Hegemony, Pan-Americanism, and National Security: The Meaning and Application of the Monroe Doctrine in the Early Twentieth Century

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Abstract

This thesis traces the history of the Monroe Doctrine during the early twentieth century and examines the ways in which its meaning was reinterpreted between the Spanish-American War of 1898 and its centennial anniversary in 1923. It argues that United States foreign policy elites engaged in a protracted and unprecedented debate over the doctrine's meaning and application for a quarter-century, transforming it into a national security framework that justified new directions in United States foreign relations, whilst simultaneously facilitating debate and contestation. As politicians, diplomats, academics, international lawyers, and high-ranking military figures scrutinised the value and importance of the doctrine, its meaning fractured into two overarching reinterpretations that were each aligned to antithetical core values of United States national security, namely regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and inter-American cooperation. Both ideals were deemed essential to the existence and security of the United States, and the Monroe Doctrine was reinterpreted to maintain these core values that it was perceived to embody.

The expansion of the United States Empire through informal, economic, and colonial imperialism during the early twentieth century clashed with the simultaneous growth of the Pan-American movement, and the doctrine's capricious meaning reflected the discord that permeated national perceptions of the United States' role in the world. Drawing upon a collection of archival material and published primary sources, including governmental documentation, personal papers, congressional debates, academic publications and conference papers, and literary-political magazines and newspapers, this thesis addresses the complicated relationship between notions of hegemony and

cooperation in the conduct and formation of United States foreign relations. Through analysing the Monroe Doctrine debate of the early twentieth century, this study provides a nuanced account of the doctrine's evolution throughout major events, such as the annexation of the Philippines, the construction of the Panama Canal, the Mexican Revolution, the First World War, and the treaty fight; positions Latin America at the heart of United States national security; and offers a critical insight in the identification of United States core values.

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Because she will never be able to see the results of my research, I dedicate this thesis and everything that follows it to her memory.

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List of Abbreviations

AAPSS – American Academy of Political and Social Science

ABC – Argentina, Brazil, and Chile

ACNP – American Commission to Negotiate Peace (formerly The Inquiry)

AIL – Anti-Imperialist League

ASIL – American Society of International Law

IPAC – International Pan American Committee

LEP – League to Enforce Peace

NAAIC – National Association of Anti-Imperialist Clubs

NLUS – Navy League of United States

PAU – Pan American Union (formerly the International Bureau of the American Republics)

SCFR – Senate Council on Foreign Relations

Introduction: A Cluster of Loyalties

The Monroe Doctrine and the American Way of Life during the Early Twentieth Century

In one of his earliest publications, *The Stakes of Diplomacy*, Walter Lippmann summarised the unique position that the Monroe Doctrine held within the national consciousness of the United States during the early twentieth century. The rising foreign policy intellectual noted that the doctrine could 'mean anything or nothing in the actual affairs of Central and South America', yet for the people of the United States it equated to 'a cluster of loyalties' that could be effectively 'summoned to action' when required. Sanctioned by years of habit, domestic reaction to the doctrine had become 'almost automatic' and Lippmann argued that this had permitted authoritative officials to invoke it for almost any purpose:

> It may cover a totally new course of action. In the last ninety years or so it has covered many courses of action. But it has covered them. Because the covering was familiar, the action has been palatable. We have been ready to fight in defense of the Monroe Doctrine, leaving it for the President to decide what it means.[1]

What Lippmann had exposed in 1915 was the Monroe Doctrine paradox of the early twentieth century. When the doctrine was first enunciated in 1823, President James Monroe outlined that the United States would view any further colonisation of the

[1] W. Lippmann, *The Stakes of Diplomacy* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1915), pp. 18-20.

American continents as a threat to its national interests and advised abstention from European conflicts. However, Lippmann's reference to the doctrine's ability to 'cover' a variety of policies highlighted the fact that its fluid and ever-changing meaning had become one of its most defining features by the early twentieth century. As historian Gaddis Smith confirms, the doctrine 'meant many things to different people at different times.'[2] Yet Lippmann's description of the doctrine as a 'cluster of loyalties' suggested that citizens of the United States held its malleable tenets in the highest esteem. Even though the revered policy's meaning and application had become so unsettled and open to reinterpretation over the course of nearly a century, it retained the potency of a historic tradition and continued to represent American values that were deemed worthy of a tenacious defence at any cost.[3]

By re-examining the history of the Monroe Doctrine from the Spanish-American War of 1898 through to its centennial anniversary in 1923 and charting the ways in which its meaning was subject to modification, this thesis draws upon Lippmann's assertion and argues that the doctrine functioned as a national security framework that justified new directions in United States foreign relations in a moment when the nation emerged as one of the world's leading powers. During the early twentieth century, the doctrine underwent a distinct process of reinterpretation and it was aligned to two antithetical notions simultaneously – the maintenance of regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere on the one hand, and a commitment to inter-American cooperation and Pan-American unity

[2] G. Smith, *The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine 1945-1993* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), p. 21.
[3] A popular trans-Atlantic joke of the period claimed that Americans were fiercely loyal to the Monroe Doctrine even though they did not know what it meant. For one example among many, the British journalist A. Maurice Low commented in 1914 that 'Europe does not know what the Monroe Doctrine is or means, and I doubt very much if anyone in America is better informed': A. Low, 'The Attitude of Europe Toward the Monroe Doctrine', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 54 (1914), p. 102.

on the other.[4] Both of these guiding ideals were at the heart of United States national security during this period, and the Monroe Doctrine's unsettled meaning reflected the contested nature of United States foreign relations and domestic perceptions of the nation's role on the world stage.

As a historical paradigm in the field of United States foreign relations, United States national security is defined as the defence of what its citizens consider to be the American way of life, namely national core values. As Melvyn Leffler explains, national security transcends the assessment of rival nations' capabilities for the purpose of defending citizens and territory, because threat perception is additionally influenced by a nation's own strength, the appeal of its ideology, and the patterns of the international system. Examining United States foreign relations through the paradigm of national security considers the ways in which policy makers combined material national interests with broader ideological and cultural goals, and identified national core values that were determined worthy of defence regardless of the cost.[5]

Leffler and other leading proponents of the national security paradigm demonstrate that United States core values have primarily been generated by foundational documents such as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. They argue that it has been the defence of domestic notions such as liberty, republicanism, democracy,

[4] By regional hegemony I refer to the formation of an imperialistic power relationship within the Western Hemisphere that permitted the United States to exert influence and dominance over the nations of Latin America, facilitating economic and military intervention. Inter-American cooperation refers to acts of political, economic, cultural, intellectual and military cooperation between the United States and the nations of Latin America that were deemed attainable due to an adherence to shared American traditions and values.

[5] M. Leffler, 'National Security', in F. Costigliola and M. Hogan (eds), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed., 2016), pp. 25-29.

liberalism, and capitalism that has guided the nation's security policy since its founding.[6] Through an analysis of the Monroe Doctrine, this thesis presents an alternative approach to the study of United States national security by identifying core values of an international nature. It contends that during the early twentieth century, the doctrine's malleable 'cluster of loyalties,' namely regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation, assumed the role of core values within the formulation of United States national security. Americans who belonged to what Bruce Kuklick describes as the 'decision-making class,' specifically American elites who collectively influenced the direction of United States foreign relations, frequently engaged with the Monroe Doctrine as an issue of national security and perceived its tenets as fundamental to the existence of the United States. Because the doctrine's meaning was fluid and easily manipulated, politicians, diplomats, international lawyers, academics, and high-ranking military figures reinterpreted the doctrine to provide justification for the renegotiation of the nation's foreign relations on the grounds of maintaining the core values that it was deemed to embody.[7] Yet the Monroe Doctrine's capricious nature additionally facilitated dispute

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[6] M. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 267; W. Walker, *National Security and Core Values in American History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 5-6; A. Preston, 'Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security', *Diplomatic History*, 38, no. 3 (2014), p. 480.

[7] B. Kuklick, *Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 44. This term will be used interchangeably with phrases such as 'United States elites' and 'foreign policy establishment' throughout the thesis. On the role of academics in influencing United States foreign relations, see: R. Salvatore, *Disciplinary Conquest: U.S. Scholars in South America, 1900-1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016); I. Tyrrell, *Historians in Public: The Practice of American History, 1890-1970* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005); M. Berger, *Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and US Hegemony in the Americas, 1898-1990* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); G. Morotta, 'The Academic Mind and the Rise of U.S. Imperialism: Historians and Economists as Publicists for Ideas of Colonial Expansion', *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 42, no. 2 (1983), pp. 217-234. Richard Kirkendall's term 'service intellectual' is also of particular interest: R. Kirkendall, 'Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Service Intellectual', *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 49, no. 3 (1962), pp. 456-471. For the role of international lawyers, see: B. Coates, *Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations in the Early Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); C. Neff, *Justice Among Nations: A History of International Law*

and contention over the evolution of United States foreign relations, and provided a medium through which Americans debated and contested matters of national security. A protracted debate over the application of the doctrine (hereafter referred to as the Monroe Doctrine debate) engaged the nation for a quarter of a century, and its meaning fractured into two overarching reinterpretations, one tied to the maintenance of regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, and the other to the promotion of inter-American cooperation. It was this clash over competing, antithetical core values and notions of national security that directed much of United States foreign relations during the early twentieth century.

Whilst most studies that utilise national security as a guiding methodological framework tend to focus on the years after the Second World War, due to the emergence of the terminology in 1940s political lexicon, it remains a valuable lens through which to view United States foreign relations during the early twentieth century.[8] Americans still engaged with the inherent notion of defending core values from external threats during this period and Andrew Preston lauds national security as a paradigm that can be used 'to explain America's actions in the world at any point in U.S. history.'[9] William Walker presents a compelling case for the creation of an American 'national security state' at the close of the nineteenth century, arguing that the United States 'actively engaged the world to protect its economic interests and enhance its security' through tying its core

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); For military officials, see: R. Challener, *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy 1898-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[8] The National Security Act of 1947 and the formation of the National Security Council popularised the term. Although it was attributed to notions of threat perception and national defence, Walter Lippmann had already begun to conceptualise national security in terms of safeguarding core values during the early 1940s, arguing that a 'nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war': W. Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), p. 51.

[9] Preston, 'National Security', p. 480.

values to external events.[10] Indeed, Ross Kennedy has analysed Woodrow Wilson's approach to the First World War in terms of national security, positing that because the President was driven by a desire to prevent the United States 'becoming an authoritarian, militarized state constantly on the verge of war,' he sought to dismantle the European balance of power because it was a direct threat to American values. As Kennedy explains, Wilson believed that a system of international relations based on alliances, secrecy and suspicion had to be replaced with one of collective security to protect not only United States citizens and territory, but the American way of life as well.[11] By approaching the history of the Monroe Doctrine through the paradigm of national security, this study contributes to the formation of a more refined understanding of the United States' core values during the early twentieth century.

This thesis positions Latin America at the centre of United States conceptions of national security during the early twentieth century. As Lars Schoultz argues, maintaining stability in Latin America has consistently been a primary security concern of United States policy makers, because they believed that regional instability would invite extra-hemispheric intervention and pose direct challenges to the United States' national interests and security.[12] Although the majority of United States elites adhered to this security concern during the early twentieth century, they held conflicting opinions about how national security should be maintained and what core values they were actually seeking to defend. Through an analysis of the Monroe Doctrine, it becomes clear that the

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[10] Walker, *National Security*, pp. 52-62.
[11] R. Kennedy, 'Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security', *Diplomatic History*, 25, no. 1 (2001), pp. 1-3.
[12] L. Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 37-38.

nation was divided between the need to defend the United States' hegemonic status within the Western Hemisphere and safeguard unity among the American republics.

Yet, for national security to become a guiding component of United States foreign relations, fear of perceived foreign threats must exist among foreign policy elites. Preston describes fear as the basic and elemental bond of national security and Walker similarly argues that it 'often mobilizes people to give their support to policies of dubious provenance.'[13] During the early twentieth century, the fear of a foreign challenge to the Monroe Doctrine was pervasive. As Nancy Mitchell demonstrates, the United States foreign policy establishment was obsessed with the possibility of a German threat to national interests in the Western Hemisphere, regardless of the actual intent of German policy makers.[14] The spectre of a "German Peril" in the Western Hemisphere generated a sense of urgency in the Monroe Doctrine debate and the doctrine was invoked by advocates of both hegemony and cooperation. As such, the Monroe Doctrine became an integral part of the military, political, and popular national response to this perceived European challenge to United States interests. Although Germany was positioned as the United States' primary antagonist during the early twentieth century, Japan was additionally viewed as an equally daunting foe, especially after its military victory over Russia in 1905. The possibility of a Japanese challenge to the Monroe Doctrine fundamentally altered its geographic scope and it was during this period that the language

[13] Preston, 'National Security', p. 479; Walker, *National Security*, p. 8.
[14] N. Mitchell, *The Danger of Dreams: German and American Imperialism in Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). See also: R. Fiebig-von Hase, 'The United States and Germany in the World Arena, 1900-1917', in H. Schröder (ed.), *Confrontation and Cooperation: Germany and the United States in the Era of World War I 1900-1924* (Providence: Berg Publishers, 1993); M. Jonas, *The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); M. Small, 'The United States and the German "Threat" to the Hemisphere, 1905-1914', *The Americas*, 28, no. 3 (1972), pp. 252-270.

of the doctrine was reinterpreted to target not only European interference in the Western Hemisphere, but that of all non-American nations.[15]

Although scholars have not specifically referred to the Monroe Doctrine in terms of national security, they frequently conceptualise it as a signifier of American identity, principles, and values. Kenneth Coleman describes the doctrine as a 'political mythology' that functioned as a 'minor national litmus test of citizenship,' whereas Gretchen Murphy defines it as a 'cultural ideology' that served as a 'set of discourses' through which Americans formulated their 'national identity as well as foreign policy.'[16] Anders Stephanson similarly equates the doctrine to 'an "empty signifier"… a discursive space that can be filled with a wide range of content … depending on how a certain political contestation over hegemony works out.'[17] These descriptions highlight the importance the doctrine held among citizens of the United States and demonstrate that its malleable tenets were akin to national core values that Americans sought to defend. By continuing to uphold the Monroe Doctrine throughout the early twentieth century, American elites sought to bolster the nation's security by maintaining and defending the various core values that they believed it embodied.

Yet herein lays the crucial idiosyncrasy of the Monroe Doctrine. Because its meaning and application were equivocal, the core values that it represented were additionally open to reinterpretation, complicating and contesting the nature of United

[15] For an overview of United States-Japanese relations, see: W. Nester, *Power Across the Pacific: A Diplomatic History of American Relations with Japan* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1996); A. Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).

[16] K. Coleman, 'The Political Mythology of the Monroe Doctrine', in J. Martz and L. Schoultz (eds), *Latin America, the United States and the Inter-American System* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 100-104; G. Murphy, *Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 4-17.

[17] A. Stephanson, 'A Riff', *H-Diplo Roundtable Review*, 14, no. 10 (2012), p. 36.

States national security. The original text of the doctrine was non-committal and open-ended, containing traces of anti-colonialism, isolationism, non-interventionism, hegemonic aspiration, imperial ambition, and Pan-Americanism.[18] These traces were ambiguous, which not only presented future policy makers with a malleable document through which to frame the nation's foreign relations, but also provided a fluid set of core values to defend. American policy makers could justify policy formation and advocate certain approaches to international relations by electing to defend which ever core value the doctrine was thought to embody as the course of foreign relations dictated.

Jay Sexton analyses the ramifications of the doctrine's elasticity during the nineteenth century and demonstrates that the doctrine's inherent anti-colonialism and pretension for imperial expansion 'reflected the discord and conflict that accompanied the larger project of national consolidation in nineteenth-century America.' He argues that the rise of the United States was the product of an interconnected process of 'anticolonial liberation, internal national consolidation, and imperial expansion,' and that the Monroe Doctrine provides historians with a means through which to clearly observe this process in practice.[19] Whilst Sexton's study clearly demonstrates how contested the Monroe Doctrine's meaning and application was during the nineteenth century, this thesis argues that the contention over the doctrine's meaning during the early twentieth century was a distinct enough phenomenon to warrant specific scholarly analysis. Sexton concludes his study with the formation of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904 and

[18] The term Monroe Doctrine was not coined until the mid-nineteenth century. What we now refer to as the Monroe Doctrine consists of a number of non-contiguous paragraphs from Monroe's 1823 annual message to Congress. For the relevant sections see: 'Monroe Doctrine' (2 December 1823), *Avalon Project*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/

[19] J. Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011), pp. 3-12.

argues that this reinterpretation of the doctrine served as a moment of 'compromise and consensus' that bridged the divisions between anti-imperialists and territorial expansionists that had emerged after the Spanish American War. At the dawn of the twentieth century, the doctrine facilitated the 'fusion of imperialism and anticolonialism' in the conduct of United States foreign relations by embracing interventionism but stopping short of outright colonialism. Sexton's analysis does not extend any further into the twentieth century, however, he notes that during the following century the doctrine became a 'symbol of the rising power of the United States' that 'obscured its complex and protean nature in the nineteenth century' and 'glossed over' its previously contested meaning and controversial application.[20] Although this emphasis on consensus formation at the turn of the century is certainly valuable for understanding the impact of the doctrine's flexibility, it is the contention of this thesis that the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine's meaning during the early twentieth century divided conceptions of United States national security and foreign relations rather than generating any consensus. The ways in which the doctrine was reinterpreted were primarily antithetical and as a result, the doctrine fractured into two distinct interpretations that ran alongside one another. Through highlighting this fracturing of the doctrine's meaning, this thesis argues that between 1898 and 1923, the doctrine facilitated debate and contestation over national aspirations for both regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation, dividing American elites on the issue of national security rather than uniting them. How these Americans sought, and ultimately failed, to reconcile these two competing core values with the geopolitical, economic and military expansion of the United States through the Monroe Doctrine is the primary focus of this thesis.

[20] Ibid., pp. 244-248.

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The meaning of the Monroe Doctrine began to cause contention in the wake of the Spanish American War of 1898, a moment in which the doctrine had assumed the status of a semi-sacred historic tradition within the United States.[21] Its popularity was reignited just years before the war during the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute of 1895 when President Grover Cleveland and his Secretary of State Richard Olney firmly reminded the world of the nation's commitment to the doctrine, challenging the British Empire's influence in the Western Hemisphere over a seemingly insignificant border dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. The sensationalism of this diplomatic clash between the two Anglo-Saxon powers generated intense domestic support for the doctrine and Olney fiercely claimed that the United States was 'practically sovereign' in the Western Hemisphere, hinting at the new meaning the doctrine would soon adopt.[22] After the war with Spain, the United States annexed the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam, and Puerto Rico, and established a protectorate over Cuba, forcing Americans to question the role the doctrine ought to serve in the nation's foreign relations as the geopolitical position of the United States on the hemispheric and world stages drastically altered. Historians almost unanimously agree that the United States had been an empire since its foundation, yet the adoption of overseas colonialism and informal imperialism as new imperial policies after the war was perceived by vast swathes of Americans as a departure

[21] Jeffery Malanson argues that after the Civil War the Monroe Doctrine replaced Washington's Farewell Address as the 'core expression' of United States foreign policy ideals: J. Malanson, *Addressing America: George Washington's Farewell Address and the Making of National Culture, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 2015), pp. 180-181.
[22] Quoted in N. Cleaver, *Grover Cleveland's New Foreign Policy: Arbitration, Neutrality, and the Dawn of American Empire* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 127.

from what were understood as traditional methods of expansion.[23] Subsequent acquisitions, including the Panama Canal Zone and the Danish West Indies, were supplemented by practices of economic imperialism and interventionism in the Central American and the Caribbean regions, widening the scope and reach of the United States Empire. Regardless of whether Americans supported or opposed this policy shift, the Monroe Doctrine had to be reinterpreted to both accommodate the process of overseas expansion and address the new security concerns that the nation now faced as a result.

Although the American Anti-Imperialist Movement invoked the Monroe Doctrine to prevent the annexation of the Philippines, they ultimately failed to convince advocates of imperial expansion that the doctrine forbade overseas colonial acquisitions. In enunciating his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt granted governmental approval to a new interpretation of the doctrine, one that sought to defend United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere through justifying the expansion of the United States Empire in 'familiar' terms, advocating imperial expansion as a legitimate defence of national core values. However, it is important to draw a distinction between the maintenance of regional hegemony and the expansion of the United States Empire as two distinct concepts when considering matters of national

[23] The nature of United States imperialism continues to attract significant interest among historians. Recent analyses of the United States Empire include: D. Immerwahr, 'The Greater United States: Territory and Empire in U.S. History', *Diplomatic History*, 40, no. 3 (2016), pp. 373-391; P. Kramer, 'Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World', *American Historical Review*, 116, no. 5 (2011), pp. 1348-1391; R. Immerman, *Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); M. Heiss, 'The Evolution of the Imperial Idea and U.S. National Identity', *Diplomatic History*, 26, no. 4 (2002), pp. 511-540; P. Kramer, 'Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910', *Journal of American History*, 88, no. 4 (2002), pp. 1315-1353; F. Ninkovich, *The United States and Imperialism* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001); E. Crapol, 'Coming to Terms with Empire: The Historiography of Late Nineteenth-Century American Foreign Relations', in M. Hogan (ed.), *Paths to Power: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations to 1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

security. This thesis identifies the former as the core value that the doctrine was deemed to embody rather than the latter. Initially, this relationship may seem backward. After all, hegemony is a form of imperialism that Charles Maier describes as 'potential empire, leadership where force has not become necessary to maintain control.'[24] However, in terms of discerning national core values, it was United States influence and dominance over the Americas that the nation sought to defend via the doctrine, rather than the entire range and scope of the nation's imperial activity. As such, empire was subservient to hegemony in the act of protecting the American way of life, and the Monroe Doctrine was reinterpreted to accommodate new forms of United States imperialism for the goal of securing and maintaining regional hegemony.

Yet the Monroe Doctrine did not simply transform into the Roosevelt Corollary and this thesis argues that it fractured in two. Historians have traditionally advocated the former argument and Walter LaFeber and Serge Ricard claim that the doctrine was reconstructed into a distinct new policy declaration that sought to facilitate the nation's imperial designs.[25] Whilst the Roosevelt Corollary was certainly distinctive from previous applications of the doctrine, this reading of the Monroe Doctrine's evolution lacks nuance. It upholds the notion that the doctrine evolved in a linear manner as it was reinterpreted over time, which unnecessarily simplifies the complexity of United States foreign relations during this period. The doctrine did not simply transform into the Roosevelt Corollary by virtue of a presidential enunciation. Instead, it fractured into two

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[24] C. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 63.

[25] S. Ricard, 'The Roosevelt Corollary', *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36, no. 1 (2006), p. 18; W. LaFeber, 'The Evolution of the Monroe Doctrine from Monroe to Reagan', in L. Gardner (ed.), *Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams* (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1986), pp. 123-132.

disparate yet interconnected interpretations as a variety of American elites within and without the White House and the State Department sought to reinterpret and debate its meaning. To appreciate the impact of the Monroe Doctrine upon United States foreign relations and national security, historians must subject it to a more nuanced gaze to better reflect the contested nature of United States foreign relations more broadly.

Latin American politicians and intellectuals were the first to raise dissent against the hegemony-facilitating interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and proposed its multilateralization during the first years of the twentieth century. Pan-Americanists in the United States soon adopted the notion of a Pan-Americanised Monroe Doctrine in their own rhetoric, arguing that some, if not all, of the American republics ought to maintain the doctrine together. These individuals interpreted the doctrine as a facilitator of inter-American cooperation and a policy that bound the Americas together for the benefit of mutual security. Rather than worsening the already decaying state of United States-Latin American relations through tightening the United States' imperial grip on the hemisphere, matters of security ought to be met by strengthening inter-American unity through cooperative and multilateral policy initiatives. Together, these two opposing reinterpretations of the doctrine presented divergent policy avenues for the United States to take, breaking its meaning apart as American elites scrutinised its application and failed to establish a consensus between these two antithetical core values. Although Niall Ferguson attests that the rise of the hegemonic United States Empire was inevitable and formed absent-mindedly in a condition of 'full-blown myopia', this was simply not the

case.[26] Hegemony was contested by Pan-American alternatives and rebuttals through efforts to renegotiate the Monroe Doctrine.

At its core, Pan-Americanism is the belief that the United States and the nations of Latin America share a special relationship and ought to cooperate for mutual benefits. Whilst this notion was grounded in geography at its most basic form, it gradually extended to politics, primarily in support of New World republicanism, and culture.[27] In his classic study, Arthur Whitaker argues that, like the Monroe Doctrine, Pan-Americanism was one of the many 'shifting and imperfect forms' of the 'Western Hemisphere idea' given political expression. This notion proposed that the peoples of the Western Hemisphere stood 'in a special relationship to one another which sets them apart from the rest of the world.'[28] It is not without reason that proposals for a multilateral Monroe Doctrine were made during the milieu of Pan-Americanism within the United States. In the 1880s, the Pan-American movement was initiated by the United States and was motivated to bring about inter-American unity to prevent European intervention in the Western Hemisphere and develop inter-American trade.[29] Despite the rise of Pan-Americanism in the early twentieth century, efforts to Pan-Americanise the Monroe Doctrine have received scant attention among historians.[30] In 2016, Juan Pablo Scarfi conducted the first focussed study through surveying the efforts of both Latin Americans

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[26] N. Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 294.
[27] For detailed definitions of Pan-Americanism, see: M. Petersen, 'Argentinian and Chilean Approaches to Modern Pan-Americanism, 1888-1930' (University of Oxford, Ph.D., 2014), pp. 21-30; J. Fagg, *Pan Americanism* (Malabar: Krieger Publishing, 1982), p. 3.
[28] A. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 1.
[29] D. Shenin, 'Rethinking Pan Americanism: An Introduction', in D. Shenin (ed.), *Beyond the Ideal: Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs* (Westport: Praeger, 2000), pp. 1-2.
[30] Mark Gilderhus' study of President Wilson's Pan-American policy is one of the few studies to examine the notion of a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine: M. Gilderhus, *Pan-American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere 1913-1921* (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1986).

and United States citizens to redefine the doctrine in four different aspects during the early twentieth century: from interventionist to non-interventionist; from unilateral to multilateral; from policy to international law; and from national to hemispheric. He argues that 'these hemispheric redefinitions of the doctrine allowed the United States to begin a progressive but still difficult and slow transition from interventionism to multilateral Pan-Americanism.'[31] Scarfi's study provides historians with some much-needed details on the early efforts to Pan-Americanise the doctrine and highlights the importance of Pan-Americanism as an ideological challenge to United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. This thesis builds upon his research by detailing a comprehensive account of the efforts within the United States to multilateralise the doctrine within the context of the Monroe Doctrine debate, and examining how Pan-Americanism impacted conceptions of United States national security during the early twentieth century.

Whilst Pan-Americanists aspired to high minded goals of unity and equality, policy makers frequently adopted Pan-Americanism as a disguise for unilateral gains. As such, Pan-Americanism is often criticised for being, in the words of David Shenin, the 'friendly face of U.S. dominance in the hemisphere.'[32] Benjamin Coates accurately highlights this tension, describing Pan-Americanism as a concept that 'simultaneously erased and heightened distinctions between North and South Americans,' legitimising United States geopolitical advancement through the rhetoric of shared Americanness.[33]

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[31] J. Scarfi, 'In the Name of the Americas: The Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898-1933', *Diplomatic History*, 40, no. 2 (2016), pp. 189-218.
[32] Shenin, 'Pan Americanism', p. 1.
[33] B. Coates, 'The Pan-American Lobbyist: William Eleroy Curtis and U.S. Empire, 1884-1899', *Diplomatic History*, 38, no. 1 (2014), p. 33.

Pan-Americanists have additionally been criticised for making assumptions about the reality of hemispheric unity. Mark Gilderhus argues that they 'presumed the existence of natural harmonies in the western hemisphere and reasoned that the creation of a functioning, regional system would benefit all participants by facilitating, among other things, the settlement of disputes, the expansion of trade, and the diminution of European influences.' Latin Americans were generally more concerned with disparities of wealth, power and culture than cooperating with the Colossus of the North, and often found Pan-Hispanic or Pan-Latin alternatives more desirable.[34]

Although historians have addressed the failures and imperial nature of Pan-Americanism during the early twentieth century, its role in the conception of national security has not. The historiography of United States-Latin American relations is predominately concerned with the hegemonic aspirations of the United States, which has led to Pan-American initiatives being overlooked. Since the 1960s, historians have tended to occupy what Gilderhus refers to as the 'radical perspective' of United States-Latin American relations, namely that 'the distinguishing feature of U.S. relations with Latin America has been the prevalence of conflict and exploitation.'[35] Whilst this thesis makes

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[34] Gilderhus, *Pan-American Visions*, pp. ix-xi. For more on the difficulties facing inter-American unity, see: G. Grandin, 'Your Americanism and Mine: Americanism and Anti-Americanism in the Americas', *American Historical Review*, 111, no. 4 (2006), pp. 1042-1066; A. McPherson, *Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 11-20; E. Rosenberg, 'World War I and Continental Solidarity', *Americas*, 31 (1975), pp. 313-334.

[35] M. Gilderhus, 'An Emerging Synthesis? U.S.-Latin American Relations since the Second World War', *Diplomatic History*, 16, no. 3 (1992), p. 431. Examples of this perspective include: B. Loveman, *No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere since 1776* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); M. Gilderhus, *The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2000); P. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2000); F. Niess, *A Hemisphere to Itself: A History of US-Latin American Relations*, trans. H. Drost (London: Zed, 1990); D. Healy, *Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean 1898-1917* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); H. Molineu, *U.S. Policy Toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); L. Langley, *The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire 1900-1934* (Lexington: University Press

no effort to downplay the severity of this power relationship, nor deny the imperial nature of Pan-American initiatives, it revisits Pan-Americanism through the Monroe Doctrine debate and scrutinises the relationship between notions of hegemony and cooperation and their impact upon United States national security. Although this thesis is based largely on mono-national research, it seeks to, in the words of Max Paul Friedman, acknowledge 'the enormous impact of the Western Hemisphere's only superpower without ignoring the role of Latin Americans in shaping their own history' through examining proposals for inter-American cooperation.[36] The tensions between core values of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation were at the heart of the debate over the Monroe Doctrine's meaning and this thesis explores the complicated relationship between these two notions that guided the nation's Latin American policy. Along with Andrew Tillman, Scarfi argues that scholars ought to devote more attention to the interconnections between hegemony and cooperation in the history of United States-Latin American relations to 'shed new light on the contradictions that have governed inter-American relations,' and this this thesis seeks to use the Monroe Doctrine to do so.[37]

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This study begins with the events of the Spanish-American War in 1898 and ends with the Monroe Doctrine centennial anniversary of 1923. It was during this period that an identifiable, protracted debate over the Monroe Doctrine took place among the decision-

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of Kentucky, 1983); W. LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963); W. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W. W. Norton, [1956] 2009).

[36] M. Friedman, 'Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations', *Diplomatic History*, 27, no. 5 (2003), p. 625.

[37] J. Scarfi and A. Tillman, 'Cooperation and Hegemony in US-Latin American Relations: An Introduction', in J. Scarfi and A. Tillman (eds), *Cooperation and Hegemony in US-Latin American Relations: Revisiting the Western Hemisphere Idea* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 2-12.

making class. It is important to emphasise that it was not just policy makers who poured their energies into reinterpreting the Monroe Doctrine; rather it was an entire class of elites who influenced the direction of United States foreign relations. As such, this thesis draws upon a wide range of source material to analyse the debate in its entirety. It was through public addresses, congressional debates, academic publications and conference papers, literary-political magazines, newspapers, and official and private correspondence that these Americans wrestled with the meaning and application of the doctrine. Through surveying the varied forums through which Americans debated the Monroe Doctrine, the staggering scale and reach of the debate becomes apparent - no citizen who held any interest in the foreign relations of the United States could have avoided the ensuing debate. The Wilson presidency oversaw the peak moment of interest and engagement with the doctrine and in 1914, the Director General of the Pan American Union, John Barrett, explained that there was 'hardly a day that we do not get requests from individuals or libraries for a list of books, articles, speeches, etc., on the Monroe Doctrine.'[38] Handbooks that prepped citizens on the important topics of the day frequently chose to address the doctrine and it found itself the subject of many political cartoons.[39] As historian George Blakeslee argued in 1914, Americans were faced with 'an epidemic of discussion regarding the Monroe Doctrine.'[40]

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[38] Barrett to Huntington-Wilson (20 January 1914), Box 36, John Barrett Papers [hereafter JBP], Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. [hereafter MDLC].

[39] R. Ringwalt, *Briefs on Public Questions With Selected Lists of References* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 2nd ed., 1906); E. Phelps (ed.), *Selected Articles on the Monroe Doctrine* (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 2nd ed., 1916). Despite its abstract and contested form, the doctrine was easy to caricature and was often represented as a wall, a barrier, a warning sign or a physical document in the hands of Uncle Sam, among some other more obscure personifications. As Bonnie Miller argues, cartooning was 'a vernacular art form with both "opinion-moulding" and "opinion-reflecting" capacities', and they offer an intriguing and often amusing insight into how the doctrine was understood: B. Miller, 'The Image-Makers' Arsenal in an Age of War and Empire, 1898–1899: A Cartoon Essay, Featuring the

Despite the prominence of the doctrine during this period, there has yet to be a study dedicated to the nuances of the Monroe Doctrine debate. Dexter Perkins' classic study on the doctrine's history presents a reliable overview of the period; however, it requires updating having been published over fifty years ago.[41] A number of historians have recognised the value of such a study, including Stephanson and Marco Mariano, who describe the early twentieth century as a period that 'witnessed the most sustained debate' over the doctrine and saw a 'massive use of the doctrine in the public discourse.'[42] Indeed, Greg Grandin has hinted at the underlying relationship between notions of hegemony and cooperation that came to the fore during the debate, highlighting that it revealed the tension between 'the particular interests of an ascending world power' and 'a justification of policy based on universal New World moralism.'[43] As such, this thesis fills a temporal and analytical gap that exists in the historiography of the Monroe Doctrine.

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Work of Charles Bartholomew (of the Minneapolis Journal) and Albert Wilbur Steele (of the Denver Post)', *Journal of American Studies*, 45, no. 1 (2010), p. 55.

[40] G. Blakeslee, 'Should the Monroe Doctrine Continue to be a Policy of the United States?', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting*, 8 (1914), p. 217.

[41] D. Perkins, *A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (London: Longmans, [1955] 1960). This study serves as a monumental amalgamation of Perkins' life-long research on the Monroe Doctrine. Perkins completed his doctoral studies in 1914 at the height of the Monroe Doctrine debate and the young historian readily contributed to the nationwide discussion. At the Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in April 1914, he argued that the doctrine had not protected Latin America against European aggression – a claim that was not willingly accepted by steadfast patriots of the time: Comments of Dexter Perkins in H. Bingham, 'The Latin American Attitude Toward the Monroe Doctrine', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting*, 8 (1914), pp. 197-199.

[42] Stephanson, 'A Riff', p. 23; M. Mariano, 'Identity, Alterity, and the "Growing Plant" of Monroeism in U.S. Foreign Policy Ideology', in M. Cullinane and D. Ryan (eds), *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Other* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), p. 65.

[43] G. Grandin, 'The Liberal Traditions in the Americas: Rights, Sovereignty, and the Origins of Liberal Multilateralism', *American Historical Review*, 117, no. 1 (2012), p. 72.

Although notions of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation dominated the Monroe Doctrine debate, several additional issues were interwoven into emerging conceptions of national security. The way in which Americans understood notions of race was particularly significant and is worth highlighting at the outset. Schoultz's excellent history of United States-Latin American relations argues that underlying United States interests in Latin America was a 'pervasive belief' that Latin Americans constituted an inferior branch of the human species.[44] This attitude was part of what Michael Hunt describes as an adherence to a 'hierarchy of race.' Hunt argues that American policy makers drew distinctions between the peoples of the world upon the basis of their skin colour when forming foreign policy and the people of Latin America were positioned half way up this hierarchy. Based upon the condemnatory 'black legend' of Spanish character, Latin American nations were perceived to be 'parodies of the republican principles that they claimed to embody.' Racial mixing further tarnished their reputation; however, the darker the skin the harsher the outlook. Haiti, for example, was often singled out as occupied by particularly inferior peoples.[45] Hunt argues that there were three particular images of Latin Americans within the United States. The first, the dark skinned Latin male, was perceived as lazy, cowardly, dishonest and corrupt. The second, the Latin female, was a much more positive, fairer-skinned image of a redeemable Latin living in what was depicted as a mongrelised society without succumbing to its degrading effects. It was the role of Americans to save this Latin and introduce her to civilisation and this image was popularised during the Spanish-American War. The third type, the black

[44] L. Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. xv-xvii.
[45] B. Plummer, *Haiti and the United States: The Psychological Moment* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992), pp. 1-3.

Latino child, developed as the United States drove for regional hegemony. Americans worried that the idea of a Latin female implied the benefits of racial mixing and reverted to an image that was deemed less appealing. Unwilling to sacrifice dominion over Latin Americans, United States elites perceived Latin Americans as poor and ignorant but capable of advancement under guidance.[46]

American adherence to a racial hierarchy was complicated further during the early twentieth century and had implications upon the ways in which the Monroe Doctrine was understood. South American nations were perceived in a more positive light than those of Central America and the Caribbean; however, there were further divisions drawn among the South American nations. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (collectively known as the ABC nations) attracted the most favour, placing them on a superior platform to other South American nations, who were in turn seen as more advanced than the Central American and Caribbean regions.[47] There was, as Ricardo Salvatore notes, the existence of a 'Great Divide' among the Andean and ABC nations within popular United States perceptions.[48] Mexico occupied an unusual position and its ranking among the other Latin American nations fluctuated continuously. Joseph Smith argues that the very act of referring to the other nations of the Western Hemisphere via their own distinctive groupings; South American, Central American or Caribbean, 'reflected contemporary progressive ideas, which distinguished between different nations and placed them in an ascending order of merit.'[49] What makes this racial division particularly important for

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[46] M. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 48-62.
[47] The term ABC was popularised in the 1910s, most notably after the ABC mediation of United States intervention in Mexico, which took place at Niagara Falls in May 1914.
[48] Salvatore, *Disciplinary Conquest*, pp. 4, 254-256.
[49] J. Smith, *Unequal Giants: Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Brazil, 1889-1930* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), p. 52.

this thesis is that it helped foster certain reinterpretations of the Monroe Doctrine. The apparent advancements of the ABC nations prompted many Americans to consider whether these nations ought to uphold the Monroe Doctrine alongside the United States. At the other end of the spectrum, the apparent inferiority of the Central American and Caribbean nations made these regions an important location for the stringent enforcement of the doctrine. Through the medium of race, the tensions that existed between notions of hegemony and cooperation were emphatically demonstrated.

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This thesis adopts a chronological approach and charts the development of the Monroe Doctrine debate over the course of the early twentieth century. Chapter One examines the origins of the debate in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. The clash between anti-imperialists and territorial expansionists demonstrated the contested nature of the doctrine as the American Anti-Imperialist Movement attempted to invoke the Monroe Doctrine in its campaign against the McKinley administration's policy of colonial overseas expansion. Through the act of invoking the Monroe Doctrine, anti-imperialists presented their idealised vision of the form the United States Empire ought to take, using the doctrine to differentiate between a structure, practice and policy of imperialism that they believed was consistent with American tradition, and one that was both akin to colonial European imperialism and antithetical to American ideals. Expansionists realised that the doctrine as interpreted by anti-imperialists was at odds with the direction of United States foreign policy, prompting them to reshape the doctrine's meaning, viewing it as a flexible and malleable policy that could accommodate overseas colonialism to

secure regional hegemony. Traditional policies were rejected as Americans reshaped conceptions of national security in the wake of imperial expansion.

Chapter Two outlines how the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine fractured once it was widely understood as a fluid set of guiding principles that were open to reinterpretation. Over the course of the following decade, two major reinterpretations of the doctrine emerged, one aimed at ensuring the hegemony of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, and the other aimed at fostering inter-American cooperation. The Monroe Doctrine formed a distinct discursive linkage between notions of hegemony and cooperation, serving as a means through which Americans sought to scrutinise the tensions between the two notions that underpinned conceptions of national security. Regional security demands, perceptions of racial inequality, and the importance of Latin American trade were all considerations that could arguably be met with a policy of hegemony or cooperation, and it was through debating the application of the Monroe Doctrine and its relationship to these issues that Americans sought to determine which core value was the most beneficial, or whether they could be reconciled.

Chapter Three examines the extent to which the Monroe Doctrine's meaning had fractured by the first presidential term of Woodrow Wilson. An unprecedented and concentrated debate erupted between 1913-1914 on the meaning and application of the doctrine, catalysed by the critical work of historian Hiram Bingham. As Americans continued to align the doctrine to notions of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation, the outbreak of the First World War complicated security matters even further. The United States initially looked upon the doctrine as a barrier warding off the conflict from the Americas; however, it soon became apparent that the belligerent nations

had altered the fabric of international relations and that the doctrine had to be reshaped to meet security demands. As such, the debate over the doctrine's application was amplified as Americans sought to respond to the war via policies of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation.

When the United States entered the First World War in 1917, the concurrent debate over the doctrine's meaning and application shifted in tenor and combined with the debate over post-war international organisation known as the treaty fight. Chapter Four examines how the two debates became symbiotic: as the treaty fight shaped the ways in which the Monroe Doctrine was reinterpreted, the Monroe Doctrine influenced the attitudes that Americans held toward a league of nations and the prospect of international organisation. This chapter seeks to modify and expand the traditional conceptual framework of the treaty fight through examining the role the doctrine played during the debate. By positioning the efforts to reinterpret the Monroe Doctrine's meaning and application within the narrative of the treaty fight, the debate over international organisation can be more accurately framed as a trichotomy: a debate between proponents of unilateralism, global organisation and regional organisation. To protect national core values, Americans were faced with three potential degrees of commitment to internationalism.

Chapter Five examines the ways in which the Monroe Doctrine was understood during its centennial anniversary. Several high-profile events were held across the United States in 1923 that celebrated and lauded the wisdom of the doctrine one hundred years after its enunciation, ranging from expositions to academic conferences. Yet the centennial was not an isolated episode in which the Monroe Doctrine momentarily held

the attention of the nation, rather it served as an important milestone in the debate over the meaning and application of the doctrine that had been taking place since the Spanish-American War. After one hundred years of service, the doctrine remained central to the way in which Americans understood the role of the United States in the world and its national security. The centennial served as an ideal moment in which American elites attempted to reconcile notions of hegemony and cooperation and determine the future course of United States foreign relations.

By 1923, the Monroe Doctrine was far removed from President James Monroe's original message. Over the period of the Monroe Doctrine debate, it had become a contested concept at the heart of wider debates over the conduct of United States foreign relations and the conception of national security, fracturing into two disparate yet related interpretations. It became aligned with a broad range of ideologies and issues, including isolationism, anti-colonialism, Pan-Americanism, regional hegemony, informal imperialism, and the reach of international law, and was an acute consideration for the United States decision-making class during key historical events, such as the acquisition of the Philippines, the Mexican Revolution, the construction of the Panama Canal, the First World War, and the debate over the League of Nations. Through reinterpreting the doctrine, American elites did not simply posit new directions in United States foreign policy - they emphasised the complexity and divisive nature of United States national security.

Chapter One: Manila or Monroe Doctrine?

Empire, Anti-Imperialism, and the Monroe Doctrine after the Spanish-American War (1898-1902)

The Spanish-American War of 1898 was a resounding victory for the United States. Spain's Pacific and Caribbean armed forces were defeated in the space of ten weeks and its imperial presence in the Western Hemisphere finally came to an end. The United States claimed the spoils of war and absorbed Spain's colonial possessions into its own imperial sphere, annexing Guam, Puerto Rico, and the far-flung Philippines and placing Cuba under the supervision of a protectorate.[1] With the annexation of Hawaii during the same year, the ascendency of the United States Empire was emphatically confirmed. Yet United States policy makers could not take this ascendency lightly. The expansion of the United States Empire drastically altered the nature of United States foreign relations and prompted a serious re-evaluation of national security. In 1900, international lawyer John Bassett Moore warned his fellow countrymen that they should not forget the 'graver meaning' of overseas expansion, because it brought with it 'an increase of national

[1] As Louis Pérez argues, the term Spanish-American War is problematic because of the emphasis it gives to the United States and Spain at the expense of Cuban and Filipino combatants: L. Pérez Jr., *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p. xii. However, for reasons of brevity, the term will be used throughout. Notable histories of the Spanish-American War include: T. Schoonover, *Uncle Sam's War of 1898 and the Origins of Globalization* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003); K. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); T. Paterson, 'United States Intervention in Cuba, 1898: Interpretations of the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War', *The History Teacher*, 29, no. 3 (1996), pp. 341-361; J. Smith, *The Spanish-American War: Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific, 1895-1902* (London: Longmans, 1995); D. Trask, *The War with Spain in 1898* (New York: Macmillan, 1981); P. Foner, *The Spanish-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism*, 2 vols (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).

responsibilities.'[2] Not only did the United States now have overseas territory and colonial subjects to defend (and pacify), the new composition of its empire had to be reconciled with traditional core values.

This chapter analyses the moment in which the Monroe Doctrine began to assume the role of a national security framework and became the subject of an intense and protracted debate in the United States. As anti-imperialists and territorial expansionists argued over the nature of United States imperialism in the aftermath of the war with Spain, the doctrine was scrutinised to determine how vital it was to the national security of the United States and was ultimately perceived as a fluid policy that was open to renegotiation by the turn of the century. Anti-imperialists invoked the doctrine to protest the annexation of the Philippines and argued that the two were incompatible. For these traditionalists, overseas expansion transformed the United States Empire into a distinctly European-style empire that would not only endanger the lives of its people, but jeopardise United States regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere – the core value that they believed the Monroe Doctrine embodied.[3] Abandoning the doctrine posed external threats to national security by thrusting the United States into the colonial conflicts of the Far East and inviting European powers to seek conquest in Latin America, and internal

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[2] J. Moore, 'A Hundred Years of American Diplomacy', *Harvard Law Review*, 14, no. 3 (1900), p. 181.

[3] For studies of the American Anti-Imperialist Movement, see: I. Tyrrell and J. Sexton (eds), *Empire's Twin: U.S. Anti-Imperialism from the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015); M. Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism: 1898-1909* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); J. Zwick, 'The Anti-Imperialist Movement, 1898-1921', in V. Bouvier (ed.), *Whose America? The War of 1898 and the Battles to Define the Nation* (Westport: Praeger, 2001); R. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists 1898-1900, with a new foreword* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1992); R. Welch Jr., *Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979); D. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War* (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1972); E. Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate 1890-1920* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970); F. Harrington, 'The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900', *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 22, no. 2 (1935), pp. 211-230.

threats by facilitating domestic militarism and transforming the nation into the type of empire that would inevitably decline.[4] Through the act of invoking the Monroe Doctrine against Philippine annexation, anti-imperialists presented their idealised vision of the form the United States Empire ought to take. Anti-imperialists were more anti-colonial in their outlook than outright anti-imperialist, given their distaste for overseas colonies rather than all forms of empire and policies of imperialism. They invoked the doctrine to differentiate between a structure, practice and policy of imperialism that they believed was consistent with American tradition and one that was akin to colonial European imperialism and antithetical to American ideals. As Paul Kramer notes, the overseas colonial empire that the United States formed through the annexation of the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico can be considered an 'annex' to the wider informal United States Empire that most anti-imperialists favoured.[5] For many anti-imperialists, the Monroe Doctrine justly facilitated the United States' ability to establish a form of hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. It was specifically the formation of the 'Greater United States' through a policy of extra-hemispheric colonialism that was deemed inconsistent with the Monroe Doctrine and a threat to regional hegemony.[6]

Because the anti-imperialists ultimately failed to prevent the annexation of the Philippines, the doctrine was placed in an unusual theoretical position: if it was deemed incompatible with Philippine annexation, why did it not cease to exist and fall out of political rhetoric? Anders Stephanson notes that this 'sticky point was either evaded by

[4] Anti-imperialists frequently argued that traditional empires were destined to fall, citing the Roman Empire as a typical illustration. See for example: M. Swift, *Imperialism and Liberty* (Los Angeles: Ronbroke Press, 1899), pp. 194-196. See also: F. Hilfrich, 'Falling Back Into History: Conflicting Visions of National Decline and Destruction in the Imperialism Debate around the Turn of the Century', in K. Krakau (ed.) *The American Nation – National Identity – Nationalism* (Münster: LIT, 1997), pp. 149-152.
[5] Kramer, 'Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons', pp. 1316-1318.
[6] Immerwahr, 'Greater United States', pp. 373-391.

rhetorical claims to the effect that the spirit of generosity expressed in the Monroe Doctrine vis-à-vis Latin America was now merely being extended; or it was peremptorily dismissed.'[7] Whilst this summary is true, it does not provide a full explanation. To understand why the doctrine persisted, one must examine how territorial expansionists sought to square Philippine annexation with the meaning and application of the doctrine. Expansionists perceived colonial expansion as a means through which to strengthen United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and they actively reshaped the doctrine's meaning and application to align new policy developments with existing ideological values. This process set the precedent for a greater and protracted division among United States elites as to the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine and the core values at the heart of United States national security that would develop over the subsequent decade.

After the Spanish-American War, expansionists realised that the Monroe Doctrine as interpreted by the anti-imperialists was at odds with the direction of United States foreign policy. Both sides of the debate agreed that the doctrine facilitated regional hegemony; however, it was the implementation of imperial policies in pursuit of this goal that caused contention. In response to the anti-imperialist protest, foreign policy elites reinterpreted the doctrine as a flexible and malleable policy that was open to renegotiation as events dictated. By reconstructing the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, they argued that Philippine annexation was compatible with the maintenance of United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and opened the possibility of justifying

[7] A. Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), pp. 92-93.

future policy developments based on defending the core values that the Monroe Doctrine represented.

Out of Line with American History – Philippine Annexation and the Monroe Doctrine

In the events leading up to the Spanish-American War, the Monroe Doctrine was almost entirely absent. Dexter Perkins notes that it was rarely invoked to justify the war or the territorial expansion that followed, which is surprising because the doctrine had been previously invoked throughout the nineteenth century to serve expansionist designs and it would not have been out of place to rationalise the conflict with Spain as an effort to prevent European interference in Cuba.[8] Jay Sexton similarly describes the doctrine as 'the dog that did not bark' during the conflict and argues that large-policy advocates such Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, who sought to use the war with Spain to directly facilitate territorial expansion, deliberately avoided the term. The national exceptionalism that the doctrine embodied 'contradicted their rationale for colonial expansion' and it had become associated with the preceding Democratic Cleveland administration, whose members were openly opposed to territorial expansion after the war with Spain.[9] It was for these reasons that Manifest Destiny was the idealistic weapon of choice chosen by territorial expansionists.[10]

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[8] Perkins, *Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 196-197. Senator William Mason of Illinois was one of the few who did invoke the doctrine in making the case for war with Spain, arguing in February 1898 that the United States must intervene in Cuba or 'the Monroe Doctrine is a lie': quoted in P. Gleijeses, '1898: The Opposition to the Spanish-American War', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 35, no. 4 (2003), p. 682.

