic visual qualities, a standing structure/virtual environment cannot be the sort of mind-independent constituent from which the character of a naïve realist experience is inherited.

¹⁰⁹ For a similar reasoning see Chalmers (2017: 319). Chalmers appeals to Wollheim's *seeing in* (1987): just like when we see a picture of Winston Churchill we *see* him *in* the photograph, when we see an image on the display screen of a virtual headset, we *see* a virtual environment *in* the display screen.

¹¹⁰ For the idea that "rejecting the existence of data structures due to philosophical reasoning is laughable" see McDonnell and Wildman (2019: 388, fn. 19).

4.4 Tackling the Second Horn

In the previous section, I have suggested that proponents of the Monist Strategy seem to face a dilemma. In this section, I will try to show how proponents of the Monist strategy might tackle the second horn.

As we have seen, the charge seems to go along the following lines: if we construe a virtual environment/standing structure as a data structure, a standing structure/virtual environment cannot be the sort of mind-independent constituent from which the character of a naïve realist experience is inherited. Data structures have several interesting properties, but surely, they do not possess the sort of properties that are necessary for an entity to show up in a naïve realist experience: basic visual properties.

One way of making this reasoning more precise is to see at work the following Restricted Inheritance Thesis (R-Inheritance for brevity):

(R-Inheritance) Naïve realist phenomenal properties are inherited only from basic visual properties or complex visual properties.

Since complex visual properties are either partially determined by basic visual properties (i.e., situational properties) or are just aspects of basic visual properties (e.g., Kalderon's looks (2011a)), a virtual environment construed as a data structure cannot be the sort of entity from which the phenomenal character of a naïve realist experience is inherited. Indeed, the reasoning goes, a virtual environment so construed is not composed of entities which possess basic visual qualities.

Now, the R-Inheritance thesis can be seen as partially driven by the following Visibility claim:

(Visibility) it is a necessary condition on x being an object of conscious vision that x is a basic visual property (or construction out of these) or has some basic visual properties.

Visibility seems non-negotiable for physical objects. When it comes to events or properties, though, it might be thought that it is less clear whether we should accept it. Let us set aside events for the moment and focus just on properties.¹¹¹

The issue I want to address might be taken by some as to partially overlap with themes that are traditionally discussed in the dispute between the so-called Thin View and the Rich View that I have briefly mentioned in Chapter 1 (§1.3.3). According to the Thin View (Byrne 2017), only Low-Level Properties, or Thin Properties, can be presented to one in visual experiences. Broadly construed, the Thin View can be seen as holding that only basic visual qualities or complex visual properties can be presented to one in visual experiences. Proponents of the Rich View (Siegel 2017) hold that there are, strictly speaking, non-sensuous aspects of the phenomenology of visual experiences: in undergoing a visual experience, one can be presented with some properties which do not belong to the list of Low-Level Properties: High-Level Properties (e.g., kind properties and traits).

Now, it might be suggested that proponents of the Rich View are forced to deny Visibility if they want to hold that High-Level Properties can be presented to one in visual experiences. And this might be thought to provide advocates of the Monist Strategy with an independent reason to call the principle into question. But it is doubtful whether proponents of the Rich View are actually forced to reject Visibility, and even if they were, there are reasons to think that this would be of no help for advocates of the Monist Strategy.

First, “being presented with High-Level Properties”, at least in the dispute at issue, is ambiguous between (1) consciously *seeing* High-Level Properties, and (2) High-Level properties figuring in the intentional content of one’s experience. But notice that the fact that High-Level properties figure in the intentional content of one’s experience is compatible with the fact that they are not consciously seen. So, if by “being presented with High-Level properties” one means the fact that High-Level properties figure in the intentional content of one’s experience there is no pressure to deny Visibility.

¹¹¹ Does the event of a ball rolling down the hill possess basic visual properties? Is it coloured? Does it have a shape? Perhaps there might be a sense in which the event is *located* somewhere and thereby possesses basic visual properties. However, it seems that the bulk of the qualitative aspect that is appreciable in event-perceptions is provided by the *constituents* of events. In seeing a ball rolling down the hill we can appreciate the roundness of the ball and its colour. Perhaps then when it comes to events the following event-visibility claim holds: (Event-Visibility) it is a necessary condition on an event *e* being an object of conscious vision that *e*’s constituents have some basic visual properties (or construction out of these).

Second, even in the first interpretation, i.e., consciously *seeing* High-Level Properties, it might be contended that it *is in virtue* of seeing basic visual properties (or construction out of these) that one sees High-Level properties. How could the property of *being an apple* be presented to you without you being also presented with some basic visual properties or complex ones? Suppose that proponents of the Rich View are actually forced to reject Visibility: some properties, e.g., High Level Properties, can be visible even if they are not basic visual property (or construction out of these). Here are a couple of reasons to think that advocates of the Monist Strategy could not take advantage of this.

First, High-Level properties would arguably be visible in virtue of the visibility of basic visual properties (or construction out of these). So, whatever refinement Visibility requires, it would still mention basic visual qualities. But a data structure, as we have seen, has no basic visual qualities. Second, High-Level Properties might enter the non-naïve realist component of visual experiences—if there is any. So, for instance, an intentionalist might reject Visibility for reasons that are completely alien to the rejection of the R-Inheritance thesis.

Advocates of the Monist Strategy need to find a way to broaden the R-Inheritance Thesis so as to include what we might call *special properties*, that is, i.e., properties that are visible without being grounded in and being visible in virtue of basic visual properties.¹¹² But what could such special properties be?

4.5 Special Properties and the Virtual Way

We are all familiar with the fact that things that are not *ordinarily visible* can become visible using special tools. Consider magnifying tools. Such tools use special lenses to bend light at an angle to increase the size of the image that is sent to the retina. Mites and ticks are very similar creatures that differ in a salient way for humans. The latter, but not the former, are visible in the ordinary sense.¹¹³ Ordinary visibility concerns what is discernible by human sight, and it is thus compatible with the failure of a given individual or group to discern the object in question at a given occasion. Mites, we might suggest, are not ordinarily visible. However, they are *hypervisible*. We might allow for a

¹¹² Strictly speaking properties such as Kalderon's looks, *qua* aspects of basic visual properties, are not grounded in basic visual properties. For the sake of simplicity I ask the reader to include such properties in the first conjunct.

¹¹³ This discussion draws on some remarks on invisibility made by Martin (2006: 381).

realm of entities that, despite being invisible in an ordinary sense, are visible once there is a certain setup in play.¹¹⁴

Now, arguably mites and ticks do possess basic visual properties. But now consider *surface heat* for instance. In the context of supporting the Monist Strategy, Masrour (2020) suggests that there is an intuitive sense in which night vision goggles make surface heat visible:

Consider night vision goggles that transform heat-generated infrared waves from the surface of objects into a visible green colour pattern. There is an intuitive sense in which the goggles are assessable for accuracy. For example, if a non-uniformly heated surface appears uniformly green, then the goggles are not performing accurately. There is therefore a sense in which we can regard some ways in which the goggles make heat visible as veridical and some as non-veridical. (Masrour 2020: 754)

Masrour suggests that “there must be a sense of visibility that corresponds to ‘made visible’ and applies to items that are not visible in a narrow sense” (Ibid.). Such a distinction seems similar to the one drawn here between two senses of being visible: ordinary visibility and hypervisibility. Would it be open to proponents of Naïve Realism to account for the experience of surface heat? And, if so, is there any interesting conclusion we can draw for our discussion about the Monist Strategy? After all, it might be suggested that surface heat might be one of those special properties that can furnish the phenomenology of naïve realist experiences.

Now, it is a fact that humans can visually detect heat via infrared light. Instruments such as night-vision goggles, or infrared cameras can detect infrared energy emitting from warm objects. And indeed, it seems correct to say that in the case considered by Masrour, the vocabulary of vision would be relevant. One would see, say, *that* the surface is hot. But we need to be careful in understanding which visual vocabulary is being used. Is it, drawing on Dretske’s famous distinction (1969), a case of *simple seeing*, i.e., a case of seeing that does not require beliefs, or should we rather take it as a case of epistemic seeing, i.e., a case of seeing that requires beliefs about what is seen? And if it is a case of epistemic seeing, is it epistemic in the primary sense or in the secondary sense? To illustrate this further distinction, let us go back to the case in which Mary sees a red apple before her.

¹¹⁴ This is not to say that *all instruments* and any method can be used to empower our visual capacities. For scepticism on hypervisibility so construed see Van Fraassen (1980).

Consider the veridical conscious perception that Mary undergoes when she sees a red apple before her. Mary can see *that* the apple is red just by looking at it. Since, in such a case, Mary sees directly the relevant entity, this epistemic case of seeing counts as primary epistemic seeing. But we can also see things epistemically *indirectly*. In such cases, we come to know that something is F by seeing, not the thing itself but something else. Consider this example from Dretske (2006: 151): one looks at a fuel gauge to discover how much gas remains in a tank one cannot see. We learn that the tank is empty by seeing that the fuel gauge is a certain way. Both cases are underpinned by cases of non-epistemic or simple seeing, i.e., cases in which we simply see an object and its properties. But the tank, in the second case, is neither seen epistemically in the primary sense (that is, directly), nor simply seen.

In the case presented by Masrour, there is no doubt that we would be using our eyes to gather information about the world. Arguably, however, the case is to be construed as a case of secondary epistemic seeing. In using night vision goggles, one would thereby undergo an illusory experience of colours. The illusory aspects of the experience would surely track surface heat, just like the fuel gauge tracks the amount of gas in the tank.¹¹⁵ But surface heat is neither simply seen nor seen in the primary epistemic sense. It is seen in the secondary epistemic sense. The secondary epistemic sense according to which one sees that something is F by simply seeing something else is incompatible with perceptual awareness with F.

Although I have expressed my scepticism as to whether Masrour's case could be of help to the Monist Strategy, I now want to suggest that there seems to be a promising way to go for advocates of the Monist Strategy. Let us go back to our analogy with virtual reality. I suggest that by reflecting on it, we can see how to implement what I will call the *Virtual Way* of the Monist Strategy. In recent works, Chalmers (2017; 2022) has addressed some of the interesting metaphysical questions regarding virtual reality and virtual reality experiences. Chalmers recommends a view according to which virtual objects and their properties are real, mind-independent entities of the world. Virtual entities just *are* digital entities, which in turn are *data structures* grounded in physical processes. Moreover, Chalmers addresses the issue of what kind of properties one would

¹¹⁵ It might be argued that animals such as vipers can *see* heat because their sensory organs can detect infrared radiation. So, why should one not equate their experiences with those of humans using night goggles? Contra this, I do not want to deny that surface heat might have a qualitative nature, and that there might be something it is like for some non-human animals to experience surface heat. What I have am trying to resist is that claim that it can be *simply seen* by humans, by offering what I take to be the best explanation of the experience at issue.

be presented with in having a virtual reality experience using the current implementation. Consider this passage:

Red roses are red, then, because they produce reddish experiences in the conditions that are normal for human perceivers. The digital object corresponding to a virtual red rose is not red, because it does not produce reddish experiences in normal conditions. Under normal conditions (that is, looking at the circuit with the naked eye) data structures are not really visible at all, but if they were visible there is no reason for them to produce reddish experiences. Now, the digital object *does* produce reddish experiences when it is accessed in a certain special way, namely through a virtual reality headset. Using a virtual reality headset is not (yet) a normal condition for ordinary human perception, so this is not enough to make the digital object count as red in the ordinary sense. But it is enough to make the object count as virtually red (Chalmers 2017: 322)

Chalmers, in the passage above, assumes a dispositional account of colour: red roses are red because they produce reddish experiences in the conditions that are normal for human perceivers. According to Chalmers, the digital object corresponding to a virtual red rose is *not red* because it does not produce reddish experiences in normal conditions. Under normal conditions, Chalmers contends, data structures “are not really visible at all” (Ibid.). So, if we use our ordinary notion of visibility, a virtual red rose cannot be seen because it lacks basic visual properties.

However, Chalmers suggests that virtual roses become visible when they are accessed in a special way. It is tempting to read Chalmers as suggesting that virtual roses are hypervisible.¹¹⁶ Although they do not possess basic visual properties, virtual objects, which are, in turn, digital object/data structures, can be hyperseen because they possess special visual properties, i.e., properties that are visible without being grounded in and being visible in virtue of basic visual properties.

Let us consider virtual colours, for instance, and let us also assume that the following analysis applies *mutatis mutandis* to other virtual properties. Consider a virtual red rose again. Virtual red roses produce reddish experiences when they are accessed through a virtual reality headset. Using a virtual reality headset, or, we, can presume, the apparatus involved in the scenario involving a super-computer, is not a normal condition for ordinary human perception, and therefore it is not enough to make virtual objects count as, say, red in the ordinary sense. However, it is enough to make the object count as

¹¹⁶ Note that Chalmers’ discussion is completely alien to the issue we are considering: whether the Monist Strategy might rescue Naïve Realism from the Master Argument.

virtually red. For an object is virtually red when it produces reddish experiences in the conditions that are normal for virtual reality. And, again, if we extend the conditions that are normal for virtual reality so as to include the one present in the case we are considering, we come to the conclusion that some properties, namely virtual ones, are visible without being grounded in and being visible in virtue of basic visual properties.

This picture seems *prima facie* highly congenial to the Monist Strategy. If we can broaden the conditions that are normal for virtual reality so as to include the kind of setup that we have taken as involved in cases of Philosophers' Hallucination, we seem to get a promising way of cashing out the special properties that the Monist Strategy is after. In short, we get what I call the *Virtual Way* of the Monist Strategy. Undergoing a Philosophers' Hallucination is not a normal condition for ordinary human perception, and thus one cannot be perceptually aware of familiar objects and their properties. However, it might be enough to be perceptually aware of a distinctive class of entities possessing special properties: virtual entities. Things being so, advocates of the Monist Strategy might suggest that virtual colours and related properties (e.g., virtual shapes) are some of the special properties from which the phenomenology of Philosophers' Hallucinations is inherited.¹¹⁷

4.6 The Failure of the Virtual Way

In the last section, I have suggested that proponents of the Monist Strategy might try to implement their view by endorsing the Virtual Way, i.e., the view that the phenomenal character of Philosophers' Hallucinations is to be characterised in terms of properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of perceptual awareness with a distinctive class of entities: virtual objects and properties.

In this section, I briefly sketch four objections against the Virtual Way. I will suggest that whilst advocates of the Virtual Way might have the resources to overcome the first two objections, their view falls prey to the remaining two objections. Moreover, the last and decisive objection has a greater import, for it targets all Eliminativist views committed to Character Monism and the Causal Receptivity Intuition. Let us start with the first objection.

¹¹⁷ It might be objected that nothing so far shows that virtual properties constitute the *qualitative nature* of the standing structure/virtual environment. And this seems to be a pre-condition for the kind of claim of inheritance that naïve realists have in mind. In what follows I will show that regardless of this objection, the virtual way is not viable.

4.6.1 Screening Off

The first objection against the Virtual Way aims to show that it cannot be counted as a way to implement the Monist Strategy, and so, at least in the form we have presented it so far, it is not to be considered a viable strategy to resist the Master Argument. If this diagnosis is correct, then it seems that in looking for options for the Monist Strategy to address the Character Question, we have actually ended up outside its camp. Here is why.

In the second chapter (§2.2), I distinguished two senses of interpreting the idea that a visual experience has naïve realist phenomenal properties. On the one hand, we can interpret this in a specific sense: an experience constituted by familiar mind-independent entities like tables, chairs and their properties. On the other hand, we can interpret this in a generic sense: an experience constituted by visible mind-independent entities in general.

Although it is not immediately evident, there are reasons to think that the Virtual Way meets the minimum constraint to be counted as a version of Naïve Realism in the generic sense. We have seen that Naïve Realism, understood in the generic sense, is committed to the thesis that the constituents of naïve realist experiences are mind-independent entities. It is now time to provide a more precise qualification of the sort of mind-independence that Naïve Realists appeal to. We can define the notion of mind-independence at issue in the following way¹¹⁸:

(Absolute Mind-Independence) An entity *x* is Absolute Mind-Independent iff its essential nature is constitutively independent of conscious experiences.

Now, let us call those naïve realist phenomenal properties grounded in the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and Absolute Mind-Independent entities *pure properties*.

If proponents of the Virtual Way were to conceive of virtual properties as dispositional properties of the sort I have mentioned or, similarly, as some sort of properties grounded in the obtaining of a relation with conscious subjects (e.g., Averill 1992; Cohen 2004), they would be committed to the idea that such special properties are not Absolute Mind-Independent. Indeed, although an analysis of the existential

¹¹⁸ I take it that the notion of ontological dependence at issue is one that has to do with the *identity* of objects, rather than on their existence.

dependence of virtual properties so construed would be compatible with the idea that virtual objects would preserve their virtual properties even if no one perceived them and if no conscious subject existed, such properties would not qualify as Absolute Mind-Independent, for their identity would depend, at least in part, on conscious experiences.

At any rate, there is an important sense in which such properties would still count as mind-independent. For although such properties would depend for their identity on conscious experiences, they would not depend for their identity on any *particular* conscious experience. Suppose that Mary undergoes a Philosophers' Hallucination as of a red apple which, following the Virtual Way, we can construe as the experience of a virtual red apple. Although, say, virtual redness, construed in the way we are construing it, would depend for its identity on conscious experiences, it would not depend for its identity, say, on Mary's Philosophers' Hallucination. There is a sense in which virtual properties so construed are mind-independent, although only in a particular sense:¹¹⁹

(Particular Mind-Independence) An entity *x* is Particular Mind-Independent iff its essential nature is constitutively independent of any particular conscious experience.¹²⁰

Now, call *impure properties* those phenomenal properties grounded in the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and *mere* Particular Mind-Independent entities, i.e., entities that are particular mind-independent without being absolute mind-independent. Since a token naïve realist phenomenal property cannot be at once pure and impure, in order for the Virtual Way to qualify as a version of Naïve Realism in the generic sense, we should commit to Generic Impurity:

(Generic Impurity) Naïve realist phenomenal properties in the generic sense are either pure or impure properties.

A commitment to Generic Impurity would make the Virtual Way count as a version of naïve realism in the generic sense. However, the objection goes, even if one were to accept Generic Impurity, the Virtual Way would fail to count as a version of Naïve

¹¹⁹ Colours understood in terms of dispositional properties are often considered to be mind-independent properties (Shoemaker 2006; Noë 2004), but my take is that insofar as such accounts treat the identity of colours in terms of colour experiences they are committed to their being dependent on conscious experiences. Cf. Allen (2007) and Schellenberg (2008: 56, fn.2).

¹²⁰ For the notion of Particular Mind-Independence I draw on Mackie (2020) and Robinson (1985). See also Peacocke's minimal objectivity (Peacocke 2009: 740).

Realism understood in the specific sense. This makes all the difference when it comes to resisting the Master Argument.

The Monist Strategy requires rejecting the possibility of non-naïve realist Philosophers' Hallucinations understood in the specific sense of not having the sort of mind-independent constituents that Naïve Realists think are present in familiar cases of veridical conscious perceptions: familiar mind-independent objects and their properties. However, virtual properties and objects are precisely not the sorts of mind-independent constituents that Naïve Realists think are present in familiar cases of veridical conscious perceptions. Things being so, the objection goes, the Virtual Way does not do any work in rejecting premise (3) of the Master Argument:

- (1) Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible. [From Empirical Naturalism]
- (2) If Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible, then Character Monism is true.
[from the Reverse Causal Argument and Screening Off problem]
- (C1) Character Monism is true. (from 1 and 2)
- (3) Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible. [From Empirical Naturalism]
- (C2) Naïve Realism is false. (from C1 and 3)

Suppose you disagree and you think that the Virtual Way can actually be implemented as a version of the Monist Strategy.

