Consciousness Presentation and Shifts in Point of View in Virginia Woolf's Novels —from a Linguistic Perspective

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Abstract

This thesis explores the presentation of consciousness in Virginia Woolf's novels with a particular focus on shifts in narrative point of view. I argue that the linguistic mechanisms triggering or co-occurring with viewpoint shifts are important means of presenting or linguistically capturing the socially-oriented interactive quality of fictional minds, a significant aspect of consciousness presentation that has not been fully explored in either narratological studies of fiction or literary criticism of Virginia Woolf. Aiming for a systematic examination of the linguistic correlates of viewpoint shifts, I conduct detailed stylistic analysis of two of Woolf's most representative stream of consciousness novels, *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*, in which shifts in point of view occur frequently and rapidly. I focus on four crucial linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts: discourse parentheticals, attributing parentheticals, connectives and adjacency pairs. Drawing on findings in linguistics and discourse analysis, I explain how these linguistic indices allow the text to accommodate multiple viewpoints and, more importantly, to convey the inter-subjective connections between different consciousnesses. With these linguistic features linking different viewpoints, the very fabric of the text embodies the social nature of fictional minds and puts into question the assumption of the impenetrable consciousness.

I supplement the examination of linguistic correlates of viewpoint shifts with an empirical study that explores reader responses to shifts in point of view in narrative texts. The results show that the complexity resulting from this narrative technique is not only recognised by scholars working in the fields of literary criticism or narratological studies but can also be perceived by readers who have received no specific training in literary interpretation. Shifts in point of view can cause difficulty for readers in both general comprehension and viewpoint attribution. I propose that the perceived difficulty may direct attention to the juxtaposition of different narrative viewpoints and thus guide readers towards identifying the connections between different minds.

This thesis sets out to be a significant work in both narratological investigation of fictional consciousness and literary studies of Virginia Woolf. From a narratological perspective, it contributes to the study of fictional consciousness by redressing the imbalance between the linguistic investigation of individual consciousness and the linguistic investigation of social minds; meanwhile, it also expands existing theoretical accounts of the linguistic presentation of inter-subjective orientedness of consciousness. From a literary perspective, it brings a fresh insight into Woolf's presentation of consciousness by providing a detailed linguistic account of her narrative techniques and in-depth probing into the nature of consciousness as reflected in her novels.

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Chapter 1 The study of fictional consciousness

1.1 Introduction

The presentation of consciousness has been regarded as one of the most important aspects of fiction. As Dorrit Cohn remarks, 'fictional consciousness is the special preserve of narrative fiction' (1978: vi). This comment is echoed by David Lodge, who states that 'literature is a record of human consciousness, the richest and most comprehensive we have' (2002: 10). The richness and comprehensiveness in the presentation of fictional mental worlds are probably one of the main reasons why narrative texts have attracted the attention of numerous researchers.

What primarily fascinates researchers of fictional consciousness is the problem of rendering consciousness in a third-person context. It is a problem first because of the contradiction between mediation and immediacy. A big challenge for writers of consciousness is to give readers the impression that they are inside a character's mind instead of merely being told about what a character is thinking by an external narrator. No less challenging is the need to reconcile the contradiction between the non-verbal nature of consciousness and the verbal form of narrative. It is generally agreed that consciousness is not a verbal matter, or at least a large part of it is not verbalised or even verbalisable. However, writers can only present consciousness through words on the page. Thus how writers manage to overcome the difficulties and create the illusion of consciousness becomes an initial focus of enquiry for researchers. What further

increases the challenge for writers is the complexity of consciousness. On the one hand, mental functioning occurs at various levels of conscious awareness. It ranges from the most inchoate unconscious inner states to the most heightened reflective thoughts. On the other hand, consciousness contains both the introspective private aspect and the socially-oriented public aspect. How narrative texts convey such complexity of consciousness is a further question to be answered.

