

**The Role of the Military in the Arab Uprisings:
The Cases of Tunisia and Libya**

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Abstract

This thesis examines the role of the military in Tunisia and Libya during the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings by asking why the two states' military forces chose to either defect from or defend the ruling administration. Using a comparative case study methodology, this study demonstrates that the joint configuration of energy capacity, military structure and the strength of protests led to the different outcomes in these two cases. The data indicates that one can understand the impact of these three factors using theories that focus on the correlation between rational action, institutional identity, economic inducements, and ideological stances. Thus, I employed approaches from rational choice and institutionalism as the theoretical framework for this study. This study shows that the actions of the Tunisian and Libyan military forces should be read through this theoretical framework. While informative, conclusions drawn from these cases do not allow for universal generalizations. Additionally, it is important to note that the three influential factors are not the only elements that influenced the variations in outcome during the Tunisian and Libyan conflicts. Moreover, I do not make a comparison in terms of the absolute values of the factors, but rather in terms of relative values.

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List of Abbreviations

AfDB: African Development Bank Group

ASM: Arab Social Media

ASU: Arab Socialist Union

AU: African Union

BAT: Anti-Terrorism Brigade

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation

BP: British Petroleum

BPC: Basic People's Congress

CMR: Civil Military Relationship

CPI: Corruption Perceptions Index

CPR: Congress for the Republic

EEAS: European External Action Service

EIA: Energy Information Administration

ESF: Economic Support Fund

ETA: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

EU: European Union

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

FMF: Foreign Military Financing

GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GICDF: Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation

GOT: Government of Tunisia

GPC: General People's Congress

GPC: General People's Committee

HRW: Human Rights Watch

IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ICC: International Criminal Court

IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies

IMET: International Military Education and Training

IMF: International Monetary Fund

INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

INS: National Institute of Statistics, Tunisia

IRA: Irish Republican Army

ITUC: International Trade Union Confederation

LIFG: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

LROR: Libya's Revolutionaries Operations Room

MDS: Most Different System

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

MENAS: Middle Eastern and North African Studies

MoD: Ministry of Defence

MSS: Most Similar System

NADR: Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO: Non-Commissioned Officer

NEDB: National Economic Development Board

NOC: National Oil Corporation

NTC: National Transitional Council

OAPEC: Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries

OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OIC: Organization of Islamic Cooperation

OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

PSD: Socialist Destourian Party

RCC: Revolutionary Command Council

RCD: Democratic Constitutional Rally

RCM: Revolutionary Committees Movement

R2P: Responsibility to Protect

SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SOE: State Owned Enterprises

UfM: Union for Mediterranean

UGTT: General Union of Tunisian Workers

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

US: United States

UTA: Union de Transports Aériens

WMC: Western Military Council

Chapter I

Introduction

The public protests of 2010-2011 brought about the change of national leadership in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. The protestors sought to depose the existing rulers of their respective states and open the ways for economic, political, and social development. In each case, the protesters viewed their state leaders as the cause of the social inequality, economic difficulty, and political exclusion that persisted within their countries. Thus, they saw the deposition of the leaders and their ruling regimes as the cure to their countries' social, economic, and political ailments.

In sum, the Arab Uprisings of 2010-2011 brought about an end to the reigns of Tunisian leader, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali; Egyptian leader, Hosni Mubarak; Libyan leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi; and Yemeni leader, Ali Abdullah Saleh. While each of these countries experienced the same ultimate result of the protests, the specific actions of the military varied in each case. In states where the military did not utilize brute force against protesters, the regime left power with little violence, as in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. However, in the states where the military maintained total or partial support of the ruling administration, the regime did not fall without a long, difficult, and violent conflict, as in the cases of Libya and Yemen. Rebels forced Ben Ali (Tunisia) and Mubarak (Egypt) to leave their presidencies less than one month from the start of the protests. Conversely, Gaddafi and Saleh took about seven months and one year, respectively, to leave office; and they left mass killings and casualties in their wake.

Although the trigger point for the change in leadership (the protests) was the same in each state, the historical records have demonstrated that the actions of the military powers within each nation also played a decisive role in the respective outcomes of the conflict. Thus, the study employs a comparative case study to identify and explore the factors that contributed to the military's varying reactions to the conflicts in Tunisia and Libya.

During this study, I collected data from a number of secondary sources to address my research question: Why did the military forces in Tunisia and Libya choose to either defect from or defend their respective country's ruling regime during the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings? In addition to using relevant secondary sources, I interviewed experts from both academia and the research field. I also conducted fieldwork in Tunisia to interview relevant military, political, and civil society elites. I could not engage in such fieldwork in Libya due to security issues.

Regarding data collection, the fact that I do not master the Arabic language may appear a weak side of my study but I overcame that challenge by accessing relevant literature and secondary sources. In addition, my expert and elite interviewees filled this gap because I could interview them in English, while most of them had themselves access to the Arabic sources. My lack of Arabic language skill only became a problem during my fieldwork in Tunis, Tunisia. I addressed this challenge by hiring an interpreter. I should also emphasize that most of the top military officers, social activists, and politicians in Tunisia were fluent in English. Most of the top military officers had training in the United States (US), and many in the latter two groups had travelled to the US and Europe for their education.

I.I Research Subject

As mentioned above, throughout this study, one primary question guided my research: Why did the military forces in Tunisia and Libya choose to either defect from or defend their respective country's ruling regime during the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings? To address this query, I explored the factors that led the Tunisian military to desert Ben Ali and support the protesters, and influenced soldiers in the Libyan military to split into pro-Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi factions.

I hypothesize that the Tunisian military refused to clash with protestors during the 2010-2011 uprisings due to the following three factors. First, Tunisia is an energy-poor state that relied on foreign investments. Second, state leaders had established the Tunisian military as an apolitical and institutional organization. Third, the Tunisian protestors demonstrated decisiveness and endurance during the conflict.

In contrast, Libya is an energy-rich state that had little dependence upon foreign investors. Second, the Libyan state leaders established a political and patrimonial military force. Third, Libyan protests were less powerful during the 2011 uprisings.

As mentioned above, this thesis explores how energy capacity, military structure, and the strength of protests influenced the outcomes of the 2010-2011 uprisings in Tunisia and Libya. First, a high-energy capacity can help ruling powers to offer an economic incentive to the military to ensure their support. This material investment becomes even more essential during turmoil. Military structure is also crucial in understanding the military's behaviour because its configuration likely influences the armed forces' stance with civilians during times of conflict. Last, the protests' strength is a key factor to explore military behaviour due to that a clash with a large number of demonstrators is less likely than a clash with small crowds.

I explore these three factors jointly to demonstrate that the elements are complementary and only yielded the outcomes in Tunisia and Libya because all three factors were present. These three factors are by no means the only reasons for the varying outcomes in Tunisia and Libya. Moreover, I do not argue that the different outcomes emerged as a necessary outcome of the above factors. Rather, I demonstrate the notable impact of the joint configuration of these factors on the different outcomes.

I.II Research Object

First, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature on civil-military relations and the reasons that military forces may have chosen to support or desert the incumbent political powers during the 2010-2011 uprisings. A number of valuable studies emerged after the Arab uprisings, such as Sharon Erickson Nepstad (2011) and Eva Bellin (2012), but this inquiry is unique because I specifically examine the cases of Tunisia and Libya. I should stress, however, that the focus of this thesis is not on these individual states. Rather, this study hones in on the role of the military during the 2010-2011 uprisings in two distinct cases, and considers the characteristics of the states in seeking to understand the context within which the conflict took place. Thus, I utilize a crosschecking comparative case study to assess the data from Tunisia and Libya. The Libyan case helped me to cross check the findings from Tunisia, and vice versa.

This inquiry also examines the relationships between energy capability, military structure, the strength of protests, and military behaviour during the anti-government uprisings. At first glance, the three factors seem unrelated; however, this thesis demonstrates that the factors are complementary and represent different aspects of an integrated reality. Moreover, the data shows that the factors, when analysed

together, serves as a useful lens through which one can view and understand the military's behaviour.

This study also aims to contribute to the social protests literature. Anti-government social protests are not common in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries because of their repressive state structures. Thus, this study aims to contribute to the newly developed field of social movements in the MENA with its comparative study of Tunisia and Libya through an exploration of the historical background of the two states, the genesis of the uprisings in each case, and the factors that influenced the military's behaviour during the conflict.

To examine the military's actions in Tunisia and Libya during the 2010-2011 protests, I employ a new theoretical framework developed via analytic eclecticism. I developed this framework by adapting two related theoretical approaches. That implementation aims to introduce a new theoretical approach to the civil-military relations literature.

I.III Thesis Structure

Chapter I of this thesis introduces the research subject and research object. Chapter II, subsequently, reviews the literature on civil-military relationships. That review begins with a discussion of data on civil-military relations in the literature. Discussing the entire body of literature on civil-military relationships is beyond the scope of my research. Thus, I explore important and related works. The chapter continues with an examination of the literature on civil-military relations in the MENA region, and then narrows further to explore the existing research on the role of the military during conflicts in the area. The chapter concludes with a review of the military's role during the Arab uprisings.

Chapter III explains this theoretical framework of the thesis and explores the role of the military in Tunisia and Libya in the light of this framework. Chapter IV presents my empirical approach and includes a discussion of my methodology, case selection, and outcomes. In Chapter V, I examine the historical background of the Tunisian uprisings, exploring the political development of Tunisia during the reigns of Bourguiba and Ben Ali. The chapter also explores the role of the military in the Tunisian political design and discusses the scenarios that led to 2010-2011 protests. Chapter VI complements Chapter V by exploring some of the key actors and factors that influenced the uprisings and the behaviour of the military during the conflict.

In Chapters VII and VIII, I apply the outlines of Chapters V and VI to Libya. Chapter VII examines Libya's political and military structures before the uprisings and explores how those structures led to and influenced the 2011 protests. Chapter VIII discusses a number of the key actors and factors that had a significant influence on the Libyan uprisings and on the role of the military during the conflict. In Chapter IX, I return to Tunisia to explore the three contributing factors—energy capacity, military structure and the strength of protests—that (individually and collectively) led to the outcome of the Tunisian protests. To confirm the findings in this chapter, in Chapter X, I examine the impact of the same factors during the Libya conflict in 2011. Chapter XI discusses the findings and conclusions drawn from the study, as well as the contributions and the findings to the larger field. The chapter also presents the limitations of the study and a discussion of potential areas for future research.

Chapter II

Literature Review

The year 2010 represented a revolutionary moment for the Arab world (Gerges 2014, 2); as the nations of the Arab world, who had lived under anti-democratic regimes for decades, started to demand democratic formation that represented a systemic transformation rather than a simple cosmetic change. The states' national armed forces¹ played an important role during the myriad of demonstrations that took place over the course of the year and had the option of using their power against demonstrators or siding with existing rulers. Each state experienced a restructuring of civil-military relations once the armed actor chose its side within this Arab uprising (also known as the Arab spring).


To understand the military behaviour in the Arab uprisings, one must examine the general framework of civil-military relations. Therefore, I explore the general picture that sheds light on the different approaches to and perspectives of the civil-military relations that evolved during the Arab uprisings of 2010.

I begin my literature review by explaining the general concept of civil-military relations. I then examine research that specifically explores the civil-military relations in the Middle East and North Africa. Third, I examine civil-military relations during times of protest. I end the chapter with an exploration of the literature on civil-military relations during the Arab uprisings. In sum, the literature review begins with a macro-level analysis of the literature regarding civil-military relations, then takes a

¹ For syntactical reasons, the terms “army,” “armed forces,” and “military” are used interchangeably throughout this chapter and this study.

continuously more specific view of the topic until arriving at the area of study, civil-military relations during the Arab uprisings (see Figure II.I).

Figure II. I: Pyramid model of this literature review



In the past decade, a number of scholars have addressed civil-military relations. Siddiqa (2007), for example, explored the topic by considering the political and financial autonomy of military power. According to Siddiqa, once military forces acquire economic power, they subsequently seek political power that will help them retain their economic benefits. In essence, economic and political interests are linked, although the former typically precedes the latter (Siddiqa 2007). As Siddiqa noted, “Financial autonomy gives the armed forces a sense of power and confidence of being independent of the ‘incompetent’ civilians” (Siddiqa 2007, 2). The weakness of the civil society and civil authority is an incentive that drives military forces to become a direct (dominant) or indirect power (hegemonic) over the civil-society (e.g., Haiti and Pakistan) (Siddiqa 2007, 44).

Siddiqa explained that in *democratic* regimes, the civilian authority subordinates the military, which works to support the civilian power. Maintaining a military force that is subject to civilian power requires a strong civil society and a competent civil political system (e.g., US, France). In *authoritarian* systems, while the

military serves as a partner that supports the civilian authority, the civil-military relationship has more of a symbiotic structure (e.g., China, Syria). In these instances, the military fills in any gaps left by the civilian authority and can serve as a ruler, arbitrator, parent-guardian, or warlord authority (see Table II.I). In essence, the power of the military increases as the power of the civil authority decreases.

Table II.I: Typology of civil-military relations

	Civil Society			
M i l i t a r y		Partner	Dominant	Hegemonic
	Civil-military partnership	US (Modern day ²), France (Modern day), UK (Modern day)		
	Authoritarian-political-military partnership	China (Modern day), Syria (post-1979), Egypt (Nasser-Mubarak)		
	Ruler military		Chile (1970s-1980s), Haiti (1970s-1980s), Burma (Modern Day)	
	Arbitrator military		Pakistan (pre-1977), Turkey (pre-1961), Indonesia (pre-1966)	
	Parent-guardian military			Pakistan (post-1977), Turkey (post-1961), Indonesia (post-1966)
	Warlord		Nigeria (Modern day), Ethiopia (Modern day), Somalia (Modern day)	

Source: Siddiqi 2007, p.37.

² Modern days meaning is 2007 when the book was published by Siddiqi.

II.I Civil-Military Relations in Literature

The above typology provides general information and structure on how and why civil-military relations differ. This section will present a discussion of relevant research on these relationships, with a particular focus on the influential works of Huntington, Janowitz, Finer, and Moskos, along with landmark studies from Feaver, Barany, Desch, and Schiff.

In the milestone work, *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington explored the question of whether the military should be subordinated by civil powers. According to Huntington, the military should be subject to objective civil authority for their mutual benefit. Huntington clarified, “The one prime essential for any system of civilian control is the minimizing of military power. Objective civilian control achieves this reduction by professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral” (Huntington 1957, 84).

Huntington also explained that the military should have autonomy in the form of an institutional structure that is separate from civil authorities. This autonomy, he noted, professionalizes military power. Once this autonomous structure is in place, the professional military then becomes subject to civil authority. Essentially, civil authority can control the military when the military becomes a separate, autonomous professional power. Huntington defended this idea of objective civilian control: “Objective civilian control not only reduces the power of the military to the lowest possible level vis-a-vis all civilian groups, it also maximizes the likelihood of achieving military security” (Huntington 1957, 85). Successful objective civilian control results in “[the] minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military” (Huntington 1995, 9).

While Huntington supported the idea that civilian authority should control military powers, he also defended the recognition of professional military autonomy by civil powers. As such, professionalization is the source of the democratic civil-military relationship (Huntington 1957, 84). One must question, though, the extent to which such professional autonomy will keep military powers subject to civilian authority. Furthermore, who will guard the autonomous guardians? Once the military gains autonomy and authority, what structures are in place to keep it from pursuing its own interests according to its own standards and priorities?

Creating a separate position would render the military an actor who might equalize himself to civilians rather than being an officer who would be overseen by civil rulers. Another problem in Huntington's argument is that when the civil and military interests clash, there is no one in place to guard the civilians. Huntington failed to address these issues as he championed the military's independent position, which could potentially undermine the strength of civilian authority.

Janowitz concurred with Huntington on the idea that military authority should be subordinated by civilian powers. However, he noted that controlling the military is not very likely because they are separate from civilian powers. As Lutterbeck underlined, "According to Janowitz, the best way to make sure that the military remains responsive to the demands of the civilian authorities is to encourage mutual exchange and regular interaction between the two domains" (Lutterbeck 2013, 9).

Moreover, unlike Huntington, Janowitz defended the idea of general conscription because he believed it would lead to the integration of the military officers and the civil authority. In his view, integration would lead to civilianized military forces. Consequently, the civilianized military would not encroach on the political arena (Janowitz 1960).

It is important to note that Janowitz is a sociologist, while Huntington is a political scientist. The two different disciplines played a key role in the authors' varying approaches because, "to political scientists, institutional civilian control is the heart of civil-military relations. To sociologists, civil-military relations is about the integration (or the absence of it) of civil and military institutions" (Feaver 1996, 166). Janowitz did not refute the differences between civil and military powers, but he posited that having two different autonomies could lead to a clash of authority between the two powers. Janowitz noted the following:

"He [the military authority] is amenable to civilian political control because he recognizes that civilians appreciate and understand the tasks and responsibilities of the constabulary force. He [the military authority] is integrated onto civilian society because he shares its common values. To deny or destroy the difference between the military and the civilian cannot produce genuine similarity, but runs the risk of creating new forms of tension and unanticipated militarism." (Janowitz 1960, 440)

Feaver (1996) commented on the differences between the works of Huntington and Janowitz. He stated,

"Janowitz understood civilian control in terms of societal control rather than state or institutional control. State institutions play a secondary role as an extension of society, but societal control, measured in part as integration with society, was Janowitz's normative and empirical focus." (Feaver 1996, 166)

Burk (2002) also noted some shortcomings of Janowitz's perspective. Burk asserted that Huntington's and Janowitz's prominent theories were liberal and civic republican, respectively. He identified what he considered the flaws in both authors' works by stressing the importance of a new theory about the civil-military relations.

Burk stated, “Huntington's theory focuses on the matter of protecting democracy, but neglects the problem of sustaining democratic values and practice. Janowitz's theory focuses on the matter of sustaining democratic values, but neglects the problem of protecting the democratic state” (Burk 2002, 14).

I noted also that Janowitz failed to explain clearly how living together would prevent the probability of politicization of the military or militarization of politics. Janowitz's proposal for integration carried with it the possibility of unintended integration between the military and civil powers, rather than the development of a structure that solidifies the civil power's authority over the military. Additionally, like Huntington, Janowitz examined only single case studies in the United States, which makes it difficult to draw generalizable conclusions.

Similarly, Burk and Feaver also found both Huntingtonian and Janowitzian approaches problematic. Feaver argued that the military should be strong to secure the state against external threats, but who would control the strong guardians (military) within the state, especially when something threatened the legitimacy and authority of the civil authority (Feaver 1999, 211-214). “The coup happens when the fighters determine that the regime has violated the will/interests of the collective. The fighters still see themselves in theory as the agents of the state (albeit not terribly subservient agents)” (Feaver 1996, 153). Feaver, unlike Huntington and Janowitz, emphasized the importance of a checks and balance system between the civil and military authorities and criticized Huntington and Janowitz's presumption that the military would voluntarily obey a civilian power. According to Feaver (2003), without setting up a civilian-run monitoring mechanism for the military, military forces would not submit to civil authority.

Feaver (2003) used agency theory to explain civil-military relationships. He asserted that the civilian power is the employer and the military is the employee. Feaver stated, “I argue that the essence of civil-military relations is a strategic interaction between civilian principals and military agents” (Feaver 2003, 2-3). He stressed that civil authority should closely monitor the military’s actions and provided specific steps for this mechanism as follows. The military’s reactions to civil oversight and specific orders—obedience [working] or disobedience [shirking]—should be rewarded or punished by the civil authority respectively.

Feaver viewed civil-military relations using democratic theory. He explained,

“In some circumstances, civilian experts on national security may know more than military experts. But the claim of democratic theory is that even when civilians are less expert, they are still rightfully in charge. The military assesses the risk, the civilian judges it.” (Feaver 2003, 6)

As a result, “Civilians should get what they ask for, even if it is not what they really want. In other words, civilians have a right to be wrong” (Feaver 2003, 6).

The weakness in Feaver’s approach, however, is his failure to clarify which party will control the civilian authorities’ actions. While he is clear that the civilians will check the military’s actions; he does not identify the party that will monitor the accuracy and acceptability of civil decisions or defend military rights. Indeed, Feaver himself confesses to this deficit in his paper:

“The application of agency theory I have presented focuses on just one side of the problematique, namely the mechanisms for implementing civilian control over the military, and has paid relatively less attention to the other side, how civilian control might affect the ability of the military to carry out its

functional role to defend and advance the national interest.” (Feaver 2003, 298)

The main question for Feaver, then, is how a nation ensures that the civil authority will not abuse its control over the military.

In the late 1970s, Moskos argued that military moved from an institutional model to an occupational paradigm. In his view, the occupational model prioritizes “self-interests” and “specific performances” more than the institutional model (Moskos 1977, 43, 1986, 381). Moskos used the newly emerged military trade unions as an example of this transition, during which, he asserted, the military turned its focus to corporate goals and the pursuit of individual commercial tendencies.

Because of this change in the military’s focal point, civil and military officers developed a closer relationship. Since, the military’s interest in the business arena necessitated more civilian involvement in the military for technical reasons. In addition, civil-military cooperation in favour of the individual interests of military officers created a close civil-military relation. Moskos further explained, “Reality, moreover, is complicated in that the armed forces have had and will continue to have elements of both the institutional and occupational types” (Moskos 1977, 44). According to Moskos, the change of military officers’ agenda to one focused more on individual interests helped with the rapprochement between civil leaders and military officers.

While Moskos provided significant insight into civil-military relations, he did not discuss why civilian authorities would want to share their business profits with the military. Moreover, Moskos did not specify the positive and negative implications of the change in the military model (e.g., how to protect military’s *esprit de corps* and avoid authority fissures between the militaries individual and corporate goals).

Finer (1962) approached the civil-military relations from a different perspective. In his book *The Man on Horseback*, he made the following argument:

“Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military vis-a-vis other and civilian groupings are overwhelming. The military possess vastly superior organization. And they possess arms.” (Finer 1962, 5)

According to Finer, the military engaged in politics because the states were neither liberal, despotic, nor autocratic. He classified military-engaged or military-dominant states as “empirical autocracies and oligarchies” (Finer 1962, 4). As Finer stated, “*Empirical* distinguishes them from the ideological autocracies and oligarchies of the Soviet type; *autocracies and oligarchies* distinguish them from the democracies” (Finer 1962, 4).

In addition to this general classification, Finer identified five causal variables of the military’s intervention into civil authority: (a) nationalism, (b) popular sovereignty, (c) the insurrectionary army, (d) the professionalization of the army, and (e) the emergence of new states (Finer 1962, 207-210). While these developments increased the army’s strength and the guardian’s role in the (re)structuring and protection of the state, consequently, a stronger army helped to the state to remain sovereign and strong in the international arena.

Finer explained that the military often intervenes because of the weakness of civil political structure. Underdeveloped or immature civil authorities and political cultures pave the way for military forces to take on a governmental role (Finer 1962, 208-209). Because military leaders see themselves as the guardians of the state, the violation of national interests or the incompetence of civil authority can move them to take on the responsibility of intervening and finding solutions to identified problems

(Finer 1962, 207). Finer noted that the intervention level varies based upon the development stage of the country's political culture. He classified the levels of military intervention into politics as follows: "influence, pressure or blackmail, displacement, and complete replacement (sweep away)" (Finer 1962, 86-87).

Based on this categorization, the military's level of influence in politics increases as they move from influence to complete replacement of civilian governing structures. Finer stressed, "The modes of military intervention are as often latent or indirect as they are overt or direct. Often they merely substitute one cabinet for another, or again simply subject a cabinet to blackmail" (Finer 1962, 4). He further explained, "In most cases the military that have intervened in politics are in a dilemma: they cannot withdraw from rulership nor can they fully legitimize it. They can neither stay nor go" (Finer 1962, 243).

Finer did not legitimize or justify military intervention, but he highlighted the weaknesses of internal and international factors as causal variables for military intervention. If I go back to Finer's initial query that is why the military does not intervene despite they entail power and arms, response to that is also coming out by Finer in Marshall's quote, "What 'has prevented the military . . . from establishing its rule throughout the globe' is 'technical inability to administer any but the most primitive community' and 'lack of moral title to rule'" (Marshall 1963, 243).

The first limitation of this perspective is that Finer presumed that the military is the single power that can intervene when civil authority becomes incompetent or loses its legitimacy. Is there no power other than the military that can resolve a state's problems? Finer did not blame but demonstrated competition in international affairs for establishing strong armed forces. However, there are many countries, like South Korea, that do not have strong military forces, despite their experience with

aggressive outside threats. Finer left each of these issues unaddressed that weakens his argument.

Rebecca Schiff made another important contribution to the civil-military literature with her argument that theories on civil-military relations also need to account for the influence of “culture” and “history” (Schiff 1995). She also stressed that scholars should examine cases in countries other than the United States to obtain more generalizable results about civil-military relations.

Drawing on these two points, Schiff claimed that the cooperation of the military, political elites and citizenry that is concordance theory is paramount to preventing a military intervention. Schiff eschewed institutional theory (and aligned with convergence theory) to propose cooperation instead of separation. The crux of her approach is that she also added a new variable into the relationship nexus: citizenry. As such, Schiff, unlike the other theorists, considered cultural and historical variables in the examination of the civil-military relations. Schiff asserted that as long as the military, political elites and society can cooperate, military intervention will not exist. Schiff used examples from Israeli and Indian history as proof for her argument. She explained that the three parties should cooperate on the following issues/decisions: “the composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style” (Schiff 1995, 14-15).

Schiff asserted that the biggest limitation of the concordance theory is that it does not address in detail the role that external threats play in civil-military relations. She argued, “Concordance theory does not deny the importance of external threat conditions, but similarly to current civil-military relations theory, domestic politics is the primary focus” (Schiff 1995, 9). According to Schiff, concordance theory can be

feasible in practice, insofar as international variables are *ceteris paribus*, which is not very likely.

Unlike Schiff, Desch examined civil-military relations from both internal and external perspectives. External and internal threats were the independent variables, and military-civilian relation served as the dependent variable. According to Desch's structural model, "A state facing high external threats and low internal threats should have the most stable civil-military relations" (Desch 1999, 13). He further explained, "External threats have obvious effects: they threaten the entire state, including the military; they usually produce increased unity within the state; and they focus everyone's attention outward" (Desch 1999, 12).

Desch found that internal threats, conversely, created rifts between the society, state, and the military. Desch stated, "If a country faces significant internal threats, the institutions of civilian authority will most likely be weak and deeply divided, making it difficult for civilians to control the military" (Desch 1996, 14). Desch used Argentinian and Brazilian cases to show how high internal and low external threats could create divisions between civil and military officers. The findings indicated that the worst civil-military relations came out in such situations; because the divided civilian authority became impotent to the rein in the military powers, and divisions in the military resulted in conflicting stances on how to respond to civilian orders (Desch 1996, 5).

Desch's model used the nature and intensity of the threats to assess civil-military relations and found stable civil-military relations in environments with high external/low internal threats. One might question, though, if the reverse is true: Do unstable civil-military relations exist in environments with low external/high internal threats? Desch's model asserts that if a state had stable and strong civil ascendancy

over military structure, the state also had a high level of external threats and only low-scale internal threats. Can one assume, then, that high external threats and low internal threats are essential aspects of stable civil-military relations? Sweden presents one example of a nation where civilian authority subordinated the military when no high external threat existed. Conversely, Turkey, in the 1960s and 1970s, had high external and low internal threats, but could not establish stable civil-military relations. Desch does not address this issue in his work.

Barany (2012) examined civil-military relations through the lens of democracy. According to Barany, democratic armies are the pre-condition for a democratic state. He also stated that if a state wanted to establish a consolidated democratic structure, leaders should base civil-military relations on democratic premises—i.e., the military should be democratic and should develop democratic relations with civilian authorities and society.

Barany claimed that a democratic army is “supportive of democratic rule” (Barany 2012, 11). When the democratic military obeys both the rules of the democracy and the democratically elected rulers, they foster democratic civil-military relations (Barany 2012). Barany stated,

“There is no organization more important for the survival of the state than its armed forces. The state needs the armed forces for its own protection, but the same forces, owing to their monopoly of the tools of large-scale violence, also present a potential threat to the state's very existence.” (Barany 2012, 14-15)

While democracy may be an important condition for a stable civil-military relation, countries have fostered stable civil-military relations without establishing a democratic regime. In Barany’s view, military power does not interfere in such political structures due to the following reasons: (a) The military is committed to

civilian rule, whether or not civilian rulers are democratic; (b) The civilian authority is superior to that of the military; (c) The military intervenes into politics, but they fail and retreat; and (d) The military complete what they expect from interference, and they go back to their barracks after “mission completed” (Barany 2012, 40-41). Thus, even if Barany claimed that a democratic army is a pre-requisite for democratic governance, he does not contend that it is also pre-condition for a stable civil-military relation.

While Barany’s approach seems essential, the flaw in this approach is that he presumed that even if the military intervened in the undemocratic political structure, they would eventually retreat. One must question, though, what would happen if they went against Barany’s assumption and refused to retreat.

Lasswell (1941) categorized soldier-prevailed states as “garrison states.” He explained that a garrison state was a “world in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society” (Lasswell 1941, 455). Laswell explained that in such nations, the people do not see instrumental democracy but mystic democracy. Since, first, the government will be formed by plebiscite instead of elections. Second, the government will be rigidly centralized and composed by officer corps. Third, governmental decisions will be anti-democratic, and oppositions will be repressed (Lasswell 1941, 461-462). Lasswell stated, “Not only will the administrative structure be centralized, but at every level, it will tend to integrate authority in a few hands. The leadership principle will be relied upon; responsibility as a rule will be focused upon individual ‘heads’” (Lasswell 1941, 463).

Hence, the state will not build civil-military relations upon stable and democratic standards. According to Laswell, “In the garrison states, the respect pyramid will probably resemble the income pyramid” (Lasswell 1941, 463). He

continued, “Those standing at the top of the military pyramid will doubtless occupy high positions in the income pyramid.” Essentially, as long as their interests do not clash, civil and military officers would continue to have ongoing relations. The benchmark is their pursuit of joint interests. A garrison state is something of a hybrid-democratic state and a military state. It is less rigid and centralized than is a military state, but more autocratic and centralized than a hybrid-democratic state.

While Lasswell made a number of good points, the reality is that talking about civil-military relations in relationship to garrison states is very difficult because there is very little distinction between civilians and military forces. Laswell did not provide any clarity about the symbiotic civil-military relationship. The two parties are intertwined, and civilians are subordinated by military powers.

Matei presented an alternative perspective on civil-military relations that she defined as “the trinity of control, effectiveness and efficiency” (Matei 2013, 28-29). Through this concept, Matei posited that “democratic security” preceded “national security” (Matei 2013, 28-29). She explained, “[These] new regimes focus on control of the armed forces as more important than the ability of the armed forces to defend the country” (Matei 2013, 28).

Matei contended that global challenges and developments required that state’s examine their military’s control, effectiveness, and efficiency (Matei 2013, 29). She asserted that military should be subject to democratic rules and democratically elected rulers and should have a structure that allows military personnel to follow the orders of civilian leaders effectively and efficiently (Matei 2013, 30-32). An undisciplined, uncontrolled, and impotent military could impair the civil-military relations.

Young (2006) provided some insight into key strategies for developing a controlled, effective, and efficient military that recognizes the authority of civilian

leaders. Young stated that civil authority should provide oversight for the military's missions, size, and budget and suggested that constitutional constrictions, cultural impositions, social norms, and free press could help to establish boundaries and systems of accountability for military forces (Young 2006, 26-29). Young stressed that the construction of stable civil-military relations required joint and sustainable efforts. He provided the following explanation:

“The members of the armed forces must accept that their institution exists to serve the state, not its own parochial interests. Likewise, politicians must respect the military's indispensable contribution to the state and become skilled at managing the soldier's need for certainty in an uncertain world.”
(Young 2006, 29)

As showed above, a number of researchers have explored civil-military relations. However, because civil-military relations shift and evolve over time and demonstrate different characteristics by case, none of the authors' theoretical approaches address the full complexity of civil-military relations in all circumstances.

Each state has its own idiosyncratic conditions, so such uniqueness requires distinctive definitions of civil-military relationship for each state. Accordingly, in the following section, and throughout the remainder of this study, I specifically focus on civil-military relations in the Middle East and North Africa by inquiring about where civil-military relations stand in the region. This increasingly micro-level approach will help to provide clarity about the role of the military in the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings.

II.II Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East and North Africa

The military is one of many important protagonists in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states. Until World War I, a number of MENA states fell under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, from the early 16th century until the early 20th

century. After the war, the states were able to emancipate themselves from the hegemony of the empire, but they struggled to establish fully liberated nations. Following the empire's collapse, however, the states eventually found themselves subject to European powers: France, Spain, Italy, and Britain. Extended foreign rule had forced the states to fight against external threats and their internal proxies to win and sustain their independence.

After World War II, the MENA states finally achieved their liberation after a long and hard struggle. As each nation moved towards independence through diplomatic negotiations or armed struggles. Following the struggle for independence, the Arab nations faced new external and internal opposition as follows: Israel and foreign-supported kingdoms. The military became very important in these states because most of the states earned their independence largely because of their armies' involvement in conflicts against external and internal actors at different levels (Pollack 2002). In the eyes of the people, army personnel had sacrificed their lives for the people's independence.

Despite the similarities between the histories of the various MENA states, their differences make it unlikely to categorize all of the states using one model. State, society, and military structures differ in each country, as well as the states' stance on international relations. For example, Algeria received its independence from France through a military struggle, but Tunisia gained its independence using diplomatic negotiations.

In each case, however, military forces played important roles in shaping the systems of the Middle Eastern and North African states. Kamrava (2000) classified the states, according to the military's role and position, as follows: (a) democratic states under civilian authority where the military plays an important role in the

political domain (Israel and Turkey); (b) inclusionary states where regular military forces are controlled and passivized by the regime's loyal military forces (Iran, Iraq, and Libya); (c) exclusionary states where military officers have left their barracks to become the civilian rulers of their states (Egypt, Syria, Tunisia); and (d) monarchies that rely heavily upon foreign mercenaries (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) or tribal forces to maintain their positions of power (Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia) (Kamrava 2000).

In the following section, I explore the literature on civil-military relations in the MENA region by dividing scholars' works into three different parts: (a) military coups, (b) coup proofing, and (c) ruling but not governing.

Table II.II: Civil-Military relations in the Middle East of 2000

Tribally dependent monarchies		Autocratic officer-politicians			
Oil monarchies	Civic-myth monarchies	Mukhaberat states ³	Military states	Dual militaries	Military democracies
Saudi Arabia Kuwait Bahrain Qatar UAE Oman	Jordan Morocco	Syria Egypt Tunisia Yemen	Algeria Sudan	Iran Iraq Libya	Israel Turkey

Source: Kamrava 2000, p.71.

Military Coups: From the 1950s to the 1970s

Armed powers played a significant part in the restructuring of their states from the 1950s to the 1970s. Huntington asserted that “in these early stages of political modernization, the military officers play a highly modernizing and progressive role” serving as something of a “midwife” during the transitional period (Huntington 1968, 203). However, in the post-independent period after the 1950s, the military in the

³ Mukhaberat states mean police or intelligence states (Kamrava 2000).

MENA states usurp and maintain power with frequent coup d'états. As Be'eri explained, "Since March 1949, until the end of 1980 there [the Arab world] have been 55 such coups, approximately half of them successful, the remainder abortive" (Be'eri 1982, 70).

Steven Cook cited Huntington's 1968 work, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, as he discussed the impact of the frequent coup d'états: "Violence and instability in a given society was the result of 'rapid social change and rapid mobilization of new groups in politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions'" (Cook 2007, 4). In the same work, Huntington defended the military's transitional role. In Gaub's words:

"Huntington endorsed the highly politicised military as the bearer of modernisation, explaining military coups as a normal step towards modernity. He claimed that once the military accomplished its role as midwife, stable institutions would be established and the armed forces would naturally retreat into the barracks." (Gaub 2013b, 222)

In contrast to Huntington's idealistic views of the military, the politicized army powers' uncontrolled and ambitious actions in the MENA states destabilized the region and led to egregious depravity within the borders of each nation. During this period, the military established structures that resembled strict versions of garrison states. The lack of civilian authority led the armed forces to take power in the transitional period.

The heyday of the coup d'états declined after the 1980s (Taylor 2014, 35). Were the armies replaced with democratic forces, or did they voluntarily become subject to civilian authorities?

Coup Proofing: From the 1980s to the 2000s

After many coup d'états, the people who moved into power sought to protect themselves against the same fate by developing a pre-emptive defence against future coups. As Be'eri explained, "The ruling Arab leaders in the seventies had carefully studied the art of coup-making, particularly those among them, who themselves had seized power in this way; they learned to take preventative measures to forestall their recurrence" (Be'eri 1982, 78). To this end, the rulers developed a coup-proofing strategy. Quinlivan defined *coup proofing* as "the set of actions a regime takes to prevent a military coup" (Quinlivan 1999, 133). While specific coup-proofing strategies vary by case, Quinlivan identified five structural features of the approach: "the exploitation of family, ethnic, and religious loyalties; the creation of parallel militaries that counterbalance the regular military forces; the establishment of security agencies that watch everyone, including other security agencies; the encouragement of expertness in the regular military; and, funding" (Quinlivan 1999, 135).

Like Quinlivan, Albrecht (2014) discussed the "integration" and "segregation" of coup-proofing strategies. Albrecht defended the idea that "during times of systemic regime crisis, integrative coup-proofing is more effective than segregation" (Albrecht 2014, 6), and posited that if military officers became loyal to the ruling regime by sharing some of the governing responsibilities, they would be more protective and supportive of the civilian authority (Albrecht 2014). Albrecht showed the different military positions of Syria and Egypt in 2011 to support his argument. While Syrian military officers have stayed loyal to their ethnically linked rulers; the Egyptian military leaders have deserted their rulers.

Feaver (1996 & 1998) explained that civilians typically expect military powers to protect them from external and internal threats. Feaver categorized these civilian expectations as functional and relational goals, respectively (Feaver 2003, 62). In the Arab states, once the external threats were no longer an issue, after the early 1980s, the civilian leaders began to pay more attention to the relational goal of defending against internal threats (e.g., a military coup d'état). To this end, the rulers of certain Arab states initiated coup-proofing strategies designed to emasculate their armed forces and maintain their rule. Rukavishnikov and Pugh explained that in a democracy, rulers would have attempted to create a military force "for and within democracy" (Rukavishnikov and Pugh 2006, 148-149). However, the MENA states' leaders instead created anti-democratic armies that were loyal to the sitting regime, an effort that manipulated and corrupted the armed forces.

Rulers of most of the MENA states obtained the bulk of their funding from natural resources (gas and oil) and foreign aid, which increased after the 1970s. Rulers in energy-rich states like Libya and Algeria effectively used the non-tax income to create their own loyal military forces, providing economic privileges to military leaders in exchange for their loyalty to the regime. Conversely, energy-poor states used their geostrategic positions to obtain foreign aid and investments. Tunisia and Egypt, for example, received economic and political support from the European states and from the US to develop secular, pro-Western government structures. As such, these energy-poor states also neutralized their own armed powers by giving them economic perks or marginalizing them by restricting their economic and organizational competence (Brooks 2013).

Although the number of coups diminished after 1980s in response to these strategies, the MENA nations continued to suffer from abject underdevelopment.

While their coup-proofing strategies lessened the probability of military coups, authoritarianism remained intact within most of the MENA states, although the new power centre had shifted to civilians or civilianized military forces. In essence, the coup-proofing policies created military-backed authoritarian powers at the cost of democracy. The ruling regimes manipulated the military for the sake of their own interests, and coup-proofed military powers rubber-stamped the newly formed system. “[F]rom about 1970 and onwards, the role of the military [challenger] changed into becoming the principal protector of the (still authoritarian) regimes” (Hansen and Jensen 2008, 30-31).

Feaver’s armed servants model provides an ideal perspective for examining this coup-proofing period. During this time, civil authorities became the employer, and the armed forces became their loyal employees. In these states, the strengthened civil authoritarian powers created armies loyal to the regime; while in democratic states, the armies are supposed to be loyal to the state (Gaub 2013a, 5). Furthermore, instead of creating objective civilian control over military, civil authorities formed mechanisms of subjective civilian—but still authoritarian—control across the MENA region. The new trend in the MENA states was civilianized authoritarian regimes, which fostered stable, undemocratic civil-military relations. These symbiotic relationships also garnered the support of international super powers, the European Union and the United States, because the authoritarian rulers and their militaries excluded radical Islamists from the system and kept the region stable. International actors subsidized the states in exchange for the promise of a secure and stable region. The anti-democratic states used the trade-off as blackmail for international legitimacy (Gelvin 2012, 5). Brooks noted the important role that the military played during this period: “The fact that regimes have successfully managed political military relations

does not necessarily imply that the military's importance has diminished. The armed forces remain powerful behind the scenes constituencies, whose support must be maintained and opposition guarded against” (Brooks 1998, 74).

Ruling but not governing: The new age of military forces

As both the internal and external threats abated, Arab rulers sought to protect their existence in power. While they proofed their armies from coup d'états, they also sought to garner their support. The new role of the “incumbent regime’s guardian” (Rubin 2001, 53) kept the armies role in the political scene even more limited than previous years, and “a new symbiotic relations” developed between military and civilian powers (Herspring 2009, 669).

On the other hand, Cook (2007) conducted a study of Egyptian, Algerian, and Turkish political systems and found that in each case, the armies of the states ruled but did not govern. Cook noted that in each of these states, the military apparatus took pains to exclude strong Islamist powers from the political arena, including the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria after a 1992 election victory, the Welfare Party in Turkey after success in the 1995 general elections, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after 1952 “Free Officers” military coup (Cook 2007). “The ‘balance’ between officers and civilians, demonstrating how officers in the Middle East can rule but not govern without ever having to step beyond the boundaries of their barracks” (Cook 2007, 8).

Finer (1974) labelled these regimes “military supportive states,” because their survival depended upon their military’s support. In other words, the man was on horseback. Perlmutter noted that these states represented a praetorian model in which “the military tends to intervene in the government and has the potential to dominate the executive” (Perlmutter 1969, 383). These types of armies prefer to “operate from behind the scenes as a pressure group” (Perlmutter 1969, 396). It is important to note,

here, that military support of civilian and democratic rulers is a normal and expected process. However, the problem is how to distinguish military support from military imposition. In the MENA states, the civil-military balance worked to the mutual benefit of civilian authoritarian rulers and military powers, but excluded the rest of the society from participation in the political arena.

A number of anti-democratic states fell after the Soviet collapse, but military supported authoritarian regimes in the MENA region continued to maintain their power base. Bellin explained that Arab leaders in the region maintained authoritarianism as an exception through the “robustness of the coercive apparatus” (Bellin 2004, 144-146). Even the robustness lasted a very long time, but someone had to stop the authoritarianism for the sake of national interest, dignity, justice, and freedom.

II.III Protest Movements and Military Powers

The main reason for the emergence of anti-governmental protests is the people’s dissatisfaction within a specific class(es). Aberle’s approach classifies four criteria that help to explain the reasons of discontent: (a) possessions, (b) status, (c) behaviour, and (c) worth (Aberle 1982, 315-326). When people in society feel that they have insufficient access to or are deprived of and excluded from these four things, dissatisfaction and collective action ensues. This truth was particularly salient in the MENA region. As Hafez explained, Muslims rebel “because they encounter an ill-fated combination of political and institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and reactive and indiscriminate repression on the other” (Hafez 2003, 199-200).

Dissatisfaction does not necessarily always lead to a social movement. Cameron (1966) noted that, firstly, the unsatisfied people must know and be able to share their discontent; and become aware of their capability to change their life

structures. Then, when people find conditions that are appropriate to act together, a social movement is born (Cameron 1966). That means the dissatisfied people must have the opportunity to convene and organize each other to create a social movement.

However, while anti-governmental protests have been ubiquitous around the world, revolutionary changes have been the exception rather than the rule. As such, the emergence of social movements and protests are insufficient alone for a revolutionary change in an authoritarian state. The 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal serves as an example of how a military force can depose a long-standing ruler and that pave way for the development of a democratic system (Varol 2012).

Armies' attitude varies, and it is dependent upon the cases and the nature of the social protests. It is important to stress that the military stance cannot be classified as neutral during the anti-government uprisings. Since, the military abstain meaning is indeed *de facto* permission for the protestors to storm against the government.

The literature detailed above reveals five of the most common relationships that occurred between civilians and the military during the anti-governmental protests: "The military (or a part of it) trying to crush a rebellion; The military (or a part of it) joining a rebellion; The military (or a part of it) joining international forces to restore stability and introduce democracy; The military (or a part of it) fighting international forces; and The military disintegrating" (Hansen and Jensen 2008, 34).

Barany also identified the following four factors that one must consider when examining the behaviour of military forces during civil uprisings: "the military establishment, the state, society, and the external environment" (Barany 2013a, 63). He explained that if the internal cohesion of the military deteriorated, such as professional versus conscripts or elites versus regulars; if the state failed to get the support of the army; if protestors succeeded in affecting the army's behaviour; or if

outside actors encouraged the army to side with the protestors, the probability that the regime would fall was quite high (Barany 2013a, 63-73).

Parsa (2000) also emphasized the significant role played by the army during a revolution and social protests. Parsa asserted that conscript armies become more open to revolution and change demands in comparison with professional armies. He explained that because conscripts tend to have closer relationships with citizens, therefore, they are more likely to understand the agenda of protestors. Successful social protests, or so-called *colour revolutions*, in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2005), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) and failed social protests in Burma (2007) and Iran (2009) show the different impact that conscripted and professional military structures, respectively, may have during civil uprisings.

Unlike Parsa, Lee (2005) discussed the internal cohesion of military structures during times of national turmoil. He stated, “Militaries are likely to be successful in suppressing political protests if authoritarian leaders do not implement policies that fragment the organizational integrity of the armed forces” (Lee 2005, 81). To support his argument, he claimed that the 1998 anti-government protests in Indonesia were successful because of internal fragmentation within the Indonesian armed forces. In contrast, 1989 Tiananmen protests in China were suppressed by military forces because the Chinese government maintained strong control over the military, which led to internal cohesion (Lee 2005).

Russell examined the military impact on protests and social movements by using three standards: “(a) the degree of disloyalty [D], (b) the timing of disloyalty [T], and (c) the proportion of the armed forces that were disloyal [P]” (Russell 1974, 72-73). Russell explained that a high combination of $D \times T \times P$ increases the likelihood that social upheavals will succeed, as in Afghanistan in 1929, Bolivia in 1952, and

Cuba in 1959 (Russell 1974, 74). In addition, Nepstad (2013) revealed that civil resisters encouraged defections of armies using the following steps. First of all, revealing the costs of remaining loyal to the regime: Civil resisters convince the army supporting the regimes would be socio-economically and morally costly for them. Second, explaining the personal costs: Civil resisters try to prove that regime collaborators in the army would have to pay for their loyalty. Third, facilitating defection: Civil resisters try to (a) convince army personnel that their regimes would not be able to punish the soldiers if they withdrew their support and (b) suggest that the soldiers would receive some personal incentives if the regime fell, such as a promotion in the army (Nepstad 2013).

Together, these contributions to the body of literature on this topic indicate that military structure, civil-military and the military-protests relations serve as important variables that influence the success of social movement.

Barany explored whether the army's support was sufficient for a successful revolution in an authoritarian state. He provided the following conclusion:

“This is not to say that the army's backing is sufficient to make a successful revolution; indeed, revolutions require so many political, social, and economic forces to line up just right, and at just the right moment, that revolutions rarely succeed. But support from a preponderance of the armed forces is surely a necessary condition for revolutionary success.” (Barany 2011, 28)

From this finding, one can conclude that the army's backing was a necessary condition for the social movement being successful in the MENA anti-democratic states. Because the regimes excluded the potential political challenges against their ruling, the only alternative and competent power seemed to be the military-backed mass protests.

After drawing the general picture of the nexus between civilians, military officers, and social protests, I will deepen my question by asking how and to what extent did the military play a role in the Arab uprisings, specifically in Tunisia and Libya. The following section reviews the literature on the military's involvement in the 2010-2011 uprisings.

II. IV Military Involvement in the Arab Uprisings

State leaders in several Arab countries countered numerous anti-governmental riots throughout their history. Recent examples include the 1977 bread and 1986 central security forces' riots in Egypt, the 1981 economic-based upheavals in Morocco, and the 1983 bread and 2008 minor riots in Tunisia (Achcar 2013, 94). However, none of these anti-governmental protests brought about revolutionary change in their states. According to Bellin, the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East was the result of (a) the fiscal health of the coercive apparatuses, (b) the low level of institutionalism of security, (c) the enduring international support for the security establishments, and (d) the weak social protests against the ruling regimes (Bellin 2004, 144-146). In addition, Gause stated that the stability of the Arab dictatorships resulted from "the military-security complex" and "state control over the economy" (Gause 2011). Moreover, rich oil reserves, foreign aid, and state leaders' rigid control over the economy created strong, state-run, central economic structures. All of the above factors eliminated strong opposition and the probability of change in leadership.

However, the literature also discusses several cases in which the Arab uprisings' were a success,⁴ as in Egypt and Tunisia. These states proved a prominent exception because protestors were able to remove anti-democratic rulers by forming a

⁴ The term *success* refers to the deposition of an anti-democratic leader by public protests.

de facto alliance with military forces. In essence, the protectors of the autocratic rulers sided with the people on the street. These uprisings, and the role the military played in them, opened a new page in the literature on civil-military relations in the MENA states. As Taylor explained, “Previous models of civil-military relations [treated] the military as the progenitor of political intervention or the stalwart defender of the regime, not as the arbiter of massive popular upheaval” (Taylor 2014, 40).

Bellin (2012), also, recasts the robustness of the authoritarianism in the Middle Eastern states after these seismic changes. She explained, “Two factors proved primary in the Arab spring: the institutionalization character of the military and the level of social mobilization” (Bellin 2012, 131). Institutionalized military forces avoided costly actions, such as shooting the mass protestors, for their own institutional benefits. Moreover, nonviolent social protests received significant support from different sections of society. According to Bellin, the aforementioned factors led to the change of regimes in Egypt and Tunisia recently, as they did previously in Brazil (1985) and Argentina (1983) (Stepan 1988). In contrast, weakly institutionalized or patrimonial military forces and violent protests engendered different results, as in Libya and Syria.

Gause (2011) also stressed the importance of the level of institutionalization and the professionalization of military. In addition, he argued that the social upheavals received the support of the military forces in places with a homogenous social composition, as in Tunisia and Egypt. In contrast, diverse societies, like Syria and Bahrain, failed to achieve success because of sectarian divisions within the societies (Gause 2011).

Gause also noted the role that energy resources played during the protests and stated that the oil-rich states (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) protected themselves

against social upheavals, with the exception of Libya. Gause explained, “Qaddafi's example establishes that oil money must be allocated properly, rather than wasted on pet projects and hare-brained schemes, for it to protect a regime” (Gause 2011). On the other hand, according to Gause, the energy-poor states, such as Tunisia and Egypt, experienced the backfire of the privatization policies in their economies after the 2000s. These policies created new super-wealth and crony capitalism among close colleagues and relative of the leaders, which also increased the public revulsion.

Like Gause, Springborg (2014) underlined the importance of institutionalism and professionalism during the uprisings. He states that Tunisian and Egyptian militaries were more institutionalized, cohesive, and professional than were Yemen's and Libya's armies. As a result, military forces in Tunisia and Egypt cohesively defected from their rulers, while those in Yemen and Libya eventually fragmented.

Albrecht (2014) took a different approach, using the coup-proofing perspective to explain the varying outcomes during the uprisings. Albrecht noted that Mubarak's Egypt “neglected personal bonds with the military” and instead developed corporate-based relationships by giving the military forces economic power (i.e., “economic coup-proofing”) (Albrecht 2014, 11-12, Makara 2013). Bashar Assad's Syria, conversely, developed a different strategy, establishing ethnic, familial, and religious-based personal links with military officers that resulted in “communal military” (Albrecht 2014, 12).

Parsons and Taylor (2011) dissected the army's behaviour in the Arab uprisings using two perspectives: political restraints and the interests of the military. The researchers contended that the high level of interests along with the low scale of restraints increased the likelihood of the military's intervention into politics. If both restrictions and interests at either the low or high end of the scale, the army might

have split or tentatively supported the protestors. According to Parsons and Taylor, because of the different degrees of restrictions and interests for military forces, various behaviours emerged in the Arab uprisings states (see Table II.III).

Table II.III: The behaviour of the armed forces in Libya, Tunisia, Syria and Egypt .

Restraints High		Restraints Low
Interests High	Outcome: Ambiguous; Fracture or Side with Regime Libya “fractured support” Other: Iran	Outcome: Side with Protestors Tunisia “ambitious support”
Interests Low	Outcome: Side with Regime (regime doubly secure) Syria “fervent support” Others: Bahrain, Jordan, Yemen	Outcome: Ambiguous; Fracture or Side with Protestors Egypt “reluctant support”

Source: Parsons and Taylor 2011, p.33.

These findings from the existing literature indicate that the Egyptian military wanted to protect its economic and social standing by backing the winning side of the conflict: the revolutionaries. Researches indicate that the Egyptian military controlled around 40% of the Egyptian economy at the time of the uprising (Brooks 1998, Lutterbeck 2013). Before the revolt, former President Hosni Mubarak’s son Gamal was preparing to succeed his aging father in a few years (Barany 2013a, 69). Gamal never served in the army, and he was a strong defender of the privatization of the army’s assets, a policy that threatened the army’s main economic interests (Gelvin 2012, 40). While the Egyptian army saw the revolutionaries as a viable alternative to Gamal, Springborg noted that in their support of the protestors, they were still protecting the regime:

“The *raison d’être* of the Egyptian military is to sustain itself, and by so doing, any regime that rests upon it. This is the only duty it can be said without reservation to have effectively discharged, even in the crisis of 2011, when the military preserved the regime by severing its head.” (Springborg 2013, 103)

Tunisia provides another striking case of civil-military, because the Tunisian army, like the military force in Egypt, declared its support for protesters. However, unlike the Egyptian military, the Tunisian army had little to lose. Brooks provided the following explanation:

“The decision to refrain from using force against the Tunisian protesters therefore occurred in a context in which the military had little to lose (and potentially some to gain) from abandoning Ben Ali, while protecting him would have introduced significant costs to the military.” (Brooks 2013, 207)

To coup-proof their military forces, Ben Ali and his predecessor Bourguiba controlled the Tunisian army by excluding military personnel from the political arena and creating counterbalance police and security forces (Brooks 1998). While the Egyptian rulers coup-proofed their army mostly by rewarding it, Tunisian leaders chose the strategy of counterbalancing.

