Counter-culture as an Explanation of Jewish Violence and Civil Disobedience in Israel.

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ABSTRACT

The phenomenon of Jewish political violence and civil disobedience in Israel is a current issue, with incidents taking place on a regular basis. Yet, it remains under-researched and does not receive much attention, particularly outside of Israel. This thesis makes a contribution to academic knowledge by drawing attention to this issue and elaborating on the existing literature. As such, this thesis explains Jewish political violence and civil disobedience in Israel using the counter-culture framework. It supports the claims by data obtained through interviews conducted in Israel with members of the counter-culture communities to determine the extent to which counter-culture influences Jewish political violence and civil disobedience in Israel.

This research is based on the hypothesis that mainstream Israeli Jewish culture opposes violence whereas the counter-culture communities, Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) and Dati Leumi (religious Zionist), reject the peace process and democratic principles the mainstream culture endorses. These groups, when presented with a crisis that is framed as catastrophic by leaders, are more likely to perpetrate violence and engage in civil disobedience.

The main objective of this thesis is to develop and build on the counter-culture framework drafted by Pedahzur and Perliger. This research builds on the framework in order to understand how living in counter-culture communities influences its members and to find out these groups' characteristics and their attitudes towards political developments and their responses towards crises of a political and religious nature. Therefore, the central research question this thesis aims to answer is:

How does the counter-culture framework explain Jewish political violence and civil disobedience in Israel between the start of the Second Palestinian Intifada until the 2015 Israeli legislative election?

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

IDF – Israel Defense Forces

IDI – The Israel Democracy Institute

JDL – Jewish Defense League

MK – Member of Knesset

ODS – Operation Defensive Shield

PA – Palestinian Authority

PIJ – Palestinian Islamic Jihad

PLO – Palestine Liberation Organisation

UTJ – United Torah Judaism

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

WZO – World Zionist Organization

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GLOSSARY

Aliyah – a Jewish immigration to Israel, literally "ascent"

Ashkenazi (Jews) – Jews of Central/Eastern European origin. Plural: Ashkenazim

Bagrut – an Israeli matriculation certificate

Bat Ayin – a settlement in Judea, home to Bat Ayin underground group

Bayit Yehudi/ HaBayit HaYehudi – a Dati Leumi party, literally "the Jewish Home"

Brit Hakanaim – a theocratic Jewish underground group, operated in Israel in 1950s. Literally "Covenant of the Zealots"

Cheder (heder) – a traditional Jewish primary school

Dati Leumi (Jews) – religious Zionist/national religious. Plural: Datiim Leumim

Eretz Israel – the Land of Israel

Gemara – rabbinical commentary on the Mishnah, forming the second part of the Talmud

Gush Emunim – a Dati Leumi movement advocating Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank, literally "Block of the Faithful"

Gush Katif – a bloc of 17 Israeli settlements in Gaza that were destroyed in 2005 as part of the disengagement process

Halacha/Halakha – the Jewish religious law/Jewish legal system, the foundational texts of which are the Torah (the Pentateuch) and the Talmud

Hamahane – a theocratic Jewish underground group, operated in Israel in 1950s. Literally "the Camp"

Haredi (Jews) – ultra-Orthodox, literally "God-fearing". Plural: Haredim

Hassidic/Hasidic movement – an Orthodox spiritual revivalist movement that emerged in Eastern Europe in the 18th century, literally "pious"

Hiloni (Jews) – secular. Plural: Hilonim

Irgun – a Zionist paramilitary organisation using terrorist tactics during the Mandatory Palestine. Also known as Etzel. Literally "The National Military Organization in the Land of Israel"

Jewish Underground – a right-wing oriented Jewish terrorist organisation

Kabalah – a system of Jewish mysticism

Kach movement – a hard-line Israeli political group, denoted by the US State Department as a terrorist group

Kashrut – a set of Jewish religious dietary laws

Kibbutz – a collective agricultural settlement. Plural: kibbutzim

Kolel – an advanced Talmudic study institution for married students

Knesset – the Israeli parliament

Lehi – a Zionist paramilitary organisation using terrorist tactics during the Mandatory Palestine. Also known as the Stern Gang. Literally "Fighters for the Freedom of Israel"

Litaim – Litvaks or the Lithuanian Jews, the term used to describe non-Hassidic Ashkenazi style of learning

Mamlachti – statist, state

Masorti (Jews) – traditional, neither secular nor particularly observant. Plural: Masortim

Matzpen – an anti-Zionist Marxist movement, literally "The Socialist Organization in Israel"

Mishnah – the edited record of the complex body of material known as oral Torah

Mitnagdim – opposers of Hassidism. A group of Haredi, non-Hassidic Jews. Literally "Opposers"

Mitzvah – a sacred duty. Plural: mitzvot

Mizrachi/Mizrahi (Jews) – Oriental, Eastern Jews, of the Middle Eastern or North African origin. Plural: Mizrahim

Mizrachi/Mizrahi (the Mizrahi movement) – a global religious zionist movement, a religious movement within the World Zionist Organization, acronym for merkaz ruchani, literally "spiritual centre"

Moser – an informer

Nakba – a Palestinian term for the establishment of Israel. Literally "disaster"

Noahide laws (seven laws of Noah) – laws for all of humanity

Pikuah nefesh – a mandate to preserve life

Pulsa denurah – a religious curse that originates in Kabbalistic mysticism, literally "whip of fire"

Rabbanut – the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, the supreme rabbinic and spiritual authority for Judaism in Israel

Rebbe – a charismatic leader of a Hassidic sect, sometimes also known as a tzaddik, or a righteous man.

Rodef – a pursuer

Sabra – a native Israeli

Sephardi (Jews) – Jews of Spanish, Portuguese as well as North African/Middle Eastern origin. Plural: Sephardim

Shabbat/Shabbes – Sabbath, Saturday. Holy day in Judaism

Shas – a Haredi political party. Acronym for Shomere Torah. Literally "Observing Sephardim"

Shidduch – a marriage match

Shin Bet/Shabak – the Israeli Security Agency

Streiml (shtreimel) – a fur hat mainly worn by the married men

Tag mehir – a price tag attack

Talmud – the summary of oral law, it has two main components: the Mishnah, and the commentary on the Mishnah, known as the Talmud (or Gemara)

Tanakh – the Hebrew Bible, it is composed of the Torah, Prophets (Nevi'im) and the Writings (Ketuvim)

Torah – the written Torah, the Pentateuch (the Five Books of Moses)

Tzniut – Jewish modesty laws of dress and behaviour

Ulpans – a Hebrew language school for immigrants

United Torah Judaism – a Haredi political party, composed of two parties: Degel HaTorah and Agudat Israel

Yad Vashem – the World Holocaust Remembrance Center, based in Jerusalem, Israel

Yesha Council – an organisation formed to promote Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Yeshiva – a religious seminary

1 Introduction

God said to Abram . . . :

> I will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you; I will make your name great, and you shall be a blessing. I will bless those who bless you and curse him that curses you; And all the families of the earth shall bless themselves by you (Genesis, 12:2-3).

The phenomenon of Jewish political violence and civil disobedience in Israel is a current issue, with incidents taking place on a regular basis. Yet, it remains under-researched and does not receive much attention, particularly outside of Israel. This thesis makes a contribution to academic knowledge by drawing attention to this issue and elaborating on the existing literature. As such, this thesis explains Jewish political violence and civil disobedience in Israel using the counter-culture framework. It supports the claims by data obtained through interviews conducted in Israel with members of the counter-culture communities to determine the extent to which counter-culture influences Jewish political violence and civil disobedience in Israel. The first step this thesis takes is to build on the counter-culture framework drafted by Pedahzur and Perliger in the book *Jewish Terrorism in Israel* (2009). This framework distinguishes between the mainstream population and counter-culture communities, with the latter being the focus of this thesis. Thus the thesis focuses on two factions of the Israeli Jewish population: Dati Leumi (national religious/religious Zionist) and Haredi (ultra-Orthodox). As these two groups are the fastest growing groups among the Israeli Jewish population (Miskar 2017), it makes the issue of political violence, and by extension civil disobedience, even more pressing because this population growth will influence the nature of Israeli politics on one hand and may lead to more frequent violent attacks on the other. This thesis argues, and demonstrates in the subsequent chapters, that in this case,

politics, religion and violence are interlinked. As such, topics like a two-state solution, settlements withdrawal, religious sources and edicts, and threat perception are covered within three empirical chapters, with each one focusing on one of the three areas outlined above.

This chapter introduces this thesis and its main focus on Jewish political violence and civil disobedience. It outlines the development of the phenomenon, including differences from Palestinian political violence. It explains the complexity of the issue, defines the time frame covered in this thesis and major problems associated with Jewish political violence. It briefly outlines the theory used in this thesis as well as the research questions and main hypothesis deployed.

1.1 Scope and Purpose

Since its foundation in 1948, Israel has been involved in numerous wars, conflicts, territorial disputes, and waves of political violence/terrorism. The Israel-Palestine conflict has claimed the lives of many Israelis, Palestinians and others. Although the exact number is nearly impossible to obtain, the estimates are that at least 14,265 Israelis were killed between 1948 and 2014, and 87,840 Arabs, including Palestinians, were killed during the same period (Jewish Virtual Library n.d. b). Whilst this thesis does not focus on the Israel-Palestine conflict (or the wider Arab-Israeli conflict), the conflict has influenced political violence carried out in Israel.

This thesis focuses on Dati Leumi communities and Haredi communities, which are two major camps among (Orthodox) religious Jews in Israel. Each has its own subdivisions (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 14). Therefore, this thesis does not argue that the communities are homogenous or even that the entire group has all the characteristics of counter-culture, which is this thesis'

premise of how political violence in Israel is perpetrated. However, despite many subgroups and divisions, trends can still be established within the two major camps.

First of all, the scope of this thesis needs to be defined, including political violence and civil disobedience. These concepts may encompass various acts, with the definitions below providing some clarity as to what these two concepts include.

Having looked for a definition that would be most comprehensive, this thesis adopts the definition of political violence as proposed by Mars:

> the concept of political violence as distinct from violence in general has come to represent a combination of all or most of the following elements:
> (a) Activities carried out by aggregates of individuals such as a group or collective movement.
> (b) Activities which tend to be more organized in contrast to the completely unorganized or spontaneous type of activities.
> (c) Activities which tend to challenge the legitimacy of the governing regime, thus threatening the stability of the political system as a whole.
> (d) Activities directed toward changes either of the governing regime itself, or of aspects of the political system as a whole.
> (e) Activities involving a high probability of resistance and coercive reaction by the governing regime.
> (f) Activities involving a high degree of risk of injury and economic cost to both the participants and the opponents in the political violence process (Mars 1975: 228).

As for civil disobedience, this thesis adops the most inclusive definition that refers to:

> any act of public defiance of a law or policy enforced by established governmental authorities insofar as the action is premeditated, understood by the actors to be illegal or of contested legality carried out and persisted in for limited public ends and by way of carefully chosen and limited means (Bay 1971: 76).

Overall, this thesis focuses on views related to political violence and civil disobedience during a specific time-period: between the

start of the Second Palestinian Intifada until the 2015 Israel legislative election. The selection of period under study is based on the theoretical framework that suggests that the crises the counter-culture communities perceive as catastrophic will lead to violence. These crises are usually a peace process, government initiative or Palestinian violence. It is therefore logical that one such crisis should serve as a starting point for the time frame of this thesis: the Second Intifada. It was a crisis that threatened the entire Jewish population, due to a rise in Palestinian terrorist attacks. Therefore, the time period looked at in this thesis is from 28 September 2000 (Ariel Sharon's infamous visit to the Temple Mount which is considered to mark the start of the Second Intifada) until the 2015 Israeli legislative election, i.e. 17 March 2015. The legislative elections have the potential to impact the character and direction of the state for four years, therefore the 2015 election was chosen as a cut off point for the thesis, leaving almost 15 years in total to be looked at.

As the focus is on political violence and civil disobedience, the violence perpetrated by the state actors such as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is omitted from this thesis, as per the definitions above. This leaves political violence and civil disobedience perpetrated by non-state actors only. However, this does not exclude members of the IDF off-duty.

When compared, there are several differences between Palestinian and Jewish Israeli violence that identify the more complex nature of Jewish political violence, which makes it intriguing to study.

Unlike Jewish political violence, Palestinian terrorism has been at the centre of attention for decades, stirring the interest of scholars, statesmen and the wider public, both in Israel and globally. Studies have been undertaken to identify motivations for partaking in Palestinian terrorism. For instance Moghadam identified several motivations, such as religious (including Jihad, considering infidels or Judaism as enemies, glorifying death and

martyrdom, etc.), personal (elevated status after death, benefits to the martyr's family, revenge, regaining dignity, etc.), economic, as well as nationalist motives (Moghadam 2003: 69-75). Unlike Moghadam, Kimhi and Even argue that terrorists with a nationalist cause are usually associated with a secular organisation, such as Fatah (Kimhi and Even 2004: 824-828). The centrality of nationalism is reflected by statements by Palestinian political leaders (Moghadam 2003: 74). The nationalist cause is promoted by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which was established to represent the Palestinian national movement with the aim of establishing the State of Palestine (Permanent Observer Mission of the State of Palestine to the United Nations n.d.).

Compared to Palestinian terrorism, where nationalism is one of the central motives (Moghadam 2003: 74), modern Jewish political violence does not arise from the need to liberate or establish a new country. Israel as an independent and sovereign country does not need to fight for independence or freedom, at least not in the traditional meaning of the word. Therefore, this thesis argues that despite being part of the state and even taking part in national politics, Haredi and Dati Leumi communities to an extent reject the state. This comes from the communities' worldviews that stand in opposition to those of State of Israel, which was founded on the principles of secular ideology. These communities seek to try and impose their own worldviews.

The other difference between Palestinian and Jewish political violence (that tactics of terrorism are a part of) is public support for violence. Support from the Palestinian population for Palestinian violence against the Jewish population is relatively high and stable. Between 1994-1996 a third of the polled Palestinians supported suicide operations, and after 2000, two-thirds did (Bloom 2004: 65). According to research conducted by Sharvit *et al.* (2015), during the Second Palestinian Intifada support for the Intifada peaked at 84% in March 2002 and was at

its lowest in May 2005 at 53% (Sharvit *et al.* 2015: 77). The conclusion that can be drawn from these numbers is that the mainstream Palestinian society supports Palestinian terrorism.

On the other hand, Jewish Israeli political violence does not receive the support of the general, mainstream, population. Instead, the general public and politicians condemn it. For instance, according to the survey conducted by the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research in October 2011 on a sample of 606 Jewish Israeli respondents, only 10% of the Jewish Israeli population was either somewhat or very supportive of *tag mehir* "price tag"[1] activities by the settler groups. As Jones describes, the term "settler" has become synonymous with an ideology and unwillingness to compromise over the partition of the land (Jones 2013: 204). *Tag mehir* activities include uprooting trees, burning mosques, etc., in response to hostile acts by the Palestinians (Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute)[2]. In addition to this, Israeli politicians, as representatives of the mainstream culture, often condemn acts of Jewish political violence. For instance, the firebomb attack of 31 July 2015 by Jewish settlers on a Palestinian village in the West Bank that resulted in casualties, including the death of a baby, was condemned by the Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Rivlin and the Defense Minister Ya'alon, who promised to fight Jewish terror (Margalit 2015). Therefore, the conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the mainstream Israeli society does not support Jewish political violence.

Another difference that makes the issue of Jewish political violence considerably more complex than the Palestinian one, is that it is particularly difficult to identify a case of political

[1] The US Department of State defines price tag attacks as 'property crimes and violent acts by extremist Jewish individuals and groups in retaliation for activity they deemed to be anti-settlement' (US Department of State 2016: 183).
[2] See Appendix C, Table 10-1.

violence.[3] Notably, the overall number of acts of Jewish political violence is unknown, which presents challenges as well as provides opportunities for further research, as outlined in Subchapter 9.4.

In comparison, Palestinian violence and terrorism are tracked more vigorously. For instance, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs compiles a comprehensive list of victims of Palestinian terrorism. Between 28 September 2000 and 15 March 2015 (i.e. the time period this thesis mostly focuses on), 1,293 people died as a result of Palestinian terrorism in Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d.). However, there is no such comprehensive list that contains data on Jewish political violence. In contrast, those acts that would be classified as political violence and civil disobedience on the Palestinian side, often go unreported in the case of Jewish perpetrators . For instance, As the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* reported (David 2015), incidents are only counted if damage or casualties are reported. They range from uprooting trees, destroying fields, stone throwing, and arson to physical attacks. Despite Israel's commitment to contain Jewish extremism, human rights groups report that the state fails to investigate, prosecute and convict Israeli suspects when their victims are Palestinian, contrary to what happens when Palestinian violence is perpetrated. Jewish terror suspects are tried in civilian courts, can be bailed and prepare their defence at home, while Palestinians face military tribunals (David 2015).

However, even though there is no official list of victims of Jewish political violence in Israel available in English, apart from "alternative" websites (i.e. pro-Palestinian websites that do not cite any official sources), this does not mean that Jewish political violence is non-existent. There have been numerous attacks by Jewish Israeli perpetrators. Therefore, modern Jewish political

[3] As Subchapter 9.4. discusses in detail, the large databases such as *RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents* or *Global Terrorism Database* do not contain all the acts of Jewish political violence. As such, certain acts of political violence perpetrated by Haredim and Datiim Leumim do not appear in these databases.

violence, its causes, motives and perpetrators, should be researched, as should civil disobedience, considering its prevalence in the recent years.

Among the more high-profile incidents in the past years, there was a deadly firebombing of a Palestinian home in the West Bank village of Duma in July 2015, which killed three members of the same family and wounded a fourth (G. Cohen and Levinson 2016). More recently, a Palestinian woman was killed in a stone-throwing attack that caused her car to crash with Jewish settlers considered as suspects (J. Magid 2018).

Whilst not all of the acts necessarily resulted in casualties, it is worth noting that there is a potential for an increase in these attacks, mainly because as this subchapter will show, the dynamics in Israeli society are changing, and the Haredi segment in particular is growing at a fast rate (Israel Democracy Institute 2016b: 6-7). The Dati Leumi segment is growing as well, however not as fast as the Haredi one (Miskar 2017).

It is the Dati Leumi sector that has received more attention, primarily due to *tag mehir* attacks that are predominantly perpetrated by Dati Leumi groups (Nir 2011: 277), with price tag being a new form of political violence perpetrated by the Hilltop Youth (Eiran and Krause 2018: 651). In addition to that, two of the most infamous acts of modern Jewish political violence were perpetrated by members of this community: the Cave of Patriarchs massacre and the assassination of the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. This does not mean, however, that the Haredi sector is violence-free. There is, again, an issue as to what is labelled as political violence. The paragraphs below contain three recent examples of Haredi violence that were not defined as political violence.

In 2015, a Haredi man living in a Haredi settlement in the West Bank stabbed six people at Jerusalem's annual Gay Pride Parade (Ettinger *et al.* 2015), one of whom died. He refused any representation in the court saying he did not recognise the court's

authority (Hasson 2016), a view that will be explained later on in the thesis whilst discussing Haredi Judaism.

There are incidents reported in early 2017 that included stone-throwing at a police patrol car, damaging the windshield; children throwing rubbish and dirty diapers; youths and adults surrounding a group of teenagers, pushing, spitting and throwing things at them. They were part of the violent community associated with anti-Zionism, a puritanical approach to Jewish law and female modesty. These are not isolated cases. In May 2017 in Beit Shemesh a Haredi youth threw a stone at a 50-year old woman, injuring her and causing her to bleed from the head (Sharon 2017).

On another recent occasion in Jerusalem, in June 2017, Haredi residents of the Mea Shearim neighbourhood threw rocks at police, injuring one officer. They also set dumpsters on fire and attempted to block roads. In addition to this, a week before the incident, a poster headlined "religious ruling" was found in the neighbourhood instructing Haredi draftees to kill female soldiers and IDF commanders. It also encouraged Haredi teenagers to commit suicide rather than be drafted (Times of Israel 2017a). As Chapter 7 demonstrates, religious rulings play an important role in these communities.

Some of the traits found in the above incidents point to arguments discussed later in the thesis, such as the importance of founding myths, and above all, counter-culture characteristics, such as the rejection of the mainstream culture and its values, including the legitimacy of the court or the army.

Most importantly, this thesis not only addresses Jewish violence against the Arab/Palestinian population, but also against their own people, which constitutes another difference crucial for this thesis, i.e. intra-Jewish violence. Whilst Palestinians have been victims of Palestinian violence, the intentional targeting of Palestinian by Palestinians is less prevalent, although not completely absent, for instance when in March 2017, three Palestinians were killed by Hamas for collaborating with Israel

(BBC News 2017).

As shown above, this thesis has highlighted that Jewish political violence does not enjoy popular support from the Jewish Israeli population, and instead is condemned by the general, mainstream public. It does not enjoy the same media coverage as the Palestinian one does, and it does not cause as many casualties as its Palestinian counterpart. Lastly, compared to Palestinian political violence, Jewish political violence is under-researched.

This thesis argues that Jewish political violence deserves equal attention. Not only it is more complex than the Palestinian one, but most importantly, it is vital to conduct more research on intra-Jewish violence in particular.

There has been an intra-religious conflict between Palestinian groups, culminating in a civil war between Fatah and Hamas (Brown 2010: 37). Several explanations are offered for the conflict. First of all, traditionally civil wars relate to groups aiming to take power (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 76). As for the Jewish groups, there are political parties representing the two mentioned communities that participate in elections, therefore in the case of Jewish groups, the conflict is not about taking power by force. Secondly, often the conflict between Hamas and Fatah is explained by secular and religious attitude to national identity, however the difference is not absolute (Brown 2010: 46-47). Regarding the Jewish communities, the differences are about the secular and religious divide. However, there has never been a civil war. Mayer acknowledges the possibility that two groups within the same religion could cooperate in some areas while being in conflict in others (Mayer 2013: 4). This thesis will show that Jewish communities can and do cooperate, for instance they do often form government coalitions together. However, the differences will also be covered and explained. Moreover, this thesis will also explain the role that the charismatic leaders play in counter-culture communities. Explaining the intra-religious conflict, De Juan argues that religious elites play a central role in

many violent conflicts which they interpret in religious terms and disseminate radical religious interpretations among the believers (De Juan 2015: 775). It is, therefore, vital that this thesis covers the intra-Jewish violence.

Intra-Jewish violence is a more recent phenomenon but Jewish political violence is not. Even though this thesis focuses on Jewish political violence since the Second Palestinian Intifada, and thus after the independent State of Israel was founded, Jewish political violence is not a modern phenomenon. Prior to the Second World War, underground (terrorist) groups that fought for independence, like Irgun or Lehi, fought both the British presence and the local Palestinian population, and eventually succeeded in achieving their goal: the creation of the independent Jewish state. However, not all the Jewish communities were happy with the nature of the state, and violence persisted. They did not agree with the democratic, secular and Zionist nature of the state and/or wanted to cleanse the state of Palestinians. Thus they attacked Palestinians, but also secular/moderate Jews whom they perceived as enemies (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 29). That is the reason why Jewish political violence is so intriguing, and differs from many other forms of political violence around the world. Palestinians as members of the competing community and religion are not the only victims of Jewish Israeli perpetrators, but so are members of their own religion.

Most importantly, the rationale for undertaking this research stems from the fact that Jewish political violence is on the rise and so is the population segment that perpetrators come from.

First of all, this is a current topic. Violence is still being perpetrated as the earlier examples showed. Furthermore, Jewish political violence is on the rise. In 2000, Pedahzur and Perliger logged 12 acts of Jewish terrorism (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 188-189), as a subgroup of political violence. In 2015, the Israeli Security Agency, Shabak/Shin Bet, reported that 16 terrorist attacks were carried out by Jewish attackers. Even though the

number of attacks did not increase from the previous year, the agency noted that both the severity of the attacks and the number of casualties increased (Shabak 2015). Moreover, the newspaper *Haaretz* reported that '"nationalist crimes", violence and property damage by Jews against Palestinians in the West Bank' (Harel 2019) are on the rise. Whilst the number was 140 for 2017, it increased to 482 for 2018 (Harel 2019), thus pointing to a rise in non-terrorist attacks, including political violence and civil disobedience.

With recent violent examples such as those already mentioned, the Israeli government announced a decision to contain Jewish extremism (Kershner 2015). At an emergency meeting, ministers 'approved the use of "all means necessary" to catch the killers, alleged to be Jewish terrorists' (Times of Israel 2015) responsible for the Duma attack. Security officials warned that the Hilltop Youth were responsible for a series of hate-crime attacks in recent years (Times of Israel 2015). As this thesis makes a case later on, the Hilltop Youth group are part of the counter-culture communities. Therefore, Jewish political violence is worth studying, and the role that living in counter-culture plays shall be explored.

Furthermore, to elaborate on the point of the importance of undertaking this study, the topic is likely to become even more relevant in future, as with the demographic changes in Israel, the dynamics are likely to change. As the Haredi population is growing, this is likely to impact Israeli politics. Toft argues that due to Israel's small size relative to its neighbours, it means that even relatively small demographic shifts may have unexpected and threatening political consequences (Toft 2012: 22). Therefore, a change in the parliament and government, leaning in favour of the Haredi or Dati Leumi parties, could thus influence the nature of the state, including domestic policy or policies to the two-state solution. Research conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) shows that the Haredi population is growing rapidly. At the end of 2015, the Haredi population comprised of

950,000 people, which is 11% of the entire Israeli population (Israel Democracy Institute 2016b: 6). That is a stark contrast to the 30,000 Haredim back in 1948 when Israel was founded (Asa-El 2016). The annual growth of Haredim is 4%, as opposed to 1% of non-Haredi Jews. On average, a Haredi woman has 6.9 children compared to 3.1 per woman from the general population (Israel Democracy Institute 2016b: 6). According to the Miskar agency, in 2017 the birth-rate of a Haredi woman was 6.7 births per woman, as compared to 3.0 among religious traditional women and 2.1 among secular women (Miskar 2017). The reason this thesis argues that the dynamics may change is that the share of Haredim as a percentage of Israel's total population (including Jewish, Arab, and other parts of the population) is predicted to be 12% in 2024, 19% in 2039 and 27% in 2059, which represents 35% of the Jewish Israeli population (Israel Democracy Institute 2016b: 7).

As for the Dati Leumi population, 10% of the entire Israeli population identify as Dati (Pew Research Centre 2016:), and the birth-rate of an average Dati Leumi woman is 4.2 children (Miskar 2017). However, a study conducted by the Chotam organisation claims that even though the Dati Leumi population has a high fertility rate, its percentage in the population does not increase due to a high dropout rate (JNi.Media 2017). This means that many members born into the community leave the community. Subsequently, with the demographic changes, support for political parties is likely to shift. The next chapter will look in detail at the political preferences of the counter-culture communities. In short, the Haredi population tends to vote for its traditional Haredi parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism. This arguably stems from a rational choice economic theory of ethnic voting behaviour, which claims that:

> a voter tends to vote for a party candidate who is a member of the same ethnic group because of the higher probability that the candidate will keep his/her political promises to members of their own ethnic community

> and, because of the lower costs of communicating with a candidate of one's own community, more effective representation of the community's interests in the parliament will likely result (Landa 1995: 436).

This thesis agrees with the above-mentioned theory, and thus it is therefore likely that the Haredi and the Dati Leumi communities will keep voting for their parties in the future, even when their numbers grow. As the previous paragraphs showed, the birth rate of the Haredi and the Dati Leumi population is significantly higher than that of the secular population. This means that while these two population segments are growing, the secular population is not. Therefore the overall percentage of these two groups out of the entire Jewish Israeli population will increase, and that of the secular population will decrease. Chapter 6, entitled "Political Trends and Developments in the Counter-culture Communities" examines the party preferences of both Haredi and Dati Leumi populations in detail. It shows that both groups lean heavily to the right on the political spectrum. Therefore it can be expected that in future Israel will be more oriented towards the right as well.

These parties often offer support to Likud in government coalitions. For instance, in the aftermath of the 2015 legislative election, Likud formed a coalition with Shas and United Torah Judaism, as well as the Jewish Home and Kulanu (Kenig 2015). Therefore it could be argued that Likud changes its rhetoric to be an appealing option for the Haredi or the Dati Leumi parties. Likud has a hardline approach to peace negotiations, as it is based on the ideology of the revisionist Zionist leader, Ze'ev Jabotinsky. For Jabotinsky, *Eretz Israel* (the Land of Israel) was a central issue (Pedahzur 2012: 22) and he believed that *Eretz Israel* should contain both banks of the Jordan river (Shindler 2001: 98), which influenced his views on territorial concessions and the peace process.

In addition to this, as is clear from Jabotinsky's 1923 article 'The Iron Wall', he disagreed with the conciliatory approach of the

Jewish community towards the Mandate authorities. Moreover, Zahar (the Alliance of Revisionists Zionists) that had been established by Jabotinsky, was considered radical and right-wing at the time of its establishment. This was mainly due to Jabotinsky's commitment to pure ethnic nationalism which contradicted mainstream Zionism (Pedahzur 2012: 22).

Another example of these hard-line positions towards a peace process includes Likud's opposition to the 1993 Oslo Accords. However, Likud did also engage in some peace effort, such as when the Wye River Memorandum was signed in 1998, ratifying the Oslo and Hebron agreements. The Memorandum was signed reluctantly by Netanyahu, who was under pressure from the Clinton administration as well as despite internal Likud disagreements and settlers' dismay. Yet, it also ultimately led to the Knesset's dissolution (Pedahzur 2012: 137-139) and Likud's loss at the next parliamentary election.

Although in 2009 Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu affirmed his support for the two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict (BBC News 2013), in 2015, just before the election, to appeal to the right-wing voters, he declared that if he was returned to office he would never establish a Palestinian state (Rudoren 2015). The question is what other concessions would Likud be willing to make if it wanted to form coalitions with the Haredi or the Dati Leumi parties in future. Therefore, with these changing dynamics, it is desirable to be aware of the characteristics of the counter-culture communities, to find out their extent of alienation and subsequently, support for violence as they are going to be influencing the future character of Israel and Middle East politics.

Lastly, as mentioned earlier, one of the reasons for undertaking this research is that this topic remains under-researched, especially compared to the Palestinian side, which is to an extent a consequence of media attention. As a result of causing more casualties, Palestinian terrorism attracts wider media attention, both outside and in Israel. For instance, the

Palestinian terrorists receive worldwide attention following airplane hijackings (Byman 2017).

Arguably there is a tendency to focus on Muslim terrorism, however this does not mean that Jewish political violence should be overlooked. For instance, Almond *et al.* suggest that while it was Islam that produced a global form of radical fundamentalism, other traditions, including Judaism have also caused movements that may be compared to Islamist ones (Almond *et al.* 2003: 5). Therefore, as the topic is under-researched, there is a great potential to discover new information, patterns, and characteristics of perpetrators of political violence. Moreover, this thesis builds on an already-existing theory and aims to expand it, looking at the time period between the Second Intifada and the 2015 election. As this research builds on the existing theory, the following subchapter provides a concise summary of the framework before it is introduced in detail in Chapter 5.

1.2 Theoretical Framework Overview

This thesis builds on the framework of Pedahzur and Perliger described in their book *Jewish Terrorism in Israel* (2009) designating the counter-culture community as the one that opposes the mainstream culture. The counter-culture framework states that religion is important, especially because perpetrators mainly come from the ultra-religious communities. However, the fact that the community lives in separation and with minimal interaction with the mainstream culture is its most defining feature. Pedahzur and Perliger note that the horizontal-type structures of the terrorist networks that engage in political violence are typical of the counter-culture. Rather than hierarchical structures, the groups are made up of friends and family (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: x-xii).

The counter-culture framework is compelling because it outlines the process leading to the perpetration of violence and includes the alienation of the perpetrators who are influenced by their social networks and leaders who frame certain crises as catastrophic.

Moreover, this thesis builds on the framework to include acts of political violence and civil disobedience, in addition to terrorism as suggested by Pedahzur and Perliger, arguing that acts of political violence and civil disobedience perpetrated in recent years can also be explained through the framework.

1.3 Aim and Original Contribution

Even though this thesis extends an existing theory, the original contribution stems from the application of the framework on civil disobedience by the Jewish Orthodox factions in addition to political violence; thorough characterisation of counter-culture; and identifying differences between the two major counter-culture communities in Israel, and how these differences translate into views related to political opinions and behaviour, religious behaviour and ultimately motivations to engage in violent behaviour. More specifically, this thesis looks at a specific timeframe between the Second Palestinian Intifada and the 2015 Israeli legislative election. In effect, this thesis argues that the counter-culture framework explains Jewish political violence and civil disobedience perpetrated by the Orthodox groups whereas other explanations as per the literature review chapter do not. This framework was chosen over others particularly because previous works of Pedahzur and Perliger demonstrated the effectiveness and usefulness of the framework in case of terrorism. Therefore, considering the groups in question remain the same, the framework was chosen to be extended to also encompass political violence and civil disobedience.

Therefore the central research question this thesis aims to answer is:

How does the counter-culture framework explain Jewish political violence and civil disobedience in Israel between the Second Palestinian Intifada and the 2015 Israeli legislative election?

As explained in Subchapter 1.1, the rationale for the time period focused on in this study is derived from the crises that have threatened the Jewish population of Israel. As such, the central research question will be answered by examining the perceptions of political, religious and existential crises throughout the 15 year period and responses of the counter-culture communities to these crises.

Secondly, as there are two counter-culture communities this thesis looks at, the second research question is:

How do the two counter-cultures', Dati Leumi's and Haredi's, different characteristics, including extent of alienation, social networks, leaders and existential crises, translate into the groups' political and religious viewpoints and their attitudes to violence and civil disobedience?

The key argument of this thesis maintains that the mainstream Israeli Jewish culture opposes violence, while the counter-culture communities such as the Haredi and the Dati Leumi communities reject the peace process and the democratic principles the mainstream culture endorses. When presented with a crisis that is framed as catastrophic, these groups are more likely to perpetrate violence (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: x-xii).

The objectives of this thesis are two-fold: to develop and build on

the existing framework and to explore how living in counter-culture influences perpetrators of violence and civil disobedience. To meet the objectives of this thesis and thus to answer the two research questions, qualitative research has been undertaken. The thesis has been structured as outlined in the following subchapter.

1.4 Thesis Structure

This thesis is composed of nine chapters, with each one contributing to a better understanding of the topic.

Chapter 1 provides a rationale for this research, it sets out the original contribution of this thesis and outlines the scope and purpose of this thesis, and also introduces the concept of counter-culture.

Chapter 2 explains the choice of methods used in this thesis, including the data collection and analysis process. At the same time, it highlights the challenges encountered while working on the thesis, including fieldwork.

Chapter 3 provides the historical and religious context for the thesis. This chapter addresses the historical significance of events that have influence on the actions of modern day perpetrators of political violence in Israel, such as founding myths. Apart from highlighting the importance of history, this chapter lays down the foundations for the subsequent chapters, particularly the theory chapter by introducing the two Jewish counter-culture groups this thesis focuses on, and outlines their belief systems and characteristics.

Chapter 4 serves to explain major debates in the field and critically assess them, and it sets out how this thesis contributes to the literature, including that on political violence, civil disobedience, and radicalism and fundamentalism, ethnic conflict and sectarian violence, nationalism and Zionism.

Chapter 5 provides a theoretical overview of the counter-culture framework, which is the backbone of this thesis and looks at the concepts of alienation, social networks, leaders and crises.

There are three main empirical chapters that bridge the theoretical framework, wider literature and interview data to explain how radicalisation develops. The empirical chapters deal with three core themes that the interviews were based on and are tied to the theoretical chapter: politics, religion and violence. However, whilst they are interlinked, each piece makes a contribution in its own right.

Chapter 6, the first empirical chapter, examines political trends and developments in the Israeli Jewish counter-culture communities. However, to understand the position of the counter-culture communities, the chapter first establishes the trends in Israeli society as a whole. It defines the mainstream culture and outlines how the counter-culture population's views deviate from the mainstream population. In addition to that, the chapter establishes the link of the communities to right-wing ideology, and lastly it shows how these views feed into the communities' outlook on the political crises, the two-state solution and settlements withdrawal. These views on the political developments are to a great extent influenced by religious views.

Thus, the first issue that the second empirical chapter, Chapter 7, addresses is how people's religious views influence political views, and how it translates into the daily lifestyle of the counter-culture communities. Coming from that, the chapter identifies the role of religious leaders. However, as it is not only leaders who influence people's views and opinions, this chapter also explores religious sources and concludes on a similar note as the first empirical chapter, and looks at crises that can trigger violence.

The final empirical chapter, Chapter 8, focuses on the main motivations for counter-culture violence by aiming to establish the link between a threat perception and a threat response, including a violent action.

Lastly, Chapter 9 as the last chapter of this thesis summarises findings of the thesis, and lays out ideas for further research.

This thesis now moves on to discuss methodology, providing a detailed account of why and how this thesis has been approached.

2 Methodology

2.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the process of both collecting and analysing data, including the fieldwork preparation process, with a particular focus on research ethics. To accomplish this goal, this chapter explains the choice of research design and methods and why they can appropriately answer the research questions.

This is a qualitative study using the case study approach, which is based on semi-structured interviews with counter-culture groups in Israel, non-participant observation and analysis of field notes, all of which were examined using a thematic analysis. These methods were used as they help to answer the research questions better than the other methods. This chapter will show that the other methods, such as structured interviews or surveys were not feasible. Three empirical chapters look in depth at the themes that arose from the interview data. Apart from the issues most research projects experience, such as validity, reliability, and various limitations, there were also multiple ethical issues that arose due to the nature of the project, in particular access and security.

The next section looks at how the objectives of this project are reflected in the research design and how the project is structured.

2.2 Research Design

This qualitative project is based on three case studies that deal with three interlinked themes: politics, religion and violence. The research design thus uses case studies to obtain information and

apply the counter-culture framework on real cases. This section clarifies the selection of case studies, time period and events under study.

As this project studies characteristics, perceptions and behaviour of the counter-culture communities, qualitative research gives better insight into their lifestyle than the quantitative one (Merriam 2014: 40, 266). The use of case studies is a particularly suitable choice, as case studies allow for an in-depth analysis of a complex issue on a limited number of cases (Merriam 2014: 40, 266). Bryman adds that the most common use of a case study is linked to a location, such as a community or an organisation with emphasis on an examination of the setting (Bryman 2012: 67). As the focus of this research is on the counter-culture communities, the case study is clearly a useful tool. This thesis is comprised of three case studies that shed light on three major interlinked issues that influence each other in turn.

Considering the objectives of this thesis, the next section explains the choice of methods used in this project.

2.3 Research Methods

In addition to the primary and secondary sources available through the university library and the Internet, this thesis utilised ethnographic research methods, which also included undertaking fieldwork in Israel. The methods used in this thesis are semi-structured interviews, non-participant observation and analysis of field notes. There is a benefit of using these methods, as the combination of several methods within a study can be an important means of limiting error (Murphy 2003: 181).

2.3.1 Fieldwork

This section lays out details about the fieldwork, including its duration and information about the sites where it was conducted. In addition to this, it outlines the preparation process prior to this fieldwork, it presents what had to be done during the fieldwork, and finally, it finishes with what needed to be done after its completion. This sets the background for the following sections about the interviews and non-participant observation that were conducted during the fieldwork.

Duration

Fieldwork took place between 15 May 2017 and 28 July 2017, for a total of 74 days, during which 21 members of the Haredi and the Dati Leumi communities were interviewed. During this time, non-participant observation was also undertaken and documented with field notes.

Research sites

Locations that were determined to be the main research and residence sites were largely determined by the UK Foreign Office travel advice website that did not recommend travelling to the Occupied Territories, and certain other parts of Israel. Therefore, while for instance many incidents as pointed out in the Introduction chapter take place in the West Bank, for safety reasons it was not possible to visit the area at all. As it was not possible to leave Israel proper, the focus was on three biggest cities in Israel with different population dynamics:

- Jerusalem

Jerusalem as Israel's de facto capital city is also Israel's largest city. The city was chosen as the main point to conduct fieldwork considering its demographic dynamics, especially since 32% of Jews living in Jerusalem identify as Haredi and 17% as Dati (Grave-Lazi 2016). This is much higher than Israel's average of 9% and 13%, respectively (Pew Research Center 2016: 7), which

in theory could have increased the chances of securing more interviews. At the same time, with numerous Haredi neighbourhoods, it was a valuable place to do participant observation. Moreover, in addition to the one third of Haredim, another one third of its population are Arab-Palestinians (Alfasi and Fenster 2005: 354), showing dynamics between religious Jews and Arab Israelis/Palestinians.

- Tel Aviv

Tel Aviv as the second biggest city in Israel has a completely different character. There is a vivid nightlife as opposed to Jerusalem's spirituality (The Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs 2015). Tel Aviv is a secular city and neither national nor religious identities are considered important in social life. Arab-Palestinians create only 4% of the city's population (Alfasi and Fenster 2005: 352, 354).

- Haifa

Haifa is the third biggest city in Israel, but it is mainly known to be a place of co-existence between Jews and Arabs (The Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs 2015) or as one interviewee put it 'you could say that Haifa is the only place in the whole country where you can nearly see what coexistence would look like' (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017). Therefore there are different dynamics as when compared to the rest of the country.

In addition to these cities, one interview was conducted in the city of Rishon LeZion with a resident of Jerusalem, who preferred to be interviewed there. It was originally envisioned to visit other cities as well, for instance Bnei Brak and Beit Shemesh which have predominantly Haredi population. However an absence of local contacts prevented this researcher from visiting these areas, especially in case a dangerous situation arose. However, even though interviewees were interviewed in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa and Rishon LeZion, they resided in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Beit Shemesh and the West Bank.

Non-participant observation was conducted and field notes were taken as part of the fieldwork. The non-participant observation was conducted where the interviews took place, but also in public places, such as streets, museums, buses, synagogues and other places with secular, mixed, as well as a purely Orthodox population.

Fieldwork checklist

A fieldwork checklist was created and followed based on Norman's recommendations (2009: 85-86), regarding what to do before, during and even after the fieldwork.

Before fieldwork there was an emphasis on developing a sound understanding of the conflict dynamics context of the research; acquiring at least a minimum proficiency in the Hebrew language and research skills and mitigating possible ethical issues and barriers to trust development (Norman 2009: 85-86). This included regularly checking security developments in the region; reading extensively about the conflict, attending Hebrew classes and passing the methodological training in the first year of the PhD studies.

It was also equally important to constantly monitor the conflict dynamics and the security situation during fieldwork. Norman emphasises the need to clearly explain objectives of the research and get consent from the participants, and ensure their confidentiality and security (Norman 2009: 86). Whilst consent, confidentiality and security were secured for every interview, and the guarantee of anonymity and secure data storage were outlined in the consent form, the true purpose of the research was not stated in the information sheet or the consent form as it would have caused additional access issues. This was done in order to improve the participant recruitment progress and to minimise participant withdrawal from the study. Thus, had the potential participants known the topic is associated with Jewish political violence, they could have assumed they were suspected of, or associated with violent activities. This negative association would

have also most likely affected the snowballing approach chosen for this study, as participants would not have been willing to introduce their own contacts. In addition to that, to explicitly state what the research is about could have contributed to data bias as participants may not answer the questions truthfully. Therefore, as Section 2.4.2 outlines in more detail, participants were told the study dealt with diversity in Israeli society. After all, this research focuses primarily on the counter-culture element, rather than political violence itself.

After completing the fieldwork, Norman suggests providing feedback to participants and preserving confidentiality in written reports and dissemination of findings (Norman 2009: 86). While being cautious when presenting findings or sending any materials to publishers, etc., there is no intention to provide feedback nor send copies of the thesis to the participants. If the participants received copies of the thesis they would find out the real purpose and nature of the interviews and the thesis, and they could decide to withdraw their answers or potentially take legal action for not being told the true purpose. However, interviews conducted in Israel did not directly focus on the political violence aspect of the thesis but rather on the counter-culture aspect, and therefore the level of information provided to participants was not misleading. Nevertheless, a few participants said they were keen on reading the thesis once published, which will be mitigated by restricting access on the Nottingham e-theses database once the thesis is submitted for three years as allowed by the university guidelines, and mitigated in the publication process by emphasising that all data has been anonymised.

2.3.2 Semi-structured interviews

There are a number of reasons why interviews were chosen as the primary research method. Interviews provide the ability to access what happens in the world, what people do in real life.

Interviews are a method for accessing people's attitudes and values that cannot be observed in questionnaires (Silverman 2006: 113-114). Qualitative interviews seek to understand the subjects' life experiences in great depth, coherence, and density (Gu 2012: 507). Therefore interviews are the most advantageous method for this research that deals with communities' attitudes and values that are sought to be explored in depth.

Out of three types of interviews (structured, semi-structured and unstructured) semi-structured were chosen, being seen as the most beneficial type and the right choice for this type of study for several key reasons. Semi-structured interviews are often used to illustrate a specific case or event, or to explore perceptions in more depth (Lemke and Bellows 2012: 323-324), which was another benefit, as this study asked (indirectly) about specific events of political violence and political views.

Semi-structured interviews brought benefits such as consistency, but also a level of flexibility and ability to develop rapport with interviewees. All the participants were asked to set the date and place that would suit them, and the researcher always accommodated their requests. Therefore, on some occasions interviews took place in busy, noisier venues, such as restaurants or cafés, which ultimately impacted the transcription process as well as results, as some words were difficult to identify as the background noise was too loud. However, less than 0.5% of words could not be transcribed. The interviews were conducted in English as discussed in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.5.

The interview questions consisted of both closed and open-ended questions. The closed questions were useful to understand and compare trends between and within different religious streams, while open-ended questions, as Silverman rightly points out, helped to get a better understanding of interviewees' views, their interpretation of events, experiences, and opinions (Silverman 2006: 114).

Ideally, to maximise the validity of the research design, it

would have been useful to interview people of different gender, age, education (Reeves *et al.* 2008), however, this was not possible due to access issues, as discussed in detail in Subchapter 2.4.

Participants were given code names to be used throughout the thesis to ensure their anonymity. Names were chosen to represent their religious stream and original names, for instance, if the real name originated in Yiddish, a code name was picked from the pool of Yiddish names.

Haredi participants:

Female:	Male:
Chava	Itzik
Sheina	Asher
Rivka	Yirmiyahu
Leah	Shlomo
Daniella	Jacob
Shoshana	

Dati Leumi participants:

Female:	Male:
Rachel	Ari
Efrat	Daniel
Tamar	Isaac
	Joseph
	Avi
	Uri
	Aaron

2.3.3 Ethnography: non-participant observation and field notes

This thesis utilises an ethnographic approach to the fieldwork. Campbell and Lassiter report that ethnography can allow researchers to participate in the lives of others, observe and document people and events (Campbell and Lassiter 2015: 1). This would ideally be the most appropriate approach to answer the research questions, and become part of the community for a limited time. However, this was not feasible, as to get a better picture of several communities, this would require several years of living in the community and getting rid of the outsider status. Therefore, due to security, access and time issues it was not possible to be living in the communities or participating in the communities' daily life.

As an alternative, non-participant observation was chosen in place of doing traditional ethnography and thus limiting risks associated with it, for instance in the case of participant observation this may mean getting too involved in the lives of communities, and violating cultural norms. This thesis limited the ethnographic elements to non-participant observation and use of field notes.

Yet, even non-participant observation gave insight into the social dynamics and situations that show relationships within communities as well as towards outsiders. It allowed the researcher to record activities and the physical settings in which activities, such as the treatment of outsiders or reactions to governmental activities, take place and thus enable information about the behaviour of individuals or groups to be obtained (Lemke and Bellows 2012: 324). For instance, when walking around Jerusalem or traveling on the bus in casual clothes (yet still modest, but not according to rules of Jewish modesty, i.e. long trousers and long-sleeved t-shirt), Haredi women did not dare to sit next to this researcher. However, when wearing long

skirt and long-sleeved blouse, women were willing to sit or even talk to this researcher (Field notes, Israel, 25 June 2017). Behaviour like this, reluctance to engage or even be in physical proximity to people who are perceived as immoral or immodest due to not being or not looking Orthodox, is linked to the theory chapter and alienation characteristic of counter-culture communities.

The purpose of ethnographic research is to provide detailed descriptions of the social setting being investigated and commitment to understand events and behaviour (Bryman 2003: 62-63). Thus, by using non-participant observation, events were observed as they happened, which helped to understand dynamics between groups of people and see how the environment surrounding them affects them. Moreover, Mason suggests that by observing participants, researchers can pick up verbal and non-verbal cues about the social situation, visual and spatial dynamics and the mood of interviewee (Mason 2002: 75). Guest *et al.* recommend general things to observe, such as appearance, which could indicate membership in groups, verbal behaviour and interactions, physical behaviour and gestures, personal space, human traffic and people who stand out (Guest *et al.* 2012: 91-92). This proved valuable as it helped to categorise which counter-culture community participants belonged to and how they differed from members of the same group that were not interviewed.

To an extent, ethnography is about understanding the participants' world and culture. It requires cultural sensitivity as the interviewees and the interviewer come from different worlds. When a researcher makes the effort to learn the interviewees' language, it is appreciated and the rapport between the two parties can be more easily established (Gu 2012: 508, 515). It was why it was crucial that a 22-week Hebrew language course was completed in the first year of the PhD, which ultimately helped to build trust with the communities during fieldwork and was an excellent conversation starter.

In addition to the non-participant observation, this thesis makes use of another ethnographic feature: field notes. As Campbell and Lassiter suggest, field notes help to keep track of fieldwork experiences and enable to revisit them, leading to new insights (Campbell and Lassiter 2015: 54). As Mason confirms, ethnographers can reflect on their experiences and perceptions and see them as part of the data, including their own record of observations, interpretations and experiences of interview (Mason 2002: 77). Therefore, a reflexive journal included in the field notes was maintained throughout fieldwork, as well as after the fieldwork, during the analysis stage. Notes were categorised, adding understanding to information obtained through interviews. Thus overall, reflection on field notes served as data in itself, experiences of interviews as well as why reflecting on why some interviews did not go ahead, and how participants behaved, and understanding one's own actions.

2.4 Challenges

There were methodological challenges and limitations associated with this thesis. This included validity, reliability and generalisability, ethics, security, language and access barriers.

2.4.1 Methodological limitations

There were limitations in the choice of methods, in addition to the used methods. If there had been no financial, language and access barriers, it would have been useful to conduct a large number survey of randomly selected participants. However, even this would have had limitations as the majority of the Haredi population does not have access to the Internet or has limited

access. Therefore the survey would have had to be contacted in person using questionnaires, and the same barriers as for the interviews would apply, but in addition to that, the number of people necessary to complete the survey would have to be much higher.

This study consisted of 21 participants, therefore it cannot be considered a representative sample of the population. However, despite the small sample size, the number is big enough to be indicative of trends among the Haredi and the Dati Leumi communities. The term "trend" will be used throughout this thesis to delineate indications of patterns within the communities whereas the term "representative" will be used to assert there is a clearer pattern of ongoing behaviour within the communities.
Overall, even given the small sample size, an indication of "trends" can be useful. For instance, in their study, Guest *et al.* determined that at least 12 interviews were sufficient to ensure research validity (Guest *et al.* 2006: 61, 65). On the other hand, Warren's position is that for a qualitative interview study to be published, the minimum number of interviews should be between 20 and 30 (Warren 2002: 99, cited in Bryman 2012: 425). In contrast, Dukes recommends three to 10 participants in a phenomenological study (Dukes 1984: 200) and Ray recommends between eight and 12 people (Ray 1994, cited in Sim *et al.* 2018: 621). Therefore, 21 interviews should provide a sufficient insight into the phenomenon such as the counter-culture communities. In addition to this, people who agreed to be interviewed are not representative of their own community for one important reason – that they were willing to be interviewed in the first place. As the theory chapter emphasises and the participants themselves reiterated, representative members of the communities, particularly Haredi ones, do not interact with outsiders.

Another methodological issue related to the sample of people who were interviewed included language. Despite taking

Hebrew evening classes for eight months and passing the Hebrew exam with the score of 85%, proficiency in the language remained basic and not sufficient to undertake interviews in Hebrew. However, basic knowledge of the language helped to build rapport with people and gain access to the communities. As a result, only people who spoke English were interviewed, thus this excluded a great number of people who do not speak English. Moreover, even though all the participants were Israeli, 11 participants were not born in Israel, i.e. 52.4 % of interviewed people were not born in Israel, but in the United States, United Kingdom, South Africa and France and therefore there was some selection bias. In comparison, in 2017, 25% of the total Jewish population in Israel was born outside Israel (Jewish Virtual Library n.d. a).

Therefore, as with most qualitative projects, there is a question about validity, reliability and generalisability.

In addition to the issues mentioned above, as Silverman points out, interview data do not give us access to facts (Silverman 2006: 117). However, it should be highlighted that the objective of the qualitative projects is to take the subject's perspective (Bryman 2003: 61). Therefore it should be taken into consideration, and even in cases when a participant said something factually incorrect, whether on purpose or not, it should be itself considered as data. An example of that is for instance a participant saying, without providing any factual evidence or source, that Palestinians do not exist as a nation or that Palestinians do not want to live in an independent state. Bryman also points out the issue with external validity or generalisability in the case study approach, such as this one, as a single case cannot be representative of the entire group and findings may not be applied more generally to other cases (Bryman 2012: 69).

The researcher's own presence also impacted the data. Murphy says that the researcher's personal characteristics can considerably impact the data, and research participants have

been found to say different things to male and female researchers (Murphy 2003: 181-195). In Jewish religious circles, particularly the Haredi ones, contact between men and women is restricted. As Stadler notes, this realm has always been the province of male ethnographers. When Stadler conducted her study dealing with the Haredi *yeshiva* world, she noted that encounters between researcher and informant posed 'a potential threat to the community's basic definitions of masculinity and femininity and its sacred order' (Stadler 2007: 185-186, 188).

Similarly, in this case the presence of the female researcher presented a threat and therefore the likelihood of securing interviews with men was lower. In addition to that, unlike in Stadler's case there was never a male mediator present at the interview, and the researcher was a complete outsider, a non-Jew. Another example similar to this case is Dalby's (1983, cited in Guest *et al.* 2012: 79) study of geisha culture. As Guest *et al.* point out, this study could have only been conducted by a female fluent in Japanese, and no male researcher could have done this (Guest *et al.* 2012: 79). A similar barrier was present in this case. Only a male member of their own communities would be able to conduct in-depth interviews with the counter-culture communities' male members who never interact with women and outsiders. On the other side, the researcher was able to meet women that male researchers may not be able to talk to (Norman 2009: 83).