Traditional narratological studies of fictional consciousness (Brinton, 1980; Cohn, 1978; Fludernik, 1993; Humphrey, 1954; Leech & Short, 2007[1981]) have developed from the preliminary exploration of narrative techniques used for presenting the private flux of inner experience to the fine-grained distinction of various narrative modes which serve to portray consciousness at different levels of awareness. These studies help us better understand the construction of fictional minds on the linguistic plane of narrative texts, but their focus is mainly set on the portrayal of individual consciousness. A group of researchers who approach fictional minds from a cognitive narratological perspective (see Butte, 2004; Palmer, 2004, 2005, 2010) start a new phase of investigation by moving beyond the presentation of individual consciousness to examine how narrative texts present consciousness as engaged in its social environments. Their research draws on theories from neuroscience, psycholinguistics, psychology and philosophy of mind, but they do not concern themselves with the linguistic details of texts. Therefore, the linguistic mechanism for the presentation of the social aspects of consciousness is left unexplored.

This thesis sets out to explore this under-developed field. I propose to investigate the linguistic presentation of the social nature of fictional minds by focusing on a particular narrative technique that becomes prominent in the Modernist presentation of consciousness—shifts in point of view. But before I explain why this narrative technique offers a good start to explore how narrative texts present the socially-oriented nature of consciousness, the following sections will first provide a review of previous studies of consciousness presentation. The aim of this review is threefold: to identify the limitations of previous studies that lead to the current research gap; to highlight the achievements that can aid the present investigation; and to elucidate how the present investigation both builds on, and departs from, previous achievements.

1.2 Consciousness as a private stream

Early scholars approach fictional consciousness by concentrating on stream-of-consciousness writing (Edel, 1955; Friedman, 1955; Humphrey, 1954). Stream of consciousness is a term coined by William James to refer to the continuous flow of thoughts and impressions through the mind. Despite his deep insight into the nature of individual consciousness, James holds a rather constrained view on the relationship between different consciousnesses. When discussing the possibility of connection between the "streams" which belong to different individuals, he states:

> The only states of consciousness that we naturally deal with are found in personal consciousnesses, minds, selves, concrete particular I's and

> you's […] Neither contemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor similarity of quality and content are able to fuse thoughts together which are sundered by this barrier of belonging to different personal minds. (James, 2007 [1890]: 226)

Thus, for James, consciousness is isolated and private. It seems that borrowing James's terminology also entails his emphasis on the private nature of consciousness, as many researchers are interested in finding out how writers manage to communicate to readers the private non-communicative states of consciousness. Robert Humphrey, a forerunner in the study of stream-of-consciousness novels, points out the following challenge facing writers:

> What, then, are the essential problems of depicting consciousness in fiction? There are two orders of them and both come from the nature of consciousness itself. First, a particular consciousness, we assume, is a private thing; and second, consciousness is never static but is always in a state of motion. […]
>
> The greatest problem of the stream-of-consciousness writer is to capture the irrational and incoherent quality of private unuttered consciousness and in doing so still to communicate to his readers.
>
> (Humphrey, 1954: 42, 62)

The assumption of the privacy of consciousness underpins his investigation. In his study, Humphrey tries to identify the devices that writers employ to create the illusion of a private consciousness. The identified devices include: the application of the principle of free association, usually without

making the relationship of association explicit; using space-time montage to create an impression of the fluidity of consciousness; the use of rhetorical figures such as repetition, ellipsis, anacoluthon and parenthesis to represent discontinuity and compression of thought in order to indicate the incoherent, disjointed texture of consciousness; and using images and symbols to suggest multiple levels of meaning beyond the power of denotative meaning (Humphrey, 1954). The identification of these devices illuminates how the private aspect of consciousness is presented, but the preconceived notion of the privacy of consciousness prevents Humphrey from taking heed of the complexity involved in the interconnections between different consciousnesses.

1.3 Taxonomies of consciousness presentation modes

Researchers advance from those early studies by providing taxonomies of narrative modes for rendering consciousness. The primary concern of their investigation is no longer the presentation of the privacy of consciousness. Rather, they aim at a comprehensive view of the ways in which consciousness can be portrayed. Their studies delineate various methods for depicting not just the irrational and incoherent quality of consciousness but consciousness at different levels of awareness.