Now, since Philosophers' Hallucinations are constituted by replicable properties, their character properties, i.e., properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of perceptual awareness with virtual properties, would be present in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well. But now it seems that those aspects of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions of familiar objects and their properties that Naïve Realists presume to be grounded in familiar objects and their basic visual properties (or constructions out of these) are made explanatorily redundant when it comes to accounting for the subject's perspective in undergoing such experiences. For those properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of perceptual awareness with aspects of a virtual environment have the explanatory power to account for the subject's perspective in undergoing a veridical conscious perception of familiar objects and properties. In a nutshell, virtual objects and their properties seem to screen off familiar physical objects and their properties from explaining the subject's perspectives on their experience in cases of veridical conscious perceptions of physical objects and their properties.

So, the objection goes, although the Virtual Way can be seen as committed to a form of Character Monism, when this is understood in the *generic* sense, that is, as the claim

that veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations have a character of a single *generic* nature, it cannot be implemented as a version of the Monist Strategy. The Monist Strategy requires a commitment to Character Monism construed in a *specific* sense.

Now, it is not entirely clear whether this line of argument is compelling. Some room is left open for proponents of the Virtual Way to suggest that once it is acknowledged that one can veridically perceive virtual objects and properties, the naïve realist properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of perceptual awareness with such entities are indeed naïve realist in a *specific* sense. Advocates of the Virtual Way might suggest that their view recommends taking virtual entities and their properties amongst those familiar entities that can be perceived. After all, given the obtaining of the appropriate circumstances of perception, the experience of a virtual environment would count as a genuinely veridical conscious perception.

If so, however, given the plausible assumption that one could be in the same neural state, *N*, on an occasion in which one, say, is having a veridical conscious perception of a red apple, and on another occasion where one is undergoing a veridical conscious perception of a red apple-shaped soap, no screening off worry can be raised for the Virtual Way. For a virtual red apple, just like a red apple-shaped soap, is just one of those familiar mind-independent entities that can be perceived.

At any rate, even conceding that the objection goes through, it seems that the Virtual Way could be put to work in the context of a different Eliminativist strategy: a version of the Non-Replicability strategy considered in the last chapter (§3.3). It might be suggested that the phenomenal character of neurally matching hallucinations is constituted by virtual properties and that the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations are *non-replicable* properties. Perhaps it is open to proponents of the Virtual Way to suggest a version of the Physical Implementation Way: familiar veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations have mutually exclusive physical underpinnings. Proponents of the Virtual Way might invoke the difference between different forms of Causal Receptivity we have mentioned in the discussion of the Constituency Question to support the Eliminativist strategy.¹²¹

¹²¹ Notice that, as I have already stressed, Character Monism and Eliminativism about Philosophers' Hallucinations are not at odds with each other. Character Monism is a view about the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations. So, one might consistently reject the possibility of Philosophers' Hallucinations whilst accepting the possibility of neurally matching hallucinations.

Recall, in considering extant versions of the Physical Implementation Way, i.e., the Phenomenal-Causal View and the Dual Processing View, it was unclear how the broad non-replicable condition is supposed to be derived from the real definition of the character properties of a neurally matching hallucination. But things look different when we look at the Virtual Way. Consider again the claim that the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions is constituted by naïve realist phenomenal properties. It is constitutive of such properties that they are grounded in a relation of *perceptual awareness* between a subject and aspects of their mind-independent environment. Proponents of the Virtual Way of Non-Replicability Strategy might contend that veridical conscious perceptions of familiar mind-independent entities such as tables, chairs and their properties and veridical conscious perceptions of *virtual* mind-independent entities such as virtual chairs and virtual properties are underpinned by two mutually exclusive physical processes.

The relation of perceptual awareness with familiar mind-independent entities might be taken as a case where a certain physical process, probably understood in terms of information transduction is nomologically necessitated. The relation of perceptual awareness with virtual entities might be taken to require a physical process of a different sort that cannot occur in the former case. Both cases would require a physical implementation understood in terms of information transmission, but the physical processes underpinning cases of perceptual awareness with virtual entities and familiar ones would be mutually exclusive.

To sum up, it is not entirely clear whether the screening off objection against the Virtual Way of the Monist Strategy actually goes through. At any rate, I have suggested how proponents of the Virtual Way might implement their view as a version of the Non-Replicability Strategy. In what follows, I will proceed as if the Virtual Way could be implemented as a version of either the Monist Strategy or the Non-Replicability Strategy.

4.6.2 Circularity

In the previous section, I have suggested that the Virtual Way may be seen as minimally committed to the following thesis:¹²²

¹²² Note that if proponents of the Virtual Way had compelling reasons to resist the screening off problem highlighted in the previous section, they could be seen as committed also to *Specific Impurity*, i.e., the view that naïve realist phenomenal properties in the specific sense are either pure or impure properties.

(Generic Impurity) Naïve realist phenomenal properties in the generic sense are either pure or impure properties.

Now, the second objection goes, there are reasons to think that Naïve Realists cannot accept Generic Impurity: there seems to be a worry of circularity.

Consider this passage from Allen, where he provides an assessment as to whether it is open to proponents of Naïve Realism to endorse the claim that the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions associated with the perception of colours can be inherited from the qualitative nature of colours understood as having a dispositional nature of the sort we are considering:

A proponent of a naïve realist theory of perceptual experience could not accept that colours are individuated in terms of colour experiences, and colour experiences in turn individuated in terms of colours: it could not be the case that what it is for something to be red is for it to be disposed to produce red experiences, and what it is to be a red experience is to stand in a certain relation to something red. Naïve realist theories of perception are commonly presented as views about what determines the phenomenal character of experience, or ‘what it is like’ to have that experience. According to the naïve realist, the phenomenal character of experience is determined by, or, as Campbell (1997: 189) puts it, ‘inherited from’, the elements of the world that serve to individuate the experience; in the case of colour, what it is like to perceive colour is therefore determined by what the colours themselves are like. But colour experiences could not inherit their phenomenal characters from that which they are experiences of, if the essential natures of that which they are experiences of are in turn constituted (as the dispositionalist claims) by those very experiences. This would be a clear case of colours and colour experiences ‘living by taking in each other’s washing’. (Allen 2016: 44)

Allen seems to suggest that if it is of the nature of colours to be Particular Mind-Independent, then a naïve realist view of their conscious perception cannot be true. Why?

The problem seems to be that if colours are individuated in terms of some aspects of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions of a certain sort, and some aspects of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions of a certain sort are in turn individuated in terms of colours we end up with a circularity at the constitutive level. To appreciate how this problem arises specifically for Naïve Realist views, consider how a sensationalist account of the phenomenal character of veridical

conscious perceptions might handle the alleged particular mind-independence of colours without significant worries.

A sensationalist would contend that colour experience is to be analysed in terms of a property (e.g., a sensational property) that is not individuated in terms of the actual property perceived. Suppose we endorse a sensationalist account of visual experiences, and let us bring in virtual properties. If virtual colours were understood as dispositions to cause experiences of a certain kind, to subjects of a certain type, in the conditions that are normal for virtual reality, or similarly as some sort of properties grounded in the obtaining of a relation with experiential subjects, then virtual colours would have their identity fixed by virtual colour experiences that *are not* individuated in terms of virtual colours.

This route is not available to proponents of the Virtual Way, though. And if proponents of the Virtual Way were to stick to understanding virtual properties in terms of Particular Mind-Independent entities, this would constitute a genuine worry. This issue is particularly interesting given the fact that there are other sorts of entities we perceive that are *not* concrete and that might be plausibly construed as particular mind-independent. I am thinking here about *pure visibilia*: entities like shadows, rainbows, flames, and the vault of the sky. A central metaphysical question about such entities is whether their identity is at least in part constituted by conscious experiences (yet not any given conscious experience). And it has been contended that at least some pure visibilia possess such a metaphysical profile.¹²³

If Naïve Realism is supposed to be the philosophical articulation of how we think pre-theoretically about perception, then a case could be made for the fact that we should find a place in a naïve realist account of visual perceptions for entities such as visibilia. As Austin remarked (1962: 8), it seems that people would happily accept that they see shadows or rainbows. So, perhaps it might be open to proponents of the Monist Strategy to suggest that Naïve Realists had better find a way to overcome the circularity worry for reasons that are quite independent of the Master Argument from Hallucination.¹²⁴

¹²³ For instance, it has been suggested that shadows should be treated as entities whose identity is constituted by conscious perceptions. Similar considerations have been raised regarding rainbows. The suggestion that shadows are particular mind-independent can be found in various places in Martin's work, e.g. (2010: 188), in Phillips (2018) and Scruton (2009: 59).

¹²⁴ Perhaps it might be suggested that we typically accept that not all sort of circularity is vicious. And that the sort of circularity at issue here is benign because proponents of the Virtual Way might reject the claim that the real definition of the relevant aspects of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions is to be *fully* specified in terms of properties that are in turn individuated in terms of such phenomenal aspects.

Perhaps, however, proponents of the Virtual Way might suggest that there is no need for advocates of the view to accept Generic Impurity. For so far we have assumed that virtual properties are to be understood either in terms of dispositional properties of a certain sort or as properties that obtain in virtue of the obtaining of a relation with experiential subjects. But proponents of the Virtual Way might suggest that virtual properties are perfectly *Absolute* Mind-Independent. How? It might be suggested that virtual properties are Absolute Mind-Independent *primitive* properties of virtual objects. For the sake of the argument, I will assume that proponents of the Virtual Way could overcome the circularity worry or provide compelling reasons to think that virtual properties are perfectly absolute mind-independent properties.

4.6.3 Inappropriate Objects

The third objection goes as follows. According to proponents of the Virtual Way, neurally matching hallucinations have a character constituted by virtual properties. As we have seen, in undergoing a neurally matching hallucination, according to proponents of the view, one would be perceiving a virtual environment. Now, the problem is this: whilst in the typical case of the super-computer we have considered so far, the appeal to a virtual environment might be taken by some as cogent, it is less clear how such an apparatus can be generalised to all neurally matching hallucinations. To be more precise, the appeal to a virtual environment seems completely implausible when we reflect on the ways in which a neurally matching hallucination might be brought about.

Recall, so far we have assumed, following Chalmers, that virtual objects and properties just *are* digital entities, which in turn are *data structures* grounded in physical processes. Now, suppose that a bolt of lightning hits Mary and thereby causes her to be in the neural state *N* she would be in if she were to see a red apple before her. Or, less controversially, suppose that rather than the complex super-computer we have envisaged so far, we have just a surgeon stimulating Mary's brain. As we have seen, a data structure is grounded in physical processes. But what would ground a data structure in the cases we have considered? The surgeon's intentions? The bolt of lightning? There seems to be no plausible candidate.

Raleigh seems to be aware that there seems to be a tension in the idea set forth by proponents of the Virtual Way that all neurally matching hallucinations would have character properties to be specified in terms of the obtaining of a relation of perceptual

awareness with a virtual environment/standing structure.¹²⁵ Although Raleigh's argumentative line is not entirely clear to me, Raleigh seems to suggest that the Virtual Way might set forth a more modest claim: *some* neurally matching hallucinations are not Philosophers' Hallucinations. Consider this passage:

A relational theorist should be committed to the idea that a perceptual experience is not instantaneous — it always has some non-negligible duration. It also requires the right kind of structured stimulus and the right kind of 'exploratory' activity/impulses on the subject's part. When these conditions are not met, the subject does not achieve perceptual contact with the external world, and instead enjoys *mere* visual sensation. (Raleigh 2014: 96)

Raleigh seems to identify three conditions that are necessary for one to enjoy an experiential event of the perceptual sort. When such conditions are not met, Raleigh contends, a subject would enjoy mere visual sensations.¹²⁶ But now note that neurally matching hallucinations could be plausibly brought about without it being the case that such conditions are met. So, Raleigh can be seen as conceding that some neurally matching hallucinations are not cases where one would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with aspects of a virtual environment. Some neurally matching hallucinations are cases in which the subject would enjoy mere visual sensations.

This is a problem for proponents of the Virtual Way because it is not open to them to endorse a disjunctive account of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations when some such neurally matching hallucinations are construed as Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations. The reason is simple: we can then run an *Internal Argument from Hallucination*. On the plausible assumption that neurally matching hallucinations (allegedly) involving a relation of perceptual awareness with a virtual environment can share the same neural activity as an Inner Philosophers' Hallucination, the inner properties distinctive of the latter would screen off virtual properties from explaining the subject's perspective on their experience in undergoing those neurally matching hallucinations that proponents of the Virtual Way take as involving a relation of perceptual awareness with a virtual environment.

¹²⁵ Note that Raleigh does not actually invoke a virtual environment. As I explained, Raleigh's Virtual Way is cashed out in terms of a standing structure.

¹²⁶ Although Raleigh is not entirely clear about this in his paper, some passages seem to suggest that it is open to the idea that not all neurally matching hallucinations can be construed as involving perceptual awareness of what he calls a 'standing structure'. See especially Raleigh (2014: 92).

To sum up, plausibly not all sorts of causes of a neurally matching hallucination could act as grounds for a virtual environment. However, on the plausible assumption that some neurally matching hallucinations are to be construed as Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations, it seems that given the Internal Argument from Hallucination, no neurally matching hallucination is actually to be characterised as proponents of the Virtual Way suggest.

4.6.4 The Argument from Nearly Chaotic Cases

In this final section, I will offer an argument to the effect that it is not open to Naïve Realist Monism generically construed to accept the Causal Receptivity Intuition. This objection bears on the Virtual Way because, as we have suggested, it can be minimally seen as endorsing a generic version of Character Monism. Consider again the Causal Receptivity Intuition:

(Causal Receptivity Intuition) In the actual world, you are in a relation of perceptual awareness with aspects of the mind-independent environment only if some form of Causal Receptivity obtains.

We have seen how proponents of the Virtual Way might suggest that Causal Receptivity should be fleshed out in terms of *information* transmission, a more generic causal relation involving an external entity that does not necessarily require information transduction. In what follows, I will argue that neurally matching hallucinations, however construed, do not meet any form of Causal Receptivity.

Let us start by considering a potential counter-example to the view that neurally matching hallucinations involve Causal Receptivity. Here is how Raleigh introduces it:

Presumably it is in some sense possible [...] that the photoreceptors in the eye [...] might begin to fire even though they have received no readily identifiable prior stimulus. And so presumably it is possible [...] that such random firings precisely match the pattern of firings that would occur were the subject to see a lemon. But in such a hypothetical case there would be no equivalent of the machine or demon to be a candidate object of visual awareness—the subject, or the disembodied brain, is perhaps just floating in empty space. So there would be, by hypothesis, exactly the same neural activity as in a perceptual visual experience but with absolutely no candidate object of awareness in the environment. (Raleigh 2014: 103)

Let us call such a case Neural Chaos.¹²⁷ Neural Chaos involves an uncased neural state. It seems built in the scenario envisaged by Neural Chaos that no entity in the scene before the perceiver is actually causing the experience. So, Neural Chaos directly challenges all those Naïve Realist Monist views that are committed to the Causal Receptivity Intuition.¹²⁸

Raleigh proposes four different strategies to tackle Neural Chaos (Raleigh 2014: 103-106). I think that the most promising one would be to try to challenge their nomological possibility. Neural Chaos is a case where the experience is *caused* by a neural state. But it might look suspect whether we should accept that the neural state itself might be uncased compatibly with our laws of nature. Some might contend that empirical research itself typically takes spontaneous activity as a pervasive property of the brain. Some neurophysiological theories of real-life hallucinations – such as the deafferentation theory (ffytche 2013: 55) – do invoke spontaneous activity in the brain as crucial to the explanation of how some such hallucinations might come about. However, it is doubtful whether “spontaneous” in this context has to be taken as uncased. Arguably, spontaneous brain activity stands for brain activity generated in the absence of an explicit task.¹²⁹

Although it might be implausible to think that the activity in the brain in Neural Chaos is ultimately uncased, it is extremely plausible to think that in at least Nearly Chaotic Cases, it would be caused by an endogenous cause, i.e., a cause endogenous to the brain.¹³⁰ To illustrate, consider a patient with Charles Bonnet syndrome. Some such patients experience significant or complete vision loss. Yet, they can undergo complex visual hallucinations in the absence of external stimuli. So, whatever the *relevant* cause

¹²⁷ The case that Raleigh considers in this quote is an elaboration of Chalmers’ Chaos Hypothesis. Chalmers introduces the so-called Chaos Hypothesis in this way: “I do not receive inputs from anywhere in the world. Instead, I have random, uncased experiences. Through a huge coincidence, they are exactly the sort of regular, structured experiences with which I am familiar.” (Chalmers 2005: 23). Chalmers seems to suggest Experiential Chaos: an uncased experience. However, if such experiences were uncased they would not be neurally matching hallucinations. For neurally matching hallucinations are hallucinations that are brought about by the same neural basis as a perceptual experience of an F.

¹²⁸ Both Ali (2018) and Raleigh (2014) discuss such a case.

¹²⁹ Cf. Raichle et al. (2001).

¹³⁰ This is not to say that scientists do not consider the option of spontaneous activity being actually uncased. Consider for instance this passage in Tozzi et al. (2016: 5): “In line with the celebrated experiments of Libet et al. (1983), our ability to make choices might arise from random fluctuations in the brain’s background electrical noise; this suggests that individuals might well behave independently of cause and effect (Bengson et al., 2014).”.

of such hallucinations is, it is plausible to think that it must ultimately be an endogenous cause. Even though these hallucinations are typically *not* indistinguishable from veridical conscious perceptions, and plausibly they do not match the neural activity of a veridical conscious perception, there seems to be nothing in our laws of nature that prevent us from conceiving of a case where such conditions are met.

Now, such cases do not seem to be at odds with our laws of nature, and yet are cases where it is extremely implausible to think that the mind-independent environment would be the relevant causal factor. Such cases constitute a problem for those Naïve Realist Monists committed to the Causal Receptivity Intuition. For the Causal Receptivity Intuition requires an *exogenous* cause, that is, one that is to be found in the external environment. Let us call cases of neurally matching hallucinations that are caused by endogenous causes *Challenging Cases*. How are Naïve Realist Monists committed to the Causal Receptivity Intuition to deal with such cases? Let us see if one of the alternative strategies proposed by Raleigh to deal with Neural Chaos might help Naïve Realist Monists to deal with Challenging Cases.

The first option is to suggest a disjunctive analysis of the character properties of neurally matching hallucinations: Challenging cases have a different phenomenology from what we can call Unchallenging cases, i.e., those neurally matching hallucinations that might be construed as having exogenous causes. The latter, but not the former, have a naïve realist phenomenal character. This option, however, is not viable. On the plausible assumption that Challenging Cases are Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations, we can run an Internal Argument from Hallucination. Since Unchallenging cases and Challenging cases can share the same neural state, the inner properties distinctive of the latter would screen off naïve realist properties from explaining the subject's perspective on their experience in undergoing Unchallenging Cases.

The second strategy inspired by Raleigh's discussion tackles the claim that the firings that would be present in Challenging Cases would precisely match the pattern of firings that would occur were the subject to undergo an Unchallenging case. Consider how Raleigh uses this strategy to tackle Neural Chaos:

One might try to make trouble for the assumption that the floating-in-a-void brain really is behaving in exactly the same physical manner as in the perceptual case. After all, presumably at some highly microscopic scale or level of magnification there are, by hypothesis, supremely unlikely quantum events taking place somewhere inside the neurons of the brain in the chaos scenario that are absent in the perceptual case. For in the perceptual case, energy is transferred from some external stimulus, rather than

generated by sheer random, uncaused quantum fluke. And after all, there have been theorists (e.g. Penrose, 1989; Lockwood, 2003) who have argued that quantum level activity is somehow essential to explaining consciousness. (Raleigh 2014: 104)

Raleigh seems to suggest that we should draw a distinction between a macroscopic level and a microscopic one. It might be suggested that despite being indiscernible at the macroscopic level, Challenging and Unchallenging cases would differ at the microscopic level. This difference would show up if we were to focus on a more fundamental physical level: the quantum level. This would be enough to block the Internal Argument from Hallucination. For the argument relies on the sameness of physical states in the brain. But is it viable?