As stated before, the professional, cohesive and institutionalized structure of the Tunisian military; unarmed and decisive protests; and the energy poor structure of the Tunisian’s economy played a significant role in the military’s decision to support the protesters. The Tunisian army held high interests and little to lose by supporting the people against the Ben Ali regime. While Ben Ali had established a substantial police force with his internally- and externally-sourced economic income, he did not have any non-tax revenue from energy resources to help him become economically independent from his society and from the external interests. He developed close

relationships with representatives from the Western liberal world for the economic benefits they provided—most notably with France, a long-term ally. According to Ritter, Ben Ali found himself in the “iron cage of liberalism,” as his relationship with the liberal world prevented him from using lethal force against the unarmed protestors (Ritter 2015).

In contrast, the split within the Libyan army caused a nearly 9-month civil war, and NATO’s responsibility to protect (R2P) military intervention. On the one hand, Gaddafi defended himself with his relatives, close friends, and tribal-connected paramilitary forces; on the other hand, foreign-supported armed protestors and defectors from the Libyan regular armed forces fought until the end of Gaddafi’s regime. The foreign intervention ended this civil war and Gaddafi’s term in October 2011.

The quick meltdown of the Libyan regular military forces proved that they were much less professional, institutional, and cohesive than their Tunisian counterpart (Gaub 2013b). The long-term struggle against the internal and external forces also demonstrated that Gaddafi had his own patrimonial loyal forces that fought until the end with him. The energy resources were critical in helping Gaddafi establish and maintain his own loyal forces during his 42-year rule. Furthermore, armed protestors, unlike Tunisia, and its consequent violence was another difference between the Tunisian and the Libyan uprisings. As a result, Libya experienced an armed revolution, while Tunisia’s rebellion was largely nonviolent.

In sum, the 2010-2011 social upheavals proved that national armies can play an important role in the outcome of social protests, as they decide whether they will defect, defend, or split. This chapter began with a discussion of the literature on civil-military relations, generally. I then moved on to explore the literature specific to civil-

military relations in the MENA region and protest movements and military power. I ended the chapter with an examination of the literature on the behaviour of military forces during the Arab uprisings. While a number of researchers have explored the role of military in the Arab uprisings from many perspectives, no one has yet examined how energy sources, military structures, and the strength of protests jointly influenced the role that the Libyan and the Tunisian military played during the 2010-2011 uprisings. My study aims to fill that gap by providing an in-depth and comparative case study of Tunisia and Libya.

In the following chapter, I explain the theoretical framework of my research. My theoretical structure sheds light on the impact of the energy capacity, the protests type, and the military structure on the different behaviours of the Tunisian and Libyan armies.

Chapter III

Theory of Military Behaviour in the Arab Uprisings: 'Pro- State' and 'Pro-Regime'

III.I Introduction

Protestors involved in the Arab uprisings generally demanded three things: “freedom, jobs and dignity” (Kaboub 2013, 534). The uprisings were the confluence of the prolonged social, economic and political backwardness. One of the most surprising aspects of the protests, however, was the role that the military in each case chose to take. In Tunisia, the military chose to side with the demonstrators, while the Libyan military powers split into two parts as pro-Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi. This study proposes to explore the motivating factors that led the Tunisian and Libyan forces to make their respective decisions during the anti-government upheavals.

The behaviour of military in the uprisings times is very important because as Svolik (2009) stated,

“[A]mong the 303 leaders for whom I was able to unambiguously ascertain the manner in which they lost power, only 32 were removed by a popular uprising and another 30 stepped down under public pressure to democratize. Twenty more leaders lost power by an assassination that was not part of a coup or a popular uprising, whereas 16 were removed by foreign intervention. But the remaining 205 dictators—more than two-thirds—were removed by government insiders, such as other government members or members of the

military or the security forces, an event typically referred to as a *coup d'état*.”
(Svolik 2009, 477-478)

Russell also noted the following by Lenin and Le Bon:

“No revolution of the masses can triumph without the help of a portion of the armed forces that sustained the old regime” Lenin.

“It is obvious that revolutions have never taken place, and will never take place, save with the aid of an important faction of the army” Le Bon. (Russell 1974, 12)

In Tunisia, the *de facto* alliance between the military and protestors brought about an unarmed revolution that led to revolutionary changes in the state’s political structure. However, remarkably, the Arab states’ static military stances had long been the significant reason for the protracted anti-democratic governments. That was one of the linchpin reasons that the Ben Ali regime survived as long as it did (from 1987-2011). The military’s decision to back the pro-democratic protests during the Arab uprisings was antithetical to their historical pattern of behaviour (Springborg 2014, Picard 1990).

This chapter provides a comparison of the military’s behaviour in Tunisia, which led to the success of the uprisings, and the military’s behaviour in Libya, where the army fought protesters and precipitated the NATO intervention and about 9 months of armed struggle. The data indicates that the military’s response to the social protests played an undeniable role in the diverse outcomes of the uprisings.

In this study, I utilize my theoretical framework to address one key query: What are the reasons for the variant military decision making processes during the Arab uprisings. It is important to note that each case involved its own unique conditions. Accordingly, I employed analytic eclecticism method to capture the

complexity of the two cases and strengthen my theoretical framework. Furthermore, instead of classifying theories as incorrect or correct, I instead determined whether the theories were appropriate from case to case.

Rational choice and institutionalism contributed to my theoretical framework. I theorized that the power and socio-psychological objectives of the military, along with its rational priority and institutional character helped shape the role of the military during the anti-government uprisings. I also theorized that the military's behaviour was not immune from the character of uprisings. Accordingly, my theoretical framework integrates rational choice and institutionalism to aid in explicating the military's behaviour in the 2010-2011 uprisings in Tunisia and Libya.

The Tunisian military supported the pro-democratic or anti-government protestors because they harboured both materialistic and non-materialistic goals, though their aims leaned more toward the non-materialistic side. In addition, the rational choice of institutionalism helped pave the way for the military to achieve strategic cooperation with demonstrators. I refer to the behaviour of the Tunisian military as 'pro-statism.'

In Libya, the military, conversely, made very different decisions. A significant part of the Libyan military chose to remain loyal to the Gaddafi regime; because they believed that the current regime was the most rational choice for their state. Materialistic aspirations played a large role in this decision, because their choice to protect the Gaddafi regime was in their best political, social, and economic interests. The non-materialistic fragment behind the decision related to the fact that the pro-Gaddafi armed forces had ethnic, sectarian, and tribal connections to Gaddafi.

The lack of institutional character among the Libyan armed forces paved the way for the split within the military and the lack of cooperation between the military

and the protesters. In contrast to Tunisia, I categorize the Libyan military's behaviour as 'pro-regime.'

In the first part of this chapter, I examined the analytic eclecticism and defined theories that help guide this analysis. The remainder of this chapter explores the military's role in Tunisia and Libya using this theoretical framework, which serves as the foundation of my research. I build my causal variables on that foundation to address my research question, which asks why military forces chose to defect in Tunisia and split in Libya? The theoretical framework helped to determine what variables I should examine to explain these phenomena.

III.II Analytic Eclecticism

Sil and Katzenstein explained that analytic eclecticism is "a means for social scientists to guard *against the risks of excessive reliance* on a single analytic framework and the simplifying assumptions that come with it" (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 414). To extend that, analytic eclecticism argues that while one theoretical framework could fail to explain the whole part of a question, selecting more than one theory could decrease such risk by providing a more comprehensive approach. The method provides a way to fill any gaps and provide a complete theoretical foundation for the research by applying multiple theories. As Waltz explained,

"The prescriptions directly derived from a single image [of international relations] are incomplete because they are based upon partial analyses. The partial quality of each image sets up a tension that drives one toward inclusion of the others . . . One is led to search for the inclusive nexus of causes." (Waltz 1959, 229-230)

This method becomes more important in research that involves the comparison of different cases. Even a single theory can shed light on such a comparison, but using

only one model runs the risk of discounting important aspects of the data. Instead, multiple theoretical frameworks can help the research conduct a stronger, more convincing and inclusive analysis.

It is important to note, though, that analytic eclecticism is not a unified synthesis, multi-method research, or methodological triangulation. Sil and Katzenstein explained,

“[A]nalytic eclecticism does not require the acquisition or use of multiple methodological skills; it simply requires a broad understanding of the relative strengths and trade-offs of different methods and an openness to considering causal stories presented in different forms by scholars employing different methods.” (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 415)

For example, instead of examining the reasons of a social movement only from the resource mobilization, relative deprivation, or political opportunity approach, analytic eclecticism allows the research to examine a social movement under the framework of all these approaches. Analytic eclecticism provides links that bridge connections between different theories used when conducting case studies. Some theorists may posit that every social movement has its own prime and unique conditions and should be analysed by the most suitable approach, but analytic eclecticism contends that examination of a social movement with a single approach has the risk of exclusion of the other suitable approach(es). Such constraints also could undermine the research’s findings and reliability.

III.III Theoretical Approaches

Using analytic eclecticism, I employ two theoretical approaches to build my research’s theoretical framework: (a) rational choice, and (b) institutionalism. The

theories will buttress and strengthen each other by shedding light and covering the different parts of my research.

III.III.I Rational Choice

Scott (2007) explained, “Rational choice theories hold that individuals must anticipate the outcome of alternative courses of action and calculate that which will be best for them.” These theories emphasize that individuals have social and economic exchanges with each other through rewards, threat, and so on (Scott 2007). These theorists argue that individual decisions are dependent on the maximum utility.

Gurr examined the utility from the “relative deprivation” perspective (Gurr 1970). Gurr explained relative deprivation as follows. “Relative deprivation is defined as actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities” (Gurr 1970, 24). He continued, “The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity” (Gurr 1970, 24). Accordingly, widespread and intense discontent makes the collective rebellion more likely.

That means deprivation makes the deprived people frustrated, and then frustration leads to aggression. In the words of Gurr, “[T]he primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism” (Gurr 1970, 36). He continued, “The frustration-aggression relationship provides the *psychological dynamic* for the proposed relationship between intensity of deprivation and the potential for collective violence” (Gurr 1970, 23).

“The assumption that discontent has primarily physical origins, hence that satisfaction of material aspirations is its cure, is no more accurate. Men aspire to many other conditions of life than *physical* well-being, not the least of

which are security, status, a sense of community, and the right to manage their own affairs.” (Gurr 1970, 358)

Deprivation represents a causal connection between behaviour and outcome (*rebellion*). In other words, discontent gives the people potential for rebellion. If dissidence is high in scope and in degree, that increases the probability of rebellion not only at the individual but also at the collective level. The main goal of such a rebellion is reaching the maximum utility by ending discontents. Gurr explained the rational utility of violence as follows:

“The qualified assertion is that most participants in collective protest and violence have utilitarian as well as aggressive motives: they believe that they stand a chance of relieving some of their discontent through violence.” (Gurr 1970, 210)

Gurr argued the source of deprivation (*rebellion*) under the following frameworks: “Decremental deprivation, aspirational deprivation and progressive deprivation” (Gurr 1970, 46-52).

“[D]ecremental deprivation, in which a group’s value expectations remain relatively constant but value capabilities are perceived to decline; *aspirational deprivation*, in which capabilities remain relatively static while expectations increase or intensify; and *progressive deprivation*, in which there is substantial and simultaneous increase in expectations and decrease in capabilities. All three patterns have been cited as causal or predisposing factors for political violence.” (Gurr 1970, 46)

Regarding the military involvement, Gurr said, “The more intense collective violence becomes, however, the more likely the armed forces are to intervene against the

incumbent president” (Gurr 1970, 221). To summarize, Gurr demonstrated the frustration-aggression nexus as the main reason for the behaviour of rebellion. In addition, according to Gurr, the aim of ending of deprivation is the rational baseline of uprisings.

By contrast with Gurr’s social-psychological model, Collier and Hoeffler explained the rational utility of a rebellion from an economic (*greed*) approach (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 1998). They argued the “greed thesis” as the primary motivation for rebellion (Berdal 2005, 687). Both authors focused on the economic causes of a rebellion and they argued that economic causes mainly motivate people to rebel. “The incentive for rebellion was increasing in the probability of victory, and in the gains conditional upon victory, and decreasing in the expected duration of warfare and the costs of rebel coordination” (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 571).

Collier and Hoffman claimed that “the availability of finance, the cost of rebellion and the military advantage” increase the probability of rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 588). In other words, according to Collier and Hoffman, men rebel if economic benefits prevail over the costs of rising up. They underlined the importance of having rich energy resources as the source of rebellion and conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 588).

The greed approach did not ignore the impact of grievance on rebellious actions. Collier and Hoeffler considered four measures of grievances in their research: “ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 570). However, they argued that economic motives (*or greed*) prevails over psychological motives (*or grievance*).

“While it is difficult to find proxies for grievances and opportunities, we find that political and social variables that are most obviously related to grievances

have little explanatory power. By contrast, economic variables, which could proxy some grievances but are perhaps more obviously related to the viability of rebellion, provide considerably more explanatory power.” (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 563)

Kalyvas (2006) explained the rational baseline of a rebellion from a different perspective. As Tarrow stated, “[Kalyvas] refuses to reduce his actors to people who join insurgencies either to satisfy their greed or to right their grievances” (Tarrow 2007, 592). Rather, Kalyvas presented “selective violence” and “indiscriminate violence” in his book *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Kalyvas 2006). In his own words, “Against prevailing views that such violence is either the product of impenetrable madness or a simple way to achieve strategic objectives, the book demonstrates that the logic of violence in civil war has much less to do with collective emotions, ideologies, cultures, or “greed and grievance” than currently believed” (Kalyvas 2006, 1).

Thus, according to Kalyvas, people make cooperation with the government or the incumbent power to avoid violence. That means government also applies violence only to the people-who refuses cooperation with the incumbent power or prefer collaboration with the opposition against the ruling regime. This is the “personalization of violence” (Kalyvas 2006, 173). That cooperation represents bipolar rational choice and benefit for political actors and individuals. Indiscriminate violence becomes counterproductive for the incumbent by widening rival factions (Kalyvas 2006, 151-172). The collaborators of the incumbent power also sustain or increase their benefits from such cooperation. “While political actors “use” civilians to collect information and win the war, it is also the case that civilians “use” political actors to settle their own private conflicts” (Kalyvas 2006, 14). Kalyvas stated,

“Indiscriminate violence is an informational shortcut that may backfire on those who use it; selective violence is jointly produced by political actors seeking information and individual civilians trying to avoid the worst-but also grabbing what opportunities their predicament affords them.” (Kalyvas 2006, 388)

In the following section, I examine institutionalism to complete my research’s theoretical framework.


III.III.II Institutionalism

As explained above, socio-psychological, economic and the logic of avoiding violence constitute the primary motives for individuals to rebel. However, when an individual believes collective action or cooperation will give them more advantage, or that the collective behaviour will protect them from possible losses, the individual prefers collective action to moving forward alone. Collective action prevails when it offers either more profit or less loss.

Reciprocity and reciprocal relationships are important factors in the collective action model. According to Ostrom, reciprocity could occur in the following forms. First, “Always cooperate first; stop cooperating if others do not reciprocate; punish non-cooperators, if feasible” (Ostrom 1998, 11). Second, “Cooperate immediately only if one judges others to be trustworthy; stop cooperating if others do not reciprocate; punish non-cooperators, if feasible” (Ostrom 1998, 11). Third, “Once others establish cooperation, cooperate oneself; stop cooperating if others do not reciprocate; punish non-cooperators, if feasible” (Ostrom 1998, 11). Fourth, “Never cooperate” (Ostrom 1998, 11). Fifth, “Mimic (first) or (second), but stop cooperating if one can successfully free ride on others” (Ostrom 1998, 11). Sixth, “Always cooperate (an extremely rare norm in all cultures)” (Ostrom 1998, 11).

Ostrom also noted that the other important point in the reciprocal relationship model focuses on building trust and reputations between agencies, which raises the probability of cooperation between the potential partners and increases the reward and punishments incentives (see Figure III.I). However, the question remains of how one establishes the transparent and interactive conditions and how the interaction emerges at the individual and institutional levels.

Figure III.I: The Core Relationship in Collective Action Theory



Source: Ostrom 1998, p.13.

Institutionalist theory provides an answer to the question of how strategic interactions and strategic calculus may emerge. The central argument of institutionalism is that institutions shape decision-making process. Additionally, the theory argues that the institutions increase the level of trust, eliminate unclear issues, and create proper conditions for cooperation between the actors (Slaughter 2011). More importantly, such cooperation might play out both among institutions and between individuals and institutions (Peters 1999). Individuals shape and use institutions to maximize their utilities, while institutions behave in the interests of individual incentives, as well (Peters 1999). Slaughter explained, “Institutionalists argue that institutions—defined as a set of rules, norms, practices and decision-making procedures that shape expectations—can overcome the uncertainty that undermines co-operation” (Slaughter 2011).

Historical institutionalists define institutions using historical and path-dependent developments, while sociological institutionalists emphasize the role of culture and ideologies within institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996). Conversely, political institutionalists highlight the importance of political party systems (Amenta and Ramsey 2010), and rational choice institutionalists emphasize strategic interactions and strategic calculus between actors during the decision-making process (Hall and Taylor 1996). That means interaction helps actors to calculate the scale of the potential gains and losses for any decision. Decision maker(s) make the most rational choice according to this cost-benefit analysis. “Institutions, in the rational choice perspective, are designed to overcome identifiable shortcomings in the market or the political system as means of producing collectively desirable outcomes” (Peters 1999, 59).

Moreover, rational choice institutionalism argues that strategic interaction paves the way for players to obtain total, not relative, gain, which becomes available through the strategic cooperation of decision makers.

“Realists interpret the relative-gains logic as showing that states will not cooperate with one another if each suspects that its potential partners are gaining more from cooperation than it is. However, just as institutions can mitigate fears of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge, so can they alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation.” (Keohane and Martin 1995, 45)

Rational choice institutionalism provides the most convincing explanation of military decision making during the anti-government uprisings in Tunisia and Libya. One cannot deny the impact of culture, ideology, and the political party system on the role of the military during the uprisings, but rational choice institutionalism seemed

the most appropriate framework. Since, though military could have some affairs with political parties and their members, active military officers do not run and represent interests of a political party as much as the party leader and its members. Culture and ideology are important, but not crucial, for the decision of military under uprisings as much as civilians, especially for the apolitical military structures. In addition, historical facts have an impact but not a chain to the past for military behaviour. Utility-based rational decisions are the most expected and appropriate decision-making process used by military forces.

In sum, rational choice institutionalism theory argues that even though decision makers pursue their own interests, they do not necessarily have to pursue a relative gain. Rather, players can obtain a total gain by cooperating with other actors in the political realm. Accordingly, “institutions structure such interactions” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 12). Rational choice institutionalism argues how actors increase their utility by using institutional tools.

In the following section, I combine rational choice and institutionalism into my research. I apply the aforementioned theoretical framework to my research cases in Tunisia and Libya to explain why the military forces defected in Tunisia, but chose to split in Libya.

III.IV The Cases: Tunisia and Libya

In this section, I examine the Tunisian and Libyan military cases using the framework explained above. The framework provides a unique perspective for viewing the varying responses and behaviours of the Libyan and the Tunisian military forces and reveals that the military forces demonstrated pro-state and pro-regime behaviours in the 2010-2011 Tunisian and Libyan uprisings, respectively.

Tunisia

The pro-statist framework offers a unique insight into the defection of the Tunisian military from a socio-psychological (frustration-aggression) stance rather than a materialistic one, since both President Ben Ali (1987-2011) and his predecessor Bourguiba (1956-1987) depoliticized and marginalized the state's armed forces. They built strong police forces and presidential guards to stabilize internal security. Western support, especially from France and the United States, also propelled the Tunisian leaders to build smaller armed forces.

The Tunisian army possessed little economic power, and their defence budget represented only a small portion of the Tunisian gross domestic product (GDP) (Hanlon 2012, 4, Lutterbeck 2011, 22). When the uprisings took place, the military did not seek to protect its economic assets because they did not have much to secure. Moreover, Tunisia received its independence from France through diplomatic negotiations pioneered by the first diplomatic president, Habib Bourguiba, rather than through military struggle. There was a low-scale struggle for independence against the French between 1952 and 1954, but that did not take place on a national level. Gelvin explained, "The Tunisian army was thus the product of independence, not the progenitor of independence" (Gelvin 2012, 61). All of these policies led to the development of a rubber stamp military structure during Bourguiba's and Ben Ali's administrations.

Anderson asserted that the Tunisian military's driving force in 2010-2011 was the belief that supporting large-scale protests at the national level would help to avoid a national clash (Anderson 2014, 55). This impetus represented a *pro-state* approach, as the goal of protecting the state and its national stability was more important than supporting the existing regime (Anderson 2014, 55). The post-Ben Ali developments also demonstrated that the military did not have a compelling economic or political

agenda because they left the political arena to civilians and retreated to their barracks shortly after Ben Ali was deposed (Townsend 2015).

The environment in Tunisia propelled the military to cooperate with protestors during the uprisings. The protests were decisive and supported by international players; and Ben Ali's police forces and presidential guards were ineffective. The rational decision occurred as cooperation with demonstrators to avoid the risk of national friction. This decision represented the *pro-statist* side of the Tunisian military. The maintenance of national integrity and stability in the state worked to the benefit of the military (Gerges 2014, 3). Otherwise, public clashes or a civil war, like the conflict that took place in Algeria (1991-2002), could have occurred (Gelvin 2012, 94). In the initial phases of the protests, the military developed a defensive intervention by protecting public buildings and avoiding any offensive measures against the protestors (Albrecht and Bishara 2011). Thereafter, the Tunisian military demonstrated its cooperation with protestors by withdrawing its support from Ben Ali and refusing to end the protests with a heavy response.

On January 14, 2011, two incidents marked the end of Ben Ali's regime. First, then Chief of Army General Rached Ammar refused to protect the house of Ben Ali's second wife, Trabelsi's, family members by saying that protecting private places was not the army's responsibility (Interview with Nasr 2015). Second, General Ammar refused to fight the Anti-Terrorist Brigade (BAT), under the command of Colonel Samir Tarhouni, that captured Trabelsi's family members at the Carthage Airport that day (Jebnoun 2014). These two incidents served as tipping points that led Ben Ali to leave the country (Pachon 2014, 9). In essence, the military used its power by deciding not to act and choosing neutrality in the initial phases of the uprisings. That action of inaction (Lukes 1974, 50) created a decisive effect in the uprisings by

encouraging protestors. Later, the military act demonstrated its force by demanding that Ben Ali leaves the country.

The military largely based its defection on socio-psychological (frustration aggression) factors (Gurr 1970) and acted under conditions that facilitated cooperation. As the uprisings progressed, the military saw that the protestors were quite decisive and unarmed and were demanding a regime change without any conditions. The police forces and presidential guards were unable to ease the protests. Moreover, the disproportionate and “*indiscriminate*” violence (Kalyvas 2006) towards protestors widened the protests across Tunisia. The weakness of security forces also demonstrated that they would be unsuccessful in any clash with the military. Additionally, international key actors, the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), sided with the pro-democratic protests to prevent turmoil in this strategic location. Accordingly, the behaviour of military propelled Ben Ali to leave the presidency on Jan 14. The decision was neither free of materialistic aims nor irrationality.

The post-Ben Ali developments revealed that the Tunisian military acted in the interests of the state rather than its own individual sake, because there have not been any important benefits that have emerged for the military in the post-Ben Ali term other than some promotions and wage increases (Jebnoun 2014). The military accepted the legitimacy of the interim government after Ben Ali, the national election’s results that took place in October 2011, and this new troika government that took power (Hababou and Amrouche 2013). Moreover, in 2014, the majority of the Tunisian assembly accepted the new constitution, which Tunisian people widely appreciated (Marks 2014), and one of the most important people of the 2011 uprisings, General Ammar, retired in June 2013 (Al-Jalassy 2013).

In brief, ideal conditions before and during the uprisings brought about a *de facto* cooperation between the pro-democratic demonstrators and the state's military force. The theoretical framework explains that outcome as follows. Tunisian military's behaviour was constituted largely objective of *intensive deprivation* but not entirely free from power (*greed*) objectives; and its rational choice based institutional character influenced its behaviour. I define that behaviour as 'pro-statist'.

Libya

During the Libyan uprisings in 2010 and 2011, the state's military forces split into two factions—pro-Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi. My theoretical framework explains that behaviour as follows. First, largely materialistic, but less socio-psychological, tendencies propelled the split within the Libyan military. Second, the low level of military institutionalism and the highly politicized military structure generated a lack of cooperation between anti-Gaddafi protesters and the Libyan military. The pro-Gaddafi military and the anti-Gaddafi demonstrators had very different priorities. Third, the environment in Libya made high-scale cooperation between the military and protestors very difficult. As a result, the protestors armed themselves, and they battled the military after Gaddafi applied lethal means to quell their protests.

"The men of the tent," Gaddafi's close friends, relatives, and tribally-connected loyalists stayed with him until the end of the conflict; since they were Gaddafi's *Jamahiriyah* (state of the masses), and the end of Gaddafi's regime also meant the end of the social, political, and economic benefits that they enjoyed (International Crisis Group 2011a, Pargeter 2012).

Deep fissures within the Libyan army emerged as soldiers in the eastern part of the state supported the anti-Gaddafi protestors, while the soldiers in the western part of the state-controlled brigades and mercenaries defended Gaddafi's interests until the

end. While there was cooperation between the military forces and the protestors, it was limited, because many people supported Gaddafi's regime for the sake of their own interests.

For the pro-Gaddafi part, the military demonstrated more loyalty to Gaddafi's regime than to the state. Fighting for Gaddafi was the rational choice of the pro-Gaddafi armed forces, but that choice developed from materialistic aspirations (*greed*). The influence of socio-psychological link was restricted to tribal, relative, and somewhat sectarian connections with Gaddafi (Sunni Islam). Therefore, the pro-Gaddafi military's behaviour involved materialistic goals because they wanted to maintain the benefits that they enjoyed under the Gaddafi regime. I define that behaviour of Libyan military as 'pro-regime'. It is also important to state that Gaddafi, in general, applied "*indiscriminate violence*" (Kalyvas 2006) by applying a massive and brutal response to protestors. That became counterproductive for Gaddafi because of widening anti-Gaddafi factions and inviting international intervention.

It is also important to note that the strength and brutality of Gaddafi's loyal military forces compelled some of the Libyan soldiers to stay with them. The armed structure of protestors also propelled some armed groups to fight with Gaddafi, hindered the pro-democratic protestors' non-violent power, and proved the legitimacy of the pro-Gaddafi forces decision to exert lethal means to thwart the resistance. International interventions also affected that outcome of the conflict, because Gaddafi declared a patriotic campaign to protect Libya against international intervention. Both sides made their rational choice by either supporting or deserting the Gaddafi regime. The former group desired to maintain what they had (*greed*), but the latter group aspired to get what they had not had (*relative deprivation*).

The impact of institutions was very low in this scenario, because Libya was a tribal state rather than an institutional one (Martinez 2014). As I will detail in the following chapters, both military and state structures were established on patrimonial relations and patrimonial rules rather than the rule of law. The highly patrimonial and political military structure hindered high-scale cooperation with protestors and led cracks within the military forces. As such, NATO chose to execute an immediate intervention in Libyan (March, 2011), while choosing to take a more passive role in other locations of the Arab uprising, because Gaddafi and his forces would have carried out a massacre of anti-Gaddafi factions to protect the regime structure.

III.V Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the military behaviour in the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings from two perspectives. The chapter began with an exploration of the rationale behind the Tunisian military's support of the demonstrations, then moved on to discuss the Libyan army's reasoning for splitting into two factions supporting opposite sides of the national conflict.

I also introduced a new theoretical framework, which helped to explain the military's behaviour during the uprisings using two factors: (a) rational choice, and (b) institutionalism. This framework demonstrates the relationship between these two concepts and my research question, through which I seek to understand the role of military in Tunisia and Libya. Through this discussion, I arrived at two new theoretical definitions of the role of the military during the Arab uprisings—"pro-state" and "pro-regime."

The pro-state theory claims that the partnership between greed and frustration-aggression were the prominent factors that shaped the military's behaviour in Tunisia. The Tunisian military followed the path of socio-psychological deprivation because

they had few economic incentives to lose but high marginalization. They supported the protests to aid in building a state according to the national demands. More importantly, by lending their support to the protestors, the military avoided national conflict that would not have been in their institutional interests.

The Tunisian military chose to cooperate with the protestors without demonstrating any cracks within their ranks. The protests were influential and peaceful, and the military responded in kind. Because of this *de facto* alliance between the military and national protests, civil-led, but military-backed, revolutionary social movement occurred in Tunisia (Blumer 1995, 63). As Youngs stated, “The Arab Spring’s initial flavour of civic-led ‘ruptured’ transitions has morphed into an elite-controlled ‘pacted’ transition dynamic” (Youngs 2014, 11).

Unlike the Tunisian military, the Libyan army divided into two factions during the Arab uprisings. Materialistic goals, along with blood and tribal relations, influenced the military powers to support Gaddafi and protect the spoils they had gained during his regime. Because the weakness of the Libyan military’s institutional design limited any strong cooperation with the protestors, small military factions were only able to show their support of the anti-Gaddafi groups in the eastern part of Libya. While the lack of institutional military structure created fissures within the state’s armed forces, the protestors’ choice to lead an armed uprising also played a factor in the outcome.

In this chapter, I argue that materialistic (greed) and non-materialistic objectives (relative deprivation), selective or indiscriminate violence, and institutional design and protest type influenced the role of Tunisian and Libyan military in the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings. Accordingly, pro-state and pro-regime framework aid in

the exploration of this phenomenon by integrating rational choice and institutionalism to develop a comprehensive lens through which we can view this phenomenon.

In the following chapters, I apply the theoretical framework to the case studies in Tunisia and Libya. The empirical chapters examine the three causal variables: energy capacity, military structure, and the strength of protests. Those variables implement my theoretical framework that is rational choice institutionalism (high degree of cooperation, and power and socio-psychology partnership). In the next chapter, previously, I explain my empirical approach.

Chapter IV

Empirical Approach

IV.I Introduction

In this chapter, I detail my empirical approach to answering my research question. I begin the chapter with a discussion of my research methodology. I then explain my case selection, define the sources I utilized in my research, and state my research outcomes. Lastly, I define my contributing factors and draw a clear-cut line between the variables.


IV.II Methodology: Comparative Case Study

My research methodology is a comparative case study, but I did not employ a Most Similar System (MSS) or Most Different System (MDS) design logic (Mill 2002). Specifically, the study is a comparative analysis of military behaviours with key differences. I compared two cases that demonstrate very different military behaviours with similar contributing factors to measure the impact of the same factors on the various outcomes. I examined the same factors in the two cases because the cases showed different historical records. In other words, the cases differ in terms of the outcome they witnessed rather than the process in which they were involved. Instead of providing a description of the Arab uprising in two different countries, I conducted a comparative case analysis between two different cases specifically designed to identify and validate the factors that contributed to the military's actions (Skocpol 1979, 37-38). Furthermore, my methodology does not compare the countries themselves, but focuses on the military's actions during the uprisings in each country and the reasons behind their behaviour.

The study involved an in-depth cross-national comparison, in which I examined the same factors in two different cases to demonstrate the impact of those factors. I used a qualitative research methodology because qualitative research fosters internal validity of the data and facilitates intensive analysis. The absence of archival data and the difficulties involved in obtaining reliable quantitative data in my cases also made this qualitative methodology more feasible. However, to ensure external validity and a broad range analysis, I used a crosschecking methodology to strengthen my discoveries from each in-depth exploration of the cases. As such, my methodology became a link between my theoretical framework and empirical findings.

The lack of quantitative analysis and the absence of a large number of cases⁵ constrained the external validity of my research. Even if I did not cover all possible combinations of factors, my research demonstrates that my cross-cases analysis convincingly explores the link between the factors and the outcomes. First, my research demonstrates the link between each individual factor and the military's behaviour during the 2010-2011 uprisings (see Figure IV.I); however, the factors are not incompatible with each other. In fact, the factors complemented each other as I conducted my analysis.


Figure IV.I: The Correlation of Individual Factors with the Role of Military



⁵ According to the quantitative logic, I should have at least eight cases because I examine three factors ($2^3=8$).

Following the exploration of the relationship between each factor and the outcome (military behaviour), I used the confluence of the three factors (single configuration) to demonstrate the place of the joint configuration on the military behaviour. To illustrate that with an example, I used three separate numbers 1, 1, and 1⁶ together as 111 to make my claim much stronger (see Figure IV.II). I did not add the factors (1+1+1) because it does not provide me with as much leverage (111). Rather, I used the factors together in a single configuration to explain my outcome. This methodology strengthened the application of my theoretical framework and my findings by comparing two opposite cases to each other. In other words, the case of Libya demonstrated that my argument about Tunisia was correct, and vice versa.

Figure IV.II: The Joint Configuration of Factors with Comparative Case Study of Tunisia and Libya



⁶ The numeral 1 refers to the fact that the factors had some impact on the outcome.

IV.III Case Selection: Depth or Breadth?

Because this study examined the role of military in the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings, there were only six countries—Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 20)⁷—that could have served as potential cases due to the massive protests that they experienced as the people took to the streets to demand a change of leadership and/or regime. In this section, I explore why I selected Tunisia and Libya over the other states involved in the Arab uprisings.

Why Tunisia and Libya?

In a comparative case study, the researcher can select cases in a random or a systematic way. While random selection will lessen bias in a research study, it presents a serious threat in terms of missing important variables. Thus, I followed a systematic instead of a random case selection. Several researchers have identified several different types of cases, including typical cases, deviant cases, crucial cases, influential cases, contrast cases, extreme cases, and most similar/most different cases (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, George and Bennett 2005). Studying only one type of case is possible, but the inclusion of multiple case types in a research study is also likely. My research utilizes deviant, influential, and crucial case categories.

Based on the aforementioned explanations, Tunisia represents a deviant, influential, and a crucial case. The case is deviant because the anti-democratic ruler was overthrown by a *de facto* alliance between the military and unarmed protestors. It is also a crucial case because this alliance and the subsequent resignation of Ben Ali were the least likely results of the protests. Last of all, Tunisia represents an influential case because it instigated the uprisings that eventually spread across the Middle East and North Africa.

⁷ Even though Algeria and Morocco faced some protests, due to protests' weakness the cases are not strong examples of the Arab uprisings (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015).

I compare the findings from Tunisia with the dissimilar case of Libya to test the reliability of my findings. As such, I compare my findings from the Tunisia case to those of the contrast case to strengthen the depth and breadth of the research results. I began by testing my hypothesis through separate examinations of Tunisia and Libya. I then tested my hypothesis by comparing the findings from Tunisia and Libya to each other. As will be detailed below, the structure of the variables are not appropriate to quantitative coding, so I did not code my variables in the case study as 1 or 0. Rather, I compared the variables in my cases according to a relative value comparison.

Why not Egypt and Syria?

Egypt and Syria are, of course, key cases in the Arab uprisings; however, my research focuses on the military's defection and split during the conflicts. The Egyptian military made a similar decision to that of the Tunisian forces, who decided to defect during the 2010-2011 uprisings (Albrecht and Bishara 2011). Thus, conducting a comparison between Egypt and Tunisia would have provided me with breadth but not depth. I prefer having a depth research instead of breadth. That is why I eliminated Egypt and focused on only two contrast cases—Tunisia and Libya—during my comparative case study.

I also did not include Syria because the state stands in the same group as Libya. In both cases, the uprisings brought about a split within the military forces and international involvement following a civil war on varying scales. In addition, the Syrian civil war is still ongoing, as of 2016, and conducting an analysis of an ongoing process would have been very difficult because the outcome remains uncertain. Therefore, like Egypt, adding Syria to my cases would have provided me with a wide-scale but not a very deep research analysis. Moreover, the international players' active involvement in Syria (particularly those of the United States, Russia, Iran, and

Turkey) has turned the case into an internationally supported proxy war (Martin 2015). The process of how internal upheavals can evolve into a proxy civil war would be an interesting area for future research.

Why not any case from the Gulf States, Yemen, Algeria, or Morocco?

I did not examine Algeria and Morocco because the two states did not encounter strong protests during the Arab uprisings. Neither state faced a strong anti-government challenge that could truly test the military's position. While some weak protests occurred in these two states, state rulers simply responded by developing a few cosmetic reforms that placated the protestors in short order.

In Morocco, the protestors did not demand the removal of the existing political structure regime. Instead, they called for more economic and social rights (Hüllen 2013, 196). Moroccan King Mohammed VI responded to the demands by making some tactical concessions and constitutional changes ratified by a national referendum in September 2011 (Aday et al. 2012). The king never applied any lethal measures to quell the protests, which prevented the mild conflict from growing and evolving into something insurmountable.

Likewise, protests in Algeria did not grow beyond a manageable crowd. Volpi commented,

“Yet in Algiers, unlike in Cairo, security forces outnumbered protesters by ten to one; about thirty-thousand police had been mobilized for the occasion. Riot police blocked would-be protesters from neighbouring suburbs and other towns from reaching the centre of the capital to participate in the demonstration in May First Square.” (Volpi 2013, 108)

Another likely reason was that Algeria had a bloody civil war between 1992 and 2001 (Gelvin 2012, 94). The probability of facing such a recurrence of war discouraged people from more violent protests.

The most striking concession of the Algerian government occurred in the lifting of a 19-year emergency law in February 2011 (Volpi 2013, 108). The government also voted to alleviate unemployment (Huber, Dennison, and Sueur 2014). However, the Algerian government did not attempt to create a more democratic and inclusive state. They developed a face-saving strategy that prevented the protests from developing into a serious threat.

In addition, the geostrategic position of Yemen and the Gulf States made them quite different from the other states involved in the Arab uprising. First, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia, in particular, provided economic and military support for their dictatorial regimes that prevented the spread of the uprisings' over the Gulf area and the Arabian Peninsula (Anderson 2013, 14, Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 24, Aday et al. 2012). For example, the GCC forced President Ali Abdullah Saleh to resign to prevent the spread of the protests across the Arabian Peninsula (Aday et al. 2012, 157-158). Additionally, the fear of Iran's Shiism (Tripp 2014, 149) and Islamic terrorist organizations, specifically in Yemen, motivated the United States and the Western actors to follow a different agenda in this region.

Bahrain hosts the US Fifth Fleet, and President Obama said in May 2011, "Bahrain is a longstanding partner, and we are committed to its security. The only way forward is for the government and opposition to engage in a dialog, and you cannot have a real dialogue when parts of the peaceful opposition are in jail"(The White House 2011). In the end, "[the] Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries

came together to crush dissent in Bahrain and to prevent its emergence elsewhere on their home turf” (Aday et al. 2012, 104). This bifurcation strategy from the Western actors strengthened the position of the dictatorial regimes against the rebels by categorizing most of them as Iranian or radical Islamist agents. In contrast, the GCC states and the United States fuelled protesters, at different extents, to step down their regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria—e.g., NATO’s intervention in Libya under the guide of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Lynch 2012:163-164).

Research Time Period and the July 2013 Military Coup in Egypt

My research examines the impact of the military during the Arab uprisings that broke out in 2010-2011. I tested my hypotheses within this time period. While I do explore the outcomes of the uprisings, my research does not address the post-uprising term. Instead, my research focuses on the destruction period, when uprisings had emerged and the military ultimately made their decision to desert or support the existing regimes.

The military coup in Egypt in July 2013 took place in the post-uprising term. Thus, I have no in-depth research on this coup because this period is outside of my time interval of focus. More important, in comparison with the Arab uprising years, the following conditions shifted in the post-uprising term. First, the Egyptian government changed from an anti-democratic to a democratically elected one. Second, this democratically elected government structured the army, while Mubarak and his regime had previously designed it. Third, the uprisings’ structure changed as the protestors moved from defending dignity, freedom and bread to focusing their efforts on economic demands that overwhelmed all other interests. Fourth, the position of the international powers changed from one that supported pro-democratic agendas to a focus on more strategic foreign policies (e.g., pro-Western, secular, etc.).

Because of these differences, the July 2013 coup requires further research by asking the question of why people invited the military to depose the democratically elected ruler, and why the military staged a coup against the democratically elected government. What changed during this time and caused the pro-democratic uprisings to evolve into pro-military protests? For now, I contest that the July 2013 military coup was a “counter-revolution” (Zollner 2013) against the 2011 pro-democratic revolution and the Muslim Brotherhood government.⁸ The unsolved economic problems forced people to invite the military to participate in this coup.

IV.IV Sources: Elite/Expert Interviews and Secondary References

During this study, I sought information that would shed light on three key areas: energy sources, military structure, and protests’ strength of 2010-2011. I employed secondary sources and interviews to collect data. Tunisia and Libya had long lived under anti-democratic regimes; therefore, neither state had an available archive that would allow me to access the state’s primary sources. Even though Tunisia had some archives, as one of my informants told me in an interview, most state data was recorded according to the Ben Ali’s personal desires (Interview with Willis 2015). Ben Ali wanted the world to perceive Tunisia as the modern, democratic welfare state of North Africa so that the state could increase tourism and political support from outside interests, specifically Europe. The only primary sources that I could access were that the speeches and interviews of Ben Ali, Colonel Gaddafi, and some rulers that belonged to their governments. As a result, I applied a discourse analysis once secondary sources became inadequate.

Accordingly, I used secondary sources that provided more reliable and objective data. I selected the secondary sources according to their relevance to my


⁸ For the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, please see: Barbara Zollner, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, in Routledge Handbook of Political Islam, Shahram Akbarzadeh (ed.) (New York: Routledge, 2011).

research and the amount of interpretation and analysis of the key sources that I had needed for my research. In the end, I used the following secondary sources: textbooks, journal and magazine articles, newspaper articles, and conference papers.

I also conducted interviews with elites, experts, and specialists to gain insight into my research question. The information from the elite interviews constitutes the main pillar of my research data. I have managed a fieldwork in Tunisia and settled down my interview with civilian, politician and military elites; however, due to the security gap in Libya, I had difficulties reaching Libyan elites. As a result, I interviewed a number of experts and specialists to fill in the gap in the Libyan data, and to round out the data I collected on Tunisia. I also found some former Libyan military officers in Europe who had great knowledge about the Libyan military and the 2010-2011 Libyan uprisings. I selected the experts and specialists based on their expertise and work related to my research, but my interviews released the points they do not state in their works.

The interviews with experts and specialists also provided me with data that I could not have obtained from the secondary sources and elites, because some elites might hold power without any great knowledge of the uprisings; whilst experts may have knowledge, but not power. Specialists filled the gaps that remained after I collected data from the first two groups (see Figure IV.III). I also crosschecked the data provided by my expert interviewees. The central goals of the expert and specialist interviews were as follows. First of all, obtaining new data that is not available in the secondary sources. Second, cross-checking of the accounts from expert interviewees. Third, evaluating and analysing of findings from the secondary sources. Fourth, providing new perspectives that should be asked to the elite interviewees. Lastly, providing access to reach elite interviewees.

Figure IV.III: Power and Knowledge axis



Source: Littig 2013.

During the second portion of my interviews, I conducted my fieldwork in Tunisia. The elite interviews in Tunisia and the interviews with Libyan military officers provided me with primary data that filled the gaps left unfilled by secondary sources and expert-specialist interviews. In Tunisia, the elites belonged to the military, civil society, and political arenas. I interviewed active and retired military officers (including the former chief of military intelligence in 2010-2011), former and current political party officials, and civil society activist and advocates who experienced the 2010-2011 protests personally in Tunisia. I selected the three groups of elites according to the contributing factors of my research, which influenced my selection of elites from the military, politics, and civil society groups.

IV.V Outcomes: Defection and Split

Outcomes of my research cases are twofold. First defection implies that military forces deserted their government during the Arab uprisings. Second split means that the military split⁹ into factions in the Arab uprisings. I define the defection of the military in Tunisia and the military's split in Libya according to the following standard. In theory, a state's military force is supposed to protect the ruling power,

⁹ Split refers to that while a part of military remained loyal to ruling power, some deserted the ruling power.

and the nation as a whole, against both internal and external threats, regardless of the character of the threats. Once internal security powers become insufficient to provide protection, the military should be prepared to move in to stabilize the state, secure the ruling government (regardless of the government structure), and protect the nation. Because constructing a form of government (e.g., democracy or autocracy) is a constitutional issue but armed powers guard the ruling power and nation, they do not determine the nature of them. Accordingly, the Tunisian military's choice to allow protesters to overthrow the existing regime by supporting them (or demonstrating passive support by refusing to stop them) constituted the military's defection from the ruling legacy in favour of the protestors (Brooks 2013, 206).

During the uprising in Libya, the military split into pro- and anti-government factions because the armed forces lacked cohesion in their reaction to the anti-government uprisings. In addition, the number of government deserters and protectors should be proportional to classify that case as defection. In other words, rather than small desertions in the military force, I define that military split as major cracks that affected the whole structure and capability of military forces in Libya.

It is noteworthy to point out that the benchmark of protection and defection can be categorized with the confluence of degree (d), timing (t), and proportion (p) of the loyalty or disloyalty of military during the uprisings (Russell 1974, 72-73). However, I do not need to formulate the cases of Tunisia and Libya according to that blueprint. The historical records clearly demonstrate that the Tunisian military defected, while Libyan military split into pro-Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi factions (Makara 2013). Thus, my research focuses on the contributing factors of the various outcomes rather than the conceptualization of those outcomes.

“Even though small numbers of disaffected Libyan army officers chose to sit out the anti-Gaddafi uprisings by staying third-party instead of supporting anti-Gaddafi groups, this phenomenon was not significant enough to alter the course of the conflict or inhibit a large number of Gaddafi’s forces from defecting to the rebels” (Interview with Pack 2015). Although the split within the Libyan military forces undermined the strength of the Gaddafi regime, Gaddafi’s integrative coup-proofing strategy and communal ties that tethered the higher officer corps to the power centre prevented the complete defection of the military forces (Albrecht 2014, Makara 2013). In contrast, Ben Ali’s coup-proofing strategy that distanced the Tunisian military from the power centre brought about the desertion of the armed forces during the uprisings.

In the sections that follow, I will compare the differing outcomes of the uprisings in Tunisia and Libya (defection and split, respectively) by determining why such variance emerged in the actions of the military.

IV.VI Contributing Factors

In this section, I examine the factors that contributed to the outcomes of the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings in Tunisia and Libya. These factors include military structure, energy resources, and the protestors’ strength. These variables proved salient for a number of reasons. First, it would be difficult to understand the role of the military in Tunisia and Libya without exploring the structure of the militaries. There is an inexorable relationship between the behaviour of the military and its structure. Second, economic power¹⁰ plays a significant role in the structure of the armed forces. Economic resources become a tool for political and military power during times of crisis and influence the role of the military during social upheavals. Lastly, it is important to examine the power that the protests have to influence the decisions of the

¹⁰ Economic power refers energy richness, because many Arab states derive their economic richness from energy sources.

military. During the Arab uprisings, the character of the protests (e.g., violent vs. nonviolent) had a notable impact on the military's reaction. In sum, analysing the behaviour of the armed forces without considering the environment within which their behaviour took place is very likely to neglect a number of important factors.

However, I do not claim a sequence of arrival between these three variables from energy capacity to army structure, and from army structure towards protests' strength. Rather, the three variables are interwoven factors that affected the military behaviour during the 2011 uprisings.

Why not any other variable(s)?

It is important to note that the aforementioned variables are by no means the only factors that affected the role of the military in the Tunisian and Libyan uprisings. However, these three variables did have a significant impact on the different military behaviours during the conflicts, and appear to be some of the main contributing factors in these two cases.

I chose not to examine the impact of international actors separately because the discussion of energy resources also considers their role. As I examined the economic impact of these resources, I found that a nation's degree of energy capacity brought about different stances from international actors towards the state. Similarly, the state also developed different approaches towards international actors based upon its energy capability.

I also chose to not to include an examination of the social media's role in the military's decision in Tunisia and Libya. While the media played a crucial role in the spread of the uprisings, a discussion of this role had no *sine quo non* place in my research. While it influenced the escalation of the uprisings, "Social media should be seen as facilitators of protest rather than causes" (Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer 2013,

120). Moreover, the media had very little impact on the behaviour of the military. Media should be analysed within the context of social uprisings and social movements.

Energy Resources

The economic capability of a state is a crucial factor that influences the military's decision during an uprising. Economically rich but democratically underdeveloped states are likely to structure and control their armed forces by providing military personnel with material privileges. If the military enjoys such privileges, they are more likely to comply with civilian rulers. In democratically underdeveloped states, anti-democratic rulers offer the armed forces material privileges in exchange for their protection of the ruling power. The material ties create a military apparatus that is more politically and economically dependent upon the existing regime. As Moskos explained, the military's self-interest and business agenda lead to a business style trade-off between the military and the government (Moskos 1977). Accordingly, the military power becomes beholden to a particular regime, not of the state itself, because they receive economic support from the regime.

One of the primary sources of revenue for many Middle Eastern and African states comes from energy exports, particularly hydrocarbon energy (oil and gas). The discovery and export of petrol and gas from the Middle East and African nations started in the 1950s (Bahgat 2012). The date is important, because most of the MENA states also received their independence in the early 1950s, after World War II (Gelvin 2005). This energy income has played a significant role in these states' basic social, political, and economic structures. However, the non-tax or derivative rents often deteriorate a state's democratic structure by rendering it free from taxation and making it unaccountable in three ways (Vandewalle 2006, 2).

“First, it has allowed them to buy off citizens by providing them with many benefits with virtually no taxation. Second, autocrats who get most of their funding from national oil industries find it easier to keep their countries' finances secret. Secrecy helps give oil wealth its democracy-repelling powers: citizens are satisfied with low taxes and seemingly generous benefits only when they do not realize how much of their country's wealth is being lost to theft, corruption, and government incompetence. Finally, oil wealth allows autocrats to lavishly fund-and buy the loyalty of- their armed forces. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for example, has given billions of dollars in no-bid contracts to businesses associated with the elite paramilitary Revolutionary Guards.” (Ross 2011, 2-4)

As discussed in Chapter II, the leaders of less democratically developed states often seek to protect their reign from a potential coup by developing a coup-proofing strategy. Buying the loyalty of the military is one such tactic (Quinlivan 1999, Ross 2011). In that way, rulers provide military forces with material privileges either to segregate them from the political decision-making process or obligating them to the ruling regime (Albrecht 2014, Makara 2013). In the MENA states, energy income provides the resources necessary for the government to buy the military's loyalty. The downside of this strategy is that the vulnerability and unpredictability of world oil prices can bring about economic stagnation at a domestic level (Ross, 2013, p. 6). Insurgents, the clash of shared oil interests, and division within the armed forces might arise during such times of fiscal crises. Each of these occurrences could undermine the fiscal robustness of the ruling power and create lasting divisions within the armed forces.

A state's energy resource capacity plays an important role during times of uprising, because energy-rich states and their loyal armed forces often develop their own policies by discounting the reactions of outside actors. State leaders become less dependent and less vulnerable to outside factors because their survival is based on their own economic capability. By contrast, less economically developed and energy poor states consider the external factors of their economy more carefully because they are dependent on foreign aid and foreign investments. Bellin explained, "First, the robustness of the coercive apparatus [in the Middle East] is directly linked to maintenance of fiscal health. The security establishment is most likely to give up when its financial foundation is seriously compromised" (Bellin 2004, 144).

Energy rich states also tend to enjoy more tolerance and support from strong, but energy poor, international actors. Petro dollar Gulf States (e.g., Saudi Arabia) represent a clear example, as the United States has supported their anti-democratic regimes for years simply because of their energy resources. These resources, accordingly, also influence international powers' attitude toward the states' national security and political power.

In some cases, though, a state's energy resources might serve as the impetus for international intervention. Once a development arises that can threaten the energy importers' interests, they may feel forced to take action to secure those interests. This threat can make states that are energy exporters more vulnerable to international interventions than are energy poor places. Since, international players perceive that the energy rich state's stability and the security of its energy supplies benefit their own interests; these states must take great pains to secure their resources against the probability of being seized by terrorist groups.

Exploring the influence of a state's energy capacity helps to shed light on the behaviour of the military forces in Tunisia and Libya during the Arab uprisings. Energy capacity, and the resources this capacity provides, can help to determine the military's degree of dependency on civilian rulers. Less democratically developed, but energy rich, states tend to have loyal, patrimonial military forces with a strong economic reliance upon the ruling regime. In these cases, it is in the military's best interests to keep the existing rulers in place. In contrast, apolitical military forces in the MENA region tend to develop in energy poor states that also lack consolidated democracy. By no means is energy the only reason¹¹ for the two different outcomes in Tunisia and Libya, but in the MENA states, energy is the prominent source for the funds that provide military forces with material privileges. Energy richness offers states economic freedom that helps them to close their doors to international efforts to bring about modern democratic reform. The capacity of energy sources shapes the position of the ruling regime and, subsequently, the stance of military power within this structure.

Military Structure

The second causal factor involved in the outcome of the uprisings in Tunisia and Libya is military structure. If a military force has an institutional identity, it is most likely one that is apolitical and conforms to reform demands. By contrast, patrimonial military features the opposite. However, one should not confuse the institutionalization of military forces with professionalization, because professionalization refers to the subordination of the armed forces to civilian rulers (Huntington 1957, Bellin 2004, Feaver 2003).