Therefore, to minimise the barriers, during the interviews, it was imperative to stay culturally aware and know the limits. For instance this included dressing according to the Jewish laws of modesty. Thus, when meeting a person belonging to the Haredi stream, it always meant wearing a shirt with long sleeves and covered neckline, and a skirt with hemline below a knee, and wearing shoes concealing entire feet. When meeting a person belonging to the Dati Leumi stream, the dress code was slightly more relaxed, but yet still modest. It was also imperative not to shake someone's hand from one's own initiative, particularly men,

as that is not allowed in the Haredi circles. To illustrate, upon meeting Shlomo, he did not offer to shake hands. When asked to sign the consent form, and offered a pen, he instead searched his bag to find his own (Field notes, Israel, 01 June 2017).

There were limitations with non-participant observations as well. The researcher could not spend a longer time period observing in the streets, as this would have raised suspicions in the community who can tell who the outsiders are. It was also not possible to record observations as well, as this would again raise suspicion.

2.4.2 Ethics

As the focus of this thesis is on political violence and civil disobedience, there are several ethical issues. These were mitigated accordingly and risks minimised. This research passed the school's ethical review process (the approved and signed off copy of the form is attached in Appendix B). Initial concerns raised by the school were associated with fieldwork, interviews, including security of the researcher, participant consent and anonymity. There were additional issues raised during fieldwork, which are all discussed below.

Security

One of the major concerns raised by the school was related to security – of the researcher, as well as of research participants.

It was agreed, as outlined in the ethical form REC3, that the researcher would follow advice by the UK Foreign Office and not travel to the West Bank or Gaza. However as there are Israeli settlers who reside in the West Bank, and many incidents of Jewish political violence have been undertaken by settlers, the fact that the researcher could not travel to the West Bank presented a great challenge and prevented from securing more valuable interviews. Moreover, it was agreed in the revised REC3

form that the researcher would not approach people who were known to have been involved in political violence. It was perceived by the school that the groups that would be interviewed about political violence may perceive the researcher as potentially dangerous thinking potential perpetrators may be identified. Thus, this significantly changed the nature of interviews from a focus on political violence onto the counter-culture framework.

The fact that the fieldwork location was in Israel presented a challenge. Violence could have erupted unexpectedly, the researcher could, as a bystander, have got caught up in an incident such as a clash between protesters and the Israeli security forces. Even though the safety of the researcher was not compromised at all during the fieldwork, there were several outbreaks of violence, including stabbings and shootings. In this case, the UK foreign travel advice website was followed, and areas such as the Old City of Jerusalem, were avoided for as long as the UK government considered necessary. At all times the researcher was ready to escape to a safe location. To mitigate risks, volatile areas were avoided and use of public transport was minimised.

Full travel insurance was obtained before travelling on fieldwork, and REC5 form (Pro Forma for Field Trip Health & Safety Requirements) was emailed to the School's Health and Safety Officer. In addition to that, regular weekly updates were sent to the first supervisor. The researcher was familiar with Israel's emergency procedures, including how to call medical help, and what to do upon hearing a siren, including finding shelter in case of rockets fired from outside Israel into Israeli territory.

The majority of interviews were conducted in public space, this included cafés, restaurants, a library, a retirement home, a park, a classroom, and a research institute. Three interviews were conducted in the work office and one at home. When entering an interviewee's home, it was made sure that the researcher did not feel uncomfortable or unsafe. At all times, a friendly and professional manner was adopted when conducting interviews but there was no sense of being over-familiar. The researcher's family

was at all times aware of the location, time and expected duration of the interview and mode of transport used to get there. Supervisors were given a contact sheet that included all the places of lodging in Israel, local contact and researcher's contact details. The researcher had basic first aid equipment on hand, insurance leaflet and a charged mobile phone at all times, including a power bank, a map of the local area and important contact details.

Participant anonymity

One of the main concerns was related to participant anonymity. Therefore, in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998, data is being stored securely and not shared with the third parties. Data obtained during the fieldwork was anonymised and the code names, as outlined in the previous chapter, are used. To ensure any possible data breach that might lead to participant identification, names and any other form of identification are stored separately and not correlated to the interview material.

It was raised during the ethical review process that the Israeli authorities may have a right of access under their law to the information acquired during this fieldwork. This would thus undermine the commitment that all the information about participants would be anonymised. To prevent confiscation by the Israeli authorities, and thus breaching the promise to keep the information secure and anonymous, upon leaving the country, no information related to thesis or interviews was kept on a laptop, but instead kept on safe university cloud storage.

Access and trust building

One of the concerns prior and during the fieldwork was access and trust building. As this thesis notes, the counter-culture communities do not talk to outsiders, and interactions between men and women are not welcome in the Haredi communities. Therefore to gain access to the communities, there was a need to get contacts willing to introduce an outsider to the communities. This proved extremely difficult, and despite contacting many

people, some did not respond at all, some promised they would help but they then they did not and only a fraction of people were willing to be interviewed in the end. There were limitations to who was willing to be interviewed. As some of the participants suggested, those people who only stay within the enclaves do not interact with outsiders at all. Despite being a Hassidic Jewish woman herself, Chava said she struggled to get interviews done in the community for her own PhD thesis. She also acknowledged that this research may struggle with access issues due to the researcher's background (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017). Indeed, as Norman points out, attributes such as nationality, gender, age or religion can impact trust (Norman 2009: 83).

After the interview the participants were asked if they could recommend any other people willing to be interviewed, and while some did help, some did not. For instance, Jacob said he could not introduce a non-Jewish, Slovakian girl to his friends or neighbours, as this would raise suspicions and they may potentially find out he keeps secrets about his job from his community. Ultimately, he was worried this would ruin his children's *shidduch* (marriage match) (Field notes, Israel, 05 June 2017).

The most useful contact was from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who introduced other people who at some point studied at the university. This also presents a methodological challenge, as most people who were interviewed were not a representative sample of their own communities as they got a secular education at some points in their life and thus interacted with outsiders more than a regular counter-culture member.

As mentioned earlier, it was the researcher's background that was an obstacle to securing more interviews and prevented some participants from introducing the researcher to their acquaintances and friends. And in instances when the people were willing to introduce the researcher, their contacts were not always willing to be interviewed. For instance, the researcher approached one of her secular contacts who works at an *ulpan* (Hebrew

language school for immigrants). She was positive that some of her few Haredi friends and former students would be willing to be interviewed if she asked them (Field notes, Israel, 04 July 2017). However, after a few days, it became obvious her friends and former students were not willing to be interviewed (Field notes, Israel, 12 July 2017). This shows how big the barriers between the communities and outsiders are. Whiting suggests that participants often respond more favourably to interviewers who are similar to themselves (Whiting 2008: 37), while here the outsider status was apparent.

Semi-covert element

One of the most serious issues that arose during fieldwork was its semi-covert element. Prior to embarking on fieldwork, the supervisory team decided that the consent form and information sheet should not contain the actual thesis title. First of all, as the topic of Jewish political violence can cause some negative feelings and participants could perceive it as harmful, negative or even unfair, this could have significantly decreased chances of people being willing to be interviewed. It was decided to rebrand the thesis topic for the purpose of the fieldwork to "Diversity in Israeli Society". Without doubt had the true nature of the thesis been revealed, no participants would be willing to take part. Apart from discouraging potential participants from taking part, secondly, if the Israeli officials had by any chance read the information sheets, this may have prevented the researcher from entering the country/or being asked to leave the country as conducting controversial research may seem undesirable by the Israeli authorities. Therefore, the participants were given the information sheet that did not fully explain the rationale for research.

However, it should be noted, that at no point were questions about Jewish political violence or participants' involvement in violence mentioned and the focus was on the counter-culture element of the thesis. Therefore participants were

not exploited, and they were not harmed in any way, and above all, this thesis does not claim they were ever or would ever be involved in violence.

Whilst the research methods literature advises against research in a covert or deceitful manner (Bryman 2012: 139; Mason 2002: 93; Dolnik 2011: 4), Mason acknowledges there are merits to it, as overt research is not always easy or possible to maintain (Mason 2002: 93). Moreover, as Dolnik notes, terrorism research, a research area directly linked to political violence and civil disobedience, is a quite sensitive area and therefore it is not practical to follow all the ethical guidelines. That is often done to protect the interviewee, but also to establish rapport and gain access (Dolnik 2011: 7-8, 13). Thus, semi-covert elements can be helpful to overcome, for instance, access issues as was the case here.

Bryman concludes the use of covert methods may be justified in certain circumstances (Bryman 2012: 139). In this case, as emphasised earlier, all data has been anonymised, and as the next paragraph outlines, participation was voluntary. Therefore rather than covert methods, this research employed a semi-covert element/deception. Actually, as Bryman notes, deception is quite widespread in social research. It is used to ensure that participants respond more naturally and it is often not desirable to provide participants with a totally complete account of what the research is about (Bryman 2012: 143). As Dolnik notes:

> if informed consent is established by providing the participants with a long list of reasons for why participation is dangerous and potentially harmful to them, why in the world would anyone want to participate at all? (Dolnik 2011: 13)

Voluntary participation

All participants voluntarily took part in the research and signed a consent letter, which outlined the conditions of anonymity and information regarding the interviewee's right to withdraw from

the study anytime without providing a reason up to three months after the interview. There was an option to be recorded or participants could choose, if they preferred, for the researcher to take notes. A copy of the consent form and the information sheet can be found in Appendix B.

As Whiting advises, using a recorder is effective, and allows an accurate and verbatim transcription of the interview and contributes to a more relaxed atmosphere because the interviewer is freed from the distraction of note taking and can concentrate on what is being said (Whiting 2008: 36-37). Indeed, when interviews were recorded, it was easier to probe and pay attention to the participants and show them what they were saying was valuable and their time thus appreciated. However, when notes were taken, participants were often distracted themselves and did not provide such elaborated answers as the participants who were recorded. There was also a difference in answers from English native speakers and those whose first language was different from English. Apart from two exceptions, all English native speakers provided long, elaborate answers, whilst some participants whose first language was not English, struggled to provide longer answers.

2.5 Data Collection and Data Analysis

Interview participants

There were 21 participants involved in this study, excluding two interviews that were discarded from the study, thus out of 21, nine (42.9%) were female, 12 (57.1%) male, 11 (52.4%) were Haredi, 10 (47.6%) were Dati Leumi. 12 of these were native English speakers (including the ones who were born in Israel). The number of native English speakers is disproportionally higher than is representative of the Israeli population, as the researcher's contacts recommended these participants, as they

were aware of the language barrier. Even though English is taught as a compulsory subject in Israel, many children achieve very little and often fail the subject (Stupniker 2015) and it became apparent during fieldwork that most people could not speak English fluently.

As noted earlier, participants who were interviewed cannot be considered representative of their own respective groups. This is mainly a result of the access and trust issues. As explained above, regular members of counter-culture, particularly Haredi, groups do not interact with outsiders. Thus those who were interviewed are more open than their communities. Moreover, participants who were involved in this study had more exposure to secular education. When being interviewed, some participants made sure to explain how their own views differ from their own community's. The sampling method worked on an opportunist and snowball basis, which was the easiest way, and the most reliable way to secure interviews. Bryman suggests that the problem with snowball sampling is that it is very unlikely that the sample will be representative of the population (Bryman 2012: 203), which happened to be this case. There was selection bias, as the interviewees did not reflect the composition of the Israeli society.

Interview procedure

After thanking participants for taking part, giving them the information sheet to read and the consent form to read and sign, the researcher either switched the recorder on or prepared to take notes and the interview started. The interview was split into three parts: community, community leaders and politics. The first questions asked the participants to talk about their own community and lifestyle. This usually served as a barrier breaker and served to get the participants to talk. There was no reward or remuneration for the interview, however, when at the café, the researcher always bought a drink or coffee for the participant as well as for herself.

The duration of the interviews ranged from 20 to 75 minutes. Out of 21 participants, three asked not to be recorded. When tape recording was not possible, real-time transcriptions were taken. The fact that consent to be recorded was not granted, is a useful finding in itself. This indicated that an interviewee did not trust outsiders. This can be demonstrated by the example of Rivka. Rivka did not consent to be recorded. The fact that she did not trust the researcher could be observed after the end of the interview. During the interview she did say she never interacted with outsiders, like the researcher herself (Interview, Rivka, 04 July 2017). After the interview she said she parked her car a minute away from the retirement home - the place of the meeting. By coincidence, not intentionally, the researcher went the same direction as Rivka did after the interview, without Rivka being aware of it. Rivka walked for ten minutes, and she did not have a car parked a minute away. She clearly wanted to meet in the retirement centre away from her own community so that she would not be seen in the company of the outsider (Field notes, Israel, 04 July 2017). Itzik did not want to be recorded for a different reason. He works for the Israeli government, and said he worried he may say something that could be used against him and cause him trouble at work (Field notes, Israel, 08 June 2017).

There was a set of primary and secondary questions, and based on the participant's time availability, the full set of questions, just primary questions, or a combination of primary questions and some secondary questions were asked. There was an interview guide that the researcher brought to all the interviews, and followed it, but as the interviews were semi-structured, questions were not always asked the same way, but the meaning was preserved. The set of questions asked in the interview can be found in Appendix B.

The researcher also used many probes to get the participants talk and many expressions and gestures, such as nodding to let the participants know she was listening and

interested in what they were saying. Some of the probing techniques that Whiting described were used, including remaining silent and allowing the participant to think aloud; using phrases such as the interviewer expresses interest in the participant's 'uh-huh', 'yes' or okay', or explicitly asking the interviewee to expand on a particular point (Whiting 2008: 38).

Sensitive questions

As the thesis topic was not shared with the interviewees, questions had to be asked indirectly. In addition to that, the focus was on the counter-culture element of the thesis rather than asking about participation in violent activities. Therefore most questions were related to the role of communities, leaders, and crises that based on this thesis' framework should lead to violence. This approach was based on Juergensmeyer's approach of interviewing violent religious activists. Rather than asking directly, Juergensmeyer started with questions about autobiographical background, which often led to follow-up questions about religion, politics and violence (Juergensmeyer 2015: 855). And whilst Jewish political violence and participants' involvement in violence was not mentioned, it indirectly provided their potential reactions if presented with a crisis.

Transcription and analysis

Each recorded interview was transcribed in full. As several interviewees are not English native speakers, direct quotes often contain grammatical errors. Due to the amount of mistakes, [SIC] is not used throughout the thesis and instead grammatical mistakes are acknowledged here.

Each recording was listened to as many times as needed to identify what was being said, even though sometimes not all words were recognised, usually due to issues such as background noise, participant's accent or when a participant said an unknown Hebrew word. Whilst this process was exceptionally time-consuming, it made the researcher more familiar with the data,

giving a chance to hear the participant's tone, identify mood, and think about the pauses the interviewee made. Therefore, the interviews were not only about what the participants were saying but how they were saying it. In addition to that, rather than focusing on preselected themes only, this allowed for a more comprehensive overview of data, making sure no patterns or information have been overlooked and thus minimising data bias.

Each transcript was read through a number of times, and coded using the pre-set codes: meaning of community; reliance on community; interactions with outsiders; interactions with secular Jews; interactions with Datiim Leumim; interactions with Haredim; desire to impose their views on the rest of Jews; role of leaders; obedience to leaders; influence of religion on politics; government representation; party representation; *Halacha* perception; relationship with Israel; perceptions of Palestinians; reactions to Palestinians (crisis); perception of government and secular Jews; reactions to government and secular Jews (crisis); reaction to religious change (crisis). In addition to that, emergent codes were noted, including recurring words, phrases and themes emerging from the data and things that were surprising.

This thesis took an interpretive reading of the data, and constructing a version of what the researcher thought the data means, represents, or what can be inferred from them (Mason 2002: 149).

2.6 Reflection

Massoud recommends reflecting on the field research experience and challenges that arose in light of existing literature (Massoud 2016: 98). During the fieldwork it became apparent that speaking to the interviewees challenged existing views, as well as some literature. The literature argues that community belonging is universal in the Jewish world, 'Jewish peoplehood is about

belonging to an "extended family with a purpose"' (Galperin and Brown, cited in Center for Jewish Peoplehood n/a). But, for instance, some participants experienced a lack of a sense of community (Interview, Daniella, 09 July 2017; Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017). On the other hand, Leah said 'there's a sense of greater community in the Jewish world and in the Israeli world that bridges religious and political and even national, sometimes, boundaries' (Interview, Leah, 04 July 2017). Another realisation that came from the interviews is the danger of making generalisations about the entire population and framing them all as prone to violence. This therefore makes it even more important to find out the distinguishing trait that makes people engage in violent activities.

There are a few aspects of the research that would have been done differently if possible. One of these would have been to enrol in an *ulpan* in Israel for a longer time period to improve the Hebrew language proficiency and thus eliminate the participant bias. Secondly, having undertaken the interviews, it was difficult to cope with emotions during the fieldwork. All interviewees were very kind, nice and willing to help, and therefore at times it felt as exploitation of their good will to suggest they are part of the population prone to political violence and terrorism (Field notes, Israel, 05 June 2017).

However, some facts were always to going to present challenges and impact the validity of the research, such as the gender or religion of the researcher. Therefore, re-designing the research differently would not have helped.

Despite all challenges, the data collected during the fieldwork was extremely beneficial and essential to complete the empirical chapters. The following chapter provides context and background for these empirical as well as other remaining chapters. Above all, the next chapter gives insight into the belief systems of the two communities, Haredi and Dati Leumi, which this research focuses on.

3 Historical and Religious Background

This chapter addresses the historical significance of events that have influence on the actions of modern day perpetrators of political violence in Israel. Even though the focus of this thesis is on the Jewish political violence and civil disobedience perpetrated after the Second Palestinian Intifada, history does play a significant role. History always matters, as it is essential to understand linkages between the past and the present (Corfield 2008). For that reason this chapter focuses on the historical trajectories that have contributed to Jewish violence. This thesis argues that the long-standing grievances, collective memory, founding myths and divisions have shaped the conflict and impacted Jewish political violence and civil disobedience. Apart from highlighting the importance of history, this chapter lays down the foundations for the subsequent chapters, particularly the theory chapter, by introducing the two Jewish counter-culture groups this thesis focuses on, and outlines their belief systems and characteristics. Lastly, the chapter will link the historical development of messianic trends within the Haredi and the Dati Leumi populations to Jewish political violence and civil disobedience.

3.1 Founding Myths and Emergence of Jewish Violence

The modern conflict between Jews and Arabs living in the historic land of Palestine dates back to late 19th and early 20th century. The first organised Jewish immigration to Palestine started in 1883 as part of the First *aliyah* (Harms and Ferry 2008: 53), which is a term for the Jewish immigration to the Land of Israel (*Eretz*

Israel). The growing conflict between the two competing groups later escalated into the Arab Revolt (1936-1939), which included non-violent means used by Arabs such as strikes or boycotts of Jewish goods, but also violence against Jews as well as the British. The two main causes of Arab violence identified by the Peel Commission (1937) included the Arabs' desire for independence, and hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish national home (Harms and Ferry 2008: 78-79). Similarly, Jewish violence prior and during the Second World War came out of the desire for independence and targeted the British and the Arabs (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 29).

Yet, negative feelings between the groups prevailed until the present day, and, just as they did a century ago, they also culminated in violent responses. There is a cycle of violence as the action of one group triggers a reaction from the other. This cycle of violence, described by Martha Crenshaw as an 'action-reaction syndrome', was originally used to describe government actions as the catalysts for terrorism. Crenshaw argues that the government's use of force in response to protests or reform attempts compels terrorist retaliation, which establishes the structure of the conflict between the regime and its challengers (Crenshaw 1981: 384-385). For instance, during the Second Intifada when Palestinian terrorism rose exponentially, settlers demanded a harsh response from the IDF, which the IDF ultimately delivered (Byman 2011: 289). Moreover, a significant increase in total terror incidents perpetrated by Palestinians during Operation Defensive Shield (ODS) was found, including suicide terrorism. However, most large-scale Israeli military operations had no significant effect on terror incidents committed by Palestinians (Sharvit *et al.* 2013: 32-33).

Thus, Crenshaw's argument regarding the government use of force is not compelling. Moreover, during the Second Intifada Jewish settlers were often targeted by the Palestinian groups, which were using both lethal and non-lethal means. In response, attacks on the Jewish population provoked revenge by the Jewish

groups, such as the Bat Ayin group that attacked and killed Palestinians (Byman 2011: 288-289).

Thus, an action by one group triggers a reaction from another. In addition to that, there are other historical reasons contributing to Jewish political violence and civil disobedience.

Tosh argues that history can intensify a sense of belonging to a group, and it may shape national heritage, group identity and political ideology (Tosh 2008: ix, 6). Indeed, collective memory in Israel plays an important role as a motivating force behind violence. One of the historical elements that has had an impact on both collective memory and contemporary violence, is the role of founding myths. Founding myths (or origin myths) 'bring about collective identify beyond the social, cultural and political fragmentation of a given community' (Probst 2003: 45). Almond *et al.* point out that highlighting the past and founding myths are of particular importance in the Haredi society (Almond et *al.* 2003: 60). However, it is also the case in the Dati Leumi society, as for instance Daniel highlighted the past: 'Israel for me . . . it's the dream that my ancestors dreamt of for 2000 years, we were in exile . . . this is the most exciting project for me' (Interview, Daniel 07 June 2017).

Community leaders, populist politicians, Zionists, rabbis and even those who seek to legitimise their violent practices, including terrorists such as the Jewish Defense League (JDL), often refer to these founding myths. There are two collective memory examples that this thesis highlights. The first one includes the Sicarii and the Siege of Masada (73 CE) and the second one relates to the Holocaust (while the Holocaust is not a myth, the Holocaust trauma has shaped national consciousness and collective memory).

The Masada myth is based on the work of historian Josephus. Historians argue about accuracy of Josephus' writings. Some, like archaeologist Yigal Yadin, argue that the Sicarii were

heroes just as Josephus portrayed them (Yadin 1966, cited in Gelvin 2007: 8-9) and some argue they were extremists (Sasson and Kelner 2008: 147-148). However, for the purposes of collective memory, the public perceptions are more important than the validity of sources. During the First Jewish-Roman war (66-73 CE), the Sicarii committed murders directed against fellow Jews rather than the Romans, as a punishment for collaboration with the Romans and in hope to deter and prevent the population from future collaboration. Their ultimate goal was the liberation of the Jewish people from Roman rule. They believed they were carrying out God's will (Horsley 1979: 438-440, 444). Obviously, the Sicarii were not the last Jews to carry out attacks against fellow Jews using the same argument. The modern-day Jewish perpetrators attack other Jews for a number of reasons. They see them as traitors to the Jewish nation and also see them as obstacles to creating a truly Jewish (non-secular) state. And thus, as Sicarii did, they see themselves as the ones saving Jews and acting on God's orders, often receiving rabbis' blessing (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 76, 93-94). For instance, when some Haredim join the army, they are marginalised and even attacked by their own community (Times of Israel 2017c).

The second parallel that can be drawn from the Sicarii example is the Siege of Masada, which is one of the most well-known Israeli founding myths. The Sicarii chose suicide instead of surrendering to the Romans (Gelvin 2007: 8). The Siege of Masada became a symbol of the fight for the land, never giving in to the enemy, national struggle, national pride, survival, but also not straying away from killing fellow Jews (B. Schwartz *et al.* 1986: 151). There are parallels with the past: the Masada Jews found themselves surrounded by hostile enemies, just as the present-day Orthodox Jews perceive they do - whether by the hostile Arab nations or secular Jews who have betrayed them. The Sicarii engaged in terrorism and believed that the Romans had to be defeated because if they continued to rule, the redemption would be delayed (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 6-8). Today this

is manifested by both Haredi and Dati Leumi factions that fight the Palestinians because they see them as obstacles to the building of the Third Jewish Temple and thus the redemption of the Jewish people. It is believed in Judaism that once the final, Third Temple is built, the Messiah will come. The Jewish Temple was destroyed twice. The First Temple was destroyed by the Babylonians in the 6th century BCE and the Second Temple was destroyed by the Romans during the siege of Jerusalem in 70 CE (Inbari 2009: 3). The Temple Mount, a site where the Temple is believed to have stood, is now the holiest site in Judaism.

An example of a group desiring to rebuild the Temple is Gush Emunim ("Block of the Faithful"), which is a Dati Leumi movement founded in 1974. Gush Emunim's objective was to incorporate the Occupied Territories into the Israeli state. This was based on their religious ideology that sees the Land of Israel as the land promised to the Jewish people by God. The group saw gaining these territories in the 1967 war as a miracle. Therefore the territories were not to be given up to the Arabs again, not even if the government decided otherwise, as that would be in contradiction to the law of the Torah (Newman 2005: 194-196). Clearly, the Torah or interpretations thereof, play an important role in the collective memory.

A great emphasis being placed on history and national consciousness in Israel became obvious during the research fieldwork (2017). Museums and places visited by the researcher during fieldwork were all attended by school trips and organised groups of soldiers. And while places such as the World Holocaust Remembrance Center, Yad Vashem, were attended by Haredi, Dati Leumi as well as secular groups and individuals (Field notes, Israel, 17 May 2017), museums that focus on the history of the State of Israel and Zionism were only attended by the latter two. The history of the fight for independence of Israel, including the history that includes groups using terrorist tactics to drive out the British as well as the Arab population was at the forefront. The Museum of the Underground Prisoners in Jerusalem emphasises

the story of two fighters, Moshe Barazani and Meir Feinstein. Barazani, a member of Lehi, planned to assassinate a British commander, and Feinstein, a member of Etzel/Irgun, participated in the terrorist attack on a train station. They were executed by the British and are highly praised for their actions and celebrated as martyrs by a memorial in the museum (Field notes, Israel, 21 May 2017), as Figure 10-1 in Appendix A captures.

In addition to this, an example that shows that the founding myths impact the behaviour of the counter-culture communities, and thus are still relevant, is the Haredi group calling itself "Sicarikin", after the ancient Sicarii. The group operated in Jerusalem and Beit Shemesh in 2007 using tactics such as intimidation, making threats, setting stores on fire, throwing stones, and beating anyone within the Haredi community who was deemed not pious enough (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 99-100).

As for the second event that shaped national consciousness and collective memory, the Holocaust, the paragraphs below outline its contributions towards engagement in political violence.

As a result of the First Jewish-Roman war and the destruction of the Second Temple by the Roman soldiers, *Halacha* (Jewish religious law) ruling adopted a no violence principle in order to avoid the anger of gentiles (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 8). It remained in the collective memory and consequently, for 2000 years in the diaspora, Jews generally refrained from terrorism and violence until the 19th century (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 8). There were several exceptions, however, such as the Revolt of the Diasporas (115–117 CE), and the Bar Kokhva Revolt (132– 136 CE) against the Roman Empire. Other violence had a predominantly ritual character and was mostly related to celebrations of Jewish holidays, such as Purim (Aran and Hassner 2013: 358, 374, 387). However, while Pedahzur and Perliger (2009) or Aran and Hassner (2013) claim Jews refrained from violence for centuries with some exceptions, Horowitz points out Jewish acts of violence against Christians in the Middle Ages (Horowitz 2006, cited in in S. Magid 2007: 1503).

Yet, the *Halacha* ruling is considered to be the reason the European Jews did not stand up against the Nazis (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 8). This resulted in an event that shaped the collective memory. As the previous paragraph pointed out, the Jewish population was not allowed to use violence by the *Halacha* ruling, at least before the Second World War. However, this attitude changed following the Holocaust, and collective memory and identity led to two implications: toleration and moderation on one side and inflicting violence on others on the other (Aran and Hassner 2013: 392). "Never Again" has become a Holocaust slogan (as well as a slogan of the JDL and its leader Meir Kahane) and the trauma of the Holocaust is one of the motivational factors for violence even nowadays. As one interviewee pointed out:

> I think the State of Israel has that duty for history, . . . for my great-parents who were slaughtered in Auschwitz, and for their parents that were slaughtered for thousands of years to come to Israel (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017).

Peri notes that the Holocaust trauma is reflected in the everyday life of Jewish people, claiming it was the helplessness and hatred of the Nazis that contributed to support for Meir Kahane (Peri 2000: 134). Kahane, a Dati Leumi leader, founder of the JDL in the USA and Kach party in Israel and founder of the Kahanist ideology, argued that the Arab-Israeli conflict was a manifestation of Jew-hatred, and he argued the Arabs were set to wipe out the Jewish state. Kahane regarded the Arab countries and the Palestinian terrorists as the successors of the Nazis, and he used the Holocaust metaphor to legitimise his stance (Cromer 1987: 290-291). Some other Jews hold Palestinians responsible for the Holocaust, pointing to the collaboration of Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, with the Nazis (Lesch 2009: 113).
The second way in which the Holocaust trauma contributes to violence is the Holocaust denial in large swathes of the Palestinian side (Litvak and Webman 2009: 378-379). According to a 2008 survey, 40.5% of Arab citizens of Israel said that the Holocaust

never happened (Waxmann 2012: 15). Litvak and Webman argue that some Arabs tried to minimise the significance of the Holocaust and even blamed Jews for it (Litvak and Webman 2009: 378-379).

However, the perception of the Nazi-like enemy does not only stop with Palestinians, but extends to other enemies as well, including secular or moderate Jews, such as Yitzhak Rabin (Peri 2000: 135) or the Israeli state, which is based on secular principles. In 1949 the Haredi-oriented group Brit Hakanaim was founded. To oppose secular practices, they used tactics such as setting fire to shops or movie theatres. Their swearing-in ceremony required new recruits to commit themselves to 'establish Torah life in the country' (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 87). Together with another group, Hamahane, they wanted to smuggle a (scare) bomb into the Knesset to draw attention to their objection to recruit women into the army (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 87). This example indicates that religion plays a significant role. This can also be combined with counter-cultural tendencies, such as imposing the culture's values on the mainstream society.

The constant threat of annihilation, described above, is not based on the Holocaust trauma only, but also on wars with Arab neighbours, often hostile relations with the Palestinian Authority and the nearly constant threat of Palestinian terrorism, as Chapter 8 will demonstrate. As mentioned in the previous chapter, data from Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows that 1,293 people were killed by Palestinian violence and terrorism between the start of the Second Intifada in September 2000 until the 2015 Israeli election (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d.). This demonstrates that the threat is real. Since groups such as Hamas view the Jewish population as their enemies, this intensifies perceptions of Palestinians as the modern day Nazis (Warschawski 2004: 43; Massad 2000: 57). Thus, this makes the conflict not only about the land, but also about survival and avoiding another Holocaust. Based on the study of Israeli youth's perceptions of Palestinians, not surprisingly, it was found that the

perceptions were negative, mainly because the word "Palestinian" came to symbolise a threat, a desire to take over the Israeli land and a reluctance to recognise the existence of Israel, which has been the dominant Palestinian rhetoric throughout the duration of the conflict. The negative perceptions increased following Palestinian terrorist attacks in 1996 (Bar-Tal and Labin 2001: 275-276).

These perceptions and a desire to protect themselves from another Holocaust, or to protect the Land of Israel have led to a response from Jewish perpetrators, usually in the form of vigilante violence. Some Jewish groups, particularly settlers in the territories, felt that the state will not protect its citizens. Thus they have repeatedly decided to avenge crimes (such as Palestinian terrorist attacks that harmed the Jewish population) and engage in violence, such as stoning or burning, and even killing (Pedahzur and Perliger 2003: 10, 19).

These responses usually come, as the theoretical framework of this thesis suggests, in response to a crisis – usually a peace process or outbreak of Palestinian violence. Examples of these crises include the Oslo Accords, withdrawal from the Sinai or the Palestinian Intifadas. As Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter suggest, conflict increases threat perceptions; increases in-group identification; and increases political intolerance (M. Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006: 575). Chapter 8 shows in a greater detail what this means for the counter-culture communities.

During the Second Intifada, characterised by Palestinian terrorist attacks, including a rise in suicide terrorism, the Jewish collective identity grew and tolerance towards Palestinians declined (M. Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006: 588). An example of this is the Bat Ayin group that started its attacks after the outbreak of Intifada to avenge the victims of Palestinian attacks. Thus attacks from the Palestinians were answered with Jewish counter-attacks (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 118-119).

As pointed out in the Introduction chapter, while the Israeli government condemns Jewish violence, it is not always the same

in the case of Palestinian terrorism by the Palestinian Authority (PA), which again leads to negative perceptions of Palestinians. The Israeli government has often criticised the PA for failing to condemn the terrorist attacks and often even for inciting terrorists to undertake attacks. Therefore, two decades after the PA's creation, the Israeli media still report that it supports Palestinian terrorism (Keinon 2015). As shown above, negative perceptions of Palestinians, including of their official representatives, have fuelled violence from the Israeli Jewish side, as to avoid another Holocaust and to protect themselves as the Sicarii did.

To sum up, the emergence of Jewish violence has been partly impacted by the influence of the founding myths, and the Holocaust trauma together with other aspects of the Israel-Palestine conflict, such as Palestinian terrorism.

Groups such as Irgun and Lehi were Zionist paramilitary organisations, and Zionism acted as an organising force behind the creation of the Israeli state. Zionism is also one of the central tenets of the Dati Leumi belief system. However, it is opposed by Haredim. Thus, whilst there are similarities between the groups, there are also differences. As such, the following two subchapters clarify who the Dati Leumi and the Haredi communities in focus are, which also helps in understanding the theory chapter.

3.2 Dati Leumi Ideology - Introduction

Twenty-two per cent of Israeli Jews consider themselves to be part of the Dati Leumi, religious Zionist, camp, although one-third of them do not identify as religious at all (Ettinger 2014).

As a group, Datiim Leumim are not always easily identified (particularly in statistical terms). At times the group is referred to as religious Zionist, but also as national-religious, or in Hebrew, Dati Leumi. Sometimes they are called just "Dati" (religious) –

which is a problematic term, as in surveys it may also include other religious groups (excluding Haredim). Nowadays, the Dati Leumi communities are more diverse, including groups such as the "hilltop youth" (Schwartz 2009: 120). As such, this chapter will also deconstruct the understanding of the group, pointing out that the group as a whole shall not be treated holistically as a counter-culture group due to some members' integration into mainstream culture and institutions. As Datiim Leumim are one of the groups this thesis focuses on, this subchapter looks at the Dati Leumi ideology and explains who the members of these communities are and what characteristics they exhibit.

The Religious Zionists of America organisation defines religious Zionism as 'an ideology based on the synthesis of a Jewish religious and national outlook' (The Religious Zionists of America n.d.). As for the other group that this research focuses on, the word "Haredi" means the one who is anxious or fearful of God. Thus the common denominator between these two groups is an Orthodox Jewish religious outlook.

There are some scholars, like Rabbi Landes (a prominent rabbi and a scholar), who argue that between 1947 and 1967, Datiim Leumim and Haredim overlapped. They had strong ties and shared the vision to restore religious Judaism. They shared a dedication to family life, holidays and dietary laws, prayer and *Halachic* process. He further argues that while Datiim Leumim served in the army and preserved the religious institutions whilst in government in the early years, they recognised differences from the Haredi community, such as a commitment to the general society, secular education, and work (D. Landes 2013). This relates to some members of Datiim Leumim more integrated into the mainstream culture, despite maintaining some separate frameworks, as opposed to less integrated Haredim. The biggest differences between the two groups relate to messianism and nationalism. The messianic element will be covered in more detail in Subchapter 3.4.

Briefly, whilst Haredim live in perceived "exile" despite the existence of the Jewish state, radical religious Zionism sees Israel and Zionism as a messianic process and the fulfilment of the biblical vision of redemption (Ravitzky 1996: 8, 80).

Messianism is one of the defining characteristics of religious Zionism. Briefly, when religious Zionism originated in 1902, messianic tendencies of Datiim Leumim were revolutionary. Contrary to the previous passivity of the Jewish people, it was about refusing to await redemption by divine means and instead take action, so people could take God's place. Datiim Leumim saw Israel as a land that would bring God, as God was tied to the soil (D. Schwartz 2009: 1, 3-4).

The relationship to the land is thus important, and so is nationalism. Schwartz notes that religious Zionism is the expression of religious nationalism and is thus perceived as the "centre" of Judaism (D. Schwartz 2002: 134). The relationship between nationalism, land and messianism was further intensified by the outcome of the Six-Day War in 1967. Israeli victory and occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula was seen by Datiim Leumim as 'God's will to redeem His people' (Inbari 2009: 21). As Don-Yehiya argues, Datiim Leumim interpreted the war and its results as a heavenly call from above to do whatever possible to keep all the Occupied Territories under Israel's rule. This resulted in a very profound change in the positions of religious Jews on the Israeli-Arab conflict (Don-Yehiya 2014: 240).

After the war, the Gush Emunim movement, that was already briefly introduced earlier in Chapter 2, started the settlement movement with the intention to establish facts on the ground in the Occupied Territories and thus settle the biblical Land of Israel with Jews (Inbari 2009: 21). For Datiim Leumim, renewing Jewish settlements meant reviving the religious dimension of the Holy Land (D. Schwartz 2002: 157). Gush Emunim indeed played a very important role, as Schwartz argues,

by supplying Datiim Leumim with the myths they were lacking. The movement gave people the sense that they were making history (D. Schwartz 2009: 103). This was particularly through their settlements initiative, which was derived from their messianic interpretation of the Six-Day War. The victory in the war was interpreted as a miracle and a sign of redemption (Stadler 2005: 224; Sprinzak 1998: 119; Don-Yehiya 1987: 220).

Ultimately, the Gush Emunim became the face of the Dati Leumi society (D. Schwartz 2009: 103). However, at the time of its establishment in 1974, the Gush Emunim movement did not project a messianic vision, and was established over the issue of Sebastia, a settlement in the West Bank. The group established the settlement without official permission, and was evicted on numerous occasions, later reaching an agreement with the government despite the opposition of some within the first Rabin government (Inbari 2012: 4). Rabbi Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, a founder of the Dati Leumi ideology, also took part in the establishment of a settlement in Sebastia in Samaria (Inbari 2012: 32). In addition to that, Inbari argues that Gush Emunim was established due the fear of failure and messianic retreat, as it was established not in the wake of the successful Six-Day War but rather of the Yom Kippur War. The Yom Kippur War led to giving up lands, thus leading to the disappointment of Gush Emunim with secular Zionism, and thus ultimate departure from secular Zionism (Inbari 2012: 17).

The development of the Dati Leumi ideology, particularly its radical element, and also ultimately its departure from the secular form of Zionism can be captured by Gush Emunim's example as well as Rabbi Kook's positions.

During the twenty years from the establishment of the state, through the Six-Day War, Kook's position remained relatively stable (Inbari 2012: 29). After the war, his identification with the state intensified due to victory perceived as divine realisation (Inbari 2012: 29).

Firstly, from the Gush Emunim perspective, the Six-Day War reconnected the State with the Land, and the return of the territories brought Zionism closer to Judaism (Aran 1991: 273). Secondly, as the movement evolved, it also gradually departed from more secular forms of Zionism. At first the movement maintained good links with secular Zionism, as when the movement was joined by a group of Mercaz Harav yeshiva graduates under the leadership of Rabbi Kook. They believed it was under secular Zionism that God's will helped the return of Jews to Israel (Inbari 2012: 4).

However, the departure from secular Zionism can also be manifested by the integration of the ideas of the father of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, Rabbi (Rav) Abraham Isaac Kook, primarily by emphasising the holiness of the *Eretz Israel* and the holiness of the State of Israel. As such, the *Eretz Israel* was holy, and no one had the right to give any of it away. Since the *Eretz Israel* was a result of the Zionist movement, it was a tool that could be used to implement God's will.Thus, the State of Israel, although secular, could also be sanctified as part of the messianic process (Inbari 2012: 5).

It should be noted that Rav Abraham Kook's ideas did not rapidly win a large number of adherents in the Dati Leumi camp, and did not radicalise anyone until his death in 1935 (Ravitzky 1996: 122). Nevertheless, they did play a central role in the wake of the Six-Day War, especially with the Rabbi's son Zvi Yehuda Kook working for thirty years taking his father's ideas into action (Ravitzky 1996: 125).

The departure from secular Zionism is important because later on, from the Dati Leumi perspective, the State of Israel also proved to be a disappointment in the sense of failing the messianic hope by uprooting settlements and handing over the parts of the Biblical Land of Israel (Inbari 2012: 5). After the Yom Kippur War, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook's identification with Zionism changed, and he started challenging the legitimacy of the State, who he sees as having abandoned its defence of Zionism, due to

the land concessions in the War's aftermath to return the territories (Inbari 2012: 16, 30), ultimately leading to the point of departure from more secular forms of Zionism.

Nowadays, Datiim Leumim remain one of the firmest supporters of the idea of the *Eretz Israel*. They take a leading part in building the settlements in the territories and also oppose withdrawal from these territories as well as evacuation of their Jewish settlers (Don-Yehiya 2014: 239-240).

Overall, the support for *Eretz Israel* and the State of Israel is one of the defining features of Datiim Leumim. As the State of Israel was founded on the principles of the Zionist ideology, the paragraphs below further examine the relationship between the Zionist movement, religious Zionism, Israel and the secular Israeli society.

The strife between religious Zionists and the World Zionist Organization (WZO) dates back to before Israel was founded. The WZO was founded to establish a home for the Jewish people and the Mizrahi movement[4] was founded around the same time as the political expression of religious Zionism (D. Schwartz 2009: 1).

Even before Israel was founded, religious Zionism had struggled with the WZO to preserve the religious character of education, of Shabbat, and they opposed the Zionist movement's secularisation and political line (D. Schwartz 2009: 51). While secular Zionism viewed theological elements as burdensome and unnecessary, religious Zionism assumed that a religious purpose was part of the Zionist idea. In their view, sovereign political existence led to a religious ideal, as they viewed nationalism and religion as bound together (D. Schwartz 2002: 139, 156). In addition to this, Schwartz argues that religious Zionism does not consider secular Zionism legitimate or acknowledge the separate existence of secular Zionism (D. Schwartz 2002: 159).

[4] In this context, Mizrahi refers to the Mizrahi movement – a religious movement within the WZO rather than the Mizrahi Jews, i.e. Jews of Oriental origin.

As for the attitude to Israel itself, Don-Yehiya argues there are even differences among Datiim Leumim about Israel and its institutions. There are two camps of opinion, the "Mamlachti" (Statist) camp and another camp which does not have a name. The former gives the state a sacred status and condemns expressions of disrespect toward it. The latter also identifies with the state and attaches significant value to its existence but is more reserved and its acceptance is dependent on various conditions (Don-Yehiya 2014: 259). For instance Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook viewed Israel as a sign of God's will, but at the same he attacked Israeli peace governments (D. Schwartz 2009: 101) – the governments that were trying to pursue peace with Arabs, such as the first Rabin government.


These contradictory attitudes towards the state are a recurring feature in the Dati Leumi camp as this thesis demonstrates by the following example.

Evidence of the behaviour of Datiim Leumim, including the radical elements within the Dati Leumi sector, demonstrates that not all Datiim Leumim accept the State of Israel. For instance, there is a notorious case of the Dati Leumi terrorist Baruch Goldstein who used to wear a Star of David band with "Jude" written on it to compare the Jewish state to Nazi Germany (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 71). Inbari argues that the central stream of messianic Religious Zionism do not perceive Goldstein as a role model (Inbari 2016: 222). However, since his tomb has become a pilgrimage place for his sympathisers (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 71), it demonstrates that his views are neither rare nor rejected. He is praised for preventing a massacre of the Jewish population and has a saint-like position (Grossman 2010).

The above paragraphs demonstrated a complicated relationship between religious Zionism, Zionism and the Israeli state. The following paragraphs outline how Dati Leumi religious beliefs translate into the communities' daily life and views.

A Pew Research Center survey conducted between October 2014 - May 2015 identified several trends for those who identified as Dati. The survey found that most Datiim were traditionally observant (keeping kosher and observing the Shabbat, for example), but concluded they were 'more integrated' into society than Haredim, as for instance they serve in the army (Pew Research Center 2016: 7). As for further characteristics, Figure 3.1 below summarises core Dati Leumi characteristics and beliefs.

Figure 3.1: Dati Leumi beliefs: Summary (in %). Sample size: 584.



(Adapted from: Pew Research Center 2016: 6, 14, 16, 19, 24)

It shows that 58% of the polled Datiim prayed daily or more (Pew Research Center 2016: 24), which suggests high levels of religiosity. Don-Yehiya also agrees that religion plays a great role, arguing that the community adopts strict patterns of religious behaviour (Don-Yehiya 2014: 249). Religion clearly influenced other views, such as stances towards the Jewish state, democracy and *Halacha*. These religious viewpoints consequently translate into views such as whether public transport should be used on Shabbat or whether gender segregation should be imposed on the buses. Moreover, Figure 3.1 also suggests that that 56% of

Datiiim lean towards the right (Pew Research Center 2016: 6, 14, 16, 19). Similarly, according to Don-Yehiya, Dati Leumi parties in recent decades have become identified with radical or right-wing positions on foreign and political affairs, especially those that are related to the Arab–Israeli conflict (Don-Yehiya 2014: 239). The same Pew Research Centre study also showed that the majority of Datiim felt closest to HaBayit HaYehudi, Shas and Likud (Pew Research Center 2016: 21).

HaBayit HaYehudi ("The Jewish Home"), a right-wing religious party, stands out as a successful Dati Leumi party. Led by Naftali Bennett[5] since 2012, the party's agenda consisted of opposition to the Palestinian state, refusal to uproot settlements, and a suggestion to annex Area C to Israel (Roth 2015: 220). The Oslo Accords divided the West Bank into three areas, Area A (18% of the land), Area B (22%) and Area C (60%), Israel has almost complete control of the Area C (B'Tselem 2017). Roth argues that annexing Area C would strengthen Jewish-Zionist identity, and thus turn religious Zionism into the leading and central political force that cannot be ignored (Roth 2015: 220). Moreover, as Pedahzur and Perliger argue, counter-cultures aim to impose their worldview on others (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 298). Bennett criticised the justice system and called for religious Zionism to take leadership from secular Zionism to give Israel Jewish values (Roth 2015: 220). Thus, this example shows that Datiim Leumim aim to replace the secular nature of Israel with their ideology based on Jewish values and religion.

Furhermore, this subchapter briefly outlines where religious Zionism stands in relation to violence. Landes also claims that

[5] Following the announcement of the new Israeli Knesset election that is due to take place in April 2019, Naftali Bennett, together with Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked, left HaBayit HaYehudi in December 2018 to form a new political party HaYamin HeHadash (New Right Party). However, as this thesis focuses on the time period between 2000-2015, HaBayit HaYehudi is throughout this thesis referred to as it was during the designated time period, including the leader and central tenets.

that Datiim Leumim are averse to extremism as a middle class, which supposedly puts them at odds not only with Haredim, but also with their own settler faction (D. Landes 2013). However, the ideas of aversion to extremism can easily be contested by looking at the history of extremism perpetrated by the members of the Dati Leumi stream.

To give an illustration, Datiim Leumim tend to support the use of harsh measures in dealing with the Palestinian resistance to Israel. Some of them take the law in their hands and engage in retaliatory violent actions against Arabs (Don-Yehiya 2014: 239-240). Some of the most notorious cases of Jewish political violence were perpetrated by those who are associated with the Dati Leumi camp, such as Yigal Amir, the assassin of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin or Baruch Goldstein, the perpetrator of the "Cave of Patriarchs massacre", which left 29 Palestinians dead and another 125 injured.

The examples above, however, illustrate the counter-culture core part of the Dati Leumi camps as opposed to the entire group. As this subchapter already indicated, Datiim Leumim are generally speaking more integrated into Israeli society, as for instance compared to Haredim. Some are more integrated than the others, however.

For instance, the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) found there were different self-assessed affiliations within Datiim Leumim. Based on their survey[6] the IDI found that the Dati Leumi camp encompassed not only just those individuals who identified as Dati-Leumi (31%) and liberal Modern Orthodox (12%), but surprisingly also Haredi (11%), Torani[7] (6%), traditional religious (24%), traditional non-religious (9%) and even a small group of

[6] The IDI produced a study based on a survey conducted in 2013 and focus groups conducted in 2014 (Israel Democracy Institute 2014: 6).
[7] The term "Torani" in this IDI study refers to Datiim Leumim who have moved closer to the Haredi world, primarily in terms of religious observance (Israel Democracy Institute 2014: 8).

secular Jews (3%). From a strictly religious perspective, the group is divided into: Torani (12%), National-Religious (63%, liberal/Modern Orthodox (24%) (Israel Democracy Institute 2014: 10). The study also found there was a "hard core" within the Dati Leumi camp, that was more religiously observant, more close to *Halacha*, and also with a tendency to take a segregationist approach, and less openness with other parts of Israeli society (Israel Democracy Institute 2014: 14). The study also noted this "core" was characterised by religious conservatism and hawkish political and security views (Israel Democracy Institute 2014: 26).

Overall, it can be established that whilst the "core" of Datiim Leumim exhibits counter-culture characteristics, the other, more integrated, Datiim Leumim do not. It will be this "core" group that this thesis will be making references to throughout, rather than the group as a whole.

In conclusion, this subchapter has outlined the tenets of the Dati Leumi ideology. The subchapter has identified messianism as one of its defining features. Moreover, this subchapter has delineated the relationship and conflict between religious Zionism, secular Zionism and the Israeli state. It has also showed how the Dati Leumi beliefs are reflected in daily life, attitudes and political views. The following subchapter looks at the Haredi beliefs, with the same objective to outline and understand the principles of the distinct Haredi stream.

3.3 Haredi Judaism - Introduction


Having explained who Datiim Leumim are, this subchapter will now focus on the ultra-Orthodox Jews, also known as Haredim, a term they prefer to be called by. The Hebrew word "Haredi" means the one who is anxious or fearful of God. Haredi Jews

strictly adhere to the *Halachic* rules and view themselves as students who defend themselves against the secular. According to Ben-Yehuda, the Haredi community strongly manifests characteristics of a counter-culture that negates the mainstream culture. That is mainly because of Haredi strong opposition to the mainstream culture that they describe in demeaning terms (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 19). They also relate to traditional Jewish society of late 19th century Eastern Europe (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 16, 18). They are dedicated to the unchanged tradition of Judaism and its values (Finkelman 2014: 274). The name "ultra-Orthodox" suggests that the communities are strictly religious. They are committed to *Halacha* and *mitzvot* (religious tenets) in the most fundamental, literal, pious, and stringent way and their lives are focused mostly around synagogue life (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 18-19). Moreover, unlike Datiim Leumim, they deny the theological significance of Israel (Almond et *al.* 2003: 63).

As Figure 3.2 shows, compared to Datiim Leumim, more Haredim pray daily, prefer *Halacha* as a state law as well as prefer *Halacha* if there is a contradiction between *Halacha* and democracy. They are more likely to support shutting down public transport on Shabbat and also more likely to support gender segregation on buses. However, as opposed to Datiim Leumim, less Haredim are likely to claim that Israel can be both a democracy and a Jewish state and less Haredim lean towards the right (Pew Research Center 2016: 6, 14, 16, 19, 24).

From a sociological view, their principal distinctive feature is self-segregation, resulting in a separate and all-encompassing society (Foscarini 2014: 56) that is composed of separate workplace, education and residence frameworks.

Figure 3.2: Haredi beliefs: Summary (in %). Sample size: 584.



(Adapted from: Pew Research Center 2016: 6, 14, 16, 19, 24)

Haredi communities put a strong emphasis on family as a social unit, and on family life (Foscarini 2014: 56; Finkelman 2014: 273). They get married as soon as possible and give birth to as many children as possible, in a home that revolves around faith (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 19). Although in the tradition of the strong family unit women are associated with the domestic sphere, due to male Torah study, women are required to be the breadwinners (Finkelman 2014: 273-274).

Undoubtedly, Torah is in a central position and education plays a vital role in the community life and Haredi men are committed to their studies. Haredim have a separate education framework to isolate them from the danger of people and values they reject (Finkelman 2004: 297). Males and females are separated in this system and the state does not intervene in the curriculum (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 18-19).

Haredim live in Haredi-only neighbourhoods or Haredi-only cities to protect the community from the outside (Finkelman 2014: 269), as exposure to modern culture could distract them from the strict observance of *Halacha* (Finkelman 2004: 296). Defined geographic spaces play a vital role in moulding social processes within Haredi communities (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 18).

Separation is evident also in the segregation of the sexes, a mandatory dress code for men and women, and language and jargon (Foscarini 2014: 56). All these help isolate Haredim from people and values they reject (Finkelman 2004: 297). Apart from separation from secular Jews, it separates them also from non-Jews, whom they perceive as unreliable and hostile toward the Jews (Don-Yehiya 2014: 250). However, these characteristics are not uniform across all the Haredi groups.

The Haredi community [8] is divided into two main streams: Ashkenazi Haredim of European or American descent, and Sephardi Haredim of Asian or North African descent. These groups are not homogeneous and are divided into many subgroups and communities (Foscarini 2014: 56; Ben-Yehuda 2010: 20).

The Ashkenazi Haredim are split into Hassidim and Lithuanians (Litaim), also known as Mitnagdim ("Opposers"). The "Opposers" oppose Hassidic teachings (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 20).

The Lithuanians have no rabbi around whom they congregate; the rabbi is the head of a *yeshiva* and is not perceived as a mediator between heaven and earth, but as a guide, both spiritually and in matters of *Halacha*. The Lithuanians focus their education on learning and mastering the Holy Scriptures. They live more individualised lives and after graduating *yeshiva* they become independent (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 20).

Hassidim adhere to the central belief that the *rebbe* (leader of a Hassidic sect) is a righteous man who mediates between the heaven and earth. They focus their education on worshipping God with prayers and rituals, and on social relations within the community. They live their entire lives in the Hassidic community, which provides for everything. There are many Hassidic factions (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 20-21), the most known one being Chabad.

Chabad, Chabad-Lubavitch or Lubavitcher Hassidism, is a

[8] Not only Haredim are split into Ashkenazim and Sephardim, so is the rest of the Jewish communities, secular or religious, across the world.

philosophy, a movement, and an organisation. Chabad is an acronym for the three intellectual faculties: wisdom, comprehension and knowledge, which govern a person's every act. The movement is guided by the teachings of its seven *rebbes*, who personified the biblical qualities of piety and leadership (Chabad n.d.).

Sephardim (also known as Mizrahim) are generally closer to the Lithuanians. They are divided into two categories that promote lifestyles that centre around either learning and interpreting the Holy texts or around some mystical texts and beliefs like the *Kabalah*, or their Mizrahi communities of origin (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 21).

Despite divisions, one can also examine Haredim by other criteria: stance towards Israel, tolerance of other groups, and how extreme their beliefs are (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 21).

The previous subchapter demonstrated the complex relationship between Datiim Leumim and the secular State of Israel. The relationship between Haredim and the State of Israel is also complicated, although Haredi views on Israel differ vastly from those of Datiim Leumim.