[9] Sexton, *Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 211-213.


[10] See for example: H. Powers, 'The War as a Suggestion of Manifest Destiny', *Annales of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 12 (1898), pp. 1-20; 'The Prizes of Victory', *Munsey's Magazine* (July 1898), pp. 522-553; *Washington Post* (23 May), p. 6; *Los Angeles Times* (30 April 1899), p. B7.

This left the Monroe Doctrine in the rhetorical armoury for the anti-imperialists to wield. The doctrine was invoked in speeches, letters, and publications to demonstrate that the annexation of the Philippines would abrogate the venerated foreign policy tradition and thrust the United States into an uncertain and dangerous future. In the words of Senator Charles James Faulkner, anti-imperialists believed that abandoning a doctrine that had 'proven so beneficial to our national peace and security' was not 'the evidence of wisdom, nor the inauguration of a sound policy for this country.'[11] Anti-imperialists objected to Philippine annexation for a variety of reasons, including constitutional, moral, racial, and political motives, and the Monroe Doctrine, like Washington's Farewell Address and the Declaration of Independence, represented a historic abstract political principle that was deemed incompatible with a policy of imperialism (Figure 1.1). Whilst some anti-imperialists were certainly sympathetic to the cause of the Filipinos, and other anti-imperialist causes around the globe, it was the destruction of American traditions that acted as the driving motivation of the movement. These historic principles were what differentiated the republic-empire of the United States from the empires of Europe and, as such, they held a 'very real meaning' for anti-imperialists.[12]

Aside from one or two outlying individuals, anti-imperialists were almost entirely unified in the way in which they interpreted the Monroe Doctrine.[13] This is significant because the American Anti-Imperialist Movement is renowned among historians for its

[11] *Washington Post* (6 November 1898), p. 32.
[12] Harrington, 'Anti-Imperialist Movement', pp. 211-213.
[13] Yale's William Graham Sumner is the most notable anti-imperialist critic of the Monroe Doctrine. He argued that the Monroe Doctrine was imperial in nature and referred to it as the 'Monroe fetish': W. Sumner, 'Earth Hunger or the Philosophy of Land Grabbing', in W. Sumner, *Earth-Hunger and Other Essays*, ed. A. Keller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1913), p. 59; W. Sumner, *Conquest of the United States by Spain* (Boston: Dana Estes and Co., 1899), p. 31. Stanford's David Starr Jordan expressed similar

Figure 1.1: 'Expansion'



"EXPANSION."

The water-cure method of extorting from Uncle Sam the confession that an Empire is better than a Republic.

Source: *The Public* (31 January 1902)

disunity. Indeed, the prominent anti-imperialist and grandson of John Quincy Adams, Charles Francis Adams Jr., described anti-imperialism as 'an incoherent, inarticulate mass of discontent.'[14] This is not to argue that a commitment to the doctrine can be considered another 'enduring ideological bond of the movement,' as Michael Cullinane demonstrates that the concept of liberty was; however, the doctrine was certainly a topic

views, but he nonetheless invoked the doctrine for the anti-imperialist cause: D. Jordan, *Imperial Democracy* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1899), pp. 19-20.

[14] Adams to Bryce (31 May 1900), Reel 69, Viscount James Bryce Papers [hereafter VJBP], Weston Library, Bodleian Libraries, University of Oxford [hereafter WLUO].

of significant internal consensus.[15] For example, the National Association of Anti-Imperialist Clubs (NAAIC), a splinter organisation of the Anti-Imperialist League (AIL), positioned the Monroe Doctrine in pride of place alongside the United States Constitution and the Declaration of Independence in Article 1 Section 1 of its own constitution as a political principle that anti-imperialists needed to strive to maintain.[16] In a treatise titled *Manila or Monroe Doctrine?*, anti-imperialist John Chetwood argued that invoking the Monroe Doctrine would bring about a decisive verdict against the acquisition of the Philippines, trumping all other concerns. The doctrine had 'been a rudder to the ship of state and a guarantee of good faith to the whole world' and the prospect of its abandonment was 'a more momentous issue than has engaged the public mind since the close of the Civil War.'[17] Even the leader of the Filipino armed forces that fought against Spanish rule during the Philippine Revolution and the Spanish-American War, Emilio Aguinaldo, recognised the power of the Monroe Doctrine and invoked it during an address on the topic of Philippine independence.[18] Anti-imperialists viewed the Monroe Doctrine as a historic cornerstone of United States foreign policy that had ably directed the nation's foreign relations with both the nations of Europe and the Western Hemisphere since its enunciation in 1823 and they believed that Philippine annexation presented a rupture with its tenets of non-entanglement and anti-colonialism. The United

[15] Cullinane, *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism*, pp. 5-6.
[16] The NAAIC's constitution was printed in the organisation's magazine *The Republic* to be used as a basis for new anti-imperialist organisations: *The Republic*, 1, no. 2 (1900), Reel 112, Carl Schurz Papers [hereafter CSP], MDLC. The AIL was the most prominent anti-imperialist organisation. Richard Welch argues that it provided 'the organizational structure for a large part of that protest' and Selig Adler dubs the league as the 'the first important national foreign policy pressure group' of the twentieth century: Welch, *Response to Imperialism*, pp. 56-57; S. Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction* (New York: The Free Press, 1957), p. 26.
[17] J. Chetwood, *Manila or Monroe Doctrine?* (New York: Robert Lewis Weed, 1898), p. 3. Chetwood's short book is a rare example of an anti-imperialist arguing against Philippine annexation based solely on the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine. Unfortunately, Chetwood himself remains an enigma, having left little trace in the historical record.
[18] *New York Times* (2 October 1898), p. 22.

States had no reason to become involved in extra-hemispheric affairs via the Philippines and any colonial gains were simply not worth the abandonment of a tried and tested foundational tradition.

In their advocacy of the Monroe Doctrine, anti-imperialists demonstrated their adherence to the Western Hemisphere Idea. The doctrine framed a division between the republican United States and a monarchical and colonial Europe, denoting the Western Hemisphere as the region in which the United States' national interests laid and warning against foreign wars and European intrigue. For anti-imperialists, annexing the Philippines would draw the United States out of the Western Hemisphere where its primary geopolitical interests lay. As Colonel Thomas Livermore argued, the Western Hemisphere was the region 'where we already have our burden' rather than in 'remote territories like the Philippines.'[19] As such, the Monroe Doctrine was deemed to enforce what Major John Parker described as an 'implied limitation' upon the reach of United States foreign policy. The doctrine not only declared that the United States should 'defend the Western Hemisphere from outside interference, but inversely, that we will refrain from unnecessary interference in the affairs of the Eastern Hemisphere.'[20]

However, the problem was more than a concern with maintaining the traditional geopolitical interests of the United States. Anti-imperialists argued that abstaining from extra-hemispheric expansion permitted the maintenance of the "other half" of the Monroe Doctrine that justified the United States' opposition to any European interference in the

[19] Letter from Thomas Livermore in *In the Name of Liberty: Anti-Imperialist Meeting, Tremont Temple, April 4, 1899: Protest Against the Philippine Policy* (Boston: The Anti-Imperialist League, 1899), p. 24. See also: C. Adams Jr., *Imperialism and the Tracks of Our Forefathers* (Boston: Dana Estes & Company, 1899), pp. 12-13; Jordan, *Imperial Democracy*, pp. 107-108; E. Winslow, 'The Anti-Imperialist Faith', *North American Review*, 175, no. 553 (1902), p. 815.
[20] J. Parker, 'What Shall We Do With the Philippines?', *The Forum* (February 1902), p. 669.

Western Hemisphere. Acquiring the Philippines would function as an abrogation of the doctrine and invite European nations to seek territory in the Americas. The American Peace Society's magazine *The Advocate for Peace* adeptly summarised this position in an article titled 'Criminal Use of the Monroe Doctrine':

> To suppose that we can push our sovereignty at will over the islands of the Pacific, to the coast of Asia, and can hover threateningly over the "spheres of influence" of the European powers, and then expect these "expanding" nations to quietly hold aloof from the vast unfilled territories of South America and to endure forever our vaunted paramountcy over the whole western world, is the height of absurdity … If the half of the Monroe Doctrine which applies to our conduct in the eastern hemisphere has by our own act ceased to be operative, the European nations are perfectly consistent in declaring that the other half is dead also.[21]

Therefore, upholding the Monroe Doctrine was perceived by anti-imperialists as a delicate balancing act between the United States and the nations of Europe, one that would crumble if the Philippines were annexed. Maintaining the doctrine demanded restraint on both sides and was, as former Vice-President Adlai Stevenson described it, a 'binding force' that applied to and limited the geopolitical activity of the United States as well as European powers.[22] Charles Francis Adams Jr. looked back at the way in which the United States upheld the Monroe Doctrine against the United Kingdom in 1895 during the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute as an example of how the United States ought to act. By reasserting what Adams called the 'Hands-off' principle of the doctrine in

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[21] 'Criminal Use of the Monroe Doctrine', *The Advocate of Peace* (June 1900), p. 125.

[22] A. Stevenson, 'A Republic Can Have No Subjects', in W. Bryan (ed.), *Republic or Empire?: The Philippine Question* (Chicago: The Independence Company, 1899), pp. 270-271. See also: G. Seward, *The Philippine Question*, Montclair, New Jersey (21 October 1898), Reel 23, John Hay Papers [hereafter JHP], MDLC; Untitled speech delivered at Omaha, Nebraska (14 June 1898), Box 50, William Jennings Bryan Papers [hereafter WJBP], MDLC.

1895, the United States had chosen not to establish a protectorate in Venezuela, despite an alleged history of instability in the nation. This had been a 'far-seeing, beneficent, and strictly American' policy and it followed from this, Adams argued, that the United States should be true to its own traditions: 'Having relieved the Spanish islands from the dominion of Spain, we should declare concerning them a policy of "Hands-off," both on our own part and on the part of other powers.'[23]

Extending the geopolitical interests of the United States outside the Western Hemisphere was additionally perceived as a dangerous decision. Alongside inviting European influence in Latin America, anti-imperialists argued that acquiring the Philippines would tie up the United States in the tumultuous diplomatic affairs of the Far East. As John Chetwood outlined, anti-imperialists perceived Asia as an 'annex of Europe' and if the United States acquired the Philippines it would find itself 'in a nest of European or Japanese dependencies' and exposed to European colonial conflicts.[24] According to Carl Schurz, the German-born former Secretary of the Interior, the United States would be exposed to and become involved in the European balance of power that the Monroe Doctrine had sought to avoid.[25] A cartoon from the *Washington Post* emphasised that however tempting annexation was, colonial imperialism was European in nature and aligned with conquest and aggression, whereas the Monroe Doctrine demanded anti-imperialism and a rejection of annexation (Figure 1.2).

[23] Adams, *Imperialism*, pp. 35-36.
[24] Chetwood, *Manila or Monroe Doctrine?*, pp. 18-19.
[25] C. Schurz 'Our Future Foreign Policy' (19 August 1898), Reel 97, CSP, MDLC.

Figure 1.2: ‘Uncle Sam’s Temptation’



Source: *Washington Post* (26 June 1898)

Anti-imperialists additionally predicted that abandoning the Monroe Doctrine and annexing the Philippines would make the formation of larger armed forces a necessity, which was largely opposed by anti-imperialists as both an unnecessary financial burden

and facilitator of domestic militarism. Andrew Carnegie, the famous industrialist who offered to buy the Philippines its independence from the United States government for $20 million, was particularly adamant on this issue. Annexing the Philippines would destroy the oceanic barrier that had protected the United States' territory and would drag the nation into a region that was a hotbed of conflict: 'It is chiefly this Far Eastern question which keeps every shipyard, gunyard, and armor yard in the world busy night and day, Sunday and Saturday, forging engines of destruction.' The United States did not have a strong enough navy to compete with the other imperial powers and would thus have to either increase military spending or rely on a humiliating and unreliable alliance with Britain to ensure the safety of the Philippines. The United States could increase its armed forces in strength and number if necessary, but this was the major downside of Philippine annexation for Carnegie. Militarism would fester within the United States and would suppress the moral forces that made the United States a higher civilisation.[26] In short, the Philippines would bring all the evils of colonial conflict to the United States' front door. Capturing these sentiments, attorney turned anti-imperialist poet Howard Taylor wrote the following lines in the 'The Creed of the Flag' - an attack on imperialism written at the request of presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan:

Must we turn to the Old World, again,
With the penitent Prodigal's cry?
Must we arm us and march in the van
Of Europe's barbaric parade

[26] A. Carnegie, 'Americanism versus Imperialism', *North American Review*, 168, no. 506 (1899), pp. 1-5; A. Carnegie, 'Distant Possessions: The Parting of the Ways', *North American Review*, 167, no. 501 (1898), p. 242.

And boom out a gunpowder gospel to man

To open a pathway for trade?[27]

Prior to the annexation of the Philippines, the United States put an end to the longstanding debate over the proposed annexation of Hawaii.[28] As the war against Spain raged on, Congress resumed its debate on whether to annex the islands and on 14 June. President William McKinley elected not to return the Philippines to Spain, which motivated the House to vote in favour of Hawaiian annexation the following day. The following month the Senate approved the annexation resolution which was signed by the President on 7 July. Whilst congressmen who opposed Hawaiian annexation invoked the Monroe Doctrine in a similar manner to the subsequent protest of the Anti-Imperialist Movement, it must be noted that anti-imperialist sentiment was not as vocal in the Hawaiian case.[29] All anti-imperialists opposed the annexation of the Philippines, yet many had fewer qualms with Hawaiian annexation. As Robert Beisner argues, the 'Hawaiian issue caused considerable disunity and confusion' among the American Anti-Imperialist Movement.[30]

Theobald Otjen of Wisconsin differentiated between Hawaii and the Philippines, arguing that Hawaiian annexation ought to be an exception to the United States' policy of opposition to the acquisition of colonial territory, because the islands were 'practically a

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[27] H. Taylor, 'The Creed of the Flag', Box 22, WJBP, MDLC.

[28] On United States-Hawaiian relations prior to annexation, see: T. Osborne, *Empire Can Wait: American Opposition to Hawaiian Annexation, 1893-1898* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1981); M. Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

[29] For statements of opposition to the annexation of Hawaii based on the Monroe Doctrine, see: U.S. Congress. Senate. Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Congressional Record* (30 June 1898), pp. 6517-6544; U.S. Congress. House. Proposed Annexation of Hawaii, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Appendix to the Congressional Record* (14 June 1898), pp. 633-637; U.S. Congress. House. Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Appendix to the Congressional Record* (15 June 1898), pp. 714-719; *The Nation* (23 June 1898), p. 470.

[30] Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, p. 221.

protectorate' and within the sphere of the Monroe Doctrine already.[31] This was not the first time that the scope of the Monroe Doctrine had been applied to Hawaii, as in 1842 Secretary of State Daniel Webster had argued much the same.[32] Samuel Barney of Wisconsin posited that annexation was justifiable 'not as an initiatory step in a colonial policy, but rather as an act to protect our present national individuality and to secure us from foreign intervention with affairs upon the American continent.' It followed, he argued, that annexation was 'a natural result and consummation of the Monroe doctrine than a departure from it.'[33] Daniel Ermentrout of Pennsylvania was critical of the ways in which anti-annexationists invoked the Monroe Doctrine, describing their line of argument as 'without foundation.' The doctrine was proclaimed to prevent Europe from 'intermeddling with us' and the acquisition of the islands would only 'strengthen our means of defense against European intermeddling.'[34] For proponents of annexation the motive was clear: if the United States did not acquire the islands, another rival nation would and the nation's regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere would come under threat (Figure 1.3).

Even though Philippine annexation was deemed incompatible with the Monroe Doctrine, anti-imperialists did not simply wish to abandon the Philippines after the war. After all, many anti-imperialists had supported the war against Spain in 1898 on anti-colonial grounds and saw the Cuban protectorate as an acceptable outcome of the

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[31] U.S. Congress. House. Proposed Annexation of Hawaii, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Appendix to the Congressional Record* (11 June 1898), pp. 496-502.
[32] Sexton, *Monroe Doctrine*, p. 112.
[33] U.S. Congress. House. Proposed Annexation of Hawaii, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Appendix to the Congressional Record* (11 June 1898), pp. 560-562.
[34] U.S. Congress. House. Proposed Annexation of Hawaii, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Appendix to the Congressional Record* (14 June 1898), pp. 648-652.

Figure 1.3: Cartoon Depicting American Desire to Annex Hawaii



Source: *Saint Paul Globe* (17 June 1897)

conflict.[35] According to the legal scholar Ernst Freund, a nation placed under a protectorate would relinquish control of its foreign relations, maintain armies solely for the purposes of upholding domestic order and aiding its protector against common enemies, only appoint civil officers with the consent of its protector, but retain control of

[35] For example, after war was declared against Spain, William Jennings Bryan informed President McKinley that he was willing to 'perform to the best of my ability any duty to which you … may see fit to assign me' in the conflict: Bryan to McKinley (25 April 1898), Box 20, WJBP, MDLC.

its internal government.[36] Subjecting the Philippines to this guardianship was deemed acceptable by many anti-imperialists. Like their rival expansionists, most anti-imperialists adhered to the concept of a racial hierarchy, which positioned the Anglo-Saxon race as racially superior to Filipinos. This was, of course, another important reason why anti-imperialists rejected annexation, eager to avoid the admission of Filipinos into the Union; however, it also demanded that the United States act out a civilising mission.[37] Senator George Hoar pleaded that the United States needed to protect the Filipinos from the 'cupidity of any other power until they could establish their own independence in freedom and in honor,' but that it had to do so by keeping 'to the old channels.'[38] The Filipinos, William Jennings Bryan argued, should be granted independence and protected 'from outside interference while they work out their destiny,' just as the United States would provide for Cuba. The establishment of a temporary protectorate in the Philippines, rather than annexation, would hardly be a burdensome task, as the anti-imperialists believed that the United States had acted as a protector of the Central and South American republics under the Monroe Doctrine for almost a century prior. Here Bryan differentiated between European and American protectorates: 'An American protectorate gives to the nation protected the advantage of our strength, without making it the victim of greed,' whereas a European protectorate resulted in the 'exploitation of the ward by the guardian.' Ultimately, the Monroe Doctrine had acted as a shield for Latin

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[36] E. Freund, 'The Control of Dependencies Through Protectorates', *Political Science Quarterly*, 14, no. 1 (1899), pp. 19-38.

[37] On the racial dimensions of the debate over Philippine annexation, see: P. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); W. Williams, 'United States Indian Policy and the Debate over Philippine Annexation: Implications for the Origins of American Imperialism', *Journal of American History*, 66 (1980), pp. 810-831; C. Lasch, 'The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man', *The Journal of Southern History*, 24, no. 3 (1958), pp. 319-331.

[38] G. Hoar, *The Conquest of the Philippines: Extracts from the Speech of Hon. George F. Hoar, of Massachusetts, in the United States Senate, Thursday, April 12, 1900* (Washington: s.n., 1900), p. 2.

America for three quarters of a century without inflicting any burdens upon the United States and ought to be replicated in the Philippines rather than committing to annexation.[39]

Andrew Carnegie similarly pondered why the Philippines should be annexed rather than put under a protectorate, invoking the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere as justification:

> Cuba is under the shield of the Monroe doctrine; no foreign interference is possible there. Place the Philippines under similar conditions until they have a stable government, when eight millions of people can be trusted to protect themselves. The truth is that none of the powers would risk the hostility of eight millions of people, who had tasted the hope of Independence. "Free and Independent" are magical words, never forgotten, and rarely unrealized.[40]

George Hoar made plain that it was the duty of the United States to protect both Cuban and Filipino liberty, but crucially outlined that it had to protect these nations against the greed and ambition of the United States itself. In an open letter, he declared that:

> If we were bound in honor and in righteousness, bound by the history of our past, bound by the principles and pledges of our own people, to abstain from depriving Cuba of the liberty we had given her because it was right, we are, in my judgement, all the more bound to abstain from

[39] 'Imperialism', W. Bryan, *Speeches of William Jennings Bryan*, vol. 2, ed. M. Bryan (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1909), pp. 46-47.
[40] Carnegie, 'Americanism versus Imperialism', p. 12. Carnegie frequently referred to the 'magic words "Free and Independent"' in his demands for Philippine independence. See for example: Carnegie to Hay (27 December 1898), Reel 6, JHP, MDLC.

> depriving the people of the Philippine islands of their liberties because it is right.[41]

Indeed, when the Platt Amendment formalised the United States protectorate over Cuba in 1901, Hoar described it as 'a proper and necessary stipulation for the application of the Monroe Doctrine.'[42]

After being charged by a New York newspaper that he only opposed the annexation of the Philippines to allow Germany the chance to acquire the islands, Carl Schurz claimed that Germany would not want the islands because 'a sensible government would be about as eager to grab that archipelago as a prudent dog would be to grab a porcupine.' To Schurz, President McKinley was seemingly unaware that under the Monroe Doctrine the United States had protected Latin America with a protectorate by demanding that European nations stop short of infringing their territorial integrity and independence, all without the need for annexation or the burden of a large navy. In turn, the application of this protectorate ought to be same for the Philippines.[43] Turning to the musings of former President Benjamin Harrison, it becomes clear it was only outright annexation that was deemed to abrogate the Monroe Doctrine rather than a limited form of involvement. He too argued that the implication of the Monroe Doctrine was that 'we shall leave the rest of the world alone'; however, he often expressed a desire to see the United States 'secure a snug little harbor for a coaling station' in the Philippines to obtain both commercial and strategic benefits.[44] Harrison's opinions are perhaps not surprising

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[41] G. Hoar, *Our Duty to the Philippines* (Boston: New England Anti-Imperialist League, 1900), pp. 3-9.
[42] George Hoar quoted in Sexton, *Monroe Doctrine*, p. 219.
[43] 'For Truth, Justice and Liberty' (28 September 1900) in F. Bancroft (ed.), *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz*, vol. 6 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), pp. 248-249.
[44] 'Former President Harrison' in Ross to Harrison (20 May 1898); Harrison to Gilder (20 May 1898), Reel 41, Harrison to Foster (10 March 1900), Reel 42, Benjamin Harrison Papers [hereafter BHP], MDLC.

when one recalls that he had attempted, reluctantly, to annex Hawaii during his own presidency, but his statements only reinforce the intense opposition among the anti-imperialists to the complete annexation of the Philippines.[45] Harrison may have been satisfied with the strategic location of the Philippines, but he still argued that the United States had 'done something out of line with American history' by acquiring 'insular regions, situated in the tropics, and in another hemisphere.'[46]

A handful of anti-imperialists realised that a Philippine protectorate would draw less criticism from Latin American nations than annexation. Carl Schurz argued that the Monroe Doctrine had gained the United States the respect of the Latin American republics by protecting them from European interference. How, he asked, would turning a war of liberation against Spain 'into a war of conquest affect the relations of the United States with their Southern neighbors?' For Schurz, it seemed obvious that Philippine annexation would fill Latin Americans with dread.[47] Former Senator George Boutwell similarly argued that the weaker nations of the world would view the United States with caution if it annexed the Philippines, claiming that there would be no guarantee that 'our flag may not be carried across the Rio Grande into Mexico, or to the mouth of the Amazon, or to the city of Rio Janeiro.'[48] Diplomatic dispatches from Latin America offered some confirmation of this expectation. Charles Page Bryan, the minister to Brazil, reported several instances in which these fears were expressed. The newspaper *Cidade de*

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[45] G. Baker Jr., 'Benjamin Harrison and Hawaiian Annexation: A Reinterpretation', *Pacific Historical Review*, 33, no. 3 (1964), p. 296; Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire*, p. 188.
[46] 'The Status of Annexed Territory and of its Free Civilized Inhabitants' (No date), Reel 121, BHP, MDLC.
[47] C. Schurz, 'Thoughts on American Imperialism', *The Century* (September 1898), pp. 783-784.
[48] G. Boutwell, 'Address by the President', *Annual Meeting of the Anti-Imperialist League, Now the New England Anti-Imperialist League, at Wesleyan Hall, Boston, Saturday, November 25, 1899* (New England Anti-Imperialist League, 1899), p. 22.

Rio argued that Brazilians ought to have no faith in the future course of United States foreign policy and Eneas Martins, the chairman of Brazil's Committee on Foreign Relations, declared that the Spanish-American War was an injustice and protested against United States imperialism, declaring that the 'victory of the North Americans meant the subjection of America by Americans by a practical and real application of egoistic Monroeism.'[49] The minister to Nicaragua, Costa Rica and El Salvador, William Merry, reported that the Costa Rican paper *La Republica* argued that the Monroe Doctrine was 'undergoing a radical and alarming transformation' as the United States strove to become 'Lord and Master' of all the Americas.[50] It was for these reasons that the prospect of the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine was so loathed by anti-imperialists.

When Andrew Carnegie published his autobiography in 1920, he argued that Philippine annexation represented a 'serious departure from our traditional policy of avoiding distant and disconnected possessions and keeping our empire within the continent.'[51] His recollection aptly summarised the way in which the Anti-Imperialist Movement interpreted the structure of the United States Empire in the debate after the Spanish-American War. By invoking the Monroe Doctrine in their protest against the annexation of the Philippines, anti-imperialists differentiated between what they understood as the distinct nature of United States and European imperialism. The Monroe

[49] Bryan to Hay (9 June 1899), Reel 66, Despatches from United States Ministers to Brazil, 1809-1906 [hereafter DMB], Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 [hereafter RDS], National Archives II, College Park, Maryland [hereafter NAII]. After President McKinley's assassination in 1901, Bryan reported that similar comments appeared in the Brazilian press. For example, the *Correio de Manha* attacked the achievements of the late President, arguing that the Spanish-American War was a repudiation of the Monroe Doctrine: Bryan to Hay (19 October 1901), Reel 68, DMB, RDS, NAII.

[50] Merry to Hay (20 November 1900), Reel 86, Dispatches from United States Ministers to Central America, 1824-1906 [hereafter DMCA], RDS, NAII. Merry was critical of this argument and complained a few years later that Central Americans had quickly forgotten the Venezuelan boundary dispute of 1895 in which the United States had demonstrated that it was willing to fight Britain in defence of Latin American interests: Merry to Hay (9 January 1902), Reel 90, DMCA, RDS, NAII.

[51] A. Carnegie, *Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920), p. 358.

Doctrine embodied and represented a form of imperialism, namely informal imperialism and hegemony in Latin America that was deemed as compatible with national tradition. The empire was understood as being limited to the Western Hemisphere and needed to be protected from European designs by an adherence to the delicate diplomatic balance that the Monroe Doctrine had established and maintained. Extra-hemispheric colonialism would drag the United States into a system of inter-imperial rivalry in the Far East, whereas reliance on a system of protectorates would alleviate diplomatic risk whilst providing potential economic and strategic benefits and fulfilling the civilising mission of the nation. As Democratic Senator Horace Chilton expressed in a letter to William Jennings Bryan, it was wholly necessary to oppose any extra-hemispheric expansion, but there was no need to temper expansion in the Americas. The line for expansion, and the empire, ought to be drawn 'on the same general circle with the Monroe doctrine.'[52] This would ensure the maintenance of United States regional hegemony.

A General Principle of Living Policy – The Expansionist Response and the Renegotiation of the Monroe Doctrine

The geographic boundaries of the United States Empire were, however, ultimately broken through the annexation of the Philippines despite the anti-imperialists' invocation of the sacred Monroe Doctrine. Yet the doctrine did not suddenly pass out of existence, as the anti-imperialists would have had Americans believe. The doctrine only became a more prominent issue in United States foreign policy as the twentieth century progressed. As if

[52] Chilton to Bryan (31 December 1898), Box 22, WJBP, MDLC.

to prove the anti-imperialists wrong in the moment that they proclaimed its death, the doctrine was enshrined by the United States delegation at the First Hague Peace Conference held between May and July 1899 in a reservation to the convention.[53] The tenacity of the doctrine was made abundantly clear by President Theodore Roosevelt two years later in his first annual message to congress as President when he outlined that the United States would commit itself to the administration of the Philippines, guiding its people along the path to self-governance, all the while upholding the Monroe Doctrine as the 'cardinal feature' of United States foreign policy.[54] Proponents of Philippine annexation did not accept the arguments made by anti-imperialists and refused to believe that extra-hemispheric expansion would render the Monroe Doctrine abrogated. Yet this is not to say that their protests had no effect. On the contrary, by making the Monroe Doctrine a central component of the post-war debate over imperialism, the anti-imperialists inadvertently forced their rivals to reconceptualise the doctrine's application so that it accommodated a new form of imperial policy, providing the context for the doctrine's subsequent fracture. The following section will examine how the expansionists responded to the anti-imperialist protest and their efforts to reshape the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine.

A prominent response was to simply state that the Philippine annexation was not relevant to the application of the Monroe Doctrine. An editorial in *Harper's Weekly* posited that there was only one instance in which it was conceivable that the doctrine would fall through the annexation of Spanish territory, namely if 'we deliberately take

[53] The role of the Monroe Doctrine during the Hague Peace Conferences will be discussed in Chapter Four.
[54] 'Message of the President' (3 December 1901) in United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1901* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), pp. xxxii-xxxvi [hereafter *FRUS*].

that territory by conquest, and merely to increase our territory.'[55] Whereas anti-imperialists clung to the New and Old World division of the globe, positioning Europe and Asia in the same geopolitical region (the Eastern Hemisphere), expansionists saw Asia and Europe as distinct geopolitical areas. Diplomat Whitelaw Reid argued that the Monroe Doctrine 'might have been properly understood as a general assurance that we would not meddle in Europe so long as they gave us no further trouble in America; but certainly it did not also abandon to their exclusive jurisdiction Asia and Africa and the islands of the sea.'[56] Reid believed that Philippine annexation did not violate the Monroe Doctrine because the doctrine stood primarily against the further colonisation of the Americas, which was in no way conflicted 'with our holding what our Navy and Army conquered in the China Sea, South of Asia, in the course of our just war with Spain.'[57] Civil War veteran Horace Fisher adamantly informed the Secretary of the Navy John Davis Long that 'our foreign policy outside of America and Europe – whether in the pacific, eastern Asia or southern Africa – has no connection with, nor can it in any way affect, our Monroe Doctrine for good or for evil.'[58]

A few months later, Fisher published his thoughts in the *Atlantic* and took a modified stance, arguing that the United States 'reserved the right to change or modify' the doctrine when cases arose for its 'practical application in the promotion of great

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[55] 'No European Interference', *Harper's Weekly* (23 July 1898), p. 707.
[56] W. Reid, 'The Territory With Which We Are Threatened', *The Century* (September 1898), p. 793.
[57] Reid to Gayley (14 April 1899), in D. Contosta and J. Hawthorne (eds), 'Rise to World Power: Selected Letters of Whitelaw Reid 1895-1912', *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, 76, no. 2 (1986), pp. 59-61. For other examples of this line of argument, see: W. Peffer, 'A Republic in the Philippines', *North American Review*, 168, no. 508 (1899), pp. 316-317; C. Turner, 'The American Primacy', *The Sewanee Review*, 12, no. 2 (1904), p. 237; *Washington Post* (28 November 1898), p. 6; *New York Times* (4 October 1898), p. 8.
[58] Fisher to Long (15 July 1898), in G. Allen (ed.), *Papers of John Davis Long 1897-1904* (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1939), pp. 156-159.

Figure 1.4: ‘Uncle Sam’s Picnic’



Source: *Puck* (September 1898)

permanent interests of the nation.’[59] The Monroe Doctrine, as interpreted by the anti-imperialists, was now viewed as outdated. This theme was capitalised upon by pro-expansionist humourist magazines in their political cartoons. *Puck* characterised the Anti-Imperialist Movement as an old man wearing out-dated attire with the Monroe Doctrine adorned on his tricorne hat (Figure 1.4). *Judge* similarly depicted the Monroe Doctrine as an old horse that had been abandoned by Uncle Sam as he rode a more modern bicycle that straddled both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres (Figure 1.5).[60] These images

[59] H. Fisher, ‘The Development of our Foreign Policy’, *The Atlantic* (October 1898), p. 553.
[60] As Nathan Cardon argues, that the bicycle had become an inherent symbol of United States imperialism by the Spanish-American War: N. Cardon, ‘Major Taylor, World Cycling Champion: Race, Ability, and the

pointed toward the emergence of a wider theoretical understanding of how the Monroe Doctrine ought to be considered: a fluid set of guiding principles that needed to be reconsidered as conditions at the national, hemispheric and global level changed and developed. A rigid interpretation of the doctrine as enunciated in 1823 did not meet the needs of United States policy makers at the turn of the twentieth century, nor the new vision of the United States Empire. In order to ensure the maintenance of regional hegemony, expansionists argued that the doctrine needed to be adapted so that it could remain in force alongside new policy directions.

President Roosevelt had begun to reconsider the nature of the Monroe Doctrine before his presidency and he had concluded that it ought to be considered a fluid policy rather than a rigid set of guidelines. In 1896 during the aftermath of the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute, Roosevelt authored an article in which he conceptualised the Monroe Doctrine as 'a broad, general principle of living policy,' in other words, a policy that needed to adapt to the changing conditions the United States encountered.[61] Throughout his presidency, Roosevelt would continue to voice this interpretation more frequently to justify his own corollary to the doctrine, arguing that it could not 'remain fossilized while the nation grows,' either it had to be abandoned or 'modified to meet the changing needs of national life.'[62] Historian Albert Hart, who would go on to write a detailed history of the doctrine, echoed these remarks, claiming that a whole host of changed conditions


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Global Colourline', presented at BrANCH 22nd Annual Conference, Cambridge, United Kingdom (28-30 October 2016).

[61] T. Roosevelt, 'The Monroe Doctrine', *The Bachelor of Arts*, 2, no. 4 (1896), p. 437.

[62] Roosevelt to Spring-Rice (24 July 1905) in E. Morison (ed.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 1283-1287 [hereafter *LTR*]. For similar remarks see: Roosevelt to Root (20 May 1904) in *LTR*, vol. 4, pp. 801-802; Untitled Speech, Chautauqua, (11 August

Figure 1.5: ‘Coasting’



Source: *Judge* (circa 1898)

warranted a modification of the doctrine.[63] Alfred Mahan, a former United States Admiral and renowned naval expert, held a similar opinion. To Mahan, the doctrine possessed ‘an inherent principle of life, which adapts itself with the flexibility of a

1905) in T. Roosevelt (ed.), *Presidential Addresses and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 4 (New York: Colliers, 1905), pp. 439-441.

[63] A. Hart, ‘The Monroe Doctrine and the Doctrine of Permanent Interest’, *American Historical Review* (October 1901), pp. 82-83.

growing plant to the successive conditions it encounters.' Without the ability to adapt to the 'national necessities' of the United States, the doctrine would no doubt 'die deservedly.'[64] Mahan did not fear the militarisation of the United States like Carnegie and believed that strengthening the nation's armed forces, particularly the navy, would empower United States influence. He had argued since the 1890s that the United States would reinforce national security through territorial expansion, bolstering the navy, and projecting the nation's power, rather than invite threats.[65]

At this juncture, it is worth dwelling on the opinions expressed by John Barrett, the former United States minister to Siam. Barrett was a central figure in the history of the Monroe Doctrine during the early twentieth century, primarily due to the prominent role he played in advocating the pan-americanisation of the doctrine during his directorship of the Pan American Union between 1907 and 1920. In the immediate aftermath of the Spanish-American War, before his turn to Pan-Americanism, Barrett was known for his knowledge of Far Eastern markets and he supported the expansionist policy of the McKinley administration, believing that the Philippines would grant the United States significant economic and strategic gains in the Far East.[66] Barrett

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[64] A. Mahan, 'The Monroe Doctrine', *National Review* (February 1903), pp. 871-889. An extended version of this article was later published as: A. Mahan, 'The Monroe Doctrine: A Consistent Development' in A. Mahan, *Naval Administration and Warfare: Some General Principles With Other Essays* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1908), pp. 355-409.

[65] D. Milne, *Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), p. 21. Mahan's influential work included: A. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1890); A. Mahan, *The Interest of American in Sea Power, Present and Future* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1897).

[66] On Barrett's expertise, see: Lawton to Barrett (6 October 1899); Kent to Barrett (1 February 1900), Box 18, JBP, MDLC. Barrett was well known and disliked by several anti-imperialists, given his advocacy of annexation. Carl Schurz labelled Barrett 'an ardent imperialist' and he was discussed unfavourably in Edwin Doak Mead's book on Philippine annexation: C. Schurz, 'The Policy of Imperialism' (17 October 1899), Reel 97, CSP, MDLC; E. Mead, *The Present Crisis* (Boston: Geo. H. Ellis, 1899), pp. 14-19. Barrett returned the sentiment and claimed that anti-imperialist protest bolstered the resistance of Filipino insurgents during the Philippine-American War: *New York Times* (21 June 1899). Anti-imperialists were

personified the economic motive of annexation, referring to the Philippines as 'the southern key to the Far East' and the 'Cuba of the Far East.'[67] Pioneered by the Wisconsin School, historians have placed significant emphasis on the economic motivation for the annexation of the Philippines to maintain the Open Door policy.[68] Rather than acquiring the islands to exploit their natural resources, the Philippines were vital in the formation of a system of coaling and naval stations that would help establish a trade network to Far Eastern markets.[69] As argued by Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, world power was frequently understood as tied to centres of monetary exchange, and the United States was on the verge of being able to seize this power if it could prevent China from being divided. To Lodge, the Philippines would provide what the United States needed in the region: 'coaling stations and ports in the East,' both of which had become 'essential conditions in our time.'[70] Expansion was thus widely argued by its supporters as a logical adaptation to the changing economic climate of the world,

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often branded as treasonous, because, in the words of one newspaper editorial, their hearts 'beat warmly for the enemies of their country' whilst American soldiers risked their lives in the Philippines to restore order: *New York Times* (12 February 1899), p. 16. Expansionists lambasted their opponents and William Howard Taft referred to anti-imperialists as 'a crowd of men, who when they come to die will look back over their lives and be unable to point out clearly any good which they have done to their fellow men': quoted in Roosevelt to Root (17 July 1903), Box 162, Elihu Root Papers [hereafter ERP], MDLC.

[67] J. Barrett, 'The Problem of the Philippines', *North American Review*, 167, no. 502 (1898), p. 260; J. Barrett, 'The Cuba of the Far East', *The North American Review*, 164, no. 483 (1897), pp. 173-180.

[68] Williams, *American Diplomacy*; LaFeber, *New Empire*; T. McCormick, 'Insular Imperialism and the Open Door: The China Market and the Spanish-American War', *Pacific Historical Review*, 32, no. 2 (1963), pp. 155-169. See also: J. Fry, 'From Open Door to World Systems: Economic Interpretations of Late Nineteenth Century American Foreign Relations', *Pacific Historical Review*, 65, no. 2 (1996), pp. 277-303. On the Open Door, see: M. Cullinane and A. Goodall, *The Open Door Era: United States Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017).

[69] *The North American Review* is a particularly good source for detailed discussions over the necessity of the Open Door and the role of the Philippines in maintaining it: C. Conant, 'The Economic Basis of "Imperialism"', *North American Review*, 167, no. 502 (1898), p. 340; M. Hazeltine, 'What Shall Be Done about the Philippines?', *North American Review*, 167, no. 503 (1898), pp. 389-390; M. Dunnell, 'Our Policy in China', *North American Review*, 167, no. 503 (1898), pp. 393-409.

[70] Henry Cabot Lodge quoted in W. LaFeber, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, vol 2, *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 157-158. See also: W. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980), pp. 93-98.

aimed at maintaining access to China's markets and bringing with it newfound international power for the United States. 'If we seize the opportunity we may become leaders forever,' Barrett proclaimed, 'but if we are laggards now we will remain laggards until the crack of doom.'[71]

Despite the promise of economic prosperity, Barrett realised the power the Monroe Doctrine had when invoked by the anti-imperialists. He noted that 'the strongest adverse argument' against Philippine annexation would be that:

> permanent occupation will place us on the same basis with European nations as a foreign colonial power, and make us a party to all international entanglements in either Asia or Europe, and destroy the splendid New World isolation that gives the Monroe doctrine its breath of life.[72]

Yet Barrett was unconvinced, jotting in a notebook that the doctrine was '<u>not</u> destroyed – not even impaired but […] strengthened' by the annexation of the Philippines.[73] He believed that because economic and geopolitical conditions on the world stage had shifted so dramatically since 1823, an adherence to the Monroe Doctrine as originally enunciated would unnecessarily restrict the development of United States foreign policy. This was the crucial objection that expansionists posed against the anti-imperialists:

> If conditions, precedents, law, the Constitution, and traditional policy are against colonization … is it not possible, after a great war that has no respect for precedents and traditions and evolves entirely new conditions,

[71] Barrett, 'The Problem of the Philippines', p. 267.
[72] Ibid., p. 263.
[73] Undated Notebooks, Box 2, JBP, MDLC. Emphasis in original.

> that our Constitution or laws shall be so modified as to permit a system of colonial or dependent government?[74]

The United States had ascended to the status of a world power and expansionists saw its interests located in the Far East as well as in the Western Hemisphere. Why should the Monroe Doctrine hold the nation back? Could it not be reinterpreted and modernised to meet the demands of a new century whilst maintaining a commitment to regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere? Even some anti-imperialists eventually admitted that a modification of the doctrine was necessary. Madison Jayne, honorary vice-president of the NAAIC, argued that because the doctrine of 1823 was no more, it could be modified and even strengthened:

> The underlying principle of the Monroe Doctrine is a protest against tyranny, and its spirit is universally beneficent; in 1820 we were weak, and merely from expediency we restricted its application to this hemisphere: but now we are strong, and the doctrine should be without territorial limitation; since we have become a world-power, let us make its application world-wide.[75]

As former Iowan Congressman John Kasson noted in his 1904 history of the doctrine, the 'original Declaration was limited, in words, by the circumstances of that epoch. The reasons upon which it was founded provided room for a further development and extension of that declaration.'[76] According to the response of pro-annexationists, a choice did not have to be made between the annexation of the Philippines and the maintenance

[74] Barrett, 'The Problem of the Philippines', pp. 263-264.
[75] M. Jayne, *The Monroe Doctrine* (Bay St. Louis: s.n., 1900).
[76] J. Kasson, *The Evolution of the Constitution of the United States of America and History of the Monroe Doctrine* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1904), p. 255.

of the Monroe Doctrine as John Chetwood had argued - both Manila *and* the Monroe Doctrine could be claimed by the United States.

The protests of the American Anti-Imperialist Movement and their invocation of the Monroe Doctrine ultimately failed to prevent the overseas colonial expansion of the United States Empire. In response to their elegies, the doctrine became widely understood as a policy that was open to reinterpretation and adaptation. Although both factions of the post-war debate associated the doctrine with the core value of regional hegemony, it had become a contested concept at the heart of the debate over United States imperialism as Americans attempted to reconcile its principles with the challenges posed by the new structure of the United States Empire. As both sides of the debate argued over its application and relevance to the future of United States foreign relations, the doctrine's meaning became unsettled, representing competing visions of the United States Empire. It was this fundamental understanding of the doctrine as a modifiable policy that facilitated an active drive within the United States to reinterpret the doctrine's meaning and application during the first decade of the twentieth century. As the following chapter will demonstrate, the relationship between notions of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation underpinned the doctrine's subsequent reinterpretation and assumed the role of as core values of United States national security.

Chapter Two: A Measure of Benevolent Supervision

Hegemony, Pan-Americanism, and the Fracturing of the Monroe Doctrine (1902-1912)

Between October 1901 and January 1902, John Barrett found himself back in the service of the State Department. After struggling to attain another post in the Far East, the former minister to Siam was appointed as a member of the United States delegation to the Second Pan American Conference, held in Mexico City. Although Barrett would soon become known for his advocacy of Pan-Americanism, he was relatively unfamiliar with inter-American relations at the time and he sought the advice of some trusted correspondents before attending the conference.[1] The responses that Barrett received were particularly telling of the contested nature of the United States' Latin American policy during the early twentieth century. Charles Gardiner, an attorney for the Manhattan Railway Company, informed Barrett that at the conference he ought to be led by two goals: firstly, to oversee the development of a Pan-American coalition against any European designs in the Western Hemisphere, and secondly, to ensure the primacy of the United States within such system. Gardiner argued that these principles had been central to United States foreign policy and had been clearly enunciated in the Monroe Doctrine.[2] Albert Shaw, the editor of the American *Review of Reviews*, made similar suggestions, recommending that Barrett make it his chief business to cultivate good will among the

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[1] S. Prisco III, *John Barrett, Progressive Era Diplomat: A Study of a Commercial Expansionist, 1887-1920* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1973), pp. 49-51. For details of the conference, see the United States delegation's report: *Second International Conference of American States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902).

[2] Gardiner to Barrett (4 September 1901), Box 19, JBP, MDLC.

Latin American delegations, whilst remembering that 'in the Western Hemisphere the overshadowing principle must be the paramountcy of the authority of the United States.'[3]

During the early twentieth century, both regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and inter-American cooperation were widely perceived by United States elites as core values of national security that were embodied by the Monroe Doctrine. Although the two notions were antithetical, the doctrine's ambiguous enunciation contained traces of both hegemonic aspiration and Pan-American sentiment, forming a distinct discursive linkage between the ideals. The doctrine had become understood as a fluid set of guiding principles that was open to modification after the Spanish-American War, and its meaning began to subsequently break apart as two major reinterpretations of the doctrine were proposed by United States elites: one aimed at ensuring the hegemony of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, and the other aimed at fostering inter-American cooperation. The debate over the meaning and application of the Monroe Doctrine that developed during the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft reflected the contested nature of United States foreign relations and national security, and by analysing the moment in which the Monroe Doctrine fractured during the first decade of the twentieth century, this chapter will explore the interrelated role of hegemony and cooperation in the development of United States foreign relations.

This chapter begins by tracing the ways in which the Monroe Doctrine was reinterpreted to secure the core value of United States hegemony in Latin America. Personified by the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and policies of dollar diplomacy, this interpretation justified policies of interventionism within Central America

[3] Shaw to Barrett (30 November 1901), Box 19, JBP, MDLC.

and the Caribbean as a means to establish dominance, stopping short of outright colonialism. Scholars emphasise several motives for this drive to hegemony that the Roosevelt Corollary encapsulated. Historians such as David Healy and Marc-William Phelan stress the primacy of economic motivations, arguing that profits and the desire to control Latin American markets directed most United States policy decisions in the region.[4] Dana Munro, in his classic study of dollar diplomacy, instead highlights political motives, arguing that regional stability was the primary objective of United States interventions, a line of argument echoed by Alan McPhereson.[5] Finally, historians such as Emily Rosenberg and Lester Langley emphasise the cultural motivations that directed interventionism and justified the idea of United States dominance. They argue that policy makers' adherence to racial hierarchies justified a paternalistic attitude toward the people of Central America and the Caribbean.[6] Combining a desire to secure and then protect an inter-oceanic isthmian canal, obtain economic benefits, ensure regional stability, and act out the civilising mission of the Anglo-Saxon race, United States hegemony was perceived as a core value that was in harmony with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine.

An analysis of the proposals made for a multi-lateralised or Pan-Americanised Monroe Doctrine that aimed to foster a climate of inter-American cooperation and Pan-Americanism will follow. Although less dominant within official policy making circles, this interpretation presented an alternative policy approach that would grow more popular in the 1910s. Latin Americans first advocated this reinterpretation; however, it gradually

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[4] Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, pp. 145-163; M. Palen, 'The Imperialism of Economic Nationalism, 1890-1913', *Diplomatic History*, 39, no. 1 (2015), pp. 162-163.
[5] D. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 531-537; A. McPherson, *The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. Occupations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 4-7.
[6] E. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 1-3; Langley, *The Banana Wars*, xvii-xx.

found support in the United States. Influenced by anti-Yankee sentiment and Latin American critiques of the doctrine, the perceived economic and political benefits of hemispheric unity, the significant growth of the ABC nations, the rise of Pan-American ideology, and the "rediscovery" of South America, Pan-Americanists within the United States adopted the call for closer inter-American relations and began to propose their own interpretations of a Pan-Americanised Monroe Doctrine. For Pan-Americanists, it was through cooperation and seeking to understand Latin American history and culture, rather than through interventionism, that national gains in regional trade and security could be secured. Permitting all, or some, of the nations of Latin America to uphold the Monroe Doctrine was viewed as a vital component of this Pan-American vision. Ultimately, these national gains were perceived as facets of a wider adherence to the core value of inter-American unity.

The final section of this chapter outlines how these two competing core values were considered in light of perceived German and Japanese threats to United States interests in Latin America. Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, the United States was preoccupied with the fear that Germany, and to a lesser-extent Japan, would challenge the Monroe Doctrine and seek geopolitical and economic influence in Latin America. The doctrine was granted a new modern significance when faced with the so-called "German Peril" and discussion and debate was generated partly in an attempt to discern how its application ought to be reinterpreted to specifically meet perceived external threats. Whilst the Japanese threat brought about a historic enlargement of the Monroe Doctrine's scope, the German threat demonstrated that both reinterpretations of the doctrine were deemed applicable responses, exacerbating the need for the United

States decision-making class to reconcile notions of hegemony cooperation in United States-Latin American relations. Through reinterpreting the Monroe Doctrine to combat external threats, United States elites revealed what they believed to be the core values of the United States' role in the Western Hemisphere and the wider world. For advocates of the Roosevelt Corollary, the ascendancy of the nation and its guiding role in the world was under threat if regional hegemony was challenged, whereas advocates of the pan-americanisation of the doctrine sought to defend the Western Hemisphere Idea and inter-American unity from non-American threats. The revered policy tradition served to bridge notions of hegemony and cooperation whilst simultaneously emphasising their incompatibility, collating disparate facets of United States foreign relations into a common discourse and conversation. As the Monroe Doctrine fractured under the spectre of foreign threats, Americans did not simply posit new directions in United States foreign policy. They emphasised the complexity and divisive nature of the United States' core values.

