Analogy and Dialectics

A Genealogical Comparison of Hegel and Przywara

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The Genealogy of Analogy and Dialectics

Analogy is a form of grammar that differentiates many distinct terms that remain related by a proportionate similitude, and dialectics is a mode of argument that opposes many contradictory theses for the purpose of resolving these contradictions into a synthetic unity of opposites. Both principles have been alternatively championed as central principles of theology: analogy has been presented as a metaphysical-causal principle of the proportionate participation of imperfect analogate in perfect analogon terms; while dialectics has alternatively been presented as an onto-noetic principle that annuls so as to preserve contradictory theses. But both have also been placed in implacable opposition by Platonists and Aristotelians, Thomists and Hegelians, Catholics and Protestants: both were already opposed in the ancient academy of Plato and Aristotle; were antagonistically systematized by late medieval scholastics and early modern idealists; and have more recently engendered endless controversies concerning the nature of theological language, divine names, and even the very possibility of theology.

The champions of analogy and dialectics typically subordinate one to the other. Analogy is subordinated to dialectics as an equivocal opposition of theses, while dialectics is subordinated to analogy as a restricted hypo-dialectics between terms. This mutual subordination is intended to preserve the purity of analogy and dialectics, but proves to subvert both principles: for when dialectics is subordinated to analogy the force of its contradictory theses can be fossilized; and when analogy is subordinated to dialectics the bonds of participation between its analogate terms can be broken. This broken analogy can, afterwards, no more grammatically intermediate opposed terms, than this fossilized dialectics can argumentatively unite opposites. Each instead remains paralyzed in its fixed opposition to the other. But because analogy possesses the power to suspend any distinction between terms, and dialectics possesses the power to sublate any opposition between theses, dialectics can erupt from its fossilized form to restore the broken bonds of analogy.

Analogy and dialectics can concretely coincide, therein, even as each are abstractly distinguished. Their recurring opposition results from the abstract distinction between their positive and negative

operations: for analogy positively unites analogate terms by intermediating grammatical relations in their analogon terms; while dialectics negatively divides abstract propositional theses into contradictory antitheses for the purpose of sublating both into the intermediating logical relations of shared syntheses. Both are meant to intermediate distinct terms and theses but analogy positively unites them while dialectics negatively divides them. But because every negative division must also remain related to a positive unity, both can be re-united in the principle of the analogy of being.

The analogy of being (*analogia entis*) is a grammatical, causal, and metaphysical principle of proportionate participation between imperfect analogate and perfect analogon terms. It was first formulated in ancient philosophy as a generic analogy of one over many, but was later re-formulated in medieval theology as an analogy of attribution and proportion. Late medieval theologians rejected it, but Hegel and Przywara have reconceived and reaffirmed it in two competing models of dialectics and analogy: Hegel's analogical dialectics, in which analogy is subordinated to dialectics and contradictions are resolved in the Absolute Idea; and Przywara's dialectical analogy, in which dialectics is subordinated to analogy and contradictions are retained in the Absolutum Mysterium. The mutual subordination of analogy and dialectics subverts both models, but also allows each model to be reconstructed into the modern speculative analogy.

Since analogy and dialectics are formally distinct, the inner unity of these principles cannot be discerned from any direct analysis of their definite forms. Analogy and dialectics are conventionally segregated into separate spheres of terms and propositions: analogy is placed in the sphere of many auxiliary analogate terms that are interrelated in and through one primary analogon term; while dialectics is placed in the sphere of many abstract antitheses that are interrelated in and through one concrete synthesis. Both consist in many abstract terms and theses but both may be interrelated in and through one concrete analogon-synthesis. This concrete analogon-synthesis can, however, never be artificially and analytically dismantled, but can only be organically and synthetically reconstructed, by following a long and winding path through each successive historical configuration. Its concrete unity of opposites may, accordingly, never be grasped until each successive configuration of analogy and dialectics has been adequately articulated through the tandem movement of their shared genealogy.

Most genealogies merely excavate the ancestry of some suspect concept so as to expose the alternative possibilities that lie hidden at the roots of its historical emergence. Any concept that pretends to be incontestably necessary may, through this method, be unmasked in its alterable contingency. Genealogies can thus fulfil the critical function of de-constructing the narratival necessity of any concept into mutually contradictory and alternative narratives, from which none may be advanced as any more logically necessary than any other. Yet this function must clearly be subverted at the apex of its achievement for the simple reason that genealogical de-construction can also be turned upon itself so that it too may be de-constructed, demonstrated to be contingent, and blunted as a critical instrument. Genealogy thus appears to 'self-deconstruct' into an infinitely prolific flux of narratival contingency that can drown any demonstrative de-construction into the sea of its own no less necessary but even more self-reinforcing contingency.

This genealogy of analogy and dialectics must be distinguished from all contingent genealogies for the simple reason that it must teleologically presuppose the Trinity, which is alone and for itself absolutely necessary. Since each ancestor at every successive stage of a genealogy must teleologically presuppose the end of its ultimate descendent, and this genealogy is meant to show how its subject matter must comingle and coincide in its essential relations, each successive configuration of analogy and dialectics must teleologically presuppose that it is determined by the Trinity. And since analogy and dialectics must prove to be not merely the matter of analysis but also the very method for that analysis, the method with which this genealogy begins must be equally predetermined by and derived from this same singular source. Since, finally, the divine essence is only necessary for itself, the Trinity must determine this entire genealogy in and by its own inner and absolute necessity.

Analogy and dialectics appear to have been haphazardly formed and re-formed, throughout the strata of historically submerged systems within a kaleidoscopic medley of forms that share no single common ancestor. Yet this flurry of forms must remain related, in each successive configuration, by its shared semiotic relations. Signs are the common medium of analogy and dialectics. The terms of analogy and the theses of dialectics can be constructed from the semiosis of simple signs, through increasingly complex meta-semiotic paradigms, into the omni-semiosis of the Trinity. Since each

person is fully divine, each divine person possesses all signs. But because the Son first signifies the Father, the totality of all signs must signify one another in and through an originary semiotic surplus. This originary omni-semiosis is the shared semiotic medium from which all of the distinct configurations of analogy and dialectics proceed from and return within the Trinity.

Since the divine persons of the Trinity must eternally proceed from the Father to the Son to the Holy Spirit before the creation of the world and its ensuing history of thought, any thought of dialectics and analogy can only be thought at all by the light of its final fulfilment. The genealogy of analogy and dialectics must, accordingly, presuppose its end as its beginning – like a snake that devours its own tail – so that the content of each successive configuration can anticipate and participate in its consummate coincidence. But because each configuration must also serially fail to fulfil this consummate coincidence, each inevitably unravels its relations to disband analogy and dissolve dialectics. Since, however, each moment also anticipates and participates in the relationality of the Trinity, all of these dispersed elements can be gathered up again and re-articulated into ever new configurations that can retain all of the previous moments as their genetic inheritance.

Since this genealogy teleologically presupposes the unity of analogy and dialectics in the Trinity, it cannot be derived from any lowlier observation of any lesser form. No analytic deduction or empirical analysis will suffice to satisfy its highest aims. It must rather proceed through a dialectical movement of successive analogical configurations from original configuration, to collapsing dis-configuration, to its consummate re-configuration. Its method must, accordingly, be both dialectical and analogical: it must dialectically divide each original configuration into abstract analogate-antitheses and analogically combine both into concrete analogon-syntheses for the purpose of suspending and sublating each successive configuration in and for its highest source. Analogical judgements can thus act as the theses of dialectics, but the antitheses of dialectics can only be resolved by analogy as each are successively annulled and sublated into ever higher and richer configurations.

The modern speculative analogy is the supreme configuration of analogy and dialectics, in which analogate terms are interchangeably related through dialectics, dialectical theses are intermediated

through analogy, and analogy and dialectics can reflect upon so as to know themselves in the singularly self-knowing Idea of the Trinity. Since the Trinity is teleologically presupposed, its supremely speculative analogy must also be anticipated at each successive stage, and its method must be both analogical and dialectical. But because each successive configuration fails to fulfil its purpose, this method must also prove inadequate until it has been fully realized at the end. The method must, thereby, prove to be nothing other than the analogy and dialectics that are known through the Idea of the Trinity. The Trinity can, accordingly, continually operate in the background as the dialectical motor and analogical framework for every foregrounded configuration of analogy and dialectics until the foreground can be fully opened to the background.

The following genealogy is meant to chart the path that leads, through its vestigial triadic reflections, to this unity of analogy and dialectics in the Idea of the Trinity: (1) the ancient generic analogy is the one supremely generic and universal subject of all predication that opposes all particular and specific multiplicity within so as to dissolve itself into this self-opposed particularity of substantival signs; (2) the medieval analogy of attributive proportion is the self-opposed particularity of non-generic transcendental predication of the hidden hyper-generic and universal subject whose self-opposed predication of the dual analogies of attribution and proportion is objectivized and subjectivized into the individuality of de-substantivized pure signs; and (3) the modern speculative analogy is the individuality of these pure signs in intuitions that are constructed into concepts to predicate all objects of pure objectless subjectivity and all subjects of pure subjectless objectivity, as each are annulled in their shared self-oppositivity, but both are preserved in the essential relations of the Trinity.

This unity of analogy and dialectics in the Trinity has hitherto remained concealed because each principle has been artificially consigned to the distinct domains of grammar, logic, and metaphysics, even as the principles of theology have been cast beyond the furthest stars: analogy has been construed as the grammatical structure of metaphysical causation; dialectics has been construed as the logical mixture of contradictory arguments; and the Trinity has been derided even as it is defended as the most inconceivable and incommunicable article of an ancient faith. This dissertation will attempt to demonstrate that each principle must genealogically interpenetrate and theologically coincide; that

nothing can be or be thought that is not always already both analogical and dialectical; and that analogy and dialectics are nothing if not united in and through the essential relations of the Trinity.

1. Ancient Generic Analogy

Ancient generic analogy, from Plato to Proclus, is a proportion between one generic and many specific forms that is suspended from and within a supreme hyper-genus. All forms are meant to be proportionately related within the hyper-genus in a genus-species hierarchy from the most universal genus to the most particular species. This genus-species hierarchy produces a contradiction that catalyses the dialectic of the ancient generic analogy: for, as the supreme genus, the hyper-genus is both the genus of all genera as well as the genus of itself; but because it is the genus of itself, it must be a genus beyond all other genera. The hyper-genus is, thus, both a genus within itself and not within itself; or, a genus in and beyond every genera. Since, moreover, the hyper-genus is also the genus of all genera and, as such, must contain every specific form and any contradiction, it must subsume even this contradictory genericity of a genus in and beyond every genera back within the hyper-genericity of the hyper-genus. Since it is in and beyond every genus, the hyper-genericity of the hyper-genus must continually exceed every genera to separate itself as one genus over many genera. But because this hyper-genus also contains all genera, it must subsume even this very own self-exceeding of many genera back into one single genus. Hyper-genericity thus produces a dialectical movement of one genus over many genera, in which the supreme hyper-genus exceeds so as to separate itself from and then return to subsume all genera into itself: Plato first universalized all generic forms into Ideas arrayed in a genus-species hierarchy that collapses upon the paradox of participation; Aristotle then individualized each genera into the essence of causally interlinked substances that are de-substantivized into indeterminate individua; and Plotinus and Proclus finally particularized each into the opposition between participants and participated in and against this single hyper-genus. The dialecticity of hyper-genericity ultimately produces an acidic hyper-negativity of self-opposed particularity that separates every genus from its specie to subvert any subordination of many specie to one genera to dissolve all of its proportionate relation into a multiplicity of substantival signs.

1.1. Plato

Analogy was first studied by the followers of Pythagoras, while dialectics was first studied by the followers of Parmenides. Yet both were first bound together into a single principle by Plato. The discovery of infinite continued fractions prompted him to transform the Pythagorean quantitative analogy of finite mathematical proportions into qualitatively infinite continuous proportions in and between all predicative terms. The semanticization of the negative difference of Parmenides in Heraclitean flux similarly inspired him to transform indeterminate negativity into determinative negations for the dialectical construction of a cosmological analogy.[1] The *locus classicus* for the unity of analogy and dialectics most inconspicuously appears in the "truly beautiful bond" (ἀναλογία κάλλιστα) that binds the first, middle, and last terms in a continued proportion, where each term acts as the intermediating middle term between the first and last extremes, from which a dialectical mixture of opposed terms may be united into a single proportionate analogy.[2] This dialectical construction of the cosmos is meant to bind together every part through an all-encompassing mixture where analogy and dialectics are interwoven to coincide as one.

Analogy first appears in the guise of metaphors, while dialectics is first found in the voice of dialogue. Plato's many myths operate, within his dialogues, as metaphoric analogies, where fanciful images can signify super-sensible Ideas (*eide*).[3] In the *Cratylus*, Plato argues, against both radical conventionalism and naïve naturalism, that the meaning of every metaphor, word, sign - and even the very possibility of thought and speech - must depend on an analogy between the signifying name and the signified essence, which can only be discerned through a dialectical process of division and definition.[4] He subsequently developed these metaphoric analogies into various analogical inferences, where some observed similarity between two objects may imply some further unobserved similarity.[5]

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[1] Plato, *Cratylus*, 439b-440b; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 987a29, 1078b12.
[2] Plato, *Timaeus*, 31c-32a. Cf. Paul Pritchard, "The Meaning of Δύναμις at Timaeus 31c". *Phronesis*, vol. 35, no. 2 (1990): 182-193.
[3] Plato, *Cratylus*, 438d.
[4] Plato, *Cratylus*, 385a-391b.
[5] Plato, *Republic*, 368e, 375a, 440d, 444c, 451d, 459b; Cf. Richard Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 204-217; G.E.R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early*

In the 'Good City' (*Kallipolis*) of the *Republic*, Plato externalized and politicized this analogical inference into an ideal of justice, in which the entire city appears as an analogy for the justice of the soul, and its curriculum of philosophic education culminates in the study of dialectics.[6]

Socrates appears to have practiced disputational dialectics to question hypotheses and discern the definition of terms. Yet it was Plato who, for the purpose of overcoming the unmediated negativity of Heraclitean flux, first began to hunt for true definitions by hypostatizing these hypothetical definitions into self-subsisting forms, or Ideas.[7] Plato thus began to hypostatize these hypotheses, first as they are posited by the soul, but finally as they meant to constitute the soul in its own self-movement.[8] Yet this hypostatization of hypotheses immediately produced a paradox of participation, in which participating hypotheses are both like and unlike the hypostatic Ideas in which each participate: for since the universal Ideas are formally different from but identical in being with the particular instances, Ideas are – in their simple self-identity – both identical and not identical to their particular participants.[9] The supreme hypothesis of all hypotheses is, ultimately, nothing less than the science of all sciences that paradoxically exceeds and returns into itself by including the opposites of science and non-science in one universal science of wisdom.[10] Since this participation of hypotheses in Ideas also extends to all images, even Plato's myths and metaphors can be constituted as analogies to bind together the images of discourse into various qualitative proportions with the Ideas.

The metaphor of the Sun, at the apex of all metaphoric analogies in the *Republic*, is the peak at which Plato first fully transfigures Socratic questioning (*elenchus*) into a dialectical logic that ascends to and descends from the unhypothetical (*anupotheton*) highest metaphor and first principle of the Good itself. He writes: "As the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world of vision and the objects of vision."[11] The Idea of the Good itself thus appears as the first principle, beyond every thought of being, that gives "truth to the objects of

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Greek Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 389-403; Constantine Ritter, *The Essence of Plato's Philosophy* (Oxford: Routledge, 2015), 256.

[6] Plato, *Republic*, 368e, 504a. Cf. Robinson, 204.

[7] Aristotle, *Metaphysic*s, 1086b. Cf. Plato, *Euthydemus*, 290c; *Meno*, 75c; *Theaetetus*, 187bc, 200e-201a.

[8] Plato, *Phaedo*, 100a-d.

[9] Plato, *Phaedo*, 100c-101e; *Parmenides*, 130e-131e.

[10] Plato, *Charmides*, 169b-170d.

[11] Plato, *Republic*, 508b-511e.

knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower."[12] It divides reality, through the analogy of the *Divided Line*, into "two unequal sections" of intelligible and sensible realms that are "divided again in the same ratio."[13] This division of reality by analogy allows Plato to develop dialectics into a hypothetical-deductive method: for, since the absolute transcendence of the principle of the Good, beyond all intermediary boundaries, also makes it absolutely immanent in every thought, the principle of the Good may immediately impart being so as to hypostatize each contingent hypotheses as a necessary unhypothesis. Where formerly Socrates had asked to set "speech against speech" to judge each opposed hypothesis by testing its consequences, after this division of reality by the *Divided Line* he instead recommends a circuitous dialectical movement that advances from contingent hypotheses to the necessary unhypothesis that transcends hypotheses and alone ensures the very possibility of dialectics.[14]

Dialectics depends, for its unhypothetical necessity, upon the hypostatization of the metaphoric analogy of the Sun that is hypostasized in the Idea of the Good. Since, however, this very hypostatization ultimately depends, for its discursive construction, upon the science of dialectics, analogy must be circuitously circumscribed within the circle of dialectics. Plato first describes this art of dialectics, under the light of the Good, as the supremely speculative science that educates the philosopher kings to rise from hypotheses to "that which requires no assumption and is the starting point of all" in the realm of "pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas."[15] It is meant to move in a spiralling motion from hypotheses through hypotheses spiralling on an asymptotic approach towards unhypothetical Ideas. Its infinite approximation, from many oppositive hypotheses to one unhypothetical henad, can only be terminated, in each successive movement, by the immediate impartation of individual unity from the simple unicity of the Good: the one-many problematic of dialectics can only be resolved, in this way, through the hypostatization of many into one by the previously hypostatized metaphoric analogy of the Sun in the Good. The asymptotic ascent from many hypotheses to one unhypothetical henad thus depends, at the entrance to the

[12] Plato, *Republic*, 508e-509c.
[13] Plato, *Republic*, 509d-e.
[14] Plato, *Republic*, 348a-b, 510b; *Phaedo*, 100a; *Hippias Minor*, 369d; Cf. Robinson, 81.
[15] Plato. *Republic*, 503b, 505a, 511b-c. Cf. Robinson, 160.

Allegory of the Cave, upon the immediate impartation of unity by the Good, while the metaphoric analogies of the soul, the city, and even the Good itself altogether depend for their discursive construction upon the power of dialectic, which is circuitously employed at the beginning even as it is eternally consummated at the end.[16]

Analogy and dialectics can coincide in the supreme principle of the Good, but their circuitous coincidence produces a paradox of Ideas: for as an Idea beyond all the Ideas, the Good is, no less than the science of sciences, paradoxically in and beyond itself; the Good can impart this paradox into each and every Idea; and analogy and dialectics can accordingly circle around and coincide with this originary paradox. Dialectics must thus continually exceed so as to return within so as to repeatedly reconstitute itself in each and every analogical formation. Since each can coincide in the Good, this dialectical construction of analogy proves to be an analogical configuration of dialectics: for the dialectical construction is meant to divide all genera into a genus-species hierarchy of analogical forms that are subsequently combined to super-determine the order of questions, hypotheses, and henads in the spiralling movement of dialectics.[17] The dialectical division of genera into specie can thus reiterate the previous Parmenidean inscription of negation within Being itself, while the combination of specifically differentiated terms into definitions can reiterate the Pythagorean construction of continuous proportions in a new dialectical analogy. Yet since these proportions form of analogy are now inscribed with the negativity of dialectics, can continuously re-circumscribe the excessive negativity of the Good to 'destroy' each analogical formation of successive dialectical hypotheses.[18] Although opposing hypotheses are meant to be successively posited, contradicted, and annulled, this infinitely reiterated self-annulling dyadic opposition must also be united in and through a triadic unity of opposites by its participation in the simple unity of the Good.[19]

Plato directly confronted these paradoxes in the *Parmenides* by dialectically dispersing analogy into an ever more aporetic multiplicity. The barrage of arguments against the paradoxical consequences of

[16] Plato, *Meno*, 80d-e; *Theaetetus*, 209a-e.
[17] Robinson, 64. Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 263a-264c; *Cratylus*, 426a.
[18] Robinson, 161.
[19] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Plato's Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus*, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 76, 93.

participation in the first half of *the Parmenides* appear to have dissolved any participative unity of opposites into an endlessly aporetic multiplicity of contradictory hypotheses: the 'Third Man Argument' implies that there must be an infinitude of forms between each participated henad and its participant hypotheses; while the 'Greatest Difficulty Argument' implies an unmediated duality between all universal forms and particular instances.[20] To answer these arguments Plato prescribes a "severe training" of dialectical exercises to explore the hypothetical possibilities of predicating one of many and many of one. Since, however, the difference between one participated universal and many particular participants must remain unmediated, each successive one-and-many predication must reiterate the originary paradox. The dialectical exercises of *the Parmenides* thus threaten to dissolve each and every henadic unity of hypothetical opposites into an infinite differentiation of differentia, and break the bonds of analogy into an entirely indistinct flux of difference without differences.

This dialectical dissolution that breaks the bonds of analogy also allowed Plato to begin to reconceive of the nothingness of Parmenides as a relative non-being of relational negations in various determinative negations. The unmediated difference between being and nothing had, in the *Parmenides*, produced the equally unmediated difference between the many particular participating hypotheses and one participated universal unhypothesis. Yet once Plato has demonstrated this unmediated difference to produce an infinite differentiation of infinite differentia, then all of its differences could be folded back in and upon being. And once the nothingness of Parmenides had been reconceived, in this way, as a relative non-being, that is always virtually derived as a privation from being, then he can also reconceive of every negation as a relational negation that remains related to some further positive determination as its determinative negation.[21] Once dialectics has dissolved the paradox of participation, then Plato can reconceive of the negative difference between hypotheses in dialectics as a determinative negativity that divide so as to recombine every difference into further analogical formations. The division of every species in and under an over-arching genus can accordingly be analogously re-combined through its determinative negations. Dialectical division

[20] Plato, *Parmenides*, 132a-134e.
[21] Plato, *Sophist*, 256d-e.

may afterwards configure each self-articulating genera, by dividing and combining itself within itself, in imitation of the Good that exceeds and returns within into its own analogy.[22]

The Beautiful Bond is the analogy of the Good itself that uniquely unites both simple elemental qualities through quantitative proportions in complex qualitative bond and binds analogy and dialectics into a single cosmological analogy. Plato promises, in the *Timaeus*, to further reify the metaphoric analogy of soul and the city in cosmology.[23] Yet unlike the merely metaphorical city of the *Republic*, this cosmological analogy of the *Timaeus* must be necessarily "created by some cause" according to an "unchangeable pattern."[24] It's originary creative cause is nothing less than the immediately imparted cause of the unitary being of every dialectical mixture: in the *Philebus*, Socrates describes it as a 'divine method' for dialectically mixing the oppositive hypotheses of unlimited phenomena in limited forms.[25] Since, it can only be explained as "a wondrous regulating intelligence" that orders "the sun, the moon, the stars, and the revolutions of the whole heaven", the dialectical method of the *Philebus* must be caused by the cosmological analogy of the *Timaeus* so that this cosmological analogy must be caused by the 'divine method' of dialectics.[26]

The cosmological analogy of the Timaeus is thus meant to be dialectically constructed in a speech that imitates the originary divine creation: the divine craftsman (*demiurge*) mixes simple elements into complex mixtures according to eternal forms (*archetypes*), and in which these forms are imitated by a creaturely dialectic of copies (*ectypes*) that are reflexively related to the originals by analogy.[27] The Beautiful Bond is the central Platonic analogy that is meant to mix together 'unlimiteds' with 'limiteds', *ectypes* with *archetypes*, and microscopic elements within the macroscopic World-Soul. Although it is presented as a quantitative analogy of continued proportions, its terms are unmistakably qualitative elements that have been dialectically constructed from the mixture of delimited forms into lines, polygons, and polyhedra: the *tetrahedron* (fire), *octahedron* (air), *icosahedron* (water), and *cube*

[22] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 265e.
[23] Plato, *Timaeus*, 26c.
[24] Plato, *Timaeus*, 28a.
[25] Plato, *Philebus*, 16c, 23c-26e.
[26] Plato, *Philebus*, 28a-e.
[27] Plato, *Timaeus*, 27d-29d.