As Ben-Yehuda notes, for Haredim, Zionism is a rebellion against the God, and Zionism is seen as morally inferior, dangerous, and religiously wrong (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 14-15). At the same time, Finkelman argues that proper Haredim love and feel attached to the Jewish people who live in Israel and even to the state. However, rejection of secular Zionism is necessary to maintain the Haredi enclave (Finkelman 2014: 273). They recognise the secular, Zionist, and the democratic State of Israel de facto, but not de jure. This is because they need the state and enjoy the benefits it provides them with, but at the same time they deny its cultural authority (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 24).

Ben-Yehuda argues that Haredi counter-culture was created as a response to modernity. This is paradoxical because even though the Haredi counter-culture relies on the glorious past

and it challenges the secular modern culture; it depends on both secular culture and modernity (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 17). For instance, whilst most Haredi men and virtually all Haredi women do not serve in the army (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 25), Haredim are protected by the IDF, and they are aware of that dependence (Finkelman 2014: 273).

This shows that whilst Haredim reject the state, they do also benefit from living in it. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, counter-cultures aim to impose their worldview on others. This thesis argues Haredim have to an extent been successful in imposing their worldview. The Orthodox-Haredi combination in areas such as marriage, divorce, burial, and regulations concerning kosher food, as well as being viewed as representing the "real Jews", dominates Israel. In other words, the Orthodox interpretation has become the norm (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 15).

In addition to this, as will become more clear in Chapter 4, this thesis argues that the alienation of the communities from the mainstream is one of the defining characteristics of the counter-culture. Yet, this does imply that the counter-culture communities are completely absent from participating in politics. Haredim are not absent from politics, just like Datiim Leumim. Participating in politics allows them to impose their own views and also to gain access to government resources. However, even when they have representatives in the Knesset and in the government, to maintain their legitimacy, Haredi politicians, at least the Ashkenazi ones, symbolically refuse to serve as full ministers, and serve as deputy ministers (although in reality they have the same authority) (Finkelman 2014: 274). There are two major Haredi political parties.

United Torah Judaism (UTJ), is an Ashkenazi, non-Zionist party, which works for the Haredi interests in education and social welfare as well as on specific issues such as national military service. On principle it only accepts deputy minister positions in government (BBC News 2013).

Shas is a Sephardi political party, which also attracts many

non-Haredi traditionalist voters, with its promotion of a pious religious lifestyle (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 16). It aims to lead Sephardi Jews back to religious observance and the cultural heritage, and it works to end prejudice against the Sephardi community and highlights economic issues and social justice (BBC News 2013).

Political passivity that stems from traditional Judaism, according to Don-Yehiya, prevents Haredim from supporting militant positions in political and military matters and from using violent means against "the Gentiles" (Don-Yehiya 2014: 250). However, contrary to the above argument, there are numerous incidents of Haredi violence. As an example, in response to excavations of the biblical City of David, to oppose the excavations, Haredim assaulted police offers, made threats, exerted political pressure, blocked roads, threw stones, incited to riot, engaged in arson and threw Molotov cocktails (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 65-66). This corroborates the argument that they do not shy away from using violence if they oppose some actions that do not conform with their beliefs. In addition to this, hate towards the secular institutions or political figures is not unknown in the Haredi camp. In 1996, the Haredi camp's disagreement with the Supreme Court and its judges and particularly Chief Justice Barak led even as far as making threats to Barak by referring to Rabin or threats with a *pulsa denurah*, a magical curse intended to kill the person against whom it is directed (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 79). These disagreements cover issues such as the Supreme Court's injunction against closing the road on Shabbat (The Jewish Telegraphic Agency 1996).

The aim of this subchapter has been to present the tenets of the Haredi beliefs, various factions of Haredi Judaism, and the complicated relationship with the State of Israel, including the difficulty of being dependent on the state while at the same time rejecting it. This subchapter has also briefly mentioned how

religious views of Haredim influence their political views and participation in violence. The next subchapter reviews the role of millenarian and messianic tendencies among both counter-culture communities, and it assesses what role these tendencies play in the perpetration of violence.

3.4 Millenarianism and Messianism

Aran and Hassner argue that 'Judaism displays an affinity between messianism and violence' (Aran and Hassner 2013: 381). Moreover, Hall remarks that most countercultural groups are "apocalyptic" in their initial break with an existing social order. These groups are likely to emerge if experiencing some crisis, such as oppression or fundamental social changes (J. Hall 2013a: 1, 3). Messianic ideas flourished among Jewish people in times of oppression, social change, deprivation and disaster, such as pogroms in Europe (Lee 1996: 24). This subchapter therefore looks at concepts of millenarianism and messianism, as they are a common feature in counter-culture communities, both Haredi and Dati Leumi, although manifested differently.

First of all, this subchapter explains the above-mentioned concepts, and outlines what role they play in Dati Leumi and Haredi beliefs. Secondly, this subchapter looks at what role these concepts play in regards to the communities' involvement in violence. Thus, this subchapter provides a background for understanding the Jewish counter-culture communities in Israel.

Traditionally, millenarian, millennialist or apocalyptic movements and sects embrace ideologies which revolve around the end of an era. They promise relief from evil and the sufferings of this world and its present age and thus giving rise to salvation in a new utopian social order, peace, justice and freedom (J. Hall 2013a: 1; Lee 1996: 18). Millenarian groups focus on immediate and

radical transformation. Those who seek change are disadvantaged in their economic, political or social position. These groups have four characteristics: desire for change, new interpretation of life, a prophet, and a heaven or earth dichotomy. To offer an example, the 1st century Judaism experienced a millenarian movement as a result of oppression by Rome, perceived desertion by God, injustice, violence and uncertain security (Lee 1996: 18).

While the literature mainly used to focus on Christian millenarian movements (Lee 1996: 18), more recently there has also been a rise in Muslim millenarian movements. Examples of this include, for instance, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Winter 2018a: 113), which had apocalyptic inclinations as a millenarian cult (Fromson and Simon 2015: 8, 28). Another example is Boko Haram in northern Nigeria which has a millenarian and utopian ideology (Celso 2015: 250). Yet, there is literature on messianism, especially the Jewish form of millenarianism, which sees this specific type of millenarianism as a concept/ideology driving the actions of some Jewish groups.

The messianic idea is a central foundation of traditional Judaism. For a long time it was characterised by passive waiting for redemption, dismissal, and deferral to a distant future. The term "messianic" refers to beliefs that revolve around the idea where a dynamic, charismatic figure who has the power to bring about salvation and enjoys a deity-like status. These messianic movements tend to be hierarchic (R. Landes 2015: 432).

Almond *et al.* argue that Haredim are the passive strand of Jewish messianism, as opposed to the Datiim Leumim who aim to hasten the arrival of Messiah (Almond *et al.* 2003: 62-63). Thus, there are messianic worldviews within the Haredi Jewry. Some Haredi groups view life in the Jewish state of *Eretz Israel* as an "exile", and some groups claim they live in "exile" because of the existence of the State of Israel, and they despise its existence.

The exile in this case is a metaphysical state (Ravitzky 1996: 146-147).

On the other hand, Zionism is oriented towards Jewish return to history[9], to political self-determination and to the present (Morgan and Weitzman 2014: 2). At the beginning, the Zionist movement was a secular movement and its leaders wanted to establish a Jewish state on a national basis devoid of Torah and commandments (Ravitzky 1996: 4). Zionists wanted to bring about a human, worldly redemption. Thus, from the Orthodox point of view, they interfered with the holy idea of redemption. As the Talmud prohibits a return to Palestine by force and instead says it should be a godly decision, the Orthodoxy viewed Zionism as fake messianism as opposed to their own tendency towards miracle-centred messianism (Ravitzky 1996: 10-13, 22). A majority of Haredim reject the religious significance of Zionism and the State of Israel, and even some consider it Satanic or anti-Jewish because it was built on secular, Zionist values (Ravitzky 1996: 7, 145, 151; Ben-Yehuda 2010: 18).

Religious Zionism introduced an activist element to the idea of redemption (Don-Yehiya 2014: 241). Sprinzak notes that Datiim Leumim such as Gush Emunim, unlike Haredim, view Zionism positively and view the secular institutions as essential and as a starting point for the process of Jewish redemption and the expected establishment of the kingdom of Israel (Sprinzak 1998: 118-119). Thus, Datiim Leumim combine Zionism with messianic ideas. Religious Zionism interprets historical events in Israel in messianic terms and believes that national reawakening would lead to spiritual renewal (Ravitzky 1996: 37-38). Out of two kinds of messianic ideologies described by Don-Yehiya, the first one defines its objectives in messianic terms, while choosing its modus operandi according to pragmatic considerations. The

[9] Jewish return to history refers to evaluating the past, engaging with the present and planning for the future on one side and asking historians to arrange history of the diaspora and communal diversity into a national unified whole on the other side (Hasak-Lowy 2008: xxii, xxiv).

second one selects both its goals and its means on the basis of messianic criteria. In the second, "here and now" messianism, Zionism and Israel are seen as holy manifestations of a process of redemption. The nation's mission is to respond to the call and actively take part in redemption, even if it means to ignore the needs of other people (Don-Yehiya 2014: 247).

Dati Leumi beliefs are based on the ideo-theology of Rabbi (Rav) Abraham Isaac Kook (father) and Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook (son), that combines observance of *Halacha*, open-mindedness towards modernity, and a desire to fully participate in the building of modern Israel (Sprinzak 1998: 118-119). Schwartz argues Rav Kook aimed to create religious Zionism that would combine theology, militancy and *Halacha* (D. Schwartz 2009: 32).

Rav Kook and his disciples saw Zionism as a way to national and religious fulfilment, and as a messianic process and the State of Israel as a biblical vision of redemption (Ravitzky 1996: 5, 80). His son, Zvi Yehuda Kook, laid the foundations for messianic interpretations of current events, such as the Six-Day War, with the idea that wars would be replaced by a miraculous period (D. Schwartz 2009: 100). Thus, the result of the Six-Day War, particularly the conquest of Jerusalem and territories of Greater Israel, inspired a messianic and settler movement among Datiim Leumim in Israel (Reiter 2010: 228).

The ideology of messianic determination has grown more extreme since then. Messianic nationalists, led by the Gush Emunim movement, fanatically opposed ceding any of the biblical land gained in the Six-Day War (Shlaim 2012: 90). The victory was seen as a heavenly sign to keep all the gained land (Don-Yehiya 2014: 240) as 'the Land of Israel must remain in [our] hands' (Ravitzky 1996: 133). Therefore withdrawal from Sinai resulted in violent opposition from the settlers who considered it a betrayal of the Land of Israel (Don-Yehiya 2014: 251). Moreover, it is from this stream of messianic nationalists that a group, the Jewish Underground, which was planning to blow up the Temple Mount mosques in the 1980s arose (Pedahzur and

Perliger 2009: 50). Avruch suggests that the Jewish Underground wanted to blow up the mosque on the reasoning that this would lead the Muslim world into Jihad and thus hastening the apocalyptic battle of Gog and Magog (Avruch 1998: 148).

On the whole, this subchapter has examined the influences of messianism on Haredi and Dati Leumi communities, especially when combined with the Zionist ideology. Thus, the subchapter has provided background for understanding the religious and messianic influences in how crises are perceived and how this ultimately leads to violence, for instance framing withdrawal from Palestinian territories as an obstacle to redemption.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on several areas that provide the historical background for this thesis. This includes the role of history and founding myths, and how they impact on the contemporary world, national consciousness and actions of modern-day terrorists. Furthermore, parallels can be drawn between the actions of ancient communities and the contemporary ones. This chapter has delineated the origins of the Israeli-Palestine conflict, and introduced the two counter-culture communities central to this thesis, including their belief systems, factions and characteristics (which will be further elaborated on in Chapter 5 in relation to counter-culture characteristics). In addition to this, this chapter has indicated there are messianic tendencies within both communities, which have influence over their involvement in violence.

The next chapter, the literature review, examines major concepts that together provide insight into political violence and civil disobedience in Israel. The theories of political violence, civil disobedience, ethnic conflict, and nationalism are useful and

provide understanding of Jewish violence. However, the counter-culture framework encapsulates the unique environment of Israel better and addresses characteristics of Jewish political violence and civil disobedience in Israel that other concepts fail to do.

4 Literature Review

> We and the Palestinians 'are destined to live together, on the same soil in the same land. We, the soldiers who have returned from battle stained with blood, we who have seen our relatives and friends killed before our eyes, . . . we who have fought against you, the Palestinians. We say to you today in a loud and clear voice: Enough of blood and tears. Enough. We have no desire for revenge. We harbor no hatred towards you. We, like you, are people who want to build a home, to plant a tree, to love, live side by side with you in dignity, in empathy, as human beings, as free men. We are today giving peace a chance and again saying to you in a clear voice: Enough.' (Rabin 1993, cited in Rabin 1996: 408)

In the above quote, the former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin called for the end of hostilities between the Israelis and the Palestinians. What he did not know, two years later at a peace rally on 4 November 1995, a Jewish terrorist, who unlike Rabin desired revenge and harboured hatred, would kill him.

The phenomenon of Jewish political violence is different, although not completely unique, from other forms of political violence. In particular, the targets are not limited to people of a different/competing religion or ethnicity, but they also include members of the same religion and ethnicity, as the above example demonstrates. As is discussed throughout the thesis, Jewish violence has been shaped by complex history, culture, religion and other factors. This thesis, particularly this chapter as well as the theory chapter, address issues that traditional explanations of political violence or ethnic conflict fail to explain.

To reiterate, this thesis argues that the mainstream Jewish culture in Israel opposes violence but there are counter-culture groups that oppose the values of the mainstream culture, and when presented with a crisis that is framed as catastrophic, these groups perpetrate violence (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: x-xii). As in the past the Dati Leumi and the Haredi groups have carried out violent attacks against both the moderate/secular Jewish population and the Palestinians/Israeli Arabs, there are several

themes to explore to get a sufficient overview of the topic. The main themes discussed in this chapter include: political violence; civil disobedience; ethnic conflict and sectarian violence; and nationalism/Zionism. These themes will be discussed individually, as each area can provide insight into Jewish violence. However, they are interlinked and together they bring about the specific character of Jewish political violence.

Overall, the objective of this chapter is to show where it fits in the existing research. As this thesis focuses on political violence and civil disobedience, the objective of the first subchapter is to actually briefly examine these two concepts, their definitions, causes, motives and perpetrators as to understand why they occur and how the radicalisation develops. The subchapter also examines the concept of religion in detail, considering the groups this thesis focuses on are characterised by their Orthodoxy. These groups also exhibit traits of fundamentalism and radicalism. At the same time, it can be argued that the Israel-Palestine conflict is of an ethnic origin, and therefore the second subchapter explores the ethnic dimension of the conflict to understand the occurrence of violence. Literature on sectarian violence and ethnic conflict thus can clarify why Jewish violence in Israel has been directed against the Israeli Arabs and Palestinians as well as Israeli Jews. Notwithstanding, divisions between ethnic groups are to an extent a result of nationalism. While briefly referred to in the first and the second subchapter, nationalism is examined in the third subchapter. Nationalism is often discussed as a cause of violence, and since a form of nationalist movement, Zionism, has shaped the conflict and is a central motive in religious Zionism, it is vital to examine it in detail.

4.1 Political Violence and Civil Disobedience

The objective of this subchapter is to examine definitions, theories and causes of political violence and civil disobedience and to assess their appropriateness in the Israeli setting. Thus, this subchapter analyses scholarly debates on the concepts with the focus on what causes them, who the perpetrators are and what the aims are. Brief references will be made to terrorism literature, being a form of politically motivated violence. When looking at debates, there will be a particular focus on the role of religion, as the topic of Jewish political violence in Israel does imply that religion plays an important role.

4.1.1 Political violence definitions

Before debating causes or types of political violence, it is vital to review the literature's definitions of political violence. This thesis uses the definition as outlined in Section 1.1. However, the issue remains that there is in fact no universally accepted definition of political violence. The concept is too vague and it incorporates too many factors (Mars 1975: 221). Marsden and Schmid point out that typological efforts have focused on assassination, civil war, coups d'état, ethnic conflict, genocide and politicide, hostage taking, insurgency, looting, resistance, revolution, riots, suicide bombers, vigilantism, violent non-state actors, war and warlordism (Marsden and Schmid 2011: 160).

Indeed, there is little consensus on how political violence is distinct from other types of violence. For instance, similarities between political violence and terrorism may be observed in terms of the purpose of conflict, motivations and ideological justifications (Marsden and Schmid 2011: 192). Furthermore, Crenshaw suggests it is difficult to draw a line between terrorism and other forms of political violence, especially when it comes to

manifestations of wider violence that mobilise large numbers of people and the boundaries between combatants and non-combatants are blurred (Crenshaw 2011: 3).

In the Israeli case a line between combatant and non-combatant is not clearly defined. The victims of Jewish perpetrators in Israel are both Palestinians and Israeli Jews. However, a majority of the Israeli Jews serve in the IDF and released soldiers continue serving as reservists into their early 50s (Mahal-IDF-Volunteers.org n.d.).

Armborst argues that for those who perpetrate political violence, the target has attributes that interfere with the interest of the group and they kill the target for this reason as the goal cannot be reached by killing anyone else (Armborst 2010: 424). An example of this would be Prime Minister Rabin, as before his death, Rabin had been portrayed by his opponents as a traitor leading the Israeli nation to surrender (Peri 2000: 5). From Yigal Amir's perspective, killing Rabin was meant to spoil the peace process and prevent further concession to the Palestinians (Ben-Yehuda 2000: 73).

As for perpretrators, Mars argues that political violence can be produced through the particular whims or caprice of the individual or group (Mars 1975: 223) whereas in comparison Lutz and Lutz argue that for political violence to be classified as terrorism there must be an identifiable organisation, as an individual is unable to carry out the action (Lutz and Lutz 2013: 7- 10), a conception this thesis disagrees with, and rather assents with the US Department of State's definition that also does mention 'subnational groups or clandestine agents' (US Department of State n.d.), i.e. the plural form. As such, this thesis agrees with Simon who criticises that lone wolf terrorism has been overlooked and excluded from most definitions of terrorism. He argues that this should not be the case, as the attacks perpetrated by lone wolves create the same impact on society (Simon 2015: 3). In support of Simon's argument, the example of Baruch Goldstein can be brought in. Goldstein perpetrated "the Cave of

Patriarchs massacre" which left 29 Palestinians dead. Thus, despite being perpetrated by an individual, this most lethal case of modern Jewish terrorism had a significant impact on Israeli society. Elaborating on the lone wolf terrorists, according to Simon whilst these perpetrators are sometimes mentally unstable, they generally act on the same motivations as groups. This means they act out of secular (including, political, ethnic-nationalist, or separatist motives), religious or single issue (such as abortion, animal rights, etc.) motivations. In addition to that, he proposes two motivations unique to lone wolves: criminal (e.g. financial gain); and idiosyncratic (e.g. eccentric, or mentally ill) (Simon 2015: 6-7). Thus, this argument suggests that the US Department of State's definition fails to include alternative motivations. As this thesis argues in Chapter 7, political and religious motives do overlap in the case of Jewish counter-culture perpetrators.

Building on the definition, political violence involves acts of disruption, destruction or injury and its purpose and effects have political significance, and they modify the behaviour of others and have consequences for the social system (Nieburg 1969, cited in Mars 1975: 227). For instance, this is applicable to a great extent to Palestinian terrorism. Palestinian terrorist attacks, particularly suicide ones, generate publicity for the Palestinian cause, guarantee recognition, cause physical damage and sow fear and anxiety among the Israelis (Ahmed 2005: 95). However, the latter part of this definition is not applicable to many of the Jewish counter-culture perpetrators. Instead, they often seek to eradicate, destroy the old system and replace it with a new one. For instance, some Jewish networks aim to establish a state based on *Halacha* (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 165).

This section has highlighted the issue of absence of a universally agreed definition of political violence. This issue, as this thesis will highlight, also means that political violence, including terrorism,

databases are not consistent in their categorisations of acts of political violence.

4.1.2 Causes

Following up on the previous sections, this section aims to further elaborate on the causes of political violence.

As noted in the previous section, as Marsden and Schmid argue, similarities between political violence and terrorism may be observed in terms of motivations and ideological justifications (Marsden and Schmid 2011: 192). As such, the paragraphs below examine these shared motivations and causes.

The causes have ranged from exploitative economical systems, discrimination, religious beliefs, ethnic concerns, ideological issues, poverty, a mixture of these (Lutz and Lutz 2013: 16-19) or desire to get revenge (Crenshaw 1981: 394). Crenshaw suggests that to analyse settings for terrorism, a distinction is to be made between factors that may encourage participation in terrorist actions: preconditions and precipitants. Preconditions are factors that set the stage over the long run. These may include modernisation, urbanisation, the government's inability to prevent terrorism, a lack of political participation or a concrete grievance. These preconditions may lead to an ethnic minority feeling discriminated against by the majority population and feeling deprived. In contrast, precipitants are specific events that immediately precede the attacks, there are permissive factors – opportunities allowing terrorism to happen. These may include events that snap the terrorists' patience with the regime (Crenshaw 1981: 381-383, 385; Crenshaw 2011: 36-38). The preconditions and precipitants approach does hold value in relation to Jewish terrorism. Using the example of the "Cave of the Patriarchs massacre", the long-term preconditions that had affected Goldstein's decision to carry out the massacre may include hatred towards the Palestinians and

a Zionist worldview. A precipitant could have included the Oslo Accords. It is an event such as the Oslo Accords that snaps the patience with the regime.

Moreover, the above-mentioned point about certain preconditions leaving an ethnic minority deprived maintains value in relation to Jewish political violence. The study conducted by Pedahzur *et al*. explains that violence begins when the group feels dissatisfied and frustrated. The source of violence – de-legitimatisation – is a consequence of deprivation, diminution of state credibility and a breakdown of the government's legitimacy. The study, focusing on religious Israeli Jews and their deep division with the secular Israeli Jews, argues that while Haredim are a minority in Israel, they do not see themselves as a minority. They struggle with the secular Jews over the control of Israel, and reject legitimacy of the government. This study also argues that religious Jews not only support violence more than the secular ones, they also have deeper feelings of deprivation (Pedahzur *et al.* 2000: 22-25). Another study on violence in Israel also concluded that religious respondents were more deprived than less religious people (Zaidise *et al.* 2007: 8-16).

Seeing that religion is one of the central subjects in Jewish political violence in Israel, the following section focuses on religion.

4.1.3 Religion

This section's aim is to further discuss and assess whether religion is the most suitable lens to analyse Jewish political violence with.

Laqueur notes that Israel followed the worldwide trend toward religious fundamentalism with a radicalisation of national religious elements following the Six-Day War. Moreover, he highlights the growing importance of the Israeli messianic Zionism (Laqueur 1999: 148).

Religious perpetrators, including Jewish ones, believe violence is legitimised based on their religious beliefs, they are alienated and seek religious and racial purification of the country and elimination of their enemies (B. Hoffman 1995: 3-6). This can be illustrated by an example from Israel. The above-described characteristics are noticeable in the case of Rabbi Meir Kahane.

Overall, Kahane's viewpoints were radically nationalist, racist as well as fundamentalist. His ideas included sectarian approaches and the hatred of secular Jews (Rosenak 1993: 402) and he wanted to wage a war against irreligious and leftist Jews (Rosenak 1993: 403). In addition to this, he hated Arabs whom he wanted to expel (B. Hoffman 2006: 97-98; Rosenak 1993: 403) and, as Hoffman argues, even to kill (B. Hoffman 2006: 97-98). This stems from his view that in the Jewish state, there must be a majority of Jews (Mergui and Simonnot 1987: 30). He was opposed to the idea of mixed marriages, and considered them a crime (Mergui and Simonnot 1987: 81).

Kahane promoted the virtues of Jewish aggressiveness and the right of self-defence (B. Hoffman 2006: 97-98), his belief in unrestrained violence stemmed from his mistrust and animosity towards gentiles (Sprinzak 1993: 478). He also believed in Jabotinsky's "Jewish Iron" idea that the Diaspora Jews should not bow to their oppressors but respond with physical force if necessary (Sprinzak 1993: 481).

When asked what would happen if the government decided to give back all or a part of the West Bank, and if he would oppose it by force, he responded 'No. Not by physical force. We would use civil disobedience. Like we did in Yamit, passive resistance' (Kahane, cited in Mergui and Simonnot 1987: 56). However, he did also indicate that violence had its place in Judaism (Mergui and Simonnot 1987: 55). This can also be demonstrated by the acts of the JDL he had founded.

He denounced the Israeli government policies (B. Hoffman 2006: 97-98), he saw the State of Israel as sinful where Israeli leaders did not respect God. He emphasised the State of Israel

was established by God rather than secular Zionists (Sprinzak 1993: 478). As such, rather than democratic institutions, he insisted that the supreme authority must lie with a rabbinic court. His ideas also included *Halacha* as the supreme law, compulsory Sabbath and religious schools (Mergui and Simonnot 1987: 32, 34).

His ideology also contained a messianic element (Rosenak 1993: 402). In his worldview the Jews had to work actively to bring about the redemption (B. Hoffman 2006: 97-98). He believed that Zionism accelerates the coming of the Messiah and that the creation of Israel was only the start of messianic era. He was convinced he lived at the end of time, in a messianic era (Mergui and Simonnot 1987: 43-44).

Active attempts to bring about redemption, as explained in Subchapter 3.4, are symptomatic of millenarian and apocalyptic visions that are tied to religious political violence. Millenarian perpetrators are not likely to adapt to reality because of being threatened and deprived and because of their isolation and their dependence on fantastical beliefs about relations to the world. Millenarians may believe in withdrawing from secular society to create a separate community of believers (Crenshaw 2011: 97, 108). For instance, Gush Emunim had a millenarian dimension. The group wanted to destroy a Muslim holy place and thus facilitate the resurrection of the Jewish Third Temple (B. Hoffman 2006: 99). The Gush Emunim movement also exhibited many characteristics of fundamentalism and radicalism. As such, the following section examines the two concepts, their definitions, and it clarifies each one's link to violence.

4.1.4 Fundamentalism and radicalism

This section will explain what both fundamentalism and radicalism entail. It will also also provide an overview of how these two

concepts are exhibited by the Jewish groups in Israel. Lastly, a link to violence of each of these concepts wll be explored.

Starting with fundamentalism, Marty and Appleby argue that fundamentalists fight back, they fight against others, they fight for their worldview, they fight with their ideal concepts and they fight under God (Marty and Appleby 1991: ix-x).

More specifically, Jewish fundamentalism is traditionally based around the Torah which is interpreted by traditional or charismatic leaders to be comprehensive and exclusive (Rosenak 1993: 380). Liebman recognises two strands of Jewish fundamentalism, Haredi and Gush Emunim, even though these groups have very little in common (Liebman 1993: 69).

In the case of Haredim, fundamentalism is exhibited as an alternative to the modern world. It is represented in the form of traditional values that are in competition with the modern ones (M. Friedman and Heilman 1991: 216). They interpret the religious law stringently (M. Friedman and Heilman 1991: 254; Sprinzak 1993: 464) and they also theologically negate Zionism as a guiding ideology of secular Israel (Sprinzak 1993: 464) which has deep roots in their sense of alienation from the state' secularist lifestyle (Sivan 1995: 40). They are hostile to fellow Jews just as they are hostile to gentiles (Almond *et al.* 1995: 418). They fear contamination by secular families, and to avoid it, they practice endogamy (Sivan 1995: 33).

As for the links to violence, Friedman and Heilman argue that Haredi fundamentalism does not transform into violence because of their passivity (M. Friedman and Heilman 1991: 241).

For Haredim, the sense of crisis must be extraordinarily intense to get actively engaged, which is when then they stop being passive and move into radical stance (Heilman 1994: 184). This sense of crisis, will be further explored as per the thesis' framework.

Whilst Haredim do not kill, they are very militant (Sprinzak 1993: 468) From the Haredi perspective, Friedman and Heilman argue, the physical injury or death of other Jews is perceived as unjustified and violence with the intention to kill is extreme and implies desire for "direct history" which goes against their aforementioned passivity (M. Friedman and Heilman 1991: 241). On top of this, Sprinzak argues there are three reasons why Haredi militancy is contained. It is primarily because they live in self perceived exile and cannot take initiatives; they have a sense of physical powerlessness, and are unable to challenge the state; and lastly, the existence of internal threats to the integrity of the Haredi order prevents them from taking a violent action (Sprinzak 1993: 465).

When they do perpetrate violence, however, it is aimed at enforcing Haredi lifestyle over deviant individuals (Sprinzak 1993: 465). Sprinzak also argues that extremist Haredim would be more aggressive and dangerous if not for the Israeli policy (Sprinzak 1993: 467).

As for Datiim Leumim, and the Gush Emunim movement in particular, they also exhibit characteristics of fundamentalism, particularly in the form of intense religious experience and rituals with Gush Emunim activism being a kind of religious ritual. Moreover, Aran argues, their political activism is fed by the radical Jewish ethic (Aran 1991: 299). Gush Emunim see the world in the light of redemption, including Judea and Samaria, as key to salvation (Aran 1991: 292).

This is in contrast to Haredim. The exception to this, however, would be Haredi Chabad. Whilst its stance towards Israel is typical Haredi in its views of being illegitimate, Chabad members believe that the territories must not be given up as they are part of the Promised Land to the Jewish people, who as such must be in possession of the Land when the Messiah comes (M. Friedman 1994: 352-353).

This fundamentalist thinking can to a certain degree be a consequence of the Dati Leumi educational method that involves one dimensional thinking, blocks thought and criticism, and encourages surrender to authority. Overall it may result in extremism in attitudes and actions (Rosenak 1993: 399).

Bötticher defines radicalism by advocating political change and hostility against the status quo and establishment. At the same time, Bötticher argues that 'radicals are not extreme in their choice of means to achieve their goals, and are not necessarily violent' (Bötticher 2017: 75). Instead, they use political violence pragmatically and on a selective basis. Moreover, Bötticher argues that 'when numerically weak, radicals can withdraw from mainstream society into . . . niche culture, co-existing with plural societies and not continuously seeking a direct confrontation with mainstream society' (Bötticher 2017: 75). On the other hand, Aran notes Gush Emunim's physical confrontations with agents of law and order, which together with Gush Emunim's religious-messianic character that includes collective behaviour characterised by charisma, ecstasy, romanticism, heroism, ritual singing and dancing, prayer and Torah study, sets Gush Emunim's radicalism from the right-wing Likud (Aran 1991: 304).

Moreover, Aran suggests that Gush Emunim is radical in three senses. First of all, in settling the *Eretz Israel* and their disregard of Arab rights and interests, secondly in striving to impose religion on secular sectors and lastly in their view of seeing Zionism as an integral part of religion and in Judaism encompassing nationalism (Aran 1991: 296). This radicalisation was contributed by the influence of Rabbi Kook's Mercaz Harav yeshiva that favoured militant policies, and presented negative images of foreign nations, religions and cultures (Don-Yehiya 1994: 267, 272). Other radical ideas of the Dati Leumi stream include for instance, Rabbi Kook's statement in the aftermath of the Six-Day War suggesting that a person should even risk their life for the conquest of the Whole Land of Israel (Aran 1991: 275).

Bötticher argues that the links between radicalism and terrorism are much weaker than those between extremism and terrorism (Bötticher 2017: 76). In contrast, while Aran notes that initially during years 1974-1977 Gush Emunim were primarily involved in protest demonstrations mainly against the post-war disengagement, having experienced a series of crises and setbacks in the time period between 1983 and 1987, such as the Camp David Accords, this led to a series of terrorist attacks against Arab institutions and people in the West Bank (Aran 1991: 278, 284).

Overall, based on the literature consulted above, it can be concluded that radicalism leads to violence, but so does fundamentalism, if fundamentalists' beliefs are under threat.

4.1.5 Civil disobedience

As this thesis has previously discussed, particularly in the Introduction chapter, this research aims to clarify how the counter-culture framework explains Jewish political violence and civil disobedience in Israel. Whilst Pedahzur and Perliger's work focuses on terrorism only, this thesis bring in the concepts of political violence as well as civil disobedience, using the definitions as per the Introduction chapter, thus providing original contribution by building up on the work of Pedahzur and Perliger. As such, this section shall review the literature on civil disobedience, and thus also clarify the term considering the empirical chapters refer to the acts and concepts that fall within the umbrella of both political violence and civil disobedience.

To start with, the author of the infamous essay Civil Disobedience Henry David Thoreau, proclaimed: 'I simply wish to refuse allegiance to the State, to withdraw and stand aloof from it effectually' (Thoreau, cited in Pepperman 2015: 208). Thoreau's

rejection of the allegiance to the State is remarkably comparable to the one exhibited by Haredim towards the State of Israel. Moreover, Pepperman notes that Thoreau felt 'deeply alienated from his fellow citizens, and the degree to which he views the state as the representative of the majority of those around him' (Pepperman 2015: 41). Thus, Thoreau's own alienation from the society is again remarkably comparable to the one exhibited by Haredim and the "core" Datiim Leumim towards the State of Israel.

First of all, to understand civil disobedience the paragraphs below provide a brief overview of the concept.

As was the case with political violence, civil disobedience also suffers from the same lack of definitional clarity. The Introduction chapter delineated the working definition to be used throughout this thesis, which is:

> any act of public defiance of a law or policy enforced by established governmental authorities insofar as the action is premeditated, understood by the actors to be illegal or of contested legality carried out and persisted in for limited public ends and by way of carefully chosen and limited means (Bay 1971: 76).

There are, however, other definitions that shall be reviewed. The one used above, and the one this thesis agrees with and adopts as its working definition is primarily because of its focus on public defiance of a law that the actors understand to be illegal in a premeditated fashion.

Other scholars provide slightly different definitions. For instance, Murphy outlines that those who engage in civil disobedience use non-violent means and they accept their punishment for the given act (Murphy 1971: 2) and Hook also suggests that civil disobedience must be non-violent (Hook 1971: 58). The definition used by this thesis refers to "carefully chosen and limited means". Therefore, this may thus include violent acts such as those mentioned in the Introduction chapter, such as

protests, blocking traffic, burning trash (Times of Israel 2017b) or throwing rocks and objects (Times of Israel 2017a).

One part of the other definition that is compelling however refers to the act is regarded as civil disobedience if it considered illegal under some law that is believed to be immoral, irreligious or ideologically objectionable (Murphy 1971: 5). People become civilly disobedient when they are in deliberate violation of laws that have been sustained by the highest legislative and judicial bodies of the nation (Hook 1971: 55). Sometimes, Rawls explains, people choose to do so when this perceived unjust law undermines the position of a religious group (Rawls 1971: 49). This is often the case with both Haredim and Datiim Leumim. The previous chapter showed that whilst the former do not accept the State of Israel and its law, the latter also experience issues, particularly with the democratic character of the State.

This subchapter has had several objectives. It has reviewed definitions of political violence and some of its causes, particularly religion, fundamentalism and radicalism. Overall, this chapter has given insight into political violence and civil disobedience. However, other lenses can equally give insight into the issue of Jewish Israeli violence. As such, the next subchapter examines the issue through the ethnic conflict lens.

4.2 Ethnic Conflict and Sectarian Violence

> Everybody sees a difficulty in the question of relations between Arabs and Jews. But not everybody sees that there is no solution to this question. No solution! There is a gulf, and nothing can bridge it ... We, as a nation, want this country to be ours; the Arabs, as a nation, want this country to be theirs (David Ben-Gurion 1919, cited in Elliot 2006).

The above quote indicates the most obvious conflict in Israel is between Arabs/Palestinians and Jews. This suggests that the

conflict and subsequent violence in Israel is of an ethnic character. However, the Palestinian-Jewish divide is not the only one. There is also a divide between secular and Orthodox Jews, but also between the Jews of Sephardi and Ashkenazi origin, but also between the Israeli right and left.

Thus, as violence is perpetrated on the basis of ethnicity and religious sects, it is vital to examine literature on these areas. Reiter asserts that significance of religion within ethnic and religious conflicts has risen steadily in recent decades, and especially within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Reiter 2010: 228). Indeed, ethnic conflict has been a major source of violence, and various groups are motivated by ethnic concerns, including the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and many others (Kaufman 2006b: 45). This subchapter thus addresses several topics, including definitions of ethnicity, ethnic conflict and sectarian violence. Ultimately, the aim of this subchapter is to show that the lens of ethnic conflict and sectarian violence is appropriate for an analysis of Jewish political violence.

4.2.1 Ethnicity

Ethnic identity connects individuals through perceived common past experiences; it is concerned with group judgments (Ross 2001: 157). People identify with a group if they care about the status of the group and their similarity to other members of the group (Sambanis and Shayo 2013: 296). The ethnic group is defined by myths of shared culture and an interpretation of history that binds the group together and distinguish it from others (Kaufman 2006b: 50). For instance, as Chapter 3 outlined, in the case of Israel this would include past experiences such as the Holocaust or myths such as Masada.

However, unlike the earlier definitions that suggest that ethnicity is primordial, and contrary to the view of this thesis, Bowen suggests that ethnicity is a product of modern politics. In

his view ethnicity becomes nationalism when it includes fight for land or resources, and nationalism too is a manipulated set of ideas rather than primordial sentiment. As an example, he provides colonialism as a cause. He argues that the colonial powers and the independent states following them declared that every person had an ethnic identity (Bowen 2000: 80-81). As such, he disagrees with the notion that ethnic diversity brings about the likelihood for violence (Bowen 2000: 85). Similarly, Sambanis and Shayo acknowledge that ethnic cleavages do not always increase the risk of violent political conflict (Sambanis and Shayo 2013: 294).

However, Sambanis and Shayo assert that histories of animosity and ethnic hatred are important explanations of ethnic conflict (Sambanis and Shayo 2013: 319). This thesis disagrees with Bowen's position, and finds Sambanis and Shayo's argument more compelling, considering the history of conflict between Jews and Arabs in Israel, which goes back to before the foundation of Israel. For instance, this includes the Arabs' desire for independence, as well as their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish national home (Harms and Ferry 2008: 79). As Chapter 3 of this thesis, Historical and Religious Background, indicates, the role of history and myths is crucial. Both the Palestinian myths denying the ancient Jewish presence in Israel and the Israeli myths about the impact of the establishment of the Jewish state on Palestinians are of great importance: they lead each side to fear that the other aims at their annihilation (Kaufman 2006a: 206).

Apart from belonging to an ethnic group, individuals also belong to a nation, which Sambanis and Shayo define as the union of ethnic groups living in a given country. A problem may arise when individuals identify with their ethnic group but not with their nation (Sambanis and Shayo 2013: 296). Referring to the above instance, some Arabs living in Israel are Israeli citizens, but do not necessarily identify with the Israeli identity. A poll conducted in 2015 on a sample size of 688 respondents found that 23% of

Arab Israelis identified as non-Israeli Palestinians (Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute)[10].

4.2.2 "Us" vs. "them"

The literature suggests that a conflict may arise when ethnic identities or divisions between people of the same ethnicity lead to perceptions of "us" and "them". "Us" can be different from "them" in a number of ways apart from ethnicity; this may include dialects, skin tone differences, religious or ideological differences. "Us" or the dominant, core group possesses attributes that the rest of the nation does not share (Sambanis and Shayo 2013: 296-297, 313). Ethnic divides may occur because of the dominance of one ethnic group, for instance in governance or the military, causing resentment and distrust (Haleem 2003: 468). In addition to that, the dominant group tends to devote more resources to confronting the other ethnic group (Sambanis and Shayo 2013: 296-297). Correspondingly, with the "us" and "them" paradigm, according to Ross, people with the same identity share targets of externalisation - common enemies - which reinforces a shared view of the world filled with enemies and allies (Ross 2001: 160). Thus, Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter suggest that conflict increases in-group identification, threat perception and political intolerance. Political intolerance in a society in conflict may be seen as either an expression of "ingroup love" pressures or of threat-driven "outgroup hate" (M. Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006: 573).

The question that arises is whether the perceptions of "us" and "them" and cleavages between the opposing groups lead to an ethnic conflict, and how the ethnic conflict is defined. Similarly,

[10] See Appendix C, Table 10-2.

as the previous subchapter found that there is not a single unilaterally accepted definition of political violence, this subchapter finds that there is no single unilaterally accepted definition of ethnic conflict/war. According to Kauffman, the conflict/war is ethnic if the actors identify themselves or other groups using ethnic criteria (Kaufman 2006b: 46). In ethnic conflict, at least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict along an existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide and pursues policies related to one or more of the ethnic and territorial claims (Cordell and Wolff 2010: 85). Ethnic conflicts are described as long, deadly with often devastating economic consequences (Sambanis, Shayo 2013: 294). Cordell and Wolff outline two ways an ethnic conflict can be described. It can be described as a conflict between a group and a state, and as an inter-ethnic conflict when two groups compete (Cordell and Wolff 2010: 85). Esteban *et al.* argue that one criterion for a conflict to be classified as ethnic is that it involves a rebellion against the state on behalf of some ethnic group (Esteban *et al.* 2012: 858), which would thus exclude the ethnic conflict perspective from this thesis. This argument thus also excludes two ethnic groups fighting with each other, and is thus in opposition with most of the theories of ethnic conflict.

Kaufman's symbolic politics theory of ethnic war is more plausible. The main element of the theory suggests that the group narrative justifies hostility towards the adversary, which is perceived as "them". Preconditions leading to an ethnic war include: 1) Symbolic decision-making – in this case politicians or extremists use emotive symbols to appeal to people. 2) Fears of extinction – in the Israeli case there is a fear of (another) genocide. 3) Opportunity to mobilise – Kaufman argues that if a group lacks a territorial base, then ethnic war is impossible (Kaufman 2009: 404- 405). Kaufman suggests that his symbolic politics theory is more useful than the rational choice theory. Rational choice theory argues that extreme behaviour is a result of a rational choice. In rationalist models, ethnic conflicts are

created as a result of individuals' interests such as security or wealth. In the case of pure-uncertainty security dilemma, conflict is caused as a result of no side wanting war, which leads to insecurity that can eventually overestimate hostility and cause violence to erupt. Rational choice and symbolic politics differ over the nature of ethnicity, ethnic conflict and causes of ethnic war. Symbolic politics gives importance to intangible concerns such as emotional motives, and Kaufman's theory is based on group myths as causes of ethnic violence that justify hostility, fear of extinction and the politics of chauvinist mobilisation (Kaufman 2006b: 46-50). A fear of ethnic extinction may be based on threatening demographic trends and a history of domination by one group over the other (Kaufman 1996: 109), which is why the symbolic politics theory is so compelling in the case of Israel. In addition to this, this thesis agrees with Kaufman's explanation why the symbolic politics interpretation is to be preferred over competing approaches. Most crucially, this model recognises the importance of emotions: 'hostile emotions such as hatred and resentment tend to have roots in pre-existing ethnic myths justifying hostility against the ethnic out-group' (Kaufman 2006a: 204). It argues that ethnic wars are intractable because of intangible concerns, myths and fears, even though ethnic civil wars are fought over tangible concerns, such as land, resources, power, and security (Kaufman 2006a: 214). At the same time, Kaufman also acknowledges that rationality still plays a role, affecting racial bias (Kaufman 2014: 7) as well as mass hostility. For instance, he describes necessary preconditions for mass hostility, including rational dissatisfaction and emotional heat, with the former including some degree of economic pain, and the latter being linked to a fear of ethnic extinction (Kaufman 1996: 113). Nevertheless, he argues that rational grievances alone, while necessary, are not sufficient to motivate ethnic war (Kaufman 1996: 112).

Akin to Kaufman's argument, Ross clarifies that narratives about a longstanding conflict contain culturally rooted aspirations

linked to the deepest fears of ethnic communities. There is a "chosen trauma" that symbolises a group's deepest threats and fears through feelings of helplessness and victimisation. When group members feel humiliated, angry or helpless by the losses suffered in the trauma, they incorporate the emotional meaning of the traumatic event into its identity (Ross 2001: 166). Ross uses the concept of psycho-cultural dramas to explain ethnic conflict. Psycho-cultural interpretations are important when dealing with meaning and identity that define cultural communities. They are at the centre of a group's narratives of origin, history, and conflicts with outsiders, as well as in the community's symbolic and ritual behaviours. The psycho-cultural dramas are polarising events involving non-negotiable cultural claims, threats, and/or rights that become important because of their connections to core metaphors and group narratives that embody a group's identity. In ethnic conflicts, psycho-cultural dramas arise between groups over competing, and apparently irresolvable, claims that engage the central elements of each group's historical experience and identity and invoke suspicions and fears of the opponent (Ross 2001: 157, 159).

As for other explanations, Esteban *et al.* argue there are two broad views on the ethnicity-conflict nexus. The "primordialist" view takes the position that ethnic differences are ancestral, deep, and irreconcilable. On the other hand; the "instrumental" approach sees ethnicity as a strategic basis for coalitions that seek a larger share of economic or political power. And thus ethnicity restricts resources to a smaller set of individuals. Agreeing with other theorists, they acknowledge that ethnic conflict could be aggravated by hatreds and resentments, often ancestral or as a result of recent clash of interests. Moreover, they argue that exclusion is easier if ethnic groups are geographically concentrated (Esteban *et al.* 2012: 859). In contrast, Bowen disagrees with the idea of conflicts being fuelled by age-old ethnic loyalties and cultural differences, as it misrepresents the genesis of conflict and ignores the ability to

coexist. He argues what is called ethnic conflict is in reality related to power and land rather than a result of ethnic diversity (Bowen 2000: 79-80).

Bowen thus rejects the idea that people target members of other ethnic groups for violence. Instead, he argues, the conflict arises after a long period of being pushed and threatened by leaders who control the army. And thus fear and hate generated from the top, and not the ethnic differences, lead to violence. Similarly, the tensions that are a result of political choices and negative stereotyping and fear of another group, or what he frames as the myths of ethnic conflict, are the doing of leaders (Bowen 2000: 83, 88).

This thesis leans towards Esteban *et al.*'s primordialist view and Kaufman's symbolic politics theory. The conflict in question, between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs/Palestinians, is defined by profound ancestral differences, as the previous subchapter demonstrated. However, this does not omit the fact that the conflict is about the land and thus indirectly about the political power.

4.2.3 "Us" vs. "them": the case of Israel

The literature review of ethnic conflict in the above section has shown a wide range of interpretations of theories of ethnic conflict. Using these definitions and theories, this section will evaluate political violence perpetrated by the Jewish Israeli groups and individuals.

As the perpetrators are Jewish, the ethnic divisions may be understood first of all as Jews against Palestinians, which means the majority[11] population against the minority or even the host nation against the alien ethnic group. The second dimension of

[11] According to the Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010, there are 20.3% of Arabs living in Israel proper compared to 75.52% of Jewish people (Central Bureau of Statistics 2015).

sectarianism comes from the division of moderate/secular Jews versus Haredim and Datiim Leumim. In addition to that, to a lesser degree, there is also a conflict between Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews (Sprinzak 1998: 116).

As for the Arab/Palestinian and Jewish division, Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter assert that the conflict between the two peoples involves fighting over tangible (territorial) and symbolic (identity) resources, with a high toll in human life and economic damage on both sides. The conflict is over land, boundaries, statehood and national identity, and thus both tangible and symbolic issues, such as the status of Jerusalem and the holy sites or the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees into Israel (M. Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006: 570). Reiter agrees, adding that the status and sanctity of the territory in dispute – the Land of Israel/Palestine, including Jerusalem – add a significant religious-cultural aspect to the national conflict (Reiter 2010: 229).

Moreover, the perceptions of "us" and "them" are very strong in this case. Litvak and Webman claim that in the Arab countries Jews are often portrayed as Nazi collaborators or persecutors of Palestinians (Litvak and Webman 2009: 377). At the same time, the Israeli media depict the Arab citizens of Israel as a threat to the Jewish social order, and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip Palestinians tend to be depicted as terrorists (Rinnawi 2007: 160). A case of the "us" versus "them" paradigm can be illustrated by the example from the Second Intifada. The Israeli media presented the Jewish actions as defensive (and thus legitimised them) while the actions of the "disadvantaged" group (or "enemies" – Palestinians) were presented as provocative, and thus delegitimised (Rinnawi 2007: 164).

As pointed out earlier, there are also significant sectarian divisions within the Israeli Jewish population, particularly due to the religious-cultural aspect. Kaufman claims that violence is the result of how two sides perceive each other: "us" (perceived as a victim) and "them" (victimisers) (Kaufman 2009: 402). Therefore it can be argued that even though Haredim and Datiim Leumim

live in Israel in which they are part of the majority group, they see themselves as the victims. This can be due to their religious beliefs, traditions and dissatisfaction with the nature of the Jewish state. For instance, Haredim reject the idea of the Zionist state on religious grounds and they have been in conflict with the secular authorities over a range of issues. However, Sprinzak argues that despite their denunciation of the Jewish state and its secular values they never practiced extreme violence, but were limited to street demonstrations, rock throwing or occasional clashes with the police (Sprinzak 1998: 116). However, contrary to his argument, in 2015, a Haredi man living in a Haredi settlement in the West Bank stabbed six people at Jerusalem's annual Gay Pride Parade (Ettinger *et al.* 2015), one of whom died. He refused any representation in the court saying he did not recognise the court's authority (Hasson 2016), which indicates his position towards the Jewish state. As for the Dati Leumi stream, Eisen argues this is the stream where the most dangerous violent Zionism is found. He goes as far as saying it is Datiim Leumim who are the obstacle to peace with the Arab world, due to building settlements on the Palestinian territories and their aggressive approach to Palestinians living there (Eisen 2011: 147). Overall, the conflict between the secular and the religious population periodically escalates to arson, mass riots, destruction of public property, and other violent assaults on public order (Wald and Shye 1994: 158).

Another division as Seliktar points out is a result of their ethnic and cultural background, i.e. division between Sephardim (who are of Asian or African origin, usually from the Arab countries) and Ashkenazim (who are of Central-Eastern European origin). Both Sephardim and Ashkenazim struggled with being a minority in their respective countries of origin. Before the establishment of Israel Sephardim had been a minority in their host Arab countries and when they moved to Israel and transformed from the minority to majority, this was not immediately followed by their psychological transformation.

Ultimately, lower classes of Sephardim were hostile to Arabs after the experience of being a Jewish minority under Islam (Seliktar 1984: 35, 37). On the other hand, Giladi argues that Sephardim actually identified with the Palestinian struggle for independence, having suffered racial discrimination in Israel from Ashkenazim in terms of employment, housing, education, parliamentary representation and health and social services (Giladi 1990: 4-5). However, the division between Ashkenazim and Sephardim has not yet transpired into a violent conflict comparable to the one between the Jewish secular and Orthodox factions or between Jewish Israelis and Israeli Arabs/Palestinians.

This subchapter has had several objectives. First of all, it has defined and examined the role of ethnicity in relation to the conflict in Israel. Secondly, this subchapter has examined three main types of ethnic and religious divisions in Israel. These divisions, primarily between Jewish Israelis and Israeli Arabs/Palestinians, and within the Jewish population, between secular and Orthodox Jewish groups, have resulted in violence. As such, the ethnic conflict and sectarian violence lens is to a degree useful tool to examine violence in Israel with. However, these sectarian divisions, and the groups' characteristics are closely tied to nationalism. Therefore, the following subchapter examines nationalism, and the Jewish nationalist movement, Zionism, in greater detail.

4.3 Nationalism and Zionism

The aim of this subchapter is to review literature related to the concept of nationalism, and its form manifested in Israel, Zionism. It is worth examining nationalism as it is correlated with terrorism and ethnic conflict. As examined in the previous subchapter, ethnic conflict arises from the perceptions of "us" and "them", and nationalists also use these distinctions to promote their cause.

4.3.1 Nationalism

Nationalism is defined as a '"political principle that holds that the political and national units should be congruent," and a nationalist movement as one designed to bring about or preserve such congruence' (Gellner 1983: 2, cited in Reus-Smit 2011: 223). Similarly, Breuilly defines nationalism as 'the idea that membership of the nation provides the overriding focus of political identity and loyalty which in turn demand national self-determination' (Breuilly 2014: 388). All nationalists emphasise the glorious past, current and unique suffering of people to prove their movement is unique (Gelvin 2007: 14). Nationalism is instilled to citizens by the state reinforcing and glorifying national symbols, rituals, traditions, national museums, etc. It is also associated with feelings attached to the nation and belief in national superiority and hostility to outsiders (Solt 2011: 821, 824; Schrock-Jacobson 2012: 828). Moreover, Shrock-Jacobson suggests that nationalism plays a role in the provocation of international conflict and it can potentially promote aggression. He further argues that political elites use nationalism to obtain mass cooperation for the achievement of their goals (Schrock-Jacobson 2012: 828).

Similarly to the ethnic war pre-requisites, the nationalist propaganda can succeed if the "other" – "them" group does not belong to the nation. The "other" group does not share the distinctive character of "us" group, which determines the identity of "us" (Schrock-Jacobson 2012: 829). Thus, nationalist politics is often represented as ethnic politics (Breuilly 2014: 396). Bowen argues that ethnicity becomes nationalism when it includes a fight for land or resources. He also argues that nationalism is a manipulated set of ideas rather than primordial sentiment (Bowen 2000: 80-81).

The above attributes can be found in various nationalist movements. The nationalist movement associated with Israel and the Jewish population is called Zionism, and it is examined in the section below.

4.3.2 Zionism

The Zionist movement gained prominence and was embodied by the idea of the Jewish state as outlined in Theodore Herzl's *Der Judeenstaat* (1896). Herzl called for sovereignty to be granted to Jews (Herzl 1896: 35) as 'Palestine is our-memorable historic home' (Herzl 1896: 36).

Gelvin notes that Zionist and Palestinian nationalist movements have developed in response to the emergence of the other, competing, one (Gelvin 2007: 93). One of the characteristics of nationalist movements is emphasising the periods of "birth", "decay" and "return", and also stressing the uniqueness of the movement (Gelvin 2007: 6). This is for instance demonstrated in *Der Judeenstaat* (1896). Herzl implied that Jews were hated and persecuted by other nations, and needed to found/restore their own Jewish state. Herzl pointed out the glorious past of Jews and fact that they were happy when they lived in historical Palestine ("birth"), after they left Palestine they were persecuted and hated by other nations ("decay"), and to achieve the "return" of the glorious past, Jews had to establish their own Jewish state (Lesch 2009: 39-41). And indeed Zionism set out to build an independent Jewish state in Palestine and this goal was achieved.