Ordered Liberty - Dollar Diplomacy and the Theodore Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

The Roosevelt Corollary to Monroe Doctrine and the Drago Doctrine were the two policy declarations that encapsulated and shaped the broad reinterpretations of the Monroe Doctrine during this period and they were both formulated in response to the Venezuela crisis of 1902-1903. Great Britain, Germany, and at a later instance Italy, enacted a joint naval blockade of Venezuela in late 1902 after the Castro government defaulted on its

loans. Seeking to settle their various claims, the European nations sought the acquiescence of the United States prior to taking any action and both President Roosevelt and the State Department were willing to permit the blockade so long as no territory was sought by the European powers. The President had made clear in his annual message of 1901 that the United States would not 'guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power' and he expressed privately that he was willing to permit European nations to 'spank' any Latin American nation that 'misbehaves.'[7] However, when the blockading powers began to bombard coastal fortifications, the United States press reacted critically to the violence and foresaw a danger to the Monroe Doctrine, vocally opposing European methods.[8] Roosevelt pressed for the dispute to be submitted to international arbitration at The Hague, to which the Castro government and the European powers eventually submitted. This was seen as a great success for the Roosevelt administration and subsequent accounts of the crisis were filled with praise for what was perceived as Roosevelt's maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine.[9] Roosevelt himself was imbued with the feeling that he had successfully upheld the Monroe Doctrine, informing Grover Cleveland that he was proud to have continued the policy the former President had enunciated in the Venezuelan boundary dispute of 1895.[10] The

[7] 'Message of the President' (3 December 1901) in *FRUS 1901*, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii; Roosevelt to Sternburg (12 July 1901) in *LTR*, vol. 3, pp. 115-117.
[8] Examples of protest include: 'Venezuela and the Monroe Doctrine', *The Outlook* (27 December 1902), pp. 971-973; *Washington Post* (25 December 1902), p. 6. Reports also reached the State Department that Central American opinion similarly objected on the grounds of a violation of the Monroe Doctrine: Merry to Hay (17 January 1903), Reel 91, DMCA, RDS, NAII.
[9] See for example: *Washington Post* (24 January 1903), p. 6; *New York Tribune* (3 April 1903), p. 6; W. Penfield, 'The Anglo-German Intervention in Venezuela', *North American Review*, 177, no. 560 (1903), pp. 86-96; T. Edgington, *The Monroe Doctrine* (Little, Brown and Company, 1904), p. 312.
[10] Roosevelt to Cleveland (26 December 1902) in *LTR*, vol. 3, p. 398. He later referred to the resolution as a 'striking enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine': Roosevelt to Root (2 June 1904), Box 163, ERP, MDLC.

Republican Party even declared in its 1904 party platform that the resolution of the crisis had 'signally vindicated' the doctrine.[11]

The result of the tribunal in February 1904 was, however, disappointing for the United States as preferential treatment was awarded to the blockading powers, effectively enshrining their aggressive actions.[12] Fearing that European powers would attempt further aggressive action to pursue other claims within the Western Hemisphere, Roosevelt sought to develop a policy that would prevent European nations from finding any pretext for forcible intervention.[13] The President's gaze was immediately drawn to the Dominican Republic, a Caribbean nation that was wracked with national debt, resulting primarily from the actions of the United States based San Domingo Improvement Company.[14] Discussing the matter with Elihu Root, a lawyer who had served as the President's Secretary of War until January 1904, Roosevelt began to formulate a solution by recasting the application of the Monroe Doctrine.[15] Root threw his support behind the President, outlining in letters to General Thomas Hubbard that he would present the idea before the New England Society in December. Like the President, Root surmised that there was:

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[11] 'Republican Party Platform of 1904' (21 June 1904), *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu.

[12] For the full text of the tribunal award see: 'Germany, Great Britain, and Italy v. Venezuela et al', *American Journal of International Law*, 2, no. 4 (1908), pp. 902-911.

[13] The importance of the Venezuela Crisis and the subsequent Hague ruling upon the formation of the Roosevelt Corollary has been recently emphasised in: J. Thompson, 'Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of the Roosevelt Corollary', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 26, no. 4 (2015), pp. 571-590; M. Maass, 'Catalyst for the Roosevelt Corollary: Arbitrating the 1902-1903 Venezuela Crisis and Its Impact on the Development of the Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 20 (2009), pp. 383-402.

[14] C. Veeser, *A World Safe for Capitalism: Dollar Diplomacy and America's Rise to Global Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 1-7.

[15] Roosevelt to Root (20 May 1904) in *LTR*, vol. 4, pp. 801-802; Roosevelt to Root (7 June 1904), Box 163, ERP, MDLC. The best biographical study of Root remains: P. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, 2 vols (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1938).

> an obligation correlative to the right that we can insist upon the right to keep European Nations from overwhelming the small American Republics only so long as these Republics fulfil the functions of civilized governments and performs their international duties, and that the assertion of the right of protection carried with it the duty of insisting upon the small Republics not violating the rights of the Nations against which we protect them.[16]

Roosevelt formally announced his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in his annual message of 1904, declaring that:

> Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.[17]

Invoking the doctrine, Roosevelt proclaimed that as a civilised nation the United States had a duty to intervene in the affairs of any nation within the Western Hemisphere that acted in an uncivilised manner. By functioning as an international police power, the United States would set right the wrongs of incompetency, removing the need for any European powers to do so forcefully themselves, ensuring its dominant and guiding role in the Western Hemisphere.

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[16] Root to Hubbard (17 November 1904); (1 December 1904), Box 185, ERP, MDLC. For the address, see: 'The Monroe Doctrine' (22 December 1904), E. Root, *Miscellaneous Addresses*, eds R. Bacon and J. Scott (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917), pp. 267-273.
[17] 'Message of the President' (6 December 1904) in *FRUS 1904*, pp. xli-xlii.

Because the Dominican Republic had failed to act with financial integrity, Roosevelt believed that the doctrine demanded United States intervention. The President soon drafted a protocol which would permit the United States to take over the custom houses of the Dominican Republic, stating that such action 'affords a practical test of the efficiency of the United States Government in maintaining the Monroe doctrine.'[18] Unfortunately for Roosevelt, it found significant opposition within the Senate and was ultimately rejected. The President was adamant, however, that to prevent European nations from challenging the Monroe Doctrine the United States had to take preventative measures and establish order in the Dominican Republic by taking over the financial machinery of the island. He went so far as to claim that voting against the protocol was a vote in favour of the violation of the Monroe Doctrine and decided to implement the protocol without Senate approval.[19]

The establishment of the customs receivership and the enunciation of the Roosevelt Corollary embodied the reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that was not only driven by a desire to prevent European intervention in the Western Hemisphere, but to ensure the United States' dominance of the Caribbean and Central American regions through justifying interventionism. As Jay Sexton argues, the corollary 'articulated the themes that Roosevelt had come to associate with the doctrine,' namely, the inevitable conflict between civilised and uncivilised peoples; the right of the United States to act as both judge and guardian of the Western Hemisphere; and opposition to any imperial rivalry within the United States' sphere of influence. The doctrine was transformed from

[18] 'Message from the President of the United States' (15 February 1905) in *FRUS 1905*, pp. 334-342.
[19] Roosevelt to Tiffany (14 March 1905) in *LTR*, vol. 4, p. 1139. For further details on the establishment of the customs receivership, see: G. Atkins and L. Wilson, *The Dominican Republic and the United States: From Imperialism to Transnationalism* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), pp. 37-43.

a negatively framed policy to a positive one that actively called for United States intervention and divided the globe between civilised and uncivilised nations, rather than between the Old and New Worlds.[20] Building directly upon Sexton's analysis, Anders Stephanson notes that the community of the doctrine now extended across the Atlantic to other civilised nations rather than southwards to encompass solely American states. Once civilisation was deemed as the core facet of the doctrine, 'all manner of places and spaces including Latin America could be redefined, reinscribed with new meaning according to an evolutionary scale.' Central America and the Caribbean region were perceived as populated by uncivilised peoples who needed the discipline of the United States and Roosevelt had, therefore, altered the 'smooth, republican space of "the Americas"' into a 'striated' space, one that was 'ordered according to quite different criteria' and based upon the idea of a more traditional sphere of influence.[21] The Monroe Doctrine's dichotomy was, in the words of Marco Mariano, recast to support a dominant role of the United States in shaping the order of the world, signifying the influence of Progressive Era values upon foreign policy.[22]

Initial opposition, primarily from senators who opposed the Dominican protocol, was voiced against the corollary, which Senator Isidor Rayner dubbed a 'counterfeit presentment' of the Monroe Doctrine.[23] Yet advocacy tended to drown out opposition. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge outlined that maintaining peace and 'ordered liberty' in the

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[20] Sexton, *Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 229-239.
[21] Stephanson, 'A Riff', pp. 37-38. See also: Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny*, pp. 107-108.
[22] Mariano, 'Monroeism', pp. 65-69.
[23] U.S. Congress. Senate. The Genuine Monroe Doctrine, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* (8 January 1906), pp. 793-797. For other criticisms of the corollary on similar grounds, see: *On the Charge that President Roosevelt is Attempting to Subvert the Monroe Doctrine* (New York: Parker Constitution Club of New York City, 1904); 'The Monroe Doctrine and the Santo Domingo Treaty', *North Carolina Journal of Law*, 2, no. 4 (1905), pp. 147-149.

region was essential to prevent any challenges to the Monroe Doctrine and Thomas Patterson proclaimed his support for any policy that prevented European nations from oppressing nations of the Western Hemisphere, calling for the doctrine's 'robust, manly, and unqualified support, in its broadest sense.'[24] To historian Albert Bushnell Hart, the Monroe Doctrine had been necessarily enlarged, standing against the establishment of colonies in the Americas and the use of military force in collecting indemnities, whilst authorising the United States to 'keep its neighbors up to a reasonable standard of good order and financial responsibility toward foreigners.'[25]

The construction of the Panama Canal granted stability and ordered liberty in the circum-Caribbean unprecedented importance among United States policy makers. In November 1903, in between the Venezuela crisis and the Hague tribunal, the Republic of Panama separated from Columbia with the aid of the United States. The signing of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty granted the United States control over the Panama Canal Zone, inciting Roosevelt to famously claim years later that he personally 'took the Canal Zone.'[26] Whitelaw Reid, a diplomat and editor of the *New York Tribune*, perhaps best outlined the way in which the future control of an isthmian canal altered perceptions of the Monroe Doctrine and made the Roosevelt Corollary a necessity. Speaking at Yale University, Reid outlined that the moment had arrived in which the doctrine had to be

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[24] U.S. Congress. Senate. Moroccan Conference and Relations with Santo Domingo, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* (24 January 1906), pp. 1470-1475; U.S. Congress. Senate. Moroccan Conference and Relations with Santo Domingo, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* (31 January 1906), pp. 1802-1803. For positive press reactions to the corollary see: *New York Times* (24 December 1904), p. 6; *Washington Post* (12 December 1905), p. 6; 'The New Monroe Doctrine', *The Outlook* (11 February 1905), pp. 366-368.

[25] A. Hart, 'The Monroe Doctrine in its Territorial Extent and Application', *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute*, 32, no. 3 (1906), p. 797.

[26] *New York Times* (23 April 1911), p. SM6. On the acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone, see: R. Collin, *Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean: The Panama Canal, the Monroe Doctrine and the Latin American Context* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), pp. 163-338; M. Conniff, *Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 3rd ed., 2012), pp. 63-83.

stringently applied to the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, given their proximity to the future canal. The United States, he argued, could not afford to 'tolerate nuisance at its doors, and the races that people those shores must keep the peace and preserve order as to us, and conform to ordinary international obligations toward the world. To this the moral duty of our strength points and our material interest binds us.'[27] In private he expressed similar sentiments to Roosevelt, claiming that the United States must dominate the region and that the chief use of the Monroe Doctrine must be to assert the 'paramount authority' of the United States.[28] The doctrine had become associated with the United States' self-proclaimed right to construct an isthmian canal long before the secession of Panama and John Major argues that throughout the late nineteenth century, policy-makers consistently believed that the doctrine entitled the nation to 'construct and to dominate a trans-isthmian canal.'[29] The Panama Canal would continue to dominate the Monroe Doctrine debate, and its construction, coupled with United States paternalism, granted this new reinterpretation of the doctrine vindication, establishing a precedent for United States interventionism within Latin America that would ensure regional hegemony.

Whilst the formation of the Roosevelt Corollary initiated the policy of dollar diplomacy, it was the Taft administration that coined the term. The chief policy makers of the administration, namely Secretary of State Philander Knox and Assistant Secretary Francis Huntington-Wilson, adhered to the corollary as the guiding principle in United

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[27] W. Reid, 'The Monroe Doctrine, the Polk Doctrine and the Doctrine of Anarchism', *Yale Law Journal*, 13, no. 1 (1903), pp. 16-41.

[28] Reid to Gillett (7 November 1903); Reid to Roosevelt (9 November 1903), in Contosta and Hawthorne (eds), 'Letters of Whitelaw Reid', pp. 85-86.

[29] J. Major, *Prized Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal 1903-1979* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 10, 36, 158. See also: R. Hammond and C. Lewin, *The Panama Canal* (London: Frederick Muller, 1966), p. 33; D. McCullough, *The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal 1870-1914* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), pp. 608-610.

States-Latin American relations, conducting a policy of interventionism in nations such as Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua and Honduras that strengthened the hegemony-facilitating reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.[30] Huntington-Wilson described dollar diplomacy as 'using the capital of the [United States] in the foreign field in a manner calculated to enhance fixed national interests,' which Taft famously summarised as 'substituting dollars for bullets.'[31] As David Healy remarks, it became 'an article of faith in Washington that the customs receivership had solved the Dominican problem, and policy makers awaited similar cases to which the new technique could be applied.'[32] In short, the administration was driven by Progressive Era values and sought to provide Central American and Caribbean nations with stable financial machineries to prevent any revolutions that would otherwise herald European interference in the region.

In the few instances in which Taft chose to discuss the Monroe Doctrine, he echoed the paternalism of the Roosevelt Corollary, stressing that the Monroe Doctrine could only be upheld by aiding the nations of Central America and the Caribbean and ensuring the stability of the region.[33] Knox was far more vocal on the subject and he informed the President that the enforcement of the doctrine required 'a measure of

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[30] Taft had very little interest in foreign relations as President and he left most policy making to Knox, who in turn relied heavily on Huntington-Wilson. Historians view both policy makers as poor diplomats who rarely contained their disdain for Latin Americans. For more information on this dynamic, see: W. Scholes and M. Scholes, *The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970), pp. 12-19; Munro, *Dollar Diplomacy*, pp. 160-162; Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, pp. 145-146.

[31] 'Mr. Huntington Wilson's Address at Baltimore' (4 May 1911), Box 14, Philander Chase Knox Papers [hereafter PCKP], MDLC; 'Message of the President' (3 December 1912) in *FRUS 1912*, p. x.

[32] Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, pp. 124-125.

[33] 'Message of the President' (3 December 1912) in *FRUS 1912*, p. xii. Unlike most Presidents before him, Taft was not particularly fond of the Monroe Doctrine and his devotion toward it was, in the words of an early biographer Henry Pringle, 'slowly acquired, like a taste for olives': H. Pringle, *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft*, vol. 2 (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1939), pp. 694-695. Indeed, during the Venezuelan crisis, Taft was particularly unimpressed with Roosevelt's invocation of the doctrine. See: Schoultz, *Beneath the United States*, pp. 205-206.

benevolent supervision over Latin American countries to meet its logical requirements.'[34] The Secretary of State believed that the Monroe Doctrine held the United States 'responsible for order in Central America, and its proximity to the Canal Zone makes the preservation of peace in that neighborhood particularly necessary.'[35] Whether 'rightfully or wrongly,' the United States was 'held by the world responsible under the Monroe Doctrine' to help turbulent American republics 'take their rightful place among the law-abiding and progressive countries of the world.'[36] In his most notable address on the doctrine, Knox outlined its role in ensuring the stability of the region surrounding the soon-to-be completed Panama Canal. Like Roosevelt, he argued that the Monroe Doctrine ought to be considered as a living policy, stating that it 'has required interpretation and construction to apply its precepts to special cases.' For Knox, the formation of the Roosevelt Corollary and the crisis in the Dominican Republic acted as a moment in which the doctrine's focus changed to ensuring the stability of Caribbean and Central American nations. In a phrase which personified dollar diplomacy, Knox likened upholding the Monroe Doctrine to 'an insurance risk, our risk decreases as the conditions to which it pertains are improved.' As interventions in Honduras and Nicaragua had proved, certain nations 'find it impossible to extricate themselves from the thraldom of civil strife, and they quite naturally look to their more prosperous and powerful neighbor for aid and guidance.' He concluded that it 'would not be sane to uphold a great policy like the Monroe Doctrine and to repudiate its necessary corollaries and neglect the

[34] Quoted in: Munro, *Dollar Diplomacy*, pp. 161-162.
[35] 'Notes for Argument in Favor of Honduras and Nicaragua Loan Conventions' (undated), Box 9, PCKP, MDLC.
[36] Untitled Note Addressed to the Senate (January 1911), Box 28, PCKP, MDLC.

sensible measures which reason dictates as its safeguards.'[37] Such was Knox's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that even in a speech dedicated to the Pan-American Union in April 1909 he could not resist in stating that the organisation's 'sympathies should swiftly respond to the demands of justice, and it should frown upon, as intolerable or seditious, violence, plottings, plunderings and revolt.'[38] The United States press frequently mirrored this official rhetoric and took great effort to tie the Monroe Doctrine to dollar diplomacy.[39]

In 1912, Taft advised Knox to conduct a tour of Central America. Stressing the importance of the region, Taft stated that for the United States to exercise a useful influence in the region closer diplomatic ties had to be stimulated.[40] Knox travelled the region giving a number of speeches in nations that were all too aware of the imperialistic nature of United States foreign policy. Speaking on the Monroe Doctrine in Panama, Knox stated that the doctrine would

> reach the acme of its beneficence when it is regarded by the people of the United States as a reason why we should constantly respond to the needs of those of our Latin American neighbors who may find necessary for our assistance in their progress toward better government or who may seek our aid to meet their just obligations and thereby to maintain relations to the family of nations.[41]

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[37] P. Knox, *The Monroe Doctrine and Some Incidental Obligations in the Zone of the Caribbean*, New York (19 January 1912), Box 43, PCKP, MDLC.
[38] 'Address of Hon. Philander C. Knox' (15 April 1909), Box 28, JBP, MDLC.
[39] See various newspaper transcriptions in: Box 14, PCKP, MDLC.
[40] Taft to Knox (10 February 1912), Box 16, PCKP, MDLC.
[41] *Speeches Incident to the Visit of Philander Chase Knox Secretary of State of the United States to the Countries of the Caribbean, February 23 to April 17 1912* (Washington: Government Printing Press, 1913), pp. 15-16.

Figure 2.1: 'Errores de óptica imperialista'



Source: Box 33, Philander Knox Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

The United States press celebrated the tour and several newspapers noted that Knox was undertaking the trip to adhere to the obligations of the Monroe Doctrine.[42] However, the Central American reaction was far from celebratory, as indicated a cartoon printed in the Costa Rican paper *La Republica* which depicted Knox as an imperialist who viewed Central Americans as inferior peoples. Observing the Costa Rican President through the wrong end of a pair of binoculars, the cartoon predicted that Knox would only turn them around when he returned to Washington (Figure 2.1). Anti-United States demonstrations

[42] See various newspaper clippings in: Box 38, PCKP, MDLC.

had been conducted in Nicaragua prior to Knox's visit and Ignacio Suarez, the President of the Nicaraguan Assembly, had publicly attacked the Secretary of State's intentions. Responding to this criticism, Knox stressed that the Monroe Doctrine did not imply imperial desires on the part of the United States; rather it guided a policy which sought to maintain republicanism within the Western Hemisphere, proffering aid to those nations which needed help to prevent the destruction of republicanism from within.[43]

The administration's attitude toward Latin America and the Monroe Doctrine is best explained through an adherence to idea of a global racial hierarchy. As explained in the introductory chapter, United States policy makers drew distinctions between the peoples of the world based on racial categorisations and Latin Americans were deemed inferior to Anglo-Saxon Americans. Typical of political cartoons of the period, Latin Americans were portrayed and perceived as child-like peoples that required the steady and firm hand of the United States through the implementation of this new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine (Figure 2.2). In a memorandum on Central American affairs to Taft, Knox tellingly prefaced his words in pencil, stating that the President would find the issue 'somewhat tedious.' To ensure peace in the region, Knox argued that there 'should be some conventional right to intervene in Central American affairs promptly, without waiting for outbreaks and with a view of averting rather than quelling internal disturbances.' The United States 'should be in a position to apply an effective remedy at any time.'[44] Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, echoed this racist paternalism in an account of his official visit to the Caribbean. Stimson expressed pity for the United States

[43] *Speeches Knox*, p. 57. On the anti-United States sentiment in Nicaragua at the time, see: M. Gobat, *Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), p. 82.
[44] Knox to Taft (25 September 1909), Box 8, PCKP, MDLC.

officials stationed in the Dominican Republic, including the diplomatic representatives and the customs receivers, because they were 'doing a very useful work under most trying circumstances'. According to Stimson, the island was subjected to 'the pall of the negro despotism' and was 'weighed down now by a far more hopeless population than existed on it when Columbus discovered it four hundred years ago.'[45] For the two Republican administrations and a vast swath of the decision-making class, there was ample reason to assume the role of hegemon in the Western Hemisphere and the Monroe Doctrine was appropriately reshaped to justify this desire.

Figure 2.2: 'Cutting a Switch for a Bad Boy'



Source: *Baltimore Sun* (1910)

[45] 'Trip to the West Indies and Panama', Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries [hereafter HLSD], Reel 1 Volume 2, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, ff. 42-46 [hereafter YUL].

Fellow Sponsors – Early Efforts to Pan-Americanise the Monroe Doctrine

Latin Americans were immediately wary of the Roosevelt Corollary and a famous cover of the Argentinian magazine *Caras y Caretas* was typical of the reaction.[46] Making his way southward, past Central America and the Caribbean, Roosevelt was depicted proclaiming that no one dares lay a hand on South America but himself, the Monroe Doctrine acting as a means by which Roosevelt could interfere and extend United States influence (Figure 2.3). As Juan Pablo Scarfi attests, proposals for the redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine were made by prominent Latin Americans at the time the Roosevelt Corollary took shape; however, these proposals envisioned the doctrine as a multilateral policy that tapped into the notions of inter-American cooperation and non-interventionism that were perceived as inherent in the original message.[47] By the turn of the century, United States activity within the Western Hemisphere had created discontent among Latin American nations and the Monroe Doctrine was viewed primarily with disdain. As one example of many critical voices, Columbian writer José Vila angrily described the doctrine as 'the jawbone of an ass brandished in the hands of Cain.'[48] This widespread anti-Yankee sentiment prompted efforts among prominent Latin Americans to seek a modification of the Monroe Doctrine along lines which would benefit all the American republics, rather than just the United States.

[46] Upon notifying Hay of the cartoon, the United States minister to Uruguay, William Finch, reported that Argentinian response to the corollary was particularly negative: Finch to Hay (26 December 1904), Reel 21, JHP, MDLC.
[47] Scarfi, 'Pan-American Redefinition', pp. 191-192.
[48] Quoted in J. Rippy, 'Literary Yankeephobia in Hispanic America (Concluded)', *Journal of International Relations*, 12, no. 4 (1922), pp. 524-538.

Figure 2.3: ‘El Peligro Yankee’



Source: *Caras y Caretas* (17 December 1904)

One of the first Latin Americans to make such a proposal was Argentine statesman Luis Drago. Drago reacted to the severity of the Venezuela crisis by issuing what would become known as the Drago Doctrine in a dispatch to the State Department. Seeking to prevent any future instances of European gunboat diplomacy, Drago proposed that those who invested or lived in foreign nations should make claims with local tribunals and courts rather than resorting to diplomatic and military interventions as had taken place in Venezuela. Claiming that any forceful collection of debts would lead to a

situation 'at variance with the Monroe Doctrine,' Drago desired to develop an anti-interventionist and hemispheric reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.[49] Whilst popular throughout Latin America, the Drago Doctrine was viewed unfavourably in the United States and was rebuffed by Hay and Roosevelt, which Lester Langley describes as an effort on the part of United States policy makers to keep the Monroe Doctrine out of 'the Pan-American system.'[50]

However, upon Hay's death in 1905, Elihu Root took up the position of Secretary of State and began to direct most of the United States' Latin American policy. Root viewed the Drago Doctrine more favourably and whilst United States hegemony was his top priority, as demonstrated by his initial advocacy of the Roosevelt Corollary, he often favoured policies of cooperation over coercion and was keen to undo the negative reaction instilled by the corollary.[51] As such, Root's appointment is perceived by many historians as a turning point in United States policy toward Latin America. In the words of David Healy, his 'goals were multiple: to win the Latin's friendship by espousing their cause, to give them a larger international voice in safeguarding their own interests, and to erect new barriers against European interventions in the western hemisphere. While it was meant to serve United States purposes, Root's course represented enlightened self-interest, for it was intended to serve the needs of others as well.'[52]

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[49] For Drago's dispatch, see: Drago to Mérou (29 December 1902) in *FRUS 1903*, pp. 1-5. For further details of the Drago Doctrine, see: A. Hershey, 'The Calvo and Drago Doctrines', *American Journal of International Law*, 1, no. 1 (1907), pp. 26-45; Whitaker, *Western Hemisphere Idea*, pp. 86-107; D. Shenin, *Argentina and the United States: An Alliance Contained* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2006), p. 33.
[50] L. Langley, *America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2nd ed., 2010), pp. 101-103.
[51] Root's approach was referred to as 'New Pan-Americanism': 'The New Pan Americanism', *World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series*, 6, no. 1 (1916), p. 3.
[52] Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, pp. 135-139.

Root's reputation grew largely from his 1906 goodwill tour of Latin America. Coinciding with the Third Pan American Conference held during July and August in Rio de Janeiro, Root set a remarkable precedent in conducting this trip, being one of the first American statesmen to undertake a high-profile tour of Latin America, inspiring Knox's aforementioned tour. At the conference, Root was well received and he outlined that the United States wished for 'no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except sovereignty over ourselves.'[53] At a later speech in Uruguay, he referred explicitly to the Monroe Doctrine, stating that the

> great declaration of Monroe, made in the infancy of Latin-American liberty, was an assertion to all the world of the competency of Latin-Americans to govern themselves and their countries. That assertion my country has always maintained, and my presence here is, in part, for the purpose of giving evidence of her belief that the truth of the assertion has been demonstrated.[54]

The purpose of Root's visit was clear: to allay fears of United States imperialism and soften United States rhetoric that frequently referred to Latin Americans as racially inferior. Symbolically, the building in which the conference was held was renamed the Palácio Monroe in August as a sign of friendship (Figure 2.4).[55] Pan-Americanist missionary Samuel Guy Inman later recounted in 1917 that the palace's name testified that 'our Monroe doctrine has no terrors' for Latin America, arguing that nothing since Root's tour had 'so increased the friendship of the two Americas'.[56]

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[53] R. Bacon and J. Scott (eds), *Latin America and the United States: Addresses by Elihu Root* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917), p. 10.
[54] Ibid., pp. 58-59.
[55] *Washington Post* (2 August 1906), p. 4.
[56] 'Travel Experiences in Brazil' (1917), Box 13, Samuel Guy Inman Papers [hereafter SGIP], MDLC.

Figure 2.4: The Palácio Monroe



Source: *Richmond Times Dispatch* (August 1906)

It was during the Pan American Conference that Root expressed his advocacy of the Drago Doctrine and suggested that it should be discussed at the upcoming Hague peace conference of 1907. Impressively, Root secured the unprecedented attendance of many Latin American nations at this gathering of world powers and he personally joined the United States delegation. Before the Hague conference began, the United States delegation met at the State Department and Joseph Choate, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom, asked Root to outline the United States' attitude toward the Drago Doctrine. Echoing Drago's assertion that debt collection should be a local matter, Root explained that the forceful collection of Latin American debts was 'dangerous to the best interests of the United States, and the abandonment of the practice of forcible collection

would relieve the stress or pressure of the Monroe Doctrine upon this country.'[57] However, Root's conduct during the Hague conference itself revealed the limits of his Pan-Americanism. Despite his advocacy of the Drago Doctrine, he was primarily interested in its specificities, namely preventing forceful debt collection, rather than shaping a new Monroe Doctrine and potentially limiting United States political action.[58] As such, the United States delegation only advocated the tenets of the Drago Doctrine that referred to debt collection, proposing a distorted version of the doctrine referred to as the Porter Convention, named after the delegate General Horace Porter.[59] Drago and the Argentinean delegation personally rejected the convention in frustration, tainting the good-feeling that had been produced during the Pan-American Conference.

Root's approach to Latin America was guided by a more nuanced approach to the concept of race than the likes of his successor, implementing a policy that distinguished between the geographical divisions of Latin America. Root's correspondence clearly outlines his opinions and Lars Schoultz argues that his 'specific contribution to inter-American relations was to disaggregate the nations of the region into two different classes – one the turbulent Caribbean region, the other the stable, progressive countries of southern South America and Mexico.'[60] Root had a high opinion of South Americans and in a letter to Senator Benjamin Tillman he stated the following:

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[57] 'Meeting of the American Commission to the Second Hague Conference' (20 April 1907), Box 21, Joseph Hodges Choate Papers [hereafter JHCP], MDLC.
[58] While discussing the Hauge conference with Roosevelt, Reid predicted that the Drago Doctrine would not be accepted as it was 'too much of a self-denying ordinance to be entirely agreeable to any [delegation]': Reid to Roosevelt (15 January 1907), in Contosta and Hawthorne, 'Letters of Whitelaw Reid', p. 121.
[59] For the full text of the Porter Convention see: 'Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts' (18 October 1907) *The Avalon Project*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu
[60] Schoultz, *Beneath the United States*, p. 192.

> South Americans now hate us, largely because they think we despise them and try to bully them. I really like them and intend to show it. I think their friendship is really important to the United States, and that the best way to secure it is by treating them like gentlemen. If you want to make a man your friend, it does not pay to treat him like a yellow dog.[61]

This favourable opinion was influenced by the recent "rediscovery" of South America. Ricardo Salvatore argues that this was a moment in which the United States decision-making class sought to learn more about South American culture, history, politics, and geography, both for the purpose of improving inter-American relations and to exert a form of control and dominance via methods of informal imperialism such as knowledge production. Root's tour signified the influence of Progressive Era faith in the accumulation of knowledge upon United States-Latin American relations, which was additionally reflected in the professionalisation of Latin American studies at United States universities.[62] As archaeologist-historian Hiram Bingham claimed in 1907, Latin American History and Politics was becoming 'an uncommonly good' field for research, arguing that inter-American friendship had to rest upon 'a basis of intelligent appreciation.'[63]

However, Root's thoughts on the inhabitants of Central America and the Caribbean reveal why his approach was limited to South America and ultimately favoured hegemony over cooperation. In a letter to Andrew Carnegie, Root claimed that Central Americans had 'always lived in an atmosphere of suspicion of each other, and

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[61] Root to Tillman (13 December 1905), Box 186, ERP, MDLC.
[62] Salvatore, *Disciplinary Conquest*, pp. 25-31; R. Salvatore, 'The Enterprise of Knowledge: Representational Machines of Informal Empire', in G. Joseph, C. LeGrand and R. Salvatore (eds), *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 80.
[63] *Bulletin of the Pan-American Union* (February 1908), pp. 283-300.

dealing with them requires a great deal of patience and consideration, which is sometimes difficult to maintain', paternalistically referring to them in another letter as 'the proud and sensitive people of those little republics.'[64] Root described Haitians, who were often detested by policy makers above all other peoples of the Western Hemisphere, as 'densely ignorant' and hoped that some situation would arise 'in which we could be of material help to them and in which we could give them that help in such a way as to establish the right sort of relations.'[65] This perception of racial inferiority altered the way in which Root understood the Monroe Doctrine and, combined with the paramount importance of the Panama Canal, the Caribbean was deemed the region in which the United States had to exercise a predominant influence: 'It is there that the true justification and necessity for the Monroe Doctrine is found. We must control the route to the Panama Canal … We cannot permit any un-American power to obtain possession of any of those countries.'[66] Financial stability was crucial and in reference to Costa Rica, Root claimed that it was 'so important to have the next door neighbor of Panama under the financial control of Americans, with a power of ultimate control by the United States rather than have it vested in any foreign power.'[67] To Albert Shaw he summarised his stance, emphasising a commitment to hegemony in the circum-Caribbean:

> If we can maintain for a time the right sort of relations with them, we can exercise an enormous influence over their conduct for their own good and for ours … patience and a few years of the right kind of treatment I am

[64] Root to Carnegie (13 December 1907); Root to Lyman (27 December 1907), Box 188, ERP, MDLC.
[65] Root to Shaw (14 December 1908), Box 189, ERP, MDLC.
[66] Root to Abbott (24 December 1908), Box 189, ERP, MDLC.
[67] Root to Hay (7 January 1905), Box 185, ERP, MDLC.

> sure will give us in that part of the world the only kind of hegemony we need to seek or ought to want.[68]

Therefore, Root held absolute faith in the necessity of maintaining a unilateral Monroe Doctrine, rather than any multilateral reinterpretations, personally embodying the tensions between a desire for both hegemony and cooperation. Root occasionally floated the idea that an ABC nation could take on some of the responsibility of the Monroe Doctrine, but it was not typical of his opinion.[69] Whilst serving as Secretary of State, he ultimately aimed to 'lose no convenient opportunity to impress upon [Latin Americans] that it is a matter of our own concern, not theirs.'[70]

As the Republican administrations implemented dollar diplomacy and soured of United States-Latin American relations, Pan-American sentiment began to rise in the United States. The Pan American Union (PAU) assumed a greater presence in inter-American affairs under the directorship of John Barrett in 1907 and the organisation generated significant interest in Latin American trade. Through a combination of a genuine commitment to the Pan-American ideal and a desire to increase inter-American commercial activity, efforts to improve inter-American relations, rather than resorting to coercive policies, gradually became more popular among the decision-making class. As Latin Americans continued to posit multilateral reinterpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, several Pan-Americanists from within the United States warmed to the possibility of a Pan-Americanised Monroe Doctrine as an alternative interpretation to the Roosevelt Corollary.

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[68] Root to Shaw (3 January 1908), Box 188, ERP, MDLC.
[69] J. Smith, *Brazil and the United States: Convergence and Divergence* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010), p. 60.
[70] Root to Watterson (16 May 1906), Box 186, ERP, MDLC.

Alongside the Drago Doctrine of 1902, two Latin American proposals stand out. The first was enunciated by Alejandro Álvarez, a Chilean international lawyer with connections to the United States international law community. At the first Pan American Scientific Conference of 1908, Álvarez outlined that there were distinctly American problems in international law due to the nature of the geography, settlement, economic development and racial issues present in the New World.[71] In subsequent papers on the subject, Álvarez proposed that the Monroe Doctrine could be used as the basis for the establishment of a system of American International Law. The doctrine gave a 'characteristic touch to the international relations of the states of the New World' that made it of great importance to international law and Álvarez believed the principles growing out of the Monroe Doctrine 'may be regarded not merely as incidents of policy but as declarations of actual principles of international law of American origin.'[72] The second emanated from two Brazilian diplomats, José Paranhos, the Foreign Minister more commonly known as the Baron of Rio Branco, and Joaquim Nabuco, an Ambassador to the United States. Both men were keen on ensuring strong ties between Brazil and the United States and they believed that a multi-lateralised Monroe Doctrine could serve the interests of both nations.[73] Rio Branco tended to speak highly of the Monroe Doctrine, writing an article for the *Jornal do Commercio* in 1908 that emphasised that Brazil was the first South American government to officially accept the

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[71] *Report of the Delegates of the United States to the Pan-American Scientific Conference Held at Santiago, Chile December 25, 1908, to January 5, 1909* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909), p. 44.

[72] A. Álvarez, 'Latin America and International Law', *American Journal of International Law*, 3, no. 2 (1909), pp. 269-353; A. Álvarez, 'American International Law', trans. L. Rowe, *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting*, 3 (1909), pp. 206-220. On the idea of American International Law, see: J. Scarfi, 'Pan-American Legal Designs: The Rise and Decline of American International Law in the Western Hemisphere', in Scarfi and Tillman, *Cooperation and Hegemony*.

[73] B. Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants: The Misunderstood History of U.S.-Brazilian Relations* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), p. 29.

Monroe Doctrine, tracing the history of United States-Brazilian relations as an embodiment of an 'ancient friendship.'[74] Nabuco had intended to achieve practical results, planning to discuss the multi-lateralisation of the doctrine at the Fourth Pan American Conference in 1910. However, he died just months before. The Brazilian delegation attempted to honour his wishes and informally discussed the proposition with other delegations during the conference. The United States delegation refused to debate the possibility of a multi-lateralised Monroe Doctrine.[75]

It is worth highlighting that these suggestions for a multilateral Monroe Doctrine came from nationals of the ABC nations. Widely regarded as racially, politically, culturally and economically superior to the rest of Latin America, Argentina, Brazil and Chile were more respected by most United States policy makers. Roosevelt was certainly no stranger to recognising that certain Latin American nations no longer needed the protection of the doctrine and as early as 1901 he stated that the nations of South America 'can work out their own salvation for themselves.'[76] In his annual message of 1905, he further outlined that there were 'certain republics to the south of us which have already reached such a point of stability, order, and prosperity that they themselves, though as yet hardly consciously, are among the guarantors of this Doctrine.' It was the ABC nations that the United States should 'now meet not only on a basis of entire equality, but in a spirit of frank and respectful friendship, which we hope is mutual. If all of the republics to the south of us will only grow as those to which I allude have already grown, all need

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[74] *Jornal do Commercio* (20 January 1908), p. 1.
[75] Details of the conference can be found in: A. Álvarez, 'The Monroe Doctrine at the Fourth Pan-American Conference', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 37, no. 3 (1911), pp. 24-30; S. Inman, *Problems in Pan Americanism* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1926), pp. 207-209; Connell-Smith, *The Inter-American System*, p. 52.
[76] Roosevelt to Coudert (3 July 1901) *LTR*, vol. 3, pp. 105-107.

for us to be the especial champions of the Doctrine will disappear.'[77] The Taft administration was also keen to stress this and the President stated that 'the changed circumstances of the United States and of the Republics to the south of us, most of which have great natural resources, stable government and progressive ideals, the apprehension which gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine may be said to have nearly disappeared.'[78] Knox referred to South American nations as being 'consciously or unconsciously fellow sponsors with the United States of the Monroe Doctrine as a Pan-American idea as well as an American policy' and Choate believed that Argentina and Brazil were 'getting to be such great and powerful nations' and would have to be considered as 'no longer in any manner under the guardianship of the United States, and will certainly have to be consulted, in any attempts, at any rate within their own territory, to enforce the Monroe doctrine.' [79] This view would not, of course, apply to the rest of Latin America, which in turn granted any ABC proposals an air of respectability.

There were, however, concerns in the State Department that the ABC nations would form their own Monroe Doctrine rather than unofficially uphold the original. For example, Nicolai Grevstad, the United States minister to Uruguay, predicted that after the opening of the Panama Canal the ABC nations would come to establish closer diplomatic relations to offset United States dominance. He reported that South Americans had expressed the opinion that 'it would be wise for the South American republics to enter into closer relations for mutual protection of their independence and interests' which

[77] 'Message of the President' (5 December 1905) in *FRUS 1905*, pp. xxxiii-xxxv.
[78] 'Message of the President' (7 December 1909) in *FRUS 1909*, p. xv.
[79] Knox, *Incidental Obligations*; Choate to Morgan (27 January 1911), Box 15, JHCP, MDLC.

could result in the formulation of 'a definite formula, not a Drago doctrine, but a South American Monroe doctrine, fronting north as well as east.'[80]

The early United States proposals for the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine reflected these national distinctions. William Scruggs, a former diplomat in Latin America, argued in an unpublished essay that there were certain Latin American nations which were admirable in their development and governance, proposing that there should be 'an American concert of good States, working in harmony with the United States, to keep the peace, to foster trade, to advance collective civilization, and to regulate and even punish the disorderly and dishonest States.' Such a proposal would preserve the Monroe Doctrine and 'relieve us of sole responsibility for disorders in the bad States and save us from ungenerous suspicions.'[81] In his famous book *The Promise of American Life*, the Progressive intellectual Herbert Croly noted that the Monroe Doctrine had developed a 'dangerously militant tendency' which ought to be addressed by modifying the doctrine as 'a positive principle of political action in the Western hemisphere.' Croly argued that European influence within Latin America could be gained through means other than territorial acquisition, namely via immigration and commercial ties, and that the Monroe Doctrine made inevitable a clash between the United States and the nations of Europe. The separation of the New and Old Worlds was diminishing every year and it was 'only in relation to the Monroe Doctrine that we still make much of the essential incompatibility between European and American institutions.' Croly thus advocated the

[80] Grevstad to Knox (1 May 1912) in Department of State, Division of Information, Series A, The ABC Alliance, Box 40, PCKP, MDLC.
[81] W. Scruggs, (Undated) 'The Monroe Doctrine and its Future', Reel 2, William Lindsay Scruggs Papers, MDLC, ff. 43-45. This essay served as the basis for a subsequent article, although the content cited in this chapter was not published: W. Scruggs, 'The Monroe Doctrine: Its Origin and Import', *North American* Review, (February 1903), pp. 185-199.

creation of a political system between the Americas; however, the internal conditions of most Latin American nations posed a problem to this end. Pan-Americanism, he argued, must be more than a mere matter of geography, demanding the establishment of a 'pacific system of public law in the two Americas.'[82]

Barrett seized his new-found prominence in the PAU and began to express the opinion that Latin America would soon be able to uphold the Monroe Doctrine itself.[83] He ensured that the organisation's official bulletin printed similar statements, reporting in 1910 that Joseph Sears had argued before the American Historical Association that in order to lessen diplomatic tension, the doctrine 'should be made to typify to the Latin American mind a mutually beneficial alliance, not a protectorate assumed by the United States.'[84] Personifying this emerging reinterpretation of the doctrine, William Sulzer, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, claimed in 1912 that he was in favour of the Monroe Doctrine 'because I am a Pan American.'[85] Texan Representative James Slayden also proposed his own interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1912. Slayden argued that the Monroe Doctrine did not give the United States the right to intervene, proclaiming that the 'rule laid down by Mr. Monroe served a good purpose one time, but the necessity for it passes long ago … I can see no harm to come from its frank abandonment, at least so far as it is supposed to interdict colonization.' Slayden thus proposed a new American policy for peace, one that 'proposes that the various American governments shall mutually agree that hereafter no territory shall be transferred from one to the other as a consequence of war. It proposes a treaty that will simply say that the American

[82] H. Croly, *The Promise of American Life* (New York: Macmillan, 1909), pp. 291-314.
[83] Prisco, *John Barrett*, p. 68.
[84] *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* (February 1911), p. 250.
[85] *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* (June 1912), p. 797.


governments in the future shall not steal territory from each other.'[86] Whilst the efforts of Slayden and likeminded Pan-Americanists had limited political impact during the Roosevelt and Taft presidencies, they demonstrated that the doctrine was open to a very different reinterpretation and that not all Americans were satisfied with Roosevelt's corollary. Unity rather than hegemony ought to be defended from external threats.

Phantom Perils – German and Japanese Threats to the Monroe Doctrine

The proposals to reshape the Monroe Doctrine were fundamentally influenced by the tenacity of the "German Peril" within the national consciousness of the United States. Americans first grew concerned about German designs during the Spanish-American War when German naval activity at Manila aroused suspicion.[87] The Ambassador to Germany, Andrew White, reported in 1898 that certain German newspapers viewed the war as an opportune moment to secure naval bases in South America and advocated German acquisition of territory in the Philippines. Whilst White noted that there 'seems nothing in all this specially threatening as yet,' he advised that the United States should 'be on its guard.'[88] Combined with the passage of the First Fleet Bill in the Reichstag during the same year and the discovery of German war plans aimed at the United States, naval officials grew wary of the strength of the Germany Navy. It was not long before this suspicion solidified itself in the political and public realm due to President Roosevelt's

[86] J. Slayden, 'The Relations of the United States to Other American Governments: The Monroe Doctrine and its Limitations', *Proceedings of the Third American Peace Conference Held in Baltimore, Maryland May 3 to 6, 1911* (Waverly Press: Baltimore, 1911), pp. 157-173.
[87] T. Bailey, 'Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay', *American Historical Review*, 45, no. 1 (1939), pp. 59-81; Collin, *Roosevelt's Caribbean*, pp. 66-74.
[88] White to Hay (13 May 1898); (18 June 1898), Reel 85, Despatches from United States Ministers to the German States and Germany, 1799-1906, RDS, NAII.

Figure 2.5: 'How Emperor William's Face Looks When He Thinks of the Monroe Doctrine'



Source: *Spokane Press* (February 1906)

intimate connection with naval affairs.[89] Indeed, German rhetoric only served to fan the flames as German officials were infamous for their criticism of the Monroe Doctrine (Figure 2.5).[90]

[89] Mitchell, *Danger of Dreams*, pp. 218-220.

[90] Criticism of the Monroe Doctrine was rampant in the German press, but it was Otto von Bismarck's historic comments that Americans tended to refer to. He described the doctrine as 'international impertinence', 'that monstrosity in International Law' and, during the Spanish-American War shortly before his death, as 'a species of arrogance peculiarly American and inexcusable': Bismarck to Münster (1 June 1884) in E. Dugdale (ed.), *German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914*, vol. 1 (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1928), p. 176; H. Kraus, 'What European Countries Think of the Monroe Doctrine', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 54, (1914), p. 109; W. von Schierbrand, 'Conversations with the Four German Chancellors', *The Century Magazine* (May 1902), p. 155.

Much like the United States, Germany began to establish itself as a global power at the turn of the century, positioning the two nations on a potential collision course.[91] Unlike most of the other global powers of the period, Germany captured the United States' attention and became the nation's primary rival in Latin America in the minds of United States policy makers. For example, despite Britain's dominance of the region throughout the nineteenth century, it was not viewed as a threat to the Monroe Doctrine as the twentieth century dawned. British policy makers actively deferred geopolitical, although not commercial, influence in Latin America to the United States as a process of Anglo-American rapprochement developed.[92] The outcome of the Venezuela crisis accurately reflected this. Despite joint European action during the Venezuelan blockade, it was only Germany that gained a negative image within the United States. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge noted that the United States press differentiated between Britain and Germany during the crisis, stating that 'there has been up to today no against England of any kind.' Expressing his own opinion, he believed that it was 'inconceivable that any English Government should really wish to destroy their good relations with us for the sake of playing the German game.'[93] Former Rear-Admiral Alfred Mahan wrote that he was sorry to see that 'Britain has associated herself with any other power in the Venezuela business,' whilst Secretary of State John Hay noted with pleasure that Germany had come out of the affair with a damaged reputation, one which the United


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[91] Fiebig-von Hase, 'United States and Germany', p. 37; Jonas, *United States and Germany*, pp. 51-55.

[92] On Anglo-American relations during this period, see: I. Adams, *Brothers Across the Ocean: British Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' 1900-1905* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005); A. Dobson, *Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 1995); W. Kneer, *Great Britain and the Caribbean, 1901-1913: A Study in Anglo-American Relations* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1975); B. Perkins, *The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914* (New York: Atheneum, 1968); A. Campbell, *Great Britain and the United States 1895-1903* (London: Longmans, 1960); C. Campbell, *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1957).

[93] Lodge to White (3 February 1903), Box 17, Henry White Papers, MDLC.

Figure 2.6: 'That's a Live Wire, Gentlemen'




Source: *New York Herald* (December 1902)

States could use to its advantage within Latin America.[94] As the numerous cartoons highlighted at the time, it was Germany that was perceived as having attacked the Monroe Doctrine rather than Britain or Italy. Most images depicted German figures as taking the first move challenge the doctrine as its allies looked on cautiously (Figures 2.6 and 2.7). What made the perceived threat more acute was that it clashed with the United States' own ascendency. As Nancy Mitchell argues, the perceived aggression of Germany 'helped to exonerate the interventionism of the United States,' as it distinguished United States policy from European policy. It was not just that an enemy was needed, rather the

[94] Mahan to Maxse (22 December 1902) in R. Seager and D. Maguire (ed.), *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan*, vol. 3 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975), pp. 49-50. [Hereafter *LPATM*]; Hay to White (15 March 1903), *John Hay-Henry White Correspondence, Digital Maryland* http://collections.digitalmaryland.org/cdm/

Figure 2.7: ‘Only a Scarecrow? Yes! With a Bees’ Nest in its Hat’



Source: *Sioux City Journal* (February 1903)

United States needed to be seen as ‘different and better.’[95] It was through the Monroe Doctrine that the United States made this differentiation, tying a revered policy to notions of regional hegemony.

The main bone of contention, however, was the presence of Germans in Brazil. In the early nineteenth century, German emigrants began to establish diasporic hamlets and settlements, subsequently referred to as colonies by citizens of the United States, within

[95] Mitchell, *Danger of Dreams*, pp. 2-8; N. Mitchell, ‘The Height of the German Challenge: The Venezuela Blockade, 1902-3’, *Diplomatic History*, 20, no. 2 (1996), pp. 185-186. See also: Small, ‘German “Threat”’, p. 254; Sexton, *Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 224-226; Healy, *Drive to Hegemony*, pp. 71-76.

several Latin American nations, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela. Southern Brazil attracted the most German emigration and it is estimated that by 1900 over 350,000 Germans lived within the states of Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. Before the First World War, Brazil was home to the largest German diaspora outside the United States and was perceived by German nationalists as a possible location for the rebirth of a new Germany. What made this German presence in Brazil unnerving to the United States was the persistence of a distinctly German culture within the colonies, the German dominance of trade in the region and the fact that the Pan-German movement was vocal in its desire to see the establishment of a formal colony in Brazil (Figure 2.8). Building upon the fears expressed against German naval expansion, Americans were wary that Brazil could be used as a naval base by Germany and as a location to barrack troops in a future conflict with the United States.[96]

The concern with which the State Department regarded the existence of European colonies in the Western Hemisphere is aptly demonstrated by a dispatch that was issued by John Hay to all diplomatic and consular officers in Latin America in March 1900. The colony issue had become 'one of great importance' to the Department of State and Hay was 'desirous to have as full information as possible upon the subject.' He attached a total of sixteen questions that he required answering as soon as possible for every Latin

[96] On German immigration to Latin America, see: S. Conrad, 'Rethinking German Colonialism in a Global Age', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 41, no. 4 (2013), p. 548; Mitchell, *Danger of Dreams*, pp. 108-109; T. Schoonover, *Germany in Central America: Competitive Imperialism, 1821-1929* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998), pp. 112-115; B. Fausto, 'Brazil: The Social and Political Structure of the First Republic, 1889-1930' in L. Bethell (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol. 5, *c. 1870-1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 783-784; F. Luebke, 'A Prelude to Conflict: The German Ethnic Group in Brazilian Society, 1890-1917', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 6, no. 1 (1983), pp. 1-9; I. Forbes, 'German Informal Imperialism in South America before 1914', *The Economic History Review*, 31, no. 3 (1978), p. 388; F. Rippy, 'German Investments in Latin America', *Journal of Business of the University of Chicago*, 21, no. 2 (1948), pp. 65-66.

Figure 2.8: ‘Germany Colonizing Brazil as Move to Down Monroe Doctrine’



Source: *Seattle Star* (February 1906)

American nation, including: when any colonies were first established; how many separate colonies existed; what nationalities they were composed of; whether the colonists retained their original nationalities and preserved their own languages and schools; and whether separate laws were established for their own local governance.[97] If Europeans were establishing colonies in which their own cultures, laws and systems of governance were being maintained, then one of the core tenets of the Monroe Doctrine was being directly challenged.