Well, first of all, even granting that there would be differences at the microscopic level, no argument to the effect that this is the *relevant* physical level for visual experiences has been offered. Second, and more importantly, even if we assumed for the sake of the argument that the microscopic level is the *relevant* physical level for visual consciousness, I see no reason for an opponent not to conceive of a different case where physical sameness is postulated at this more fundamental level. Raleigh may have given us a reason why in some cases, focussing on the microscopic level, we will find a difference between Challenging and Unchallenging cases. What he has not done, however, is to argue that it is nomologically impossible to replicate the microscopic level of an Unchallenging case.

I submit that there is a strong case for thinking that no form of Naïve Realist Monism can adhere to the Causal Receptivity Intuition. Neurally matching hallucinations can be brought about in the complete absence of Causal Receptivity.

4.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have assessed, based on the extant literature, the prospects of rejecting the Master Argument from Hallucination by endorsing the Monist Strategy. I have articulated the Character Question for the Monist Strategy and developed a view I dubbed the Virtual Way. According to such a view, in undergoing a neurally matching hallucination, one would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with a virtual environment. I have offered four objections to the Virtual Way and suggested that it is not viable. The fourth objection, in particular, shows that it is not open to Naïve Realist Monists to accept the Causal Receptivity Intuition, i.e., the idea that in the actual world, one is in a relation of perceptual awareness with aspects of the mind-independent

environment only if some form of Causal Receptivity obtains. In the next and final chapter, I will assess the prospects of developing the Monist Strategy consistently with a rejection of the Causal Receptivity Intuition.

Chapter 5 Spatial Monism

In this final chapter, I sketch a novel solution to the challenge raised by the Master Argument from Hallucination to Naïve Realism. I develop a version of the Monist Way inspired by a view I dub Spatial Monism, i.e., the view that the character of visual experiences is constituted by properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of perceptual awareness with a region of space. I develop this alternative for Naïve Realists by considering how Spatial Monists can address the Character Question: how can the phenomenology of neurally matching hallucinations be constituted by a relation of perceptual awareness with a region of space, such that what it is like to undergo a neurally matching hallucination is inherited from the qualitative nature of such regions?

5.1 Spatial Monism

Throughout this work, I have articulated the way in which the possibility of Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations poses a threat to the view that at least part of the conscious character of conscious veridical perceptions is inherited from familiar mind-independent entities in a subject's surroundings and assessed ways in which the possibility of such experiential events might be called into question. All the ways we have considered so far to reject the possibility of Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations were found unconvincing.

In the previous chapter, I presented the Monist Strategy and tried to develop it following the proposals outlined in the literature:

- ❖ **The Monist Strategy:** Accept the nomological possibility of neurally matching hallucinations construed as having *only* replicable character properties that ground the indistinguishability in principle from veridical conscious perceptions, but reject that such character properties would be *inner properties*.

In this chapter, I will present a version of the Monist Strategy that, it seems to me, has the potential to rescue Naïve Realism from the threat posed by the Master Argument from Hallucination.

The Monist Strategy I will consider is supported by a view I dub Spatial Monism. Spatial Monism requires adopting Spatialism about visual experiences. As I take Spatialism as the view that a given class of visual events has a phenomenology constituted by the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness with a region of space, Spatial Monism consists in the idea that the character of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations has a single nature, and such a nature is to be characterised in terms of the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and a region of space. As we will see, since there are different ways in which we might think of regions of space, this characterisation needs further qualification.

The Spatialist account of Philosophers' Hallucinations that I will develop in this chapter is based on two general tenets. We can see them *in nuce* in Barnes' discussion of the so-called myth of sense data (1944). Consider Mary's Philosophers' Hallucination as of a red apple before her, when no apple is actually present in her surroundings. Barnes suggests that we should characterise experiences of this sort as ones where *something* appeared to be an apple. If there is a compelling philosophical issue when it comes to characterising experiential events of this sort, it has to do with "exactly what it is in such circumstances appears to be possessed of qualities which it does not possess" (Barnes 1944: 163), or otherwise put, *what* entity is presented to one in an *illusory way*. Once this is acknowledged, Barnes remarked, "hallucinations and delusions need present no insuperable difficulties." (Ibid.)

Spatialism about Philosophers' Hallucinations shares the main insight of Barnes' analysis. In undergoing a Philosophers' Hallucination, the Spatialist contends, one surely would be in a *presentational state*. Surely there would be *something* a subject would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with. In saying so, as I have suggested in Chapter 1 (§1.2), the Spatialist quarrels with an intentionalist analysis of Philosophers' Hallucinations, and sides with the alternative conception propounded by friends of sense-data. The entity presented to one in a Philosophers' Hallucination, according to the Spatialists, just is a *region of space*. Such a region of space, however, (typically) appears to be a way it is not. Philosophers' Hallucinations are experiential events constituted by a relation of perceptual awareness with a region of space, such that the phenomenology of such experiences, though illusory, is – at least in part – inherited from the actual character of such a region.

The appeal to regions of space in theorising about visual consciousness is certainly not new. Even paradigm subjectivist views of conscious experiences take physical space as playing some crucial role in articulating the nature of visual experiences: Jackson (1977: 102) locates visual sense-data in physical space; Peacocke thinks that sensational

properties are individuated by their relations to “real, physical space” (2008: 13). But also the idea that the characterisation of some hallucinations might require appealing to regions of physical space is not entirely new.

In his defence of the Theory of Appearing, a view according to which perceptual consciousness “consists, most basically, in the fact that one or more objects appear to the subject as so-and-so” (Alston 1999: 182), Alston suggests the following:

If Macbeth’s hallucination of a dagger is to be handled by [the Theory of Appearing], we must find something actually existing that looked dagger-like to Macbeth. And what might that be? There are various candidates. One is the air occupying the region where the dagger appears to be. Another is the portion of space apparently occupied by the dagger. (Alston 1999: 191).

Among the options he considers, Alston mentions “the portion of space apparently occupied by the dagger” (Ibid.). Alston is not the only philosopher who has at least toyed with the idea that some partial hallucinations might need a characterisation that appeals to regions of physical space.¹³¹ At any rate, and as far as I am aware, the idea that Philosophers’ Hallucinations might require a characterisation which appeals to regions of space and is somehow in tune with Naïve Realism is briefly considered only by Langsam (1997):

According to this combined view, the stimulation of some portion of my visual cortex can in one case give rise to a certain relation coming to obtain between an apple and myself (a perceptual experience of the apple), and in another case give rise to a certain relation coming to obtain between a region of physical space and myself (an hallucinatory experience of an apple). (Langsam 1997: 47)

Langsam, who defends a version of the Theory of Appearing, does not develop this view or explicitly endorse it.

As we will see, developing Spatial Monism will require taking seriously underexplored or neglected considerations regarding how perceptions might occur and the way in which the physical world might appear to us in visual experiences. The revisionary attitude that the Spatialist recommends on crucial issues regarding the relation between the physical world and the domain of visual consciousness might strike as a somewhat desperate attempt to rescue Naïve Realism from the challenge of the

¹³¹ Cf. Smith (2002: 192).

Master Argument from Hallucination. And this might ultimately be taken by some as a decisive reason to reject Naïve Realism altogether.

As I will try to show, however, if there is any compelling reason to take Spatial Monism as untenable, it is not one that stems from a glaring inconsistency with the way in which we think about the world through the lens of our shared naturalistic commitments. Neither can it be traced to the way in which we construe how the world might be presented to us in conscious visual events.

In this final chapter, I will then present a particular version of the Monist Way that relies on Spatial Monism: the *Spatial Monist Way*. In so doing, I will provide the first comprehensive elaboration of Spatialism about Philosophers' Hallucinations, and Spatial Monism more generally. We are now familiar with the explanatory challenge that arises for all Naïve Realist Monist views and so for advocates of the Monist Strategy as well:

(The Character Question) How can the phenomenology of neurally matching hallucinations be constituted by a relation of perceptual awareness with familiar mind-independent aspects of the world, such that what it is like to undergo such experiences is inherited from the qualitative nature of such mind-independent aspects of the world?

As I have suggested in the last chapter (§4.1), we can decompose the Character question into the Constituency Question and the Character question. I will address both in turn. Let us start with the Constituency Question.

5.2 The Constituency Question

For the Monist Strategy to be viable, it should be able to provide an account of the phenomenology of Philosophers' Hallucinations that respects the Constituency Thesis, i.e., the thesis that naïve realist phenomenal properties are properties grounded in the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and familiar aspects of their mind-independent environment. The Constituency Question for the Monist Strategy arises once we try to understand how Philosophers' Hallucinations could have phenomenal properties construed as the Constituency Thesis prescribes:

(The Constituency Question): How can the phenomenology of neurally matching hallucinations be constituted by properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of

perceptual awareness between a subject and familiar mind-independent aspects of the environment?

As we have seen (§2.3 and §4.2), there is a powerful argument to the effect that Philosophers' Hallucinations cannot have phenomenal properties that obtain in virtue of the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness with familiar mind-independent aspects of the environment: the Argument for the Inner Status of Philosophers' Hallucinations.

In order for an experience to be naïve realist in the specific sense we are interested in, its constituents *must* be the sort of mind-independent entities we are familiar with from genuine perceptual intercourse with the world. Philosophers' Hallucinations, the argument goes, cannot be so constituted. And if I am correct, at least part of the reason for this dismissal is constituted by adherence to the following principle:

(Causal Receptivity Intuition) In the actual world, you are in a relation of perceptual awareness with aspects of the mind-independent environment only if some form of Causal Receptivity obtains.

Causal Receptivity requires that an appropriate causal chain occurs. And, as we have seen, Empirical Naturalism might be taken to prescribe that an appropriate causal chain involves an *external* entity causing the experience and information transduction: light gets transduced into neural signals that carry information.

In the last chapter (§4.2), we have seen how some advocates of the Monist Strategy might challenge the idea that Causal Receptivity is to be strictly understood in terms of information transduction. A broader sort of information transmission, one that does not require any light or the subject's normal apparatus might be well enough. However, I suggested (§4.6.4) that there is a strong case for thinking that no form of Naïve Realist Monism, and so no form of the Monist Strategy, can adhere to the Causal Receptivity Intuition. I contended that nearly chaotic cases should convince us that neurally matching hallucinations could be brought about in the complete absence of an exogenous cause, i.e., an external entity causing the experience. Neurally matching hallucinations can be brought about in the complete absence of Causal Receptivity.

Ali seems to be aware of the distinctive tension that proponents of the Monist Strategy face when it comes to Chaotic or Nearly Chaotic cases. Consider this passage:

Chaotic cases [...] arise out of spontaneous causal replication. But the state randomly causally replicated is just the state of putting the subject in perceptual contact with her current surroundings. [...] For relationalists, the function of the brain's perceptual processing is to make features of the surroundings transparent to the perceiver, rather than generating mental representations of these features. This means that for relationalists, replicating a neural state, even randomly, is replicating a state that makes the surroundings transparent to the perceiver. (Ali 2018: 625)

One way of reading this passage is the following: proponents of the Monist Strategy should find a way to contend that the state brought about by neural replication in a Philosophers' Hallucination would just be the state of putting the subject in perceptual contact with her current surroundings, *regardless* of its causal antecedents.

Ali does not elaborate on these remarks, but in the passage above he mentions an analogy famously presented by Campbell to show how Naïve Realists can think about visual processing. Campbell suggests that just like a highly volatile medium which, like glass, can be transparent “needs constant adjustment and recalibration if it is to remain transparent in different contexts” (2002: 119) so “there is a kind of complex adjustment that the brain has to undergo, in each context, in order that you can be visually related to the things around you” (Ibid.). Campbell, however, would not want to say that (plus or minus a bit) visual processing itself can *disclose* aspects of the mind-independent reality before the perceiver. Visual processing just is one of the necessary components that allow such a disclosure, and its adjustment has an impact on the ‘transparency’ of the medium.

Now, in what follows, I will try to show how advocates of the Monist Strategy might suggest that visual processing can be seen as, plus or minus a bit, sufficient for such a disclosure. To do so, I will draw on Martin's insightful discussion in his unpublished *Uncovering Appearances* (manuscript, Ch. 3) of the unstable position that early sense-data theorists found themselves in when they wanted to stick to the conception of sense-data as *mind-independent entities*, a position we have already encountered in the second chapter (§2.2).¹³²

Before getting to the core of the discussion, it is helpful to summarise the key tenets of the early sense-datum view, for it is precisely in rejecting one or more of such commitments that we can see a possible development of the Monist Strategy.

¹³² See Moore (1914), Russell (1912), Broad (1923) and Price (1932).

(Character Monism) The character of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations has a single nature.

(Mind-Independence) The constituents of visual experiences are mind-independent non-physical entities.

(Actualism) Whatever qualities one experiences, some actual instance of those qualities and the object which bears them must exist and be experienced (Cf. Martin 2000: 217).

According to such a version of the sense-datum view, whenever one has a visual experience, one is in a presentational state that involves mind-independent *non-physical* entities: sense-data. Whatever qualities one experiences, an appropriate mind-independent sense-datum and some of its features should exist and be experienced.

In Chapter 2 (§2.3), I presented Martin's overall diagnosis according to which *Experiential Naturalism*, i.e., the view that sensory experiences are part of the causal order and thereby subject to broadly physical or psychological causes, makes the mind-independence of the object experienced in the hallucinatory cases untenable, thus rendering the early sense-datum view a non-starter (§2.3):

If we hypothesize (as the early sense-datum theorists did) that the relevant relata must be mind-independent, then the conditions for bringing about an experience must involve not only suitable manipulation of a subject's body and mind but also a guarantee of correlation between the perceiver and candidate objects of awareness. Given that such entities would be non-physical (since this is a hallucination) and non-mental (being awareness-independent), causing someone to have a hallucination would require causal influence over something neither physical nor psychological: the non-physical object of awareness. Therefore, if one holds to experiential naturalism and countenances only physical and psychological causation, one must deny that any such influence could take place. (Martin 2007: 718)

In his unpublished work, Martin discusses in more detail why we should dismiss the early sense-datum view, and considers an alternative available to advocates of the theory that is not straightforwardly at odds with Experiential Naturalism.

Martin argues (manuscript, Ch. 3) that if we want to stick to the idea neural activation is sufficient for bringing about a visual experience of a certain sort, but also allow for the mind-independence of sense-data, then we need to contend that sense-data and visual experiences are at least nomologically correlated with each other. He then

considers three ways in which early sense-data views could conceive of such a nomological correlation but find them all wanting. Two strategies are clearly inconsistent with Experiential Naturalism, for they presuppose that there should be *causal interaction* between the causes of experience and such non-physical and non-mental entities. A third one, Martin seems to suggest, is not clearly at odds with Experiential Naturalism for it does not presuppose that there is any causal interaction between the two but just a *nomological correlation*.

Here is how Martin introduces this option:

[W]e live within a universe which is entirely replete with suitably placed sensibilia, such that whoever is caused to have a sensing of a given character, there is bound to be an appropriately placed sense-datum for them to be aware of. Whether I take you to the top of Mount Everest and cause you there to have an hallucination of dancing pink elephants [...] there are bound to be corresponding sense-data which match the way things then strike you as being. (Martin: manuscript, Ch. 3: 22)

The option considered by Martin posits a nomological correlation between sense-data and visual experiences: “given the laws of nature, whenever one has a sensory experience of a certain character there are sense-data experienced which match it but require no causal interaction between them” (Ibid.).

Martin suggests that any attempt to use purely *a priori* reasoning to refute this strategy will fail. However, he contends that it is clear by our contemporary principles that we should reject this account as being “grossly extravagant” (Ibid.) in what it commits to, especially given the evidential base that it can draw on.¹³³ Advocates of the Monist Strategy should surely agree with Martin’s diagnosis. However, if they were in a position to identify a less controversial entity which must always be present in cases of Philosophers’ hallucinations, irrespectively of *how* this entity appears to one, they might contend that in such cases *Harmony* obtains:

(Harmony) There is a nomological correlation between (some) visual experiences and a familiar entity, *X*, such that whenever one is in the right kind of experiential state one is thereby related to *X*.

But what could such an entity be?

¹³³ Martin takes issue with positing mind-independent non-physical entities: “If sensibilia can interact with physical events, why cannot we devise measuring instruments to determine their presence in situations where no one can sense them?” (Martin: manuscript, Ch. 3:24).

I suggest that the answer to this question can be found by looking closely at what the deliverances of introspection are in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations. In the last chapter (§4.2), I suggested that there is indeed introspective evidence for the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations. After all, in cases of Philosophers' Hallucination as of an F, things would be introspectively for a subject as if one were having a veridical conscious perception of an F. In what follows, I will suggest that in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations, there is indeed introspective evidence for the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and a particular entity and that it is not immediately obvious that such an entity would not be present before one's mind.

Let us start by considering how Alston attempts to characterise the way a case of veridical conscious perception strikes him:

I look out my study window and observe a variegated scene. There are maple, birch, and spruce trees in my front yard. Squirrels scurry across the lawn and up and down the trees. Birds fly in and out of the scene, hopping on the lawn in search of worms. Cars and vans occasionally drive by. My neighbor across the street is transplanting some geraniums. A truck pulls up in his driveway. The most intuitively attractive way of characterizing my state of consciousness as I observe all this is to say that it consists of the presentation of physical objects to consciousness. Upon opening one's eyes one is presented with a variegated scene, consisting of objects spread out in space, displaying various characteristics, and engaging in various activities. (Alston 1999: 182)

Suppose that Alston's veridical conscious perception was brought about by neural state *N*, and that his brain is now being stimulated so as to reproduce *N*. In undergoing such a Philosophers' Hallucination, things would strike Alston as being exactly the same. However, we can presume that now he is just in a lab room, surrounded by the complex machinery that is stimulating his brain. Surely there would be no squirrels, birds etc. But a proper characterisation of how things strike him as being in such an experiential case would not be exhausted by citing objects such as squirrels and birds that seem to be presented to him. As Alston remarks, in the case of veridical conscious perceptions, objects would appear to him to be "spread out in space" (Ibid.)

Now, such an aspect of how things would strike one as being in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations would arguably pertain to all such experiences. Presumably, no birds or squirrels would be potential objects of perceptual awareness in the hypothetical Philosophers' Hallucination Alston would undergo. Similar considerations are usually

taken as motivating a disjunctive account of visual experiences as Robinson remarks in this passage:

[T]he naïve realist must provide a different account of hallucinatory experience from that provided of perception, because the experiential state itself cannot consist in a relation to something external: if I hallucinate a pink elephant there is no pink elephant to which I am experientially related. (Robinson 2023: 12)

The original veridical conscious perception Alston undergoes is committal about the presence of several objects spread out in space. The corresponding Philosophers' Hallucination is probably deceiving about the presence of such objects and their properties, but is it equally deceiving about the presence before one's mind of a region of space?

Naïve Realists have typically taken for granted that all those aspects of which the hallucinatory experience is committal about are actually missing in the correct articulation of the modification of consciousness that occurs in such cases. If I hallucinate a pink elephant "spread out in space" there surely is no pink elephant spread out in space to which I am experientially related. In what sense, however, could one equally firmly contend that there is no region of space to which I am experientially related?

Here are a couple of reasons that might be proposed to think that Philosophers' Hallucinations are also deceiving when it comes to the seeming presence of a region of space before one's mind. First, the fact that the region of space before the perceiver does not look the way it appears. But note that Naïve Realists typically do not think that illusory experiences of objects cannot be naïve realist merely because such objects do not appear in the way they are. So, why should not a region of space appear in a way it is not?