Related to the earlier definitions of ethnic conflict and ethnic divisions, Yiftachel claims that in Israel, there is Judaisation in all regions under the Israeli control and there are separate and unequal conditions with Jews enjoying a privileged political and legal position, while Palestinians are divided into several proto-groups (Yiftachel 2009: 7). Moreover, he claims that Zionism

remains a deeply ethnocratic movement, based on a narrative of a historical right to the entire Promised Land (Yiftachel 2009: 11) and the moral right of Jews to return to Palestine (Shlaim 2012: 83). He argues this approach justified the disposal of Palestinians opposing this right. He further alleges that most Jews justify nakba ("disaster" – establishment of Israel) and legitimise what he calls an ethnic cleansing and destruction of Palestinian villages in 1948 (Yiftachel 2009: 11). Shlaim even argues that violence was implicit in Zionism from the beginning and thus the Arab-Israeli conflict was inevitable as the Zionist movement sought to create a Jewish state in a land already inhabited by another people (Shlaim 2012: 80). Eisen concludes that on one side there are those arguing that Zionism is an aggressive movement founded on taking land from Palestinians and hostile to Arabs in general. The other side claims that Zionism was only violent for defensive purposes (Eisen 2011: 145-146).

However, the idea of the Jewish state, and thus Zionism, as envisioned by Herzl, had no violent characteristics, and was envisaged as a secular state with socialist elements. Herzl rejected the idea of theocracy and wanted to keep the priests separate from state. He claimed that theories of a divine institution or of superior power, patriarchal and patrimonial theories had no place in the modern world (Herzl 1896: 55, 59). Moreover, contemporary Zionism is embraced as an emblem of Jewish national rights and as a defence against attempts to destroy the Jewish people (Divine 2014: 103).

However, there is a divergence between Zionism and religious Zionism. Aware that Zionism was largely a secular movement, Rav Kook interpreted it to serve a religious function as well, and transformed it into a spiritual and redemptive movement (Eisen 2011: 149). Kook's teachings were further developed by his son, Rabbi Kook, who popularised and radicalised his father's ideas among Datiim Leumim in the decades after the Six-Day War and encouraged a hostile attitude

toward Palestinians, Arabs, and non-Jews in general (Eisen 2011: 150).

The aim of this subchapter has been to explore the concepts of nationalism and its Jewish variation, Zionism. The subchapter has shown that whilst some literature points out to violent association with nationalism, a nationalism lens on its own is not a sufficient framework to explore Jewish political violence with.

4.4 Conclusion

This literature review is divided into three subchapters: political violence and civil disobedience; ethnic conflict and sectarian violence; and lastly nationalism and Zionism. While these themes were examined independently, this thesis concludes that they are interlinked and influence each other, and together bring about the distinctive character of political violence perpetrated by Jewish groups in Israel.

The first subchapter examined definitions of political violence, with a particular focus on the role of religion. Additionally, the concept of civil disobedience has been brought in to illustrate the actions of some of the individuals and groups that are being studied in this thesis. The literature review showed these concepts provide some insight into the actions of Jewish perpetrators. The second subchapter also showed that ethnic conflict happens to be a major source of political violence. Considering there are ethnic and sectarian divisions in Israel, the subchapter reviewed literature related to ethnicity, ethnic conflict and sectarian divisions. Finally, the third subchapter brought in a concept first introduced in the first two subchapters. As such, Zionism, particularly religious Zionism is a powerful concept that drives parts of the Jewish population in Israel into taking violent action.

Yet, the phenomenon of Jewish political violence appears too complex and unique to be explained by the three above-mentioned lenses and their respective theories. Therefore, the theoretical framework chapter will demonstrate that the counter-culture framework is the most suitable tool to explain Jewish political violence and civil disobedience in Israel.

5 Theoretical Framework: Counter-culture

This chapter explains the theoretical approach used in this thesis. It lays the foundations for the three empirical chapters that follow. The introduction chapter briefly described the meaning of counter-culture for the purposes of this thesis. To reiterate the main points, this thesis' theoretical framework uses and builds on the counter-culture framework developed by Pedahzur and Perliger in their *Jewish Terrorism in Israel* (2009) book and articles following later on, such as 'Counter Cultures, Group Dynamics and Religious Terrorism' (2016).

This framework has been chosen because it allows Jewish political violence to be examined in the unique religious, cultural and political setting of Israel. In this thesis, the focus is to apply the framework and evaluate its relevance to Jewish political violence and civil disobedience between the start of the Second Palestinian Intifada and the 2015 Israeli legislative election. As the literature review chapter has demonstrated, the literature has provided insight into Jewish political violence and civil disobedience in Israel to a certain extent. The gap in these theories can be addressed by this framework. The added value of this framework is that it highlights the influence and role of alienation, leaders, social networks and crises on Jewish political violence and civil disobedience. Coupled with new data gained from interviews and non-participant observation, this thesis contributes to an understanding of Jewish political violence and civil disobedience. It does so by thorough characterisation of counter-culture, identifying differences between the two major counter-culture communities in Israel, and analysing how these differences translate into views related to political opinions and behaviour, religious behaviour and ultimately motivations to engage in violent behaviour.

Pedahzur and Perliger's framework itself is relatively simple, and makes generalisations about the entire communities,

with no split between Datiim Leumim and Haredim. Thus there is a risk that over-simplifying can ultimately leave out other instances of Jewish violence in Israel. In this case, this theory completely ignores attacks perpetrated by the mainstream society.

To begin with, the first subchapter summarises Pedahzur and Perliger's characteristics of counter-culture. The following subchapters focus on the main individual characteristics, drawing also from other sources. Ultimately, the overall objective is to assess and build on Pedahzur and Perliger's framework and provide a revised counter-culture framework that explains the period and events under study. Therefore, it is also the objective to define the counter-culture characteristics, which will drive the empirical case study chapters and methods employed during fieldwork.

5.1 Pedahzur and Perliger's Counter-culture Definition

This subchapter summarises Pedahzur and Perliger's ideas and characteristics of counter-culture, which serves as a starting point for the further development of the theory. Brief mentions of counter-culture in relation to political violence in Israel come for instance from Sprinzak in his description of the radical fundamentalist movement (Sprinzak 2000: 101); however, he does not further explain the term or counter-culture characteristics. As such, Pedahzur and Perliger were the first ones to claim Jewish terrorism is the result of counter-culture and to describe the radicalisation process in the counter-culture communities.

Even though they do not often have the same meaning, counter-culture theories are established in other disciplines, such as sociology, cultural studies or arts. However, some similarities

can be observed. For instance, Binkley defines counter-culture as a group whose norms, values, symbolic references and lifestyle deviate from those of the dominant culture. However, the term is usually used in relation to youth movements (Binkley 2011: 92). A common trait that can be found between the Jewish counter-cultures in this thesis and the 1960s American counter-culture is the antagonism towards the mainstream, dominant culture (Whiteley 1992: 2). Similarly Moore describes counter-culture as a revolt against the current order and tradition in a quest for freedom and innovation (Moore 2014: 30, 34).

In *Jewish Terrorism in Israel* (2009) Pedahzur and Perliger introduce counter-culture with an idea of totalistic ideologies, as they argue it is in particular totalistic ideologies which possess a religious strain that provide for the infrastructure for the development of a counter-culture (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: x). They argue that those who adhere to totalistic ideologies are more prone to engage in religiously motivated violence (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 299). Perhaps the most crucial definition they provide is the distinction between a sub-culture and counter-culture:

> subcultures, including religious ones, which accept the dominant culture in a given society, perhaps adding to it a series of beliefs and rituals that are shared by a community of believers, most often pose no threat to the culture pillars of the society. However, a counter-culture encapsulates the values and behavioral norms of a group that run counter to those of the current social mainstream (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: x).

In addition to this, unlike subcultures, counter-cultures aim to impose their worldview on others, and living in social enclaves enables them to preserve their lifestyle with minimal inferences from the outside world. Rituals play a role in reinforcing cohesion and enforcing the belief that their community is superior (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 298-299).

Their framework explains the radicalisation of communities when they feel threatened by outsiders. The characteristics of

those within the community who are radicalised include their tendency to live in the same area, their commitment to their own community, collective mindset, which ultimately slides some of the community's individuals into violence. These individuals are mainly those who strongly identify with the community's values and are alienated from the outside world. They are part of close-knit social networks within the community that get radicalised. Radicalisation is accelerated due to the central role of community leaders, who frame certain situations as an existential threat. Perliger and Pedahzur also note these individuals enjoy high levels of 'biographical availability' (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 297-300). Biographical availability refers to the absence of constraints, such as full-time employment or marriage (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 300) that may increase the risk of movement participation, such as activism in social movements and groups, including terrorist groups (McAdam 1986: 70).

Perliger and Pedahzur identify two main types of counter-culture in Israel, Haredi and Dati Leumi. Their 2016 study showed that most Israeli Jewish terrorists (81.6%) came from either one of these backgrounds (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 300-301). Moreover, since counter-cultures develop in groups that possess a religious strain (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: x), it thus follows that this thesis focuses on the Dati Leumi and the Haredi communities, which are two major camps among (Orthodox) religious Jews in Israel, and each has its own subdivisions (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 14).

The four main traits of the counter-culture communities and their radicalisation process this thesis identifies are: alienation, social networks, community leaders and crises.

These four traits are exhibited differently by these two groups, and since there are multiple subgroups within these two groups, they will not always be representative across all the subgroups. It is also this thesis' intention to understand the differences between the two main groups.

The following subchapter examines the first characteristic, alienation, which is perhaps the most defining characteristic of counter-culture. This thesis argues that alienation comprises several areas, including morality, cultural characteristics, residence areas, education and work and military service, which are manifested differently by the two groups this thesis focuses on.

5.2 Alienation

As the above subchapter outlined, a community's alienation is one of the key characteristics of counter-culture. Pedahzur and Perliger assert that people who are committed to a certain worldview that is in opposition to other cultures tend to join closed communities where they can live according to their chosen way of life with minimal exposure to outside influences. Sharing a common physical space intensifies the effect of counter-culture on members of the community. Ongoing ceremonial communication between them strengthens their belief in the righteousness of their path, their social cohesion and their willingness to sacrifice personal resources for the collective and their faith (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: x-xi). Living in social enclaves enables these communities to preserve their unique lifestyles, minimise exposure to external influences and enforce internal monitoring mechanisms that prevent internal dissent. Their rituals reinforce the belief in their superiority (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 299).

Whilst these groups self-segregate themselves, this thesis argues that this is a consequence of the groups' alienation from the mainstream culture for the reasons that are discussed either in this chapter or throughout this thesis. These reasons include for instance alienation by the impure and immoral mainstream culture; alienation in terms of clothing; alienation in terms of

attitudes towards to the State of Israel or alienation in terms of political and religious viewpoints.

Stern concurs that both Haredim and Datiim Leumim are alienated. In his view, Haredim replace compartmentalisation with alienation. This means that avoidance is replaced by retreat, which is a consequence of the Haredi mentality of the subjugated. They view the rest of the Jewish people as sinners, in contrast to their own communities. They do not share the same values and they are estranged from the Zionist state. However, despite removing themselves, they can still cooperate with other Jews, although cooperation is minimal and instrumental. As for Datiim Leumim, their alienation is defined by Rav Kook's thought and its messianic mission (Stern 2017: 6). Furthermore, Olsen states that alienation is linked to discontentment, dissimilarity, dissatisfaction, and disillusionment (Olsen 1969: 298). As the literature review showed, the study by Pedahzur *et al*. showed that violence begins when the group feels dissatisfied and frustrated (Pedahzur *et al.* 2000: 22-25) whilst another study on violence concluded that religious respondents were more deprived than less religious people. The study measured objective and subjective deprivation. Whereas objective deprivation was measured by income, education and place of residence, subjective deprivation was assessed by asking the respondents whether they felt discriminated against on grounds of their ethnicity or nationality (Zaidise *et al*. 2007: 8, 11, 16-17).

As Pedahzur and Perliger mention, one way of exploring alienation is through the lens of enclaves. Relations in the enclave are defined as inside-outside, rather than hierarchical relations within the community (Almond *et al.* 2003: 17, 32). This thesis proposes that in Israel's case of counter-culture communities, alienation from the mainstream culture is evident in several areas. This thesis suggests it includes morality, cultural characteristics, residence areas, education, work and military service. Whilst Pedahzur and Perliger note some of these characteristics, such as

residence areas, education and work, they do not elaborate on how these characteristics shape and define counter-culture. The remaining characteristics this thesis proposes are important indicators of counter-culture and as such they have to be thoroughly defined and developed. Thus, expanding the existing theory by elaborating on these characteristics and explaining the differences between the two counter-culture groups is one of the contributions of this thesis. Moreover, three empirical chapters explain three themes: politics, religion and violence using the framework, and thus the original contribution stems from explaining how these two counter-cultures function on the daily basis and ultimately how life in counter-culture frames the communities' viewpoints on the above-mentioned topics.

As mentioned above, living in social enclaves enables the counter-culture community to preserve their lifestyle from the outside world (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 298-299), particularly Haredim, indicating that the physical division between the mainstream and the counter-culture is present. Whilst there are differences between the two groups, Datiim Leumim also adopt a more secluded and sectarian lifestyle (The Jewish People Policy Institute 2016: 139). Counter-culture communities are noted for cultural and social frameworks separate from the state-run ones. In addition, there is also a separate educational framework. The reason to establish a separate education framework dates back to the days after Israel was founded when laws were enacted that recognised several education tracks (Rosenbaum 2016). Alienation in terms of work is also discussed, especially since it is directly influenced by education (or lack thereof). Just as in education, there are several tracks in the IDF. Whilst service is compulsory, and a majority of the mainstream population serves, members of the counter-culture population usually either join one of the separate tracks or do not serve at all. This is a consequence of how Haredim and Datiim Leumim perceive military duty. Before these subjects are discussed in depth in the sections below, Table 5-1 provides a brief summary of the main characteristics of

Haredim and Datiim Leumim to show the differences between the two counter-culture groups, but above all, to show how they are defined against the mainstream they are alienated from.

Table 5-1: Summary of mainstream and counter-culture characteristics.

Culture type Characteristic	Mainstream	Haredi	Dati Leumi
Dresses (including head covering)	Men: virtually no secular men cover their heads, some traditional do. Women: most secular do not wear a head covering, some traditional do.	Overwhelmingly modest clothing. Men: always wear a head covering. Women: almost always wear a head covering, wigs.	Mostly modest clothing. Men: almost always wear a head covering. Women: usually wear a head covering.
Language	Hebrew (official); Yiddish (quasi-sacred language of Ashkenazim); Russian; others.	Yiddish (especially in anti-Zionist communities); Hebrew.	Hebrew.
Names	Modern; traditional; biblical.	Traditional; Biblical.	Sabra-nationalist; rare biblical.
Residence areas	Throughout Israel (including the West Bank).	Mixed or separate neighbourhoods, or separate cities in Israel and the West Bank.	Mixed neighbourhoods in Israel; settlements in the West Bank.
Education	General stream; gender-mixed. High levels of matriculation.	Separate Haredi frameworks; Haredi frameworks in religious institutions; Haredi frameworks in secular institutions. Gender-segregated. 1/3 eligible for matriculation.	Religious education stream. Primary education – usually mixed gender; middle and high school education – gender-segregated. High levels of matriculation.
Employment	86% men employed, 80% women employed.	51% men employed; 73% women employed.	Separate statistics n/a.
Military service	Mandatory.	Exempt/separate framework (only men).	Men serve in mixed or separate framework. Some women participate in national service.

5.2.1 Haredi alienation

5.2.1.1 Modesty

As proposed above, this thesis argues that alienation in counter-culture communities is demarcated in several areas, including in terms of modesty, thus it has a moral dimension. Apart from physical boundaries, there are moral boundaries between the perceived morally superior and virtuous enclave and the inferior "others". The outgroup is seen as polluted, contagious, dangerous, or harmful (Almond *et al.* 2003: 34-36, 83) and perceivably does not subscribe to the same moral rules (Brewer 1999: 435). Behaviour is regulated by the enclave that wields group constraints to have its members to conform to the norms (Sivan 1995: 27). For instance, there are "modesty" signs in the Haredi neighbourhood Mea Shearim instructing what kind of clothing and behaviour has to be observed in the area (Field notes, Israel, 25 May 2017). In the past modesty was necessary because women and men participated together in the daily life and the only place they were separated was the synagogue. However, in the past decades this transformed into almost complete gender separation in other areas, such as on buses (Ilan 2012). As Finkelman argues, the social function of increased gender separation is to set up boundaries between Haredim and non-Haredim (Finkelman 2014: 287).

Thus, morality and modesty play important roles in Haredi life, and the emphasis on modesty has been rising. This is especially seen in the case of Haredi women. Foscarini notes that 'modesty is considered one of the most important characteristics to understand the social and personal existence of the Haredi women' (Foscarini 2014: 64). Modesty is instilled into women, they are educated to be good wives and mothers, and to keep a low profile. In the classical patriarchal paradigm, women restrict their activities to the sphere of the household. And while women

financially support the household, they are kept subordinated and dependent on male figures (Foscarini 2014: 63-64). Out of Haredi women, 59% work part-time, less than 35 hours a week, as they struggle to combine full-time work and child-care responsibilities (Israel Democracy Institute 2016b: 20). Some jobs, for instance, accommodate the Haredi women's needs by having working hours from 7am to 3pm (Goichman 2018). Yet, despite working and supporting the family financially, Haredi mothers are still presented as homemakers. In Haredi textbooks, for instance, they are portrayed in their traditional roles as responsible for the home and raising the children whilst fathers are presented as heads of the family and providing for the family's livelihood (IMPACT-se 2017: 70, 72).

Haredi men are increasingly imposing their rules more forcefully and enforcing modesty whilst Haredi women are becoming more circumscribed. Some consider themselves to be moral guardians, called the "modesty police" (O'Loughlin 2008; Ilan 2012). Reports of "the Modesty Guards" date back to a time before Israel was established. They are a secret, illegal and violent semi-police Haredi enforcement organisation. Its members use force against those who deviate from the rules of the community, such as modesty, Shabbat observation, Internet use, male-female intermingling and many others (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 94, 96).

However, it is not only Haredi men who impose modesty. There are some Haredi women who voluntarily embrace extreme modesty, including covering their entire bodies. For instance, the so-called "Burqa sect" has a few hundred members (Zaltzman 2015) and is primarily concentrated in Beit Shemesh and Jerusalem. It was established around 2006 to fight immodesty in Israel (Novick 2011).

This enforcement of the modesty laws is in direct opposition to the moral mainstream. Unlike Haredim, the mainstream culture does not enforce Jewish modesty laws, *tzniut* (modesty of dress and behaviour). Moreover, in addition to imposing the rules on

their own population, there are numerous examples of Haredim rallying against the immodesty of the mainstream culture. For instance, this includes attacking the mainstream population in regards to "immodest" clothing or things, such as stores selling MP4 players in fear that Haredi men would use them to download pornography (NBC News 2008). Their reasoning is that when a female wears revealing clothing or chats with the opposite sex, it could entice the men (Schaechter 2012). Therefore those who do not dress according to their standards are often attacked. As the *International Religious Freedom Report* published by the US Department of State notes, expressions of animosity between secular and religious Jews in Israel are frequent, and include instances of Haredim harassing or assaulting women whose appearance they considered immodest (US Department of State 2014). Thus, these kinds of incidents are not isolated examples. Moreover, the secular population is not the only one harassed by Haredi extreme interpretations of modesty laws. An incident from 2011 shows that Haredim shouted at girls from a Dati Leumi school (thus Orthodox but not Haredi) in Beit Shemesh and called them "prostitutes", which ultimately led to a fist fight between Haredim and the parents (Ettinger 2011).

Given these points, it can be concluded that modesty plays an important role and acts as a barrier between the "immoral" mainstream culture and the "moral" counter-culture.

Therefore, these modesty rules translate into the customs and the daily life of the Haredi communities. As such, clothing is another area where a clear distinction is evident between the mainstream and counter-culture population. Haredim are more conservative in their clothing choices (Almond *et al.* 2003: 47).

As for head covering, in contrast to the secular population (also called Hilonim), almost all Haredim and Datiim in Israel wear some sort of head covering, like a kippa (yarmulke). Table 5-2 summarises the breakdown of male head covering, implying that whilst almost no secular men cover their heads, their Dati Leumi

and Haredi counterparts overwhelmingly do. Haredi men in most cases wear a large black fabric kippa, a smaller kippa or a small crochet (Lipka and Theodorou 2016). The typical dress may also include a streiml (shtreimel) – a fur hat mainly worn by the married men and other headgear, accompanied with shaggy beards (Almond *et al.* 2003: 47).

Table 5-2: Male head covering (in %).[12]

	Small black kippa	Large black kippa	Large white kippa	Black crocheted kippa	Crocheted kippa with pattern or colour	Fedora/ shtreimel	No head covering
All Jewish men	5	10	1	5	11	1	64
Haredi	13	53	2	6	1	13	0
Dati	20	13	3	10	48	0	3
Masorti	4	8	1	9	18	0	57
Hiloni	0	0	0	0	0	0	>99

(Adapted from: Pew Research Center 2016: 114)

A majority of Haredi women, 93%, cover their hair, as Table 5-3 shows. Half of Haredi women wear a wig, the rest usually wear a snood or a hat. This is in stark contrast to the mainstream population, with only 1% of women covering their hair. Married Jewish women typically cover their hair, or/and wear wigs as a sign that they are no longer single (Enkin 2015).

In addition to covering their hair, laws of *tzniut* translate into modest clothing for women, deemed as essential for Orthodox women. They tend to wear clothes that are not too bright or tight-fitting, sleeves cover the elbows, skirts cover the knees, and trousers are forbidden. In some communities, women wear socks or tights (Enkin 2015). And while for women the

[12] Note that figures do not add to 100% because respondents provided up to three responses.

clothing is tied to *tzniut*, wearing long black clothes for men is a custom. Wearing black signifies that the wearer is not influenced by fashion and is inner-oriented (Tilles n.d.).

Table 5-3: Female head covering (in %).[13]

	Wig	Snood	Scarf	Hat	No head covering
All Jewish women	5	4	5	6	81
Haredi	50	22	10	14	7
Dati	6	15	18	27	38
Masorti	1	2	5	3	89
Hiloni	0	0	1	1	99

(Adapted from: Pew Research Center 2016: 116)

In addition to their distinct clothing, the communities are also alienated in a physical sense, which is analysed in the following section.

5.2.1.2 Residence areas

As for where Haredim reside in Israel, in the past a majority lived in proximity to Datiim Leumim and the secular population. However, over time, separate Haredi neighbourhoods were established in attempts to keep themselves separate from the secular population (Inbari 2016: 14), followed by new all-Haredi cities in the past twenty years (B. Cohen 2015: 43; Finkelman 2014: 269). Even more, Haredi neighbourhoods are often separated by Haredi subgroups (Finkelman 2014: 287). Living in separate areas plays a role in moulding social processes in the communities (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 18), and the enclave can help them to prepare for their struggle against modern culture (Inbari 2016: 228).

This physical separation from the mainstream culture is unlikely to cease, as few Haredim are prepared to live in secular

[13] Note that figures do not add to 100% because respondents provided up to three responses.

neighbourhoods. This means that the government will have to construct more separate Haredi cities or Haredi neighbourhoods in cities with a mixed population, especially since the Haredi population is growing (Arlosoroff 2016).

To offer an empirical example, Haredi interviewees participating in this research lived in a range of neighbourhoods, ranging from mixed to Haredi neighbourhoods. For instance, Shoshana lived in a neighbourhood that was 'quite secular' even though her 'husband is born and bred Israeli, he's from Bnei Brak . . . one of the most ultra-religious Orthodox places' (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017). On the other side of spectrum, Jacob explained that his family had lived in complete poverty in a Haredi neighbourhood before he went to law school (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017). Also living in a Haredi neighbourhood, among Hassidim, Chava praised her community for being very warm and nice, however she noted 'the community is quite segregated, meaning, most of the boys do not learn any secular subject, no math, no English, no computers. The girls do get full curriculum, but the boys are not' (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017). Even more, Asher described his experience growing up in Mea Shearim, arguably the most radical Haredi neighbourhood in Jerusalem and in Israel:

> Mea Shearim is a very extreme society, . . . people who live in Mea Shearim is really really extreme. They protect themselves from all things around the world . . . I can say that in the age of 20. I didn't speak even Hebrew . . . Just Yiddish (Interview, Asher, 25 July 2017).

5.2.1.3 Education and workplace

In addition to separate residence areas, Haredim do also have separate education frameworks, thus further limiting their contact with the secular mainstream culture. These separate frameworks teach little of the government's curriculum, and as Finkelman notes, Haredi educators would like to eliminate government

oversight entirely (Finkelman 2014: 269). The gap between Haredim and the mainstream culture is thus noteworthy. There are even notable differences between the education provided to girls and boys. Education for Haredim can be divided into institutions for Haredim only; Haredi frameworks in religious institutions and Haredi frameworks in secular institutions (Foscarini 2014: 62).

From age 13 to age 16 boys transfer to a lower *yeshiva*[14] or *yeshiva ketana*, where they study the Talmud all day (Foscarini 2014: 58-59). Thus, at this age, in most Haredi schools boys stop studying secular subjects such as mathematics, science and English (Rosenbaum 2016). Boys remain at *yeshiva* until marriage, with some men continuing to be full time scholars in *kolel* after marriage (Hakak and Rapoport 2012: 251-252, 265). In contrast, whilst boys study mainly or only sacred subjects, girls are allowed to take some secular subjects such as foreign languages, computer science and accounting. However, they have been adapted to the Haredi ideology and priority is still given to religious subjects (Foscarini 2014: 58, 60).

All in all, Haredim have the highest levels of education compared to the average Israeli population (Elazar 1998: 4), however, their education is mostly obtained in Torah institutions (Zrahiya 2010). Therefore, it is not surprising to see that only 32.5% of Haredi students are entitled to a matriculation certificate, as Table 5-4 shows. This is in stark contrast to both secular and religious education streams that the secular and the Dati Leumi populations are parts of, respectively.

[14] *Yeshivot* (note: pl. of *yeshiva*) are Jewish religious seminaries and primary education institutions for Torah studies that are restricted to men. They were meant to protect the young men from exposure to the wider society and prevent assimilation. *Yeshivot* were set up in around the 8th century in Babylonia (Stillman 2010: 90) and their influence expanded geographically during the 9th through 11th centuries (M. Berger 2010: 319). Organised Torah study dates back to 1803 when Volozhin *yeshiva* was set up (Hakak and Rapoport 2012: 259).

Table 5-4: Matriculation examinees, by entitlement to a certificate and selected characteristics (in %).

Hebrew education		
Supervision	**Not entitled**	**Entitled**
General	19.4	80.6
Administration of Religious Education	20.5	79.5
Haredi	67.5	32.5

(Adapted from: Central Bureau of Statistics 2015)

Only 3%-5% of boys who study in Haredi schools receive a full matriculation certificate (*bagrut)*. The number is higher for girls as approximately between 10% and 20% of Haredi girls study core curriculum subjects in order to obtain a *bagrut* (Rosenbaum 2016). Often, at the end of secondary school, girls have a chance to continue with teacher-training courses and get a degree as licensed teachers or they can attend seminars in subjects such as computer technology and bookkeeping (Foscarini 2014: 59).

The failure to obtain a *bagrut* translates into Haredim, particularly boys, being unprepared to enter the current job market (Rosenbaum 2016). This consequently impacts their likelihood of employment and socio-economic status. Around 56% of Haredim live under the poverty line and make up 20% of the country's poor despite constituting only 10% of the population (Zrahiya 2010).

Yet, despite lower matriculation rates, the percentage of Haredim in the workplace has increased in the past years. In 2016 the percentage of Haredi men in the workplace reached 51.2% and the percentage of Haredi women in the workplace was at 73%. Whilst far below those of the general population (compared to 86% of men and 80% of women who work) it was an increase from previous years in which just 36% of Haredi men and 61.5% of Haredi women worked (Rosenbaum 2016).

Yet, when employed, Haredim still have separate arrangements. Examples of this include a strict religious work environment, such as a separation between men and women and

no work on in-between holiday days (B. Cohen 2015: 44). Most Haredim work in community jobs, education, health or public service (Zrahiya 2010). From the 1990s onwards, a growing number of women were employed outside the community in companies and institutions as secretaries or bookkeepers (Foscarini 2014: 61).

5.2.1.4 Military

Haredim are alienated from the mainstream culture by their attitudes and participation in the military service.

In Israel, army service is mandatory, and includes women's service as well (Ben-Eliezer 2004: 50). However, in 1947, then Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion agreed to defer conscription of some full-time *yeshiva* students and to exempt Haredi women from all forms of services. The gesture was to show that the nascent Jewish state had a duty to salvage the way of life that had been destroyed in the Holocaust (S. A. Cohen 1999: 395). However, the number of affected Haredim back in the 1940s was minimal. As this thesis showed in the Introduction chapter, the Haredi segment grows at unprecedented rate, which thus results in a large segment of the Israeli Jewish population not serving in the IDF.

Until 2013 Haredim had been exempt from serving in the military (Tepper 2014). That was to protect the tradition and the enclave culture (Finkelman 2014: 273). In 2014, however, the Knesset passed a law to be enforced from 2017 imposing a draft on the majority of Haredi men (Inbari 2016: 233), which was later revoked and postponed until 2020 (Bender *et al.* 2015). Until then, Haredi men are able to avoid the service by studying at *yeshivot* (Tepper 2014).

To increase the enlistment rate of young Haredi men into the IDF, two tracks were set up, *Netzach Yehuda* (*Nacha"l Haredi*) and the *Shachar* track ("Haredi integration") (B. Cohen 2015: 45).

These tracks allow them to maintain their lifestyle. They either remain in segregated units, or work in a semi-segregated team but within the general military environment. They are completely segregated from women, and are even permitted to retain some of the elements of their religious clothing. After their training is finished, they live at home and commute daily to the base. There are more restrictions for unmarried men in terms of contact with mainstream military personnel, which includes women and secular soldiers. In addition to that, they engage in regular religious study classes, prayers, and proper Shabbat and holiday observance (B. Cohen 2015: 46; S. A. Cohen 2013: 6).

5.2.2 Dati Leumi alienation

5.2.2.1 Modesty

Section 5.2.1.1 demonstrated that the Haredi communities are alienated from the mainstream in terms of their moral viewpoints and consequently in terms of their translation into practice by modest clothing. Whilst not exhibited to such extremes as compared to Haredim, the Dati Leumi communities also adhere to the religious and cultural practices of modesty. This is evident from the case of Dati Leumi schoolgirls highlighted in Section 5.2.1.1. The case showed that the Dati Leumi population also gets called out by Haredim for modesty not being enforced to the greatest extremes (Ettinger 2011). Yet, Datiim Leumim also maintain a certain level of modesty that distinguishes them from the mainstream population.

The study on Dati Leumi high school girls shows that the concept of modesty is instilled into girls from an early age. Girls are taught to be self-restrained, unobtrusive in public or taught to mute their voices. They learn the importance of concealing their elbows and knees, and learn that woman's honour and value are bound up with modesty and inwardness, which are exhibited

by dress, speech and actions (Rapoport *et al.* 1995: 53). Comparable to Haredim, as outlined in the previous subchapter, the mainstream culture is perceived as immodest, and their behaviour, different from the Dati Leumi one, is perceived as shameful and dangerous (Rapoport *et al.* 1995: 54).

As Table 5-2 shows, almost all Datiim in Israel wear some sort of head covering, like a kippa (yarmulke). Religious Jews mostly wear a small black kippa as well as coloured or patterned crocheted versions. Datiim Leumim tend to wear what is called "kippa sruga" (knitted kippa), which is seen not only as an exhibit of religious identity but also reflects political views (Lipka and Theodorou 2016). Men start covering their hair by the age of three or four, as a symbol of connection to God (Seigelshifer and Hartman 2011: 351).

Similarly for women, Table 5-3 outlines that in contrast to their secular counterparts, a majority of Dati Leumi women do cover their hair, and they mostly prefer a hat, a scarf or a snood to cover their hair with. In line with religious and cultural traditions, most women who cover their hair are married.

5.2.2.2 Residence areas

Following up on the earlier arguments regarding morality and modesty, Ettinger argues that like Haredim, the conservative wing of Datiim Leumim tends to view secular Israelis with condescension. This consequently translates into Datiim Leumim's desire to live in religiously homogeneous neighbourhoods and settlements. However, the more liberal wing does consider secular Israelis as strategic partners with many common interests (Ettinger 2017: 10). The 1998 study of the Dati Leumi population in Jerusalem came to a similar conclusion. The study found Datiim Leumim lived in separate neighbourhoods and had larger families than non-religious Jews (Elazar 1998: 2).

While this appears similar to the way Haredim are ostracised from the society, the study found that most Datiim Leumim resided in the city's wealthiest neighbourhoods and in the city centre. Thus there was a significant disparity between Datiim Leumim residing in the central and southern areas and Haredim in the north (Elazar 1998: 3).

In addition to this, regarding residential preferences, it shall be pointed out that it was the Dati Leumi camp that started the settler movement in the West Bank (The Jewish People Policy Institute 2016: 137) and they remain the main backers of the settler movement.

As an empirical example, a majority of Dati Leumi interviewees lived in mixed areas. For instance, Uri lived in a 'mixed community, secular and religious and keep traditions' (Interview, Uri, 06 July 2017). Rachel, however, noted changes in her neighbourhood, in the Old City of Jerusalem, over the years:

> it was such a beautiful mix of people . . . it's changed, it's become more religious . . . although I am religious, I really liked the diversity, of living in a mixed community and now I don't (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017).

5.2.2.3 Education and workplace

When it comes to education, Datiim Leumim usually belong to the state religious education system (Seigelshifer and Hartman 2011: 351; Elazar 1998: 2).

State religious education, which is de facto based on the Dati Leumi ideology, is based on religious, modern and nationalist (Zionist) education (Z. Gross 2003: 150). Nationalist *yeshivot*, similarly to the Haredi ones, are 'intensive socialization contexts that seek to internalize values and life styles in their students through the exclusive study of religious sources' (Don-Yehiya 2014: 249). Students are thus influenced by the ideology of Rabbi

Abraham Kook and they adopt strict religious behaviour. Furthermore, in some nationalist *yeshivot*, radical messianism is one of the sources of militancy (Don-Yehiya 2014: 250).

However, contrary to Haredim, they spend as many years in education as the average Israeli (Elazar 1998: 4) and as Table 5-4 shows, 79.5% of the graduates are eligible for matriculation, which is a considerably higher number when compared to Haredim. The graduates of the state religious education system integrate into roles across many spheres while preserving their religious views. This means that students from the Dati Leumi community are more likely to obtain a degree and participate in the workforce. Nevertheless, they maintain separate social frameworks that they consider essential for the religious socialisation process. There are also higher education theological institutions they can attend, many of which integrate military service with the study of the Torah. Most of these institutions, high schools as well as higher education, are gender segregated (Engelberg 2016: 350), just as middle schools, while a majority of primary schools are mixed-sex (Seigelshifer and Hartman 2011: 351).

5.2.2.4 Military

Datiim Leumim, like most Israeli Jews, serve in the military (Engelberg 2016: 350). Until the late 1990s on average 90-95% of Dati Leumi women did not participate in the military service (S. A. Cohen 2013: 7). This high rate can be explained due to the law exempting religious women in Israel as long as they confirm they cannot serve due to their religious convictions and way of life (Rosman-Stollman 2018: 158). Yet, nowadays, it is estimated that 22.5% of girls who graduate from the religious state education subsystem do serve. Those girls who do not serve, participate in the national service, which is a form of a community work for a year or two (Seigelshifer and Hartman 2011: 351).

Men usually serve in the IDF (Seigelshifer and Hartman 2011: 351), and they constitute half of the infantry brigades, three times their demographic proportion and they have now exceeded the number of secular Jews in combat units (S. A. Cohen 2013: 8).


Overall, in the past two decades there has been a huge increase in the number of Datiim Leumim in the IDF. Some Datiim Leumim saw the service as a *mitzvah*, a sacred duty (Lubell 2016). What is more, gradually Judaism has been seen to influence the collective identity of the army and nature of deployments. Moreover, religious authorities play a role in shaping the army's actions (The Jewish People Policy Institute 2016: 137, 145).

5.2.3 Alienation: Interactions with people outside the communities

Having discussed the areas which the counter-culture communities are alienated in, this section aims to understand to what extent alienation impacts interactions between the different subgroups and how these interactions are reflected in people's views. The interviewee sample is not representative of their own communities as Chapter 5 explains in detail due to the fact that hard-line community members do not interact with outsiders. However, the responses can still provide insight into the communities' mindset. Therefore, the interviewees were first asked how often they interacted with outsiders to their communities, such as the researcher herself.

Figure 5.1 indicates that a majority of interviewees, both Haredi and Dati Leumi, interacted with outsiders to their communities. As they explained, this was often in their line of work, which was a frequent explanation mentioned by several interviewees.

Figure 5.1: How often do you interact with outsiders to your community? (in numbers)[15].




Therefore, those individuals from the communities who work within their own separate community frameworks, will not be exposed to and interact with the mainstream culture. Moreover, whilst Ari said that at work he was 'in touch with on day to day basis, but like people outside the circles of my work, friends, not a lot' (Interview, Ari, 01 June 2017). Tamar said she also interacted with outsiders all the time because of her work, but she also highlighted that she had 'friends all around the country but they're also religious' (Interview, Tamar, 25 July 2017). This suggests that the principle of homophily underlies many processes of social interaction (Kilduff and Tsai 2003: 52). Both Yirmiyahu and Asher explained that now, in their work, they interact with outsiders, which was not the case when they were younger. As Asher said 'when I was a little kid - never. Never' (Interview, Asher, 25 July 2017). Yirmiyahu elaborated on the situation of a typical Haredi man noting:

[15] "Other" in the table refers to responses that were too vague. Shlomo said he 'very much love to interact with outsiders. It depends, it depends if I meet them'. As such it was not clear how often he interacted with them. Similarly, Isaac's response was vague '. . . I like to talk with non-Jewish people that come to Israel to vacation . . .'. As such, it was not clear how often.

> the regular typical Haredi my age has nothing to do with people outside of his community he doesn't meet them . . . , doesn't live near them, he doesn't shop in the same places, . . . he has nothing to do with them. He's not interested either in the same music, or the same culture, nothing, he's in his bubble (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017).

It can be thus concluded that working in a mixed community environment impacts people's openness. Moreover, in addition to finding out the extent of interaction with the outsiders to the community, this section also focuses on the interactions with the secular Jewish Israeli population in particular. Thus interviewees were asked how often they interacted with the secular Jewish population, as summarised by Figure 5.2 below.

Figure 5.2: How often do you interact with secular Jewish population? (in numbers).[16]



Interestingly enough, Figure 5.2 indicates that Haredim were less likely to interact with secular Jews as opposed to outsiders as shown in Figure 5.1. Yet, an indication of alienation from the

[16] "Other" in the table refers to responses that were too vague. Shlomo gave the exactly same response to this question as to the one represented in Figure 5.1. Shoshana indicated 'at my course, there's also a very broad spectrum of women, it's non-religious, religious, non-Jewish also, so that's pretty much every week, three times a week, I go and I love it'. As such, it was not clear whether this should be labelled as sometimes or often.

secular population is important mainly since some members of the counter-culture communities perpetrated attacks against the secular population. Again, as in the previous case, these interactions were to a great extent influenced by exposure in the line of work. As Ari described: 'here at my work most of them are seculars' (Interview, Ari, 01 June 2017). Lastly, this section is also interested to identify the level of interaction between Haredim and Datiim Leumim. As such, the interviewees were asked how often they interacted with the other population, as summarised in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: (Haredim): How often do you interact with Datiim Leumim? (Datiim Leumim): How often do you interact with Haredim? (in numbers)[17]




Figure 5.3 suggests that Haredim were more likely to interact with Datiim Leumim than vice versa. As Yirmiyahu noted, he interacted more with Datiim Leumim than the secular population because 'they are religious . . . we have like very serious issues and argument with them about a lot of things, but we're more close to Datiim Leumi than Hilonim' (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June,

[17] "Other" in the table refers to responses that were too vague. Sheina said that her neighbours were Dati Leumi but it was not clear how often she interacted with Datiim Leumim on general basis. Shlomo said it depended, and he provided a vague response about respecting all societies. Efrat said she did not know.

2017). A majority of Haredim noted there was an issue of ideology and the views on the state. Jacob noted that Datiim Leumim had 'a very strong ideology for the state and it's not the same way the secular people are, believe in the state. They believe the state . . . is the Messiah' (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017). Chava argued along similar lines:

> the religious Zionists see in the Land of Israel as the redemption, as a messianic thing, as an ultimate goal and the ultra-Orthodox community views Israel as a great thing, a big miracle that happened (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017).

In addition to this, Chava noted that Datiim Leumim sometimes take an extreme approach to the state:

> . . . you should not die for it, you should not kill for it, . . . the main thing is the way you live a . . . to keep the Torah, keep the laws, keep the morality, and the values . . . living in Israel is a great gift and it's a miracle that God give us, but we should not kill for it and we should not get killed (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017).

Jacob also highlighted that 'if you talk to the…somebody who really believes in the ideology of Dati Leumi, it's…you know, we're the enemy' (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017). This may be a result of the fact highlighted by Yirmiyahu who said that Datiim Leumim 'believe in taking part in real life, meaning as going to the army, working, getting education, Haredim don't take part in that thing' (interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017). Thus, Yirmiyahu identified some of the areas in which the Haredi community is alienated not only from Datiim Leumim but also from the secular population. As for the Dati Leumi interviewees, Figure 5.3 shows they were less likely to interact with Haredim. Some of the barriers raised by interviewees included the alienation aspect. For instance Ari noted they 'have more closed community' (Interview, Ari, 01 June, 2017) and Daniel said 'they tend to close themselves off' (Interview, Daniel, 07 June, 2017). This results in minimal interaction: 'because they have such closed lifestyle, . . . there is

almost no interaction at all' (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017). As raised by Yirmiyahu above in respect to different participation in the workforce, Avi noted from the Dati Leumi perspective that:


> if they cannot work in Israel, then, . . . because if Haredi person decides to go to *yeshiva* to study and not to go to the army, so, there's . . . tension around that (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017).

5.2.4 Counter-culture and the imposition of views

As Perliger and Pedahzur argue, counter-cultures 'aim to impose their worldview on others' and 'living in social enclaves enables them to preserve their lifestyle with minimal inferences from the outside world' and 'they are alienated from the outside world' (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 298-300). Thus, having focused on the alienation aspect in the previous three subchapters, this subchapter will aim to understand what areas counter-culture aims to impose their views on.

This characteristic is not exclusive to Jewish counter-culture communities. Masmoudi argues that most religious extremists want to impose their views (Masmoudi 2003: 42). For instance, Al-Qaeda desired to impose an extreme version of Islam on Muslim countries and then the rest of the world (Marshall 2002). As for the case in Israel, de Kadt argues that Haredim want to impose their views on religion on the rest of the community, such as the Shabbat laws (de Kadt 2005: 58). Therefore, to find out what the perceptions of the interviewees were, they were asked whether they would like other Jewish communities to follow their way of life.

Figure 5.4: Would you like other Jewish communities to follow your way of life? (in numbers)[18]



Overall, the interviewees were more likely than not to say they would not prefer such an option, particularly among Haredim. Shoshana believed that 'everyone should do what they wanna do and what works for them. I think . . . the way my lifestyle is it's like actually tiring sometimes it can be problematic' (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017). Daniella also believed in people's own choice but she also said: 'Do I think there's beauty if every Jew appreciated what the Torah is? I do think there is beauty in it and I would like to give everyone opportunity to experience that' (Interview, Daniella, 09 July 2017). Arguing along similar lines, Sheina mentioned that she would like other Jews to follow her way of life, but only if they wanted to and not through coercion, but she thought 'it would be nice if all Jewish people had more exposure to religion' (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017). Joseph said he believed 'in variety of communities . . . I think there's a lot of people who would benefit from my way of life or maybe from the sort of community I live in' (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017).

[18] "Other" in the table refers to responses that were too vague. Shlomo said he could not separate between idealistic and realistic. Jacob said 'Parts of it, yes, parts of it, no'. Joseph said that whilst he thought a lot of people would benefit from his lifestyle, he would not like to force it onto anyone, and he appreciated various communities. And Avi gave a long response saying he thought people would gain a lot out of it, but then his response was not definitive enough to be clearly categorised.

Daniel believed 'that this is the healthiest way for Israeli society' (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017). Tamar said she 'would like all the Jews to be religious, I mean they don't have to be very religious but believe that this is our country through the Torah and live according to' (Interview, Tamar, 25 July 2017). Whilst personally they would not like other communities to follow their way of life, Yirmiyahu and Chava both mentioned that a lot of Haredim do. Chava elaborated 'they think like we're it…we are absolute truth' (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017).

The above responses provided by the interviewees show that when participants indicated they would like other Jewish communities to follow their way of life, this viewpoint would come from their religious beliefs.

5.2.5 Conclusion

To sum up, the previous sections have shown that both the Haredi and the Dati Leumi communities are alienated from the mainstream culture in several areas, including perceptions of morality and modesty, physical space, education, workplace and military service. This thesis argues that alienation in these areas leads to the counter-culture communities' sense of uniqueness and further reaffirm their values and sense of superiority over the secular Jewish populations and the non-believers, such as Palestinians. Thus, they reject outsiders as well as the secular, mainstream Israeli society. This rejection is further deepened and embraced due to the role of social networks, which is examined in the next subchapter.

5.3 Social Networks

On the subject of Jewish terrorism in Israel, Pedahzur and Perliger

argue that social networks play a vital role in radicalisation and the way violence is perpetrated (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: xii). These social networks are composed of family and friends, and the terrorist networks are horizontal rather than hierarchical, which are more typical of Islamic networks (Torstrick 2011: 2; Gunaratna and Oreg 2010: 1045-1046). These networks lack hierarchy, structures, and they are not institutionalised (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 160-161). Therefore, unlike a hierarchical network that can be eliminated through the decapitation of its leadership, a small-world network resists fragmentation because of its dense interconnectivity (Sageman 2011: 40). This thesis argues the same concept should also be applied in the case of political violence and civil disobedience as well.

Moreover, 'in a religious enclave the pure heart and pious inner intention are more important that the hierarchical structure that values the outward form' (Hakak and Rapoport 2012: 265). Thus, this subchapter aims to elaborate on this narrative, examine the role of social networks and assess the role of social networks play in counter-culture communities and ultimately in radicalisation.

There are several reasons why the role of social networks is crucial in the radicalisation process. Kilduff and Tsai argue that networks affect everything: health, success or identities (Kilduff and Tsai 2003: 2). Moreover, it is crucial to understand relationships in the social networks, as many of the social networks engaging in terrorism existed long before they became involved in terrorist activities (Perliger and Pedahzur 2011: 46).

On top of what Pedahzur and Perliger argue, this thesis aims to understand how social networks influence their members, not only that they do. As such, based on the social networks theory, this thesis proposes that cognition is the first step to understanding the role of social networks. People learn by observing other people's interactions and noticing who is a friend and who is "outside the circle". This is important if the group wants to identify who is the enemy of the community (Kilduff and

Tsai 2003: 24). For instance, people observe behaviour from their peers or elders. This behaviour may be explained using an example of the Hilltop Youth. The group is composed of young Hassidic-looking men and women, who live on top of hills in Judea and Samaria. They abandoned their communities to join others who believe that Israel is evil (Gershuni 2016). In the case of the Hilltop Youth, those "outside the circle" include the government, Muslims as well as Christians (Melman 2016). Secondly, apart from observing behaviour, 'people tend to rely on others in their networks for help in making major decisions' (Kilduff and Tsai 2003: 5). Thus, these relationships in the social network show that the idea of friendship and trust are extremely important. Social networks may take a form of cliques, and throughout *Jewish Terrorism in Israel*, Pedahzur and Perliger (2009) point out that the cliques were formed prior the attacks.

A clique, a small network of friends, consists of people who all interact with each other but according to Stroope they arguably have no common links to anyone else. Moreover, what is even more important considering the Orthodox nature of counter-culture communities, literature points to connections between the religious composition of friendship networks and religious activities (Stroope 2012: 275). This includes collective rituals stimulating social cohesion and religiosity stimulating or reducing trust (Berggren and Bjørnskov 2011: 462-463). Religion contributes to trust, strong network ties and/or social capital (Adamczyk and LaFree 2015: 20). Cliques may form on the basis of shared demographic characteristics that are relatively rare in a particular setting (Kilduff and Tsai 2003: 6). Therefore the principle of homophily underlies many processes of social interaction. The main idea is that people like to associate with others who are similar. They have common background, education, beliefs, ethnicity, religion and age (Kilduff and Tsai 2003: 52; Sageman 2011: 152; Vargas and Loveland 2011: 714-715). This contributes to greater loyalty and cohesion, and makes it easier for the leaders to identify people's positions and

consequently mobilise them to take action (Druckman 1994: 56). These cliques are local, not global and based on face-to-face encounters, attraction, and development of long-term bonds (Sageman 2011: 152). People in cliques tend to develop and enforce norms that tend to standardise attitudes and behaviour (Kilduff and Tsai 2003: 58), such as attitudes and behaviour towards the mainstream culture. Ultimately, these intense relationships affect people's identities and as a group they develop a shared collective social identity and strong emotional feelings for the in-group (Sageman 2011: 154-156). As a result:

> the clique becomes closed in on itself and operates like a subculture or counterculture, leading to intense cohesion in both emotional ties to the group and cognitive view of the world (Sageman 2011: 156).

Elaborating on the preference of the in-group, from a social psychologists' perspective feelings of loyalty to groups play a vital role and strengthen identity and sense of belonging. Being told one belongs to a particular group as opposed to another can make one prefer the group to others (Druckman 1994: 43-48). Brewer argues that to an extent all groups discriminate between in-group and out-group, with the former perceived as more trustworthy, friendly and honest, in contrast to the latter (Brewer 1999: 435). Furthermore, as discussed in Section 4.2.2, this thesis adopts a more primordial identity. Blood, kinship and ancestry play a key role in forging national bonds (Hearn 2006: 21), and so does being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or a dialect, and following certain social practices (Geertz 1994: 31). Moreover, as Subchapter 5.2 outlined, counter-culture communities often lived in separate residence areas. Fleishman and Gubman point out that this "neighbourhood effect" means that people join neighbourhood social networks dominated by people who have similar individual characteristics as well as values, attitudes and behaviours. Knowing who interacts with whom and where shapes opinions and

attitudes. Ultimately, people living in proximity are more likely to think and act in similar ways (Fleishman and Gubman 2015: 3).

This can be demonstrated by the example of the Jewish Underground. Asal *et al*. describe that the ties between members, together with the geographic proximity and the group's ideological and cultural homogeneity led to the trust in the group and work toward a common goal. This internal cohesion and a strong sense of loyalty between the members of the group also intensified suspicion and hostility toward outsiders (Asal *et al.* 2014: 403, 406). Coming back to the clique definition, although they were a heterogeneous group from a social and demographic standpoint, they shared similar political and spiritual beliefs, which brought them closer together and heightened their sense of solidarity with the broader community. Moreover, apart from being socially connected, all members shared deep friendship ties; they were socially and ideologically bonded for many years (Asal *et al.* 2014: 413). Family ties and close friendships accentuated the sense of trust within the group and intensified the shared feeling of hostility toward, and fear of, the Palestinian population. This made them feel obliged to help each other when needed (Asal *et al.* 2014: 419).

Thus, the sense of obligation is another central feature of relationships within the Jewish Underground, but also a concept which can be applied beyond the group. Obligations represent the commitment to engage in action; they are a product of frequent social interactions (Asal *et al.* 2014: 415, 419). Obligations to secure commitment to engage in action in this case can be explained using the collective action theory and the free-rider problem. There are a number of reasons how the free-rider problem was overcome to secure commitment. Olson argued that the non-excludability of collective benefits would cause widespread free-riding in a variety of settings. In large, symmetric groups everyone would free-ride, while in small, asymmetric groups some actors might contribute (Olson 1965, cited in Dougherty 2003: 249). This can also apply to the case of

extremists, as self-interest groups (Appelbaum and Katz 2007: 32). Olson's solution to this was to offer selective utilitarian incentives to supplement the public goods and attract contributions for their production (Olson 1965, cited in Knoke 1988: 312). Incentives (rewards or punishments) can help large groups at least partially overcome the free-rider problem (Pecorino 2015: 244). Therefore, proximity can overcome this, by for instance allowing solidarity, moral principles, fairness and emotional ties to persons and groups (Knoke 1988: 313).

Ultimately, the question that arises is how these groups' characteristics lead to the group's involvement in violence and civil disobedience. Sageman argues that over time and space, cliques may respond to various systematic socio-political appeals and events occurring at the time and in the vicinity (Sageman 2011: 153). For instance, this thesis' framework suggests that events such as the 2005 Gaza withdrawal, the Oslo Accords or the mandatory Haredi enlistment to the army will motivate some of the counter-culture communities' members into action. In general, as a person's social ties are consolidated in a group, the group exacts pressure on the individual more intensely, conforming both action and belief to the network. Networks within religious groups may be particularly important because social relations and roles in the group become infused with a moral force or solidarity that takes on otherworldly significance (Stroope 2012: 273-274). Selected events that might be otherwise largely independent and disconnected are linked through symbolic means that stress continuity and form a unified worldview (Sageman 2011: 154). For instance, arguably the shock, anger and moral outrage from Palestinian terrorism led the Jewish Underground to take action (Asal *et al.* 2014: 406, 413). Examples of cases that incited them include perceived inadequate IDF responses to Arab attacks on Jews, the IDF's inability to protect the Jewish population in the territories, Arab violence such as the killing of a *yeshiva* student from Hebron, the 2001 killing of a Jewish settler in Gaza or the killing of a Jewish infant girl in Hebron in the same

year (Pedahzur and Perliger 2003: 22).

To conclude, this subchapter has argued that social networks are important in the radicalisation process. Social networks can influence a person's behaviour in a number of ways. People who are part of a social network notice who is a part of the in-group and who is in the out-group. Moreover, apart from observing behaviour, forming strong ties within the network and ultimately taking action as the group exacts pressure, people also tend to rely on their network to make decisions. This theme is also prominent in the following subchapter that focuses on the role of community leaders.

5.4 Community Leaders

Jewish Terrorism in Israel makes a point that many counter-culture communities follow a charismatic or authoritative religious figure (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: xi). During peacetime these leaders embody the communities' lifestyle and values, and translate the foundational texts into practical imperatives. In contrast to their own community, the outside world is portrayed as impious and interactions and disagreements are seen as a threat. These disagreements can escalate when the leaders frame the crises as catastrophic that can influence the community to remove the threat (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 299). Therefore, this subchapter's objective is to examine the role the leaders play in the communities.