The usage of the term colony is additionally important. Whilst it was used to refer to diasporic settlements, it was a loaded term that carried with it the severity of a genuine colony in the political sense. William Scruggs, posited that the settlements were ‘already

[97] ‘Department of State Circular’ (31 March 1900) Reel 12 (Argentina), Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State 1801-1906 [hereafter DIDS], RDS, NAII.

colonial in every sense except in name' and worried that Europeans in Latin America would look to their home governments to intervene if they were wronged during periods of civil unrest, which would in time cause friction with the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine.[98] The existence of these colonies was even reported to be having a detrimental impact upon the way in Latin Americans perceived the Monroe Doctrine. Before beginning his tour of Latin America in 1906, Root received a briefing from George Cole, a consul in Buenos Aires, outlining Argentinian opinion. Whilst the doctrine was largely unpopular, he argued that the reason for this was the influence of European colonists who 'teach these people that the Monroe Doctrine is only a snare to entrap them.'[99]

One of the most anxious protestations against German colonies came from Emory White, a businessman with significant trade interests in Latin America. In December 1902, he shared his concerns with President Roosevelt, outlining that he was 'simply astonished at the growth of German commerce,' arguing that Germans had managed to gain significant influence among the armies and governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. According to White, the German colonists demonstrated an 'inbred hatred of everything American' and laughed at the futility of the Monroe Doctrine. United States trade in the region was actively curtailed by Germans and he believed that a crisis would soon emerge: 'The very air in South America is impregnated with German ideas, German goods, German aggressiveness and a little later, if you lease, with a German Government.'[100] Such economic concerns prompted significant discussion throughout

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[98] Scruggs, 'The Monroe Doctrine', ff. 38-41.

[99] Cole to Root (26 April 1906), Reel 25, Despatches from United States Consuls in Buenos Aires 1811-1906 [hereafter DCBA], RDS, NAII.

[100] White to Roosevelt (16 December 1902) *Theodore Roosevelt Digital Library*. http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library. For other similar expressions of concern, see: Adee to Bryan (6 September 1901), Reel 26 (Brazil), DIDS, RDS, NAII; 'German

both the Roosevelt and Taft presidencies as academics, businessmen, diplomats and organisations such as the Merchant Marine Commission outlined how strong the German, and indeed wider European, economic and commercial presence was in Latin America. United States steamship lines to Latin America were pitiful in comparison to European lines, European banks were dominating, and the United States share of trade was embarrassing.[101]

Whilst Nancy Mitchell emphasises that a policy of preventative interventionism was favoured among policy makers to counter German influence, particularly regarding the Caribbean and Central American regions, little attention has been paid to the fact that Pan-Americanists believed that the German threat called for greater inter-American unity as an appropriate response. Whilst serving as Ambassador to Argentina in 1904, John Barrett submitted a memorandum to President Roosevelt outlining that German influences were 'bending their energies to forestall all American effort [in Latin America].' The southern republics were, in his opinion, entering upon a period of unprecedented development, however, this would only be assured 'provided the policy and attitude of the United States Government is in harmony and sympathy with [Latin American] ambitions and progress.' For Barrett, it was through a policy of inter-American cooperation that the United States could advance its interests in the region and

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Expansion', *The Outlook* (18 May 1901), pp. 150-151; J. Simmons, 'The Monroe Doctrine: Its Status', *Michigan Law Review*, 5, no. 4 (1907), p. 248; H. Johnson, 'The Lamb Rampant', *Everybody's Magazine* (March 1908), pp. 291-301; P. Reinsch, *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1900), pp. 281-286; A. Hale, *The South Americans* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1907), pp. 321-323.

[101] *Report of the Merchant Marine Commission, Together with the Testimony Taken at the Hearings*, vol. 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), pp. iv-v; L. Rowe, 'The Danger of National Isolation', *North American Review*, 185, no. 617 (1907), p. 425; Cole to Bacon (7 December 1905), Reel 25, DCBA, RDS, NAII; *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* (February 1908), pp. 272-273; C. Pepper, 'Steamship Lines to South America' (10 September 1909), Box 7; Finley to Knox (8 July 1909), Box 8; Youngman to Knox (14 September 1909), Box 27, PCKP, MDLC.

prevent nations such as Germany from 'securing a position from which it will be most difficult to oust them.'[102]

After leaving his post in Argentina, Barrett submitted some suggestions to the newly formed Merchant Marine Commission with the main intention of impressing the importance of establishing improved steamship communication between the United States and South America. The lack of direct lines for passengers, mail and cargo was problematic and needed to be resolved to improve inter-American commercial, social and political relations.[103] Barrett suggested that the United States must make gains in commerce and influence within Latin America 'through the cultivation of friendly relations and mutual confidence' rather than through protectorates or intervention along the lines of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.[104] A "holier than thou" paternalistic attitude within the United States was something that should no longer hold any sway.[105] After assuming the directorship of the PAU, Barrett desired to work directly with any United States commercial bodies, manufacturing centres and businesses to awaken interest in Latin American trade opportunities, offering the services of the PAU in supporting trade expansion.[106] One of Barrett's most noticeable efforts was when he organised a Pan American Commercial Conference in February 1911. With over seven hundred delegates in attendance, Barrett outlined that the conference would act as a forum for United States business leaders to discuss the possibilities of Pan-American

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[102] Barrett to Roosevelt (20 December 1904), Box 21, JBP, MDLC. Emphasis in original.
[103] 'Memorandum of Remarks Submitted to the Merchant Marine Commission' (24 June 1904), Box 21, JBP, MDLC; *Report of the Merchant Marine Commission: Together with the Testimony Taken at the Hearings*, vol. 2, *Hearings on the Great Lakes and Pacific Coast* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), pp. 677-683.
[104] Barrett to Finley (1 June 1906), Box 25, JBP, MDLC.
[105] 'The United States as a World Power' (26 February 1910), Box 29, JBP, MDLC.
[106] J. Barrett, 'A Ready Aid in Foreign Trade', *System* (March 1908), pp. 91-104; Barrett to Taft (14 September 1909), Box 29, JBP, MDLC.

commerce and ultimately collaborate with one another and with the Pan American Union to achieve commercial success in Latin America.[107]

Underpinning this drive for trade, aside from the demand for markets and the desire to oust European competitors, was the notion that said trade would benefit the nations of Latin America through increased contact with the United States. For Barrett and many other Pan-Americanists, Latin America was paradoxically perceived as both a developed and underdeveloped region, functioning as a viable and reliable location for trade and investment, but one that additionally required trade and investment to develop. As such, there was a noticeable tension within Barrett's promotion of the Latin American market. Whilst he took great care to refer to Latin American nations as members of an equal relationship with the United States, utilising lofty Pan-American rhetoric, he contradicted this notion by claiming that, aside from the more developed ABC nations, the majority of Latin American nations were 'in the infancy of their possibilities' and would stand to benefit from closer ties with the United States.[108] This disjuncture between the idealised rhetoric of Pan-Americanism and its actual implementation was clear to see at the Pan American Commercial Conference, as Barrett did not invite any Latin American business leaders to the gathering. Whilst Barrett outlined that United States businesses needed to be buying produce from Latin America as well as selling, he was more concerned with getting United States businesses mobilised. Only the diplomatic representatives of Latin American nations were present at the conference, their role simply to promote the economic conditions of their home nations. Despite

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[107] *Proceedings of the Pan American Commercial Conference February 13-17, 1911* (Washington: Pan American Union, 1911).
[108] J. Barrett, *The Pan-American Union: Peace, Friendship, Commerce* (Washington: Pan American Union, 1911), p. 10.

advocating cooperation over hegemony, Pan-Americanists still tended to exhibit paternalism during the first decade of the twentieth century. This notion of racial inferiority was shared between both reinterpretations of the Monroe Doctrine.

The perception of the German Peril did not, however, go unopposed. The United States minister to Brazil, Charles Page Bryan, was insistent in his despatches to the State Department that there was no need to be concerned about German colonies in Brazil. Shortly before his resignation in 1902, he conducted a tour of southern Brazil in response to Hay's request for information. He reported that German immigrants were loyal to Brazil, that the Monroe Doctrine was praised at gatherings he attended and that Brazilians themselves held no quarrels with the Germans.[109] Indeed, it appears that Brazilian statesmen were unhappy with this American paranoia. John Bassett Moore, an international lawyer, received a letter from the renowned Brazilian statesman Baron Rio Branco informing him that no German threat existed. Attaching a table showing immigration figures, he noted that numbers had rapidly declined in recent years, arguing that there was no foundation for the 'sensational articles' published in the United States about a German invasion. He told Moore that he would 'render a great service by contradicting the false reports that some of your newspapers put in circulation in order to excite ill-feeling between the United States and Germany.'[110] The *Journal do Commercio* insisted that Germans were not seeking territory in Brazil and that Bryan's trip proved that Americans could not find 'the famous German peril which is preoccupying so many journalists and depriving devotees of the Monroe Doctrine so much sleep.' The article

[109] Bryan to Hay (25 June 1900), Reel 67; Bryan to Hay (2 April 1901); (17 May 1901), Reel 68, DMB, RDS, NAII.
[110] Rio Branco to Moore (22 November 1901), Box 119, John Bassett Moore Papers [hereafter JBMP], MDLC.

took the opportunity to ridicule American paranoia, claiming that some Americans will be disappointed by the absence of a genuine threat: 'they [will] lament that their heroism as knights errant of American independence will be without employment.'[111]

Some Americans even argued that greater European influence in certain Latin American nations would be beneficial and claimed that the Monroe Doctrine was actually a barrier to improving the conditions of Latin America. G. Crichfield was one such proponent, arguing that, despite the rhetoric of Roosevelt, the Monroe Doctrine acted as a shield for nations considered uncivilised. If the United States was to abandon the Monroe Doctrine 'we are morally certain that the civilized powers would speedily intervene to put an end to the present intolerable conditions.'[112] This particular argument has parallels with the Roosevelt Corollary in its division of the world into civilised and uncivilised nations, but took the concept to the extreme. An article for *The Atlantic* went so far as to describe Germans as 'a most desirable kind of immigrant. Wherever they go a higher civilization goes with them.'[113] Another commentary argued that if 'a new Prussia or Bavaria were set up in Brazil, a new Italy in Argentina, another Holland in Patagonia, a new Brittany in Guiana, who can say that the result would constitute a menace to the United States?'[114] Upon recognising that there was friction between the Monroe Doctrine and Germans in Brazil, Stephen Bonsal argued that it should not be a cause for concern: 'To many, as to myself, these well-ordered, prosperous communities have always appeared pregnant with hope for the future of the neglected continent, as oases of activity

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
[111] Dawson to Hay (1 November 1901), Reel 69, DMB, RDS, NAII.
[112] G. Crichfield, *American Supremacy: The Rise and Progress of the Latin American Republics and their Relations to the United States Under the Monroe Doctrine*, vol. 2 (New York: Brentano's, 1908), p. 635.
[113] C. Dole, 'The Right and Wrong of the Monroe Doctrine', *The Atlantic* (April 1905), p. 569.
[114] W. Wellman, 'Shall the Monroe Doctrine be Modified?', *North American Review*, 173, no. 541 (1901), pp. 832-844.

and industry in a dreary desert of intrigue and corruption that stretches almost without interruption or exception from Panama to Cape Horn.'[115] For Americans who invested deeply the idea of a racial hierarchy, there was no German threat to the Monroe Doctrine, rather the Monroe Doctrine was an outdated obstacle to the advancement of civilisation. For these Americans, Germany's national development and growth displayed the weaknesses of the Monroe Doctrine and they argued that appropriate adjustments ought to be made to its application for the benefit of Latin American nations and United States interests.

The German Peril additionally aligned the Monroe Doctrine to the United States Navy and the two became intertwined in the national consciousness during the early twentieth century (Figure 2.9). This is particularly noteworthy because the doctrine had been traditionally lauded as a policy that had been maintained without the need to resort to force of arms. Several historians attest to the prominence of the Monroe Doctrine within naval planning during this period. Nancy Mitchell notes that official reports and proceedings specifically referred to the Monroe Doctrine as under threat from the growing German Navy and Richard Challener argues that the Monroe Doctrine was 'a fixed star by which the political course of the United States Navy could be forever charted.'[116] According to Dirk Bönker, the Navy displayed a commitment to the Monroe

[115] S. Bonsal, 'Greater Germany in South America', *North American Review*, 176, no. 554 (1903), pp. 58-67.
[116] Mitchell, *Danger of Dreams*, pp. 57-63, 128; Challener, *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy*, pp. 18-23.

Figure 2.9: ‘Let it be Written so it can be Read’



Source: *New York Herald* (January 1901)

Doctrine, mobilising it ‘to justify its demands for imperial control of the Caribbean and military dominion over the canal.’[117]

Mahan and Roosevelt were both prolific in expressing the necessity of expanding the navy to uphold the Monroe Doctrine.[118] Mahan argued that because Germany’s colonies were ‘far from the first order of commercial value,’ it would look toward Latin

[117] D. Bönker, *Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States before World War I* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), pp. 39-41.

[118] As noted in Chapter One, Mahan devoted significant attention to the Monroe Doctrine in his letters and writings. David Milne argues that Mahan ‘had long worried that the Monroe Doctrine … was not accorded sufficient respect by the major European powers’ and thus approved the enunciation of the Roosevelt Corollary: Milne, *Worldmaking*, p. 65. On the relationship between Mahan and Roosevelt, see: R. Turk, *The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); P. Karsten, ‘The Nature of “Influence”: Roosevelt, Mahan and the Concept of Sea Power’, *American Quarterly*, 23, no. 4 (1971), pp. 585-600.

America for expansion. The United States needed to expand its navy and the question was not 'what we are willing to pay, but whether we are willing to hold our most cherished international dogma – the Monroe Doctrine – at the mercy of a superior navy.'[119] Speaking at the Naval War College in 1908, Roosevelt argued that the Monroe Doctrine 'unbacked by a navy is an empty boast' and would not be 'observed by foreign nations with sufficient strength to disregard it.'[120] Upon taking the post of the Secretary of Navy in 1909, George von Lengerke Meyer outlined the guiding principles for his administration of the Navy, noting that the 'Monroe Doctrine is no stronger than the Navy; the Navy is no stronger than the Fleet; and the Fleet is the Navy.'[121]

This concern was prominent in congressional debates and on 20 February 1904, Alston Dayton of West Virginia invoked the doctrine as one of many reasons to increase the size of the United States Navy. Along with the need to defend the nation's newly acquired island possessions, to ensure that an isthmian canal was built and to protect American citizens abroad, the maintenance of the 'fixed policy' that was the Monroe Doctrine demanded a larger navy.[122] His claim regarding the doctrine, however, was challenged by Gilbert Hitchcock of Nebraska, which he called 'a most ridiculous proposition.' Hitchcock reminded the House that the doctrine had been enforced without

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[119] Mahan to Stewart (19 March 1909), in *LPATM*, vol. 3, pp. 290-292. For similar comments see: Mahan to the Editor of the *New York Times* (22 May 1912) in *LPATM*, vol. 3, p. 457; *New York Times* (12 March 1900), p. 3; R. Seager, *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), pp. 490-517.

[120] *The Navy* (July 1908), pp. 16-20. For similar comments see: Roosevelt to Long (30 September 1897) in *LTR*, vol. 1, p. 695; Roosevelt to Cannon (27 December 1904) in *LTR*, vol. 4, pp. 1080-1081; Roosevelt to Watson (18 August 1906) in *LTR*, vol. 5, pp. 372-378; Roosevelt to Foss (11 January 1907) in *LTR*, vol. 5, pp. 545-549; *New York Times* (2 September 1902), p. 1; H. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1956), pp. 38-39; W. Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958), pp. 14-15.

[121] M. Howe, *George von Lengerke Meyer: His Life and Public Services* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1920), p. 451.

[122] U.S. Congress. House. Naval Appropriation Bill, 58th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Congressional Record* (20 February 1904), p. 2149.

a large navy since its enunciation and argued it was only endangered by an aggressive policy. In Hitchcock, one finds the remnants of the anti-imperialist argument regarding the doctrine, as he observed that European nations would not keep out of the Western Hemisphere whilst the United Sates asserted its own right to cross the oceans with its own 'conquest of empire.'[123] As the Navy was continuously linked to the Monroe Doctrine, criticism too was frequent, which caused Roosevelt a great deal of annoyance. Carl Schurz argued against the claim that a navy is required to uphold the Monroe Doctrine based on lack of past instances in which it has been challenged.[124] Former Secretary of the Navy, John Long, expressed some concern in 1905 at the prospect of imminent naval expansion through citing the Monroe Doctrine. He worried that a larger navy might tempt offensive activity and believed that the Monroe Doctrine was being pushed 'a little too far' through the Roosevelt Corollary.[125] In April 1908 Theodore Burton of Ohio attacked a policy of naval expansion, stating that the strength of the United States and its ability to uphold the doctrine was to be found 'not only in our Navy and Army, but in our resources and our position in the world.' Demanding that the doctrine requires naval expansion was a 'destructive argument' and took the nation away from its 'ancient moorings' of keeping out of Old World affairs.[126] Burton proved to be a thorn in Roosevelt's side and the President had previously written to him directly in an attempt to convince him otherwise.[127] Furious at the lack of progress, Roosevelt claimed

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[123] U.S. Congress. House. Naval Appropriation Bill, 58th Cong., 2nd Sess., *Congressional Record* (20 February 1904), p. 2154.
[124] 'Parker vs Roosevelt: An Open Letter to the Independent Voter' (September 1904) in Bancroft (ed.), *Papers of Carl Schurz*, vol. 6, pp. 370-371.
[125] 'Hon. John D. Long on Increase of Navy', *Advocate of Peace* (April 1905), p. 71.
[126] U.S. Congress. House. Naval Appropriation Bill, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* (15 April 1908), pp. 4777-4778.
[127] Roosevelt to Burton (23 February 1904) in *LTR*, vol. 4, pp. 735-737.

that the House and the likes of Burton 'seemed to possess an infinite capacity to do wrong.'[128]

Yet the idea that the Navy and the Monroe Doctrine required one another remained prominent and the arguments were continuously made in various forms of print media.[129] As a cartoon from *Puck* in 1908 demonstrated, the Monroe Doctrine was not safe unless the United States realised that it required a larger Navy (Figure 2.10). This can be explained by the efforts of the Navy League of the United States (NLUS). Founded in 1902 with the aim of advocating the expansion of the United States Navy, the NLUS was largely ineffective in achieving its goals within the first decade of its operations, however, it brought naval matters into the public and political eye.[130] In discussing its formation, Lieutenant-Commander John Gibbons explained that 'a strong feeling is aroused whenever the Monroe Doctrine is attacked, and the concentration of interest upon internal affairs gives way to legislative liberality in appropriations for ships and men.'[131] Whilst far less prominent during the Taft administration, similar sentiments were certainly expressed. In his inaugural address, Taft claimed that the United States armed forces ought to be organised to rapidly expand 'into a force sufficient to resist all probable invasion from abroad and to furnish a respectable expeditionary force if necessary in the maintenance of our traditional American policy which bears the name of

[128] Roosevelt to Hobson (16 April 1908) in *LTR*, vol. 6, pp. 1008-1009.
[129] F. Loomis, 'The Position of the United States on the American Continent – Some Phases of the Monroe Doctrine', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 22 (1903), p. 3; E. Stanwood, 'The Moral Aspects of the Monroe Doctrine', *The Outlook* (8 February 1902), p. 371; *The Navy* (August 1908), p. 13.
[130] A. Rappaport, *The Navy League of the United States* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), pp. 3-14.
[131] J. Gibbons, 'Navy Leagues', *North American Review*, (May 1903), p. 761.

Figure 2.10: 'Magnified Security'



Source: *Puck* (May 1908)

President Monroe.'[132] It was specifically against the idea of a German threat, however, that such arguments were primarily posed. Prominent naval figures such as Asa Walker, George Dewey and David Taylor voiced with certainty that Germany would soon test the Monroe Doctrine.[133] To Mahan, Germany was a continual threat to the doctrine and the

[132] W. Taft, 'Inaugural Address' (4 March 1909), *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
[133] Challener, *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy*, pp. 15-29.

security of the Panama Canal made the matter even more serious.[134] Roosevelt was similarly rampant in this view in his letters, claiming that Germany would 'make us either put up or shut up on the Monroe doctrine.'[135]

This naval rhetoric was tied to the hegemony-facilitating interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as it was intrinsically linked to the security of the Panama Canal. It became vital that Germany was prevented from using its naval strength to acquire a strong strategic position in the surrounding region. Rumours continuously circulated concerning German plans to purchase both the Galapagos Islands and the Danish West Indies, purchases that would call the Monroe Doctrine into question and threaten the canal. The United States itself had no desire to acquire the Galapagos Islands but was not willing to let them fall into German hands and the United States eventually purchased the Danish West Indies in 1917, just before entering the First World War. In both instances, United States policy was justified on the grounds of preventing Germany from acquiring the islands and challenging the Monroe Doctrine.

Many American statesmen had sought to acquire the Danish West Indies since the end of the Civil War, given their strategic location in the Western Hemisphere. It had become widely known that the Danish government was unhappy with the islands' unprofitability, which facilitated frequent diplomatic efforts to purchase the islands. Around 1902 a deal was almost secured by Henry White, however, the Danish parliament

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[134] Mahan to Clark (23 July 1909) *LPATM*, vol. 3, pp. 307-308; Mahan to Lodge (8 January 1912) *LPATM*, vol. 3, pp. 443-444; Mahan to Henderson (28 March 1912) *LPATM*, vol. 3, pp. 451-452.
[135] Roosevelt to Lodge (27 March 1901) in *LTR*, vol. 3, pp. 31-32; Roosevelt to Meyer (12 April 1901) in *LTR*, vol. 3, p. 52; Roosevelt to Lodge (19 June 1901) in *LTR*, vol. 3, pp. 97-98; Roosevelt to Spring-Rice (3 July 1901) in *LTR*, vol. 3, pp. 107-109; Roosevelt to Spring-Rice (1 November 1905) in *LTR*, vol. 5, pp. 61-64.

unexpectedly refused to allow the sale.[136] By the turn of the century, the islands had become closely associated with the Monroe Doctrine in public consciousness and their purchase was deemed to be in accordance with its maintenance.[137] At a British royal gathering in April 1903 White managed to discuss the islands with the Queen consort Alexandra, who was herself Danish, and reported on what Secretary of State John Hay described as some 'rather interesting gossip about the way the Danish Islands business is regarded in Royal circles in England and Denmark.'[138] Alexandra informed White that she was pleased that the recent acquisition negotiations had failed and expressed a hope that her home nation could turn around their economic viability. White assured her that the United States had no intention of acquiring the islands if it were against Danish will, to which she replied that 'I hope you will never let Germany have the islands; that is what we Danes would dread above all things.'[139] White confidently informed her that the United States would never permit that to happen as it would be the 'grossest infringement' of the Monroe Doctrine. Comments like these, relating to the possibility of German challenges to the Monroe Doctrine, were at the centre of subsequent drives to acquire the islands during the Wilson administration.

Turning to the Pacific Ocean, the Galapagos Islands were offered on lease to the United States at the close of the nineteenth century by the Ecuadorian President Eloy Alfarno. However, Naval officials did not deem them of any value, even for a coaling

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[136] For White's role in these negotiations, see: White to Hay (15 May 1901); White to Hay (23 October 1901) *John Hay-Henry White Correspondence, Digital Maryland*, http://collections.digitalmaryland.org/cdm/

[137] See for example: *Washington Post* (3 January 1901), p. 6; Fisher to Long (29 January 1902) in Allen (ed.), *Papers of John Davis Long*, pp. 421-423.

[138] Hay to Roosevelt (15 April 1903), Reel 5, JHP, MDLC.

[139] It is worth noting that Queen Alexandra was vehemently anti-German and had never forgiven Germany for the events of the Prussian-Danish war of 1864.

station. After construction began on the Panama Canal, the islands took on more strategic importance and United States policy makers sought to keep the islands out of European control. Long-serving State Department official Alvey Adee adeptly summarised the United States position: 'We don't want them for ourselves and won't allow any European (or extra-American) power to acquire control of them.'[140] Rumours emerged in 1908 that a German syndicate intended to buy the islands from the Ecuadorian government which caused concern in the State Department. Elihu Root stated that there would be no objection if an American nation purchased the islands, however, if they were sold to a non-American power then the United States would object. Any 'attempt to obtain possession of those Islands by a foreign power would raise for the United States the question whether the Monroe Doctrine was to be abandoned or not.'[141] This concern was adopted by the Taft administration and Huntington-Wilson recommended to Knox that he inform the German Ambassador about the rumours, stating that the 'United States would learn with very grave concern of a project for the control of those Islands by any non-American power.' Huntington-Wilson was 'convinced that Germany is trying to get the Islands' and outlined that 'our special objection to the acquisition by non-American powers of coaling stations or naval bases in either of the localities mentioned, or elsewhere near the trade routes of the Panama Canal.'[142] Hegemony was deemed vital in the Western Hemisphere and any prospect of a non-American challenge to the United

[140] Quoted in R. Pineo, *Ecuador and the United States: Useful Strangers* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007), pp. 85-87.
[141] Root to Fox (18 June 1908) in Department of State, Division of Information, Series A, Sale of the Galapagos Islands, Box 39, PCKP, MDLC.
[142] F. Huntington-Wilson, 'Galapagos Islands' (undated), Box 28, PCKP, MDLC; Huntington-Wilson to Hill (16 July 1910) in Department of State, Division of Information, Series A, Sale of the Galapagos Islands, Box 39, PCKP, MDLC.

States' geopolitical position was deemed dangerous on the grounds of the Monroe Doctrine.

Just as the Monroe Doctrine became tinged with anti-German sentiment during this period, Japan suffered a similar fate. Like Germany, the emergence of Japan as a global power at the turn of the century was perceived as a potential threat to United States interests and deemed as a direct threat to the Monroe Doctrine. Unlike the perception of the German threat, however, the Japanese threat is regarded by historians as being latent and one which only became more acute toward the end of Roosevelt's presidency.[143] Diplomatic tension between Japan and the United States primarily stemmed from the issue of Japanese immigration to Western United States.[144] In a letter to Roosevelt, Mahan claimed that Asiatic immigration was 'against the spirit' of the Monroe Doctrine because 'they don't assimilate, they colonize, and virtually annex. Permitted, the Pacific slope would be an Asiatic territory in twenty years.'[145] According to a memorandum produced by the British Embassy in Washington, Roosevelt truly believed that 'the Japanese intend to colonise on the Pacific slope of America and Canada.'[146] The Russo-Japanese War made plain that Japan was bound to be a powerful rival and its proximity to the Philippines was a constant concern. In a despatch to the Ambassador to Japan, Root expressed his concern at Japanese activity in Manchuria during the conflict, claiming that Japan had acted in a manner which aimed to establish its own commercial advantages in the region, thereby forgoing its commitment to the Open Door. It would be 'a grievous

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[143] Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement*, pp. 72-73; Nester, *Power Across the Pacific*, p. 59.
[144] For further details, see: D. Patterson, 'Japanese-American Relations: The 1906 California Crisis, the Gentlemen's Agreement, and the World Cruise' in S. Ricard (ed.), *A Companion to Theodore Roosevelt* (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), p. 391-401; M. Cullinane, 'The "Gentleman's" Agreement: Exclusion by Class', *Immigrants & Minorities*, 32, no. 2 (2014), pp. 139-161.
[145] Mahan to Roosevelt (2 December 1911) in *LPATM*, vol. 3, pp. 435-436.
[146] 'Memorandum' (March 1908), Reel 83, VJBP, WLUO.

disappointment if the abortive attempt of Russia to create a national monopoly of material interests in that quarter were to be succeeded by a similarly exclusive establishment of Japanese interests there', wrote Root, subsequently asking the Ambassador to 'make our apprehensions impressively known to the Japanese Government.'[147] George Meyer, whilst serving as Postmaster General under Roosevelt, recorded in his diary that Root had expressed the notion that Japan certainly had the potential to 'demolish the Monroe Doctrine.'[148] Toward the end of his presidency, Roosevelt even noticeably switched between German and Japanese antagonists. Briefing Knox, he claimed that the most important foreign policy developments would concern United States-Japanese relations, confessing that he no longer believed that Germany had any designs against the doctrine.[149]

This anti-Japanese sentiment would have an important impact upon the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine, notably switching the doctrine's targets from European powers to all non-American powers and from colonisation to non-political forms of influence. In the summer of 1912 a Senate resolution was passed which has become known as the Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In response to the suspected purchase of Magdalena Bay in Mexico by a Japanese business, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations worked on a resolution in opposition to the deal.[150] In May Senator Lodge, who had headed the subcommittee, claimed that the moment was opportune for the Senate to make a declaration in regard to the Monroe Doctrine 'in order

[147] Root to Wright (24 March 1906), Reel 108 (Japan), DIDS, RDS, NAII.
[148] Howe, *Meyer*, pp. 370-371.
[149] Roosevelt to Knox (8 February 1909) in *LTR*, vol. 4, pp. 1510-1514. See also: Roosevelt to Lee (17 October 1908) in *LTR*, vol. 4, pp. 1292-1293.
[150] As Walter and Marie Scholes highlight, this was a moment in which the Mexican Revolution also inflamed the issue: Scholes and Scholes, *Taft Administration*, pp. 93-94.

to make it clear that that statement is not confined to government action merely or to colonization under government auspices, but that by the word "colonization" we also cover action by companies or corporations or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State which might do, at a place, for instance, like Magdalena Bay, precisely what the doctrine was intended to prevent.'[151] Debate emerged in the Senate over the extent to which the doctrine was really applicable in this case, but did not gain any headway.[152] Criticism was surprisingly widespread in the press and one cartoon depicted Lodge as trying too hard to impress foreign powers by attempting to make the Monroe Doctrine roar inappropriately (Figure 2.11). The *Advocate of Peace* tellingly referred to the Magdalena Bay issue as the 'Annual Japanese War Scare,' expressing surprise that Lodge would accept the rumours without sufficient investigation:

> Does Senator Lodge or any other well-informed man really believe that Japan, from her far distant seat, with her comparatively small navy and small resources, has been quietly and craftily planning to dispute with the United States the Monroe Doctrine at the cost of a terrible war with us, and that she is expecting for this purpose to secure a naval base on Magdalena Bay without our Government discovering her?[153]

On 31 July Lodge submitted the final resolution which stated:

> That when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association

[151] U.S. Congress. Senate. Land at Magdalena Bay, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., *Congressional Record* (1 May 1912), p. 5661.
[152] Ibid., pp. 5662-5666.
[153] 'The Annual Japanese War Scare', *Advocate of Peace* (May 1912), p. 106.

Figure 2.11: ‘Starting Something for Effect’



Source: *Literary Digest* (August 1912)

> which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power of control for national purposes.

The resolution was briefly debated before being passed on the 2 August. Albert Cummins of Iowa requested that Lodge speak ‘with regard to the real meaning of the resolution as it affects what we ordinarily know as the Monroe doctrine,’ asking whether it was ‘an extension of that doctrine as it has been generally interpreted or is it a mere application of

the doctrine?' Lodge replied by stating that it rested on broader and older grounds than the doctrine, on the law of nations, but that the Monroe Doctrine was an extension of this principle.' As such, the resolution was 'merely a statement of policy, allied to the Monroe doctrine, of course, but not necessarily dependent upon it or growing out of it.'[154]

In his history of the Monroe Doctrine, Dexter Perkins describes the Lodge Corollary as a 'quasi interpretation,' in that it 'did not remain dissociated from Monroeism in the debates in Congress or in the public mind, and probably owed at least some of the support which it secured to the same kind of sentiment which gave strength to the principles of 1823.'[155] Thus, whilst it was arguably not an appropriate extension to the Monroe Doctrine, it is remembered as a corollary. What makes the Lodge Corollary important is that it altered the doctrine's scope and set a precedent for subsequent interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine. Not only was the doctrine now positioned against all non-American powers rather than European, it emphasised that economic and financial influence in Latin America were now considered threats to United States interests. The discourse surrounding the German Peril reflected the development of this thought process and it was an interpretation that the Wilson administration would develop further in the coming decade.

When the Taft presidency ended in 1912, the Monroe Doctrine had undergone a considerable transformation process. Widely recognised as a flexible and malleable policy, the doctrine's meaning had fractured into two broad reinterpretations over the course of a decade. In response to the new conditions that the United States faced on the

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[154] U.S. Congress. Senate. Foreign Occupations on American Soil, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess., *Congressional Record* (2 August 1912), pp. 10045-10047.
[155] Perkins, *Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 271-274.

hemispheric and international stages, the essence of the doctrine was distilled and aligned to the notion of regional hegemony on the one hand and inter-American cooperation on the other. The Monroe Doctrine served as a discursive tool through which these core values were debated, linking the two antithetical policies to a common point of reference and demonstrating their distinct, yet interconnected relationship. The desired result of each reinterpretation of the doctrine was the same, namely to keep non-American influence out of the Western Hemisphere and defend American republicanism. However, the devil was in the details. Under Roosevelt and Taft, there was an official consensus that the Monroe Doctrine ought to ensure United States hegemony at the expense of inter-American cooperation, at least in the circum-Caribbean. Yet the stage had been set for an unprecedented moment of debate in which the two reinterpretations of the doctrine would clash in a more emphatic manner. Furthermore, the doctrine's scope had simultaneously been enlarged and transformed into a military as well as political policy. All activity conducted by any non-American that was deemed to interfere in affairs of the American republics was now perceived as a threat to United States interests and the Monroe Doctrine became synonymous with the United States Navy.

As conditions in international relations changed, the doctrine evolved to meet them. Yet, it did so at the cost of unanimity. More so than any point in time since its enunciation, the Monroe Doctrine was now simultaneously understood and interpreted in a variety of different ways. As well as the two overarching interpretations, arguments were posed that challenged the value of the Monroe Doctrine, emphasising the contested nature of United States-Latin American relations. Whilst it retained its status as a revered foreign policy tradition, the doctrine had become unstable as Americans used it as a

medium through which to understand the role of the United States in the world and determine core values of national security. When Woodrow Wilson assumed the presidency, new challenges in international affairs would continue to unsettle the position of the Monroe Doctrine and the United States decision-making class would push its meaning and application to its limits, drawing upon these formative years of debate.

Chapter Three: Overlaid with Comment

The Monroe Doctrine Debate and the Outbreak of the First World War (1913-1916)

After rediscovering the awe-inspiring Incan ruins of Machu Picchu, the archaeologist-historian Hiram Bingham became a quasi-celebrity in the United States. Americans were fascinated by the Yale academic's discoveries in Peru and he found nationwide fame as one of the 'first white men in over 400 years' to enter the remains of the ancient city.[1] The discovery bolstered his career and served to promote the value of studying Latin American history; however, it additionally provided Bingham with a platform from which to embark upon his 'campaign against the Monroe Doctrine.'[2] In 1913 Bingham published *The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth*, a scathing critique of the revered foreign policy tradition that drew upon his knowledge of Latin American history and current affairs.[3] He argued that the Monroe Doctrine had caused significant damage to United States-Latin American relations and called for its outright abandonment. European nations, he argued, no longer posed a threat to the sovereignty of the American republics as they had done in 1823 and certain South American nations, such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, could ably defend themselves from any extra-hemispheric threats, making its application redundant. More importantly, the doctrine had produced

[1] *New York Times* (22 December 1911), p. 2. For more information on Bingham's academic career and the political implications of his rediscovery of Machu Picchu, see: Salvatore, *Disciplinary Conquest*, pp. 75-104.
[2] Bingham to Bryce (21 October 1915), Reel 74, VJBP, WLUO.
[3] First published as an article, Bingham soon expanded his critique in monograph form: H. Bingham, 'The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth', *The Atlantic Monthly* (June 1913), pp. 721-734; H. Bingham, *The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1913).

and facilitated a long history of United States hegemony and informal imperialism within the Western Hemisphere, rather than generating the admiration of Latin American nations, which soured hemispheric relations and made the doctrine unpalatable to most Latin Americans. For Bingham, the only way to ensure hemispheric peace and stability was to alter the direction of United States foreign relations through the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine and the adoption of a more amicable and cooperative Latin American policy.

In his study of Bingham's relationship with the Monroe Doctrine, Thomas Karnes notes that the response to *Obsolete Shibboleth* within the United States was 'surprising and substantial.' A deluge of articles were published in response to Bingham's critique and the Monroe Doctrine assumed pride of place in the national consciousness.[4] Although Bingham stimulated significant interest in the doctrine, his study was born out of the debate that had been taking place over the doctrine's meaning since the Spanish-American War. The discussions and debates that took place after *Obsolete Shibboleth* drew upon those of the previous decade – what differed was the volume. At a series of academic conferences; in public addresses and personal correspondence; and through articles in literary-political magazines, newspapers and journals, Americans with an interest in international relations sought to analyse Bingham's conclusions and determine what role the Monroe Doctrine ought to play in the conduct of United States foreign relations. Three conferences functioned as the main forums of this debate. The first was devoted to the subject of Latin America and held at Clark University, Worchester, Massachusetts, during November 1913; the second was the National Conference of the

[4] T. Karnes, 'Hiram Bingham and his Obsolete Shibboleth', *Diplomatic History*, 3, no. 1 (1979), p. 46.

Foreign Relations of the United States, which took place on the 3 and 4 April 1914 and held under the auspices of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (AAPSS) in Philadelphia; and the third was the Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (ASIL), held in Washington between the 22 to the 25 April 1914.[5] Under scrutiny, the doctrine was positioned at the centre of a wider debate over the relationship between core values of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation in the conduct of United States foreign relations. In the words of academic Theodore Woolsey, writing in 1914, the Monroe Doctrine became 'so overlaid with comment and so modified and enlarged in development that we are apt to lose sight of its real and fundamental character.'[6] This moment of intense analysis persisted for twelve months until the outbreak of the First World War suddenly demanded the nation's attention. However, because the debate over the doctrine's meaning had occupied such a prominent place in the United States' national consciousness, it had immediate consequences that influenced the nation's response to the first years of the war.

The pervading opinion during the debate was that the doctrine as enunciated in 1823 was archaic and needed to be reinterpreted and applied to modern international

[5] Clark historian George Blakeslee organised the first conference and it attracted experts from various American republics. The five papers presented on the Monroe Doctrine were published in *The Journal of Race Development* and in an edited collection: G. Blakeslee (ed.), *Latin America Clark University Addresses November, 1913* (New York: G. E. Stechert and Company, 1914). The National Conference of the Foreign Relations of the United States dedicated an entire session of panels to the Monroe Doctrine and consisted of fourteen papers presented by both Americans and Europeans. The conference proceedings were published in the AAPSS's journal the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. The ASIL's annual meeting devoted five sessions of papers over four days to the sole topic of the Monroe Doctrine, which were published in the societies' proceedings. The attention the ASIL gave to the doctrine was a testament to its contemporary importance. Although international lawyer Phillip Marshall Brown commented during a discussion that it was 'out of place for us to discuss the Monroe Doctrine' and Frederic Kirgis describes the choice of topic as 'curious,' the ASIL was well connected with academic and policy making circles: Comments of Phillip Marshall Brown in 'Statements, Interpretations, and Applications of the Monroe Doctrine and of More or Less Allied Doctrines', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting*, 8 (1914), p. 114; F. Kirgis, *The American Society of International Law's First Century 1906-2006* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), p. 37.

[6] T. Woolsey, 'Monroe Doctrine Fundamentals', *North American Review*, 199, no. 703 (1914), p. 833.

Figure 3.1: Group of Delegates at the Clark University Conference on Latin America



Photograph by E. B. Luce, Worcester, Mass.

GROUP OF DELEGATES AT THE CONFERENCE ON LATIN AMERICA, CLARK UNIVERSITY, WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS, NOVEMBER 18–21, 1913.

Front row, left to right: Nevin O. Winter, author; Leopold Grahame, journalist; Francisco J. Yánes, assistant director Pan American Union; Dr. G. Stanley Hall, president Clark University; John Barrett, Director General Pan American Union; Prof. Ellsworth Huntington, Yale University. Upper row, left to right: Dr. Edgar E. Brandon, vice president Miami University; Dr. John Howland, president Colegio Internacional, Guadalajara, Mexico; Sr. Don David G. Montt, Chilean journalist; Earl Harding, journalist; Prof. George H. Blakeslee, Clark University; Mr. Winn; John Hay, Inland South American Missionary Union; S. W. Reynolds, formerly president Mexican Central Railway Co.; Prof. James M. Callahan, West Virginia University.

Source: *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* (January 1914)

conditions or replaced with a new policy. Advocates of inter-American cooperation proposed the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine with greater urgency as more Americans became convinced that United States national security was tied to inter-American unity and cooperation. However, the imminent completion of the Panama Canal and the instability of the Mexican Revolution made regional hegemony, supported by a unilateral and interventionist interpretation of the doctrine, very appealing. The nation's elites almost unanimously believed that the Monroe Doctrine had to be reframed for it to remain a useful policy tool; however, the question was whether it should be aligned and framed around the core values of cooperation or hegemony.

The issues at the heart of the debate were reflected by the attitude of the Wilson administration toward the Monroe Doctrine during his first presidential term. Wilson and his inner circle also sought to reconcile the tensions inherent in the doctrine's application and determine the value of inter-American cooperation and regional hegemony in the formation of their foreign policy. The President paradoxically desired to apply the doctrine in both interventionist and multilateral terms, resulting in the conduct of a muddled Latin American policy that exemplified the doctrine's fractured nature. Although he criticised the policies of dollar diplomacy that his predecessors had enacted, Wilson oversaw numerous interventions in Latin America during his first term, including Mexico, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, that functioned as the application of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.[7] At the same time, Wilson sought to multi-lateralise the doctrine through the formation of a Pan-American pact and he spoke favourably about Pan-Americanism and inter-American cooperation in public. The extent to which Wilson truly adhered to Pan-American ideology has long been questioned by historians; however, his administration's conflicting attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine drew upon its fractured meaning, pandering and subsequently contributing to the debate over notions of hegemony and cooperation.[8]

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[7] Historians tend to pin this disjuncture on Wilson's lack of knowledge relating to both foreign relations and the Latin American region, forcing him into following tried and tested policies: A. McPherson, *A Short History of U.S. Interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), pp. 72-73; Loveman, *No Higher Law*, pp. 194-195; M. Neagle, 'US Policies Toward Latin America', in R. Kennedy (ed.), *A Companion to Woodrow Wilson* (New York: Wiley & Sons, 2013), pp. 206-207; K. Clements, *Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1987), p. 125. John Milton Cooper Jr., however, refutes the argument that Wilson was unprepared for the demands of foreign relations: J. Cooper Jr., *The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 266.

[8] Renowned Wilson scholar Arthur Link, for example, argues that the President and his cabinet were more concerned with reaping the benefits of inter-American cooperation without having to renounce interventionism: A. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 1910-1917* (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), p. 106.

Historians recognise that this was a moment in which the Monroe Doctrine was subjected to a significant amount of scrutiny, and a number of implications of this period of debate have been identified. Existing scholarship demonstrates that the debate influenced Wilson's decision to pursue a Pan-American pact and that it emphasised the tensions between hegemony and cooperation in United States foreign relations.[9] However, its significance is not yet fully appreciated. By conducting a study of the period of debate that emerged after the publication of *Obsolete Shibboleth*, this chapter argues that this conspicuous moment in the doctrine's history influenced perceptions of national security and had important and immediate ramifications upon the United States' conduct during the First World War. Although the First World War broke out during this intense moment of debate, historians have not drawn a connection between the United States' approach to the war and the reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. This oversight can be attributed to the fact that narratives of United States neutrality rarely analyse the doctrine's role, and that the war itself is surprisingly absent from histories of the Monroe Doctrine.[10] The doctrine was a prominent facet of the nation's response to the conflict and, in turn, the war prompted further attempts to reinterpret the doctrine's meaning and application. The Monroe Doctrine was initially praised for having kept the United States out of the war; however, as the fighting continued, a sense of urgency took hold of the debate over the doctrine's meaning, and the tensions between inter-American cooperation and regional hegemony that had shaped the doctrine's history since the turn of the century transferred seamlessly into the context of a global conflict. The war served to

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[9] Scarfi, 'Monroe Doctrine', pp. 217-218; Grandin, 'Origins of Liberal Multilateralism', p. 72; Gilderhus, *Pan-American Visions*, pp. 15-19.

[10] For example, Dexter Perkins emphasises the role of the Monroe Doctrine in the debate over the League of Nations at the expense of its role in the period of neutrality, a trend that most other historians have mimicked.

highlight the division between the Old World and the New, generating further justification for the doctrine's pan-americanisation; however, the threat of war signified to many Americans that the Western Hemisphere needed a stringently and unilaterally enforced Monroe Doctrine supported by a larger navy. Because of its fractured and fluid meaning, the Monroe Doctrine functioned as an ideal frame of reference through which the United States determined its national security demands and the conduct of its relations with Latin America and the belligerent nations during the first half of the First World War.

An Obsolete Shibboleth? - Mexico, the Panama Canal and the Monroe Doctrine Debate

When Woodrow Wilson began his first term as President in March 1913, the Mexican Revolution became an immediate diplomatic problem. Victoriano Huerta had recently seized power in Mexico and Wilson was left to decide whether to recognise his presidency by the outgoing Taft administration. Objecting to the undemocratic formation of the government, Wilson chose not to recognise the regime and developed a personal distaste for Huerta. As the revolution became increasingly violent and unstable, it caused widespread apprehension across the United States, given how invested the nation was in Mexico's stability.[11] Former Secretary of War Henry Stimson believed that 'we were going to have great trouble in some form with Mexico' and the safety of the so-called American Colony in Mexico City often prompted concern.[12] The revolution additionally

[11] William Raat and Michael Brescia argue that the revolution was 'not simply a Mexican event, but an episode in the history of the United States as well': W. Raat and M. Brescia, *Mexico and the United States: Ambivalent Vistas* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 4th ed., 2010), p. 132.
[12] 'Outline of Mexican Trouble', HLSD, Reel 1 Volume 2, YUL. Whilst United States citizens lived all over Mexico, approximately twelve thousand lived in Mexico City by 1910: J. Hart, *Empire and*

threatened to endanger the United States' investments which had been primarily funnelled in what Lars Schoultz describes as 'politically unstable' ventures such as mining, railroads and petroleum.[13] The Monroe Doctrine reared its head when Americans realised that European nations, who had invested an equally significant amount of capital in Mexico, might intervene to restore order.[14]

As such, when Wilson won the election, he began receiving letters urging him to take some sort of action in Mexico because of the duty the Monroe Doctrine bestowed upon the United States to maintain order. The Governor of Texas, Oscar Colquitt, wrote to Wilson in February 1913 claiming that 'the obligation of the United States to the world under the Monroe doctrine makes it now a duty for our Government to intervene in Mexico, not for conquest or territorial gain but to restore order and protect life and property.'[15] A few months later, Delbert Haff, a lawyer who specialised in representing American mining and railway companies before Mexican courts, urged the President in a memorandum that, whilst armed intervention would be a calamity, the United States had a responsibility 'growing out of the Monroe Doctrine' to act in some manner to resolve the Mexican crisis.[16] These letters, expressing a notion of duty, would not have been out of place in a memorandum written by the Taft administration. Caricaturing the predicament that the nation found itself in, *Puck* depicted the Mexican Revolution as a mad, rampaging dog that was walled off from the clamouring European powers, as well

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Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 271-272.

[13] Schoultz, *Beneath the United States*, pp. 236-237.

[14] J. Skirius, 'Railroad, Oil and Other Foreign Investments in the Mexican Revolution, 1911-1914', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 35, no. 1 (2003), p. 38; J. Womack, 'The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920', in Bethell (ed.), *Latin America*, vol. 5, pp. 93-94.

[15] Colquitt to Wilson (12 February 1913), *FRUS 1913*, p. 705.

[16] Haff to Wilson (12 May 1913), A. Link (ed.), *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, vol. 27, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 419-425 [hereafter *PWW*].

as Japan, by the Monroe Doctrine. Frustrated by the disturbance that the revolution was causing on his side of the wall, Uncle Sam was left alone to decide whether to reach into his holster labelled intervention and silence the dog (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2: 'Mad Dog?'



Source: *Puck* (6 August 1913)

Demands for United States intervention on the broad and unspecific grounds of maintaining the Monroe Doctrine did not, however, go unchallenged. Commentators such as former State Department Solicitor Joshua Reuben Clark argued that the application of the doctrine was not relevant to the Mexican Revolution, angrily suggesting in a memorandum that people should '[r]ead the Monroe Doctrine before talking about it.'[17]

[17] 'Suggestive Points on the Mexican Situation' (July 1913), Box 9, PCKP, MDLC.

Proposals for Pan-American initiatives and solutions were also posed as a more amicable alternative. Confident in his position as Director General of the Pan American Union, John Barrett devised a plan to mediate the revolution in February 1913, proposing that the crisis be resolved through the formation of an international commission held under the auspices of the United States.[18] Although the proposal was rejected by the Wilson administration and lambasted by the Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, Barrett received enough favourable comments to remain committed to the idea that the revolution could be resolved through Pan-American cooperation. In July, Barrett wrote to Wilson again and began to formulate a Pan-American reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine that might guide mediation efforts:

> Even if Latin America may not be overenthusiastic about the Monroe Doctrine, in so far as it suggests our leadership and dominance in the Western Hemisphere, it is unanimous for the Pan American Doctrine as a possible substitute for the former. In other words, if you can give a Pan American tone to mediation, you will strengthen Mexican confidence in your good intentions and gain the lasting sympathy of the rest of Latin America.[19]

It is likely that Barrett's memorandum was influenced by the publication of *Obsolete Shibboleth*, which first appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly* a month prior. Like Bingham, Barrett believed that inter-American cooperation ought to guide United States-Latin American relations; however, he believed that the Monroe Doctrine's principles still held

[18] Barrett's proposal was sent to various politicians, including the President, and was published in the press: Barrett to Taft (13 February 1913), Box 34, JBP, MDLC; *New York Times* (14 February 1913), p. 1. His proposal is analysed in detail in: S. Prisco, 'John Barrett's Plan to Mediate the Mexican Revolution', *The Americas*, 27, no. 4 (1971), pp. 413-425. Mexico had always held significance for Barrett and he had often expressed a desire to be appointed as Ambassador: Barrett to Roosevelt (20 December 1904), Box 21, JBP, MDLC.