Second, the absence of Causal Receptivity. This brings us back to the point we were discussing. I have suggested that if proponents of the Monist Strategy were in a position to identify a familiar mind-independent entity that must always be present in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations, irrespectively of *how* this entity appears to one, they might contend that in such cases Harmony obtains, i.e., there is a nomological correlation between Philosophers' Hallucinations and such an entity, such that whenever one is in the right kind of experiential state one is thereby related to such an entity. The considerations set forth so far seem to suggest that there actually is a potentially compelling way of implementing this suggestion.

Consider this fact: no neurally matching hallucination could occur in the absence of a region of space. This mere correlation is, of course, not enough to support the idea that (I) there is a genuine *nomological* correlation between some visual experiences and regions of space and (II) that such a correlation is the nomological correlation that underpins cases of perceptual awareness with a region of space. Given our commitment to Experiential Naturalism and the knowledge we have of the functioning of the visual system, one could analogously suggest that there is a (causal) nomological correlation between experiences and brain activity. But few would be tempted to say that such a correlation underpins cases of perceptual awareness of such brain activity.¹³⁴ However, there is a crucial difference between the cases.

The difference is that whilst visual experiences are not committal about the *presence* of brain activity before the mind, it turns out that they are actually committal about the presence of a region of space. So invoking the existence of a nomological correlation between experiences and regions of space is actually supported by the same sort of considerations that Naïve Realists set forth when they take physical objects as constituents of some visual experiences, combined with some naturalistic commitment about visual experiences.

So, I suggest that it is open to proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy to reject the Causal Receptivity Intuition and contend that a more inclusive claim is to be set forth.

(Broad Receptivity Intuition) In the actual world, you are in a relation of perceptual awareness with aspects of the mind-independent environment only if some form of Causal Receptivity or Spatial Harmony obtains.

Where Spatial Harmony is the nomological correlation that holds between (at least some) visual experiences and regions of space.

Granted a minimal realist attitude, regions of space seem perfect candidates to be the sort of mind-independent constituents that Naïve Realists think are present in familiar cases of veridical conscious perceptions. For surely, we should expect that also veridical conscious perceptions consist of a relation of perceptual awareness with a region of space.¹³⁵ So, Spatial Harmony can be used by proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy to suggest that the phenomenology of Philosophers' Hallucinations is constituted by the

¹³⁴ A notable exception is Johnston (manuscript).

¹³⁵ I will return to this point in the next section.

obtaining of a relation of conscious acquaintance between a subject and a region of space.¹³⁶

At this point, advocates of the Argument for the Inner Status of Philosophers' Hallucinations would presumably stress that one's commitment to the existence of a nomological correlation between experiences and regions of space is at odds with Empirical Naturalism, i.e, the body of naturalistic commitments, empirical evidence and armchair reasoning that supposedly supports the inner status of Philosophers' Hallucinations. Let us start by considering whether Spatial Harmony is at odds with Experiential Naturalism:

(Experiential Naturalism) “our sense experiences, like other events or states within the natural world, are subject to the causal order, and in this case are thereby subject just to broadly physical causes (i.e. including neuro physiological causes and conditions) and psychological causes (if these are disjoint from physical causes).” (Martin 2004: 273)

Now, if we interpret Experiential Naturalism in a broader sense so as to include nomological correlations that are not causal in nature, then the nomological correlation holds between a physical/mental entity – the experience – and a perfectly physical entity: a region of space. Even if one were to take Experiential Naturalism in a restricted sense, notice that the claim is that our experiences “are subject to the causal order”, not that they are subject *only* to the causal order. The hypothesis that there is a nomological correlation of Spatial Harmony is perfectly compatible with the fact that experiences are part of the causal order (e.g., there is some sort of causal dependency of experiences on brain activity).

This leads us to the following point: perhaps endorsing the Broad Receptivity Intuition is at odds with what is reinforcing Experiential Naturalism: scientific facts in general, or how we should construe the physical underpinnings of the relations of perceptual awareness compatibly with our knowledge of the functioning of the visual system. Lowe, for instance, contends that “any theory of perception that is to respect the known scientific facts of human physiology and the laws of physics must be a *causal*

¹³⁶ Note that by “space” here I mean what Mehta (2013) calls ‘ordinary space’, or simply physical space. We use the word ‘space’ in several ways. I can tell that I need some space to someone, without referring to ordinary space. Moreover, in philosophical contexts, it is sometimes said that in using sensory imagination one conjures up an image in an imaginary space. If there is such a thing as an imaginary space it is not *ordinary space*. For eliminativist views about space in connection with visual perception see Cutter (2021)

theory” (Lowe 1995: 59). So, it might be suggested that Spatial Monism is at odds with the science of perception, and should therefore be rejected.

Now, by “Causal Theory” Lowe probably had in mind the traditional causal theory of perception, which involved the idea that all visual experiences are inner events.¹³⁷ If so, his point could be said to show that Naïve Realism itself does not respect the known scientific facts, and hence Empirical Naturalism. But just as nothing in the Naïve Realist claims about veridical conscious perceptions should be seen as at odds with Empirical Naturalism, so nothing in Broad Receptivity Intuition is glaringly at odds with it. Here are some reasons to support this claim.

First, if one were puzzled by the idea of a genuinely lawful non-local correlation, it is worth noting that contemporary physics allows for non-local nomological correlations: non-local correlations are one of the main features of entangled states. Moreover, borrowing a line of reasoning I have suggested in the articulation of the Virtual Way (§4.2), advocates of the Spatial Monist Strategy could suggest that what we observe is that if the relation of perceptual awareness occurs at all, it occurs in cases where information transduction or some similar form of Causal Receptivity occurs. This is quite compatible with the fact that we should acknowledge another relation that can underwrite the relation of perceptual awareness. Even if we were to build into perception some form of Causal Receptivity, the way the relation of perceptual awareness is construed is based on broadly a priori reasoning, and advocates of the Spatial Monist Strategy contend that such reasoning should lead us to think that we should make room for some form of Spatial Harmony.

To sum up, it seems open to proponents of the Monist Strategy to reject the Causal Receptivity Intuition and set forth the Broad Receptivity Intuition, according to which the relation of perceptual awareness is underpinned by either Causal Receptivity or Spatial Harmony. In such a way, it is my contention, the Spatial Monist Strategy has the potential to offer a compelling answer to the Constituency Question. In cases of Philosophers’ Hallucinations, the character of the experience is to be specified in virtue of the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and a perfectly familiar entity in one’s mind-independent environment: a region of space. Since there are different ways in which we can understand a region of space, however, a complete answer to the Constituency Question will be provided only in the next section, where we will see that the Spatial Monist Strategy can take different routes.

¹³⁷ For discussion see Snowdon (1980).

5.3 The Spatial Monist Strategy and Regions of Space

In the previous sections, I suggested that Philosophers' Hallucinations, according to Spatialists, should be understood as conscious mental events in which a subject is in a relation of perceptual awareness with a region of space. So far, I have simply assumed that the reader possesses an intuitive grasp of what I am referring to when I talk of regions of space, and that regions of space would count as genuine Naïve Realist constituents. But there are different ways in which we might construe regions of space, and so different ways in which one might articulate the Spatial Monist Strategy.

I propose to start our enquiry by considering the distinctively spatial phenomenology of conscious perceptions. Consider the visual experience you are having looking at this page. In what follows, I will assume that there is a distinctively phenomenological feature of experiences such as this one: they involve a *visual field* in the sense developed by Martin (1992).¹³⁸ The visual field so construed is not to be identified with a region of space, it is rather what fixes the *boundaries* of a cone of physical space that is part of visual experiences:

[T]here is in normal visual experience some sense of not only being aware of objects in space, but being aware of a region they occupy. The field of vision can be thought as delimiting a cone of physical space which is experienced at a time. (Martin 1993: 214)

The space that the visual field delimits is *not* the space containing everything a subject sees at a given time. If you are reading this page seated at a table, you will not presumably see your feet. Yet, your feet are part of the region of space delimited by your visual field. We can then talk of sub-regions of the region of space delimited by the visual field to single out the portion of physical space that is actually seen. I shall refer to such a sub-region of space as 'scene' or 'field of view'.¹³⁹

Now, it seems true to say that, as Cheng remarks in the following quote, regardless of how one construes a region of space, there is a minimal sense in which the world we experience via visual experiences is a spatial world:

¹³⁸ Martin (1992: 198) contends that the visual field so construed is quite independent "of a commitment to any specific theory of perception". For insightful discussions and elaboration of Martin's *visual field* see Richardson (2010) and Soteriou (2011, 2013).

¹³⁹ For the idea that sub-regions of space delimited by the visual field might not be seen see Martin (1992: 199). I borrow the label 'field of view' from Richardson (2010: 233) who in turns takes it from Clark (1996: 2).

The world we know from experiences is a *spatial* world, no matter how one understands the nature of space: varieties of objects and phenomena are presented to us in experiences as spatial in the sense that they occupy regions of space or they exhibit spatial *properties*, such as being extended and shaped. (Cheng 2019)

If you pay attention to the scene around you, you will probably see many objects arranged in a certain way: the paper before you, say, is on the table, next to a pencil. Such objects seem to possess spatial properties, and there seem to be spatial relationships between them. There is a minimal sense in which every conscious perception involves the perception of a scene, or so I shall assume.¹⁴⁰ If Mary gets close enough to the Trajan's column, it is likely that a portion of such an object is going to occupy the whole of her field of view, given its width and height. But that there is no more space visible to her should not be equated with the fact that she is not aware of a region of space.

As Cheng rightly remarks in the passage above, we also typically take objects as *occupying* regions of space. We take the objects before us as arranged 'within' space, just like one might be situated 'within' a building. Veridical conscious perceptions of the world seem to present a world made of spatial objects and properties that are somehow *contained* in the region of space we are perceiving. The naïve picture we get from visual experiences is one that is committal, or so I will assume, about a specific understanding of the nature of regions of space. It is in reflecting on whether conscious perceptions might be deceiving about such aspects of the fabric of the universe that we can see some possible developments of the Spatial Monist Strategy.

I propose to lay out the conceptual groundwork that will allow us to see how to implement the Spatial Monist Strategy by considering how a position like the one suggested by Langsam (1997) could be developed. As we have seen, Langsam toys with a view about visual experiences that seems to commit one to Spatialism about Philosophers' Hallucinations:

¹⁴⁰ Some have argued (Campbell 2007, 2012; Schwenkler 2012) that empirical evidence supports the idea that some visual experiences involve object-perception but not space-perception (e.g. visual experiences of subjects with Bálint's syndrome). As French argues (2018b), however, philosophers have been too quick to endorse this claim, which he dubs the *absence claim*. French contends that we need to distinguish between the absence claim and the limitation claim, i.e., the claim that in cases of Bálint's syndrome patients seeing an object have "severely limited visual perception of the object as located in space, and severely limited visual perception of space" (Ibid, 230). French rightly argues that empirical evidence does not decide between the absence and the limitation claim, and that thereby the challenge can be resisted.

According to this combined view, the stimulation of some portion of my visual cortex can in one case give rise to a certain relation coming to obtain between an apple and myself (a perceptual experience of the apple), and in another case give rise to a certain relation coming to obtain between a region of physical space and myself (an hallucinatory experience of an apple). (Langsam 1997: 47)

Now, Langsam presents such a view as a disjunctive view. He does not explain why we should consider such a view as disjunctive, but presumably, the idea he has in mind is something along the following lines. A difference in the metaphysical status of the presented entities is sufficient for a difference in the metaphysical status of the experience. Since regions of space are not material objects, we have a difference in the metaphysical status of the objects of experiences between veridical conscious perceptions and Philosophers' Hallucinations, and therefore a difference in the metaphysical status of the experiences.¹⁴¹

Now, under the framework I have been working with, the view suggested by Langsam would count as Monist. After all, regions of space are perfectly mind-independent entities. But we should not get stuck in this issue. Consider this fact: Langsam's point seems to hold only if *Relationalism* about space is rejected. For after all, Relationalists hold that insofar as there is such a thing as space it is nothing over and above objects and their spatial relations to one another.¹⁴² So, if Relationalism about space were true, in cases of both veridical conscious perceptions and Philosophers' Hallucinations one would be presented with the same kind of entities: physical objects and their properties. Both experiences would involve what we can call *spatial awareness*: the awareness of spatial objects, their spatial properties, and relations.¹⁴³

I am persuaded that Langsam's stance is extraneous to any prior commitment to the nature of space. Rather I think that what drives Langsam's suggestion is a deeper intuition about the two cases. An intuition about what can be present in cases of genuine perceptions, and what must be absent in the hallucinatory case. The claim that a region

¹⁴¹ Langsam confirmed this to me in a private exchange. The reason for taking the disjunctive stance is that "I was thinking that a region of space is not a material object." For this sort of Disjunctivism about the objects of visual experiences see Thau (2004).

¹⁴² For discussion see Dasgupta (2015). Sometimes Relationalism is presented as a view according to which there is no such thing as space; there are just material bodies, spatially related to one another. As Field remarks, however, "a relationalist might want to 'logically construct' regions [of space] out of aggregates of matter, and given such a 'logical construction' the relationalist will assert that regions do exist" (1984: 33).

¹⁴³ This is the sort of awareness that Schwenkler (2012: 310) dubs as 'spatial perception' or 'mere spatial perception'.

of space is to be understood, at least in part, in terms of something over and above objects and properties merely follows from a commitment to such an assumption. I want to capture such an intuition with the following claim:

(The Absence Claim) In cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations, one cannot be in a relation of perceptual awareness with mind-independent physical objects and their properties.

In short, once one takes material objects and their properties as necessarily *absent* in the hallucinatory case, then one finds a region of space not construed in the way Relationalists do as a plausible object of perceptual awareness. But what motivates the acceptance of the Absence Claim in the first place?

It is hard not to see a more local form of the Causal Receptivity Intuition as partially driving the assumption. In the case of veridical conscious perception, unlike the hallucinatory one, there is a causal process involving an external entity. So, in such a case, the experience reaches out to material objects, courtesy of Causal Receptivity, whilst, in the hallucinatory case, perceptual awareness with a region of space would fall short of perceptual awareness of material objects and their properties given the absence of Causal Receptivity.

Now, as we will see, I think that the Absence Claim should be taken into serious consideration by proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy. The idea that what we have called spatial awareness, i.e., the awareness of spatial objects, their spatial properties, and relations requires some form of Causal Receptivity will have a significant role in assessing which Spatial Monist Strategy is to be preferred. It is worth noting, however, that the apparatus developed so far allows us to see a development of the Strategy that rejects the Absence Claim. It is a way of rejecting the Absence Claim that is in line with the parsimonious ontology of proponents of Relationalism about Space: *Austere Spatial Monism*.¹⁴⁴

	Veridical Conscious Perception	Philosophers' Hallucination
Austere Spatial Monism	Spatial Awareness	Spatial Awareness

¹⁴⁴ For the sake of the discussion, I will proceed as if the phenomenal character of visual experiences could be exhaustively characterised by referencing spatial aspects and entities in the world.

If spatial awareness does not require Causal Receptivity, then it seems open to one to suggest that also Philosophers' Hallucinations might involve spatial awareness. This could be so for two reasons. One of them preserves a certain role for Causal Receptivity: spatial awareness is multiply realisable. In one context, such as the veridical perceptual one, spatial awareness is underpinned by Causal Receptivity. In different contexts, such as the hallucinatory one, it is underpinned by Spatial Harmony. The alternative view is that Spatial Awareness is not multiply realisable: despite initial appearances, Spatial Harmony underpins spatial awareness across the cases. Both versions would allow proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy to remain agnostic about the metaphysics of space.

To see how the Spatial Monist Strategy could be developed consistently with the Absence Claim we need to take regions of space as – at least in part – constituted by *Absolute Space* construed as not identical with objects, their spatial properties and relationships, but as *containing* material objects which can be regarded as a distinct sort of substance. This sort of dualistic substantivalism, as Schaffer remarks (2009: 133), is “by far the more natural and popular view”. In what follows, whenever I will talk about Absolute Space I will have this conception in mind.¹⁴⁵

The acceptance of Absolute Space in our ontology opens up the possibility that such an entity is actually perceived. And our discussion so far has proceeded on the assumption that our visual experiences are actually committal about the presence before one's mind not only of physical objects and their properties, but also of the regions of absolute space they *occupy*. It is easy to see how such a thought is easily accommodated by the fact that we actually need to countenance the presence, over and above spatial awareness, of what we can call, following Schwenkler, *awareness of space*, i.e., “awareness of the sort of thing that Newton (and Kant) supposed could be ‘empty’ and was somehow independent of the objects within it, and that [...] constitutes a kind of experiential framework within which all particular spatial things are necessarily represented as situated” (Schwenkler 2012: 310).¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ Note that on some versions of monistic substantivalism, or super-substantivalism as it is sometimes called, space or spacetime is construed as *identical* with material objects. This position differs from Relationalism insofar as it does not take regions of space to be derivative from spatial relations between material objects, but in the dialectical context we are in this difference is not significant. For such a way of construing space would be equally unhelpful for those proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy interested in preserving the Absence Claim.

¹⁴⁶ The distinction between spatial awareness and awareness of space is also endorsed by Cheng (2019: 35) who suggests that perhaps perception of location, which he counts as an instance of spatial awareness, “is

The introduction of Absolute Space provides us with a richer picture of how regions of space are to be understood. Regions of space can now be seen as a mereological complex comprising not only physical objects and their properties but also the region of absolute space they occupy. Given that regions of absolute space are independent of the entities that inhabit it, moreover, we can expect that some such regions of space might be devoid of physical objects.

Now, a natural way to understand how a region of space is perceived once regions of absolute space enter the picture is to suppose that how things are metaphysically with regions of space is somehow mirrored at the level of perception of such regions. Spatial Awareness requires Awareness of Space, but Absolute Space can be perceived quite independently of the objects and properties that inhabit it. A proponent of the Spatial Monist Strategy inspired by these thoughts could try to implement a strategy inspired by a view I will call *Kantian Spatial Monism*.

	Veridical Conscious Perception	Philosophers' Hallucination
Kantian Spatial Monism	Awareness of space <i>or</i> (Awareness of Space <i>and</i> Spatial Awareness)	Awareness of Space

Kantian Spatial Monism, given the commitment to the Absence Claim, has it that in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations no Spatial Awareness could occur. In cases of veridical conscious perceptions, one could be either aware of regions of absolute space alone or such regions and the entities that inhabit it.

On the other hand, it might be contended that when it comes to the realm of visual consciousness one could be in a relation of perceptual awareness independently with absolute space and physical objects. From this picture, we can envisage at least a couple of versions of what I will call the *Sui Generis View*:¹⁴⁷ Suppose that you are fascinated by Spatial Harmony: there is a nomological correlation between experiences and regions of space in the hallucinatory case. You might think that such a nomological correlation obtains in the hallucinatory case, but might or might not obtain in the veridical conscious perceptual case. For crucially, in such a case, there is Causal Receptivity. From this, we can get at least two versions of the *Sui Generis View*:

a natural bridge to perception of an overarching space, since being located seems to entail or at least suggest, being *located in an overarching space*".

¹⁴⁷ See also Schwenkler (2012: 325-326, fn. 8).

	Veridical Conscious Perception	Philosophers' Hallucination
Sui Generis 1 (SG1)	Spatial Awareness	Awareness of Space
Sui Generis 2 (SG2)	Awareness of space <i>and</i> Spatial Awareness	Awareness of Space

The first option – which is the one that Langsam would presumably endorse – has it that in cases of veridical conscious perceptions, awareness of a scene involves spatial awareness alone (guaranteed by Causal Receptivity), whilst, in the hallucinatory case, it involves awareness of space (guaranteed by Spatial Harmony). The second suggests that whilst in the genuinely perceptual case, there is both spatial awareness (guaranteed by Causal Receptivity) and awareness of space (guaranteed by Spatial Harmony), in the hallucinatory case, there is awareness of space alone (guaranteed by Spatial Harmony).