¹¹ For instance, Egypt is not an energy rich state but toll revenues for the Suez Canal and foreign aid, specifically from the US since Camp David agreement in 1978 (Mckenzie and Packard 2011), construct the important part of its economic power.

“Rather, institutionalization invokes the constellation of qualities that Weber used to distinguish bureaucracies from patrimonially driven organizations. By contrast, institutionalization will have more tolerance for reform. First, where the coercive apparatus is institutionalized, the security elite has a sense of corporate identity separate from the state. It has a distinct mission, identity, and career path. Officers can imagine separation from the state. Second, where the coercive apparatus is institutionalized rather than patrimonial, it is distinguished by a commitment to some broader national mission that serves the public good, such as national defence and economic development, rather than to personal aggrandizement and enrichment alone.” (Bellin 2004, 145-146)

As stated earlier, institutional structure helps military forces to move separately from the ruling side and being open to improvement requests. In these cases, the mission of the army is to protect national interests rather than those of any one ruling power. The military serves as soldiers of the state and is not beholden to a ruling family or regime. Commonly, such armed forces include a large majority of conscripts, because conscription prevents the development of allegiances to rulers over national interests (Barany 2013a). On the contrary, their commitment to the corporate identity of the military far surpasses any personal interests to which individual civil leaders may try to appeal to gain leverage.

Additionally, having an army that largely consists of conscripted personnel makes them more open to society’s demand because they share the agenda of the society (Barany 2013a, 67). There is no privilege in being recruited from a unique group, tribe, or ethnicity to serve in the armed forces. The change of the ruling family and regime does not represent a threat to their institutional identity because they are

more obligated to the nation's laws than to any one regime's personalistic rules. The *raison d'être* of such a military force is the preservation of the state and its interests, and the institutional structure and principles foster a sense of shared purpose and unity among the military force. It follows, then, that nepotism and political loyalties are less important for conscripted military officers (Bellin 2004).

Conversely, patrimonialism within a military structure produces an environment in stark contrast to that seen with institutionalism. As Lutterbeck explained, "[The] security apparatus is characterised by political favouritism and cronyism" (Lutterbeck 2011, 14). Armies characterized by patrimonialism are most common in anti-democratic states. These military forces behave more as the special forces of a regime than as an extension of the state, and feature more commonalities with the ruling regime than with the nation as a whole. The patrimonial army, accordingly, relies heavily upon the ruling family and ruling regime. Promotions are the result of personal relationships instead of merit, and the ruling regime recruits loyal groups to provide protection against its opponents. The ruling regime also constitutes relations based on individual relations instead of corporate identity. The continuity of the ruling regime means a preservation of the individual officers' interests.

During an uprising, patrimonial military forces fight to support the ruling regime (Interview with Achcar 2014). Such military types become closed to national and international access. The internal working structure of the military is designed by the regime's much unknown and subjective principles. Additionally, the employment of mercenaries is a common feature of a patrimonial army structure (Interview with Springborg 2015). Institutional armed forces do not employ mercenaries.

Ruling regimes typically adopt three strategies to create a patrimonial military force. First, officer appointment and promotion in the military forces are strongly controlled through the ruler's personal ties. Second, leaders offer material privileges and buy the military's loyalty. Last, they establish a loyal "communal military force" (Albrecht 2014, 12). In brief, the ruling regime strongly controls the patrimonial military forces by wedding its presence on the regime. As a result, the military forces do not defect from the ruling power when conflicts arise.

The drawback of the patrimonial military structure is that the development cliques and factions during times of turmoil are more likely than it is with institutional structures. Due to that patrimonial armies are more beholden to the ruling family's personal standards than they are on the rule of law and national interest. An undefeatable challenge to the ruling regime also undermines the loyalty of the military towards the regime. Moreover, the lack of corporate identity brings about individual and separatist actions that obscure solidarity and joint action within the military structure. In addition, the armed forces become a central target of anti-regime protests, along with the ruling regime, due to their central position and active role within the regime.

In sum, armed forces with an institutional structure tend to be more apolitical, meritocratic, and independent from any particular regime. Conversely, patrimonial armies are dependent upon ruling powers and most concerned with preserving the current regime. They also cooperate with mercenaries. During the present study, I used these classifications to analyse the Libyan and Tunisian armies' structure, mission, and recruitment prior to the Arab uprisings. I also explored the degree to which the military forces were more institutional or patrimonial and the impact this classification had on the military's decisions during the Arab uprising. The structure

of the military provides important insight into the behaviour of the armed forces in Tunisia and Libya during the 2010-2011 uprisings.

The Strength of Protests

The third causal factor in my research is the strength of the protests. The strength, resolute, and solidarity of protests are the benchmarks that affect their influence. This leverage may have a significant influence on the military's position during anti-government protests. I argue that the high strength of protests features mainly the following attributes. First, anti-government protests are widely accepted by the people. Second, the protestors have promising, alternative agendas to replace those of the existing rulers. Third, the protestors are unarmed. Fourth, the protests do not challenge the military's existence, interests, or reserved domains. When the protests meet these conditions, they have the potential to compel the military to end its support of the ruling regime. As such, the structure of the protests is another key component in this study.

It is important to note that the above principals can vary from case to case. For example, protests can receive wide acceptance in different societies with different agendas. In other words, the quantity of protests is the first standard to measure the protests' strength. For that goal, people should have some spaces and means to be able to access each other, coming together and organising some events against the government (resource mobilization theory) (Tilly 1978).

In addition to its quantity, quality of the protests is also important because of its impact capability over internal and external actors and factors. Since, the protests should be able to promise that the end of the ruling regime would not lead to a chaotic environment there. Ensuring that the alternative agenda is feasible and inclusive only strengthens the impact of the protests. Therefore, the protestors' education level and

social status also play a significant role. It is likely that protests led by the well-educated and middle class groups would have more impact (Challand 2015). The inventive strategy is that having no affiliation with any specific group, ethnicity or political faction, especially in diverse societies. That wide range of protests discourse strengthens the power of its denominator.

The potential influence of protests also increases when they are nonviolent in nature. This type of protest has become more ubiquitous in the last century because the global media and global access has prevented most states from using violent repression that would lead to the isolation of the state in the international arena. As such, most state leaders avoid exerting violent measures to repress non-violent movements, because the justification of such actions has become very difficult and very costly at the domestic and international level (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 42-43).

Nepstad asserted that “nonviolent revolutionary movements that win the support of the regime’s military institution are likely to achieve regime change” (Nepstad 2011a, 488). The researcher explained,

“The sixth way that citizens can non-violently subvert a regime is by undermining the state's sanctioning power. They rely on members of the armed services and police force to do so. If the movements succeed in winning troops' sympathy, then police may refuse to carry out orders, and soldiers may defect. When this occurs, a ruler loses the capacity to impose sanctions.” (Nepstad 2011b, 10)

Unfortunately, non-violent resistance does not always end without violence. However, the unarmed protestors and nonviolent means differentiate them from violent protests.

The last factor that affects the strength that the protests can exert over the military's decisions is the military's perception of the protests. To garner military support, the protests cannot threaten military interests (e.g., economic, political, or logistical) in any way. As Nepstad stated, troops are more likely to defect "if [they] do not derive any direct benefits from the regime" (Nepstad 2011a, 489). Furthermore, if the protests promise incentives, such as better working conditions and revenues for the military forces, the troops are more likely to give their support to the protestors and desert the existing regime.

In brief, the strength that the protestors wield is one of the important variables that can influence the military during times of uprisings. While a strong, anti-government (but not anti-military) protest can lead the military to desert the existing regime, the opposite scenario can only strengthen the military's support of the ruling power. Exploring the strength of the protests provides insight into the military's decisions during the 2010-2011 uprisings in Tunisia and Libya, particularly when this factor is considered along with energy capacity and military structure.

IV.VII Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored my empirical approach. First, I defined my methodology as a comparative case study that examined the role of the military in the Tunisian and Libyan uprisings from 2010-2011. I then laid out the data sources that were utilized in the study, which included elite and expert interviews and secondary sources. I also defined the two varying outcomes of the uprisings in Tunisia and Libya—military defection and split, respectively. Last, I discussed the factors that contributed to the military's decisions to either defect or support the ruling regime.

I acknowledged that these variables are not the only factors that influenced the diverse outcomes in Libya and Tunisia. However, the selected variables provide

significant insight into the different military behaviours during the uprisings. Thus, I examined the impact of these three factors on the outcome variance.

In the following chapter, I begin by explaining the genesis of the 2010-2011 Tunisian and Libyan uprisings. I then apply the three aforementioned variables to these two cases to examine their influence on the military's behaviour during the uprisings. The following chapters are important because the 2010-2011 uprisings and then the behaviour of the military in Tunisia and Libya are also result of prior process.

Chapter V

The Genesis of the Tunisian Uprisings

V.I Introduction


This chapter is structured as follows. First, I explore the political and military structure of Tunisia from Bourguiba to the Ben Ali term. This retroactive analysis helps to provide context for the 2010-2011 uprisings and clarifies the role of the military, because the 2010-2011 uprisings were not independent of the past. In the second part of the chapter, I explain the genesis of the 2010-2011 uprisings. This explanation helps to demonstrate the link between the reasons behind the military's behaviour in the 2010-2011 uprising and provides background information before focusing on the key factors that contributed to the outcomes of the conflict.

The overthrowing of Tunisia's ruler of 23 years, Ben Ali, took slightly less than one month. The self-immolation of a young person on December 17, 2010 triggered the nationwide anti-government protests within the state. Initially, the Ben Ali government tried some conciliatory policies to end the protests; however, when the Tunisian military refused to shoot the protestors, Ben Ali stepped down on January 14, 2011. While this entire process happened relatively quickly, it is important to understand the impetus behind the decisions and behaviours that led to the ultimate outcome. The protesters' demands during the uprisings proved that, the 2010-2011 uprisings resulted from social, economic, and political exclusion and inequality, but the actions of political, civil, and military actors also played a key role in the scenario (Gelvin 2012, Lutterbeck 2011). Furthermore, the resolved and ongoing protests, the government's ineffective reaction to the protests, and the

international players' support of the protestors all had a significant impact on this revolutionary social movement (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2013). In sum, an amalgam of reasons, actors, and factors worked together to bring about the 2011 Tunisian revolution and its ultimate outcome.

As discussed earlier, the Tunisian military chose to avoid clashing with the anti-government protestors in an effort to prevent an escalation of the conflict. Instead, they chose to cooperate with the protestors, who were demanding a more democratic, legitimate, and inclusive Tunisia. At the time of the protests, the Tunisian military was apolitical and small in comparison to police forces. As a result, initially, they took a passive stance in reaction to the protests. However, after a while, once the police forces and presidential guards became ineffective against the demonstrators, Ben Ali employed his military forces. This second stage represented a brief period of defensive crisis management, as the military sought to defend the government and public buildings from the protestors' attacks. The last phase of the conflict began on January 12, 2010, when Ben Ali put a curfew in place to end the protests. Contrary to his expectations, the military refused to shoot protestors when they defied the curfew. During this phase, the Chief of the Army, General Ammar and the military played a significant role in the outcome of the protests by participating in the decision to call back Ben Ali's plane from Saudi Arabia without taking back Ben Ali. As a result, Ben Ali's rule ended.

Figure V. I: The process of military role in the Tunisian uprisings in 2010-2011



Source: Adapted from Albrecht and Bishara 2011.

The milestone events that undermined the Ben Ali regime's efforts to use the military to repress the protests are as follows. First and foremost, General Ammar issued a cable on January 10, 2010 that ordered all soldiers not to shoot at protesters unless they received an order from the top of the military command (Jebnoun 2014, 305, Interview with Nasr 2015). This mandate prevented a likely confrontation between the military and the protesters. Second, even though Ben Ali declared a curfew on January 12, 2010, thousands of people defied his mandate and continued their protest in the streets of Tunisia; even in the nation's capital, Tunis (el-Khawas 2012, 11). However, the military did not shoot the protestors when they challenged the curfew.

Third General Ammar refused the request of Chief of Presidential Forces Ali Seriati to protest the Trabelsi family's houses on January 14, 2010 (Jebnoun 2014, 307) and declared that protecting private houses was not the mission of military (Interview with Nasr 2015). His statement demonstrated that the military stayed loyal to its institutional principles. Fourth, On January 14, 2010, President Ben Ali, via the Defence Minister Ridha Grira, ordered Ammar to use all necessary means (including live ammunition and killing BAT officials) to free the detained Trabelsi family members at the Carthage airport after they were captured by the Anti-Terrorism Brigade (BAT)¹² (Jebnoun 2014, 307). Once again, Ammar refused. Instead, he chose to negotiate with BAT and handed the Trabelsi family members to take them into custody (Interview with Air Force Colonel 2015).

If one examines this historical experience from only a state-centric approach, this research would remain incomplete. The state-centric approach "focuses on the political leadership and treats the military as a coherent whole that faithfully serves

¹² BAT was working under the command of the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior (Pachon 2014).

the political leadership” (Koren 2014, 2); it does not contend with political power. However, many underdeveloped states feature independent or semi-independent military structures under a weakly centralized civil government. Military power is not completely relied on the civilians in such states. Accordingly, in this study, I employed military and state centric approach, which focused on the perspectives of both the state and the military (Koren 2014, 2), to reach a comprehensive analytical approach on the Tunisian experience.

V.II Tunisia: Politics and the Military

In this section, I focus on the political and military structure of Tunisia before the 2010 uprisings. I demonstrate that the executive branch (president) dominated the legislative and judicial branches of the government. The lack of workable separation between these powers gave the president unlimited and uncontrolled power. In addition, I explore the fact that the Tunisian government created a weak, small, mostly conscripted, apolitical military organization to prevent any notable military involvement in the political power scene and avoid the threat of a military coup. While this structure seemed to exclude the military from any significant decision-making processes, in fact, the exclusion from the politics led the Tunisian military to institute its own professional and institutional identity. Moreover, such exclusion and minimizing of the military power created a close relationship between the military and the larger society, because both sides felt victimized by the restrictive Tunisian ruling regime.

V.II.I The Politics of Tunisia

As stated previously, Tunisia was involved in local conflicts with French colonists between 1952 and 1954 during their fight for independence. Tunisia obtained its independence from France in 1956 through diplomatic negotiations, and

afterwards, abolished the monarchy by declaring itself a republic in 1957 (Willis 2012). Lawyer Habib Bourguiba ascended to the presidency in 1957 (Sorenson 2007). Bourguiba played a pioneering role in the nation's independence by taking part in negotiations with France and ensuring the foundation of the Tunisian republic (Gelvin 2012, 61). As the first president of the Republic of Tunisia (1957-1987), Bourguiba established a government structure where the executive branch was empowered without having a check and balance against it. Frequent leader changes in the MENA region and numerous military coups, especially the 1952 military coup in Egypt, pushed Bourguiba to establish a small army governed by a central administration with a single party dominance¹³ to accomplish the idea "modernization of Tunisia from above" (Anderson 1986, 272). Ben Ali succeeded Bourguiba and he maintained that order by establishing his new single party Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) to maintain that undemocratic ruling regime (el-Khawas 2012).

In Tunisia, like Libya, state leaders established and structured the societies by playing "an independent causal role" from top (Anderson 1986, 8). "The role of state formation in precipitating social structural change and in creating the rural elite in the global periphery produces a relationship between the state and society profoundly different from that of its European predecessors" (Anderson 1986, 274). As a result of that process,

"The state is not simply a neutral arbiter or arena for the resolution of social conflict, but neither is merely the political expression of class domination. It is an agent of change, simultaneously attempting to ensure its own continuity while creating and responding to new social forces." (Anderson 1986, 274)

¹³ Neo-Destour (1934-1964) (Perkins 2004, 95) and Socialist Destourian Party-PSD (1964-1988) (Anderson 1986, 237).

The big difference between Tunisia and Libya was that Tunisia had stronger state administration and bureaucracy than Libya, from its time as a French colony (protectorate period) to Ben Ali's reign (Anderson 1986, 272). After gaining its independence, single party regime under Bourguiba and Ben Ali created state structure in Tunisia.

Executive Branch

Tunisia's first constitution went into effect on June 1, 1959 and established *de jure* separation between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the state (Rowsell 2015). The constitution declared that "to establish a democracy founded on the sovereignty of the people, and characterized by a stable political system based on separation of powers" (preamble). Despite this declaration, the executive branch, dominated by the president and his party, largely controlled the judicial and legislative branches. "Bourguiba, who led the independence battle against the French and then erected a secular, single-party authoritarian regime" (Angrist 2011, 76).

Even though state leaders amended the constitution in 1988, 2002, and 2005, they protected its framework until the 2010-2011 revolution. This framework dictated that after being elected, the president's term lasted for five years and he or she was re-electable (Article 39). However, in contrast to the primary object of the separation of powers, the constitution gave the president excessive authority, even though he was an elected official.

According to the Tunisia's 1959 constitution, the president appointed the prime minister and then selected cabinet members on the recommendation of prime minister (Article 50). Second, the president could end the functions of the government or a member thereof, at his initiative or upon the recommendation of the prime minister (Article 51). Third, the president had the power to propose a new bill and

could approve or reject the bills from the legislature (Article 28). Fourth, the president had the authority to declare war and peace, with the approval of the chamber of deputies (Article 48). Fifth, the president appointed the chief of constitutional council (Article 75). Sixth, the president appointed high civilians and military officials on the recommendation of government (Article 55). Seventh, The president had the power to declare a state of emergency (Article 46). Last, the president was the chief of the armed forces (Article 44).

More importantly, judicial prerogatives for the president provided him or her with protection against prosecution. “The President of the Republic enjoys judicial immunity in the exercise of his duties. He also enjoys such judicial immunity after the presidential term for all acts executed as part of the office” (1959 Constitution, Article 41).

This absence of checks and balances in the Tunisian government clarifies why Tunisia had only two presidents in its 53 years as a republic (1957-2010). Until 1974, no other candidate contested President Bourguiba’s reign during the state’s presidential elections until 1974 (Fahmi and Meddeb 2015, Alexander 2012). At that time, he declared himself the president of Tunisia for life and abolished presidential elections in 1975 (Alexander 2010).

In 1987, Ben Ali demonstrated that Bourguiba was medically incompetent and unable to fulfil the duties of the presidency. Prime Minister Ben Ali ascended to the presidency after this bloodless medical coup (Jebnoun 2014, 300). Ben Ali began his term in 1988 by amending the constitution of Tunisia to establish a three five year-term limit for the presidency. Furthermore, presidential elections restarted in 1989, yet Tunisia waited 10 years to see a multi-candidate presidential election; because, according to the constitution, presidential candidates had to obtain endorsements from

at least 30 political actors, but opposition parties had been legally allowed to run since 1987 (el-Khawas 2012). The rule was moderated by parliament, and the first oppositional presidential election took place in 1999 (Brumberg 2002). The election concluded in Ben Ali's victory, with 99.45% with 92% turnout (Brumberg 2002).

In 2002, President Ben Ali again amended Articles 39 and 40 in the constitution via a national referendum (Alexander 2010). The amendments abolished the three-term limit and raised the age limit of a being president from 70 to 75 (Article 40). In essence, 65-year-old Ben Ali began eliminating any obstacles to his continued reign. After such amendments, his term continued after the 2004 and 2009 elections, with 94 and 84% support, respectively (BBC 2009).

Legislative Branch

The legislative branch of the Tunisian government is bicameral, including a chamber of deputies (the lower house) and a chamber of advisors (the upper house). The latter became effective after the 2002 constitutional amendments (Article 18), but was not inaugurated until August 2005 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2008). According to the Tunisian constitution, the main role of the legislative branch was to initiate or adopt a law initiated by the president (Article 28, 33). The legislative branch also endorsed the annual state budget. If they failed to fulfil this second role, the president had the power to implement the budget by decree. Simply, the president was the final decision maker in almost all scenarios:

“The power to initiate laws is shared equally by the President of the Republic and the members of the Chamber of Deputies. Priority is given to bills submitted by the President of the Republic (Article 28). The budget must be adopted on December 31 at the latest. If the two chambers have not voted on

the budget by that date, the provisions of the draft finance laws may be implemented by decree, in renewable quarterly instalments.” (Article 28)

Members of the upper house were restricted to a six-year term, and its number of members were the two-thirds of the lower house (Migdalovitz 2009). The upper house was responsible for examining law proposals before they went to the president for approval. The upper house included 126 members, 71 of whom were chosen by the Chamber of Deputies and city councils, 14 were chosen by the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), and 41 were appointed by the state president (Article 19).

The Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) had 189 members who were elected by direct vote to serve a five-year term (Migdalovitz 2009). While direct voting contributed it with a democratic feature, indeed Bourguiba’s and his successor Ben Ali’s party the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD, 1988-2011), heavily dominated and prevented polyphony in the assembly. Even though the Tunisian government allowed *de jure* multi-party elections after 1983, a *de facto* one-party system remained in the Tunisian parliament (Perkins 2004). The RCD gained 148 seats of the 189-member assembly’s in 1999, 152 seats in the 2004 elections, and 161 seats in the 2009 general elections (el-Khawas 2012). In addition, RCD included around two million members (or one fifth of the Tunisian population) (Murphy 2011, 299). Clearly, the president’s party controlled the legislature, with allowing a symbolic opposition within it.

Judicial Branch

The president also controlled the judicial branch of the government. According to the Tunisian constitution, “Judges and prosecutors shall be appointed by decree of the President of the Republic upon the recommendation of the High Council of the Judiciary” (Article 66). Additionally, the Constitutional Council held the highest place

in the judicial order and, in theory, served as the gatekeeper for any bill proposal or amendment that violated the constitution. In fact, like the legislature, the judicial branch played rubber-stamping role.

According to the Tunisian constitution, the Constitutional Council included nine members, including the president, four of whom the president appointed. Chambers of Deputies, approximately 90% of were the president's party members, appointed two of Constitutional Council members (Article 75). The remainder of three members included the President of the Court of Cassation, the President of the Administrative Tribunal, and the President of the Court of Auditors (Article 75).

The structure of the Tunisian government gave the legislative and judicial branches limited power and largely answered to the executive branch, represented by President Bourguiba, and later, Ben Ali.

V.II.II Military Balance

In this section, I discuss the military balance of Tunisia to reach a comprehensive analysis of the role of the military during 2010-2011 protests. Ben Ali's reign brought no radical changes in terms of the structure and formation of the military. Ware's work sheds light on the Tunisian military structure.

“Of the military establishments in the Arab world, Tunisia is almost unique. It is a non-praetorian, highly professional body of officers and men which, as an armed force, never mounted a coup or fomented revolution against the state, never involved itself directly in the Arab-Israeli crisis, has never been the instrument of national emancipation except as the adjunctive arm of civilian policy, and has always answered to the authority of the state through the intermediary of a civilian minister of defence.” (Ware 1985, 47)

He continued,

“The military has, therefore, never participated in the decision-making process as political elite. Nor has the military had the opportunity to play the historical role of modernizers of a nation. Rather, they have served solely in the capacity of defenders of the national sovereignty and of the status quo and as a symbol of unity and an instrumentality that links people with government in the nation-building enterprise.” (Ware 1985, 47)

Article 15 of the Tunisian constitution states, “It is the duty of each citizen to protect the country and to safeguard its independence, its sovereignty and the integrity of the national territory. It is each citizen's sacred duty to defend the nation.” In addition, according to the constitution, the president of Tunisia served as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces; but in practice, the armed forces reported to the civilian minister of national defence:

“Under Decree No. 75671 of September 25th, 1975 establishing the powers of the Minister of National Defence. The Minister of National Defence, under the President of the Republic, Supreme Commander of Armed Forces, has the task of ensuring the security and integrity of national territory and protection of people's lives.” (Tunisian Ministry of National Defence. Retrieved March 15, 2014)

That division did not make any real difference in terms of presidential authority, because the president had appointed the defence minister upon the recommendation of prime minister.

“The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is an almost entirely civilian organization and has primary responsibility for implementing policy decisions regarding the uniformed services. The chief of staff of the armed forces is the principal

adviser to the minister. The chiefs of staff of each of the three services—army, air force, and navy—command each of their respective services but do not serve on a unified general staff. Coordination among the services is the responsibility of the chief of staff of the armed forces. The minister of defence's specific authorities is defined by a 1975 presidential decree, which specifies that the minister of defence serves the president of the republic, who is the supreme commander of the armed forces.” (Hanlon 2012, 9)

As of 2010, the Tunisian population included approximately 10,500,000 citizens, but the Tunisian military had only 35,800 active members—27,000 army, 4,800 navy, and 4,000 air forces (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2010, 274). The Tunisian military also included 12,000 paramilitary forces that served as the National Guard (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2010, 274, Cordesman and Nerguizian 2010, 49-50, Cordesman 2005, 37-39). These numbers did not compare to the active military forces in neighbouring states like Morocco (195,800) and Algeria (147,000), who had populations of 31,000,000 and 34,000,000 citizens, respectively (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2010, 245). In addition, military expenditures represented only 1.3% of the 2010 GDP in Tunisia, compared to 3.5% in Algeria and Morocco (SIPRI 2014).

“Ben Ali's predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, had deliberately kept soldiers out of politics during his three decades as president (1957–87), even banning them from joining the ruling party and withholding from them the right to vote. Ben Ali continued the policy of keeping the armed forces on the political sidelines.” (Barany 2013b, 60)

Of the 27,000 members of the Tunisian army, 22,000 were conscripts who served for 12 months after their selection. An additional 700 conscripts served the

navy and 700 conscripts served the air force (Cordesman 2005, 38-39). As Table V.I shows, nearly 70% of the armed forces consisted of conscripts, which demonstrated that the Tunisian government saw service in the armed forces as a short-term responsibility rather than a lifelong professional career.

The difference between the paramilitary and military forces was that the former armed group fell under the control of the minister of interior (Brooks 2013, 210, International Institute for Strategic Studies 2010, 274). This variance made little difference, however, because the president appoints the minister of interior based upon the recommendation of the prime minister, like the defence minister (Article, 50).

Table V.I: The Size of the Tunisian Armed Forces in 2010 ¹⁴

	Conscripts	Professional	Total
Army	22,000	5,000	27,000
Navy	700	4,100	4,800
Air Forces	700	3,300	4,000
Armed Forces	<i>23,400</i>	<i>12,400</i>	<i>35,800</i>

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies 2010.

The Tunisian Minister of Interior directly managed the Tunisian police force, which included approximately 130,000-150,000 officers, as of 2010 (Lutterbeck 2011, p.22). No precise numbers are available, because the Tunisian government was not open with the data. Ben Ali wanted to create a strong and loyal police force as an alternative to the military and, furthermore, policing internal order (Henry and Springborg 2011, 133). His strong experience on security forces also provided him a

¹⁴ Due to the obscure nature of the state archives in Tunisia, there is no consensus among scholars about the size of armed forces. For example, Henry and Springborg (2011) stated that the military included 45,000 individuals, while Barany (2013) claimed the numbers was close to 30,000. My interviewee, Colonel Major (retired) Ben Nasr, contended that the number fell between 30,000 and 35,000 (June 2015). According to another interviewee, former Ghannouchi government official Jeridi, the armed forces included 20,000 soldiers (June 2015).

familiarity in building a police state (see Table V.II). “Police forces were perceived as agents of the Ben Ali regime” and called as “political police forces” (Interview with Jeridi 2015, Lutterbeck 2015, 9, Droz-Vincent 2014, 184). Presidential guards were a small but strong defensive power that worked under the oversight of the Ministry of Interior and mainly trained to protect the president and his family (Hanlon 2012, 6).

“Central to Ben Ali’s security forces was his 5,000–6,000 strong presidential guard, which played an important role as protector of the regime and whose chief, Ali Seriati, was arrested soon after Ben Ali’s departure from the count.” (Brooks 2013, 213)

Table V.II: The size of police and paramilitary forces¹⁵

	Police Forces	National Guard	Presidential Guard
Total Number	130,000-150,000	12,000	5,000-6,000


Source: Brooks 2013; Lutterbeck 2011.

In brief, Ben Ali deliberately focused on weakening the military while developing a strong police force, National Guard, and presidential guard to protect himself against a military coup, because the neighbouring states had experienced so many such incidents. As stated in the literature review, the Arab world experienced 55 coup attempts, half of them successful, between 1949 and 1980 (Be’eri 1982, 70). A more recent military coup in Algeria in the 1990s once again demonstrated that regimes in the region were vulnerable to military rebellions.

¹⁵ Like the size of armed forces, researchers did not agree on the size of the police force, presidential guard, and national guard. According to Schraeder and Redissi (2011), for example, the presidential guard included 8,000 soldiers, and the national guard included 20,000. According to Henry and Springborg (2011), the rest of security forces were about 120,000-180,000. Brooks (2011) claimed that the numbers fell between 120,000 and 200,000. Barany (2013) claimed that police force included 150,000 individuals. My interviewee, Ben Nasr, stated that the number of presidential guards was closer to 5,000-6,000 and, interestingly, the police was, a maximum of 10,000 (June, 2015). My interviewee, Jeridi, stated that police forces numbered 30,000-35,000, not 130,000, and the presidential force included only soldiers (June, 2015).

In 1987, Ben Ali established the National Security Council (NSC), and the NSC comprising the following figures (Jebnoun 2014, 301). “The Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Interior Minister , the Foreign Minister, the Chief of the Armed Forces, and the General Director of the Military Intelligence” (Jebnoun 2014, 301). He collected all the power apparatuses under one umbrella—the presidency—and monopolized the role of commanding the security forces (see Figure V.II).

Figure V.II: The Organizational Structure of the Tunisian Military and Security Forces



As stated before, unlike other states in the region, the Tunisian military had never experienced a military coup. In fact, the military forces helped security powers to quell national strikes against state fiscal policies in 1978 and 1984 (Ware 1985, 27). Despite this fact, Bourguiba and Ben Ali both excluded military forces from politics and governance.

According to Feaver’s *agency theory*, the military and government structures discussed above indicate that the civil-military relationship within Tunisia falls into an employee-employer model (Feaver 2003). At first glance, this relationship seems to align with Huntington’s institutional theory that models the separation of civilian and military power structures under objective civilian control (Huntington 1957, 84). The main goal of the objective control is the “recognition of autonomous military professionalism on civil-military relations” for the interest of both sides (Huntington

1957, 83). This objective control aims “the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military” (Huntington 1995, 9). However, Tunisian rulers intervened by limiting the military’s power. As a result, the Tunisian model worked for the ruling party, but not for the military.

According to Feaver, agency theory argues that “the essence of civil-military relations is a strategic interaction between civilian principals and military agent” (Feaver 2003, 2-3). In essence, civilians are rulers, and the military is ruled. However, the agent (the military) serves as the supporter and is an integral part of the civilian rule. In Tunisia, both Bourguiba and Ben Ali served as the only civilian principal during their respective reigns, and they created an agent-type army by following a coup-proofing strategy since the country’s independence in 1956. The Tunisian military had no integral part in the political scene, but it had no oppositional stance either, which indicated their support of the ruling power.

The Tunisian model minimized the size and capacity of military power. The loyal police forces and presidential guards became the security valve for the government against the risk of domestic turmoil or a coup d’état. This power structure created stable civil-military relations. However, the stability occurred not because of the separation of powers, but because of the civilian powers’ dominance over the weakened military.

In addition, the absence of an external threat propelled Tunisian rulers to discount the military power. Even though Tunisian leaders were wary of Gaddafi’s aggressive foreign policy in the region, U.S. and European support reduced their concern about the threat that he posed. External threats have propelled several states to develop a strong defensive military power, for example Egypt, who was involved in several conflicts with Israel (1948-1956-1967), and Algeria, who fought for

independence against France (1954-1962). In contrast, the Tunisian government strengthened its internal security forces against potential internal threats and terrorist groups (Ware 1985, 30).

In sum, the Tunisian government deliberately moulded the military structure into an apolitical, professional,¹⁶ and institutional structure to suit its own purposes. As stated earlier, Tunisian soldiers did not even have the right to vote in the assembly or presidential elections (Sorenson 2007, 107). There was no space within the political arena for the members of the military. That marginalization propelled the military into a professional, apolitical, and institutional pattern. In the following section, I examine the reasons those had mainly paved causal pathway and forced the Tunisian uprisings.

V.III The Prominent Causes of the Tunisian Uprisings

In the 53-year history of the Tunisian republic, it had only two presidents: Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987) and Ben Ali (1987-2011) (Lynch 2011). The two leaders' hegemonic and robust authority largely contributed to the main problems that existed in Tunisia. These leaders and their entourages operated without accountability as they controlled and shaped social, political, and economic structures within the state. As detailed before, instead of a check and balance system between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches, the president and his executive branch functioned with unchallengeable power over the judiciary and legislature. This structure resulted in social, political, and economic exclusion and inequality for the majority of the Tunisian people, which ultimately created unrest among the masses.


V.III.I Exclusive Social-Economic Growth: The Problem of Effectiveness

The main issue in Tunisia was exclusive economic growth. The Tunisian economy experienced notable growth after its independence in 1956. The 1980s

¹⁶ Professional refers to that not to interfere in civilian authorities.

economic crisis and the end of the Cold War moved Tunisian leaders to implement neo-liberal economic policies (Ayadi and Mattouss 2014, 4, Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015, 11), but the liberalization stayed limited and “the core thrust of the economic model remained fundamentally unchanged, as the state retained close control of most of the domestic economy” (World Bank Group 2014, 4) (see Figure V.III).

Figure V.III: Private Sector Investment in the Tunisian GDP (percent, 2000-2009)



Source Achy 2011, p.13; Central Bank of Tunisia.


Tunisian state leaders directly controlled over 50% of state’s economy as of 2014 (World Bank Group 2014, 4).

“The public sector dominates all the strategic sectors in the economy (e.g., energy, transport, telecommunications, pharmacy, collection and trade of basic food, etc.) and basic commodities prices are controlled by the government (which represents one third of the CPI). The Nine largest firms (in turnover) of the country are SOEs.” (African Development Bank Group 2012, 19)

As Figure V.IV illustrates, the economy had grown steadily from the early 1995s onwards. At the same time, the overall unemployment rate also rose (see Table V.III).

Tunisia became a “production state,” but not an “allocation state” (Picard 1993, 573, Luciani 1990, 74), as “the state-led model was characterized by limited competition and active state intervention” (World Bank Group 2014, 5). As a result, the national economic growth moved in the opposite way of the economic welfare simultaneously.

Figure V.IV: GDP of Tunisia - 1995-2010 (US Dollar-Billion)



Source: World Bank Group 2015.

Table V.III: The Unemployment Rate in Tunisia

	1995	2000	2010	May 2011	May 2012
Unemployment size (in 1000)	440	480	491	720	750
Unemployment rate (%)	15.7	15.6	13	18.3	19


Source: Boughzala 2013; Tunisian National Institute of Statistics (INS) Labour Survey 2011; Marty- Gauquié 2013.

Moreover, Tunisia is home to the largest middle class in the MENA region, with 89.5%, followed by Morocco (84.6%) and Egypt (79.7%) (Way 2011, 24, African Development Bank Group 2012). Like unemployment, the gap between the middle class and upper class was also deepening. While the level of wealth increased,

the level of poverty also rose; a large part of the Tunisian population was unable to take part in the growing economy (see Figure V.V).

“The implementation of this neoliberal economic agenda by Ben Ali and Mubarak was a deeply corrupt endeavour that enabled the inner circles of the regime to amass fortunes through privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), exclusive/monopoly import licenses, and mafia-style competitive advantage, backed by the state security apparatus and the political influence of the ruling party.” (Kaboub 2013, 537)

Figure V.V: Income Inequality in Tunisia (Based on Gini Index)¹⁷




Source: Achy 2011, p.17; INS. Retrieved May 11, 2012; The World Bank. Retrieved April 7, 2012.

This inequality was more striking in the interior regions of Tunisia, because the state economy relied heavily upon tourism, which brought the wealth to coasts more than the interior regions. It is also important to note that the centre east Sahel region (in particular, the cities of Sousse and Monastir) was the most developed part of Tunisia since the state’s independence (Pargeter 2009). Many important figures, including President Habib Bourguiba, President Ben Ali, and Prime Minister

¹⁷ Gini Index represents perfect equality at 0, and the largest inequality at 100.

Mohammed Ghannouchi, were from this area (Interview with Kahlaoui 2015, Pargeter 2009, 1035, Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015, 14). In addition, the limited private sector, public investment and population made most investment on the fascinating sides of offshore export where coastal regions (Ayadi and Mattouss 2014, 5-6). According to the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics (INS), poverty remained in the interior regions of the country, and was four times higher than it was in the coastal areas during the early 2010s (World Bank Group 2014, 6) (see Figure V.VI).

Figure V.VI: Economic Disparity in the Coastal and Interior Regions of Tunisia (%)



Source: World Bank Group 2014, p.6.

The large but poor middle class in Tunisia played a crucial role in the social protests of 2010-2011. Social incidents in the repressive states mostly emerge through the mobilization of the civilian population, because repressive state structures leave few options for the opposition outside of street protests. The middle class plays a key role in such mass protests because of its prominent influence and large base in organizing people (Skocpol 1994 , Tilly 1978). The Tunisian middle class used this leverage by exhorting Tunisian citizens to take part in anti-government protests (Hussain and Howard 2013, 48-49, Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015). According to an Arab Barometer survey administered after the 2010-2011 revolution, the middle

class contributed almost 30% of the revolutionaries (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015, 5). As I will detail in Chapter IX, in less than one month, protests spread very quickly among the millions of Tunisians in the capital city of Tunis and throughout the country.

Additionally, the Tunisian population has maintained a high literacy rate over the years. The literacy rate among young males and females (ages 15-24) in 2011 was 98% and 96%, respectively (United Nations Children's Fund, 2014). However, the unemployment ratio was also very high among well-educated youth—above 20% among university graduates and higher than 30% among young university graduates (15-30 ages) in 2010 (The World Bank 2015, Boughzala 2013, 5-6) (see Table V.IV.). That year, close to 200,000 of the total 700,000 unemployed individuals in Tunisia had a university degree (Boughzala 2013, 6). As Achy explained, “During the last decade, the labour force’s level of education has substantially increased, but this fundamental change has not been matched by a similar trend in labour demand” (Achy 2011, 3).

Table V.IV: Unemployment Rate by Education Level

Percent %	2005	2007	2009
None	6.3	4.4	6.1
Primary	14.3	11.5	10.4
Secondary	13.3	13.5	14.0
Higher	14.0	18.2	21.9

Source: Boughzala 2013; INS Labour Survey 2011.

One reason that the economy and unemployment rate were rising simultaneously was that the Tunisian economy heavily relied on external factors and fell short of creating its own independent economy (Marty-Gauquié 2013). As a

result, the state had insufficient employment opportunities for the large number of qualified individuals.

Corruption also played a significant role in the contradiction between the high unemployment rate and the growing economy. In 2010, Tunisia ranked 59/177 in the world in corruption and had a very low transparency score of 41/100 (Rogers 2010). Global Financial Integrity commented on the amount of corruption in Tunisia by stating that “bribery, kickbacks, trade mispricing and criminal activity between 2000 and 2008 was, on average, over \$1 billion a year” (Economist 2011), and “that is a substantial sum for a country whose GNP barely reaches \$80 billion at purchasing-power parity” (Economist 2011).

As the Central Bank of Tunisia declared, Ben Ali’s second wife, Leila Trabelsi, and the other relatives owned approximately 140 big companies within the state (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 9). The African Development Bank declared that “about 7 percent of banking loans were granted to the companies controlled by the former president’s extended family and entourage” in the late 2000s (African Development Bank Group 2012, 19-20). Daniel Lebegue, head of the French branch of Transparency International, declared, “Our Tunisian lawyer friends tell us that the Ben Ali and Trabelsi families controlled between 30 and 40 percent of the Tunisian economy”¹⁸ (Lewis 2011). Corruption and lack of employment opportunities generated large unemployed classes in Tunisia. As a matter of course, this high unemployment rate had a significant impact on the nation’s young adults. The World Bank stated, “Ben Ali and his extended family were capturing 21 percent of all private sector profits annually in Tunisia (or \$233 million, corresponding to over 0.5 percent of GDP)” (World Bank Group 2014, 15-16).

¹⁸ In February 2016, the Tunisian Finance Minister Slim Chaker stated the sale of assets from ousted President Ben Ali and his allies, “Since 2011, we made 1.5 billion dinars (of which) around 1 billion (\$500 million, 442 million euros) went into the state’s coffers” (Al-Arabiya 2016).

Tunisia's economic growth had varying impacts on the nation's different classes. For most of the masses, the unemployment rate continued to grow, particularly among well-educated young adults, as the ruling class enjoyed the spoils of the growing economy. Consequently, the angry and educated young people became the mainstay of the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings once the protests began. More striking, about 35% of Tunisian protestors were under the age of 24 (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2013). The young, educated, but unemployed people became a driving force for the protests, and they used the power of social media in a great way. For example, Tunisian blogger Yassine Ayari released that confidential information General Ammar would not shoot at protesters on Jan 14, 2011 (Interview with Ayari 2015b). That created very significant resistance among the protesters, and brought about defections within the police force (Interview with Air Force Colonel 2015).

“Tunisia has long enjoyed the Arab world's best educational system, largest middle class, and strongest organized labour movement. Yet behind those achievements, Ben Ali's government tightly restricted free expression and political parties.” (Anderson 2011, 322)


V.III.II Anti-Democratic Political Structure: The Problem of Legitimacy

In this section, I first discuss democratic political structures, generally, and then I explore the extent to which Tunisia's political structure fits into the democratic model. Democracy seeks the common good for the people by providing them with democratic tools to discuss how to find their common good. Accordingly, in a democracy, the two sine qua non conditions are the “right to participate” and “public contestation” (Dahl 1971, 5). In other words, inclusiveness and political liberalism are the key conditions for a democratic structure. In this sense, a fair competition between

political parties (at least two), transparent elections, the right to vote, and political leaders play prominent roles in a democratic structure.

In Tunisia, all people who were older than 18 years old were eligible to vote in elections, with the exceptions of active military members and prison inmates (Rowse 2015). However, because Tunisia was a *de facto* single party state, the constitution seemed to give people the right to vote and become a candidate for assembly and presidency; but in fact, the former ruling party—the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) and its previous versions—strictly dominated the politics. Figure V.VII demonstrates Tunisia’s freedom rating from 2001-2010.

Figure V.VII: Tunisia’s Democracy Score ¹⁹



Source: Freedom House. Retrieved October 24, 2013.

After the 2004 general elections in Tunisia, the U.S. State Department declared, “The ruling party’s domination of state institutions and political activity precluded credible and competitive electoral challenges from unsanctioned actors.” The RCD included 152 of the 189 members of the chamber of deputies, while the five opposition parties shared only 37 members among them (Migdalovitz 2009, 1).

¹⁹ According to Freedom House, 1 is the best and 7 is the worst in terms of freedom rating.

As another example, Ben Ali also prevented an important political figure, Nejib Celebi's, candidacy for the presidency by amending electoral law just before the 2009 elections to state, "Only candidates who have been party leaders for a minimum of two years can run in presidential elections" (Jawad 2009). Celebi did not meet this requirement. Even when opposing candidates were able to overcome these types of obstacles, they still had to face the challenge of the elections failure to provide a fair competition. Presidential candidate Ahmed Ibrahim expressed his frustration during the 2009 elections, "The government is preventing me from getting public platforms to speak to my supporters" (Jawad 2009).

Furthermore, in 1991, Ben Ali banned one of the strongest moderate Islamist movements Al-Nahda (*Renaissance*) from the elections and forced the leader of Al-Nahda, Rachid Ghannouchi, to flee to Europe (Hababou and Amrouche 2013). In fact, he excluded most of the Islamist activists from this political structure (Sharqieh 2013). In 1991, Ben Ali arrested 116 officers and 128 non-commissioned officers in the army, accusing them of having an affair with the Al-Nahda movement (Jebnoun 2014, 302). Ben Ali also banned the Congress for the Republic (CPR) party and its leader Moncef Marzouki from participating in the political arena (Farid 2011).

Once the uprisings forced RCD and Ben Ali to step aside, the political process became more democratic. Al-Nahda won the 2011 post-revolution general assembly election. The people also elected Marzouki to the Tunisian parliament, and he later became the new president of Tunisia. Additionally, more than 500 political prisoners have been released after the revolution in February 2011 (Human Rights Watch 2012).

All these aforementioned post-Ben Ali developments demonstrated that Ben Ali constructed a *de facto* single party state to prevent any challenge to his authority. It was *de facto* because, in the constitution, Tunisia had multi-party parliamentary and

multi-candidate presidential elections; however, the reality was quite different. During the 2009 elections, for example, candidates from nine political parties' competed for the presidency, but Ben Ali won 89% of the voters' support with 89% turnout (Schraeder and Redissi 2011). The result ostensibly demonstrates that the Tunisian political structure was heavily built on the cult of Ben Ali's personality. The elections, indeed, implied only "presidential plebiscites" (Sadiki 2002, 506). As a result, many scholars defined the Tunisian regime as the "Ben Ali regime" (Willis 2012, Gerges 2014). The other parties could contest as long as they did not represent a serious alternative/threat to Ben Ali.

In summary, both of Tunisia's presidents subverted the separation of powers. In fact, the Tunisian political scene featured an exclusive and uncontested anti-democratic structure. The opposition of Ben Ali was moribund, and the monoparty system was pervasive. This structure promoted "exclusion, repression, and rebellion" (Hafez 2003, 201-202) that led to feelings of frustration among millions of Tunisians.

V.III.III Globalization

The impact of the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings leads one to question why such transformative protests had not occurred before 2010. What happened in 2010 that instigated the protests of 2010-2011? In Tunisia, the lack of freedom, dignity, and equality played a significant role in the origin of the unrest. These conditions had existed long before 2010, but somehow, the long-held frustrations found a crack through which they could explode in the 2010-2011 protests (Tilly 1978, 7). Interaction and integration of the Tunisian nation with the developed part of the world-specifically Europe and the United States- played an indispensable role to foster the 2010-2011 uprisings.

Globalization has transcended geographic, social, and cultural boundaries across the entire world. The new global village facilitated new avenues for learning, communicating, and co-operating with each other. The Internet played an important role in this tremendous shift. As Hillary Rodham Clinton (2011) stated, the Internet provides a singular space “where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and ideas” (Diamond 2010, 82). More importantly, with the end of the Cold War, U.S. and Europe backed democratization and human rights became the dominant value of a new global order (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015, 11). MENA region was not irresponsible to that transformation as well.

As Table V.V indicates, in the Middle East, internet use increased significantly between 2000 and 2008. This freedom that access to the internet created challenges for anti-democratic structures (Lynch 2011). For example, Facebook had over 21 million Arab users by 2011 (Arab Social Media Report 2011).

Table V.V: Internet Penetration in the Middle East

Region	Internet usage in 2000	Internet usage in 2008
Middle East	3,284,800	41,939,200

Source: Internet World Stats, 2012. Retrieved May 22, 2014.

Satellite television played another prominent role in globalization, particularly the news channel Al-Jazeera. As Pargeter stated, “Globalization has seen the spread of satellite television, which for those in the shanty towns and popular neighbourhoods is often the only way of connecting to the outside world” (Pargeter 2009, 1013). By 2009, between 10 to 15% of Arabs in the Middle East regularly watched satellite television (Alterman 1998, 15). Through this outlet, Tunisians became aware of global developments related to social, political and economic rights. Al-Jazeera became an opponent of Ben Ali, and transmitted several broadcasts in Arabic and English that

spoke against Ben Ali and his government (Achcar 2013, Aday et al. 2012, 76). As a result, Ben Ali shut down Al-Jazeera many times during his reign (Aday et al. 2012, 76).

In Tunisia, the Ministry of Information strictly controlled the country's media and communication outlets, which Ben Ali's relatives and friends mostly dominated:

“The process for granting licenses to private media (including Hannibal-TV, Nessma-TV Mosaïque- FM, Jawhra-FM, Shems-FM, and Express-FM) was largely opaque, which created a strong barrier to the development of the broadcasting sector. All licenses had to be authorized by the Minister of Information.” (Chakchouk et al. 2013, 579)

This censorship compelled the people to organize through online social and digital media tools. Hussain and Howard explained that “when physical spaces for public conversation and debated closed down, the internet provided virtual spaces for political communication” (Hussain and Howard 2013, x).

During the 2011 uprising, the Tunisian government banned Facebook, Twitter, Daily Motion, YouTube, and many other video and social media outlets (Hussain and Howard 2013, x). In 2010, more than 6.2 million Tunisians, using their cell phones and smartphones (Haugbolle 2013, 168), broke the ban to communicate with each other and organize the demonstrations.

Economic investments and partnerships also played an important role on Tunisia's global connections. Foreign direct investments (FDI) were taking the big part of GDP for the MENA region (see Figure V.VIII). In 2010, Tunisia's inflow of FDI was \$1.51 billion (2.2 billion Tunisian dinars-TND) (United Nations 2012, 1). Although the numbers were high, in 2010, FDI inflows were substantially lower than the average for the period from 2005 to 2009, which exceeded \$2 billion (United


Nations 2012, 1). Inflows to Tunisia had been on a downward trend since 2008 because of economic stagnation in Europe. EU countries accounted for two thirds of FDI inflows in 2010, and the United Kingdom, Italy and France became the three largest source countries (United Nations 2012, 1).

In 1996, Tunisia signed an agreement with the EU to remove all tariff and trade barriers by 2008 (Migdalovitz 2009, 7). In the early 2000s, more than 75% of the Tunisian trade was with the EU (World Bank, 2004), and more than 55% was with France and Italy (World Bank Group 2014, 14).²⁰ This foreign involvement increased mutual interactions between different societies and different cultures. Such cooperation led to the contagious and progressive penetration of the modern world into Tunisia (Kubicek 2003, Pridham 2005).

The migration of Tunisians to the countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) served as another link that constructed bridges between Tunisia, the Western world, and the European states (African Development Bank Group and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2008). Many people migrated to these states for work and school (see Table V.VI). For example, the number of Tunisians in France numbered about 600,000, as of 2010 (Kallander 2013, 117).

²⁰ The exports were largely dominated by low-value added activity that was assembling foreign made inputs for exports (World Bank Group 2014, 14-15).

Figure V.VIII: FDI Flows to Tunisia (\$)



Source: “Foreign Direct Investments,” data.worldbank.org. Retrieved June 12, 2013.
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD/countries?page=1>.

Table V.VI: Migration from Tunisia to Europe

Country of residence	2001	2009
France	470, 459	598,500
Italy	78, 581	152, 700
Germany	44, 143	85, 500
Rest of the Europe	49,358	74,700
Total Europe	642,541	911,400

Source: Migration Policy Centre 2013.

Interactions between the Western and Tunisian societies encouraged Tunisians to desire the conditions that citizens of the developed world enjoyed. It was similar to Gorbachev’s glasnost policy and the fall of the iron clad of the communism in the Soviet Union.

In sum, globalization linked Tunisians with the developed world and led them to desire an existence that mirrored that of their counterparts in the developed world, with all of the rights available to citizens of modern democratic societies. Their frustration with the lack of freedoms in Tunisia grew until it exploded into the 2010 protests:

“In an era of globalization, with its feature of ‘time–space compression’, such diffusion processes are especially rapid and arguably more effective than in earlier periods or waves of democratization. Thus, whole countries may be influenced through diffusion processes. Citizens in one country can be inspired by movements and processes in other countries.” (Moghadam 2013, 395)

In this section, I explained the basic factors and scenarios that led to the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings in 2010-2011. Exclusive social and economic growth, high levels of literacy, educated but unemployed youth, an anti-democratic political structure, and globalization were all driving forces behind the protests.

Ben Ali’s government lacked two important characteristics: effectiveness and legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of the Tunisian people (Goldstone 2001, 148), and the people quickly grew tired of the blatant corruption. The self-immolation of Mohammed Bouzazi was the match that lit the fire of their pent-up frustrations. The actions of Bouzazi resonated with millions of people.

Moghadam (2013) provides a thought-provoking summary of the reasons for the Arab uprisings throughout the MENA region (to include Tunisia):

“These [endogenous factors] include the rise of an educated middle class and a ‘youth bulge’; grievances over widespread corruption, unemployment, and the high cost of living (attributed by many to the effects of government policies of privatization and liberalization), along with human rights violations; a

citizenry, including the large population of young people, outraged over the above but with access to the Internet for purposes of information-sharing and coordination of protest activity.” (Moghadam 2013, 398)

She continued,

“Exogenous factors include the effects of the global neoliberal policy framework; transnational links via social media networks to such groups as the Serbian youth protest group Otpor and the writings of Gene Sharp (especially relevant to Egypt’s youth protestors); the WikiLeaks revelations (which included information on the corruption of Tunisia’s first family); and the global diffusion of the democracy frame through social networks and international funding agencies.” (Moghadam 2013, 398-399)

V.IV Conclusion

In this chapter, I explained the historical genesis of the Tunisian uprisings, as the 2010-2011 protests did not occur independently of the context within which they took place. Rather, the outrage against Ben Ali and his regime resulted in the frustrations that led to the protests. The chapter also included a discussion of political and military structures and the role these structures played in the Arab uprising. Understanding Tunisia’s history provides clarity about the environment that produced the nation’s uprisings. This contextual information also aids in understanding the factors that influenced the military’s role in the uprisings.

The 2010-2011 public-led uprisings revolutionized the prolonged status quo in the MENA region. The following conditions played a significant role in the “revolutionary infrastructure” that resulted in Tunisia in the 2010-2011 uprisings (Khatib and Lust 2014b, 3). First of all, exclusive social and economic growth. Secondly, anti-democratic political structure. Lastly, globalization.

The next chapter will explore the key actors and factors of the Tunisian uprisings. The chapter continues the discussion of the Tunisian uprisings and the role of the military in the protests.