[19] Barrett to Wilson (26 July 1913), Box 35, JBP, MDLC. Emphasis in original.

some value and should be reinterpreted rather than abandoned. Even though it was essentially a matter of semantics that divided their proposals, Barrett felt the need to defend the doctrine and criticise Bingham's thesis.[20]

As the Monroe Doctrine debate gained traction, Barrett readily contributed. In various addresses, he outlined that a Pan-Americanised Monroe Doctrine would 'adopt, absorb and enlarge the Monroe Doctrine as an original policy of the United States into a greater and all-American policy, where each nation would have the same rights of attitude, the same dignity of position and the same sense of independence as the United States now has.' The obstacle that Barrett foresaw was that Latin Americans would not trust any policy born out of the Monroe Doctrine, not because they perceived the original message of 1823 as dangerous to their interests, but because of the way it had been reinterpreted and applied since. He posited that whilst the tenets of Monroe's message would be maintained and made multilateral, new terminology ought to be used to absolve it from any negative associations. Referencing Bingham's critique, Barrett claimed that if 'its haphazard interpretation can be supplanted with responsible and reasonable judgment, the majority of arguments against the doctrine in Latin America, and also in the United States, in describing it as obsolete will fail absolutely in their purpose and logic.'[21] Summarising his thoughts to George Peabody, Barrett explained that many Americans had simply interpreted the doctrine 'in the wrong way' and reiterated the primary issue at stake: 'If we can get away from the idea of patronizing our sister

[20] Barrett's opinion on Bingham can be found in an untitled and undated memorandum in: Box 96, JBP, MDLC.
[21] Barrett to Ronconi (6 December 1913), Box 35, JBP, MDLC; J. Barrett, 'Pan-American Possibilities', *Journal of Race* Development, 5, no. 1 (1914), pp. 19-29; J. Barrett, 'A Pan-American Policy: The Monroe Doctrine Modernized', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 54 (1914), pp. 1-4.

republics and can make them feel that the Monroe Doctrine belongs to them as much as to us, there will be no doubt about it regaining its popularity among them.'[22]

Other notable advocates of a Pan-Americanised Monroe Doctrine were figures such as former minister to Argentina Charles Sherrill and Latin Americanist historian George Blakeslee.[23] The growth in power, both geopolitically and economically, of the ABC nations was cited as the main justification for the doctrine's pan-americanisation, as was the need to understand how Latin Americans interpreted the doctrine. Participants believed that there was no genuine European political or military threat to the American republics anymore and that the time was ripe to enact policy modifications for the good of hemispheric solidarity. Harvard professor Archibald Coolidge was impressed by the volume of these proposals and claimed that the Pan-American conception of the doctrine 'completely overshadows any other side of the doctrine.'[24]

As noted in the previous chapter, the Monroe Doctrine was primarily reinterpreted among United States elites during the Roosevelt and Taft presidencies as a facilitator of United States hegemony, yet the response to *Obsolete Shibboleth* generated a debate in which both rival reinterpretations enjoyed similar degrees of support. What accounted for the upsurge of interest in the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine was the recent progress made by the Pan-American movement. From around 1910 onwards, Pan-

[22] Barrett to Peabody (7 April 1914), Box 36, JBP, MDLC.
[23] C. Sherrill, 'The Monroe Doctrine from a South American Viewpoint', *The Journal of Race Development*, 4, no. 3 (1914), pp. 322-323; Blakeslee, 'Monroe Doctrine', pp. 217-230. See also: Address of John Latané in 'Statements, Interpretations, and Applications of the Monroe Doctrine and of More or Less Allied Doctrines', p. 113; H. Bingham, 'Should We Abandon the Monroe Doctrine?', *The Journal of Race Development*, 4, no. 3 (1914), pp. 353-354; G. Tucker, 'The Monroe Doctrine', *The Journal of Race Development*, 4, no. 3 (1914), pp. 326-327; Comments of William Hoynes in Bingham, 'Latin American Attitude', pp. 200-201; C. Adams Jr., 'The Origin of the Monroe Doctrine', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting*, 8 (1914), p. 26.
[24] Comments of Archibald Coolidge in 'Annual Banquet', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting*, 8 (1914), p. 334.

Americanism, as an ideal and policy, was discussed in the press and other print media with more interest. The PAU made a concerted effort to make Pan-Americanism a popular talking point and it became a much more potent force in apolitical inter-American relations after the construction of its new headquarters in 1910 (Figure 3.3).[25] When Barrett assumed the organisation's directorship in 1907, he expressed his desire to improve the PAU's services and 'accomplish results that will be of benefit to all the nations of the western hemisphere.'[26] He informed President Taft in 1909 that he had a 'big campaign' underway, which involved improving the quality of the organisation's monthly bulletin; organising commercial conferences and meetings to stimulate inter-American trade; and facilitating an inter-American exchange of academics.[27] As the latter strategies suggests, Barrett often strove to work with academics who studied Latin America to educate the citizens of the United States about Latin American history, culture and politics because he believed that a major obstacle to Pan-American comity was the 'profound ignorance prevailing among the greater portion of the educated men and women of the United States as to the real Latin America.'[28] Through corresponding and collaborating with academics as they undertook research trips in the region, the PAU

[25] Mark Petersen describes apolitical inter-American affairs, such as communication, housing, health, and patent protection, as 'second dimension' Pan-Americanism, in contrast to 'first dimension' Pan-Americanism that encompasses geopolitical considerations: Petersen, 'Modern Pan-Americanism', pp. 29-30. It was in 1910 that the International Bureau of American Republics became officially known as the Pan American Union. For information on the organisation's new building, which today houses the Organization of the American States, see: J. Barrett, *The Pan American Union: Peace, Friendship, Commerce* (Washington: Pan American Union, 1911).
[26] Barrett to Ryan (17 January 1907), Box 26, JBP, MDLC.
[27] Barrett to Taft (14 September 1909), Box 29, JBP, MDLC.
[28] Barrett to Butler (14 December 1904), Box 21, JBP, MDLC.

became part of an informal Pan-American network that sought to utilise expert knowledge to increase inter-American commercial, academic and cultural links.[29]

Figure 3.3: Corner-stone Laying Ceremony of the Pan American Building



Source: J. Barrett, *The Pan American Union: Peace, Friendship, Commerce* (Washington: Pan American Union, 1911)

Collectively, these experts on Latin America often chose to highlight the opinion of Latin Americans to bolster their Pan-American credentials and give weight to their arguments in favour of the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine. Barrett, for example, was conscious that Latin American voices were not given enough consideration during debates on the doctrine and informed international lawyer James Brown Scott that the absence of a 'big Latin American' to speak at the ASIL's Eighth Annual Meeting was 'a pity.'[30] In the absence of Latin Americans, academics drew upon their expert

[29] On working with academics, see for example: 'Memorandum for the Press' (3 February 1907), Box 26, JBP, MDLC.
[30] Barrett to Scott (8 April 1914), Box 36, JBP, MDLC.

knowledge and diplomats claimed expertise due to personal experience. Bingham and Blakeslee outlined that they could discern Latin American opinion on the Monroe Doctrine through their continual study of the region and research trips, whereas Barrett tended to refer to himself as 'the only Pan-American officer in America' or as 'an impartial, nonpolitical and international officer,' given his position within the PAU.[31] It is worth noting, however, the importance of this knowledge production in United States-Latin American relations. Ricardo Salvatore argues that whilst Latin Americanist scholars favoured 'expanding the forces of cultural engagement and scientific cooperation', knowledge production 'constituted the appropriate mode of engagement for a benevolent empire,' particularly in South America.[32] Mark Berger similarly believes that scholarship, study, and data collection reinforced United States hegemony, explaining that most scholars were just as estranged from Latin America as policy makers were. To Berger, the study of Latin America can be evaluated as a weak profession before the First World War with a limited critical output.[33] The interaction between notions of hegemony and cooperation in the process of knowledge production is readily apparent in the debates over the Monroe Doctrine. Early twentieth century efforts to understand Latin America may have been conducted with the end goal of facilitating inter-American cooperation through the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine; however, they were inherently tied to a system and mechanisms of informal imperialism.

Participants in the debate who favoured a policy of regional hegemony over inter-American cooperation subjected the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine to a

[31] Blakeslee, 'Monroe Doctrine', pp. 218-220; Bingham, 'Latin American Attitude', p. 182; Barrett to Tumulty (5 October 1913), Box 35, JBP, MDLC; Barrett, 'Monroe Doctrine Modernized', p. 1.
[32] Salvatore, *Disciplinary Conquest*, pp. 2, 212.
[33] Berger, *Under Northern Eyes*, pp. 2-29.

barrage of criticism. They agreed that the ABC nations could certainly uphold the doctrine themselves, yet they baulked at the thought of Central American and Caribbean nations attempting to do so. For example, Former Rear-Admiral French Ensor Chadwick outlined that working together with the ABC countries was essential to the development of the doctrine, however, the matter stood 'on a very different footing as to the regions bordering on the Caribbean seas and the Gulf of Mexico, and on the part of the Pacific in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal.'[34] As examined in the previous chapter, an adherence to rachial hierarchies fundamentally shaped this opinion, yet on top of this, Chadwick's statement included the magic words "Panama Canal," the opening of which was eagerly anticipated throughout the United States because of the important strategic and commercial benefits it would provide. Scheduled to be completed in the summer of 1914, this valuable asset had to be protected and the stability of the surrounding region became of vital importance. Like Mexico, any European influence in the area was deemed to be unacceptable and figures such as Chadwick argued that the Monroe Doctrine ought to prioritise ensuring regional stability over protecting Latin American nations. The United States needed to protect its own interests and the commercial and strategic benefits of the Panama Canal, secured though regional stability, would far outweigh those of Pan-American cooperation. This point was emphatically repeated over the course of the debate, most notably by former Secretaries of State, John Foster and Elihu Root.[35] The dispute with Great Britain over canal tolls that took place between

[34] F. Chadwick, 'The Present Day Phase of the Monroe Doctrine', *The Journal of Race Development*, 4, no. 3 (1914), p. 314.

[35] Address of John Foster in 'Misconceptions and Limitations of the Monroe Doctrine', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting*, 8 (1914), pp. 125-126; E. Root, 'The Real Monroe Doctrine', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting*, 8 (1914), p. 20. See also: W. MacCorkle, 'The Monroe Doctrine and its Application to Haiti', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 54, (1914), pp. 35-53; J. Latané, 'The Effects of the

1912 and 1913 emphasised the desire of the United States to maintain total control over the canal's operation. As John Foster Dulles argued, the doctrine ought to be 'rigidly enforced' in 'that portion of Central America where it was of peculiar importance to the United States.'[36]

Participants such as former diplomat Paxton Hibben argued that the United States could never share the responsibilities and privileges of the Monroe Doctrine with any of the other American republics for reasons of national interest and refuted the idea that the ABC countries would even want to uphold it. Pan-Americanists had simply 'erected in their imagination an alluring mirage' which they would never attain.[37] Latin Americanist scholars were even attacked for attempting to use their academic knowledge as justification for the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine. Despite the prominence of Progressive Era faith in the use of experts, these scholars were branded as out of touch with reality, basing their arguments on academic nonsense from the misguided perspective of their ivory towers.[38] The Monroe Doctrine, it seemed, was too sacred a tradition for academics to meddle with. Pessimism was also expressed about the future intentions of non-American powers and suspicion of German and Japanese designs in Latin American persisted unabashedly. Conditions may have changed since 1823, but

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Panama Canal on Our Relations with Latin America', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 54, (1914), pp. 84-91.

[36] 'The Panama Canal Controversy Between Great Britain and the United States' (12 January 1913), Reel 1, John Foster Dulles Papers [hereafter JFDP], Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University [hereafter PU].

[37] P. Hibben, 'The South American View as to the Monroe Doctrine', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 54, (1914), pp. 63-65. See also: W. Hull, 'The Monroe Doctrine: National or International?', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting*, 8 (1914), pp. 162-163; C. Pepper, 'The Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 54, (1914), pp. 114-116.

[38] Comments of Charles Herrick in Bingham, 'Latin American Attitude', p. 196; C. Chester, 'The Present Status of the Monroe Doctrine', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 54, (1914), p. 21; Pepper, 'Monroe Doctrine', p. 113.

there was no reason to lessen the dominance the United States maintained in the Western Hemisphere.[39]

Events in April 1914 brought Mexico back into the spotlight as the Tampico Affair shook United States-Mexican relations. Nine United States sailors were arrested by Mexican armed forces on 9 April in the port city of Tampico after a misunderstanding exacerbated by the revolutionary context. Although they were promptly released, frayed tensions led Wilson to order military intervention and United States marines captured Veracruz on 21 April. The following day Wilson received official support from Congress, a date which coincided with the first day of the ASIL's Eighth Annual Meeting, the last of the three conferences that framed this period of the Monroe Doctrine debate. Elihu Root, the President of the society, stated at the banquet held on the 25 April that over the course of the meeting he had 'been feeling very unhappy over our affairs in Mexico' and he aptly emphasised the fractured nature of the Monroe Doctrine in relation to Mexico: 'It is not in the possibilities of human nature that there should not be differences of opinion, differences as to policy, and everyone who has a duty to perform must act according to the dictates of his own judgment and his own conscience in the performance of his duty.'[40]

[39] J. Callahan, 'The Modern Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine', *The Journal of Race Development*, 4, no. 3 (1914), p. 365; Hull, 'Monroe Doctrine', p. 159; J. Wheless, 'The Monroe Doctrine and Latin America', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 54, (1914), pp. 73-75; U.S. Congress. House. Mexico and Asiatic Menace, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., *Appendix to the Congressional Record* (27 March 1914), p. 266.
[40] Comments of Elihu Root in 'Annual Banquet', p. 327.

The crisis was mediated by the ABC nations in May through a diplomatic peace conference at Niagara Falls, although responses were mixed.[41] On the one hand, figures such as former Senator Albert Beveridge viewed the mediation as damaging, arguing that it would solidify Latin American solidarity against the United States and represent a challenge to United States hegemony and the Monroe Doctrine.[42] John Barrett, however, urged support of the mediation, arguing that it would have far reaching consequences and help foster Pan-American solidarity. He proclaimed that it would be the 'first great example of a tangible and practical application of the right kind of Pan-American cooperation' and represent the value of a Pan-Americanised Monroe Doctrine.[43] Representative James Slayden similarly highlighted that the mediation had set a precedent for solving future problems via Pan-American means and inter-American cooperation appeared more viable now that it had been put into practice (Figure 3.4).[44]

As the summer of 1914 dawned, it was clear that the Monroe Doctrine was in a state of crisis. Dissent against the doctrine had suddenly become far more vocal from within the United States and arguments for the doctrine's reinterpretation dominated the discourse. Should the doctrine serve the interests of the United States or those of the entire hemisphere? Should it be applied to foster inter-American cooperation or establish hegemony among the Americas? With these unresolved and contested questions at the

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[41] M. Small, *The Forgotten Peace: Mediation at Niagara Falls, 1914* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2009); P. Haley, *Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 140-151.
[42] 'Mexican Question' (18 May 1914), Box 305, Albert Jeremiah Beveridge Papers [hereafter AJBP], MDLC.
[43] 'Statement of John Barrett' (27 April 1914), Box 36; Barrett to White (15 July 1915), Box 37, JBP, MDLC
[44] J. Slayden, 'The A.B.C. Mediation', *American Journal of International Law*, 9, no. 1 (1915), p. 150.

forefront of American minds, the First World War broke out, underlining the debate and further altering the way in which the doctrine was understood.

Figure 3.4: ‘Opportunity Knocks’



Source: *Rochester Herald* (18 August 1915)

Divorced from the Old World? - Reframing the Monroe Doctrine during the Period of Neutrality

As the war broke out, the Monroe Doctrine became a central facet of the United States' national reaction and it was widely regarded as having kept the nation out of the conflict. Not only had the doctrine warned Americans away from forming alliances with European powers, it had prevented European political and colonial systems from spreading further throughout Latin America, in turn distancing the American republics from the imperial conflicts of the Old World. The Monroe Doctrine stood as a symbol of the initial relief and pride felt by Americans as a distant war began to tear empires apart. Author Ellery Sedgwick viewed the war like many of his fellow Americans, as a conflict born out of the 'complexities of European politics which it is not our business to unravel.'[45] The *New York Tribune* ran an editorial on 6 August which informed its readers what they owed to the historic doctrine, namely neutrality brought about by the 'almost complete divorce of the New World from the poisonous tyrannies and rivalries of the Old.' The *Tribune* was quick to snub the recent arguments in favour of the doctrine's abandonment 'by men with a reputation for thoughtful wisdom', arguing that before the end of the war the Monroe Doctrine 'will have more friends than ever before.'[46] Had the doctrine not been upheld over the past ninety years, 'nothing under heaven', former President Theodore Roosevelt argued, could have prevented the United States from being involved in the war.[47] As a

[45] Sedgwick to Bryce (2 February 1916), Reel 73, VJBP, WLUO.
[46] *New York Tribune* (6 August 1914), p. 8.
[47] *New York Times* (16 August 1914), p. 10.

popular cartoon of 1915 highlighted, the doctrine was perceived as a great wall separating the United States from the flames of a deadly European war (Figure 3.5).[48]

Figure 3.5: 'The Great Wall'



Source: *Nashville Tennessean* (1915)

The war made it easy for United States citizens to draw distinctions between the tragic Old World and the hallowed New, presenting Pan-Americanists with an

[48] Historian William Shepherd similarly described the doctrine in these terms: 'Shepherd -- General Conference' (Undated), Box 1, William Robert Shepherd Papers, MDLC.

opportunity to bolster Pan-American sentiment and promote closer inter-American commercial and political ties. As war-time trade between Europe and Latin America declined, Americans realised that it was an ideal moment to secure dominance in Latin American markets.[49] 'Act Promptly,' advised an article in the *Los Angeles Times*, for there was a 'sudden and great demand in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and other South American parts for American goods.'[50] To Francis Huntington-Wilson, the war forced upon the United States a 'unique opportunity to gain and hold our proper place in the finance, trade, and enterprise of Latin America.'[51] Given the PAU's interest in commercial relations, Barrett seized the moment and vigorously promoted the necessity of trade expansion. Barrett had long advocated Latin American markets; however, he had previously experienced difficulties in convincing the nation of their value. A *Puck* cartoon from 1911 aptly captured his frustration, as the PAU is depicted making futile attempts to convince old businessmen that South American trade will yield profitable results (Figure 3.6).

The war thus served a valuable purpose and reinforced existing views on Pan-Americanism. During the first weeks of the conflict, Barrett drew upon the plight of the American republics and claimed that there was a 'commercial, financial and shipping crisis resulting in South America from the European war.' United States businesses ought to fill the void left by Europeans not just for commercial gains, but because doing so would earn the nation the 'lasting gratitude of South America' and place it in a 'position

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[49] S. Rinke, *Latin America and the First World War*, trans. C. Reid (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 80.
[50] *Los Angeles Times* (24 September 1914), p. II4.
[51] H. Wilson, 'Pan-American Relations As Affected by the War', *Current History*, 2, no. 2 (1915), pp. 351-357.

Figure 3.6: ‘There is Rich Land to the South’



Source: *Puck* (29 March 1911)

of great permanent advantage with every South American country concerned.’[52] Indeed, two years into the war Barrett conducted a trip to Britain and France and learnt that European businesses would seek to restore their lost trade with Latin America after the war, generating a need on the part of United States businesses to act promptly.[53] The long-awaited opening of the Panama Canal in August 1914 made inter-American trade even more appealing and as Henry Fletcher, the Ambassador to Chile, argued, European

[52] ‘Press Memorandum’ (7 August 1914); ‘The South America-United States Situation as Affected by the European War’ (8 August 1914), Box 37, JBP, MDLC.
[53] ‘Memorandum’ (16 October 1916), Box 41, JBP, MDLC.

nations had presented the United States with a prime opportunity by 'looking off the book and into the trenches.'[54]

The Wilson administration was inclined to agree. William Gibbs McAdoo, the Secretary of the Treasury, led the governmental drive toward Latin America and temporarily converted to the Pan-American cause in the first few years of the war. He vigorously pursued trade expansion and pushed a bill proposing that government owned shipping corporations operate inter-American merchant fleets in an effort to ensure the United States' economic primacy.[55] In the Progressive Era, trade was a considered a crucial component of United States-Latin American relations. As Emily Rosenberg argues, United States policy makers adhered to an ideology of 'liberal-developmentalism,' namely a belief that the United States' own economic and social history could serve as a universal model for less developed nations to adopt. In order for a nation, in this case a Latin American nation, to transform into a modern society, policy makers believed that it needed commercial interaction with the United States so that it may develop similar commercial practices and institutions.[56]

This helps explain why the PAU was so focussed on trade and commercial relations as they were justifiable in benevolent terms. Benjamin Coates argues that Pan-Americanism 'simultaneously erased and heightened distinctions between North and South Americans', depicting Latin American nations as 'redeemably inferior' and

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[54] Fletcher to Patchin (2 October 1914), Box 3, Henry Prather Fletcher Papers [hereafter HPFP], MDLC.
[55] D. Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 299-308; D. Murphy, 'Professors, Publicists, and Pan Americanism, 1905-1917: A Study in the Origins of the Use of "Experts" in Shaping American Foreign Policy' (University of Wisconsin, Ph.D., 1970), pp. 421-436.
[56] E. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p. 7.

'capable of uplift via external pressure,' and Barrett's rhetoric serves as a prime example.[57] He frequently lauded Latin American nations and attempted to dispute common stereotypes, yet he emphasised their 'potentialities' and noted that most of the republics were 'in the infancy of their possibilities.'[58] The war thus not only offered potential commercial gains, but would help facilitate hemispheric unity through connecting the Americas via trade and commerce. Here we can see the relationship between hegemony and cooperation at work. United States influence was central to both notions; however, it was the means of establishing influence that differed drastically.

The war was additionally perceived as an opportunity to serve the diplomatic interests of the Pan-American movement and strengthen desires for hemispheric unity through continued advocacy of the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine. After the PAU convened a special meeting to discuss the implications of the war upon the neutral American Republics, Barrett increased his efforts to promote the necessity of Pan-Americanising the Monroe Doctrine, arguing that the war was fostering amicable relations between the United States and Latin America.[59] For Barrett, war made the 'evolution of the Monroe Doctrine into a Pan-American doctrine or policy' inevitable and its adoption would 'mean that the Republics of Latin America will stand with their physical and moral force for the protection of the sovereignty and unity of the United States against a foreign attack just as the United States would stand for them in an hour of similar distress.' Filled with enthusiasm, he believed that no greater good than the Pan

[57] Coates, 'Pan-American Lobbyist', p. 33.
[58] J. Barrett, 'All America!', *North American Review*, 192, no. 657 (1910), p. 178; Barrett, *Pan American Union*, p. 10.
[59] *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* (December 1914), pp. 929-931.

Americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine could possibly come from the conflict for the Americas.[60]

Other prominent Pan-Americanists such as William Shepherd and Charles Sherrill joined in Barrett's chorus, drawing upon their pre-war arguments with renewed vigour.[61] An editorial in the *Outlook* declared that in the climate of a world war the Monroe Doctrine was 'now no longer something that merely concerns the United States' and must become a policy of cooperation between 'the stable governments of the New World,' whilst the *New Republic* proclaimed that the war had 'increased the desire and the necessity for a cooperative international policy in the two Americas', concluding that the doctrine had been 'vindicated.'[62] The prospect even gained some favourable attention in Latin America. The Chilean newspaper *La Union*, for example, declared that the jealousies aroused by the Monroe Doctrine had disappeared and that it was now animated by the 'fraternal spirit of the big brother of the American continent' and the notion of mutual aid.[63] For Barrett, the war was the pinnacle of his nation branding strategy and seemed to prove that Pan-Americanism was 'an up-to-date question, which <u>appeals to the imagination of the people of all callings</u> and possibly interests them more than any other phase of our foreign affairs.'[64] Yet it must be noted that despite his public optimism,

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[60] 'Thanksgiving Statement' (24 November 1915); Barrett to Editor of New York Times (3 December 1915), Box 39, JBP, MDLC; J. Barrett, 'Practical Pan-Americanism', *North American Review*, 202, no. 718 (1915), pp. 413-423; J. Barrett, 'The Pan-American Union and Peace', *Advocate of Peace* (January 1916), pp. 7-8; *New York Times* (8 November 1915), p. 5.

[61] W. Shepherd, 'New Light on the Monroe Doctrine', *Political Science Quarterly*, 31, no. 4 (1916), pp. 578-589; C. Sherrill, *Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916); *New York Times* (18 April 1915), p. SM21; *Washington Post* (24 October 1915), p. 17.

[62] 'The War and the Monroe Doctrine', *The Outlook* (25 November 1914), pp. 654-655; 'Pan-Americanism', *The New Republic* (19 December 1914), pp. 9-10.

[63] Translation of article from *La Union* (7 March 1916), Box 4, HPFP, MDLC.

[64] Barrett to Hughes (24 July 1916), Box 41, JBP, MDLC. Emphasis in original. Nation Branding is described by Jessica Gienow-Hecht as the act of promoting the popularity or attractiveness of one's own nation to achieve goals that should or could not be reached by more violent or subversive means: J.

Barrett still held doubts about the feasibility of transforming the Monroe Doctrine, as hinted in a letter to former Senator Theodore Burton. While giving advice to Burton about his upcoming tour of South America in 1915, Barrett suggested that he ought to be very careful when discussing the Monroe Doctrine, as Latin Americans paid close attention to the topic and 'will remember what your utterances are.'[65]

With Pan-American sentiment buoyed by the war, historian Roland Usher was prompted to conduct a study of Pan-Americanism and it seemed inevitable to him that the victor of the war would clash with the Monroe Doctrine.[66] He argued that Pan-Americanism was not yet a reality and that to realise its potential an administrative union of the American republics had to be formed, including the multi-lateralisation of the Monroe Doctrine. The problem was that despite the rhetoric of Pan-Americanists, there had been no tangible progress towards the establishment of a political American union. More importantly, Usher argued that there was 'no actual evidence of a desire on the part of the American states to make it real.' Pan-Americanism was based upon the premise of an organic bond between the American republics, however, Usher believed that such a bond did not really exist:

> Unless we can demonstrate that Pan-Americanism has behind it deep fundamental concepts and is likely to subserve important American ends,

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Ginenow-Hecht, 'Nation Branding', in Costigliola and Hogan (eds), *American Foreign Relations*. Throughout his career, Barrett conducted an alternative form of nation branding by seeking to promote positive representations of Latin American nations to further Pan-American, although ultimately United States, interests. By positioning himself as an 'international officer', Barrett sought to grant himself the authority to promote the national images of all the American republics, rather than just the United States, to achieve the Pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine.

[65] 'Memorandum for Senator Burton re trip to South America' (March 1915), Box 38, JBP, MDLC. Burton ignored Barrett's advice and mentioned the Monroe Doctrine during his tour, although he quoted the opinion of Theodore Roosevelt rather than enunciating his own: O. Schoenrich, *Former Senator Burton's Trip to South America 1915* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1915), p. 38.

[66] R. Usher, *Pan-Americanism: A Forecast of the Inevitable Clash between the United States and Europe's Victor* (New York: Century Co., 1915), p. 5.

> a close connection with the Latin-American republics will scarcely be a policy for the maintenance of which the United States ought to sacrifice anything of substantive value. If such is now the true meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, the expediency of its continuance will then become a matter of grave doubt.

Ultimately, Usher believed that Pan-Americanism was a flawed ideology. It was a misnomer that the American states shared a close geographical proximity, merely an assumption that North and South America shared political and economic interests, and a fallacy to claim that the Western Hemisphere was isolated. The American republics were deeply connected to Europe and the North and South Americas were not well acquainted: 'they do not know one another – race, language and religion act as barriers … [w]e have no common interests with them, nor are we closely connected with them; we are, in fact, sundered by totally dissimilar interests and by a generally different outlook upon life.'[67] Whilst Usher questioned the ability of Latin Americans to function as equals to Anglo-Saxons, he noted that they were keenly aware of the ways in which Native Americans were treated and did not believe that they would be treated as equals either. For Usher, the United States could not grant equality in a Pan-American confederation whilst it maintained social barriers against African and Native Americans.[68] For the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine, this presented obstacles as the establishment of a closer connection between the United States and the Latin American republics would be considered 'so abnormal and artificial, so lacking in mutuality, and so entirely devoid of popular confidence.' To Latin Americans, the Monroe Doctrine equated to imperialism and territorial expansion and whilst the United States was free to apply the doctrine to

[67] Ibid., pp. 204-233.
[68] Ibid., pp. 294-300.

new circumstances as it saw fit, it must recognise that it was a scheme that Latin Americans would perceive as inimical to their interests.[69]

Whilst the prospect of inter-American trade prompted Pan-Americanists to look upon the war as an opportunity, optimism was far from all encompassing. The Monroe Doctrine may have kept the United States out of the war, but that did not mean that it would remain unchallenged. The German Peril became even more pronounced in the context of the war and it seemed inevitable to many Americans that if Germany was victorious, it would seek to expand its empire into Latin America. Walter Page, the United States Ambassador to Great Britain, frequently referred to the danger that Germany posed to the doctrine, claiming that unless the Allies could prevent the onslaught of German militarism, the doctrine would be, to quote his oft-used phrase, 'shot through.'[70] The Ambassador to Germany, James Gerard, seemed to agree, referring to the British Royal Navy as the only barrier between Germany and the doctrine.[71] The fears of the past decade regarding the German presence in Brazil were reignited and Americans grew concerned that the war would eventually spread to the Western Hemisphere.[72] In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, Alfred Mahan argued that if Germany gained control of the European continent it would not be long

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[69] Ibid., pp. 390-402.
[70] Page to Wilson (6 September 1914), *PWW*, vol. 31, pp. 6-8; Page to Bryan (15 October 1914), *PWW*, vol. 31, pp. 159-160; Page to House (22 September 1914), B. Hendrick (ed.), *The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*, vol. 1 (New York: Doubleday, 1922), pp. 328-335.
[71] Gerard to House (3 August 1915), *PWW*, vol. 34, pp. 238-239. See also: J. Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1917), p. 152.
[72] See for example: *Washington Post* (10 June 1914), p. 3; *New York Times* (7 June 1915), p. 10; W. Lippmann, 'What Program Shall the United States Stand for in Internal Relations?', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 66 (1916), p. 63; (24 November 1914), Diaries, Volume 2, Edward Mandell House Papers [hereafter EMHP], YUL, f. 231; Stokes to Barrett (23 February 1915), Box 38, JBP, MDLC.

before it came to challenge the Monroe Doctrine.[73] This pre-existing suspicion of German designs did not, however, erase any sense of shock at the transpiration of events. For example, Joseph Choate confessed that 'we never thought at the Hague in 1907 that Germany would threaten all treaties as scraps of paper or that she was then (as it now appears she must have been) preparing for this horrific slaughter.'[74] The doctrine may have served as a barrier to the conflict, but it now needed reinforcing.

The first indication that Germany might challenge the Monroe Doctrine surfaced in October 1914 when a brief controversy erupted in the United States press concerning the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to Canada in the case of a potential German invasion of the British dominion. The German Ambassador to the United States, Johann von Bernstorff, and former Colonial Secretary, Bernhard Dernburg, made a series of public comments outlining that Canada had voided any protection the Monroe Doctrine might have granted it by sending troops to fight against Germany in the war. It followed from this, the Germans argued, that the United States should not view any wartime invasion of Canada as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Normally a forgotten event in the narrative of United States neutrality, Phillips O'Brien has recently brought the controversy to scholarly attention in his examination of United States reactions to the outbreak of the First World War. O'Brien argues that the reaction to the controversy was an example of a moment when the American press genuinely pondered intervention into the conflict, supporting his thesis that the American public were not simply shocked and

[73] Mahan to Daniels (15 August 1914) in *LPATM*, vol. 3, pp. 541-542.
[74] Choate to Bryce (10 January 1915), Reel 70, VJBP, WLUO.

appalled by the outbreak of the war.[75] However, O'Brien describes the incident as a storm 'in a regional teacup' and limited his source base to local Boston newspapers, when it actually garnered national responses. Historian Albert Bushnell Hart, writing in 1916, even went so far as to claim that the issue had caused a 'fierce discussion' of the Monroe Doctrine across the United States.[76]

Canada's relationship with the Monroe Doctrine is a peculiar one. The doctrine was often regarded as applicable to Canada informally despite that fact that it was not an American republic.[77] The relationship was most notably considered in 1938 when President Franklin Roosevelt declared that 'the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire,' a statement which is often referred to as Roosevelt's extension of the Monroe Doctrine to Canada.[78] Yet for the century prior to this statement, the relationship is largely ignored by historians. The explanation for this lies in the fact that original remit of the Monroe Doctrine is not considered applicable to Canada due to its colonial connection to Britain.[79] However, some passing thought was given to this relationship in the first

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[75] P. O'Brien, 'The American Press, Public, and the Reaction to the Outbreak of the First World War', *Diplomatic History*, 37, no. 3 (2013), pp. 469-470. Historians rarely examine this incident. However, brief references to the controversy can be found in: S. Triana, *Some Aspects of the War* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1917), pp. 146-154; A. Álvarez, *The Monroe Doctrine: Its Importance in the International Life of the States of the New World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 105; Perkins, *Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 357-358.

[76] A. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1916), p. 279.

[77] In his classic history of United States foreign relations, Samuel Flagg Bemis argued that the Monroe Doctrine had 'always applied to Canada in spirit if not in word': S. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 5th ed., 1965), p. 795. Indeed, in 1902 the Canadian Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier claimed that the Monroe Doctrine protected Canada 'against enemy aggression'. See: J. Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), pp. 276-277; J. Dickey, *Canada and the American Presence* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), p. 61.

[78] Franklin Roosevelt quoted in: C. Fenwick, 'Canada and the Monroe Doctrine', *The American Journal of International Law*, 32, no. 4 (1938), p. 782.

[79] H. Meiertöns, *The Doctrines of US Security Policy: An Evaluation Under International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 79; J. Thompson and S. Randall, *Canada and the United States:*

decade of the twentieth century. From Britain, a former member of the Governor-General's Council in India, Sir Alexander Miller, argued that the Monroe Doctrine was unquestionably in the interests of Canada, and in a lengthy letter to the *New York Times*, a reader claimed that it was in relation to Canada that the doctrine would receive 'its greatest test' over the coming years.[80] In discussing the prospect of a war between Britain and Germany, diplomat Lewis Einstein even predicted that the relationship would be tested.[81] The 1914 controversy, therefore, represented a unique moment to determine how the doctrine applied to Canada.

When war broke out, concerns initially appeared within both Canada and the United States that Germany might invade the former. Letters were sent into various newspapers that expressed the anxiety of American citizens, primarily arguing that Canadian action in the conflict was a direct threat to the Monroe Doctrine as it would invite German military action into the hemisphere.[82] The controversy itself originated with Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the British Admiralty. In late August 1914, Churchill was interviewed by an American journalist and claimed that Germany desired territorial acquisitions in South America. If the nation was victorious in the current conflict, Germany would quickly aim to fulfil its desires and challenge the Monroe Doctrine.[83] In response to Churchill's comments, Ambassador Bernstorff sent a note to

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Ambivalent Allies (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 4th ed., 2008), pp. 5-6; Perkins, *Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 356-357.

[80] A. Miller, 'The Monroe Doctrine from an English Standpoint', *North American Review*, 176, no. 558 (1903), p. 733; *New York Times* (24 August 1902), p. 8.

[81] L. Einstein, 'The Anglo German Rivalry and the United States', Box 17, PCKP, MDLC.

[82] *New York Times* (23 August 1914), p. 6; *Honolulu Star Bulletin* (29 August 1914), p. 9; *Washington Herald* (13 September 1914), p. 22; *New York Times* (26 September 1914), p. 2. See also: M. Kitchen, 'The German Invasion of Canada in the First World War', *The International History Review*, 7, no. 2 (1985), pp. 245-247.

[83] *The Manchester Guardian* (31 August 1914), p. 4.

the State Department on 3 September which attempted to convince the United States that there was no truth in Churchill's claims and that Germany did not intend to expand into South America. The note was largely ignored, as were Churchill's inflammatory remarks, and it was not made known to the United States public at large. However, it was brought to public attention a month later by Dernburg after Canadian troops were assigned to the British war effort. On 22 October, he gave an address at Newark in which he made Bernstorff's note public, attempting to allay any fears within the United States that a victorious Germany would seek to challenge to Monroe Doctrine.[84] The following day, however, he was asked to speak further on the matter and he expanded, referring to Canada's aid to Britain in the war as a direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine.[85]

The press was eager to hear the German Ambassador's opinion and Bernstorff outlined that by sending troops to Europe to fight against German forces, Canada had forfeited any claim it had to United States protection under the Monroe Doctrine. As such, the United States should not view any landing of German troops on Canadian territory as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.[86] Whilst this was not intended as a threat, it had the opposite effect, and the press responded angrily. Bernstorff and Dernburg had inadvertently landed Germany in a diplomatic *faux pas* that the Ambassador desperately tried to resolve. Feeling the pressure, he issued two further statements, one as an official statement from the embassy, which placed all the blame for the affair on Churchill. However, he remained adamant that Canada had not acted 'in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine' and that the 'German point of view is that by joining in a European war Canada

[84] *New York Times* (23 October 1914), p. 4.
[85] *New York Times* (24 October 1914), p. 1.
[86] *New York Times* (26 October 1914), p. 4; *Washington Post* (26 October 1914), p. 1.

has put herself outside of the pale of the Monroe Doctrine.'[87] The State Department did not become involved in the affair but articles filled the press that questioned the relationship between Canada and he Monroe Doctrine.[88] Prominent political figures also presented their opinions and Elihu Root continuously expressed the opinion that a German victory would result in a threat to the Monroe Doctrine through a Canadian invasion.[89] Former President William Howard Taft, however, outlined that the Monroe Doctrine did not bind the United States to a defence of Canada if it was attacked. The only situation that would justify objections from the United States would be if any territory was permanently occupied.[90]

This incident demonstrated the hold the German Peril continued to have upon much of the United States. In the context of the war, even farfetched comments prompted an impassioned defence of the Monroe Doctrine as old fears were reignited. The reaction is made even more emphatic when compared to the response of the Canadian press, which displayed little anxiety. Summarising the reaction, the *Literary Digest* outlined that 'Canada smiles at Count von Bernstorff, refuses to take Dr. Dernburg seriously, and even makes it plain that she does not take much stock in our Monroe Doctrine.'[91] As a Canadian cartoon aptly demonstrated, Canadians did not seem to take much notice of this unlikely invasion of their homeland (Figure 3.7). Yet in matters concerning the Monroe Doctrine, the United States press simply could not ignore the Germans' words and took

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[87] *The Sun* (27 October 1914), p. 8. For Dernburg's review of the controversy a month later see: B. Dernburg, 'Germany and England: The Real Issue', *Saturday Evening Post* (21 November 1914), p. 25.
[88] See for example: 'Germany and the Monroe Doctrine', *The Outlook* (4 November 1914), p. 524; *New York Times* (26 October 1914), p. 4; *Los Angeles Times* (8 November 1914), p. 8; *Washington Post* (8 November 1914), p. 13.
[89] Jessup, *Root*, vol. 2, p. 325.
[90] *New York Times* (28 November 1914), p. 12; (17 February 1915), p. 10.
[91] *Literary Digest* (14 November 1914), p. 956.

the opportunity to delve into the curious relationship between Canada and the doctrine.

Figure 3.7: Canadian Satire of Ambassador Bernstorff's Remarks on the Monroe Doctrine



BERNSTORFF—"And by the way, tell your friend that I—that is, we—have no desire, that is, no intention, of taking his country."
—*Beck's Weekly* (Montreal).

Source: *Literary Digest* (14 November 1914)

For advocates of naval expansion, Germany's belligerency confirmed pre-existing fears that the United States required a larger navy to defend the Monroe Doctrine. Senators and Congressmen such as Augustus Gardner pleaded for the creation of more battleships and invoked the Monroe Doctrine directly as the war gave their demands a

sense of urgency.[92] Once again, opponents of naval expansion claimed that the Monroe Doctrine had never required a strong navy in the past, but within the context of a world war these rebuttals were largely ineffective.[93] The Navy League of the United States (NLUS) grasped the opportunity to increase the effectiveness of its campaign and, whilst it advocated neutrality, argued that preparedness was essential to prevent a future invasion of the United States. In his history of the NLUS, Armin Rappaport argues that the league was the 'most active and persistent preparedness group.'[94] In December 1915, President Wilson presented new naval estimates and introduced the largest naval bill the nation had ever seen. The NLUS was naturally ceaseless in its support of the bill and it adeptly enlisted the Monroe Doctrine to ensure its passage. Consulting the official organs of the league, which during this period were the periodicals *Seven Seas* and *Sea Power*, the prominence of the doctrine is clearly visible.

One member of the NLUS who took almost every opportunity to invoke the doctrine was Perry Belmont. A former Democrat, Belmont had been partly responsible for inserting into the 1912 Democratic Party Platform a clause concerning naval defence and the Monroe Doctrine.[95] As a primary contributor to the articles that appeared in both *Seven Seas* and *Sea Power*, Belmont pointed out at every available opportunity that the platform of 1912 had yet to be realised in terms of naval defence and the Monroe

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[92] *New York Times* (18 October 1914), p. 10; (6 December 1914), p. 18; 'The Monroe Doctrine', *Current History*, 5, no. 1 (1916), pp. 154-163. See also: J. Doenecke, *Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America's Entry into World War I* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), p. 36.
[93] U.S. Congress. House. Naval Appropriation Bill, 63rd Cong., 3rd Sess., *Appendix to the Congressional Record* (29 January 1915), p. 903; U.S. Congress. House. The Naval Bill, 63rd Cong., 3rd Sess., *Appendix to the Congressional Record* (29 January 1915), pp. 926-927.
[94] Rappaport, *Navy League*, pp. 44-52.
[95] 'Democratic Party Platform of 1912' (25 June 1912), *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/. See also: P. Belmont, *An American Democrat: The Recollections of Perry Belmont* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2nd ed., 1941), pp. 500-501.

Doctrine.[96] Whilst expressing his disappointment, he would always discuss the conflict that persisted between the systems of divine right and republicanism, arguing that the doctrine, backed up by a suitable navy, was the nation's only safeguard against European systems of governance. Belmont argued that divine right was 'in our own time as much the antithesis of the principles of the sovereignty of the people as when it called into life the Monroe Doctrine which has now become the universal aspirations of all the free governments, wherever situated, and the embodiment of the most effective policy in their defense.'[97]

The cardinal feature of the NLUS's activity, however, was its annual convention in April 1916, which garnered a significant turnout. The NLUS managed to attract the support of Albert Hart, a historian of the Monroe Doctrine, who in an address outlined that the doctrine required 'a powerful navy, a navy constantly advancing, a navy ready at all times for instant service.' Hart argued that the doctrine, 'as a piece of paper upon which are imprinted certain black characters, has come to the end of its usefulness. You cannot longer impose it upon peoples who can raise such fleets as have been raised by Germany and France and Great Britain during the present war.' The choice was clear: 'either we must give up the Monroe Doctrine … or else stand behind the Doctrine from top to bottom.'[98]

Other preparedness organisations displayed a similar commitment to the Monroe Doctrine. Upon being made the Honorary President of the National Security League,

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[96] *Seven Seas* (September 1915), pp. 5-10.
[97] *Seven Seas* (August 1915), pp. 6-9.
[98] A. Hart, 'Naval Defense of the Monroe Doctrine', *Addresses Before the Eighth Annual Convention of the Navy League of the United States Washington, D.C. April 10-13, 1916* (Washington, D.C.: Navy Printing Co., 1916), pp. 24-36.

Joseph Choate claimed that the doctrine was 'not worth the paper on which it is written' unless adequately supported, and the American Defense Society included the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine in its platform.[99] Pan-Americanists additionally sought to utilise the preparedness movement to foster inter-American solidarity. Barrett informed Solomon Stanwood Menken, the founder of the National Security League, that the security of the United States was linked to the security of the entire Western Hemisphere, and offered to cooperate with the movement from a Pan-American perspective.[100] In an address at Illinois, he declared that the war's conclusion would bring about 'a final test by Europe or Asia of the real meaning of the Monroe Doctrine,' outlining that it had to be suitably defended by force of arms, and multi-lateralised, to ensure its survival.[101] Fortunately for these organisations, Wilson's naval bill was approved on 21 July 1916 and signed on 21 August. The NLUS was naturally satisfied with the Naval Act of 1916, as almost its entire platform had been achieved. Having utilised the doctrine to seemingly great effect, the league continued to present the doctrine as a vital consideration in naval affairs as the war developed.[102]


The significance of the German threat and the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine, Canada and the United States Navy was that the doctrine was primarily portrayed as part of a system of United States hegemony rather than a facilitator of inter-American cooperation. The imperial imagery of the Monroe Doctrine shines through a map that appeared in the August 1915 issue of *Seven Seas* outlining the geographical

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[99] Choate to Menken (21 January 1916), Box 22, JHCP, MDLC; *Hand Book of the American Defense Society* (New York: American Defense Society, 1918), p. 2. See also: R. Ward, 'The Origin and Activities of the National Security League, 1914-1917', *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 47, no. 1 (1960), pp. 51-65.
[100] Menken to Barrett (15 November 1916), Box 41, JBP, MDLC.
[101] 'A Pan American Preparedness Appeal to Illinois' (20 February 1916), Box 98, JBP, MDLC.
[102] See for example: *Sea Power* (August 1916), p. 22.

scope of the Monroe Doctrine (Figure 3.8). The entire Western Hemisphere fell under the shield of the doctrine, including Canada, as did the Philippines, Hawaii and American Samoa. It was clear from this map that the United States needed a larger navy to defend its Pacific holdings and the rest of the Americas and the doctrine was depicted as an imperial sphere of influence rather than a statement of policy. The United States had a vested interest in ensuring that around a third of globe was within the geographical boundaries of the Monroe Doctrine.

Figure 3.8: 'The Vast Territory That Our Monroe Doctrine Obligates Us to Defend'



Source: *Seven Seas* (August 1915)

Conflicted Diplomacy - The Wilson Administration's Interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine

By August 1913, Ellen Axon Wilson had predicted that the Monroe Doctrine was going to be an integral aspect of her husband's presidency. United States-Mexican relations were creating so much trouble for the President and he was forced to spend less time with the First Lady, prompting her to jokingly wish 'a plague on the Monroe doctrine.'[103] Most Presidents of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were forced to deal with matters relating to the doctrine in some fashion whilst in office; however, Wilson's preoccupation with the doctrine arguably surpasses even that of Theodore Roosevelt. On 27 October 1913, Wilson first outlined his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine at the Fifth Annual Convention of the Southern Commercial Congress in Mobile, Alabama, as part of his enunciation of the administration's Latin American policy. Although he did not invoke it by name, likely in an effort to avoid offending Latin Americans, the policy he proclaimed at Mobile was referred to in relation to the Monroe Doctrine in private correspondence.[104] During his address, the President stated that he desired to improve relations with Latin America and that the 'United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest.' However, Wilson was deeply concerned about Latin American dependence on European investment, which had manifested itself in his reaction to the Mexican Revolution, and he believed that European investors were gaining a subtle form of control over Latin American political affairs by seeking special

[103] Ellen Wilson to Wilson (19 August 1913), *PWW*, vol. 28, pp. 194-195.
[104] See for example: 'A Draft Circular Note to the Powers' (24 October 1913), *PWW*, vol. 28, pp. 431-432; Colonel House Diary (30 October 1913), *PWW*, vol. 28, pp. 476-478; Bryan to Wilson (28 October 1913), *PWW*, vol. 28, pp. 455-457; Moore to Wilson (28 October 1913), *PWW*, vol. 28, pp. 487-463; Page to House (26 November 1913), *PWW*, vol. 28, pp. 593-594; Page to Wilson (21 December 1913), *PWW*, vol. 29, pp. 51-53.

commercial concessions and privileges. Wilson therefore proclaimed his desire to see Latin America undergo 'an emancipation from the subordination … to foreign enterprise,' a statement that, according to Mark Gilderhus, 'verged on a declaration of economic war' and actually foreshadowed United States intervention.[105] The Mobile address thus drew directly upon the ideas of the recently proclaimed Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, emphasising that non-American control of Latin American affairs via financial means would be viewed as detrimental to United States interests. Like Pan-Americanists, Wilson believed that European influence could be countered by increasing United States trade with the region. Commercial ties would foster more favourable inter-American relations, expose Latin American nations to superior United States ideals and stabilise the circum-Caribbean though an influx of finance.[106] Although he framed United States policy as anti-imperial, Wilson instead sought to strengthen regional hegemony.

William Bayard Hale, a journalist who served as an emissary for the President in Mexico, viewed Wilson's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as a signifier of the United States' domination of the Western Hemisphere and the establishment of 'our moral Empire in America.' All the United States wanted, Hale proclaimed, was order in Mexico and Central America and if these nations look to the United States for protection under the Monroe Doctrine, then 'we are at the very least entitled to see that the governments of these countries are lawfully constituted, in order that a due and proper continuity of internal order shall be maintained.' Using phraseology akin to that of the Roosevelt Corollary, Hale argued that the moral United States Empire, supported by the

[105] 'An Address on Latin American Policy in Mobile, Alabama' (27 October 1913), *PWW*, vol. 28, pp. 448-452; Gilderhus, *Pan American Vision*, pp. 17-18.
[106] Neagle, 'US Policies Toward Latin America', pp. 208-209.

Monroe Doctrine, would put right the wrongs of less civilised nations and, 'contrary to the ways of material empire, will aim at no petuity [sic] for itself.'[107]

Robert Lansing, a counsellor to the State Department and Secretary of State from June 1915, reinforced Wilson's views on the Monroe Doctrine through producing two memoranda on the subject, the first written just before the First World War broke out. Lansing voiced his agreement with the sentiments of Wilson's Mobile address, claiming that aside from the acquisition of power by means of occupation, conquest or cession, European control via finance should be a crucial consideration of the United States. He additionally believed that the doctrine should be modified to oppose political control only if it possessed 'the element of permanency' and that the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism were not always in harmony. To the Secretary, the 'integrity of other American nations is an incident, not an end' of the doctrine.[108] His second memorandum, which came in November 1915, intended to restate the financial aspect of his previous and highlight the necessity of keeping the Canal Zone free of European control.[109] He chose to emphasise the Caribbean region as particularly susceptible to financial control, arguing that the Monroe Doctrine should be expanded to define the Caribbean region as an area in which the United States 'will not tolerate control over or interference with the political or financial affairs of these republics by any European power or its nationals or permit the occupation, even temporarily, by a European power, of any territory of such

[107] W. Hale, 'Our Moral Empire in America', *The World's Work* (May 1914), pp. 52-58.
[108] 'Present Nature and Extent of the Monroe Doctrine, and its Need of Restatement' (11 June 1914), *FRUS The Lansing Papers 1914-1920*, vol. 2, pp. 460-465; Lansing to Bryan (16 June 1914), *FRUS The Lansing Papers 1914-1920*, vol. 2, pp. 459-460. Emphasis in original.
[109] Lansing to Wilson (24 November 1915), *FRUS The Lansing Papers 1914-1920*, vol. 2, pp. 466-467.

republics.'[110] Much like the defenders of a unilateral Monroe Doctrine, Lansing believed that the safety of the Panama Canal required a rigid enforcement of the doctrine and that the doctrine ought to be applied differently to the various regions of the Western Hemisphere.[111] His distinction between Latin America and the Caribbean region not only emphasised the latter's strategic importance, but that its populace was deemed unable to maintain order itself.