Now, it seems to me that SG1 could not be used for implementing a version of the Spatial Monist Strategy for considerations that I have outlined in assessing the Virtual Way of the Monist Strategy (§4.6.1). The reason is this: although the hallucinatory case would count as naïve realist in the generic sense of being constituted by mind-independent entities, it would not count as naïve realist in the *specific* sense of having the sort of mind-independent constituents that Naïve Realists think can be present in familiar cases of veridical conscious perceptions. Indeed, according to SG1, regions of Absolute Space cannot figure as constituents of veridical conscious perceptions.

Now, since Philosophers' Hallucinations are constituted by replicable properties, their character properties, i.e., properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of perceptual awareness with Absolute Space, would be present in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well. But now it seems that those aspects of the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions of familiar objects and their properties that Naïve Realists presume to be grounded in familiar objects and their basic visual properties (or constructions out of these) are made explanatorily redundant when it comes to accounting for the subject's perspective in undergoing such experiences. For those properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of perceptual awareness with regions of absolute space have the explanatory power to account for the subject's perspective in undergoing a veridical conscious perception of familiar objects and properties. In a nutshell, regions of absolute space seem to screen off familiar physical objects and their properties from explaining the subject's perspectives on their experience in cases of veridical conscious perceptions of physical objects and their properties.

The same seems not to hold for SG2 and Kantian Spatial Monism. The hallucinatory case would indeed count as naïve realist in the *specific sense* of having the sort of mind-independent constituents that Naïve Realists think are present in familiar cases of veridical conscious perceptions. Regions of absolute space are constituents of veridical conscious perceptions according to both SG2 and Kantian Spatial Monism. In what follows, as I will not take a decisive stand on whether Kantian Spatial Monism or SG2 is to preferred, I will refer to both views as versions of *Ambitious Spatial Monism*.

Let us sum up. I suggested that the Spatial Monist Strategy might take two different routes depending on one's commitment to the Absence Claim, i.e., the claim that Philosophers' Hallucinations cannot involve a relation of perceptual awareness with physical objects and their properties. One way is inspired by the view I have called Austere Spatial Monism, the view that both veridical conscious perceptions and Philosophers' Hallucinations involve spatial awareness alone. Austere Spatial Monism rejects the Absence Claim. Another way is inspired by Ambitious Spatial Monism, a view consistent with the Absence Claim, according to which both veridical conscious perceptions and Philosophers' Hallucinations would involve awareness of space, but veridical conscious perceptions alone (can) involve spatial awareness.

In the next section, I will address the issue of how advocates of the Spatial Monist Strategy might explain the fact that the phenomenal character of philosophers' hallucinations is inherited from the actual *character* of regions of space based on the two ways we have identified in this chapter: the Austere Way, inspired by Austere Spatial Monism, and the Ambitious Way, inspired by Ambitious Spatial Monism. This will allow us to see which way is best equipped to represent a compelling Naïve Realist response to the Master Argument.

5.4 The Inheritance Question

Proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy hold that Philosophers' Hallucinations are to be regarded as visual experiences in which one would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with a region of space in virtue of the obtaining of Spatial Harmony. This constitutes, as we have seen, the bulk of the Spatial Monist answer to the Constituency Question. But Naïve Realism is committed to a more specific claim about the *way* in which the constituents determine the phenomenology of naïve realist experiences. According to Naïve Realists, naïve realist phenomenal properties are inherited from the actual character of the experience's mind-independent constituents. Given the Naïve

Realist's commitment to the Inheritance Thesis, the Monist Strategy is subject to the *Inheritance Question*:

(The Inheritance Question) How can the phenomenology of neurally matching hallucinations be inherited from the actual character of their mind-independent constituents?

For proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy, the question becomes: how can the phenomenology of Philosophers' Hallucinations be inherited from the actual character of the region of space one is perceiving?

Now, typically, the region of space one would be perceptually aware of in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations would *look* nothing like it actually is. To address the Inheritance question, I suggest that advocates of the Spatial Monist Strategy should resort to the strategies developed by Naïve Realists to address the problem of perceptual illusions, and in particular, as I will show, to those strategies that reject the Diaphaneity of visual experiences, i.e., the claim that sameness and difference in phenomenology just is sameness and difference in the character of the constituents of the experience (see Martin 1998: 175).

As I have already shown that the naïve realist accounts of perceptual illusions I have discussed so far are compatible with the Inheritance Thesis (§4.3.1), my efforts will be devoted to assessing whether it is open to proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy to explain the phenomenal character of Philosophers' Hallucinations by adopting one or more of such accounts. I will start by considering the Austere Way.

5.4.1 The Austere Way and the Inheritance Question

Advocates of the Austere Way are committed to the idea that Philosophers' Hallucinations are to be characterised, just like cases of veridical conscious perceptions, as mental events in which one would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with a region of space construed as nothing over and above objects, their properties and relations. At least when it comes to the Austere Way, one might think that whatever naïve realist account of perceptual illusions is adopted for traditional illusory cases could be applied to the case of Philosophers' Hallucinations. Things are not so straightforward though. Let us start by considering a traditional case of perceptual illusion to point out the peculiarities of the hallucinatory case.

Suppose that Mary is confronted with a scene constituted by a red apple on the table in her living room. Mary is having a veridical conscious perception of the scene before her. Now consider a numerically different scene that is constituted by objects that are, visually speaking, exactly like the ones present in the previous scene except for their colours which are inverted. The apple is green rather than red, and so on. Further, suppose that due to the lighting conditions typical of the room, colours there look like their inverted version. Mary, in the inverted case, would have an illusory perception of the scene before her, but arguably her experience would have the same phenomenal character as the original one.

We can get a grip on how such conscious perceptions might be construed by Naïve Realists by drawing on the dual-aspect account developed by French and Gomes (2019). French and Gomes, drawing on Martin (2002b), suggest that the *overall* naïve realist phenomenal character of conscious perceptions can be seen as composed of two aspects. We have said that the naïve realist phenomenal character of visual experiences is constituted by naïve realist phenomenal properties. This approach invites us to further specify such properties as falling into two categories: *particular* naïve realist phenomenal properties and *general* naïve realist phenomenal properties.¹⁴⁸ Particular naïve realist properties are an unrepeatable aspect of the phenomenology of naïve realist experiences, as they are essentially tied to the particulars the experience is of (Martin 2002b: 187). Such properties cannot be shared by numerically different experiences.¹⁴⁹ On the other hand, general naïve realist properties are essentially tied to the *qualitative nature* of the objects constituting the experience. They are the “qualitative shadow” (French and Gomes 2019: 50) of particular naïve realist properties, and as such, they can be shared among naïve realist experiences.¹⁵⁰

Now, Mary’s veridical and illusory experience would presumably share the same general naïve realist properties, albeit differing in particular naïve realist properties. After

¹⁴⁸ French and Gomes (2019) dub such aspects the *phenomenal nature* (drawing on Martin 2002b) and the *phenomenal character* of a veridical conscious perceptions. I chose not to follow their terminology to preserve the standard use of the term ‘phenomenal character’. On the particularity of conscious perceptions see also Soteriou (2000).

¹⁴⁹ As French and Gomes (2019: 48-49, fn. 5) acknowledge, on Martin’s view (2002b) the phenomenal nature of a perceptual experience is not *exhaustively* individuated by the particulars one would be acquainted with. For there are other factors that individuate the phenomenal nature (for instance, conditions and circumstances of perception, place, time etc.). Therefore, a numerically different experience of the same object, according to Martin’s characterisation, would possess a different phenomenal nature.

¹⁵⁰ Of course, they cannot be shared with experiences that have no familiar mind-independent objects as constituents.

all, the two scenes contain different objects. Naïve Realists can explain this sameness in general properties in a couple of ways. In the last chapter (§4.3.1), we have seen that one approach might invoke complex visual properties, understood either as situational properties, i.e., non-basic visual properties that are determined partly by basic visual properties and partly by perfectly mind-independent aspects of the scene before one, or, at least in the case of colours, as aspects of basic visual properties.

In the inverted case, one might suggest that the apple, despite being green, also possesses, under the relevant illumination conditions, a *situational* property that looks like red. As we have seen, Fish would presumably hold that in such a circumstance, the apple would exemplify a particular shade, i.e., a relational property grounded partly in basic visual properties of the apple (its greenness) and partly in perfectly mind-independent aspects of the scene before one (the illumination conditions). Alternatively, it might be suggested that Mary, in the inverted case, is perceptually aware of an aspect of the greenness of the apple: a red look that is merely selected by the standpoint. It is a similarity in terms of basic visual properties (or complex visual properties) and complex visual properties that might account for sameness in terms of general naïve realist properties in the case we were considering.

Let us go back to Philosophers' Hallucinations. Suppose that Mary undergoes a Philosophers' Hallucination as of a scene constituted by a red apple when she is actually confronted with a scene constituted by a banana. In what follows, I will focus on specific aspects of the phenomenal character of the experience Mary would undergo. If we found a plausible way to go, we could tentatively extend the treatment to all the aspects of the phenomenal character of the experience.

If advocates of the Austere Way were to rely on the apparatus developed by those Naïve Realists who invoke additional complex visual properties, they should suggest that the yellow banana would also instantiate additional complex visual properties. For instance, taking complex visual properties as situational properties, the banana, given the relevant circumstances of perception, would also instantiate a particular shade (following Fish) similar to redness, and a perspectival shape similar to the shape of an apple etc. Again, it would be a similarity in terms of basic visual properties (or complex visual properties) and complex visual properties that might account for the sameness in terms of general naïve realist properties between a veridical conscious perception and a corresponding Philosophers' Hallucination.

Now, although it is not entirely clear whether this approach could be simply swiftly dismissed, I suggest that advocates of the Austere Way had better find an alternative explanation. The reason is simple: it is hard to understand how complex visual properties

might be instantiated in the hallucinatory case, especially when we understand complex visual properties as situational properties. Indeed, situational properties are partly grounded in what we have called environmental sophisticators (e.g., the relevant point of view of the subject and the lighting conditions). But in the case of Philosophers' Hallucinations, unlike the inverted case, it is hard to make sense of what perfectly mind-independent fact in the environment could act as a partial ground of the required situational properties.

Things look different when we understand at least some complex visual properties in terms of aspects of basic visual properties. As we have seen, according to Kalderon (2011a: 257), "colours may have multiple qualitative characters that may be perceived by different kinds of perceivers". So, in the case at issue, it might be suggested that, despite being yellow, the banana would also instantiate a red look, ready to be selected by the standpoint. At least when it comes to colour experience, advocates of the Austere Way might contend that in the hallucinatory case, the subject would perceive different aspects of the actual colours that are instantiated by the objects in the scene perceived. What about the remaining visual properties present in the scene before Mary, though? A mixed approach, that is, one invoking both looks understood as Kalderon does and situational properties, does not seem viable. As I have remarked, it is not clear what aspects of the scene before one could act as the partial ground of situational properties in the hallucinatory case. Should the Naïve Realists think of, say, spatial properties like shape and size as following the mould of Kalderon's looks? Although it is not clear whether Austere Monists could not appeal to complex visual properties understood in this sense, I suggest that there is a better way to go.

The appeal to properties over and above basic visual ones to deal (also) with illusory cases is typically set forth on the background of a commitment to a thesis we have dubbed Diaphaneity: sameness and difference in phenomenology just is sameness and difference in mind-independent constituents (Martin 1998: 175). As French and Phillips remark (2020: 4), we can see Diaphaneity as composed of two principles:

(Difference Principle) Necessarily, if two experiences differ in phenomenal character, then they differ in character-constituting presented elements.

(Sameness Principle) Necessarily, if two experiences are alike in phenomenal character, then they are alike in character-constituting presented elements.

In a recent contribution, French and Phillips (2020) suggest that it is open to Naïve Realists to both reject Diaphaneity and, more specifically, the Difference Principle and provide an adequate naïve realist account of illusory experiences.

Consider this pair of experiences: a typical case of perceptual illusion where a red apple looks green to one and a veridical conscious perception of a red apple. If you subscribed to the Difference Principle, such experiences should differ in character-constituting presented elements. Hence the need to invoke additional complex properties. But it is unclear why the Naïve Realist should be seen as inevitably committed to such a principle. According to French and Phillips, Naïve Realists can offer an equally compelling account of illusory experiences by invoking basic visual properties only.

Consider again our pair of experiences: an illusory perception of a red apple as green, and a veridical conscious perception of a red apple. In both cases, French and Phillips contend, we can explain the phenomenology of the experience by appealing only to the apple and its basic visual qualities. We can do so by acknowledging that the same object can be consciously perceived in different *ways*. It is open to Naïve Realists to suggest that in the illusory case, Mary would perceive the apple and its basic visual qualities (e.g., the apple's distinctive shape and red colour) but in a particular way (due to the particular circumstances of perception such as the lighting conditions). The apple and its basic visual qualities are constituents of Mary's experience and shape its character. But *only in part*. The way in which the apple and its redness are perceived in the illusory case *contribute* to determining the phenomenal character of her experience.

According to the strategy developed by French and Phillips, for this view to be viable, the apple's red colour should be "relevantly similar" (Ibid, 12) to greenness. They contend that to understand the way in which redness can be said to be similar to greenness, we must appeal to the perceiver's inclination or "subjective measure of similarity" (Ibid.) in the relevant circumstances of perception. In the relevant circumstances, the subject looking at the red apple will be *inclined* to find the actual colour of the apple as more like green than anything else. The *psychological impact* that redness has on the subject in those circumstances is similar to the psychological impact that green has on subjects who see it in the appropriate lighting conditions. (Ibid, 12)

At a structural level, we can explain why the basic visual qualities of the red apple in the illusory case strike a perceiver as being more like greenness than anything else by appealing to the way in which the basic visual properties are perceived:

In the first instance, to talk of ways is simply to insist that there is no function from presented elements to phenomenal characters. This is essentially a structural claim: We can see one and the same scene in different ways. Nothing more informative can be said about ways at this level of generality. There is no general answer to how scenes and circumstances of perception interact to settle the way the scene is seen, and so fix character. In particular cases of perception, however, we can fruitfully ask: Why does the way in which the subject perceives the scene affect the phenomenal character of their experience as it does? Our answer here will advert to how the various elements of the scene strike the subject, given the way they are perceived — and in particular, to the visually relevant subjective similarities and differences with paradigm cases of perception. (French and Phillips 2020: 13-4).

French and Phillips (Ibid, 13) hold that why subjects are inclined to classify stimuli as they are is a matter of empirical investigation and that “[t]here is no general answer to how scenes and circumstances of perception interact to settle the way the scene is seen, and so fix character.” However, they also suggest that in specific cases there might already be at least a tentative *deeper explanation* of this subjective similarity. For instance, they suggest that in a case similar to the one we are considering, one might appeal to a match in proximal input, “in light incident at the retina” (ibid.).

This is a promising approach, for it would allow advocates of the Austere Way to account for the phenomenal character of Philosophers’ Hallucinations without invoking complex visual properties. Moreover, and crucially, French and Phillips suggest that “[n]euro-computational factors may figure amongst the perspectival factors which generate different ways of perceiving. But they do not exhaust such factors, nor exhaustively determine such ways.” (French and Phillips 2020:10, fn.17). It is extremely likely that in the unfavourable circumstances of perception of a Philosophers’ Hallucination, we should find a role for neuro-computational factors as partially determining the way in which regions of space are perceived.

But there seems to be an immediate obstacle. French and Phillips explicitly take a stand only on the rejection of the Difference Principle, that is, the view that necessarily, if two experiences differ in phenomenal character, then they differ in character-constituting presented elements. All the cases they consider are cases in which two experiences of objects with the same basic visual properties differ in phenomenal character.

However, proponents of the Austere Way need to reject the Sameness Principle, i.e., the claim that, necessarily, if two experiences are alike in phenomenal character, then they are alike in character-constituting presented elements. For they hold that

Philosophers' Hallucinations and veridical conscious perceptions can have the same character (same general naïve realist properties to be more precise) despite differing in the constituents of the experience. Now, it seems to me that there is little reason to hold on to the Sameness Principle once it is accepted that the ways in which mind-independent constituents are seen can contribute to the phenomenal character of visual experiences.

Although French and Phillips would not endorse this move, as they claim that it is not open to Naïve Realists to provide any positive account of the introspectable properties of a neurally matching hallucination (2020: 10, fn. 17), I suggest that advocates of the Austere Way could rely on their apparatus to account for the phenomenal character of Philosophers' Hallucinations.

Suppose that in seeing a region of space A, Mary undergoes a veridical conscious perception of a red apple on the table. Suppose she then undergoes a Philosophers' Hallucination as of a red apple on the table when no apple is on the table before her. Mary is perceptually aware of a region of space B, according to proponents of the Austere Way. In such a case, advocates of the Austere Way would contend that the Philosophers' Hallucination Mary undergoes involves seeing the region of space B in such a way that given the way the region of space is and the particular way of perceiving it given the peculiar circumstances of perception, she has an experience as of a red apple on the table. We can explain this in terms of the region of space B being visually similar to A in that the psychological impact that B has on Mary in the peculiar circumstances of perception is similar to the psychological impact that A has on a subject in paradigm circumstances of perception.

Now, although this seems a promising way in which proponents of the Austere Way might account for the phenomenal character of Philosophers' Hallucinations, I suspect that many would find the Austere Way unattractive. There are, of course, perfectly well-grounded questions that proponents of the Austere Way should be able to address. Note, however, that if there is any resistance to such a strategy, it cannot be grounded on the fact that there is anything deeply puzzling in thinking about cases where two numerically different scenes strike one as being exactly the same. Neither is the case that there is anything problematic in thinking about two numerically different and, in propitious circumstances, discernible scenes that could strike one as being identical.

I suspect that part of the resistance to accepting the explanation provided by the Austere Way stems from an implicit commitment to the Absence Claim. Many would deem the idea that there could be cases where one is perceptually aware of objects and properties in one's environment, although in an illusory way, in the total absence of

Causal Receptivity, unpalatable.¹⁵¹ This is the reason why, although the Austere Way seems *prima facie* able to provide an answer to the Character Question, I think that proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy should rather be committed to a serious development of the Ambitious Way.

5.4.2 The Ambitious Way and the Inheritance Question

In the last section, I have suggested that advocates of the Spatial Monist Strategy should be committed to developing a compelling version of the Ambitious Way. For the Ambitious Way has the resources to respect a key intuition many share about visual experiences: only when Causal Receptivity occurs can one genuinely be perceptually aware of physical objects and their properties.

Now, according to proponents of the Ambitious Way, Philosophers' Hallucinations have a character constituted by the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness between a subject and a region of absolute space. Things being so, the view requires an extra ontological commitment: regions of absolute space exist. Arguably, however, visual experiences are committal about the presence before one's mind of regions of absolute space. Veridical conscious perceptions of the world, as I have suggested, seem to present a world made of spatial objects and properties that are somehow *contained* in the region of space we are perceiving. And arguably, visual experiences play a significant part in constituting our *naïve* picture of space, which, as Mac Cumhaill remarks in this passage, is arguably absolute:

For example, we appreciate that things can move about 'in' space, but we don't think that space can move. Rather we take space, a bit like a container, to be independent of the things that move 'in' and 'through' it. As such, we distinguish objects from their places. What's more, because things can move about 'in' space, aggregates of things can be formed where the parts are primary and the whole secondary. But we understand that this is not the case with space itself. Since parts of space can't be moved we can't make aggregates of space. Rather, just as a slice of cake is a sub-volume of the larger cake, parts of space, assuming we can conceive of space as having

¹⁵¹ Notice that, as we have seen, Austere Monists could find a place for Causal Receptivity in underpinning cases of veridical conscious perceptions. If awareness of physical objects and their properties can be realised in multiple ways, then one might well think that in cases of veridical conscious perceptions Causal Receptivity underpins the awareness of physical objects and their properties.

parts, are conceived as existing only as subvolumes of the larger space in which they are. (Mac Cumhaill 2015: 709-710)

Things being so, the Ambitious Way, despite requiring an extra ontological commitment, seems to be in tune with our naïve conception of visual experiences and space.