(earth) are bound in the continuous proportions of (fire : air :: air : water) and (air : water :: water : earth) within the *dodecahedron* (cosmos).[28]

Plato's Beautiful Bond should thus be interpreted as an infinitely reiterated continuous proportion of polyhedral elements that are meant to be dialectically re-circumscribed within one cosmological analogy.[29] But because it is a continuous proportion, this cosmological analogy must continually exceed from and return within its hyper-generic principle, in order to dialectically re-inscribe its originary paradox. Since the infinite approximation of many hypotheses into one unhypothetical henad can only be terminated by the immediate impartation of individual unity from the simple unicity of the supreme hyper-generic principle of the Good, the Good must, through this dialectical re-inscription of its originary paradox, also impart its paradox into each and every mixture. Since a paradox, in which contradictory opinions are mutually affirmed, can annul the consistency of any inference, this dialectical re-inscription of paradox into analogy and dialectics must annul the consistency of dialectics, disperse any mixture of opposites and subvert its own dialecticity.[30] Platonic dialectics is thus meant to resolve the paradoxes of Platonic analogy, but proves to reproduce the paradoxes at every dialectical interval and each analogical formation. The paradoxes of hyper-genericity can disperse dialectical mixtures to dissolve the cosmological analogy and reduce the 'divine method' to nothing more than a spurious syllogism of human rhetoric. Once the hyper-genericity of the Good has subverted its own dialecticity, then dialectics can no longer resolve the paradoxes of analogy, dialectics must be severed from analogy, and the original universality of the cosmological analogy can collapse into the individuality of its fundamental elements.

1.2. Aristotle

Aristotle further individuated Plato's cosmology into concrete substances that syllogistically reflect

[28] Plato, *Timaeus*, 32a, 33b-c, 53e-57d; Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, 1090b2-14; Cf. F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato* (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1935), 211-228.
[29] Plato, *Laws*, 716c-d.
[30] Plato, *Republic*, 436b, 476a-480a, 508e-511e.

upon their own simple formality, but by subordinating dialectics and dissolving analogy, breaks the bonds of analogy and fossilizes the force of dialectics that preserves the individuality of every substance. He revises Plato's principles of analogy and dialectics by first subordinating dramatic dialectics to a didactic exposition and finally by transposing analogy from the paradoxical proportions of cosmology to the energetic activity for the function of creatures: where for Plato analogy and dialectics were meant to proceed from the principle of the Good, through the Beautiful Bond, to the cosmological analogy; for Aristotle analogy and dialectics are, at best, only potentially present in the energetic activity that is teleologically directed towards the actuality of individual substances. The grammar of analogy and the logic of dialectics are altogether subordinated and subsumed within the metaphysics of individual substances. But by subordinating and subsuming both into substance, Aristotle subverts any dialectical division and analogical recombination of individual substances into de-substantivized individua: for once analogy and dialectics have each been transposed from principles to substances, then neither may separately subsist in and between substances; analogy becomes merely metaphorical; dialectics becomes merely rhetorical; and substances, once deprived of dialectical difference and analogical intermediation collapse into nothing more than the logical individua at the conclusion of any syllogism. The dissolution of Aristotle's substance metaphysics into a de-substantialized individua finally emancipates the force of dialectics to re-bind the bonds of analogy in and through the supreme hyper-generic principle of the One.

Aristotle initially opposes Plato by rejecting both quantitative and qualitative analogy, together with all Pythagorean principles and Platonic paradigms, in favour of a meta-principle of analogy in substances.[31] Since Plato had first introduced the Ideas to explain the mathematical forms, Aristotle critiques the separate existence of these forms for the purpose of reducing each to abstract forms in concrete substances.[32] He develops a dilemma whereby mathematical entities must either exist within or separate from sensible substances and argues that, since the separation of mathematical entities into

[31] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1080a12-30, 1080b4-33, 1083a20, 1083b19, 1086a2-13.
[32] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1080a10-1086b12; Plato, *Phaedo*, 74a-75d.

super-sensible Ideas threatens to annul the very possibility of counting, mathematical entities may only be abstracted by counting or measuring sensible substances.[33]

Since the proportions of terms in analogy must be mathematical in form, and all mathematical forms must be abstracted from sensible substances, this reduction of mathematical forms must reduce even the mathematical form of analogy to a meta-principle in sensible substances.[34] But because this meta-principle of analogy cannot contain any quantitative proposition of mathematical forms, it must be deployed as a qualitative proportion between wholes and parts, genera and species, bodies and organs. Aristotle thus conspicuously deploys analogy throughout his biological works for the purpose of comparing the functional properties of specie across different genera: for example, fish are found to differ from birds by analogy because a scale is to a fish as a feather is to a bird.[35] He further individuates Plato's cosmological and quantitative analogy of numerical ratios into a qualitative analogy of functional properties that are signified by predicative terms so as to elide the paradoxes produced by the excess and return of continued proportions by reducing the proportions of analogy within the inner proportionality of substances.

Aristotle rejects Plato's method of dialectical division and combination (*diaeresis*) for the purpose of preserving analogy in substance: he argues that *diaeresis* is a 'weak syllogism' that always circularly presupposes the divisions that it purports to deduce, and recommends an inductive method of observing the brute composition of genera in specific forms that are grounded in substances.[36] He accordingly bifurcates dialectical *diaeresis* into definitions in names and essences in substances: a definition is an argument from sameness and difference that signifies an essence; while an essence is a genus-species classification of the specifically differentiated forms in a substance.[37] Since these specific forms cannot be deduced through dialectical *diaeresis*, each can only be observed *ex post facto* as though they already exist in sensible substances. Where, therefore, Plato had previously

[33] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1076a32, 1080b1-1085a2.
[34] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1016b30; *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1131b3.
[35] Aristotle, *Parts of Animals*, 640a1-645b16.
[36] Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, 46a31-46b37; *Posterior Analytics*, 91b12-92a5.
[37] Aristotle, *Topics*, 101b6-102a16.

combined the extreme terms of oppositive hypotheses in the analogy of each self-specifying generic Idea, Aristotle now abstracts and combines genera into the specific forms of essences in substances.[38]

Once analogy is preserved in its inner proportions of essence, then dialectics may likewise be preserved through the inmost energetic activity of substance. The principles, causes, and elements of substances could thus be thought to be distinct but equally the same according to analogy.[39] Aristotle describes this analogy between distinct substances as the principle of potentiality in the actuality of all existing substances.[40] He writes: "Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other. But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually, but only by analogy."[41] This analogy of potentiality-to-actuality is meant to proceed by an energetic motion between negative opposites, through a quasi-dialectical movement, where actuality is the cause of its own potentiality in and for itself.[42] Yet the fulfilment of this dialectic of energetic potentiality in and for actuality produces a paradox in which negative opposites coincide: "for the action is the end, and the actuality is the action."[43] Since any action involves potentiality that is negatively distinguished from and against actuality, but this action must coincide in actuality, actuality must contain its own contradiction. Plato had sought to resolve a similar paradox of the coincidence of rest and motion, but, after subordinating dialectics, Aristotle alternatively traces every posterior effect of moved potentiality to the paradoxical coincidence of all opposites in an ultimately prior 'unmoved mover'.[44]

Aristotle briefly alludes to Plato's paradoxical principle of the Good when, at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he asks whether the Good may be one by analogy.[45] Yet, for the purpose of securing a universal science, he argues, in the *Metaphysics*, that the first, unhypothetical, and most certain of all principles must be nothing other than the principle of non-contradiction, which prohibits

[38] Aristotle, *Parts of Animals*, 642b10-20, 643a35-61, 644b7-11.
[39] Ibid., 1070a31-1070b35.
[40] Ibid., 1071a4-12.
[41] Ibid., 1048a30-1048b9.
[42] Ibid., 1048b1-1049a1, 1050a9-16.
[43] Ibid., 1048b1-1049a1, 1050a9-16.
[44] Ibid., 1050a32-1050b33; Plato, *Statesman*, 279a.
[45] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1096b27-29.

any paradox.[46] Where Plato had previously subordinated axiomatic understanding to the supremely speculative science of dialectics spiralling to and from the Good, Aristotle has, to the contrary, deliberately subordinated dialectics to the universal science of being *qua* being, so that metaphysics, rather than dialectics, must explain the "first principles and highest causes" of being in substances.[47] The many senses of being, like the many senses of good, can never be conjoined in one paradoxical principle, but must rather be related to one focal meaning in and by the meta-principle of analogy where "There are many senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', but they are related to one central point."[48]

Dialectics, once subordinated to metaphysics, can no longer select the first principles of every science, including the meta-principle of analogy. Since, however, every science must begin with some undemonstrated axioms, that can only be selected through dialectics, Aristotle should surreptitiously instrumentalize dialectics to corroborate the first principles of metaphysics.[49] In the *Topics*, Aristotle subordinates dialectical deductions, beginning from reputable opinions, to proper deductions, beginning from apodictic first principles, and apparently relegates dialectics to little more than "a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries."[50] Dialectics is thus meant to posit 'theses' in conflicting deductions so as to reduce reputable opinions (*endoxa*) to contradictory opinions (*adoxa*). He writes: "dialectical arguments are those that deduce from reputable premises to the contradictory of a given thesis."[51] This dialectical reduction of opinions to contradictions is rigorously deployed in the *Metaphysics* as an indirect argument to reduce a thesis to impossibility (*reductio ad impossibile*).[52] After denying the possibility of demonstrating first principles without admitting an infinite regress, Aristotle immediately proceeds to indirectly argue that it is impossible

[46] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 994b5, 1005b17; Cf. J.D.G. Evans, *Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 49.
[47] Plato, *Republic*, 510b-511e; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1003a22-31, 1005b14; Dirk Baltzly, "Aristotle and Platonic Dialectic in Metaphysics Gamma", *Apeiron*, 32, 4, (1999), 171-202; D.T.J.Bailey, "Plato and Aristotle on the Unhypothetical", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 30 (2006), 101.
[48] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1003a32-37.
[49] Aristotle, *Topics* 101a34-101b4, 155b7-25; Cf. Evans, 31.
[50] Aristotle, *Topics*, 100a25-101a3; 101b1-4.
[51] Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutation*, 165b1-5; *Topics*, 104a9-105a1.
[52] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1006a16; *Prior Analytics*, 28a7-23.

for anyone to meaningfully deny, without tacitly presupposing, the principle of non-contradiction.[53] These indirect arguments are meant to operate, in and for metaphysics, as an instrumentally formalized dialectic, in which every alternative possibility is successively reduced by a formal syllogism to a contradictory impossibility. But because contradiction continues to operate as its primary function, this formalized dialectic must circularly presuppose the very principle of non-contradiction that it is meant to corroborate.

Aristotle boasts that, before his formalization of logic, "nothing existed at all."[54] Since, to the contrary, the first principles of every science and any syllogism can only be corroborated by a formalized dialectic, which likewise presupposes these very principles, even Aristotle's formal logic must move through a dialectical circle in and for these supreme principle of hyper-genericity.[55] Yet where Plato's dialectic had been meant to ascend from oppositive hypotheses to evermore reified and hypostatic henads, Aristotle's dialectic is instead meant to descend from hypothetical premises to evermore rarefied and contradictory conclusions. Dialectics is, for Aristotle, always arrested so that it must destroy the form of oppositive hypotheses without completing any further mixture of opposites: it can retain the Socratic testing of hypotheses (*peirastic*) in a formalized dialectic of hypothetical disjunctive inferences (i.e. *reductio ad impossibile*); but these hypotheses must remain indifferently separated over substances as unmixed and discrete propositions. Once deprived of intrinsic intermediating relations, hypotheses can only be hypostatized, and grounded again, in and through the substances of metaphysics. Aristotle's substance metaphysics is thus meant to furnish the subject matter of dialectics.[56] But because he holds primary substances to be individual, actual, and unmixed, this unmixed subject must perpetually arrest the object of any possible mixture.[57] Aristotle's formalized dialectic, for the reduction of *endoxa* to *adoxa*, may therefore amount to little more than a

[53] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1006a1-25.
[54] Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations*, 184b34-36.
[55] Aristotle, *Topics*, 105a10-20; Plato, *Republic*, 511b.
[56] Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations*, 172a15-21; Cf. Evans, 51.
[57] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1031a16, 1034a6.

negative dialectic (*antilogic*) which may destroy hypotheses in contradictions, but which may never positively demonstrate any hypostatic henad up to and including its own first principles.[58]

Aristotle's self-arresting negative dialectic can, however, preserve the ground of its being from destruction by hypostatizing its hypotheses as substances in a teleological analogy. After rejecting Platonic participation, paradigms, and paradigmatic causation, Aristotle distinguished four modes of causation and united all four modes in teleological causation.[59] Since substances are meant to fulfil their very finality through an analogy of potentiality-to-actuality, this teleological actualization of analogy in substances can be made into an 'analogy of teleology'. And once the hypotheses of dialectical thinking have been hypostatized in substances, then the first principles and fundamental primitives of thinking can likewise be united, actualized, and fulfilled through the teleology of analogy: Aristotle thus applies this teleological analogy to thinking first, in the *Posterior Analytics*, when he denies that the genera of demonstrative sciences may share the same principles and primitives, even as he affirms that they may share common principles and primitives only by analogy; and finally, in the *Metaphysics*, when he further describes how analogy is meant to operate as a trans-generic meta-principle that unites each specific demonstrative science.[60] Yet this teleological analogy must also prove to be paradoxical as soon as it reproduces the previous paradox of analogy: for, as a trans-generic meta-principle that is meant to unite the extreme terms of first and final causation in and through an intermediary effect, teleological analogy proves, no less than analogy, to be a principle beyond principles in and beyond each of the generic categories of individual substances.

Dialectics is meant to be re-substantialized to positively preserve the possibility of securing its first principles. Yet in the absence of any teleological unity, Aristotle's dialectics must remain nothing more than a negative dialectic that destroys all hypostases and disperses all substances. This dialectical destruction of substances not only de-substantivizes physics, but even de-physicalizes metaphysics: for after physical substances have been altogether dissolved in and through self-arresting negative dialectics, then there can remain nothing with which to unite the various senses of being *qua*

[58] Aristotle, *Topics*, 100a25-101a3; *Metaphysics* 1004b15-26; Plato, *Republic*, 454a; *Sophist*, 225b.
[59] Aristotle, *Physics*, 194b17–195a4, 198b10-199b32; *Parts of Animals*, 639b12–13.
[60] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 76a31-45; *Metaphysics*, 1070b15.

being. Since, moreover, an analogy without unity can only be dispersed and annulled into an illusory similitude between equivocal dissimilars, this dissolution of the unity of substance by negative dialectics must render any analogy as merely a metaphor. This metaphoric analogy of similitude between dissimilars can, at best, only designate shared properties in a de-substantivized physics that is just as much a de-physicalized metaphysics. Aristotle has thus, after individuating cosmological analogy into metaphysical substances, returned full circle to the metaphoric analogy with which Plato first began in the *Republic*. But where Plato had purported to dialectically ascend from the metaphorical analogy of the Sun to the supreme principle of the Good, Aristotle must merely reduce analogy from a meta-principle to nothing more than a poetic metaphor: for since Aristotle affirms that science depends upon definitions, but denies that metaphors can be defined. This reduction of analogy to metaphors excludes analogy from any science – even the first science of metaphysics.[61]

Once analogy has been reduced from a meta-principle to a metaphor, then the many senses of being *qua* being can no longer be united within any single substance – much less within any comprehensive cosmology – and the one universal science of metaphysics must be fragmented and dispersed into the various strata of beings that are axiomatically presupposed within each of the many special sciences. Metaphysics may thus be deposed as the sovereign science and reduced to a servile instrument of the special sciences, which may only afterwards be founded upon the most material science of physics. Yet even this usurpation of metaphysics by physics must also be frustrated by the de-substantivization of physics through negative dialectics: for after Aristotle had subordinated speculative dialectics to didactic metaphysics for the purpose of preserving the positive presence of substance from contradiction, and surreptitiously deployed formalized dialectic to corroborate its first principles, then he had inadvertently developed an ever more eristic negative dialectic; but once this negative dialectic has dissolved the analogical unity of genera and species, teleological causation, and even the specific substances of metaphysics into merely metaphorical equivocations between univocally indistinct differentia, then there can remain nothing left for physics except the naked immediacy of each and every de-substantivized *individua*. Aristotle's supreme hyper-generic principle of the unmoved

[61] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 97b 37, 99a 22; *Poetics*, 1457b.

mover, that "necessarily exists" and "moves without being moved", thus proves to be neither a physical movement nor even a genuinely metaphysical procession of actuality-to-potentiality, but rather the purely formal totality of necessary syllogistic inferences, which encompasses the movement of all premises into conclusions through its own eternal and absolute thinking of thinking itself.[62] Individual substances can afterwards be de-substantivized and re-syllogized into the *individua* that conclude syllogistic inferences. But because each of these syllogistic inferences must also be derived by an eristic and equivocal negative dialectic, all individua must be de-individuated into an infinite multiplicity of particularly opposed extremes in a cycle of self-opposed particularity circling around the one singularly intermediating middle and hyper-generic supreme principle of the One.

1.3. Plotinus and Proclus

The supreme hyper-generic principle is, for the Neo-Platonists, immediately related to each and every de-substantialized individua through this purely negatively dialectic of formalized inferences. It's pure negativity is a direct consequence of the absolute transcendence of the One: for, to escape from the dissolution of all being through the de-substantivization of Stoic physics, the Middle Platonists began to identify the first dialectical hypothesis of Plato's *Parmenides* with the supreme principle of the Good 'beyond being' of Plato's *Republic*.[63] The supreme hyper-genus of the One is thus meant to impart being into all beings, but because it is itself beyond being, every impartation of being from beyond being must also pass through the sheer difference between this 'beyond' and being. The Neo-Platonic One thus imparts its own self-opposition of being and its 'beyond' into every being to re-inscribe Parmenidean negativity within the being of every henadic unity.[64] Since the impartation of negation destroys beings, this re-inscription of Parmenidean negativity may annul every analogical formation and every dialectical mixture.

[62] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1072a21-1072b31.
[63] Deirdre Carabine, *Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to Eriugena* (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1995), 103-148. Cf. Plato, *Republic*, 508e-509b; *Parmenides*, 137c–142a.
[64] Conor Cunningham, *Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing and the Difference of Theology* (London: Routledge, 2005), xv.

Neo-Platonic analogy and dialectics begin with Plotinus before both are systematically completed by Proclus. Plotinus' dialectic is an intellectual activity of *diaeresis* that subsumes specific forms into generic Ideas on a spiritual ascent towards the Good.[65] He contends, against Aristotle, that dialectics has 'real' intellective being as its common element and subject-matter, not merely in propositions and syllogisms, but ultimately in and through the self-moving Soul of the hypostatic supreme principles.[66] Dialectics is thus meant to divide and combine all elements within the Soul as it spirals through a dialectical circle on an ascent towards the One: yet where Aristotle's division is extensional between specific substances, Plotinus' division is rather an intensional division and recombination of specific forms within each and every self-dividing genera.[67] This division and combination of all specific forms within each genera allows Plotinus to re-hypostatize each dialectical hypothesis within successive generic analogical formations, in which all beings are ranked by analogy in a hierarchy emanating from and ascending to the One: every sign, from the smallest animals to the greatest planets, are thus meant to be united, by analogy, in a musical harmony; so that all beings may dance "under the rule of number"; and even the difference of moments in the procession of time may be analogous to the "unchanging identity of essence."[68] The Sun, for Plotinus as for Plato, is the supreme analogy of the One, at the absolute middle, from which all 'light' emanates to illuminate the soul. He writes: "The only reasonable explanation of act flowing from it lies in the analogy of light from a sun."[69] Plotinus accordingly describes dialectics as an activity of "weaving" conflicting elements into an analogical harmony, "a harmony emerging directly from the conflicting elements themselves", where *Nous* acts as the "unification of reason-principles whose very opposition is the support of its coherence and, almost, of its Being."[70]

Proclus added to this picture a proliferation of intermediary analogies in and between each proceeding level of being emanating from and assimilating to the One. There remains, for Proclus no less than for Plotinus, however, an unmediated break in the relations between each unparticipated one (*henad*)

[65] Annamaria Schiaparelli, "Plotinus on Dialectic", *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 91, 3 (2009), 256.
[66] Plotinus, *Enneads*, I.3.4-5; Cf. Schiaparelli, 263-271.
[67] Plotinus, *Enneads*, IV.3.5.
[68] Ibid., IV.4.45; II.3.6; IV.3.35; VI.6.6.
[69] Ibid., VI.8.8; V.1.12.
[70] Ibid., III.1.16, III.6.16.

and each of its many participants, where the impartation of the unmediated simple unicity of the one into the oneness of each derivative henad reproduces the unmediated break in the relation of one and many in each successive analogical formation. Proclus may have attempted to bind this unmediated duality by positing an infinitude of intermediary 'participated' forms in and between the triadic relations of every unparticipated henad and many participants. Yet where Plotinus broke the bridge between these relations by imparting the negation of absolute self-opposition in every dialectical harmonization, Proclus must infinitely bind and break it anew by positing an infinitude of particularly self-opposed analogical formations between all beings, emanating from and assimilating to the One.[71] He thus places analogy as the intermediary bond in and between all signs, forms, and gods throughout every level of procession and participation: each posterior subordinate procession is assimilated to its immediately prior and proximately superior paradigm, in a dialectical circle spiralling from union to separation and assimilating back to reunion.[72]

Proclus recognized Plato's Beautiful Bond as "the same things through [which] analogy, become first, middle and last." He writes: "This bond therefore, is inseparable from the things that are bound, and is analogy, which is different from all the natures that are bound, but has a subsistence in them."[73] It is thus meant to operate as a "connective cause" of "communion" between "separated natures" to harmonize Pythagorean proportion in analogy.[74] Since the Beautiful Bond is, moreover, a continued proportion, it must surpass itself, even as it surpasses its own continually re-circumscribed self-surpassing.[75] But by infinitely surpassing its own infinite self-surpassing, Proclus' analogy breaks as soon as it binds every opposition of hypotheses in an infinitely reiterated dyadic opposition: each iterative dyadic opposition is meant to be intermediated by some further analogical triad, but, since each analogy is divided and particularly opposed in and against itself as an unparticipated one over many participants, every intermediation remains ultimately unmediated, and every analogical triad must collapse into a no less oppository dyad. The infinite reiteration of these dyadic opposites

[71] Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, trans. A.C. Ionides (Edmonds: Alexandrian Press, 1993), 25.
[72] Proclus, *Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato*, trans. Thomas Taylor (Somerset: Prometheus Trust, 1988), 1-2, 33, 51, 63.
[73] Ibid., 2, 16.
[74] Ibid., 42, 47, 80.
[75] Ibid., 2, 19.

produces a cascade of contradictions that ultimately dissolves any dialectical mixture of the ancient generic analogy in and through its self-opposed particularity.