Whilst Lansing believed that the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine trumped Pan-Americanism, he thought that the latter could be used to strengthen the former. In one of his earlier memoranda as Secretary of State, Lansing suggested that the United States adopt policies to cultivate a 'Pan-American doctrine with the object of alienating the American republics from European influence, especially the German influence.'[112] Later that year, speaking before the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress, he claimed that Pan-Americanism was 'in entire harmony with the Monroe Doctrine'; even though he knew that the reverse was not always true.[113] Wilson made similar comments at the same gathering and in his annual message of 1915, noting that they both embodied the spirit of 'law and independence and liberty and mutual service.'[114] The potential benefits of Pan-Americanism, which advocates of the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine had been clamouring for since the start of his presidency, prompted Wilson's efforts to establish a Pan-American pact. The pact was conceived to establish respect for

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[110] 'Present Nature and Extent of the Monroe Doctrine' (24 November 1915), *FRUS The Lansing Papers 1914-1920*, vol. 2, pp. 468-470.
[111] Lansing to Choate (20 January 1916), Box 15, JHCP, MDLC.
[112] 'Consideration and Outline of Policies' (11 July 1915), Reel 1, Robert Lansing Papers [hereafter RLP], MDLC.
[113] R. Lansing, *Pan-Americanism* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915).
[114] 'Message of the President of the United States to Congress, 7 December 1915', *FRUS 1915*, pp. x-xi; *New York Tribune* (6 January 1916), p. 1.

territorial integrity and international arbitration among the American republics and the administration conducted initial discussions with the ABC nations.[115] Edward "Colonel" House, Wilson's confidante on matters relating to foreign relations, was a crucial voice in convincing the President that the pact would serve United States interests and described it as an effort 'to broaden the Monroe Doctrine so that it may be upheld by all the American Republics instead of by the United States alone as now.'[116]

Ross Kennedy argues that Wilson's conception of national security was linked to the existing international system in which states were responsible for their own security. Without a ruling authority, insecurity was rampant, facilitating suspicion and entangling alliances that would eventually endanger the United States.[117] As such, Wilson's proposal for the League of Nations toward the close of the First World War was inherently connected to matters of national security. This framework can be applied to the Pan-American pact, which was based upon House and Wilson's beliefs that that the failure of European diplomacy resulted primarily from the absence of international organisation. Functioning as a precursor to the League of Nations, the Pan-American pact would serve as the basis of a Western Hemispheric system of organisation to ensure peace. He hinted at the potential possibilities of the pact in the spring of 1916 during a number of talks urging support for preparedness, openly acknowledging that a pact was being discussed

[115] For drafts of the Pan-American pact, see: 'Draft Articles for Proposed Pan-American Treaty' (29 January 1915), *FRUS The Lansing Papers 1914-1920*, vol. 2, pp. 472-473; 'Draft Articles for Proposed Pan-American Treaty' (13 April 1916), *FRUS The Lansing Papers 1914-1920*, vol. 2, pp. 495-496.
[116] House to Lansing (12 October 1915), *FRUS The Lansing Papers 1914-1920*, vol. 2, pp. 486-488; C. Seymour, (ed.), *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926), pp. 207-234.
[117] Kennedy, 'American National Security', pp. 2-3.

and that it might lead to 'that handsome principle of reciprocal respect and reciprocal defense.'[118]

Argentina and Brazil proved relatively easy to convince; however, Chile adamantly resisted the proposal. Because Chile had a long-standing territorial dispute with Peru over Tacna-Arica, it rejected the prospect of guaranteed territorial integrity.[119] Its resistance delayed proceedings and William Sater argues that the pact caused 'consternation, if not fear' in Chile and was directly against its national interests.[120] The First World War caused further problems and, rather than generating Pan-American solidarity as Pan-Americanists liked to believe, a crisis of 'continental solidary' swept Latin America. Emily Rosenberg argues that the war revealed 'an inconvenient, even dangerous, disunity within the hemisphere' which clashed with Wilson's idealised vision of a harmonious Latin America.[121] Mark Gilderhus, who has conducted the most detailed study of Wilson's Latin American policy, makes a similar point, positing that Wilson assumed the existence of natural harmonies among Latin American nations and between the United States and its fellow American republics. In reality, Latin American nations were far more concerned with their own national interests and were not comfortable with exposing themselves to further United States influence.[122]

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[118] 'An Address in Chicago on Preparedness' (31 January 1916), *PWW*, vol. 36, *1916*, pp. 63-73.
[119] On Chilean opposition see: Bryan to Wilson (3 April 1915), *PWW*, vol. 32, *1915*, p. 474; Bryan to Wilson (21 April 1915), *PWW*, vol. 33, *1915*, pp. 52-60; Bryan to Suárez-Mujica (27 April 1915), *PWW*, vol. 33, *1915*, pp. 77-80; Bryan to Suárez-Mujica (29 April 1915), *FRUS The Lansing Papers 1914-1920*, vol. 2, pp. 482-484; Fletcher to Lansing (9 August 1916), *FRUS The Lansing Papers 1914-1920*, vol. 2, pp. 496-497; (29 March 1916), EMHP, YUL, f. 120.
[120] W. Sater, *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), pp. 83-85.
[121] Rosenberg, 'Continental Solidarity', pp. 313-334.
[122] Gilderhus, *Pan American Visions*, pp. 156-157.

Thus, by the time the United States entered the First World War in April 1917 Wilson had abandoned the idea of a pact and shifted his attention to the formation of an international league as opposed to a hemispheric system of organisation. The President certainly appreciated the benefits of hemispheric solidarity and the multi-lateralisation of the Monroe Doctrine, however, if the Pan-American pact is considered alongside his other ruminations on the Monroe Doctrine, it raises questions of whether the pact would have even been established had Chile acquiesced. The administration's decision to conduct initial talks with the ABC nations exclusively demonstrated the hierarchy within which the United States had placed Latin American nations, and the nation's policy outlook toward the circum-Caribbean, not to mention the various interventions, was hardly Pan-American in spirit. Yet Wilson's shift in understanding the Monroe Doctrine mirrors the arguments of historians such as Greg Grandin who argue that Latin America served as a region in which the United States tested policy formation before applying it worldwide.[123] Through considering the administration's fractured interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, an interpretation that reflected those of the wider decision-making class, it becomes clear that the nation was unable to determine which notion - either inter-American cooperation or regional hegemony - the Monroe Doctrine, and the entirety of its relations with Latin America, should embody.

Wilson's first presidential term stands as one of the most fascinating periods in the history of the Monroe Doctrine. The heightened tensions of the Mexican Revolution and the completion of the Panama Canal provided a context of hemispheric relations that demanded reflection upon the application of the doctrine. Overlaid with comment, the

[123] G. Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007).

doctrine's meaning remained fractured to such an extent that not even the President could apply it consistently. The outbreak of the First World War complicated matters even further. Although the United States initially looked upon the doctrine as a barrier warding off the conflict from the Americas, it soon became apparent that the belligerent nations had altered the fabric of international relations and the doctrine had to be reshaped to uphold national security. As such, the debate over the doctrine's application was amplified as Americans sought to respond to the war via policies of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation. The doctrine became even more closely associated with the United States Navy as the preparedness movement utilised it in their bid for military expansion and the conflict forced the nation to consider whether the doctrine applied to Canada and what implications this had upon inter-American relations. Distinctions between the New and Old Worlds were readily drawn to unite the American republics, yet the war simultaneously demonstrated that the United States could not avoid the ramifications of the conflict by virtue of geography. In a moment of global crisis and conflict, the Monroe Doctrine's fractured interpretation lay at the heart of United States foreign relations and national security.

Unfortunately, the nation's troubles had only just begun. During Wilson's second term, the President gradually realised that the United States could not remain neutral and declared war on Germany in April 1917. Determining the shape of post-war world order became Wilson's primary concern and the debate over the Monroe Doctrine's meaning played a crucial role in the treaty fight.

Chapter Four: The Deity of the Monroe Doctrine

The Trichotomy of the Treaty Fight and the Reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine (1916-1920)

During his ill-fated Western tour of the United States in September 1919, Woodrow Wilson struggled to conceal his exasperation with the Monroe Doctrine. Throughout the great debate over international organisation that historians refer to as the treaty fight, Wilson's goal of securing United States membership to the League of Nations was continuously criticised by his antagonists on the grounds that it would destroy the revered foreign policy tradition, transforming the doctrine from a potent policy tool into a tenacious stumbling block.[1] In an attempt to allay these fears, the President had posited that the covenant of the League of Nations extended the principles of the doctrine to the entire world rather than abrogating them and he had even managed to include a specific reservation on the Monroe Doctrine in the covenant (Article 21). Yet this reservation was criticised for its lack of clarity and for misrepresenting the Monroe Doctrine as a 'regional understanding,' leaving him no better off than before. During a speech on 12 September 1919 in Spokane, Washington, Wilson vented his frustration to his gathered audience: 'I do not know how the Monroe doctrine could be any more explicitly accepted than it is in the covenant … What more could you say?' Whilst he readily admitted that the doctrine had 'escaped analysis' during the Paris Peace Conference, making it difficult to define, Wilson was adamant that Article 21 was 'the most extraordinary sentence' in

[1] I use the term "treaty fight" liberally and apply it to the wider debate over international organisation that took place in the United States during Wilson's second presidential term, rather than the debate over the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles specifically.

the covenant, because it symbolised 'the world recognizing the validity of the Monroe doctrine.' Yet his critics wanted more. 'Shall we get [the nations of the world] to express their belief in the deity of the Monroe doctrine? They accept it for the first time in the history of the world, and they say that they will do nothing that will interfere with it. I must submit that it is absolutely irrational to ask for anything more.'[2]

Wilson's irritation with the Monroe Doctrine was not misplaced. As historians have long attested, the doctrine played a significant role in the treaty fight and it was adeptly invoked by opponents of the League of Nations to block the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.[3] Advocates of international organisation failed to assure the nation that the Monroe Doctrine would be protected in a league of nations and it became, in the words of Harvard's Abbot Lawrence Lowell, the 'greatest bugbear' of the treaty fight.[4] Despite the doctrine's prominence during the treaty fight, the relationship between the two has yet to be fully appreciated by historians. The doctrine did not merely serve as a tool for pro- and anti-League factions to invoke, rather, its fluid meaning fundamentally shaped the different ways in which Americans perceived the notion of internationalism and national security during the treaty fight. When the United States entered the First World War in 1917, the concurrent debate over the doctrine's meaning and application shifted in tenor and combined with the debate over post-war international organisation. The two became symbiotic and as the treaty fight generated further commentary on the

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[2] 'Address at Spokane, Wash., September 12, 1919' in W. Wilson, *Addresses of President Wilson: Addresses Delivered by President Wilson on his Western Tour September 4 to September 25, 1919* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 170.

[3] See, for example, classic studies such as: Perkins, *Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 277-306; T. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1945), p. 232; J. Spencer, 'The Monroe Doctrine and the League Covenant', *American Journal of International Law*, 30, no. 3 (1936), pp. 400-413.

[4] *The Lodge-Lowell Debate on the Proposed League of Nations* (Boston: Old Colony Trust Company, 1919), p. 40.

Monroe Doctrine and the core values that it was deemed to embody, the fractured doctrine influenced the attitudes that Americans held toward a league of nations and the prospect of international organisation.

Orthodox narratives of the treaty fight frame the debate as a contest between two opposing notions, namely internationalism and quasi-isolationism. Historians have since revised and challenged the simplicity of this dichotomy by exploring the nuanced and variable perspectives held by both advocates and opponents of international organisation.[5] Despite these developments in our understanding of the nature of the treaty fight, the debate is still primarily perceived as having taken place within a binary framework: as a choice between membership to the League of Nations or a rejection of international organisation. This chapter seeks to modify and expand the traditional conceptual framework of the treaty fight by examining the ways in which United States elites employed the Monroe Doctrine during the debate. By positioning the efforts to reinterpret the Monroe Doctrine's meaning and application within the narrative of the treaty fight, the debate over international organisation can be more accurately framed as a trichotomy: a debate between proponents of unilateralism, global organisation and regional organisation. The core values that Americans drew from the doctrine, namely regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation, were an essential component of this trichotomy.

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[5] C. Nichols, *Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 230-231; J. Cooper Jr., *Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 5; A. Iriye, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign* Relations, vol. 3, *The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 68-72; L. Ambrosius, *Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I* (Lanham: SR Books, 1991), pp. xii-xiii; L. Ambrosius, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. xii; R. Stone, *The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), pp. 178-182.

Stephen Wertheim is one of the few historians to directly challenge the traditional dichotomy of the treaty fight. In his study of the proposed legalist-sanctionist league advocated by the likes of Elihu Root, William Howard Taft and Theodore Roosevelt, Wertheim argues that viable alternatives to the League of Nations existed and that it is restrictive to view the treaty fight as simply a 'two-sided morality tale.' Because historians embed their studies within the traditional dichotomy of the treaty fight, alternative proposals such as those made for a legalist-sanctionist league have been overlooked. For Wertheim, the debate among proponents of global organisation is just as important for historians to consider, because it demonstrates that the early twentieth century was the moment in which 'American ideas of internationalism were at their most vibrant and diverse.'[6] Drawing upon Wertheim's claim, this chapter argues that proposals for regional organisation were an integral yet overlooked component of the treaty fight. Alongside the various demands for global organisation and the maintenance of unilateralism, the prospect of regional organisation represented an alternative approach to post-war internationalism that found significant support.

Whilst the traditional narrative of the treaty fight has obscured the proposals for regional organisation, so too has the centrality of Woodrow Wilson to the debate. As noted in the previous chapter, Wilson initially desired to implement a system of regional integration when he became President through the formation of a Pan-American pact; however, by 1917 he had turned his attention to global organisation and abandoned the idea of an inter-American system. Historians such as Mark Gilderhus perceive his

[6] S. Wertheim, 'The League That Wasn't: American Designs for a Legalist-Sanctionist League of Nations and the Intellectual Origins of International Organization, 1914–1920', *Diplomatic History*, 35, no. 5 (2011), pp. 797-799.

abortive Pan-American pact as a precursor to the League of Nations and argue that his regional aspirations transformed into global ones.[7] Although this is a sound interpretation, historians tend to focus almost exclusively on the President's policies and conceal the broader advocacy of regional organisation and its impact upon the discourse of the treaty fight. Demands for the formation of a regional American league of nations permeated and complicated the traditional dichotomy of the treaty fight and prominent Pan-Americanists occupied a distinct and critical position on post-war internationalism.

Crucially, this trichotomy of the treaty fight was based upon the fractured foundations of the Monroe Doctrine. The three overarching visions of a post-war order, unilateralism, global organisation and regional organisation, were aligned to different reinterpretations of the doctrine and different core values. Unilateralists interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as a facilitator of United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, drawing inspiration from the Roosevelt Corollary. They sought to protect the unilateral nature of the doctrine and argued that if the United States joined an international league it would be powerless to prevent European, or any other non-American, powers from interfering in what they considered purely American affairs that the United States was justified to dominate. Wilson and his supporters proposed that the doctrine's core principles could be expanded to a global scope through the establishment of the League of Nations, reinterpreting the doctrine as an international defender of self-governance. Advocates of the League claimed that because the Monroe Doctrine had permitted the nations of Latin America to develop on their own terms without European meddling, all nations could benefit from its principles through international organisation. Thus, the

[7] Gilderhus, *Pan-American Visions*, p. 49.

doctrine temporarily embodied a domestic core value during the treaty fight. Pan-Americanists occupied a middle-ground and advocated the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine through the formation of a regional American league of nations. The internationalism and cooperation inherent in global organisation would be maintained, but it would take a regional form to protect hemispheric and inter-American interests. Taken together, these reinterpretations of the Monroe Doctrine presented three potential paths for the United States to follow in a post-war era: the reinforcement of a policy of unilateralism; the establishment of regional Pan-American organisation; or membership of a global concert of nations.

The Monroe Doctrine and International Arbitration – Precedents for the Treaty Fight

Before the First World War broke out, Americans had witnessed a number of instances in which the Monroe Doctrine had been deemed under threat by the ratification of international treaties and agreements. Although these events were often trivial, they set a precedent for the discourse of the treaty fight and highlighted the obsessive need of many Americans to protect the doctrine's unilateralism from the machinations of internationalism. The first example of this was during the First Hague Conference of 1899, a gathering proposed by the Russian Tsar Nicholas II that sought to regulate rules of warfare and promote international arbitration. As the conference proceeded, the United States delegation grew concerned about the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine and the proposed convention. Delegate Alfred Thayer Mahan believed that Article 27 might be considered an infringement of the doctrine and the leading delegate, Andrew White, worried that the convention would be defeated in the Senate by 'over-sensitive'

patriots if the doctrine was not protected. The delegation was thus moved to draft a reservation which excluded the Monroe Doctrine from the convention in all but name.[8] The night before the reservation was submitted, White admitted that he had 'been tossing about in my bed and thinking of our declaration of the Monroe Doctrine to be brought before the conference to-day,' expressing the fear that 'the conference will not receive it, or will insist on our signing without it or not signing at all.'[9] To White's relief, the reservation was passed without a word of objection and was even replicated verbatim in the convention of the Second Hague Conference in 1907. Whilst seemingly uneventful, this episode demonstrated the contentious relationship between the doctrine and systems of international arbitration.

The Senate issued a similar statement in relation to the Algeciras Conference of 1906. Attended primarily by delegations from European powers, the conference met to settle Germany's protestations against French control in Morocco and the Senate resolved that United States participation was not an intention to 'depart from the traditional American policy which forbids participation by the United States in the settlement of political questions which are entirely European in scope.'[10] In a letter to one of the United States representatives, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge outlined why this European dispute was of concern to the nation. In a moment in which fear of the German Peril was rife,

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[8] J. Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907*, vol. 2 (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1909), p. 210. Article 27 stated that the 'Signatory Powers consider it their duty, if a serious dispute threatens to break out between two or more of them, to remind these latter that the Permanent Court is open to them. Consequently, they declare that the fact of reminding the conflicting parties of the provisions of the present Convention, and the advice given to them, in the highest interests of peace, to have recourse to the Permanent Court, can only be regarded as friendly actions': 'Convention (I) for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes' (29 July 1899), *Avalon Project*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu

[9] A. White, *Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White*, vol. 2 (New York: The Century Co., 1905), pp. 339-342.

[10] 'Reservations of the Monroe Doctrine Appearing in Treaties or Conventions to Which the United States Was a Party' (8 March 1919), Box 58, Lester Hood Woolsey Papers [hereafter LHWP], MDLC.


United States policy makers were concerned that Germany would use the conference to secure a port in Morocco, which Lodge strangely described as Germany coming 'uncomfortably close to the Monroe Doctrine.' German activity as distant as West Africa was perceived as part of the wider German challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, transforming United States interest in the conference to 'more than that of a disinterested friend.'[11]

It was the Taft Arbitration Treaties of 1911 that served as the major portents of the treaty fight. The treaties were signed on 3 August 1911 and established systems of bilateral arbitration between the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France.[12] Opposition to the treaties had been quietly voiced before they were signed and within the space of a week the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SCFR), headed by Senator Lodge, submitted a report in which it objected to the treaties on a number of grounds, including the safety of the Monroe Doctrine.[13] During the negotiation process, British officials had been wary about the possibility of the Monroe Doctrine causing difficulties and their apprehensions were justified.[14] In an attempt to preserve the treaties

[11] Lodge to White (5 May 1906), Box 18, Henry White Papers, MDLC.
[12] J. Campbell, 'Taft, Roosevelt, and the Arbitration Treaties of 1911', *Journal of American History*, 53, no. 2 (1966), pp. 279-298; J. Noyes, 'William Howard Taft and the Taft Arbitration Treaties', *Villanova Law Review*, 56, no. 3 (2011), pp. 535-558.
[13] *S. Doc. No. 98*, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1911), Box 18, Chandler Parsons Anderson Papers [hereafter CPAP], MDLC. For statements that objected to the treaties on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine, see: 'The Arbitration Treaties and the Monroe Doctrine', Box 19, CPAP, MDLC; Roosevelt to Mahan (8 June 1911); Roosevelt to Lodge (12 June 1911) in *LTR*, vol. 7, pp. 279-284; Mahan to Roosevelt (19 June 1911) in *LPATM*, vol. 3, pp. 411-412.
[14] For British diplomatic correspondence on the Monroe Doctrine and the treaties, see: Grey to Bryce (11 May 1911), Reel 86, VJBP, WLUO; 'Arbitration Treaty' (Undated), Reel 87, VJBP, WLUO; Grey to Bryce (2 December 1911), Reel 88, VJBP, WLUO; Grey to Bryce (3 April 1911); Bryce to Grey (28 April 1911); Bryce to Grey (26 May 1911); Bryce to Grey (19 December 1911) in G. Gooch and H. Temperley (eds), *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914*, vol. 8, *Arbitration, Neutrality and Security* (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1932), pp. 561-562, 566, 575, 600.

as originally intended, Secretary of State Philander Knox and State Department Counsellor

Figure 4.1: 'The Rocky Road to Peace.'



Source: *Puck* (August 1911)

Chandler Anderson argued that the doctrine was outside the realm of international jurisdiction because it was an enunciation of policy.[15] The Senate was unmoved by these claims and crafted a reservation on the Monroe Doctrine, demanding that it could never be submitted to any form of arbitration.[16] With reservations secured the Senate ratified the treaties on 7 March 1912, yet President William Howard Taft was notably disappointed by the necessity of amendments.[17] *Puck*'s treatment of the incident

[15] Untitled and Undated Memorandum, Box 16; P. Knox, *The Arbitration Treaties Pending between the United States and Great Britain and the United States and France*, Cincinnati (8 November 1911), Box 43, PCKP, MDLC; Untitled Memorandum (8 August 1911), Box 19, CPAP, MDLC.
[16] U.S. Congress. Senate. General Arbitration Treaties, 62nd Cong. 2nd Sess., *Congressional Record* (6 March 1912), pp. 2865-2886; U.S. Congress. Senate. General Arbitration Treaties, 62nd Cong. 2nd Sess., *Congressional Record* (7 March 1912), pp. 2934-2955.
[17] Taft to Bryce (15 March 1912), Reel 87, VJBP, WLOU.

portrayed the doctrine as a stubborn obstacle to the implementation of systems of international arbitration and world peace (Figure 4.1). The treaty fight mimicked much of the discourse surrounding the Taft Arbitration Treaties on a much grander scale and many participants once again argued that the doctrine could not be maintained or enforced in a system of international organisation.

A Defence of the Monroe Doctrine – Unilateralism and Opposition to a League of Nations

The summer of 1915 witnessed the first major drive toward the establishment of an international league of nations with the formation of the League to Enforce Peace (LEP). Headed by former President Taft and prompted by the outbreak of the First World War, the LEP proposed the creation of a league that would settle international disputes and enforce peace among nations via the threat of combined military action and economic sanctions.[18] Critics of internationalism immediately questioned the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine and the LEP's platform, arguing that a league of nations would not only abrogate the doctrine's protective barrier, but bind the United States politically and militarily to European politics. The same criticism was hurled against Wilson when the President advocated the formation of the League of Nations. His opponents emphasised three interlinked facets of the Monroe Doctrine to demonstrate that United States membership would equate to the doctrine's abrogation. The first was the unilateral and distinctly American nature of the doctrine; the second was the doctrine's role as a policy


[18] Ruhl Bartlett's study remains an authoritative text on the LEP: R. Bartlett, *The League to Enforce Peace* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). See also: Wertheim, 'The League That Wasn't', pp. 808-812.

of national self-defence; and the third was the doctrine's insistence on a policy of non-entanglement in European affairs. Prominent political figures and academics gave numerous addresses and wrote a deluge of articles on the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine and international organisation, filling journals, newspapers and literary-political magazines with impassioned arguments against United States membership. The doctrine became a rallying point for anti-League organisations such as the League for the Preservation of American Independence, which proudly displayed its commitment to the doctrine on its official correspondence and membership forms, and it captured the attention of sceptical citizens who sent voluminous amounts of letters to public figures who opposed the League of Nations (Figure 4.2).[19] Furthermore, opponents of the proposal shaped the way in which the League of Nations was described and many critics compared it to the Holy Alliance: the coalition of European powers which the Monroe Doctrine had been originally formed against.[20]

In May 1916, Secretary of State Robert Lansing informed Wilson about this potential clash, outlining his scepticism toward the LEP's insistence on the imposition of international arbitration by force when considering matters of United States national interests and sovereignty. He argued that the United States should not have to limit its independence of action 'to the will of other powers beyond this hemisphere,' nor put

[19] William Borah's papers are an excellent example of this. He claimed that around ninety-eight per cent of his incoming mail expressed an opposition to a league of nations, and the Monroe Doctrine featured consistently. Boxes 76 and 767 through 770 are of particular interest in this regard: William Edgar Borah Papers [hereafter WEBP], MDLC. On the League for the Preservation of American Independence, see: Stone, *Irreconcilables*, pp. 78-81; Ambrosius, *Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition*, pp. 160-161.
[20] See for example: 'The Doctrine or the League', *North American Review*, 210, no. 765 (1919), pp. 147-148; 'The League of Nations Discussion', *The Outlook* (27 August 1919), pp. 629-630; 'Society of Nations or Holy Alliance?', Box 797, WEBP, MDLC. A concerned citizen even wrote to William Borah stating that 'people are not for the League of Nations' because 'they remember the holy alliance': Garber to Borah (3 January 1919), Box 76, WEBP, MDLC.

Figure 4.2: League for the Preservation of American Independence Membership Form



League for the Preservation of American Independence

National Headquarters
ONE MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY
Phone, Gramercy 2168

THE object of The LEAGUE for the PRESERVATION of AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE is to defend from impairment the fundamentals of American policy as expressed by the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, Washington's Farewell Address, and the Monroe Doctrine, and to cause the rejection of the constitution of the League of Nations in any form that abridges our liberties.

Source: Box 214, Albert Beveridge Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

itself in a position in which it would be compelled to send its armed forces to Europe or Asia to settle distant disputes. Lansing preferred a system based on regional organisation, much like the Pan-American pact that Wilson was still working on at the time, and was hesitant to see European nations 'cross the ocean and stop quarrels between two American Republics.' In short, he deemed the LEP 'a serious menace to the Monroe Doctrine.'[21]

This insistence inherent in the LEP was mirrored in Article 10 of the proposed covenant of the League of Nations, which functioned as the main qualm of critics in relation to the Monroe Doctrine.[22] Under Article 10, many Americans believed that the

[21] Lansing to Wilson (25 May 1916) in *FRUS The Lansing Papers 1914-1920*, vol. 1, pp. 16-18.
[22] Article 10 stated that 'The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise

Monroe Doctrine would be subjected to the jurisdiction of the League of Nations rather than the United States alone, granting non-American powers a voice in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere and abrogating a national policy of self-defence. Disputes between American nations, opponents argued, would be taken up in the League and subjected to the will of its member states, whereas the Monroe Doctrine forbade any non-American nations from interfering in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. In acting as a barrier between the Old and New Worlds, the doctrine had served to protect the geopolitical interests of the United States and facilitated its hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, a break from which would be unacceptable. Article 10 was additionally criticised for binding the United States to future conflicts all over the world, contravening James Monroe's advice to avoid wars in which the nation had no interest in.

Senator Lodge emphasised the unilateralism inherent in the Monroe Doctrine and objected to the destruction of what he described as its 'real essence.' It was essential that 'American questions shall be settled by Americans alone' and he insisted that the doctrine could only be interpreted by the United States.[23] The Lion of Idaho, Senator William Borah, tarred league advocates as unpatriotic Americans 'in favor of abandoning the Monroe doctrine and permitting European nations to determine the affairs of the Western continent,' disavowing the possibility of the 'dickering of our sovereignty to

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upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.': 'The Covenant of the League of Nations', *The Avalon Project*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu

[23] H. Lodge, *The Senate and the League of Nations* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), pp. 227-261. Lodge was particularly adept at utilising populist rhetoric in his defence of the Monroe Doctrine, frequently claiming that the American people would object to its destruction. His letters to James Bryce on the subject are typical examples of this: Lodge to Bryce (16 January 1919); (25 March 1919); (8 April 1919), Reel 71, VJBP, WLUO.

foreign powers.'[24] Other critics, such Elihu Root, were more concerned with the self-defensive nature of the doctrine, stressing that the United States would be thrown into new dangers by joining a league and would lose the protective wall that the Monroe Doctrine had for so long maintained.[25] Former Senator Albert Beveridge argued that one major pitfall of the League was the fact that it might one day permit Germany to have a say in American affairs.[26] Fortunately for Beveridge, he believed that no 'natural sentiment' truly existed for international organisation and that 'the instinct and the good sense of the people are in favor of maintaining our traditional American policy and against this and every other attempt to overthrow it.'[27]

Former Secretary of War Henry Stimson drew upon the ideas inherent in the Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in his criticism. Whilst Article 10 prohibited territorial gains through aggression, it made no reference to the peaceful acquisition of territory, which had become a far greater concern to Americans since the turn of the century. For Stimson, non-American control of Latin America via economic or demographic means was the 'danger most to be feared,' because rival designs in the Western Hemisphere did not normally start with military action, but from 'the proposal to acquire a coaling station or an innocent looking island within strategic distance of the mouths of the Panama Canal or even from the granting of a railway concession within a

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[24] Borah to Gilkey (30 December 1918), Box 76, WEBP, MDLC; Borah to Munsey (19 April 1919), Box 769, WEBP, MDLC.
[25] E. Root, 'Letter of Honorable Elihu Root to Honorable Will H. Hays Regarding the Covenant of the League of Nations', *American Journal of International Law*, 13, no. 3 (1919), p. 591. For further comments on the self-defensive nature of the doctrine, see: D. Hill, 'The Betrayal of the Monroe Doctrine', *North American Review*, 212, no. 780 (1920), pp. 586-591; W. Shepherd, 'The Monroe Doctrine Reconsidered', *Political Science Quarterly*, 39, no. 1 (1924), pp. 35-40; H. Taft, 'The Monroe Doctrine and a World Organization', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 96 (1921), pp. 42-43.
[26] A. Beveridge, 'Pitfalls of a "League of Nations"', *North American Review*, 209, no. 760 (1919), p. 312.
[27] Beveridge to Bauer (13 March 1919), Box 214, AJBP, MDLC.

strategic area.' The future of the American republics relied on keeping the Western Hemisphere 'as free as possible from the extension into it of the strategic systems of more thickly populated powerful Europe.' Under unilateral control, the Monroe Doctrine could be utilised to prevent any kind of challenge to United States hegemony, whereas the League of Nations would restrict this to purely military aggression.[28]

Stimson's comment on innocent looking islands was likely a reference to the Danish West Indies. The United States officially acquired the islands on 31 March 1917, mere days before declaring war on Germany, renaming them the United States Virgin Islands, however, unilateralists employed them as a visceral example of the dangers international organisation posed to the Monroe Doctrine. Prior to their acquisition, the LEP was criticised because its platform would prevent the United States from objecting to their purchase by any other nation. The Executive Secretary of the LEP, Theodore Marburg, received an anxious letter on the subject in April 1915, protesting the fact that the United States would have to wait for a league to make a decision on the island's purchase by a European nation before it could resist their acquisition and defend the Monroe Doctrine.[29] According to another member of the LEP, George Grafton Wilson, this objection was one of the most frequently raised criticisms of the LEP.[30] The islands were valued so highly by the United States because of their strategic location. Secretary Lansing best summarised their importance in a report to Wilson, arguing that because of the security of the Panama Canal, 'the possibility of a change of sovereignty of any of the

[28] Stimson to Hays (18 February 1919), Box 137, ERP, MDLC.
[29] Foulke to Marburg (24 April 1915) in J. Latané (ed.), *Development of the League of Nations Idea: Documents and Correspondence of Theodore Marburg*, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1932), pp. 36-37.
[30] G. Wilson, 'The Monroe Doctrine and the Program of the League to Enforce Peace', *World Peace Foundation Pamphlet Series*, 4, no. 4 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1916), pp. 9-10.

islands now under foreign jurisdiction [in the Caribbean] is of grave concern to the United States.' Crucially, because of the need to maintain the Monroe Doctrine, Americans ought to 'look with disfavor upon the transfer of sovereignty of the Danish West Indies to any other European nations.[31] The context of the First World War threatened to manifest a worst-case scenario in which Germany might attempt to acquire the islands and historian Christopher Capozzola argues that the war directly facilitated a renewed drive to acquire the islands, ensuring the spread of United States hegemony in the Caribbean and combatting the possibility of a German threat.[32]

Yet even after the islands' acquisition, unilateralists discussed their fate in a counter-factual universe in which a league of nations had existed. On the Senate floor, Borah argued that if Germany had purchased or gained the islands before the United States, and if the United States desired to object on the grounds of maintaining the Monroe Doctrine, then it would be left at the mercy of a league's decision. Should the fictitious league decide that Germany was within its rights to purchase the islands, then the United States would be unable to object to this abrogation of the Monroe Doctrine without facing dire consequences. 'I thank God,' Borah summarised, '[that] the people still vote and [that] they will control the policy of this Nation in matters which touch their vital interests and involve the security of this nation.'[33]

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[31] Lansing to Wilson (22 January 1917) in *FRUS 1917*, pp. 692-694.
[32] C. Capozzola, 'The United States Empire', in R. Gerwarth and E. Manela (eds), *Empires at War: 1911-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 239-240. Sentiment in favour of acquiring the Galapagos Islands still bubbled below the surface too, although the government remained disinterested. See for example the revealing conclusion of the following article: G. McBride, 'The Galapagos Islands', *Geographic Review*, 6, no. 3 (1918), pp. 229-239.
[33] U.S. Congress. Senate. League of Nations, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess., *Congressional Record* (6 December 1918), pp. 189-199.


For Americans who interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as a facilitator of United States hegemony and a policy of national defence, international organisation thus equated to a destruction of its core principles. As a cartoon from the *Hartford Courant* aptly demonstrated, the ghost of James Monroe haunted the United States during the treaty fight as a reminder that his doctrine had served the nation's interests well in the past (Figure 4.3). These Americans perceived a foreign policy of unhindered unilateralism a as the only viable post-war approach toward international relations if the United States intended to maintain hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, the doctrine had kept the nation out of unnecessary conflicts in the past and was worth protecting from systems of international organisation to ensure the development of an unfettered, unilateral foreign policy.

Of course, it must be noted that the very act of United States belligerency called the sanctity of the Monroe Doctrine into question, as Wilson seemingly ignored Monroe's advice by becoming entangled in a war that originated in Europe. Congressmen such as Harold Knutson of Minnesota who opposed belligerency drew attention to this disjuncture in their protests, proclaiming that belligerency was a path to 'entangling alliances which might at a future date endanger the Monroe doctrine and embroil us in another holocaust such as they now have in Poland and Flanders.'[34] Wilson personally believed that belligerency did not equate to the abrogation of the Monroe Doctrine, informing Elihu Root that it merely planted the doctrine 'more securely than ever upon the very principles upon which the world is invited to act,' however, this disjuncture

[34] U.S. Congress. House. Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., *Appendix to the Congressional Record* (5 April 1917), pp. 22-23. For similar comments, see: U.S. Congress. House. War With Germany, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., *Appendix to the Congressional Record* (5 April 1917), p. 57 and p. 73.

serves to emphasise the paradoxical manner in which the doctrine was invoked during the treaty fight and the period of belligerency.[35] The fluid and variable meaning of the doctrine explains how the same foreign policy tradition was so readily invoked as a basis for three different approaches to post-world world order.

Figure 4.3: 'Wakeful Nights'



Source: *New York Tribune* (13 July 1919)

[35] Wilson to Root (7 April 1917) in *PWW*, vol. 42, p. 6. One of Wilson's former students, journalist David Lawrence, advised Wilson to mention in his address to Congress that the Monroe Doctrine would remain the cardinal feature of United States foreign policy despite the declaration of war, however, Wilson did not heed the advice: Lawrence to Wilson (31 March 1917) in *PWW*, vol. 41, pp. 512-514.

A Monroe Doctrine for the World – Global Organisation and the League of Nations

On 22 January 1917, President Wilson addressed the Senate and put forward his vision of a post-war world order. He called for both 'peace without victory' and the establishment of a 'concert of power' to prevent further wars, stating that the elements of peace 'must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of American governments.' Wilson believed that the current conflict had been caused by the machinations of Old World politics and that the world needed to adopt 'American principles' and 'American policies' in order to ensure peace. As such, Wilson proposed that the nations of the world 'should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.'[36] For Wilson, the Monroe Doctrine had permitted the nations of Latin America to develop their own form of self-governance and the President believed that if its principles were extended to the entire world, forming the basis of a league of nations, then all nations could experience the same extent of self-governance. There would be no need for any more entangling alliances, governments would be decided by the consent of the governed, freedom of the seas would be ensured and armed forces would no longer be used as an instrument of aggression.

Wilson's reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine is telling of the way in which he conceptualised the conduct of international diplomacy. In his intellectual history of United States foreign relations, David Milne argues that United States policy makers can

[36] 'An Address to the Senate' (22 January 1917) in *PWW*, vol. 40, pp. 533-539.

be divided into two discernible groups: those who approached diplomacy as an art, and those who approached diplomacy as a science. Individuals that were drawn to the study of history, philosophy, and literature, such as Alfred Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt or Henry Cabot Lodge, considered diplomacy an art and were reluctant to 'depart from observed historical precedent,' whereas figures such as Wilson, trained in the social sciences, were more likely to see the world as 'makeable' and would attempt to 'transcend history rather than operate within its observed confines.'[37] Anti-league voices couched their interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in a discourse of tradition and precedent during the treaty fight, even though it was far removed from the original doctrine of 1823, yet the manner in which Wilson dramatically reinterpreted the Monroe Doctrine, first in terms of regional and subsequently global organisation, demonstrated his belief that national core values were 'makeable' and open to significant renegotiation. Drawing upon the notion of self-determinism inherent in the doctrine, he positioned its global extension as an essential component of United States national security.

Wilson's progressive re-envisioning of the Monroe Doctrine was, of course, fundamentally hypocritical. The President called for universal self-governance whilst the United States continued to paternalistically occupy various 'little' nations because they had been deemed unable to effectively govern their own affairs.[38] If Wilson truly desired to adhere to his own global extension of the Monroe Doctrine, then he would be forced to grant the Philippines its independence and withdraw troops from Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. However, this hypocrisy did not plague the notion of a global

[37] Milne, *Worldmaking*, p. 16.
[38] Michael Cullinane and Alex Goodall outline that rather than repudiating dollar diplomacy, Wilson 'exchanged Taft's policy of substituting dollars for bullets with a policy of dollars *and* bullets': Cullinane and Goodall, *The Open Door Era*, p. 59.

Monroe Doctrine that was formulated primarily to stand in a direct challenge to unilateralists and critics of international organisation. Rather than amounting to the destruction of the doctrine's core principles, Wilson believed that international organisation would extend them to the world for the benefit of all nations, reinterpreting that doctrine as a facilitator of global organisation. The President found a great deal of support in this reinterpretation among the members of the LEP. Whilst Abbott Lawrence Lowell found much to fault in the recent history of the Monroe Doctrine's application, he too believed that it had protected Latin American sovereignty, which made it an ideal base upon which to build a new international order. Within a league of nations, the doctrine's principles would be upheld by all member nations, making it a much more effective policy than it could ever hope to be under the United States alone (Figure 4.4).[39] Hamilton Holt similarly lauded the doctrine's ability to promote self-determined democracy and argued that it must be universalised to keep 'every democracy safe and protected against subversion of its government.'[40] George Grafton Wilson advocated the transformation of the 'narrow' Monroe Doctrine into a 'broad' application that would facilitate the unfettered development of democracy, essentially preventing nations from interfering in the internal affairs of others. He additionally criticised unilateralists for attempting to exempt the doctrine from international arbitration. Whilst the United States had secured specific reservations concerning the Monroe Doctrine in The Hague Conventions and the Taft Arbitration Treaties, the so-called Bryan Treaties of 1913-1914 had no such clauses, meaning that the doctrine was technically already subject to

[39] A. Lowell, 'The League to Enforce Peace', *North American Review*, 205, no. 734 (1917), pp. 29-30. See also: Lowell to Bryce (4 April 1919), Reel 72, VJBP, WLUO.
[40] H. Holt, 'The League to Enforce Peace', *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York*, 7, no. 2 (1917), pp. 68-69.

international arbitration.[41] Surely, Theodore Marburg argued, the United States could 'afford to submit questions involving even the Monroe Doctrine for investigation before going to war over them.'[42]

Figure 4.4: 'Why All This Fuss Over Article Ten?'



Source: *Cornell Daily Sun* (19 November 1920)

[41] Wilson, 'Monroe Doctrine and League to Enforce Peace', p. 6; G. Wilson, 'The Monroe Doctrine after the War', *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York*, 7, no. 2 (1917), pp. 297-302. On the Bryan Treaties, see: 'The Bryan Peace Treaties', *The American Journal of International Law*, 7, no. 4 (1913), pp. 823-829.

[42] T. Marburg, *League of Nations: Its Principles Examined*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1919), pp. 44-45. For similar references to the Bryan Treaties, see: H. Taft 'The Monroe Doctrine' in *The Covenanter: An American Exposition of the League of Nations* (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1919), p. 160; Plantz to Borah (18 February 1919), Box 770, WEBP, MDLC.

Influential figures such as former President Taft and his brother Henry also threw their lot in with Wilson's reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine and it was popular among a wide variety of academics.[43] Historian John Lanaté was convinced that, because of developments in the last twenty years, the time was at hand when 'we must either abandon the Monroe Doctrine altogether, or resort to an alliance to maintain it, or to some form of world federation to extend it.' He believed it was futile to cling to the traditions of the past and that the old order in which the doctrine had been proclaimed had long passed, even though 'some of our representatives in the halls of Congress are reluctant to recognize the fact.' Lanaté associated this extension of the Monroe Doctrine with 'guaranteeing to free states the right of self-development,' claiming that on no other basis could a league be established.[44] Even Republican Senator George Norris, one of the Irreconcilables, recalled in his memoirs that the 'possibility that American membership in the League might endanger the Monroe Doctrine did not frighten me.' He informed some of his colleagues that 'the right kind of league would make the Monroe Doctrine obsolete and unnecessary. If the League proved to be successful and received the genuine and honest support of all nations, the conditions that had inspired the Monroe Doctrine would not appear.'[45] Just as the unilateralists had done, Wilson and his fellow advocates of global organisation interpreted the Monroe Doctrine in a way that positioned it at the heart of their vision of the post-war world order. To Americans who took this position in

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[43] 'World Peace Debate' in F. Gerrity (ed.), *The Collected Works of William Howard Taft*, vol. 7, *Taft Papers on League of Nations* [hereafter *CWWHT*], (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003), pp. 109-110; 'The League of Nations' in H. W. Taft, *Occasional Papers and Addresses of an American Lawyer* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1920), pp. 134-139; C. Becker, 'The Monroe Doctrine and the War', *Minnesota History Bulletin*, 2, no. 2 (1917), p. 67; R. Babson, 'Drawing Together the Americas', *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York*, 7, no. 2 (1917), pp. 255-256.
[44] J. Lanaté, 'The Monroe Doctrine and the American Policy of Isolation in Relation to a Just and Durable Peace', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 72 (1917), pp. 101-108.
[45] G. Norris, *Fighting Liberal* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1945), pp. 204-205.

the treaty fight, the maintenance of the doctrine demanded global organisation in order for its role as a defender of self-governance to be fulfilled.

Additional comments are worth making regarding this reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Given its global scope, it is surprising to find that very few individuals from outside the United States advocated Wilson's vision. Whilst League advocates in Britain, such as James Bryce, referred to the need for 'a higher, nobler Monroe Doctrine for the whole world,' most foreign nations did not seem particularly interested in adopting the concept.[46] Occasional messages of support were sent to the President from Latin American diplomats and politicians, although these were likely diplomatic niceties.[47] However, one striking reference came from India. As Erez Manela notes, in late 1918 the Indian Home Rule League published a pamphlet titled *Self-Determination for India* which, among other demands, highlighted that Indian nationalists wanted the protective values of the Monroe Doctrine for themselves. This expression of advocacy was, of course, aimed at capturing Wilson's support for Indian self-determination; however, it further solidified the association between the Monroe Doctrine and self-governance.[48]

Certain proponents of global organisation made little effort to frame the Monroe Doctrine in global terms and were even happy to see it rendered redundant. These Americans believed that the predicted benefits of international organisation would far outweigh the need to maintain the doctrine, making it a necessary sacrifice for greater

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[46] *New York Times* (8 November 1917), p. 12.
[47] See for example a letter from the Columbian minister to the United States: Betancourt to Wilson (24 January 1917) in *PWW*, vol. 41, pp. 8-10.
[48] E. Manela, *Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 163-164. See also the comments of former Labour Party Leader Arthur Henderson in: *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (14 June 1918), p. 2.

aims. In a public interview, former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan argued that whilst it was 'not stated with sufficient clearness that the Monroe Doctrine is preserved' within the League covenant, any imperfections of the League should not act as a barrier to its acceptance.[49] Virginia Gildersleeve, the Dean of Barnard College, made similar comments on the Monroe Doctrine, arguing that 'unless some concessions are made … orderly government of the world is impossible.'[50] Senator Borah received occasional letters challenging his position on the doctrine, outlining that world peace was worth more to the nation than preserving the old doctrine.[51] In the words of George Wilson, 'if the American policy as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine will not stand the test of investigation and consideration', then it was 'time for the United States to be determining why it should longer give to the Doctrine its support.'[52]

Regional Organisation: The Monroe Doctrine and an American League of Nations

For Pan-Americanists, the treaty fight and United States belligerency presented an opportunity from the nation to solidify inter-American relations and develop an internationalist policy limited to the Americas. Rather than advocating or outright objecting to global organisation, United States Pan-Americanists promoted the establishment of an American league of nations, placing their faith in the growth of Pan-American sentiment and finding support from a number of leading Latin American political figures. They believed that if the Monroe Doctrine was Pan-Americanised, it

[49] 'Bryan Interview' (Undated), Box 50, William Jennings Bryan Papers, MDLC.
[50] V. Gildersleeve, *The Relationship of Nations* (New York: League to Enforce Peace, 1918).
[51] Radley to Borah (6 December 1918), Box 76, WEBP, MDLC; Guyer to Borah (26 August 1919); Hodgson to Borah (20 February 1919), Box 770, WEBP, MDLC.
[52] Wilson, 'Monroe Doctrine and the League to Enforce Peace', p. 10.

would serve as an ideal basis for regional organisation and that the Pan American Union could be adapted and expanded to serve as the foundations for the political infrastructure of the future league.

After the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917, several Latin American nations followed suit. Just as the neutrality of the American republics in 1914 was perceived as evidence of Pan-American unity, so too were the various war declarations.[53] For example, Bernard Baruch, a member of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, noted that mutual belligerency would serve to unite the American republics in defence against a common threat.[54] When Brazil revoked its neutrality in the summer of 1917, its Ambassador, Domicio da Gama, wrote to Secretary Lansing that Brazil had recognised that one of the belligerents was 'a constituent portion of the American Continent and that we are bound to that belligerent by traditional friendship and the same sentiment in the defense of the vital interests of America.' Da Gama linked the conflict to the Monroe Doctrine, arguing that its 'true character' would be revealed as a war-time policy of 'continental solidarity' brought the American republics together.[55] The German Peril in Latin America maintained a hold upon United States policy makers during belligerency and a young John Foster Dulles warned Secretary Lansing, his uncle, that the German colony at San José might facilitate Costa Rica being 'thrown into the hands of the Germans' and becoming 'a center of German activity.'[56] John Barrett, the Director General of the PAU, was similarly concerned about German activity now that the two nations were at war, expressing distaste for the

[53] Rinke, *Latin America*, p. 109.
[54] Baruch to Barrett (4 June 1917), Box 42, JBP, MDLC.
[55] Da Gama to Lansing (4 June 1917), *FRUS 1917 Supplement The World War*, vol. 1, pp. 294-295.
[56] 'Political and Economic Conditions in Costa Rica, As Bearing to the Question of Recognizing the Government of General Tinoco' (21 May 1917), Reel 1, JFDP, PU.

'insidious' presence of German propaganda throughout Latin America.[57] Now, more than ever, the American republics needed to unite and defend their shared values against German militarism (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5: 'Interpreting the Monroe Doctrine'



Source: *Literary Digest* (9 June 1917)

Yet it is worth mentioning the expectancy that many United States citizens held regarding Latin American belligerency. In March 1918, Elihu Root expressed his frustration at the fact that Uruguay and Argentina had not yet joined the war alongside the United States in a letter, claiming that conflict was 'the one opportunity to act in time for the preservation of real independence by the American republics both South and

[57] Barrett to Martin (10 June 1918), Box 44, JBP, MDLC. On German propaganda in Latin America during the war, see: Rinke, *First World War*, p. 119.

North.'[58] This expectancy was even implicit in a diagram published in the *New York Tribune* during July 1918 that listed the belligerency status of all the American republics (Figure 4.6). Those republics that had not declared war or severed diplomatic relations with German were listed as 'still neutral,' implying that they should have already joined their sister nations many months ago.

Figure 4.6: 'South and Central America in the Great War – How They Line Up'



Source: *New York Tribune* (14 July 1918)

[58] Root to Hill (5 March 1918), Box 136, ERP, MDLC.

Barrett continued to be one of the most vocal advocates of the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine during the treaty fight and he dedicated much of his public utterances to bolstering support for an American league of nations. He believed that the war was bringing an end to old animosities between the United States and Latin America and it followed that at the close of the conflict the Monroe Doctrine needed to be Pan-Americanised.[59] Whilst the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine was one of Barrett's primary goals, he also desired to expand the PAU's political role and the treaty fight offered him an ideal rostrum from which to argue that the PAU ought to be transformed into an American league of nations. Writing for the *Journal of Race Development* in 1918, he proclaimed that through the PAU, the American republics were 'showing the way to the world for international cooperation and a league of nations which shall preserve forever that peace which all men and all nations now hope will be inaugurated at the conclusion of this war.'[60] As the Director of the Massachusetts Peace Society, Jay Hudson, informed Barrett in 1915, Pan-Americanists believed that if there had been a Pan European Union similar to the PAU, then the war might have been avoided in the first place.[61]

In December 1918, Barrett formed a more coherent plan for an American league and sent his suggestions directly to President Wilson. Unfortunately, Wilson did not approve of regional organisation any longer and remained committed to a vision of peace via the establishment of the League of Nations.[62] Barrett looked at the extent to which the

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[59] J. Barrett, 'The War and the New America – The New Pan America', *The World Court*, 3 (1917), pp. 564-565; J. Barrett, 'What the War Has Done to the Monroe Doctrine', *Current Opinion*, 65, no. 5 (1918), pp. 291-293.
[60] J. Barrett, 'Pan American Outlook', *Journal of Race Development*, 9, no. 2 (1918), pp. 114-119.
[61] Hudson to Barrett (29 March 1915), Box 38, JBP, MDLC.
[62] Barrett to Tumulty (3 December 1918), Box 46, JBP, MDLC.

United States was divided over the issue of international organisation and released a statement outlining that it was an ideal opportunity to consider the formation of a Pan-American league as an alternative, one that would 'have the authority to initiate mediation or arbitration of any dispute between two American governments and to summon all the others to support such action with their moral influence.' Such a league, he argued, would 'make peace forever permanent on the Western Hemisphere, avoid the interference of Europe and Asia in American affairs and preserve the Monroe Doctrine.'[63] The Director General continued to stubbornly press Wilson on the matter during the Paris Peace Conference, asking him to make a public statement on the results the PAU had achieved as an embryonic regional league of nations.[64] Surely, he asked, if it was 'impossible to secure the ratification of the covenant except by meeting the demands of those who feel the need to protect the Monroe Doctrine, then is it not possible that this thought of developing a stronger and more practical Pan American League is deserving of attention?'[65] Unsurprisingly, Wilson was unconvinced and stated that 'it would be a pity to divide the world into two organizations.'[66]

Barrett thus sought other avenues of advancement, submitting his proposal to Senators and the press in April 1919, referring to the Monroe Doctrine as a 'solution to the League of Nations problem.'[67] Thomas Sterling responded favourably, arguing that if the Treaty of Versailles was rejected, a regional league should be created to deal with American questions and the Monroe Doctrine, concluding that 'one of the greatest benefits arising out of the present discussion of the proposed constitution for a League of

[63] 'Statement of John Barrett' (22 December 1918), Box 46, JBP, MDLC.
[64] Barrett to Lansing (12 February 1919); Barrett to Tumulty (28 February 1919), Box 46, JBP, MDLC.
[65] Barrett to Wilson (4 March 1919), Box 47, JBP, MDLC.
[66] Barrett to Tumulty (26 March 1919), Box 47, JBP, MDLC.
[67] *New York Times* (4 April 1919), p. 2; 'Statement of John Barrett' (3 April 1919), Box 47, JBP, MDLC.