The Ambitious Way, however, immediately faces a pressing question. Since advocates of such a view hold that in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations one would be in a relation of perceptual awareness only with a region of absolute space, there seems to be no straightforward explanation of how the phenomenal character of such experiences could be inherited from the actual character of such regions. In the last chapter (§4.3.2), we have seen that there seems to be a plausible constraint regarding what sort of entities can be visible:

(Visibility) it is a necessary condition on x being an object of conscious vision that x is a basic visual property (or construction out of these) or has some basic visual properties.

What sort of character could regions of absolute space possess?

Well, proponents of the Ambitious Way would stress that absolute space *does* possess spatial properties quite independently of the presence (or existence) of physical objects. And surely such spatial properties *are* basic visual properties of the sort required for an entity to show up in phenomenal consciousness. Consider the veridical conscious perception Mary undergoes when she sees two red apples before her. The distance between the red apples is underpinned by the spatial properties of absolute space. So, perhaps, our initial worry was unwarranted after all: Absolute Space possesses the sort of properties required for entities to show up in visual consciousness.

At this point, however, the opponent will face proponents of the Ambitious Way with a dilemma. Suppose that Mary is undergoing a Philosophers' Hallucination as of a red apple before her. On the one hand, advocates of the Ambitious Way might contend that *only part* of the phenomenal character of a Philosophers' Hallucination such as Mary's is inherited from the spatial character of a region of absolute space. On the other hand, they might contend that *all* the phenomenal character of a Philosophers' Hallucination such as Mary's is inherited from the spatial character of a region of absolute space. In both cases, the objection goes, advocates of the Ambitious Way are pushed into an untenable position.

Let us consider the first horn. Suppose that Ambitious Monists were to contend that only those aspects of the phenomenal character associated with the spatial properties of absolute space are naïve realist. When Mary undergoes a Philosophers' Hallucination as of a red apple before her, only those properties of the phenomenal character of the experience that are associated with the spatial properties of the region of absolute space Mary is in a relation of perceptual awareness with are naïve realist phenomenal properties. The remaining phenomenal properties that constitute the overall phenomenal character of the experience might be thought of in terms of, say, representing that a coloured entity of a certain sort is there, or properties grounded in a relation of perceptual awareness with a red sense-datum, and so on.

At this point, the opponent would be ready to launch an *internal* screening off challenge. Since Philosophers' Hallucinations are constituted by replicable phenomenal properties, i.e., properties that can occur in cases of veridical conscious perceptions as well, the non-naïve realist properties of a Philosophers' Hallucination would be replicated in the case of veridical conscious perceptions, thus screening off all the aspects of the scene before the perceiver that are not associated with the spatial properties of absolute space from explaining the phenomenal character of veridical conscious perceptions. In a nutshell, veridical conscious perceptions would end up having a very minimal naïve realist phenomenal character.¹⁵² It is not entirely clear whether in the end advocates of the Ambitious Way might be forced to settle for such a minimal claim. At this stage of our enquiry, however, we should take this option as a last resort. Let us consider the second horn.

Advocates of the Ambitious Way, the argument goes, might try to contend that *all* the phenomenal character of a Philosophers' Hallucination such as Mary's is inherited from the spatial character of a region of space. But, the reasoning goes, this option is to be quickly discarded. For it would leave a crucial aspect of the richness of our visual experiences untouched. Consider again Mary's Philosophers' Hallucination as of a red apple before her. Mere spatial properties do not seem enough to vindicate the idea that all the phenomenology of a visual experience is inherited, at least in part, from a region of absolute space. For in undergoing a Philosophers' Hallucination as of a red apple, say, it would seem to one as if a *coloured* object were present before their mind. How could an entity such as Absolute Space, which is not coloured, look, say, coloured?

¹⁵² Notice that this is an *internal* screening off problem for the considerations already provided in §1.3.3: Naïve Realism, strictly speaking, is compatible with the claim that veridical conscious perceptions might have non-naïve realist phenomenal properties (also essentially).

This seems a genuine concern, but, in what follows, I will try to show that, despite initial appearances, it is actually misguided (at least in the current form). To do so, let us start by considering the way in which friends of the Ambitious Way would construe a typical veridical conscious perception. When Mary genuinely perceives a red apple before her, she is a relation of perceptual awareness with a scene, which is composed of the region of absolute space Mary is looking at *and* all the visible entities it – so to speak – *contains*. In these circumstances of perception, the region of absolute space that Mary is looking at has a particular *configuration*, or, equivalently, it is *activated* in a particular way.

To make myself clearer, suppose that the apple Mary was looking at has now been replaced with a yellow banana. The same region of absolute space that was previously occupied by the apple and that therefore displayed the apple's distinctive look is now occupied by an object with a rather different look. This seems to suggest that regions of absolute space have the *potentiality* to manifest different sorts of configurations and that physical objects typically activate the region of absolute space's potentiality to take on some form or other.

Note that this is not just an elaborate way of saying that regions of absolute space can contain different objects at different times. Regions of absolute space could contain different objects at different times without it having *any* effect on their appearance. For there seems to be nothing incoherent in conceiving of absolute space as being such that it *conceals* the appearance of the entities that inhabit it. That is, in conceiving of a world where objects are not visible *because* of the nature of space: because space itself does not make room for the appearance of objects. So, the fact that, at least in our world, absolute space does make room, under the appropriate conditions, for the appearance of objects tells us something about its nature. Regions of absolute space have the potentiality to manifest different sorts of configurations. The notion of configuration I am using is to be read as an *appearance* notion. As it should be clear by now, I am not merely talking about the way a scene is configured in a mereological sense, but more specifically about the way it is configured or could be configured insofar as that relates to how it looks/appears.

If so, however, regions of absolute space, despite possessing only spatial properties, do possess a highly determinable way of appearing that is quite independent of such properties. If we accept what I have outlined so far, it seems natural to say that a region of absolute space could look, say, coloured even if absolute space is not coloured at all. Such considerations might be taken to show that the worry, as it has been originally

formulated, is one that the Ambitious Way could overcome. An entity such as Absolute Space, which is not coloured, can look coloured.

However, all we have said so far is compatible with the fact that this way of appearing that we have singled out is entirely *parasitic* on the look of physical objects. And yet advocates of the Ambitious Way dispense with perceptual awareness of physical objects in the hallucinatory case. So, it seems that our opponent can launch a compelling challenge to advocates of the Ambitious Way by simply reformulating their initial question: how can an entity such as absolute space, which possesses merely spatial properties appear *by itself*, that is, without any contribution provided by the character of the objects that inhabit it, as say, coloured?

Well, at this point, advocates of the Ambitious Way should stress that the particular configuration that the region of absolute space Mary is looking at takes is *not* entirely exhausted by citing the physical objects that inhabit such a region. And I think that they could make this point plausible by inviting their opponents to reflect more generally on the particular configuration that a region of absolute space could take. Consider this passage from Cassam:

When I see an object, I see it as shaped, extended, and located in relation to myself or to other objects in its immediate environment. Even though I might misperceive some of the object's spatial properties there is no such thing as seeing an object without seeing any of its spatial properties. In addition, seeing an object usually involves seeing the empty space around it, as well as the region of space it occupies. (Cassam 2007: 117)

The particular configuration that a region of space takes, as Cassam remarks, is constituted by all the elements that make up a scene, including, typically, *empty* regions of space.

When Mary genuinely perceives a red apple before her, she seems to be also aware of empty regions of space. If Mary were to see the same region of space at a different time, sub-regions that were previously occupied by objects might now be empty and vice-versa. Now, a natural way to cash out this awareness of empty regions of space is in terms of the perception of an *absence*. An elegant way to allow for a distinctive phenomenology of perceiving empty regions of space in terms of perception of an absence is the one developed by Richardson (2010) and Soteriou (2011, 2013): the Structural View.¹⁵³

¹⁵³ For the view that “empty spaces don’t have any phenomenological properties” see Mizrahi (2018: 252).

Consider again the claim that we should recognise a distinctively phenomenological feature of visual experiences such as the one Mary undergoes when she perceives the red apple before her: they involve a *visual field* that fixes the boundaries of a cone of physical space that is perceived. The visual field is an *invariant feature* of visual perception, that is, “an aspect of the conscious character of sensory experience that appears to be common to different sensory experiences that have different objects” (Soteriou 2013: 113). As Soteriou remarks in the following passage, it is by acknowledging the role of such an invariant feature of visual perception that we can explain the awareness of regions of space where no object is seen:

[T]he correct explanation of the respect in which we can be consciously aware in vision of absence—e.g. of regions of space as empty of visible objects—will sometimes need to appeal to relatively invariant features of such conscious awareness. (Soteriou 2013: 195)

According to the Structural View, in being aware of one’s visual field as bounded, one is (implicitly) aware of the presence of regions that are *not seen*. Given our sensory limitations, our visual awareness of the region of space perceived is in some sense an awareness of such a region as “a sub-region of a region of space that has that sub-region as part” (Soteriou 2013: 118). One’s awareness of the presence of such unseen regions, according to the Structuralists, makes a distinctive contribution to how things seem for a subject *within* the bounds of their visual field. Within the bounds of the visual field, the space that is delimited is experienced as one where things *can be seen*. And this feature, according to the Structuralist explains how one can be aware of regions of space where there are no objects to be seen: “[t]his is what accounts for the sense in which, in vision, one can be consciously aware of a region of space as a region within which there are no objects to be seen, but within which objects potentially can be seen” (Ibid, 120).

The Structuralist account provides an elegant explanation of how a conscious subject could be aware of empty regions of space as regions that are devoid of physical entities. But this is quite compatible with the fact that awareness of empty regions of space may be an instance of positive perception.¹⁵⁴ In what follows, drawing on the insightful work of Mac Cumhaill (2012, 2015), I will contend that a case can be made for the fact that empty regions of space have a positive appearance that does not depend on the character of physical objects and that does not appeal to invariant features of conscious vision.

¹⁵⁴ A similar point is made by Mac Cumhaill (2015: 711): we can draw a distinction between being aware of empty regions of space and being aware of empty regions of space as empty of physical objects.

Such a positive appearance is not distinctive of regions that are devoid of physical objects: all regions of absolute space possess such a distinctive look. Moreover, such a way of appearing flows from one of their spatial properties. In this way, I suggest, we can resist the charge outlined against the Ambitious Way.

Mac Cumhaill (2015) moves from considering an argument presented by Nerlich in favour of the perceptibility, in principle, of Absolute Space (1994: 38). Nerlich is convinced that Non-Euclidean regions of absolute space would be perceptible, but that the same does not apply to our (nearly) Euclidean regions. In a nutshell, Nerlich argues that if we were to perceive a Non-Euclidean region of space, things would look *distorted* because of the curvature of the region, that is, because of the *shape* of Non-Euclidean regions of space. Nerlich claims that absolute space has “essentially visual properties”, and he claims that such properties are “visually distorting ones” (1994: 39). However, Nerlich contends that (nearly) Euclidean Space is imperceptible. The reason is simple: since the curvature in (nearly) Euclidean cases approaches zero, space is uniformly *flat*, and so “our space is imperceptible in the same way as clear air in a jar is” (Ibid, 40).

Mac Cumhaill suggests that Nerlich’s conclusion about (nearly) Euclidean regions of space, i.e., that they are imperceptible can be resisted. For it seems to be largely based on an implicit endorsement of the so-called visual differentiation condition on seeing, famously discussed by Dretske (1969: 23). To briefly illustrate, consider this famous example presented by Dretske. Suppose that we attach a piece of red paper to a red wall and that we dim the lights until the paper looks exactly as a portion of the red wall. Does one, Dretske wonders, still see the piece of paper? Dretske’s reply is negative. Since the piece of paper cannot be differentiated anymore, it cannot be seen.

Similarly, according to Mac Cumhaill, Nerlich is moved to the contention that absolute space in (nearly) Euclidean settings cannot be seen because it cannot be differentiated. Nerlich’s move from the perceptibility of Non-Euclidean regions of space to the non-perceptibility of (nearly) Euclidean regions is based on understanding seeing something “in a figural sense—that is, as something that ‘stands out’” (Mac Cumhaill 2015: 705). In Non-Euclidean regions of space, things would look *distorted* because of the curvature of the region: absolute space, somehow, would ‘stand out’. But, Mac Cumhaill contends, a region of Absolute Space in (nearly) Euclidean settings “typically forms part of the ground against which opaque material stands out, which in turn explains too why we do not tend to notice its appearance” (Ibid.) But the fact that “we do not tend to notice its appearance” should not be equated with the fact that it lacks any appearance whatsoever.

To make her case in favour of the perceptibility of empty regions of (nearly) Euclidean space, Mac Cumhaill asks the reader to consider the following case.¹⁵⁵ Consider an installation in a gallery consisting of an empty frame hanging on a red wall. The installation is called ‘Invisible Frame’ as the author used a transparent material like pyrex to make the frame. Here is Mac Cumhaill’s take on this case:

The frame would look invisible because the region it occupies would look empty, which is to say that it would look the way that empty regions look, despite being filled. For expediency, call the ‘look’ that empty regions appear to have the ‘see-through’ look, this designation in recognition of the fact that when one sees immaterial paths, one typically sees opaque objects and substances through those empty regions (where, recall, this is also hypothetically so in the non-Euclidean case). On this understanding, perfectly see-through things can look invisible when the region they occupy looks the way that empty regions look: ‘see-through’. But those regions are not themselves invisible on pain of regress, even while they transmit light without loss. (Mac Cumhaill 2015: 704-705)

Now, we tend to assume, as Mizrahi (2010: 4) puts it, that transparency and *invisibility* “go hand in hand”. But as Mac Cumhaill suggests, one could hold on to the idea that (perfectly) transparent things are invisible, and so the entailment from perfect transparency to invisibility, whilst insisting that this only pertains to the *entities* that occupy regions of absolute space. Such entities can look invisible when they are perfectly transparent because the region they occupy looks the way empty regions of space look. But, as Mac Cumhaill remarks, empty regions of space must be seen and have a look “on pain of regress” (2015: 705). The entailment from transparency to invisibility does not pertain to the regions of absolute space that entities occupy.

In the passage above, Mac Cumhaill dubs the way empty regions of space look ‘see-through’, to convey the idea that we see physical objects and their properties through them. But in the same work, she also associates a further look to empty regions of space:

Empty space is both ‘see-through’ and ‘clear’ in the sense that it everywhere presents the same appearance. (Mac Cumhaill 2015: 706)

In her (2015), Mac Cumhaill does not explain if we should assimilate such looks: see-through and clear. In a different work (2012), however, she explains in detail how we

¹⁵⁵ Mac Cumhaill draws on a case presented by French (2018c: 144).

should understand the relationship between regions of absolute space looking clear and see-through. This passage is crucial for our purposes.

Drawing on Martin's parsimonious account of looks (2010), Mac Cumhaill contends that it is the curvature of the regions of Absolute Space, their *shape*, that constitutes their look because, as Nerlich's argument suggests, a change in the intrinsic curvature results in a change in its look. And this generalises, contra Nerlich, to (nearly) Euclidean regions. Regions of empty space can be said to look clear and see-through. But whilst the clear look of regions of empty space is *entirely* constituted by its shape or curvature, what warrants the claim that empty space looks see-through involves "the visual presentation of an object in a space" (Mac Cumhaill 2012: 92) that the subject is seeing:

The state of affairs that warrants the claim that empty space looks 'see-through' involves the visual presentation of an object in a space through which the subject is path-connected to that object [...] In contrast, what warrants the claim that empty space looks 'clear' is [...] the Euclidean shape of absolute space. (Mac Cumhaill 2012: 92)

The idea that we should consider regions of absolute space as having a distinctive look regardless of whether they are occupied by physical objects seems to be gestured at also in this passage:

Empty space, then, like objects, can look more or less bright as a function of the level of illumination. Still, how empty space *itself* looks does not change depending on how it is lit (anymore than a red kettle changes its colour in near darkness) - space in our vicinity always looks 'clear'. (Mac Cumhaill 2012: 92)

I suggest that the considerations considered so far provide us with a way to resist the charge moved against advocates of the Ambitious Way.¹⁵⁶

To appreciate the plausibility of the idea that regions of absolute space could look some way regardless of the physical objects they contain, consider the following two extreme cases. One is *Total Emptiness*, a case that strikes me as a genuine possibility: a total experience of empty space under natural illumination.¹⁵⁷ If we follow Mac

¹⁵⁶ Of course, I do not expect Mac Cumhaill to agree with any of what follows.

¹⁵⁷ Note that I am not using "empty" here in an absolute sense. "Empty" here stands for devoid of physical objects.

Cumhaill's suggestion, in such a case, the region of absolute space would look clear and more or less bright depending on the level of illumination.

Second, *Cosmic Blackout*: a case where one has an experience of a region of space, but the universe has gone dark. Even in the absence of light, it has been contended that one could perceive the darkness of the region of space one would be looking at (Sorensen 2004, 2008). The apparatus developed here gives us reasons to hold that the region of absolute space would look clear and dark.

Let us go back to the idea that the particular configuration that a region of space takes is constituted by all the elements that make up the scene, including, typically, *empty* regions of space. If we accept what we have said so far, it is now clear (i) that every aspect of the scene before one would possess a distinctive look and (ii) in which way we can make sense of the idea that space seems to display the potentiality to manifest different configurations.

Given the curvature of absolute space in (nearly) Euclidean settings, all regions would look clear. But for those regions occupied by physical objects, we should recognise an additional contribution that comes from the qualitative nature of such objects. In some cases, the way a filled region of space looks to you is determined by the way the region looks, given its intrinsic curvature and the character of the objects that occupy the region. The regions look clear and, given the presence of physical objects, see-through.

But once we acknowledge that a region of absolute space can look clear and see-through, it is not clear anymore what sort of resistance there could be to the idea that a region of Absolute Space could by itself, in peculiar circumstances of perception, look coloured. Proponents of the Ambitious Way should contend that Philosophers' Hallucinations are cases where one would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with a region of absolute space that would strike one as having a configuration it does not (typically) have. The region of absolute space would be perceived but in an illusory way.

Suppose that in seeing a region of space, A, Mary undergoes a veridical conscious perception of a red apple on the table. In such a case, according to advocates of the Ambitious Way I have been developing, the region of space A has a particular configuration which is given by the clarity of the region of absolute space and the character of the elements that constitute the scene. Suppose Mary then undergoes a Philosophers' Hallucination when no apple and no table are before her. Mary is perceptually aware of a region of absolute space, B, according to proponents of the Ambitious Way.

Drawing on French and Phillips's Way-Based account (2020), advocates of the Ambitious Way would contend that the Philosophers' Hallucination Mary undergoes

involves seeing the region of Absolute Space B in such a way that given the way the region of absolute space looks and the particular way of perceiving it given the peculiar circumstances of perception, she has an experience as of a red apple on the table. We can explain this in terms of the region of absolute space B being visually similar to A in that the psychological impact that B has on Mary in the peculiar circumstances is similar to the psychological impact that A has on a subject in paradigm circumstances of perception.

Let us focus once again on specific aspects of the character of the experience Mary undergoes to see how this might work. In particular, let us focus on the aspects of the experience that Mary would find indistinguishable from a veridical conscious perception of a red apple before her. In the relevant circumstances, Mary will be *inclined* to find the clarity of the region of absolute space she is perceiving as more like, say, clarity and redness than anything else. The hallucinatory case is a case where *mere* clarity is present, and it has similarities to a case where both clarity and redness are present (as in the corresponding veridical conscious perception).