A seminal study in this respect is provided by Cohn (1978), who puts forward a tripartite model of consciousness presentation. In contrast with the literary take on fictional minds in early studies which yields little clarity concerning the formal devices, Cohn (1978) supplies clear grammatical and lexical criteria for her taxonomy. She distinguishes the following three


narrative modes: psycho-narration, quoted monologue and narrated monologue.[1] *Psycho-narration* is defined by her as 'the narrator's discourse about a character's consciousness', which is signalled by the use of mental verbs, nouns of consciousness or phrases denoting inner happenings (Cohn, 1978: 14, 30). It is considered to be an indirect mode for rendering a character's mental world, since it does not evoke the syntax or reveal any detailed content of the figural mind. In comparison with psycho-narration, *quoted monologue* (or what is generally called *interior monologue*) renders consciousness in an immediate manner. Grammatically, this mode refers to the thinking self in the first-person pronoun and refers to the narrated moment in present tense. And it retains the character's idiom and syntax. Thus the deictic and evaluative systems in this mode are entirely character-oriented. *Narrated monologue* is considered to be in a midway position between quoted monologue and psycho-narration. Like psycho-narration, it uses the third-person reference to refer to the thinking self and the past tense to refer to the narrated moment, but it aligns all other deictic references with the character and also includes the character's idiom and syntax as the mode of quoted monologue does. Due to the mixture of features of both quoted monologue and psycho-narration, it 'render[s] the content of a figural mind more obliquely than the former, and more directly than the latter' (Cohn, 1978: 105). The distinction of these three modes shows how narrative texts can depict consciousness with different degrees of directness or detailedness.

[1] Cohn (1978) investigates different narrative modes in both first-person and third-person narratives. Here I only concentrate on the third-person narrative context.

Cohn elaborates the preliminary grammatical and lexical distinction by discussing the variation of semantic effects produced by different modes. She attempts to draw a connection between the degree of immediacy in different modes and the levels of consciousness represented. While admitting that actual narrative texts would be more complex, she states:

> Most generally, one can say that the more direct the technique, the more evidently verbal the activity of the mind, and therefore the more clearly conscious the mind that is exposed. (Cohn, 1978: 139)

Turned into a diagram, this relationship would look like the following:



(adapted from Cohn, 1978: 140)

Cohn's examination of the above relationship is of great value in that it reveals the potential capacity of each mode to depict consciousness ranging from the unconscious to the most conscious level, but her generalisation of this relationship also has limitations. I will start from the merits of her account.

Psycho-narration is generally treated simply as narratorial mediation. For instance, Semino & Short (2004: 46, 229) and Short (2007: 235) isolate the category of Internal Narration (the narrator's reports of a character's emotive and cognitive experience), which can be seen as a subcategory of psycho-narration, but they eventually exclude this mode from their typology of thought

presentation modes and take it as a part of pure narration. Toolan (2001 [1988]: 119) also proposes the same treatment of this mode. Unlike these researchers, Cohn (1978) refines the general treatment of this narrative mode by dividing it into two types: dissonant and consonant. According to her, the former is 'dominated by a prominent narrator who, even as he focuses intently on an individual psyche, remains emphatically distanced from the consciousness he narrates', whereas the latter is 'mediated by a narrator who remains effaced and who readily fuses with the consciousness he narrates' (Cohn, 1978: 26). It is consonant psycho-narration that functions as an important mode for rendering figural subjectivity. Whereas psycho-narration does not evoke the idiom or syntax of a character's thoughts, Cohn states, this mode can penetrate the 'subliminal zones of the mind' and capture 'those levels of consciousness that cannot be clearly shaped into verbal patterns by the fictional mind itself' (1978: 29). By acknowledging that psycho-narration establishes figural subjectivity through its rendering of the lower levels of awareness of a character's mind, Cohn provides a more apposite account for the significance of this narrative mode to the presentation of consciousness than those who treat it indiscriminately as narratorial mediation.