First of all, the theory of instrumentalism can help to understand the role of charismatic or authoritarian leaders. Instrumentalism approaches ethnicity as a product of circumstances and individual decisions, and considers how ethnicity is manipulated and used by elites to achieve political goals or political mobilisation

(Joireman 2003: 36). Instrumentalists argue that social linkages are shaped for political and material advantage and traditions are emphasised to support the collective identity (Dawisha 2002: 5). Instrumentalists argue that inter-cultural/intergroup conflict is the result of elite manipulation of nationalist appeals in pursuit of their own interests (Henderson 1997: 656), and determined leaders can manipulate religious traditions and myths for their own aggrandisement (Coakley 2004: 533; Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000: 646, 649). Symbols, memories, traditions, laws and customs set the idea for the nation, together with the sanctity of the homeland and the messianic role of the leader (Smith 2009: 44, 77). This is most likely in times of economic decay, social disintegration or state collapse when people turn to their religious traditions in search of an alternative political order that satisfies their need for welfare, recognition and security (Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000: 645). In addition to this, Almond *et al.* point out that the leaders establish new boundaries between insiders and outsiders and impose strict discipline on their followers. This is done to preserve the identity rooted in religious tradition, which is under the threat of erosion (Almond *et al.* 2003: 10).

Secondly, Max Weber's concept of "charismatic" authority provides insights into the role of leaders. In this concept, followers are personally devoted to the leader; trust in his revelation, heroism and other leadership qualities. This leader (whether a prophet, leader in war, great demagogue, or leader of the people) lives for a cause, is dedicated to their work and people believe in him (Dreijmanis 2007: 127-128). Weber's idea originated from the biblical, ancient Judaism claiming prophets were not only concerned with religion, but they also politically organised religious communities. Charisma is a force that involved a break with the pre-existing order, and they built politically-organised religious communities (Shmueli 1968: 229; Hava and Kwok-bun 2012: 15). Even more, these leaders were said to have magical abilities and power of the mind and speech (Conger and Kanungo

1987: 638). Thus, charisma is the most important trait, combining perceptions of heavenly grace, virtue, decision-making and mastery of the tradition (Almond *et al.* 2003: 76). Charismatic leaders strongly articulate their views, oppose the status quo and strive to change it. They share perspectives and visions with their followers, which makes them likeable, and consequently they can make their followers share their proposed radical changes. They transform the followers' needs into dedication and commitment to the common cause they all share in a selfless manner. If they show sacrifice for the common good, the followers trust them more (Conger and Kanungo 1987: 637-642). The leaders convince the followers that the values are moral, which leads to followers' increased commitment to the values and their cause, which according to Shamir *et al.* increases followers' self-worth, which increases self-efficacy (B. Shamir *et al.* 1993: 582, 584). The messages of charismatic leaders to their followers often contain references to values and moral justifications, references to the collective and to collective identity, references to history, references to followers' worth and efficacy, references to distant goals and less references to proximal goals. Their emphasis on vague and distant goals and utopian outcomes is in contrast with proximal, specific goals of non-charismatic leadership (B. Shamir *et al.* 1993: 583, 586). In contrast to charismatic leaders, non-charismatic leaders agree with the status quo and want to maintain it (Conger and Kanungo 1987: 641). As for the followers, they unconditionally accept the leader's missions and directives for action. They share affection for the leader, wiling obedience, identification with the leader, and have similar beliefs to those of the leaders and are emotionally involved in the mission (Conger and Kanungo 1987: 637-639). Leaders cause followers to become highly committed to the leaders' mission and to perform the call of duty (B. Shamir *et al.* 1993: 577).

Overall, the above-mentioned theories do provide an explanation of why and how counter-culture communities follow a charismatic figure.

The following paragraphs will use the above-mentioned theories to examine some of the charismatic figures in the Israeli Jewish counter-culture communities, both Dati Leumi and Haredi.

For instance, the leader of the Dati Leumi political party HaBayit HaYehudi during the time period this thesis focuses on, Naftali Bennett, attracted voters with his charisma. He was perceived as an all-Israeli icon thanks to his accomplishments as a combat officer, the CEO of a successful company, Netanyahu's former chief of staff and the director general of the Yesha Council. These achievements, together with his association with religious Zionism, right-wing views, and criticisms of the government made him a symbol of leadership, excellence and success (Roth 2015: 220-221). The party under his leadership, however, also attracted voters from beyond the Dati Leumi sector, even a sizeable number of secular voters (Israel Democracy Institute 2014: 4).

As for the Haredi communities, first of all, there is a "Torah view" – a perception that the divine spirit rests on the sages and their personal attributes, charisma grants them beliefs and teaching beyond regular human beings (Hakak and Rapoport 2012: 256). This doctrine grants rabbis authority not only on *Halachic* matters but also over public policy, political, and educational matters (Almond *et al.* 2003: 77; Finkelman 2014: 271-272). These Torah scholars excel above everyone else, they do not struggle with drives or passions and they are ideal models (Hakak and Rapoport 2012: 268, 272). This is often evident in Hassidic circles. Hassidic communities are headed by a charismatic leader, a *rebbe*. They believe that the *rebbe* is a righteous, visionary person and has extraordinary intellect, ability and heavenly guidance directing and regulating their lives. In their view the *rebbe* has connections with the upper world and uses them for the benefits of his followers (Poll 1995: 257, 260).

For instance, Chabad's *rebbe* was perceived as a spiritual master and healer, a political leader able to perform miracles (*mofsin*) and ward off misfortunes, communicating between the human and divine worlds (Enzo Pace 2007: 41-42).

In some segments of the Haredi community there has been a hardening of the society leading to the emergence of fundamentalist-style rabbis, with the rise of omnipotent religious authority and an explosion of *Halachic* works on practical observance in the communities (Almond *et al.* 2003: 18-19). Almond *et al.* suggest these male charismatic or authoritarian leaders use the past traditions to restore the politically useful doctrines and practices which help them to mobilise disgruntled youth into militant cadres or into grassroots political organisations (Almond *et al.* 2003: 10). The case of disgruntled youth is highly relevant in Israel, as mentioned in the previous subchapter, with the rise of the Hilltop Youth movement. Gershuni points out that the movement's leaders, such as Rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh, aim to delegitimise the state institutions and encourage the destruction of Israel'. Ginsburgh preaches to overthrow Zionism, disobey the courts, and oppose the government until the true Jewish state is established. Although Ginsburgh does not encourage violent acts, and preaches against them and focuses on building alternatives to the secular institutes of the state, his followers burn Palestinian fields or mosques (Gershuni 2016).

Overall, charismatic leaders do play an influential role in both communities, however, as for the question regarding how powerful the rabbis are, and what the relationship between the hierarchy in each of these groups is, these are different for the communities, as Subchapter 7.2 elaborates on in more detail.

The literature on fundamentalism notes Jewish fundamentalism is closely linked to traditional or charismatic leaders (Rosenak 1993: 380; Almond *et al.* 1995: 408). Thus, leaders in both fundamentalists streams within Haredi and Dati Leumi communities play a significant role. However, whilst Datiim

Leumim attach great importance to rabbinic authority on political issues, only a small minority feel that decisions in this area should be left to rabbis (Israel Democracy Institute 2014: 15). As such, rabbis are not as powerful as they are in the case of Haredim, as discussed below.

As for propensity to violence, it would be more appropriate to refer to the "core" of the Dati Leumi group, and particularly the fundamentalist stream, i.e. Gush Emunim rather than the entire Dati Leumi community. As an example, during the First Intifada, Gush Emunim underwent extensive rabbinical consultations on their acts, including the discussion of *din moser* and *din rodef* (Aran 1991: 287), which are also discussed later in Chapter 7. However, during the same time Gush Emunim vigilante violence often took place with limited rabbinical approval, instead with members relying on the Jewish rule of "He who comes to kill you, you kill him first" to justify the acts (Sprinzak 1998: 120).

In the case of Haredim, this thesis argues that the rabbis are more powerful, which is also to a degree enabled by the sharp boundaries that the Haredi communities tend to live in, which enables the group to maintain the cohesion, which consolidates authority within the group (Almond *et al.* 1995: 412). Leadership within Haredi communities is characterised by a small hierarchy, with 'few leaders as possible at the apex of which there is leadership of even higher and undisputed virtue that is charisma' (Almond *et al.* 1995: 413).

To conclude, this subchapter has looked at the role of charismatic leaders and their main characteristics. They influence both the religious and political spheres of life of their followers, make important decisions and have the ability to mobilise people, establish boundaries between insiders and outsiders, and frame crises as catastrophic, which may go as far as inciting followers to violence.

5.5 Crises

As Perliger and Pedahzur argue, religious violence is often triggered by external threats that threaten the community or its core values (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 299).

Hall points out that if the utopianist, dystopianist or post-apocalyptic groups (in this case arguably counter-culture Jewish communities that have messianic tendencies) feel that their chances of collective survival are limited, they may engage in violence toward their perceived opponents (J. Hall 2013b: 371). As the previous subchapter indicated, leaders can take advantage of a crisis to advocate radical change (Conger and Kanungo 1987: 645) and the highly committed followers will follow the leader's mission and take action (B. Shamir *et al.* 1993: 577).

The elements that threaten the Jewish counter-culture communities vary. For instance, in the Haredi circles, modernity is perceived as an external threat (Almond *et al.* 2003: 37), threats can also include Arab violence or governmental policies that threaten the communities' lives, values and way of life. For instance, an example of such a threat includes the Camp David Accords that accepted Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and removed the settlements from Sinai, and thus interfered with the Dati Leumi theology. Other threats include both Intifadas, the Madrid Peace Conference, the Oslo Accords or the 2005 Gaza disengagement plan. These events undermined the messianic visions of the communities, such as expansion to the West Bank and Gaza (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 302-303).

Therefore unlike the causes of violence described in the literature review that include exploitative economical systems, discrimination, religious beliefs, ethnic concerns, ideological issues, poverty (Lutz and Lutz 2013: 16-19) or revenge (Crenshaw 1981: 394), this thesis will focus on the crises that the leaders frame as existential threats to the communities. Three

empirical chapters will examine these crises through this framework's lens.

Before the empirical chapters delve into these crises, two examples below, of an individual and a group, show how the framework and its individual components can provide insight into individual or group radicalisation. These two examples encapsulate all the framework's parts, from the alienation element, through the role of social networks and leaders, to crises. Therefore their inclusion is justified, as they illustrate the framework's significance.

For instance, Yigal Amir, the assassin of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, exhibits the discussed alienation characteristics. Amir, a Dati Leumi (Z. Gross 2003: 156), was born into a lower-middle class family of Yemenite Jews. Amir went to a Haredi elementary school and then later to secondary school Haredi *yeshiva*. Unlike most of his friends, he wanted to do military service and after graduation he entered *yeshiva*. Later he studied law at Bar-Ilan University (the only religious university in Israel), but spent more time at the university's *kolel* where he rigorously studied *Halacha*. During this time he radicalised quickly and became obsessed with the radical right (Sprinzak 2000: 122-123). But it was the crisis, the Oslo Accords, opposed by many prominent rabbis, that pushed him into violence, as in Amir's view surrendering the Holy Land interfered with the coming of the Messiah (Alianak 2000: 284, 287).

The second example is a Haredi, anti-Zionist sect Neturei Karta, which means "Guardians of the City" in Aramaic. The group's alienation from the mainstream is evident in several areas. They reject the mainstream, as they refuse 'to recognize the existence or authority of the so-called "State of Israel"' (Neturei Karta International 2017). The sect is influenced by its leaders:

> Guided by the rabbis of our time and under the inspiring leadership of the late Reb Amram Blau, the Neturei Karta refuse to recognize the right of anyone to

> establish a "Jewish" state during the present period of exile (Neturei Karta International 2017).

The group has their own education framework and their own synagogues (Neturei Karta International 2017), and they also live separately in the Haredi neighbourhood Mea Shearim in Jerusalem (Ben Zion 2013). Whilst they officially proclaim that 'Jews are not allowed to dominate, kill, harm or demean another people' (Neturei Karta International 2017), this has proved not to be true, as there are crises that pushed them into committing violence. For instance, in 2013, after seeing an IDF soldier in Mea Shearim, the group attacked him, beat him and threw oil at him (Ben Zion 2013). The group often participates in demonstrations, resulting in wild and violent behaviour such as throwing stones and breaking glass (M. Friedman and Heilman 1991: 241). It should be noted, however, that Neturei Karta is the most radical of the Haredi groups, particularly in its denial of legitimacy of Israel (Ravitzky 1996: 61, 72).

5.6 Theoretical Framework Revisited

Overall, the framework proposed by Pedahzur and Perliger (2009), whilst suffering from certain vagueness and lack of detail, does provide insights into Jewish terrorism in Israel. This thesis proposes that the framework be used to also include political violence as well civil disobedience carried out by Datiim Leumim and Haredim. Thus, this would include various acts by individuals or groups challenging the state, regime or the political system in an organised or premeditated fashion, using violent means in the case of the first group and carefully chosen and limited means in the case of latter.

The framework should be applied to these acts for a number of reasons. Primarily, the groups in question still remain the same,

and as such political violence and civil disobedience are carried by groups defined by their totalistic ideologies, and their acts are motivated by their religion.

Moreover, as the literature shows, religiosity is expected to be negatively related to legal obedience (Yagil and Rattner 2002), which then leads to both acts of political violence and civil disobedience.

Accordingly, the framework would explain the process that results in hostile acts that are mentioned throughout this thesis, including but not limited to *tag mehir*, uprooting trees, burning mosques, protests, blocking traffic, burning trash or throwing rocks and objects.

5.7 Conclusion

This thesis has two main objectives, to develop and build on the existing framework and to explore how living in counter-culture communities influences perpetrators. As for the former, the chapter has so far demonstrated that the theoretical approach of Pedahzur and Perliger has gaps, and the chapter has provided explanations about how the factors mentioned in the framework influence the communities.

To reiterate, the counter-culture communities live in alienation from the mainstream culture, and the individuals who strongly identify with the communities' values who are part of social networks often composed of friends and family get radicalised due to community leaders who frame certain situations as existential threats to their communities (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 297-298).

The subchapters elaborated on these characteristics to get a better understanding of the communities' counter-cultural tendencies. The factors covered above show the counter-culture communities are alienated from the secular communities in

several areas, such as morality and modesty, physical space, education, workplace and military service. Together with the other pre-requisites, including the role of social networks and leaders who frame certain crises as existential threats, some of the communities' members will slide into violence or civilly disobedient acts. Moreover, the subchapters also showed that the Haredi and the Dati Leumi communities do differ from each other as well, which is not something that Pedahzur and Perliger's framework points out. For instance there are differences between the education provided to Haredim and Datiim Leumim, while at the same time they receive different education than the mainstream population. Yet, radicalised individuals from both groups reject the secular, mainstream Israeli society and/or want to replace it. The inside-outside paradigm is deepened even more due to the presence of social networks. These horizontal-type groups can help people determine who is a friend and who is outside the circle. People in the social network are friends who trust each other and influence each other's decisions. People's decisions are also widely influenced by charismatic leaders who have a great influence over followers' lives who trust them completely and will follow the leaders' call for action. This is crucial, as once leaders frame crises as an existential threat, people are likely to take action.

6 Political Trends and Developments in the Counter-culture Communities

'The Torah says this is our country, so…and the borders of the country is according to the Torah' (Interview, Tamar, 25 July 2017).

There are three major interlinked themes in this thesis: politics, religion and violence. The first empirical chapter deals with politics[19], more particularly, political trends and developments in the counter-culture communities. This chapter links the counter-culture elements from the preceding theoretical framework chapter to political developments in Israel. This chapter aims, first of all, to examine the most important aspects of politics in Israel. As a starting point, this chapter first examines the right-left divide in Israel, followed by an examination of the relationship between counter-culture communities and the state. Then it analyses how these views translate into positions of counter-culture communities on the two biggest political issues of modern-day Israel: settlement building and the two-state solution. The reason these two issues are included in a thesis on Jewish political violence in Israel is because, first of all, the aim of this thesis is to build on as well as to expose holes in Pedahzur and Perliger's framework. Even though these two issues play a great role in the lives of the counter-culture communities and their worldviews, Pedahzur and Perliger do not focus on settlements and the two-state solution. Yet, this thesis finds the framework compelling. Similarly, Shor affirms that their theoretical framework is the main strength of their book and the historical account they provide of fragments of the Israeli radical right is impressive. However, it is not contextualised enough to the theoretical

[19] For more information on Israel's political structures, see Jones and Murphy (2002), Chapter 2: 'Political structures and social processes' in *Israel: Challenges to Identity, Democracy and the State*.

argument, as they focus on the historical facts and do not offer enough critical analysis of the events (Shor 2010: 132). Secondly, based on the framework, crises that are framed as catastrophic by leaders, will lead to violence and civil disobedience. Arguably, these are the most significant issues in modern-day Israel that have the potential to create major crises with great impact on the counter-culture communities. As such, they should be studied as potential triggers for more violence. Therefore, this chapter can address the missing contextualisation and its link to the framework.

6.1 Right-left Divide in Israel

To better understand the two mentioned major crises, it is vital that this subchapter provides background and context, including how the right-left ideological divide influences people to perceive events in politics, such as settlements or the two-state solution. Moreover, it is this subchapter's objective to link the political ideology in Israel to the concept of counter-culture. This will be achieved by assessing characteristics of political ideologies and making comparisons with the counter-culture characteristics. The subchapter will put particular focus on assessing the right-left divide as a manifestation of cultural position that stems from counter-culture thought, and what the political consequences of cultural decisions are. The questions raised in this subchapter include the assessment of whether the counter-culture communities are exclusively right-wing.

Even though the right-left divide plays a prominent role in Israeli politics, Israel does not have a clear political left and right based on socioeconomic issues, but instead has a spectrum dominated by links to the peace process (Howson 2015: 410). The definition of Israel's extreme right refers primarily to issues of land and

security and the future of the territories occupied in the 1967 Six-Day War (Freedman *et al.* 2014: 69), which consequently justifies inclusion of the settlements building and the two-state solution in this chapter. Not only can these two big issues be viewed from the traditional right-left perspective, but also from the counter-culture one, with a focus on the characteristics that stem from living in counter-culture. These characteristics include alienation from the mainstream, the influence of leaders, the perception that the counter-culture viewpoint is superior and shall be followed, and crises that threaten the counter-culture lifestyle and worldview.

In *Jewish Terrorism in Israel,* Pedahzur and Perliger do not explicitly mention that identification with a particular wing of the political spectrum is a characteristic of counter-culture. However, that is not to say that affiliation with a part of the political spectrum is absent from political violence in Israel. For instance, terror groups such as Irgun and Lehi that operated before the foundation of the State of Israel, were right-wing oriented (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 10-11). They, however, were not part of the counter-culture. In addition to that, after Israel was founded, right-wing groups did not completely disappear, they battled the socialist political establishment. For instance right-wing groups criticised Israel Kastner[20] and ultimately led to his murder, which showed the ideological rift between right and left (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 29-30). There is a connection between right-wing ideology and counter-culture that can be shown in the example of the Kahane counter-culture (that is part of a wider Dati Leumi counter-culture). Jewish terrorists Meir Kahane and Baruch Goldstein were on the far-right Kach party candidate list for the 11th Knesset. Once in the Knesset, Kahane

[20] In 1953 Kastner was accused of collaboration with the Nazis during the Second World War II, including concealing information on the extermination plans of the Jewish community in order to save his friends and family. During the appeal process following the trial that had found him guilty, Kastner was shot by nationalist extremists and later died of the wounds (The State of Israel 2008b).

had constant confrontations with left-wing and Arab MKs (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 71, 92). A few years later, Yigal Amir, a supporter of Kahane, killed Prime Minister Rabin. Amir hated Arabs and the Israeli left, and he was influenced by right-wing led protests against the Oslo Accords (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 101, 104). Another terrorist, Yoel Lerner, believed that the right-wing National Religious Party was too moderate and together with his clique perpetrated violent attacks to create a dynamic among the religious and right-wing public in Israel (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 82-83). And finally, the Kahanist movements along with Gush Emunim were most important ideological and socio-political organisational frameworks of the Israeli radical right (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 109). Besides these examples of counter-culture groups on the right, *Jewish Terrorism in Israel* does not mention any more counter-culture groups or individuals with links to the right. *Jewish Terrorism in Israel*, however, does not make any explicit observations on the link between the right-wing and counter-culture or make an assessment of right-wing views as a characteristic of counter-culture movements, as Pedahzur and Perliger do not define counter-culture by its political ideology.

The right-left divide and violence between the two was also identified by Sprinzak. He classified four areas of Jewish violence in Israel (from the foundation of Israel until the Rabin assassination), in which violence is caused by: 1) political and ideological debate over the borders of Israel and the fate of the Palestinians, i.e. right vs. left; 2) a sense of socio-ethnic discrimination; 3) domestic tension between Israeli Jews and Arabs; and 4) conflict between Haredim and secular Jews (Sprinzak 1999: 320). This thesis proposes that the first and the fourth areas are interlinked as this thesis argues that right-wing ideology is associated with the counter-culture. In addition to that, the fourth area should not be limited to Haredim only. Instead, the fourth area should be classified as an intra-religious conflict, as the examples highlighted throughout this thesis show,

violence has been also perpetrated by Datiim Leumim on the secular population, and to a lesser degree as well as between Datiim Leumim and Haredim.

Examination of the history of Jewish political violence reveals a pattern, the right has been more violent than the left, although left-wing violence should not be completely dismissed. However, a question that arises is whether right-wing and left-wing motivated violence overlaps with counter-culture, and whether political ideology is one of the identifying traits of counter-culture. For instance, a left-wing Matzpen movement arose after the Six-Day War and it did exhibit some of the counter-culture traits, such as the calls for the elimination of the State of Israel (Sprinzak 1999: 118).

Yet, in the original framework as outlined above, Pedahzur and Perliger do not define counter-culture by its political ideology. They do say, however, that political viewpoints of counter-culture run counter to the mainstream and adhere to totalistic ideologies (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: x).

Therefore, to elaborate on this point and to understand what the counter-culture runs counter to, the mainstream culture and the views associated with it, need to be defined. First of all, the State of Israel and its institutions were founded on the Zionist ideology. Therefore, the first assumption is that the first counter-culture political rift shall be defined as counter-culture communities against the political establishment. The second assumption, as the government and the mainstream population alike have shifted towards the centre-right and right-wing in the past decades[21], is

[21] As this thesis focuses on the time period between the start of the Second Intifada until the 2015 Israeli legislative election, the make-up of the governments between this time period is following:
6 July 1999 – 7 March 2001 – centrist coalition led by One Israel (The State of Israel 2004).
March 2001 – 28 February 2003 - National Unity Government (The State of Israel 2004).
28 February 2003 – 4 May 2006 – right-wing coalition led by Likud, later by centre-right Kadima (The State of Israel 2006)

that the counter-culture communities shall be defined as leaning towards the right and far-right. As Pedahzur notes, the far-right is associated with territorial expansionism and the establishment of settlements within *Eretz Israel*. Moreover, he proposes that the definition of far-right in Israel should be expanded to include ethnic exclusionism as well as anti-democratic ideas (Pedahzur 2012: 3). This denotes the difference between the right and far-right ideology.

As for the far-left, although it equally runs counter to the mainstream, the far-left shall not be considered a defining feature of counter-culture. This is mainly because of the counter-culture's connection to religiosity, traditional family values and other characteristics associated primarily with the right-wing ideology, as is outlined in more detail later on.

As mentioned above, before speaking exclusively about counter-culture, it is necessary to look at the bigger picture and the right-left divide in Israel. As the counter-cultures run against the mainstream, it is vital to look where the mainstream population sits on the political spectrum and what the differences between the mainstream and the counter-culture population are. However, that is not easy to accurately determine. Based on different surveys, there are different pictures of the Israeli society. Table 6-1 shows that the Jewish Israeli society identifies more with centre political ideology and, more importantly, that the mainstream culture, i.e. secular (Hiloni) and traditional (Masorti) population are more centrist. They are also more leftist than Datiim Leumim and Haredim. Haredim and Datiim Leumim, particularly the latter, lean more towards the right on the political

4 May 2006 – 31 March 2009 – coalition led by centre-right Kadima (The State of Israel 2008a)
31 March 2009 – 18 March 2013 – right-wing coalition led by Likud (The State of Israel 2013)
18 March 2013 – 14 May 2015 – right-wing coalition led by Likud (The State of Israel 2015)
15 May 2015 – right-wing coalition led by Likud (The State of Israel 2016)

spectrum, as opposed to the mainstream population. On the other hand, based on this survey, Haredim lean more towards the centre.

Table 6-1: Political ideology among Israeli Jews (in %). Sample size: 3,789.[22]

	Left	Center	Right
All Jews	8	55	37
Haredi /ultra-Orthodox	1	52	47
Dati / religious	2	41	56
Masorti / traditional	3	49	47
Hiloni / secular	14	62	24

(Adapted from: Pew Research Center 2016: 19)

A survey conducted in 2016 by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), as shown in Table 6-2, gives a slightly different picture. The Jewish population as a whole leans more to the right, with Haredim and Datiim Leumim overwhelmingly leaning to the right, while Masortim lean more to the right and Hilonim to the centre and left.

Table 6-2: Political orientation of Jews in Israel by religiosity (in %). Sample size: 891.[23]

	Left	Center	Right	Don't know/ refuse to answer
Total sample	19.3	22.8	53	4.9
Haredi	2.5	11.9	75.4	10.2
Religious	2.8	9.8	83.2	4.2
Traditional religious	5.5	14.1	73.1	7.3
Traditional non-religious	14	28.8	55	2.2
Secular	33.9	27.7	33.8	4.6

(Adapted from: Israel Democracy Institute 2016a: 246)

[22] Participants of this Pew Research Center survey were asked to place themselves on the political spectrum from 1-6, with 1 representing the left and 6 the right. 1-2 were classified as "left", 3-4 as "centre" and 5-6 as "right" (Pew Research Center 2016: 19).
[23] Participants of this Israel Democracy Institute survey were asked to place themselves into one of the three political camps: right, center, and left (Israel Democracy Institute 2016a: 13).

Alternatively, as opposed to surveys that show voting preferences, looking at the actual election results can provide a more accurate picture of Israeli society. Results of the election to the 20th Knesset, and thus, the last Knesset election before this thesis' cut-off date, are summarised in Table 6-3.

Table 6-3: Knesset election results – Twentieth Knesset

Party name	% of total votes
Likud Chaired by Benjamin Netanyahu for Prime Minister	23.40
Zionist Camp Chaired by Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni	18.67
Joint List (Hadash, National Democratic Assembly, Arab Movement for Renewal, United Arab List)	10.61
Yesh Atid Chaired by Yair Lapid	8.82
Kulanu Chaired by Moshe Kahlon	7.49
HaBayit HaYehudi Chaired by Naftali Bennett	6.74
Shas	5.74
Yisrael Beitenu Chaired by Avigdor Liberman	5.10
United Torah Judaism	4.99
Israel's Left (Meretz)	3.93

(Adapted from: the State of Israel 2015)

Moreover, Table 6-4 categorises which political wing each parliamentary Jewish party is affiliated with. The table shows that out of Jewish parties, over a third of all votes went to right/far-right parties, and more than a third went to parties that are either centrist or leftist. One tenth of all votes went to religious parties that do not directly fall into a clear right/left divide. From this it could be inferred that either right or centre/left are part of the mainstream culture.

Therefore, the inference is that that counter-culture communities in Israel are primarily associated with the right, far-right wing. This is despite the fact that many Haredim hold left-leaning views on issues such as social equality. For instance, the Haredi party Shas is leftist on social issues (Howson 2015: 410), and both Shas and United Torah Judaism are concerned with social equality, for instance fighting for welfare benefits for Haredim. According to McClosky and Chong there are major differences between how the political extreme right and extreme left view issues such as racial equality, conventionality, traditional

family values, sexual freedom, women's rights, welfare, business attitudes, chauvinism and religiosity.

Table 6-4: Jewish[24] parties in the Twentieth Knesset: political spectrum[25]

Political spectrum		Jewish Israeli Parties	% of total votes	
Right	Right – far right	Likud Yisrael Beitenu HaBayit HaYehudi	23.40 5.10 6.74	35.24
	Centre right			
Centre	Centre	Yesh Atid Kulanu	8.82 7.49	16.61
Left	Centre left	Zionist Union	18.67	22.6
	Left – far left	Meretz	3.93	
Religious	Religious	Shas[26] United Torah Judaism	5.74 4.99	10.73

(Adapted from: Tharoor 2015; BBC News 2013; Heller 2015; Sales 2015b)

The extreme right significantly favours conventionality, traditional family values, business attitudes, chauvinism and religiosity, and opposes the remaining issues, which is in drastic comparison with the extreme left (McClosky and Chong 1985: 341). First of all, the defining feature of the Haredi and the Dati Leumi communities is their Orthodox religious outlook. The other traits of left-wing politics can hardly be found in their platforms. Moreover, Kook *et al.* note that the Ashkenazi Haredi rabbis are traditionally anti-left and anti-Labour (Kook *et al.* 1998: 10). In addition to that, Yagil and Rattner argue that Haredim are more moderate in terms of their right-wing political orientation, but are motivated by their religious considerations (Yagil and Rattner 2002: 205). As for Datiim Leumim, Don-Yehiya's study of the 1996 election showed that right-wing parties received almost 80% of the votes in the religious kibbutzim. The trend was even stronger in all other Dati

[24] Joint list of Arab parties was excluded.
[25] Based on party descriptions.
[26] Shas formed coalitions with both leftist and rightist parties. Howson says that Shas' notion of Zionism is more preferable to left-wing and centrist governments (Howson 2015: 410), but Pedahzur defines Shas as an extreme right party due to its nondemocratic values (Pedahzur 2001, cited in Freedman *et al.* 2014: 69).

Leumi communities (Don-Yehiya 1997: 92). Therefore, the conclusion is that strong religious views are associated with both counter-culture communities as well as (far) right parties. As for the other extreme right characteristics mentioned above, particularly traditional family values, women's rights, racial equality and chauvinism, a correlation between right-wing characteristics and counter-culture communities, both Haredi and Dati Leumi, can be observed. Traditional family values, particularly in the Haredi communities, stem from the communities' religious outlook, and result in (for instance) campaigns for gender-segregated public buses (Goldberg 2013: 154). Preference for the traditional family values is also exhibited by ignorance (IMPACT-se 2017: 82), intolerance and hatred towards the LGBT minority, among both settlers and the Haredi communities (Baden and David 2018: 520). As for women's rights, in the Haredi communities women undertake the traditional roles such as being responsible for the home and raising the children. In addition to being wage-earners, they adhere to strict rules of modesty (IMPACT-se 2017: 70, 76). As for racial equality and chauvinism, according to the IDI poll[27] findings, less Haredim (61%) and Datiim Leumim (78.5%) than secular Jewish Israelis (93%) were prepared to accept Arabs as citizens (Israel Democracy Institute 2016a: 153). Another poll[28] conducted by the Miskar agency found that three-quarters of polled Datiim Leumim would like to see the government push the Arab Israelis to leave the country (Sales 2015a). In addition to that, public figures such as the Dati Leumi Bayit Yehudi party MK Betzalel Smotrich, called for racial segregation, such as in maternity wards (Ynetnews 2016).

Furthermore on the issue of extreme right parties, Pedahzur distinguishes between "old" and "new" extreme right parties. The "old" ones are defined by territorial issues and the

[27] Sample size: 891 Jewish respondents (Israel Democracy Institute 2016a: 12).
[28] Sample size: 480 Dati Leumi respondents (Sales 2015a).

"new" ones are defined by nationalism, racism, anti-democracy, and xenophobia (Pedahzur 2001, cited in Freedman *et al.* 2014: 69). However, Freedman *et al.* found that the gaps between the extreme right parties are small, with the exception of whether the state should adopt *Halacha*, which suggests gaps between the "old" and the "new" extreme right voters may be smaller than previously claimed (Freedman *et al.* 2014: 72). Since *Halacha* is a religion-related issue, the question that shall be posed is whether religious fundamentalist citizens vote for radical right parties. The characteristics Hirsch-Hoefler *et al*. ascribe to religious fundamentalists include a totalistic commitment to religious beliefs, views of the state as an enemy, demands to have a truly religious state and dualistic divisions of the world into two. Counter-cultures adhere to totalistic ideologies (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: x). In totalistic ideologies, people tend to view the world in dualistic terms – all-bad or all-good, and differentiate between "people" and "non-people", in-group and out-group, between true believers who have a right to exist and those with a different worldview (Anthony *et al*. 2002: 213, 215). They hold anti-democratic views and reject equality of citizens, which in Israel reflects the views on Arabs as well as desire to establish a Jewish theocracy or a "Zionist democracy" (Hirsch-Hoefler *et al.* 2010: 679-680). In addition to that, as this thesis suggests, this would not only include Jewish theocracy and a negative stances towards Arabs, but to the secular, mainstream Jewish population as well.

Thus, views on issues such as democracy and *Halacha* are thus useful tools in determining divisions between counter-culture and mainstream, and right and left. Table 6-5 indicates that while the Haredi and the Dati Leumi populations think that the democratic element is too dominant, the majority, the mainstream population does not agree. It is worth reiterating that Haredim and Datiim Leumim make up 11% and 10%, respectively, out of the entire Israeli population, so they are still in a minority in Israel (Israel Democracy Institute 2016b: 6; Pew

Research Centre 2016). Therefore, all together, their views are views of a minority as opposed to the dominant, mainstream culture.

Table 6-5: Views on democracy and *Halacha* by different religious groups (in %). Sample size: 891.

	There is a good balance between the two components	Jewish component is too dominant	Democratic component is too dominant	Other / Don' t know
Haredi	17	4	69	10
National religious	38	9	45.5	7.5
Traditional religious	36	17	36	11
Traditional non-religious	37.5	40.5	18	4
Secular	23	59	12	6

(Adapted from: Israel Democracy Institute 2016a: 81)

6.2 State and Zionism

Following on the right-left introduction, this subchapter further builds on the notion of the right-left divide in Israel and establish links to another distinguishing trait of the counter-culture communities, i.e. the relationship with the State of Israel and Zionism. Therefore trends within counter-culture communities as well as the right-left wing ideology will be examined through the prism of state-related issues such as democracy or satisfaction with the state.

One of the arguments reasserted in this subchapter includes that the Haredi and the Dati Leumi communities and the (far) right groups often share views towards the state. However, this does not imply that the mainstream population is exclusively

associated with left or centre views, as the mainstream population votes for right-wing parties as well.

As the theoretical framework emphasises, one of the characteristics of those who are part of the counter-culture communities is alienation from the mainstream population and the mainstream political system. Even though Likud is a right-wing party, it is part of the establishment. It led several governments, and maintained the status quo on settlements building and the two-state solution. In addition to that, it even led some peace efforts, such as the Sinai withdrawal, and thus communities are often even unhappy with right-wing parties such as Likud. This leads, as this thesis will argue, to the communities' alienation from the government as well. This premise was reinforced during fieldwork in Israel. Out of 21 interview participants, 50% of Datiim Leumim felt explicitly[29] represented as opposed to 27% of Haredim. Speaking about the Haredi community in general, whether they felt represented, Chava noted: 'As a community we don't, we don't, we really don't' (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017).

Furthermore, this subchapter will present arguments in favour of the link between the extreme right views and counter-culture by looking at satisfaction and representation. Freedman *et al.* maintain that extreme right party voters are more likely to be dissatisfied with government and more hawkish regarding peace. Those who are most dissatisfied on the political front, and concerned about the security outlook (i.e. most hawkish) are more likely to vote for right and far right parties (Freedman *et al.* 2014: 72, 76). Throughout *Jewish Terrorism in Israel* there are examples of terrorists who came from counter-culture backgrounds and exhibited dissatisfaction with the government.

[29] By explicitly this thesis notes fully represented without any caveats. For instance, this excluded some interviewees who expressed that their feelings of representation depended on e.g. police behaviour, and some felt represented 'in some ways yes and in some ways not' or 'sometimes yes and sometimes not at all'.

Thus it could be argued they were underrepresented by the government as well. For instance, Baruch Goldstein was exposed to Meir Kahane's philosophy which stated there was a contradiction in the original Zionist (establishment) idea to create a Jewish and democratic state (Paine 1995: 12). By wearing "Jude" on his sleeve, he compared Israel to the Nazi regime (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 71). One of the interviewees held a similar outlook on Israel saying:

> I would say something that the Israeli society has in some ways fascist, fascist, fascist parts . . . They oppress Haredim, the oppress Dati Leumi, they oppress leftists, extreme leftists, they oppress Arabs. . . . . And, and in my eyes the biggest organisation . . . that represents this fascist parts is the police, . . . whoever is not me, is killed, is oppressed (Interview, Shlomo, 01 June 2017).

A majority of Haredi interviewees were torn, saying that even though they did not feel fully represented, they could see some positives about the (i.e. 20th Knesset) government.

> Do I feel represented by our government? Sometimes yes, sometimes not at all. There are certain things that the government does, which are very nice. And then there are things they do that I really disagree with (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017).

Interviewees acknowledged that the government and its leaders do their best, as Leah summed up: 'I think that…no government represents me or any individual very well and this government does its very best and in this incredibly imperfect world' (Interview, Leah, 04 July 2017). Despite his earlier criticism of Israel as a fascist state, Shlomo praised Prime Minister Netanyahu: 'I think he's a responsible leader, I think he's a good leader, I think he's trying to do good for the people, I don't hate him' (Interview, Shlomo, 01 June 2017). Although Jacob said he did not feel represented by the government, he admitted that in some ways he did and asserted that he did not feel disenfranchised as opposed to many people in the Haredi

community (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017), which backs up Chava's earlier statement.

As for more arguments in favour of dissatisfaction and representation this can be demonstrated by findings shown in Table 6-6. Table 6-6 shows that as opposed to the secular population and in stark contrast to Datiim Leumim who give the state a religious significance, Haredim do not feel part of the state to such an extent as the rest of the Jewish population does.

Table 6-6: Israeli Jews by religiosity – feel part of the state and its problems (in %). Sample size: 891.

	Feel part of the state and its problems
Haredi	63.5
National religious	92
Traditional religious	83.5
Traditional non-religious	85
Secular	85

(Adapted from: Israel Democracy Institute 2016a: 74)

For instance, one of the Haredi interviewees explained that:

> people feel that the whole system doesn't even see them. . . . doesn't recognise them, it's against them. . . . From the police, through the court, to the Welfare Ministry, every aspect, it's all the enemy (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017).

On the Dati Leumi side, whilst according to Table 6-6 Datiim Leumim were more likely to feel represented, Daniel found himself on the other side of the spectrum and felt unrepresented by the government:

> I feel very disappointed in that area. I feel that there is no real representative, I feel that the government leaders today have separated themselves from the people . . . I feel like they live in an ivory tower and they have no idea of what's going on in the street (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017).

Whilst other Datiim Leumim feel more represented under the right-wing government, Daniel falls into the minority of Datiim Leumim who still feel unrepresented, as outlined in the quote

above. When for instance Baruch Goldstein perpetrated his terrorist attack, or when Yigal Amir assassinated Yitzhak Rabin, the government in power was left-wing and peace process negotiations were in progress. However, since then governments gradually shifted towards the right, often including Dati Leumi and Haredi parties in coalitions. Out of the interviewed Datiim Leumim, all but Daniel felt represented to at least some extent or fully. Some, like Isaac, felt represented because of governments increasingly turning more right-wing: 'I'm OK with the Israeli government now because I am…I am on the right [wing]' (Interview, Isaac, 13 June 2017). Similarly, Rachel felt represented by the right-wing government:

> When it's a left wing government I really don't feel represented, because they, they are disgusted with my religion. They are disgusted with my Zionism, . . . So this government, I feel supported by. In the past there have been many governments where I haven't felt supported (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017).

Although a Haredi, Itzik also felt represented because the religious party he had voted for was part of the ruling coalition (Interview, Itzik, 08 June 2017). In contrast, despite being religious herself, Efrat pointed out that she did not like religious people in the coalition influencing Prime Minister Netanyahu's decisions and exerting religious coercion (Interview, Efrat, 20 July 2017). Shoshana also felt there was religious coercion, noting:

> I remember, when I was in *ulpan*, it was the elections, we had day off, it was very exciting and then I couldn't even vote for who I wanted to vote for. 'Cause my husband just told me "just vote for . . . the religious party" (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017).

As per the theoretical framework, the "Torah view" in the Haredi communities grants charismatic leaders/rabbis authority over political matters (Almond *et al.* 2003: 77; Finkelman 2014: 271-272). This idea is further corroborated by Shoshana as she explained how she voted in the 2015 legislative election:

> So, as religious Jews we are instructed to listen . . . to the rabbis of the generation, to the leaders. I don't know where it is in the Torah, like it is but, I think that the rabbis of the generation say something, they know the best and you should listen to them. . . . back in the old old day, we had prophets, and we listened to them. Nowadays we don't have prophets, so we listen to what our rabbis . . . . So…the rabbis two years ago, and I'm sure throughout all the elections, said that who we should vote for, and technically, like if we're going to follow the law, the Jewish law, you have to listen to it. So that kind of takes the democracy out of it, if you ask me (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017).

Further elaborating the point about representation, all interviewees in general felt more represented by a particular party than the government, although Haredim less than Datiim Leumim. This may be for a number of reasons. As Shoshana outlined the situation in the Haredi circles, the fact that Haredim are obliged to listen to their leaders in regards who to vote for, may be a reason why they feel less represented. As Shoshana outlined in further detail:

> . . . for me it was a joke. I don't care really who governs. There was one party that was legalising marihuana, so I was like, let's vote for them! No, we have to vote for the party that supports . . . Haredim, you know who give more money to the families where men are learning (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017).

Thus, a majority of the Haredi interviewees felt not represented at all, for instance Yirmiyahu noting 'even the Haredi representatives don't represent me . . . I'm like the modern side of the Haredi community. I feel the Haredi representatives represent more radical Haredi movement' (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 July 2017). Similarly, Sheina said that as a religious person she in theory votes for the religious parties, but she feels dissatisfied as they are not as right-wing as she would like them to be (Interview, Sheina, 25 July 2017). Leah was of a similar opinion:

> I feel that the religious parties are narrow in that and I feel the economic parties are narrow in that and the

> left-wing parties are narrow in that and that is why I actually feel better represented by the government than any particular party (Interview, Leah, 04 July 2017).

On the other side, there were some Haredim who felt represented, and two of them said they were represented by United Torah Judaism (UTJ). However, based on Shoshana's example as well as the literature indicating that the leaders make decisions for the followers, it is debateable whether these participants felt truly represented. For instance, whilst Rivka confidently answered she felt represented by UTJ, when asked whether she supported the two-state solution, she said she did not know anything about it (Interview, Rivka, 04 July 2017). The other plausible explanation, however, is that Rivka has no interest in the Zionist state. As Table 6-6 indicated, Haredim do not feel part of the state to such an extent as the rest of the Jewish population does, including Datiim Leumim who give the state a religious significance.

To further elaborate on the lack of representation by a political party, Kook *et al*. argue that a Haredi vote does not reflect a stand on national policy issues, but rather it is a choice for a particular way of life and a system of values and interests that need to be preserved (Kook *et al.* 1998: 9). Cohen calls this a "camp party", which is bound to the enclave culture. On the electoral level, a majority of those affiliated with the "camp" vote for that camp's party (A. Cohen 2007: 328). Similarly, Wald and Shye argue that a vote for a religious party is intended to counter the "threat" from the secular government to essential religious services and needs (Wald and Shye 1995: 499). Giving an example of UTJ, Don-Yehiya says that UTJ draws

> support almost exclusively from a Haredi sub-culture whose members would vote in any case for the party that represents their way of life and shared interests and is endorsed by the Torah giants (Don-Yehiya 1997: 91).

As such, as pointed out by Shoshana, Haredim are expected to vote in accordance with the Haredi leaders' instructions. At the

same time, in Israel, the vote is often influenced by issues such as the two-state solution and security in general (Howson 2015: 410), as Leah points out:

> one of the hardest self-identity point, and I'm left-winged, is that the main issues keep coming up that define the processes, security, religion. For which I end up being pigeonholed . . . and I resent it and it's not me but it's literally life and death in this part of the world (Interview, Leah 04 July 2017).

On the Dati Leumi side, a majority of interviewees felt represented by a particular party. For instance, Joseph found it difficult to choose a party and felt that the politics had gone more to the right side, although he acknowledged it was representative of the public (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017). Yet, a majority of Dati Leumi interviewees feel represented by some party, most of them right-wing, such as HaBayit HaYehudi, Likud or centrist Yesh Atid, and while Isaac did not say which party he would vote for but said 'far right in Israel. Far right. Right of the right' (Interview, Isaac, 13 June 2017).

Coming back to feelings of representation by the government, the issue at a greater level, greater than the government, is the state itself. Whereas for Datiim Leumim the state bears almost a holy significance, as a combination of Zionist ideology and religion, among Haredim it is different. Many Haredim are anti-Zionist, they reject Israel as an abomination against religion or alternatively, they have a complicated relationship with the state, rejecting it whilst enjoying benefits from living in it (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 24). Sheina's stance encapsulates one of the Haredi perceptions of the state:

> State is to me, it's a technical, it is an administrative body, I don't have any great love or hate for it per say, when they do things that I agree with, I am happy, when they don't, I'm very annoyed. But obviously you need somebody to like keep the streets clean, and defend from enemy (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017).

The idea that the state is just an instrument but does bear any symbolic meaning is also espoused by Shlomo:

> Just every building has one of the neighbours who is responsible to pay the cleaner and to and to make sure it's clean and whatever and to instruct new light bulbs, so that's, that's what the state is basically for me (Interview, Shlomo, 01 June 2017).

Jacob differentiated between the state and the land: 'As a state, it doesn't mean anything to me, I don't identify with Israel as a state. . . . I see in the state, just a state' (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017). Shlomo added: 'I wouldn't say it's my homeland, but in some ways it's my homeland' (Interview, Shlomo, 01 June 2017). However, the Land of Israel he considered to be something completely different, and religion-related.

Religion was an often repeated theme among Haredim, which indicates the importance of religion in the Orthodox communities in Israel. Most importantly, the role of religion plays a major role in how the communities view the Israel-Palestine conflict, settlements building in Judea and Samaria and any future deal on the independent Palestinian state. One of the important points made was that the land was for Jews, as Daniella said: 'Israel is the Land of the Jews. It's the place where I am able . . to observe our Torah and our commandments' (Interview, Daniella, 09 July 2017). Shoshana also noted that 'it means for me a place that is ... has Jewish people' (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017) and Leah highlighted that 'the tension and the pressure of that is too much for many. So in this imperfect world it's not for everyone. And it shouldn't be' (Interview, Leah, 04 July 2017). Therefore, an emphasis on religious and historical rights of Jews to live in Israel, also justifies the right to live in the territories, as the following subchapter explains further. The symbolism of history and victory of Jews is also echoed by Avi's words: 'a lot of promises that were given 5000 years ago and seemed to be almost impossible for 2000 years have . . . found themselves

coming to the fruition' (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017).

All in all, all participants, both Haredim and Datiim Leumim, were able to say something positive about Israel. Common themes included a sense of identity, a safe place, a home, culture, tradition, roots. Moreover, as was pointed out earlier, a common theme among Datiim Leumim is to give the state a scared status (Don-Yehiya 2014: 259). The idea of sacredness of the state, the holy combination of state and religion is best expressed by Daniel's words:

> Israel means everything to me, . . . my whole existence . . . Israel is not only the land . . . Everything that the State of Israel represents, I agree with. I have disagreements with the leaders but they're not the state, the state is greater than the leaders, the leaders are temporary, now they are leaders, tomorrow they won't be leaders (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017).

Overall, all the participants could say something positive about Israel, despite giving Israel varying degrees of significance. However, when asked if there were any elements of the state they disagreed with, people highlighted several recurring themes.

Treatment of Palestinians by the state was raised by some Haredim. Chava disliked the government for not giving rights to Palestinians, she felt angry she was part of the system, the state, that abuses Palestinians (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017). Similarly, Shlomo pointed out there were double standards, and Arabs were often mistreated at the hands of Israeli police (Interview, Shlomo, 01 June 2017). Likewise, Jacob felt that the government's laws were often biased against Palestinians:

> Netanyahu said certain things about how we use the peace process and I say yeah I agree with that but then they do things like this law against the muzzaim, I think, I feel like I want to put a bullet through his head, figuratively, you know? (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017).

Religious coercion was another common theme. Asher said he did not like Haredim, despite being one of them, telling Hilonim not to drive or have public transportation on Shabbat. He felt it was not religious to force other people to do something (Interview, Asher, 25 July 2017). Ari, who belongs to the Dati Leumi stream, also thought that a separation between religion and state was needed (Interview, Ari, 01 June 2017). On the same note, both Joseph and Efrat were critical of the *Rabbanut* and its power (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017; Interview, Efrat, 20 July 2017). Contrary to the above participants, Shoshana thought that the state should be more supportive of religious Jews (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017). Rivka went even further and said she disagreed with 'those who oppose *Halacha'* (Interview, Rivka 04 July 2017). Similarly, Sheina responded that anything that compromises Jewish religion and law was a problem for her (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017). Ultimately, these views transform into views that are discussed later on this chapter, such as the settlements building and the two-state solution. For instance, Daniella disagreed with giving back land or confiscating territory (Interview, Daniella, 09 July 2017). On the same note, Sheina disagreed 'when they give away land, and bring terrorism closer and closer to the country' (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017).

Additionally, another issue that caused a disagreement, is assimilation. Assimilation is one of the crises that are perceived as critical (S. A. Cohen 2013: 165) and need to be eradicated, as is for instance one of the objectives of the radical group Lehava (Bar-Stav 2015). One of the interviewees raised the issue:

> there is a very big issue of assimilation of Jews marrying non-Jewish people . . . the integration means that in 50 years there are no Jews outside of Israel. They are going to be assimilated and disappear, I don't want that. I want the Jewish people to survive the same way, as they survived already for so many years (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017).

This perception is supported by data in Table 6-7. Opposition to assimilation by the counter-culture communities is evidenced by 1% and 3.5% of Haredim and Datiim Leumim, respectively, prepared to accept Arabs as potential spouses. The number is significantly higher for those belonging to the mainstream culture.

Table 6-7: Israeli Jews by religion – prepared to accept an Arab as a spouse (in %). Sample size: 891.

Prepared to accept an Arab as a spouse	
Haredim	1
National religious	3.5
Traditional religious	7
Traditional non-religious	15.5
Secular	36

(Adapted from: Israel Democracy Institute 2016a: 153)

To sum up, the aim of this subchapter was to outline the political beliefs and stances of counter-culture communities towards the state, Zionism and how these differ from the mainstream. Moreover, religion was shown to play a significant role in regards to attitudes towards the state and Zionism. Effectively, religion plays a major role in how the communities view the Israel-Palestine conflict, settlements building in Judea and Samaria and any future deal on the independent Palestinian state.

6.3 Counter-culture Crises: the Gaza Disengagement, Settlements in Judea and Samaria, and the Two-state Solution

This thesis' framework states that those individuals within the counter-culture communites with the propensity to violence and civil disobedience tend to live in alienation; are part of a social network and are influenced by a charismatic leader who will frame certain crisis as an existential threat. Therefore this subchapter

examines political issues that have a potential to become major crises for the counter-culture communities and threaten their messianic worldview and their communities. The future of the Israeli settlements and the two-state solution are interlinked, as any future deal on the Palestinian state will involve a discussion of the Jewish settlements that are beyond the 1967 borders. Therefore, these two big issues are examined together. This subchapter outlines the attitudes of both the mainstream and counter-culture populations towards the two-state solution and focuses on the reasons why counter-culture communities perceive the two-state solution and settlements withdrawal differently.

First of all, this subchapter briefly describes the history of settlements, outlining their significance and objectives, followed by views of the mainstream culture and the counter-culture communities towards settlements and particularly settlements withdrawal. Secondly, this subchapter outlines the attitudes of both the mainstream and the counter-culture towards the two-state solution.

The history of settlements started with Israel's capture of Gaza, the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and the West Bank in the Six-Day War in 1967. During the 1967–1978 period, the territories were primarily used as bargaining chips for achieving peace with the Arab states. In the second half of this period, Prime Minister Rabin opposed settlements building, which gave rise to the counter-culture Gush Emunim movement that began building settlements in the hills of Samaria without government approval and with widespread support. During the 1979–1984 period, under Ariel Sharon as a chairman of the council of ministers on settlements, settlements expanded until the 1984–1992 period when Rabin, as a Minister of Defence, opposed building new settlements again. In the 1990 to 1992 period, although the Likud government planned the settlements expansion, they refrained from doing so following pressure from the US, leading to a settlements freeze policy. However during the 1992–2008 period,

the existing settlements continued to grow with or without government support (Billig 2015: 332-334). Susser adds that 'as the settlement enterprise continued to expand, so did the perceptual divide that set the settlers apart from the majority of the Israeli people' (Susser 2011: 80). This further affirms the geographical and political alienation of the settler population that are primarily of the Dati Leumi background.

At the time of writing this thesis, there were more than 380,000 settlers currently living in the West Bank, over 40% of them outside the settlement blocs (Y. Berger 2017). These settlements in the West Bank, the biblical Judea and Samaria, are illegal under international law, just as East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. However, Israel has applied Israeli law to the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem, effectively annexing the area. There are now approximately 200,000 Israelis in East Jerusalem (Liebermann 2017).

6.3.1 The Gaza disengagement

As for the Gaza Strip, in 2005 Ariel Sharon's government enforced disengagement, which brought about the evacuation of all settlements in Gaza and four settlements in Samaria (Billig 2015: 335).

As Table 6-8 shows, a majority of the Israeli Jewish population (i.e. 58.82%) supported Sharon's plan to some extent, and most of these people came from the traditional (55%) and secular (75.4%) Jewish population, i.e. the mainstream population. In comparison, only 26% of polled Haredim and 20.4% of Datiim Leumim supported the move. This is evidence of political alienation of the two latter groups from the majority of the population.

Using the case study of the United States Olsen illustrates two categories of political alienation. The first one is not plausible in the case of the Gaza disengagement, as it is related to

"attitudes of incapability", and it involves attitudes such as powerlessness, meaninglessness, and guidelessness (Olsen 1969: 298).

Table 6-8: Gaza disengagement support (in %). Sample size: 493.

The Peace Index - July 2004							
Currently, do you support or oppose Prime Minister Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan for Gaza?							
	Haredi	**Religious**	**Traditional**	**Secular**	**Not Jewish (in Jewish population)**	**Between religious and secular/ believing secular**	**Total**
Support it a lot	12.5	11.9	29.4	51.3	100	42.9	37.12
Somewhat support it	12.5	8.5	25.6	24.1		14.3	21.70
Somewhat oppose it	25	11.9	15	7.8		14.3	11.76
Oppose it a lot	43.8	61	25	10.8		28.6	23.73
Do not know, no answer	6.3	6.8	5	6			5.68

(Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute)

With settlers' active opposition, this category can be dismissed. However, the second one relates to "attitudes of discontentment", and it contains attitudes such as dissimilarity, dissatisfaction, and disillusionment as people's responses to politics and the government (Olsen 1969: 298).