Chapter VI

Towards a Conceptual Framework of Actors and Factors Involved in the Tunisian Uprisings

VI.I Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explained the causes of the Tunisian uprisings by shedding light on the political, economic, and social structures that existed in Tunisia at the time of the protests. In this chapter, I examine the Tunisian uprisings through the lens of the actors and factors that played a significant role in the uprising. While my research focuses on three specific contributing factors—energy resource, military structure, and protests’ strength —examining the key actors who contributed to and drove the factors that shaped the uprising is important in terms of understanding the role of the military. Understanding the motivation and role of these key actors contributes to my theoretical framework and aids in the overarching analysis of how the three aforementioned factors influenced the military’s action during the 2010-2011 uprisings.

In addition, I examine how the factors contributed to the 2010-2011 uprisings and influenced the role of the military. I explain them to avoid my research from contributing factor selection bias by focusing only three factors in the following chapters. To extend that, I explore the other factors that contributed the military’s behavior in Tunisia. However, I do focus primarily on the role of energy resources, military structure, and protests’ strength because these three factors had the greatest impact on the military at the time of 2010-2011 uprisings (see Chapter X and XI).

While I do not examine all actors and factors of note in this chapter, I do select key players and elements that are relevant to my research. In brief, this chapter aims to demonstrate the extent to which the actors and factors influenced on the role of the military.

In this chapter, I first focus on the actors who contributed to the Arab uprisings and to the role of the military. I then explore the factors relevant to the uprisings of 2010-2011 and the correlation between these factors and the military's behavior during the conflict.

VII.II Actors

The actors who started, maintained, and concluded the 2010-2011 protests with a revolution are the other complementary part of the Tunisian uprisings. Protestors' anti-government action and reactions to that from state rulers and security-military actors, furthermore, non-governmental organizations' (NGO) and international players' stance all together formed the road map of the revolution.

VI.II.I First Protestor Mohammed Bouazizi

Twenty-six-year-old vendor Muhammed Bouazizi ignited the revolution by setting himself on fire on December 17, 2010; he died on January 4, 2011 (Way 2011). The extreme reaction from a young Tunisian, at first glance, seemed to be a rebellion against the police forces' unfair approach to him. According to his relatives and friends, the police frequently asked him for bribes (Beaumont 2011b). Once Bouazizi refused to pay the bribes, they confiscated his handcart (Goodwin 2011). He appealed to Tunisian officials to get back his cart, but government officers rejected his request with slap²¹ (Beaumont 2011b). Thereafter, he voiced his protest of the government's unbending response by burning himself in front of the municipal

²¹ Jeremy Bowen claims that, "Bouzazi had been slapped by Feyda Hamdi, the only woman on the inspection team" (Bowen 2012, 36). However, Feyda Hamdi rejected that claim by saying, "We confiscated the box of fruit...[But] Nobody beat him" (Bowen 2012, 37).

building in a small city, Sidi Bouzid. This action opened the gate for the Tunisian people's pent-up frustrations. The Tunisians' dissatisfaction and discontent exploded into a full-fledged protest at the cost of Bouazizi's life.

Bouzazi represented an important figure for both Tunisia and the entire repressed Arab population for a number of reasons. First, he was a young and belonged to a lower economic class. His mother said, "We are poor people in Sidi Bouzid. We do not have money but we have our dignity, and his dignity was taken away with that slap and those wrong words" (Beaumont 2011b). In addition, because of the financial problems, he had to quit high school to help support his family. His mother explained, "He had that dream himself when he was younger but he had a brother and sisters to support, so he quit school at 18 to work" (Beaumont 2011b). Lastly, he was a frequent victim of the exclusive and corrupt Tunisian government, which forced merchants to pay bribes to its officials (Lutterbeck 2015).

Bouazizi's actions resonated among the millions of young, uneducated, humiliated, and poor Tunisians. More importantly, he was an anti-government protestor without having any secular, religious, Shia, or Sunni affiliations (Beaumont 2011b). As a result, many Arabs related to his plight, and the loss of his life incited millions of Arabs to action. A "sense of interconnectedness" and "emulation of prior action" caused the millions of Tunisian and Arab people to jump on the bandwagon and take part in the protests (Beissinger 2007, 263). The actions of Bouzazi was truly the incarnation of collective will for justice, dignity, freedom, equality, and welfare.

VI.II.II President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali

As mentioned previously, Ben Ali became president of Tunisia in 1987 after deposing the Tunisian republic's first president, Habib Bourguiba, by proving that he was medically incapable of serving in the role. Ben Ali, like his predecessor, did not

have a strong military background (see Table VI.I). Bourguiba was a lawyer before he ascended to the presidency, and Ben Ali worked in intelligence services instead of in the regular armed forces (Lutterbeck 2015, 4-5).

Table VI.I: Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s Rise to the Presidency

Ben Ali’s Ascent to Presidency	Year
Head of the Military Intelligence Department	1964-1974
Military Attaché	1974-1977
Director of National Security	1977-1980, 1984-1985
Ambassador	1980-1984
Minister of Interior	1985-1987
Prime Minister	October 1987-November 1987
President	1987-1989 (Acting) (Ascended by a Bloodless Coup D’état) 1989-2011 (Ousted by a Pro-Democratic Revolution)

Source: Jebnoun 2014, pp. 300-301.

Ben Ali’s lack of military experience distinguished him from the rest of the region’s leaders because he did not feel indebted to the military, and he did not believe that he had to share his power with the military to remain in the presidency. Tunisia was not a military-backed state like Egypt and Algeria (Volpi 2013, Cook 2012). On the contrary, Ben Ali had witnessed military coups in neighbouring states, and he decided to adopt a coup-proofing strategy by creating a small military force, like Bourguiba. He also created a security apparatus as an alternative to the military structure.

“Ben Ali’s approach to managing the military involved two complementary tactics. First, it involved marginalizing his military leaders’ roles in state institutions and limiting the organisation’s and its officers’ access to resources.

Ben Ali kept the military small and poorly funded, limiting its leaders’

opportunities for personal enrichment or influence in political networks and regime institutions. Second, and related, Ben Ali's approach involved maintaining a division of labour in which the task of regime security would fall to forces under control of the Ministry of Interior and its constituent components, while the military would be largely excluded from daily security roles." (Brooks 2013, 208)

Ben Ali was a strong pro-Western political leader. Throughout his rule, Tunisia maintained strong relationships with the United States and the members of the EU, particularly with France. There were two reasons for Ben Ali's fruitful relationship with Europe and the US. First, Ben Ali was a pro-Western leader, and did not put his support behind Russia and Iran. Second, Ben Ali was a pro-secular, pro-liberal, anti-Islamist leader who was not also a pan-Arabist (el-Khawas 2012, Pargeter 2009). As a result, he excluded the moderate Islamist movement, Al-Nahda, from the political arena. Furthermore, in 2006, he became the only Arab leader to ban headscarves in public spaces (Migdalovitz 2009, 4). Ben Ali's pro-secular and pro-western portfolio helped him to become a strong ally of the Western world. Boukhars explained, "Ben Ali, like Bourguiba, portrayed Islamists as dangerous reactionaries who manipulated religious symbols to exploit the gullibility of the poor, uneducated, and misinformed" (Boukhars 2014, 5).

Because of this strong relationship, the EU and the US provided huge economic assistance to Tunisia (see Table VI.II). Tunisia was not as energy rich as the Gulf States or its neighbours, Libya and Algeria. However, because of its strategic position and geographical proximity to Europe and the Mediterranean, the EU received 75% of Tunisia's foreign trade (Noi 2013, 116). In essence, the EU and the US provided economic support to establish a stable and trusted ally in the region.

These relationships and the resulting international fiscal support was one of the prominent reasons for the robustness of the long-term Ben Ali government repression in Tunisia (Bellin 2004).

Table VI.II: Tunisia's Net Receipts of External Financial Resources (1990-2001 yearly averages)

	<i>1990-1991</i>		<i>1991-1995</i>		<i>1996-2001</i>	
	\$m	%	\$m	%	\$m	%
Total receipts, net ²²	689	100	762	100	315	100
IBRD ²³	33	5	48	6	18	3
EC/EU	347	50	280	37	413	67
France	98	14	64	8	132	21
Germany	26	4	26	4	23	4
Japan	100	15	100	13	100	16
United States	62	9	128	17	-4	-1
Arab countries and agencies	3	0	17	2	-10	-2

Source: World Bank 2004. Retrieved May 14, 2011.

During the Arab uprisings, Ben Ali initially wanted to end the protests using brute force. On December 20th, Ben Ali “branded the demonstrators as ‘terrorists’ and ‘thugs’ and the police were ordered to open fire on them” (Murphy 2011, 300). However, as the protests intensified, Ben Ali changed his strategy by trying to offer incentives to the protestors.²⁴ He promised to create 300,000 new jobs and replaced his Ministers of Communication, Trade, Handicrafts, and Religious Affairs on December 29th and the Minister of Interior Rafik Belhaj Kacem on January 12th as a compromising step (Arabiya 2010, Byrne and Khalaf 2011, Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 7, Murphy 2011, 301). Meanwhile, he warned the rioters, once again, “The law will be applied in all firmness” (Borger 2010).

²² Both official and private flows, from all sources, excluding the Islamic Development Bank

²³ IBRD refers to International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

²⁴ That is defined as ‘smart power’ combine hard and soft power resources (Nye 2004).

In the following days, Ben Ali offered many more concessions in an effort to end the protests. After reshuffling his cabinet, he also promised not to run for the coming presidential elections in 2014 (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 7). Furthermore, on January 13th, he announced that he would lift all censorship on Internet sites (Kerrou 2013, 46). This move proved to be a strategic mistake, as it only served to encourage and organize the protesters to continue their demonstrations (Interview with Ayari 2015a). None of Ben Ali's efforts convinced the protesters to end their campaign. On the contrary, his dismissal of the Minister of the Interior generated fear among many security officials, particularly the security forces that worked with the Ministry of Interior. "Ben Ali made a big mistake and changed the Minister of the Interior Kacem on Jan 12 that scared other ministers and many people from the Ministry of Interior. They [security forces under the Ministry of Interior] handed their weapons to the army" (Interview with Air Force Colonel 2015).

Tunisia's chief of presidential security forces, Ali Seriati, explained to Ben Ali the precarious nature of security in Tunis and at the presidential palace in Carthage. Ben Ali ordered General Ammar to serve as general coordinator of the both security forces under the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior and left Tunisia on January 14, 2011 at 17:48 pm (Interview with Air Force Colonel 2015).

"Seriati told Ben Ali he should leave. There was a rumour on January 14 around 10 am some young people were coming to fire his family's houses. Military, police, presidential guards understood Ben Ali had to leave to calm the people." (Interview with Nasr 2015)

In addition, a number of my interviewees provided the following statements:

"Ben Ali took his wife, son and daughter with him to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011. He only planned to go to Saudi Arabia not anywhere else. Trying

other places, such as Malta and France claimed by pilot but not confirmed. Ben Ali planned to return back that is why he told the pilot to stay there but the Minister of Defence Grira told the pilot on the night of January 14 to return Tunisia without getting President.” (Interview with Air Force Colonel 2015, Interview with Jeridi 2015, Interview with Chabir 2015)

VI.II.III Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi²⁵

Ghannouchi assumed the ministry under the Ben Ali term from 1989 to 2011. During the uprisings, he was the Prime Minister of Tunisia. He played an important role during the Tunisian revolution because Ghannouchi took over the presidency shortly after Ben Ali left his administration. Ghannouchi delivered the following statement the day that Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia:

“Citizens, men and women! In accordance with the provisions of chapter 56 of the constitution, which stipulates that in case of the impossibility of the president to conduct his duties temporarily, he would delegate his prerogatives to the prime minister. Given the difficulty for the president of the republic to carry out his duties temporarily, I will, starting from now, exercise the prerogatives of the president of the republic.” (BBC 2011c)

In addition, Ghannouchi was on the council that made decision to call Ben Ali’s plane back from Saudi Arabia without Ben Ali (Interview with Chabir 2015, Interview with Jeridi 2015). Moreover, Ghannouchi seemed a more compromising and popular leader in the eyes of Tunisians than was Ben Ali. According to 2006 WikiLeaks records,

“[The length] of his service as PM also suggests Ben Ali does not view him as a threat and he is unlikely to be viewed as a qualified successor. However,

²⁵ Mohammed Ghannouchi had no blood relation with Rached Ghannouchi. The same family names are all coincidence.

average Tunisians generally view him with respect and he is well liked in comparison to other GOT [Government of Tunisia] and RCD [ruling party] officials.” (Guardian 2011)

Ghannouchi enforced laws and one day later, on January 15th, gave the presidency over to the head of parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, and returned to his previous position as prime minister (Murphy 2011, el-Khawas 2012). However, the post-Ben Ali term undermined Ghannouchi’s popularity. Even though, he seemed more open to reform than Ben Ali, the Tunisian protestors were unhappy with him as well. The large protests, labelled the *Kasbah 1-2* protests, at Kasbah (the Old City) were to include many ministries including prime minister- called Ghannouchi as “Mr. Oui Oui” because of his long service to Ben Ali (Hounshell 2011, Kerrou 2013, 43). The protests forced Ghannouchi to resign as prime minister of the post-Ben Ali term on Feb 27, 2011 (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 15).

VI.II.IV General Rachid Ammar

General Ammar became chief of the staff of the Tunisian army in 2002. Ben Ali promoted him to this position after the death of Abdelaziz Skik and 12 top military officials in an unsolved helicopter crash in 2002 (Jebnoun 2014, 7). Skik was a respected and a highly prestigious person, and many people saw him as a strong alternative to Ben Ali because they were not close allies. No one can say whether Ben Ali was responsible for the crash (Parsons and Taylor 2011, 12), but he trusted general Ammar’s loyalty and promoted him to the chief position. General Ammar also remained loyal to the civilian authority’s orders. The point is argued that the military tolerated rather than supported Ben Ali, like the Portuguese army during the Salazar regime (Porch 1977, 23). This claim has not been substantiated. If true, it would help to explain why the military deserted Ben Ali during the uprising.

During the uprisings, Ammar showed his loyalty Ben Ali by deploying military forces as a defensive intervention on the January 9th, the third week of the uprisings (Albrecht and Bishara 2011). Military forces protected government buildings from the protestors' attacks, but they did not strike out at the protestors to defend the buildings. They played the role of a mediator between the police forces and the protestors (Interview with Chabir 2015). However, according to research participants who had fair to good relationships with Ammar, confirmed that Ben Ali never gave a direct order for Ammar to shoot protestors (Interview with Chabir 2015, Interview with Nasr 2015, Interview with Manceur 2015 , Interview with Jeridi 2015). Either way, General Ammar issued a cable to the Tunisian army mandating that no soldier was allowed to shoot any protestors without an order from the top commander of the military (Interview with Nasr 2015, Jebnoun 2014, 305). Researchers have claimed, however, that Ben Ali did, in fact, give such an order to his police forces (Byrne and Khalaf 2011).

The military also played an important role after Ben Ali's regime imposed a curfew on January 12 that the protestors blatantly defied (Murphy 2011, 301). The military could have shot the protestors pouring into the streets for their defiance against the president's order. Since, as stated before, according to the Tunisian constitution the president was the head of armed forces (Article 44). However, the military did not shoot at protestors for the sake of the president's decision.

“[The army] sometimes played a mediating role between people and police forces, but it was not against people or police. That avoided many killings. Police and military forces worked together, side-by-side, but daily problems are the responsibility of police forces, not army. In 2010-2011, [the] police

[were], alone, unable to end [the] protests. That is why [the] army helped [the] police forces.” (Interview with Chabir 2015)

Ammar stated in an interview with Nouredine Jebnoun that he refused the request from Ben Ali’s head of security Ali Seriati to protect the Trabelsi family’s homes, saying that their duty was the protection of state buildings and public places, not private residences (Jebnoun 2014). His response was an important sign of defection against Ben Ali’s security chief. Last, General Ammar did not comply with President Ben Ali’s order via the Defence Minister Grira to rescue the Trabelsi family members in the Carthage airport from the BAT’s arrest using any means, including live ammunition and killing the BAT officials (Jebnoun 2014, 307). Rather, Ammar chose the more secure but longer way that was negotiation with BAT.

Despite the aforementioned tensions established flaws between the Ben Ali regime and the military, this was not perceived as a disloyalty to Ben Ali. Ben Ali charged General Ammar to the coordinator of security forces and armed forces from Ministry of Interior on Jan 14 at 2pm, and Director of Military Security Ahmed Chabir took Ammar’s position temporarily in the Ministry of Defence until Feb 2nd, 2011 (Interview with Chabir 2015). In contrast to the rumour that Ben Ali replaced General Ammar with the director of military security, Ahmed Chabir, sent General Ammar to home prison, General Ammar stayed in the Ministry of Interior after Ben Ali left, and he was one of the council members that made the decision to call Ben Ali’s plane back from Saudi Arabia without Ben Ali (Interview with Jeridi 2015, Interview with Chabir 2015). General Ammar was promoted to the chief of the Tunisian armed forces by the interim government in April 2011 (Jebnoun 2014, 313).²⁶

²⁶ That was an exceptional position for General Ammar, because there was no such position before that date; and there has been no such position since General Ammar’s retirement after June 2013. Three

Even though Ben Ali left the presidency, the protests did not immediately come to a stop. On January 24th, General Ammar gave a speech to quell the demonstrations. He stated, “Our revolution is your revolution. We will protect your revolution.”²⁷ The post-Ben Ali term represented a substantial term to test the Tunisian military’s reaction to the new order, and it confirmed that the Tunisian military wanted to stay out of the political realm as long as politics did not work in contradiction to the wellbeing of the Tunisian nation. On a June 24th television interview in 2013, Ammar said, “On January 15, 2011, I was called to become the president, but I refused for the sake of my country.”²⁸ Interviews with respondents also strengthened the probability of call by people for army involvement into the power after Ben Ali. “Presidential Guard Sik Salim asked Rachid Ammar to come [to] Carthage place to protect them because he was afraid of [being killed] by protestors, but Ammar said, ‘No.’ And Salim enforced constitution” (Interview with Nasr 2015). Chabir stated, “Sik Salim called Ammar come to the Carthage palace. Maybe, Salim thought Ammar should be in the same picture with Mebazaa, Ghannouchi and Kallel. But Ammar said he could not come without getting order from the Ministry of Defence” (Interview with Chabir 2015).

In addition, in the 2011 parliamentary elections, long-term (22 years) exiled leader Rashid al-Ghannouchi returned to Tunisia, and his moderate Islamist party, Al-Nahda, won the parliamentary elections. While Al-Nahda’s candidate, Hamadi Jebali, assumed the prime minister’s office, Congress for the Republic’s (CPR) leader,

chiefs of army, navy, and air forces exist separately under the command of the Ministry of Defence (Interview with Nasr 2015).

²⁷ Rached Ammar: Tunisia’s Army will protect Revolution, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AsHs-Kn--oc#t=11> (Accessed March 18, 2013).

²⁸ Rached Ammar’s TV programme, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rEYzxSHFd4M> (Accessed September 7, 2014).

Moncef Marzouki, became president of the Tunisian Republic (Arief 2012). All of these developments are milestones of the post-revolution era, because the Tunisian military has been on the side of the secular side of Tunisia, while Al-Nahda has represented a moderate Islamist movement. The army had an interesting reaction, because they could have rescinded the election results or requested a re-election. Contrary to such expectations, the military respected the voting results and retreated to their barracks. Islamist militants on the border of Algeria, close to Mount Chaambi, also served as a distraction for the Tunisian military (Interview with Willis 2015). For example, on the July 16, 2014, 15 Tunisian soldiers were killed and 20 soldiers were injured near Mount Chaambi (Blioua 2014). Meanwhile, Rashid al-Ghannouchi, made it clear that “his party did not want a Khomeini-type religious state; he favoured a non-religious and civil state” (Bayat 2013, 591).

In sum, General Ammar played a prominent role in the uprisings in Tunisia. He stood his moral ground and refused to compromise his standards or those of the military. Had he made different choices, there could have been dissension within the military similar to the split that occurred in Libya during the uprisings. The strong solidarity of the Tunisian military was demonstrative of their institutional form (Lutterbeck 2011, 22). The state’s armed forces determined its *raison d’être* to be the protection of Tunisian state, not a specific regime or ruler. The military also stayed away from politics and respected the people’s election results after Ben Ali left the country. In June 2013, General Ammar announced his retirement (Al-Arabiya 2013).

VI.II.V Samir Tarhouni

Samir Tarhouni was the chief of the Anti-Terrorism Brigade (BAT) and captured the Trabelsi family and Ben Ali’s daughter at the National airport at Tunis-Carthage when they were trying to leave Tunisia on January 14 (Tarhouni 2014).

Tarhouni released Ben Ali's daughter Shirin from his first wife Na'ima el-Kafy (Mirak-Weissbach 2012) without giving a reason (Interview with Air Force Colonel 2015, Ben Ghazi 2011). Tarhouni also refused the Minister of the Interior's order to release the people (Ben Ghazi 2011).

This arrest and subsequent insubordination ultimately led to the defection of the security forces under the Interior Ministry (Pachon 2014, 11-12). That unprecedented development also prompted Ben Ali and his second wife, Leila Trabelsi, to leave Tunisia on that day. Tarhouni handed over the Trabelsi family to the air force colonel, Elyas M'nakbi, after the Defence Minister Grira's order via Chief of Air Force Taieb Lajimi (Interview with Air Force Colonel 2015). After the revolution, Colonel Mohamad Arfaoui replaced Tarhouni, who received a promotion from the Ministry of the Interior.

VI.II.VI General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT)

The General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) was an exceptional feature of the Tunisian society, as well as the other MENA states. The union was originally founded in 1946 to combat French colonialism (Yousfi 2015, 320). Over the years, it has advanced to become a nationwide defender of its workers, and includes 24 regional unions, 19 labour federations, and 21 general unions (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 13). Even though, initially, the UGTT cooperated with ruling power, the 1978 general strike became a vital point in the evolution of its mission.

“As long as the party and the union agreed on a definition of national development, cooperation was taken for granted. Yet whenever national development threatened the interests of the working class, cooperation was replaced by a conflict so sharp that the party risked losing its hegemony to the union. When in 1969 modernization broke down with the failure of the party's

socialist experiment in guided economics and its return to laissez-faire policies, the union began to reassert its traditional distance. The union resorted to a general strike on January 26, 1978, which ended permanently its alliance with the state.” (Ware 1985, 32-33)

During the 2010-2011 uprising, the UGTT represented the strongest labour union, with its more than 500,000 members (International Trade Union Confederation, 2013). The strength of the UGTT came from its large numbers and its well-educated members, which included teachers, lawyers, and doctors. Despite some divisions that occurred between the top leadership and the rest of the union as the Arab uprisings began, the UGTT eventually developed a strong stance against Ben Ali (Zemni 2013, 140). UGTT members played a key role in the uprisings, as it was the union’s members that decided to stage a strike in the stronghold of the UGTT city of Sfax, close to Sidi Bouzid, where the first protests began (Interview with Aouadi 2015, Interview with Eyewitness Expert 2015).

Nabil Haouachi, a representative of the teachers’ union within the UGTT, stated, “We support the demands of the people. The UGTT will never abandon the people in their struggle to demolish the old regime” (Al-Jazeera 2011a). Syed asserted, “The revolution was fortified when UGTT joined it. On January 14, UGTT had given a call for national strike. That day, Ben Ali stepped down” (Syed 2013, 7). This strike was, by no means, the only reason for Ben Ali’s decision, but it played quite a significant role in that result.

Former executive member and secretary general of the university section of the UGTT (as of 2010-2011), Sami Aouadi, provided the following statement during our interview, “Secretary Abdesselam Jarad [at the time of protests] signed [papers] in terms of supporting protests. But it was sectorial and regional. Who says UGTT did

not support protesters are ex-Ben Ali term members or Islamists” (Interview with Aouadi 2015). He underscored the importance of the UGTT’s role during the 2008 Gafsa protests, and explained, “UGTT were protesting Ben Ali from the 2008 Gafsa protests, but leadership was afraid of Ben Ali. Regional and local sectors of UGTT supported the 2010-2011 protests. After Dec 17, UGTT members organized regional strikes in Tunisia. In Tunis, UGTT organized strikes after Jan 11, 2011” (Interview with Aouadi 2015).

The UGTT also had a significant impact in the post-Ben Ali era. First, the UGTT refused to support the RCD-led government formed immediately in the wake of Ben Ali’s deposition, and they participated in the Kasbah 1 and 2 protests (Kerrou 2013, 50). Second, once the political groups had reached a political impasse because of the two assassinations of political figures from the secular opposing group in February and July 2013, UGTT served as a mediator between the Islamist and secular sides of the conflict (Rowse 2015). In mid-September of 2013, the UGTT led four civil society groups²⁹, so called Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, submitted a new road map with goals that included a new constitution, appointment of a new prime minister, and new electoral laws (Sweeney 2013, Rowse 2015). The roadmap was widely accepted by the most of the political parties. This situation demonstrated once again how UGTT had a prominent power within the Tunisian political arena.

VI.II.VII Sami Sik Selim

Sik Selim worked in the presidential guards under Ben Ali’s chief of presidential guards, Ali Serati. His most significant role during the uprisings was that he called the President of the Chamber of Deputies Fouad Mebazaa, Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi, and President of the Chamber of Advisors Abdullah Kallel

²⁹ The other unions were Union of Industry and Trade, Lawyers Union, Tunisian League for Defence of Human Rights (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 145).

to enforce the constitution once he had been informed Ben Ali flew to Saudi Arabia (Interview with Jeridi 2015, Interview with Air Force Colonel 2015). Indeed, he obliged them to come to the presidential palace (Interview with Jeridi 2015). In the palace, they made a video in which Ghannouchi read the 56 chapters of the constitution, along with Mebazaa and Kallel, and declared that Ben Ali had left the state and his presidency.

The state leaders broadcasted the video on the Tunisian state channel immediately on January 14, 2011. According to one respondent, Seriati was arrested in the airport, but he used his second phone secretly and called Selim from the airport to tell him what he should do (Interview with Air Force Colonel 2015). Selim's actions prevented what would have been a power gap, military involvement, or even bloodshed, in Tunisia. At the time of this study, Sik Selim was still working at the presidential palace.

VI.II.VIII Acting President Fouad Mebazaa

On the day Ben Ali left Tunisia, Fouad Mebazaa, the head of the lower house of parliament, protected his position as head of parliament. More importantly, he sided with Prime Minister Ghannouchi to declare the abdication of Ben Ali and took a role in the council that decided not to call Ben Ali back from Saudi Arabia (Interview with Nasr 2015). Tunisia's constitutional court appointed Fouad Mebazaa as interim president of Tunisia one day later on January 15, 2011 (Murphy 2011). Mebazaa's role was ensuring a constitutional, transparent parliamentary election. To this end, the Tunisian parliament widened Mebazaa's power to expedite the post-revolution process (Arieff 2012). In brief, he was a caretaker during the precarious transformation term. More importantly, the interim government expected him to respect the election results and leave his presidency after the elections, because

according to the Tunisian constitution, the acting president could not become the elected president (Article 57).

He carried out these expectations as anticipated. He managed the transitional term with minimum cost and the general elections took place in October 2011. The banned parties, Al-Nahda and the Congress for the Republic (CPR), and many other leftist, socialist, and secular parties freely participated in the parliamentary elections (Hababou and Amrouche 2013). Mebazaa respected the parliamentary election results by passing his position to Marzouki, the leader of CPR, who the parliament elected in 2011 (Sharqieh 2013).

The first half of this chapter included an analysis of the key actors in the Tunisian uprisings and the role that they played in the conflict and its resolution. In the remainder of this chapter, I analyse the factors that had an impact on the protests.

VI.III Factors

Several key factors require an examination to develop a comprehensive understanding of the Tunisian revolution. In this context, I examine the legacy of the 2008 Gafsa mining protests, Ben Ali's response to the 2010-2011 protests, the media's facilitating role, the incompetence of the security forces, and the attitudes of the international players. These factors had a significant impact, not only on the Tunisian revolution of 2011, but also on the role of the military therein. Each factor was a key component of events before and during the revolution and thus relevant to my research on the role of the military.

VI.III.I Legacy of the 2008 Gafsa Mining Protest

The Gafsa mining protests started on January 5, 2008 and continued until June 2008 with different measures in the phosphate rich region Gafsa Mining Basin-cities, which included Redeyef, Moularet, M'dhila, and Metlaoui (Gobe 2010, 1). The main

reason for the protests was the high level of unemployment that exceeded 22.6% at that time (AfDB 2011, 3, el-Khawas 2012) and nepotism throughout the employment of mineworkers by the Gafsa Phosphate Company (GPC) (Schraeder and Redissi 2011). The local population rebelled against these inequitable employment conditions. The explosion point was the GPC's recruitment of 380 employees on January 5, 2008, which the local people perceived as unfair (Gobe 2010, 6-7). The UGTT's role remained limited, and they only actively supported protesters in the city of Redeyef (Gobe 2010, 17-18).

The protests took almost six months, and included hunger strikes and general strikes, but the influence of those efforts was restricted during these protests. The Tunisian authority did not allow media coverage, and as a result, the protests could not spread Tunisia across at that time (Migdalovitz 2009).

According to one interviewee, "Ben Ali government contained Gafsa protests within local region" (Interview with Benghazi 2015). Ben Ali's administration deployed the first police, and then army forces, to end the protests. Gobe stated,

"On June 6 in Redeyef, after the police announced the start of a curfew, they shoot without warning at a procession of demonstrators, killing young Hafnaoui Maghdhaoui, aged 25, and wounding 21 others, more or less seriously.³⁰ In order to guarantee the success of the repressive action, the army deploys on June 7 and takes hold of the major parts of the city." (Gobe 2010, 15)

The 2008 Gafsa revolt marked a milestone event in Tunisian history because the protestors saw that they could protest Ben Ali's regime, even though they had no outside support. For example, *Takriz*, an anti-Ben Ali "cyber think tank" founded in

³⁰ Three people killed by government's lethal measures during the Gafsa protests (Gall 2014).

1998, sent its members (also known as Taks) to establish networks with the activists in that local region during the protests (Pollock 2011). A second and more important lesson from the 2008 revolts was that the protests paid off, because Ben Ali dismissed the governor of Gafsa and the director general of the GPC. In addition, “[The] children of 60 company widows were promised employment as a result of the sit-in” (Green 2014). One of the chief advisors to the former president, Marzouki, stated in his interview with me that the “2008 Gafsa region protests were the beginning for 2011. People won against police forces for the first time. [The] army finished the 2008 protests, but [the] people saw that [the] protests worked” (Interview with Manceur 2015).

VI.III.II Unconvincing Response from the Ben Ali Regime

As stated earlier, Ben Ali’s administration initially responded to the unprecedented protests with force as they spread throughout Tunisia. The police force used live ammunition, rubber bullet, and tear gas to quell the unrest (Brooks 2013, 206). Their goal was to repress the protests at the local level before they moved to a national level. The strategy was ineffective, and their show of force received national attention. In his secondary response to the protests, Ben Ali attempted to use incentives. He visited the first protestor, Bouzazi, in the hospital,³¹ reshuffled his cabinet, offered new economic reforms, established a commission to investigate allegations of corruption,³² and even promised to leave the presidency after the 2014 elections (Syed 2013, 10).

None of these tactics worked, and the anti-government protests continued. The people’s negative response to Ben Ali’s efforts resulted from the government’s initial

³¹ According to some accounts, Ben Ali even offered Bouazizi’s family near 15,000 dollars (El Sakhawy 2015, 3).

³² He never mentioned Trabelsi family name. My interviewee said “if Ben Ali stated Trabelsi name, the result could have been different” (Interview with Jeridi 2015).

volatile and indiscriminate reaction that only served to increase solidarity among the protestors (Aday et al. 2012, 78). For example, security forces applied brute force in the cities of Kasserine and Tala, and more than 20 people were killed in the first days of the uprisings (Jebnoun 2014, 305, International Crisis Group 2011b, 5). According to the post-Ben Ali interim government, in total, 240 civilian protestors were killed and 1,464 injured throughout the uprisings (Human Rights Watch 2012).

However, repressive regimes, in general, remain in power by applying proactive and selective repression measures against protestors (Wiktorowicz 2004). Due to that such measures prevent oppositions from becoming larger and spreading towards uninvolved sides (Hafez 2003). Ben Ali's indiscriminate approach to the protestors increased the legitimacy of the protests, and the determination and unity among the protestors, at the national and international level.

As the protests continued, Ben Ali struggled to establish a balance between the use of hard and soft power resources. When he witnessed the unfavourable response to his show of force, he recognized the need for a different approach. On the twelfth day of the uprisings (December 28), he declared that only the protestors who used violence measures would be punished. These targets were the "minority of extremists and mercenaries who [resorted] to violence and disorder" (Borger 2010). Ironically, this tactical shift only encouraged the protestors to continue their efforts, as they saw the fruit of their labors.

After several strategic mistakes, Ben Ali eventually deployed military forces to end the protests, because the police forces became an inadequate stopgap to subdue the protestors. Once the military refused to crack down upon protesters using brute force, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia with his relatives to escape from the unrest (Interview with Nasr 2015).

VI.III.III The facilitating role of media

Television, the Internet, and mobile phone penetration played a very important role in terms of constituting common behavior and collective action among the restive Tunisian population. Khatib and Lust explained, “[A]ctivists carve out, sometimes unexpectedly, socio-political space to make demands. The nature of such public space is largely defined by pre-revolutionary structure. Certainly, social media was a public space that was largely left untouched by the authoritarian regimes” (Khatib and Lust 2014b, 3).

As Table VI.III shows, internet penetration in Tunisia has been on the rise in the years prior to the uprising. Additionally, the usage of mobile phones was at 95% in 2009 (York 2014, 12778). According to the Arab Barometer survey, 36% of participants in the Tunisian unrest reported that they used the Internet as a source of information during the protests (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015, 9). This easy global access led to increased attention and support from the rest of the world. One could claim that Ben Ali hesitated to employ a wide-ranging show of force against the protestors because of the world’s live access to the unfolding events.

Table VI.III: Internet Penetration in Tunisia


Year	Users	Population	% Penetration
2000	100,000	9,666,900	1.0 %
2006	953,000	10,228,253	9.3 %
2007	1,618,440	10,342,253	15.6 %
2008	1,765,430	10,383,57771	17.0 %

Source: Internet World Stats 2014. Retrieved June 10, 2014.

Twitter and Facebook also played a significant role. As Figure VI.I shows, in 2010, Facebook penetration in Tunisia was 17.5% or approximately 1,820,880


Tunians (Arab Social Media Report 2011). Foetus,³³ the chief technology officer of the Tunisian organization *Takriz*, stated, “Facebook is pretty much the GPS for this revolution” (Pollock 2011). Facebook became the “streetbook” of the Tunisian protestors (Garbaya 2011). The Tunisian revolution also became a trending topic on Twitter during the 2010-2011 uprisings (see Figure VI.II).

Figure VI.I: Number of Facebook Users in Tunisia



Source: Arab Social Media (ASM) Report 2011.

Figure VI.II: Number of Tweets in Tunisia 2011



³³ Foetus is the anonymous name because of security issues.

Source: “The Mena Protests on Twitter,” dfreelon.org. Retrieved May 10, 2014.
<http://www.dfreelon.org/2011/05/19/the-mena-protests-on-twitter-some-empirical-data/>.

Television usage was much higher than internet usage among the Tunisian demonstrators, 61% (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015, 9). Moreover, a 24-hour live broadcast by Al-Jazeera channel encouraged protestors to advance their efforts, since they recognized that the police force was less likely to use lethal force while the world was watching them (Shadid 2011, Achcar 2012). Simply, Al-Jazeera channel played the role of *international buy-in* (Hussain and Howard 2013, 26) that CNN played in the 1990s Gulf war, with one difference—Al-Jazeera supported one side of the Tunisian conflict over the other (Livingston 1997).

Media resonance helped the protests to spread quickly across the region. In summary, the impact of “liberation technology” (Diamond 2010) occurred as “promoting contentious collective action; limiting or enhancing the mechanisms of state repression; affecting international support for the regime; and affecting the overall control of the public sphere” (Lynch 2011, 4). Thus, it is important to acknowledge that social media and communications tools “provided the fundamental infrastructure for social movements and collective action” (Howard and Hussain 2013, 118). However, the role of the media was more of a facilitating role than one that helped to generate the uprisings (Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer 2013, 120, Kerrou 2013, 46, Aday et al. 2012).

VI.III.IV The incompetence of security forces

As stated above, Ben Ali created a police state in Tunisia (Henry and Springborg 2011, 133). That is why Ben Ali’s first reaction to the protests was to send the police forces and presidential guards to quell the unrest (Brooks 2013, 213). Both

of these security apparatuses seemed strong and loyal to the Ben Ali regime. If they could have handled the protests sufficiently, there might not have been a revolution. In spite of the large numbers and facilities they possessed, they were unable to keep the demonstration from growing. “One issue is the national police force’s lack of skill and preparation for the task at hand. Recruitment to the police in Tunisia operated effectively as a jobs program and rank and file recruits were generally poorly paid, trained and managed” (Brooks 2013, 218).

As previously stated, the Tunisian internal security forces and the military forces together quelled the 1978 and 1984 national strikes. However, the military sided with the opposite part of the police forces during the 2010-2011 uprisings that were protestors. In addition to this fundamental position change, the security forces’ brutal responses to the civilian protestors garnered the ire of the military. Al-Mahjubi (2011) said, “[The] repressive attitude of the Internal Security Forces in these regions led to clashes between the army and the riot police, especially in the town of Riqab in the Sidi Bouzid Governorate” (Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies 2011, 12).³⁴ The police and national guards did not want to clash with the military forces.

The military’s unexpected resistance to Ben Ali’s mandates worked for the protestors to cope with Ben Ali’s security forces. The Western states’ condemnation for the police force’s use of live ammunition also limited the guard’s ability to take decisive action against the protestors. Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon very clearly underlined this point, “The political situation is developing fast and every effort must be made by all concerned parties to establish dialogue and resolve problems peacefully to prevent further loss, violence and escalations” (BBC

³⁴ Key Moments in the Tunisian Protests- <http://observers.france24.com/content/20110114-videos-key-moments-tunisian-protests-ben-ali-citizen-journalism> (Accessed January 14, 2014).

2011a). The security forces feared being subject to Western sanctions, particularly because the Tunisian economy profoundly relied on these outside allies.

VI.III.V International players' support towards protestors

The EU and the US became the main suppliers of Tunisia's economic and armament needs. As mentioned above, the largest portion of the Tunisian trade took place with the EU. For example, in 2008, the EU partnered with 15 Mediterranean countries to found the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), which established a free trade agreement with European and North African states (European External Action Service 2013). The UfM helped to strengthen the mutual security and trade relationships between these regions. Despite the fact that Tunisia was a resource-poor state, its geographic position made the state a strategic partner for the EU and the US. The partnership was built upon mutual economic and security interests.

The MENA region has always been one of the most strategic locations for the US and its regional ally, Israel, and the events of 9/11 propelled the US to pay more attention than ever to the area. Meanwhile, the US-led intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan forced Al-Qaeda and other radical terrorist organizations to seek empty rooms in the MENA region to survive. Therefore, protecting the administration of the secular, Western-friendly Ben Ali was essential for the US. All involved parties benefitted from the partnership; while Ben Ali received economic assistance from the outside powers, the US and the EU fostered an ally against radical Islamists (Willis 2012).

Despite this symbiotic relationship, the 2010 unprecedented anti-government protests astonished the EU and the US. In response, then French Foreign Minister Michele Alliot-Marie offered Ben Ali security help to quell the protests in 2010-2011.

(Ramadan 2012, 24). The US, alternately, opted to take a more passive stance until they had a clear understanding of the protestors' agenda (Syed 2013, 11-12).

The EU and the US eventually recognized the determination of the protestors, and they declared their support for the pro-democratic demonstrations. This support did not manifest as a military intervention or the provision of weapons to protestors; rather, it took the form of the withdrawal of their support from Ben Ali. The US Ambassador to Tunis, Gordon Gray, then told Ben Ali that he had to leave his position of power without the option of exile to the US (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 14).

On January 14, 2011, US President Barack Obama declared, "I condemn and deplore the use of violence against citizens peacefully voicing their opinion in Tunisia, and I applaud the courage and dignity of the Tunisian people" (Arieff 2012, 7). On the same day, former President of France Nicolas Sarkozy stated "Only dialogue can bring a democratic and lasting solution to the current crisis" (Irish 2011). In addition, the EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, and Commissioner Stephen Fuele remarked, "We want to express our support and recognition to the Tunisian people and their democratic aspirations, which should be achieved in a peaceful way" (European External Action Service 2013). The important shift caused by this withdrawal of support encouraged the protestors and ultimately led to the end of the Ben Ali regime. The post revolution developments also support this claim.

After the Tunisian revolution, several of these international partners resumed their support of the state by committing a significant amount of funds to facilitate the transition process:

"Since the January 2011 revolution, the U.S. has committed more than \$350 million to support Tunisia's transition. U.S. assistance to Tunisia focuses on an array of targeted areas that include ensuring and enhancing internal and

external security, promoting democratic practices and good governance, and supporting sustainable economic growth.” (US Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 2013)

The World Bank provided two contributions of \$500 million, France gave €180 million, and the EU offered €100 million in foreign aid to Tunisia in 2011 (Marty-Gauquié 2013, 246). After helping to force Ben Ali to leave, they went back to work strengthening their ties with the state to protect their interests in the region. All of the aforementioned financial Western support to the post-Ben Ali (Al-Nahda led) government has also demonstrated the Western powers’ security and stability priority.

VI.IV Conclusion


The 2010-2011 uprisings in the Arab world generated dynamic but unprecedented outcomes in areas that were least likely to experience such public-led social movements because of the absence of a strong civil society, weak institutions, inept social mobilization capacity, coercive security apparatus, and international support for ruling powers (Bellin 2004, 139-145). Tunisia, in particular, underwent seismic shifts after the uprisings. The 2010-2011 uprisings and the deposition of Ben Ali became a landmark in the history of Tunisia.

In this chapter, I explored the actors and factors that played key roles in the revolutionary changes that took place during and after the Tunisian revolution. Bouazizi’s self-immolation constituted the explosion point, sparked the uprisings, and inspired millions of Tunisians to rise up in protest to the corrupt government structure. The aforementioned actors and factors played a significant role in both the protests and the subsequent outcomes of the demonstrations. If not for Ben Ali’s inadequate tactics to end the protests, General Ammar’s approach to the protesters, the role of

social media, and the stance of the US and the EU amid the protests, the demonstrations might have come to a completely different end.

This important point also should be stressed the reasons stated in the previous chapter, and actors and factors explained in this chapter were all interrelated in the sense of a positive or a negative way (see Figure VI.III). While some of the things became complementary, some of them contradicted one another. The big question that remains unanswered is whether the revolution process has ended in Tunisia, as of 2016. Tocqueville posited, “In a revolution, as in a novel, the most difficult part to invent is the end.”

Figure VI.III: The Nexus of Reasons, Actors, and Factors in the Tunisian Uprisings



In the next chapter, I examine the genesis of the Libyan uprisings. I apply the same structure to the Libyan case to demonstrate the differences between the two situations. The data that this process reveals provides clarity about why the military had varying responses in these two cases during the 2010-2011 uprisings.


Chapter VII

The Genesis of the Libyan Uprisings

VII.I Introduction

The first anti-Gaddafi protests began on Feb 15, 2011 in the eastern city al Bayda, and the nonviolent demonstrations continued in Benghazi (Kuperman 2013). However, the Gaddafi regime's brute show of force in reaction to the protests transformed the demonstrations into an armed struggle. Benghazi became the stronghold of the anti-Gaddafi forces, which spread across the nation in just a few weeks. While the Tunisian military forces exhibited a cohesive reaction to the protests, the Libyan military split into the two main factions: anti-Gaddafi and pro-Gaddafi forces. While the majority of the eastern Libyans fought against Gaddafi's loyal forces, a significant number of Libyans on the western side of the country (Tripoli and around) stayed with Gaddafi until the end. This split led to the NATO-backed civil war that lasted from February 2011 until Gaddafi's death in October 2011.

Figure VII.I: The timeline of the 2011 Libyan revolution



Source: Adapted from Albrecht and Bishara 2011.

Generally, the different historical roots and political culture in Tunisia and Libya led to the varying outcomes in each state during the 2010-2011 uprisings. More

specifically, (a) Libya's idiosyncratic state and political structure, (b) its lack of a professional and disintegrated army structure, (c) challenging geographic conditions, and (d) Gaddafi and his Azlam's (friends or men) strange ideological and practical state-building approaches all played a role in the unique actions of the military force in Libya. In stark contrast to Tunisia, Libya had rich natural resources, but "the absence of state bureaucracy [inhibited] the transfer of resource within society" (Anderson 1986, 274). After the regime change from Idris's kingdom to Gaddafi's state of the masses, Libya evolved from a "rentier monarchy to [a] distributive Jamahiriya" (Anderson 1986, 251).

"Unlike Tunisia, Libya came to independence without a stable state apparatus. In stark contrast to the Tunisian experience, Libya's history of independence witnessed little stable political activity on the basis of class or clientelism, despite the country's high level of integration into the world capitalist economy, and exhibited a consistent avoidance of bureaucratic state structures." (Anderson 1986, 251)

In this chapter, I examine the Libyan revolution, first, by exploring the political and military structure in the Gaddafi period. I then explain the key factors that paved the way for the uprisings in 2011: socio-economic and political exclusion, regional disparity, and aggressive foreign policy. This discussion of the conditions that led to the Libyan protests helps to provide context for the role that the military played during the uprisings.

VII.II Libya: Politics and the Military

At the time of the uprisings, Libya had no state traditions and lacked well-designed state institutions. While Gaddafi was an eccentric leader because of his idiosyncratic ideology—Jamahiriya, *state of masses* (Joffe 2011a)—he also

established this small nation- around 6.1 million population (Lutterbeck 2011, 32)- that relied upon tribal links instead of institutions. There was also no separation of executive, legislative, or judicial powers. Colonel Gaddafi (officially brother leader) and his relatives and friends were the ruling power of Libya (Pargeter 2012).

A period of Italian colonialism following the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the British ruling period after the World War II prevented Libya from establishing a strong and deep state tradition. Under the Ottoman Empire, Libya divided into three provinces: Cyrenaica (East), Tripolitania (West) and Fezzan (South) that had very unique characteristics (Pargeter 2012, 12). King Idris's monarchy established a federal system with the 1951 constitution that divided the country into three federal provinces Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan (Vandewalle 2006). With the discovery of oil in the late 1950s and the exportation of it that began in 1961, state revenues increased and the financially strengthened central government abolished federalism in April 1963 (Vandewalle 2006, 43-75, El-Kikhia 1997, 111).

King Idris's monarchical term (1951-1969) unwittingly paved the way for Muammar Gaddafi to stage his military coup on September 1, 1969. Since, first, the foreign backed, pro-Western and Eastern tribes based (Sa'adi and Al-Obeidi) kingdom had the lack of legitimacy and authority among the large number of Libyans. "The monarchy thus started Libya on the road of political exclusion of its citizens, and of a profound de-politicization, that continue to characterize it today" (Vandewalle 2006, 5). Libya was also suffering from the lack of established state institutions and national identity. For example, King Idris banned all political parties and exiled National Congress Party's leader Bashir al-Sadawi to Egypt because of his protest of fraud allegations in the 1952 national elections (Anderson 1986, 256-257). "From then on, politics was a matter of family, factional, tribal and parochial interests, as networks of

kinship and clan provided the organisational structures for competition...[T]he monarchy operated as an alliance of extended family” (Anderson 1986, 257).

Last, but not least, the discovery of oil inspired Gaddafi to stage a coup to establish a state of the masses. Idris’s shortfalls paved the way for Gaddafi and his supporters to overthrow the king in 1969 with a military coup. Gaddafi established his *Jamahiriya* regime (state of the masses or stateless state) and maintained his regime until the 2011 uprisings (Owen 2012, 467).

VII.II.I The Politics of Libya

The 1969 military coup opened the door for a new phase in Libyan politics: popular revolution. Gaddafi established a 12-member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) that served as the highest decision-making force in the post-Kingdom Libya (Chorin 2012). In addition, the RCC promoted captain Gaddafi to the position of colonel and commander of the armed forces, and he led the new Libya towards a new transitional phase shortly after the military coup (Blanchard and Zanotti 2011, 4). Gaddafi modelled his political approach after Egypt’s charismatic pan-Arabist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser (Pargeter 2012). To that end, he developed an alternative theory of socialism and capitalism that he called “*third universal theory*,” and in 1975, he published his three-volume green book to justify the claims of the theory (Blanchard and Zanotti 2011).

“The theory, which blends pan-Arab, Islamic, and socialist values, is enshrined in Qadhafi’s three-volume Green Book. The redistribution of land and wealth, the allocation of fluctuating oil revenues, and a near total decentralization of political institutions reshaped Libya’s social landscape in line with Qadhafi’s principles.” (Blanchard and Zanotti 2011, 5)

Colonel Gaddafi established strong policies that nationalized foreign banks, hospitals, properties (mostly belonged to Italians), and oil companies in Libya

(Vandewalle 2006, XVI-XVIII). Moreover, he demanded that British and American troops withdraw their forces from the Al-Adem and Wheelus Airbases (Vandewalle 2006, XVI-XVII). While he closed the doors to the Europe and the United States, he signed arms agreement with the Soviet Union in 1974 (Vandewalle 2006, XIX). The attack on the U.S. embassy in Tripoli on December 2, 1979 signalled the end of diplomatic relations between the US and Libya. After the attack, the US added Libya to the list of states that sponsored of state terrorism (Vandewalle 2006, XXI).


In 1977, Gaddafi pronounced “the declaration on the establishment of the authority of the people” at Sabha (Vandewalle 2006, XX) and shifted Libya’s name from “the Libyan Arab Republic” to the “Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” (Article I, 1977). Under the new system, “*the state of the masses/direct popular democracy*” (Joffe 2011a) or “*peopledom*” (Anderson 1986, 264), there was no place for a parliament or political parties, with the exception of Gaddafi’s revolutionary party, the Libyan Arab Socialist Union (1971-1976). In his work, *Green Book*, Gaddafi stated,

“A parliament is a misrepresentation of the people and parliamentary governments are a misleading solution to the problem of democracy....The members of the parliament represent their party and not the people...Under such systems the people are victims, fooled and exploited by political bodies...Representation is fraud.” (International Crisis Group 2011a, 7)

Instead, to reflect the national demand, the new ruling system formed the Basic People’s Congress (BPC), a local forum; General People’s Congress (GPC), a national parliament; and Professional Unions (Article III, 1977). The new system designed BPC as the local branch of the direct democracy. In essence, every Libyan citizen was supposed to join the local congressional sections to express their concerns.

Each BPC had a committee that was selected by BPC, and the committees were transmitting the decisions to the GPC (Article III, 1977). The GPC's executive body, the General People's Committee (corresponds with the cabinet) was formed by secretaries (corresponds with ministers), selected by the GPC (Article III, 1977). The top echelon of the GPC committee was the General People's Secretariat (prime minister) (Article III, 1977). Gaddafi appointed himself as the head of the Secretariat of General People's Congress (Pargeter 2012, 93). In terms of professional unions, there was no clarification what exactly it meant other than this short intro "Members of each profession form their own union to defend their professional rights" (Article III, 1977).

Figure VII.II: The Formal Political System of Libya (1969-1978)



With the execution of the new system in 1977, Colonel Gaddafi abolished the RCC. Its members, however, retained the following key positions: Abu Bakr Younis Jabr served as the Secretary of Defence (the Defence Minister) and the head of the Libyan military; Khuwaildi al-Humaidi served as the general inspector of the armed forces; and Mustafa al-Kharubi served as the chief of staff and the leader of the military secret service (Gaub 2013b, 227, Mattes 2004, 6-7, International Crisis Group 2011a, 10). The new system also abolished all private property rights, private

businesses, and private assets. Gaddafi's Jamahiriya established a strongly centralized, state-run economic program in terms of so-called achieving people's ownership (Preamble, 1977). "There was to be no private retail trade, no wages, no rent-all of these had been declared forms of exploitation. By 1981, individual bank account had been seized, an action designed to guarantee that all Libyans had equal assets" (Anderson 1986, 264-265).

In 1978, Colonel Gaddafi developed an interesting policy that separated the revolutionary power from the people's authority and resigned from the GPC, along with his former RCC member friends in March 1979 (Mattes 2004). Although he left the GPC, he formed the Revolutionary Committees Movement (RCM) to safeguard his revolution and referred himself as "Brother Leader" or "Leader of the Revolution (*qa'id ath-thawra*)" (Vandewalle 2006). According to Pargeter, Gaddafi stated that the duties of RCM were as follows:

"The mission of the revolutionary committees is to be everywhere, secret or public....to carry out the duty of urging the masses to revolt in order to seize power and to destroy any organization that stands in the way, including political parties [and] reactionary conventional tools of governments such as tribes, families, sects and classes." (Pargeter 2012, 97)

Formally, Gaddafi remained Libya's *de jure* "Brother Leader" until the 2011 revolution; but in fact, he had *de facto* executive, legislative, and judicial power. In essence, Colonel Gaddafi ruled Libya, but did not govern it. The informal power structure incorporated the following design. First, Gaddafi's trusted associates, tribal connections, and family members took the key leadership positions in Libya (*the men of the tent-Rijal al-Khaimah*) (International Crisis Group 2011a). Abdullah Senussi (brother in law of Gaddafi and chief of intelligence), Moussa Kusa (secretary of

foreign affairs), Abu Bakr Younis Jabr (secretary of defence), Khuwaildi al-Humaidi (son Saadi Gaddafi's father in law, the general inspector of the armed forces) were a few of the key actors who carried out and survived Gaddafi's revolution.

In addition, his son, Mutassim, was the national security advisor, while Khamis controlled the strongest 32nd brigade (Parsons and Taylor 2011). Gaddafi's other kids—Mohammed, Hannibal, and Aisha—directed a larger part of the Libyan economy, telecommunication, maritime transport, and many other undisclosed economic sectors (Pargeter 2012, 210-212). Conversely, Gaddafi's European-educated son, Saif al-Islam, preferred to be the reformist face of Jamahiriya. He founded the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation (GICDF 2003)³⁵ for Charity Organisations in 2003 and played the role of arbitrator between Libya, the US, and the European states (Mattes 2004).