Nations is the information which the people of the United States are receiving in regard to the Monroe Doctrine and the great interest they are taking therein.'[68] However, many other replies were less appreciative. Henry Myers favoured a reservation on the doctrine within the League of Nations covenant rather than the formation of a regional league, and Lodge argued that the question of the Monroe Doctrine must first be considered by the Senate in relation to the League of Nations before any plan for its preservation could be discussed.[69]

Unfortunately for Barrett, this campaign proved to be disastrous for his reputation, contributing to his resignation and disappearance from public life. Submitting his resignation in the autumn of 1919 and stepping down officially in September 1920, Barrett claimed that he had to resign for financial reasons; however, in reality he had proven himself a continual nuisance to the Wilson administration. As historian Salvatore Prisco outlines in his biography of Barrett, he had continuously clashed with the President over the role of the PAU in political affairs and alienated himself from the State Department through his various schemes. The disfavour which Barrett found himself in was viewed as problematic by the Latin American representatives on the governing board of the PAU, who worried that his reputation was obstructing favourable treatment from the State Department. The fact that he pursued initiatives concerning the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine and the establishment of an American league of nations in a unilateral fashion was an additional cause for complaint.[70]

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[68] Sterling to Barrett (28 April 1919), Box 47, JBP, MDLC.
[69] Myers to Barrett (11 April 1919); Lodge to Barrett (30 April 1919), Box 47, JBP, MDLC.
[70] Prisco, *John Barrett*, pp. 85-90.

Despite these personal complaints against Barrett from Latin American representatives, the notion of a Pan-Americanised Monroe Doctrine at the centre of an American league was still largely popular among them. South American diplomats, such as Ignacio Calderon of Bolivia, Francisco Varela of Peru, and Rómulo Naón of Argentina all advocated these designs vocally.[71] They were additionally popular within academic circles, gaining support from figures such as Nicholas Murray Butler, Henry Ballantine and George Blakeslee; although these academics stressed that the past friction caused by imperialistic interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine had to be overcome.[72] Even Lodge toyed with the idea, although he proposed that as part of this dual league system the United States would be 'in control' of the American system 'under the Monroe Doctrine.'[73]

Talk of regional organisation briefly shone a spotlight on Canada's relationship with the Monroe Doctrine once again. Although Barrett had previously advocated Canadian membership to the PAU during several trips to Canada in the early 1910s and had received little favourable response, he was reinvigorated by the treaty fight.[74] During a visit to Toronto in November 1917, Barrett re-emphasised his desire to invite Canada to join the PAU, having proposed to the rest of the Governing Board that the issue be

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[71] I. Calderon, 'The Pan-American Doctrine' in *Report of the Twenty-Second Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration: May 17th, 18th and 19th 1916* (Mohonk Lake: Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, 1916), pp. 179-180; I. Calderon, 'The Pan-American Union and the Monroe Doctrine', *Journal of International Relations*, 10, no. 2 (1919), pp. 133-137; *Washington Post* (9 February 1919), p. 28; F. Varela, *Early Efforts in Both Americas Towards the Establishment of a League of Nations* (Washington: s.n., 1919); R. Naón, *The European War and Pan Americanism* (New York: American Association for International Conciliation, 1919).

[72] Cosmos [N. Butler], *The Basis of Durable Peace* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917), pp. 108-110; G. Blakeslee, 'True Pan-Americanism: A Policy of Coöperation with the Other American Republics', *The Journal of Race Development*, 7, no. 3 (1917), pp. 342-360; H. Ballantine, 'Shall the United States Join a League to Enforce Peace?', *The Advocate of Peace* (February 1917), p. 55.

[73] Quoted in Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, pp. 316-317.

[74] P. McKenna, *Canada and the OAS: From Dilettante to Full Partner* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), pp. 66-67.

discussed at the next Pan American Conference. Whilst Canada was not an American republic, Barrett believed that some sort of honorary membership ought to be granted because the war was strengthening hemispheric solidarity and Canada was fighting for the same causes as the United States and the belligerent Latin American nations. It would be fitting, he continued, that after the war 'all the other countries of America should invite Canada to be a potent factor in their continued solidarity.' To support his suggestion, Barrett provided proof that Canadian membership had been contemplated for some time. When the new Pan American Building was finished in 1910, the Governing Board ordered that 'a chair should be made carrying the coat of arms and the name of Canada to be occupied by some future representative of that country who might sit at the Governing Board table!' Barrett believed that this act intimated the invitation to Canada and that the American republics needed to 'prepare to make it real and develop for the first time in history a perfect Pan American Union.'[75]

Through Barrett's personal persistence and the recent growth of Pan-American sentiment, advocacy of regional organisation was presented as a viable alternative during the treaty fight that represented a middle ground in terms of the extent to which the United States ought to embrace internationalism. Like unilateralists, Pan-Americanists desired to remain removed from distant affairs, however, they believed that inter-American cooperation via regional organisation, rather than regional hegemony, was the most appropriate path for the United States to follow.

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[75] 'Pan America and Pan Americanism: Their Mighty Meaning to Canada' (26 November 1917), Box 98, JBP, MDLC.

Recognition, Reservation, and Rejection – Article 21 and the Trichotomy of the Treaty Fight

When Wilson left for Paris in December 1918 with the American Commission to Negotiate Peace (ACNP), he remained committed to the idea that the League would extend the doctrine to the world. As such, he initially saw little need to refer to the Monroe Doctrine within the first draft of the League covenant despite critics demanding some form of reservation. Certain members of the ACNP, however, were concerned about the hold the Monroe Doctrine might have upon the American people and attempted to convince Wilson that a reservation or some sort of clause relating to the doctrine was wise. In the weeks prior to the conference, Lansing advised Wilson in a number of memoranda to consider the doctrine's position in relation to the League, primarily because his opponents would continue to utilise it against his cause. Every effort had to be exhausted 'to make public opinion unanimous and to deprive the opponents of the League of the plausible arguments of unconstitutionality and abandonment of national policies.' He additionally suggested that Wilson should try and frame the League covenant negatively, rather than filling it with positive guarantees, on the grounds that a negatively framed covenant would pose less of a challenge to existing policies such as the Monroe Doctrine.[76] This latter argument was supported by David Hunter Miller, a legal advisor of the ACNP who made significant contributions to the drafting of the Treaty of Versailles. Miller was keen on developing a reservation on the Monroe Doctrine because he was 'not in favor of having guarantees of Latin-America made by non-American

[76] 'Memorandum on League of Nations and U.S. Traditional Policies' (18 December 1918), Reel 1, RLP, MDLC; R. Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), pp. 48-50.

Powers.'[77] Miller subsequently informed the President of his views on the matter, arguing that the doctrine needed to be 'thrown into the balance' because it had permitted the nations of Latin America to develop their own form of civilisation and ideals. Whilst Miller argued that Latin American development could be criticised as 'slow' and 'faulty,' it was still a form of self-determined development which had been enabled by the Monroe Doctrine.[78]

Wilson refused to heed this advice and there was no reference to the Monroe Doctrine in the first draft of the League of Nations covenant. Unsurprisingly, when Wilson returned to the United States in February 1919 to present the draft, the Monroe Doctrine continued to be a point of contention. Upon his return to Paris in March, Wilson received a string of telegrams from Taft in which he strongly advised Wilson to draft a reservation on the Monroe Doctrine, claiming that a suitable reservation 'would probably carry the treaty.'[79] The ACNP thus occupied itself with forming a Monroe Doctrine clause throughout March. Charles Thompson, an American journalist at the conference, recorded in his diary that because of this anxiety over the Monroe Doctrine a number of possible amendments were being worked on 'by almost everyone in the American commission.'[80] Stephan Bonsal also recorded in March that Wilson 'has been to see [Edward] House twice since his return, and the subject of these conferences is how best

[77] D. Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. 1 (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1928), pp. 29-30.
[78] Miller, *Covenant*, vol. 1, pp. 45-48.
[79] Taft to Wilson (18 March 1919); 'Memorandum for the President' (19 March 1919); Taft to Tumulty (28 March 1919) in *CWWHT*, vol. 7, pp. 295-299.
[80] C. Thompson, *The Peace Conference Day by Day: A Presidential Pilgrimage Leading to the Discovery of Europe* (New York: Brentano's, 1920), pp. 257-258.

to introduce the Monroe Doctrine reservation, demanded by the Senate, into what had been hopefully regarded as a closed covenant, signed and sealed.'[81]

What made matters more complicated was the attitude of other delegations present at the conference. Whilst the British delegation did not oppose the inclusion of a Monroe Doctrine clause in theory, Seth Tillman argues that Prime Minister Lloyd George 'undertook to exploit the President's domestic embarrassment for purposes of securing an Anglo-American agreement on naval armaments,' creating an 'artificial opposition to the Monroe Doctrine.'[82] Edward House worried that this resistance might wreck any chance of a Monroe Doctrine reservation; however, he took it upon himself to convince Wilson that it was necessary, insisting that the President 'force Lloyd George to come to our way of thinking.'[83] The French delegation was just as troublesome. On 10 April at the Fourteenth Meeting of the Commission on the League of Nations, Wilson aimed to finalise the position of a Monroe Doctrine reservation in the covenant, proposing that the clause be attached to Article 10 as an amendment. However, the French delegation was particularly vocal in its objections, demanding a clear definition of the doctrine be given. What followed was quite unexpected. Miller recorded that Wilson 'became very much stirred,' his agitation visible in the quivering of his lower lip. Unwilling to take any more criticism from the French, he gave an impromptu speech which Miller described as 'perhaps the most impressive speech I ever heard.' The President outlined that the Monroe Doctrine had been declared in the face of European absolutism, demanding that

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[81] S. Bonsal, *Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1946), p. 263.
[82] S. Tillman, *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 280-289. See also: A. Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931* (New York: Viking, 2014), pp. 269-270.
[83] (27 March 1919), Diaries, Volume 7, EMHP, YUL, ff. 112-114.

such absolutism should not spread to the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine was, therefore, a forerunner to the League of Nations, and through its belligerency the United States had sought to defend its principles. Was the United States, Wilson asked, to be denied the recognition that it was the first nation to uphold these principles? Were the other nations going to withhold from the United States the 'small gift of a few words' which state the fact that it had been devoted to the principles of liberty and independence that were to be consecrated in the League of Nations for the past century? The covenant was, Wilson concluded, the highest tribute to the Monroe Doctrine because it was an extension of its principles, and a reservation was nothing more than proclaiming that the doctrine was not inconsistent with the covenant.[84]

House similarly recorded in his diary that the meeting was 'one of the stormiest meetings we have had at all.' He criticised the stubbornness of the French delegates, referring to their complaints as one of the most 'stupid performances I have ever witnessed.' House recorded that Wilson's speech was 'impassioned' and 'full of eloquence and good sense,' convincing everyone present except for the French.[85] At the conclusion of Wilson's address, the American delegates believed that the Monroe Doctrine reservation had been passed, being transferred from Article 10 to 21. However, as the next day began, it transpired that the French still objected to the reservation. Wilson remained frustrated and outlined his annoyance at the suspicion cast upon the Monroe Doctrine, emphasising that the reservation was made to 'relieve a state of mind

[84] Miller, *Covenant*, vol. I, pp. 442-450. See also: 'Minuets of a Meeting of the League of Nations Commission' (10 April 1919) in *PWW*, vol. 57, pp. 218-232.
[85] (11 April 1919), Diaries, Volume 7, EMHP, YUL, f. 150.

and misapprehension on the other side of the water.'[86] House recorded that the American delegates were 'not in a humor to take anything except what we wanted' and as such the reservation was finally accepted. It had been, House reflected, 'an exhibition of Anglo Saxon tenacity.'[87] The Monroe Doctrine was now formally recognised in the League of Nations covenant, with Article 21 stating that: 'Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.'[88]

In the United States the response to Article 21 was largely divided. League advocates felt that the reservation had not only met the demands of the Senate and protected the Monroe Doctrine but enshrined it. Wilson personally defended Article 21 upon his return, attesting its value before the SCFR and during his Western tour.[89] Vice President Thomas Marshall and Democrat Senators Key Pittman and Claude Swanson all voiced their approval of the reservation, arguing that it had suitably taken care of the problem and Lowell described the doctrine as occupying a 'very favorable position.'[90] ACNP delegate Henry White defended the reservation's terminology, arguing that if it

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[86] Miller, *Covenant*, vol. 1, pp. 453-460; 'Remarks on the Monroe Doctrine' (11 April 1919) in *PWW*, vol. 57, pp. 266-268.

[87] (12 April 1919), Diaries, Volume 7, EMHP, YUL, f. 151. It is worth noting that even up to the very day in which the Monroe Doctrine reservation was agreed upon, Taft and Lowell were sending Wilson telegrams which stated that without the reservation the treaty would fail: Taft and Lowell to Wilson (10 April 1919); Taft and Lowell to Wilson (12 April 1919) in *PWW*, vol. 57, pp. 233; 315-316.

[88] 'The Covenant of the League of Nations', *The Avalon Project*, http://avalon.law.yale.edu

[89] For the SCFR meeting see: 'A Conversation with Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee' (19 August 1919) in *PWW*, vol. 62, pp. 339-411.

[90] T. Marshall, 'America, the Nations and the League', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 84, (1919), p. 196; U.S. Congress. Senate. Address by Senator Key Pittman, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* (10 June 1919), pp. 894-897; U.S. Congress. Senate. Treaty of Peace with Germany, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* (14 July 1919), pp. 2532-2545; Lowell to Root (1 May 1919), Box 137, ERP, MDLC.

expressly exempted too much, other nations would have demanded similar privileges.[91] What is perhaps more noteworthy, however, was the way in which Article 21 made Americans consider the connection between the Monroe Doctrine and international law. In response to Article 21, the *New York Times* ran an editorial which boldly claimed that the reservation equated to recognition of the doctrine's status 'as public law.'[92] Many advocates of the League believed that achieving this allegedly legal recognition of the doctrine was a great achievement. Prior to this moment, the doctrine had been widely regarded as separate from the realm of international law, functioning as a policy declaration of the United States.[93] Former Secretary of the Interior, Walter Fisher, had remarked in 1917 that 'it would be a good thing if we had to define and defend the Monroe Doctrine at the bar of reason' and Historian George Blakeslee lauded the League covenant as having placed the doctrine 'in whole or in part, in the body of international law,' giving it the 'legal backing and the pledged support of all states of the World League.'[94] Whilst Taft had repeatedly argued that the doctrine was not part of international law, its recognition within the League Covenant was cause for celebration: 'Never before in our history has the world set its approval upon the doctrine as in this Covenant. It is really a great triumph for the supporters of the doctrine. It is not only a

[91] White to Root (7 March 1919); White to Root (19 March 1919) Box 137, ERP, MDLC.
[92] *New York Times* (14 April 1919), p. 12.
[93] Root's address before the American Society of International Law in 1914 best represented the ways in which Americans perceived the relationship between international law and the Monroe Doctrine: Root, 'Real Monroe Doctrine', pp. 427-442. For a recent evaluation of the Monroe Doctrine's relationship to international law, see: Meiertöns, *Doctrines of US Security Policy*, pp. 50-51. On Article 21 of the League covenant specifically, see: J. Spencer, 'The Monroe Doctrine and the League Covenant', *American Journal of International Law*, 30, no. 3 (1936), pp. 400-413.
[94] W. Fisher, 'A League to Enforce Peace', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 72 (1917), p. 195; G. Blakeslee, 'The Monroe Doctrine and the Proposed Constitution of the League of Nations', *The Journal of Race Development*, 9, no. 4 (1919), pp. 420-428.

reservation in favor of the United States asserting it, but it is an affirmative declaration of its conventional character and of its value in securing international peace.'[95]

It transpired that this argument was, however, largely unconvincing due to the strength of Article 21's critics and because of the reality that the Monroe Doctrine was not an instrument of international law. Yet this legalist rhetoric is understandable when one accounts for the prominence of international law during this period. This was a moment in which international law was becoming increasingly professionalised and international lawyers were occupying prominent positions within the State Department. There was a growing sense that legal measures could be utilised for the good of peace and, as Benjamin Coates argues, that international law was 'an essential component of the nations' emergence as a Great Power.'[96] Whilst the League of Nations itself represented a departure from traditional aspects of international law, this rhetoric demonstrated that global organisation was widely perceived as a way to grant the Monroe Doctrine some form of legal recognition.

Despite Wilson's efforts, prominent anti-League figures had a field day when Article 21 was revealed. Beveridge's correspondence was filled with criticism of the Monroe Doctrine reservation and Henry Cabot Lodge claimed that Article 21 'proposed

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[95] 'Analysis of the League Covenant as Amended' in *CWWHT*, vol. 7, pp. 290-291.

[96] On the primacy of international law in early twentieth century foreign policy, see: Coates, *Legalist Empire*, p. 2; Neff, *Justice Among Nations*, pp. 300-306; K. Rietzler, 'Fortunes of a Profession: American Foundations and International Law, 1910-1939', *Global Society*, 28, no. 1 (2014), p. 13; F. Boyle, *Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International Relations, 1898-1922* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), pp. 3-23; J. Hepp, 'James Brown Scott and the Rise of Public International Law', *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era*, 7, no. 2 (2008), p. 151; C. Reid, 'Peace and Law: Peace Activism and International Arbitration, 1895-1907', *Peace and Change*, 29, no. 3&4 (2004), p. 528; F. Kirgis, *The American Society of International Law's First Century 1906-2006* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), pp. 1-24.

to kill' the doctrine, describing it as 'worse than worthless.'[97] Hiram Johnson argued that it 'could not have been written with any other purpose than the destruction of the Monroe doctrine,' concluding that Article 21 was typical of every aspect of the League: 'It is pretended that it does one thing when it is intended it shall do another. It is not frank, nor fair, nor open, nor honest. Where plain language might express, without equivocation or ambiguity or evasion, the plain language is not employed.'[98] Former Ambassador Charlemagne Tower referred to the reservation as a 'statement so non-committal that is difficult to ascertain what meaning it may have at all in relation to the Monroe Doctrine,' whereas historian David Hill posed the key questions on most Americans' lips: 'Between whom is it an engagement? What does it engage? If President Wilson could not define it, what are the foreign Powers to understand by it? Here is clear ground for indefinite controversy.'[99] Historian William Shepherd was troubled by the strange definition, likening it to the act of describing a crab as a 'red fish that swims backwards,' and lawyer George Pepper found fault in the doctrine's apparent peace keeping nature, stating that it was proclaimed with the interests of the United States in mind, not world peace.[100] Whilst certain commentators noted that Article 21 'scarcely deserves serious consideration' due to the infrequency in which the United States would be powerless to act against a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, there was an overwhelming sense of

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[97] See, in particular, letters to William Borah, Will Hays, Philander Knox, Frank Munsey, Medill McCormick and George Moses in Boxes 214-216, AJBP, MDLC; U.S. Congress. Senate. League of Nations, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* (12 August 1919), pp. 3778-3791; Lodge to Bryce (27 May 1919); (10 June 1919), Reel 71, VJBP, WLUO; Lodge to Root (29 April 1919), ERP, Box 161, MDLC.

[98] U.S. Congress. Senate. The Monroe Doctrine, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* (2 June 1919), pp. 505-506.

[99] C. Tower, 'The Origin, Meaning and International Force of the Monroe Doctrine', *The American Journal of International Law*, 14, no. 1/2 (1920), p. 24; Hill, 'The Betrayal of the Monroe Doctrine', pp. 592-593.

[100] Shepherd, 'The Monroe Doctrine Reconsidered', pp. 65-66; G. Pepper, 'The Objections to the League of Nations Covenant', *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York*, 8, no. 3 (1919), p. 36.

dissatisfaction with the reservation.[101] Ultimately, Article 21 did little to satisfy critics of the League and the Monroe Doctrine remained a core reason as to why the Senate rejected the Treaty of Versailles.

Despite Barrett's suggestions, the prospect of a regional league was not discussed formally at the peace conference.[102] Yet the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles in the United States Senate granted even more impetus to demands for regional organisation and support came from a number of Latin American officials as well as from within the United States. The Chilean representative, Beltran Mathieu, informed Edward House that he believed that an American League could function alongside the League of Nations and the President of Uruguay, Baltasar Brum, outlined a plan for regional organisation closely related to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.[103] Brum's proposal attracted significant attention and Barrett proudly noted that it was 'in harmony with what it has been my privilege to advocate for many years in connection with the Pan American Union,' arguing that a regional league ought to be considered at the next Pan American Conference.[104] Former Congressman James Slayden once again advocated the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine, stating that the failure of the League of Nations signified the necessity of an American league, one that would permit all the American

[101] T. White, 'The Amended Covenant of the League of Nations', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 84 (1919), pp. 187-188; A. Hall, *The Monroe Doctrine and the Great War* (Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co., 1920), pp. 146-147.
[102] John Bassett Moore noted, however, that Wilson did speak about the abortive Pan American pact in passing to Epitácio Pessoa, the President-elect of Brazil: Moore to da Gama (19 June 1919), Box 120, JBMP, MDLC.
[103] (26 July 1920), Diaries, Volume 8a, EMHP, YUL, f. 73; B. Brum, *American Solidarity* (Montevideo: Imprenta Nacional, 1920). Brum was so committed to the notion of an American league that within the space of a week he had challenged a newspaper editor who had denounced his proposal to a duel: *Washington Post* (27 April 1920), p. 5.
[104] 'Memorandum requested Mr. Hudson Halley' (23 April 1920), Box 99, JBP, MDLC.

republics to uphold and maintain the doctrine.[105] International lawyer Philip Marshall Brown agreed, noting that the Senate's actions signified that regional issues should be tackled before international ones and that 'there should be no inherent logical difficulty in converting this declaration of rights [the Monroe Doctrine] into a Pan-American declaration.'[106]

Whilst Pan-Americanists had much to be hopeful for, no tenable progress was made in the aftermath of the treaty fight to Pan-Americanise the Monroe Doctrine or to form an American league of nations. The fact that many Latin American nations joined the League of Nations challenged any prospect of hemispheric unity under a multi-lateralised Monroe Doctrine (Figure 4.7).[107] More importantly, many Latin American nations remained cautious of the United States, given the manner in which it had used the Monroe Doctrine in recent history, and favoured securing Latin American solidarity over outright Pan-American unity.[108] The proclamation of the Carranza Doctrine by the Mexican President Venustiano Carranza in 1918 aptly demonstrated this. Carranza's emphasis on policies of non-intervention, and his demand that diplomacy should not be used to protect private interests, was framed by the United States' unfavourable reaction to the new Mexican Constitution, however, the United States perceived the doctrine as a direct challenge to the Monroe Doctrine and a call for Latin American nations to unite

[105] J. Slayden, 'A League of the Americas', *Advocate of Peace* (June 1921), p. 231.
[106] P. Brown, 'The Monroe Doctrine and the League of Nations', *The American Journal of International Law*, 14, no. 1/2 (1920), p. 210.
[107] As Yannick Wehrli argues, the League of Nations presented Latin American nations with the opportunity 'to strengthen their position on the international stage, particularly in relation to the United States.': Y. Wehrli, 'New Histories of Latin America at the League of Nations', in A. McPherson and Y. Wehrli (eds), *Beyond Geopolitics: New Histories of Latin America at the League of Nations* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2015), p. 2.
[108] Rinke, *First World War*, pp. 251-254.

Figure 4.7: 'The Coop that was Built to Keep the Chickens at Home'



Source: *Des Moines Register* (12 February 1920)

against United States interests. Mexican newspapers such as *El Pueblo* vocally disavowed the Monroe Doctrine and a lengthy report prepared by the State Department's Office of the Solicitor claimed that the Carranza Doctrine aimed to ultimately 'array

Latin-America against the United States.'[109] Internationalism, whether full-blown or regional, seemed to be off the table by the dawn of the 1920s.

On 30 December 1919, Hiram Bingham, the Yale historian who had advocated the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine in 1913, presented a paper at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association titled 'The Future of the Monroe Doctrine.' Although Bingham had been largely silent on the Monroe Doctrine throughout the course of the treaty fight, as a new post-war era dawned, he renounced his earlier demands and called for the strict maintenance of the doctrine that he had previously so despised. He argued that his 1913 thesis was based on the supposition that European nations had 'long since lost their tendency towards despotism' and that the stronger nations of South America would join the United States in any future defence of the Americas. The conduct of the war had shattered these suppositions, Bingham argued, and he criticised Germany's aggressive policy and the lacklustre attitudes of Argentina and Chile during the conflict. He believed that the Monroe Doctrine was now no longer obsolete but 'more firmly held than ever before' and argued that its maintenance was essential in order to prevent potential Japanese and Russian ambitions in the Western Hemisphere, proposing that the United States should 'Cubanize' Mexico through a policy of intervention. The United States, he concluded, must remain committed to upholding

[109] 'The Attitude of the United States Toward the Carranza Doctrine' (23 August 1918), LHWP, Box 18, MDLC. Lansing was equally as critical of the doctrine: Lansing to Wilson (21 August 1919) in *PWW*, vol. 62, pp. 449-450. On the formation of the Carranza Doctrine, see: M. Gilderhus, 'Wilson, Carranza, and the Monroe Doctrine: A Question in Regional Organization', *Diplomatic History*, 7, no. 2 (1983), pp. 112-115; J. Buchenau, *In the Shadow of the Giant: The Making of Mexico's Central American Policy, 1876-1930* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1996), pp. 121-122; Raat and Brescia, *Ambivalent Vistas*, pp. 127-128.

the Monroe Doctrine, ensuring that it was 'latent in Temperate America, active in Tropical America, and immediately effective in Mexico.'[110]

Bingham's reversal emphatically demonstrated that the unilateral, imperialistic and hegemony facilitating interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine emerged dominant after the conclusion of the war and the treaty fight. The idea that the Monroe Doctrine could be globalised quickly died along with the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and it was clear from Bingham's paper and its lack of support among policy makers that Pan-American unity under the Monroe Doctrine was not yet achievable. Consequently, a unilateral interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, and by extension a unilateral approach to the wider conduct of United States foreign policy, was deemed favourable by both policy makers and a significant portion of the decision-making class. For many Americans, the Monroe Doctrine could not function within the framework of international organisation and the threat any league of nations posed to its unilateral maintenance was an important contributing factor to the Senate's rejection of the treaty. Not even a reservation could satisfy ardent supporters of the Monroe Doctrine, as they claimed that only the United States could interpret its application.

By focusing on the role of the Monroe Doctrine during the treaty fight, the debate can be analysed as a trichotomy, offering a new perspective from which to consider early twentieth century notions of internationalism. The doctrine had begun to fracture into a variety of interpretations since the turn of the century that were aligned to visions of post-war world order. The flexibility of the doctrine highlighted the different perspectives

[110] H. Bingham, 'The Future of the Monroe Doctrine', *Journal of International Relations*, 10, no. 4 (1920), pp. 392-403. On Bingham's reversal, see: Karnes, 'Hiram Bingham', pp. 55-57.

Americans held regarding internationalism during the early twentieth century. The future role of the United States on the world stage was more contested than historians have previously emphasised, suggesting that the treaty fight requires further re-investigation.

Despite the apparent victory of the unilateral interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, the treaty fight still served to emphasise how fractured the doctrine's meaning had become nearly one hundred years after its enunciation. The fact that Bingham enacted a complete reversal in his understanding of the Monroe Doctrine was a testament to its fluidity and it is undeniable that each of the three varied interpretations that emerged during the treaty fight found significant support. As the next chapter will argue, Wilson's Republican successors attempted to utilise the Monroe Doctrine's centennial anniversary to solidify their particular interpretation of the doctrine. However, as the various celebratory events demonstrated, the doctrine's meaning was far from clear and remained very much open to renegotiation. The notion of a global Monroe Doctrine may have waned, yet demands for its pan-americanisation clashed with Republican unilateralism, demonstrating the tension that remained among the nation's core values.

Chapter Five: After One Hundred Years of Service

Hegemony, Pan-Americanism, and the Monroe Doctrine Centennial Anniversary (1923)

According to Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the celebration of anniversaries was 'one of the most fashionable and popular amusements of the American people' during the early twentieth century. Although he offered this observation with a hint of disdain, Lodge informed the readers of *Scribner's Magazine* that the forthcoming centennial anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine was one of the 'distinguished few' that was worthy of 'reverence and commemoration' not only by the people of the United States, but by all the nations of the world.'[1] Popular opinion reflected Lodge's sentiments and an unprecedented amount of appreciation was showered upon the revered doctrine throughout 1923. In the spring, Congress signified its interest in ensuring that the centennial anniversary was duly recognized and celebrated appropriately by establishing the Monroe Doctrine Centennial Commission. Tasked with organizing several celebratory events across the nation, the commission was granted $122,500 from the Treasury and was headed by individuals such as former Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, Governor of New York Alfred E. Smith, and author George Henry Payne.[2] A myriad of privately organized events and demonstrations of gratitude were arranged by

[1] H. Lodge, 'One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine', *Scribner's Magazine* (October 1923), p. 413.
[2] U.S. Congress. Senate. Anniversary of Monroe Doctrine and Death of James Monroe, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., *Congressional Record* (24 February 1923), p. 4491.The resolution stated that $67,500 should be expended to both aid the James Monroe Memorial Association in the purchase of Monroe's former residence in New York and establish a memorial foundation to raise funds to further the 'progress, amity, and good will among the peoples of the Pan American Republics.' The remaining $55,000 was to be expended in organising 'a general program of public celebration' of the Monroe Doctrine's centennial in New York City, Washington D.C. and Virginia.

patriotic individuals and organizations as oratory, imagery and the written form were utilized to laud the role the doctrine had served since its enunciation in 1823. As the cartoons published in the press throughout December 1923 illustrated, the anniversary was expected to be a moment of national celebration (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).

Figure 5.1: 'One hundred years old and still going strong. You can't help wishing him many happy returns of the day'



Source: *Collier's Weekly* (1 December 1923)

Significant national anniversaries present historians with a valuable snapshot of a nation's history and the Monroe Doctrine centennial is no exception. By prompting citizens and governments alike to reassess the past and discern the contemporary significance of historic events, anniversaries frequently elicit reflections upon notions of

national identity and national memory.[3] However, few anniversaries are devoid of political implications. The centennial was not simply a moment of commemoration and was marred by contention and debate over the direction of the United States' Latin American policy and wider foreign relations. Rather than an isolated episode in which the Monroe Doctrine momentarily held the attention of the nation, the centennial served as an important milestone in the Monroe Doctrine debate that had been taking place within the United States since the turn of the century. The centennial functioned as an ideal platform from which to reassess the debate of the previous quarter-century and discern the centrality of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation to the United States' post-war national security.

Both Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes and President Calvin Coolidge attempted to use the centennial to enunciate the Republican administration's official interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, yet several of the commemorative events and the accompanying commentary presented alternative interpretations, emphasising the futility of defining the fractured doctrine. The question of whether the Monroe Doctrine ought to be interpreted as a unilateral foreign policy device that strove to maintain United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, or as a Pan-American doctrine that emphasised a multilateral approach to hemispheric affairs, remained in dispute and tainted the celebratory tone. In a moment in which efforts were being made to return to normalcy after the First World War, the doctrine continued to function as a contested concept

[3] Recent studies of commemorative anniversaries in the United States include: M. Bennett, 'The Spirit of '76: Diplomacy Commemorating the U.S. Bicentennial in 1976', *Diplomatic History*, 40, no. 4 (2016), pp. 695-721; B. Giberti, *Designing the Centennial: A History of the International Exhibition in Philadelphia* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015); R. Cook, *Troubled Commemoration: The American Civil War Centennial, 1961-1965* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007); L. Spillman, *Nation and Commemoration: Creating National Identities in the United States and Australia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

through which an overriding debate over the nature of United States foreign relations took place. As historian William Shepherd reflected after the centennial's conclusion, the celebrations demonstrated how 'elusive and elastic' the doctrine's meaning had become.[4]

Figure 5.2: 'Her Birthday'



Source: Box 97, John Barrett Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

An analysis of the Monroe Doctrine centennial anniversary provides a unique insight into understanding how Americans perceived the doctrine and, more broadly, the United States' place in the world in the aftermath of the First World War. It additionally

[4] W. Shepherd, 'The Monroe Doctrine Reconsidered', *Political Science Quarterly*, 39, no. 1 (1924), p. 35.

presents historians with a fascinating example of commemorative culture within the United States. Yet despite its historical value the Monroe Doctrine centennial anniversary remains almost entirely absent from scholarship and its importance has yet to be fully appreciated. Historians frequently refer to a speech given by Secretary Hughes during the centennial, yet the context of the celebrations in which it was issued is not considered.[5] James Isenhower conducted the only scholarly analysis of the centennial in 2004 and it remains unpublished. In his doctoral thesis on the recrudescence of the Monroe Doctrine within United States foreign policy debates, Isenhower devotes an opening chapter to the centennial celebrations of 1923 to demonstrate the extent of the doctrine's popularity among United States citizens. According to Isenhower, the centennial's absence from scholarship has caused historians to overlook a 'critical period in the doctrine's development and an equally important growth of popular affection for the doctrine.'[6] Whilst Isenhower certainly demonstrates the popularity of the doctrine, his study overlooks important source material and does not address the wider implications the centennial had upon the way in United States foreign relations was understood. This chapter argues that the centennial was an important moment in the Monroe Doctrine debate that revitalised discussions and debates over the importance of and relationship between notions of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation in the conduct of United States foreign relations after the conclusion of the First World War.

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[5] See for example: Loveman, *No Higher Law*, pp. 228-229; Perkins, *Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 332-336.

[6] J. Isenhower, 'Protean Policy: Understanding the Monroe Doctrine's Regular Recurrence within the American Foreign Policy Debate', (Duke University, Ph.D., 2004), p. 23. This is not to state that references to the centennial are never made. For example, in his study of the Monroe Doctrine during the Cold War, Gaddis Smith's opening lines refer to the New York celebrations and in his study of education in the United States and its relationship to ideas of empire, Clif Stratton mentions the same celebrations in passing: Smith, *Monroe Doctrine*, p. 3; C. Stratton, *Education for Empire: American Schools, Race, and the Path of Good Citizenship* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016), p. 170.

Fiasco at Santiago – The Monroe Doctrine and the Fifth Pan American Conference

The Monroe Doctrine centennial took place during the early years of a new post-war phase of United States foreign relations. As the nations of Europe languished in the devastating aftermath of the First World War, it appeared unlikely that the Monroe Doctrine and the United States' dominance of the Western Hemisphere would be challenged in the near future.[7] It thus became increasingly difficult to rationalize the use of force in Latin America to secure national interests and policies of forceful intervention in the Caribbean region, the hallmark of Woodrow Wilson's Latin American policy, were viewed as inappropriate and gradually lost public support.[8] Efforts were made to withdraw troops from the Dominican Republic and an overriding aim was established to allay the fear of Yankee imperialism within Latin America and foster a relationship of cooperation and understanding. However, whilst policy makers were keen to demonstrate that the United States did not desire territorial conquest in Latin America and desired more amicable inter-American relations, they had no intention of relinquishing regional hegemony or straying from a unilateral foreign policy, choosing to pursue more cordial relations only if they served national interests.[9] As such, the Republican administrations felt that it was necessary to conduct a number of interventions in the mid-1920s and Marines were sent to Honduras in 1924 and Panama in 1925. The United States Empire

[7] The authoritative account of post-war relations with Europe remains: F. Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
[8] E. Rosenberg, 'World War I, Wilsonianism, and Challenges to U.S. Empire', *Diplomatic History*, 38, no. 4 (2014), p. 859; McPherson, *The Invaded*, pp. 194-195; Langley, *The Banana Wars*, pp. 169-170.
[9] For the United States' Latin American policy in the early 1920s see: Loveman, *No Higher Law*, p. 228; Langley, *America and the Americas*, p. 119; Schoultz, *Beneath the United States*, p. 253; K. Grieb, *The Latin American Policy of Warren G. Harding* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), pp. 1-13; B. Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: W.W.Norton and Company, 1961), pp. 3-5; A. DeConde, *Herbert Hoover's Latin American Policy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), pp. 3-5.


was certainly not a benevolent presence in Latin America after the war. President Warren Harding may have been torn between competing policies of hegemony and cooperation, but he still appeared to cling to the notion of the 'good old Monroe Doctrine of America dominating the affairs of the New World as they concern us'.[10]

This tension was reflected during the proceedings of the Fifth Pan American Conference, which opened on the 25 March 1923 in Santiago, Chile and concluded on 3 May. Delegations were sent to the conference from all the American republics save Mexico, because it was not represented on the Pan American Union Governing Board, and Peru and Bolivia, who refused to participate due to ill will created by the Tacna-Arica dispute.[11] The conference had originally been scheduled to take place in November 1914; however, due to the detrimental economic impact of the First World War upon several Latin American nations, including the host nation Chile, the conference was postponed.[12] The PAU revisited the conference in 1922 and revised the programme after agreeing upon a new date. The conference was intended, among a variety of issues, to discuss the possibility of naval and military reductions and limitations, the rights of aliens, disease prevention, the reorganisation of the PAU, and the codification of an American international law.[13] Crucially, this was the first Pan American Conference to

[10] Harding described the Monroe Doctrine in this way shortly before being elected President in 1920: *New York Times* (15 October 1920), p. 2.
[11] On the absent delegations, see: Collier to Hughes (22 January 1923) in *FRUS 1923*, vol. 1, pp. 291-292. For the Tacna-Arica dispute, see: E. Colby, 'The Tacna-Arica Dispute', *Georgetown Law Journal*, 13, no. 4 (1925), pp. 343-366.
[12] On the decision to postpone the conference, see: 'Memorandum for the Press' (7 October 1914), Box 37, JBP, MDLC; *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* (October 1914), p. 604. See also: J. Vivian, 'Wilson, Bryan, and the American Delegation to the Abortive Fifth Pan American Conference, 1914', *Nebraska History*, 59 (1978), pp. 56-69.
[13] For details of proposed topics, see: *Fifth International Conference of American States: Special Handbook for the use of the Delegates* (Washington: Pan American Union, 1922).

permit the discussion of overtly diplomatic and political matters, which provided scope for the Monroe Doctrine to become a topic of debate.

Figure 5.3: 'La V Conferencia Panamericana de Santiago'



Source: *Caras y Caretas* (14 April 1923)

Questions regarding the Monroe Doctrine emerged when the formation of a regional American League of Nations was proposed by the Uruguayan delegation. As discussed in the previous chapter, proposals for the establishment of an American League of Nations, based upon the principles of a Pan-Americanised Monroe Doctrine, had been voiced during the Treaty Fight. Notable proposals had been made by John Barrett and Baltasar Brum, who used their positions as Director General of the PAU and President of Uruguay respectively to advocate a system of hemispheric organisation. Although they failed to change the result of the Treaty Fight, Pan-Americanists remained committed to the cause after the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles. Brum saw the upcoming conference as an ideal opportunity to gain support and announced that the Uruguayan delegation would bring the proposal for an American League of Nations before the

conference.[14] Uruguay's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Juan Bueo, passionately outlined the reasoning behind Uruguay's commitment to a league, explaining that the 'solidarity of the nations of America is neither artificial nor vainly Utopian. It is absolutely natural, the logical sequence of their past history.' To Bueo, a 'United America is not, I repeat, an ideal merely; it is no vain dream, but an economical and social reality, which will overthrow all obstacles by the force of its own inherent fitness.'[15]

The United States, however, had lost its most vocal advocate for regional organisation, which significantly reduced the volume of opinion being dispersed domestically in favour of an American league. Having retired from the PAU in 1920, Barrett did not voice his support for an American league as stridently as he once had, although he had certainly not lost faith in the notion.[16] Whilst it might seem farfetched to attribute a dearth of interest to one man's silence, Barrett had served as one of the most influential and persistent promotors of Pan-Americanism and regional organization during his directorship of the PAU. As such, commentators from the United States gave mixed predictions. For individuals such as Senator George Pepper, Brum's proposal was seen as an essential step toward what he deemed as the inevitable formation of a world league divided between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres.[17] Yet an editorial in the *New York Times* was quick to highlight the obstacles of a regional league, stating that it would face opposition across the Americas because 'no country in South America, except

[14] For Brum's renewed proposal, see: Philip to Hughes (19 February 1923); (23 February 1923) in *FRUS 1923*, vol. 1, pp. 293-294; *New York Times* (11 February 1923), p. 4.
[15] *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* (January 1923), pp. 14-15.
[16] In his resignation announcement of 1920, Barrett noted that he would continue to dedicate his time to advocacy of an American League of Nations, however, his efforts were negligible in comparison to earlier efforts: 'Special Final Announcement of John Barrett' (25 August 1920), Box 95, JBP, MDLC.
[17] *New York Times* (3 April 1923), p. 2.

Uruguay trusts us.'[18] As the conference proceedings would demonstrate, the United States delegation, under direction of Hughes, had no intention of supporting the formation of a hemispheric league and the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine, ardently clinging to a policy of unilateralism. The proposal was doomed from the outset.

Samuel Guy Inman, a missionary from the Committee on Cooperation in Latin America, was present at the conference as a reporter and recorded the negative attitude of the United States delegation in his letters.[19] He observed that the Uruguayan delegation had been subjected to informal pressure at the start of the conference in an effort to prevent any discussion of a league, noting that the United States in particular had taken 'a negative stand in all matters referring to an American League of Nations'.[20] Inman subsequently published a lengthy report on the conference and, despite praising many other aspects of the conference, referred to the ordeal as the 'American League of Nations Fiasco.' In an act of defiance, the Uruguayans elected to place the proposal before the conference regardless, which only sparked the Columbian delegation to demand an accurate definition of the Monroe Doctrine. Ambassador Henry Fletcher, head of the United States delegation, responded by emphasising the doctrine's unilateral nature and declared that its multilateralisation would never occur, bringing the matter to a swift conclusion.[21] The *New York Times* was typical of the reaction in the press, reporting that Uruguay's suggestion was 'an embarrassment to our representatives'.[22] Indeed, in the delegation's official report, the proposal for an American league was not even recorded

[18] *New York Times* (4 March 1923), p. 10.
[19] K. Koll, 'Samuel Guy Inman: Venturer in Inter-American Friendship', *Union Seminar Quarterly Review*, 42, no. 3 (1988), p. 61.
[20] 'Travel letter from S. G. Inman' (6 April 1923); (June 1923), Box 13, SGIP, MDLC.
[21] S. Inman, 'Pan-American Unity in the Making', *Current History*, 18, no. 6 (1923), pp. 919-925.
[22] *New York Times* (12 May 1923), p. 14.

and the Columbian attack on the Monroe Doctrine was noted as being 'not discussed.'[23] Surveying the conference proceedings, academic Herman James joked that despite the efforts of the United States to avoid a discussion on the Monroe Doctrine, 'some of the delegations succeeded in paying their respects, not altogether of a respectful nature, to that inter-American bone of contention.'[24] It was this frosty exchange over the nature of the Monroe Doctrine and the role of unilateral and multilateral policies in hemispheric relations that was reflected in the centennial commemorations.

Fittingly Observed – The Monroe Doctrine Centennial Commemorations

A myriad of commemorative endeavours were conducted to observe the Monroe Doctrine's centennial anniversary in 1923. Organisations such as the American Historical Association and the Woman's Bar Association held celebratory gatherings in honour of the doctrine and both the Society of Descendants of James Monroe and the James Monroe Memorial Association and Foundation attempted to acquire various properties that had previously belonged to President Monroe.[25] The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a commemorative study of the doctrine and the centennial was even recognised by several Latin American nations, with Brazil, Chile and Uruguay

[23] *Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Fifth International Conference of American States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 6.
[24] H. James, 'Latin America in 1923', *American Political Science Review*, 18, no. 3 (1924), p. 544.
[25] 'The Meeting of the American Historical Association at Columbus', *The American Historical Review*, 29, no. 3 (1924), p. 424; *Washington Post* (2 December 1923), p. 3; *New York Times* (15 July 1923), p. E2; (21 November 1923), p. 24. Charles Chapman summarised his presentation at the American Historical Association in a subsequent paper written in the 1930s. See: 'New Corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine: With Especial Reference to the Relations of the United States with Cuba' in Chapman to Borah (12 February 1931), Box 801, WEBP, MDLC.

sending official congratulatory messages to the United States government.[26] The Brazilian Society of International Law held a special commemorative session during which the Minister of Foreign Relations, Felix Pacheco, claimed that the doctrine had been a 'clear and unmistakable call to continental solidarity', making the centennial 'a truly American festival.'[27]

Four major events served as the focal points of the centennial: the 'American Historical Revue and Motion Picture Exposition: The Monroe Doctrine Centennial', held in Los Angeles from 2 July to 4 August; the 'International Centennial Celebration of the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine', held across Virginia from 1 to 2 December; the American Academy of Political and Social Science's 'Commemorative Session of the Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine', held in Philadelphia from 30 November to 1 December; and a weeklong celebration held in New York from 1 to 7 December. Collectively, these events presented competing interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, commemorating it in disparate ways and highlighted its fractured nature.

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The Los Angeles commemoration, held in the newly constructed coliseum at the Los Angeles Exposition Park, can be best described as a faux celebration. The exposition was primarily a celebration of film organized by the Hollywood film industry that tied itself to and utilized the popularity of the Monroe Doctrine to regain lost credibility after

[26] James Brown Scott believed that the endowment was obliged to contribute to the centennial celebrations given the doctrine's perceived role in international relations as a facilitator of peace. He tasked Chilean international lawyer Alejandro Álvarez to write a history of the doctrine and compile a large collection of expressions of opinion on the doctrine by leading North and Latin Americans: Álvarez, *Monroe Doctrine*, p. v. The Latin American messages of congratulations were printed in: *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* (April 1924), pp. 424-427.

[27] *Bulletin of the Pan American Union* (March 1924), pp. 218-226; *New York Times* (3 December 1923), p. 17.

experiencing a number of scandals.[28] A festival showcasing the merits of film was chosen as the suitable panacea and plans were made to hold an exposition in the summer of 1923 that could be funded by the sale of commemorative coins. The event organisers predicated that Congress would not permit the striking of coins that commemorated the film industry and decided to make the exposition a joint celebration of film and a suitable historical event. As the Monroe Doctrine's centennial approached, the organisers decided that a somewhat early tribute to the doctrine would suffice as both a means to acquire a commemorative coin and to attract wider interest in the exposition.

Over December 1922 and January 1923, Californian Congressman Walter Lineberger was tasked with proposing a bill for the striking of a half-dollar commemorating the Monroe Doctrine, of which the exclusive right to purchase would be granted to the Los Angeles Clearing House. Lineberger was immediately asked to justify his proposal in Congress, replying that the bill was 'prompted only by the desire to celebrate in a fitting manner a very important national event.' The congressman encountered stubborn opposition and various representatives objected to de-centralized control over the sale of a commemorative coin and the unsuitability of Los Angeles as a location to commemorate the Monroe Doctrine. The coin would imply that the centennial was a local affair and dissent was raised to protect the 'national character' of the doctrine. Lineberger responded to his critics by declaring that he did not think that 'any portion of the country is more interested in the Monroe doctrine [than California], because it was through the Monroe doctrine that California was annexed.' Lineberger reasoned that the doctrine had 'kept the European powers from taking action for the acquisition of

[28] J. Trumpbour, *Selling Hollywood to the World: U.S. and European Struggles for Mastery of the Global Film Industry, 1920-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 20.

California for a period of nearly 25 years' and thus the region owed its place in the Union to the doctrine's existence.[29] The bill was eventually approved on 24 January 1923; however, it was clear that contention existed over the sanctity of the doctrine and the most appropriate methods of commemoration.

Figure 5.4: The Monroe Doctrine Centennial Half Dollar



Source: United States Mint

The coin was heralded as 'one of the most beautiful in design and execution ever put out by the United States government' and it merits analysis because it presented a particular interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine's purpose (Figure 5.4).[30] The front of the

[29] U.S. Congress. House. Coinage of 50-Cent Pieces in Commemoration of the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., *Congressional Record* (18 December 1922), pp. 636-637; U.S. Congress. House. Coinage of 50-Cent Pieces, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., *Congressional Record* (15 January 1923), pp. 1762-1763. Lineberger's argument indirectly drew upon the work of historian Robert Cleland: R. Cleland, *A History of California: The American Period* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), p. 32; R. Cleland, *One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine* (Los Angeles: Times-Mirror Press, 1923), pp. 10, 33-36. Newspapers such as the *Los Angeles Times* subsequently cited Cleland as an authority on the Monroe Doctrine and argued that there was a deep interest in 'California and the great Southwest in the Monroe Doctrine Centennial': *Los Angeles Times* (21 May 1923), p. II4.
[30] *Washington Evening Star* (13 May 1923), p. III4.


coin displayed images of Presidents James Monroe and John Quincy Adams, whereas the reverse depicted the American continents personified as female figures. North America is seen extending her hand to South America in a sign of friendship and cooperation, holding a laurel of peace, and South America, carrying a horn of plenty, can be seen reaching upwards in response, the continents' hands symbolically meeting at the location of the Panama Canal. As explained by the *Los Angeles Times*, the coin's design implied that the Monroe Doctrine had ensured peace in the Americas and had fostered cordial relations and economic prosperity between the nations of the Western Hemisphere.[31] Such an interpretation of history was often invoked by those who advocated the doctrine's pan-americanisation, and the opening of the exposition on July 3 was dedicated to 'honoring the peoples of South America' and their diplomatic representatives that had travelled to take part in the event.[32] Claims were unsuccessfully made that the designer, Chester Beach, had plagiarized the copyrighted seal of the 1901 Pan-American Exposition, which only reinforces the Pan-American imagery of the design (Figure 5.5).[33] Once struck, the first of the coins was presented to President Harding at the White House on 6 June and the bulk of the coins were sold at the exposition itself, marketed on the promise that they would increase in value.[34]

The exposition was fervently advertised in the *Los Angeles Times* and issues were littered with images of the Exposition Park and descriptions of the event (Figure 5.6). Whilst the doctrine was certainly celebrated at the exposition, through the presentation of Monroe's personal items, the erection of a statue in his likeness, and the creation of a

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[31] *Los Angeles Times* (30 June 1923), p. II1.
[32] *Los Angeles Times* (4 July 1923), p. II1.
[33] Q. Bowers, *Commemorative Coins of the United States: A Complete Encyclopedia* (Santa Ana: Bowers and Merena Galleries, 1991).
[34] *Los Angeles Times* (7 June 1923), p. I2; (4 July 1923), p. II2.