In the case study of Norway, Miller and Listhaug found two models of political alienation. In one model when governments 'do not normally represent extreme ideological positions, implement extreme policies, but seek a course on the moderate left or right' (A. Miller and Listhaug 1993: 170). They argue that this tendency could lead to persistent political alienation on the far left and the far right (A. Miller and Listhaug 1993: 170). This approach can be applied in the Israeli case. During the Gaza

disengagement, the government in power was rightist, which later led to a split that resulted in the more centrist Kadima party heading the government. The extreme policy, in this case the Gaza disengagement, left the political right alienated. According to the second model described by Miller and Listhaug, in periods with governments of the left in power, they would expect trust to increase among those who identify with the left and decrease on the right (A. Miller and Listhaug 1993: 170). While, however, the government was in fact right-wing oriented, based on the definition of Israeli left and right introduced earlier in this chapter, the withdrawal from Gaza was a leftist move. Besides political alienation, other traits mentioned in the previous paragraphs were underrepresentation and dissatisfaction. As Shor points out, the Israeli right felt that they were left out of the decision-making process and 'abandoned by mainstream Zionism and by the Israeli state' (Shor 2008: 819), including the formerly idolised Ariel Sharon (Shor 2008: 819). This was also the case of interviewee Daniel, who had an apartment in Gush Katif that he was forcefully removed from during the disengagement:

> It brought immense anger, immense anger in me and my wife and my children against the government, I think Ariel Sharon did a horrible act by what he…by the disengagement and, and I think it's inexcusable, I have no patience, I mean, the politicians who are still alive, whether it's Tzipi Livni or Ehud Olmert, I have no patience for them. I think they're horrible people (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017).

Apart from alienation, both political and arguably geographical as well, as per the framework, leaders played a major role in framing this crisis as catastrophic. According to Susser, Datiim Leumim were influenced by their rabbinical authorities, and they were determined to ensure that no Israeli government, even the one that was democratically elected, would make any territorial concessions, which caused a great gap between them and their opponents (Susser 2011: 76). The argument that there were attempts to frame this crisis as catastrophic, can be further

supported by the study that examined rhetoric used prior to the disengagement by its opponents. It showed that opponents warned against the potential damage of the move, and warned against disastrous results for the Israeli state and its citizens in three main areas: the security of its citizens, its international political stance, and its economy (Shor 2008: 811).

6.3.2 Settlements in Judea and Samaria

Similar language and reasoning that were used during the Gaza disengagement, as well as referring to the history lessons from the disengagement were used by interviewees when talking about settlements in Judea and Samaria. Similarly, disengagement from the area can represent a future potential crisis for the counter-culture communities. In addition to that, examination of the past disengagement from Gaza can provide insight into future potential withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and also give a better picture of the significance of settlements and different narratives between the mainstream population and counter-culture communities.

Security concerns are one of the reasons often cited when it comes to keeping and building settlements in Judea and Samaria (Jones 2013: 204; Liebermann 2017). Settlements built along the Jordan River were seen as a first line of defence (Liebermann 2017). Other reasons apart from security include economic viability and self-sufficiency as well as ideology (Sasley and Sucharov 2011: 1005-1006). Apart from official settlements, there are also unofficial outposts and hilltops that aim to protect access roads to their communities, maintain control of strategic locations, and prevent Palestinians from seizing government lands in the 'C' zone (Billig 2015: 337). A distinction can be made between mainstream settlers and counter-culture settlers and their different motivations to settle the area. The mainstream

motivations could refer to the above reasons, such as security, economy and state boundaries.

For instance, whilst primarily secular inhabitants of Ma'aleh Adunim, Ariel or Alfei Menashe settlements give little religious importance to settlements (Jones 2013: 204), motivations stemming from living in counter-culture would come from religious reasons, ideology or identity.

There are more than 380,000 settlers living in the West Bank, over 40% of them outside the settlement blocs (Y. Berger 2017). Pew Research Centre found that the West Bank settlers are far more religious than other Jews. The survey found that 63% of the West Bank settlers were Orthodox: 26% were Haredi and 36% were Dati. This is in a stark contrast to 9 % of Haredim and 12% of Datiim living in Israel proper (Pew Research Centre 2016: 37). Since a majority of settlers come from the Dati Leumi or the Haredi background, a large number of settlers would directly be impacted if the withdrawal of settlements from the area was implemented.

Before going into more detail about motivations, it is useful to look at support for the settlements withdrawal over the period this thesis focuses on using data obtained via the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research. Based on this data, as Table 6-9 shows, in 2009, a majority of polled Haredim (58.2%) opposed withdrawal of settlements from Judea and Samaria. As for Datiim, 80% of polled Datiim opposed evacuation. Therefore, the counter-culture population as a whole opposed evacuation. However, 59.8% of the "traditional religious"[30] and 60.4% of the "traditional secular"[31] population opposed evacuation as well, while the secular[32] population remained in favour, with 50.5%.

30 A phrase used by the Israel Democracy Institute.
31 A phrase used by the Israel Democracy Institute.
32 A segment of population different from the "traditional religious" and the "traditional secular" segments.

Table 6-9: Support for settlements withdrawal, May 2009 (in %). Sample size: 516.

The Peace Index - May 2009									
If negotiations with the Palestinians are finally renewed, and a peace agreement is reached that depends only on the settlements, in this case should Israel agree or not agree to clear all the settlements?									
	Haredi	**Religious**	**Traditional Religious**	**Traditional Secular**	**Secular**	**Not Jewish (Jewish population)**	**Between religious and secular, believing secular**	**Do not know/refuses to answer**	**Total**
Certain Israel should agree	14	4.4	14.1	20.8	20.4	55.2		34.4	22.09
Think Israel should agree	25.6	11.1	22.8	16.7	30.1	25.9		15.6	24.03
Think Israel should not agree	16.3	13.3	27.2	33.3	20.9	6.9	50	9.4	19.96
Certain Israel should not agree	41.9	66.7	32.6	27.1	20.4	8.6	50	34.4	28.68
Do not know/no answer	2.3	4.4	3.3	2.1	8.2	3.4		6.3	5.23

(Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute)

By December 2012, as Table 6-10 shows, the Haredi opposition to withdrawal increased to 70.6%. The percentage of Datiim opposed to evacuation, as compared to 2009, decreased to 70.4%. Opposition to withdrawal from the traditional population remained stable at 57.5%, and of "traditional, not so religious"[33] population at 52%, and secular population also remained supportive of evacuation, even increasing to 59.6%.

33 A phrase used by the Israel Democracy Institute.

Table 6-10: Support for settlements withdrawal, December 2012 (in %). Sample size: 513.

The Peace Index - December 2012							
Under no circumstance should Judea and Samaria be evacuated.							
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Traditional, not so religious	Not religious, secular	Between secular and religious, believing secular	Total
Agree a lot	54.9	51.9	33.6	20	15.6		27.68
Somewhat agree	15.7	18.5	23.9	32	18.9	50	21.05
Somewhat disagree	7.8	14.8	16.8	22	23	50	19.3
Disagree a lot	19.6	14.8	23	24	36.6		28.27
Do not know	2		2.7	2	4.9		3.31
Refuses to answer					1		0.4

(Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute)

In both years, opposition of both counter-culture groups to evacuation was significantly higher as compared to the secular population: less than a half of secular Jews opposed evacuation. The population as a whole in both years opposed evacuation. Data from the poll[34] conducted in 2017 by the Palestinian-Israeli Pulse indicates that the number of all Israeli Jews opposing evacuation rose to 53.7% (TSC and PSR 2017: 8), as compared to 48.64% in 2009 and 47.57% in 2012. However, that may be a result of disproportional growth of the Haredi and the Dati Leumi population, highlighted in the Introduction chapter. As for the explanation for the drop in support for evacuation of the settlements, Miller argues that events of the 2006 Second Lebanon War with Hezbollah, the 2000 unilateral withdrawal from

[34] Sample size: 902 Israelis (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 2017).

south Lebanon and especially the Gaza Wars of 2008–2009, 2012 and 2014, including firing of thousands of rockets by Hamas into Israel have reduced the appetite for future unilateral disengagements (B. Miller 2016: 443). This is a plausible argument as to why the population as a whole is slowly but steadily more opposed to the withdrawal of settlements.

In line with the above-mentioned data, a majority of the interviewed Haredi and Dati Leumi participants supported settlements building in Judea and Samaria. Among the Dati Leumi participants, three explicitly stated they lived in the settlements in Judea or Samaria. An overwhelming majority conveyed they supported settlements. Rachel said that from her view:

> there is no settlement in Judea and Samaria that was stolen from anybody. So yes I support it. Also, they call Israel occupiers of that land, which is not true. You cannot occupy what was yours (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017).

This ties back to the argument made in the previous subchapter about religious and historical right of Jews to live in Judea and Samaria. Efrat echoed Rachel's words saying she supported settlements 'because I feel like everyone should be able to live everywhere' (Interview, Efrat 20 July 2017). Leah, a Haredi participant, made the same point about having the freedom to live where one wishes to (Interview, Leah, 04 July 2017).

Another major theme, as mentioned earlier, for the mainstream population and the counter-culture communities alike, is security. There is a threat of history repeating itself and of experiencing consequences comparable to those in the aftermath of the Gaza disengagement. For instance, one interviewee remained sceptical about the withdrawal: 'I mean we see what happened in Gaza when we left the area' (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017). The Gaza disengagement had a negative impact on security in Israel (Peters 2010: 34) raising concerns among the interviewees. Daniel said that they [the settlers] warned the government that if they go ahead with the

disengagement, missiles will be fired at Sderot and Tel Aviv (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017). Joseph voiced the exactly same concerns:

> And a lot of times the feeling is that the right-wing people just know a lot more . . . . they said exactly what was going to happen after the disengagement from Gaza, they said we are going to get rockets on Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion. . . . and that's exactly what happened, so it's a very difficult not to listen to right-wing people now . . . . what's gonna happen when the West Bank is going to be given. When Gaza was given, that's exactly what happened (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017).

Thus the lessons learnt from the settlements' evacuation from the Gaza strip, as raised by the interviewees, include less security and even the firing of missiles at Israel.

Moreover, Klein Halevi says that following the capture of the territories and settlements building, almost all Israeli Jews agreed that they had acquired them legitimately in a war waged to defend themselves against destruction, and centrist Israelis are aware that they are under threat by some of Israel's neighbours (Klein Halevi 2012: 169- 170). All in all, this shows that security as well as history to an extent influence people's support for settlements. A poll[35] conducted by the Pew Research Centre shows that the majority of Israeli Jews (42%) actually support settlements building for security reasons, particularly Datiim Leumim (68%) and Haredim (50%) (Pew Research Center 2016: 35). There are also settlers who live in the settlements for economic reasons, both Hiloni and Haredi, as housing is more affordable in the settlements. Moreover, Haredim tend to live on their own, alienated from the mainstream in secluded settlements (Liebermann 2017), which serve as a protective space for the communities, where the Haredi lifestyle can be maintained (S. B. Cohen 2007: 28).

[35] Sample size: 3789 Jewish respondents (Pew Research Center 2016: 229).

Most importantly, there are settlers who build and live in settlements for ideological reasons, these are usually Dati Leumi settlers who believe that Judea and Samaria are part of Israel as promised in the Torah (Liebermann 2017) or secular nationalist settlers (Sasley and Sucharov 2011: 1006). For Datiim Leumim the Land of Israel is a religious mandate not subject to negotiations. The sanctity of the Land can be preserved only through Israeli sovereignty over all of the historic Land of Israel (S. B. Cohen 2007: 27), or in the words of one of the interviewees: 'I don't make a differentiation between Judea and Samaria, the Land of Israel, Israel is one piece of land that was given to Abraham by God himself' (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017). Both Sheina and Itzik suggested that the whole Land of Israel belongs to Jews (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017; Interview, Itzik, 08 June 2017). However, although Chava agreed with the concept, she felt it was necessary to follow the rules of the international community that does not approve of the settlements:

> I'm not religious Zionist, I don't think Messiah arrived and . . . we have to live among nations and we have to follow the rules and if the international community has not approved those, it doesn't matter as it was a Jewish land 2000 years ago, it doesn't matter that Jews lived there, it's not approved, so we cannot live there (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017).

Klein Halevi asserts that centrist Israelis realise that Israel cannot occupy the territories and at the same time be a democracy accepted by the West (Klein Halevi 2012: 169). Moreover, Shlomo pointed out that settlements create bad blood between Israelis and Palestinians. However, as the settlements were most likely to stay, he believed that Palestinians needed to make peace on the issue (Interview, Shlomo, 01 June 2017). Similarly, Jacob argued that uprooting a hundred thousand settlers was not practical and was not going to happen (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017). Jacob's view must have been to a great extent influenced by the

location of his own home, as he lived in East Jerusalem, and thus beyond the Green Line, which is internationally recognised as an occupied territory. Yet, as for building more settlements, Jacob disagreed with building settlements outside the established blocks: 'I think, it's ridiculous, it's idiotic, and there's no point to it, it doesn't accomplish anything. . . . . Arabs need a place to live also' (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017). There was also a minority of the Dati Leumi participants who disapproved of building isolated settlements as well, arguing they impact any future peace deal and the two-state solution.

6.3.3 The two-state solution

Before going into more detail regarding motivations and differing opinions between the mainstream and counter-culture, it is useful to observe the evolution of support for the two-state solution. Table 6-11 shows patterns of support for the two-state solution over a 15 year time period.

These figures show the overall support for the two-state solution, as well as the breakdown that shows how the counter-culture population in particular supported the two-state solution. After the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, there was low opposition to the two-state solution across the whole religious spectrum, however, this increased significantly for both Datiim and Haredim in 2002. Interestingly enough, after the end of the Second Intifada in February 2005, a wave of Palestinian terrorism, many Israeli casualties, the Gaza disengagement in September 2005 and missiles fired from Gaza in the aftermath, opposition to the two-state solution fell rather than rose.

Table 6-11: Summary: Support among Israeli Jews for the two-state solution by religious affiliation over years (in %).

Summary: Opposition to the two-state solution (oppose the two-state solution somewhat/a lot/oppose/prefer other solution/do not support it)							
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Traditional Religious	Traditional Secular	Secular	Total
2000[36]	37.5	31.1	37.6			19.9	26.80
2002[37]	76.4	54.9	38.5			25.3	37.57
2008[38]	52.5	41.2		27.3	23.3	17.8	22,83
2009[39]	65.2	66.7		59.8	56.3	40.3	45.73
2012[40]	72.6	66.7	36.3		22	19.7	33.73
2015[41]	69.7	66.1		56.6	36	31.4	41.43

(Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute)

According to Klein Halevi, the centrist mainstream population understands it is impossible to maintain long-term occupation despite being sceptical of Palestinian intentions. They see the occupation as an existential threat to the Jewish state, whether as a threat to preserving the democratic character of the state as further occupation may delegitimise the existence of Israel or as a demographic challenge to Israel's Jewish majority (Klein Halevi 2012: 168, 171). In addition to this, Ghanem argues that upsetting the demographic balance is a threat for a one-state, bi-national state solution (Ghanem 2009: 126). This is a sentiment also shared by some Israeli politicians, such as Pinchas Sapir, who

36 Sample size: 500 Jewish respondents.
37 Sample size: 503 Jewish respondents.
38 Sample size: 587 Jewish respondents.
39 Sample size: 516 Jewish respondents.
40 Sample size: 513 Jewish respondents.
41 Sample size: 502 Jewish respondents.

believed that the state's Jewish character needed to be preserved or Ehud Olmert who for the same reason supported unilateral withdrawals in the West Bank (Susser 2011: 69, 87). However, Daniel disagreed with Israeli politicians, who he said were afraid of 'these mythical bogeymen, for example, they'll often say the demographic problem, OK? That the Arabs will overrun the Jews, there never was a demographic problem there, never was' (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017).

Among the interviewed Datiim Leumim, the overwhelming majority (70%) opposed the two-state solution, 20% supported it in theory and only one person supported it completely. In contrast, Haredim were less hawkish, both when compared to the Dati Leumi interviewees as well as opposed to their own representative sample as shown in Table 6-11. More than 25% opposed the two-state solution, more than a 25% supported it in theory and the remaining Haredim had more complex opinions about the two-state solution.

Moreover, the examination of support for the two-state solution from the political ideology perspective, as shown in Table 6-12, shows the support for the two-state solution is related to who the survey respondents voted for in the last election. Table 6-12 focuses on the parties that successfully entered the Knesset and were categorised as per Table 6-4. The table shows that the right/far right and religious parties were less inclined to favour the two-state solution. This was in stark contrast to centre and left-wing oriented parties that were overwhelmingly willing to support the two-state solution.

Therefore, as Subchapter 6.1 argues, the definition of right and left in Israel is defined by issues such as the two-state solution. Furthermore, Table 6-11 showed that Haredim and Datiim were less likely to support the two-state solution, and therefore opposition to the two-state solution can be considered a trait of both the Israeli right as well as of the counter-culture communities.

Table 6-12: Summary: Support among Israeli Jews for the two-state solution by religious ideology (based on who they voted for in the latest elections for parliament) (in %). Sample size: 404.

The Peace Index - December 2015				
In principle, do you support or not support the solution of two states for two peoples?				
	Right-far right (Likud, Yisrael Beiteinu, HaBayit HaYehudi)	**Centre** (Yesh Atid, Kulanu)	**Left** (Zionist Union, Meretz)	**Religious** (Shas, UTJ)
Do not support it at all	33.7	9	7.9	47.2
Do not support it so much	24.2	11.7	5	13.9
Moderately support it	28.9	54.5	24.8	27.8
Strongly support it	10.5	24.7	58.4	5.6
Do not know	2.6		4	5.6

(Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute)

Moreover, Table 6-13 summarises the main reasons why different religious groups oppose the two state-solution. For the mainstream, majority (secular and traditional) Jewish population, the main reason to oppose it is security. For Haredim it is security and then secondly historic right, and for Datiim it is the historic right.

Similarly, there were several different reasons why the interviewees opposed the two-state solution. As mentioned in the previous subchapter, the historical narrative was one of the dominant reasons.

Table 6-13: Reasons to oppose the two-state solution (in %). Sample size: 179.

The Peace Index - December 2002						
For those who currently oppose: Of the following reasons, which reason, in your opinion, is the most important to oppose the "two state" solution?						
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Between religious and secular/ believing secular	Total
This solution harms the historic rights of the nation of Israel to all of Israel and all the Jewish holy places	33.3	60	18.2	7.1		23.46
This solution will make it easier for the Palestinians to use terrorism against Israel	48.7	12	25.5	37.5	25	32.40
This solution will endanger the strategic depth of Israel and its national security and the security of its citizens	12.8	16	34.5	39.3	50	29.05
This solution will give the Palestinians a state despite the fact that they don't have a right to it	5.1	8	12.7	8.9	25	9.5
Do not know		4	9.1	7.1		5.59

(Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute)

Historical right.

As Table 6-13 shows, for Datiim Leumim, the historical right is the most important reason to oppose the two-state solution. In line with this table, Rachel and Daniel, who identify as Dati Leumi, outlined their historical perspective. Rachel explained that the Land of Israel was divided by the British, who gave a chunk of land to Jordan and a smaller part to Israel (Interview, Rachel, 02

July 2017). Rachel avoided using word "Palestinian" and instead used word "Arab" during the interview. Daniel went even further:

> I don't believe there is a Palestinian Arab nation, I believe it's a historical distortion, there never was a Palestinian Arab state, never, in history you can't, you can't point to their capital, you can't point . . . to currency, you know, in Israel we have shekels, in Jordan they have the dinar, there is no currency to Palestinian nation because it never was a Palestinian nation. This whole myth was created in order to attack Israel, I think it's nothing more than another form of anti-Semitism and and in my opinion we should annex Judea and Samaria, today (Interview, Daniel, 05 June 2017).

Also touched upon in the previous subchapter was the historical and religious right of the Jewish communities to live in Israel, whilst many other people did not have that right. As such, the idea of Jewish particularism makes the two-state solution impossible. For instance, Shor reports[42] that during the Gaza disengagement, around a third of articles by right-wing authors referred to Jewish particularism, divine and natural entitlement of the Jewish people to the entire Land of Israel that no secular source of authority could waive. Some writers further maintained that the Jewish people were unique and morally superior (Shor 2008: 813; Klein Halevi 2012: 170). Sheina was of a similar opinion:

> the Land of Israel is for Jewish people, non-Jews are according to Jewish law, are allowed to live in the Land of Israel, Christians as well as anybody else is that if they abide by the Seven Noahide laws if they're loyal to the sovereign government so anyone who's loyal to Seven Laws of Noah (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017).

[42] Shor's study consisted of 138 articles that appeared on the prominent right-wing Internet web sites *Makor Rishon* and *INN* between January 2005 and August 2005 (Shor 2008: 807-808).

Security.

Security, as Table 6-13 shows, was a major motivation to oppose the two-state solution across the whole religious spectrum, including both Datiim Leumim and Haredim.

Two Dati Leumi interviewees were open to the two-state solution in theory, if it was to resolve the conflict. However, Joseph said it was not possible now as he could not trust the Palestinian government authorities to look after the security on their borders (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017). Similarly, Uri was concerned about security:

> if it was normal situation, I say yeah, take it, take two state, however . . . In 2005 Ariel Sharon evacuate Gaza strip, despite the opportunity for being prosperity for Gaza strip, they choose the violence. They throw missiles on Israel, and they say that's occupation, that's occupation (Interview, Uri, 06 July 2017).

Haredim were also concerned about security. Itzik said while Israel was always happy to compromise, the other side was not and instead became more extreme (Interview, Itzik, 08 June 2017). Yirmiyahu explained that even though he used to be very left-wing in the past, the rise of Muslim radical terrorist groups shook him and therefore he would like to keep the two-state solution as the status quo (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017). Again, as Section 6.3.2 highlighted, according to the interviewees, lessons learnt from the Gaza disengagement, such as deteriorating security including missiles fired at Israel, prevent people from supporting the two-state solution.

Foundation myths and collective memory.

The lessons learnt from Gaza, as well as other events that impacted collective memory, including the Holocaust and the more recent First and Second Intifada, also influence views on the two-state solution. Chapter 3 noted that collective memory plays an important role in Israel and founding myths shape collective identity (Probst 2003: 45) as do crises that threaten the survival

of the counter-culture communities. Yirmiyahu likened the situation to the Holocaust, in which he lost relatives. He added:

> I have many Arabs friends, . . . I think that they were not treated nice by the State of Israel. We often humiliate them, nevertheless I need to be a little bit egoistic, when I'm talking about survival, survival by Jewish people survival is something real (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017).

That is not the first time survival and the Holocaust are used as the reasoning. Shor points out that there are comparisons made between the Gaza disengagement and the Holocaust (Shor 2008: 816). Similarly, Unger shows that persecution in foreign lands, including the Holocaust, makes the preservation of a Jewish state the first condition of the survival of the Jews as a people (Unger 2002: 10). At the same time, collective memory is influenced by the events from recent history, such as the First Intifada that brought about rock throwing and Molotov cocktails, and the Second Intifada (Klein Halevi 2012: 170). These negative recent experiences resonate among the population, and Rachel gave an example why she did not support the two-state solution. She got emotional and upset by the example that threatened the lives of Israelis:

> One time, . . . almost 20 years ago, two Israeli soldiers made a mistake and they drove into Ramallah. You can find the video on YouTube. It’s disgusting. They were literally torn limb from limb, the Arabs, they took joy in getting the blood and guts on themselves . . . . with the blood dripping on their hands because they had killed Jews that made a mistake and wandered into their area. That's what a two-state solution looks like (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017).

Beneficial for the Arab people.

Another reason to oppose the two-state solution provided by interviewees was that they supported the idea and wanted to implement the one-state solution. Rachel said she supported the one-state solution as it was beneficial for Arabs, as Israel is the

only democracy in the Middle East and the only place they can live safely. Moreover, she claimed, they had rights, better jobs, better health insurance, and better services (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017). Daniel said he would annex Judea and Samaria and give the Arabs two choices: citizenship or permanent residency (Interview, Daniel, 05 June 2017), which is an idea that comes from a Dati Leumi narrative and has been proposed before, for instance by the former HaBayit HaYehudi leader Natfali Bennett (Landsmann 2018). As Susser mentions, following the Six-Day War, Dati Leumi settlers wanted to make Arabs choose between submission to the divinely inspired Jewish order or emigration to any one of the many Arab states or expulsion (Susser 2011: 75).

Independent state not a viable option.

Lastly, the last reason to oppose the two-state solution as raised by the interviewees was that they did not consider it a viable option. Jacob agreed with the idea of a Palestinian state, but he thought it was not possible at the moment as the Palestinians lack real leadership (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017). He added:

> I think the previous thing I said about Israeli state is shared by almost all Haredim. Very sceptical, but in theory we think it's a great idea. The peace is most important. . . . If you talk to Dati Leumi, to give up one square inch of *Eretz Israel*, of Land of Israel? Impossible. And then you're a traitor if you would think that (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017).

Shlomo said he preferred a state of two nations, each one would have their own culture, and the state would maintain Torah Jewish values and Palestinians would have autonomy (Interview, Shlomo, 01 June 2017). Furthermore, Jacob noted that part of the problem was that there already is the two-state solution, as there is a state in Gaza, and he did not want a three-state solution (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017). Some participants were even more critical. Shoshana thought that the Palestinians would never

be happy and would want more (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017) and Isaac said they did not want a Jewish state (Interview, Isaac, 13 June 2017) and Efrat thought that Jewish citizens would be worse off than Arab citizens (Inteview, Efrat, 20 July 2017).

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that based on the counter-culture framework drafted by Pedahzur and Perliger (2009) crises that are framed as catastrophic by leaders, will bring about violence and civil disobedience by counter-culture communities, such as Haredi and Dati Leumi. Based on this premise, the subchapter has examined political crises that have the potential to be framed as catastrophic if implemented, these are settlements withdrawal from the territories and the two-state solution. In addition to that, this chapter has set the crises into the wider Israeli political context.

The objective of this chapter has been to demonstrate that the counter-culture groups are primarily associated with the right-wing ideology, they are dissatisfied and under-represented by the mainstream political system and ultimately that the counter-culture groups are alienated from the mainstream, particularly in terms of political alienation in their viewpoints on settlements withdrawal, the main functions of settlements or the two-state solution. While there are some views that are also shared by the mainstream population, such as security, there are also views that are exclusive to the counter-culture communities such as historic and religious right of Jewish communities to live in Israel or Arabs benefiting from the one-state solution.

The next chapter builds on the concepts introduced in this chapter and examines the significance of religious beliefs in more detail. Most importantly, it argues that counter-culture

communities are influenced in their political views by their religious views.

7 Religion and Counter-culture: Impact of Religious Beliefs on Involvement in Violence and Civil Disobedience

'I can't even separate, my religious views and my political views are absolutely intertwined' (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017).

You shall not murder (Exodus 20:13).

This thesis has already pointed out in the Historical and Religious Background chapter as well as the Theoretical Framework chapter some of the implications of religious beliefs on perpetrating violence, including the role of messianic/millenarian beliefs on framing events as catastrophic crises. The original framework states that counter-cultures that adhere to totalistic ideologies are more prone to engage in religiously motivated violence (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 299), and the previous chapter discussed the range of political opinions the counter-culture communities embrace. This chapter aims to further establish the link between religion and politics in connection with the Israeli Jewish counter-culture communities with a particular focus on how religious views can influence involvement in violence and civil disobedience.

First of all, this chapter explores the link between religion and politics and it illustrates how it translates into the daily lifestyle of the counter-culture communities. Secondly, the chapter analyses the role of religious leaders, as per the framework that points to their importance in terms of framing crises as catastrophic. Thirdly, this chapter studies the sources of religious beliefs and the role they play in people's involvement in violence and civil disobedience. Lastly, the chapter concludes with an overview of religious crises that may play a role in the future involvement in violence.

7.1 Politics and Judaism

The previous chapter focused on the political developments in the counter-culture communities, including political crises represented by the potential implementation of the two-state solution and settlements withdrawal. Whilst these crises are of a political nature and will have an impact on Israeli politics if implemented, they also will have an impact on the counter-culture communities in terms of their religious worldview, as this thesis argues that political and religious matters are interlinked. As such, this makes it comparable to Islam, as in traditional Islam there is no separation between politics and religion (Bar 2004: 29). Therefore this subchapter aims to elaborate on this notion, focusing on Judaism, and thus also provide background for the rest of this chapter. This subchapter is mainly based on the fieldwork observations, in addition to drawing from the existing literature.

At the state level, Kook *et al.* point out there is no official separation in Israel between the church and the state (Kook *et al.* 1998: 1), or as one interviewee put it, 'separating religion from to state is . . . only Christian option, . . . it has nothing to do with Jewish state' (Interview, Shlomo, 01 June 2017). Another participant added that he did not make any separation between politics and religion (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017). Indeed, when asked how their religious views influence their political views, nine Haredim who were interviewed during fieldwork responded that their religious views influenced their political views to some extent, while six Dati Leumi interviewees said so. Despite the small sample size, this could be an indication of a wider trend among the population. As such, two major themes were identified based on the interviewees' responses regarding their religious views. They identified that their religious views had impacted on two interlinked aspects, lifestyle and politics.

Lifestyle.

The first major theme identified by the interviewees related to their lifestyle. As Table 4-1 summarised, the counter-culture communities are known for their distinct lifestyle that is evident in areas such as clothing, residence areas and others. Both Haredim and Datiim Leumim adopt a secluded lifestyle (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 298-299; The Jewish People Policy Institute 2016: 139). This thesis points out that the lifestyle is a result of the communities' religious convictions. Indeed, a Haredi interviewee who undertook an *aliyah* to Israel, Daniella, pointed out that her 'religious views are way of life. It's not just religion. . . . I would want them to be according to or creating the best environment for me to be able to live this lifestyle' (Interview, Daniella, 09 July 2017). Two more Haredi interviewees, Chava and Itzik, both mentioned that their religious views influenced their moral system (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017; Interview, Itzik, 08 June 2017). Although neither interviewee said so explicitly, the theoretical framework states that the communities view themselves as morally superior (Almond *et al.* 2003: 34-36), which also translates into their modest clothing. Similarly, Shlomo said that religion should not be telling people facts about what is happening, but rather to provide norms. As such, he found ideas in religious sources that help him decide to how to react to things (Interview, Shlomo, 01 June 2017). For instance, the laws of modesty *tzniut*, are based on religious norms. Therefore, the inference is that the lifestyle of the counter-culture communities is to a great extent influenced by religion.

Apart from these Haredi participants, one of the Dati Leumi participants, Joseph, pointed out that he lived 'Judaism as a way of life' (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017). He added that:

> there is a religious thing that the people of Israel should be specifically in Israel. Like if someone were to give us a safe haven in Uganda or some other place, I would reject that. And that would come from the religious reasons (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017).

The idea of Uganda as a homeland for the Jewish people was raised in Zionist circles in late 19th century and supported by Theodor Herzl (Bein 2008: 23). Arguably, to Zionists the Uganda proposal was acceptable because of their secular viewpoints. However, as Joseph pointed out, based on his religious views, Israel is the only acceptable option as the homeland. As such, this implies that religious viewpoints ultimately impact political decisions.

Politics.

In addition to the above example, the influence of religion on politics can be exhibited in a number of ways, for instance in terms of voting behaviour. Shoshana, for instance, said that in line with her religious views, she had to vote for the party that was helping the religious Jews (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017). In Jewish Haredi circles it is expected to listen to the "Torah giants" and follow their authority on political matters (Finkelman 2014: 271-272). However, Avi commented that people in his community do not ask their community leaders how they should vote (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017). This example shows a gap between Haredim and Datim Leumim.

On the other hand, in contrast to Shoshana's experience, Jacob said that his 'religious views leave me in a place where I can't support any candidate, of any party. The religious parties, I can't stand them. They're only in feud, petty, self-interest' (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017). In addition to that, Rachel mentioned that her religious views leave her in position when she cannot vote for politicians on the left, as she finds them anti-religious (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017).

Apart from voting behaviour, some interviewees also considered their stance towards the State of Israel as part of their religious outlook. Hence, for Yirmiyahu, religion is linked to the nature of the state:

> I don't expect anyone to be religious like me, but I do expect the State of Israel to declare itself that the right of existence is by the Jewish religion and without that, I don't think we have any right here on the land, at all (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017).

A similar notion was also expressed by a Dati Leumi interviewee Daniel:

> The lifestyle I chose is because of my religious perspective, so and my perspective on how this country should be run also is influenced by my religious perspective, so without a doubt my religion is my religious perspective . . . is the most important influence on me in terms of how I view what should be done in politics (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017).

In addition to that, he remarked that the reason he moved to Israel was his religious perspective (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017). Similarly, Avi agreed that his political views were strongly influenced by his religious views as he lives in a place (i.e. a religious settlement) which if his political views were not in accordance with that community's views, he would have to move (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017). These political views arguably stem from Rabbi Kook's teachings that stressed that Jews had the right over the "promised land" as promised in the Torah, including Judea and Samaria (Pedahzur and Perliger 2014: 10-11). Consequently, growing up in a settlement with the community like that had an influence on his views (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017). This is supported by the principle of homophily outlined in the theory chapter, which suggests that people like to associate with others who are similar, who have a common background, education, beliefs, ethnicity, religion or age (Kilduff and Tsai 2003: 52; Sageman 2011: 152; Vargas and Loveland 2011: 714, 715).

Other religiously-motivated political views included those related to security. Efrat said she just wanted Israel to be safe (Interview, Efrat, 20 July 2017). This relates to Rachel's point that her religious views influence her to support the Israeli army

(Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017), and indeed, some Datiim Leumim consider the service as a *mitzvah* (Lubell 2016).

Lastly, Rachel pointed out that her religious views influence her in terms of giving up land in Israel: 'I won't be willing to give up any land, so any politician that says that he will give up land, I wouldn't vote for. And I guess that's religious because, it's not ok, it's gonna uproot lives' (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017). She said she felt like that for many reasons, including that the land was 'the gift the God gave us' (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017). This ties back to the previous chapter and counter-culture views on the two-state solution and settlements withdrawal. The chapter argued, based on the interview data as well as the literature, that there are some views on the two-state solution and settlements withdrawal that are shared by both the mainstream and counter-culture population, such as security. However, there are also views that are exclusive to the counter-culture communities such as the historic and religious right of Jewish communities (Shor 2008: 813; Klein Halevi 2012: 170). For instance, Yirmiyahu noted 'the moral right, that I can come here even though Arabs used to live here and everything that I claim it's mine, because I have historical claim about it' (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017). Therefore, this religious and historical right to the territories will also impact any appetite on the part of the counter-culture communities in regards to giving the territories up. At the same time, however, it should be noted that the historical claim to *Eretz Israel* is not just restricted to Datiim Leumim. Many in the Likud maintain this right on historical grounds as well as on those of security. For instance, this is embodied by the 1977 Likud manifesto which stated that 'the right of the Jewish People to the Land of Israel is eternal, and is an integral part of its right to security and peace' (Shindler 2001: 103).

The examples above show that religious and political views are interlinked, and a majority of interviewees agreed that these two areas are connected. However, there were a few participants

who believed these two areas were not interlinked, such as Ari. Ari, who is part of the liberal wing of the Dati Leumi community, described that his religious views influenced him more in the past than they do now. As such, politics and religion were no longer interlinked in his case. He outlined that during high school he was part of a more closed Jewish religious community, including a religious youth movement. In his own words, his religious opinions were linked to right-wing opinions. However, his life became more diverse after he moved to Jerusalem, after he started studying at university and thus after he started interacting more often with the secular population (Interview, Ari, 01 June 2017). This shows that the counter-culture's alienation from the mainstream culture plays a significant role on behaviour and political views. Based on the assertion by the interviewees, it can thus be concluded that there is a correlation between interaction with people outside their own community and openness to other communities, and political ideology. For instance, Avi and Daniel who lived in religious settlements as opposed to Ari who lived in a mixed community and found himself in more contact with the secular population.

7.2 Religious Leaders

The counter-culture framework outlines the crucial role charismatic leaders play in framing crises as existential threats to the communities. Regarding this subject, the previous chapter, and particularly Subchapter 6.3, showed that leaders such as rabbis played a significant role in framing the Gaza disengagement as catastrophic. Moreover, the chapter also highlighted that leaders hold influence over their followers' voting behaviour. This subchapter focuses on religious leaders in more detail as leaders, and religious leaders in particular, play a significant role in radicalisation. As Kook *et al.* describe, there is

an important principle accepted in Judaism that 'the rabbinical authority should rule supreme over all communal matters, political and otherwise' (Kook *et al.* 1998: 6). As an example, Sheina from the Chabad movement pointed out, she was influenced by the late *rebbe*'s political views as 'the way I view the world is according to teachings that I learnt from him' (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017). One of the most infamous examples of the role of religious leaders is the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by the Jewish terrorist Yigal Amir who acted under rabbinic instruction (S. A. Cohen 2013: 14) and who admitted he would not have acted without one and the murder needed to be authorised (Cohen-Almagor 2007: 35). However, it should be noted that this phenomenon of supreme rabbinical authority is not as strong and influential across all the strata of Orthodox Jewish communities, including the Haredi ones.

That leaders play a vital role has already been analysed in the previous chapter on the case of the Gaza disengagement that the majority of Haredim and Datiim Leumim opposed. Cohen notes that several Dati Leumi rabbis denounced the move and made calls on the IDF to disobey orders to participate in the disengagement (S. A. Cohen 2013: 14, 111). For instance, in June 2004, the rabbis of Yesha (Judea, Samaria and Gaza) issued a press release prohibiting any citizen, policeman or soldier from evacuating any settlement point in the Land of Israel (Esteron 2004). In the end, however, the overwhelming majority of Dati Leumi soldiers did not obey rabbinical instructions not to help carry out the disengagement (S. A. Cohen 2013: 15). Yet, Cohen warns that the situation may be different if Judea and Samaria are ever to be evacuated, as they hold far greater significance (S. A. Cohen 2013: 15).

This subchapter analyses the extent to which leaders play an influential role in the lives of the counter-culture communities, and to find out whether, as the theory chapter outlined, people

living in enclaves believe that leaders must be obeyed (Almond *et al.* 2003: 33). Thus, first of all, the interviewees were asked if they seek advice from their leaders (either religious or political/community) on any important decisions. Eight interviewed Haredim, i.e. 72.7% of all Haredim, do seek advice, and three, i.e. 27.3% of all Haredim, said they did not seek advice from leaders at all. Similar trends among the Dati Leumi interviewees were found; two participants, i.e. 20% of all Datiim, said they did not seek advice, three, i.e. 30%, said sometimes or maybe, and a half of them, i.e. five or 50% said they did seek advice.

The reasons the interviewees gave as to why they sought advice from these leaders are in line with the analysis provided in the theory chapter, particularly the leaders' charisma. As the theory chapter outlined, this is particularly valid in the case of Hassidic communities, who believe their *rebbe* is righteous, visionary, and extremely intelligent (Poll 1995: 257). Itzik, who is a Hassidic Jew, described his own leader in a way that includes all these traits:

> He's smarter than me, more experienced, more pious, he doesn't have ulterior motives. It would be wise to follow his advice. Everyone would benefit from having someone like this. He has knowledge on life, marriage. People often act in irrational way, they are emotionally vested, they do things against their own judgement (Interview, Itzik, 08 June 2017).

Sheina, who is from the Chabad Hassidic community, said the community refers to the late *rebbe* for all advice through his books, as well as for advice from rabbis within the community. She also added that the *rebbe* had a tremendous effect on Israeli politics. She alleged that government officials - from the army and from politics - were in contact with the *rebbe* about laws and different issues (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017). Chava, who is also Hassidic, said she may consult some rabbis, such as the Belzer *rebbe* but she also pointed out that there are some leaders

she would never go and consult with as she felt they were 'rotten, and use spirituality as a card' (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017). However, extensive advice-seeking is not limited to the Hassidic communities only. Shoshana who is of non-Hassidic Haredi background explained that her father was in fact a community leader, and she had seen people consult with him on everything (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017).

The extent of consultation varied within the sample of Haredi interviewees, from the above examples suggesting a major influence of leaders on their communities, to a lesser extent outlined in the following paragraphs. Eight Haredim sought advice from leaders to some extent. Daniella revealed that if there was an issue that her husband and she were not sure how to solve, and needed to go to according to the Torah law, then she would definitely ask her rabbi (Interview, Daniella, 09 July 2017). Similarly, Shoshana gave an example of her husband who has a rabbi he calls regarding *Halachic* issues (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017). Advice on understanding and interpreting religious sources is of great importance, especially if complex laws contain references to permitted use of violence, as further examined in Subchapter 7.3. As the example of Yigal Amir demonstrates, he would not have acted without rabbinical advice (Cohen-Almagor 2007: 35), which suggests that rabbinical advice can either further validate the perpetrator's intention to undertake an attack or to deter it.

A similar trend can be observed among Datiim Leumim, as a half of the interviewees sought advice. The 2014 Dati Leumi sector survey conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute came to a similar conclusion. 58% of the surveyed Datiim Leumim attached quite a lot or a lot of importance to the *Halachic* rulings of rabbis on controversial political issues (Israel Democracy Institute 2015). For instance, Daniel confirmed that he listened to his rabbis, although not in all instances:

> I have had requests from my religious leader for, . . . which I disagreed with but I said you know what, he knows better and I did it. In other words he can make requests of me that I may disagree with and then I'll say, you know what, I'm willing to live and learn. . . .If I feel very strongly about an issue that I want to do, I won't ask a question (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017).

Interestingly, one participant raised an important point. Efrat said that while she did not seek advice from the community leaders in Israel, there is a community leader back in the country she emigrated from whom she admires very much. She said she followed his lectures and even though she did not ask him questions on Facebook, she said there were online discussions, and she felt part of the Internet community (Interview, Efrat, 20 July 2017). Ari also follows a rabbi online. He reads his papers online and follows his Facebook (Interview, Ari, 01 June 2017). As Rosenthal and Rabik note, Datiim Leumim in Israel are less isolationist than Haredim regarding media practices (Rosenthal and Ribak 2015: 149). As much radicalisation is conducted online, and online media are used to communicate with members or sympathisers (Gerstenfeld *et al.* 2003: 29-30), the role of the Dati Leumi leaders on radicalisation via the Internet should be taken into consideration in future research.

However, some participants responded that they did not seek advice. For instance, Ari admitted that whilst he would like to hear his rabbi's opinions, he does make important decisions alone, with his cultural community or his friends (Interview, Ari, 01 June 2017). This ties back to the crucial role of social networks in the counter-culture communities, as they also impact members' decision-making process, as people rely on their network when making major decisions (Kilduff and Tsai 2003: 5). Joseph said that even though he used to ask Orthodox rabbis for advice in the past, he would no longer do that as he and his opinions have changed throughout the years. He also added that:

> I sort of have enough confidence in myself to make my own decision and you could also say and some people

> do say that it's quite a phenomena in the Zionist religious like community that there are no leaders (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017).

As mentioned at the beginning of this subchapter, Yigal Amir would not have acted without rabbinic authorisation. Therefore, an important question to ask and find an answer to is whether people would act even if their rabbi disagreed with their decision. The question is whether independent thinking and determination to undertake an action supersede rabbinical instruction that would prohibit a person from taking action. Therefore, interviewees who confirmed they sought advice from religious leaders were asked whether they would do something if their rabbi disagreed with their course of action. Out of those who sought advice on at least some occasions, six Haredi interviewees, so just over a half of them, said they would do it, and five Dati Leumi, a half of them, would.

Whilst she would go ahead with her decision even if the leader disagreed with it, Chava admitted it would be hard for her, and she would doubt herself as the leaders she does consult with are experienced people (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017). Similarly, Leah said that even despite the leaders' greater level of understanding, she would stand firm and go against authority if she believed it was really the correct thing to do (Interview, Leah, 04 July 2017). Similarly, Yirmiyahu mentioned that he did not listen to anyone now and he did what he believed in. However, he acknowledged he had listened in the past, and a lot of his friends still did (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017). Jacob said that his rabbi would never tell him what to and what not to do. As an example, he pointed out that his rabbi did not care that Jacob does not have a kosher phone[43], but Jacob acknowledged that not every rabbi was like his (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017).

[43] Kosher phone is usually a basic mobile phone that can make and receive calls but it cannot send or receive texts or browse the Internet.

The above examples show that not all the interviewees accept and follow their leaders unconditionally, and thus the relationship with leaders is more complicated than the framework suggests.

As for the Dati Leumi interviewees who would go against their rabbis' advice, Uri mentioned that he would go against his rabbi's advice, but he admitted that rather than to seek advice, he visits his rabbi to receive blessings. But he also acknowledged that there are people who do seek advice, especially from the Haredi population. In contrast, Uri defined himself as Dati Leumi liberal, and thus not a member of the hardcore Dati Leumi stream (Interview, Uri, 06 July 2017), implying that the more Orthodox streams are more prone to seeking advice. Similarly, Ari noted that he did not 'really go according to the Orthodox rules' (Interview, Ari, 01 June 2017). At the same time he noted 'I can't do anything but in the synagogue that I would want to do if rabbi forbids it' (Interview, Ari, 01 June 2017). Similarly, outside the synagogue life, Avi thought that his reaction would vary, one day he would go against his rabbi's advice, another day he would not. He said he did lots of things without consulting with the community leader, such as studying at university, which was normal in his community, but not in others (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017).

Ultimately, the most common theme is related to the Jewish religious law, *Halacha*. As Avi put it, 'if you ask a *Halachic* law question, Jewish law, so yeah, you do what you are told' (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017). Daniella said the very same thing: if something is against the letter of the law, and she receives an answer, then she cannot go against it (Interview, Daniella, 09 July 2017). Sheina agreed that:

> if I go to rabbi on ask question on Jewish law, it's because I know he knows more than I do about that subject, so I would try and listen to what he has to say because I went to him in the first place because . . . he has more expertise in a topic (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017).

In addition to individual leaders, it is worth noting the role of collective authorities, such as the *Rabbanut*. The *Rabbanut*, or the Chief Rabbinate of Israel, is the supreme religious authority in the state that has control over *kashrut*, marriages, conversations and other *Halachic* related matters. It is led by Israel's two Chief Rabbis, the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi and the Sephardi Chief Rabbi (Don-Yehiya 1984: 157). As such, Israel's Chief Rabbis are the main representatives of their respective communities. Therefore, if any radical statement is proclaimed by the Chief Rabbi, it can have massive consequences on the followers. For instance, Sephardi Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef said non-Jews could not live in Israel (Times of Israel 2016). To offer another example, Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi David Lau suggested that only *Halachic* Jews should be granted Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return (Millis 2019). Moreover, Shlomo Goren, the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi between 1973-1983, opposed evacuation of settlements in Judea and Samaria. Moreover, he 'asserted that Jews were required by religious law to kill Mr. Arafat because he endangered Jewish lives' (Eric Pace 1994: 49). That the *Rabbanut* holds immense power and respect is evident for instance from the actions of Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, a Dati Leumi rabbi who allegedly proclaimed that anyone who quarrels or harasses the Chief Rabbinate has the status of *din rodef* (pursuer) (Sharon 2015).

In conclusion, the objective of this subchapter was to demonstrate that the counter-culture communities have great respect for their religious leaders, who hold power in the communities and serve as the sources of wisdom and advice for their followers. This subchapter also showed that leaders often interpret and explain religious sources to their followers. But some interviewees themselves suggested that they can never go against the letter of the law. Therefore, this thesis suggests that as religious leaders interpret and refer to religious sources, people's religious beliefs and actions will, to an extent, be

motivated by religious sources. Thus, the next subchapter examines the role of Jewish religious sources in detail.

7.3 Religious Sources

According to the counter-culture framework, leaders play a significant role in framing a crisis as catastrophic, for instance Yigal Amir claimed he would have never perpetrated the Rabin assassination without rabbinical authorisation. This thesis argues that especially in the absence of religious leaders, another significant area that should be taken into consideration in the radicalisation process is the role of religious sources.

While Pedahzur and Perliger acknowledge the role of leaders, they do not make a point about the religious sources themselves, and what role they play. The religious terrorism literature however does mention that religious terrorist acts are based on ancient rituals (Gunning and Jackson 2011: 372). Moreover, the fundamentalism literature also notes that 'wisdom is contained in the book . . . is interpreted by those who truly understand it and it is all that one needs to navigate through life' (Heilman 1995: 81). In other words, the religious sources control everything as do those who interpret them, such as rabbis.

This subchapter accordingly presents ancient rituals that play a significant role in motivation for political violence and civil disobedience, as does the Jewish religious law, *Halacha*. Similarly, in Islam, the law is given and leaders of the ummah (Islamic nation) apply it on a day-to-day basis and those who follow and perform religious duties will inherit paradise (Bar 2004: 31). The Quran permits a process of religious decision making by independent interpretations of the Quran and the religious law (Venkatraman 2007: 236). Juergensmeyer notes there is a common assumption that religious beliefs, particularly tenets of religious scripture, motivate activists to undertake acts of

violence. Based on the interviews he undertook, however, he claims that few religiously-related activists frame their motivations in scriptural or theological terms (Juergensmeyer 2015: 853). Yet, this thesis will argue that in the case of Orthodox counter-culture groups, their religious views are at the forefront of their worldview, and as the previous section showed, people do say they have to follow the religious law, and thus those who do get radicalised within the communities, will adhere to the strict Orthodox lifestyle and religious views. Thus, religious texts could be misused by followers and used as a substitution for a leader, when an attacker acts without a leader's approval. In addition to that, leaders have used religious sources to justify violence and issued religious edicts to their followers in the past, therefore this subchapter examines these sources in detail.

First of all, this paragraph provides a brief summary of Jewish religious texts. The Torah, or the first part of the Hebrew Bible called the *Tanakh*, is one of the fundamental texts in Judaism. Therefore it is important to note what it says regarding the use of violence, especially because as Zucker points out, 'every word and every law, every commandment found in the Bible is binding on a loyal Jew' (Zucker 2005: 22). This is particularly important because counter-culture communities are Orthodox, and therefore follow the laws found in and derived from the Torah. *Halacha*, the Jewish religious law, is a normative system that regulates all aspects of daily life, both private and public (Ben-Menahem 2001: 7969), all *Halacha* rests on the Talmud (Steinsaltz 2006: 279). Talmud is also one of the fundamental texts in Judaism, together with the Torah. The Talmud, as is outlined in more detail in Section 7.3.1, does mention the right of self-defence, based on the Torah's principle "if anyone comes to kill you, you should kill him first". Every individual has the right to kill those about to commit a grave crime (murder or rape), but violence should not be employed beyond the necessary and feasible minimum dictated by circumstances (Steinsaltz 2006:

210). Table 7-1 exposes an immense split between the mainstream population and the Haredi and the Dati Leumi populations in regards to perceptions of *Halacha*. Whilst almost all Haredim, 97%, and 71% of Datiim Leumim would act in accordance with *Halacha* as opposed to court rulings mandated by the secular democratic State of Israel, only 6% of the secular population would, as well as a small segment of the traditional population. As such, Haredim and Datiim Leumim are alienated from the mainstream population in terms of their perceptions of secular law and *Halacha*.

A study by Yagil and Rattner (2002) affirms that religiosity is expected to be negatively related to legal obedience. This means that the existence of a set of alternative religious laws is expected to result in lower levels of acceptance of the secular judicial system as well as higher levels of readiness to take the law into one's own hands when the two systems are in conflict.

Table 7-1: Israeli Jewish population's preference over *Halacha* or court ruling (in%). Sample size: 891.

	Would act in accordance with *Halacha*	**Would act in accordance with court rulings**
Haredi	97	2
Dati Leumi	71	20
Traditional religious	40	44
Traditional non-religious	16	72
Secular	6	89

(Adapted from: Israel Democracy Institute 2016a: 84)

The study finds this trend particularly strong among Haredi respondents (Yagil and Rattner 2002: 189, 205). Moreover, right-wing ideology is also related to lower levels of legal obedience, and the authors argue that many religious values and right-wing political ideology are similar (Yagil and Rattner 2002: 189). This shows that the relationship between counter-culture communities and right-wing ideology outlined in the previous chapter is further reaffirmed by the links to legal obedience.

Furthermore, expanding on the role of *Halacha* in the Israeli Jewish society, another survey shown in Table 7-2, shows that unlike the traditional and secular population, a majority of the Haredi (86%) and the Dati Leumi (69%) population would enjoy the idea of *Halacha* as the state law in Israel.

Table 7-2: Support/opposition to *Halacha* as state law (in %). Sample size: 3,789.

	Oppose	Favour
All Jews	64	29
Haredi	9	86
Dati	17	69
Masorti	57	32
Hiloni	90	5

(Adapted from: Pew Research Center 2016: 14)

Thus, the results of both survey summarised in Tables 7-1 and 7-2 show that ancient, religious sources still play a significant role in the lives of counter-culture communities as they are preferred over modern, democratic laws.

To better understand counter-culture communities' opinions about *Halacha*, the interviewees were asked whether they would install *Halacha* as the state law or if they were happy with Israeli laws. Unlike the respondents to the above Pew Research survey shown in Table 7-2, interviewees were less likely to install *Halacha* as the state law, although a majority of all participants, 12, would still prefer it over the Israeli law to some extent. Four Haredi interviewees would install it, although people acknowledged the change would not be able to happen overnight and would take time, as Sheina outlined:

> the only way to effectively make those changes is slowly and through a lot of education, and I don't believe in shoving it down anybody's throat because that's not called education, that's called coercion (Interview, Sheina 25 June 2017).

Several Haredi interviewees agreed that they would install *Halacha* but they would like to make sure that it was not going to be coerced on non-Jews (Interview, Itzik, 08 June 2017) or people in general (Interview, Shlomo 01 June 2017). Leah also recognised that:

> In a perfect world I would love to have a generous, compassionate *Halacha* Jewish law representing each Jewish state. We live in a highly imperfect world in a secular world of the secular state (Interview, Leah, 04 July 2017).

Likewise, only three Dati Leumi participants were inclined to fully support *Halacha* and three more to some extent. Tamar said she would prefer *Halacha* as 'you can get out of it a lot, a lot of things . . . even that it was written a long time ago' (Interview, Tamar 25 July 2017). On the other hand, Avi thought that *Halacha* did not have answers for 99% of issues that are dealt with in the state law. But he would still like to instil Jewish philosophy as the foundation of the Israeli law (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017). Daniel also felt he favoured *Halacha*: 'I see how the secular system has very much failed, . . . and my confidence in *Halacha* is much greater' (Interview, Daniel, 05 June 2017). His response is tied to the discussion in the previous chapter, the relationship between counter-culture and feelings of under-representation and dissatisfaction since alienation is tied to dissimilarity, dissatisfaction, and disillusionment with politics and the government (Olsen 1969: 298). However, he realised there would be some issues with the law enforcement by the state:

> I don't see right now any group capable of proper enforcement, . . . I think society is stumbling along . . . I think the world is coming to a head I think we realise that we've developed Western philosophy to a certain point but there are a lot of failures (Interview, Daniel, 05 June 2017).