Proclus, even more than Plotinus, celebrates dialectics as "the most capacious of all sciences", at "the vertex" and "summit of mathematics", from which all specific sciences derive "their own peculiar principles" and "first suppositions of demonstrations."[76] He summarizes how dialectics "lays down certain hypotheses, deduces their consequences, and shows that the soul is incapable of receiving the opposite of the quality that it confers on that in which it is present."[77] Dialectics is thus meant to proceed from successive hypotheses, through their disjunctive destruction, towards the unhypothetical first principles.[78] He paraphrases Plato's *Republic* when he describes dialectics as a "method of trying to attain genuine knowledge, looked at as a whole" that "unfolds before the mind the whole intelligible world, making its way from Form to Form until it reaches the very first Form of all" by "moving downwards from above and upwards from below until, having examined in every way the whole nature of the intelligible, it climbs aloft to that which is beyond all being."[79] Dialectics is thus crowned as the "purest part of philosophy" that "embraces the complete circle" of the subordinate special sciences in fourfold functions of dialectic: division, definition, demonstration, and analysis.[80]

Dialectics is, for Proclus even more than for Plotinus, explicitly meant to construct arithmological and harmonic proportions in analogical formations. He describes how it "binds it with harmonic ratios; though in intelligible forms also, there are the form of harmony, and the form of figure."[81] Proclus combines the analogical binding of elements in the *Timaeus* with the dialectical mixture of the 'limiteds' and 'unlimiteds' in the *Philebus* when he describes how dialectics is meant to mix identity and difference, "which comprehends in itself uniformly all the dialectic powers, contracts their variety by its simplicity, their partition by its indivisible knowledge, and their multitude by it occult union."[82] He describes this as the mixing of "imparticibles and particibles" into a single essence, wherein each

[76] Euclid, *Elements*, bk. V, def. 3-8; Proclus, *Euclid's Elements*, 79-80.
[77] Proclus, *Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*, trans. Dillon and Morrow (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), 655.
[78] Proclus, *On the Theology of Plato*. trans. Thomas Taylor (Somerset: Prometheus Trust, 1995), chapter IX.
[79] Proclus, *Plato's Parmenides*, 653; Plato, *Republic*, 510b.
[80] Proclus, *Plato's Parmenides*, 41-42, 353, 336.
[81] Proclus, *Timaeus of Plato*, 2, 136.
[82] Proclus, *Timaeus of Plato*, 2, 14; Proclus, *Euclid's Elements,* 81.

opposition of identity and difference can be collected in and through the 'co-harmonization' of every analogy in the cosmos. Proclus describes this dialectical construction of cosmological analogy when he writes: "For the *Demiurgus* divides, and unites the parts through analogies."[83] He similarly makes dialectical name-giving "analogous to the universal Demiurge" who, in the *Timaeus*, who "sets the allotted laws" and "ordains all things."[84] The law-giver creates names, through an analogical imitation of the originary creation of names by the universal Demiurge, by dividing and collecting definientia into definienda in an analogical imitation of their divinely pre-constructed essences.[85]

Proclus' dialectical construction of analogical formations brought the ancient generic analogy to the apex of its systematic development, but, succeeded only by suppressing rather than resolving the paradox of participation. Since Proclus denies any intermediary participation relation between the unparticipated henad and its participants, he must forthrightly reject any intermediation between henads and participants, except through an immediate impartation of forms. Yet since any such participation must in its simple immediacy be equally unmediated, this rejection of intermediation between henads and participants proves to expose Proclus' generic analogy to Plato's previous critique of participation from *the Parmenides*: the Third Man and Greatest Difficulty arguments had suggested that participation produces and infinitude of distinctly opposed forms; but Proclus begins to block this infinite regress by first denying that forms are particulars, and finally by positing an infinitude of intermediaries in and between every unparticipated henad and its many participants. Proclus thus introduces an infinitude of intermediary forms, angels, and gods, for the purpose of intermediating dyadic opposites at each and every level of triadic analogical formations.[86] Since, however, every successive intermediary form may only reproduce the previous paradox of one unparticipated henad and many participating participants, Proclus's dialectical construction of analogy must, no less than Plato, infinitely reproduce the paradox of participation at every level. The dialectic that is meant to bind analogy must therefore break the bonds of analogy in each dialectical mixture and even in every henad.

[83] Proclus, *Timaeus of Plato*, 165, 315.
[84] Plato, *Timaeus*, 41e, 42d.
[85] Proclus, *Proclus: On Plato Cratylus*, trans. Brian Duvick (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 78.
[86] Proclus, *Plato's Parmenides*, 890.

Proclus follows Plotinus in affirming that "the One transcends all antitheses" and "rises above all relations."[87] This simple transcendence of the One beyond being breaks every relation between beings: for since the One is immediately and a-relationally beyond beings, and every henad must derive its very one-ness from its paradigmatic one-ness, each and every henad must also be cast immediately and a-relationally beyond any relations to other beings. But because each henad must also be suspended by its relation of participation from the One, this a-relationality of every henad must covertly coincide in no other relation than in its immediate relation to the One. Since the a-relationality of every henad coincides in nothing other than this relationality to and from the One, a-relationality must be opposed in and against relationality within the self-opposed relationality of the One. Since the One is beyond being and there is nothing beyond the One, its self-opposed relationality beyond being proves to be an equally transcendent self-oppositivity, which we may call a hyper-negativity.

The hyper-negativity of the self-opposed One can disperse every henad, from the highest angel to the lowliest animal, into the same simple 'beyond': since the 'one-ness' of every henad is derived from its singular relation to nothing other than the One, in its self-oppositive hyper-negativity, every 'one' must be dispersed into 'many'; but because even the 'many' is nothing if not the aggregate multiplicity of 'ones', this dispersal of one into many must equally annul the many into nothing more than the self-oppositive hyper-negativity of the One. Once dialectics has broken the bonds of analogy, and re-inscribed the negativity of Parmenidean nothingness into each and every positive being, then Parmenidean ontology can be inverted into Proclean 'meontology': where ontology is the structure of being, meontology is the structure of non-being; and where Parmenides had inscribed the boundaries of being and nothing in the spherical totality of Being, Proclus re-inscribes the resulting binding and breaking of being into the infinite reproduction of negativity from beyond being. Proclus accordingly describes how hyper-negations, beyond categorematic negations, precede any positive assertions: "even as the One is the cause of all things, so these negations are the cause of the

[87] Proclus, *Plato's Parmenides*, 1076.

corresponding assertions… for all those positive assertions proceed from these negations, and the cause of these is the One, as being prior to all other things."[88]

Since the simple a-relational immediacy of the hyper-generic principle of the One must remain paramount, every mediated relation, and each analogical formation, must be broken by it's absolutely originary hyper-negations. Once this hyper-negativity has broken every analogical proportion of one over many, then there can no longer remain any subordination of many to one or signs to substances; substances may be semioticized; and signs may be substantivized. Since, however, this hyper-negativity must also annul these very substantivized signs, just as surely as it has annulled all semioticized substances, each sign of ancient semiosis must be annulled, suspended, and sublated into the self-opposed hyper-genericity of medieval meta-semiosis. The ancient generic analogy can, therefore, be annulled and superseded when the bonds of analogy are broken by the self-opposition of dialectics as its infinite continued proportion, first of quantitative measures and finally of qualitative terms, are never completed in any analogy of analogies but only ever infinitely divided by the hyper-negativity of its own self-opposed hyper-genericity.

[88] Proclus, *Plato's Parmenides*, 739-742, 1075.

2. Medieval Analogy of Attributive Proportion

The medieval analogy of attributive proportion, from Augustine to Aquinas and Scotus to Poinsot, is the non-genericity of transcendental predication in and against the hidden hyper-genus, the principle of intermediation, and the triune God. Once the ancient hyper-generic principle of the One had dissolved every fixed subordination in the infinite repetition of its acidic hyper-negativity, then many specie could never again be subordinated to one genus; but by subverting every subordination, each could coincide in a co-equal cycle of each with another. This co-equal cycle is the logical crucible from which the doctrine of the Trinity was first developed into its definitive form as the hidden principle of intermediation, which reflects within and for itself every determinative hyper-negation of the ancient generic analogy: by reflecting each into the other, it intermediates between both; but by reflecting all hyper-negations, any such reflective intermediation must also negate its predicative signs in and against the hidden hyper-genus. The signs of ancient semiosis could thereby be separated, surpassed, and suspended in and by the paradigms of medieval meta-semiosis. These self-opposed paradigms of non-generic but hyper-generic predication thus came to constitute a new class of 'transcendentals' (*transcendentalia*), where each term was predicated as a non-generic hyper-genus that exceeded any of the generic categories. The transcendentals were, in this way, predicated in and against the principle of meta-semiotic intermediation – and ultimately against the Trinity – in a hyper-dialectical contradiction that first propelled the hypo-dialectical dissolution of the dual analogies of attribution and proportion into a univocal semantic virtuality, and finally collapsed the objectivized and subjectivized concepts of medieval meta-semiosis into the formal semiosis of pure signs.

2.1. Albert and Aquinas

Albert and Aquinas deployed the hypo-dialectics of medieval disputation to develop the intermediating proportions of the analogy of being (*analogia entis*). Augustine had substantialized signs and semioticized substances to render all relations, including the essential relations of the Trinity, as intermediating semiotic proportions. But because Boethius had de-numerated the semiotic

relations of the Trinity, collapsed its intermediating proportions into a hyper-dialectical oscillation of many transcendentals around one divine essence, and equivocally divided categorematic from transcendental predications, the hypo-dialectics of medieval disputation must prove to be motivated by a hyper-dialectic of transcendentals. The medieval 'transcendentals' could thus – in secret – generate the central contradiction of medieval hyper-dialecticity: for since the first transcendental of Being (*esse*) is predicated of beings (*ens*), even as it must exceed the semantic extension of all beings, transcendental Being must produce a paradox of transcendental Being in and beyond all beings.[89] Since, however, each term in every judgment must be predicated as a being, this hyper-dialecticity of transcendental predication of Being could motivate the hypo-dialectics of medieval disputation to successively reconfigure the analogy of being.

Since the transcendental terms had acted as the surrogate genera of specific predication, even as each exceeded the highest genera of the categories, the paradox of Being in and beyond all beings could cast each of the transcendentals as self-exceeding genera to renew for medieval meta-semiosis the ancient conflict over genericity: where Plato's *pros heauto* predication had subsumed many specific predicates in one 'tree-type' self-differentiating genera, Aristotle's *pros hen* predication had alternatively subsumed many generic predicates into the 'focal meaning' of one specifically formed substance.[90] After Plotinus had suspended all possible predication from the hyper-genus of the One in and beyond genericity, Porphyry could further reify all semantic forms of universals, predicables, and transcendentals as possibly existent forms that were immediately imparted from the One: Porphyry thus inchoately introduced the 'transcendentals' as trans-predicamental terms beyond (*transcendens*) the five 'predicables'; but Boethius onticized each as hypothetical trans-categorematic entities that are convertible to being.[91] The transcendentals could thus be re-cast, by Avicenna and Albert, as, not merely non-generic terms in and beyond the categories, but rather as paradoxical non-generic hyper-

[89] Alain de Libera, "Les sources Greco-Arabes de la theorie medieval de l'analogie de l'etre", *Les Études philosophiques* (1989), 333; Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez* (Boston: Brill, 2012), 47-49.
[90] Constance Meinwald, "Goodbye to the Third Man". in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, ed. Richard Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 374-380; G.E.L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle." in *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*. ed. Ingemar Düring, and G.E.L. Owen (Göteborg : Almquist & Wiksell, 1960), 180-199.
[91] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 998b22; Cf. Aertsen, 39-47.

genera of paradigmatic predication, whose successively self-annulling relations could motivate medieval hyper-dialectics.[92]

Albert and Aquinas first reflected Avicenna's purely extensional transcendentals into various intensional relations: Albert argued that, although being is prior in intention, each ensuing transcendental may add distinct determinations; and Aquinas further elaborated that the transcendentals can be intensionally ordered according to analogical causality.[93] These intensional relations were thus meant to reconfigure the order of the transcendentals according to the determinations of analogical proportions. Since, however, all relations are meant to be restricted within the categories, every ensuing intensional relation among the transcendentals must repeat, in its trans-categorematic relations, the paradoxical non-genericity of transcendental Being.[94] Each and all transcendentals thus retained the negative moment of non-generic Aristotelian predication, even as they remained suspended from and determined by the hyper-genericity of Platonic paradigmatic predication. Since, moreover, there could be no definitive end to the possible candidates for non-generic transcendental predication, this suspension of all transcendental terms could covertly issue in an endless list of non-generic hyper-genera.[95] The indefinite proliferation of the transcendentals would, thereafter, infinitely reiterate the central contradiction of transcendental Being in each transcendental term, and even in every predicative judgment, to hyper-dialectically motivate the hypo-dialectics of medieval disputation.

Aristotle had, in the *Topics*, first subverted dialectics to demonstrations, and, in the *Metaphysics*, finally subordinated the paradoxical first principles of dialectics to syllogistic inferences, in strict adherence to the first principle of non-contradiction, wherewith each dialectical contradiction – including those of Platonic participation – could be dissolved rather than resolved in and through the deductive determinations of the increasingly ossified forms of metaphysics. But because Aristotle

[92] Jan Aertsen, "Albert's Doctrine on the Transcendentals". in *A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences*, ed. Irven Resnick (Boston: Brill, 2012), 614.
[93] Thomas Aquinas, *Sentences* I, d.8, q.1, a.3; Albert the Great, *Peri hermenaias*, tract. II, c.5; Aertsen, 47.
[94] Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q. 1, art. I; Cf. Cornelio Fabro, "Platonism, Neo-Platonism and Thomism: Convergencies and Divergencies". in *The New Scholasticism*, *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 44 (1970), 77-81; Klaus Kremer, *Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966), 353-360.
[95] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1039a.

still surreptitiously required dialectics to select the first principles of every deductive demonstration, he had inadvertently divided Platonic dialectics into a higher 'hyper-dialectics' of metaphysics and a lower 'hypo-dialectics' of rhetoric: yet where, for Plato, the 'divine method' of dialectics must impart meaning and movement throughout every creaturely repetition of dialectics, for Aristotle, hypo-dialectics is artificially instrumentalized to partially revivify by re-configuring the prior hyper-dialectical determinations of physics and metaphysics.[96] Cicero later transformed this lower hypo-dialectics of the *Topics* into the rhetorical 'art of Topics', but Boethius recast these Topics into apodictic "maximal propositions" (*proposition maxima*) whose quasi-generic 'differentiae' made rhetoric dependent upon dialectics, and dialectics dependent upon an inventory of fixed forms.[97] The hypo-dialectics of medieval disputation was, through this increasing formalization, gradually deprived of any power to revivify by reconfiguring the fossilised forms of metaphysics until it lost any living link to oral debate, even as it came to encompass the entire field of logic.[98]

The medieval *quaestiones disputatae* was developed, as early as the 12th-century, as a hypo-dialectical method that could be used to re-configure the fossilised forms of hyper-dialectics; but, by dissolving every dialectical contradiction into non-contradictory elements, eventually enervated its own dialecticity by retaining rather than resolving the contradictions of alternative hypothetical objections.[99] Albert and Aquinas used this art of investigating (*ars et via docendi*) and discriminating (*veritatis seu falsitatis discretion*) the answers of disputed questions to partially revivify the fossilised hyper-dialecticity of metaphysics by destroying, and dissolving the contradictions of alternative possibilities. Disputation was thus meant to dissolve every contradiction into non-contradictory elements according to the familiar hypo-dialectical pattern first outlined in Aristotle's *Topics*: questions are proposed (*quaeritur utrum*); affirmative or negative answers are proffered (*et videtur quod sic, videtur quod non*); objections are raised (*sed contra*); and the respondents destroy the

[96] Plato, *Philebus* 16c; *Timaeus* 35a; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1071a4.
[97] Marta Spranzi, *The Art of Dialectic between Dialogue and Rhetoric: The Aristotelian Tradition* (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2011), 47-50; Boethius, *De Topicis Differentiis*, trans. Eleonore Stump (Ithica: Cornell University, 2004), 1185b25-1187c10; Cf. Eleonore Stump, *Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1989), 31-56.
[98] Spranzi, 52.
[99] Norman Kretzmann, Anthony John Patrick Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 25.

objections (*responsio*) by either annulling (*reductio*) or distinguishing (*distinguo*) the premises before finding a final conclusion (*unde patet*).[100] Each question is thus meant to be decided by destroying objections and deducing conclusions for the purpose of disarming the explosive potential of contradictions within non-contradictory elements. Since, however, it must be altogether impossible to anticipate and destroy every objection, the hypo-dialectics of medieval disputation must always retain without resolving some hidden possibility of alternative hypothetical objections.[101]

Albert and Aquinas deployed hypo-dialectics to re-articulate the determinations of hyper-dialectics within artificially controlled parameters for the purpose of restoring a restricted domain of dialecticity by distinguishing parts, affirming and denying alternative possibilities, destroying objections, and deducing conclusions. Yet since contradiction is the essential negative moment of dialectics, every effort to dissolve dialectical contradictions could only progressively formalize dialecticity, ossify orality into spatialized forms, and finally subvert even its very own rhetorical purpose of resolving disputed questions: for since each hypo-dialectical disputation minimally involved some predication of being, and being is specifically predicated of the non-generic hyper-genus of transcendental Being, hypo-dialectical disputation remains caught within the central contradiction of medieval hyper-dialectics, in which transcendental Being (*esse*) is predicated of beings (*ens*) as a being in and beyond beings. The indissoluble contradiction of transcendental Being could only afterwards be concealed under mounting layers of fossilised forms. The function of disputational dialectic (*dialectica utens*) was thus gradually subsumed into the reflexive analysis of the forms of dialectical disputation (*dialectica docens*), as dialectic was formalized, formal logic was de-dialecticized, and the art of disputation was ultimately reduced to a stage for the performative validation of pre-formulated scholastic positions.

The analogy of being (*analogia entis*) emerged, in the mid-13th century, as the central scholastic formula for constructing a comprehensive hierarchy of intermediary proportions between equivocally

[100] Nicholas Rescher, *Dialectics: A Classical Approach to Inquiry* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 141; Spranzi, 54-56.
[101] Ronald McKinney, "The Origin of Modern Dialectics", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 44, 2 (April - June 1983), 190.

distinct terms, substances, and accidents; at varying levels of being; and – supremely – even between creatures and God.[102] Albert had derived this formula of analogy, as an intermediary function between univocity and equivocity, from the five *modi* of semantic reference found in Algazel's *Logic* of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*: he transformed the fifth *modi* of 'agreement' (*convenientia*) between equivocal meanings into a proportionate relation, or analogy (*analogia*), between one primary analogon term and many auxiliary analogate terms, which can be distinguished by prior and posterior causes (*per prius et posterius*) in a hierarchical order of causation (*ordo causae et causati*).[103] Equivocally distinct causes and effects are thus meant to be related to one another in and through the participation of the posterior effect in the prior cause, whose paradigmatic perfections are imparted from the divine essence to each primary analogon, and from the primary analogon to each auxiliary analogate term.[104] The analogy of being thus preserves the possibility of the knowledge of metaphysics and the language of theology in every predicative judgment by uniting equivocal distinctions in and between real things signified (*res significata*) and the ideal signifying concepts (*modus significandi*) according to the hierarchical prior and posterior order of causation.[105]

The analogy of being was, however, fatefully frustrated in fulfilling this function as it became bifurcated by the latent equivocity of categorematic and transcendental predication: all predication is meant to be predicated in and through the categories, even as transcendental predicates exceed these categories; but because Being is the first transcendental in the order of intention, and analogy always predicates some beings, every predicative judgment of analogy must be divided between

[102] Jennifer Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context*"*, *Mediaeval Studies*, 54, 1 (1992), 113; "Equivocation and Divine Language in Some Theology Texts from the Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries", *Unpublished Draft*, 6, 8, 13.
[103] C.H. Lohr, "Logica Algazelis". in *Traditio*, 21 (1965), 246; quoted in E.J. Ashworth, "Suarez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background", *Vivarium*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1995), 59; Cf. Alain de Libera, "Les sources Greco-Arabes de la theorie medieval de l'analogie de l'etre", *Les Études philosophiques* (1989), 330-332; Aertsen, 48, 97-98; Albert the Great, *De Praedicabilius*, tract. 1, c.5.
[104] Hampus Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World: An Investigation of its Background and Interpretation of its Use by Thomas Aquino* (Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksells, 1953), 172; Cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Ia 12. 4; Ia 13.5. III. 20; Ia 27. 4; *Sentences* I.3.1.1; 8.2.3; I.16.1 ad3; I.88.3. ad2; I.95.1; IV.49.2.1 ad6; *De Potentia*, 7. 11; *Commentary on the Physics*, lect. 3. 3; *Contra Gentiles*, I. 33; II. 16, 41-44; III. 20, 128; *Compendium Theologiae*, 27.
[105] John Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding, The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-first Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 222-230; Philipp Rosemann, *Omne Agens Agit Sibi Simile: A "Repetition" of Scholastic Metaphysics* (Louvain: Louvain Philosophical, Studies 12, 1996), 282-288. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I.4.3; *Sentences*, I.8.1, art. 2.

categorematic and trans-categorematic predication. This division of predication, in and beyond the categories, could thus bifurcate each analogical predication into the opposed predicative judgments that would later be recognized as the predicamental analogy of proportion and the transcendental analogy of attribution.[106] Since, moreover, the analogy of proportion could only occur in substances, and substances are always predicated within the categories, the earlier analogy of proportion must be categorematic and predicamental, while the later analogy of attribution may be trans-categorematic and transcendental.[107] The analogy of proportion and the analogy of attribution were thus mutually opposed to one another, as categorematic and transcendental analogies, even as each remained self-opposed in every analogical predication. This mutual opposition of self-opposed analogies produced a double-contradiction that would cause the analogy of proportion and the analogy of attribution to be separately subverted and conjointly sublated in a cycling unity of self-opposed opposites which may be called the medieval dual-analogy (*duplex analogia*) of attributive proportion.[108]

In the dual-analogy of attributive proportion, the analogy of proportion was superseded by the analogy of attribution, just as attribution was superseded by proportion, as the self-opposed analogies of attribution and proportion were successively subverted by the contradictions resulting from self-opposed analogical predication.[109] Aquinas develops the analogy of proportion, in *De Veritate*, when he describes how analogates are defined as potential accidents to actual substances; but because he also denies any determinable proportion between finite substances and the infinitude of God (*nulla determinate habitudo*), the analogy of proportion must remain restricted to the categorematic predication of finite substances.[110] Every analogate is thus meant to be predicated in and through substances. Since, however, the primary being of every substance is also predicated as a being, and even the analogy of proportion must predicate the beings of transcendental Being, the analogy of proportion must invariably involve transcendental predicates in and beyond finite substances, which

[106] Bernard Montagnes, *The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas*, trans. E.M. Macierowski (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004), 28-29.
[107] Lyttkens, 321-322; George Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960), 14-29; Montagnes, 64-72.
[108] Klubertanz, 7.
[109] Klubertanz, 14-29; Lyttkens, 244-259; Montagnes, 69-70.
[110] Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q.2.a.11; Klubertanz, 27; Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Sentences* III 6.2; *Boethii de Trinitate*, 11.2; *Contra Gentiles*, 15.20.

exceeds its restricted categorematic predication. Since, moreover, all proportions are meant to be constructed as *ratios* within the categories, but this very predication of transcendental Being exceeds the categories, the analogy of proportion must exceed the limits of categorematic proportions; annul its own proportionality; and fall into dis-proportion in the very act of predicating each proportion. This dis-proportionality dissolves the substantival basis for the predication of proportion, and subverts the categorematic predication of the analogy of proportion into the de-substantivized impartation and trans-categorematic predication of the analogy of attribution.