Cohn's (1978) account of narrated monologue is also more flexible than those confining this narrative mode to the presentation of verbal thought (see Genette, 1980 [1972]; Leech & Short, 2007 [1981], and Vandelanotte, 2009). She states that narrated monologue renders the content of a character's consciousness *as if* this character is formulating his or her thought in a verbal manner; however, as she points out, 'the words on the page are not identified as

words running through [the character's] mind' (1978: 103). Cohn suggests that it is just the ambiguous relationship between words and thoughts rendered in narrated monologue that endows this mode with a special virtue in the presentation of consciousness:

> By leaving the relationship between words and thoughts latent, the narrated monologue casts a peculiarly penumbral light on the figural consciousness, suspending it on the threshold of verbalization in a manner that cannot be achieved by direct quotation. (1978: 103).

Whereas Cohn's generalisation of the interrelationship among the directness of the narrative modes, the degree of verbality and the levels of consciousness that are represented accounts well for the functions of psycho-narration and narrated monologue, it shows a rather restricted view on the function of quoted monologue by suggesting that this mode renders highly conscious verbal mental activities. Édouard Dujardin, who is generally acknowledged as the first writer to use this mode to present consciousness in narratives, defined it as follows:

> The internal monologue, in its nature of the order of poetry, is that unheard and unspoken speech by which a character expresses *his inmost thoughts, those lying nearest the unconscious*, without regard to logical organization—that is, in their original state—by means of direct sentences reduced to syntactic minimum, and in such a way as to give the impression of reproducing the thoughts just as they come into the mind. (translated version, quoted from Edel, 1955: 54; my emphasis)

Therefore, for Dujardin, quoted monologue is used for presenting the unconscious inchoate mental states.

Dujardin's intuitive delineation of the function of this narrative mode is consolidated by stylistic evidence. Liisa Dahl (1970a, b) identifies a series of deviant syntax and lexis characteristic of the Modernist use of quoted monologue, including multiple negation, the fronting of the sentence object, the fronting of the adverb, the use of nominal sentences, the dropping of personal pronouns in the subject position, onomatopoeia, free combinations of words, broken words, and the change of parts of speech. According to her, these features create the impression of free associations of ideas that usually occur more quickly than coherent verbalisation could take place. Similarly, Vladimir Tumanov (1997) also notes the frequent occurrences in texts of quoted monologue of "sloppy" syntax, the omission of sentence elements, ambiguous reference and private reference. For him, these linguistic features convey a sense of spontaneity and unplannedness and thus help to create an illusion of a character's inner speech. The breaking of the syntactic and lexical conventions in quoted monologue renders problematic Cohn's interpretation that this narrative mode presents the conscious verbal inner speech of a character.

What further complicates the delineation of quoted monologue's function is that Cohn's view seems to be supported by other scholars: Semino & Short (2004: 118) and Rundquist (2014: 162), for instance, point out that the characters appear to be mentally articulating their thoughts in texts of

quoted/interior monologue. And Leech & Short explain the effect of this mode in the following way, which is not dissimilar to Cohn's view:

> in DT and FDT authorial intervention appears minimal; but as the result is effectively a monologue, with the character 'talking' to himself, the thoughts he produces acquire a conscious quality (2007 [1981]: 274)

Sotirova's (2013: 42-43) analysis sheds new light on this theoretical discrepancy regarding the semantic effects of quoted monologue. She points out that Cohn's restricted view on the function of quoted monologue results from the fact that she takes the direct mode of thought presentation in pre-Realist and Realist fiction and the direct mode used in the Joycean fashion as the same type except identifying only the graphological differences (*inquit* formulas and quotation marks are used in the former and absent in the latter). But in fact, as Sotirova proceeds to argue, these two direct modes are of different origins and serve different purposes. She proposes to distinguish the Joycean use of interior monologue from the traditional mode of quoted thought. According to Sotirova, quoted thought belongs to the pre-nineteenth century narrative writing, which serves to 'give a more direct access to a character's thoughts than the narrator's summary' but is associated with 'an element of dramatic posing' (2013: 43). On the other hand, interior monologue is a later form of consciousness presentation, which 'emerges as a natural disintegration of *free indirect style* into forms that erase completely the voice of the narrator' and usually exhibits 'a degree of grammatical incoherence and incompleteness that qualifies it as a transcription of the stream of consciousness' (Sotirova, 2013: 46, 48). The need to differentiate these two types of direct modes in

order to account for their functions and effects indicates that the categorisation of different narrative modes is not as crude as Cohn suggests.