Other Dati Leumi participants who favoured *Halacha* over Israeli laws, were also aware of its shortcomings. For instance, Aaron proposed *Halacha* should represent all streams of Judaism

(Interview, Aaron, 19 July 2017) whereas Uri suggested that there should be a mix between *Halacha* and democracy:

> it's something very heavy and very important for us as Jewish people, however, we're living in present, and we need laws of the state for living according those laws and beside we are mixture of people from all kind of variation, left and right, and secular and the religious, we need harmony between (Interview, Uri, 06 July 2017).

However, a significant number of Haredi interviewees were against the idea of *Halacha* as the state law. Chava thought it was very dangerous because:

> it is an extremely powerful tool . . . not all our leaders are amazing, and I feel like if they can have the weapon of politics and the army and *Halacha*, this is really bad. This is like ISIS, you know. I feel like religion and politics should be separated (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017).

Similarly, Yirmiyahu compared *Halacha* to the Sharia law, which is something he would like to avoid in Israel. Instead, he proposed, *Halacha* should be something on a personal level (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017). Jacob also did not like the idea of *Halacha* as the state law although he said that 'I love *Halacha*, it's beautiful, it's wonderful, it's everything but it's not for running the state' (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017). Similarly, there were four Dati Leumi interviewees who were opposed to the idea of *Halacha* as the state law. Ari called the idea 'crazy' (Interview, Ari, 01 June 2017) and Joseph completely opposed it: 'I think Orthodoxy is not even close to ready to run everything. It's completely out of date' (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017). Efrat also believed that *Halacha* was outdated (Interview, Efrat, 20 July 2017).

To sum up, some of the criticisms of *Halacha* by the interviewees included that it is outdated, dangerous, not practical and should be kept at personal level. For instance, Fischer also criticises *Halacha* along these lines, pointing out to practices such

as lashes or death as punishments for offences against *Halacha*, such as eating the meat of unclean animals, adultery or idol worship (Fischer 2003: 67). However, according to *Halacha*, people are forbidden from hurting another person physically, emotionally or psychologically (Practical Halacha 2018). The way certain ideas are taken out of context and justified is not a mainstream view of Judaism. Yet, there are several points in the religious sources that could be taken out of context and used to justify violence against non-Jews as well as Jews.

Last Stone points out there are few practical laws and no comprehensive theory of war in *Halacha*, nevertheless, there are two kinds of wars: commanded wars and discretionary wars, and all other wars are impermissible. Therefore any killings that ensue are not approved under the laws of war. Instead, they would be analysed in terms of the laws forbidding individuals to murder, including self-defence and the laws of the pursuer. For example, individual self-defence does not allow the taking of one life to save two, the justification of pursuit requires imminent danger, and the person killed in self-defence must be the actual aggressor (Last Stone 2012: 342-343). Yet, the idea of self-defence and the laws of the pursuer have been used as a justification for violence in the past, and therefore the following section looks at the concept in greater detail.

7.3.1 Permitted use of violence

When Yigal Amir assassinated Prime Minister Rabin, he justified his actions according to the concepts of *din rodef* (pursuer) and *din moser* (informer) (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 106-107).

Din rodef is a concept outlined in the Talmud, in the tractate Sanhedrin. The tractate confirms that according to Mishnah those:

> who are saved from transgressing even at the cost of their lives; that is to say, these people may be killed so

> that they do not perform a transgression: One who pursues another to kill him (Sanhedrin 73a).

This is explained by Gemara as an obligation to save one whose life is in danger (Sanhedrin 73a). This category is civilian in origin and permits the person whose life is threatened to attack the pursuer if no other option is available (S. A. Cohen 2013: 149). Amir used this reasoning to justify his action, as he believed that Rabin's policies brought about terrorist attacks, the result of which Jews were dying (Kifner 1995). Amir also referred to the concept of *din moser*, which can be also be found in the Talmud, in the tractate Bava Kamma. The concept states:

> it is permitted to physically destroy it is that an informer's property should not be subject to a more stringent halakha than his body. Since it is permitted to physically harm or even kill an informer (Bava Kamma: 119a).

The tractate continues to explain that the ruling is applied even when someone committed wrongdoing by indirect action (Bava Kamma: 119a). Last Stone explains that the concept of self-defence can only be used in situations of imminent danger when there are no other alternatives, and it does not permit punishment or reprisal against an aggressor after their act is over by killing them (Last Stone 2012: 344). This logical reasoning was applied by Amir in his justification of killing Rabin. He acted under a belief that Rabin was endangering the lives of Jewish people in Israel, as Rabin's policies brought about terrorist attacks, the result of which Jews were dying (Kifner 1995).

Furthermore, Last Stone outlines that in the absence of specific rules addressed to precise questions, people can develop rules of war by engaging ancient indigenous sources, such as biblical sources; or sources that are not conventionally viewed as "legal", such as biblical commentaries, narratives, and ambiguous principles as opposed to rules (Last Stone 2012: 345). Therefore, concepts such as *din rodef* or *din moser* may be misused by counter-culture perpetrators as a means to meet their ends.

Moreover, while Amir claimed it was the rabbinical authorisation that was a final motivating act for him to assassinate Rabin, it should be pointed out that the execution of *din rodef* is mostly in the province of the individual rather than that of rabbinic rulings. This means that anyone who is capable to intervene is obliged to do so, without waiting for a specific ruling (Rachelevsky 2004). Subchapter 7.2 concluded, based on the interviewees not requiring to have their decisions validated by their leader, that people who are part of counter-culture communities can make decisions without the intervention of their community leaders. Therefore, despite the fact that the counter-culture framework states that the leader will frame a situation as catastrophic, it could be argued that in the absence of a community leader, a religious text could be used as a substitution for framing a situation as catastrophic.

Nevertheless, leaders do refer to these concepts to often frame certain crises as catastrophic. There were several instances[44] when the concept of *din rodef* was brought up during the time period this thesis focuses on. In 2000, there was a case when rabbis used the *din rodef* to be applied to dangerous (particularly religious and Haredi) drivers. In this case the crisis that prompted *din rodef* was not political and not the one that threatened the lifestyle of counter-culture communities. Also in 2000, *din rodef* was often discussed in the media when Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount (Coombes 2000), which set off the Second

[44] A search on *din rodef* via LexisNexis was made, focusing on the time period this thesis focuses on, with a result of 70 documents. These were accordingly compiled into a table, read through, and it was identified whether *din rodef* was used in response to a crisis, as per the thesis framework. Out of 70 documents, four were duplicates. Out of 66 remaining ones, eight articles dealt only with the Rabin assassination which is irrelevant as it is outside the focus of the thesis, two focused on the definition of the term, and several articles were irrelevant (e.g. focused on the case in the United States, etc.). The remaining 49 articles reported relevant events (in many cases the very same one). One article was factually incorrect as it involved discussion of whether *din rodef* should be applied to the former Iranian president Ahmadinejad.

Intifada, and thus a wave of Palestinian violence. In 2001 *din rodef* was discussed in relation to Ehud Barak and Camp David talks and concessions to Palestinians. At the time, Barak was considering the evacuation of settlements and surrender of Israeli sovereignty over Judaism's holiest site, the Temple Mount in Jerusalem's Old City. As such, Barak was perceived as a traitor to counter-culture communities (Curtius 2001), and threatened their lifestyle and worldview. Another example was from 2002 when the rabbi from the Orthodox settlement Beit El allegedly called for *din rodef* on army dodgers (Shapiro and Gilbert 2002). Again, it could be argued that the worldview of counter-culture communities, in this case Dati Leumi, who perceive army service as a *mitzvah* was threatened. In June 2003, 500 members of the Union of Rabbis for the People of Israel and the Land of Israel issued a statement that was understood as a code for the injunction of *din rodef*. This was in response to a crisis – a government roadmap to evacuate settlements in the West Bank (I. Friedman 2003). Most articles that were found on LexisNexis were related to the Gaza disengagement, in particular related to Rabbi Neventzal's statement that *din rodef* shall be applied to anyone who cedes land. The articles portrayed intelligence agencies and the government worrying about another assassination of the prime minister and other government officials helping with the disengagement process, as well as dreading protests and violence against soldiers undertaking the disengagement. And thus, the narrative used in the articles contained references to the actual Gaza disengagement as well as general opposition to anyone who cedes any of the Land of Israel and removes settlements. Parallels were drawn with the Rabin assassination, as Ariel Sharon and his alleged treason of the Jews was often discussed (Agence France Presse 2004; Copans 2004; McGreal 2004). Arguably, the argument about ceding the Land of Israel as impermissible would be a result of a mix of religious and political ideology that stressed the importance of Israeli sovereignty over all of the Land of Israel (S. B. Cohen 2007: 27)

as promised in the Torah (Liebermann 2017). During the same period it was reported that more extreme/rightist rabbis believed that anyone who turns territory that is part of the Land of Israel over to non-Jews is subject to *din rodef*. In 2004, Rabbi Yosef Dayan declared the wish for Sharon's death and said that he was prepared to place a death curse on Sharon (Greenberg 2004). In 2007, a group of extreme-right rabbis issued a death threat to a senior Israeli army general over his refusal to allow settlers to return to their outposts in the West Bank, again showing that that the threat of giving up land resulted in calls for *din rodef* (Agence France Presse 2007). In 2008, allegedly, a Chabad rabbi, Rabbi Shalom Dov Wolpe, drew a parallel to the events leading up to the assassination of Rabin, when some rabbis applied *din rodef*, and he told an audience that the government leaders should be hanged for negotiating with the Palestinians (Izenberg *et al.* 2008). The crisis was again of a nature that threatened the counter-culture worldview. However, in 2010 (and 2011 again) it was reported that Rabbi Elyashiv used *din rodef* in responses to a fraud case by Haredim (Mandel 2010). And the last case that reported the use of *din rodef* was in 2014 when Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz said it should be applied to the murderers of Abu Khdeir (an Arab who was murdered by three Israeli teens) (The Jerusalem Post 2014).

In addition to the above examples, a search on the English version of the *Haaretz* newspaper website, which is not included in the LexisNexis search, showed there were a very few occurrences when *din rodef* was reported by the newspaper, in response to crises. In addition to the cases mentioned above, a case was reported in July 2004. The head of the religious kibbutz movement Amnon Shapira allegedly "begged rabbis" in the territories to declare *din rodef* against a person who harms another Jew (Shragai 2004). Moreover, another article reported that in the months following the announcement of the disengagement plan, the rabbis and educators on the extreme right called for halting the withdrawal from Gaza by murdering

Ariel Sharon, using *din rodef* as an argument that anyone who hands over the Land of Israel, deserves to die (Shtrasler 2005). During this time period, in July 2004, a poll was conducted among the Israeli Jewish population of sample size 1,016 (Ratner 2004). The poll found that out of those who identified as right-wing, 11% agreed that '"When national disaster is on the threshold and all protest measures exhausted, inflicting physical harm on politicians might be forgiven"' (Cohen-Almagor 2007: 31-32).

These examples illustrate that the concept of calling for death of opponents of the counter-culture communities tends to reappear in the times when the communities' messianic vision of the world, such as giving up the Land of Israel is threatened. Thus, in times of crises that threaten the lifestyle and worldview of the counter-culture communities, as in line with the thesis' framework.

Another ancient concept that gained attention in the aftermath of the Rabin assassination was a curse called *pulsa denurah* as during the time period preceding Rabin's death, far-right rabbis had pronounced the curse. *Pulsa denurah* involves a ceremony that is supposed to cause the death of the subject within a year, calling upon the angels of destruction to refrain from forgiving the subject his sins, to kill him, and to call down all the curses named in the Bible (Cohen-Almagor 2007: 25).

Similarly, as in the case of *din rodef*, *pulsa denurah* was brought back during the Gaza disengagement. On July 21, 2005 a *pulsa denurah* ceremony was performed against Ariel Sharon. One of the organisers was an extremist Rabbi Yosef Dayan from the West Bank settlement of Psagot. Dayan was also a member of political group Kahane Chai and who also previously placed the curse on Rabin (Cohen-Almagor 2007: 26).

All these instances have several characteristics in common. An ancient concept was used by religious leaders to authorise violence in response to the crisis that threatened the Orthodox

worldview. In the settlers' worldview, they are fulfilling God's design by living in the settlements. Therefore, dismantling settlements is a sin (S. A. Cohen 2013: 111). These crises outlined in the previous paragraphs involved either the general idea of the Gaza disengagement or specific details of the disengagement. For instance, the Israeli Cabinet passing a revised version of Sharon's plan to withdraw from Gaza (Anonymous 2004: 651) or appointing members of settlements to coordinate the settlement dismantling (Shragai 2004).

7.3.2 Targets

Apart from providing details on when the use of violence is permitted, religious sources can also be indicators of who the potential targets of violence may be. Section 7.3.1 provided examples of when violence was called for against Jews who were considered traitors based on religious sources containing passages authorising such violence.

In addition to that, violence can be sanctioned against fellow Jews if they deviate from the community values. For instance, Fischer argues that where a person's behaviour deviates from the community's values and deliberately assault them, this will elicit severe sanctions and the person will be punished. According to Jewish legal thought, every Jew has a responsibility to ensure a society of holiness and justice, and therefore if an individual disobeys or transgresses, another individual may use violence. An example of this was the Oslo Accords, when sanctions were introduced against "deviants". Sanctions including death for "infidels", and "heretics" disloyal to the community. Thus sanctions such as *din moser* were introduced into public discussion again (Fischer 2003: 68, 70, 77).

Apart from sectarian violence, religious sources can be used to sanction violence against people of non-Jewish origin as well, such as Palestinians. According to Zucker, in the biblical

world as well as in later rabbinic Judaism, all non-Israelite people are understood to be the "other" and are portrayed in a negative light (Zucker 2005: 64). Stuart Cohen adds that Palestinians may be perceived as descendants of biblical Amalek, whom the Bible commands to be annihilated (S. A. Cohen 2013: 53). For instance, Meir Kahane used the term to include all enemies of the Jewish people, particularly the Palestinians (Jones 2013: 208). Apart from the cases outlined in 7.3.1, when *din rodef* was applied to Jewish traitors, Cohen claims that the lack of explicit guidelines left it for some to apply the concept collectively on Palestinians, thus considering them as legitimate targets of pre-emptive attack (S. A. Cohen 2013: 102). The Torah also contains passages that may be interpreted and applied to violence against Palestinians. For instance, Chapter 21 of Exodus contains the Covenant Code that introduces the laws of retaliation and the idea of "eye for eye, tooth for tooth" (Zucker 2005: 86). Moreover, Chapters 7 and 8 of Deuteronomy outline that the Hebrews shall destroy the seven nations of the land into which they are going, do not show mercy to them, do not intermarry with them, destroy their shrines and places of worship (Zucker 2005: 180). Again, while this source does not command people to hurt other people, it can be used to justify violence. For instance, in 2014, a settler rabbi, Dov Lior, declared that Israel should cleanse the territories of Arabs. Three years earlier he endorsed a book, *Torat Hamelech*, which lays out conditions under which Jews can kill non-Jews (Times of Israel 2014). This thus validates this subchapter's premise that ancient sources and rituals play a significant role in the radicalisation process. Thus, the radicalised individuals and groups can respond violently to crises that involve groups of people or individuals that are perceived as threats to a counter-culture worldview.

However, it should be noted that not all Datiim Leumim and Haredim have negative or hostile perceptions of Palestinians. For instance Jacob explained that:

> The Haredim and the Arabs we are natural allies, we, we believe in God, we are against things like a gay pride parade for example, OK? . . . We are minorities, we need to get together. . . . we don't believe in the state. It's perfect, perfect alliance (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017).

7.4 Religious Crises

Chapter 6 dealt with two broad political crises that have the potential to be catastrophic for the counter-culture communities if executed: the two-state solution and withdrawal from settlements. These two crises are not purely political, but also have a religious character. For instance, based on the religious principle of *pikuah nefesh* (a mandate to preserve life), the withdrawal from the occupied territories could endanger lives of local Jewish settlers (S. A. Cohen 2013: 53). In addition to that, from the settlers' point of view, withdrawal from territories would not only be a threat to national security but also a mortal sin, as in their perception, what God gave them, only he can take away (S. A. Cohen 2013: 55). This subchapter endeavours to delve into a scenario if the communities' religious beliefs were threatened by a crisis.

Therefore to find out how counter-culture communities would react to a crisis that would be directly related to their religious beliefs, interviewees were asked how they would react to a hypothetical crisis. They were asked how they would react if the government or the secular Jewish population tried to remove the religious character of the Israeli state.

Interestingly enough, a quarter of all participants, i.e. five, were confident that such a situation would never occur and was not plausible. Some of the rational explanations included for instance Sheina's point that the religious community is growing (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017) and Daniel also believed that

this was not plausible as the population was getting more religious (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017). Itzik added that 'We don't have that problem, that would be a problem for them. But we don't. As long as they let us do our thing, then we don't care' (Interview, Itzik, 08 June 2017). Five more interviewees mentioned they would be sad or upset. Interestingly, Shlomo said that despite being sad, he would be more worried about 'Dati Leumi or Haredi rightists or Haredi fascists' who would enforce their religious views on others (Interview, Shlomo, 01 June 2017).

Four interviewees would be explicitly against such a move. Isaac said he would not support this as he wanted Israel to stay a Jewish state ruled by the law of Judaism (Interview, Isaac, 13 June 2017). Similarly, Aaron emphasised that state was based on religion (Interview, Aaron, 19 July 2017). Jacob agreed he would also be against but if this happened, it would not destroy his whole life picture (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017). The important point is, however, to what extent the individual's lifestyle, values and worldview would be threatened. It could be argued if one's lifestyle was directly affected, it would involve a more direct response. For instance, if a person was drafted into the army by force or if a person was removed from their home as part of the disengagement.

For instance, four participants would fight any proposal like this. While Joseph was not opposed to all religious elements being removed, in case 'if the religious things have to do with the core identity of the Jewish people, yes I would fight for that because that is essentially what makes us, you know, the homeland of the Jewish state' (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017). Leah said she would fight and object, and do whatever she could 'compassionately, responsibly, without, you know, devolving into hate or making individuals bad' (Interview, Leah, 04 July 2017). Tamar said she would stay until the last minute but stressed that 'we don't revenge, but…' (Interview, Tamar, 25 July 2017). Yirmiyahu also agreed he would protest and fight it, as he felt that

Jews had no right being in Israel if it was not a religious state (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017).

This shows that such a religious crisis would impact the counter-culture lifestyle and would involve a response from at least some of the counter-culture communities. An example of such a crisis is Haredi conscription into the IDF. While for Datiim Leumim army service is a *mitzvah* (Lubell 2016), Haredim are opposed to it, including Haredim who were interviewed for this thesis, such as Daniella (Interview, Daniella, 09 July 2017). At the time of writing this thesis, most Haredi men and virtually all Haredi women do not serve in the army (Ben-Yehuda 2010: 25) in order to protect the tradition and the enclave culture (Finkelman 2014: 273). However, as was already highlighted in this thesis, in 2014 the Knesset passed a law imposing a draft on the majority of Haredi men (Inbari 2016: 233). The law is currently postponed and the new status will be confirmed after the 2019 Israeli legislative election (Rosenberg 2019). The Haredi draft does have the potential to be framed as an existential crisis threatening the communities' lifestyle. As Sheina pointed out the army draft is 'extremely upsetting for any religious Jew, and that's actually a serious offense to the lifestyle, to the values to the community' (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017). As one Haredi rabbinic authority wrote, a full-time Torah study is the essence of Haredi existence, and if the Israeli authorities take that away from them, it will be the most enormous catastrophe, a matter of life and death (Steinmann 2013, cited in S. A. Cohen 2013: 176).

The premise that the Haredi draft is likely to cause an outbreak of violence can be based on the response from the Haredi community so far. First of all, public discussion of the conscription is usually met by protests and violence. Secondly, those Haredim who voluntarily join the army, experience violence from their own community. These examples show that unlike what Leah said, people from the Haredi community object not only compassionately, but also violently. For instance, there are

recurring protests every time the Haredi IDF bill is discussed in the Knesset or the Supreme Court, or in other words, whenever the Haredi lifestyle is endangered as a result of these proposals. For instance, this includes setting fire to the draft office after the Haredi army dodgers were sentenced to jail (Times of Israel and A. Gross 2017), violent incidents involving protests, blocking traffic, burning trash (Times of Israel 2017b), throwing rocks and objects (Times of Israel 2017a), in other words, acts of civil disobedience. In cases when Haredi individuals are drafted into the army, they face a backlash from their own community, as well as violence. For instance a Haredi soldier was attacked in Jerusalem in 2017 (Times of Israel 2017c). Perception of the threat to the Haredi lifestyle is amplified by the role of leaders. For instance, the late Rabbi Shmuel Auerbach praised protests against the IDF draft, and likened IDF recruitment to the Holocaust (Noy 2017).

As for other crises of a religious nature, for instance, both Yirmiyahu and Avi worried about the idea of the "new Jew"[45], both suggested this can bring about extinction of the Jewish people (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017; Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017). Yirmiyahu explained this as when people take the Jewish identity outside the State of Israel, and create a new Jew that has nothing to do with the past, and they do not preserve Judaism's main values (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017). In other words, as Avi said 'we're over-westernised . . . there's a very very strong agenda in Israel trying to prove that we're more liberal and open than all of Western society put together' (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017). Similar to what Yirmiyahu said, Avi added that when people from Europe came to Israel, they pushed away the classical Judaism, an idea which still exists in Tel Aviv to this day, the idea of the new Jew (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017).

[45] Not to be confused with the term Sabra – "the new Jew", a term for the generation of native-born Israelis produced by the Zionist movement.

7.5 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter has demonstrated that religious beliefs can translate into counter-culture communities' involvement in violent and civilly disobedient acts. Regardless of whether these beliefs are based on religious sources that authorise violence against a specified group of people or individuals, or whether these beliefs are reinforced by religious leaders framing certain situations as crises and threats to the communities' lifestyle and worldview, a religious crisis may warrant action from the counter-culture communities' radicalised individuals.

Primarily based on the interview data, this chapter has demonstrated the link between religious and political views and how these views impact the worldview of counter-culture communities. In addition to that, the chapter has showed that religious leaders influence counter-culture communities, including their role in radicalisation by referring to religious sources and authorising violence. The chapter also argued that the counter-culture communities adhere to the Orthodox lifestyle. As such they have to follow the Orthodox law, and thus, religious sources that were included in this chapter are a useful tool to provide insight into the counter-culture worldview, including when the use of violence is permitted against what kind of targets. Lastly, it supports the counter-culture framework that argues that violence and civil disobedience will be more likely to be used in times when a (religious) crisis will threaten the communities' worldview, lifestyle or values.

8 Jewish Counter-culture Political Violence and Civil Disobedience: Crises, Motivations, Threats and Responses

> You try to slap me, I'll go and punch you in the face . . . you can't, you can't be nicey nice to a person who wants to kill you . . . Turn the other cheek is not part of Judaism, it's not our philosophy, if someone is going to come and try to kill me, I'll prevent it (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017).

The overall objective of this thesis has been to examine the process leading up to the perpetration of acts of political violence and civil disobedience in the Jewish Israeli counter-culture communities, using the framework introduced earlier on in the thesis. To reiterate, the framework explains the radicalisation of communities when they feel threatened by outsiders. These individuals are alienated from the outside world, they are a part of close-knit social networks and community leaders play a central role framing certain situations as an existential threat (Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 297-300). This chapter focuses on the last characteristic, i.e. framing certain situations as an existential threat. Whilst the previous two empirical chapters contained a crisis element as well, this final empirical chapter aims to further examine motivations for involvement in violence and civil disobedience, such as fear, anger, trauma, collective threat, frustration or betrayal. This chapter is mainly based on the fieldwork observations, in addition to drawing from the existing literature.

Since motivations vary based on the threat represented by two different populations, Palestinians and secular Jewish Israelis, this empirical chapter is divided into two main subchapters reflecting this split. Both subchapters focus on potential motivations for engagement in violence and civil disobedience, based on threat perception by the counter-culture communities, both Dati Leumi and Haredi. Ultimately it aims to understand how

the counter-culture communities would respond to threats and crises.

8.1 Perceptions of the Arab Israeli/Palestinian Population


This subchapter will achieve the following: first of all, to point out the complicated relationship between the Jewish population and the Arab/Palestinian population, and to point out that the history of violence between the two populations influences the behaviour of the counter-culture Jewish communities. Secondly, it will provide examples of the direct impact of Palestinian violence on the counter-culture communities and their views towards the Palestinian population. Ultimately, the aim is to assess how these crises may contribute to violence and civil disobedience.

8.1.1 Threat perception

According to Gross Stein 'perception is the basis for understanding, learning, and knowing and the motivation for action' (Gross Stein 2013: 365). Since this thesis aims to find out motivations for actions of the counter-culture communities, this section examines the communities' perceptions of Palestinians. In addition to this, at an individual level, emotional states, information processing and patterns of inference are most important (Gross Stein 2013: 365). Therefore the individual interviewees were asked about threat perceptions. While in no way representative of the entire counter-culture Jewish population, themes identified based on a small sample can be indicative of the wider trend in the wider counter-culture population.

As Figure 8.1 shows, 16 out of 20[46] interviewees who answered the question "Do you feel threatened by Palestinians" felt threatened to some extent. Only four participants did not feel threatened at all, a majority of whom were male Datiim Leumim.

Figure 8.1: Do you feel threatened by Palestinians? (in numbers)



Finding out the level of threat perception among the groups is important because it can have an impact on the actions of the counter-culture communities towards Palestinians. Perception of outgroup collective threat is a major factor that explains support for less compromising and more extreme, aggressive, and belligerent policies towards outgroups and aggressive actions against the threatening outgroup (Maoz and McCauley 2009: 526). The interview data shows that the majority of participants did feel threatened. Haredim in particular felt more threatened than Datiim Leumim, to an extent because Palestinians 'do target like very religious looking people because they for sure know they're Jew. But like it can happen to anyone' (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017). Yirmiyahu confirmed that was the case as he described:

[46] One interviewee did not answer this question. There were 21 interviewees in total.

> when I walk in the street, . . . you look behind of you because you should know . . . Haredis were assaulted much more than other populations it's all since these attackers wanted to make sure that they get a real Jew, the only way to recognise that should someone is for 100% Jew is that someone is wearing a yarmulke. So the Haredim suffered a lot, a lot, a lot of violence at that time (Interview, Yirmiyahu 14 June 2017).

The same experience of being targeted for being Jewish happened to a Dati Leumi interviewee Rachel who also felt threatened due to her experience:

> I have been yelled at and threatened for being Jewish. Now, I didn't do anything to promote it, I was just sitting on a train or something like that, so, yeah, . . . I do feel threatened. Right, when I'm angry at someone, my response is not to throw a rock at them or not to try and bring blood. But, you know, people I know have died because, because…because they were Jews. So yeah, I do feel threatened (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017).

For instance, in 2015 there was an increase in the wave of Palestinian terror accompanied by an aggressive campaign of incitement, which included a video calling on Arabs in Jerusalem to murder Haredi and Dati Jews (Rabinowitz 2015). The fact that the counter-culture communities are more likely to be targeted because of their easily identifiable membership of the particular group means that being a part of the counter-culture communities poses a threat to these communities. This in response prompts specific behaviour and responses of these groups, as for instance Yirmiyahu described in looking behind his back.

The impact of fear is central to the study of foreign policy and international politics (Gross Stein 2013: 380). Studying fear and threats can also indicate what sort of actions will be taken by the receiving group. The interview data shows that the participants felt fear, which had a profound impact on their behaviour, as Shoshana explained:

> . . . there's periods of time when things flare up like the last, the most recent time, was the incitement. And it was scary like I didn't leave my house for a few days because every single day people were getting stabbed, run over and then you feel threatened (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017).

This can ultimately impact people's behaviour and actions, for instance Chava admitted: 'when I am on a train or bus with Palestinians, I'm always gonna move away in case they have a bomb' (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017). Likewise, Datiim Leumim as well realise the threat is omnipresent and real for the Jewish population, as Joseph has pointed out:

> . . . sometimes someone has, you know, he decided he wants to kill a Jew, and he used whatever he had, a tractor, or a knife or whatever, just in some random places in Jerusalem. In Haifa you feel a lot less threatened, but you never know where it's gonna come from, things have happened here, but very very rarely (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017).

Between the start of the Second Palestinian Intifada until the 2015 Israeli election, there were numerous instances of Palestinian terrorism and violence claiming 1,293 people's lives (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d.). Among these were several high-profile incidents that deeply impacted people's threat perception. As Efrat recalls, she used to like jogging late at night and felt safe until the well-publicised death of three boys:

> . . . there were three boys, Jewish boys who were kidnapped, they were given a ride, . . . hitchhiking and the people in the car were actually dressed up as Jews but they weren't Jews. And they were left for dead basically, they were tortured (Interview, Efrat, 20 July 2017).

Avi pointed out to the same incident, as he happened to have a link to the victims, as 'two of them were in my brother's class' (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017). Events like this can have a devastating impact on the perception of the outgroup, even when a person is not directly attacked, as Daniella explained:

> There was a family who were very close to us, . . . they came back for Pesach to visit their family, . . . three girls and their little boy, and . . . , Palestinians shot…they shot at the hotel and the mother ran trying to protect her baby into the bathroom and she looked at them after the whole episode finished they shot the little baby, . . . these sorts of things still affect you even though it's not you directly (Interview, Daniella, 09 July 2017).

Palestinian terrorism has become a part of life in Israel since the Second Intifada, and people have been exposed to suicide bombings, stabbings, shootings, stone throwing, and car ramming attacks as well as missiles and rockets (Cohen-Louck 2019: 888), which many of the interviewees seem to realise. Interestingly, despite being exposed to such incidents, some participants did not feel threatened, as Sheina explained:

> . . . on the one hand, it's extremely threatening 'cause unfortunately there's a lot . . . suffering going on . . . So on one hand I should feel very afraid, but I can't exactly explain it but actually I don't feel afraid at all . . . I stop to think about how many terrorist attacks I have been personally involved with, which is in the dozens, of friends, students, relatives and you know, personally many many friends, and students who were directly killed . . . And you can't live here if you are afraid (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017).

Lastly, while the threat perception can result in fear, it can also result in defiance as shown in the example above, but it can also lead to more hard-line views on the Palestinian population or perhaps even taking an action:

> I know they threaten us . . . I'm not afraid to enter an Arab village, . . . my attitude is I will not be limited from entering any place in the Land of Israel, the land is mine, is mine, the mere fact that I am a Jew means the land was promised to me and I go wherever I want, whenever I want, if anyone has to be afraid, they have to be afraid of me and… But obviously there are dangers, so we take precautions, you know, we do guard duty, we take precautions, we serve in the army . . . there's a saying . . . that the Land of Israel is purchased through blood (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017).

Other studies also show that terrorism in Israel has a significant effect on citizens, many of whom feel threatened (Cohen-Louck 2019: 889). As the 2015 case showed, Haredim and Datiim Leumim were designated as the primary target of Palestinian terror (Rabinowitz 2015). Out of the interviewed sample, Haredim were more likely than Datiim Leumim to feel threatened by Palestinians, as they expressed that many attacks by Palestinians had been directed at those who can be identified as Jewish by their external appearance. However, to prove whether this is factually correct would require a database detailing the religion of Palestinian terrorism's victims. At the moment, the database compiled by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs only contains names of victims and dates they were murdered.

8.1.2 Experience of direct and indirect violence


In addition to finding out the extent of being threatened by the Palestinians, more importantly, interviewees were asked whether they witnessed or suffered from Palestinian violence during the time period this thesis focuses on, i.e. 2000 and 2015. In case they did, they were asked a follow-up question that investigated how it made them feel. This was to find out how responses differ based on the direct experience of being attacked.

It is important to note that the counter-culture framework states that radicalisation occurs when crises are framed as catastrophic. The Israeli Jewish population as a whole, including the counter-culture population, were affected by several crises during this time period, such as terrorist attacks perpetrated by Palestinians or the constant threat of one. Furthermore, it can be argued that the counter-culture population are more affected than the mainstream population for two main reasons. First of all, as interviewees pointed out, their external appearance makes them a more obvious target for Palestinian terrorists across Israel. In

addition to that, a majority of settlers living in Judea and Samaria are Datiim Leumim (Liebermann 2017), thus making them also more likely to be targeted than the secular population living in the area. For instance, only during the short time period between the outbreak of the Second Intifada until the Gaza disengagement just the settlements in Gaza were attacked on 15,057 occasions (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 2005, cited in B. Hall *et al.* 2008: 22). As for Judea and Samaria, in 2015, the level of attacks and number of fatalities increased compared to 2014. Arguably, this is a result of Hamas' efforts to fund terrorist infrastructure and to encourage attacks in Judea and Samaria (Shabak 2015). Considering a high number of attacks, it is likely that at least a fraction of the population would be impacted by Palestinian terrorism, as was also pointed out by Itzik: 'Almost everyone knows someone who has been hurt by Palestinians' (Interview, Itzik, 08 June 2017).

The figure below presents a breakdown of how many interviewees suffered from Palestinian violence or witnessed it in any form. Whilst there was an almost even split of interviewees who directly suffered from or witnessed violence between 2000 and 2015, all participants mentioned they felt affected by Palestinian violence.

Figure 8.2: Number of interviewees who suffered from, or witnessed Palestinian violence between 2000-2015.



This means that 10 out of 20[47] interviewees suffered from and/or witnessed Palestinian violence. Likewise, the study conducted by Bleich *et al*. between April-May 2002 on the sample of 512 respondents representative of Israeli Jewish society, found that 55.6% had not been personally exposed or had a family member or friend exposed to an attack (Bleich *et al.* 2003: 612, 615). This suggests that 44.4 % of the surveyed population had been affected, as opposed to 50% of the interviewees participating in this research. Moreover, Table 8-1 indicates that whilst 9.1% of the secular Jewish population and 24.1% of the traditional population personally encountered threats, insults or blows from Arabs, the percentage of the counter-culture population directly affected by the same factors was significantly higher. 36% of Datiim Leumim and 37.1% of Haredim personally encountered threats, insults or blows from the Arab population.

Table 8-1: Jews who have personally encountered threats, insults, or blows from Arabs (in %). Sample size: 729.

Jewish Public 2015, Smooha Surveys – University of Haifa Have you personally encountered threats, insults, or blows from Arabs against Jews?					
	Haredi	**Dati Leumi**	**Masorti**	**Hiloni**	**Do not know/did not answer**
Almost never	62.9	64	75.9	90.9	66.7
Once or twice	18.6	18	12.9	4.5	33.3
Three to five times	8.6	5.6	4.7	1.5	
Six or more times	8.6	11.2	4.7	2.3	
Do not know / refuse	1.4	1.1	1.8	1	

(Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute)

[47] One interviewee did not answer this question. There were 21 interviewees in total.

There were also instances when interviewees were deeply affected by events preceding the time period this thesis focus on. For instance Avi described a terrorist attack a decade earlier in which his uncle was killed (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017). Moreover, he was also affected by an incident that took place after 2015 in which people on his street were killed and he lost 'a bunch of friends', including for instance a boy who 'was stoned to death' (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017). There were also instances when the indirect consequences of Palestinian violence (which also shape behaviours and actions) affected interviewees, such as Rachel:

> My husband was of course very affected by the Intifada 'cause he's a tour guide, and he had no business. So he lost his…, like he had no work for a long, long time. We stopped having money for food in the house (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017).

Based on the responses provided by the interviewees, several recurring themes have been identified, such as fear, anger, collective threat, trauma, but also sympathy with Palestinians.

Different, general, non-Israel related studies conducted on the effects of violence exposure on youth point to different responses to witnessing violence and directly being victimised. Responses to witnessing violence included, first of all, an increased belief in the effectiveness of violence as a way of solving disputes, which in turn was related to higher aggressive behaviour (Schwartz and Proctor 2000, cited in Reid-Quiñones *et al.* 2011: 52). Secondly, they included normative beliefs about the acceptability of aggression, which in turn was associated with aggressive behaviour (Boxer *et al.* 2008, cited in Reid-Quiñones *et al.* 2011: 52), and fear and avoidance, which refers to a desire to remove oneself from perceived dangerous people or places and to not continue to experience victimisation (Reid-Quiñones *et al.* 2011: 55, 57-58). In contrast, responses to direct victimisation included aggression (Schwartz and Proctor 2000, cited in Reid-Quiñones *et*

al. 2011: 52), avoidant coping (Boxer *et al.* 2008, cited in Reid-Quiñones *et al.* 2011: 52), anger and revenge (Reid-Quiñones *et al.* 2011: 57, 58).

Therefore this section illustrates the contrasting experiences of the interviewees. Even those participants who did not directly suffer or witness Palestinian violence, found themselves in proximity to violence. Jacob disclosed that 'it's happened very close to our neighbourhood' (Interview, Jacob, 05 June). Others admitted they had been impacted by the incidents that took place during this time period. For instance, Tamar noted: 'I didn't suffer, but I have a lot of friends that suffered' (Interview, Tamar, 25 July 2017) - a point also raised by Leah: 'We're always, often only one person removed' (Interview, Leah, 04 July 2017). This can be seen in Rachel's example who said that:

> my neighbour's children were killed . . . he was like best friends with some of my kids , and that happens a lot . . .. Another friend of mine also, her eldest daughter, the day she graduated high school, she was killed crossing the street coming home (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017).

Rivka witnessed a 'stabbing by the bus stop. It was very traumatising to myself, my family and my students. I felt angry and scared' (Interview, Rivka, 04 July 2017). She also witnessed another attack with her students (Interview, Rivka, 04 July 2017). Sheina described an attack that happened 'in front of my house, the bulldozer from years ago somebody, a bulldozer just rammed a woman in a car and I was literally two inches from my front door' (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017). Daniel witnessed the bombing of a bus in Tel Aviv in 2001:

> it's… literally going into hell, when you walk into the bus after the bomb went off to see who you can help. So I've seen, I've seen harsh terrorism. In our area we've had we've had neighbours who've been killed. Every one of our children have friends who are orphans because their parents have been killed, this is a reality,

> this is the reality of life (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017).

Joseph also had experience with bus bombings, describing that his 'brother was on the way home from a bus and he caught one bus after the bus that blew up and the guard in my school, he was killed on that bus that my brother missed' (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017). A number of interviewees also knew people who had been killed which had a deep impact on them. For instance, Shlomo said he 'did remotely know people that either were killed, it was a very painful experience, a very sad experience' (Interview, Shlomo, 01 June 2017), as Leah did as well: 'I have known people who have been close to somebody who was bombed, murdered' (Interview, Leah, 04 July 2017). Sheina personally knew five men, the victims of the the Har Nof attack who 'were in the synagogue, they were slaughtered in the synagogue during morning prayers in the neighbourhood' (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017). In addition to that, she 'had students that were shot here in Jaffa road' (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017).

There were also interviewees who directly witnessed and/or suffered from Palestinian violence on dozens of occasions. For instance Chava was in very close proximity to a bomb, and even though she was not injured, it impacted her in her views on Palestinians: 'I'm scared of them' (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017). Uri experienced another form of violence. He and his family had to hide in a shelter as missiles from Gaza were thrown in (Interview, Uri, 06 July 2017). Similarly, the threat of missiles impacted Yirmiyahu who recalled that he 'had to physically take my four children with my wife and run into the . . . protected area, you can't be in your windows because missiles are falling from the sky' (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017). Others also experienced violence. For instance Daniella was 'yelled at or thrown stones' (Interview, Daniella, 09 July 2017) and Daniel had 'two Molotov cocktail thrown at me' (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017).

The purpose of this section was to expose the degree to which interviewees suffered, whether by witnessing, being victimised or even by being aware of incidents that other people experienced. This is a part of the wider objective of this thesis that is to understand how the counter-cultures' characteristics, including the extent of alienation, social networks, leaders and existential crises, translate into their attitudes to violence. For this reason this section focused on threats, as the framework suggests threats may be framed as catastrophic, existential crises.

This section determined that both counter-culture populations have a relatively high direct and indirect exposure to violence. This is important because as the literature above suggested, responses to witnessing violence resulted in increased belief in the effectiveness of violence (Schwartz and Proctor 2000, cited in Reid-Quiñones *et al.* 2011: 52) and responses to direct victimisation included aggression (Schwartz and Proctor 2000, cited in Reid-Quiñones *et al.* 2011: 52) and revenge (Reid-Quiñones *et al.* 2011: 57, 58). Such responses occurred in the past as well, for instance, the Bat Ayin group avenged the victims of Palestinian attacks by terrorist attacks (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 118-119).

8.1.3 Responses to violence

The literature in Section 8.1.2, outlined some general responses to direct and indirect violence, including belief in the effectiveness of violence, higher aggressive behaviour (Schwartz and Proctor 2000, cited in Reid-Quiñones *et al.* 2011: 52), fear, anger, avoidance, and revenge (Reid-Quiñones *et al.* 2011: 55, 57-58). Whilst the above study was conducted on the population segment in the United States, based on the responses provided by the interviewees, there is a slight overlap, as they also felt fear, anger, and avoidance. In addition to that, their responses also

included collective threat, trauma, but also sympathy with Palestinians. In contrast, Cohen-Louck's study of Israeli adults and their perception of fear of terrorism came up with two main responses, fear and stress (Cohen-Louck 2019: 902).

Fear and anger.

In line with two studies outlined above whereby fear and anger were identified as two of the responses to both witnessing violence and being victimised, these two emotions were expressed by the interviewees in this research, usually in combination or individually. It should be pointed out that responses in the form of fear and anger would not be limited to the counter-culture communities only. Yet, anger and fear were identified as frequent responses by both Haredim and Datiim Leumim.

For instance, Itzik disclosed that the attacks made him 'very very angry, afraid' (Interview, Itzik, 08 June 2017), which was also shared by Shoshana who felt 'upset. Angry. Very angry. No, like when I was living here and when all this stuff was going on, I was so angry' (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017). Equally, Aaron felt 'very upset' (Interview, Aaron, 19 July 2017). Rivka found witnessing attacks 'very traumatising to myself, my family and my students. I felt angry and scared' (Interview, Rivka, 04 July). Joseph reminisced that:

> when the Knife Intifada came . . . that's when things were really scary. I remember going to Jerusalem when there were a lot of knife attacks and it was the first time I was ever scared to be in Jerusalem. I was looking around all the time. Like that was one terror that really got into you (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017).

Uri on the other hand felt angry not because that the attacks were happening but instead because 'we gave them opportunity and they wasted on missiles and guns and weapons instead of buying food or building buildings or hotels' (Interview, Uri, 06 July 2017).

Therefore, in light of opposition to the Gaza disengagement, primarily from the counter-culture communities, as summarised in Table 6-8, it can be argued that the wave of violence, including missiles that ensued afterwards, would cause more fear and anger particularly from the segment of the population that had opposed the move.

Avoidance.

As with the previous response, avoidance behaviours are linked to experiencing terrorism. A study by Malik *et al.* (2018), focused on the link between perceived risk of terrorism, fear of terrorism, and avoidance behaviours among high and low terrorism exposure groups in Pakistan. That study's setting is comparable to this thesis as both involve a high terrorism risk area. The study found that for both high and low exposure groups, perceived risk was a strong predictor of fear and they engaged in more avoidant behaviours (Malik *et al.* 2018: 43). This very same theme was identified in this research.

For instance, Itzik explained 'there were times when people were afraid to use public transportation' (Interview, Itzik, 08 June 2017). The issue of avoiding public transport was also raised by Yirmiyahu: 'when we're talking about the Second Intifada . . . I remember the days that l would not go to the centre of Jerusalem, it was like I wouldn't use buses' (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017). And actually Yirmiyahu elaborated and said that this avoidant behaviour is persistent and as the threat is ongoing and not limited to public transport:

> we go to pray to . . . the Kotel near the Temple Mount . . . you can't go through the Arabs, you're not allowed to, something's going to happen to you if you go through the Arab, Muslim market there, you go around, everyone knows, the most the most secure way to get there is to avoid meeting Arabs on the way (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017).

Sadness.

A study by Romanov *et al.* (2012) explored the effect of Palestinian terrorism on the life satisfaction (happiness) of Israelis during the first half of the Second Intifada and concluded that Palestinian terrorism had practically no effect on the happiness of Israelis (Romanov *et al*. 2012: 196), however the conclusion did not distinguish between religious and non-religious participants.

Yet, there were interviewees who did feel unhappy and sad about the situation. For instance, Shlomo described that he felt sad and emotional and admitted that 'I do feel more care and more empathy for Jewish people' (Interview, Shlomo, 01 June 2017). Rachel also said she felt: 'Scared and sad. . . . I wanna be friends with the people that live around me, . . . I'm neighbours with Christians, Armenians, Arabs, Jews we all live in a very small area, why can't we be friends?' (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017).

Trauma and collective threat.

A study by Hoffman *et al.* (2011) researching post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) using the example of Israel during the Second Intifada, argues that in situations of ongoing terror, many individuals show signs and behaviours which may appear consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD, which are responses to ongoing threat and danger (Y. Hoffman *et al.* 2011: 790). Again, the study did not differentiate between religious and non-religious participants.

Yet, some interviewees outlined responses that may be considered as traumatic. For instance, Joseph described a situation:

> I was in charge, in a settlement . . . they put me in charge of security so, it affects you, that you are in a state of mind and you always…I had a gun on me 24 hours . . . So, and you would have nightmares of, you know, you would wake up and you would have to… (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017).

Yirmiyahu remembered the events that impacted him, as well as his own family, these events showed that the threat of far-reaching, and a threat to the collective:

> It was the May 2003, I think, that was one month that more than a hundred citizens were killed around the country both in Tel Aviv and Netanya. There was the night of Pesach, our Easter, what we call Passover. Thirty people were killed in the hotel, Park Hotel Netanya, I remember it was like shocking. I remember my mother used every time, used to open the radio and hear of such a thing, she would just sit down and cry. As…a child, it does shock you (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017).

Avi also felt 'quite traumatised . . . this doesn't mean that all Palestinians are bad' (Interview, 20 June 2017).

Despite having experienced attacks, threats, and having witnessed periods of violence, the interviewees suggested that life goes on. As Ari said: 'in Tel Aviv, you know, bus got exploded and everything and….I don't know, we used buses even though' (Interview, Ari, 01 June 2017). Siman-Tov explained that Palestinian terrorist attacks during the Second Intifada resulted in public resilience because of the Israeli approach to mitigate the long-term effects of terrorism by promptly bringing the situation back to normal (Siman-Tov *et al.* 2016: 81). This is supported by Sheina's experience:

> . . . the whole mentality in Israel, . . . is to if something happens, you move on . . . I had a cousin I lost to a bus bomb . . . somebody blew themselves up on the bus, she was on that bus . . . it's part of our reality here (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017).

This approach of accepting reality as is may be derived to an extent from people's religious views, the sanctity of the state and Jewish particularism, as outlined by Daniel:

> . . . in order to do good in this world, you have to fight for it and so we just continue on our path and we will not allow evil and death to prevent us . . . from our

> goal. We will achieve our goal, we will bring good to this world that is the goal of the Jewish people, that is the goal of the State of Israel and we are determined in our goal and we will achieve it. Doesn't mean that it's an easy battle, it's a very difficult battle, but all this challenge, as saying in Israeli army, what doesn't kill you, makes you stronger. All these challenges only make us stronger (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017).

Empathy with Palestinians.

Some interviewees raised the point that being impacted by terrorism and being afraid, and recognising the suffering of Palestinians are not mutually exclusive. For instance Yirmiyahu described that 'we have a lot of Arab workers in our districts working . . . A lot of them are very nice people . . . it's not their fault . . . and I have some good friends from these people' (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017). Chava, whilst admitting she was afraid of Palestinians, she empathised:

> But I feel bad for them as well, I feel like they really suffer – some of them. I feel some of them like to certain extent brought it about themselves and I feel like for many in many ways they are victims of the leaders and they are victims of their system (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017).

Similarly, despite terrorist threats, Jacob concluded that:

> A lot of terrorist attacks . . . the target happened to be in our community. . . . I don't think we suffered more or less than our share than anybody else in Israel. . . I wouldn't say we're necessarily most tolerant community in the world, but . . . we didn't feel any increase of hatred towards Palestinians as a result (Interview, Jacob, 05 July 2017).

Ari pointed out that 'there are a lot of other people in my age who got affected stronger than me . . .. [they] think there is little to no chance of any change [with] Palestinians, because they suffered from terror' (Interview, Ari, 01 June 2017). Ari was more likely to empathise with Palestinians as he did not get affected, unlike some of his peers. And as was pointed out earlier, those people who do get directly affected, victimised, they respond with

aggression (Schwartz and Proctor 2000, cited in Reid-Quiñones *et al.* 2011: 52). Moreover, the fact that Ari comes from the Dati Leumi community, and the people he referred to were most likely Dati Leumi as well, is in line with Maoz and McCauley's study's findings that more religious respondents report lower levels of support for compromise (Maoz and McCauley 2009: 533). Table 8-2 suggests that Haredim and Datiim Leumim were less likely to be emphathetic with Arabs than their traditional and secular counter-parts, as they were less likely to agree that Arabs experience discrimination.

Table 8-2: Israeli Jewish population's views on discrimination against Arabs (in%). Sample size: 891.

	Agree that Arabs are discriminated against compared with Jews
Haredi	27
Dati Leumi	31
Traditional religious	38
Traditional non-religious	54.5
Secular	67

(Adapted from: Israel Democracy Institute 2016a: 156)

8.1.4 Crisis

The final question related to the threat from Palestinians focused on the reaction of the counter-culture participants in case of an imminent attack. The idea of an imminent attack was designed to prompt a response to a crisis, as per the framework. However, it should be noted that if the crisis had been framed as catastrophic by a leader, responses would have differed. The framework states that leaders play a crucial role, and Sheina also agreed and explained her views on concessions to Palestinians stem from the views of her leader: '*rebbe* . . . was completely against the whole notion of land for peace or anything like that. It's not really my land to give away, it's the land of the entire Jewish people' (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017).

Based on the interviews, differences can be identified between Haredim and Datiim Leumim. Haredim can be perceived as more moderate and pacific in their response to such an imminent threat – to an imminent attack perpetrated by Palestinians. This reaction is supported by the literature claiming that Haredim tend to be more passive (Almond et *al.* 2003: 62-63). However, there was also a sense of defiance. Despite all these threats people pointed out they were not going anywhere and would stay in the country because it is theirs, as Daniella pointed out: 'I believe it's my land and I don't feel like I should be running from it so, despite maybe imminent threat, I am happy to stay here and live here as a Jew' (Interview, Daniella, 09 July 2017). Only one Haredi interviewee had a different reaction than the other Haredim who would take a passive stance. Itzik stated: 'If you know they are going to attack us, we have to strike first, like in the Six-Day War' (Interview, Itzik, 08 June 2017).

Moreover, in their responses, Haredim often referred to their religiosity that helps them overcome such situations, rather than resorting to violence and for instance carrying guns. For instance Chava responded:

> We pray. We pray, that's what we end up doing. You know we're not going to the army, we pray…We're just going to shelter rooms. Not more. Not more. We're not very active, we're not very active (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017).

Likewise, Sheina highlighted: 'I don't walk around with a gun, I don't have any…I would start praying and screaming and call somebody ASAP' (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017). Similarly, Rivka would 'scream, run, pray' (Interview, Rivka, 04 July 2017) and Leah would ' continue on and I act smart and I pray' (Interview, Leah, 04 July 2017). Rather than acting themselves, Haredim would rely on someone else instead to help them, as Asher said: 'We trust the army…they will act as well' (Interview, Asher, 25 July 2017). Yirmiyahu explained one of the reasons where this Haredi passivity stems from:

> Haredim don't carry guns. So that's not like we have a lot to do if something occurs. . . . when you're talking about settlements, in the settlements every second guy you see has a gun. Haredim don't have, what are we gonna do? Not much [laughter] (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017).

To elaborate on Yirmiyahu's point about guns and settlements, it is worth noting that Datiim Leumim make up a considerable population of the settlements. Unlike Haredim, Datiim Leumim are not passive, their ideology, their messianic worldview opposes the idea of Jewish passivity and instead promotes taking up action (D. Schwartz 2009: 1, 3-4), as well as service in the army (Pew Research Center 2016: 7). Thus, it can be concluded that they would be more active in their response to an imminent attack. As Don-Yehiya notes, Datiim Leumim tend to support the use of harsh measures in dealing with the Palestinian resistance to Israel, even engaging in retaliatory violent actions against Arabs (Don-Yehiya 2014: 239-240).

Therefore, not surprisingly, the responses of Datiim Leumim were noticeably more hawkish, although Tamar did say: 'We don't want to give revenge. But, it's hard, let's say when the three boys were murdered' (Interview, Tamar, 25 July 2017). But they were ready to take action and defend themselves if necessary: 'I always carry my pepper spray around with me' (Interview, Efrat, 20 July 2017). In addition, they were generally more inclined to take action as opposed to Haredim. For instance, Avi said he 'would call the security, . . . if I had a gun with me, then I would shoot' (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017). Ari stated in 'terror attack, you defend yourself' (Interview, Ari, 01 June 2017), just as Daniel said 'We would defend ourselves' (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017). Joseph also added that 'we would attack the guy and kill him. I mean, that's what all would do' (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017).

In addition to taking action as a response to an imminent attack, one of the interviewees raised two important points that

many Datiim Leumim had referred to in the past: a sense of frustration and misunderstanding, and opposition to concessions. Regarding the first point Joseph noted:

> Terrible things happened and we don't even have the energy to be in shock anymore because this thing has been going on for way too long . . . we were trying to be as humane as possible, . . . a lot of people had been killed because we were taking measures to secure . . . civil population and the Palestinians (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017).

The second point raised by Joseph, opposition to concessions, has been a major issue for many Datiim Leumim. For instance, the National Religious Party strongly opposed the Oslo process and territorial concessions to the Palestinians (Bick 2007: 408), as Joseph confirmed:

> We've had enough, these concessions, and now we're going to look after ourselves, 'cause we had the Holocaust as well and enough things, so like it's basically like enough is enough (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017).