After he had recognized that it could not preserve the possibility of theological language, Aquinas superseded the analogy of proportion with the analogy of attribution: he describes, in *De Potentia*, a "second kind" of trans-categorematic predication, in which the Being (*esse*) of one primary analogon is imparted into the beings (*ens*) of the auxiliary analogates.[111] Every analogate is thus meant to be imparted from transcendental Being to the beings of primary and auxiliary analogates. Since, however, the predication of transcendental Being may fall inside or outside of categorematic substances, the analogy of attribution must be divided between the intrinsic and extrinsic attribution of the beings (*ens*) of substances. Only the analogy of intrinsic attribution may, however, preserve the radical participation of each being (*ens*) in Being itself (*ipsum esse*). But because the divine Being itself would thus be considered as the primary analogon (*primum analogatum*) for every intrinsic attribution of Being (*esse*) to beings (*ens*), this attribution of being would place God in an onto-theological relation to creatures in and through some third term beyond God and the world.[112] Aquinas thus twice rejected the analogy of intrinsic attribution to preserve the a-relational independence of God from creation.[113] But after this rejection, all trans-categorematic predication must fall outside categorematic substances, so that the substantival basis for the predication of proportion could only be surreptitiously re-instated by the remaining analogy of extrinsic attribution. Once the analogy of attribution proves to subvert its own trans-categorematic predication by annulling

[111] Aquinas, *De Potentia*, q.7, a.7; *Compendium of Theology*, ch. 27; *Summa Theologica*, Ia 13.2.
[112] Aquinas, *Sentences* I, 19. 5. 2; *De Veritate*, 21. 4 ad 5; *Contra Gentiles*, III. 47; *Summa Theologica*, Ia 16. 5, 16. 6.
[113] Lyttkens, 186; Cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Ia.13.7; *De Potentia*, 7.9-10; *De Veritate*, 4.5; *Contra Gentiles*, II. 11-13.

any attributive relation of divine Being to creaturely beings, the analogy of attribution may return back into the categorematic predication of the analogy of proportion.

The bifurcation of the dual-analogy of being into the analogies of proportion and attribution has, through the hypo-dialecticity of medieval disputation, finally subverted each analogy into the other in a cycle of mutually subverting opposites. Yet since even this mutually subverting cycle of opposed analogies must also involve the analogical predication of transcendental Being, it's opposition of self-opposed analogies may be mutually subverted and conjointly sublated into an analogy of hyper-attribution, in which the super-transcendental analogy of attribution beyond transcendental attribution predicates the beings of the self-opposed and mutually oppositive analogies of proportion and attribution. The concluding primacy of the analogy of attribution thus proves to be a radicalized hyper-attribution that conceals, in its hypo-dialectical determinations, the many dualisms resulting from the hyper-dialecticity of transcendental Being. Since, however, such a hyper-attribution reiterates, at a higher level, the self-subversion of the analogy of attribution, it must require further super-transcendental predication *ad infinitum*. The dual-analogy of attributive proportion consequently remains caught within the self-opposed dyadic analogy of one to another (*analogia unius ad alterum*), without exceeding these fixed oppositions towards the triadic analogy of two to a third (*analogia duroum ad tertiam*).[114]

2.2. Ghent, Scotus, and Ockham

Ghent, Scotus, and Ockham dissolved the medieval dual-analogy of attributive proportion by successively transcendentalizing analogical predications, semanticizing transcendental determinations, and individualizing these distinct semantic forms until every proportion of analogy could be dissolved into nothing more than the self-sundering virtuality of objectified concepts. Henry of Ghent initiated this process by radicalizing and polarizing the dualities resulting from the dyadic

[114] Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Ia 13.5; *De Potentia*, 7.7; *Contra Gentiles*, I. 34.

self-opposed and mutually oppositive dual-analogy of attributive proportion into a more radically equivocal analogy. After Aquinas had prioritized the analogy of attribution in a hyper-attribution of every categorematic predication of proportionate substances, Ghent radicalized Avicenna's intentional priority of transcendental Being as the hyper-determinative source of each attributive proportion: yet where Aquinas' analogy of attributive proportion had sought to balance these hyper-determinative attributions in and through the intermediating proportions of positively pre-determined substances, Ghent's hyper-determinative attributions began to immediately produce proportions through nothing more than the negative determinations of intentional distinctions in transcendental Being.[115]

The positive pre-determined beings of substances could thus be transformed into the negative determinations of transcendental Being by transforming the specific differentia of all categorematic terms into trans-categorematic intentional distinctions (*aliud intentione*) to make every positive pre-determined substance into a complex of negative determinations.[116] By prioritizing these negative determinations over positive substances, Ghent had transcendentalized every substance as a determinate mode of transcendental Being: for since Being is first known in the order of intentions, any distinct addition to Being must be intended as a negation of being; but because every negative addition must also be re-united as a mode in Being, each prior negation must suffer a posterior negation; and since any such double-negation must also add the determinate *ratio* of double-negations that are united in a mode in Being, every double-negative addition of a determinate *ratio* may be a determinate negation that can produce some positively determinate thing (*res*).

After all categorematic terms have been transcendentalized, and all substances de-substantivized, Ghent could substitute the substantive analogical causality of Albert and Aquinas for a more radically Avicennian attributive analogical causality, in which being is attributed, between God and creatures, without any real 'community' (*communitas realis*): transcendental Being is thus meant to be hyper-determined into determinate things, but because every determinate negation must reproduce the duality between the determining cause and the determined effect, there must remain an insuperable

[115] Henry of Ghent, *Henry of Ghent's Summa : the questions on God's existence and essence, (articles 21-24)* trans. Jos Decorte, Roland Teske (Dudley: Peeters, 2005); Aertsen, 304.
[116] Aertsen, 274-286.

duality in each intentional distinction between indeterminate being and determinate things, which extends to each predicative judgment of analogy.[117] The analogical community between all equivocal meanings is, consequently, annulled through the infinite reproduction of these dualities as the dual-analogy of attributive proportion is divided into a more radically equivocal analogy, in which each analogical predication reiterates an equivocal predication, and there can remain no analogical community in which to unite substances, concepts, and things.[118]

John Duns Scotus semanticized these transcendental determinations to subsume transcendental Being into the virtual semantic sphere of univocal being, and to produce a new metaphysical semantics of transcendental Being, where the old metaphysics of transcendentals (*metaphysica transcendens*) is transformed into a new transcendental science (*scientia transcendens*).[119] He thus more radically reduced any remaining hyper-genericity of the transcendentals to the negative non-genericity of any term that is not determined by a genus (*extra omne genus*).[120] The transcendentals could thus be schematized into three classes: transcendental Being, the transcendentals convertible with being, and the disjunctive transcendentals.[121] Once, however, all terms had been transcendentalized and semanticized in and through this single transcendental science, Scotus could begin to admit an infinite proliferation of transcendental terms to trivialize this very schema, annul any transcendental-categorematic distinction, and subsume all transcendentality within a single unified semantic sphere.[122] And once transcendentality had been semanticized, then genus could also be redefined as nothing more than a purely formal distinction that could be unified by each individual 'thisness' (*haecceitas*) within the quasi-genus of univocal being.[123]

The univocity of being (*univocatio entis*) is thus negatively defined, by Scotus, as a flattened field of determinate semantic forms, free from contradictions, and capable of operating as the middle term of

[117] Rosemann, 189.
[118] Mark Henninger, *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250-1355* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989), 52-58, 68-70.
[119] Catherine Pickstock, "Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance", *Modern Theology*, 21, 4 (2005), 547.
[120] Aertsen, 358.
[121] Aertsen, 387.
[122] Aertsen, 436-432.
[123] Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.8.1.3, 101-109, 137-150; Aristotle, *Categories*, 1a6-12, 3a34-3b9; *Metaphysics*, 998b23, 1003a33-1003b18, 1059b31; Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q.2, art.11, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, bk. I, ch. 25, par. 6; Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, art. 21, q.2; Pickstock, 547.

any syllogism.[124] He argues that, since transcendental Being is the first distinctly conceivable concept (*primus conceptus distincte conceptibilis*) that is irreducibly included as whatever is most common (*communisimum*) within all quidditative concepts, being must be conceived as the first and proper object of the intellect (*objectum proprium*).[125] Since transcendental Being is, in this way, prior to and distinct from any posterior division into infinite or finite being, as well as into the ten categories, it must uniquely possess one single meaning, as the univocity of being, to secure for the natural knowledge of theology the semantic unity of each concept – from the simplest univocal predicate to the most general transcendental science of metaphysics.[126]

Once all terms have been transcendentalized and all transcendentals have been semanticized, then the commonness of transcendental Being could be emptied out and externalized into a virtual semantic sphere of univocal being, where the hyper-determination of every analogical predication could produce a contradictory coincidence between each primary analogon and its auxiliary analogate terms.[127] Scotus could dissolve this contradiction by reducing Ghent's equivocal analogy, where there is no 'real likeness' between God and creatures, to a univocal analogy, where each analogical predication is meant to be virtually distinguished (*distinctio virtualis*) into deliberate equivocals (*aequivoca a consilio*), even as they are united in and through the same virtual semantic sphere of the immediate predication of univocal being.[128] Once, however, the commonness of transcendental Being has, in this way, been subsumed into and reproduced within the virtuality of univocal being, each immediate predication of univocal being must remain unmediated, derivative from, and divided into self-sundering virtual beings.[129] Univocal being can, consequently, never be predicated to unite equivocal terms; can never operate as the middle term of any syllogism; and can never save analogy from dissolving into ultimately unmediated and equivocally distinct semantic determinations.[130]

[124] Scotus, *Ordinatio*. 1.3.1.1-2, n.26; Aertsen, 395.
[125] Duns Scotus, *Philosophical Writings*, trans. Allan Wolter (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 19; Aertsen, 407.
[126] Scotus, *Ordinatio*, 1.8.1.3, nn. 137-150.
[127] John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), xxvi-xxviii; Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, I d.3, a.2, a2, 26.
[128] Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context", 101-103.
[129] Cunningham, 28.
[130] Henninger, 68-96.

William of Ockham individualized these distinct semantic determinations into simple supposits by reducing the univocal concept of being to the univocal universal of being, and ultimately all universals to nothing more than the nominal terms of subject-predicate propositions.[131] Once the being of substances had been transcendentalized and semanticized into univocal being, and univocal being had been individuated into simple supposits, then the transcendental terms may be relegated, as a group of terms marked by commonness (*communia omnibus*), to nothing more than auxiliary connotative significations, which derive their entire significance from the absolute significance of the primary substances that are supposited by true propositions.[132] The simple supposits of individual propositional judgments, rather than any series of semantic determinations, are thus rendered as the vanishing intermediaries of the imminently dissolving bonds of analogy.

Ockham acknowledges, with Scotus, that there must be univocal universals applicable to God and creatures but argues that being is distinct from, not communicated to, and may never genuinely inhere in any individual supposition.[133] Since, moreover, being may not be predicated of any ultimate difference beyond genus-species determinations, even as these differences must be contained in each individual supposition, every univocal predication of being must be superseded by the supposition of simple propositions.[134] Univocal being is thus thoroughly individualized into nothing more than the bivalent determinations of the truth or falsity of simple propositions.[135] Since these supposits must nonetheless retain the predicate of univocal being, each must conceal – behind their outward substantivality – the intrinsically unmediated self-sundering virtuality of univocal being.[136]

Ockham thus reduces the deliberate equivocity in the univocity of being to merely a confused mixture of terms when he distinguishes three forms of univocity according to varying degrees of similitude, and classifies analogy as merely a mixed likeness-unlikeness form of univocal being, midway

[131] Aertsen, 131.
[132] William Ockham, *Summa Logicae,* I, c. 10; Gordon Leff, *William of Ockham: the metamorphosis of scholastic discourse* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 125, 149, 164.
[133] William of Ockham, *Ordinatio,* d.2, q.7, 258; d. 2, q. 9, 312; d. 3, q.5, 443-5; Cf. Leff, 169.
[134] Aertsen, 525.
[135] Ockham, *Ordinatio*, d.2, q.4, 134; Leff, 175.
[136] Ockam, *Summa Logicae*, I, ch. 38, 98; Cf. Leff, 164-5.

between perfect likeness (univocity) and perfect unlikeness (equivocity).[137] Since all terms must signify either absolutely and univocally or connotatively and equivocally, any analogical mixture of equivocity in univocity must be broken, dissolved, and individualized into simple supposits.[138] Since these simple supposits are altogether a-relational, this dissolution of analogy into simple supposits can annul every relation of likeness and unlikeness between terms until all terms may be immediately conjoined in nothing more than atomic propositions without relations.[139] But because such supposits without relations can supposit nothing - not even themselves - each supposition must produce a paradoxical supposit without supposition. These supposits without supposition are pure semantic objects in sheer separation from any subjective supposition. Once, therefore, the univocity of being has been reduced to suppositionless supposits, then the hyper-dialecticity of transcendental Being can be fully de-dialecticized into the hypo-dialectical determination of objective concepts (*conceptus objectivus*).[140]

2.3. Cajetan, Suarez, and Poinsot

After Ghent's transcendentalization of hyper- attributions, Scotus' semanticization of transcendental hyper-determinations, and Ockham's individuation of these semantic forms into the simple suppositionless supposits had fully fossilized dialecticity and univocalized analogy into objective concepts, then the analogy of being could be artificially re-constructed into a succession of objectified forms. Thomas Cajetan first extracted, from a brief answer in Aquinas' *Sentences*, a threefold distinction of modes of analogy (*modos analogiæ*): the analogy of inequality (*analogia inaequalitatis*) is the analogy of being alone (*analogia secundum esse tantum*) of one generic analogon that is unequally participated by specific analogates; the analogy of attribution (*analogia attributionis*) is the analogy of intention alone (*analogia secundum intentionem tantum*) where one analogon is attributed

[137] Leff, 159-161.
[138] Leff, 151, 159.
[139] Henninger, 119-148.
[140] Cunningham, 19.

by one identical term according to many diversely related analogates; and the analogy of proportion (*analogia proportionalitas*) is the analogy of both being and intention (*analogia secundum esse et secundum intentionem*) where one analogon of a primary substance is proportionate to many auxiliary and accidental analogates.[141] Cajetan argues that the analogy of inequality consists in many equivocal analogates concealed behind one generic analogon, while the analogy of attribution consists in an extrinsic denomination of many analogates by one univocal analogon. The analogy of proportionality can be properly distinguished between the merely metaphorical similitude of improper proportionality, and the subtantival similitude of proper proportionality. The analogy of proper proportionality is thus meant to secure the unity of the objective concept of proportion between substances and accidents.[142] But because the *ratios* of the many analogate accidents can never equivalently coincide in the *ratio* of one analogon substance, each proportion may only produce a similitude between dissimilars. Since, however, such a similitude must remain conceptually disunited, the objective concepts of proportion must ultimately prove to be disproportionate.[143] The analogy of proper proportion thus collapses into a merely metaphorical similitude between ultimately dissimilar analogates.

Francisco Suarez reunited these dissimilar analogates in and through the attribution of being by objectifying the predication of being into the objective concept of Being in ontology: where previously transcendental Being had been predicated of all beings, after Being had been semanticized and individualized into objective concepts, Suarez could reformulate metaphysics into the 'supertranscendental science' of ontology where "being taken most abstractly" includes both real being (*ens reale*) and being of reason (*entia ratione*) in "being insofar as it is real being" (*ens inquantum ens reale*).[144] Since the privations and negations of the beings of reason must – on pain of paradox – be excluded from any nominal coincidence of real and ideal being, Suarez denies that being

[141] Thomas Cajetan, *The Analogy of Names; and, The Concept of Being*. trans. Edward Bushinski, Henry Koren (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953), ch.I-III, §§1-30; Aquinas, *Sentences*, I 19.5; Lyttkens, 205-209.
[142] Ashworth, "Suarez on the Analogy of Being", 66-70.
[143] Cajetan, ch.IV, §§36-39. Lyttkens, 210-215.
[144] Aertsen, 589-590.

can be the first and adequate object (*objectum adaequatum*) of the intellect.[145] But because 'being' must signify one being rather than many beings for metaphysics to be a unified science with a proper subject, Suarez argues that being can be united – as the simplest formal concept – in an insuperably idealized and objectified concept.[146] Being is thus meant to be intrinsically attributed to unite the dissimilar analogates of each proportion in the analogy of attribution.[147] But because the auxiliary analogates may only receive an attribution of being from the Being of their primary analogon, so that all auxiliary being is derived from the primary Being of the objectified concept, Suarez must assimilate the being of analogates to analogons, and ultimately of all things (*res*) to Being itself (*ipsum ens*). Since, however, such an all-assimilating objectified concept must also be a semantic determination of univocal being, Suarez has, in the guise of an analogical ontology, ultimately elevated the self-sundering virtuality of the univocity of being to the 'supertrancendental' science of metaphysics, in a virtually hypostatized ontology where being continually exceeds and returns into itself in a cycle that is continually 'abstracted' from and 'contracted' into things.

Jean Poinsot dissolved this contradictory ontology by analytically reducing (*resolutio*) the terms designating objective concepts into pure signs.[148] He defines a sign as a concept that "represents to a cognoscitive faculty something other than itself."[149] Where impure signs signify something other than the sign itself, pure signs signify something other in and through the sign itself. Pure signs may, thus, paradoxically signify themselves only by signifying another through their own self-signification. Poisnot purports to represent Cajetan's analogy of proper proportionality, but because the objectified concept of proportion has already been transformed - through a contradictory ontology of Being in and beyond itself - into objectified concepts, Poinsot must reconstruct the analogy of proportion as a 'semiotic analogy' on the basis of these pure signs. Since, however, a pure sign must always exceed itself by signifying another through nothing other than its own self-signification, the signs of the

[145] Francisco Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, 1, sect. 1, n. 5, p.3; I, sect. 1, n.8, p.4, in *Opera Omnia*, Vol. XXV; *Tractatus Tertius De Anima*, IV, c. 1, n.3, p.713, in Opera Omnia, Vol. III (Duval Paris: apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1866).
[146] Aertsen, 596-600, 607-608; Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, II, sect. 1, n. 1-9, pp.65-68; sect. 2, n.8, pp.72-75; sect. 4, n.3, p.88, in *Opera Omnia*, Vol. XXV.
[147] Aertsen, 627.
[148] Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding*, 222-231; John Poinsot, *Outlines of Formal Logic*, trans. Francis Wade, (Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1955), 29; Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, 24b16.
[149] Poinsot, *Outlines of Formal Logic*, 31-34.

semiotic analogy can never remain simply self-united, never secure the unity of the object concept, and never succeed in artificially re-constructing the scholastic analogy of being.[150] Since, finally, each pure sign exceeds so as to annul itself, every proportionate unity of analogy must be dispersed into a disproportionate dis-unity to annul all of the proportions of the semiotic analogy in its self-disproportion, and de-construct every re-constructed analogy into a formal semiosis of pure signs.

The de-construction of every artificially re-constructed analogy into pure signs collapses all of the intermediating objective concepts of medieval meta-semiosis into the unmediated subjective concepts of a purely formal semiosis to annul any shared semiosis of analogy and dialectics. Once all concepts have been reduced to pure signs, that paradoxically exceed so as to annul themselves, then all of the concepts of medieval analogy, dialectics, and meta-semiosis could be dissolved in a sea of signs. The principle of intermediation had previously reflected all substantivized signs, but, by reflecting their hyper-negativity, had negated the hyper-generic into the non-generic predication of the hidden hyper-genus. It thus produced the hyper-dialectical contradictions of transcendental predication that propelled the hypo-dialectical dissolution of the dual-analogy of attributive proportion and the univocal analogy of semantic virtuality into the opaque and objective concepts of its simple supposits. Once, however, even these objectified concepts had been reduced to pure signs, then the self-opposed non-genericity of transcendental predication could also be annulled in and by the paradox of pure signs. But after non-genericity had been annulled, then the self-oppositing hyper-genericity of non-generic transcendental predication could be annulled so that there could no longer remain any distinction between the hyper-dialectics of transcendental predication and the hypo-dialectics of medieval disputation, the hyper-dialectical propulsion of hypo-dialectical disputation could subvert its own subordination, and dialectics could erupt from the abyss in and between all signs to speculatively restore analogy. Since, finally, these signs are totally transparent to subjective cognition, all of the forms of all objective concepts could be dialectically re-constructed by predicating every object of its subject so that the universality of ancient hyper-genericity and the self-opposed particularity of

[150] John Poinsot, *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas: Basic Treatises*, trans. Simon, Glanville, and Hollenhorst (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 158, 172.

medieval non-genericity could be fully individualized into the simple subject-predicate copulation of the conceptual form of judgment.