Second, the RCM interfered with military and police forces, dominated economic relations, and strictly controlled media outlets like the *Zahf Al-Akhdar* and *Al-Jamahiriya* newspapers established during Gaddafi's reign (Mattes 2004). To end the dissidence against the RCM and Gaddafi's regime in the 1980s; Gaddafi established the *stray dogs* campaign against the dissenters who lived abroad and killed many of them, including lawyer Mahmoud Abu Salem Nafa and journalist Mohammed Mustafa Ramadan in London and businessmen Abdel Jalil Aref and Mohammed Salem Fezzani in Rome (Pargeter 2012, 104-105). To justify these actions, the regime established revolutionary courts (1975), which weakened with the establishment of people's court in 1988 and people's court was also abolished in 2005, and employed their own member not official judges for these courts (Vandewalle 2006, xix-xxvii).

³⁵ See the mission of GICDF: <http://www.gaddaficharity.org/> (Accessed April 15, 2013).

The third tool for Gaddafi to grip the revolution was controlling the tribes across Libya. The post-Kingdom term was more fragile, because King Idris al-Sanussi had gained the support of the Al-Obeidi's, the largest tribe in eastern Libya. To break up Idris's power in eastern Libya, Gaddafi obtained support from three large tribes located in western Libya (Tripolitania): Qadhadhfa, Maghraha, and Warfalla (Joffe, 2011); essentially, Gaddafi regime replaced the support from the eastern tribes with that of the western tribes. As one of my informants stated, the strategy was the implementation of a *divide and rule* policy (Interview with Vandewalle 2015). To tether the tribes to the regime, Col Gaddafi and his associates established the Social People's Leadership, which brought tribal leaders into a single body strongly controlled by the Gaddafi regime in 1993 (International Crisis Group 2011a). That institution merged the tribes into a structure that was loyal to the Gaddafi regime (Kirkpatrick 2011).

In summary, the politics of Libya after King Idris was designed on the Gaddafi's idiosyncratic ideology Jamahiriyah that was "the people rule themselves without the intervention of a state administration" (Anderson 1986, 264). Libya as a state was experiencing a period of infancy under the rule of King Idris, but Gaddafi's regime resulted in stillborn state institutions in Libya. His *Stateless state* or *direct democracy* philosophy brought about a very severe and centralized Libyan state with very weak and rubber stamp institutions (see Figure VII.III) (Vandewalle 2006, 6).

Figure VII.III: Libya's Democracy Score³⁶



Source: Freedom House. Retrieved July 12, 2013

Although the 1977 declaration emphasized that “[the] People's direct democracy is the basis of the political system in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, where the authority is in the hands of the People alone” (Article III, 1977); in contrast, the political, social, and economic structure was centralized and heavily relied upon Colonel Gaddafi and his patronage. As Joffe cited from Amal Obeidi (2001),

“In 2000, less than 10 percent actually regularly attended congress meetings and over 70 percent of people did not believe that they could influence political decisions and it is unlikely that these statistics would have improved during the intervening years.” (Joffé 2011, 522)

All of these conditions paved the way for the 2011 uprisings.

VII.II.II Military Balance

As stated above, Jamahiriyah was the driving ideology that Gaddafi used to develop Libya's state structure. Indispensably, the military had been part of that re-

³⁶ According to Freedom House, 1 is the best and 7 is the worst in terms of freedom rating.

establishing policy. Direct democracy involved bringing direct defence to Libya. Direct defence, like democracy, stated that the people should carry out state defence themselves. In 1977, the Jamahiriyah document of declaration included the “concept of the armed people (*al-sha’b al-musallah*),” which stated, “Defending the Country is the responsibility of every citizen” (Article IX; Mattes 2004, 4).

This regulation led to the legal justification of a people’s militia that was separate from the regular armed forces. The people’s militia was designed as an alternative power to the regular armed forces that would stave off a possible military coup against the Gaddafi regime (Cordesman and Nerguizian 2010). According to Mattes, “The People’s Militia is organised according to military districts and commanded by Khuwaildi al-Humaidi” (Mattes 2004, 4). Humaidi was part of the Gaddafi’s inner circle, as the father-in-law of Gaddafi’s son, Saadi.

Gaddafi’s regime selected militia groups from the pan-African region and from tribes that declared their loyalty to the Gaddafi regime (Kaur 2011). In addition, Gaddafi established revolutionary guards (*al-Haras al-thawri*) that reported to the revolutionary committees movement to maintain the revolutionary ideology (Mattes 2004, 15). In short, Gaddafi established regular armed forces and paramilitary forces to provide state defence at home and abroad (Anderson 1986, 266-267) (see Table VII.I).

Table VII.I: The Military Balance in Libya

Armed Forces	Professional	Conscript	Reserve (People's Militia)	Revolutionary Guards (Paramilitary Units)	
Army	25,000	25,000			
Navy	8,000	-			
Air Forces	18,000	-			
Total	<i>51,000</i>	<i>25,000</i>	<i>40,000</i>	<i>3,000</i>	119,000

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies 2010, p. 262; Cordesman and Nerguizian 2010; Gaub 2013, p.228.

The regular armed forces reported to the Defence Minister, and the Defence Minister was also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces (*al-qa'id al-'amm lil-quwwat al-musallaha*) (Parsons and Taylor 2011, 23). However, Gaddafi served as the *de facto* highest commander-in-chief of the armed forces (*al-qa'id al-'la lil-quwwat al-musallah*) (Mattes 2004, 6-7). In the initial phases of the revolution, Gaddafi increased the defence budget for the regular and paramilitary forces. For example, the defence budget rose from 92 million dollars in 1980 to 459 million dollars in 1981 (SIPRI, 2011).³⁷ During the 1980s, Gaddafi obtained his military equipment from the Soviet Union because he had already damaged relations with the Western world (Pollack 2002, 362).

However, Gaddafi's aggressive and expansionist foreign policy strategy caused mass destruction in the Libyan army. Gaddafi initially pursued a pan-Arabist foreign policy and wanted to unify the Arab world under the flagship of Libya. Pargeter quoted Gaddafi, who stated, "I envisage that this small people will play the role that Prussia played in the unification of Germany, and that the Libyan people will

³⁷ The values do not include spending on paramilitary forces and constant US dollar base year 2011.

this role in the unification of the Arab nation” (Pargeter 2012, 121). Initially, in April of 1971, Egypt, Sudan, and Syria agreed on the principles of the union of Arab Republics (*ittihad al jumhuriyyat al arabiyya*) (Chorin 2012). However, the Arab world did not maintain their interest in Gaddafi’s ideology for long. In the view of these Arab leaders, “[His] ideas were at best nutty, at worst, dangerous” (Chorin 2012, 36).

Accordingly, Colonel Gaddafi shifted his foreign policy course from pan-Arabist to pan-Sub-Saharan Africa (Vandewalle 2006, 6). However, Sub-Saharan Africa responded negatively to his expansionist approach to foreign policy (see Table VII.II), and he did not gain any credibility in Sub-Saharan Africa. He became involved in the interventionist wars in Uganda in 1979 and a lingering war in Chad. These involvements all undermined the power of the Libyan armed forces, but the most expensive conflict for the Libyan military was the Chadian war that lasted from 1978 to 1987 and cost the state \$1.5 billion in equipment, took 8,000 lives, and resulted in a few thousand Libyan soldiers being taken hostage Chadian forces (Pollack 2002, 397).

Table VII.II: Libya’s Wars

	Border Clashes with Egypt (1977)	Intervention in Uganda (1979)	The War for Chad (1978-1987)
Result of the Conflict	Libya’s Defeat	Libya’s Defeat	Libya’s Defeat

Source: Pollack 2002.

Between 1973 and 1994, Libya spent an estimated \$23 billion on its failed southern expansion efforts (Chorin 2012, 42). After these conflicts, Gaddafi put more resources into his people’s militias rather than investing in the regular armed forces. Because of Gaddafi’s praetorian and nepotic approach towards the armed forces, from

the 1990s onward, the regular military had much poorer equipment and training than the people's militia (Droz-Vincent 2011). The cost of the Gaddafi's political and military design led to the development of an anti-democratic and discriminative regime structure and an aggressive foreign policy.

This exclusive and anti-democratic political structure, along with the strengthened people's militias, provided important context for the 2011 uprisings. The political and military structures of the state also help to explain the dependence of the military forces on the existing government structure and their decision to split into two factions.

In the next section, I explain in more detail the factors that led to the 2011 uprisings, focusing specifically on the areas that are relevant to this research study. Exploring these factors provides clarity about the role of the military during the conflict.

VII.III The Prominent Causes of the Libyan Uprisings


This section explores the factors that led to the uprisings of 2011. These factors included (a) a corrupt regime, (b) regional disparity, and (c) a radical and eccentric foreign policy approach. I demonstrate how the factors contributed to the 2010-2011 uprisings.

VII.III.I Corruption and Socio-Economic Exclusion

As stated previously, Libya began to export oil in 1961. The new state found itself awash with oil and produced 47.1 billion barrels in 2010 (OPEC 2015, 22) (see Figure VII.IV). One of the poorest countries in the world had become the largest oil exporter in Africa, with nearly 1.6 million barrels a day prior to the 2011 uprisings (Johnson 2014). In addition to the huge oil reserves, Libya also had the fourth largest natural gas reserve in Africa (US Energy Information Administration, 2013). The gas revenues increased even more after the opening of the Greenstream pipeline from

Libya to Italy in 2003 (US Energy Information Administration 2013b). Anderson explained that “[T]he Libyans were dependent upon the Italian economy, as they would later be upon British and American support and eventually upon the international petroleum trade, for their livelihood” (Anderson 1986, 228).

Figure VII. IV: The Proved Oil Reserves in Libya and Africa (Billion Barrels)



Source: Oil and Gas Journal 2012.

The discovery of oil and gas, however, did not bring about inclusive and fair socio-politic or economic development to Libya. As King Idris stated after the discovery of oil “I wish you had found water. Water creates work. Oil enables people to have dreams” (Saxon 1996, 5). He was right, and Gaddafi and his companies dreamed of establishing a Libya that was not dependent upon Western actors. They deposed the pro-Western King in 1969 and began to control the huge reserves of oil and the revenue it produced.

Gaddafi refused any system of checks and balances that might have brought transparency to his reign. As Anderson stated, “The oil revenues freed the government from reliance on its population and permitted Gaddafi to indulge in his utopian experiment” (Anderson 1986, 268). Jamahiriya claimed a direct popular democracy by neglecting a capable parliament, a political party and independent judiciary. As

stated before, the single political party that existed during Gaddafi's reign, the Libyan Arab Socialist Union (ASU) (1971-1976) proved to be an exception (Vandewalle 2006). In fact, Gaddafi used the party to dismantle the power base of their pro-King Idris rivals (Vandewalle 2006). The advent of Jamahiriyah, quickly led to the abolishment of the Libyan Arab Socialist Union (Vandewalle 2006, XVII-XIX).

With the help of oil revenue, Colonel Gaddafi and his cronies enjoyed endless privileges; and they did not tolerate anyone who dared to criticise the regime or its guards. For example, Gaddafi ordered the assassination of his cousin, Hassan Ishkal, a top military commander, because of Ishkal criticised him for losing the war with Chad in 1985³⁸ (Kirkpatrick 2011).

In addition, the largest minority group, Berber, suffered from a severe lack of political, social, economic, and cultural rights due to Gaddafi's pan-Arabist approach towards ethnic minorities within Libya (International Crisis Group 2011a, 21, Jay 2015). Berber minorities who were Muslims, but non-Arab, (singular: *Amazigh*, plural: *Imazighen*) made up approximately 8% of the Libyan population (near 500,000) and generally resided in the north-western part of Libya (Chorin 2012, 15, Joffé 2011, 522). Gaddafi's regime refused to recognize their identity and prohibited them from using their language, *Tamazight*, and non-Arabic names (Jay 2015, Bianchini et al. 2015). He prevented people who defied the ban from right to education (International Crisis Group 2011a, 21-22). Moreover, according to the U.S. State Department, to distract from their ethnic identity, Gaddafi mandated that Berbers could only marry non-Berbers (U.S. Department of State 1994).

In the late 1970s, Gaddafi imprisoned the leader of the Berber Association in North Africa, Ali Sharwi Bin Talib, and his associates for nine years because of their

³⁸ There are also some accounts that claim he planned a coup against Gaddafi (El-Kikhia 1997, XII).

efforts to promote the Berber culture and identity in Libya (International Crisis Group 2011a, 22). However, Saif Al-Islam staged some reformative actions and organized meetings with Berber representatives in September 2005 (International Crisis Group 2011a, 22). In addition, in 2007, the GPC changed the name prohibition law and allowed Berbers to use their original names (International Crisis Group 2011a, 22). Just two months later, however, Gaddafi reinstated his previous policies, stating that *Imazighen* were Arabs (International Crisis Group 2011a, 22). “[At] the Jabal Nafusa, as the abode of Libya’s Berber population, was subject to discrimination since the regime refused to recognise any cultural heterogeneity” (Joffé 2011, 522).

The exception among the minority groups was the Tuareg, who resided in the Western part of Fezzan, and had a population of approximately 10,000 people (International Crisis Group 2011a, Interview with Amer 2015). Gaddafi wanted to develop good relations with them because he wanted to use the Tuareg who lived in Niger and particularly in Mali for his benefits. Unlike other minorities, Tuareg could speak their own language (Bianchini et al. 2015), and Gaddafi employed hundreds the group as mercenaries in his armed forces and used them in internal and external missions (International Crisis Group 2011a, 23).

That absence of a system of checks and balances brought about a democracy deficit and propelled Gaddafi and his cronies to enjoy unchecked and uncontrolled powers. With the oil revenue, Gaddafi created a regime that was separated from its society (Pargeter 2012, 12, Interview with Achcar 2014). In addition to the energy wealth, crony privatization also increased the level of corruption in Libya, as Gaddafi’s family members and cronies controlled the oil, (Chorin 2012, 15), telecommunication, maritime transport, and many more unrevealed business sectors (Pargeter 2012, 210-212).

“As foreign economic interest grew, so did corruption and, although Colonel Gaddafi himself may not have been corrupt, his seven sons and one daughter certainly were, drawing their fortunes from commissions and income streams siphoned off from the oil and gas sector.” (Joffe 2011b)

According to the Transparency International data records from 2008, 2009, and 2010, Libya was standing on the most corrupt states category. Libya’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score was 2.6, 2.5, and 2.2 (out of 10) in 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively, with the ranking of 146 (out of 178 states) (see Table VII.III).

Table VII.III: Libya’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

Country	Country rank 2010	CPI 2008 score	CPI 2009 score	CPI 2010 score
Libya	146	2.6	2.5	2.2


Source: Transparency International 2010. Retrieved September, 2012

Because of the high level of corruption, millions of Libyans were living in poverty, despite the influx of revenue from oil and natural gas exports. “The people of the eastern Libya perceived this economic inequality to be more harsh than in other areas. Gaddafi ignored the south and other parts of Libya too - but there was a particular narrative in the east which believed itself to be the most marginalised region because of the political antagonisms between it and the regime and the way in which the regime punished it after militant Islamist networks were uncovered there in the 1990s” (Interview with Pargeter 2015, Pargeter 2009). Gaddafi’s regime deliberately underfunded and ignored eastern Libya because the region, particularly Benghazi, the second biggest city in Libya after Tripoli, was home to a wellspring of anti-Gaddafi factions, not to mention the Sa’adi and al-Obeidi Islamist tribes. As a result, Benghazi became the stronghold of the anti-Gaddafi protests in 2011 (Lynch 2012). Joffé stated

that “[T]he fact that the tribes of Eastern Libya resented what had happened in 1969 as a result of the revolution; their loss of political influence” (Joffé 2011, 522).

Although, it is very difficult to acquire official unemployment and poverty data, the World Bank and General Information Authority in Libya have indicated that among the 1.3 million people in Libya, the unemployment rate was around 20% while it was 30% among the youth in 2010 (see Figure VII.V & VII.VI). Furthermore, about one-third of Libyans lived at or below the national poverty line³⁹ in the early 2000s (Senauth 2013).


Figure VII. V: The Average Unemployment Ratio in Libya (2003-2010)



Source: Trading Economics 2015. Accessed April 30, 2015.

³⁹ Poverty line is used internationally is that US \$1.25 a day (Chemingui and Sánchez 2011, 22).


Figure VII. VI: Employment to population ratio in Libya, 15-24 years (%)



Source: African Development Bank Group 2011.

As the rate of unemployment increased, the national GDP was also steadily climbing, particularly after the UN and the US lifted sanctions on the Libyan economy in 2003 (see Figure VII.VII). According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) records, the state's foreign assets increased from \$20 billion to \$170 billion from 2003 to 2010 (IMF 2012); however, extreme poverty and high rates of unemployment remained critical issues in the energy rich state of Libya, especially in the eastern part of the nation. The restriction of resources from a significant number of Libyans fed frustrations among the deprived. That prolonged grievance fed the exasperation that led to the 2011 anti-Gaddafi uprisings.

Figure VII.VII: Libya GDP 2000-2010 (Constant 2005 US \$)



Source: “GDP Libya,” data.worldbank.org. Retrieved May 24, 2013.

<http://data.worldbank.org/country/libya>.

VII.III.II Regional Disparity and Tribal Favouritism

The majority of the Libyan population is located around two cities: Tripoli in the west and Benghazi in the east (Chorin 2012). Because Benghazi was the stronghold of Islamists and anti-Gaddafi groups, Gaddafi pursued “a policy of collective punishment, depriving Benghazi” (Chorin 2012, 177). At the same time, Gaddafi staffed key military and political decision making positions (mostly in Revolutionary Committees Movement) with his blood relatives, in-law connections, and people from his own tribe, Qadhadhfa, and other ally tribes Warfalla and Maghraha (Parsons and Taylor 2011, Mattes 2004). Warfalla was the largest tribe with its around 1 million members (Taylor 2014, 161) The three main tribes were primarily located in Tripolitania (city Bani Walid and Sirte) and Fezzan (Lacher 2011). Gaddafi’s main strategy was to put people that he knew would remain loyal in key decision-making positions to guard against the threat of revolution led by dissidents (Mattes 2004, 7-10, Pargeter 2014, 2).

In addition to Gaddafi's sons and daughter, Gaddafi's cousins Ahmed Qaddafi al-Damm and Sayyid Muhammad Qaddafi al-Damm, commander of the Tobruq region brigadier and secretary of the people's Committee Brigadier, respectively, can be demonstrated as key examples to cronyism within the Libyan state design (Mattes 2004, 7-8). Furthermore, Gaddafi's nephews, Captain Al-Saadi Abdul-Salam (Presidential Guard), Mahmoud Abdul-Hamid al-Atraash (Jamahiriyah Security), and Abu Jahl al-Hilbu (Jamahiriyah Security) took premier roles within the regime (El-Kikhia 1997, 152).

Gaddafi's in-laws also played an active role in the regime. For example, the chief of the intelligence and former member of RCC Colonel Abdallah al-Senussi (member of the Maghraha tribe) was married to the sister of Gaddafi's second wife, Safia Farkash (Mattes 2004, 8). Moreover, Gaddafi's son, Saadi, was married to the daughter of General al-Humaidi's, who was the general inspector of the armed forces (International Crisis Group 2011a, 10). Colonel Al-Jarih Farkash (Safia Farkash's uncle) was the commanding officer in Hussein al-Juweifi battalion, and Colonel Khairi Abdul-Hamid Khalid (brother of Gaddafi's first wife) was commander of prisons for the military police (El-Kikhia 1997, 158).

The other significant support for Gaddafi's regime came out from the other loyal tribes the Maghraha and Warfalla. The most powerful actors from these tribes were the planning secretary, Mahmoud Jibril (Warfalla), and Abdelsalam Jalloud (Maghraha), who was the former secretary of the General People's Congress (1972-1977) (Pargeter 2012, 155). Gaddafi used these tribal affiliations to his advantage by determining key recruitments and promotions (Gaub 2013b).

From the Qadhadhfa tribe, as stated before, Colonel Gaddafi's sons, Khamis and Muttasim, took key positions in the military and national security: Commander of


32nd brigade and National Security Advisor, respectively (McGregor 2011). The other members of his own tribe that took on key military positions were Colonel Sa'd Mas'ud al-Qaddafi, Captain Muhammad al-Majdhub al-Qaddafi, Ahmad Ibrahim al-Qaddafi, and Ali Mansur al-Qaddafi (Mattes 2004, 9).

Conversely, the Defence Minister General Abu Bark Younis Jabir was a member of the al-Mujabra tribe, which had a strong presence in the southwest region of Tripoli (Chorin 2012, 177). Moreover, Foreign Minister Musa Kousa had no affiliation with an important tribe, and the Secretary of Interior Abdel Fattah Younis Al-Obeidi belonged to the Cyrenaica's Al-Obeidi tribe (Pargeter 2014). Interestingly, the latter two figures deserted Gaddafi during the 2011 uprisings.

Regarding the aforementioned Gaddafi era facts, the eastern tribes, Sa'adi and Al-Obeidi, had no real political influence in the state. As Kirkpatrick explained, "All three tribes — the Qaddafi most of all — have dominated the ranks of Qaddafi militias and armed forces, jobs that carry significant power, prestige and money in Libyan society and culture. They remain his sturdiest base of support" (Kirkpatrick 2011).

In addition to political favouritism, an inequity of economic investment was also apparent between the eastern and western regions of Libya (Mezran 2014, 310). As Figure VII.VIII shows, Tripoli, the biggest city in western Libya (approximately 2 million people) and Benghazi, the biggest city in eastern Libya (approximately 1 million people) (Chorin 2012, 13) represent clear sample of the state development favouritism for even the primary needs water supply, lighting and sewage. This regional disparity paved the way for the growing sense of frustration among the eastern Libyans that eventually led to the 2011 uprisings against Gaddafi's regime.

Figure VII.VIII: The Difference in Libya’s Economic Investments in Tripoli and Benghazi in 2006 (Thousands, Total)



Source: “Open Data for Libya,” libya.opendataforafrica.org. Retrieved May 10, 2015. <http://libya.opendataforafrica.org/data>

VII.III.III Revolutionary Foreign Stance and Cosmetic Reforms

Colonel Gaddafi’s aggressive foreign policy and eccentric ideology lagged behind Libya’s globalization and its economic advances. Gaddafi supported widely-known terrorists organizations, such as the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Aleya-Sghaier 2014), and the Red Brigades in Germany, under the framework of the anti-imperialist *Third Universal Theory* (Pargeter 2012, 136, El-Kikhia 1997, 148). Even though he developed some diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the relationship was limited to a “purely commercial exchange” (El-Kikhia 1997, 148-149).

The first big American military reaction towards Gaddafi’s eccentric ideology was the U.S. air attack that took place on April 15, 1986 in response to the allegedly Libyan-sourced April 5, 1986 disco bombing in Berlin, Germany (Chorin 2012). The

attack created serious devastation in Libya, including the capital Tripoli, and killed Gaddafi's adopted daughter, Hana (Pargeter 2012, 140). However, the watershed moment that drastically affected Libya's relations with the western countries was the bombing of American Pan Am Flight 103 (Lockerbie bombing⁴⁰) on December 21, 1988, and French UTA Flight 772 on September 19, 1989 (Pargeter 2012). The two terrorist actions resulted in 270 and 170 deaths, respectively (Chorin 2012, 47). "The Pan Am bombing could have been revenge for President Reagan's attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986; the UTA bombing, retribution against the French for foiling Libyan ambitions in neighbouring Chad" (Chorin 2012, 48).

In November 1991, while the US and Scotland accused two Libyans agents, Abdelbasset al Megrahi (member of Maghraha) and Al Amin Khalifa Fhima, of being responsible for the Lockerbie bombing, but Gaddafi strongly refused rendition claims (Wicker 2003).⁴¹ That uncompromising approach engendered sanctions from the UN, with Security Council's Resolution 748, and from the US in 1992. These sanctions lasted until 2003. Interestingly, however, the sanctions had no huge effect on Libya's oil production (see Table VII.IV); because energy-poor Europe (mainly Italy, Spain, and Germany) lobbied the U.S. for an exception to the sanctions, and they maintained their energy trade with Libya (Pargeter 2012, 156-157).

While Libya continued to export oil, the sanctions froze Libyan assets abroad, prohibited exportation to Libya, and decreased foreign investments within the nation. The subsequent decrease in Libya's GDP (see Figure VII.IX) and the invasion of Iraq by American forces propelled Gaddafi to work toward reconciliation with the UN and the United States.


⁴⁰ The bombing called Lockerbie since the plane was exposed over the Lockerbie, Scotland air lands.

⁴¹ Gaddafi accepted to render the Libyans to courts in Scotland in 1995. Al Megrahi was sentenced to life in prison, and Fhima was found not guilty (Cordesman 2002) .

Table VII.IV: Libya's Oil Production Before and After International Sanctions

Before Sanctions		Yearly Oil Production		Yearly Oil Production		Yearly Oil Production	
1990	1,389.1	1995	1,399.0	2000	1,347.2	2005	1,693.2
1991	1,405.9	1996	1,394.0	2001	1,323.5	2006	1,751.2
1992 Sanctions Began	1,432.7	1997	1,395.8	2002	1,200.9	2007	1,673.9
1993	1,361.0	1998	1,449.0	2003 Sanctions Ended	1,431.9	2008	1,721.5
1994	1,389.8	1999	1,287.2	2004	1,580.7	2009	1,473.9

Source: OPEC 2009.

Figure VII.IX: Libya GDP per capita before and after sanctions (Current US \$, 2010)

Source: "GDP Libya," data.worldbank.org. Retrieved June 25, 2014.

<http://data.worldbank.org/country/libya>.

To lifted sanctions, Colonel Gaddafi condemned terrorist attacks on the US in the wake of 9/11 and described the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as "Godless promoters of political Islam" (Vandewalle 2006, 180). He also offered to compensate the families of the victims of the Lockerbie bombing in 2003, \$10 million per family

(Pargeter 2012, 182). Last, he acknowledged ending the state's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programme and opened the doors of their weapons to foreign inspectors (Pargeter 2012).

In addition to these external efforts, Colonel Gaddafi also took steps within Libya. For example, he accepted the failure of the government sector in June 2003 and announced the abolition of people's courts in 2005 (Vandewalle 2006, xxvii). However, the reformation of Jamahiriya was limited with only oil sector and GNC selected former Trade and Economy Secretary Shukri Muhammad Ghanem, who worked at OPEC and belonged to Saif al-Islam's reformist circle, as General Secretary of the General People's Committee (prime minister) for economic liberalization and privatization, not political (Vandewalle 2006, 185, International Crisis Group 2011a, 24).

Saif al-Islam played more of a public role than ever as the reformist face of Gaddafi's regime. Saif founded an NGO, the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charitable Associations in 1997 (Pargeter 2012, 200-201), and changed its name to the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation (GICDF 2003) in 2003. As stated below, GICDF and its chairman, Saif, proclaimed that they were pursuing a policy of protecting and developing human rights at the international level. Their website states, "[GICDF] carries out developmental and humanitarian activities in the social, economic, cultural and human rights field...its functions such as maintaining and protecting human rights, and fundamental liberties, developing civil society and its organizations, promoting charitable voluntary work..." (GICDF 2003). Moreover, Saif began a *Reform and Repent* project and released some Islamist prisoners (Pargeter 2012, 203, Mattes 2004, 30).

These developments rehabilitated the Libyan economy and its political affairs with the western states. However, the reforms did not reduce the high levels of poverty and inequality within Libya. As stated before, one third of Libyans lived on less than \$2 per day, as of 2010. Moreover, anti-democratic and exclusive political design stayed as in the past. The impact of aggressive foreign policy, and the resulting isolation from the modern world, exacerbated the backwardness in Libya. In its isolation, Libya became “a giant laboratory for his [Gaddafi] own personal philosophy” without interference from the outside world (Pargeter 2012, 2).

The limited reform process could not go beyond some cosmetic changes designed to help the state recover from its economic stagnancy. Rather, as Saadi Gaddafi stated, “Saif al-Islam who had sought reforms before the unrest, for failing to address the problems of ordinary Libyans” (Al-Arabiya 2011). For example, Colonel Gaddafi fired Prime Minister Ghanem, a proponent of liberalization and privatization, in March 2006 and made him the head of the National Oil Company because of his attempts to reform Libya’s political structure (Chorin 2012, 151).

Libyans were disappointed about the renewed relationship between Libya, the UN, and the US after 2003. They saw the rapprochement as foreign support of the Gaddafi regime and its anti-democratic political structure. This scenario only added to the frustrations of the Libyan people and served as one of the motivations for the rebels in 2011, because there seemed no other promising way, other than uprisings, to depose the Gaddafi regime.

VII.IV Conclusion

In this chapter, I explained the historical background and the main factors that led to the 2011 Libyan uprisings. The chapter demonstrated how the political structure and military power within the country contributed the 2011 uprisings and showed that

the protests resulted from long-term state policies and conditions like the corrupt regime, an idiosyncratic ideology (*Jamahiriyah* - state of masses), regional and tribal disparity, a democracy deficit, very high socio-economic inequality, and aggressive foreign policy. The chapter also provided historical context for the formation of the Libyan military. Without question, Libya's military and political structure over the years influenced the military's behaviour during uprisings.

In the next chapter, I examine the complementary part of that chapter that is the effect of actors and factors on the 2011 uprisings and the military behaviour in 2011. The next chapter is important in terms of analysing how various actors and factors influenced the military's role during the uprisings.

Chapter VIII

Towards a Conceptual Framework of Actors and Factors Involved in the Libyan Uprisings

VIII.I Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explained the historical background of the 2011 uprisings and discussed some of the key reasons that led to the uprisings in Libya. In this chapter, I focus on the actors and factors that played important roles in the Libyan uprisings. Viewing this part of the uprisings will also clarify how significant actors and factors influenced the military's behaviour in 2011.

The chapter begins with a discussion of key actors and how their behaviour helped to shape the decisions that members of the military made during the conflict. I then explore the key factors that influenced the 2011 uprisings, generally, and the military's actions during the protests, specifically.

VIII.II Actors

A number of individuals played a significant role in the 2011 Libyan uprisings. While some of them stayed with Colonel Gaddafi until the end of the conflict, some actors, even those from Gaddafi's inner circle, defected to the protestors' side or abstained from the battle altogether. In the sections below, I examine the following actors who shaped the pathway of uprising: (a) Colonel Gaddafi; (b) his sons, Saif al-Islam, Khamis, and Moatassim; (c) Chief of Intelligence Abdullah al-Senussi; (d) Defence Minister Abu Bakr Younis Jabr; (e) Interior Minister Abdul Fattah Younis al-Obedie; (f) Justice Minister Mustafa Abdeljalil; (g) Secretary of National Planning

Mahmoud Jibril; (h) Foreign Minister Moussa Kusa; (i) former military officer, Khalifa Haftar; (j) well-known human rights lawyer, Fathi Terbil; and (k) the National Transitional Council (NTC).

VIII.II.I Muammar al-Gaddafi

Muammar Gaddafi was born in a poor, Bedouin family in Sirte, Libya in 1942 (Sullivan 2009). He participated in the Benghazi military academy before his coup in 1969 and ruled Libya from 1969 to 2011 (Pargeter 2012). He was a pan-Arabist; therefore, likeminded Gamal Abdul Nasser and his pan-Arabist ideology influenced his ruling philosophy (El-Kikhia 1997). Initially, after the 1969 coup, he served as the Colonel and Commander of the armed forces. However, he ascended to the head of the General People's Congress after the declaration of Jamahiriyah, and he gave himself the title of *Brother Leader* or *Leader of the Revolution* in 1979 (Pargeter 2012).

Pargeter (2012) noted that at first glance, “Gaddafi was not an exception[al] [figure]” (p. 61) that would be able to stage a coup against King Idris. Chorin (2012) explained, “He was not well educated, was not from the commercial elite or a senior army officer, and had not served in any government position [until 1969]” (p. 29). However, aging King Idris's poor and inept leadership—who had resigned and returned to his seat many times before the 1969 coup—and the corruption of Libya's elite class drove Gaddafi to the front (Taylor 2014). The discovery and exportation of oil was an economic opportunity for the newly established Kingdom for economic development; however, under King Idris's rule, “Ministers, traders, and their acolytes made fortunes, while large segments of the population remained extremely poor”(Chorin 2012, 28). These inequities within the Kingdom justified Gaddafi's coup in the eyes of the deprived Libyan population.

Table VIII.I: Colonel Gaddafi's Official Positions in Libya

Year	Key Event(s)	Ranking
1969	Military coup	Colonel & Commander of the Armed forces
1977	Declared Jamahiriyah	Head of the Secretariat of General People's Congress
1979-2011	Declared the Separation of Rule and Revolution	Brother Leader or Leader of the Revolution

Source: Vandewalle 2006.

Gaddafi faced very little resistance during the 1969 military coup, because King Idris was in Turkey at the time (Chorin 2012, 29). Most of the pro-King military members resided in Cyrenaica and lacked the efficient structure to struggle disorders.⁴² King Idris's unpopularity among the Libyan people and the lack of international support he had garnered accelerated and facilitated the military coup. As Gaddafi himself said after the coup, "The army was the only thing capable of imposing the People's will by force" (Pargeter 2012, 48). Gaddafi declared his Jamahiriyah ideology and established de jure direct popular democracy. However, the ideology the state of masses had established the cult of personality following the initial popular years. Corruption, a secretive Soviet-style government structure, an ineffective direct democracy congress, a crony business model, and regional and tribal discrimination prevailed in the social, political and economic structure of Libya (Noueihed and Warren 2013). This strong cult of personality made Gaddafi the prime target of the 2011 protests.

Gaddafi's initial reaction to the 2011 protests was strange, because, as he stated, "the day of rage on February 17" targeted Prime Minister Baghdadi al-

⁴² Cyrenaican Defence Forces (CYDEF) and Tripoli Defence Forces (TYDEF) were King Idris's praetorian guards who were staffed by tribes loyal to the Sanussi but was very incompetent (Chorin 2012, 29).

Mahmoudi, not him because he had no official position; and he would support the public's demands, as would his allies across Libya (Pargeter 2012). The subsequent developments proved that the above statement was the part of his carrot strategy.

Colonel Gaddafi summoned tribal leaders in Tripoli and met with some residents in certain Libyan cities, such as Derna, to show that he was aware of his people's demands (Pargeter 2012). Moreover, the Libyan People's Committee for General Security, the regime's highest security agency, used the state-run television station to offer money to any person who cooperated with the government and provided information about the protestors. The representative stated that "a lucrative monetary offer will be given to anyone who contributes" (Ramdani 2011). None of these efforts put an end to the protests.

On February 17th, hundreds of people gathered in Benghazi and many other cities in the eastern part of Libya. Gaddafi sent his son Saadi and Senussi, the chief of military intelligence, to quell the protests. Saadi offered the following address on a Benghazi radio station on February 17.

"I have taken permission from my father so he can give me Benghazi. No one will come near it. I am coming to live there...now we will give all of what you want. I promise good money...I will take care of the young people and infrastructure." (Radio interview 2011)

These efforts were also unsuccessful in stopping the protests. Saadi was surrounded in Benghazi's Ozo Hotel by anti-Gaddafi forces and had to be rescued and taken out of the city (Pargeter 2012, 218).

When Colonel Gaddafi recognized the protestors were not responding to his efforts, he called the protestors "rats" and threatened them by saying "[We] will purify

Libya inch by inch, home by home, street by street, person by person, from the dirt.”⁴³

In the same speech, he said he would not leave Libya until he dies. His son, Khamis’s, 32nd brigade and the Katiba militia from the Katibat Fadeel in Benghazi tried to quash the people on the street at the behest of Colonel Gaddafi and Chief of Intelligence Senussi. However, this hard-line response only increased the ire of the protestors and broadened their base of support. Ahmed Jibril, a former diplomat at the U.N.’s Libyan mission and a protestor during the uprisings, provided the following statement:

“Qaddafi’s guards started shooting people in the second day, and they shot two people only. We had, on that day in Al-Baida city, only 300 protesters. When they killed two people, we had more than 5,000 at their funeral; and when they killed fifteen people the next day, we had more than 50,000 the following day.” (MENAS, February 2011)

Gaddafi’s show of brute force led to the declaration of Libya as a no-fly zone by the U.N. Security Council on March 17, 2011. The Security Council authorized the use of “all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians (Daalder and Stavridis 2012, 2, UN 2011). The decision eventually resulted in the French and British-led NATO intervention in Libya.

In brief, Gaddafi’s personality and his show of force against protestors played a significant role in the military split of 2011. He used his loyal armed forces to end the protests until the end. Moreover, he insisted on staying in power and not leaving Libya or his position until his death. The uprisings deepened the split between the pro and anti-Gaddafi sides among the Libyan citizenship, and subsequently, within the military forces.

⁴³ See video: Colonel Gaddafi’s Public Speech (22 February 2011) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69wBG6ULNzQ> (Accessed February 10, 2013).

VIII.II.II Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi

Saif al-Islam was Colonel Gaddafi's second son from his second wife and had a stance that differed from that of his brothers and sister (Roberts, McCarthy, and Ash 2016). Specifically, he subscribed to the reformist component of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah. He received his master's and doctoral degrees from the London School of Economics, and this prestigious European education provided him access to the Western world (Chorin 2012, 119).

He also carried out some promising initiatives when he returned to Libya from Europe. For example, Saif played a significant role in Colonel Gaddafi's decision to cooperate with the US and UN regarding Libya's nuclear weapons program. Saif was intricately involved in helping both sides reach a final agreement regarding the weapons in 2003 (Pargeter 2012). He also established a new National Economic Development Board (NEDB) to initiate economic reforms (Chorin 2012, 126). Additionally, Saif supported the efforts of Western-educated technocrats Mahmoud Jibril and Shukri Ghanem to be head of the NEDB and the prime minister,⁴⁴ respectively (Walt 2011). The Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation (GICDF), headed by Saif, affirmed Libya's stance against torture and achieved instated regular inspections of the state's prisons (Mattes 2004, 30). This last policy resulted in the release of hundreds of Islamist prisoners⁴⁵ in 2006 under the Reform and Repent programme (Pargeter 2012), and the release of an additional 214 prisoners in 2010 (Chorin 2012, 150).

Each of these promising initiatives gave hope to the international actors during the 2011 uprisings. As one interviewee stated, "[The] US and UN sought negotiations

⁴⁴ Shukri Ghanem sacked from PM and appointed to head of the National Oil Company in 2006.

⁴⁵ Islamist meaning in Libya, by and large, is the member of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and Muslim Brotherhoods.

with Saif to convince his father to relinquish his power in 2011” (Interview with Achcar 2014). In reality, though, Saif was always restrained by his father’s actions, and he was aware of that.

“Saif al-Islam's reformist project was always going to be constrained by his father. As he acknowledged in August 2007, there were four lines in Libya that could not be crossed: Islam and the application of the sharia law; the security and stability of Libya; national unity; and, most importantly, Muammar Gaddafi.” (Pargeter 2012, 206)

On February 20, 2011, Saif addressed people on a state-run television station and ended all doubt in the outside world that he would succeed his father. In this speech, he pursued a policy of carrot and stick. First, he defended his father and blamed the people who protested the regime for the turmoil and deaths.⁴⁶ He threatened that the protestors would have no future and declared that there would be mass killings if they maintained the unrest. In addition to the threats, he laid out some conciliatory approaches for the protestors:

“[Now] there is a major Fitna [chaos] and a threat to the unity of Libya. Of course, there were many deaths, which angered many people in Benghazi, but why were there people killed? The army was under stress. It is not used to crowd control; so they shot, but I called them. The army said that some protesters were drunk; others were on hallucinogens or drugs. The army has to defend its weapons.”⁴⁷

He also offered talking for reforms by underlining Colonel Gaddafi’s agreement for such transformative actions, without explaining whether his father

⁴⁶ See video: Saif Al Islam’s televised speech (20 February 2011) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eL6I5hktEs0> (Accessed March 14, 2014).

⁴⁷ The script of Saif Al Islam’s speech was retrieved from uruknet.info. <http://www.uruknet.info/?p=m75191&hd&l=e&fb=1> (Accessed May 05, 2015).

would leave his power. Otherwise, he said, foreign occupation would be inevitable in Libya.

“You can say we want democracy and rights. We can talk about it; we should have talked about it before. It is this or war. Instead of crying over 200 deaths, we will cry over 100,000s of deaths. We will call for new media laws, civil rights, lift the stupid punishments, we will have a constitution. Even the leader Gaddafi said he wants a constitution. Or else, be ready to start a civil war and chaos and forget oil and petrol. The West will come and occupy you.”

In the last part of his speech, Saif al-Islam compared Libya with Tunisia and Egypt and emphasized the strength of his father and the power of his loyal military forces.

“Gaddafi is not Mubarak or Ben Ali, a classical ruler; he is a leader of a people. Tens of thousands of Libyans are coming to defend him. Over coastline Libyans are coming to support Gaddafi. The army is also there; it will play a big part, whatever the cost. The army will play a big role; it is not the army of Tunisia or Egypt. It will support Gaddafi to the last minute. We will not lose Libya. We will not let Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, and [the] BBC trick us. We will live in Libya and die in Libya.”

This defiant speech was a milestone for Saif al-Islam. Since, the promising and reformist face of the Gaddafi regime consumed his credit in the eyes of international actors by declaring his greater support toward his father. The speech also laid the foundation for the NATO intervention in March 2011, because he left nothing on the table other than an armed struggle to overthrow Colonel Gaddafi and protect anti-Gaddafi protesters from the massacre. In June of 2011, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Colonel Gaddafi and Saif al-Islam, along with Chief of Intelligence Abdullah Senussi, for their war crimes (ICC 2011). Saif al-

Islam fought until the end, but was detained in November and made to stand trial (Bassiouni 2013).

VIII.II.III Khamis and Moatassim Billah al-Gaddafi

Khamis led the 32nd brigade, the strongest elite force of the Libyan military (also known as the Khamis brigade) (Parsons and Taylor 2011, 23). According to an Italian Intelligence report presented to the Italian parliament, the brigade included four to five thousand well-trained, loyal, Russian-made, army-equipped soldiers (Politi 2011). Dave Hartwell (2011) said, “Khamis had access to 260 of the tanks, though it is unclear how many [were] fully functional.” The brigade base was located in the northwest region of Libya, in Ouezzane, on the Jebel Nefusa, and Gaddafi intentionally recruited loyal soldiers from the 32nd brigade to guard him against domestic disorders (Joffe 2011a). Tharoor also stated that Khamis recruited many mercenaries from sub-Saharan Africa to fight eastern Libyan rebels in 2011 (Tharoor 2011). During the 2011 uprisings, the 32nd brigade “led the fight against the revolutionary forces and, unlike the regular army, remained largely intact until the fall of Tripoli” (Lacher 2011, 142). Khamis was killed during the 2011 clashes with the anti-Gaddafi armed forces (Bassiouni 2013).

Moatassim Billah al-Gaddafi was another principal figure from the Gaddafi family. Colonel Gaddafi appointed him as the national security advisor for the Gaddafi regime in the mid-2000s and commanded the elite presidential guards (Tharoor 2011). He played an important role in managing his father’s transfer to Sirte, and he fought in the final battle of Sirte until the end (Pargeter 2012). Armed rebel groups captured and executed him as his father in October 2011.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ See video: Moatassim’s capture and last speech: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qrr4hIswuCY> (Accessed June 10, 2014)

The people accused both sons of corrupting the natural resources of Libya during their father's reign, and the deprived population became very frustration. As one interviewee noted; after 2003, when US and UN sanctions came to end, Gaddafi's sons possessed huge economic assets (Interview with Vandewalle 2015). Moatassim's former girlfriend, Talitha van Zon, shared an account from one of their European trips: "I asked him once how much he spent. He said, 'About \$2 million.' I said, 'You mean a year?' He said, 'No, a month'" (Meo 2011). Khamis and Moatassim were key actors during the 2011 uprisings because they actively led the pro-Gaddafi armed forces and fought until the end of their lives. In large part, their decisions contributed to the civil strife and the military split of Libya by leading pro-Gaddafi forces.

VIII.II.IV Abdullah al-Senussi and Abu Bakr Younis Jabr

Gaddafi's brother-in-law, Abdullah al-Senussi, was the one of the most confident men of the Gaddafi regime (Beaumont 2011a). In 2011, he served as the chief of the military intelligence and played an important role in crushing the rebel forces in the eastern region of Libya, along with Saadi al-Gaddafi (Taylor 2014). Nearly 400 militia forces, particularly from the Katibat Fadeel (also known as "the fist of Gaddafi") in Benghazi, moved under his strong grip; and they committed raw and brutal act against the protestors in Benghazi and nearby during the 2011 protests (Chorin 2012, 195). Because of his cruel actions toward the civilians in the uprisings, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for him in June 2011 (ICC 2011). The ICC also accused him of commanding his militias to kill more than 1200 prisoners at the Abu Salim prison in Tripoli in 1996 and an additional 170 people during the French UTA (Union de Transports Aériens) flight 772 bombing on September 19, 1989 (Joffé 2011, 523).

One interviewee shared a rumour that Senussi wanted to defect, but he was placed under house arrest by Gaddafi (Interview with Joffe 2015). The rumour could be true to some extent, but not in the initial phases of the uprisings (Interview with Joffe 2015). Another respondent supported this argument by claiming that it is likely Senussi offered Colonel Gaddafi South Africa's President Jacob Zuma model⁴⁹ (Interview with Vandewalle 2015). In the midst of speculation, the reality emerged as Senussi fled to Mauritania through Morocco after Gaddafi's death (BBC 2012). He was detained in March, 2012 and extradited to Libya for trial in September 2012 (BBC 2012).⁵⁰

Another key ally of Gaddafi was Abu Bakr Yunis Jabr. Jabr was one of the 12 original members of Gaddafi's 1969 coup council, RCC (Mattes 2004, 6-7). In 2011, he served as the Defence Minister and the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces (*al-qa'id al-'amm lil-quwwat al-musallaha*). He was an essential and powerful actor in Gaddafi's regime and called as *Rifaq al-Qa'id* (The Comrades of the Leader). From the 1969 coup to 2011, he stayed with Colonel Gaddafi and died in Sirte when he tried to flee from the siege at Sirte (Al-Jazeera, 2011).⁵¹ His resistance and support for Gaddafi occurred as one the reasons for Gaddafi's long survival and harsh clashes with the armed anti-Gaddafi groups.

VIII.II.V Abdul Fattah Yunis al-Obeidi

General Abdul Fattah Yunis al-Obeidi was another one of Colonel Gaddafi's closest colleagues and was one of the key military officers in the 1969 military coup (Pargeter 2014, 1). In 2011, he served as the secretary of the public sector

⁴⁹ That model is the parliamentary republic, in which the president is head of government and head of state; but he needs to be approved by parliament and his presidency is limited to two terms.

⁵⁰ See video: Senussi comes to Libya for trial: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19487228> (Accessed May 5, 2015)

⁵¹ See video: Yunis Jabr is dead: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YudsOKSdnww&bpctr=1430840456> (Accessed July 14, 2015)

(corresponds with the Minister of Interior) and controlled the interior brigades (Pack 2013). He defected Colonel Gaddafi on Feb 22, 2011 (Beaumont 2011a), and he explained his defection by stating, “When I found the victims were too many for no justification-the mass killings of unarmed youth-I handed down instructions to the police and special task forces, which were operating under me not to fire on any civilian for any reason whatsoever, only in the case of self-defence, and in this case to shoot at the limbs, not to kill” (Rowland 2011).

His defection was a driving force for both the Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi factions. The act served a big blow to Gaddafi because it discouraged the Libyan military officers, particularly his controlled forces, from fighting with Gaddafi, and it downgraded the strength of Gaddafi’s regime in the eyes of Libyans. As of March 2011, military analyst, Dave Hartwell, stated on Al-Arabiya news that only a third of the regular Libyan army (out of near 50,000) still fought on the side of Gaddafi (Al Arabiya 2011, Interview with Joffe 2015).

As the soldiers defected, the anti-Gaddafi forces obtained new and well-organized armed forces from the Gaddafi’s side. General Younis “urged the Libyan army to join the people and respond to their legitimate demands” (Gaub 2013b, 326). The Interim National Transitional Council (NTC) needed someone with military experience who could control trained armed forces and appointed General Younis al-Obedie as the chief of the rebel armed forces (Pargeter 2014).

However, suspicions among the rebel forces never ended, and eastern Libyans and rebel forces in Misrata challenged General Younis’s legitimacy. According to them, he served Gaddafi regime for a very long time, and he was responsible for much of the criminal history of the Gaddafi regime, especially for cruel actions against Islamists (Interview with Vandewalle 2015). In addition, some rebel groups believed

that he joined rebels to protect his relatives who lived among the eastern tribe al-Obedie from a massacre (Interview with Joffe 2015).

Colonel Gaddafi also strategically planted suspicions among the anti-Gaddafi forces by declaring on state-run media that Younis had been reinstated as the Interior Minister (Telegraph 2011). The last obstacle General Younis confronted was the rivalry with former General Haftar. Haftar returned from the US in the early stages of the 2011 uprisings and proclaimed himself the chief of the rebel forces (Pack 2013). Even though the NTC appointed General Younis to serve in that role, he was killed in July 2011, allegedly by either pro-Islamist or February 17 rebel forces (Interview with Joffe 2015, Pargeter 2014, 1, Interview with Vandewalle 2015). The head of the NTC, Abdeljalil, Gaddafi's former Minister of Justice, stated,

“Islamic extremists, who tried to assassinate him and his companions the day he dissociated himself from Gaddafi's regime, say the thunderbolt brigade, led by Younis himself, oppressed them in Derna and Ras al Helal valleys when he was a Minister of Interior during Gaddafi's rule.” (Abdeljalil 2012)

Mahmoud Jibril, another important figure in the revolution, provided a different argument:

“In fact, Younis may well have been assassinated for trying to take steps to build a real military. I believe this is a good thing, but some are totally against it. I am simply saying that some people are against a real Libyan national army because it would mean that no foreigners [could] trespass onto Libyan soil. And other people have other plans.” (Jibril 2013)

VIII.II.VI Mustafa Abdeljalil and Mahmoud Jibril

Mustafa Abdeljalil was the Secretary of Justice (corresponds with the Minister of Justice) in Gaddafi's regime from 2007 to 2011 (Roberts, McCarthy, and Ash

2016). Like Younis al-Obeidi, he was of eastern Libyan origin, and was born in Al-Baida (International Crisis Group 2011a, 25). His defection on February 21, 2011 denoted the most prominent figure who defected Gaddafi regime after long co-working under him. He served as head of the NTC from March 2011 to August 2012 (Senauth 2013). He had support from protesters because he had gained popularity among Libyans during Gaddafi's regime. They perceived him as a human rightist and reformist. In a GPC speech in 2010, he denounced the detention of 300 political prisoners and asked Gaddafi to resign, which Gaddafi declined, which helped him establish a sympathetic image among Libyans and gain a measure of respect from the West (International Crisis Group 2011a, 25).

Mahmoud Jibril also stayed as a reformist part of Gaddafi's regime and worked as secretary of the National Planning Council and head of the NEDB (2007-2010). He was brought up to the political scene, like Abdeljalil, by Saif al-Islam as a competent technocrat and reformist (International Crisis Group 2011a). He disagreed with many Gaddafi loyalists, and eventually, he opposed Saif al-Islam and resigned from his position (Pargeter 2014). During the transitional period, he served as the head of the executive board of the NTC from March to October 2011 (Diamond and Plattner 2014).

Jibril was an important actor because he took an active position during the precarious period by siding with anti-Gaddafi blocs and transferring Libya from Gaddafi to the post-Gaddafi period. Jibril also served as a driving force for the NATO intervention by meeting with the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in London with the assistance of French intellectual Bernard-Henri Levy on March 14, 2011 (Chorin 2012, 224).

Both Abdeljalil and Jibril played a significant role in the anti-Gaddafi mass uprisings and helped protestors act in a collective and systematic manner. Their involvement helped the anti-Gaddafi factions establish political credibility abroad by demonstrating they had an alternative political agenda to the Gaddafi regime. Furthermore, the Western actors found some acceptable interlocutors for talks on how to develop cooperative actions against the Gaddafi regime.

VIII.II.VII Moussa Kusa

Moussa Kusa was also the one of the most prominent people within Gaddafi's regime. Prior to serving as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (corresponds with the Minister of Foreign Affairs), he served as the Chief of the Libyan Intelligence Agency, head of external security, and Gaddafi's security chief (Chorin 2012, 29). He earned a notorious reputation because of his criminal involvements under the Gaddafi regime. "In the 1980s, he became notorious for running Qaddafi's 'Stray Dogs' campaign aimed at liquidating exiles abroad... Widely seen as a ruthless and uncompromising servant of the regime, he somewhat reinvented himself in recent years" (International Crisis Group 2011a).

Kusa's defection occurred on March 29, 2011 after the NATO intervention. Libyan Government spokesperson Musa Ibrahim confirmed his leave, but he said that Kusa obtained permission from the Libyan authority to travel to Tunisia for medical care because "he needed intensive healthcare." Ibrahim continued, "We understand now he is resigned from his position. That is his personal decision. We hope we will recover and if he decides to come back he is most welcome. He has been working within the structure of Libyan revolution for a long time."⁵²

⁵² See video: Musa Ibrahim's press conference on 31 March 2011 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/31/moussa-koussa-defection-surprises-libya> (Accessed May 6, 2015).

Kusa had very strong ties with Gaddafi's regime and had actively participated in many illegal acts. As a result, he was expelled from the UK because of his involvement in killing Libyan exiles in the UK and in the world (Bassiouni 2013). He admitted to his role in this killing by saying in *The Times* on June 11, 1980, "The revolutionary committees have decided last night to kill two more people in the United Kingdom. I approve of this."