Advocates of the Ambitious Way could suggest that there are already strong reasons, independent of the case of Philosophers' Hallucination, to suggest that at least many real-life hallucinations and some other visual phenomena can be seen as cases where clear space looks relevantly similar to, say, clarity and paradigm Fs. Consider afterimages, for instance. Here is a description of the well-known phenomenon by Richard Gregory.¹⁵⁸

An image seen immediately after the intense stimulation of the eye by light has ceased. For about a second, the afterimage is 'positive', and then it turns to 'negative', often with fleeting colours. The positive phase is due to after-discharge of the receptors of the eye; the negative phase is caused by loss of sensitivity of the receptors as a result of bleaching of the photo-pigments by the intense light. (Gregory 1987: 13)

Afterimages are sometimes taken as a paradigm case of the sensational aspects of visual experiences. But once the view we have sketched enters the picture there is an alternative explanation available: afterimages are illusory presentations of regions of absolute space.¹⁵⁹ That is, they can be construed as cases in which the region of absolute space would strike one as having a configuration it does not have.

¹⁵⁸ The quote comes from Phillips (2013: 419).

¹⁵⁹ For what I take as convincing reasons *against* the claim that afterimages are part of the so-called sensationalist aspects of visual experiences see Phillips (2013).

I suggested that in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations, proponents of the Ambitious Way should contend that one would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with a region of absolute space, and that the character of the experience would be inherited at least in part from the region of absolute space one is perceiving. Now a veridical conscious perception and the corresponding Philosophers' Hallucinations would differ in particular naïve realist properties, being constituted by different scenes. But they would share the same general naïve realist properties. In the veridical case, general naïve realist properties would be (in part) inherited from the character of the elements that constitute the scene before one, A: the region of absolute space and, typically, physical objects and their properties. In cases of Philosophers' Hallucination, the character of the experience would be (in part) inherited from the region of absolute space alone, B. The region of absolute space before one, B, would strike the subject as visually similar to the scene perceived in the veridical case, A, in that the psychological impact that the region of absolute space B has on the perceiver in the peculiar circumstances of perception is similar to the psychological impact that A has on a perceiver in paradigm circumstances of perception.

A proper articulation of the Ambitious Way of the Spatial Monist Strategy will surely require further investigation. My aim here, as I suggested, is more circumscribed. Before concluding, however, I want to briefly sketch a way to answer one of the questions that advocates of the Ambitious Way will be supposed to answer in the complete articulation of their proposal: what region of space would one be perceptually aware of in undergoing a Philosophers' Hallucination?

It might be suggested that this issue becomes pressing since it seems that the normal routes to answering it are not available to proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy. Campbell, for instance, suggests that causal considerations play a constitutive role in determining the objects perceived:

Causal considerations matter because they have a constitutive role in determining what one is experiencing, and in consequence of that they have an impact on what one can represent or think about. (Campbell 2014: 49)

But proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy insist that Philosophers' Hallucinations are cases where no form of Causal Receptivity occurs, and yet one would undergo a genuine, albeit illusory, naïve realist experience. So, what region of space would be perceived in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations?

Consider again the claim that the visual field, understood as Martin does (1992), is a structural feature of experience. As I have suggested, following Martin (1993: 214), the visual field fixes the boundaries of a cone of physical space that is somehow part of at least some visual experiences. Now, I suggest that proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy should contend that the region of Absolute Space one would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations falls under the limits delimited by the visual field.

As I have suggested, however, we can then talk of sub-regions of the region of space delimited by the visual field to single out the portion of physical space that is actually seen – what I have referred to as the field of view or scene. I suggest that we can provisionally supplement our story by suggesting something along the lines of what Langsam proposes in this passage:

Consider, for example, a view according to which the phenomenal features of hallucinations are relations between regions of physical space and minds, *the regions of physical space in which the hallucinated objects seem to be*. (Langsam 1997: 47, emphasis mine)

A natural way to interpret Langsam's suggestion is what we can dub the *phenomenal seeming* reading. Suppose that Mary undergoes a Philosophers' Hallucination as of a red apple that seems to be placed five feet away from her. It is part of Mary's phenomenology that the apple seems to be presented to her to be five feet away from her. Well, according to this reading, the region of absolute space Mary would be in a relation of perceptual awareness with falls within the boundaries of her visual field. Mary's field of view is constituted by those sub-regions of absolute space in which some entities seem to be presented to Mary.¹⁶⁰

Perhaps proponents of the Ambitious Way might suggest that to ask for more than this is to ask for clarifications about the physical underpinnings of the visual field and Spatial Harmony. But it is not clear whether proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy owe an answer regarding this issue. Proponents of the strategy could simply suggest that

¹⁶⁰ Pautz (2010: 282) suggests that "a person presumably could have a hallucination of an ostensible object five feet away from him, even though he is at the end of a spatially bounded world, so that there is *no region of space* five feet away from him." I suggest that proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy could well accept that such a world might be conceivable, but it is not nomologically possible: the universe must be, by its nature, unbounded and in constant expansion.

this question is misdirected: empirical science will further elucidate the details of the proposal.

This concludes my presentation of how the Ambitious Way of the Spatial Monist Strategy could be implemented. Although more work is needed to develop this view, and I have not yet argued for the claim that it is superior to alternative naïve realist views about visual experiences, I submit that it deserves careful consideration.

5.5 Conclusion

In this final chapter, I have sketched an original Eliminativist proposal to resist the Master Argument from Hallucination. I have argued that Naïve Realists should adopt the Spatial Monist Strategy and contend that Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations are not possible. Indeed, in undergoing a Philosophers' Hallucination, one would necessarily be in a relation of perceptual awareness with a region of space, such that the phenomenal character of the experience would be inherited, at least in part, from the actual character of the region of space.

I have shown how proponents of the Spatial Monist Strategy can reply to the Character Question. When it comes to the Constituency Question, I have suggested that advocates of the view should contend that, plus or minus a bit, mere activation of a brain state is sufficient for the obtaining of a relation of perceptual awareness with a region of space in virtue of the obtaining of Spatial Harmony, i.e., a non-causal nomological correlation between visual experiences and regions of space.

I then suggested that the Spatial Monist Strategy could be implemented in two different ways – the Austere Way and the Ambitious Way – depending on one's views about the Absence Claim, i.e., the claim that in cases of Philosophers' Hallucinations, one cannot be in a relation of perceptual awareness with mind-independent physical objects and their properties. I contended that advocates of the Spatial Monist Strategy should adopt the Ambitious Way to preserve the idea that one could be in a relation of perceptual awareness with physical objects and their property only if some form of Causal Receptivity occurs.

I developed the Ambitious Way of the Spatial Monist Strategy by addressing the Inheritance Question, and contended that the Ambitious Way has the resources to explain how the phenomenal character of Philosophers' Hallucinations is inherited, at least in part, from the region of absolute space one would be perceiving. The region of absolute space perceived would strike the subject as visually similar to a kind of scene

perceived, in that the psychological impact that the region of absolute space has on the perceiver in the peculiar circumstances of perception of the hallucinatory case is similar to the psychological impact that those scenes have on a perceiver in paradigm circumstances of perception.

Spatial Monism, in the form sketched in this final chapter, supports a view of visual experiences as naïve realist in the specific sense of being constituted by familiar mind-independent perceptible entities such as chairs, their properties, and the regions of space that contain them. Albeit I have not argued for the claim that Spatial Monism is superior to alternative naïve realist views about visual experiences, I submit that it deserves careful consideration in the central dispute about the nature of visual experiences.

Conclusion

In the first part of this work, I have articulated the Inconsistent Triad that drives the Master Argument from Hallucination against Naïve Realism. Naïve Realism, according to proponents of the Master Argument, is shown to be inconsistent with two plausible assumptions: Empirical Naturalism, i.e., a mixed body of naturalist commitments, empirical knowledge and armchair reasoning, and Character Monism, i.e., the view that the character of veridical conscious perceptions and neurally matching hallucinations has a single nature.

I proposed to reconstruct the structure of the Master Argument as follows:

- (1) Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible. [From Empirical Naturalism]
- (2) If Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible, then Character Monism is true.
[from the Reverse Causal Argument and Screening off problem]
- (C1) Character Monism is true. (from 1 and 2)
- (3) Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations are possible. [From Empirical Naturalism]
- (C2) Naïve Realism is false. (from C1 and 3)

In the second part, I have assessed Eliminativist Strategies to resist the Master Argument. Such strategies try to resist the argument by rejecting the nomological possibility of Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations.

After a careful assessment, I contended that, in their current form, the Irreproducibility Strategy, the Non-Replicability Strategy, the Distinguishability Strategy, and the Monist Strategy are not satisfactory. In the final chapter, however, I sketched a novel solution to the challenge raised by the Master Argument from Hallucination to Naïve Realism. I developed a version of the Monist Strategy inspired by a view I dubbed Spatial Monism, i.e., the view that the character of visual experiences is constituted by properties that obtain in virtue of a relation of perceptual awareness with a region of space.

I have argued that Naïve Realists could endorse Spatial Monism and contend that Inner Philosophers' Hallucinations are not possible. Indeed, in undergoing a Philosophers' Hallucination, one would necessarily be in a relation of perceptual

awareness with a region of space that would strike the subject as having a configuration it (typically) does not have.

Spatial Monism emphasises the significance of regions of space in shaping the phenomenal character of visual experiences. This is an aspect that, with a few exceptions, Naïve Realists have usually neglected in their theorising. Although more work is needed to develop this view, and I have not yet argued for the claim that Spatial Monism is superior to alternative naïve realist views about visual experiences, I submit that it deserves careful consideration in the central dispute about the nature of visual experiences. Indeed, Spatial Monism provides Naïve Realists with an elegant way to resist the Master Argument from Hallucination. For at least two reasons; first, the view does not require any commitment to the existence of additional entities, events or states than the ones Naïve Realists would be ready to accept for cases of veridical conscious perceptions. Moreover, as I have suggested, the Spatialist account of Philosophers' Hallucinations is actually supported by introspective reflection on such mental events.

In conclusion, the solution to the challenge raised by the Master Argument from Hallucination might have always been before the Naïve Realist's eyes.

References

- Ali, Rami, 2018, “Does Hallucinating Involve Perceiving?”, *Philosophical Studies*, 175(3): 601–627.
- Allen, Keith, 2007, “The Mind-Independence of Colour”, *European Journal of Philosophy*, 15 (2): 137–158.
- , 2015, “Hallucination and Imagination”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 93: 287–302.
- , 2016, *A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2019, “Merleau-Ponty and Naïve Realism”, *Philosophers’ Imprint*, 19 (2): 1–25.
- Alston, William P., 1999, “Back to the Theory of Appearing”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 13: 181–203.
- Armstrong, David M., 1961. *Perception and the Physical World*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Austin, J.L., 1962, *Sense and Sensibilia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Averill, Edward Wilson, 1992, “The Relational Nature of Color”, *The Philosophical Review*, 101(3), 551–588.
- Baldwin, Thomas (ed.), 2003, *The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Baiasu, Roxana, Bird, Graham and Moore, Adrian W. (eds.), 2012, *Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Space and Time*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Barkasi, Michael, 2020, “Some Hallucinations Are Experiences of the Past”, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 101: 454– 488.
- Barnes, Winston H. F., 1944, “The Myth of Sense-Data”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 45: 89–117.
- Batty, Clare, and Macpherson, Fiona, 2016, “Redefining Illusion and Hallucination in Light of New Cases”, *Philosophical Issues*, 26: 263–296.
- Beck, Jacob, 2021, “Mundane Hallucinations and New Wave Relationalism”, *Noûs*, 1– 23.
- Beck, Ori, 2019, “Rethinking Naïve Realism”, *Philosophical Studies*, 176: 607–633.

- Bengson, J. J., Kelley, T. A., Zhang, X., Wang, J. L., and Mangun, G. R., 2014, "Spontaneous neural fluctuations predict decisions to attend", *J. Cogn. Neurosci.* 26: 2578–2584
- Bliss, Ricki and Priest, Graham (eds.), 2018, *Reality and its Structure*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Block, Ned, Flanagan, Owen and Güzeldere, Güven (eds.), 1997, *The Nature of Consciousness*. Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press.
- Brewer, Bill, 2007, "Perception and its Objects", *Philosophical Studies*, 132: 87–97.
- , 2011, *Perception and its Objects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2017, "The Object View of Perception", *Topoi*, 36: 215–227.
- Broad, C. D., 1923, *Scientific Thought*. London: Kegan Paul.
- Brogaard, Berit (ed.), *Does Perception Have Content?*. New York: Oxford University Press
- Brogaard, Berit and Chomanski, Bartek, 2015, "Cognitive Penetrability and High-Level Properties in Perception: Unrelated Phenomena?", *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 96(4): 469-486.
- Burge, Tyler, 2005, "Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology", *Philosophical Topics* 33: 1–78.
- Byrne, Alex, 2001, "Intentionalism Defended", *Philosophical Review* 110: 199–240.
- Byrne, Alex, and Logue, Heather, 2008, "Either/Or", in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 57–94.
- Byrne, Alex and Manzotti, Riccardo, 2022, "Hallucination and Its Objects", *Philosophical Review*, 131(3): 327-359.
- Byrne, Alex and Hilbert, David (eds.), 1997, *Readings on Color*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
- Byrne, Alex, and Logue, Heather, (eds.), 2009, *Disjunctivism*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Campbell, John, 1997, "The Simple View of Color", in Alex Byrne and David Hilbert (eds.), *Readings on Color*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 177–90.
- , 2002, *Reference and Consciousness*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2007, "What's the Role of Spatial Awareness in Visual Perception of Objects?", *Mind and Language*, 22(5): 548–562.
- , 2009, "Consciousness and Reference", in Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann and Sven Walter (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 648-662.

- , 2011, “Review: *Origins of Objectivity* by Tyler Burge”, *Journal of Philosophy* 108(5): 269–85.
- , 2012, “Is Spatial Awareness Required for Object Perception?” In Roxana Baiasu, Graham Bird and Adrian W. Moore (eds.), *Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics: New Essays on Space and Time*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 67-80.
- Campbell, John, and Cassam, Quassim, 2014, *Berkeley’s Puzzle*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carter Adam, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), 2017, *Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cassam, Quassim, 2007, *The Possibility of Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cavedon-Taylor, Dan, 2018, “Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception”, *Analytic Philosophy* 59(3): 391-412.
- Chalmers, David, 2006, “Perception and the Fall from Eden”, in Gendler, Tamar Szabó and John Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 49–125.
- , 2017, “The Virtual and the Real”, *Disputatio*, 9 (46): 309-352.
- , 2005, “The Matrix as Metaphysics”, http://whatisthematrix.warnerbros.com/rl_cmp/phi.html. Also in Cristopher Grau (ed.), *Philosophers Explore the Matrix*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2022, *Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Cheng, Tony, 2019, “Is Balint’s Syndrome a Counterexample of the Kantian Spatiality Thesis?”, in Tony Cheng, Ophelia Deroy and Charles Spence (eds.), *Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science*. New York: Routledge, 31-45.
- Cheng, Tony, Deroy, Ophelia and Spence, Charles (eds.), 2019, *Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science*. New York: Routledge.
- Child, William, 1994, *Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- , 2011, “Vision and Causal Understanding”, in Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman and Naomi Eilan (eds.), *Perception, Causation and Objectivity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 161-180.
- Chisholm, Roderick, 1957, *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Christy, Justin, 2019, “Naïve Realism: a Simple Approach”, *Philosophical Studies* 176, 2167–2185.

- Clark, Austen, 1996, “Three Varieties of Visual Field”, *Philosophical Psychology* 9: 477–495.
- Coates, Paul and Coleman, Sam (eds), 2015, *Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cohen, Jonathan, 2004, “Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto”, *The Philosophical Review*, 113(4): 451–506.
- Conduct, Matthew, 2012, “Naïve Realism without Disjunctivism about Experience”, *Consciousness and Cognition*, 21(2): 727–736.
- Crane, Tim, 2000, “Introspection, Intentionality, and the Transparency of Experience”, *Philosophical Topics* 28(2): 49–67.
- , 2001, *Elements of Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2005, “What is the Problem of Perception?”, *Synthesis Philosophica*, 20(2): 237–264.
- , 2006, “Is there a Perceptual Relation?”, in Gendler, Tamar Szabó and John Hawthorne, (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 126–46.
- , 2014, *Aspects of Psychologism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- , (ed.), 1992, *The Contents of Experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Crane, Tim and Patterson, Sarah (eds.), 2000, *History of the Mind-Body Problem*. New York: Routledge.
- Crowther, Thomas and Mac Cumhaill, Clare (eds.), 2018, *Perceptual Ephemera*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cutter, Brian, 2021, “Perceptual Illusionism”, *Analytic Philosophy*, 62 (4):396–417.
- Dancy, Jonathan, 1985, *Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dasgupta, Shamik, 2015, “Substantivalism vs Relationalism About Space in Classical Physics”, *Philosophy Compass*, 10: 601– 624.
- Davis, Steven, (ed.), 2010, *Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic and Computational Perspectives*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dennett, Daniel, 1969, *Content and Consciousness*. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Deutsch, Max, 2005, “Intentionalism and Intransitivity”, *Synthese*, 144 (1): 1–22.
- Dorsch, Fabian, 2013, “Experience and Introspection”, in Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (eds.), *Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology*. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 175–220.
- Dorsch, Fabian and Macpherson, Fiona, 2018, *Phenomenal Presence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Drayson, Zoe, 2012, “The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 26: 1-18.
- , 2021, “Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Perception”, in Heather Logue and Louise Richardson (eds.), *Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 215-233.
- Dretske, Fred, 1969, *Seeing and Knowing*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- , 1995, *Naturalizing the Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- , 2006, “Perception without Awareness”, in Gendler, Tamar Szabó and John Hawthorne, (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 147–180.
- Ducasse, C.J., 1942, “Moore’s Refutation of Idealism”, in Paul Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of G.E. Moore*. Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 223–52.
- Duncan, Matt, 2022, “Externalists Should Be Sense-Datum Theorists” *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*, 8(2): 338-355.
- Eilan, Naomi, McCarthy, Rosaleen and Brewer, Bill (eds), 1993, *Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Farkas, Katalin, 2006, “Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 106: 39–59.
- ffytche, Dominic H., 2013, “The Hallucinating Brain: Neurobiological Insights into the Nature of Hallucinations”, in Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (eds.), *Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology*. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 45-64.
- Field, Hartry, 1984, “Can We Dispense with Space-Time?”, *PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984*: 33–90.
- Fine, Kit, 1994a, “Essence and Modality”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 8: 1-16.
- , 1994b. “Ontological Dependence”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 95: 269–90.
- , 2015, “Unified Foundations for Essence and Ground”, *Journal of the American Philosophical Association*, 1 (2):296-311.
- Fish, William, 2005, “Disjunctivism and Non-Disjunctivism: Making Sense of the Debate”. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 105: 119-127.
- , 2009, *Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- , 2013, “Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion: Reply to my Critics”, *Philosophical Studies*, 163: 57–66.

- , 2021, *Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction*. Second Edition. New York Routledge.
- Foster, John, 1986, *A.J. Ayer*. London: Routledge.
- , 2000, *The Nature of Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Foster, John and Robinson, Howard (eds.), 1985, *Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- French, Craig, 2014, “Naïve Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily”, *Ratio*, 27: 393–413.
- , 2018a, “Naïve Realism and Diaphaneity”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 118(2): 149–175.
- , 2018b, “Bálint's Syndrome, Object Seeing, and Spatial Perception”, *Mind and Language*, 33: 221–241.
- , 2018c, “Object Seeing and Spatial Perception”, in Fabian Dorsch, and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), *Phenomenal Presence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 134–162.
- , 2020, “Naïve Realism, Representationalism, and the Rationalizing Role of Visual Perception”, *Philosophical Issues*, 30(1): 102–119.
- French, Craig, and Walters, Lee, 2018, “The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion”, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 54: 357–364.
- French, Craig, and Phillips, Ian, 2020, “Austerity and Illusion”, *Philosophers' Imprint*, 20(15): 1–19.
- , 2023, “Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy and the Slightest Science”, in Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (eds.), *Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind* (2nd Edition), Oxford: Blackwell.
- French, Craig and Gomes, Anil, 2019, “How Naïve Realism can explain both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience”, *Philosophical Quarterly*, 69(274): 41–63.
- Gendler, Tamar Szabó and Hawthorne, John (eds.), 2006, *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Genone, James, 2014, “Appearance and Illusion”, *Mind*, 123: 339–376.
- Gersel, Johan, Thaning, Morten Sorensen and Thybo Jensen, Rasmus (eds.), 2018, *In the Light of Experience: Essays on Reasons and Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gomes, Anil, 2017, “Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase”, *Mind*, 126 (502): 529–578.