3. Modern Speculative Analogy

The modern speculative analogy, from Kant and Hegel to Schelling and Przywara, dialectically determines every dynamic proportion of interchangeable analogate-analogon terms within the self-reflective relationality and omni-semiosis of the Trinity. The ancient analogy had first distinguished between the hyper-generic analogon and the non-generic analogates, and the medieval analogy had further opposed this hidden hyper-genericity to the non-genericity of transcendental predication. Yet after all predication had been transcendentalized, semanticized, and individualized into objective concepts, and these objective concepts had been dispersed, re-united, and reduced to the subjective concepts of pure signs, then the old objectified analogy of scholastic ontology could be transformed into the new subjectified analogy of modern epistemology. Where the ancient and medieval analogies had extrinsically bound together specific analogates to a generic analogon by hyper-generic principles and non-generic transcendentals, the modern speculative analogy must intrinsically bind the proportionate relations of analogates and analogon terms by the dialectical self-predication of subjects. Since all subjects must, moreover, begin in opposition to an object, the speculative analogy must divide dialectics between the self-predicating subject that forms the dialecticity of subjectivity and the self-predicating object that forms the dialecticity of objectivity: the dialecticity of subjectivity predicates every object of the subject, while the dialecticity of objectivity predicates every subject as an object in and against the object; but because it predicates objects in and against themselves, it produces a self-opposed predication that subverts every opposition between subjectivity and objectivity so that both may be sublated in the shared dialecticity of the singularly surpassing Idea. It thus predicates every opposed object of the subject, subverts the subject into the object, and opposes this object as a subject for itself, to render all subject and object predicates interconvertible. This inter-convertibility of predicates implies the equal interchangeability of analogates, so that every analogate can be predicated as the analogon of every other, and all proportions can be self-determined by the singular dialecticity of the speculative analogy. The speculative analogy has been developed by Hegel into the analogical dialectics of subjectivity and by Przywara into the dialectical analogy of

objectivity, but because both have mutually subordinated analogy and dialectics, each could be reduced to a pure opposition between subjectivity and objectivity that must be re-united in the subject-object Idea that suspends analogy and dialectics in and through the essential relations of the Trinity.

3.1. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Hegel developed the speculative analogy from the inter-changeability of terms within the speculative proposition in each judgment and the Measure of Being in each concept within the speculative syllogism. It makes all predicates interconvertible within the speculative proposition of each judgment, all analogates interchangeable through the proportionate measures within each concept, and unites both the speculative proposition of judgments and the measures of concepts within the speculative syllogism. Hegel's speculative analogy has, regrettably, been almost entirely neglected because substances, language, and concepts, have conventionally been held apart in distinct domains: substances were thought to pertain to the domain of extra-mental objects, concepts to intra-mental objects, and language was relegated to the role of merely vocalizing their reciprocal transmission.[151] Language thus came to be employed as a vacuous valet, even as its substances could no more be conceptualized than its concepts could be substantivized. But once all substances had been transcendentalized, semanticized, and individuated into objective concepts, and these objective concepts had been subjectivized into pure signs translatable to pure intuitions, then it once again became possible to reconstruct all concepts and substances through the linguistic proportions of the speculative analogy.

3.1.1. Speculative Proposition

The speculative proposition is, in contrast to the fixed proposition, a dynamic identity of the subject

[151] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*. trans. Christopher Smith (1982), 94-95; Catherine Malabou, *The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, and Dialectic*, trans. Lisabeth During (London: Routledge, 2006), 171, 180.

and predicate terms of any propositional judgment that is determined in and through the self-determining and self-moving concept: where a fixed proposition may unite subject and predicate terms through the empty copula of a static sentence, the speculative proposition is, instead, meant to reflect the difference between these terms by annulling and sublating each into the concrete copula of the concept. Since the concept is the copula, the subject-predicate relations of speculative grammar may imminently reflect the logical inter-relations of speculative philosophy. Plato had dialectically divided and combined the terms of speech into individually distinct but intrinsically related propositions; but Aristotle had, afterwards, subverted so as to fossilize its dialecticity into an asymmetrical grammatical form, in which predicates inhered in subjects just as accidents inhered in substances, where each may only be conjoined and the copula filled by the determination of individual substances. Porphyry and Boethius subsequently suspended every copula from the ineffable One and simple God beyond grammar, from whose heavenly source issued an innumerable variety of grammatical forms. Once, following late-medieval scholasticism, all substances had been de-substantivized and all concepts had been re-subjectivized, then Kant could re-construct propositions – free from substances and representations – as singular judgments composed from the transcendental grammar of the categories and individuated by nothing more than the apperceptive unity of transcendental cognition.[152] But because this transcendental grammar must also reproduce the asymmetrical subject-predicate form in all pure propositional judgments, and its asymmetry had already cascaded into an infinite alterity of antinomies to annul any constructed unity, each copula of every fixed proposition must be emptied, so that all terms could fall asunder to falsify all judgments.

Hegel answers this falsification of fixed propositions by sublating the finite limits and fixed forms of subject and predicate terms into the judgments of the dynamically self-determining concept. In his early *Scepticism* essay, he recalls how the 'pure scepticism' of Plato's *Parmenides* can falsify every fixed proposition as soon as it is resolved into two contradictory antitheses.[153] Since every proposition is possibly false, no subject-predicate copulation in a proposition is ever necessarily but

[152] Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*. trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A341/B399-A348/B406, pp. 411-15.
[153] Plato, *Parmenides*, 135d-136a.

only ever possibly true.[154] He thus declares, in *the Encyclopaedia*, that "every judgment is by its form one-sided and, to that extent, false."[155] All judgments are, however, only false insofar as these judgments are finite, one-sided, and fail to capture the infinite multi-sided complexity of the Absolute Idea. Kant had, in this way, finitized all judgments by predicating subjects according to finite categories that were "permanently fixed and not subject to any further negation."[156] Since each proposition had been determined by the categories, and the categories were fixed in inalterable finitude, each propositional judgment had been fossilized into an equally fixed and finite form. But because "the mind cannot help feeling that predicates of this sort fail to exhaust the object", and predication limits thinking to "the propositional form" that "is not suited to express the concrete", no one-sided subject-predicate determination can ever adequately articulate the Absolute Idea.[157]

Hegel introduces the 'speculative proposition', as early as the *Jena Logic and Metaphysics*, for the purpose of preserving the truth of each of these one-sided propositional judgments by reflecting the difference between their many distinct subject and predicate terms into a single judgment through the syllogism of the concept. He describes how subject and predicate terms are universal and particular determinacies, which are constituted in the totality of determinative relations and reflected to "preserve themselves in the realization of the judgment."[158] These judgments are meant to be interlocked, united, and sublated into the syllogism that is substituted to "take the place of the empty 'is' of the judgment."[159] The empty 'is', or copula, of the judgment is meant to be filled by a speculative 'middle' where the "narrowed circle of the concept" is "gathered together into a point."[160] This speculative middle is the moment of individuality in the syllogism that unites the opposed

[154] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One". in *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism*. trans. George di Giovanni and H. S. Harris (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 335.
[155] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, The Encylcopedia of Philosophical Sciences, The Encyclopedia Logic*. trans. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company), 1991, §29-32, pp.68-70.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Jena System: 1804-5: Logic and Metaphysics,* trans. John Burbridge and George Di Giovanni (Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press, 1986), 99-100.
[159] Ibid., 99-100.
[160] Hegel, *Jena Logic*, 100, 117, 125, 128-9; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, trans. George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 21.57, p.49; 21.137, p.119; 12.105, p.603; 12.252, p.751.

extremes of all judgments, propositions, and terms by filling every empty copula of propositional judgments with the logically necessary and interior self-relations of the concept.[161]

The concept of science is thus described, in the preface to *the Phenomenology of Spirit*, as an organic system, which "is the self-directing inner soul of the concrete content", whose movement "consists in becoming another to itself" so as to take this other "back into itself" and "make itself into a movement" that "reduces itself to simple determinateness" by predicating its own othered object in a singularly individual determination, which is "the actuality and living process of the subject-matter."[162] The subject and the predicate thus pass over into one another, so that neither retains a fixed and stable meaning, and each is "shaken to its foundation", where it "really disappears" into a point where "the scattered diversity of the content is brought under the control of the self."[163] But by annulling the fixed and stable meaning of each term, "the whole of this movement constitutes its positive content and its truth", the "life-movement of truth", where subject and predicate terms are positive and negative moments – like the metre and accent in the rhythm of music – in a concept that "hovers between and unites both."[164]

These positive and negative moments of the speculative propositions are meant to be preserved from the first dialectical triad of Being and Nothing in Becoming to the consummation of the system through the return of Spirit in and for itself. Hegel describes how the abstract indeterminacies of subject and predicate terms must, to preserve each concrete determination, be suspended in the speculative proposition and sublated into the judgment.[165] Through this judgment, the totality of indeterminate subject and predicate terms can be reflected into a single determination of the concept: the subject is the first instance of being from the Doctrine of Being whose particular being exists for itself; while the predicate is the first instance of essence from the Doctrine of Essence whose universal essence reflects the object for itself; so that the subject-predication of the speculative proposition is, as the final instance of the concept from the Doctrine of Concept, an individual judgment in and for

[161] Hegel, *Jena Logic*, 99-101.
[162] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), § 53, pp. 31-3.
[163] Ibid., § 60 pp. 36-8.
[164] Ibid., §§ 47, 61, pp. 27-28, 38.
[165] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 21.77-21.80 pp. 66-69.

itself.[166] Once all terms of the speculative proposition have, in this way, been sublated into the judgment, then the embedded representational discourse of ordinary language may also be preserved and re-posited in and through the self-determinations of the concept.[167] The totality of subject-predicate determinations can thus cycle from particularity to universality and back again until each are altogether singularly united and determinately individuated in and through the judgment, where "the copula expresses that the subject is the predicate" and the delimited finitude of all terms "passes over into the infinite" life of the concept.[168] Kant's empty copula can thus be filled by uniting subject and predicate terms, through the speculative proposition, in the infinite self-determination of the concept, in which all terms, propositions, and judgements may be interrelated through the linguistic proportions of analogy.[169]

3.1.2. Speculative Analogy

The speculative analogy is the linguistic proportionality of the concept that unites every distinct determination of being by sublating each simple quality of a determinate being and every definite quantity of a qualitative ratio in and through complex qualitative measures. These complex qualitative measures of the qualitative ratio form the analogical relations between the auxiliary analogate terms of the lower subordinate concepts and the primary analogon terms of the higher superordinate concepts. Although Hegel nowhere describes measure as 'analogy', and even appears to have been altogether ignorant of the medieval-scholastic formulation of the analogy of being, he has, for the purpose of constructing concepts into an architectonic of proportionate relations, developed a homologous theory of the linguistic proportions in and between the determinate beings of every concept. He develops this theory of the speculative analogy when, in the first third of the *Science of Logic*, he constructs an 'objective logic', or ontology, of the proportionate relations in and between beings by sublating the conceptual spheres of Quality and Quantity into Measure within the

[166] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 21.79 p.68.
[167] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Nuremberg Propädeutik*, "Nuremberg Propädeutik". in *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Werke IV* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 322–323; cited in Malabou, 169; Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 47, p. 27; *Science of Logic*, 12.57 p.554.
[168] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 12.57, p.554-5.
[169] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §39, p.22; *Encylcopedia Logic*, §166, p. 244.

sphere of Being: since sublation not only annuls but preserves the lower, prior, and subordinate concepts within the higher, posterior, and superordinate concepts, this sublation of Quality and Quantity into the Measure of Being must also imply the preservation of the determinate being of Quality and the qualitative ratio of Quantity within the Measure of Being; and since this Measure of Being must, likewise, be teleologically anticipated by every subordinate sphere, as well as preserved in every superordinate sphere, the speculative analogy must unite every distinct determination of being from the first dialectical triad of Being-Nothing-Becoming to the final self-return of Absolute Spirit.

Hegel thus outlines, in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences,* how the system of the Absolute is divided into the triad of Logic, Nature, Spirit, from which the *Science of Logic* is divided into the triad of Being, Essence, and Concept, and from which Being is likewise divided into Quality, Quantity, and Measure. In the first sphere of Quality, he first unites pure indeterminate Being and Nothing, through the equal indeterminacy of each, in the alternating and reciprocal determinations that singularly constitute the first concrete synthesis of Becoming;[170] then unites the prior and posterior negations of the simple determination of Being-as-Such with the indifferently opposed and immediate being-for-other of Finitude, through its self-transcending limits, into the speculative infinitude of Determinate Being for-self;[171] and finally unites the oneness of this absolutely self-determining Being-for-Self with the immediate self-opposition of the One and the many, through the mutually mediating interrelations of Attraction and Repulsion, in the infinitely self-posited being of Quantity.[172] In the second sphere of Quantity, he first unites this singular identity of being-for-self and being-for-other in Pure Quantity with the immediate continuity and mediated discontinuity of Discrete and Continuous Magnitudes, through its self-enclosing limitation, in the self-delimited individual determination of the Pure Quantum; [173] he then unites the discrete determinations of Number and the self-externalizing Extensive and Intensive Quantum, through the doubly-transcendent reflection of the infinite 'beyond'

[170] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 21.69, p.59.
[171] Ibid., 21.97-104, pp.83-90.
[172] Ibid., 21.151-71, pp. 132-51.
[173] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 21.176-93, pp.154-67.

back into itself, into the self-related qualitative ratio in the Infinite Magnitude of the Quantum;[174] and he finally unites the self-related externality of the Direct Ratio and the alterable qualitative opposition of the Inverse Ratio, through the reflection of the externality of the exponent, in the self-related externality and complex quality of the Ratio of Powers in Measure.[175]

Measure thus emerges, from the successive sublation of the being-for-self of Quality and the qualitative ratio of Quantity, as the seminal conceptual sphere where each of the previous determinations can be re-posited into the inner proportionality of complex qualities.[176] These complex qualities must thereby be constituted by the moments of being-for-self from the sphere of Quality and qualitative ratio from the sphere of Quantity through the self-reflected externality of various qualitative ratios in the simple self-related determination of each specific quantum.[177] Specific Quantity is meant to sublate these specific and indifferent quanta, through the relapse of measure into immediate quanta, so as to constitute the intrinsic quantity and extrinsic quanta in and through the real relations of measure. This Real Measure is then meant to produce specific measures that are each themselves mediated by other measures in an infinitely intermediated network of proportionate measures, which can constitute an 'analogy of analogies'. This analogy of analogies culminates in the Measureless fluctuation of measures measuring measures *ad infinitum*, in which measure is made absolutely indifferent to being and collapses into an 'absolute contradiction' that annuls any fixed distinction between Quality and Quantity in the simple self-determination of Measure. After every distinction has been annulled, then the previous moments of determinate being and qualitative ratio may be mixed together to produce a qualitative ratio of being in each singular self-determination of Measure.

This speculative analogy must remain a thoroughly linguistic proportion because it preserves, by sublating all particularly indeterminate analogate terms into individually determinate analogon concepts, the linguisticality of the speculative proposition from the first dialectical triad of Being and

[174] Ibid., 21.194-309, pp.168-270.
[175] Ibid., 21.310-22, pp.271-81.
[176] Ibid., 21.323, p.282.
[177] Ibid., 21.326, p.285.

Nothing in Becoming through each ensuing dialectical determination. This linguistic proportionality of each determination can accordingly transform the absolutely indeterminate, univocal, and pure 'being in general' into an infinitely self-determining analogy of being: for since "there is nothing in heaven or nature or spirit or anywhere else that does not contain just as much immediacy as mediation", this pure immediate knowing of absolutely abstract and completely indeterminate pure 'being in general' must reflect - in its presuppositionless immediacy - nothing other than the absolute intermediation of the entire system, which has already been pedagogically exemplified by the culmination of the various shapes of consciousness in the Absolute Knowing that concludes *the Phenomenology of Spirit*. Hegel thus writes, at the beginning of the Doctrine of Being, that the "simple immediacy" of pure being that has been "withdrawn into this unity" is "itself an expression of reflection" that "refers to the distinction from what is mediated"; but, at the end, concludes that "Being in general and the being or immediacy of the different determinacies have thereby vanished" into "being which, through the sublation of being, is simple being with itself."[178] This simple being with itself, in which Being is consummated and passed onto every subsequent sphere, is thus, no longer univocal pure being in general, nor even any one of the vanishing determinacies of Being, but rather the linguistically proportioned Measure of being, in which the univocity of pure being has been annulled and re-posited in and through the speculative analogy.

3.1.3. Speculative Syllogism

The speculative syllogism is, in contrast to the fixed syllogism, a dynamic inference in and between each concept of cyclically interchangeable premises that proceeds from abstract universality, through infinite particularization, to the concrete individual of the conclusion where each of the premises and all of the concepts are singularly united in and through the middle term. Plato may have first distinguished the syllogism of reason as a dialectical movement from self-exemplary universality through particular predicate-properties in individual determinations. These dialectical syllogisms could be reflected through the Beautiful Bond into every eidetic construction, so that each extreme

[178] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 21.55, p.47; 21.382-3, p.335.

could be interchangeably related to a third through the continuous proportion of the cosmological analogy.[179] But after Aristotle had broken these bonds of analogy, the content of its premises could be separated from the forms of valid syllogisms so that these forms could be manufactured into a computational instrument for producing by deriving the necessary conclusions that were meant to be grounded in individual substances.[180] Once, however, the ground of these conclusions had been de-substantivized as nothing more than the individual determinations of the syllogism, then each *individua* could be absolutely suspended from the centremost point of its first cause and final end within a single sphere of syllogisms; the syllogisticity of metaphysics could thus be separated from the forms of logic; and a formal logic of syllogisms could be virtually reproduced to operate within even as it remained indifferent to the content of metaphysics. The content of metaphysics could afterwards be artificially reconstructed, through the hypo-dialectical determinations of medieval disputation, according to their virtually reproduced forms. Yet as soon as objective concepts were subjectivized and syllogisms were determined as the subjects of contradictory predication, then every syllogistic construction could collapse upon the antinomies of reason, whereby the sphere of syllogisms could only exceed its own virtuality in and through a syllogisticity that reflected the divine subjectivity.

The speculative syllogism is, for Hegel, a determinative sequence of judgments by which the immediate Concept-as-Such and the indifferently connected Judgment are united in and through the intermediation of a shared middle term (*medius terminus*) in and between the judgments of each syllogism within a sphere of syllogisms where "everything rational is a syllogism" and "the rational is nothing but the syllogism."[181] Since the speculative analogy is completed in the Concept-as-Such, while the speculative proposition is completed in the Judgment, the speculative syllogism may unite every proposition and analogy into the Syllogism of the Concept. The Concept-as-Such that unites the speculative analogy is the immediate totality and imminent negativity of the differences that posits its individuality as an indifferent externality of the terms in the original partition of Judgement; the

[179] Plato, *Timaeus*, 31c-32a.
[180] Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, 24b18–20, 25b30.
[181] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 12.90-1, pp. 588-9.

Judgment that unites the speculative proposition is the indifferently connected external unity of these two subsistent subject and predicate terms that are differentiated, intermediated, and individually re-united to fill its empty copula through the dialectical movement of the syllogism; and the Syllogism, which unites the speculative analogy of the Concept-as-Such and the speculative proposition of the Judgment, is the completely posited intermediated unity of the Concept that concretizes every external partition in a singularly unifying middle term, which sublates the intermediation of extremities into the totality of Objectivity that corresponds to the Concept.[182] The middle term is thus the "essential feature of the syllogism" that is meant to individually unite the mutual externality of judgement terms in the syllogism: each determination is, in the Syllogism of Existence, related to every other as the middle term to its extremes; so that, in containing each other in itself, each determination may, in the Syllogism of Reflection, be gathered up, reflected into, and intermediated through another; but by reflecting each into another, each determination is, in the Syllogism of Necessity, equally reflected back and sublated into each and every coincidence of mediation and extremity.

Once mediation and extremity coincide in every syllogism then each syllogism may be intermediated by every other through a cycle of interchangeable judgments: for since mediation and extremity coincide in each judgement, each judgment must be both the mediator and the extreme that may be interchangeably mediated by every other. This inter-changeability of judgments also implies an inter-changeability of concepts, in which each subordinate concept can be interchanged within every superordinate conceptual sphere from the first dialectical triad of Being-Nothing-Becoming to the final tripartition of Logic-Nature-Spirit: Being is thus just as much the mediator of Nothing and Becoming as Nothing is the mediator of Being and Becoming; and Logic is just as much the mediator of Nature and Spirit as Spirit is the mediator of Logic and Nature. Every dialectical triad of concepts must thus cycle around one another, at every level from beginning to end, through these interchangeable relations of mediation and extremity like a 'circle of circles', in which the absolutely intermediating centre and the furthermost periphery forever coincide. Within each superordinate conceptual sphere, no concept can contain the others even as each is presupposed as the intermediator

[182] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 12.31-12.126, pp.528-624; *Encyclopedia Logic*, §§ 160-193, pp. 238-271.

of all the others. The formal science of Logic cannot, therefore, exhaustively contain the content of Nature and Spirit, but must merely act as their absolute form and formal archetype.[183] The content of Spirit cannot, conversely, dispense with the formal science of Logic, but must rather remain the furthermost manifestation in which its form becomes equivalent to its content through the syllogistic self-return of Spirit in the Trinity.

The Trinity is presented, in the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, as the absolute triad of all triads in each syllogism that comprises the absolute syllogisticity of the entire system. Since the system is a syllogism, and this syllogism is the Trinity, every conceptual category of the system, including the linguisticality of the speculative proposition and the proportionality of the speculative analogy, may be sublated and re-posited in and through the syllogism of the Trinity.[184] The syllogism of each dialectical triad accordingly proceeds from the abstract universality (*Allgemeinheit*) of the pure self-thinking Absolute Idea of Logic that is represented in the 'kingdom of the Father' to the self-dirempted, determinately differentiated, and infinite particularity (*Besonderheit*) of the representational relationality of Nature and Spirit that is represented in the 'kingdom of the Son' to the concrete sensible singularity (*Einzelheit*) of free reconciliation in the cultic community of the Church that is represented in the 'kingdom of the Holy Spirit'.[185] The divine persons of the Trinity may thus, not only figuratively correspond to, but really and truly coincide with the logical moments of each syllogism and every concept. Since, moreover, each concept is cyclically interchangeable between the middle and extreme judgment-terms within every syllogism, the syllogism of all triads in the Trinity must admit the cyclical interchangeability of its concepts as each spiral outwards from the

[183] Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, pp. 592-4; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Hegel: Philosophy of Mind (Hegel's Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences)*. trans. William Wallace, A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) §§574-577, pp. 267-279.
[184] Dale Schlitt, *Divine Subjectivity: Understanding Hegel's Philosophy of Religion* (London: University of Scanton Press, 1990) 176-8, 181, 185, 202; "Trinity and Spirit", *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 64, 4 (1990), 471; "German Idealism's Trinitarian Legacy: The Nineteenth Century", in *The Impact of Idealism. The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought; Volume 4, Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 51; Cyril O'Regan, *The Heterodox Hegel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 63-75.
[185] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §214, p.130; §§759-787, pp.459-478; *Science of Logic*, 21.325, p. 284; *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*. trans. M.J. Petry (London: George Allen and Unwin LTD, 1970), §247, p.205; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Volume III: The Consummate Religion*, ed. Peter Hodgson, trans. R.F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson, and J.M. Stewart. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985: 12-13, 77, 271-274, 362.

maximally superordinate concepts of Logic, Nature, and Spirit towards every successively subordinated concept.[186] Since, however, each of these concepts can only be constructed from the excess, opposition, and return of predicate-objects in predicated-subjects, and every syllogism must unite these subject-predicate judgments in a middle term, the absolute syllogisticity of the Trinity must ultimately unite each concept and every triad in the absolute singularity of all subject-predication through the divine subjectivity that is its pure and perfect personality.[187]

The absolute personality of God is meant to be singularly revealed in Jesus Christ who is the absolute middle term of all middle terms in every syllogism within the absolute syllogism of the Trinity.[188] Christ is first dimly anticipated when, in *the Phenomenology of Spirit*, an individual consciousness emerges amidst the contradictory dualities of the Unhappy Consciousness in a mediated relation where the "middle term is itself a conscious Being."[189] This middle term is meant to be filled, in the section on Revealed Religion, when Spirit descends to become "immediately present as a self-conscious Being" in "an actual man" in whom "the divine nature is the same as the human" and "God is self-consciousness."[190] But before it can intermediate between every extreme, the God-man must yield to the "death of the Mediator" in an "abstract negativity" with which "particularity dies away" through "the death of the abstraction of divine Being" in "the painful feeling of the Unhappy Consciousness that God Himself is Dead."[191] The crucifixion of Christ thus annuls the "objective existence" of every extreme so that there remains nothing but the freedom of "pure subjectivity" in "the inbreathing of the Spirit, whereby Substance becomes Subject" and "Spirit is self-knowing

[186] Hegel, *Hegel: Philosophy of Mind*, §§574-577, pp. 267-279.
[187] Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 12.17, p. 514; 12.251, p.750.
[188] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge.* trans. Cerf and Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 80-86, 94, 153, 190; *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*. trans. H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 158; *Jena Logic*, 1986: 125.
[189] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 1977: §§207-230, pp. 126-138.
[190] Ibid., §§758-787, pp.458-478.
[191] Cyril O'Regan, *The Heterodox Hegel*, 200-201; Thomas J.J. Altizer, "Hegel and the Christian God". in *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 59, 1 (Spring 1991), 71-75; Slavoj Žižek, *The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic*, Žižek, Slavoj. *The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic*. ed. Creston Davis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 34-41; Graham Ward, "How Hegel Became a Philosopher: Logos and the Economy of Logic". *Critical Research on Religion*, 1, 3 (2013), 289, fn.35; Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §§784-787, pp. 475-478; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, 122-131.