Kusa's defection to London deteriorated Gaddafi's resistance and strengthened the stance of anti-Gaddafi forces because it appeared as if he was escaping from certain defeat to side with the anti-Gaddafi factions before it was too late. The important defection also strengthened support for the anti-Gaddafi forces from the international diplomacy to replace the Gaddafi regime.

VIII.II.VIII Khalifa Haftar

Khalifa Haftar was a former general and commander for Colonel Gaddafi's military forces (Gregory 2015). He played a prominent role in the 1969 military coup, and he was a member of the RCC (Saadah 2014). However, the Libyan-Chadian war became a milestone for his long-time friendship with Gaddafi; because Haftar was captured by Chadian forces in March 1987, and Colonel Gaddafi disavowed him by claiming he was not part of the Libyan army (Mark 1996). That forced General Haftar into exile in the United States in the early 1990s, and he stayed there until the February 2011 uprisings (Pargeter 2012, 147).

With his return to Libya in 2011, he claimed a role as the head of the army; but Abdul Hafidh Ghoga, who was vice president and spokesman of the opposition's NTC, stated, "We defined the military leadership before the arrival of Haftar from the United States" (Bahrapour 2011). The NTC appointed Younis Al-Obeidi as the head the army to control and organize forces against the Gaddafi's armies.

However, the assassination of al-Obeidi in July and the leadership vacuum that followed among rebel forces paved the way for Haftar to take a leadership role in the anti-Gaddafi militia. He led the anti-Gaddafi armed groups until the fall of the Gaddafi regime. In spite of some defections, he played a key role in organizing and commanding the anti-Gaddafi forces to fight with pro-Gaddafi forces (Wehrey 2015).

VIII.II.IX Fathi Terbil

On February 15, 2011, Gaddafi's security forces arrested human rights-lawyer Fathi Terbil (International Crisis Group 2011a, 3) and accused him of organizing anti-regime protests so known 'Day of Rage' on 17 February (Gelvin 2012). Like the self-immolation of Bouzazi in Tunisia, that incident ignited many protests in eastern Libya (Ashour 2014, 1). Terbil represented an important figure among the eastern Libyans because he represented the victims of the Abu Selim prison's massacre (detailed below). Terbil also lost his brother, cousin, and brother-in-law in this atrocity, and he was from Benghazi (Ashour 2014, 1, Pargeter 2012, 214).

The ire caused by Terbil's arrest only exacerbated existing frustrations in Benghazi and nearby, which had been building since Gaddafi's 1969 coup. Gaddafi later released Terbil to ease the protests against the existing regime (allegedly by Al-Senussi), but unrest had already ignited (Temehu 2014). The NTC appointed Terbil as a representative of the youth in the executive body, and he actively took part in the street protests until the fall of Gaddafi's regime (International Crisis Group 2011a, 24).

VIII.II.X National Transitional Council (NTC 2011)

The council served as an interim ruling body during the uprisings of 2011. Even though the anti-Gaddafi factions established the council on February 27, 2011, their first official meeting took place in Benghazi on March 5, 2011 and included 33

members from different areas of Libya (Achcar 2013, 206).⁵³ The NTC formed its executive board in May to act as a governing body (International Crisis Group 2011a, 24). Abdeljalil served as the chairperson of the NTC, and Jibril became the head of the executive board. There were no elections, and the council leaders selected members based on their government experiences and popularity within their cities (Lust 2011). The main objectives of the NTC were as follows: “establish the safety of the national territory; liberate Libya; support local organizations to protect civilians; work as a transitional government before free elections; organize a military council to protect Libyan borders and its people; and represent the Libyan nation at the international level” (NTC 2011).

The UN recognized the NTC as Libya’s legal representative on September 16, 2011 (United Nations 2011). However, the lack of a democratic election process within the NTC undermined its legitimacy. In addition, there was polarization within the NTC between former Gaddafi officials and old prominent family members (during King Idris, 1951-1969), and the conflict dominated the interim ruling power (Tempelhof and Tarkowski 2012).

Accordingly, Gaub noted that “it [NTC] also has been incapable of bridging the serious divisions (be they regional, political or tribal) existing in society” (Gaub 2013b, 238). As Gaddafi’s regime came to an end, the fissure within the NTC morphed into a power struggle between the Islamists (or “insiders”) who demanded full-fledged revenge against Gaddafi’s former officials and non-Islamists (or “outsiders”) (Pargeter 2014). For example, Ismail al-Salabi, who led the anti-Gaddafi brigade ‘February 17’ and commanded at least 3,000 fighters, said that in September 2011, “The role of the executive committee [NTC] is no longer required because they

⁵³ The number increased in time, near 50, but certain number never occurred because the names kept anonymous because of security issues.

are remnants of the old regime. They should all resign, starting from the head of the pyramid all the way down” (Farge 2011).

Despite such rifts, the NTC remained until the general assembly elections and represented a legitimate alternative to the Gaddafi government during the uprisings. In addition, international actors like France, the UK, the US, and the UN eventually accepted the NTC as the legitimate representative of Libya during the uprisings (Droubi 2014). As Droz-Vincent stated, “The National Transition Council (NTC) was an important focal point for the 17 February uprising in terms of fundraising and international legitimacy, but it never acted as a government or a unified political wing” (Droz-Vincent 2014, 201). After the end of Gaddafi’s regime, the NTC dissolved with the advent of the elected Libyan assembly in August 2012.

In sum, the aforementioned actors played an important role during the uprisings by choosing to stand with either Gaddafi or the anti-Gaddafi factions. The stance of actors influenced the events that led to the uprisings, as well as the place of the military during the uprisings. In the next section, I explain the key factors that contributed to the military split in 2011.

VIII.III Factors

In this section, I explore which factors largely contributed to the public outcry against Gaddafi among the Libyans in 2011 and highlight the links between past events and the 2011 uprisings. I also examine the factors that contributed to the end of Colonel Gaddafi’s reign. I begin by discussing four historical keystone events that fostered the people’s frustrations against the Gaddafi regime: (a) the 1993 coup plot, (b) the 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre, (c) the 1998 HIV/AIDS incidence, (d) the 2006 atrocity, (e) 2010-2011 Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings and the role of media, and (f) 2011 NATO intervention. I then demonstrate that the Tunisian and Egyptian

uprisings exposed the anger and discontent against the Gaddafi regime and triggered the end of the regime through a domino effect. I also explore the indispensable role that media played in the spread of the protests and the ways that NATO's intervention aided the protestors with its aerial attacks and helped bring about the end of Gaddafi's regime.

VIII.III.I 1993 Coup Plot

In 1993, a group of high-ranking military officers, many of whom were from the Warfalla tribe, planned to assassinate Colonel Gaddafi on a scheduled trip to the city of Bani Walid (Kirkpatrick 2011, Joffé 2011, 523). This plot marked a turning point for Gaddafi, because members of Libya's largest tribe, the Warfalla, had become loyal to Gaddafi involved into such a plot.

Colonel Gaddafi discovered the coup attempt and forced the tribal leaders to execute their own members (Joffe 2011b). When the tribes defied that request, Gaddafi punished the plotters' families and executed the conspirators in early 1997 (International Crisis Group 2011a, 11-12). Although the coup attempts proved that there were already a number of dissidents in the Warfalla tribe, the incident sowed seeds of enmity between the Gaddafi regime and many Warfalla tribe members (Joffe 2011b).

Although he later lost the support of other Warfalla members, Akram Al-Warfalli, a leading figure in the Warfalla tribe declared his defection from the Gaddafi regime (Al-Jazeera 2011b). In addition, the tribe was driving force in the political structure of Gaddafi's regime (Joffé 2011); and some key figures, such as Secretary of National Planning Mahmoud Jibril—who deserted Gaddafi in 2011—were members of this tribe.

VIII.III.II 1996 Abu Salim Prison Massacre

The Abu Salim prison was located in Southwest Tripoli and housed Islamist and political opponents (Mezran 2014). On June 29, 1996, Gaddafi's forces killed more than 1,200 inmates in a few hours (Mezran 2014). According to the Anwar Haraga (2011), who was an inmate in the prison from 1989 to 2000, the massacre occurred because three inmates held two guards hostage to escape from the prison. During the hostage, the prisoners started to protest the bad conditions in the facility. Chief of Military Intelligence Senussi came to the prison to manage the situation and told the prisoners' representatives, "Tell them all to go inside their cells and close the doors, or I will call in two jet fighters and bring this place down around your head" (Hill 2011).

The following day, when the prisoners continued their protests, Gaddafi's forces carried out the massacre. According to Hussein al-Shafa'I, who stayed in prison from 1988 to 2000, the gunshots continued from 11:00 am to 1:35 pm and left behind more than 1,200 dead (Human Rights Watch 2003). He also stated that some officials threw dead bodies into a trench in the Abu Salim prison but later removed them somewhere else (Human Rights Watch 2003). The inmates' families primarily resided in the eastern region of Libya (most of them in Benghazi), and that is a trace to estimate the regional location of the victims (Chorin 2012, 153).

Although Saif al-Islam tried to end the growing opposition against the regime by approaching the families of Abu Salim prison victims, former Libyan Secretary of Justice Mustafa Abdeljalil told Human Rights Watch that "the offers of compensation were made in the context of reconciliation. Around 30% of the families who had so far been informed of the death of their relatives have accepted the offer of

compensation, 60% have refused because they think the amount is insufficient and 10% have refused on principle” (Abdeljalil 2009).

The massacre deepened the rifts between the Gaddafi regime and the eastern Libyans (Temehu 2014, Tempelhof and Tarkowski 2012). The resulting frustrations became another contributing factor that brought about the 2011 uprisings.

VIII.III.III 1998 HIV/AIDS Tragedy

In 1998, over 410 children passed away from HIV/AIDS at the El-Fatih Children’s Hospital in Benghazi (Joffe 2011a). Libyan government accused five Bulgarian nurses and one Palestinian doctor of deliberately infecting the children (International Crisis Group 2011a, 13). The Libyan court sentenced all six of the individuals to the death penalty in 2004, five years after their arrest. In 2007, Libya’s High Judicial Court changed the sentence to life in prison and eventually released and repatriated them to Bulgaria in the same year (Joffé 2011, 523). Negotiations with the EU played a significant role in this outcome. The EU created the International Fund for Libya and paid \$1 million per victim (Chorin 2012). Libya previously had paid the same amount to the victims of 1989 September-UTA bombing (Blanchard and Zanotti 2011).

The release of the hospital’s medical staff remained a bleeding wound for the family of the children in Benghazi, because it seemed that Gaddafi was looking for scapegoats to cover his own mistakes. Due to that, in 2007, Saif al-Islam claimed that some children were infected before the medical staff came to the hospital and stated, “Yes, they [medical staff] were tortured by electricity and they were threatened that their family members would be targeted” (US Department of State 2008).

In addition, the families blamed Gaddafi’s regime for releasing the convicts in an act of vengeance in the international arena. Gaddafi used the trial in revenge for UTA

and Lockerbie bombing compensation on the west. The eastern Libyans believed that because of Gaddafi's self-centred action, the families of the victims did not get justice for the acts against their children. Suspicion also grew among the eastern Libyans that Gaddafi intentionally infected the children. As Chorin noted,

“In the wake of the February revolution, many in Benghazi continued to believe that the infection as deliberate. Many Libyans continue to believe the Bulgarians were responsible, while at least one senior diplomat is convinced Gaddafi himself ordered the infection to “punish” the East for continuing sedition.” (Chorin 2012, 134)

Thus, the grief among the eastern Libyans “added to the generalised unpopularity of the regime” (Joffé 2011, 523). Consequently, as noted before, eastern Libya played a central role in fighting Gaddafi forces during the 2011 uprisings.

VIII.III.IV Violent 2006 Danish Cartoon Protests

The 2011 protests began in Benghazi on February 17th. The protestors deliberately selected this date because it commemorated the day of the 2006 killings during the Danish cartoon protests. In February 2006, the Benghazi populace protested Danish cartoons that insulted prophet Mohammad (Joffé 2013). The protestors initially intended to attack the Italian consulate in Benghazi; however, the protests turned against the Gaddafi regime, the revolutionary committees, and state buildings in a short time (Joffé 2013). Gaddafi forces' attack to the protestor, killing 14 Libyans (Pargeter 2012, 214). The event established a new enmity and escalated the grievances against the Gaddafi regime.

These events in Libya, generally, and in eastern Libya, specifically, demonstrate that “Colonel Gaddafi's government has deliberately neglected and persecuted people in Cyrenaica, provoking more demonstrations in recent years in

turn” (Joffe 2011a). These events paved the way for the 2011 protests that brought about the end of Gaddafi’s regime. However, in addition to the deepening antagonism between Gaddafi and frustrated Libyans, some factors also contributed to the uprising and the end of Gaddafi in 2011. Accordingly, in the following sections, I examine the domino effect of uprisings in Tunisian and Egypt, the facilitating role of media and the NATO intervention.

VIII.III.V 2010-2011 Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, and the Role of Media

A few anti-Gaddafi protests and some coup attempts had occurred in Libya before the 2011 uprisings; however, none of them succeeded in overthrowing Gaddafi’s regime. One of the most significant protests occurred when young students staged freedom demonstrations for the student unions in 1976 (Vandewalle 2006, XIX, Pargeter 2012, 94). Additionally, in 1984, an unknown group attacked Gaddafi’s headquarters in Tripoli (Elmahjub 2013, 5). Moreover, two members of Gaddafi’s inner circle, Omar al Muhayshi and Bechir Hawwadi’s 1975,⁵⁴ and a number of Warfalla tribe members’ 1993 coup attempts were the other abortive challenges to the Gaddafi regime (Chorin 2012, 39). Gaddafi brutally crushed these threats to his regime by hanging the students at the Tripoli’s Al-Fateh University campus and executing the coup conspirators shortly after the plot came to light (Pargeter 2012, 94-95, Gaub 2013b).


As Warren stated, the only genuine uprising was the Tunisian since Tunisia was the birthplace of the Arab uprisings (Interview with Warren 2014); however, the uprising had not restricted within Tunisia. The end of Ben Ali’s 24-year presidency on January 14, 2011 started a domino effect among its neighbouring states, and within less than one month, Egyptian protests forced Hosni Mubarak to leave his 30-year

⁵⁴ Muhayshi and Hawwadi were the army officers and original members of the 12 RCC (Chorin 2012). Muhayshi was extradited by Morocco and killed by the Gaddafi regime in 1984 (Gaub 2013b). There is no information about Hawwadi.

presidency on February 11, 2011 (Cook 2012). Libya geographically shares borders both Tunisia and Egypt, and the ended reigns of two long-term leaders inspired Libyans to get involved in the protests. The demonstrations in Libya began shortly after Mubarak's overthrowing on February 15, 2011.

Besides the two important inspiring events in Tunisia and Egypt, satellite television (mostly anti-Gaddafist, Qatar-based Al-Jazeera) and social networking outlets like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube had a significant impact on the demonstrations in Libya. As seen at Figure VIII.I, the percentage of Internet users in Libya increased significantly from 2000 to 2010. While almost zero percent of the population used the Internet in 2000, by 2010, 14% of the population (nearly 850,000) had Internet access.

Figure VIII.I: Internet Users as Percentage of Population in Libya (per 100 people)



Source: "Internet users," data.worldbank.org. Retrieved April 17, 2014.

<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2>.

In addition, as of December 2010, nearly 260,000 Libyans (almost 3.98% of the national population) used Facebook (Arab Social Media Report 2011). Libyan activists opened a Facebook page in late January 2011 and used the page to organize

the protestors by declaring February 17th as the Day of Rage.⁵⁵ The page reached almost 82,000 followers by February 17, 2011, when the first mass protests began (Rane and Salem 2012, 106). In addition to Facebook, the protestors used Twitter to spread the word about the demonstrations using the hashtag #Feb17 (Rane and Salem 2012, 105).

Although the number of internet users seemed small in comparison with those in Tunisia (45% of the population) and Egypt (around 56% of the population) in 2011 (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015, 9), it was still significant for the small and geographically dense population of Libya. As stated previously, Libya was home to 6 million people, and the majority of them resided in Tripoli and Benghazi (Chorin 2012). As a result, access to internet and social media played a big role in rapidly spreading information about the demonstrations among the population.

Moreover, the anti-Gaddafi protestors built a website, www.libyafeb17.com, to distribute images and footage from the uprisings (Rane and Salem 2012, 106). YouTube also aided in publicizing footage of the pro- Gaddafi forces' brutal actions against the protestors. As Gaddafi said in his radio speech on March 17, 2011, "[Destroy] their communications points that are spreading lies to you."⁵⁶ Once Gaddafi's regime blocked the Internet, people began to use smart phones to access the Internet and ensure their voices were heard around the world (Elmahjub 2013, 11). In addition, eastern Libyan protestors received help from their neighbours in Egypt. As Beaumont explained, "Libyan activists also asked Egyptians to send their sim cards

⁵⁵ As mentioned previously, they intentionally selected February 17 because on February 17, 2006, more than 10 people were killed because of their protests of the Danish cartoons of prophet Mohammed in Benghazi (Pargeter 2012, 214) (Joffe, 2011).

⁵⁶ Listen Gaddafi's 17 March 2011 radio speech: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ULw5IUG5wl0> (Accessed on May 7, 2015)

across the border so they could communicate without being bugged” (Beaumont 2011c).

VIII.III.VI 2011 NATO Intervention

The UN explained the Security Council’s decision regarding the clash between Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi factions in March 2011 as follows:

“Demanding an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to the current attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute “crimes against humanity,” the Security Council this evening imposed a ban on all flights in the country’s airspace — a no-fly zone — and tightened sanctions on the Qadhafi regime and its supporters.” (United Nations Security Council 2011)

UN also declared one key point to minimize Libyans’ occupation concern because Libyan state run media was rumouring that among Libyans. “[The] Council authorized Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory — requesting them to immediately inform the Secretary-General of such measures” (United Nations Security Council 2011).

Pargeter stated that the UN’s decision turned the tables against Gaddafi (Pargeter 2012, 233). By mid-March 2011, Gaddafi’s forces reconquered the western towns of Zawiya and Zawara and the eastern cities of Ras Lanuf and Brega (Pargeter 2012, 233) and gained control of Ajdabiya, which served as a gateway to Benghazi (Chorin 2012, 206). Saif al-Islam gave an interview with TIME on March 13, 2011 and seemed very confident about Libya’s ability to quell all rebellions (Gaddafi

2011).⁵⁷ He said, “They are not rebels, they are gangsters. The militia is broken now, and they flee everywhere. They do not have future, but we do.” He continued “Nobody cares about NATO and Europe. We care Libya.” After Saif’s statement, Colonel Gaddafi gave a radio address on March 17th, just few hours before the passing of UN Resolution 1973:

“It is over ... We are coming tonight... You [anti-Gaddafi factions] will come out from inside. Prepare yourselves from tonight. We will find you in your closets. You [his fighters] all go out and cleanse the city of Benghazi. We will track them down, and search for them, alley by alley, road by road...No more fear, no more hesitation, we are no longer reluctant...destroy them.” (Tomasky 2011)⁵⁸

These developments drove the UN to pass Resolution 1973 resolution just a few hours after Gaddafi’s speech. In fact, not only Gaddafi’s threatening speech but also the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Arab League, and NTC endorsed the no-fly zone (Vaughn and Dunne 2015, 39-40). This show of opposition to Gaddafi’s tactics strongly demonstrated that he had few allies, either in the international community or in the Arab and Muslim world. NATO⁵⁹ took responsibility for protecting civilians (R2P) by starting its aerial bombings in March, and they continued different scales of attack until the death of Gaddafi in October 2011 (Mezran 2014, 320-321).

⁵⁷ See video Saif al-Islam’s Interview on TIME, 13 March 2011. http://content.time.com/time/video/player/0,32068,823039962001_2058645,00.html (Accessed May 8, 2012).

⁵⁸ Listen Colonel Gaddafi’s 17 March 2011 speech: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ULw5lUG5wl0> (Accessed May 3, 2013).

⁵⁹ It is important to underline that the intervention started as ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn’ and was carried out by the US, France, UK, Italy, and Canada (Garamone 2011). However, the operation was reframed under NATO’s framework with the new title ‘Operation Unified Protector’ because of Italy’s insistence for a NATO-backed intervention (Mezran 2014, 321).

Even though the scale and mission of the NATO intervention can be queried, the fact was that “NATO's intervention prevented the rebels’ certain defeat” (Ross 2011, 2). The rebels were looting Gaddafi’s arms arsenals, but what they found was insufficient. As Rebel Commander Tarek Zanzou said during the conflict, “Our problem is weapons. We need them, but we do not have them” (Booth 2011). The NATO intervention helped the people by providing weapons and bombing Gaddafi’s arsenals, especially in those the western city of Az-Zawiyah (Interview with Amer 2015).

One might question why NATO took so long to intervene in the struggle against Gaddafi (near 8 months). Libyan military insiders explained that NATO had no desire to end Gaddafi’s regime before making sure its interests, mostly oil exportation, had been guaranteed by his successors (Interview with Libyan Military Insiders Abdallah and Amen 2014). Indeed, U.S. President Barack Obama also explained that before the UN resolution, “We knew that a no-fly zone would not save the people of Benghazi” (Lewis 2012). Due to that Gaddafi was managing the ground battle against people in Benghazi and nearby here, but the NATO intervention remained limited with aerial bombings.

VIII.IV Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the 2011 Libyan revolution and the actors and factors that contributed to the 2011 uprising. The backdrop of this rebellion provides insight into how Gaddafi’s 42-year regime fell in less than a year. I explored prominent actors, including Colonel Gaddafi, and significant factors that led to the 2011 uprisings and influenced the military’s behaviour. These factors and actors affected that outcome to varying degrees.

The central goal of this chapter was to demonstrate the link between these key actors, factors and the military's behaviour during the 2011 Libyan uprisings. In the following chapter, I explain the interlocking explanatory variables that are foundational to my research and provide a bridge between the historical context and the military's behaviour in 2011. These variables include military structure, energy resource, and the strength of protests.

Chapter IX

Tunisia: Energy Capacity, Military Structure, and the Strength of Protests

IX.I Introduction

In this chapter, I apply my theoretical framework to the Tunisian case. The framework posits that institutional formation and the intention of possessing or protecting power along with a socio-political stance shaped the behaviour of the Tunisian military during the 2010-2011 uprisings. I begin by analysing the three contributing factors detailed in the theoretical framework: (a) energy capacity, (b) military structure, and (c) the strength of protests. The explanation of these factors demonstrates that economic interests, institutional identity and strength of protests shaped the role of the military during the uprisings. In other words, the chapter explores the extent to which economics link with ruling power, the scope of institutional structure of the military, and the power of protests to affect the military's behaviour during the uprisings.

However, I do not claim that the three factors are the only causes that influenced the Tunisian military's behaviour during the uprising. Rather, I claim that the combination of the three factors played a contributing role in the decision of the Tunisian military to defect from Ben Ali's regime, and in the sections that follow, I aim to demonstrate that contribution. The three factors' contribution on the role of the military becomes more explicit once compared with my opposite case Libya, a comparison that I make in the conclusion chapter of my thesis.

This chapter begins with an examination of Tunisia's energy sources and the impact of energy capacity on the role of the Tunisian armed forces during the uprising. I then examine the structure of the Tunisian armed forces and follow with a research on the strength of protests that emerged in the 2010-2011 uprisings. The central goal of this chapter is to show the correlation between these three factors and the behaviour of the Tunisian military behaviour during the 2010-2011 uprisings.

I examine the three factors together to clarify their impact on the role of the military because energy capacity, military structure, and the strength of protests are largely complementary. The military structure is not immune to the state's energy capacity, since economic resources often determine how ruling powers shape the military at both the institutional and individual level. In addition, the strength of protests is not independent from the military structure and energy sources, since the protesters develop their strategies based upon the military's attitude and their state's economic power. If the military was more likely to have a violent response to the protests, as they did in Libya, the protestors may, for example, have armed themselves. Conversely, if the military forces were more likely to take a diplomatic approach, then the Tunisian demonstrators might decide to engage in peaceful protests.

Additionally, economic dependence on foreign investment also strengthened the strength of protests because Europe and the United States declared their withdrawal from Ben Ali. In contrast to Tunisia, energy resources in Libya were the key economic source that helped Gaddafi to establish his *Katibas* (brigades). The economic privilege he offered to his loyal colleagues was the principle incentive for the military to side with his regime during the revolution. Accordingly, the lack of

such incentives also led the Tunisian military to have the opposite reaction to the protests. However, the economic structure was not the only factor.

China illustrates the complementary relationship between the three contributing factors, as it is also an energy poor state like Tunisia, and its 1989 revolution failed because the military was politically tethered to the ruling regime (Lee 2005, 80-81). This historical example shows that energy poverty might not alone be enough to ensure successful protests without having an apolitical and institutional military structure that will defect from the ruling regime. However, the presence of an apolitical and institutional military, along with energy poverty, may not even be sufficient to gain the support of the military during protests seen during the Arab uprising.

Tunisia's 2008 Gafsa mining protests, as an example, were unsuccessful because the strength of protests did not reach beyond the Gafsa region. Thus, in addition to a lack of energy and an apolitical and institutional military structure, the high strength of protests seems to be one of the prerequisites to gaining the military's support during an uprising. That was the three-pronged combination that proved successful during the 2010-2011 Tunisian uprisings. The elimination of any variable in my comparative case study research can detract from the strength of this theoretical framework and my argument, since I contend that the factors separately do not make a decisive difference on the military behaviour in the cases of Tunisia and Libya. However, the joint configuration of them makes an important distinction. I have chosen to compare the two differing cases of Tunisia and Libya to demonstrate the effect of any variation in that combination.

Table IX.I: The Three Contributing Factors and Outcome in the Tunisian Uprisings

Case	Contributing factors			Outcome
Tunisia	Energy resource	Military structure	The strength of protests	Military behaviour
	Poor	Institutional and apolitical	Strong and Unarmed	Did not shoot the protesters

IX.II Energy Capacity

Tunisia is not an energy rich state. The state does not have sufficient oil and natural gas reserves to export, and so the Tunisian economy is not dependent on energy revenues. Any non-tax revenue from energy exports enables state leaders to establish and maintain their regimes. Within newly established and democratically underdeveloped states, that fact becomes more important than it is in other nations. For example, the energy rich Arabian Gulf States received their independence after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century. King currently rules all these states. The main source of income that enables the kingdoms to maintain their ruling regime at home and abroad is the energy richness. As such, the Gulf States are a striking example of the theory of “resource curse on democracy”⁶⁰ (Ross 2001).

The energy wealth curse also shapes the structure, mission, and behaviour of the military towards the ruling regime and the ruled population. For example, the Saudi Arabian armed forces suppressed protests in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to end the threat towards the Kingdoms of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia during the uprisings in 2010-2011 (Simoni 2013). The military forces support state leaders’ regimes by protecting the economic resources that keep the rulers in power. While rulers might offer economic, social, or political privileges to their military supporters, most regimes provide military forces with economic privileges to secure their loyalty. In

⁶⁰ There is no such rule resource wealth necessarily propels a state into an anti-democratic stage. There are some resource rich but also democratic states, such as Norway, US and Canada (Ross 2012, 2).

exchange for that benefit, the regimes use the military power's repressive capacity to guard against dissidents (Ross 2001). Military forces then become *forces of the regime*, and their character becomes politicized. The military supports its ruling regime because they have a lot to lose if the ruling power is deposed. Consequently, they protect their regime for the sake of their material possessions and personal interests.

However, the spoils garnered from energy resources are not the only reason that the military will remain loyal to its regime. There are many cases where the state is energy poor, but the military protects the ruling regime, such as in Morocco and Turkey during the 2011 and 2013 protests (Lynch 2012, Keyman and Gumuscu 2014). Energy income does strengthen the ruling power, though, and helps leaders to establish strong relationships with armed forces, who are then willing to thwart any threats against their rule.⁶¹

As stated before, Tunisia has some oil and gas reserves, but not enough to export, and Tunisia is not a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Alexander 2010).⁶² The available oil and gas produced from its main oil producing fields—El Borma, Ashtart, and Sidi el Kilani—was not even enough for Tunisia itself (Clarke 2008). While the daily total production was 492,000 barrels⁶³ (BP 2011), the domestic consumption was close to 533,000⁶⁴ barrels in the total period between 2005 and 2010 (US Energy Information Administration 2013b)

⁶¹ There are also some examples of states that are energy poor, but the military still possesses big economic powers, such as the Egyptian military (Frisch 2013, 183).

⁶² Tunisia used to be a member of Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), from 1968 to 1986 (Kumetat 2015). However, OAPEC was formed in 1968 to create a “pan-Arab pressure group” in response to the Six Day War defeat in 1967, rather than an energy cooperation (Kumetat 2015).

⁶³ Oil production from 2005 to 2010 was as follows: 73,000, 70,000, 97,000, 89,000, 83,000 and 80,000 (BP 2011, 8).

⁶⁴ Oil consumption from 2005 to 2010 daily was as follows: 90,000, 88,000, 88,000, 92,000, 87,000 and 88,000 (US Energy Information Administration 2013b).

(see Table IX.II). In addition, the country's low refining capacity led the country to import refined petroleum products to meet its demands because Tunisia had only two oil refineries on the north coast in Bizerte and in the central east in La Skhira (US Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 2008).

Table IX.II: Tunisian Oil Facts

Tunisia	At end of 1990	At end of 2000	At end of 2010	R/P ratio ⁶⁵
Oil proved reserves (thousand million barrels)	1.7	0.4	0.4	14.6 per cent
Production (thousand barrels daily)	98	78	80	
Consumption (thousand barrels daily)	63	85	88	

Source: BP 2011; U.S. Energy Information Administration 2013. Retrieved September 3, 2015.

In terms of gas production, Miskar and Franig are the two major gas fields in the country, and total yearly natural gas production in Tunisia was around 416⁶⁶ billion cubic feet between 2005 and 2010 (US Energy Information Administration 2013a). Consumption, on the other hand, was near 708⁶⁷ billion cubic feet during the same period (US Energy Information Administration 2013a) (see Table IX.III). As a result, Tunisia did not have large gas reserves to export. Tunisia's income from oil and

⁶⁵ R/P means that Reserves to Production ration

⁶⁶ The yearly natural gas production was as follows from 2005-2010: 88, 88, 56, 48, 64 and 72 billion cubic feet (US Energy Information Administration 2013a).

⁶⁷ The yearly natural gas consumption was as follows from 2005-2010: 152, 134, 100, 98, 108 and 116 billion cubic feet (US Energy Information Administration 2013a).

natural gas per capita⁶⁸ was 250 dollars in comparison to Libya's 6,420 dollars in 2009 (Ross 2012, 20).

Table IX.III: Tunisian Natural Gas Facts

Tunisia	1990	2000	2010
Gas proved reserves (trillion cubic feet)	3.1	2.8	2.3
Production (billion cubic feet)	12	66	72
Consumption (billion cubic feet)	54	109	116

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 2013. Retrieved September 3, 2015.

Bourguiba (1956-1987) and his successor Ben Ali (1987-2011) had to find a way to rule Tunisia without having the influence awarded by energy resources. The Tunisian economy had very diverse sources of income, including manufacturing, agriculture, mining (mostly phosphate), and tourism (see Table IX.IV). Tunisia was the fourth largest exporter of textiles to the EU in 2005 (Ayadi and Mattouss 2014), and 80% of national exports were in the manufacturing sector in 2008 (Ayadi and Mattouss 2014). Moreover, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was the principal contributor to the Tunisian economy. In 2002, FDI in Tunisia was around 402 million dollars (Ayadi and Mattouss 2014, 11).

⁶⁸ Oil and natural gas per capita was calculated as follows: Per capita income=Total value of oil and gas production ÷ Country's population (Ross 2012, 16).

Table IX.IV: Economic Activities Contribution of GDP (1990-2007)

Sector	Average contribution to GDP (percent)
Agriculture	13.4
Industry	29.2
• Manufacturing	17.6
• Construction	4.6
• Gas, electricity, and water	6.2
• Mining and quarrying	0.8
Services ⁶⁹	57.4
Total	100

Source: Chemingui and Sánchez 2011, p.9.

Tunisia was not an energy rich state (or a rentier state) (Ross 2001, Mezran 2014) and depended upon foreign investments, tourism, and nonfuel domestic products. Therefore, Tunisia is a state that should not be classified in the ‘resource curse’ state category. Ben Ali thus could not take the advantage of oil income to buy the loyalty of the armed forces⁷⁰ nor could he use such revenue to establish economic independency from outside during his reign.⁷¹ As a result, the Tunisian military had no abiding economic link to Ben Ali’s regime, and they saw no threat to their personal or institutional interests if Ben Ali left his position of power. As I will detail in the next section, indeed, the Tunisian military budget was very limited under the reign of both Bourguiba and Ben Ali.

During the uprisings, supporting the Ben Ali regime had the risk of exclusion by outside economic partners and of having bloodshed in Tunisia, such as during the

⁶⁹ Services refer to tourism, financial services, health, education, data processing, telecommunications and services rendered to the companies (Chemingui and Sánchez 2011, 9).

⁷⁰ Ross used the oil rich Iranian case as an example by saying, “President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has given billions of dollars in no-bid contracts to businesses associated with the elite paramilitary Revolutionary Guards” (Ross 2011).

⁷¹ Ben Ali established loyal police forces, national guards, and presidential guards by offering them economic and social privileges. However, the source of these privileges did not come from energy income, but from foreign economic investments.

1990s in Algeria. Tunisia's Western economic partners (the US and EU) (see Chapter V for more details) declared their withdrawal from Ben Ali. At that point, staying with Ben Ali meant economic stagnation and financial crisis for the military and for the whole of Tunisia. The lack of energy resources (and economic privileges) facilitated the military's decision to end its support for Ben Ali during the uprisings without any internal strife within the institution (as was the case in energy-rich Libya) or violent conflicts with the protesters. The army declared its loyalty to the state, not to Ben Ali, by choosing not to shoot the protesters to maintain Ben Ali's presidency. There was no *energy curse on the pro-democratic protests* and no "repression effect" (Ross 2001, 335) during the Tunisian uprisings.

"Here again, the size of state's oil revenues may help block transitions to democracy: when autocrats are better financed and directly control the distribution of benefits to the military, they are more likely to retain the backing of the armed forces and extinguish any rebellions." (Ross 2012, 71)

The Tunisian military had no material incentives (*greed*) from the Ben Ali regime to support him and his regime. On the contrary, the economic restrictions imposed by Ben Ali encouraged the military to side with the anti-Ben Ali protestors. The restrictions applied by both Bourguiba and Ben Ali created intense and wide-ranging deprivation among members of the Tunisian military. Such deprivation showed its effect during the uprisings in favour of the protests, because the Tunisian military wanted to relieve their discontent through making cooperation with the protestors to end the Ben Ali regime.

In addition, as stated previously, the Tunisian economy depended on foreign investments. The nation's stability was the most important incentive for those foreign investors. Therefore protecting state stability and preventing a possible national strife

and, thus, preserving international economic support towards Tunisia as a state was more important. The end of foreign support towards Ben Ali during the uprisings (see Chapter VI) facilitated the military defection.

The basic role of energy poverty during the uprisings worked in favour of the protestors in Tunisia. The protestors co-opted the military because of the lack of economic inducements from the Ben Ali regime. That means the Tunisian military had no economic motives to support the Ben Ali regime. That impact will become clearer once I demonstrate in the next chapter how the military in Libya fought with Gaddafi until the end to protect the incentives they received from Libya's energy wealth. While the lack of energy resources played an important role in the shaping the military behaviour in the uprisings in Tunisia, the military structure was also another closely related, important factor.

IX.III Military Structure

Both Bourguiba and Ben Ali pursued a policy of coup proofing the Tunisian military. In 1962, during President Bourguiba's reign, the Tunisian government discovered a coup plot within the military, allegedly organized by Bourguiba's rivals, both Youssefists⁷² and Communists.

“The Tunisian regime thereafter kept military spending unusually low; conscription laws provided a more than adequate pool of potential draftees for the army-eight thousand troops in 1960, twenty-two thousand in 1978-while high civilian unemployment rates guaranteed adequate volunteers for the eighteen-thousand-member domestic national guard and national security police forces....[The] military was not used for political purposes like employment or large-scale domestic intelligence, and civilian control of the

⁷² Youssefists symbolized the people who supported Bourguiba's rival the former leader of the Destourian party Salah Ben Youssef. In contrast to Bourguiba, he was supported by Arab nationalists and religious groups (Anderson 1986, 231-232).

state's monopoly of force was ensured by the low allocations to the military.”

(Anderson 1986, 236-237)

In 1962, in a speech Bourguiba implied his fear of a military coup:

“Unless we take, as of today, the necessary measures [for economic welfare], the country in a few decades will experience serious convulsions. The disinherited will find leaders to express their grudges. Their children, brought up in hatred, will infiltrate the ranks of the army. Then one day, at dawn, they will try to seize power and arrest the Head of State, Sovereign or President of the Republic with ministers. They will want to put an end to corruption.”

(Moore 1965, 197)

The coup-proofing strategy worked in favor of the ruling regime once the military forces suppressed the 1978 general strike and 1984 bread riots, which resulted in at least 47 (unofficially near 200) and 89 deaths, respectively (Anderson 1986, 242, Reuters 1984).

Ben Ali's term brought no radical difference in perceptions of the military as a potential threat. The parliamentary election results in 1989 constituted a risk of serious challenge to the Ben Ali's presidency because the main rival faction al-Nahda's independent candidates⁷³ received about 15% support in that election (el-Khawas 2012, 3). As el-Khawas quoted from Murphy (1999), after the elections, Ben Ali announced that “there [was] no room for a religious party,” and that “[it was] never necessary to mix religion and politics” (el-Khawas 2012, 3). Afterwards, in 1991, Ben Ali decided to root out al-Nahda factions within the army and operations started shortly with the Barakat al-Sahil affair in 1991.

⁷³ Al-Nahda was banned to run in elections as a party that is why they ran as independent candidates (el-Khawas 2012).

Ben Ali claimed coup allegations to the military officers and he ordered alleged coup plotters to be tortured and confessed the coup plot in a hamlet Barakat al-Sahil (Lutterbeck 2015, 4). Army Captain Ahmad claimed that he had joined a secret meeting in Barakat al-Sahil that was organized by al-Nahda sympathizers who wanted to replace the existing government with an Islamist one (Nassif 2015b, 70-71). In the end, 244 military officers were arrested and accused of a coup plot against President Ben Ali (see Table IX.V).

Table IX.V: Number of Officers, NCOs, and Soldiers Arrested in the Barakat al-Sahil Affair⁷⁴

	Navy	Army	Air Force	Total
Officers	7	102	4	113
NCOs ⁷⁵	3	66	13	82
Rank and file	-	47	2	49

Source: Nassif 2015, p. 71; Cherif 2013.

Captain El Kaabi was the one of the military officers who faced interrogations at the Ministry of Interior and stayed for three months in the ministry's dungeon. He stated, "The first question was banal: name, marital status, and so on. The second was direct: 'When did you join al-Nahda?' I was not in al-Nahda and there was no plot, but Ben Ali wanted to clean out the army. They were making lists of soldiers who attended Friday prayers" (Thorne 2012). One interviewee for this study concurred with the claims of torture and stated, "The military hospital administrator said he sees the military officials tortured because of accusations of a coup attempt. Since, Ben Ali feared a coup" (Interview with Eyewitness Expert 2015).

⁷⁴ Nassif collected the data from an unpublished work *Qadiyyat Barakat al-Sahil* that was prepared by an NGO INSAF established by officers who suffered in 1991.

⁷⁵ NCO means non-commissioned officer.

In contrast to Ben Ali's coup allegations in 1991, a military insider in Tunis who participated in an interview for this study stated that it was a strategic manoeuvre from Ben Ali against capable officials. He explained, "[In fact], Ben Ali fired the officers who were practicing Islam and who were competent and intelligent enough to be a possible alternative to him. He eliminated any strong threat to his reign because he feared a coup" (Interview with Ayari 2015a).

Interestingly, though, Muhammad bin Hasin, the chief of the army at that time, protected his position until 2001. Moreover, Ben Ali appointed him to a key position as the director of the National Security Agency after his retirement (Nassif 2015b, 76). This move demonstrated that Ben Ali had no problem with top brass at that time, but wanted to undermine any potential challenge that could arise among the military officials.

During the trials of 244 officers, Said Benarbia (2015), Director of the MENA Programme International Commission of Jurists stated that "the detainees were allegedly subjected to torture and other-ill-treatment," and that "[the] majority of those detained were released without charge" (International Commission for Jurists, 2015); however, all of them were stripped of their ranks (see Table IX.VI).

Table IX.VI: Ranks of officers arrested in the Barakat al-Sahil affair⁷⁶

Rank	Number of Officers
Colonel	2
Lieutenant-colonel	2
Major	21
Captain	45
Lieutenant	37
Second lieutenant	6

Source: Nassif 2015, p. 72.

⁷⁶ Nassif collected the data from an unpublished work *Qadiyyat Barakat al-Sahil* that was prepared by an NGO INSAF established by officers who suffered in 1991.

Interviewee Abdesselem explained, “Bourguiba since the independence in 1956, and Ben Ali since his ascent to power in 1987, had both marginalized the Tunisian army in a sense, for a first common reason of a coup threat, even if the contexts of the two historical periods were different. However, Bourguiba had another reason to make such choice, which was his will to give priority to education, health and welfare. Due to that, Tunisia was a poor country without natural resources to support high military expenses. And to grant Tunisia’s security, he made a strategic choice of several protection agreements with different powerful nations like the US, preferred to the USSR, France, the former coloniser, and Algeria, the new powerful neighbour since 1962” (Interview with Abdesselem 2015).

As Table IX.VII shows, the Ministry of Defence’s budget was limited in comparison to that of the Ministry of Interior. The marginalization of the Tunisian military propelled it into an apolitical and institutional structure. Military officials were not allowed to be a member of any political party and did not even have the right to vote in either presidential or parliamentary elections as long as they are in active service (Hopkins 1989). As one interviewee explained, “[The] Tunisian army is attached to laws not to politics. Tunisian army is a democratic army. Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali never sent military officers for training to Arab states [because of pan-Arabism ideology] but they sent them to Turkey, US and Europe” (Interview with Nasr 2015). Ben Ali’s authority relied on his party RCD and security forces: police, national guards and presidential forces, which all were directed by the Interior Minister and President.

Table IX.VII: Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior Budget under Ben Ali
(1988-2010)

Year	Total budget (Tunisian Dinar)	Ministry of Interior budget	Percentage of total budget	Ministry of Defence budget	Percentage of total budget
1988	2,360,000,000	190,846,000	8	120,835,000	5.1
1989	2,560,000,000	224,086,000	8.7	134,656,000	5.2
1990	2,755,000,000	252,332,000	9.1	154,034,000	5.5
1991	3,080,000,000	284,300,000	9.2	177,667,000	5.7
1992	3,368,000,000	327,780,000	9.7	198,900,000	5.9
1993	3,780,000,000	353,736,000	9.3	210,372,000	5.5
1994	4,202,000,000	388,562,000	9.2	227,956,000	5.4
1995	4,631,000,000	419,623,000	9	241,669,000	5.2
1996	4,770,000,000	443,817,000	9.3	255,361,000	5.3
1997	8,010,000,000	523,524,000	6.5	357,837,000	4.4
1998	9,045,000,000	549,569,000	6	385,743,000	4
1999	9,590,000,000	580,649,000	6	405,530,000	4.2
2000	10,510,000,000	623,541,000	5.9	435,564,000	4.1
2001	10,820,000,000	621,988,000	5.7	453,430,000	4.1
2002	11,533,000,000	650,594,000	5.6	478,293,000	4.1
2003	11,410,000,000	697,153,000	6.1	510,586,000	4.4
2004	12,730,000,000	739,458,000	5.8	542,131,000	4.2
2005	12,990,000,000	718,368,000	5.5	469,125,000	3.6
2006	13,552,000,000	817,805,000	6	582,466,000	4.2
2007	14,360,000,000	858,786,000	5.6	612,033,000	4.2
2008	15,242,000,000	869,777,000	5.7	559,925,000	3.6
2009	17,106,000,000	1,031,841,000	6	720,793,000	4.2
2010	18,235,000,000	1,106,740,000	6	772,286,000	4.2

Source: Nassif 2015, p.75⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Nassif collected the data from Tunisian official gazette's, *al-Ra'id al-Rasni*, December issues.

Table IX.VIII: Tunisian Military Expenditures

Year	Millions in Tunisian dinar	Share of GDP (%)
1988	200	2.3
1989	222	2.3
1990	218	2
1991	241	2
1992	256	1.9
1993	277	1.9
1994	300	1.9
1995	324	1.9
1996	387	2
1997	396	1.9
1998	417	1.8
1999	424	1.7
2000	456	1.8
2001	483	1.7
2002	491	1.7
2003	525	1.7
2004	554	1.6
2005	608	1.5
2006	662	1.4
2007	629	1.3
2008	713	1.3
2009	763	1.3
2010	818	1.3

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditures (1988-2010) 2014. Retrieved June 30, 2015

Military expenditure⁷⁸ data obtained from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2014) showed further evidence of Tunisia's limited military budget.⁷⁹ After 1996, it did not exceed 2% of the GDP; and in 2010, it was only 1.3%

⁷⁸ "SIPRI military expenditure include all current and capital expenditure on: the armed forces, including peace keeping forces, defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military operations military space activities" (SIPRI, 2015).

⁷⁹ A good example to prove that Tunisia had not modernized combat staff since 1985 (Cordesman and Nerguizian 2010, 34) and 2002 helicopter clash that resulted death of 13 military officers, including

of Tunisia's GDP (see Table IX.VIII). Nassif noted that the limited budget indicated that "the military elite were not integrated into the regime's patronage networks, which meant that they had no stake in the regime's survival" (Nassif 2015a, 273). The military force embraced a different space from the regime. As Bellin noted, "[In] Tunisia, the military did not have to be persuaded to 'give up power' in large part because it never sought it" (Bellin 2013, 41).

Foreign aid to the Tunisian military also reduces the extent of its dependence on Ben Ali's regime. France and the United States provided significant help to the Tunisian military from its independence onward. Kahlaoui, who is an adviser to the former President Moncef Marzouki, said during our interview, "[The army's] budget was coming from the US. Much equipment was provided by the US. The relations of the Tunisian and the US army were very close" (Interview with Kahlaoui 2015).

While France provided a significant amount of aid to the Tunisian military until 1980, the elections of U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) and French President François Mitterrand (1981-1995) reversed the distribution of support from the two countries (Ritter 2015). Gaddafi's aggressive foreign policy towards the US and his involvement in the 1980 occupation of the Gafsa region by guerrillas⁸⁰ designed to spark a national rebellion against Bourguiba's regime (Perkins 2004, 166, 1986, 192), propelled Reagan to become more than ever involved in Tunisian affairs, whereas Mitterrand chose to avoid such involvement (Alexander 2010). According to the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia, the state is the one of the top recipients of the US military aid (see Table IX.IX).

chief of army General Skik, has been demonstrated as a result of poor modernization of air forces (helicopters called as "flying coffins") (Jebnoun 2014, 302-303).

⁸⁰ According to the Tunisian official records, the guerrillas were trained by Gaddafi and 37 people died to break the occupation (Perkins 2004, 166).

The Embassy of the United States in Tunisia (2012) stated, “The total amount of U.S. military assistance to Tunisia since the revolution has been roughly \$32 million, almost double the amount immediately prior to the revolution.” Moreover, “Military equipment from the United States comprises approximately 70% of the Tunisian military’s inventory. Tunisia has been one of the top 20 recipients of the United States” (Embassy of the US in Tunis 2012). Furthermore, “International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding since 1994; and since 2003, has ranked tenth in overall funding. Tunisia is the top IMET recipient in Africa. Over 4,600 Tunisian military personnel have trained in the US institutions since its independence” (Embassy of the US in Tunis 2012).

In addition, according to the records from the United States Embassy in Tunisia, “Tunisia is one of the few countries in the world that has cadets in all United States military academies, including the Coast Guard academy. United States Foreign Military Sales agreements to Tunisia since 1956 have totaled over \$780 million, while Foreign Military Financing has totaled over \$660 million. The United States has provided over \$890 million in grants for military financing and military equipment to Tunisia since its independence” (Embassy of the US in Tunis 2012).

During the Cold War, foreign powers provided assistance to protect Tunisia from the Soviet influence that existed in Libya and Algeria. After the fall of the Soviet Union, they continued to provide aid to secure the geo-strategic region from terrorists and maintaining the stability in the Mediterranean and the MENA regions. One respondent provided the following explanation:

“Ben Ali’s regime very successfully sold itself to the outside world. First of all, he said Tunisia was a secular state like Europe. Islamists were all crushed, and they were not allowed to join any party and all jailed etc. He also said,

“Look, we are between Libya and Algeria, two big problematic countries; we are secular, we give women rights, and we got supposedly market economy.””

(Interview with Willis 2015)⁸¹

Table IX.IX: US Foreign Assistance to Tunisia (2006-2010)

Tunisia (current year Millions in dollar) ⁸²	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010 (Estimate)
FMF	8.413	8.500	8.345	12.000	15.000
ESF	-	-	.992	.800	2.000
NADR	0.25	0.755	.497	.100	.200
INCLE	-	-	.198	-	-
IMET	1.847	1.975	1.713	1.700	1.950
Total	10.285	11.230	11.475	14.600	19.150

Source: Sharp 2010, p. 15.

The acts of terrorism during the post-Ben Ali period also demonstrate how stability and security in Tunisia are important for the United States. Terrorist attacks on the Tunisian troops and officials by the al-Qaeda branch, Ansar al-Sharia, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as well as the threats from Tunisia's mountainous Chaambi region on the border of Algeria,⁸³ propelled the United States to provide the state with an extra \$60 million in military aid in 2014 (Associated Press 2014).

⁸¹ Find more details about Willis' ideas at his book *Politics and Power in the Maghreb* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁸² FMF: Foreign Military Financing, ESF: Economic Support Fund, IMET: International Military Education and Training, NADR: Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement.

⁸³ At least 15 soldiers were killed in attacks on military checkpoints in the area in the July 2014 (Jaffe 2014).

The continuity of the terrorist attacks, especially the Bardo Museum Attack in Tunisia on March 18, 2015 that resulted in the killing of 21 tourists, again compelled the US to increase its military aid to the country. In 2015, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken stated, “We are prepared to provide additional assistance and training to Tunisia’s security forces. Our goal is to strengthen their capability to defeat those who threaten the nation's freedom and integrity” (Tejas 2015). Tunisian Prime Minister Habib Essid concurred with the mission of the military aid, stating, “To that end, President Obama is seeking to double our security assistance budget for Tunisia next year,” to increase the border security with Algeria and Libya and to “deal with the terrorism challenge presented here in Tunisia” (Tejas 2015).

Ethnic and religious homogeneity, along with the lack of tribal divisions within Tunisian society, also affected the structure of the Tunisian military. The majority of Tunisians are Muslims (nearly 98%, with Sunni dominance) with Arab ethnicity (98%) (Brown and Spilling 2009, 137). There was not a notable number of religious or ethnic fractions, other than small groups of Christians (1%) and Berbers (1%) who lived in the southern part of Tunisia (Mughal 2012, 688-689). As a result, the ruling power was not able to build the national military according to its own ethnic, religious, or tribal affiliations.

Libya, Bahrain, and Syria provide a useful comparison that helps to show how the ethnic and religious structure of the military played a critical role during the uprisings. Unlike Tunisia, Libya’s tribal-based division and Bahrain and Syria’s sectarian divisions played an important role in determining the outcomes of the protests in each state. First, the protesters directed their hatred against the ruling class, but their resentment led to division among the society that is based on religious, ethnic or tribal affiliation. For example, Bahraini and Syrian rulers used, and still use, their

Sunni and Alawi (part of Shia) affiliations among their armed forces to fight against Shia and Sunni protesters, respectively (Heydemann 2015). While the Bahraini government used the Sunni-led security forces to crack down on demonstrators to preserve the Sunni monarchy in the Shia majority country, the Alawi-led Syrian armed forces have fought for the Alawi regime against the Sunni factions to maintain the Alawi ruler in a Sunni majority country (Gause 2011, Gelvin 2012, 102). These rulers used the religious divisions to manipulate their armed forces into protecting their regime. These religious affiliations helped the rulers to strengthen their armed forces and weakened the protester's popularity among the society. Divide and rule strategies have proved effective in sectarian and tribally divided societies.

In contrast, the Ben Ali regime had no such opportunity to form the armed forces from a faction of society. "Tunisia is too homogenous a country for Ben Ali to have built a following on the basis of group solidarity" (Nassif 2015a, 273). The only noteworthy division occurred between secular and religious fraction. As stated earlier, Bourguiba (in 1962) and Ben Ali (in 1991) coordinated a very large purge among the armed forces to root out religious factions within the armed forces. In addition, Tunisian society had ended the secular versus religious division by itself because the heavy majority of Tunisian society is secularized by the state-run secular system from secular French colonial term onward (El Sakhawy 2015, 9).⁸⁴ Before the 2010-2011 protests, Tunisia had experienced three notable uprisings in 1978, 1984, and 2008. None of them had religious roots; they all occurred because of economic stagnation (Alexander 2012, Joffé 2011, Migdalovitz 2009). The factors that fuelled the 2010-2011 uprisings were much broader and prevalent. "What united these broad coalitions, more than economic grievances, discrimination, religion, or nationalism, was a shared

⁸⁴ Tunisian state was imposing very strict secular system including education and working structure. As a stark example, Ben Ali banned headscarf in public spaces in 2006 (Migdalovitz 2009, 4).

enmity toward a hated dictator – Ben Ali in Tunisia, Gaddafi in Libya, Mubarak in Egypt” (Goldstone 2011, 460).