- Gow, Laura, 2021, "Perceptual Experience and Physicalism", in Heather Logue and Louise Richardson (eds.), *Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 127-146.
- Grau, Christopher (ed.), 2005, *Philosophers Explore the Matrix*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gregory, Richard, 1987, *The Oxford Companion to The Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gregory, Dominic, 2016, "Imagination and Mental Imagery" in Amy Kind (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination*. New York: Routledge, 97-110.
- Grice, H.P., 1961, "The Causal Theory of Perception", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, 35: 121–52.
- Haddock, Adrian and Macpherson, Fiona, (eds.), 2008, *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harman, Gilbert, 1990, "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience", in James Tomberlin (ed.), *Philosophical Perspectives, 4. Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind*. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing, 31–52.
- Hawthorne, John and Kovakovich, Karson, 2006, "Disjunctivism", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes*, 80: 145–183.
- Hellie, Benj, 2007, "Factive Phenomenal Characters", *Philosophical Perspectives*, 21: 259-306.
- , 2010, "An Externalist's Guide to Inner Experience", in Bence Nanay (ed.), *Perceiving the World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 97-145.
- , 2013, "The Multidisjunctive Conception of Hallucination", in Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (eds.), *Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology*. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 149-174.
- Hilbert, David R. and Kalderon, Mark Eli, 2000, "Color and the Inverted Spectrum", in Steven Davis (ed.), *Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic and Computational Perspectives*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 187-214.
- Hinton, John, 1967, "Visual Experiences", *Mind*, 76 :217-227.
- , 1973, *Experiences*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hobson, Kenneth, 2013, "In Defense of Relational Direct Realism", *European Journal of Philosophy*, 21:4: 550–74.
- Hume, David (1748). *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Tom L. Beauchamp, (ed.), 2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Jackson, Frank, 1977, *Perception: A Representative Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackson, Frank and Smith Michael (eds), 2007, *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jago, Mark, 2018, “From Nature to Grounding”, in Ricki Bliss and Graham Priest (eds.), *Reality and its Structure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 199-221.
- Johnston, Mark, 2004, “The Obscure Object of Hallucination”, *Philosophical Studies*, 103: 113–83.
- , (manuscript), *The Manifest*.
- Kalderon, Mark Eli, 2007, “Color Pluralism”, *The Philosophical Review*, 116: 563–601.
- , 2008, “Metamerism, Constancy, and Knowing Which”, *Mind*, 117(468): 549–585.
- , 2011a, “The Multiply Qualitative”, *Mind*, 120(478): 239-262.
- , 2011b, “Before the Law”, *Philosophical Issues*, 21: 219-244.
- , 2011c, “Color Illusion”, *Noûs*, 45: 751–775.
- , 2015, *Form without Matter: Empedocles and Aristotle on Color Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2018, “Experiential Pluralism and the Power of Perception”, in John Collins and Tamara Dobler (eds), *The Philosophy of Charles Travis: Language, Thought, and Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 222-236.
- Kennedy, Matthew, 2009, “Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 79(3), 574-604.
- , 2013, “Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases”, in Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (eds.), *Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology*. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 221-254.
- Kim, Jaegwon, 2011, “From Naturalism to Physicalism: Supervenience Redux”, *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 85(2): 109–134.
- Kind, Amy (ed.), 2016, *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination*. New York: Routledge.
- Kriegel, Uriah, 2013, *Phenomenal Intentionality*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ivanov, Ivan, 2022, “Bad to the Bone: Essentially Bad Perceptual Experiences”, *Inquiry*.
- Langsam, Harold, 1997, “The Theory of Appearing Defended” *Philosophical Studies*, 87(1): 33-59.
- Lewis, David, 1980, “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 58(3): 239-249.

- Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W. and Pearl, D. K., 1983, "Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.", *Brain* 106, 623–642.
- Lindberg, David C., 1976, *Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lockwood, Michael, 2003, "Consciousness and the Quantum World: Putting Qualia on the Map", in Quentin Smith and Aleksandar Jokic (eds.) *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Logue, Heather, 2009, *Relations and Representations*. Doctoral Dissertaion, Massachussets Institute of Technology.
- , 2012a, "Why Naïve Realism?", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 112: 211–237.
- , 2012b, "What Should the Naive Realist Say About Total Hallucinations?", *Philosophical Perspectives*, 26: 173–199.
- , 2013, "Good News for the Disjunctivist about (one of) the Bad Cases", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 86: 105–133.
- , 2014, "Experiential Content and Naïve Realism", in Berit Brogaard (ed.), *Does Perception Have Content?*. New York: Oxford University Press, 220–241.
- , 2017, "Perception First?", in J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin Jarvis (eds), *Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 182–199.
- , 2018, "World in Mind: Extending Phenomenal Character and Resisting Skepticism", in Johan Gersel, Morten Sorensen Thaning, and Rasmus Thybo Jensen (eds.), *In the Light of Experience: Essays on Reasons and Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 213–236.
- Logue, Heather and Richardson, Louise, 2021, "Introduction", in Heather Logue and Louise Richardson (eds.), *Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-22.
- Lowe, Jonathan E., 1992, "Experience and Its Objects", in Tim Crane (ed.), *The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 79–104.
- , 1995, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Locke on Human Understanding*. London: Routledge.

- , 2012, “Essence and Ontology”, in Lukáš Novák, Daniel D. Novotný, Prokop Sousedík, and David Svoboda (eds), *Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 93-111.
- Mackie, Penelope, 2020, “Perception, Mind-Independence, and Berkeley”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 98(3): 449–464.
- Macpherson, Fiona, 2013, “The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An Introduction”, in Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (eds.), *Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology*. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1–38.
- Macpherson, Fiona and Platchias, Dimitris (eds.), 2013, *Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Mac Cumhaill, Clare (2012). *Seeing Through*. Doctoral Dissertation. The University of Edinburgh.
- , 2015, “Perceiving Immaterial Paths”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 90(3): 687–715.
- Markosian, Ned, 2000, “What are Physical Objects?”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 61(2): 375-395.
- Martin, M.G.F., 1992, “Sight and Touch”, in Tim Crane (ed.), *The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 196–215.
- , 1993, “Sense Modalities and Spatial Properties”, in Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen McCarthy and Bill Brewer (eds), *Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 206-218.
- , 1997, “The Reality of Appearances”, in Mark Sainsbury (ed.), *Thought and Ontology*. Milan: Franco Angeli, 81-106. Reprinted in Alex Byrne and Heather Logue (eds.), 2002, *Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings*. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 91-115.
- , 1998, “Setting Things Before the Mind”, in Anthony O’Hear (ed.), *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 157–80.
- , 2000, “Beyond Dispute: Sense-Data, Intentionality and the Mind-Body Problem”, in Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson (eds.), *History of the Mind-Body Problem*. New York: Routledge, 195–231.
- , 2002a, “The Transparency of Experience”, *Mind and Language*, 17: 376–425.

- , 2002b, “Particular Thoughts and Singular Thought”, in Anthony O’Hear (ed.), *Logic, Thought, and Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 173–214.
- , 2003, “Sensible Appearances”, in Thomas Baldwin (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 519-532.
- , 2004, “The Limits of Self-Awareness”, *Philosophical Studies*, 120: 37–89.
- , 2006, “On Being Alienated”, in Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 354–410.
- , 2007, “Perception”, in Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 701–738.
- , 2010, “What’s in a Look?”, in Bence Nanay (ed.), *Perceiving the World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 160–225.
- , 2013, “Shibboleth: Some Comments on William Fish’s Perception, Hallucination & Illusion”, *Philosophical Studies*, 163(1): 37-48.
- , 2015a, “Old Acquaintance: Russell, Memory and Problems with Acquaintance.” *Analytic Philosophy*, 56: 1-44.
- , 2015b, “Moore’s Dilemma”, in Paul Coates and Sam Coleman (eds), *Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 147-180.
- , 2020, “The Diversity of Experiences”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 100(3): 728-737.
- , (manuscript), *Uncovering Appearances*.
- Masrour, Farid, 2011, “Is Perceptual Phenomenology Thin?”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 83(2): 366-397.
- , 2020, “On the Possibility of Hallucinations”, *Mind*, 129: 737–768.
- Matthen, Mohan (ed.), 2015, *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mazzullo, Giorgio and Raimondi, Andrea, (manuscript), “Seemings and the Nature of Visual Experiences”.
- McDonnell, Neil and Wildman, Nathan, 2019, “Virtual Reality: Digital or Fictional?” *Disputatio*, 11(55): 371-397.
- McLaughlin, Brian, Beckermann, Ansgar and Walter, Sven (eds.), 2009, *Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McLaughlin, Brian and Cohen, Jonathan (eds.), 2023, *Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind* (2nd Edition). Oxford: Blackwell.

- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1944, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, translated by Landes. London: Routledge, 2013.
- Mehta, Neil, 2013, "Beyond Transparency: the Spatial Argument for Experiential Externalism", *Philosophers' Imprint*, 13(8): 1-19.
- , 2022, "Naïve Realism with Many Fundamental Kinds", *Acta Analytica*, 37(2), 197-218.
- Mizrahi, Vivian, 2010, "Color and Transparency", *Rivista di Estetica*, 43: 181-192.
- , 2018, "Perceptual Media, Glass and Mirrors," in Thomas Crowther and Clare Mac Cumhaill (eds.), *Perceptual Ephemera*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 238-259.
- Moore, G. E. (1914). "The Status of Sense-Data". *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 14: 355–406.
- Montague, Michelle, 2016, *The Given: Experience and its Content*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Moran, Alex, 2019, "Naïve Realism, Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 97: 368–382.
- , 2022, "Disjunctivism and the Causal Conditions of Hallucination", *Erkenntnis*.
- Nagel, Thomas, 1974, "What is it Like to be a Bat?", *Philosophical Review*, 83: 435–50.
- Nanay, Bence (ed.), 2010, *Perceiving the World*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- , 2015, "The Representationalism versus Relationalism Debate: Explanatory Contextualism about Perception", *European Journal of Philosophy*, 23(2): 321-336.
- , 2016, "Hallucination as Mental Imagery", *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 23(7-8): 65–81.
- , (ed.), 2017, *Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception*. New York: Routledge
- Nerlich, Graham, 1994, *The Shape of Space*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Novák, Lukáš Novotný, Daniel D., Sousedík, Prokop and Svoboda, David (eds), 2012, *Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic*. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag
- Noë, Alva and Evan Thompson (eds.), 2002, *Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception*: MIT Press.
- Noë, Alva, 2005, *Action in Perception*. Cambridge, (MA): MIT Press.
- Nudds, Matthew, 2009, "Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents", *Analysis*, 69: 334–6.

- , 2013, “Naïve Realism and Hallucinations”, in Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (eds.), *Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology*. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 271–290.
- Nudds, Matthew and O’Callaghan, Casey (eds.), 2009, *Sounds and Perception*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- O’Hear, Anthony (ed.), 1998, *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , (ed.), 2002, *Logic, Thought, and Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- O’Shaughnessy, Brian, 1980, *The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Papineau, David, 1993, *Philosophical Naturalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Pautz, Adam, 2007, “Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 21: 495–541.
- , 2010, “Why Explain Experience in Terms of Content?”, in Bence Nanay (ed.), *Perceiving the World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 254–309.
- , 2011, “Can Disjunctivists Explain our Access to the Sensible World?”, *Philosophical Issues*, 21: 384–433.
- , 2021, *Perception*. London: Routledge.
- Peacocke, Christopher, 1985, “Imagination, Experience, and Possibility”, in John Foster and Howard Robinson (eds.), *Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19–35.
- , 1993, “Externalist Explanation” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 93: 203–230.
- , 2008, “Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject”, *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 62: 7–24.
- , 2009, “Objectivity”, *Mind*, 118(471): 739–769.
- Penfield, W. and Perot P., 1963, “The Brain’s Record of Auditory and Visual Experience: A Final Summary and Discussion”, *Brain*, 86: 595–696.
- Penrose, Roger, 1989, *The Emperor’s New Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pitcher, George, 1970, *A Theory of Perception*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Phillips, Ian, 2013, “Afterimages and Sensation”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 87 (2):417–453.
- , 2018, “No More than Meets the Eye: Shadows as Pure Visibilia”, in Thomas Crowther and Clare Mac Cumhaill (eds.), *Perceptual Ephemera*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 172–193.

- Price, H.H., 1932, *Perception*. London: Methuen.
- Prinz, Jesse J., 2015, "Unconscious Perception", in Mohan Matthen (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 371-389.
- Putnam, Hilary, 1975, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 7:131-193.
- , 1981, *Reason, Truth, and History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Raichle, M.E., MacLeod, A.M., et al., 2001, "A default mode of brain function", *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.*, 98: 676–682.
- Raineri, Carlo, 2021, "What's so Naïve about Naïve Realism?", *Philosophical Studies*, 178(11): 3637-3657.
- Raleigh, Thomas, 2014, "A New Approach to 'Perfect' Hallucination", *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 21: 81–110.
- Richardson, Louise, 2010, "Seeing Empty Space", *European Journal of Philosophy*, 18: 227–243.
- Robinson, Howard, 1985, "The General Form of the Argument for Berkeleyan Idealism", in John Foster and Howard Robinson (eds.), *Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 163–186.
- , 1994, *Perception*. London: Routledge
- , 2013, "The Failure of Disjunctivism to Deal with "Philosophers' Hallucinations", in Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias (eds.), *Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology*. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 313–330.
- , 2023, *Perception and Idealism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Roessler, Johannes, Lerman, Hemdat and Eilan Naomi, 2011, *Perception, Causation and Objectivity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rosenthal, David, 1997, "A Theory of Consciousness", in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Güven Güzeldere (eds.), *The Nature of Consciousness*. Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press, 729–753.
- Russell, Bertrand, 1912, *The Problems of Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schaffer, Jonathan, 2009, "Spacetime the One Substance", *Philosophical Studies* 145(1): 131- 148.
- Schellenberg, Susanna, 2008, The Situation-Dependency of Perception. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 105(2): 55-84.
- , 2018, *The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schilpp, Paul (ed.), 1942, *The Philosophy of G.E. Moore*. Chicago: Northwestern University Press.

- Schwenkler, John, 2012, "Does Visual Spatial Awareness require the Visual Awareness of Space?" *Mind and Language*, 27(3): 308–329.
- Scruton, Roger, 2009, "Sounds as Secondary Objects and Pure Events", in Matthew Nudds and Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), *Sounds and Perception*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 50-68.
- Searle, John, 1983, *Intentionality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sethi, Umrao, 2020, "Sensible Overdetermination", *Philosophical Quarterly*, 70(280): 588–616.
- Shoemaker, Sydney, 2003, "Content, Character and Color", *Philosophical Issues*, 13: 253-78.
- , 2006, "On the Way Things Appear", in Gendler, Tamar Szabó and John Hawthorne (eds.), *Perceptual Experience*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 461-480.
- Siegel, Susanna, 2004, "Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal", *Philosophical Studies*, 120: 91–112.
- , 2008, "The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination", in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 205-224.
- , 2010, *The Contents of Visual Experience*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Siegel, Susanna and Byrne, Alex, 2017, "Rich or Thin?", in Bence Nanay (ed.), *Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception*. New York: Routledge, 59-80.
- Smith, A.D., 2002, *The Problem of Perception*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- , 2008, "Disjunctivism and Discriminability", in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 181-204.
- Smith, Quentin and Jokic, Aleksandar (eds.), 2013, *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Snowdon, P.F., 1979–80, "Perception, Vision and Causation", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 81: 175–92.
- , 1990, "The Objects of Perceptual Experience", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, 64: 121–150.
- , 2005a, "Some Reflections on an Argument from Hallucination", *Philosophical Topics*, 33(1): 285–305.
- , 2005b, "The Formulation of Disjunctivism: a Response to Fish", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 105: 129-141.

- , 2008, “Hinton and the Origins of Disjunctivism”, in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 35-56.
- Sorensen, Roy, 2004, “We See in the Dark”, *Noûs*, 38 (3): 456–480.
- , 2008, *Seeing Dark Things. The Philosophy of Shadows*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Soteriou, Matthew, 2000, “The Particularity of Visual Experience”, *European Journal of Philosophy*, 8: 173–89.
- , 2005, “The Subjective View of Experience and Its Objective Commitments”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 105(1): 177–190.
- , 2010, “Perceiving Events”, *Philosophical Explorations*, 13(3): 223–241.
- , 2011, “The Perception of Absence, Space, and Time”, in Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman, and Naomi Eilan (eds.), *Perception, Causation and Objectivity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 181-206.
- , 2013, *The Mind’s Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , 2016, *Disjunctivism*. London: Routledge.
- Speaks, Jeff, 2009, “Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 79: 539–573.
- Spener, Maja, 2022, “Naive Introspection in the Philosophy of Perception”, *Review of Philosophy and Psychology*, 13: 29–45.
- Steenhagen, Maarten, 2019, “Must Naive Realists be Relationalists?”, *European Journal of Philosophy*, 27(4): 1002-1015.
- Sturgeon, Scott, 2000, *Matters of Mind*. London: Routledge.
- , 2006, “Reflective Disjunctivism”, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 80: 185–216.
- , 2008, “Disjunctivism about Visual Experience”, in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 112-143.
- Tozzi, Arturo, Zare, Marzieh and Benasich, April A., 2016, “New Perspectives on Spontaneous Brain Activity: Dynamic Networks and Energy Matter”, *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* 10: 1-8.
- Thau, Mike, 2004, “What Is Disjunctivism?”, *Philosophical Studies*, 120(1-3): 193–253.
- Thompson, Evan and Cosmelli, Diego, 2011, “Brain in a Vat or Body in a World? Brainbound versus Enactive Views of Experience”, *Philosophical Topics*, 39 (1):163-180.

- Tomberlin, James (ed.), 1990, *Philosophical Perspectives, 4. Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind*. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing.
- Tye, Michael, 1984, "The Adverbial Theory of Visual Experience", *Philosophical Review*, 93: 195–225.
- , 1995, *Ten Problems of Consciousness*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- , 2000, *Consciousness, Color and Content*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- , 2015, "Yes, Phenomenal Character Really is out there in the World", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 91(2): 483–488.
- Valberg, J.J., 1992, *The Puzzle of Experience*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Van Fraassen, Bas C., 1980, *The Scientific Image*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- White, A.R., 1961, "The Causal Theory of Perception", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 35: 153–68.
- Williamson, Timothy, 1990, *Identity and Discrimination*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- , 1995, "Is Knowing a State of Mind?", *Mind*, 104(415): 533–565.
- Wiggins, David, 1980, *Sameness and Substance*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- , 2001, *Sameness and Substance Renewed*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Winer, G.A. and Cottrell, J.E., 1996, "Does Anything Leave the Eye When We See?: Extramission Beliefs of Children and Adults", *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 5(5): 137–42.
- Winer, G.A., Cottrell, J.E., Gregg, V., Fournier, J.S., Bica, L.A., 2002, "Fundamentally Misunderstanding Visual Perception: Adults' Belief in Visual Emissions", *American Psychologist*, 57(6–7): 417–24.
- Wollheim, Richard, 1987, *Painting as an Art*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.