Spirit."[192] This sacrificial annulling of every objectified extremity into the pure subjectivity of self-knowing Spirit is, thereafter, infinitely repeated in and through the sacramentality of the Church.[193] The freedom of divine and human subjectivity can thus be consummated as the absolute middle of Christ in each syllogism of the Trinity: for since the system is a syllogism, and this syllogism is the Trinity, the middle term of Christ in the Trinity must be the absolute middle term of all middle terms in every syllogism. Christ can therefore personally unite the mutual externality of all terms, judgments, and concepts – including every proposition and analogy – in every syllogism within the speculative syllogism of the Trinity.

3.2. Erich Przywara

The end of Hegel's speculative analogy passes over into the beginning of Przywara's speculative analogy as soon as the subject of any concept has been exceeded and enveloped in and by its object. Once all pure signs have been re-subjectivized as intuitions constructible into concepts, and these concepts have been constructed into the subjects of the syllogistic system, then each concept can be re-objectivized, released, and re-posited into the positive beings that oppose so as to predicate any subject of its object. The pure subject that closes the system can thus present itself with an equally pure object to continually re-open it so that the dialecticity of subjectivity may turn inside out into the dialecticity of objectivity: where the dialecticity of subjectivity had predicated the object of the subject through successive concepts, judgments, and syllogisms; the dialecticity of objectivity predicates the subject of the object by constructing the objects of positive being into positivism.[194] Positivism constructs ontologies of positively affirmed and pre-determined beings by predicating all

[192] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §§779-786, pp.471-476.
[193] Hegel, *Hegel: Philosophy of Mind*, §458, p.194; *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §§699-747, pp.424-453; §787, p.447; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, 152-155; O'Regan, *The Heterodox Hegel*, 243-245; Stephen Theron, *The Orthodox Hegel: Development Further Developed* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 45-6.
[194] Hegel, *The Science of Logic*, 12.126, p.624.

positive relations in and between each objectified positive being.[195] The objectified positive being is the object that predicates the subject of any relation as its own object, so that objectified positive beings may predicate objectified positive relations in an object-to-object opposition of positivity, or an oppositivity. This oppositivity is the self-opposition of positivism that plants the seed for the de-construction of every constructed ontology and ultimately annuls positivism into 'negativism': for once the subject of each concept has been re-posited into the object of every being, and each being has been predicatively constructed into an ontology, then the positive relation that is meant to be predicated of each objectified positive being can only be predicated by an object beyond the being of every relational-predication in any constructed ontology; and every positive relation of some being must equally be predicated by this negative a-relation of non-being; so that every positive relation can coincide with negative a-relations; all relationality is self-sundering a-relationality; and any possible positivist construction of an ontology of positive beings must be subverted into an equally negativist me-ontology of non-beings.[196] Positivism is thus subverted into negativism when the positive relations of any absolutizing positive ontology, or 'onto-theology', can be exposed as the self-sundering negative a-relations of an equally absolutizing but imminently self-annulling me-ontology, or 'meonto-theology'. The self-opposition of positivism thus grows into the self-oppositivity of negativism that de-constructs any constructible ontology of positively affirmed and pre-determined beings to dissolve its own self-opposition within every object.

3.2.1. Creaturely Metaphysics

Erich Przywara's creaturely metaphysics begins from the "new and independent starting point" of a phenomenological interrogation of "my act of consciousness" wherein all positive beings appear constructible into ontologies that are suspended by theontology: where ontology is a structure of

[195] Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, *The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures*. trans. Bruce Matthews (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 167-9, 179-203; Ernst Bloch, *Das Materialismusproblem, seine Geschichte und Substanz* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972); Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), 324-325; Manfred Frank, *Der unendliche Mangel an Sein. Schellings Hegelkritik und die Anfänge der Marxschen Dialektik* (München: W. Fink Verlag, 1992), 322-3; Slavoj Žižek, *The Indivisible Remainder: Essays on Schelling and Related Matters* (London: Verso, 1996), 6-7.

[196] Cunningham, *Genealogy of Nihilism*, xiii-xv, 273-275; "The Difference of Theology and some Philosophies of Nothing", *Modern Theology*, 17:3 (July 2001), 289-312.

positive beings in and through positive relations, and ontotheology is its idolatrous absolutization, theontology is an ontology that is suspended from the divine creative act of God beyond all positive beings and relations. Positivism had previously re-posited objectified beings beyond every concept to construct ontologies into ontotheology, but Przywara can elide its self-deconstruction by suspending each positive being as an energetic 'dynamic polarity' of 'potency-act' in passive obedience (*potentia oboedientialis*) from the divine act of being-knowing in analogy.[197] The divine act of being-knowing of phenomenological theontology may be distinguished from the traditional Thomistic-Suarezian divine impartation of attributive being as it exceeds so as to subsume every concept of intentional 'knowing' in each objective positive being in and between every dynamic polarity of beings.[198] It is this dynamic polarity of beings that Przywara highlights from beginning to end as his greatest innovation: for where previously the analogy of being had been presented by the Neo-Thomists as a static mode of predication for the secondary signification of primary substances, after all such predicative judgments had been re-conceptualized into syllogisms and re-objectified into self-determining positive beings, then Przywara could dynamize the medieval analogy of Aquinas, Cajetan, and Suarez with the distinctly modern polarity of Goethe, Schelling and Newman.[199] The dynamic polarity of the divine act of being-knowing is thus meant to dynamize the positive beings of every fixed analogon-analogate relation into a dynamic cycle of corollary analogate opposites that are suspended from and subsumed by the analogon of their rhythmically oscillating in-between (*metaxu*) relation within the *analogia entis*.[200]

Creaturely metaphysics subverts and subordinates so as to restrictively re-deploy the hypo-dialecticity of objectivity within the *analogia entis*. Przywara explicitly denounces the triadic dialectics of Hegel only to implicitly adopt the dyadic dialectics of Schelling to divide and dynamize each positive being into a "back and forth" cycle of corollary and contradictory opposites.[201] After all propositions, judgments, and syllogisms have been re-conceptualized and re-cast into antinomies, and all

[197] Erich Przywara, *Analogia Entis: Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal Rhythm*, trans. John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart (Cambridge: William B. Erdmann's Publishing Company, 2014), xxii-xxiii, 120-3.
[198] Ibid., xxi, 125 245-260.
[199] Ibid., xx-xxii.
[200] Ibid., 123.
[201] Ibid., 124.

antinomies are caught in contradictions, then these contradictions may only be sublated and philosophy secured through the power of dialectics. Yet where Hegel had resolved by sublating contradictions through the syllogism of each concept, Przywara renounces the syllogism to suspend the 'dynamic polarity' of contradictory opposites in a cycle of corollaries whose inner contradictions may never be resolved but only retained in and through the 'rhythmic tension' of analogy. This contradictory opposition in and between each cycle of corollaries is meant to be transposed from prior to posterior problemata: first, by reducing problems to an ultimate impasse *aporia*; second, by exposing all solutions as one-sidedly false; and third, by reducing every false solution to the true solution of an "immanent objective dialectic."[202] Such a transposition of prior to posterior problemata is meant to reduce the 'triple antithetics' of 'objective aporetics' into the antitheses and aporetics of analogy.[203] Since, however, this very transposition of problemata must retain without resolving contradictions, each successive sublation must re-produce all contradictions in an ever greater polarity of contradictory opposites.

Creaturely metaphysics may thus be positively constructed by sublating the cycling corollaries of ontical beings into successively self-opposed ontological relations: each positive being is a 'positiva'; the sum total of all positive beings is the 'positivum'; and the complete ontological construction that is suspended from God beyond being is the 'absolutum'. Since the onticality of objective beings exceeds so as to subsume all conceptuality, this ultimately ontological construction of all objective beings must exceed every concept so as to supplant the conceptuality of Hegel's *Absolute Idea* with the onticality of Przywara's '*Absolutum Mysterium*': where Hegel's Absolute Idea had been transparently open to subjective cognition, Przywara's Absolutum Mysterium must remain opaque as it ceaselessly sublates conceptuality into objectivity to enclose every subjective cognition in its ever more tightly knotted objectivity.[204] This supreme sublation of all conceptuality into objectivity also makes the Absolutum Mysterium supremely efficacious: for just as the dialecticity of objectivity oppositively predicates every object in and for itself, the Absolutum Mysterium 'hyper-posits' the

[202] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 142-143.
[203] Ibid., 153-155.
[204] Ibid., 160-1; 180-189.

divine act of being-knowing from the higher 'being-beyond', or *'ÜberSein'*, into the lower 'being-in', or '*InSein*', of each individual positiva.[205] This hyper-positive ÜberSein-into-InSein impartation relation then supplants the ontico-ontological self-relation of being in and for being that is expressed in Heidegger's *Dasein*, with the teleological and energetic 'potency-act' of ontical beings in the *metaxu* ontological relation of 'being-in-and-beyond' beings. Since each *metaxu* relation is also a positive ontological relation in and between beings, the hyper-positivity of ÜberSein-into-InSein must produce positive ontic-metaxological constructions in the cycling corollaries in and around analogy.[206] Creaturely metaphysics thus "goes through and beyond" each positive being and each positive *metaxu* relation by transposing its *aporiae* from prior to posterior problemata through successive ontic-metaxological constructions and hypo-dialectical configurations of analogy.

The dynamic polarity within each successive ontic-metaxological configuration of analogy is centred upon the 'erotic tension' and oscillating 'unity of movement' of the 'suspended middle' of the "intra-creaturely analogy" that "points beyond itself" to "the transcending analogy" "between God and creature."[207] The centre of cycling corollaries in Przywara's 'suspended middle' thus supplants the middle term of all syllogisms in Hegel's 'absolute middle'.[208] Once all concepts have been suspended from the suspended middle and sublated through their aporetic reduction into the Absolutum Mysterium, then each objectified being may re-posit so as to subsume every concept in and through its own self-oppositive predication, where "mystery becomes concept" and concept is overcome in mystery", and any concept can be overcome in and through its self-perpetuating cycle of concept-to-mystery and mystery-to-concept.[209] Przywara accordingly divides so as to dynamize 'meta-physics' into 'meta-ontics' and 'meta-noetics'.[210] This results in three successive problemata: first, the 'meta-noetic' problem of consciousness; second, the 'meta-ontic' problematic of being; and third, the meta-noetic and meta-ontic problem of the correlation of consciousness and being.[211] Przywara finally

[205] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 214.
[206] Ibid., 155-156.
[207] Ibid., 159.
[208] Ibid., 159, 216-219.
[209] Ibid., 182.
[210] Ibid., 121-129.
[211] Ibid., 130-131.

divides so as to dynamize apriorist eidetic deductive metaphysics and aposteriorist inductive morphological metaphysics as corollaries within the creaturely metaphysics of the Absolutum Mysterium.[212] The Absolutum Mysterium can, accordingly, sublate all conceptuality into its own objectivity in an infinite self-oppositive predication to propel the transposition, suspension, and sublation of every problemata from the intra-creaturely antithetic, to the creature-divine antithetic, to the intra-divine antithetic, in which all *aporiae* may be finally summated and sublated in and through its own supremely sublating objectivity.[213]

3.2.2. Dialectics and Analogy

Dialectics is contained within analogy as the dialectical motor that dynamizes the *analogia entis*. Its hypo-dialecticity is motivated by the hyper-dialecticity of objectivity to divide each positive being, reduce every *aporia*, and churn all cycling correlations of contradictory opposites. It begins as a restricted hypo-dialectic but, by its absolute self-contradiction, ultimately becomes an unrestricted hyper-dialectic that recycles and reproduces the virtual negativity of all contradictory opposites into the products of the hyper-positing divine act of being-knowing. After the dialecticity of Hegel's syllogistic system has been subverted and subsumed into objectified positive beings, then its hyper-dialecticity could be restrictively re-deployed as a subordinate hypo-dialectic for the purpose of suspending and sublating successive spheres of cycling contraries. Where, however, Aristotle and Aquinas had relegated hypo-dialectics to the increasingly rarefied *topics* of rhetoric and the *quaestiones* of disputation, Przywara innovatively implants it into the oscillating objectivity of all positive beings that are altogether sublated within the cycling corollaries of analogies in the Absolutum Mysterium: the Absolutum Mysterium re-posits hypo-dialectics, through its own intentional judgments of an 'ordering order' within each ontic *InSein* and around every ontological measure of analogy. Przywara explicitly acknowledges this restricted dialecticity of analogy when he describes how an intentional ordering relation "agrees not only with" '*logos*' but also with '*dia-logos*'

[212] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 135-138.
[213] Ibid., 184-185.

or dialectic according to a "measured consideration" in the judgment of an "ordering order."[214] The Absolutum Mysterium thus intentionally hyper-posits each measure of analogy in and through its own self-oppositing objectivity. Once all propositional judgments have, however, been assimilated to such a self-oppositing 'ordering order' of the Absolutum Mysterium, then all judgments must predicate extrinsically opposed terms within themselves so that the dialecticity of analogy can only take "place within the interval between possibilities that are antithetical" in "opposition to one another."[215]

Przywara subsumes the extrinsic self-oppositing of every judgment into each concept and sublates all conceptuality, including any concept of propositional judgments, into the creaturely logic of the creaturely metaphysics. He writes: "[Analogy] represents the *Aufhebung* [sublation] of the antithesis between logic and dialectic" that is neither Hegel's "logical dialectic" nor Heidegger's "dialectical logic" but rather the "creaturely logic" of an altogether objective "creaturely metaphysics."[216] Analogy is, through this creaturely logic, thus meant to sublate dialectics, just as dialectics sublates 'pure logic', in a tandem sublation of logic and dialectics into analogy: each aporetic antithesis between the identity of pure logic and the identity-in-contradiction of dialectics is thus meant to be suspended and sublated into the self-ordering within being-ordered of analogy.[217] Dialectics is thus sublated into analogy. But because all contradictions are retained rather than resolved, this identity-in-contradiction of dialectics must also be retained within analogy. Dialectics can thus be restrictively re-deployed as the hypo-dialectical motor of the dynamic polarity of cycling corollaries in analogy. But after he has sublated all conceptuality into objectivity, so that even the concept of the syllogism may be 'overcome in mystery', Przywara must reject the syllogisticity of dialectics, renounce all syllogistic intermediation, and de-syllogize dialectical sublation: where previously each extreme contrary opposite could be annulled and sublated through an intermediating middle term that might resolve contradictions into non-contradictory conclusions; after any such syllogistic intermediation has been supplanted by the more immediate hyper-positing of contradictory opposites, then the contradictions that were meant to be resolved in and through the speculative syllogism can never be

[214] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 192.
[215] Ibid., 193-4.
[216] Ibid., 196.
[217] Ibid., 196-197.

resolved but only ever retained in each successive sphere of cycling corollaries.[218] Once, therefore, sublation has been de-syllogized, then Przywara can only sublate conceptuality into objectivity by the immediate conjunction of contradictorily self-opposed concepts: first, through the 'critical distance' of a contradictory opposition; then through the "sheer mystical fusion with truth"; and finally as each of these previously opposed moments are immediately conjoined in the cycling corollaries of analogy.[219]

The function of contradiction in dialectical sublation thus emerges as the 'basic question' of analogy.[220] The principle of non-contradiction had, from Aristotle to Kant, prohibited contradictions within valid syllogisms. Yet after Kant had re-conceptualized all syllogisms as self-contradictory antinomies, and Fichte had made these antinomies into the antithetical moments of dialectics, then Schelling and Hegel could prescribe contradictions as the dialectical motors for the cycling forces of nature and the syllogisms of logic.[221] After the release and subsumption of all syllogisms into the self-oppositing objectivity of positive being, these dialectically motivating contradictions could only be retained in a pure potency from which to actualize the hypo-dialecticity of analogy. Przywara thus represents the principle of non-contradiction - not to prohibit but to prescribe contradictions - as the most basic and formal ground for the correlation of opposites, which is the fundamental precondition, pure potency, and true dialecticity of every suspended cycling correlation in analogy.[222] Since, however, the principle of non-contradiction can only be a pure potency of the enmeasured acts of analogy, and every potency must virtually derive its being from the prior positivity of some existing act, the principle of non-contradiction – and indeed all contradictions – must virtually derive their virtual positivity from the prior positivity of the enmeasured acts of analogy. But because Przywara has already assimilated all contradictions into the cycling corollaries of analogy, this virtual positivity of all contradictions must ultimately coincide with the hypo-dialectical negativity of self-oppositing analogy. The virtual positivity of the hypo-dialectical negativity of contradictions in all cycling

[218] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 185, 201-202.
[219] Ibid., 196, 202, 233.
[220] Ibid., 198.
[221] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, §529, 21.232, p. 201; *Encylcopedia Logic*, §48, 93-4.
[222] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 201-2.

corollaries can thus be 'recycled' into the virtual negativity of hypo-dialectics to motivate all cycling corollaries of analogy, through the contradictory cycling self-enmeasuring of analogy, into the hyper-positivity of all positive beings. Przywara thus supplants the double-negation of antitheses in Hegel's dialectical syllogism with the double-negation of virtual negativity in a 'productive nothing.'[223] This 'productive nothing' recycles virtual positivity into virtual negativity for the reproduction of the hyper-positivity of the divine act of being-knowing, from heavenly ÜberSein into creaturely InSein, in the cycling of corollaries around every analogy within the *analogia entis*.[224]

Once, however, the principle of non-contradiction has been made into the pure potency of analogy, and analogy into the consummation of all contradictions, then analogy cannot admit any non-contradictory, consistent, and valid syllogisms, so that every possible syllogism must be supplanted by an a-syllogistic imposition of the divine act of being-knowing.[225] This irresolvability of contradictions implies a more radical rendition of divine voluntarism where God must, from within the bowels of his own recycling reproduction, voluntarily hyper-posit the virtual positivity of all ontological constructions. The God of theontology is thereby presented as an indifferent voluntary operator of each energetically "enacted possibility" within any mechanically "build-able" ontology.[226] Once virtual negativity has thus been recycled to reproduce virtual positivity within analogy, then all of the negative forms of alterity, contingency, and limitation may be recycled and reproduced in a hyper-positivity of positive energetic beings that are equally suspended from and for the teleological "end-directedness" of analogy.[227]

The teleology of all analogies culminates in the "heavenly identity" of the highest analogy of all analogies that, by its inner self-oppositivity, bifurcates the totality of positiva in the absolutum into the dual-positivum of divine and creaturely spheres: the superordinate 'divine sphere' and the subordinate 'creaturely sphere' are thus distinguished by the ascending and descending transposition of reductive

[223] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 202.
[224] Ibid., 203.
[225] Ibid., 207.
[226] Cunningham, "The Difference of Theology and some Philosophies of Nothing", 289-312; Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 208.
[227] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 210.

aporetics in criss-crossing dialectical sublations from prior to posterior spheres.[228] Analogy can, by recycling and reproducing any virtual positiva, ascend and descend through these spheres, from the highest 'heavenly identity' to each individually punctiliar instance of InSein and back again.[229] The inmost depth of dialectical oscillation in In-Sein is thus revealed as the 'objective foundation' that links the ascending participative and descending imparticipative analogy.[230] The centre of this criss-crossing ascending and descending analogy is the 'suspended middle' of the 'last analogy' between the intra-creaturely and the God-to-creaturely analogies, where all horizontal and vertical forms of analogies are crossed in the consummate analogy.[231] In this last analogy, the dual-positivum of intra-creaturely and the God-to-creaturely analogies are absolutely opposed in a self-oppositive positivum, or self-oppositivum, which detonates all of the contradictions of all of the cycling corollaries in the nova of an absolute contradiction.[232] This absolute contradiction expresses the self-oppositing Absolutum Mysterium in its naked negativity: for since the hyper-positive divine act of being-knowing must suspend and sublate even this self-oppositivum, even the absolute contradiction may be recycled and reproduced to sow the higher contradiction of 'hyper-contraries' throughout the highest heavenly sphere. The resulting proliferation of hyper-contraries transforms the *analogia entis* into a fully dialectical analogy. Once, therefore, all negativity has been annulled by the absolute contradiction of the self-oppositivum, then the negativity of hypo-dialectics can be completely recycled and reproduced into the hyper-positivity of analogy.[233]

3.2.3. Absolutum Mysterium

The Absolutum Mysterium is the theontological hidden ground and mysterious source of all positive ontologies that exceeds so as to sublate all conceptuality within its ceaselessly self-enclosing objectivity. Each concept must be exceeded, sublated, and re-enclosed as soon as it has been conceptualized to secure this objectivity from collapsing back into conceptuality. Once, therefore,

[228] Ibid., 211-3.
[229] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 216-9.
[230] Ibid., 214-7.
[231] Ibid., 219-21.
[232] Ibid., 222-4.
[233] Ibid., 235-6.