In conclusion, a stark contrast has been identified between the two groups if threatened directly and imminently by Palestinians. Whereas Haredim tend to be more passive, Datiim Leumim are more active and more likely to defend themselves. Secondly, the last point raised in regards to opposition to concessions to Palestinians can be interpreted in two ways. The first one is exhibited by disenchantment with Palestinians, and the second is the disillusionment, disappointment, and almost a sense of betrayal by the secular population and the governments that have enabled these concessions. As such, the next subchapter focuses on the motivations for violence against the mainstream population.

8.2 Perceptions of the Mainstream/Secular Jewish Israeli Population

Adding on to what was mentioned in the previous subchapter, particularly frustration with the concessions given to Palestinians, these concessions come from the governmental level, supported by the mainstream population.

Grouped with lessons from the past when Jewish terrorist attacks happened in response to the Israeli government giving concessions to the Palestinians and/or pursuing peace process with the Palestinian people, this chapter's objective, similar to the previous ones, is to provide an overview of reactions of the counter-culture communities to the threat of the secular/moderate Jewish population, determine the main themes, and identify differences in the responses of the two main groups. To reiterate, these responses and themes cannot be fully representative of the views of the entire counter-culture Jewish population based on the small sample of the participants, but these can provide insights into the communities.

Therefore, the first objective is to identify how the counter-culture communities perceived any governmental initiatives and concessions to the Palestinians between 2000 and 2015, for instance the Gaza disengagement or when the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, proclaimed in 2009 there would be an independent Palestinian state. There are several recurring themes that came up in the interviews, including hope, frustration, betrayal, mistake, and others.

Hope and support.

A few participants identified hope and support for the Gaza disengagement, which is in contrast to the majority of the counter-culture population as summarised in Table 6-8. However, the plan was applauded by the general Israeli public (Peters 2010: 34). As Chava described: 'The Gaza disengagement was like big

hope. I thought oh, we're starting a new process and now we're going to get to peace treaty' (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017). That was the emotion that the initiator of the process, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, had hoped to trigger, as he proclaimed that 'the disengagement can bring hope and become the new starting point for a coordinated, successful process' (Sharon 2005, cited in Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). Ari noted that at first he opposed the move, but as he got older his views changed:

> during disengagement from Gaza I was in the high school under more stronger influence from religious institutions, educational institutions, so I was against it, and I was actively protesting against it, but today I think it was a wise step and a good step. I support. Today, I support it (Interview, Ari, 01 June 2017).

And while Asher also agreed with the disengagement on the one hand, on the other hand, he disagreed with how the process was carried out: 'I can completely agree with that they were given back for the Palestinians. But the way it has happened it's unbearable' (Interview, Asher, 25 July 2017).

Frustration with Palestinians.

Initial hope transformed into frustration for many, even though a distinction can be made between frustration with Palestinians and frustration with the government. For instance Chava was disappointed with the behaviour of Palestinians in the aftermath of the disengagement:

> Right after it [Gaza disengagement], like this whole bombing stuff from you know, there was bombing…the missiles, was like really downfall. I felt like, we felt like we just give you back land and here you're just shooting missiles towards us, so . . . it's very frustrating (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017).

Rivka also 'felt disgusted and saddened by the lack of understanding and appreciation' (Interview, Rivka, 04 July 2017). Isaac, on the other hand criticised both the Israeli government as

well as the Palestinian population, pointing out that the disengagement backfired:

> it's completely bad decision and I understand they did it again but it's a bad decision because the…the Palestinians take it as a victory and not as a gift to make peace . . . I knew it was a mistake and they get, they get Hamas and . . . they get bombs from Gaza (Interview, Isaac, 13 June 2017).

Ultimately, as was outlined above, many interviewees felt disenchanted, frustrated and disagreed with concessions given to Palestinians. Shoshana opposed concessions and negotiations with Palestinians as she believed they were pointless. Her political viewpoint as the previous chapter argued was linked to her religious views. She argued that the Torah said that 'Esau will always hate Jacob and Esau is the Arabs, . . . there's always going to be this conflict. And I think that it will all end when the Messiah comes' (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017).

As for the disengagement from Gaza, generally speaking, the majority of Israelis saw it as a strategic mistake (Peters 2010: 34), which was also echoed by some interviewees, including Itzik who said: 'I think it was a big mistake. It never contributed to peace ultimately' (Interview, Itzik, 08 June 2017). Peters also notes that following the disengagement, the peace process failed to materialise. In addition to that, it only led to a deterioration in the security situation because of missile attacks from Gaza (Peters 2010: 34, 38). Sheina also touched up on the issue of security and her opposition to concessions, blaming both parties:

> I'm totally against all concessions because terrorism is fed by weakness. And every time you give them anything, you feed them, you give them more encouragement. Just makes them wanna do more terrorism, as we see, we pulled out of Gush Katif (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017).

Betrayal, and frustration with the government.

In addition to being frustrated with Palestinians, there was a sense of great frustration with the politicians who brought about

the disengagement and made concessions to Palestinians. Daniella found this 'even more frustrating, because . . . [when] the government does do the wrong thing that's even more frustrating when your own people won't look after their people' (Interview, Daniella, 09 July 2017).

Ariel Sharon, as the Prime Minister at the time, led the disengagement process, and his name was often mentioned by the interviewees. Leah noted that 'MK Sharon, don't like, agree, disagree he's changed so much once he got into the office from a religious perspective this is where religion and politics mash' (Interview, Leah, 04 July 2017). Daniel went even further in his criticism: 'I think Ariel Sharon did a horrible act by . . . the disengagement and, and I think it's inexcusable (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017). Sharon was denounced for betraying the settler movement and for undermining Israel's security (Peters 2010: 33), which Aaron agreed with: 'I didn't like it. It felt like a betrayal' (Interview, Aaron, 19 July 2017). As Section 7.3.1 outlined, Sharon was perceived as a traitor, and the public discussion went as far as to suggest he should be assassinated, since the concept *din rodef* could be applied (Agence France Presse 2004; Copans 2004; McGreal 2004).

Joseph contrasted his frustration with the Gaza disengagement with actions of the Prime Minister Netanyahu:

> There was a bit of optimism towards the disengagement from Gaza. And when that blew, that killed any hope at all whatsoever to anything . . . There was a feeling that you can trust Netanyahu. He would not give us two-state solution without knowing that we'd really be secure (Interview, Joseph, 18 June 2017).

Generally, Daniel felt frustrated with Israeli politicians, as he was directly affected by their decisions to provide concessions to Palestinians, both psychologically as well as physically:

> there've been a lot of stupid moves by Israeli politicians, it started with Rabin and Peres in Oslo. And

> that's what began the the persecution of the Jews in Judea and Samaria, literally was persecution. First they sent police against us, we used to have protest rallies and they tried to scare us and beat you, literally physically beat us up (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017).

Empathy with the Jewish population.

The previous section outlined that several interviewees mentioned they were felt frustrated by the Gaza disengagement. Many were equally frustrated by the impact the disengagement had on the Jewish settler communities that had lived in the area. Shoshana recalled that 'we were watching videos of people leaving their homes, it was so sad, I mean, I was crying for them' (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017). This empathy can be explained by a shared collective social identity and strong emotional feelings for the in-group (Sageman 2011: 154-156), as ultimately blood, kinship and ancestry play a key role in forging national bonds (Hearn 2006: 21). On the other hand, Daniella, although she empathised with the settlers' suffering, she was aware they were to blame as well:

> I think the whole situation in general is frustrating because we are hearing about children and mothers being killed in the hospital and my heart broke . . . but not long after that, it was also heard how they were warned three times to evacuate the building (Interview, Daniella, 09 July 2017).


8.2.1 Threat perception

To better understand the interviewees' viewpoints on the government and the secular population, rather than intertwining any of their views on concessions with the views on Palestinians, interviewees were asked whether they felt that the government or the secular population were trying to interfere with their way of life. Figure 8.3 summarises responses of both Haredi and Dati Leumi interviewees.

It can be concluded that Haredim perceive they are more directly affected by interference from the government and/or the secular population than the Dati Leumi population does.

Most examples the Haredi interviewees gave were related to their religious outlook, which was threatened the most by the governmental interference. This included a previously examined Haredi 'draft – forcing *yeshiva* students' (Interview, Itzik, 08 June 2017).

Figure 8.3: Has the government or the secular population ever interfered with your way of life? (in numbers).



Shoshana mentioned the same example of

> the recruitment of religious boys to the army . . . this is something that the secular are doing on purpose because they don't like religious Jews. I'm generally speaking, obviously, not all of them (Interview, Shoshana, 19 July 2017).

In addition to the army conscription, Chava noted that there was an issue with education, as the government 'tell us how we should educate our children and how we should live our life' (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017). On the other hand, a minority within the interviewee sample, Jacob and Yirmiyahu acknowledged that the

government was trying to interfere into the Haredi lifestyle, but they were not necessarily opposed to it:

> vast majority of the Haredi people do feel that the government is trying to change their lifestyle . . . most of the Haredi people are very very intimidated by the fact that the government is trying to force them to study secular studies, to go to the army, to go out to work, I'm not so scared of these things (Interview, Yirmiyahu, 14 June 2017).

Jacob believed that government interference was not something rare, and explained why he, unlike the rest of the Haredi population was not threatened by the government interference:

> [Haredim] don't have an understanding of the system, they don't have a basic understanding of how democracy works, and what it means to accept the fact that in a democracy you're the minority and all that it entails (Interview, Jacob, 05 June 2017).

Whereas the Haredi interviewees were more inclined to say they felt affected by the government and the secular population's involvement in their lives, Datiim Leumim less so. However, despite not feeling threatened by interference Rachel felt she was threatened and judged 'when the politicians together with the media, which is very left wing, create this image of what the religious Jew looks like, they destroy who I am' (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017). The second issue the Dati Leumi interviewees seemed to have agreed on was the issue of the land. Tamar and Avi focused on settlements. Tamar opposed destruction of settlements as 'they took the whole settlement and destroyed it. It's hard' (Interview, Tamar, 25 July 2017). Similarly, Rachel disagreed with the government and the secular population's views towards concessions and giving up land for peace, which is something she felt strongly about:

> when they're willing for example to give away the Old City, just because they don't care about the Old City, it doesn't mean that it doesn't have a value to us, right? It does. It's our holiest place (Interview, Rachel, 02 July 2017).

Avi brought up the issue of the government's policy on settlements building: 'They prevent us from building. Not because they want to, just because they are under pressure' (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017).

In addition to being asked about their views on the government and the secular population's interference into their lives, interviewees were asked to recall any events or times between 2000 and 2015 when they felt threatened by the government or the secular population, whether physically or when their way of life was threatened. This was to find out the extent of their threat perception. As previously pointed out, since perception of outgroup collective threat can explain support for more extreme and aggressive actions against the threatening outgroup (Maoz and McCauley 2009: 526), it is vital to understand how the interviewees perceive the government and the secular population. Even though the interviewee sample is too small to be representative of the entire counter-culture Jewish population, the trends identified here can be indicative of the wider trend in the counter-culture population. Out of 14 interviewees who were asked this question, six did not recall any such events, five did and three felt partly affected.

As in the previous paragraphs, the issue of the government involvement in settlement destruction was raised, even though Avi pointed out that 'when someone wants to build somewhere and they come and knock it down, that's quite uncomfortable. . . . I wouldn't say threatened' (Interview, Avi, 20 June 2017). Tamar, however, felt more strongly about the issue, pointing out to the 2013 initiative to lodge families out of the settlement in the West Bank: 'Let's say Amona, yeah, when it was before with Gush Katif, and you see those people that built things that were sent from the government and suddenly . . . everything is destroyed, it's hard' (Interview, Tamar, 25 July 2017). Sheina equally sympathised with the Jewish settlers who had been evicted from

the settlements in Gaza, which is why she felt threatened by the actions of the government:

> when they pulled out of Gush Katif, even though I didn't personally live there . . . It was really a nightmare to see the tragedy of uprooting 10,000 people from their homes, and Jewish people in the Land of Israel. . . I was so mad, I don't think I will ever forgive the Israeli government for this actually (Interview, Sheina, 25 June 2017).

Unlike Sheina, Daniel did live in Gush Katif, and felt personally victimised by the government's actions which threatened him: 'they succeeded to a certain extent when they took our property, they took my property, they took my house' (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017). It was not the first time he felt threatened by the government though as he described:

> the Meretz and and Labour government made a serious attempt to destroy religious Zionism . . . when they entered government in 1993, they passed laws in order . . . to harm the religious Zionists (Interview, Daniel, 07 June 2017).

Another example of a government policy that impacted on the counter-culture communities specifically was explained by Chava who recalled that 'in 2003 the government cuts child allowances, child allowance, and this really like is a big shock to lot of families you know, average family can be eight, nine, ten kids' (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017). As the move, designed by then Prime Minister Sharon, pushed many Haredim into poverty (de Quetteville 2005), it can be argued this was an example when the Haredi lifestyle was directly threatened. Actions like these then ultimately create an image of the government attempting to interfere into the Orthodox communities' lifestyle:

> they are telling us how to educate our children, and they are telling what to do, they are telling us that our way of life isn't good and basically they want us to be secular, that's the way my other ultra-Orthodox friends would see it (Interview, Chava, 29 May 2017).

Lastly, Asher mentioned an example of the secular population's actions that he found had threatened his way of life, his lifestyle. He was opposed to the LGBT parades that took place in Jerusalem:

> It's a holy city . . . a lot of people feel uncomfortable . . . I really respect people who do their own choices and I am not judgmental . . . I would expect from the government to interfere or to say something. Let's find an agreement . . . Because it's not comfortable for a lot of ultra-Orthodox. And also for a lot of the national, national religious (Interview, Asher, 25 July 2017).

Finally, Subchapter 7.4 showed that the interviewees' responses concentrated more on the crises rather than the involvement of the secular population in causing such crises when asked about their reaction if the government/secular population tried to remove religious elements of the state – as an example of a crisis. It can be concluded, however, that the counter-culture population would perceive such actions by the mainstream population and/or the government negatively. While the interviewees themselves did not say they would commit a violent action in response, based on the past examples and in response to a crisis caused by the mainstream population such as the Haredi army draft, a violent or a civilly disobedient action is highly likely if an event of a similar nature shall occur.

8.3 Conclusion

Since this thesis examines the radicalisation process in the counter-culture communities, this chapter involved an important element of the radicalisation process as per this thesis' framework: crises. Crises will lead to violent and civilly disobedient behaviour if they are framed as existential threats to the communities. Therefore this chapter focused on the threats to the communities. First of all, it established a relationship between

threat perception and a threat response. The chapter was split into two main parts, based on the type of threat and thus consequently the type of target of their violent or civilly disobedient action - Israeli Palestinians/Arabs on one hand and the mainstream/secular Jewish population on the other. Both these two populations can pose a threat to the counter-culture communities, whether in the form of violence from the Palestinian people or in the secular population's threat of impacting the counter-culture lifestyle. This is important because studying fear and threats can provide insight to indicate what sort of actions will be taken by the victimised group.

Thus, the first subchapter exposed a link between Palestinian violence, threat perception of Palestinians by the counter-culture communities and actions of the latter towards Palestinians, including violent behaviour. There are several conclusions this subchapter came to. First of all, Haredim are more likely than Datiim Leumim to feel threatened by Palestinians. To an extent this is because Haredim perceive that many attacks by Palestinians had been directed at them. In fact, 10 out of 20 interviewees directly suffered from and/or witnessed Palestinian violence. Nevertheless, based on the interviews, Haredim appear more moderate and pacifist in their response to an imminent threat posed by Palestinians.

The second subchapter focused on the secular population and the government and the counter-culture communities' perceptions of their actions, particularly the threats that the secular population and the government pose to these communities. Again, based on the interviews, Haredim perceive they are more directly affected by the threats posed by government and/or the secular population than Datiim Leumim.

9 Conclusion

The main objective of this thesis has been to develop and build on the counter-culture framework drafted by Pedahzur and Perliger in the book *Jewish Terrorism in Israel* (2009) and articles following later on, such as 'Counter Cultures, Group Dynamics and Religious Terrorism' (2016) and extend it to the acts that fall under the umbrella of political violence and civil disobedience. This research has built on the framework in order to understand how living in counter-culture influences its members and to find out these groups' characteristics and their attitudes towards political developments, as well as their responses towards crises of a political and religious nature. As such, to avoid causal claims between the two, this research has focused on counter-culture.

This final chapter will, first of all, explain the rationale behind this thesis; briefly reiterate the framework this thesis uses and builds on; and summarise the main findings of this thesis, including the original contribution, and lastly, it will conclude with reflection and ideas for further research.

9.1 Project Rationale

First of all, this topic is still relevant. While the most infamous examples of Jewish terrorism in Israel date back decades, and include incidents such as the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin or the Cave of Patriarchs Massacre, Jewish extremism is present and there is a potential for more attacks to take place. Moreover, having extended the framework to include political violence in general as well as civil disobedience, acts that fall under these concepts, have been prevalent in recent years, including for instance protests against the Haredi draft or for instance, the number of *tag mehir* attacks against Palestinians increased threefold in 2018 from the previous year (Harel 2019). Moreover, not only the number of *tag mehir* attacks is growing,

but so is the birth-rate of the Haredi and Dati Leumi population. The birth-rate of these communities is disproportionately higher than the one of the mainstream population. This means that the importance of understanding and studying the life in counter-culture is growing as well.

In 2017, the birth-rate of a Haredi woman was 6.7 births per woman whilst the birth-rate of a Dati Leumi woman was 4.2 births per woman. This is in stark contrast to 3.0 among religious traditional women and 2.1 among secular women (Miskar 2017). Pedahzur and Perliger note that 'a counter-culture encapsulates the values and behavioral norms of a group that run counter to those of the current social mainstream' (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: x). However, if the demographic trends continue, in a few decades Haredim and Datiim Leumim will become the social mainstream. Whilst at the time of writing this thesis, 10% of the entire Israeli population identified as Dati Leumi (Pew Research Centre 2016: 7) and 11% as Haredi, it is estimated that Haredim will make up 27% of the entire Israeli population in 2059 (Israel Democracy Institute 2016b: 6-7). This also means that the Haredi and the Dati Leumi population will play a much greater role in Israeli politics. Chapter 6 concluded that counter-culture communities are primarily associated with the right-wing ideology. Therefore, if the communities keep growing at the same pace, and the right-wing tendencies in the communities are maintained, this means that Israeli politics will most likely become more right-wing. Ultimately, this is going to impact how issues such as settlements and the two-state solution are going to be handled. In addition to that, other issues that the State of Israel is currently struggling with will be impacted. For instance this includes the Haredi army draft. Even if it is implemented following the 2019 legislative election, in couple of decades the Haredi community's Knesset representatives will be able to repeal it. When Haredim surpass the secular population in overall population numbers, this will have a dire consequence on Israeli

national security, as there will not be enough draftees in the army to protect the country.

Therefore it is vital to understand the life in counter-culture, to understand the communities' alienation from the mainstream population, and to understand crises that may radicalise some of the individuals.

9.2 The Counter-culture Framework

As has been reiterated throughout this thesis, the framework this thesis builds on and extends was drafted by Pedahzur and Perliger in their book *Jewish Terrorism in Israel* (2009) and their other works. The framework refers to totalistic ideologies, providing a distinction between sub-culture and counter-culture, outlining that counter-cultures aim to impose their worldview on others. The theory describes how radicalisation develops within the community, including that those individuals who do get radicalised within the community tend to live in the same area, they are committed to their community, share collective mindset and they are alienated from the outside world. They are a part of close-knit social networks and influenced by the community leaders who frame certain situations as an existential threat (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: x; Perliger and Pedahzur 2016: 299). The same theory, this thesis argues, shall be extended to include other acts of political violence as well as civil disobedience, in contrast to terrorism only. This is also a result of a decrease in terrorist attacks since the 1990s and an increase in other forms of political violence such as *tag mehir* or acts of civil disobedience. Whilst the tactics have changed, the motivations of the acts have not, and as such, the framework remains to be a compelling tool for analysis.

This research has concluded that acts perpetrated by the Jewish groups and individuals are different because targets do not

include only members of a competing religion and ethnicity, but members of the same religion and ethnicity as well. Similarly, the literature on ethnic conflict and nationalism is only helpful to a degree mainly because it does not provide enough understanding of the religious aspect. Yet, it does provide insight into the conflict and differences between the Israeli Jews and the Israeli Arabs/Palestinians from the ethnic and the nationalist perspective. This thesis has argued that the counter-culture framework can instead more fully explain Jewish political violence and civil disobedience and the processes leading to it because the framework addresses the religious, ethnic and nationalist divide. In addition to that, it introduces other factors that prompt violence, including alienation, social networks, leaders and crises.

9.3 Research Conclusions

This thesis has defined alienation and the ways it is exhibited, including geographical, educational and workplace alienation, as well as alienation in terms of political viewpoints. In particular, this is seen in terms of voting behaviour but above all in terms of views on settlement withdrawal and the two-state solution. Secondly, the thesis has advanced the framework by reasserting that social networks and leaders do play a critical role in counter-culture communities, especially when framing crises as catastrophic. However, this thesis has also proposed that the role of religious texts and individuals who do not need their decisions to be validated by their leaders is significant as well. Thus, this thesis has strengthened the original case made by Pedahzur and Perliger by demonstrating the counter-culture plays a significant role in the lives of the counter-culture population, and it influences them in terms of politics and religion.

The first empirical chapter has argued that based on the counter-culture framework, crises that are framed as catastrophic by leaders will bring about violence by counter-culture communities, such as Haredi and Dati Leumi. Based on this premise, the chapter has examined political crises that have the potential to be framed as catastrophic if implemented. These are settlements withdrawal from the territories and the two-state solution. To achieve this, this chapter has set the crises into the wider Israeli political context. As such, the chapter has come up with several conclusions. First of all, the counter-culture communities are primarily associated with the right-wing, far right-wing ideology. Secondly, the communities are alienated from the mainstream population in several areas, including the political system and the government as well. The communities generally feel represented by a political party, even though Haredim felt less so than Datiim Leumim. The communities are alienated from the mainstream population also in their views on the State of Israel. To Haredim, the state is just an instrument, it does not bear any symbolic meaning. In contrast, to Datiim Leumim, the state is everything, it is holy. Most importantly, Haredim and Datiim Leumim are alienated from the mainstream population in terms of their views on settlements and the two-state solution. While there are some views that are also shared by the mainstream population, such as security, there are also views that are exclusive to the counter-culture communities such as the historic and religious right of Jewish communities to live in Israel or Arabs benefiting from the one-state solution. Although there are differences between Haredim and Datiim Leumim, both communities oppose withdrawal of settlements from Judea and Samaria, in contrast to the views of the secular population. Both groups also opposed the Gaza disengagement. Moreover, both communities' opposition to the two-state solution remains high, and higher than the one of the secular population. In fact, the counter-culture communities' association with the right-wing ideology was further validated by these hawkish attitudes towards the settlement withdrawal and

the opposition to the two-state solution. In addition to this, the framework's applicability regarding the role of leaders has been demonstrated in this chapter. The leaders are shown to have played a role in their communities' voting behaviour, as well as framing crises as catastrophic, such as the crisis of the Gaza disengagement.

More recent events outlined below show that the discussion of the two-state solution and settlements is still relevant when talking about political violence and civil disobedience. As the recent events show, withdrawal of settlements represents a crisis for the communities and triggers a violent response. For instance, on 12 June 2018, 15 unauthorised homes in the Netiv Ha'avot outpost in Judea were demolished, which led to protests and objection from the settlers' side (Lazaroff 2018). In addition to that, comments left on the news coverage of the events on *the Jerusalem Post* website and *Arutz Sheva/Israel National News* show that rhetoric calling for violence is not uncommon. For instance comments found included: 'I hope you get smashed up by the IDF terror settler' (TruthnotHasbara 2018); 'The "supreme court" is a sick joke. . . . . The day will come for THEM to get justice' (Pinny 2018) or 'May ALL who participate in this destruction be destroyed themselves, in this world and in the next' (Israel Truth Times 2018). All in all, this shows that withdrawal of the settlements in the West Bank, the biblical Judea and Samaria, would leave the population in a position that requires an action.

The second empirical chapter's main argument is that political and religious matters are interlinked, which is supported by the interview data. In addition to this, the chapter has examined the role of leaders, particularly religious leaders, in the counter-culture communities. The chapter has concluded that a majority of interviewees sought advice from their leaders, proving that leaders play a vital role in the lives of the counter-culture communities. Moreover, it was pointed out that when advice

regarding the religious law, *Halacha*, is in question, then the communities are obliged to listen to their rabbi. Thus, religious sources play a significant role in the lives of counter-culture communities, and are often even preferred over modern, democratic laws. In addition to this, when framing a crisis as catastrophic, leaders often refer to religious sources. For instance, the chapter has showed that the concept of *din rodef* was brought into public discussion on several occasions during the time period this thesis focuses on. Lastly, the chapter has implied that a crisis that would threaten the religious outlook of the communities would be met by a response from the communities.

Whereas the first empirical chapter provides an overview of developments in Israeli politics, and the second empirical chapter argues there is a link between politics and religion, and provides an overview of the influence of leaders and sources, the third empirical chapter fully focuses on threats, and thus crises that may lead to violent or civilly disobedient action. Whereas the first empirical chapter focused on political crises and the second empirical chapter focused on religious crises, the third empirical chapter tackles the issue of crises from a different perspective, based on who poses a threat to the counter-culture communities. Thus, the chapter focuses on responses to threats posed by the Arab/Palestinian population as well as by the secular Israeli Jewish population and the Israeli government. The chapter has concluded that both counter-culture communities feel threatened by the Arab population, and Haredim more than Datiim Leumim. Yet, Haredim would respond to a hypothetical threat posed by Arabs in a more moderate manner than Datiim Leumim. Additionally, Haredim also feel more threatened by the secular population than their Dati Leumi counter-parts.

9.4 Issues and Further Research

This thesis has identified several limitations it has struggled with, most of them explained in the methodology chapter. One notable limitation stems from the small sample interviewee size that subsequently cannot be considered representative of the wider communities they are a part of. However, as has been noted, their responses can indicate trends within the communities but they are not necessarily representative of the entire communities. There are also more issues that shall be mentioned. Whilst these limitations presented challenges at this stage, they can be addressed by further research.

First of all, there are issues with recording and classifying acts of Jewish political violence, resulting in missing data in the publicly available databases of political violence. It is thus necessary to compile a complete database in the future that would provide a comprehensive overview of Jewish political violence, and where possible, assess the perpetrators' background and actions using the counter-culture framework. Thus, at the moment it is not possible to provide a quantitative overview of incidents of Jewish political violence and quantify how many times the perpetrator exhibited traits of the framework, which consequently complicates a thorough assessment of the counter-culture framework on all the incidents of political violence.

To give an illustration, there are currently no English language databases available to the public, that provide a complete overview of acts of Jewish political violence and terrorism listing all the incidents during the timeframe this thesis focuses on (28 September 2000 until 17 March 2015). The only thorough list of Jewish political violence and terrorism in Israel was compiled by Pedahzur and Perliger in their book *Jewish Terrorism in Israel* (2009). However, the last logged incident was 14 May 2007. This list is the most thorough one, completed by coding incidents of Jewish terrorism as reported in newspapers. However the issue with it is that it does not provide details about

perpetrators. As for the major publicly available terrorism databases, these are deeply flawed as far as Jewish terrorism in Israel is concerned. Having reviewed two open access databases, *RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents* and *Global Terrorism Database* it can be concluded that they contain major omissions and are incomplete. The *RAND database* does not provide an option to select a perpetrator of Jewish origin, and thus it is necessary to go through the entire list and manually read through incidents. Although some of these incidents were perpetrated by a Jewish attacker, a majority were perpetrated by Arab Israeli or Palestinian individuals and groups, as well as perpetrators of unknown origin. Additionally, the database for Israel is only complete up to 2010. The fatal flaw of this database is that some of the incidents as recorded by Pedahzur and Perliger (2009) cannot be found in the *RAND database*, such as an incident from 20 October 2000[48] (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 189). The incident cannot be found in the *Global Terrorism Database* either. Moreover, the *Global Terrorism Database* provides separate data for Israel and Palestine, not indicating what areas Palestine is composed of (e.g. East Jerusalem, Area C of the West Bank) and therefore it cannot be guaranteed the number of incidents is accurate.

Therefore, considering these databases' incomplete and unreliable information, there is a need to complete the list of attacks as compiled by Pedahzur and Perliger, using a comparable methodology, and code incidents as reported in newspapers (including Hebrew language ones). This will have to involve several coders fluent in Hebrew.

Similarly, a completion of a database that would log incidents of civil disobedience using the framework is also another area to be explored.

[48] This incident was chosen because it occurred shortly after the start of the Second Intifada, i.e. the time period this thesis focuses on. On that day, an Arab from Beit Fourik, a village in West Bank, was killed by a settler. Pedahzur and Perliger report that no other details are known about the event (Pedahzur and Perliger 2009: 189).

Further research is also needed on specific subgroups of Haredi and Dati Leumi communities and their involvement in violence. This thesis focused on the main groups, but it would be enlightening to compare and contrast differences between different subgroups, as there are several dozen subgroups, particularly among Haredim, including various Hassidic sects.

Moreover, whilst deviating from this thesis and perhaps taking a step back to Pedahzur and Perliger's direction, this thesis proposes that further research is needed on the participation of Jewish Israeli women in particular in terrorist activities. Whilst general trends indicate that women's involvement in terrorism might be on the rise, in roles such as attackers, kidnappers, hijackers and as "martyrs", as well as in support roles (Sjoberg *et al.* 2011: 2, 5), this does not appear to be the case in Israel. Following the foundation of the State of Israel, women have mostly disappeared from the discourse. Yet, the regional trends in the Middle East show that women do get involved in terrorist activities, for instance, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Palestinian terrorist groups as well as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria have all used women in some capacity, and their roles have been expanding in the past years. For instance, Palestinian women's roles have expanded and include involvement in suicide bombings (Margolin 2016: 926). Likewise, ISIS' women are likely to get involved in more active roles (Winter 2018b). In conclusion, the regional trends show that women's role in political violence have been expanding. It is therefore also necessary to understand the development of Israeli Jewish women's participation in political violence, whether active or in support roles. As such, further research is necessary to explore the role of gender in Jewish political violence in Israel, to explain the absence of female perpetrators in modern Jewish political violence and terrorism, and to compare and contrast the phenomenon with regional female terrorists.


Further research is needed, and this thesis has contributed to the existing scholarly work on the phenomenon of modern

Jewish political violence and civil disobedience. Most importantly, its original contribution stems from addressing intra-Jewish violence, often overlooked in comparison to Jewish violence perpetrated against the Israeli Arab/Palestinian population. Research like this on the political violence perpetrated by the Haredi and the Dati Leumi communities will become even more important in the future because of the demographic challenges awaiting Israel. The birth rate of the Haredi and the Dati Leumi communities is significantly higher compared to the rest of the Israeli Jewish population. When demographic shifts are expected to be significant, there will be political consequences which may threaten peace and stability. Therefore, the original and significant contribution of this research stems from providing insight into these communities, particularly their political and religious viewpoints and how these may translate into violent behaviour.

10 Appendices

10.1 Appendix A: Figures


Figure 10.1: Museum of the Underground Prisoners Jerusalem leaflet



(Poniscjakova 2017)

10.2 Appendix B: Forms

Figure 10.2: Approved and signed off Ethical Review



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School of Politics and International Relations
Research Ethics Committee

Ethical Review

If you have answered 'YES' to any of the questions on the checklist (REC#2), you should complete this form.

Researchers should not begin data collection or approach potential participants until the process of ethical approval has been completed, and you are in possession of an approval form from the Research Ethics Committee.

Before completing and submitting the form, it is strongly recommended that you study carefully, and cite, the ESRC's 'Framework for Research Ethics', which is available here: http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/information/research-ethics.aspx

Please proceed as follows:

1. Complete the form, as far as it applies to your situation.
2. Attach a copy of your research proposal, and any other relevant documentation (e.g. sample letter/email to potential participants), as appropriate. Make a list of any attachments in the box on the form.
3. Email the form, with attachments, to Carole Yates (carole.yates@nottingham.ac.uk).

DETAILS (TO BE COMPLETED IN ALL CASES)

Name: Veronika Poniscjakova
Status (i.e. PGR/Staff): PGR
Email: ldxvp1@nottingham.ac.uk
Names of other researchers on the project: N/A
Project title Rethinking political violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict: counter-culture as an explanation of Jewish political violence and terrorism.
Summary: (please give a brief outline of the project/proposal to include subject areas, sources, research methods and intended audience) The research will aim to explain how Jewish political violence and terrorism in Israel occurs using a counter-culture framework. The focus of the fieldwork would be on the counter-culture communities. Fieldwork would last between 12-16 weeks, exact date TBD, expected in the third term of the academic year 2016/17. I would be covered by personal insurance. In my fieldwork I would aim to interview members of the counter-culture communities, in particular religious Zionist and ultra-Orthodox communities. These communities are not dangerous. I would not interview people who were involved in any violent attacks in the past.

REC#3 Ethical Review Page 1

I am interested in their lifestyle, and would like to identify traits of these counter-culture groups and how they perceive Jewish political violence and crises that have led people to perpetrate violence, such as Palestinian violence. I want to look at their education, interests, perception of crises, social networks & cliques, and assess where they sit on the political spectrum and whether they feel represented in the mainstream politics. I would also like to do observation which would give me a better understanding of the context. I would not participate in any of the communities' activities.

Suggested methods for the project that are affected by the ethical review are:

- Accessing/monitoring of the extremist websites ***(APPROVAL GRANTED ALREADY)***
  Note: for clarification, these websites would be accessed only from a school computer, not my laptop, and thus only in the UK, not abroad. If there are any changes to the list below, my supervisors, school and the ethics committee will be contacted immediately and any new websites would go through ethical review process.
- Interviews and observation outside of the UK – in Israel. These will include discussion of sensitive topics such as religious views. I will be following UK government travel advice to avoid any regions they do not consider suitable to visit. It is not expected that I would be seen as a threat to these communities or vice-versa.

The sources used in this research project will be mainly secondary – such as using data in the already conducted studies from interviews or from surveys; journals, books, reviews, news articles and court documents. However, the topic is under-researched and there is a great potential to uncover more information, patterns and behaviours; there are gaps in the undertaken studies that need clarification, and there is a demand from the Israeli government to address the topic, it is therefore imperative that I undertake the fieldwork in Israel to gather new data.

The intended audience includes but is not limited to especially Israeli policy makes, NGOs, and other researchers.

List of attachments:
1. Abstract of thesis

ADDITIONAL DETAILS (TO BE COMPLETED BY STUDENTS)

Student ID number: 4253932
Supervisor: Dr Andrew Mumford **Dr Daniel Ritter**

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE TO BE COMPLETED IN ALL CASES

1. Procedures for gaining participants' informed consent

A letter (in both English and Hebrew) will be distributed to every participant prior to an interview. It will contain:

- Brief summary of the research and the objective of the interview (characterise counter-cultures).
- Confirmation from a participant:
  - I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
  - I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time up to three months after completion of the interview, without giving a reason.
  - I agree to take part in the above study.
  - I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications

2. Procedures relating to participants' right to withdraw from the research

Please see above.

3. Confidentiality, anonymity, and non-traceability of research participants

I will be referring to the participants only by their allocated pseudonyms. Allocating code names will protect identity. No real names will be mentioned, which will be securely stored as outlined below. In the thesis, no personal details allowing identification of participants will be provided. The only information discussed in the thesis will be about gender, age, level of education, degree of religiosity, etc.

4. Data storage (to ensure compliance with the Data Protection Act, 1998), and participants' right of access to any personal data stored in relation to them

Personal data is defined as data which relate to a living individual who can be identified. As outlined above, it will not be possible to identify the participants in my research and I will be storing personal data such as names securely, which will help to identify individuals. This is in compliance with the Data Protection Act.

All the interview data will be stored on University of Nottingham home drive https://files.nottingham.ac.uk/. This is a university secure website that requires authentication in the form of my username and password that only I have access to. All centralised file stores are backed up and users can request the restoration of lost data.

5. What are the anticipated risks associated with this research? How will this be minimised or dealt with?

Risks with this research and fieldwork are outlined in the "Summary" section of this document, and further risks are briefly outlined in REC#5 Fieldwork (which will be updated and submitted one month before the travel as is the school's policy) and the risk assessment form (also to be updated one month before the travel).

Based on the UK Foreign Office travel advice website I am aware of the risks associated with visiting Israel. As a result I will not be travelling to: Gaza, the Sheba'a Farms and Ghajjar and within 500m of the border with Lebanon (the 'Blue Line') east of Metula, including the northern edge of the town and east of Route 98 along the Syrian border.

Actions to minimize risks:
I will keep up to date with local media and travel reports.
I will not be using public transport in certain places.
I will be vigilant at all times.
I will familiarize myself with the safety actions that I should take in the event of a warning siren.
I will be especially vigilant after Friday prayers and on religious holidays.
I will send regular email updates to my supervisors and I will inform my family via phone and email on a daily basis.

Risk associated with the monitoring of the extremist websites – I will not be myself participating in any form of discussion or comments on the websites, but will only be observing. I will not be accessing the mentioned websites from my own laptop or from abroad and will only be using a school computer to visit them.

6. Potential harm to research participants and/or others

N/A

7. Are there any specific issues relating to children or vulnerable adults? Is so please specify.

N/A

8. Is there any covert element to this research? If so please provide a justification.

N/A

9. Is there a deception involved in this research (eg misleading participants as to its purpose)? If so please provide a justification.

N/A

10. If funding for this research is **not** from a UK Research Council, the British Academy, the Leverhulme Trust, or the University of Nottingham, please provide details of funding sources.

Self-funded.

11. If this is **student** research that involves the monitoring of 'extreme' websites (e.g. pornographic sites or sites that advocate violence) please detail what supervisory arrangements are in place for this.

APPROVAL GRANTED FOR THE FOLLOWING SECTION:

As part of the research, I will be monitoring websites of groups that I consider to be part of the counter-cultures communities. The UK Government Home Office did not list any of these groups on the list of the foreign terrorist organizations.

For clarification, these websites would be accessed only from a school computer, not my laptop, and thus only in the UK, not abroad. If there are any changes to the list below, my supervisors, school and the ethics committee will be contacted immediately and any new websites would go through ethical review process.

The current list of groups whose website I want to monitor is (but is not limited to due to rapid evolution of Jewish violence in Israel in the present day):

- Lehava – Lehava is an extremist group, but it is not on the U.S. Department of State list of foreign terrorist organizations. It has not been banned in Israel.
- Kach and Kahane Chai - Kach, as well as the splinter group Kahane Chai, promote violence as a method for establishing a religiously homogenous state. Kahane Chai (Kach) was listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization – however the group has not staged a large terrorist attack since 1994, although people affiliated with the groups have been arrested for low-level attacks since then.
- Blog of Meir Ettinger – Ettinger is a grandson of the late US-born ultranationalist Rabbi Meir Kahane. He is currently serving a 6-month sentence in Israeli prison.
- Bat Ayin – Bat Ayin is religious settlement affiliated with the Hassidic sects, which is home to The Bat Ayin underground members, but it is not listed as a terrorist organization.

12. Any other matters that you would like to bring to the attention of the Research Ethics Officer.

N/A

Please note:

It is your responsibility to follow the University's code of Practice on Ethical Standards and any relevant academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study. This includes proving appropriate information sheets and consent forms, and ensuring confidentiality in the storage and use of data. Any significant change in the question, design or conduct over the course of the

research should be notified to the Research Ethics Committee and may require a new application for ethics approval.

Signed

Date 15/06/16

If submitted by a student please pass to your supervisor for signature

Supervisor's Comments: Veronika has diligently re-drafted her ethical review forms in light of the committee's previous comments. She has held detailed discussions with me and her annual reviewer as a way of fine-tuning the proposal in order to minimise her own risk exposure. Fieldwork in Israel is essential to the thesis overall as she needs to conduct face-to-face interviews with members of counter-culture groups in order to produce a thesis of genuine originality.

Name of supervisor Dr. Andrew Mumford

Signature of supervisor

Date 20/6/16

Name

(Chair of REC or representative)

Signed

Date 4/7/16

Name S. FIELDING

(Chair of REC or representative)

Signed

Date 24/6/16

Risk Assessment Form

School/Dept: **Politics & IR**

Date Of Assessment:

Date Of Last Assessment: **N/A**

Responsible Person Name: **Veronika Ponisejakova**

Section:

Name Of Assessor:

Date Of Next Assessment:

Signature:

Activity	Hazards	Existing Precautions	OK/ NOK	Deficiencies	Hazard Severity	Risk	Extent	Risk Severity
Interviews with the members of the counter-culture groups i.e. ultra-Orthodox and religious Zionist communities	I will not know the interviewees very well; I will not know how trustworthy they are.	I will not enter someone's home if I feel uncomfortable or unsafe. I will not enter a house if the person I arranged to see is not there. Therefore using a place more public will be a safer option than the interviewee's home. I will consider an appropriate exit strategy (what to say etc.) should I wish to terminate an interview early. I will study a map of the area, or visit the location in advance I will take steps to leave a situation immediately if I feel unsafe or uncomfortable. I will not give a personal telephone number or address to an interviewee. Upon arrival, I will explain my research and the conditions of confidentiality to the interviewee(s) and offer them the opportunity to ask questions. I will adopt a friendly and professional manner when conducting interviews but be careful not to be over-familiar. I will ensure that my family/supervisors know my mobile number., location where I will be conducting interviews, method of transport, time of interview and expected duration of visit time, and contact details for the both Slovak and British Embassy in Israel.		An interviewee may assault me, which is unlikely.	1 - slight	1 - low	1 - individual	Trivial (1)

Visiting Israel.	Violence may erupt unexpectedly and I will need to escape to a safe location	I will learn in advance the location of hubs of activity such as shops, pubs, schools or the local police station may provide me with a possible escape route should this be necessary. I will have basic first aid equipment with me at all times. I will have a charged mobile phone with me at all times, map of the local area and important contact details (including Slovak and British Embassy)/ In case I need to defend myself: I attended self-defence classes for women and hold a brown belt in karate.		As a bystander I could be caught up in an incident such as stone throwing or a clash between protesters and the Israeli security forces. However this is unlikely and I will avoid volatile areas.	1 - slight	2 – medium	1 – individual	Acceptable (2)
Using public transport.	Travelling to an interview on a public transport.	I will not be using public transport in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. If using public transport outside of these cities, I will check its reliability and also carry the telephone number of a reputable local taxi firm.		There may be an incident on public transport in other town/villages.	3 - major	1 - low	1 - individual	Moderate (3-5)

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School of Politics and International Relations

Checklist and Declaration

This document applies to **all research conducted by staff and research students** in the School of Politics and International Relations. Please make sure that you complete the checklist before signing the declaration.

- Checklist – ethical considerations (please see also **Guidance for Staff and Postgraduate Research Students**).

  If the answer to any of the questions below is 'YES', then please go on to complete an Ethical Review Form (REC#3)

- Declaration – to be completed and submitted as detailed for those projects for which you do NOT consider ethical review to be necessary

Research that may require a full review:		
Questions adapted from the ESRC's Framework : http://www.esrc.ac.uk/_images/framework_for_research_ethics_tcm8-4586.pdf		
	Yes	**No**
Does the research involve any vulnerable groups: children, those with cognitive impairment, or those in unequal relationships eg your own students?		X
Will the study require the co-operation of a gatekeeper for initial access to the groups or individuals to be recruited? (eg students at school, members of self-help group)	X	
Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without their knowledge and consent at the time? (eg covert observation of people)		X
Will the study involve discussion of sensitive topics? (eg sexual activity, drug use)	X	
Could the study induce psychological stress or anxiety or cause harm or negative consequences beyond the risks encountered in normal life?		X
Will the study involve prolonged or repetitive testing?		X
Will the research involve administrative or secure data that requires permission from the appropriate authorities before use?		X
Is there a possibility that the safety of the researcher may be in question? (eg international research; locally employed research assistants)	X	
Does the research involve members of the public in a research capacity (participant research)?		X
Will the research involve respondents to the internet or other visual/vocal methods where respondents may be identified?		X
Will the research involve the sharing of data or confidential information beyond the initial consent given?		X

Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for time) be offered to participants?		X

Does the research involve monitoring of extreme websites?	X	

Research outside of the UK

	Yes	No
Will the research take place outside of the UK?	X	

If the research is to be undertaken outside of the UK, this will have Health & Safety implications therefore REC#5 should be completed and submitted with this declaration.

Previously reviewed?

	Yes	No
Has the research undergone an ethical review elsewhere?		X

Please give details of other ethical review and attach correspondence pertaining to this. If however the nature of the research has changed since the previous review, please submit a completed REC#3 form.

Declaration

Title of Research Project:	Rethinking political violence in the Israel-Palestine conflict: counter-culture as an explanation of Jewish political violence and terrorism.

Type of submission - projected outcome: (eg thesis, book, article, funding application)	Thesis

Summary of project:
(to include some indication of sources and methods)

The research will aim to explain how Jewish political violence and terrorism in Israel occurs using a counter-culture framework. The focus of the fieldwork would be on the counter-culture communities. Fieldwork would last between 12-16 weeks, exact date TBD, expected in the third term of the academic year 2016/17. I would be covered by personal insurance.
In my fieldwork I would aim to interview members of the counter-culture communities, in particular religious Zionist and ultra-Orthodox communities. These communities are not dangerous. I would not interview people who were involved in any violent attacks in the past.
I am interested in their lifestyle, and would like to identify traits of these counter-culture groups and how they perceive Jewish political violence and crises that have led people to perpetrate violence, such as Palestinian violence. I want to look at their education, interests, perception of crises, social networks & cliques, and assess where they sit on the political spectrum and whether they feel represented in the mainstream politics. I would also like to do observation which would give me a better understanding of the context. I would not participate in any of the communities' activities.

Suggested methods for the project that are affected by the ethical review are:

- Accessing/monitoring of the extremist websites ***(APPROVAL GRANTED ALREADY)***
  Note: for clarification, these websites would be accessed only from a school computer, not my laptop, and thus only in the UK, not abroad. If there are any changes to the list below, my supervisors, school and the ethics committee will be contacted immediately and any new websites

would go through ethical review process.

- Interviews and observation outside of the UK – in Israel. These will include discussion of sensitive topics such as religious views. I will be following UK government travel advice to avoid any regions they do not consider suitable to visit. It is not expected that I would be seen as a threat to these communities or vice-versa.

The sources used in this research project will be mainly secondary – such as using data in the already conducted studies from interviews or from surveys; journals, books, reviews, news articles and court documents. However, the topic is under-researched and there is a great potential to uncover more information, patterns and behaviours; there are gaps in the undertaken studies that need clarification, and there is a demand from the Israeli government to address the topic, it is therefore imperative that I undertake the fieldwork in Israel to gather new data.

APPROVAL GRANTED FOR THE FOLLOWING SECTION:

As part of the research, I will be monitoring websites of groups that I consider to be part of the counter-cultures communities. The UK Government Home Office did not list any of these groups on the list of the foreign terrorist organizations. The current list of groups whose website I want to monitor is (but is not limited to due to rapid evolution of Jewish violence in Israel in the present day):

- Lehava – Lehava is an extremist group, but it is not on the U.S. Department of State list of foreign terrorist organizations. It has not been banned in Israel.
- Kach and Kahane Chai - Kach, as well as the splinter group Kahane Chai, promote violence as a method for establishing a religiously homogenous state. Kahane Chai (Kach) was listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization – however the group has not staged a large terrorist attack since 1994, although people affiliated with the groups have been arrested for low-level attacks since then.
- Blog of Meir Ettinger – Ettinger is a grandson of the late US-born ultranationalist Rabbi Meir Kahane. He is currently serving a 6-month sentence in Israeli prison.
- Bat Ayin – Bat Ayin is religious settlement affiliated with the Hassidic sects, which is home to The Bat Ayin underground members, but it is not listed as a terrorist organization.

There is no requirement for ethical review if:

- You use no data (e.g. theoretical research)
- You only use secondary anonymised records (i.e. where no individual can be identified)

These requirements apply to all staff and student research, regardless of source of funding. Funding bodies may themselves have further requirements that must be complied with.

Declaration

I confirm that the research to be undertaken does **not** require ethical review:

Name:	
Signed:	Date:
Signature of supervisor if appropriate:	
Name:	
Signed:	Date:

Authorisation:

Name: (Chair of REC or representative)	S. FIELDING.
Signed:	Date: 24/6/16

Figure 10.3: Interview guide

Part 1: "warm up" + community

I would like to ask you a couple of questions about yourself and the community you live in.

PQ: How would you describe your community and your way of life?

SQ: probes: describe your lifestyle, the way you practice your religion

SQ: How much do you trust your community? [Not at all, very little, somewhat, to a great extent]

SQ: Do you rely on your community to make any important decisions? Why?

PQ: How often do you interact with outsiders like myself? [Never, sometimes, often, always?]

SQ: (Follow up: Why not?)

SQ: What kind of barriers/obstacles/problems are there?

PQ: How often do you interact with secular Jews? [Never, sometimes, often, always?]

SQ: (Follow up: Why not?)

PQ: What kind of barriers/obstacles/problems are there?

SQ: Can you describe any differences between them and you/your community/religious group?

PQ: How often do you interact with Haredi/religious Zionist Jews? (if interviewee Haredi, ask about RZ & vice versa) [Never, sometimes, often, always?]

SQ: (Follow up: Why not?)

PQ: What kinds of barriers/obstacles/problems are there?

SQ: Can you describe differences between them and you/your community/religious group?

PQ: Would you want other Jewish communities to follow your way of life and your beliefs? Why?

Part 2: leaders

PQ: Can you explain your rabbi's/leader's position in the community and your relationship to him?

SQ: What qualities would you ascribe to him?

PQ: Do you seek advice on important decisions from your rabbi/rebbe/other?

PQ: Would you do something if your rabbi disagreed with it?

Part 3: politics

PQ: How do your religious views influence your political views?

SQ: Do you oppose or support the two-state solution?

SQ: Do you oppose or support settlements building in Judea and Samaria?

PQ: Do you feel represented by the government?

SQ: Is there any particular party that you think represents you?
To what extent does it represent you?
[Not at all, very little, somewhat, to a great extent]

PQ: If given a choice, would you install Halakha as the state law or are you happy with the Israeli laws?
[Not at all, very little, somewhat, to a great extent]
PQ: What does Israel mean for you?

SQ: Are there any elements of the State that you disagree with?

PQ: Do you feel threatened by the Palestinians?
[Not at all, very little, somewhat, to a great extent]

SQ: Between 2000 and 2015, did you ever witness or suffer from Palestinian violence, particularly during the Second Intifada? How did it make you feel?

SQ: Between 2000 and 2015, how did governmental initiatives and concessions to the Palestinians make you feel? (if cannot remember, remind them of Israeli disengagement from Gaza; or 2009 PM Netanyahu's declaration of conditional support for a future Palestinian state?, etc.)

PQ: In case of imminent threat from Palestinians, how do you think you or your community would react?
PQ: Have you ever felt that the government or the secular population are trying to interfere with your way of life? Have there ever been any problems?

SQ: Between 2000-2015, can you remember any particular events/times you felt threatened by the state or the secular Jewish population? Physically or when your way of life was threatened?

PQ: How would you react if the government or the secular Jewish population tried to remove the religious character of the Israeli state?

SQ: Is there anything else you would like to share with me?

Is there anybody else you think I should talk to? Do you have their contact details or could you put me in touch with them?

Figure 10.4: Consent form and information sheet

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School of Politics and International Relations

Consent Form

Project title	**Diversity in Israeli society**
Researcher's name	Veronika Poniscjakova
Supervisors' names	Dr Andrew Mumford
	Prof Katharine Adeney

Please read this form and sign it once the above named or their designated representative, has explained fully the aims and procedures of the study to you.

- I voluntarily agree to take part in this study.
- I confirm that I have been given a full explanation by the above named and that I have read and understand the information sheet given to me which is attached.
- I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study with the researcher on all aspects of the study and have understood the advice and information given as a result.
- I authorise the researcher to disclose the results of my participation in the study but not my name.
- I understand that information about me recorded during the study will be kept in a secure database. Data will be kept for 7 years after the results of this study have been published. Data may be transcribed by a third party.
  Participants will be given a number on tape to ensure anonymity.
- I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications
- I understand that I can ask for further instructions or explanations at any time.
- I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time up to three months after completion of the interview, without having to give a reason for withdrawing
- I agree to be recorded: Yes ☑ ☐
  No ☒ ☐

Participant number: __

Signed ……
(research participant)

Print name ……

Date ……

Contact details

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The University of Nottingham
UNITED KINGDOM · CHINA · MALAYSIA

School of Politics and International Relations

Information Sheet

Project title	**Diversity in Israeli society**
Researcher's name	Veronika Poniscjakova
Supervisors' names	Dr Andrew Mumford Prof Katharine Adeney

You have been invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether to take part it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with friends and relatives if you wish to. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether you wish to take part or not. If you decide to take part you may keep this leaflet. Thank you for reading this.

Background
This project researches diversity in Israeli society, and the aim of these interviews is to find out information about lifestyle, education, interests, role of social networks and leaders; and whether people feel represented in the mainstream politics; how they perceive Israeli politics and its developments.

What does the study involve?
You will be involved for the duration of an interview, which may last between 30-60 minutes, or as you wish.

Why have you been chosen?
You have been chosen based on your background.

Do you have to take part?
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form (or alternatively give a verbal consent that will be recorded). If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time up to three months after completion of the interview and without giving a reason.

What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?
There are no known risks.

What if something goes wrong?/Who can I complain to.
You can contact the researcher's supervisor(s).

Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept on a password protected database and is strictly confidential. Any information about you which leaves the research unit will have your name and address removed so that you cannot be recognised from it. Recordings will not include participant's name.

Who has reviewed the study?
This study has been reviewed and approved by the University of Nottingham School of Political and International Relations Ethics Committee.

Contact for Further Information

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10.3 Appendix C: Tables

Table 10-1: Support for price tag activities by settlers (in %). Sample size: 606.

The Peace Index – October 2011		
Recently, there has been an increase in price tag activities by the settler groups, for example uprooting trees, burning mosques, etc., in response to hostile acts by the Palestinians. Do you support or not support these price tag acts?		
	Respondents	**%**
Very supportive	23	4
Somewhat supportive	37	6
Somewhat not supportive	111	18
Not at all supportive	423	70
Do not know	12	2
Total	606	100

(Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute)

Table 10-2: Israeli Arab self-identity (in %). Sample size: 688.

Arab Public 2015, Smooha Surveys – University of Haifa				
	Muslim	**Christian**	**Druze**	**Total**
Self-identity				
Israeli non-Palestinian	34.2	34.3	87.8	40
Israeli Palestinian	39.3	50	8.1	37
Non-Israeli Palestinian	26.5	15.7	4.1	23

(Data courtesy of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute)

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