Ben Ali marginalized the military (via coup-proofing) from the centre of power by limiting its size (see Chapter V), its budget, and its rights. As stated before, such restrictions toward the Tunisian military created intense and wide scope deprivation and frustration among members of the Tunisian military. Additionally, the massive foreign assistance, especially from the EU and the US, provided to the military forces created strong links with the Western powers, and the military power largely relied upon on external financial sources rather than on the Ben Ali regime (Interview with Kahlaoui 2015). The ethnic and religious homogeneity also impeded the development of a military force with special religious or ethnic affiliations with the ruling regime. As a result, the Ben Ali regime did not have a joint threat with the Tunisian military to get the military support during the 2010-2011 uprisings (Nassif 2015a, 273). It is also important to note that the Tunisian military was largely a conscript force (see Chapter V for numbers), which established “strong connection between the military and society at large due to broad-based conscription” (Lutterbeck 2011, 24). In other words, the members of the military forces felt that they were a part of the Tunisian society.

In essence, Ben Ali and his policies unintentionally gave the Tunisian military an institutional, apolitical, and corporate identity that led the soldiers to support reform demands and refuse to shoot the protesters for the sake of regime during the 2010-2011 uprisings. They operated independently of Ben Ali by showing loyalty to the state instead of the regime, and demonstrated a corporate identity and organizational coherence by avoiding any strife among their ranks (Droz-Vincent 2013, 8). The military got involved in the state council’s decision making process that

decided to reject Ben Ali's return after he left, when Ben Ali wanted to come back (Interview with Chabir 2015).

In sum, the lack of energy resources and the institutional and apolitical military structure significantly influenced the military's behaviour in the 2011 Tunisian uprisings. However, both factors existed during the 2008 protests, and the military chose to shoot the protesters as commanded to end those demonstrations. As such, I argue that there was one more important factor that led to the military's defection: the strong strength of the Tunisian uprisings in 2010-2011.

IX.IV The Strength of Protests

The strength of the Tunisian uprisings was quite high and conclusive in terms of achieving the goal of their protests—the deposition of President Ben Ali and his regime. One reason for their success was that the demonstrators did not affiliate themselves with any political party, NGO, or specific segment of society (e.g., young, educated, unemployed, women, etc.) (Tripp 2014, 142). They articulated very commonly desired demands with “worldly language” like *bread, freedom, and dignity* (Dabashi 2012, 81-82).

Additionally, no specific group “owned” the protests or declared the protests as “their” uprisings. Even one of the strongest labour unions, UGTT, stayed away as an institution until the last few days of the Ben Ali regime, according to former executive member of UGTT, Aouadi (Interview with Aouadi 2015). As stated in Chapter V, although the middle-class contributed a disproportionately large number of the revolutionaries, the income level of the protestors spanned a wide range. According to the 2011 Arab Barometer survey, outside of the middle-class, participants came from three primary groups: “workers (17% of participants), students (19%), and the unemployed (22%)” (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015, 5). Thus, the

participation of the Tunisian uprisings constituted “a cross-class alliance” (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015, 5-6).

“[The] Tunisian revolt did not adopt signs and symbols identifying the movement with a specific social or political affiliation; protesters, for instance, did not raise placards indicating that their revolt was based on labour, the peasants, the bourgeoisie, religion, or regional/racial belongings. This led to a unity of purpose among all participants, who coalesced under the banner of the ‘people’: ‘the people wants the fall of the government,’ or, to the president, ‘Leave, leave.’” (Lahmar 2011, 7)

One respondent for this study agreed, stating, “No [one] institution, organization, or anybody [organized] the protests. There was [not] any affiliation. It is lie if anyone says they have led the revolution” (Interview with Benghazi 2015).

Another factor that strengthened the Tunisian protests was the protesters’ lack of weapons, other than a few Molotov cocktails, knives, and stones (Interview with Benghazi 2015 , Interview with Ayari 2015b, Interview with Chabir 2015). There was violence, but it was not like an armed conflict between the state forces and protesters. The most brutal violence from protesters involved burning police stations using Molotov cocktails.

Because the protestors were unarmed, Ben Ali had a difficult time justifying the use of force against them, especially considering the number of international eyes that were watching the protests. As noted in the theoretical framework, indiscriminate violence had become counterproductive by the Ben Ali regime (Kalyvas 2006), and the indiscriminate violence broadened the anti-government protests. The force employed by the police force increased the intensity of the protests and incited formally neutral citizens to join the anti-government demonstrations. Ben Ali knew

that he had lost his ability to carry out sanctioned strikes against the demonstrators (Nepstad 2011b, 10). However, Jeridi a former staff member for Prime Minister Ghannouchi, stated, “Some protesters were criminals. For example, protesters captured 3-4 police officers in a police station and killed [them] by throwing Molotov [cocktails] in south of Tunis, [in the] town [of] Mornag” (Interview with Jeridi 2015).

Tunisia’s size also helped in the success of the protests. Tunisia is relatively small in comparison to neighbouring states like Libya and Algeria (Alexander 2010). Its size enabled protesters transportation and mobilization advantages, specifically as they travelled from rural to urban areas. While the first events emerged geographically in the centre of country city Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, Sfax, Gafsa, capital Tunis and the whole country were affected from the first spark shortly (International Crisis Group 2011b). Tunisia also had a small population of around 10 million, as of 2010 (Lutterbeck 2011). Chabir, the military chief of intelligence at the time of uprisings, stated that, “There is no tribe in Tunisia. Everyone knows each other. Tunisia is a small country with [a] small population” (Interview with Chabir 2015).

As an example, while Yassine Ayari was writing a powerful blog⁸⁵ against Ben Ali’s regime during the uprisings, his father, Lieutenant Colonel Taher Ayari, was working under the Tunisian Ministry of Defence (Interview with Ayari 2015b). Moreover, some soldiers took off their uniforms during the uprising in support of the protesters, but they returned to duty after Ben Ali left the country (Interview with Eyewitness Expert 2015). The country’s small size created close links among the Tunisian people, which facilitated communication and joint action during the protests.

The media also played a significant role in the impact of the protests. As stated in Chapter VI, protests also took place in the Gafsa region in 2008; but unlike the

⁸⁵ Yassine Ayari’s writings mainly released on the blog: <http://mel7it3.blogspot.co.uk/> (Accessed 26 March 2013).

2010-2011 revolts, they did not result in significant changes in the state. According to eyewitness accounts, one of the significant differences between the 2008 and 2010 uprisings was the role of social media (Interview with Ayari 2015a, Interview with Benghazi 2015). Through social media, news about the protests spread across Tunisia like wildfire, and led to a domino effect within the Tunisian society, creating “connective action” to accomplish their goal (Shirky 2008, 24, Bennett and Segerberg 2012). Moreover, Qatar-based Al-Jazeera provided great help to the protesters by broadcasting the events live from Tunisia to the world (Howard and Hussain 2013). This worldwide attention also influenced the military’s response. While they shot the protesters in the 2008 Gafsa revolts, they chose not to in 2011, when there was greater attention from the outside world.

The fact that the protestors offered alternative and promising agendas to the existing ruling system (i.e., a more democratic, inclusive, and equal Tunisia) also helped to further their cause. Their demands were feasible and offered a “plausible promise” (Raymond 2001, 47) that spurred Tunisians to take part in the protests. The platform of the protests influenced and attracted people, especially unemployed youth, and moved them to join the demonstrations in the streets (Fahmi and Meddeb 2015). There were also no large-scale acts of violence that could have scared the people away from getting involved. The high level of education among the largely middle class and young population shaped the structure of the peaceful protests (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur 2015). Moreover, the civil society, especially Al-Nahda and UGTT members at the individual level, played an important role in maintaining resolute protests during the demonstrations (International Crisis Group 2011b).

The last factor that aided in the success of the demonstrations was that the protestors did not challenge Tunisian military’s existence, interests, or reserved

domains. They never demanded changes in the military's structure, staff (including chief generals), or budget (Interview with Nasr 2015, Interview with Ayari 2015b). On the contrary, they chanted the slogan, "The military and the people are one hand (*al-jaich wa al-chaab ayad wahida*)" (Droz-Vincent 2013, 6). While there were clashes in some parts of Tunisia between the army and the protestors, protestors' compromising approach to the military institution prevented a potential enmity from the military to the protesters at the institutional level. One of the most well-known bloggers, Yassine Ayari, shared a story that, "Chief of Army Rachid Ammar will not open fire on the people" (Interview with Ayari 2015b). This established another commonality between the army and protesters. After Ben Ali left his position, General Ammar was promoted to a new position, chief of armed forces, in April 2011 without any public backlash from the Tunisian society (Achcar 2013).

In sum, the Tunisian protests had a significant impact for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the protests' leaderless structure generated common support among the Tunisian society. Second, the protests featured non-violent and unarmed tactics and demanded reasonable and well-received changes for the majority of Tunisian society. Third, Tunisia's small size and integrated society established allowed the protesters to reach and communicate each other easily and facilitated transportation to the demonstrations. Fourth, the media coverage from standard and social media outlets ensured that the world was watching the goings on in Tunisia. Fifth, The protestors' agenda presented no threat to the interests of the Tunisian military.

All these factors increased the impact of the protests, shaped the position of the armed forces, and ensured that the uprising in 2011 had significantly different outcomes than the one that took place in 2008. Signé and Smida provided the following explanation:

“The 2008 regional protests of Gafsa demonstrated that the army was willing to back the regime and commit crime on its own population. [Since] the spread of the demonstrations was, unlike the 2011 uprisings, not as big of a threat for the regime. [However], at that time [2011] was such that the probability of having a new regime in place was likely...the risk to shoot at protesters was too high, as the potential new government would have punished them harshly.” (Signé and Smida 2014, 21-22)

IX.V Conclusion

In this chapter, I demonstrated that the energy poverty, the institutional and apolitical military structure, and the greater impact of the protests played a significant role in the outcome of the 2010-2011 uprisings. These three factors were not alone in their influence on the military’s behaviour; however, they played a significant, contributing role in the military’s decision. Within the chapter, I argued that the three contributing factors should be analysed together to have an overarching understanding of their impact. I do not assign one factor more importance than the others because no one factor would have a significant impact without the other two. For example, the uprising might have fallen without the wide-reaching influence of the protests. All three contributing factors worked together to lead to the powerful result of the demonstrations.

As stated in the empirical chapter, hundreds of other factors could have influenced the Tunisian military’s behaviour during the 2010-2011 uprising, but it is not feasible for one research study to examine all of them. Thus, I selected three key factors that I could analyse separately and comprehensively. This analysis led to three primary conclusions. First, the lack of massive energy resources undermined Ben

Ali's influence over the military. That accounted for the lack of a *greed* motive among the members of Tunisian military.

Second, the military forces' lack of economic incentives helped them to evolve into an apolitical and institutional organization. Moreover, the marginalization of the Tunisian military from the centre of power and restrictions applied by the Ben Ali regime caused wide-scale frustration-aggression (*relative deprivation*) among the Tunisian military. That demonstrated its effect during the 2010-2011 uprisings when the Tunisian military chose a *de facto* alliance with the anti-government protestors. Third, the strong influence of the protests led the military to defect. The importance of the three contributing factors will be much clearer after I explore the opposite case of Libya in the following chapter.

In Chapter X, I demonstrate that energy richness, a patrimonial and political military structure, and the poor influence of the protests precipitated the division among the Libyan military forces and led to civil strife.

Chapter X

Libya: Energy Capacity, Military Structure, and the Strength of Protests

X.I Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explained why and how Tunisia's energy poverty, apolitical and institutional military structure and the high strength of protests influenced the military's behaviour during the 2010-2011 uprisings. In this chapter, I examine the factors that affected the military's actions in Libya during the conflict. I argue that the Libyan military behaved differently because (a) Libya is an energy rich state, (b) the Libyan military had a patrimonial and political character, and (c) the protests were armed and therefore less strong and effective than in Tunisia. As in the Tunisian case, I claim that these three contributing factors are complementary and must be analysed simultaneously to truly understand the Libyan military's behaviour during the 2010-2011 uprisings. My research sheds light on the triangular nexus between military-economy, military-state and military-society for a full understanding of the different military behaviours in Libya and Tunisia (Picard 1990).

The chapter is structured as follows. I begin by examining Libya's energy sources and their impact on the Libyan military in the 2011 uprisings. I then dissect the structure of the Libyan military and identify the relationship between that structure and the military's behaviour during the protests. Finally, I discuss the form and the strength of protests that emerged in 2011. The central goal of this chapter is to explore how the three variables led to a different outcome to the protests than the one that

occurred in Tunisia. Accordingly, I argue that the variations in the contributing factors led the Libyan and the Tunisian military forces to play very different roles during the uprisings.

Table X.I: Three Contributing Factors and Outcome in the Libyan Uprisings

Case	Contributing factors			Outcome
	Energy resources	Military structure	The strength of protests	Military behaviour
Libya	Rich	Patrimonial and political	Armed and Poor	Internal strife

X.II Energy Capacity

Libya is an energy-rich state and has been a member of OPEC since 1962 (Ramady and Mahdi 2015). The main energy sources are oil and gas. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Libya holds the richest oil reserves and the fourth biggest gas reserves in Africa (EIA June 2012). At the global level, Libya holds 3.4% of the world's oil reserves (Bahgat 2012). Between 2005 and 2010, whilst the total daily oil production in Libya totalled 10,511,000 barrels,⁸⁶ the amount of consumption amounted to only 1,673,000⁸⁷ (US Energy Information Administration 2013b, BP 2011) (see Table X.II). The main oil fields were located in the eastern region of Libya.

“Broadly speaking, about two-thirds of Libyan oil production comes from fields in the eastern part of the country (geologically, these fields are part of the Sirte Basin), followed by 25 percent in the southwest (Murzuq Basin), and

⁸⁶ Yearly oil production was as follows from 2005 to 2010: 1745, 1815, 1820, 1820, 1562, 1659 (thousand barrels daily) (BP 2011).

⁸⁷ Yearly oil consumption was as follows from 2005 to 2010: 265, 268, 254, 268, 287, 331 (thousand barrels daily; (US Energy Information Administration 2013b).

most of the remainder from the offshore Pelagian Shelf Basin near Tripoli (there are also small fields in the western Ghadames basin).” (EIA June 2012)

Table X.II: Libya Oil Facts: Reserves, Daily Production and Consumption

Libya	At the end 1990	At the end 2000	At the end 2010	R/P Ratio ⁸⁸
Oil proved reserves (million barrels)	22.8	36.0	46.4	76.7%
Production (thousand barrels daily)	1407	1475	1659	
Consumption (thousand barrels daily)	155	210	331	

Source: BP 2011; US Energy Information Administration 2013. Retrieved March 23, 2014.

Libya also has very rich natural gas reserves. Total daily gas production between 2005 and 2010 was 3,118 trillion cubic feet,⁸⁹ whereas the consumption during the same period totalled 1,215⁹⁰ (US Energy Information Administration 2013a) (see Table X.III). Libya experienced an increase in the natural gas exports after the advent of the Greenstream Pipeline to Italy in 2003, with the cooperation of the Italian company, Eni, and Libya’s state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC) (EIA June 2012, Bahgat 2012). Both oil and gas management were run by the NOC (EIA June 2012).

⁸⁸ R/P means Reserves to Production Ratio.

⁸⁹ Yearly gas production was as follows from 2005 to 2010: 399, 465, 539, 561, 561, and 593 (billion cubic feet) (US Energy Information Administration 2013a).

⁹⁰ Yearly gas consumption was as follows from 2005 to 2010: 205, 168, 187, 194, 212, and 249 (billion cubic feet) (US Energy Information Administration 2013a).

Table X.III: Libya Natural Gas Facts: Reserves, Production and Consumption


Libya	1990	2000	2010
Gas proved reserves (trillion cubic feet)	25.5	46.4	54.3
Production (billion cubic feet)	219	211.8	593.7
Consumption (billion cubic feet)	174	183.6	249.4

Source: US Energy Information Administration 2013. Retrieved March 23, 2014.

As the data above indicates, Libya had great oil and gas resources and with only nominal national consumption in comparison to its energy reserves. The massive surpluses helped Libya become a large oil and gas exporter state in 1961, and the state economy was heavily dependent upon the resultant energy revenue (OPEC 2014). Libya's geographic closeness and easy access to the Mediterranean, along with its high-quality sweet crude oil⁹¹ made Libya one of the largest energy exporters to the energy-poor European market (Bahgat 2012, Müller-Kraenner 2007). In 2010, Libya exported about 75% of its crude oil to Europe and North America (OPEC 2011). Before 2011, oil revenue constituted more than 90% of export earnings and government revenue and more than 70% of the state's GDP (see Figure X.I) (EIA June 2012, IMF 2011, 16).

⁹¹ Sweet crude oil is the most preferable oil type for oil importer countries because of its high quality (Johnson 2014).

Figure X.I: Libyan GDP by sector in 2006



Source: African Development Bank Group and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2008.

Its significant energy exports made Libya a *par excellence* rentier state.⁹² More straightforwardly, oil export revenue alone resulted in more than 210 million dollars from 2006 to 2010 (OPEC 2011). This massive non-tax income was supposed to bring significant economic wealth to the nominally-populated state (Luciani 1990, 76). However, despite this wealth, unemployment and poverty was rampant. That was a great paradox during Gaddafi's reign, as he used the energy revenue to establish his regime, *Jamahiriyah*, and its armed forces and to secure his 42-year reign (Joffe 2011b).

Gaddafi avoided establishing state institutions by imposing his stateless society ideology without asking Libyans for any notable tax payments, except during the 1992-2003 period of internationally imposed sanctions (Vandewalle 2006, 2). The absence of “no representation without taxation”⁹³ (Beblawi and Luciani 1987, 75)

⁹²A rentier state is not necessarily only an oil exporter. Any other resource(s) could make a state a rentier, as long as it exports the resource abroad, and income from that export makes up more than 40% of the GDP (Luciani 1990, 70-71).

⁹³ American revolutionaries originally used this term's reverse version in the 1750s (Gladney 2014).

created a self-contained and repressive state that was independent from its society (Farsoun 1988, 167). Moreover, Gaddafi pursued expansionist and pan-Arabist foreign policies that caused three individual wars with Egypt, Uganda, and Chad, along with long international sanctions.

Nevertheless, Gaddafi enjoyed a lengthy reign, despite such domestic and foreign idiosyncratic and exclusive policies. Admittedly, it is very difficult to survive without having big economic resources while enduring costly actions at home and abroad. For example, energy-rich states Iran and Iraq maintained an eight-year war despite its huge costs. Following that war, the leaders in both states kept their positions because they had economic resources to finance their political schemes (Cronin 2014, 251, Foran and Goodwin 1993, 220). Energy richness was not the only factor that strengthened their stance, but its impact was substantial and discernible. Likewise, Gaddafi exhibited similar economic strength with his energy wealth.

Gaddafi spent billions of dollars on internal and international confrontations “between 1973 and 1994, Libya spent an estimated \$23 billion on its southern campaigns” (Chorin 2012, 42). During sanctions from the US and Europe from 1992 to 2003, Gaddafi survived by exporting oil, on a much smaller scale, to energy-poor European states and requesting taxes from the Libyan society (see Table X.IV) (OPEC 2009, Pargeter 2012, 139). The economic revenue from the exports helped Gaddafi to protect his inner circle with himself during the sanctions. “Any normal country or this kind of regime can have collapsed but if you have oil you can survive for long” (Interview with Achcar 2014).

Table X.IV: Libyan oil and tax revenues

Percent of national revenue by year							
Year	1999	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Tax revenue	17.7	4.1	2.8	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.4
Oil revenue	15.6	50.6	63.7	66.3	68.1	73.4	74.0

Source: African Development Bank Group and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2008.

Energy exportation provided Gaddafi with the economic resources to establish repressive political power (Beblawi 1990, 88). The military had no immunity from that system. “He [Gaddafi] did not spend money on armed forces or regular army he spent money on militias and paramilitary forces. The forces were led by his brother in law, son, or friends” (Interview with Barany 2014).

Gaddafi used the energy revenue to establish his loyal armed groups from his relatives and tribes (Warfalla, Maghraha, and Qadhadhfa). As stated in the previous chapters, Gaddafi’s “state of masses” ideology caused the military to be heavily dependent on Gaddafi’s patronage. Gaddafi used the energy revenue to reward individuals within the military for their support towards him (Interview with Vandewalle 2015). The energy revenue created significant economic motives (*greed*) for the pro-Gaddafi forces to protect the Gaddafi regime. Moreover, Gaddafi established the paramilitary People’s Militia force, using soldiers from groups with regional and tribal loyalty to him, as an alternative to the regular armed forces (St. John 2014). Furthermore, Gaddafi employed foreign and domestic mercenaries for use during domestic upheavals (White 2011). The foreign mercenaries came from states in Sub-Saharan Africa, mostly from Chad and Niger, while unemployed residents from Tabu and Tuareg constituted the domestic mercenaries (Wehrey 2015). With the

energy revenue, Gaddafi bought the loyalty of military forces in exchange for their protection against dissidents.

“Gaddafi family was spending the oil money. It was like a kind of trickle down corruption. Because you had a lot of big extended family how it worked. Even since 1969 there were some big families in different parts of the Libya were supporting Gaddafi. They continued to be rewarded; they were getting a lot of money. Top guys were getting millions and thousands of people who were benefiting from that. Some cities would have nice streets or new schools or new infrastructure because they traditionally supported Gaddafi. Other regions neglected, Benghazi as well. For sure, one of the reasons for Gaddafi’s long survival was oil.” (Interview with Warren 2014)⁹⁴

During the 2011 uprisings, the Libyan military forces divided into two factions that largely split along geographic lines: pro-regime (western region) and anti-regime (eastern region) (Fishman 2015). Western Libyans fought for Gaddafi until the end of the conflict (Droz-Vincent 2014). The key exceptions in the western region were Misrata (the so-called “Stalingrad of Libya”) and Zintan (Wehrey 2015). Gaddafi’s sons, in-laws, and friends from the 1969 revolution seized the central parts of that western resistance, and the resulting civil combat took about nine months to conclude (Chorin 2012). As an example, the western town Bani Walid was held by pro-Gaddafi tribe Warfalla, and resisted the anti-Gaddafi forces until mid-October 2011 (Pargeter 2012, 243, Bassiouni 2013, 811-812). The fall of the capital, Tripoli, also took nearly six months (Pargeter 2012, 241). Gaddafi’s loyal forces offered strong resistance against the international aerial bombings and domestic armed groups.

⁹⁴ For more details about Warren’s ideas, please see: *The Battle for the Arab Spring*, Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).

Gaddafi's forces were able to resist for such a long period, in large part, because of his energy wealth. These forces consisted of Gaddafi's friends and relatives, as well as many recruited mercenaries, and all fought for their own materialistic agendas and the economic incentives that Gaddafi promised (Salama 2011). Gaddafi's removal from power meant the loss of their economic benefits, which had become the main reason for defending Gaddafi's regime. Even UN sanctions on Libya during the uprisings did little to sway their loyalty, as the pro-Gaddafi forces were more interested in the economic advantages of Gaddafi's longevity than in the international actors' support (Buera 2015). In sum, *greed* or economic variables demonstrated their effect (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) among the pro-Gaddafi forces. Economic motives primarily explain the actions of the pro-Gaddafi forces during the 2011 uprisings.

In addition, while internationally supported protestors bombed and looted many of Gaddafi's arsenals, his forces maintained sufficient weaponry to continue their fight. Their resources demonstrated how the energy revenue helped Gaddafi to buy a wealth of military equipment for his forces during his reign. In the initial years (from 1973 to 1983), Libya bought about 28 billion in new armaments from the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries (Mattes 2004, 3). From 2003 to 2008, Libya spent 5.068 billion dollars on armaments, while Tunisia spent only 2.696 billion dollar (SIPRI 2014).⁹⁵ During the uprisings, the military purchases demonstrated significant impact since even though Libya faced a strict international arms embargo, the pro-Gaddafi forces survived with their stockpiles of arms. On February 26, 2011 the UN resolution 1970 imposed an arms embargo on Libya shortly after the first protests

⁹⁵ At constant 2011 dollars and do not include spending on paramilitary forces. Year by year from 2003 to 2008 is as follows. In million dollars: 831, 1085, 1069, 941, 885, 1338 (SIPRI 2014).

started on February 15, 2011. The UN Security Council issued the following statement:

“[All] Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment....” (UN Security Council 2011)

Besides economic motivation, the tribal links and family connections within the pro-Gaddafi forces added socio-political and psychological features to their struggle because they believed they were protecting Gaddafi’s Jamahiriya against foreign supported rebels (Maynard 2015). The Tripolitania region, located the three tribes Qadhadhfa, Maghraha and Warfalla, and Fezzan part based ethnic minorities Tuareg and Tabu supported pro-Gaddaf forces against the coalition that involved mainly tribes from the Cyrenaica region⁹⁶, largely Sa’adi and Al-Obeidi, and non-Arab Amazigh (Lacher 2011, Joffé 2011, Parsons and Taylor 2011).

In sum, the pro-Gaddafi forces pursued a largely greed driven approach based on economic incentives. The economic benefit of keeping Gaddafi in power was quite substantial. However, the huge energy revenue was not the only factor that led to the military split. Libya was an energy rich state even before. However, the 2006 protests, provides a useful example, failed to achieve their goal because there was no military support for the protesters. Energy revenue alone does not necessarily result in a military split during such uprisings. The structure of the military also played a role in

⁹⁶ As explained in the Genesis of the Libyan Uprisings chapter, Libya was considered three provinces, Tripolitania (West), Cyrenaica (East), and Fezzan (South) (Blanchard 2012, Pargeter 2012).

shaping the Libyan military's behaviour during the 2011 uprisings. In the next section, I examine this structure of the Libyan military force.

X.III Military Structure

The Libyan military exhibited a patrimonial and political character during the Gaddafi reign. Gaddafi ruled Libya for 42 years by avoiding any notable system of checks and balances. As Falk stated, "Gaddafi was the Libyan state, and left no institutional infrastructure behind following his departure" (Falk 2011). In addition, as stated earlier, Gaddafi followed aggressive foreign policy towards his neighbours and other global actors. His idiosyncratic policies created significant resentments against him and his regime within Libya and abroad. He faced a few coup attempts and international interventions during his reign because of his acts of aggression (see Chapter VII). It was a wonder that Gaddafi was able to stay in power for 42 years considering the extent of the internal and international tension he created.

Armed forces played a key role in repressing dissidents and helping Gaddafi to stay in power. Gaddafi established garrisons in urban areas and around the country, which is sub-divided into seven military regions, the most important of which are located in Tripoli, Benghazi, Tobruq, and Sirte (Mattes 2004, 3-4). As Gaddafi created his loyal armed forces, he recruited from his blood relatives, in-laws, and loyal tribal members. There was no meritocracy and objective assessment in terms of promotion and recruitment within the military (Taylor 2014, 162).

Gaddafi and his comrades from Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) scrutinized the armed forces very closely. His sons Khamis (Commander of the 32nd Brigade), Muttasim (National Security Advisor), and Saadi (Colonel and Chief of the 9th Brigade during the 2011 uprisings) were the most striking examples that took key positions in the Libyan military (Parsons and Taylor 2011). Moreover, his cousins and

Qadhadhfa tribal members Sayed Gaddaf Eddam and Ahmed Gaddaf Eddam served in leadership positions within the armed forces (McGregor 2011). Sayed used to be the military head of Cyrenaica, while Ahmed was a part of Gaddafi's special military envoy (McGregor 2011). Gaddafi's inner circle included a number of military units.

“This network also comprises key individuals who carried out the revolution with Qaddafi and belonged to the original Revolutionary Command Council. They include General Khuwaildi al-Humaidi (whose daughter is married to Qaddafi's son, Saadi), the general inspector of the armed forces; Mustafa Kharroubi, former head of military intelligence and one time head of protocol; Khalifa Khanesh, who directs security at Qaddafi's residence; and Abu Bakr Yunis Jabr, commander in chief of the armed forces. Sometimes referred to as Rifaq al-Qa'id (The Comrades of the Leader), this group derives a certain degree of legitimacy from its participation in the revolution.....and Abdullah Senussi, the intelligence chief, who is a member of the Maghraha tribe but also married to the sister of Qaddafi's wife.” (International Crisis Group 2011a, 10)

In addition, Gaddafi applied a very strict purging policy to Islamists⁹⁷ and anti-Gaddafi factions within the military. “In 1983, five officers were executed for plotting a coup, in 1984, fighting broke out in barracks over a similar plan, leading to the arrest of several thousand soldiers. In 1985, 60 officers were arrested for a similar cause” (Gaub 2013b, 229).

Libya was divided as Gaddafi's loyal supporters in the west and south conflicted with the pro-old regime (kingdom) and anti-Gaddafi factions in the eastern Libya. As explained previously, the state-led investments focused on the west, not the east. Gaddafi used this regional disparity approach within the military as well

⁹⁷ The Islamist purge increased once the Islamist fighters returned from Afghan war in the 1989s.

(Anderson 2011). Gaddafi largely recruited top members of the military from his loyal regional allies Tripolitania and Fezzan regions, but not from al-Sanussi monarchy's stronghold in the Cyrenaica region (Bell and Witter 2011). In addition, he provided equipment and training facilities to the armed groups in the west, but he neglected to provide similar resources to forces in the east (Interview with Amer 2015, Ostander 1993). In essence, Gaddafi marginalized a large portion of the *people's army* (regular armed forces) with poor training and equipment (Achcar 2013, 201).

The marginalization and deprivation of the military caused large scale frustration among the neglected members of the Libyan military. Gaddafi's former Interior Minister, General Younis, confirmed this marginalization by stating that the strong part of the military was located on the perimeters of the western town of Al-Aziziyah, 47 kilometres south of Tripoli because eastern Libya always demonstrated such antagonism towards Gaddafi's regime (Rowland 2011, Johnson and Mueen 2012). The powerful 32nd Brigade (also known as the *Khamis Brigade*) was based in the west, Ouezzane on the Jebel Nefusa, and commanded by Gaddafi's youngest son, Khamis Gaddafi (Joffe 2011a, Sorenson 2007, 111). While eastern Libya, from Benghazi to Tobruq, fell in only six days to the anti-Gaddafi forces, the western region took around six months to fall (Tempelhof and Tarkowski 2012).

The strong military forces were not the only reason for the long resistance, but the strong resistance of military constituted the larger part of that long conflict. Moreover, half of the regular Libyan army (25,000) consisted of conscripts (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2010). While the duration of conscription differed from 1 to 2 years, their training and equipment were very poor (Interview with Amer 2015, Cordesman 2002). That emasculated the institutional character of the Libyan military as well.

Gaddafi also established paramilitary forces called the *people's militia*, which included approximately 45,000 soldiers (Mattes 2004, 4, Martinez 2014, 3, Pargeter 2012, 78-79). The group was run by Khuwaildi al-Humaidi, who was a member of the RCC and father-in-law of Gaddafi's son, Saadi (International Crisis Group 2011a, 10). The costly defeat in the Chadian war and the Islamist infiltration into armed force following the end of the Afghan war led Gaddafi to marginalize the regular armed forces and strengthen the paramilitary forces (Sayigh 2014, Pollack 2002, 2, Sorenson 2007, 112). Gaddafi withheld economic resources from the regular armed forces and gave them to the specialized forces run by his loyal *Azlam* (men) (Cordesman 2002).

These specialised forces served as a substitute for the marginalized regular armed forces because Gaddafi feared a coup d'état. He monitored the regular military force with the loyal guards. As a result, he was able to foil coup attempts in 1993 (so called *Beni Ulid*) and in 1996 (Blanchard and Zanotti 2011). Following those plots, he purged many officers within the military who had challenged his authority (Joffe 2011b, 17, Blanchard and Zanotti 2011).

Gaddafi's 42-year reign clearly demonstrates that his coup-proofing strategy was effective. As Table X.V shows, the share of the GDP that went to regular military expenditures decreased from 1998 onwards, with an average of 2.3 percent (1998-2008). In contrast, the average military expenditure in energy-rich states like Algeria and Angola during the same years was about 3.5 and 5.5 percent, respectively (SIPRI 2014). Consequently, the number of soldiers in the regular armed forces in Libya was also reduced from 85,000 to 65,000 from 1993 to 1998 (World Bank 2015).

Table X.V: Libyan Military Expenditures and GDP share 1997-2008⁹⁸

Year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Million dollars ⁹⁹	570	643	496	531	520	668	831	1085	1069	941	885	1338
Share of GDP (%)	4.1	5.3	3.8	3.1	2.7	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.4	1	0.9	1.2

Source: SIPRI 2014.

Gaddafi's strategy also entailed recruiting foreign and domestic mercenaries that worked under the Islamic Pan-African Legion until its formal dissolution in the late 1980s after Libya's defeat in the war with Chad (Taylor 2014, 165, Kaur 2011). He recruited the foreign mercenaries from Sub-Saharan Africa, mostly Sudan, Chad, Guinea, Kenya, and Mali (Taylor 2014, 165, Henry and Springborg 2011, Kaur 2011, McGregor 2011). Domestic mercenaries largely enlisted from the Fezzan region's in Tuareg and Tabu (Interview with Joffe 2015). According to Kaur, Gaddafi offered mercenaries \$2,500 per day to fight for him (Kaur 2011).

Gaddafi also used the historic conflict between the Libyan Arabs and the Tuareg and Tabu ethnicities to further his own interests. As Lacher explained, "Confrontations between revolutionary forces and the Tuareg in Ghadames, as well as small Arab tribes such as the Mesheshiya in the Western Mountains, reflected their positions on opposite sides of the conflict but were also rooted in longer standing tensions between these communities" (Lacher 2011, 145).

As Senauth explained, "According to numerous eyewitnesses accounts, mercenaries were more willing to kill demonstrators than Libyan forces, and earned reputation as among the most brutal forces employed by government" (Senauth 2013,

⁹⁸ Do not include expenditures on paramilitary forces and development expenditure. Rest of the years are unavailable.

⁹⁹ At constant 2011.

85-86). Gaddafi began recruiting the mercenaries in the 1980s and used them in foreign conflicts, such as in Chad and Uganda, as well as in potential domestic upheavals (Joffe 2011a, Joffe 2011b). It is very difficult to know how many mercenaries he recruited in total. In 1987, it was reported that more than 7,000 were employed, while the records have claimed that Gaddafi ordered approximately 4,000 mercenaries to suppress anti-Gaddafi forces in 2011, specifically in Benghazi and nearby (Parsons and Taylor 2011, 21, Taylor 2014, 165). In 2011, a Malian government official stated that “200-300 members of the Tuaregs community from its Kidal region had left for Libya to join pro-Gaddafi forces” (Kaur 2011).

The mercenaries mainly trained in Obari, in the Fezzan region of southwestern Libya (Tempelhof and Tarkowski 2012, 10). Gaddafi’s former chief of protocol Nouri Al-Masmari confirmed the use of mercenaries but refused their actions against Libyan citizens before 2011. He stated, “Those mercenaries may be being used for decades, but they were not acting against Libyans. But now [2011], they are acting against Libyans for simple reason. He [Gaddafi] has no more trust in the armed forces” (Salama 2011, Al-Jazeera 2011c).¹⁰⁰ Moreover, then Libyan Ambassador to India Ali al-Essawi resigned by condemning the use of mercenaries against Libyan citizens in 2011 (Sharrock 2011).

In brief, the Libyan military did not remain immune to the Gaddafi’s stateless society (or state of masses and people’s state) ideology. Gaddafi designed and formed the military structure according to that ideology that was *people’s army and people’s military* (Pargeter 2012, St. John 2011). Thus, the Libyan military featured patrimonial and political character. Gaddafi controlled officer appointments,

¹⁰⁰ See Nouri Al-Masmari’s TV speech:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9uUNZDD1LAE> (Accessed March 19, 2013).

promotions, and the budget through his personal ties, and he provided material privileges to the loyal members of the regular and paramilitary forces. Tribal, regional, blood loyalty and economic interests shaped the military structure rather than a meritocracy.

In retrospect, Gaddafi created a praetorian military force. He marginalized the regular forces by strengthening his paramilitary forces, mostly those located in the western part of Libya. Gaddafi followed the policy of “primordialization” and shrank the military’s numbers and budget, and the core of the remaining soldiers were strongly loyal to Gaddafi (Droz-Vincent 2014, 193-194). The blood relatives and cronies became the backbone of Gaddafi’s regular military forces, along with the mercenaries. His loyalists took the top roles within the military without having any qualifications for the positions. Thus, the military became a force that served Gaddafi, not Libya. As “[Libyan] patrimonial military associates with the political ruler instead of identifying their primary role as the service of the state” (Chennoufi 2015, 56-57).

“So, the military in Libya was strange and different from Tunisia or Egypt. It was more about military not as an institution, but rather it quickly became about different tribes, different towns of cities joined the revolution, and different town of cities stayed loyal to Gaddafi. The army as an institution quite quickly broke down, just quickly broke down into who supports Gaddafi and who protestors. Like city Misrata came against Gaddafi, a lot of local army groups switched side, and they started to fight against the anti-Gaddafi factions.” (Interview with Warren 2014)

During the uprisings, the military largely fragmented into two groups, and they lacked institutional cohesion with the lack of esprit de corps, unlike Tunisia (Cronin 2014, 5). Salama quoted from Fawaz Gerges, saying that the troops defected because

“there [was] no cohesive institution [in the Libyan military]” (Salama 2011). That state weakness, including the military, brought about around nine months of civil conflict and hundreds of casualties (Anderson 2014, 55). As stated earlier, the military fought for Gaddafi since the change of the Gaddafi regime meant the loss of their economic interests provided by Gaddafi’s revenue from energy exports. The power of greed demonstrated its significant effect upon the members of the Libyan military forces during the 2010-2011 uprisings. In addition, the military fought for Gaddafi because tribal and blood relation compelled them to support him. Such support also showed the impact of socio-political and psychological perception among the pro-Gaddafi forces. The coup attempts against Gaddafi, in the past, from Gaddafi’s loyal tribes also showed that the non-material motivations lagged behind economic and power ambitions.

The military split occurred because of the Libyan military’s political behaviour and low level of institutional characteristic (Bellin 2012, 131). As Bellin explained,

“[Where] the military is organized along patrimonial lines, where military leaders are linked to regime elites through bonds of blood or sect or ethnicity, where career advancement is governed by cronyism and political loyalty rather than merit, where the distinction between public and private is blurred and, consequently, where economic corruption, cronyism, and predation is pervasive, then the fate and interests of the military’s leadership become intrinsically linked to the longevity of the regime.” (Bellin 2012, 133)

The Libyan military split into two parts because the military was invested in the survival of Gaddafi’s administration, because of its blood, tribal, and financial ties to the regime. The military had a significant incentive to fight for Gaddafi until the end; however, some military officers decided to defect to the anti-Gaddafi side. The

historical records show that the people who defected wanted to protect their family and tribal allies' against Gaddafi's brutal actions. For example, the Interior Minister General Abdel Fatah Younis al-Obeidi was the member of eastern-based Obeidi tribe, and he defected Gaddafi in 2011 (Beaumont 2011a). Some military officers chose to defect because they wanted more than what Gaddafi offered them. To put it differently, the intense and large scope of relative deprivation among some members of the Libyan military, specifically in the eastern Libya, motivated them to fight Gaddafi. The post-Gaddafi term clearly indicated that fact because there are so many clashes between militia groups to take the power control in politics and controlling oil basins (Chivvis and Martini 2014).

Additionally, some members of the regular military wanted to defy Gaddafi's repressive 42-year long term. Gaddafi's brutal response to the protests actually led many military officers to switch to the other side. That was proof for how Gaddafi's indiscriminate violence became counterproductive (Kalyvas 2006). As Gaddafi's former army officer, Mohammed Sharif, stated, "The men in Qaddafi's army had no spirit at all; no will to fight for him. When Qaddafi hired mercenaries to kill us [the Libyan people], I joined the opposition" (Gillis 2011). In addition, two generals Oun Ali Oun and Melud Massoud Halasa deserted Gaddafi and declared that, "[G]enocide and violence against women in various cities" by pro-Gaddafi forces (BBC 2011b). Moreover, two pilots from the Libyan air forces also defected in the early stages of the uprisings by fleeing to Malta on February 21st (McGregor 2011, Bassiouni 2013). They said they refused to bomb Libyan protesters: "The base was on high alert. Our primary orders were to travel to Sirte, arm the planes, and start bombing Benghazi" (Sherlock 2011).

Last, the international aerial intervention led additional members of the military forces to defect. The assault occurred shortly after the protests started and became a strong incentive for segments of the military to side with anti-Gaddafi forces because the large-scale intervention signalled that the end of Gaddafi's reign was near (Droz-Vincent 2013, 8). NTC member Suleiman Fortia told news agencies after meeting with then French President Sarkozy in Paris in July 2011, "With a little help from some friends, we will be in Tripoli within days" (Gauthier-Villars 2011). Around the same time, then General Secretary of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that "[T]he opposition forces are now more experienced, better trained, and better coordinated. So, I think we will see east and west join forces and move forward" (Fidler 2011). He continued by stating, "[The Libyan situation is] absolutely not a stalemate, and Gaddafi's forces have suffered a very, very clear weakening" (Fidler 2011). Shortly afterwards, in August, anti-Gaddafi forces captured Tripoli (Parsons and Taylor 2011, 22). The military defectors wanted to be on the winning side by taking the internationally supported side. Accordingly, the two military sides developed their rational choices but the lack of institutional character, the large economic interests (*greed*), also tribal, blood and regional tie based socio-psychological stance (*relative deprivation*) differed the behaviour of military members within the Libyan military.

In sum, the patrimonial and political character of the military played a significant role in the actions of the military during the 2011 uprisings, as many of them had a strong interest in the longevity of Gaddafi's regime. Libya confronted a destructive civil war, and pro-Gaddafi forces survived that fight against anti-Gaddafi forces until the end. The energy richness and its advantages constructed a strong motivation and reason for the military to side with Gaddafi. Besides, the patrimonial

and political structure of the military contributed an ideological object for them to stay with Gaddafi. However, the facts do not necessarily lead to military split. For example, the Libyan military forces were political and patrimonial even before; however, no split occurred in the state's military forces during the 2006 protests. This different outcome shows there was one more contributing factor that led to the split of the Libyan military—the strength of protests.

X.IV The Strength of Protests

Compared to the Tunisian protests of 2010-2011, the influence of the Libyan protests was relatively low in terms of achieving its goal of removing Gaddafi from power. The first protests ignited on February 15, 2011, but the struggle to oust Gaddafi from the capital in Tripoli lasted until August 2011 (Parsons and Taylor 2011, 22). Moreover, the resistance from Gaddafi himself and his supporters continued until October 2011 (Bassiouni 2013). Eventually, Gaddafi's regime fell nearly nine months after the uprisings began, despite significant international intervention. In contrast, the uprisings in Tunisia resulted in a change in leadership in less than one month (Inbar 2013).

This study indicates that the relative ineffectiveness of the protests in Libya resulted from the following four factors. First, unarmed protests morphed into an armed fight (Gerges 2015). Second, the diverse, tribal-based societal structure complicated the protestors' ability to engage in a unified action and brought about severe internal strife within the opposition and a lack of organizational coherence among demonstrators during the conflict (Lawson 2015, 7). Third, the expansive geography of the state made collective action difficult among the anti-Gaddafi forces. Last, the people's protests transformed to an official body (the NTC) which itself generated conflicts about its authority among the protestors.

According to several reports, when the initial anti-Gaddafi protests started on February 15, 2011 in the city of Al-Bayda, participants engaged in nonviolent demonstrations (Interview with Libyan Military Insiders Abdallah and Amen 2014, Mezran 2014, 314). On February 17th, the day of rage began in nearby Benghazi, the second biggest city in Libya. However, when pro-Gaddafi armed forces used coercive measures against the unarmed protestors, civilians soon responded in kind (Blanchard and Zanotti 2011, Tharoor 2011). On February 17th, the total number of deaths numbered 67 in Benghazi, Al-Baida, Derna, and Ajdabia (Pargeter 2012, 221). Indiscriminate violence was counterproductive for Gaddafi. Lynch stated, “The indiscriminate violence against uprisings infuriated previously neutral Libyans, and Benghazi based rebellion quickly gained support from new tribes, regions and sectors of society” (Lynch 2012, 112). The armed and indiscriminate reaction of Gaddafi forces engendered armed protests.

The protests on February 17th were not entirely without violence, as some demonstrators set fire to and attacked government buildings while calling for the end of the Gaddafi regime (Blanchard and Zanotti 2011, 2, Kuperman 2013). However, after the military’s response on February 17, the protesters realized they had reached the point of no return. If they were not successful in removing Gaddafi from his position, they would face dire consequences for their actions, as many had over the course of Gaddafi’s 42-year reign (see Chapter VI). Thus, the protestors moved forward into an armed struggle against the Gaddafi’s forces (Mezran 2014, 310).

In addition, the lack of institutional structure in the Libyan military and the tribal system fostered the protests to form armed groups. The Libyan military, specifically troops in the eastern region of the state, disintegrated quickly and sided with the protesters (Lacher 2011, Noueihed and Warren 2013), because most of the

recruits were conscripts from the eastern region. Their tribal loyalty outweighed their loyalty to Gaddafi, and their defection brought about a decline within the military. Some of the pro-Gaddafi soldiers chose to stay with anti-Gaddafi forces if not they could succeed to escape out of eastern Libya (Interview with Amer 2015). As mentioned earlier, the civil protesters also looted Gaddafi's armouries and used the ammunition against him. Because, Gaddafi lost control of most of eastern Libya in the first weeks of the protests, chaos reigned in the absence of authority (Interview with Warren 2014).

The military defectors and General Younis's support of the protests also helped to transform the civilian protests into an armed struggle (Telegraph 2011). The experienced military officers helped the protestors to fight more as organized armed groups than mass militias. Initially, the protests were "far from an organized process; rather, [they] consisted of locals armed with old and makeshift weapons forming their own military battalions and brigades" (Pargeter 2014, 4). Last, the proclaimed diplomatic and military support of international actors, especially Qatar and France, for the anti-Gaddafi protestors conferred upon them the legitimacy to fight against the Gaddafi regime (Gauthier-Villars 2011). Qatar, in particular, dispatched hundreds of Western-trained Libyan armed forces to Libya and provided significant financial support for the rebels (Kuperman 2013, Shadid 2011). As a result, "the popular protests morphed into a military struggle against the regime" (Pargeter 2014, 4).

Despite this support, the armed feature lessened the effectiveness of protests in terms of achieving its goal. While the nonviolent protests evolved into an armed struggle, Gaddafi also increased his heavy-handed responses by employing his military and militia forces. The armed protests helped Gaddafi to justify his brutal actions and to strengthen solidarity among his supporters. As stated in Chapters VII

and VIII, Colonel Gaddafi and his son Saif al-Islam identified the protestors as the source of *fitna* (chaos), and they forced their supporters to clean up Libya from them to end *fitna*.¹⁰¹

Moreover, the rebels' armed attacks created the perception that there would be brutal revenge against the Gaddafi loyalists. For example, General Younis defected from Gaddafi's forces, but because of his long service to Gaddafi, he was allegedly killed by the anti-Gaddafi factions (Interview with Vandewalle 2015, Interview with Joffe 2015, Chivvis 2014, 159-160). That strengthened the apprehension of killing among the Gaddafi loyal forces, and they rallied around Gaddafi to fight until the end (Interview with Libyan Military Insiders Abdallah and Amen 2014, Khatib and Lust 2014a). The armed conflict reduced defections from Gaddafi's armed forces and undermined the legitimacy of civilian protests (Nepstad 2013). As a result, the armed struggle lasted nine months, and, according to NTC, resulted in at least 30,000 deaths and 50,000 injured (Laub 2011).

During the struggle, the anti-Gaddafi factions demonstrated deep fractions among themselves. Although the Islamist February 17th Martyrs Brigade, led by Ismail al-Salabi, was the strongest group among the armed protestors (Farge 2011), there was dissension among the rebels. The February 17 Brigade accused of NTC asserting that "the revolution was hijacked by the lawyers," who serve Gaddafi (Tempelhof and Tarkowski 2012, 5). The other Islamist-rooted groups, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), also operated separately from both the NTC and the February 17 Brigade (Bassiouni 2013, Tempelhof and Tarkowski 2012). According to research respondents, the NTC appointed commander of the armed groups, General Younis, was killed by Islamist

¹⁰¹ The script of Saif Al Islam's speech was retrieved from uruknet.info, <http://www.uruknet.info/?p=m75191&hd&l=e&fb=1> (Accessed May 05, 2015).

fighters, probably February 17 Brigade fighters, because they accused of him being a loyal servant of Gaddafi and enemy of Islamists (Interview with Joffe 2015, Interview with Vandewalle 2015). That murder caused a schism between the hard-line Islamists and the NTC, which comprised a number of former Gaddafi officials. Ali Salabi, brother of Ismail Salabi, an influential Islamic scholar, and a protestor during the uprising, told Al-Jazeera that Mahmoud Jibril and NTC were “extreme secularists” who wanted to establish “a new era of tyranny and dictatorship” (McDonnell 2011).

“Regionalism and tribalism” also caused divisions among the anti-Gaddafi protesters because of historic antagonistic relations between eastern and western cities and the large number of tribes in Libya (Achcar 2013, 170). The two key western cities, Misrata and Zintan, had no experience cooperating with Benghazi since the time of King Idris, and this lack of collaboration had a negative impact during the 2011 conflict. The people of Benghazi believed that the Misrata and Zintan protestors did not suffer from the Gaddafi regime as much as they did, but that the Misratan and Zintan residents wanted to be the dominating power in the post-Gaddafi era (Pargeter 2014, 6). According to the protesters from eastern Libya, the line was drawn between “true revolutionaries and those deemed to be tainted by their past” (Pargeter 2014, 1).

Tribal societal structure also caused fractions among the anti-Gaddafi forces. Libya is home to an estimated 2,000 tribes, separated into 140 main tribes (Tempelhof and Tarkowski 2012, 8-9, Chorin 2012, 15). As stated before, during the kingdom, the Sanussi allied tribes were the dominating power of the Libyan government. Gaddafi’s 1969 coup reversed that power balance by replacing the power axis with his own tribe members and its allies (Senauth 2013). The new situation created grievances among eastern Libyans towards the new power centre in western Libya. During the uprisings, the intertribal rivalry re-emerged, since while Gaddafi loyal tribes were struggling to

protect their possessions retrieved from Gaddafi, the excluded tribes were striving to control the power centre by removing Gaddafi from power. In May 2011, a large number of tribal leaders, even some from the eastern region, came together in Tripoli to declare their rejection of an NTC- and NATO-backed armed uprising against Gaddafi. "What is called the Transitional Council in Benghazi was imposed by NATO on us and we completely reject it. We intend to oppose with all the means available to us the NATO crusader aggressors and their appointed lackeys" (Dorado 2011).

The Warfalla, Libya's largest tribe, and members of the pro-Gaddafi movement, also showed some cracks during the uprisings. For example, Akram al-Warfalli, a leading actor in the Warfalla, told Al-Jazeera "We tell the brother Qaddafi, well, he is no longer a brother. We tell him to leave the country" (Kirkpatrick 2011). Conversely, Abdel Majid al-Dursi, Gaddafi government spokesman, refused that account by stating that the tribe's support for Gaddafi remained strong (Kirkpatrick 2011). The subsequent developments also confirmed al-Dursi, because anti-Gaddafi forces had no success in breaking the strong resistance from Bani Walid until October 2011, along with city Sirte (Farmer 2011).

More important, there was fracture among the anti-Gaddafi tribes because each one was trying to be the leading power. The tribal society made centrally planned action difficult among the anti-Gaddafi forces. Despite the leadership of the NTC and the February 17 Martyrs Brigade, the anti-Gaddafi forces demonstrated significant disorganization (Bassiouni 2013). Without a central command structure, dozens of militias and local power centres emerged during the internal conflict, because the tribal groups acted together only for as long as their interests concurred. For example, Gaddafi's former commander, General Khalifa Haftar, a member of the al-Furjan

tribe,¹⁰² declared his military leadership and collected many militias to fight under him as a non-recognition of the NTC's General Younis choice, who was a member of the Obeidi tribe (Bahrapour 2011, Ajbaili 2014). Haftar defied the NTC's decision to make Younis leader of anti-Gaddafi military forces not only because of Younis's earlier service to Gaddafi but also because the impossibility to ignore their tribal differences.

Furthermore, the Nida Libya Brigade (Libya's Call Brigade) deserted anti-Gaddafi forces, or unveiled its hidden agenda, in the summer of 2011 by managing a jail break and releasing 300 inmates from prison in Benghazi to fight against the anti-Gaddafi forces (Smith 2011, Stephen 2011). Then Deputy of the Interior in the NTC, Mustafa El Sagezli, declared that the Nida Brigade was part of the fifth column (*traitors*), and claimed that Nida Brigade wanted to be a powerful tribe, without declaring the specific tribe (Stephen 2011). In short, the tribal society and tribal loyalty for Gaddafi weakened a joint and collective action against Gaddafi. A number of tribes maintained their loyalty towards Gaddafi, while the anti-Gaddafi tribes had difficulty unifying to take collective action. As a result, "political mobilization and military organization largely occurred along tribal or local lines" (Lacher 2011, 140).

Challenging geographic conditions within the state also undermined the power of protests (Gelvin 2012, 74). Libya is a large state, but the population is quite small in comparison to its geographic size. As a result, the population density¹⁰³ was only 3, compared to 68 in Tunisia as of 2010 (The World Bank 2015). Moreover, the Libyan population largely resides in the two biggest cities on the coastal West and East, Tripoli (near 2 million) and Benghazi (more than 650,000), respectively (Chorin 2012,

¹⁰² One of the largest tribes in the central Libyan, with a stronghold of Sirte (Atwi 2011).

¹⁰³ Population density equals the number of people per square kilometre of land (The World Bank 2015).

13). Without capturing the government's centre in Tripoli from pro-Gaddafi forces, the fall of the Gaddafi regime was unlikely for the Benghazi-centred anti-Gaddafi protestors (Netto 2014). However, Tripoli's distance to the Benghazi weakened the protests mobility and strength (Interview with Achcar 2014).