creaturely metaphysics has been suspended in cycling corollaries in and around each analogy, and every analogy has been recycled, reproduced, and re-dialecticized into the concept of *analogia entis*, then this concept of a supra-historical 'negative reductive formality' must also be exceeded, sublated, and re-enclosed, through the 'superaddition' of the positive intra-historical content of analogical configurations, within the objectivity of the Absolutum Mysterium.[234]

The Absolutum Mysterium is thus meant to re-enclose the conceptuality of metaphysics, logic, and dialectics into the objectified being that can be recollected from the history of analogy. Yet this historical recollection is always directed towards its own self-enclosing objectivity. Przywara thus steps out of the *ressourcement* stream of tradition to recover the source of analogy, but because he can only recover it by sublating conceptuality into objectivity, he ineluctably recycles so as to reproduce the sources of each succeeding analogy.[235] He represents three cycling historical-content correlations: first, Parmenides-Heraclitus; second, Plato-Aristotle; and third, Augustine-Aquinas. Each *aporia* of cycling corollaries is meant to be sublated into the next so as to transpose each historical aporetic through successive problemata. The 'minimum ground' of each *aporia* is nothing less than the "constantly renewed and counterbalanced debate between thoughts' two deepest antitheses" of Parmenidean identity-in-rest and Heraclitean difference-in-motion.[236] The principle of non-contradiction already operates in this 'deepest antithesis' as the "fundamental dynamic middle" that "indicates a dynamic 'measured equilibrium' within it" to indicate the "most general sense of analogy."[237] Analogy is thus already indicated as the teleological actualization of the pure potency of every contradiction and the "most basic midpoint" of a "measured equilibrium" between Heraclitus and Parmenides that "establishes itself as the foundation of all thought."[238]

Plato exceeds, annuls, and sublates this aporetic antithesis of Parmenides and Heraclitus by suspending every paradoxical contradiction between universal paradigms (*archetypes*) and particular

[234] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 238.
[235] Ibid., 151-152.
[236] Ibid., 205.
[237] Ibid., 206.
[238] Ibid., 206.

instances (*ectypes*) from an instantaneously imparted *metaxu* relation of participation (*methexis*).[239] The infinite reiteration of this self-opposed duality of metaxological archetype-ectype relations reinforces each and every oscillating cycle of contradictory opposites.[240] These cycling contraries culminate in a paradoxical 'collision' of the "supra-antithetical in-between within the immanence of antitheses" in an instantaneous "flash of a moment of a neutralized middle" by a "'relation to the divine' that is expressed in the vacillating mystery of the *Euthyphro*."[241] The triple inter-changeability of syllogistic terms in the Beautiful Bond can thus be supplanted by the double-alternating cycle of contradictory opposites that may only be voluntarily united through the divine hyper-positing of *metaxu* participation relations.[242] Since, however, this immediate hyper-positing is altogether unmediated, these *metaxu archetype-ectype* relations must irresolvably alternate in an always aporetic antitheses without any possibility of dialectical mixture.[243]

Aristotle united these alternating antitheses in a "relation of alterity" from a "delimited and delimiting equilibrium" of oscillating opposites "beyond everything determinable" within the 'tension-filled torso' of analogy.[244] Aristotelian analogy is thus meant to actualize Platonic metaxology. But because it merely unites each preceding cycle of contraries in a 'relation of alterity', it must retain without resolving all contradictory antitheses so as to reproduce each in a collision of coinciding contraries in and through the "unresolved back-and-forth of the metaphysical structure of the world."[245] This immediate coincidence of contraries is meant to point "above all antitheses" and beyond the "cycle circling into itself" towards the supremely unmoved but self-moving pure act of being (*actus purus*).[246] Every energetically realized act over potency is thus made into an equally enigmatic "alternation within itself" between the "span of contradiction" within the "innermost movement of being."[247] The ancient Plato-Aristotle analogy thus culminates in the 'great enigma' of the contradiction-in-identity of an alternating movement within the metaxologically 'mutilated torso'

[239] Ibid., 239-40.
[240] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 240.
[241] Ibid., 240-2.
[242] Ibid., 240-2.
[243] Ibid., 243.
[244] Ibid., 247-8.
[245] Ibid., 253.
[246] Ibid., 251-254.
[247] Ibid., 256-7.

where Plato and Aristotle are caught in a gigantomachic struggle and trans-historical tragedy of an insuperably contradictory and self-arresting dialectic, whose irresolvable remainder can only indicate its supremely sublating and originary source where "the mystery of God reveals itself in the mystery of creaturely integration."[248] The tragically inescapable *aporia* of Plato and Aristotle is thus, like the previous problematic of Parmenides and Heraclitus, meant to be reduced, suspended, and sublated into the superior sphere of Augustine and Aquinas.[249]

Augustine's analogy is a reciprocally alternating movement from creatures-to-God and God-to-creatures that suspensively sublates the Platonic-Aristotelian dialectical alternation within the "most veiled mystery of God."[250] It proceeds in a "filiation of God" to the "likeness of the Son" with the "Holy Spirit in our hearts" through the hyper-positive impartation of always aporetic metaxological dualities.[251] The 'suspended middle' reappears as the centremost point of this movement where all alternating dialectics of intra-creaturely and divine-to-creaturely aporetics are consummated by the 'contradiction of the cross' so that creation may be absolutely "redeemed by God and into God by the killing of God."[252] This contradiction of the cross is the singular event by which the absolute contradiction of the self-oppositivum is revealed in and through the positive objectivity of history. It is thereafter imparted in both ascending and descending directions by vertically reiterating the cycling of creature-creator corollaries to upend the 'horizontal' intra-creaturely Platonic-Aristotelian dialectical alternation so as to fully actualize the principle of non-contradiction in the 'vertical' divine-to-creature dialectical alternation of the final analogy.[253] Where Hegel's 'absolute middle' had annulled all extremes through the middle term to resolve all contradictions into the conclusion of the syllogism, Przywara's 'suspended middle' suspends and sublates the cycling corollaries of contradictory opposites to retain rather than resolve the explosivity of virtual negativity that may motivate the restricted dialecticity and dynamical rhythm of analogy.

[248] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 258-9.
[249] Ibid., 259-60.
[250] Ibid., 261-6.
[251] Ibid., 266-7.
[252] Ibid., 267-8.
[253] Ibid., 269-270.

The virtual negativity of dialecticity in the Augustinian analogy is finally recycled and reproduced in and through the hyper-positivity of the Thomistic *analogia entis*. The Augustinian analogy had previously suspended all cycling corollaries of contradictory *aporiae* as an infinite reserve of virtual negativity that could be recycled and reproduced into the hyper-positivity of the divine act of being-knowing by the self-oppositivum centred upon the suspended middle. Since, however, this suspended middle of the cross must also be hyper-positively imparted as a miraculous revelation of hyper-being (*ÜberSein*) into hyper-sense (*ÜberSinn*), all of the virtual negativity of dialecticity must be sublated – without remainder – in and through its hyper-positivity. This all-sublating hyper-positivity can therefore finally 'decide' the dilemma between negative formality and positive historicality so that every negative concept may be exceeded and sublated into the positive being of mystery, just as the totalizing conceptuality of the Absolute Idea may be sublated into the self-enclosing objectivity of the Absolutum Mysterium.[254] This miraculously revealed hyper-positivity thus "points beyond itself – to a 'holy order'" where the virtual negativity of all contradictions and conceptuality can be suspended and annulled by the absolute contradiction of the cross to resolve every aporetic antithesis in a sacerdotal cosmology, where the divine act of being-knowing establishes the "essential unity and "definitive ground in the essence of God" which "immanently overcomes any disintegration into antitheses."[255] Christ is thus placed at the centre of all dialectical sublations in the "midpoint of all creation's antitheses" as the absolutely 'suspended middle'.[256] Through the contradiction of the cross, God can finally 'break through' so as to contradict, annul, and suspensively sublate the objectified order of all ontologies into the hyper-positive theontology of the Absolutum Mysterium.[257]

3.3. Hegel and Przywara

The modern speculative analogy is meant to dialectically determine the dynamic proportionality of

[254] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 270-2.
[255] Ibid., 273-4.
[256] Ibid., 276-8.
[257] Ibid., 280.

analogate-to-analogon terms so that each may be freely interchanged in cycling triads that reflect the essential relations of the Trinity. Yet its freedom has hitherto been frustrated by the self-oppositivity of objectivity in and against subjectivity. This self-oppositivity has emerged from the inner opposition of judgment between the content of representations and the form of the concept: after Kant had conjoined the content of representations in the empty copula of pure concepts, then Hegel had filled this empty copula with the conceptuality of the speculative syllogism; but after all objects had been predicated of conceptuality by its pure subjectivity, then Schelling could exceed every concept so that each copula could only be continually re-emptied and re-filled as all subjects were predicated of its pure objectivity. The inner opposition of judgments has thus turned subjectivity into an objectivity within and opposed to itself. Once subjectivity was turned into objectivity, then the roles of analogy and dialectics could be reversed: where formerly analogy had been determined by the dialecticity of self-opening subjectivity, afterwards analogy could exceed so as to sublate dialecticity into its own self-enclosing objectivity. The conceptuality of dialecticity could thus be sublated and subordinated to the objectivity of analogy. But because this very objectivity remained within and opposed to subjectivity, the speculative analogy remained caught within and opposed to dialectics within the self-oppositivity of objectivity. Objectivity can then only maintain itself in its purity by continually opposing so as to exceed and sublate all of the conceptual resources of subjectivity. But because copulas could only continue to be re-emptied and re-filled in and through subjectivity, objectivity must remain caught in a cycle of self-oppositivity in and against subjectivity.

This cycle of self-oppositivity has divided and opposed the speculative analogy within itself into a dual-analogy of subjectivity and objectivity: the paragon of the analogy of subjectivity is the analogical dialectics of Hegel, while the paragon of the analogy of objectivity is the dialectical analogy of Przywara. The former was developed through the speculative proposition, analogy, and syllogism into the system of the Absolute Idea, while the latter was developed through the creaturely metaphysics of dialectic and analogy in the Absolutum Mysterium. The luminous transparency of the Idea was thus eclipsed by the dazzling darkness of the Mysterium. Each is opposed to one another as subjectivity is opposed to objectivity: for where the analogy of subjectivity subordinates the

analogicity of the speculative analogy to the dialecticity of the speculative syllogism, the analogy of objectivity subordinates the dialecticity of dynamic polarity to the analogicity of *analogia entis*. Such subordination breaks the bonds of analogy and fossilizes the force of dialectics to annul the object and the subject in and for the singular realization of pure subjectivity and pure objectivity: the dialecticity of subjectivity dissolves every object by subordinating analogy to dialectics and emptying the intermediation of the syllogistic system into the immediacy of the cycling circuit that is centred upon pure objectless subjectivity, while the dialecticity of objectivity dissolves every subject by subordinating dialectics to analogy and enclosing the voluntary immediacy of the divine act of being-knowing into the recycling sea that is entirely enveloped by pure subjectless objectivity.

The self-opposition of the speculative analogy divides it into the pure opposition of subjectivity and objectivity. Through the emptying of intermediation into immediacy, the dialecticity of subjectivity is purified into pure objectless subjectivity, but through the envelopment of this immediacy, the dialecticity of objectivity is purified into pure subjectless objectivity. The dialecticity of subjectivity thus dissolves every object while the dialecticity of objectivity dissolves every subject, so that each may stand mutually opposed as the pure subject against the pure object. But because the emptied immediacy of pure subjectivity is enveloped in pure objectivity and each may only maintain its purity by nullifying the other in and for themselves, each must remain negatively united in and over this pure opposition. This pure opposition can thus be dissolved in and by the acidic negativity of their shared self-oppositivity. Yet each can also be preserved through their singular striving for purity by oppositing the other in and for themselves. Once, therefore, every opposition has been dissolved in and by its opposition to the other, then neither may be subordinated to another, and the speculative analogy may freely know itself in and through the singular coincidence of analogy and dialectics.

3.3.1. Contra Hegel: Analogical Dialectics

Hegel's analogical dialectics must be critiqued for breaking the bonds of analogy by subordinating analogy to dialectics: the subordinate sublation of the speculative analogy of Measure into the dialecticity of the speculative syllogism must de-analogize dialectics so that each of its concrete

syntheses may remain intrinsically equivocal, agonistically opposed, and ultimately univocal. Criticism is, in this way, meant to oppose so as to proceed beyond a position. Yet Hegel appears to have left the critic no possible position over and against the system: there can, it seems, be no tenable extrinsic critique for this system possesses the power to assimilate every opposed position, just as it sublates all concepts, within its singularly totalizing self-mediation. The only genuine refutation of Hegelian philosophy must rather proceed by way of an intrinsic critique from the abstract foundations of its deepest dungeons towards the concrete firmament of its tallest tower, so that - by leaping beyond - it may subordinate and sublate the system into an even higher sphere. This is how Hegel prescribes, in his remarks on Spinoza, that the only "effective refutation must infiltrate the opponent's stronghold and meet him on his own ground" by "acknowledging its standpoint as essential and necessary and then raising it to a higher standpoint on the strength of its own resources."[258]

The breach for this infiltration has already been begun but not yet carried to completion: Schelling has previously presented a positive critique for deriving all positive being from the virtual negativity of dialecticity; while Heidegger has presented a negative critique for deriving all negative nothing from the virtual positivity of the Absolute.[259] Once, however, all positive being has been recycled and reproduced as virtual positivity, then both positivity and negativity can be assimilated to the virtual positivity of the Absolute, and the positive and negative critiques can be combined into a single critical standpoint: the positive critique of positive being that is derived from negative dialectics thus points towards and is fulfilled in its original significance by the negative critique of negative dialectics that is derived from positive ontotheology, as both issue forth from the fissures of self-exceeding and self-empting concepts that are opened in the Absolute. The Absolute accordingly exceeds and empties itself, not from the highest center of its singularly concrete universal Idea, but rather from the gaping fissures of its lowest peripheries at the extremities of any and all abstract antitheses.[260] Since these fissures are intrinsic to the system, even as they empty forth from beyond it, they can open a window of speculative defenestration from which an intrinsic critique can extrinsically emerge. This

[258] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 12.14-15, p. 511-13.
[259] Martin Heidegger, *Hegel*, trans. Joseph Arel and Niels Feuerhahn. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (2015), 9-11.
[260] J.M.E. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1922), 93-4.

decisive critique may be found in the premature closure of each of these openings, which appear inadequately positive precisely because each is inadequately negative: each has not yet been adequately negated, and the resources of the system have not yet been entirely spent.

Analogical dialectics is meant to predicate the abstract analogate terms of all objects in and for the concrete analogon subject, through the dialecticity of subjectivity, but breaks the bonds of analogy by inadequately negating each of its terms, dispersing the intermediation of every syllogism and each judgment into the equivocity of self-opposed particularity, and emptying any copula of all conceptuality. It seeks to sublate all analogate objects into the analogon subject but exceeds every analogical relation and opens the fissures of equivocal oppositivity by predicating every object of the singular source of its own subjectivity. The subject can thus remain indifferently isolated, as the original beginning and final end of predication, from all of its activity in and among the objects of analogate terms. The conceptual form of judgment had previously united the duality of objectified representations in the unity of the copula according to the pure concept of the subject. Since the subject not only opposits its object but also sublates by predicating this object of the subject, the entire activity of judgment had ultimately remained with the subject in its activity of subjectivity. Hegel recognized this and purported to suspend subject-predicate judgments from the Syllogism in the Concept, re-objectify Subjectivity into Objectivity, and exhaustively sublate the dialecticity of subjectivity into the Absolute Idea.[261] But because the Absolute Idea can only think itself by predicating and annulling any oppositive object in and for its own absolute subjectivity, it must ultimately annul all objectivity, apotheosize subjectivity, and absolutize the subject-object duality that had been latent all along in the subject-predicate form of judgment.[262]

The duality of judgment, in which the subject predicates its object of itself, can thus be reproduced in the dyadicity of dialectics, in which the abstract antitheses are doubly-negated so as to be predicated as moments in and for one concrete synthesis. This dyadicity of dialectics accordingly conflicts with the triplicity of moments in each dialectical triad of the system. It must, however, remain inadequately

[261] Hegel, *the Science of Logic*, 12.31-126, pp.528-624.
[262] Ibid., 12.176, p. 673.

negative because it neglects to negate all of the abstract antitheses: Hegel alternatively describes dialectics as a 'double-negation' of both antitheses or as a 'triple-negation' of each individual antithesis as well as this double-negation of both antitheses together.[263] Where the triadic triple-negation negates the antitheses singularly and together, the dyadic double-negation only negates the antitheses together even as it spares each of the antitheses from any subsequent singular self-negation. Whenever the antitheses are spared from singular self-negation then each can remain a singularly positive and subordinate moment in a fixed negative opposition to its subsequent double-negation by any superior synthesis.[264] The dyadicity of dialectics can thus reproduce the duality of judgment in the fixed negative opposition between all antitheses to open fissures of negative oppositivity from the beginning of each concept, at the base of its complete pyramidal construction, and around the periphery of the system as a whole.[265] All of the concepts are, of course, meant to be enclosed in and through the concrete universality and firmamental heights of the Absolute, but each remains disunited by its dyadicity in and between the abstract antitheses of each dialectical triad, so that the system can remain open at the bottom rather than the top, where every concept may exceed and oppose itself to any dialectical enclosure within the system as a whole.

The positive content of each concrete synthesis must be emptied from these fissures of self-exceeding and self-oppositing concepts into the infinite negativity beyond all abstract antitheses, as each concept exceeds and opposes itself, until the positivity of all conceptuality has been emptied into the non-conceptual void beyond each and every concept. This non-conceptual void must, however, be positively onticized as soon as it has been filled so that the negative excess of conceptuality can be subsumed into the positive plenitude of its being. Once conceptuality has proved to be self-exceeding, self-oppositing, and self-emptying, then concepts can be construed as imminently self-negating and intrinsically negative; but because conceptuality has, by this intrinsic negativity, also

[263] Hegel, *the Science of Logic*, 21.38-41, 21.103-4, pp. 33-36, 89-90.
[264] Ibid., 21.102-4, pp. 88-90.
[265] Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, "Extract from the Logical Question in Hegel's System (1843)". in *G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, ed. Robert Stern vol. I. (London: Routledge, 1993), 191; Karl Michelet, "Die Dialektische Methode und der Empirismus". in *Sachen Trendelenburgs gegen Hegel Der Gedanke*, 1 (1861), 186-222; Elena Ficara, "Contrariety and Contradiction. Hegel and the "Berliner Aristotelismus"", *Hegel-Studien Band* 49 (2016), 45-46; Giacomo Rinaldi, *A History and Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 342.

emptied itself so as to fill and be subsumed into the non-conceptual void of being, this very being can be construed as imminently self-filling and intrinsically positive. But because positive being can only be finally filled by first emptying negative concepts, positive being can only be produced by the virtual negativity of the concept and the conceptuality of the dialectical system. The fissures opened by its self-exceeding conceptuality can thus empty the positivity of each concept out into oppositive negativity, so that all positivity appears as nothing more than virtual negativity.[266] Since, however, even this virtual negativity can only be negative in and by its negative opposition to positivity, all negativity must be united in opposition to positivity, so that negativity can be re-assimilated, through its virtual positivity, into the absolute positivity of the Idea.[267]

The emptying of positivity from the base of each concept into virtual negativity beyond conceptuality, the subsumption of negative conceptuality into positive onticality, and the assimilation of its virtual positivity into the absolute positivity of the Idea, casts a circuit beyond and around the system to subvert and supplant the syllogistic intermediation of the Trinity with the more immediate movement of positivity emptied into virtual negativity and assimilated into the Idea. Hegel had described, at the conclusion of the *Encyclopedia*, how the interchangeability of judgments implied the interchangeability of the highest categories of Logic, Nature, and Spirit in the speculative syllogism of the Trinity.[268] Once, however, all positivity has been emptied and re-filled from the fissures in and around the periphery and base of the syllogistic system, then the syllogistic intermediation of all categories, up to and including the highest categories, can be circumvented by the circuit from self-emptying negativity to self-subsuming positivity. This circuit around the system can, thereafter, dispense with the intermediating middle term of all triads as it cycles in alternatively opposed directions: the forward direction of Logic-Nature-Spirit prioritizes the pure archetypal form of the Logic as the all-originating monarchic beginning from which each successive sphere emanates, while the backwards direction of Spirit-Nature-Logic prioritizes the all-subsuming pneumatic end into

[266] Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 148-161.
[267] Cunningham, *Genealogy of Nihilism*, 119-125.
[268] *Hegel, Hegel: Philosophy of Mind*, §§574-577, pp. 267-279.

which all successive spheres are teleologically assimilated.[269] Since, however, each immediate movement is meant to encompass the other, as well as any and all other spheres, there can remain no possible juncture of intermediation between Logic and Spirit.[270] Logic and Spirit are thus severed from one another onto separate circuits, even as each encompasses the other, in an immediate coincidence of unmediated opposites.[271] Once Logic has been incommunicably severed from Spirit, then Spirit can never impart any conscious apprehension of pure being in general to the beginning of the *Logic*.[272] Neither can there be any awareness of any 'local motion' of dynamic self-determining concepts.[273] Consequently, pure being must appear as nothing more than a simple and static *a priori* concept, and all antitheses must remain caught in fixed contradictions without any chance of dialectical sublation, or even any hope of a totalizing synthesis in the Absolute.

The dissolution of dialectical sublation must demolish the pyramid of Hegelian philosophy from its highest capstone in the syllogistic Trinity to its lowest cornerstone in the speculative proposition.[274] Once the intermediary middle of every dialectical triad has been circumvented by the immediacy of the cycling circuit, then the Trinity may be supplanted and subverted to reduce Trinitarian theology into non-Trinitarian a-theology, and the objectified 'absolute religion' of Christianity into an equally absolute atheism of pure objectless subjectivity.[275] The inner mediation of all concepts in the speculative syllogism of the Trinity can thus be evacuated from the absolute middle to the absolute periphery, where all mediation is swallowed up into immediacy and immediacy collapses into the

[269] Rinaldi, 331-342; Johann Eduard Erdmann, *Outlines of Logic and Metaphysics*. trans. B.C. Burt (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1896), 169-171; *Grundriss der Logik und Metaphysik*. ed. G. Bolland (Leiden: Adriani, 1901), 94, 145, 159; Karl Michelet, *Das System der Philosphie als exacter Wissenschaft, enthaltend Logik, Naturphilosophie und Geistesphilosophie*, Vol. 1, Logik, Dialektik, Metaphysik. Erst Band. (Berlin: Nicolaischer Verlag, 1876), 121-122.
[270] Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity.* trans. George Eliot (London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1957), 65-73.
[271] Lawrence Stepelevich, *The Young Hegelians: An Anthology*, *The Young Hegelians: An Anthology*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Josiah Royce, *Lectures on Modern Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), 232-249.
[272] Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 21.54 p.46.
[273] Trendelenburg, 189-190, 195-196.
[274] Jacques Derrida, "The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology", in *Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy*. trans. Alan Bass (Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1982), 69-108; Hegel, *Hegel: Philosophy of Mind* , §458, p.194.
[275] Henri de Lubac, *the Drama of Atheist Humanism*, trans. Edith Riley (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1967), 3-35; Zvi Rosen, "The Radicalism of a Young Hegelian: Bruno Bauer", *The Review of Politics*, 33, 3 (July, 1971), 379; Nicholas Adams, "Introduction: The Impact of Idealism on Religion". in *The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought The Impact of Idealism: Volume 4 Religion*. ed. Nicholas Adams, Nicholas Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1-23.

sovereign centre of the subject. Any totalizing synthesis must, thereafter, collapse into an all-encompassing immediate identity of unmediated opposites. Its individuality, in the 'hypostasis' of any divine person, can only afterwards remain opposed within the self-encompassing circuitry of this same broken mediation.[276] The individuality of the 'absolute middle' must, consequently, be broken into self-opposed particularity as Christ is de-personalized, dis-embodied, and dismembered into nothing more than a ghostly textuality that haunts historical 'facts' with supra-historical 'myths'.[277] The axial centre of the self-individuating Absolute can accordingly be displaced from its infinite re-enactment in the Eucharistic and liturgical sacrifice of the Mass into the disparate and finitized representations of a merely spiritual communion in and for the liberal nation-state.[278] Once the 'absolute middle' of Christ in the speculative syllogism of the Trinity has been opposed, broken, and displaced, then all syllogisms must collapse into an immediate conjunction of opposed, particulate, and contrary judgments within an imminently self-arresting, ossifying, and deadening dialectic. After every syllogism has been de-syllogized, then the copula of any judgment must be emptied, and every speculative proposition must be dissolved into extrinsically opposed terms, so that the speculative analogy can collapse into the equivocal oppositivity of its own analogate terms.