Figure 5.5: Logo of the 1901 Pan-American Exposition



Source: *Pan-American Exposition, Buffalo, May 1st to November 1st, 1901* (Buffalo: Pan-American Exposition Company, 1901)

float depicting the doctrine, it is clear from these adverts that the Monroe Doctrine was of secondary interest to the organisers.[35] Perhaps the most telling example of this was the 'Special Monroe Doctrine Centennial Section' of the *Los Angeles Times* that was published on the first day of the exposition. Despite its title, this ten-page supplement barely gave any attention to the doctrine, devoting merely one article to it. Unwilling to admit that Hollywood was experiencing a crisis of confidence, one article even attempted to argue that it was the film industry that was assuring the success of the doctrine's

[35] For details of the Monroe Doctrine related exhibits at the exposition, see: *Los Angeles Times* (2 July 1923), p. IV2; (4 July 1923), p. II2.

Figure 5.6: Monroe Doctrine Centennial Advert



Source: *Los Angeles Times* (22 March 1923), p. 9.

centennial celebrations, rather than the reverse.[36] Local businesses similarly sought to capitalise upon the centennial. For example, the Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corporation printed an advert that listed all the luxuries President Monroe had missed out on in 1823. He would never have seen a gas mantle, eaten a meal cooked with gas, turned on an electric light, or ridden in an elevator and his 'shirts and collars never felt the caress of an electric iron,' all services that the corporation aimed to provide.[37] Despite the peculiarity of the Los Angeles commemoration, it generated early publicity for the centennial anniversary and presented a powerful Pan-American personification of the

[36] 'Special Monroe Doctrine Centennial Section', *Los Angeles Times* (2 July 1923) pp. IV1-10.
[37] *Los Angeles Times* (2 July 1923), p. IV8.

doctrine through the commemorative coin that many Americans would have been exposed to.

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Between 1 and 4 December, President Monroe's home state, Virginia, became the host of the 'International Centennial Celebration of the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine,' a four-day celebration organised by the Southern Commercial Congress that took place at William and Mary College in Williamsburg, in the state capital Richmond, and at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. The focal event of the celebration was a grand pilgrimage to Monroe's tomb, yet most of the celebration was dedicated to speeches, which were collated in a senate document and published as official proceedings in 1924.[38] The Virginian celebrations positioned the figure of Monroe himself at the forefront of the commemorations, which meant that the event was almost entirely celebratory in nature. A general mood of excitement and pride permeated from the region in anticipation of the centennial, with one historian from the University of Richmond boldly claiming that 'whilst the Monroe Doctrine is not law, it is life.'[39] Many of the addresses at the celebration contained similarly superfluous accounts of the beneficial impact of the doctrine and how it had ensured the successful and peaceful development of the Western Hemisphere. Individuals such as the Elbert Trinkle, the Governor of Virginia, and Georgian Congressman William Upshaw referred to the doctrine as having provided 'protection against foreign penetration into our western world' and embodying an 'uncringing, stalwart stand for American integrity and American development'

[38] *Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine: Proceedings of the International Centennial Celebration of the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine Held at Richmond, V.A., December 2-4, 1923* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924).
[39] *Washington Post* (11 June 1922), p. 4.

respectively.[40] The official proclamation issued by the governor at the start of the celebration confusingly referred to the doctrine as having a 'magic power' and it was even the subject of two poems that emphasised its peace bringing nature.[41]

Yet the celebration was not without controversy. A significant number of the speeches given over the course of the celebration addressed an issue which was, in Virginia at least, of pressing importance: the authorship of the doctrine. Present day scholarship firmly establishes John Quincy Adams as the primary author of the principles of the doctrine, yet at the time of the centennial there was a strong backlash against this argument.[42] Even though numerous historians had been arguing since the turn of the century that Adams was the author, 'New England historians' were criticised at the commemoration for positing a falsehood.[43] Clarence Jones, the president of the Southern Commercial Congress, claimed that by giving credit to Adams these 'false historian[s]' had almost managed to 'snatch from Monroe the one glory that has been remembered by an association with his name.'[44] When former Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan did not give Monroe adequate credit in his speech, he was scorned by the president of the Society of Descendants of James Monroe, Rose Gouverneur Hoes. In her subsequent

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[40] E. Trinkle, 'Address at the Tomb of Monroe', *Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine*, p. 20; W. Upshaw, 'In Memoriam', *Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine*, p. 28.

[41] M. Andrews, 'Ode', *Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 83-85; H. Carlisle, 'The Monroe Doctrine', *Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 85-86; 'Proclamation', *Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine*, p. vii. The Commonwealth of Virginia continues to enact official recognition of the doctrine's anniversaries akin to this proclamation, however, it refrains from describing the doctrine as holding a 'magic power.'

[42] C. Edel, *Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 6.

[43] For example, James Angell, the President of the University of Michigan, argued in 1905 that Adams inspired 'the slow moving and lethargic President to fling out the challenge of 1823 … James Monroe held the trumpet, but John Quincy Adams blew the blast': J. Angell, *The European Concert and the Monroe Doctrine* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1905), p. 13. The development of the Adams argument is explored in: E. Crapol, 'John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine: Some New Evidence', *Pacific Historical Review*, 48, no. 3 (1979), pp. 413-418.

[44] C. Owens, 'Remarks', *Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 5-6.

speech, she announced that 'I fear no one and from this time forth I want to challenge the man or woman who claims the Monroe doctrine for anyone but the man to whom the credit is due - James Monroe - the fearless Virginian.'[45] The authorship controversy was particularly acute during the year of the centennial because former presidential candidate Alton Parker discovered and publicised a letter written by Thomas Jefferson that arguably contained the genesis of the doctrine.[46]

The address of most interest to this study, however, came from Robert Moore, the Virginian congressman who had expressed his advocacy of the Monroe Doctrine centennial in the House of Representatives earlier that year. Toward the end of a typical speech outlining the history of the doctrine, Moore referred to its role in recent foreign policy debates, arguing that the doctrine had not been abrogated through the annexation of the Philippines or belligerency in the First World War. Like so many other Americans had come to believe, Moore argued that the doctrine ought to be considered as a flexible policy, because there had been no suggestion in 1823 that 'our Government should subject itself to a perpetual restriction, regardless of any and all changes that might occur.' To Moore, the doctrine was 'a single, comprehensive inhibition under which the United States has placed the nations of the Old World, while leaving itself complete freedom in any contingency that may arise to decide whether it will or will not relate itself to their affairs.'[47]

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[45] R. Hoes, 'Response', *Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 100-101.
[46] Parker to Trinkle (28 November 1923), Box 8, Alton B. Parker Papers, MDLC. See also various press clippings from October 1923 in Box 32.
[47] R. Moore, 'President Monroe and his Message of December 2, 1823', *Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 16-18. Moore's speech was subsequently printed in the Congressional Record: U.S. Congress. Senate. 'President Monroe and his Message of December 2, 1823', Address of Representative R.

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The New York commemorations presented another opportunity to emphasise the Pan-American nature of the Monroe Doctrine. Beginning on 1 December, a weeklong celebration of the Monroe Doctrine was organised by the International Pan-American Committee (IPAC). The IPAC was a New York based organisation established by John Barrett in April 1923 for the purpose of 'awakening continental public attention on the importance of Pan-American solidarity for the peace and progress of the western hemisphere.'[48] Barrett was aware of the importance the centennial would have in shaping the nation's understanding of the Monroe Doctrine and aimed to emphasise its Pan-American facets rather than any political or partisan interpretations through the New York celebrations. As such, Barrett believed that emphasis should be given to the fact that the doctrine had facilitated and protected the growth of democracy, ensured peace in the Western Hemisphere, aided in the progress of Latin American nations and strengthened inter-American solidarity.[49] In November Barrett wrote to Secretary Hughes informing him that the IPAC aimed to ensure that the celebration would not offend Latin American sensibilities. He was eager to ensure that similar sentiments were expressed at the other major celebrations but decided not to approach the organisers of the Virginia and Philadelphia celebrations due to their semi-official nature. The committee was directly approached by the organisers of the Los Angeles commemoration for advice, however, Barrett recalled that 'they completely disregarded it and the Monroe Doctrine celebration part of the program was a complete fizzle and the subject of much sarcastic

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Walton Moore, of Virginia, at William and Mary College, Virginia, Saturday, December 1, 1923, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., *Congressional Record* (6 December 1923), pp. 77-81.

[48] *Washington Post* (30 April 1923), p. 3.

[49] 'Report of the Chairman on the Celebrations of the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Declaration of the Monroe Doctrine' (1 January 1924), Box 97, JBP, MDLC.

comment in Mexico and California and in some of the Central and South American countries.'[50]

Barrett's dedication to the centennial demonstrated his continued faith in achieving the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine. He sought the input of other prominent figures, contacting the new Director General of the PAU, Leo Rowe, to inquire about the organisation's own initiatives, and managed to meet President Harding's successor, Calvin Coolidge, who agreed to write a special message. Emboldened by the meeting, Barrett began appointing honorary members of the IPAC specifically in recognition of the centenary and additionally sought the expertise of academics such as Albert Hart, Archibald Coolidge and Hiram Bingham to help discern the 'essence of the Doctrine.' Drawing upon his past experiences of awarding the John Barrett Prizes earlier in his career, he announced that prizes would be offered through educational institutions and public schools for the best papers on the significance of the Monroe Doctrine.[51] Whilst Barrett did not speak himself during the celebration, he was present in New York throughout, politely declining an invitation to speak at the Virginian celebrations.[52]

In mid-November Murray Hulbert, the Acting Mayor, issued a proclamation to prepare the city for the celebrations. Outlining his own appreciation for the doctrine, he urged all persons to make the 2 December:

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[50] Barrett to Hughes (11 November 1923), Box 62, JBP, MDLC.
[51] Barrett to Rowe (11 November 1923); Barrett to Butler (13 November 1923), Box 62; Untitled Announcement (2 December 1923), Box 96, JBP, MDLC. For information on the John Barrett Prizes, first established in 1904, see: 'The John Barrett Prizes', Box 95, JBP, MDLC.
[52] Owens to Barrett (17 November 1923), Box 62, JBP, MDLC. Barrett informed Elihu Root that he would be in New York for the week to ensure that the celebrations ran as planned: Barrett to Root (24 November 1923), Box 62, JBP, MDLC.


> a day of Thanksgiving for the privilege of dwelling beneath the starry banner of Old Glory, a day of tribute to the sagacious and fearless Americans who made it possible for us to enjoy our priceless American heritage, and a day of reconsecration to that excellent American policy which has steered our national craft away from the shoals and the rocks and has made us realize in every generation that if we would be strong and happy and prosperous we must paddle our own canoe.[53]

The celebrations began in earnest on 1 December after a resolution was adopted at the City Hall which stated that, along with Washington's Farewell Address, the Monroe Doctrine had 'furnished a foreign policy for America to follow for all time' as was 'as necessary today as when first promulgated for the protection of the rights and interests of the American people.'[54] Throughout the following week, readings were given in churches (Figure 5.7), schools, public meetings and social clubs, all providing what Barrett hoped would be a 'non-controversial' review of the doctrine's historic impact.[55] On the day of the centennial itself, the President of the Pan-American Society, Severo Mallet-Prevost, gave addresses over radio, transmitted along with readings of Monroe's message from the WEAF station of the Radio Corporation of America. He emphasised that the doctrine had facilitated inter-American solidarity by allowing the 'weak and struggling communities of 1823' to grow into great nations.[56]

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[53] M. Hulbert, 'Proclamation' (17 November 1923), Box 97, JBP, MDLC.
[54] *New York Times* (2 December 1923), p. 22.
[55] 'Memorandum regarding the nation-wide commemoration of the one hundredth anniversary of the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine' (2 December 1923), Box 97, JBP, MDLC. On the doctrine being taught in schools, see: 'To the Students and Pupils in the Schools of New York' (27 November 1923), Box 62, JBP, MDLC; 'A History Lesson', *Time*, 2, no. 2 (1923), p. 4.
[56] S. Mallet-Preovost, 'Monroe Doctrine' (2 December 1923), Box 97, JBP, MDLC. The Radio Corporation of America subsequently thanked Barrett for permitting the station the 'privilege of broadcasting an event as important as the Monroe Doctrine Centennial': Popenoe to Barrett (3 December 1923), Box 62, JBP, MDLC. Other radio stations also broadcast commemorative messages. The Philadelphia based Lit Brothers Radio Broadcasting Station broadcast addresses by former Ambassadors Roland Morris and William

Figure 5.7: Church Service Featuring an Address on the Monroe Doctrine



Source: *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* (1 December 1923)

President Coolidge sent Barrett his promised message which was made public on the date of the centennial. The President was pleased that 'in hundreds of cities, all over the continent, this anniversary occasion is to be fittingly observed' because it deserved more than 'passing notice.' Coolidge continued to outline his satisfaction that 'within recent years a greatly improved understanding of the true intent and significance of the Monroe Doctrine has come to be entertained not only throughout the American world, but in the whole world as well.' It was clear to Coolidge that the doctrine had acted as a guarantor of peace for one hundred years and he had no doubt that the doctrine would

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Potter, who discussed the doctrine's relationship with the Far East and Europe respectively: Lit Brothers to Barrett (26 November 1923), Box 62, JBP, MDLC.

continue to serve such interests for another century. Concluding his comments, Coolidge noted that the American people 'cannot but be glad to know of the widespread recognition of this celebration as marking one of the important epochs in the history of our country, and of its sister republics of the three Americas.'[57] It is important to note, however, that Coolidge expressed a slightly different sentiment in his annual message to Congress on 6 December. The President reiterated that the doctrine was 'one of the main foundations of our foreign relations', however, he noted that great changes had taken place:

> We are no longer a weak Nation, thinking mainly of defense, dreading foreign imposition. We are great and powerful. New powers bring new responsibilities. Our duty [in 1823] was to protect ourselves. Added to that, our duty now is to help give stability to the world. We want idealism. We want that vision which lifts men and nations above themselves. These are virtues by reason of their own merit. But they must not be cloistered; they must not be impractical; they must not be ineffective.[58]

Here Coolidge placed a very different emphasis on the nature of the doctrine. Rather than simply lauding the doctrine, he recognised that it was not wise for the nation to adhere blindly to historic policy and Americans ought to adapt its principles when required, reflecting the prominent opinion that the doctrine now needed to be understood as a fluid policy for the good of national interests.

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[57] Coolidge to Barrett (1 December 1923), Box 62, JBP, MDLC. The letter was printed in newspapers during the week: *New York Times* (3 December 1923), p. 17.
[58] 'Message of the President of the United States to Congress, December 6, 1923', *FRUS 1923*, vol. 1, p. xxii.

The Philadelphia commemoration played host to the Republican administration's most detailed enunciation of its interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. On the 30 November and 1 December 1923, the American Academy of Political and Social Science (AAPSS) held a commemorative session of addresses in Philadelphia to honour the Monroe Doctrine's centennial. Whilst the event's immediate audience was limited to members and invited guests, all the addresses were published in the AAPSS's journal and were widely reported in newspapers. The president of the AAPSS, Leo Rowe, opened the two-day session at Philadelphia by declaring that the doctrine had 'marked the beginning of an epoch of Pan-American service of which we as citizens may well be proud.' More importantly, however, Rowe noted that the United States now faced international problems far greater in extent than in 1823 and thus the AAPSS arranged this gathering to ascertain 'the obligations of the present and the immediate future rather than to congratulate ourselves on the services of the past.'[59] The tone of this particular commemoration of the doctrine was thus set for Charles Evan Hughes' keynote.

Hughes delivered a sweeping explanation of United States foreign policy considering the Monroe Doctrine's continued importance one hundred years after its enunciation. The speech was very similar in content to another speech Hughes had given earlier that year in August before the American Bar Association in Minneapolis and they will be analysed together.[60] Hughes outlined that since its enunciation the doctrine could be regarded as modified in two particulars. Firstly, rather than only applying to the

[59] L. Rowe, 'Introductory: The Monroe Doctrine Centenary', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924), p. 5.
[60] The earlier speech was published as: C. Hughes, 'Observations on the Monroe Doctrine', *The American Journal of International Law*, 17, no. 4 (1923), pp. 611-628 and C. Hughes, 'The Monroe Doctrine After One Hundred Years', *Current History*, 19, no. 1 (1923), pp. 102-113. The AAPSS speech was published as: C. Hughes, 'The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924), pp. 7-19.

activity of European nations, the doctrine's principles now applied to all non-American powers. Secondly, the opposition to colonisation was now extended to oppose any acquisition of territory through transfers of dominion or sovereignty. These modifications, Hughes claimed, did not change the essentials of the doctrine which could now be summarised as being 'opposed to any non-American action encroaching upon the political independence of American States under any guise, and to the acquisition in any manner of the control of additional territory in this hemisphere by any non-American Power.'[61] Crucially, the United States' actions on the world stage since the turn of the century were deemed by Hughes to have been in line with this interpretation of the doctrine. The war with Spain, he argued, was fought to secure Cuban independence and the acquisitions gained because of the war were not taken to encroach upon the territory of or interfere in the political independence of the peoples of the East. The maintenance of the Open Door, which was facilitated by these acquisitions, was a pursuit of the 'same aims of independence, security, and peace which determined the declaration of Monroe.' Entering the Great War was similarly not a violation of the doctrine 'for the cause of liberty itself was at stake' and no territory was sought by the United States. Indeed, the Treaty Fight had demonstrated that as a nation the United States still desired to avoid unnecessary meddling in European affairs.[62] Turning to the present, Hughes outlined that the United States' post-war European policy was to oppose any alliance, to pursue peaceful settlements for international disputes and to facilitate an economic recovery.

[61] Hughes, 'Centenary', p. 9.
[62] Ibid., pp. 9-12.

Thus, any cooperation with Europe as an independent nation to further peace was consistent with traditional policy and not an obstacle to international cooperation.[63]

Even though there appeared to be little danger of any non-American intervention within the Western Hemisphere, Hughes warned that the future was uncertain and that the doctrine needed to remain essential policy in order to be applied whenever necessary: 'To withdraw it, or to weaken it, would aid no just interest, support no worthy cause, but would simply invite trouble by removing an established safeguard of the peace of the American Continents.'[64] Hughes made clear that the doctrine was a unilateral policy declaration and one that was maintained for the national security of the United States. Whilst foreign recognition of the doctrine was welcomed, the United States would never submit its interpretation or enforcement to other powers. Despite this, the doctrine had 'rendered an inestimable service to the American Republics.' The United States held no policy of aggression towards Latin America; rather it desired 'to make available its friendly assistance to promote stability in those of our sister Republics which are especially afflicted with disturbed conditions involving their own peace and that of their neighbors.' Hughes sought the establishment of 'a *Pax Americana* maintained not by arms but by mutual respect and good will and the tranquillizing processes of reason.' It was apparent, therefore, that whilst Pan-Americanism was 'not in strictness an application of the Monroe Doctrine,' the doctrine did not stand in the way of Pan American cooperation; 'rather it affords the necessary foundations for that cooperation in the independence and security of American states.'[65] However, Hughes was eager to note

[63] Hughes, 'Centenary', p. 13; Hughes, 'Observations', p. 627-628.
[64] Hughes, 'Centenary', p. 13.
[65] Hughes, 'Centenary', pp. 13-17; Hughes, 'Observations', p. 626-627.

that the United States maintained special polices in the Caribbean region of the highest importance, namely involving the protection of the Panama Canal. The canal's 'complete immunity from any adverse control' was deemed essential to the United States' peace and security. Any disturbances in the Caribbean were to be regarded as of 'special interest to us not for the purpose of seeking control over others but of being assured that our own safety is free from menace.' Any right to intervene in the region, however, was to stem from the rights of the United States to protect itself, not from the Monroe Doctrine.[66]

It seems clear that for Hughes the AAPSS celebration acted as an ideal location to enunciate the current position of United States foreign policy by framing it around the doctrine, which was outlined as an essential component of such policy. Hughes had already enunciated his views on the doctrine in August but with the eyes of the nation focussed on the doctrine at the close of the year it was no doubt an opportunity to reinstate the projection of policy that could not be passed. Looking at Hughes' personal papers of 1923, he often mentioned to his correspondents that the centennial was set to be an important point in the nation's history and he was keen to make the entire population of the United States aware of this.[67] Rowe concluded Hughes' address by claiming that historians of the future would 'refer to the Philadelphia address … as one of the few instances in which the official immediately responsible for the direction of our international relations has laid before the people a comprehensive review of the foreign policy of our country.' There was no doubt in Rowe's mind, then, that Hughes had

[66] Hughes, 'Centenary', p. 18; Hughes, 'Observations', pp. 620-626.
[67] For example, Hughes' first speech appeared in *Current History* as a result of him sending a copy of the text to its editor with the aim of directing the people of the United States to the doctrine's 'true content': Hughes to Oakes (24 August 1923), Reel 56, Charles Evan Hughes Papers, MDLC.

clarified national public opinion and made clear to foreign nations 'the position which America occupies in relation to them.'[68] The *Washington Post's* report on the gathering further emphasised this, claiming that Hughes' speech 'will enable millions of his countrymen to clarify and crystallize their opinions.'[69]

Hughes' famous speech, however, was just the first of a number given at the AAPSS. Following Hughes were speeches from three Latin American ministers, Jacobo Varela of Uruguay, Ricardo Alfaro of Panama and Salvador Cordova of Honduras. All three speeches embodied diplomatic niceties more than critical arguments, as they outlined that Latin America had benefited from the doctrine's existence. Alfaro, however, made certain to highlight the extent to which the doctrine was still misunderstood in the south, which was a poignant cause of diplomatic tension.[70] The session ended with speeches from international lawyer Phillip Marshall Brown and academic Harry Collings. Brown's address was certainly not celebratory and contrasted starkly with the preceding speakers. He began his address by outlining that he did not believe that the United States had achieved dominance in the hemisphere yet, claiming that the European political tradition of the Balance of Power remained as prominent as ever and had every reason to be 'deplored and resented.' The Monroe Doctrine, he continued, was established on the basis that the nations of the Western Hemisphere did not function within this political system, but crucially, he argued the United States 'has the sovereign right to protect its

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[68] L. Rowe, 'Concluding Remarks by the President of the Academy', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924), p. 20.
[69] *Washington Post* (2 December 1923), p. 28.
[70] J. Varela, 'The Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine to the Republic of Uruguay', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924), pp. 21-23; R. Alfaro, 'A Century of the Monroe Doctrine', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924), pp. 24-31; S. Cordova, 'The Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine to Honduras', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924), pp. 32-33.

national interests irrespective of the Monroe Doctrine.' To Brown, the United States had 'no valid reason or right to arrogate to itself the sole interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.' The doctrine was a Pan-American principle and whilst the United States may be forced to take the lead in defense of the hemisphere, it could not be claimed as 'private property.' Doing so led to resentment within Latin America, as the Fifth Pan American Conference had keenly demonstrated. Regardless of the reasons for its unilateral enforcement, the doctrine had 'been a policy productive of lamentable results without any apparent compensating advantages. The possibility of a genuine understanding and sympathy with these nations is becoming increasingly difficult.' In short, a unilateral enforcement of the doctrine should not dictate the United States' relations with Latin America. Defense against encroachments in the hemisphere required true Pan-American action, a 'regional understanding' for the good of the entire hemisphere in distinction from the European Balance of Power. Brown noted that this is what the PAU had been trying to achieve since its creation, but if the United States refused to accept that all the nations of the hemisphere should be co-guarantors of the doctrine, then it was doomed to fail in its purpose.[71]

Concluding the session, Professor Collins brought attention to the fact that the doctrine had a problematic amount of interpretations, meaning that the doctrine was only ever going to be 'as strong as its weakest interpretation.' There was no agreement on the true purpose of the doctrine and whilst one hundred years of history had not weakened its principles, 'popular prejudice has read into them interpretations and extensions alien to the original declaration.' Paraphrasing Otto von Bismarck's infamous criticism of the

[71] P. Brown, 'The Monroe Doctrine and Latin-America', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924), pp. 34-36.

doctrine, Collings argued that the doctrine itself was free from impertinence, rather the impertinence of the doctrine lay in its many misinterpretations. It was undeniable, he continued, that all these misinterpretations were somewhat related to the doctrine, but they were not part of its true meaning. The doctrine was not isolationist in nature and it did not demand domination of hemispheric affairs. The method by which to absolve the doctrine of its false interpretations was twofold. The first had just been carried out by Hughes, to shear it of its accretions and make it acceptable to the nations of the hemisphere. The second step, however, was more aligned to Brown's argument, to give Latin American nations a part in its maintenance.[72] Whilst the Philadelphia commemoration can primarily be seen as a stage from which Hughes outlined the Republican administration's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, tensions emerged among the presenters concerning the need to maintain the unilateral nature of the doctrine or Pan-Americanise its application, highlighting the core contention at the heart of the Monroe Doctrine's application.

Defects in Its Own Nature – The Fractured Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine

Unsurprisingly, the Monroe Doctrine centennial generated significant commentary. Newspapers, literary-political magazines and academic journals saw an influx of articles dedicated to the doctrine's meaning and application that often contrasted sharply with the celebratory tone of the commemorative events. *The Forum* headed its December issue with two articles focussing on how the Monroe Doctrine had evolved since its

[72] H. Collings, 'Misinterpreting the Monroe Doctrine', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 111, Supplement: The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine (1924), pp. 37-39.

enunciation. The editor, Henry Leach, explained in a letter to readers that the issue would address the centennial because it was claiming so much attention, however, he outlined that this was 'not because it has been found unworkable – but because minds concerned with the constructive development of our Western Countries see danger in the continuation of its strict interpretation.'[73] In the first article, former Ambassador to Argentina, Charles Sherrill, argued that a change in the doctrine's meaning was beneficial. As noted in previous chapters, Sherrill advocated the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine and he reasoned in 1923 that the doctrine needed to be 'kept up to date, and thoroughly modernized, just as our education, our business methods, our machinery.'[74] Ernest Gruening presented the counter argument, pointing to the fact that too many interpretations now existed, necessitating a return to its original meaning and application so far as possible.[75] What was clear from these two opinion pieces was that both authors were displeased with the current application of the doctrine.

As Megan Threlkeld argues, during the 1910s and 1920s women internationalists from the United States frequently criticised the nation's foreign policy in Latin America as imperialistic.[76] During the centennial, a number of suffragists reflected this stance by criticising the Monroe Doctrine as an imperialistic tool. One of the more striking commentaries came from suffrage leader Carrie Chapman Catt who spoke at a luncheon held under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association. Catt outlined that the Monroe Doctrine was 'false in theory and pernicious in its application' because there was no

[73] Leach to Barrett (10 December 1923), Box 62, JBP, MDLC.
[74] C. Sherrill, 'Monroe Reinterpreted', *The Forum* (December 1923), pp. 2161-2162.
[75] E. Gruening, 'Monroe Versus His Interpreters', *The Forum* (December 1923), pp. 2170-2178.
[76] Threlkeld notes, however, that suffragists still viewed Latin Americans as racial inferiors: M. Threlkeld, 'The Pan American Conference of Women, 1922: Successful Suffragists Turn to International Relations', *Diplomatic History*, 31, no. 5 (2007), p. 826.

logic, justice or ethics which could 'possibly make justifiable the right of any nation, by its own assumption of authority, to assume direction over any other nation without that nation's consent.' In defiance of the vocal laudations the doctrine had received, Catt claimed that Latin Americans had not forgotten the war with Mexico, Richard Olney's imperialistic reinvigoration of the doctrine, or the Roosevelt Corollary, and argued that it was now outworn and had become 'a defense of commerce and big business.' She did not blame Hughes for attempting to clarify the doctrine's meaning at the centennial, however, Hughes was only a 'temporary interpreter', as the doctrine would continue to be reinterpreted over time. She likened the doctrine to an old umbrella that one cannot dispose of: '"Ashes to ashes and dust to dust" doesn't apply to umbrellas and the Monroe Doctrine.'[77] Fellow suffragist Alice Blackwell was similarly critical, arguing in the *Woman's Journal* that the Monroe Doctrine of the twentieth century had transformed the United States from 'big brother' to 'big highwayman'. Blackwell advised women to concern themselves with the post-war situation in Latin America as well as Europe, as the fear and suspicion generated in the Western Hemisphere by the Monroe Doctrine could 'prepare the soil of war.'[78]

Inspired by the centennial, historian David Thomas published a history of doctrine that drew upon Woodrow Wilson's vision of a global Monroe Doctrine that had been enunciated during the treaty fight. Thomas argued that it had been the policies used to implement the Monroe Doctrine that had changed since 1823 rather than its core

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[77] C. Catt, 'The Monroe Doctrine and our Latin-American Relations', *Pamphlet*, 21 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1924). The *Washington Post* printed segments of Catt's address and subsequently criticised her words as worth 'very little': *Washington Post* (16 December 1923), p. 1; *Washington Post* (18 December 1923), p. 6.

[78] A. Blackwell, 'The Monroe Doctrine: The Other Side', *Woman's Journal*, 8, no. 15 (1923), p. 28.

meaning.[79] In his assessment, he argued that the anti-colonisation tenet had been well enforced and that the United States had only participated in European affairs when it 'was not of our own seeking.' He believed, however, that the main problem was that the United States had not left Latin American nations alone. Drawing upon the debates of the treaty fight, Thomas posited that the 'next step will be for the "advanced" nations not to "advance" any more at the expense of the weaker nations, and mutually to pledge themselves to restrain anyone who does.' If this could be achieved, 'the Monroe Doctrine will not have been abandoned, but will have become what Woodrow Wilson sought to make of it, the guiding principle of action for the nations of the earth.'[80]

Significant advocacy of the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine was also voiced despite the failures of the Fifth Pan American Conference. The *New York Times* featured an article by Pan-Americanist Richard Skinner who argued that the centennial ought to merit 'a freshening up of our recollections' because the principles of the doctrine were of South American origin and was always intended by Monroe and Adams to be multilateral.[81] As the cartoon that accompanied his article depicted, Skinner believed that the United States had high-handedly appropriated the doctrine as its sole property which relegated Latin American figures such as Don Manuel Torres to obscurity (Figure 5.8). Former Undersecretary of State Norman Davis signalled that after one hundred years the doctrine needed to function as a facilitator of inter-American cooperation as this was 'the role for which it was intended.'[82] Pessimism was expressed by Captain Conway Cooke who argued that international relations were as dangerous as ever and the Monroe

[79] D. Thomas, *One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1923* (New York: Macmillan, 1923), pp. vii-viii.
[80] Ibid., pp. 554-567.
[81] *New York Times* (2 December 1923), p. SM3.
[82] N. Davis, 'American Foreign Policy: A Democratic View', *Foreign Affairs*, 3, no. 1 (1924), p. 30.

Doctrine would take on more importance in the future, primarily because of the 'rise of fanatic Socialism, Bolshevism, dictatorships, and disruptive social upheavals in Europe.' In light of these potential threats, the time had arrived 'for the United States to enter Latin America on a co-operative investment basis, making the Americas a self-supporting, self-contained community of nations.'[83]

Figure 5.8: 'Mounting the South American Great Horse'



Source: *New York Times* (2 December 1923), p. SM3.

One of the most astute analyses prompted by the centennial was written by the well-connected historian Archibald Coolidge. Writing in the newly founded *Foreign*

[83] C. Cooke, 'An Expanding Doctrine', *The Outlook* (28 November 1923), pp. 539-541.

Affairs, of which he was an editor, Coolidge summarised that the dominant theme of commentary on the doctrine around the centennial had been one of 'satisfaction and praise.' With few exceptions, the American people were still proud of it as a moment of past wisdom which benefitted the entire hemisphere, yet it occupied a problematic position within the foreign relations of the United States given the extent of its interpretations. For Coolidge, the Monroe Doctrine contained 'defects in its own nature' and was threatened by the 'tendencies of the age.' The first of these was the supposed existence of an 'especial community of interests and aspirations between the peoples of the western world'; in other words, the Western Hemisphere Idea. Geographically, the separation of the New and Old Worlds was by now virtually non-existent and this was certainly the case economically. Foreign trade depended on many variables 'among which sentimental ones are apt to play a small part and are not likely to be durable.' There was no reason, after all, why 'non-contiguous American countries should deal with each other rather than with anyone else. In the long run trade will follow whatever are the natural lines.'[84] Coolidge believed it would be foolish to simply assume that the entirety of the Americas were culturally compatible, arguing that the people of the United States had far more in common with Northern European nations. Turning to Pan-Americanism, Coolidge could not deny that a natural sympathy existed between the American republics, however, the political systems of the world had changed since 1823. Republics were now far more common and even despotic in other parts of the world. Systems of governance alone, therefore, could not continue to be the justification of the Monroe Doctrine. Inter-American cooperation was certainly achievable, yet Coolidge doubted whether 'the

[84] C. [Archibald Coolidge],'The Future of the Monroe Doctrine', *Foreign Affairs*, 2, no. 3 (1924), pp. 373-376.

Monroe Doctrine and the Pan-Americanism which has grown out of it are based on any unusual solidarity between the commonwealths concerned.'[85]

Invoking the arguments of the American Anti-Imperialist Movement after the Spanish-American War, Coolidge questioned the course of United Sates policy since the turn of the twentieth century. To subscribe to the doctrine implied that the United States should refrain from interference in Europe and Asia. Through the annexation of the Philippines and advances in communication and transportation, the United States had been drawn in the affairs of Europe and Asia. Whilst the United States was justified in its entrance into the Great War, in doing so it 'assumed an active role in remaking the map of Europe and the leading one in creating a league meant sooner or later to include all nations.' This hypocrisy made the 'logic of the situation and the Monroe Doctrine look peculiar.'[86] Coolidge admitted that a shift in national interests was not necessarily problematic, yet the Monroe Doctrine ought to be 'superseded by some new conception, either because of increasing resistance to it as it stands or because its objects may be obtained by other and better means.'[87]

Latin American resistance was another vital consideration. Coolidge argued that there was no real proof the Monroe Doctrine had protected these nations from harm, and even if it had, the United States had soured any good relations the doctrine facilitated in 1823 by its war with Mexico in the 1840s. American protection was hypocrisy considering interventions in Panama and the Caribbean and the destruction of native cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Most ironically, Latin American nations

[85] Ibid., pp. 376-377.
[86] Ibid., pp. 377-379.
[87] Ibid, pp. 379-380.

feared the United States more than any European nations. Certain Latin American officials may have been vocal advocates of a Pan-Americanised Monroe Doctrine, yet the events of the Fifth Pan American Conference and Secretary Hughes' pronouncements demonstrated that such a transformation would never take place: '"Monroeism" and Pan-Americanism in spite of our efforts to reconcile them may come to represent incompatible ideals between which we shall have to choose. Such a prospect is not pleasant.'[88]

Finally, Coolidge discussed the League of Nations. He believed that the doctrine could be maintained if the United States joined the League, yet resistance was powerful. The price of the doctrine's abrogation could be considered worth paying, yet

> there is a price to pay even if it is only a sentimental one. To be sure, the mere suggestion of our being called upon to sacrifice one of our most cherished dogmas is still enough to fill with anger many, perhaps the majority, of the American people and to imperil the prospect of their adhesion to either League or Court.[89]

To Coolidge, it was not attacks from without that threatened the doctrine's integrity one hundred years after its enunciation, but its own dissolution from within.

In 1922, Charles Chapman, a historian of Latin America, argued that an official presidential message outlining the definitive meaning of the Monroe Doctrine was urgently required. The doctrine had become so misunderstood over the course of its

[88] Ibid., pp. 381-386.
[89] Ibid., pp. 387-389.

existence that it had become a 'Monroe Doctrine divided.'[90] Chapman's wish was fulfilled during the centennial anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine via President Coolidge's various comments and Secretary Hughes' lengthy address, yet there was still no consensus on what the Monroe Doctrine meant and how it ought to be applied. The Republican administration used the centennial as a platform to announce its interpretation of the doctrine and align it with its foreign policy goals, but it was unable to restore the Monroe Doctrine to a clearly defined set of principles. Since the turn of the century, the doctrine's meaning had fractured to the extent that consensus was impossible to attain among the decision-making class of the United States and the centennial only emphasised its contested meaning. Laudation did not equate to clarification as a variety of interpretations were celebrated and debated at the close 1923.

The ambiguity of President Monroe's original message made the doctrine a flexible policy that was open to continual renegotiation and during the early twentieth century and it had become a contested concept that was inextricably tied to the debates over United States foreign relations, acutely highlighting the tension between the United States' desire for both inter-American cooperation and regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. As Hughes strove to ardently protect the unilateralism of the Monroe Doctrine during the centennial, a variety of prominent Americans drew upon the discourse of the prior years of debate and voiced their own reinterpretations of the doctrine. Challenging official conceptions, Pan-Americanists remained committed to the prospect of a multilateral Monroe Doctrine and critics attacked to the doctrine whilst it was in the spotlight.

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[90] C. Chapman, 'A Monroe Doctrine Divided: Suggestion for a Presidential Message', *Political Science Quarterly*, 37, no. 1 (1922), pp. 75-82.

The fundamental guiding tenet of United States foreign policy had fractured into divergent and antithetical interpretations, reflecting the contested nature of United States foreign relations in a period of national ascendency. The once sacred doctrine that Americans frequently pledged their allegiance to now divided the nation as much as it united it. Competing notions of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation tore the doctrine's meaning apart as Americans debated the value of the two antithetical visions of post-war order that the Monroe Doctrine embodied. The tension and contestation that tainted the centennial acutely emphasized that if the United States intended to retain its prominent position on the world stage, it had to reconcile the notion of hemispheric solidarity with empire, unilateralism with multilateralisim, and cooperation with hegemony.

The centennial anniversary keenly demonstrated that it was almost impossible to invoke the doctrine without providing a disclaimer as to its meaning, yet it also emphasised how important it had become to the formation of United States foreign relations. After one hundred years of service, the doctrine remained central to the way in which the United States decision-making class understood the role of the nation in the world, serving as a medium through which they attempted to reconcile notions of hegemony and cooperation and come to terms with the future course of United States foreign relations. It remained a potent signifier of national identity and core values, yet it was now one that divided the nation in matters of foreign relations and national security as much as it united it.

Conclusion: International Core Values

Assessing the Implications of the Monroe Doctrine Debate

When Walter Lippmann described the Monroe Doctrine as a 'cluster of loyalties' in 1915, he made a remarkably perceptive analysis. Reflecting upon the currents of the Monroe Doctrine debate and writing within the context of the First World War, the young intellectual realised that the doctrine's fluid meaning was fundamentally shaping perceptions of United States foreign relations during the early twentieth century, and he hinted that this was not just a moment in which a historic foreign policy tradition was being modified and modernised. Although Lippmann was unable to frame his observation with modern terminology, he believed that the United States foreign policy elites equated the disparate interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine to core values of United States national security. Its various 'loyalties,' whatever they may be determined as, were widely perceived as essential components of the American way of life that required defending from external threats.

Lippmann did not attempt to discern what these loyalties were, and this study has sought to find out. Through examining the ways in which the Monroe Doctrine's meaning was reinterpreted between the Spanish-American War of 1898 and its centennial anniversary in 1923, it has argued that the doctrine functioned as a national security framework that justified new directions in United States foreign relations during a pivotal moment in the nation's ascendancy. It has posited that regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and inter-American cooperation were the two overarching core values of

United States national security that the doctrine embodied during the early twentieth century. As the doctrine was renegotiated to facilitate the maintenance of these notions, its meaning fractured into two interpretations that represented the antithetical nature of United States national security. By presenting both regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation as fundamental to the existence of the United States, the doctrine highlighted the importance of Latin America within conceptions of national security, and its capricious meaning reflected the discord that permeated perceptions of the nation's role in the world.

In retrospect, it is not particularly surprising that the Monroe Doctrine played such an integral role in the formation of United States national security policy. The doctrine held a semi-sacred status among citizens of the United States and it was frequently showered with as much admiration as other documents that generated core values, such as the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution. The doctrine had already become steeped in a discourse of national security by the turn of the twentieth century and had been positioned as a policy that guarded, defended, secured, and protected the citizens and territory of the United States. A verse from Le Roy F. Lewis' 1896 musical dedication to President Grover Cleveland serves as a popular example of this relationship between the doctrine and the language of security:

The coast of fair America
We'll guard from every foe,
And spread o'er the glorious land

The Doctrine of Monroe.[1]

As the United States Empire expanded over the course of the early twentieth century and the German and Japanese empires assumed the role of potential foes, the doctrine's alignment to practical matters of national security only grew more prominent. It was affiliated with the necessity of naval expansion and demands for military preparedness, and as Elihu Root explained during the peak of the Monroe Doctrine debate, the doctrine was understood as a policy of security that rested 'upon the right of self-protection'.[2]

More importantly, the Monroe Doctrine established a unique discursive linkage between ideologies of hegemony and cooperation and established what can be described as a "Monroe Doctrine discourse." The doctrine acted as a nexus for debates over disparate facets of United States foreign relations, including imperialism, trade, race, and international law, and it permitted United States elites to relate these facets to notions of hegemony and cooperation in what Lippmann would describe as 'familiar' ways. The need to establish hegemony in the Western Hemisphere was one of the many ambiguous messages present in the original enunciation of the doctrine in 1823, as was the antithetical notion of inter-American cooperation, and the doctrine positioned Latin America at the geographic heart of United States national security. Yet in the early twentieth century, Americans were torn between the need to maintain hegemonic control or foster Pan-American unity. Rarely could the two be reconciled, given the range of opinions that Americans held on issues such as race, imperialism, and strategic and economic interests, and the course of United States foreign relations appeared less certain

[1] L. Lewis, *The Doctrine of Monroe* (Brooklyn: Chas. W. Held, 1896).
[2] Root, 'Real Monroe Doctrine', p. 11.

and preordained as a result. Like the doctrine itself, national security was fluid and subjective. Beyond the defence of citizens and territory, it contained no inherent meaning and was a contested concept that was reinterpreted and reassigned core values to suit the needs and demands of the time. What made the Monroe Doctrine such an ideal yet problematic indicator of core values was its equivocal and contradictory meaning.

Ultimately, through outlining the Monroe Doctrine's relationship to United States national security, this thesis has provided an alternative approach to the identification of United States core values. Historians of United States foreign relations predominantly identify core values as domestic in nature. Liberty, democracy, and capitalism are touchstones in studies of national security and Melvyn Leffler specifically argues that national security policy 'encompasses the decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect *domestic* core values from external threats.'[3] Yet an examination of the Monroe Doctrine debate has demonstrated that core values were not solely domestic ideals - they were additionally generated outside national borders. As such, this study proposes an expanded definition of United States national security and argues that to acquire a more detailed understanding of the concept, historians ought to reconsider the categorisation of core values by looking to the world stage and identifying "international core values" of national security that the United States sought to defend at all costs. Rather than a domestic core value, regional hegemony can be identified as an "imperial core value" of national security that framed the American way of life in terms of its relationship to empire and imperialism. On the other hand, inter-American cooperation functioned as a "Pan-American core value" that the United States subscribed to. These ideological values

[3] Leffler, 'National Security', p. 25. Emphasis added.

dominated the conduct of United States foreign relations during the early twentieth century and were promoted both domestically and abroad as embodiments of the American way of life *on the world stage*.

However, this is not to argue that international and domestic core values are disconnected from one another. Although regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation represented the American way of life on the world stage, and were defended to protect the United States' international identity, they were often promoted to maintain and protect domestic core values simultaneously. As this thesis has demonstrated, inter-American cooperation was perceived as a progressive means to promote United States domestic values within Latin America, and regional hegemony was deemed essential for the maintenance of liberty and democracy within the Western Hemisphere. International core values were defended in of themselves, but by doing so, United States elites sought to secure a world (or at the very least a hemisphere) that was receptive to its domestic core values. As such, national security ought to be considered as a layered paradigm.

This study of the Monroe Doctrine debate provides additional insights into the narrative of United States foreign relations during the early twentieth century. Firstly, it highlights the relationship that notions of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation had with national perceptions of race and empire. United States elites considered racial hierarchies and the nature of imperialism in different ways depending on which core value they adhered to the most, and the analysis of Elihu Root's Pan-American policies in Chapter Two serves as an acute example of how amorphous these perceptions were. Secondly, it positions the Monroe Doctrine as a crucial facet of the nation's reaction to the outbreak of the First World War. The doctrine served as a potent

medium through which United States elites determined the nation's security demands and its diplomatic relations with Latin America and the belligerent nations during the period of neutrality. As Iowan historian Harry Plum proclaimed in 1918, Americans believed that 'this war had violated the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine.'[4]

A detailed analysis of the history of the Monroe Doctrine during the early twentieth century further stipulates that the treaty fight needs to be reconsidered as a trichotomy rather than a choice between quasi-isolationism and internationalism. By placing the Monroe Doctrine debate within the narrative of the treaty fight, it becomes clear that Americans were torn between three different post-war approaches to internationalism: either policies of unilateralism, global organisation, or regional organisation. It additionally draws attention to the importance of the overlooked Monroe Doctrine centennial anniversary. The centennial was more than a moment of celebration and it functioned as a stage from which notions of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation were debated.

Moreover, the Monroe Doctrine debate was the period in which Canada's relationship with the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism was first seriously considered. Often assumed or ignored, Canada's relationship with United States hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and an inter-American system emerged as a point of discussion throughout the debate. As early as 1902, a letter was published in the *New York Times* indicating that the doctrine's maintenance would soon revolve around questions of 'coaling stations, of the trans-isthmian canal, and, last and most important,

[4] H. Plum, 'The Monroe Doctrine and the War', *University of Iowa Extension Bulletin*, 31 (1918), p. 21.

of the status of Canada.'[5] Although it remained a relatively niche subject, by 1923 Pan-Americanists like John Barrett were arguing that 'the Pan American Union is a Part American Union, because Canada … has no voice in the practical workings of Pan American commerce, friendship and general cooperation for the common good of the Western Hemisphere.'[6] Finally, this thesis demonstrates the importance that the doctrine held within the United States' national consciousness during this period and signifies that the Progressive Era was a crucial moment in the doctrine's evolution. Much of the discourse that surrounded the doctrine during the debate remained affiliated to the doctrine throughout the remainder of the century and even persists to this day.

Between 1923 and 1945, the Monroe Doctrine continued to serve as a national security framework as it had done since the turn of the century. Both overarching reinterpretations of the doctrine that had developed after the Spanish-American War persisted and notions of regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation remained central to the conduct of United States foreign relations. Moreover, the demands for the pan-americanisation of the Monroe Doctrine that had their genesis during the early twentieth century found considerable advocacy in the 1930s. Although regional hegemony remained a policy priority throughout the 1920s, the Hoover administration began to initiate a drive to closer inter-American relations.[7] In 1930, the Clark Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine was published which disavowed the Roosevelt Corollary, thus removing an iconic embodiment of hegemonic control from the official

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
[5] *New York Times* (24 August 1902), p. 8.
[6] 'Shall Canada Become a Member of the Pan American Union?' (19 February 1923), Box 95, JBP, MDLC. Emphasis in original. See also: 'Members and Subjects of the Pan-American Conference', *The Outlook* (14 March 1923), p. 470; *New York Times* (18 December 1925), p. 22.
[7] A. McPherson, 'Herbert Hoover, Occupation Withdrawal. And the Good Neighbor Policy', *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 44, no. 4 (2014), pp. 623-639; DeConde, *Hoover's Latin American Policy*.

interpretation of the doctrine.[8] Dexter Perkins argues that by the 1930s there had been a 'complete reversal' of the interventionism of the 1900s and 1910s, which was keenly demonstrated by the revoking of the Platt Amendment in 1934. By 1941 and United States entry into the Second World War, it seemed clear that 'the great body of the American people were entirely ready to accept the concept of hemispheric solidarity.'[9] Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy made great strides in the multilateralisation of the Monroe Doctrine and, as Mark Stuckey argues, the President sought to reshape the doctrine in terms of increasing inter-American solidarity and 'strengthening hemispheric security.'[10] Indeed, Raymond Buell, the President of the Foreign Policy Association, described Roosevelt's Latin American policy in 1934 as extending the Monroe Doctrine to defend Latin America from the United States as well as extra-hemispheric threats.[11] Whereas *Seven Seas* had presented the Monroe Doctrine as a hegemonic hemispheric security zone in 1915 (Figure 3.8), comparable imagery from the 1940s after the formation of a Pan-American security zone via the Declaration of Panama adopted a greater equilibrium between control and cooperation (Figure 6.1). United States

[8] United States Department of State, *Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine: Prepared by J. Rueben Clark Undersecretary of State December 17, 1928* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1930), pp. xxiii-xxiv. See also: G. Sessions, 'The Clark Memorandum Myth', *The Americas*, 34, no. 1 (1977), pp. 40-58.
[9] Perkins, *Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 346-362.
[10] M. Stuckey, *The Good Neighbor: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Rhetoric of American Power* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2013), p. 174. See also: Scarfi, 'Monroe Doctrine', p. 218; Loveman, *No Higher Law*, pp. 242-250; M. Gilderhus, 'The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications', *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36, no. 1 (2006), p. 13; J. Doenecke and M. Stoler, *Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign Policies, 1933-1945* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 124-125; R. Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1995), p. 176; G. Haines, 'The Roosevelt Administration Interprets the Monroe Doctrine', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 24, no. 3 (1978), pp. 332-345; Wood, *Good Neighbor Policy*, pp. 355.
[11] R. Buell, 'The Monroe Doctrine: A New Phase and its Significance', *New York Times* (7 January 1934), p. XX3.

hegemony had to be protected from the Axis powers, but so too did inter-American solidarity.

Figure 6.1: 'U.S. Defense Map and Western Hemisphere Strategic Bases'



Source: Richfield Oil Company, *U.S. Defense Map and Western Hemisphere Strategic Bases* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1941)

However, by the onset of the Cold War, the nature of United States national security was so far removed from that of the early twentieth century that the Monroe Doctrine ceased to generate vital core values. With reference to Latin America, Lars Schoultz argues that after the Second World War, a new 'consensually held belief

system' directed United States policy makers, who sought at all costs to prevent communism from taking hold in the region.[12] Regional hegemony and inter-American cooperation were no longer held as core values, but strategies in defence of a new core value: Western democratic capitalism. The Monroe Doctrine was reinterpreted as a tool of containment and in March 1950, George Kennan formulated the Kennan Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which considered any attempt to extend communism to the Western Hemisphere a threat to United States national security.[13]

Yet the Monroe Doctrine debate of the early twentieth century established an important relationship between the United States and Latin America. Not only did it simultaneously generate advocacy for notions of hegemony and cooperation, it denoted Latin America as a region that was of vital interest to United States national security. Although tensions persisted between the approaches the United States ought to take in its relations with its sister republics, it was clear that the region would continue to determine the international core values of United States national security.

[12] Schoultz, *National Security*, pp. 13-14.
[13] Smith, *Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 65-72. It is worth noting that it was during the Monroe Doctrine debate that the doctrine first began to take on an anti-Communist slant. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, references to the relationship between the Monroe Doctrine and a potential Russian or Bolshevik threat dotted articles and speeches. See for example: Bingham, 'Future Monroe Doctrine', p. 395; Cooke, 'Expanding Doctrine', pp. 539-541.

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