The anti-Gaddafi forces in the western Libya demonstrated an inability to reach a decisive victory against Gaddafi's stronghold in Tripoli without gathering crucial support from the east. Moreover, Gaddafi centralized his forces around Tripoli and ordered them to resist all attacks (Khatib and Lust 2014a). The protestors would need support from Benghazi, the birthplace of the protests, and its neighbours to overthrow Gaddafi. However, mobilization between east and west was very difficult. According to Google Maps, the distance from Benghazi to Tripoli is 1,024 kilometres, which is a 13-hour drive by car.¹⁰⁴ The transportation infrastructure was also very poor within the country and did not allow for a quick trip. The overlooked eastern region, in particular, suffered from very poor road conditions (Interview with Pargeter 2015), which made collective action and hasty resource mobilization challenging between eastern and western Libya. Consequently, the operative and swift support from east to west became problematic during the uprisings. As Achcar stated, "Libya's geographical condition made more difficult to see the same kind of concentrated uprisings like in Egypt and Tunisia" (Interview with Achcar 2014).

The power of the protests was also weakened by the formation of the NTC. Although the NTC provided structure for the armed struggle, former Gaddafi officials and Islamists butted heads within the organization. As stated previously, Gaddafi's former Minister of Justice and the Minister of Economy took the two most prominent

¹⁰⁴ Distance between Benghazi and Tripoli, <https://www.google.co.uk/maps/dir/Benghazi,+Libya/Tripoli,+Libya/@31.5584253,14.4662579,7z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m14!4m13!1m5!1m1!1s0x13831c55479eee2b:0xe497dfce76d293e0!2m2!1d20.1879106!2d32.0947711!1m5!1m1!1s0x13a892c4c11c43d9:0x8d99d8947b5cec86!2m2!1d13.1913383!2d32.8872094!3e0> (Retrieved January 8, 2015).

positions in the NTC: the head of NTC and the head of the executive board. Another main criticism towards the NTC was that the members were selected not elected (International Crisis Group 2011a, 24). While the February 17 Brigade claimed that former Gaddafi officials hijacked their revolution, other accounts indicated that they were selected by high-level officials in the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Fawzi Abu Kitef, Abdullah Shamia and Abdel Hakim Belhaj, then the Deputy Ministry of Defence, in charge of the economics and spokesman of NTC, respectively (Ashour 2012, Pargeter 2014, 5).

The other complaint about the NTC was that the Libyan diaspora dominated the NTC, even though they had not suffered from the Gaddafi's repression. The NTC's opposition argued, "[They] were not here during Gaddafi, they did not suffer like we do, and now they are taking all" (Tempelhof and Tarkowski 2012, 7). The most prominent figure was Ali Tarhouni, who lived abroad from 1973 to 2011 and became the Minister of Oil and Gas at NTC (Fisher 2011).

On the other hand, the people who joined the anti-Gaddafi forces from the western cities like Misrata and Zintan claimed that elite family members from Benghazi heavily dominated the NTC (International Crisis 2011). Indeed, according to them, they should have taken the centre of power since they fought valiantly against Gaddafi (Laremont 2014). As Pargeter stated, "Misrata in particular fought an extremely bloody battle, with the port city being put under siege for three months ending in the city's liberation in May 2011" (Pargeter 2014, 8).

Accordingly, the NTC was designed according to local representatives, and that brought many different figures from many distinct places under the same roof. In addition, the fact that the members were selected, not elected by local councils, through a very obscure process led to tensions between the NTC and local residents

(Mezran 2014, 324). The residents claimed that the NTC needed to prove its legitimacy before it could represent them. As a result, “The National Transition Council (NTC 2011) was an important focal point for the 17 February uprising in terms of fundraising and international legitimacy, but it never acted as a government or a unified political wing” (Droz-Vincent 2014, 201).

The power gap and the lack of a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” (Weber 1965) that had emerged from February 2011 onwards established grievances between the different groups under the NTC. Some of the groups had enmity from the past, and each faction desired to take the largest role in the newly designed power settlement. Differences in ideology and the thirst for power divided the rebel groups. The NTC accelerated the power-sharing discussions; however, the tensions inevitably led to a lack of unity among the different factions of the rebels. The developments during the post-Gaddafi period and the clash of different militias and political groups demonstrate the extent of the polarization among the anti-Gaddafi forces (Lecha 2015). After Tripoli fell to anti-Gaddafi forces, significant strife occurred between the Zintan-based Western Military Council (WMC), the Misrata Military Council and the NTC’s central authority (Mezran 2014). An accommodation was reached when the commander of WMC Osama al-Juwaili and Misratan general Yousef al-Mangush were appointed as the Defence Minister and the Chief of Army Staff under the interim government of 2011 (Mezran 2014, 316, Pack and Barfi 2012, 9).

The strife between the rebels also came to fore in 2013, when the liberal-leaning Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was kidnapped and released by the Islamist-leaning group Libya’s Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR) (Lefèvre 2014, 2). More remarkable, in terms of underlining the rift between the Libyan groups, LROR was

established by then Chairman of the General National Congress Nuri Abu Sahmayn (Finucci 2013). Zeidan said, “This is a coup against legitimacy” (Stephen 2013). The other development that reflects the past division among the different groups is that Libya was ruled by two competing governments in Tobruq and in Tripoli after the 2014 parliamentary elections (Lima 2015, 3).

In sum, the overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime took about nine months and the lengthy battle demonstrated that the protests were not as effective as were those in Tunisia. Although the change of leadership seemed the common goal of the entire protests, the effort still lacked a strong unifying structure. Data indicates that the protests were less effective for four reasons: (a) the transformation of the unarmed protests into an armed struggle led to “the militarization of the uprisings” (Droz-Vincent 2014, 208); (b) the Libyan society’s ossified tribal-based structure eclipsed major coalitions between the different segments of Libya, causing tribal and local interests to overshadow the collective mission of the protests; (c) Libya’s geography and poor transportation system made swift collaborations between the eastern and western factions of the anti-Gaddafi forces difficult; and (d) the establishment of the NTC caused conflicts between local residents and NTC members and among the NTC members themselves.

These factors outlined above conspired to make the Libyan protests “fierce but neither strong nor effective” (Ayubi 1995, XI) in comparison to the Tunisian case. The ineffectiveness of the protests influenced the behaviour of the Libyan military in different ways. The military responded to the extended conflict and significant bloodshed by splitting along anti- and pro-Gaddafi lines. The lack of strong solidarity and collective action undermined the anti-Gaddafi protestors’ power, conclusiveness and chances of success against the Gaddafi regime. That in turn created an obstacle

for larger defections in the pro-Gaddafi forces during the conflict of 2011. Rather, the absence of strong determination and coalescence pushed the armed forces to fight with Gaddafi until the end.

In many cases, the military develops its strategy according to the extent of the challenge faced by the ruling power (as seen in the Tunisian case). The ineffectiveness of the protests was not the only factor that influenced the military's behaviour; but in combination with the state's energy richness and military structure, it had a significant effect.

X.V Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored some of the key factors that led to the Libyan military split during the 2011 uprisings. First, the revenue that energy-rich Libya brought in from exporting oil and natural gas strengthened Gaddafi's ability to establish his loyal armed forces within and apart from the regular Libyan military. The economic privileges Gaddafi provided to these loyalists motivated those who were in the military to side with Gaddafi during the conflict. That was the implementation of the greed theory (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). In addition, Gaddafi established a stateless society, *Jamahiriyah*, and he shunned any dependence on international and national actors. The energy richness provided him the ability to move forward his own agenda for the state. Gaddafi's Libya emerged as an institutionally weak, but fiscally sovereign, nation.

Gaddafi shaped the Libyan military according to that state ideology and state structure. The military supported his tactics and his reign, because of the economic incentives that he provided. For the soldiers loyal to Gaddafi, a change in Libya's leadership meant the loss of the benefits they enjoyed under his regime. As a result, parts of the Libyan military were more heavily indebted to Gaddafi than to the state,

and that caused the split within the military during the 2011 uprisings. The soldiers in eastern Libya, who did not enjoy the economic benefits that their western counterparts enjoyed, sided with the anti-Gaddafi forces. That was the outcome of the intense and wide relative deprivation among the Libyans (Gurr 1970).

The second factor that led to the military's split was the structure of the Libyan military. The state's armed forces were political and patrimonial, and had no true institutional identity. The military served the Gaddafi regime, not the Libyan state, and enforced Gaddafi's personal edicts, not the rule of law. The revenue from energy exports helped Gaddafi to establish such a military structure. Gaddafi created neither a strong institution nor a meritocracy within the military force; instead, he established the military by "the cleavages of kinship and region" (Anderson 2011, 326). Moreover, Gaddafi employed domestic and external mercenaries during his reign to fight abroad and to protect him if the regular forces disobeyed him. He also reserved the mercenaries for situations when the regular forces became inadequate to end domestic upheaval. Because of the above points, the Libyan military became patrimonial, political, and non-institutional, but existed as the backbone of Gaddafi's regime and its ideology.

The third reason for the Libyan military's split was the ineffective power of the protests. This factor links to the first two variables because energy revenue caused the division among the protestors due to clashes of interests, while it also provided the army capability via international assistance. The military structure also influenced the effectiveness of the protests because the army exerted brutal and indiscriminate tactics to end the demonstrations, which propelled the protesters to engage in an armed struggle. Moreover, the lack of institutional structure in the Libyan military brought about a quick collapse of military unit and military struggle between the defectors and

the pro-Gaddafi forces. Each of these situations undermined the protestors' ability to achieve their goal without nine months of bloody civil strife.

In conclusion, the chapter demonstrates that these three factors—energy richness, the military structure, and the effectiveness of the protests—played a contributing role in the behaviour of the Libyan military during the 2011 uprisings. As I stated previously, while these factors are not the only elements that influenced the military's actions, they did have a significant impact on the outcome of the conflict. I analysed these three factors together because they are complementary and valid only insofar as they are analysed simultaneously in my research.

It is also important to note that one factor was not more important to the outcome than was another, and it is difficult to say which factor had the most significant impact on the military. The data in this study indicates a clear interaction between the elements, and in this study I focus on their joint configuration to understand the outcome of the 2011 uprisings.

Chapter XI

Conclusion

This study aimed to explore the role of the military during the 2010-2011 uprisings, with specific case studies of Tunisia and Libya. Research has indicated that the behaviour of the military in Tunisia and Libya contributed decisively to both the outcomes and the forms that the respective uprisings took. In Tunisia, where the military deserted the old regime, the change of leadership occurred in a nonviolent way. In contrast, in Libya, where part of the military remained loyal to the old regime, the protests evolved into violent civil conflict. Thus, this study has sought to answer the following question: Why did the military forces in Tunisia and Libya choose to either defect from or defend their respective country's ruling regime during the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings?

Prior to exploring this specific question in empirical Chapters IX and X, I examined the anti-democratic political structure, military balance, and exclusive and unequal social and economic structures that existed in both Tunisia and Libya before the protests (Chapters V and VII) to demonstrate the context within which the uprisings took place in 2010-2011. In addition, this study explored the key actors and factors that played a significant role leading up to, during, and after the uprisings (Chapters VI and VIII).

This concluding chapter is structured as follows. First, I synthesize the main findings of this study and discuss this study's contribution to the existing knowledge base on the Arab uprisings in Tunisia and Libya. I then detail the limitations of this

study. The chapter ends with a presentation of ideas for future studies and final remarks.

XI.I Main Findings

The most significant finding in this study is that the joint configuration of energy capacity, military structure, and the strength of protests heavily influenced the military's behaviour in Tunisia and Libya during the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings. Data indicated that individually, these factors do not have the same influence during a rebellion as they do when working in conjunction with each other, as indicated by the failure of previous protests in both states. Additionally, it is clear that this set of variables does not offer a universal explanation of military behaviour in the Arab uprisings. These factors should be regarded as important contributing factors that make the examined outcomes more likely, but not inevitable.

My first case is Tunisia. In Chapter IX, the data indicated that the combination of the following three factors played an important role in the Tunisian military's defection: first, the lack of energy wealth that led to a lack of strong economic ties between the military and Ben Ali's regime; second, the institutional and apolitical military structure; and third, the high strength of protests.

Lack of energy wealth. The lack of energy resources played a significant role in the outcome of the protests because the Tunisian economy relied upon external investments. As a result, the Tunisian military had no concerns about losing economic assets if the rebels removed Ben Ali from office. That meant that the Tunisian military had no greed motives. Because the armed forces were not economically beholden to Ben Ali in any way, they adhered to a pro-state approach, and did not ascribe their loyalty to any one regime. Their goal was to keep Tunisia safe, stable, and secure so that the nation could continue to receive foreign economic support. As a result, when

the protests broke out in 2010-2011, the military deserted Ben Ali to provide state security. In this way, the energy poverty shaped the military's behaviour during the uprisings but it was not the only factor.

An apolitical and institutional military force. The military force in Tunisia was apolitical and institutional in nature, because both Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali insisted that they refrain from participation in politics. Moreover, the marginalization of the military from political decision making also propelled military into institutional structure. Because they felt no ownership of the political power that was in place in 2011, they were more willing to defect. The data clearly demonstrated that the apolitical and institutional nature made it easier for the military to support the people's demands for a regime change. Furthermore, the marginalization of the military caused deep relative deprivation among the members of the Tunisian military. The defection decision did not create any division among the military ranks because the armed forces had a corporate identity and largely agreed with the decision to support the people and defect from the ruling regime.

The power of the protests. Chapter IX demonstrated that the strong influence and impact of the Tunisian protests contributed to the military's decision to support the rebellion. Data indicates that the strength of the protests resulted from four key characteristics: (a) the protests were non-violent and leaderless; (b) the protestors' agenda did not conflict with that of the military; (c) the protestors included large pockets of middle class, educated people who used social media effectively to spread the word about the demonstrations; and (d) the small size of the state and the ethnically homogenous population facilitated communication and collaboration.

Accordingly, this study has demonstrated that the joint configuration of energy poverty, the institutional and apolitical military structure, and the high strength of

protests played a contributing role to the Tunisian military's decision to defect during the 2010-2011 protests. The comparison provided by the case of the military's behaviour in Libya during the same uprising lends credence to this conclusion.

In Chapter X, I examined how energy capacity, military structure, and the strength of protests led the Libyan military to behave quite differently than Tunisia's armed forces. The data demonstrated that the following attributes contributed the variation and led to division among the military forces over whether to defect from or defend Gaddafi's regime during the 2011 uprisings: first, the energy wealth that helped Gaddafi to establish strong economic ties with the military; second, the patrimonial and political military structure; and third, the low strength of protests.

An energy-rich state. Libya was an energy-rich state, and Gaddafi used the revenue from energy exports to establish his own patrimonial military among the troops, mostly in the western region of the state. During the uprisings, the fear of losing the economic possessions that Gaddafi provided led the forces in the western region to support the regime. That was the outcome of economic motives (*greed*) among the Libya military forces. The protection of Gaddafi meant the protection of the military's economic opportunities. The troops in the eastern region, however, had not received the same economic incentives; and they chose to support anti-Gaddafi forces when the rebellion began. That defection was the result of the high relative deprivation among the neglected Libyan population. As a result, the military split into two factions: those who supported Gaddafi (pro-Gaddafi) and those who wanted him removed from power (anti-Gaddafi).

A patrimonial and political military force. According to the data, energy resources were not the only reason that the Libyan military split into two factions. The military's political, patrimonial structure also played a significant role. Gaddafi used

his relatives and tribal affiliations to establish a military that was loyal to him, not to the state. Pro-Gaddafi Warfalla, Maghraha and Qadhadhfa tribes played decisive roles during the Gaddafi reign, while Eastern based tribes Sa'adi and Al-Obeidi excluded. Therefore, in addition to the materialistic agenda, socio-political and psychological concerns shaped the western troops' decision to support the regime. The split along geographical and ethnic lines also demonstrated the military's lack of institutional character and corporate identity.

Less powerful protests. Unlike the Tunisian demonstrations, the Libyan protests had limited influence during the 2011 uprisings. Although they started non-violently, the protests quickly evolved into an armed struggle after the brutal and indiscriminate response from Gaddafi's forces. The violence severely undermined the strength of protests and extended the length of the struggle, which served to deepen the fractures between pro- and anti-Gaddafi groups within the military forces. Tribal heterogeneity, regional polarization, and geographic challenges also contributed to the inefficient nature of the protests. The large geography and poor transportation infrastructure made cooperation and collaboration difficult. Most of the anti-Gaddafi forces resided in the eastern part of Libya, but a large number of the nation's population lived in the western region (largely in the capital city, Tripoli). Gaddafi also remained in the western portion of the state during the conflict. The challenge of travelling from the east to the west also contributed to the low strength of protests.

The establishment of National Transitional Council (NTC) also had both a beneficial and detrimental effects on the success of the protests. While the NTC helped to end Gaddafi's regime by serving as a bridge between international actors and anti-Gaddafi groups, the contests over power between different groups created contention within the organization during the uprisings. Some armed groups preferred

to operate separately from the NTC command. This lack of unity also weakened the protests.

The central goal of this dissertation has been to demonstrate that energy capacity, military structure, and the strength of protests contributed to the variances in the behaviours of the Tunisian and the Libyan military forces. These three factors looked quite differently in Tunisia and Libya. It is noteworthy to state that I do not make a comparison in terms of absolute values (on level) of the factors concerned, but rather in terms of relative (i.e., comparative) values. Thus, the data clearly demonstrated that Tunisia is an energy poor state in comparison to Libya; that the Tunisian military is more institutional and apolitical than Libya's political and patrimonial forces; and that the strength of protests was higher in Tunisia than it was in Libya.

XI.II Contribution

The study's contributions to the academic field can be placed under three main headings: literature, theoretical and methodological. To begin, uprisings and forced changes in leadership are quite uncommon in the MENA region. Thus, after the 2010-2011 uprisings, social movement-led regime changes became a new field of study among MENA scholars. As a result, researchers have conducted many studies on the topic since 2011. For example, Hamid Dabashi (2012), Tariq Ramadan (2012), James L. Gelvin (2012), Marc Lynch (2012), Alison Pargeter (2012), Ethan Chorin (2012), Gilbert Achcar (2013), Fawaz A. Gerges (2015), and Daniel Ritter (2015) have all made important contributions to the field. However, none of these important works have primarily examined the role of the military during these conflicts.

Thus, the first contribution that this inquiry makes to the field is that the data highlights the important role of the military in this new academic field. This study has

aimed to explain the role of the military in the Arab uprisings, with a particular focus on Libya and Tunisia. In Chapters V and VII, I explored the Tunisian and Libyan uprisings from historical and present perspectives; however, a secondary goal of the above chapters has also been to identify the basis for military-centred analysis.

However, some scholarly works have emerged since the Arab uprisings that specifically focused on the role of the military. For instances, both Kevin Kohler's doctoral dissertation "*Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen in Comparative Perspective*" (2013) and Hicham Bou Nassif's Tunisian-based doctoral dissertation "*Generals and Autocrats: Coup-proofing and Military Elite's Behaviour in the 2011 Arab Spring*" (2014) examined military behaviours through the lens of military elite. In addition, William C. Taylor (2014) analysed the military's actions in the four cases of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria from a restraints and interests perspective. Additionally, Robert Springborg (2014) examined the military's behaviour from institutional and professional perspectives. Eva Bellin (2012) also contributed to the field by examining the military's "institutional character" and "level of mobilization" during the Arab uprisings. Bellin, however, focused on the robustness of the authoritarian regimes rather than on the military power. While these works contribute greatly to the existing knowledge base, none of them has examined the military's behaviour from the joint configuration of energy capacity, military structure, and the strength of protests.

This study also contributes to the literature by shedding light on the military forces' decision to defect from or defend ruling powers in their state through the lenses of energy capacity, military structure, and the strength of protests. This inquiry has demonstrated the importance of the joint configuration of the three factors by comparing the impact of these factors using cases of Tunisia and Libya.

This study also adds to the literature by exploring some of the reasons behind the social protests in Tunisia and Libya. Chapters V and VII demonstrated how the long-term anti-democratic, repressive, and exclusive state structures paved the way for uprisings in Tunisia and Libya, which is the outcome of “relative deprivation” (Gurr 1970, 37). Chapters VI and VIII explored the actors and factors that played critical roles in establishing and maintaining such structures in those countries before and during the protests, which is the implementation of “political opportunity” (Tarrow 1994, 6). This data contributes to the social protests literature by clarifying how long-term structural conditions brought about mass uprisings in the two states.

My fourth contribution is theoretical. I developed my own theoretical approach by combining two existing theoretical frameworks with applicable features for my case study. Rational choice and institutionalism became the basis for the theoretical model. I used the framework to interpret the Tunisian and Libyan military behaviours from the perspectives of economic incentives (*greed*) and the socio-psychological aspect (*relative deprivation*), along with selective and indiscriminate violence in Chapter III. I also argued that the Tunisian military’s defection should be defined more from the framework of relative deprivation (non-material force) and less from the notion of greed (material force). In addition, the institutional structure of the Tunisian military propelled troops to make the rational choice to cooperate with protestors, which saved Tunisia from a potential civil conflict.

In Chapter III, the framework demonstrated that portions of the Libyan military demonstrated pro-regime behaviour. Various factions of the Libyan forces split because the pro-Gaddafi forces wanted to protect their earnings and tribal power, and the anti-Gaddafi group sought to remove Gaddafi and his regime. According to the framework, the pro-Gaddafi forces demonstrated an economic motive more than a

socio-psychological cause. In addition, I explored that the lack of institutional character that prevented the Libyan military cooperating and led to a deep split within the forces. Lack of cooperation and power seeking agendas became the theoretical approaches to explain the Libyan military's behaviour.

The study's fifth contribution is methodical. I combined three similar but qualitatively different factors into a single configurational perspective to examine my cases. In Chapter IV, I explained that joint configuration to interpret the military's behaviour in the two states. That chapter demonstrated that this methodological approach strengthened my findings by using the similar factors together, not separately, and showed that each factor is an integral part of a larger, multi-faceted configuration. In fact, considering the factors separately could weaken the strength of this study. More importantly, a single factor analysis would run the risk of obtaining a limited explanation of the different military behaviours from Tunisia and Libya.

XI.III Limitations of the study

The first limitation of my research is that I only examine two cases. As of 2016, six states were involved in the Arab uprisings; however, examining all of the cases is beyond the scope of my research. As such, I selected two key cases that demonstrate two varying roles that the military played during the Arab uprisings. I could have added two similar cases to my comparison, such as Egypt and Yemen, to achieve more breadth, but I chose to conduct an in-depth examination of only two cases.

The second limitation of my research is that the uprisings occurred in 2010-2011. That means that many top officers, including retired Tunisian General Rached Ammar and former Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi, were not available to be interviewed because they did not want to trigger negative reactions from the new

ruling powers while the country is still in a transitional phase. For example, I approached General Rached Ammar for an interview during my fieldwork in Tunisia, and he accepted, with the condition that I get official approval from the Tunisian Ministry of Defence. Unfortunately, the Tunisian Ministry of Defence would not allow me to interview General Ammar, but he did offer a meeting with someone else. This encounter indicated that there are still some hidden sides of the uprisings, or that new rulers would like to control perceptions about the conflicts. I overcame that problem by approaching others on my interviewee list, such as the spokesperson of the Tunisian Ministry of Defence and other expert interviewees. I also persuaded some of my interviewees by guaranteeing their anonymity.

The third limitation of my study is the security problem in Libya. I managed to complete my fieldwork in Tunis, Tunisia, but I was unable to go to Libya because of the fierce armed struggle between regular military forces and militia groups. The lack of security prevented me from entering Libya to interview important actors in the uprisings, such as General Khalifa Haftar, Mahmoud Jibril, and Fathi Terbil. I overcame that challenge to some extent by speaking with the Libyan military officers who fled to Europe. Additionally, as in the case of Tunisia, I interviewed significant Libyan experts who had access to the elites to fill the gaps and obtain the data that I needed.

XI.IV Areas for future research

This intensive study is constrained to the two cases of Tunisia and Libya. More cases studies from the Arab uprising are necessary to generate extensive and multifaceted conclusions and further assess the applicability of the subject. Specifically, I recommend the following areas for future study.

First, future research should explore the two cases of Yemen and Egypt; since the Yemeni military's behaviour mirrored that of the Libyan army, and the Egyptian military demonstrated actions that paralleled those of the Tunisian military during the 2010-2011 uprisings. Adding two more cases would provide breadth to the depth of this study.

Additionally, future study should explore the remaining cases involved in the Arab uprising—Syria and Bahrain. This examination should focus on the impact of international and regional actors on the form of the uprisings and the stance of the military. It should also explore how sectarian factors influenced (and still influence, in Syria) the strength of the uprisings and the role of the military. These findings would add to the literature on the influence of domestic and international issues' on the military's role.

Another potential area of study area involves the post-Arab uprisings period in Tunisia and Libya. I discussed some of the developments in the wake of the uprisings in Chapter IX and X, but it would be useful to (a) determine whether the uprisings in 2010-2011 caused either a change of leader(s) or a change of regime(s) and (b) explore the role and place of the military following the uprisings. What would be the military's role if the democratic transitions had been successful?

An additional area of future research might involve an exploration of why the uprisings remained limited and did not lead to ruler or regime changes in neighbouring countries like Algeria and Morocco. This research would also examine the role of the military in maintaining the existing regimes in the two countries and investigate why anti-governments protests had little effect. Researchers could compare the findings from the suggested study to those from the cases of Tunisia and Libya examined in the present inquiry.

All of these suggested areas for future studies would contribute greatly to the knowledge base on the role of the military during the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings. However, I should note that new studies would contribute various theoretical frameworks and characteristic conclusions for each case or case group, but a universal conclusion seems not very likely. Because each Arab uprising case has its own unique condition, despite several commonalities, a single theoretical framework or an empirical approach should not be expected as a proper way to explain the Arab uprising cases.

This study provided an analysis of why military forces chose to defect from or defend their state's existing regime during the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings, with a particular focus on the cases of Tunisia and Libya. The findings of this study have established its originality by demonstrating the link between military action and the joint configuration of energy capacity, military structure, and the strength of protests. In addition, the study adds to the existing knowledge base about the role of military in social movements by demonstrating the importance of the military with an in-depth comparative case study.

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Appendix A: Chronology of the Tunisian Uprisings¹⁰⁵

December 2010

- **December 17:** Grocery vendor Mohammed Bouzazi set himself on fire in the city Sidi Bouzid due to that police force confiscated his vendor cart.
- **December 18:** The angry youth protests started at his home town Sidi Bouzid, and clashes between the security and protests occurred.
- **December 20:** Development Minister Mohamed Al Nouri Al Juwayni travelled to Sidi Bouzid and promised for 10 million dollars employment program to ease protests but protests continued with increasing its scale.
- **December 22:** An unemployed young man Houcine Nejji committed to suicide by jumping from the top of an electric pole to protest Ben Ali in the Sidi Bouzid.

¹⁰⁵ I use the following sources throughout the whole part and accessed in May-June 2015:

-Arab spring: an interactive timeline of Middle East protests
(<http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline>)

-Timeline: Arab Spring
(<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/12/timeline-arab-spring-20131217114018534352.html>)

-Timeline: Tunisia's Uprising
(<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/tunisia/2011/01/201114142223827361.html>)

-Key Moments in the Tunisian protests
(<http://observers.france24.com/en/20110114-videos-key-moments-tunisian-protests-ben-ali-citizen-journalism?page=59>)

-Arab Spring: Country by Country- Tunisia
(<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482315>)

-Tunisia since the Arab Spring: timeline
(<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/tunisia/11480587/Tunisia-since-the-Arab-Spring-timeline.html>)

- Huffington Post
(http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/12/16/arab-spring-timeline-_n_1153909.html)

- **December 24:** Hundreds of demonstrators gathered in front of the Tunisian labour union headquarters. They demanded labour unions to address the unemployment and rampant poverty.
- **December 25:** Demonstrations spread to neighbour cities Kairouan, Sfax and Ben Guerdane and the government accepted the usage of hard power against the demonstrators because the Ministry of Interior spokesperson stated that polices were forced to “shoot in self-defence”.
- **December 27:** Protests reached the capital, Tunis. Around 1,000 people gathered outside headquarter of General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) and protesters fought with police forces.
- **December 28:** President Ben Ali visited Mohammed Bouzazi in hospital.
In addition President Ben Ali delivered a speech on national television broadcast. He promised more jobs and also said “the law will be applied in all firmness” against the protestors who apply violence.
President Ben Ali sacked the Ministers of Communication, Trade and Handicrafts, and Religious.
Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi held talk with Ben Ali over the telephone and he ordered easier entry procedures for unemployed Tunisians.

January 2011

- **January 4:** Bouzazi died in hospital. Tunisian Bar Association declared general strike will begin on Jan 6.
- **January 5:** More than 5,000 people participated to the Bouazizi’s funeral in his hometown of Sidi Bouzid.
- **January 6:** More than 90% of the lawyers commenced the general strike.

- **January 8:** Military first time entered into events in the city of Kasserine and town Thala to protect public buildings and facilities.
- **January 9:** The uprising was spreading across the whole country and massive killings from protestors emerged in Thala and Kasserine, especially by snipers.
- **January 10:** President Ben Ali gave his second speech on television. He declared new 300,000 job employment and organizing a national conference in February to be attended by various sections of Tunisian society. Besides, he underlined that the law will be applied against the protesters as he described them as of criminals and extremists.

Moreover, Ben Ali expressed his appreciation to the Libyan leader Gaddafi for his economic initiatives.

- **January 11:** In response to 11 January protests police used riot gear to disperse protesters. Military personnel were also deployed in many cities around the country.

US Ambassador to Tunis Gordon Gray told the Ben Ali he had to leave his power and he should not plan living in exile in the United States.

- **January 12:** The army deployed in capital Tunis and government imposed a curfew in larger part of Tunis.

President Ben Ali sacked the Interior Minister Rafik Belhaj Kacem from his post.

In addition, UGTT declared a strike in its stronghold city Sfax.

French Foreign Minister Alliot-Marie offered help to the Tunisian police to restore calm.

- **January 13:** Ben Ali gave his final speech on television. He many times underlined that “I have understood you.”

Ben Ali promised to establish an independent commission to investigate the casualties, corruption and bribery allegations.

In addition, he promised to lift any censorship on the media and internet.

Furthermore, he declared not to run for the presidency in 2014.

- **January 14:** President Ben Ali declared state of emergency and dismissed the whole government.

Trabelsi family was arrested in the Carthage airport by Samir Tarhouni the chief of antiterrorist brigade (BAT).

Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia with his family. In the meantime, Ben Ali charged chief of army Rachid Ammar as the chief coordinator of all security forces from the Ministry of Interior. Rachid Ammar moved the Ministry of Interior from the Ministry of Defence by giving his position to Ahmed Chabir, the chief of the military intelligence.

Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi announced on television that he had assumed the role of interim president.

President Obama declared his support towards the people and condemned the use of violence against citizens.

At the night of that day, the council in the Ministry of Interior that mainly included Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi, the Chief of the Tunisian Parliament Fouad Mebazaa and the Interior Minister Ahmed Friaa, and the Chief of the Tunisian Army Rachid Ammar decided to call back Ben Ali's plan without bringing Ben Ali.

- **January 15:** Congress speaker Fouad Mebazaa took the interim President of Tunisia according to the article 57 of constitution.

Ghannouchi continued as Prime Minister.

- **January 17:** Ghannouchi announced new interim government and widespread reform promises, such as press freedom and the release of political prisoners.

The new government included several Ben Ali loyalists, including the defence, interior and foreign ministers.

- **January 18:** Disgruntled people because of the new government poured the streets in protest.

Prime Minister Ghannouchi and the Acting President Mebazaa resigned from the Ben Ali's party RCD to placate protesters.

Human rights advocate and leader of the banned party Congress for the Republic (CPR) Moncef Marzouki returned Tunisia after exile in France. He also proclaimed his candidacy for presidency.

- **January 20:** Protests continued and all ministers who were the member of the RCD quitted the party but they kept their seats in the cabinet. Moreover, the central committee of RCD was dissolved.
- **January 24:** The protest continued and they demanded the dissolution of the interim government.

General Rachid Ammar publicly told the protesters "Our revolution is our revolution. The army will protect your revolution." He also advised them being patient.

- **January 27:** Ghannouchi announced the second interim government. He dissolved most members of RCD from the key positions in the new interim government.

- **January 30:** The long exiled leader of Al-Nahda movement Rachid Ghannouchi returned Tunisia from London.

February 2011

- **February 6:** All activities of RCD were suspended by the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior.
- **February 18-20:** Anti-government protests continued throughout Tunisia, including the capital Tunis, so called *Kasbah (government square)* 1-2 protests
- **February 27:** Mohammed Ghannouchi eventually resigned on Feb 27th after many mass protests against him.

Acting President Mebazaa appointed Beji Caid Essebsi, who was the Foreign Minister of Habib Bourguiba and chief of parliament under the Ben Ali, as the new interim Prime Minister of Tunisia, that lasted until the parliamentary elections in October 2011.

Appendix B: Chronology of the Libyan Uprisings¹⁰⁶

February 2011

- **February 15:** People protested the Gaddafi regime in eastern city Al-Bayda. Human rights lawyer Fathi Terbil, who was also lawyer of Abu Selim prison victim families, was arrested in Benghazi.
- **February 16:** Anti-Gaddafi protests erupted in Benghazi to protests the arrest of Fathi Terbil.

In Al-Bayda, two people were killed by Gaddafi forces.
- **February 17:** Anti-Gaddafi protesters declared that day as “Day of Rage.” Pro-Gaddafi rallies also occurred to counter such protests.

The anti-Gaddafis protests spread the eastern cities Ajdabiya and Darnah.
- **February 18:** Gaddafi blocked most of the internet and media access. Gaddafi forces from the Khamis Brigade moved into Benghazi, Bayda and several other cities. Protests also occurred in Tobruq.

Dozens of protesters were killed by the pro-Gaddafi forces.

¹⁰⁶ I use the following sources throughout the whole part and accessed in May-June 2015.

-Arab spring: an interactive timeline of Middle East protests
(<http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline>)

-Timeline: Three Years after Libya's Uprising
(<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2014/02/timeline-three-years-after-libya-uprising-201421691755192622.html>)

- Arab Spring Timeline: 17 December 2010 to 17 December 2011
(http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/12/16/arab-spring-timeline-_n_1153909.html)

-Libya Rebellion: timeline
(<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8838340/Libya-rebellion-timeline.html>)

-Libya profile-Timeline
(<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13755445>)

- *Libya: From Repression to Revolution*, M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), pp. i-xiii (Leiden: Brill, 2014)

Most part of the city Al-Bayda was controlled by anti-Gaddafi forces.

Obama said that “I am deeply concerned by reports of violence in Bahrain, Libya and Yemen.”

- **February 20:** Gaddafi’s son Saif Al-Islam gave a televised speech. Saif blamed the protestors and their foreign supporters for bringing chaos in Libya, while promising for some reforms and increase in wages. He also warned the protesters with civil war unless they do not end their resistance.

Large part of Benghazi control fell to the anti-Gaddafi forces.

- **February 21:** Libya’s Justice Minister Mustafa Abdel Jalil has resigned over ‘the excessive use of violence against protesters.’

Libya’s deputy permanent representative of UN Ibrahim O. Dabbashi called Colonel Gaddafi to resign.

UK Prime Minister condemned the use of violence by Gaddafi.

- **February 22:** Colonel Gaddafi appeared on state television. He called his supporters to clean-up Libya from the oppositions; he called them as “rats”. He also declared that he will not leave Libya until he die.

The Interior Minister General Abdul Fattah Younis Al-Obeidi declared his resignation to join the anti-Gaddafi forces in Benghazi.

- **February 23:** The Gaddafi forces were driven out from the third biggest city in the western coast Misrata, after Tripoli and Benghazi.
- **February 24:** Gaddafi spoke to state television by phone and described the protester as “criminal drug users”. He portrayed himself as symbolic leader and underlined that the people will be punished because of their actions.
- **February 25:** Gaddafi appeared in public speech at Green Square in Tripoli with crowd. He pledged to open up arsenals.

In the same day, Libyan government announced raising wages, increasing food subsidies and giving 500 Libyan dinars to each family (about £250).

UN Human Rights Council passed resolution on Libya to condemn the use of violence against civilians by Gaddafi.

- **February 26:** UN Security Council unanimously adopted 1970 sanction that meant international condemnation for the use of violence and sanctions at the international level, including arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze.
- **February 27:** National Transitional Council (NTC) was officially established by anti-Gaddafi groups, including defectors, in Benghazi.
- **February 28:** US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the UN Human Security Council “It’s time for Ghadafi to go – now, without further violence or delay.”

March 2011

- **March 1:** After UN’s urgent request, France and UK answered to help the Libyan refugees in Tunisia, numbered more than 70,000.
- **March 2:** Arab League Chief Amr Moussa condemning Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s crackdown on protesters.
- **March 3:** The prosecutor of international criminal court (ICC) Luis Moreno-Ocampo announced that Gaddafi and his sons would be investigated for crime allegations against humanity

US President Barack Obama said “Muammar Gaddafi has lost the legitimacy to lead and he must leave.”
- **March 5:** NTC held its first meeting in Benghazi and declared itself as the single representative body of Libyan nation.

- **March 8:** Colonel Gaddafi talked in a press conference and said Al-Qaeda rebels will kill us all. He accused of the protestors as the selfish people killing Libyans for their own interest.
- **March 9:** UK Prime Minister David Cameron and US President Barack Obama agreed on forward step, including NATO intervention and no-fly zone, to protect civilians from violence.
- **March 10:** Gaddafi forces took back key city Zawiya close to capital and important oil refinery town Ras Lanuf from the anti-Gaddafi forces.

After that defeat of opposite forces, Saif Al-Islam said there would be more action without any tolerance.

France became the first country recognized NTC as legitimate representatives of the Libyan nation.
- **March 11:** Gaddafi forces retook town Brega located in the eastern Libya and near Benghazi.
- **March 12:** The Arab League called on the U.N. Security Council to immediately impose a no-fly zone over Libya. In addition, the Arab League recognized NTC as country's legitimate government.
- **March 13:** Saif gave interview on TIME. He described the anti-Gaddafi forces as gangsters and claimed that they have no future but we have.
- **March 14:** Libyan anti-Gaddafi forces urged for no-fly zone because Ajdabiya was under heavy bombardment from Gaddafi forces. Ajdabiya seemed the biggest obstacle for Gaddafi to reach Benghazi.
- **March 17:** Colonel Gaddafi addressed Benghazi residence on radio and said "It is over ... We are coming tonight."

Following shortly after, UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 with 10 approval and 5 abstentions from Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russian Federation. That resolution approved no-fly zone and authorized UN for all measures to protect civilians including air strike.

- **March 19:** Operation Odyssey Dawn started with US, UK and France aid bombardment.
- **March 20:** Colonel Gaddafi's Bab al-Aziziya military compound was hit by air strikes.
- **March 23:** US, UK and France agreed that NATO would take over military command of no-fly zone.
- **March 26:** Anti-Gaddafi forces forced out pro-Gaddafi forces from town Ajdabiya and take control of that key city gate to Benghazi.
- **March 28:** Anti-Gaddafi forces retook important oil towns of Brega, Ras Lanuf and Ben Jawad and advanced on Gaddafi's hometown Sirte.
- **March 29:** UK pioneered to be agreed on establishing Libya contact group in London. The mission of that group was explained by UK Foreign Secretary William Hague taking leadership and coordination with United Nations, African Union, Arab League, Organisation of the Islamic Conference and European Union to received support to Libya.
- **March 30:** Gaddafi's Foreign Minister Moussa Kusa defected to UK, and that represented a serious blow to the Gaddafi regime from inside.
- **March 31:** NATO took command of air strike and operation name renewed as 'Operation Unified Protector.'

April 2011

- **April 1:** Colonel Gaddafi's envoy Mohammed Ismail visited London for negotiations. In the meanwhile, anti-Gaddafi forces offered ceasefire if Gaddafi withdrew his forces.
- **April 2:** The Deputy of the Foreign Ministry visited the Foreign Minister of Greece in Athens for an exit strategy.
- **April 6:** NTC exported oil for the first time from Marsa el-Hariga port, near Tobruq.
- **April 7:** Turkey proposed a peace deal to Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi sides and both sides approached positively to that deal included ceasefire, humanitarian aid and political reforms.

NATO mistakenly hit the anti-Gaddafi forces near Ajdabiya.
- **April 8:** General Carter Ham who served as the second commander in the military intervention into Libya stated that the stalemate looks more likely than deposing Gaddafi by using military means. That signed for a deadlock in the future of Libya.
- **April 10:** Gaddafi forces advanced in the key city Ajdabiya on the way of retaking the stronghold of anti-Gaddafi forces Benghazi.

African Union (AU) negotiators including South Africa's president Jacob Zuma met with Gaddafi government in Tripoli. They declared an agreement for an immediate ceasefire and transition to political reforms before they talked to the other side NTC.
- **April 11:** NTC rejected AU's 'road map to peace' due to that the deal did not require the leave of Col Gaddafi from power.

- **April 13:** Libyan Contact Group met first time in Doha under the chair of Qatar and Britain. The western and Arab leaders unanimously agreed on that boost of support towards the NTC.
- **April 15:** President Obama, President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron wrote a joint letter and declared that there can be no peace while Gaddafi remains in power.
- **April 16:** Gaddafi's intensified his military attack on the besieged city Misrata. Anti-Gaddafi groups invited NATO troops into Misrata to end the desperation and devastation.
- **April 19:** UK and France decided to send a team of military advisers to Libya in order to help NTC in improving their military skills.
- **April 20:** UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, at that time, condemned the use of cluster bombs in Misrata by Gaddafi forces and stated that such act "could amount to international crime."
- **April 21:** White House approved the use of armed drones in Libya.
- **April 25:** NATO hit Gaddafi compounds in Tripoli.
- **April 26:** President Obama authorized 25 million dollars in non-lethal support to anti-Gaddafi forces.
- **April 30:** Gaddafi appeared on television and called for negotiation and ceasefire with NATO forces. He expressed his peace deal intention but repeatedly refused resignation claims.

NTC rejected Gaddafi's ceasefire offer.

NATO hit a building in Tripoli that killed Gaddafi's youngest son and three grandchildren.

May 2011

- **May 1:** UK embassy and other western missions' buildings in Tripoli were ransacked by pro-Gaddafi Libyans. In response to that, UK declared Libyan Ambassador to London as persona non grata.
 - **May 5:** Twenty-two nations and number of international organization met in Rome to figure out the NTC forces' financial problems.
 - **May 16:** Colonel Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam and chief of intelligence Abdullah Senussi were accused of crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC) chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo.
 - **May 24:** NATO managed the heaviest bombardment over Tripoli since the intervention started on March 19.
 - **May 26:** Gaddafi's Prime Minister Al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmudi offered peace talks with anti-Gaddafi forces without ever mentioning Col Gaddafi's name.
 - **May 30:** 8 Libyan military officials, including 5 generals, appeared at news conference in Rome to declare their defection from Gaddafi.
- Tripoli witnessed the biggest protests against Gaddafi since the onset of uprisings. Gaddafi forces applied live ammunition to disperse the protesters.

June 2011

- **June 1:** NATO announced that the mission in Libya extended for 90 days.
- **June 4:** British apache helicopters struck pro-Gaddafi forces for the first time
- **June 16:** Saif al-Islam declared that his father would agree to an internationally supervised national election. More important, he said, his father would leave if he lost the elections.

Anti-Gaddafi forces rejected that offer.

- **June 27:** ICC issued arrest warrant for Col Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam and Abdullah Senussi, the Chief of Intelligence.
- **June 29:** France admitted arming the anti-Gaddafi forces and NATO decided to review its conduct of military campaign in Libya after the flagrant defiance of France.

July 2011

- **July 4:** Saif al-Islam talked to France TV TF1 and said they will fight and never surrender.
He also claimed that Gaddafi is ready for elections and ceasefire but the other side rejects.
- **July 13:** Human Rights Watch stated that anti-Gaddafi forces burned and looted some medical facilities, shops and homes.
- **July 15:** Libyan contact group formally recognized NTC as the legitimate government of Libya.
- **July 16:** US and Gaddafi government held first face to face talk in Tunisia.
There was no point agreed by both sides.
- **July 18:** Anti-Gaddafi forces achieved significant success in the oil town Brega after heavy NATO air bombardment.
- **July 21:** Anti-Gaddafi forces made important advances in Zintan against the pro-Gaddafi forces.
- **July 25:** British Foreign Secretary Hague and chief of NTC Abdeljalil stated that Gaddafi and his family could stay in Libya if they relinquished their power.

- **July 28:** The military leader of anti-Gaddafi forces Abdul Fattah Younis Al-Obeidi was killed.

August 2011

- **August 1:** Anti-Gaddafi forces entered western town Zliten after about two months struggle with Gaddafi forces.
- **August 3:** Saif Al-Islam said in an interview anti-Gaddafi forces were backed by radical Islamists. Thus, if Gaddafi fell, there would be an Islamic state in Libya.
- **August 8:** NTC chief Abdeljalil dissolved the executive board of NTC and asked head of executive board Mahmoud Jibril to redesign.
- **August 14:** Anti-Gaddafi forces made significant achievement against the pro-Gaddafi forces on the way of Tripoli. They controlled large part of the city Zawiyah just near 50 kilometres on the west of Tripoli.
- **August 15:** Gaddafi talked over phone to his supporters and called them “get ready for fight to escape Libya from traitors and NATO.”
- **August 17:** Libya’s the biggest oil refinery Zawiyah fell to anti-Gaddafi forces.
- **August 20:** Anti-Gaddafi forces surrendered Tripoli from west (Zawiyah), south (Al-Gharyan) and east (Misrata). NATO air bombardment continued to support that move.
- **August 21:** Anti-Gaddafi forces entered capital Tripoli. Gaddafi called the forces as rats and called his supporters to fight with him until end.
- **August 23:** Saif Al-Islam reappeared in public at Tripoli and called his supporters to fight.

- **August 24:** Anti-Gaddafi forces entered stronghold of Gaddafi forces Bab al-Aziziya compound.

Gaddafi published an audio record and explained his retreat as a tactical move.

- **August 25:** Gaddafi published another audio record. He told his supporters “Do not leave Tripoli to these rats. Destroy them with no mercy.”

- **August 26:** NTC announced that they will move their government from Benghazi to Tripoli.

Anti-Gaddafi forces advanced towards the hometown of Gaddafi Sirte.

- **August 29:** Gaddafi’s wife, daughter and two sons crossed neighbouring Algeria.

September 2011

- **September 1:** NTC and world leaders met in Paris to discuss the post-Gaddafi term. Eyewitnesses declared that Col Gaddafi left Tripoli with his long convoy.

Col Gaddafi said he was ready for a long fight in an audio message and called Sirte as “the capital of resistance”.

- **September 8:** Gaddafi sent a defiant message from hiding. He called his supporters to fight and never to leave Libya.
- **September 10:** Gaddafi’s son Sadi fled to Niger.
- **September 12:** The chief of NTC Abdeljalil talked the public in Tripoli. He said there would be no place for any extremist ideology in Libya. In addition, he emphasized the role women in revolution.

- **September 15:** British PM Cameron and French President Sarkozy visited NTC leader Abdeljalil in Tripoli. The both leaders claimed that the Arab spring could become an Arab summer with the advent of democracy.
- **September 16:** Anti-Gaddafi forces involved in heavy fighting in Sirte with pro-Gaddafi forces.
UN general assembly approved giving Libyan seat to NTC officially.
- **September 20:** US President Obama congratulated the Libyan people for ousting Col Gaddafi, and he exemplified the NATO mission in Libya as role model of international action.
Gaddafi taunted NATO intervention in Libya in a voice record.
- **September 21:** The fighting continued in Sirte and Bani Walid.
NATO announced to extend its mission Libya as long as necessary but also to terminate as soon as possible.

October 2011

- **October 4:** Heavy fighting continued in the stronghold of pro-Gaddafi city Sirte.
- **October 6:** Colonel Gaddafi made a recording in which he urged his supporters to fight. He also warned developing world to face same faith like Libya because of their support towards NTC and NATO.
- **October 12:** NTC forces declared more than 80% of Sirte was controlled by their forces.

In addition, Col Gaddafi's son Moatassim was captured while he was trying to flee from Sirte.

- **October 17:** Gaddafi stronghold town Bani Walid fell to full control of NTC forces.
- **October 20:** Col Gaddafi was captured and killed by armed groups in Sirte.
- **October 23:** The executive leader of NTC Mahmoud Jibril announced official liberation of Libya from the Gaddafi regime.
- **October 27:** UN Security Council unanimously voted to end no-fly zone in Libya starting from October 31.
- **October 31:** NATO announced the end of operation in Libya

Appendix C: Interview Process

In this appendix, I explain my interview process to demonstrate how I collected data to supplement the secondary sources. As I stated in Chapter IV, during my fieldwork in Tunisia, I met with several elite actors and eyewitness experts. I could not accomplish the same tasks in Libya because of security concerns; however, I found some former Libyan military officers and experts who experienced the 2011 uprisings at first hand and were living in the United Kingdom and Europe at the time of the study. I also interviewed former Tunisian politicians, notable civil society managers, and military insiders, who also lived in Europe, by Skype and phone.

Prior to my fieldwork, I interviewed experts to get insight into the role of the military during the Arab uprisings. This insight helped me develop appropriate questions for the elites I would later interview. I selected expert interviewees using the following criteria. First, they had to have knowledge about civil-military relations. Second, they had to have knowledge about the Tunisian and Libyan uprisings. Third, the expert interviewees had to have been in Libya and Tunisia many times for academic research. Ultimately, I chose my expert interviewees according to their areas of speciality that were relevant to my research area. I assessed their relevance and expertise by reviewing their publications. In total, I interviewed ten prominent experts from different countries and different backgrounds.

I selected my interview questions by identifying the inquiries to which I could not find answers using secondary sources. The interviews helped me to fill any gaps in the information I had collected thus far. I adapted my interview questions based on my interviewees' expertise, and I used a semi-structured interview technique. In some cases, I asked similar questions of multiple interviewees to conduct a crosschecking analysis.

Once I completed the interviews, I had the data transcribed. I analysed the interview transcripts to reach an analytical review of the experts' insights. Accordingly, I have drawn my own conclusions and arguments from the expert interviewees.

Table I: List of Experts Interviewed

Name	Affiliation	Area speciality
Dirk Vandewalle	Dartmouth College	Libya
Michael Willis	University of Oxford	Tunisia
George Joffe	University of Cambridge	Libya
Zoltan Barany	University of Texas, Austin	Military politics and revolution
Alison Pargeter	Royal United Services Institute	Libya
Gilbert Achcar	School of Oriental and African Studies, London	Middle East and North Africa
Derek Lutterbeck	Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta	Civil-military relations
Robert Springborg	King's College London	Civil-military relations and the Middle East
Jason Pack	University of Cambridge	Libya
Alex Warren	Frontier	Middle East and North Africa

After getting insight from the experts, I began interviewing members of the Tunisian elite in Tunisia and Europe who were (or had been) involved in the state's military, politics, or civil protests. The expert interviewees helped me to reach many of these respondents. As I stated in Chapter IV, some of the elites had great knowledge, but not high positions. I still categorized them as elites, though, due to their key roles and significant insights about the uprisings. The criteria for the selection of elite interviewees were that my research subject and my contributing

factors that I examine in this study. I state the names below who allowed me to reveal their names.

I utilized a semi-structured interview technique when interviewing the elites. I selected my questions for these interviews based on each respondent's position and expertise, as well as the gaps in my data after my review of secondary sources and expert interviews. During these meetings, I asked more advanced and imprecise questions to clarify the unanswered points in my research. In total, I interviewed 22 elites, which was very close to my goal of interviewing 25 respondents. The expert and elite interviews provided me with a wealth of useful data.

Table II: List of Elites Interviewed

Name	Affiliation	Interview location
Ahmed Chabir	Tunisian Chief of the Military Intelligence (2010-2012)	Tunis, Tunisia
Mokhtar Ben Nasr	Spokesman of the Tunisian Ministry of Defence (2011-2013)	Tunis, Tunisia
Tunisian military insider (Tunisian Air Forces)	Used to serve at the Carthage Airport where Ben Ali used for fleeing (Active)	Tunis, Tunisia
Tunisian military insider	Tunisian Military Forces	Lives abroad
Tunisian civilian insider	-	Tunis, Tunisia
Sami Aouadi	UGTT, Executive Member (2009-2011)	Tunis, Tunisia
Civilian insider	Al-Nahda Party (Active)	Lives abroad
Sayida Ounissi	Member on the National Constituent Assembly from Al-Nahda (2014-Present)	Tunis, Tunisia
Adnan Manceur	Advisor to Former President Moncef Marzouki and still active in political party Congress for the Republic (CPR) (2011-Present)	Tunis, Tunisia
Nejib Jeridi	Former staff to the Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi	Tunis, Tunisia

Selim Ben Abdesselem	Former member on the National Constituent Assembly (Ettakatol Party, then Nidaa Tounes, then independent)	Lives abroad
Tarek Kahlaoui	Member of Former President Moncef Marzouki's team	Tunis, Tunisia
Yassine Ayari	Tunisian leading activist in 2010-2011 uprisings	Lives abroad
Kais Saied	Constitutional Law Professor at Tunisian University	Tunis, Tunisia
Sami Brahim	Sociology Researcher at Tunisian Government in 2014	Tunis, Tunisia
Civilian eye witness expert	-	Tunis, Tunisia
Myriam Benghazi	Tunisian Activist in 2010 uprisings	Tunis, Tunisia
Moutia Ayari	Tunisian Activist in 2010 uprisings	Tunis, Tunisia
Mazen Cherif	Security Expert	Tunis, Tunisia
Omar (Libyan military insider)	Libyan Military Forces	Lives abroad
Amen (Libyan military insider)	Libyan Military Forces	Lives abroad
Abdullah (Libyan military insider)	Libyan Military Forces	Lives abroad