Analogical dialectics has, by inadequately negating abstract antitheses, emptied the positivity of each concept into a virtual negativity beyond conceptuality, and supplanted the syllogistic intermediation of the Trinity with an immediate circuit that disperses individuality into self-opposed particularity so as to dissolve dialectical sublation; collapse all syllogisms, judgments, and concepts; and break the bonds of the speculative analogy. This dissolution of dialecticity therefore implies the breaking of analogy. Yet the 'dialectical' does not exceed the 'analogical' because the negativity of dialectics has not been subordinately constrained and restrictively re-deployed in and for the positivity of analogy. It is rather precisely the reverse: dialectics exceeds analogy because it is not adequately negative; has neglected to singularly self-negate each of its abstract antitheses; and fissured the syllogistic system by its fixed oppositions in and around the abstract periphery of its self-exceeding and self-emptying

[276] O'Regan, *The Heterodox Hegel*, 135-140, 408f.
[277] Ibid., 200-203.
[278] Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, 152-3; O'Regan, 242-5; Derrida, 71.

base. The dialectical closure that was meant to be completed at its axial centre thus merely conceals the fissures from which flow forth all of the positivity that is emptied into virtual negativity, and virtual negativity that is assimilated into the virtual positivity of the Idea, in an immediate circuit that supplants so as to subvert the intermediation of the syllogism; de-syllogize the system; and dissolve every syllogistic, analogical, and propositional bond between beings. The subordination of analogy to dialectics, by which dialectics exceeds analogy, thus opens the fissures for the dialectical dissolution of analogy that collapses the conceptuality of the Logic into an undeterminable, univocal, and endlessly agonistic Spirit within the sovereign centre of a singular subject so as to petrify the spirit just as it fossilizes dialectics in the immediate identity of a pure objectless subjectivity.

3.3.2. Contra Przywara: Dialectical Analogy

Przywara's dialectical analogy must be critiqued for subordinating dialectics to analogy, separating the dynamic polarity of analogates from their analogon in each analogy, and inadequately positing analogy. By restricting and redeploying dialectics in and for analogy, it continually re-restricts dialectics in a self-arresting dialecticity that ultimately dissolves all cycling corollaries and collapses the mysterious object of *analogia entis*. Once analogy has collapsed into a concept, then this concept can only be re-constructed into an ontotheology that is imminently de-constructible into a self-annihilating meontotheology. Creaturely metaphysics can thus dissolve the positivity of analogy in and through the negativity of its own dialecticity. Yet Przywara appears to have inviolably secured the *analogia entis* from collapsing into conceptuality by suspending all of the ontological constructions of creaturely metaphysics from a theontology of God beyond being, where every concept can be exceeded, enveloped, and hidden behind the apophatic curtain of a wholly mysterious objectivity. Nothing seems conceivable of God because only negative judgments can be said of God. Any concealment of apophatism can, however, always be unconcealed by exposing the dependence of its negative judgments upon some prior positive presence: for since nothing can be predicated – even as though it were not predicated – without something, any negative judgment of 'what God is not'

must ineliminably depend in his absence upon some prior presence.[279] This positive presence of the unknown God is the hidden core of ontotheology into which every definite theontology must always remain liable to collapse.

Dialectical analogy is meant to dialectically divide, reduce, and sublate the prior problemata of the abstract analogate terms of all subjects in and for the concrete analogon object, through the dialecticity of objectivity, but, by subordinating, restricting, and arresting hypo-dialectics within analogy, it first fossilizes but finally absolutizes dialectics to dissolve analogy. The fossilization of dialectics, which is meant to restrict it within analogy, rather radicalizes it against analogy. The separate subordination of dialectics to analogy restricts and redeploys dialectics as a hypo-dialectic of dynamic polarity between the cycling corollaries of contradictory opposites in and for each analogy of the *analogia entis*. This hypo-dialectic is meant to selectively reduce *aporiae* to transpose problemata and motivate the cycle of contraries in each analogy.[280] But because no concept can be spared and any concept may be aporetically reduced, even this separate subordination and restrictive redeployment of hypo-dialectics in and for analogy may be annulled. Hypo-dialectics, therefore, always threatens to subvert its own subordination. Analogy may, to secure its objectivity from collapsing into conceptuality, continuously re-restrict and re-deploy hypo-dialectics. Yet this continuous re-restriction can only accelerate its eventual subversion: for since every restriction must impose an extrinsic limit and fixed opposition in contradictory antitheses, and any fixed opposition must re-produce contradictions in successive antitheses, this restriction of hypo-dialectics in and for analogy must, by extrinsically delimiting fixed oppositions, infinitely reproduce its contrariety at every dialectical interval. When, therefore, hypo-dialectics is continually restricted, it must also be continually arrested in a self-arresting dialectic. But because any such self-arresting dialectic must reproduce rather than reduce contrariety, the continuous re-restriction and re-deployment of hypo-dialectics in analogy must radicalize hypo-dialectics into hyper-dialectics, subvert the subordination of dialectics to analogy, and ultimately radicalize dialecticity to dissolve analogy.

[279] Carabine, 23-34, 111-32, 259-68, 279-94; Plato, *Parmenides*, 137c-142a; Plotinus, *Enneads*, I.6-10, II.9.1, III.8.10, V.2.1, V.3.1, VI.7.25, VI.7.37.
[280] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 166-171.

Since every concept must be exceeded and enveloped within the objectivity of the Absolutum Mysterium, this subordination of dialectics to analogy must also be enveloped in and for the dialecticity of objectivity, which motivates the dynamic polarity in each cycling corollary of analogy. After, however, all analogical intermediation has been dissolved, then the dialectical dynamic of cycling corollaries can be singularly imparted from nothing other than the immediate divine act of being-knowing.[281] The divine act must thus retain the unrestricted radicality of dialecticity in each immediate impartation of analogy. It is meant to posit all problemata just as it predicates all analogates of subjects in and for the concrete analogon object of the Absolutum Mysterium. Since all subjects are predicated as objects in and against its objectivity, every positing by the divine act of being-knowing is equally a self-opposed positing or oppositing in and against itself. It thus opposits itself in and against itself in every divine act; in every positing of any problemata; and even in each impartation of analogy.[282] Since, therefore, every positing of the divine act of being-knowing is equally its own self-oppositing, the intermediation of the syllogism in the dialecticity of subjectivity must be exhaustively emptied into the immediate self-oppositivity of the dialecticity of objectivity. Once all syllogistic intermediation has been emptied into immediate self-oppositivity, then the abstract antitheses of cycling corollaries can be immediately suspended in and between this their voluntary source. Przywara thus concludes that there can be no possible resolution to dialectics except that "it rather certifies the antitheses in their insolubility" as the "confirmation of a (perduring)" and "in between" *metaxu* relation.[283]

All of the contradictions of 'objective aporetics' can, accordingly, be reduced to the opposition of the dual-positivum of intra-creaturely and the God-to-creaturely analogies in the inner self-opposition of the positivum, the self-opposed positivum, or the self-oppositivum. This self-oppositivum produces an absolute contradiction that detonates all contradictions, annihilates all cycling corollaries, and envelops every dynamic polarity of oscillating and oppositing concepts into its self-exceeding and self-enclosing object. Once every concept has been enclosed into its object, then there can never

[281] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 174-9, 232-3.
[282] Ibid., 130, 211-5, 241.
[283] Ibid., 194-5.

remain any 'third thing' (*tertium quid*) with which to mediate concepts in and between objects: each object envelops its concept so as to coincide with even as it exceeds its conceptuality; and each concept equally exceeds so as to evacuate any such intermediating centre of conceptuality into the immediate periphery of objectivity. But because every concept must be exceeded and enveloped in its object, this emptying of the centre into the periphery can no longer coincide with the cycling circuit of subjectivity, but can only ever coincide with the recycling of every concept of any subject in the all-enveloping Absolutum Mysterium.

Once every concept has been exceeded and enveloped in its object, revelation must be reconceived as, not merely any supra-phenomenal message entering into a phenomenal medium, but rather as the non-phenomenal-being becoming a visible phenomenal-being by predicating phenomenality through the same medium from its supra-phenomenal and invisible depths. It is not merely a message from beyond being but rather the very medium of being that opposes so as to predicate its message in and for itself. Since the message of revelation can only be predicated in and through the medium of its sheer self-oppositivity, by exceeding and enclosing its conceptuality in and for its own objectivity, there can be no discernible intermediation between the supra-phenomenal revealer and the phenomenal revelation except by an equally immediate, inscrutable, and voluntary divine act. All of the mysteries of faith, no less than all analogies, must thereby be assimilated back to this singular voluntary source. Its sheer immediate imposition of will can admit no rational intermediation. The Trinity must, accordingly, be revealed as nothing other than an immediate self-revelation of the "inner personal life of God" without any discernible role to play in analogy and dialectics.[284] Since, moreover, all being and knowing utterly depend upon this singular self-oppositing and self-revealing source, nothing can be or be known that is not also voluntarily revealed by its inscrutable divine act.[285] But because any such divine act must retain the unrestricted radicality of dialecticity even as it exceeds and envelops its conceptuality into objectivity, all revelation must be oppositively predicated in and against the objectivity of being. The apophatic voluntarism of God beyond being in theontology thus conceals the collapse of freedom into being in ontotheology, the onticization of its

[284] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 185-7, 263-79.
[285] Ibid., 174, 193.

will in each positive 'will-to-be', and the very conceptuality of self-constructing, de-constructing, and re-enclosing objectivity. Since, therefore, every free divine act remains bound in and by the self-oppositing of objectivity, every revelation must reveal itself in its phenomenality only to conceal itself in its supra-phenomenality, so that every revelation of phenomenal-being remains unrevealed in the invisible depths of the Absolutum Mysterium.

The sheer separation, with which each concept is exceeded and enveloped within its object, is the deepest transcendence of the object over and beyond its concept, but because this sheer separation is conceptually unmediated and simply immediate, it proves to be nothing more than the shallowest immanence of the concept in and against the object.[286] The Absolutum Mysterium may, thereby, envelop the exceeding of any concept and all conceptuality within its own all-embracing objectivity. Since it envelops every 'exceeding', it must embrace any such 'exceeding' within itself, so as to exceed itself within itself, and transcend even the deepest transcendence in a double-transcending movement in and for its own self-enveloping immanence.[287] But because every transcendence can only result from the simple, immediate, and sheer separation between the transcended and the transcending, this double-transcending movement must oppose, contradict, and collapse every self-transcending theontological escape into an equally self-immanentizing ontotheological enclosure within its own dazzlingly dark mysterium. Once this deepest transcendence of theontology has collapsed into the shallowest immanence of ontotheology, then even the mysterium that is meant to overcome by exceeding and enveloping every concept may be fully re-conceptualized and fatefully re-cast into the furthest polar opposition between the absolute subjectivity of Hegel's syllogistic system of light and the absolute objectivity of Przywara's Absolute Mysterium of ever-enclosing and dazzling darkness.[288]

The *analogia entis* may afterwards be re-constructed into an all-enveloping conceptual-machine for the purpose of recycling its virtual negativity of hyper-dialectics and reproducing it into the hyper-

[286] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 181, 210, 216, 235.
[287] Ibid., 159, 176, 201, 214-9.
[288] Ibid., 233.

positivity of analogy.[289] Yet this proves to be reductively mechanical because its teleology is not, as it initially appears, simply suspended in passive obedience to and from the living God beyond being: it is not merely – as it purports to be – the Aristotelian-Thomistic teleology of substances intrinsically fulfilling their functions according to their final ends, but rather more like the Schellingian teleology of an entirely onticized 'will-to-be' that extrinsically motivates a violent movement of externally related and immediately objectified beings.[290] Przywara describes it in vividly mechanistic terms "like an unstable dam set against the tempestuous ocean of possibilities, while the sea itself, admitted by the dam "in rations", surges within its bounds and causes them to tremble."[291] This mechanism is meant to recycle the virtual negativity of hyper-dialecticity into an infinite reserve of pure possibility and energetic potentiality from which to reproduce the hyper-positivity that is imparted from *ÜberSein* into *InSein* in each divine act. Yet its function must be frustrated by its sheer separation between concepts and objects: for since every machine must multiply its force through the immediate intermediation of its parts, but all objects immediately envelop their concepts, there can remain no intermediary medium in and between any of the conceptual objects of its mechanical motion. The sheer separation between each exceeded concept and its enveloping object thus opens an "abyss of pure negation" through which there must pass the hyper-positive force of any divine act.[292] Since pure positivity and negativity must coincide in any such divine act, and the virtual negativity of hyper-dialectics can never be completely recycled and reproduced into the hyper-positivity of analogy, dialecticity must dissolve analogicity, and the machinery of *analogia entis* must annihilate itself through the force of its own mechanical motion.[293] Przywara had intended to secure in *analogia entis* the singularly intermediating positive ground of the Church, but has inadvertently sapped its strength by collapsing the object of theontology into a concept that is re-constructible into ontotheology even as it is self-deconstructible into meontotheology.[294] It can only afterwards conceal its gaping absence of mediation by appealing to the hidden presence of an unknown mediator with the Church doctrine

[289] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 224-5.
[290] Ibid., 185; Hegel, *Science of Logic*, 12.133-47, 631-44; *Encylcopedia Logic*, §§195-99 , 274-7.
[291] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 208.
[292] Ibid., 209, 229-32.
[293] Ibid., 232-3.
[294] Ibid., 179-81.

that "for every similarity between God and the creature there is an even greater dissimilarity (*maior dissimulitudo in tanta similitudine*)."[295] But because analogy is nothing without the intermediation between analogate and analogon terms, this absence of mediation must break the bonds of analogy, and turn every difference of the subject into the identity of the object. The subordination of dialectics to analogy thus radicalizes rather than reduces its dialecticity to dissolve every subject of analogy into its pure subjectless objectivity.

3.3.3. Analogy and Dialectics in the Trinity

The speculative analogy can now be finally consummated by uniting the analogical dialectics of subjectivity and the dialectical analogy of objectivity in the singularly self-surpassing Idea. Yet this union of analogy and dialectics can only be carried to completion after its cardinal opposites of subjectivity and objectivity have each been purified into their furthermost polarity. This polarity had formerly remained hidden in their mutual subordination but has now been prepared by Hegel and Przywara: Hegel subordinated analogy to dialectics, but, by inadequately negating dialectics, broke the bonds of analogy, and emptied the syllogistic intermediation of every concrete synthesis from the periphery of antithetical abstracta into the cycling circuit at the base of the pyramid; and Przywara subordinated dialectics to analogy, but, by inadequately positing analogy, fossilized dialectics, and re-cycled so as to re-produce all aporetic abstracta in and through the conceptual-mechanical hyper-positivity of the immediate divine act of being-knowing. The absolute middle of the Absolute Idea was thus emptied into the absolute periphery of the cycling circuit to be recycled into the suspended middle of the immediately exceeding and all-enveloping Absolutum Mysterium. Once the pyramid of ontotheology has been hollowed out into the pit of meontotheology, and all of the riches of Egypt have been carried off by the tribes of Israel, then analogy and dialectics can be re-crafted by turning the base into its peak and the peak into its base to spin every cycling triad into the self-reflexive relationality of the Holy Trinity.

[295] Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 234-5.

The speculative analogy was founded, from the objectivization and subjectivization of concepts, upon the subject-object conceptual form of judgment, in which the subject predicates its object of itself just as the object predicates its subject as an object of itself, and both subjectivity and objectivity can be altogether conjoined in and through their shared dialecticity in the subject-object Idea. Its alternative modes of predication had motivated its opposed dialectical developments: the dialecticity of subjectivity had subordinated analogy to dialectics in an analogical dialectic just as it predicated so as to annul its object in and for itself into pure objectless subjectivity, while the dialecticity of objectivity had subordinated dialectics to analogy in a dialectical analogy just as it predicated so as to annul its subject in and for itself into pure subjectless objectivity.

The speculative analogy thus produced the furthermost polarity within itself between the pure objectless subjectivity and the pure subjectless objectivity where each opposed the other by annulling its opposite in and for themselves: the subject predicates so as to annul its object in and for itself; while the object predicates so as to annul its subject as an object in and against but for itself; but because the object must also predicate its subject for itself, the object must retain the subject through its own self-opposition in the self-oppositivity of objectivity. Since, moreover, even this pure subjectless objectivity predicates all subjects as objects in and against itself, in the self-opposition of self-oppositive objectivity, and this pure objectless subjectivity predicates all objects, which contain this self-oppositivity, in and for itself, each must retain its opposition to the other even as each annuls the other in themselves.

The furthermost polarity of the speculative analogy can thus contain a concealed coincidence of opposites. Each remains united to the other by annulling its opposite for the purpose of maintaining its polarity and purity against the other in and for itself. Since each can only purify itself by annulling the other within itself, each must retain the impurity of the other within itself. But by retaining the impurity of the other within itself, each can only purify itself by annulling the other that is also itself within itself. Pure subjectivity and pure objectivity can, consequently, only become pure by annulling themselves to annul the other that is itself within themselves.

This mutual annulling of subjectivity and objectivity ultimately dissolves any distinction between subject and object so that subjectivity and objectivity may each be reunited in the shared supersession of opposites. Since subjectivity and objectivity altogether annul every subject and object within themselves, there cannot remain any irreconcilable opposition between any subject and object. All that remains, in the midst of their vanishing distinctions, is this singular self-surpassing movement. Since each coincides with the other in itself, this self-surpassing subject-object can only become a pure subject through its object, and a pure object through its subject, by opposing, surpassing, and turning around into the other, where each coincides with the other to unite subjectivity and objectivity in and through their shared self-surpassing movement in the singular coincidence of subjectivity and objectivity within the subject-object Idea.

This singular self-surpassing Idea is neither subjectivity nor objectivity but the co-equivalence of both where every subject is an object and every object is a subject, but neither remains in a fixed opposition but both turn around into the other that is equally itself. It is the perfect paradigm for all analogy and dialectics: for since the analogical dialectics in pure objectless subjectivity and the dialectical analogy in pure subjectless objectivity culminate and coincide in this Idea, the Idea must singularly exemplify the perfect paradigms of analogy and dialectics; and since whatever coincides is contained in and by its coincidence, the Idea must also paradigmatically contain all examples of analogy and dialectics. Every analogon surpasses so as to sublate its analogate terms in and for itself, and every dialectical synthesis surpasses so as to sublate its antitheses in and for itself, so that the surpassing and sublating of analogates into analogons for analogy, and antitheses into syntheses for dialectics, may be singularly united in this self-surpassing Idea.

The Idea surpasses so as to sublate its own opposite in and for itself through the tandem activity of all analogical terms and dialectical judgments in the syllogism where the Idea reflects upon so as to know itself in the pure personality of the speculative analogy. Analogy and dialectics are minimally united by the signs that are shared between the terms of analogy and the theses of dialectics, but are perfectly and paradigmatically united in the syllogism, where these terms signify concepts, theses signify judgments, and all concepts and judgments are sequentially sublated. Since all being is bonded by

analogy, and all thought is deliberated through dialectics, and all that can be known must be known through syllogisms, the Idea can singularly reflect all thought and being in and through the pure personality of the speculative analogy. Analogy and dialectics can thus be really and truly personified in the syllogistic self-reflection of intermediary angelic spirits. This self-reflection is consummately synthesized in the absolute spirit of the divine hypostasis, where the self-surpassing movement of analogy and dialectics rests in its pure and perfect self-reflexive equilibrium.

This divine hypostasis spirals into triads of triads to first annul all analogicity and dialecticity but finally restores analogy and dialectics in and through the essential relations of the Holy Trinity. Since analogy and dialectics are nothing if not relations between terms and theses, each divine hypostasis must reflect all relations in and through its singular self-relationality. But because this singular self-relationality is only possible through the relations of analogy and dialectics, the divine hypostasis must be essentially relational; and because relations are nothing without relata, each hypostasis must also be essentially related to another. Since all relations of analogy and dialectics are triadic, each intra-hypostatic relation must consist in the triads of analogy and dialectics. But because all of these relations require relata *ad infinitum* each must also spiral out into an infinity of triads, even as each reflect upon and return to the triad of triads. Since each of these triads is also a syllogism, in which each extreme must be annulled in and by its intermediating middle term, each can be interchangeably cycled into a circle of triple relations, where the triad of triads can equivalently coincide with the circle of circles, and the triplicity at the periphery can be sublated into the singular sovereign centre of the Trinity.

The Trinity can thus be apprehended, from the limited standpoint of this Idea, as the cycling triple relationality of divine hypostases, where analogy and dialectics paradigmatically coincide in its essential relations. Since these essential relations are the paradigms of all relationality, all derivative relations of signs, numbers, and gifts can vestigially articulate the relationality of the Trinity into all constructions of subjects and predicates, terms and theses, and ultimately into the entire ecology of language throughout history. The preceding genealogy of analogy and dialectics may thus reflect these essential relations in the necessary stages of its development: each successive configuration

collapses whenever analogy and dialectics are subordinated to break the bonds of analogy and fossilize the force of dialectics; but the contradictions resulting from each collapse can catalyse dialectics to restore the bonds of analogy and re-articulate their reflection from the Trinity. The end of its essential relations can, through its circling triads, be reflected into its earliest beginnings, where analogy and dialectics are always already nascently and naively Trinitarian. Since, therefore, nothing can be or be thought that is not always already analogical and dialectical, we can conclude that there is nothing in either heaven or on earth that is not beautifully bonded by the intermediary angelic spirits of analogy and dialectics that eternally proceed from and return within the Holy Trinity.

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