Apart from the variation within the mode of quoted monologue that is not clearly reflected in Cohn's categorisation, researchers have also found that there are a number of intermediary narrative modes that cannot easily fit into the tripartite model. Thus many researchers (see McHale, 1978; Leech & Short, 2007 [1981]; Rimmon-Kenan, 1983) propose a scale model in order to accommodate more easily those intermediary categories. Leech & Short's (2007 [1981]) model is a representative one in this regard. Their model is further augmented and revised by Short, et al. (1996), Semino, et al. (1997), Semino & Short (2004) and Short (2007). In the fully developed model, six modes for presenting a character's thoughts are identified and placed on a cline according to the degrees of narratorial intervention or character autonomy, and the cline of thought presentation runs in parallel with a cline that includes six formally corresponding modes for speech presentation:

Speech presentation:	[N]	NV	NRSA	IS	FIS	DS	(FDS)
Thought presentation:	[N]	NI	NRTA	IT	FIT	DT	(FDT)

N: Narration

NV: Narrator's Presentation of Voice	NI: Narration of Internal States/ Internal Narration
NRSA: Narrator's Report of Speech Act	NRTA: Narrator's Report of Thought Act
IS: Indirect Speech	IT: Indirect Thought
FIS: Free Indirect Speech	FIT: Free Indirect Thought
DS: Direct Speech	DT: Direct Thought
FDS: Free Direct Speech	FDT: Free Direct Thought

(adapted from Semino & Short, 2004: 49)

This model exhibits a more fine-grained categorisation of narrative modes, which allows for a more accurate description of formal variations. FIT equals the mode of narrated monologue in Cohn's categorisation. Cohn's category of quoted monologue is divided into DT and FDT. However, the distinction of these two modes is still mainly based on graphological difference: FDT is DT minus the *inquit* tags and quotation marks. Short (2007: 233) speculates that FDT without quotation marks might be used for pragmatic reasons to distinguish speech quotation from thought presentation and that DT with quotation marks is sometimes used to 'signal very dramatic internal effects'. But other than these speculations, he does not pursue further the differences between these two modes regarding their historical origin and their functions in presenting consciousness. The mode of psycho-narration in Cohn's categorisation is divided into NI, NRTA and IT in this model. But again the distinguishing signals are mainly syntactic and lexical features: IT has the formula of a verb of thought plus complementiser plus a subordinating clause; and NRTA is signalled by verbs indicating thought act. NI is not strictly distinguished based on syntactic or lexical criteria, but expressions indicating cognitive or emotive experience usually signal this mode. On the whole, the main reliance on syntactic and lexical features to distinguish different modes indicates that these modes are treated as sentential units instead of functional units for consciousness presentation.

It is true that Leech & Short (2007 [1981]) enrich the linguistic delineation of these modes by adding the dimension of narratorial mediation to the cline of formal variation. According to them, the categories placed towards the right

end of the cline present a character's speech and thought in a more mimetic manner; whereas those placed towards the left end display more of the narrator's mediation. However, the degree of narratorial mediation in each mode does not always correspond to their position on the cline. For instance, the category of NI is placed towards the left end of the cline, which means that the narratorial intervention is prominent. But as can be seen from Cohn's (1978) analysis, this mode can strongly evoke figural subjectivity albeit that, as a mode for presenting the non-verbal mental activities of a character, it does not have a mimetic effect. And Sotirova (in press (a)) also points out that NI is not necessarily narratorial just because a character is unlikely to verbalise his or her inner states as thought. Fludernik, after noting the frequent involvement of expressive elements in this mode, points out that such instances 'argue against a characteristic of decreasing mimesis towards the "top" of the scale which is occupied by (authorial) speech and thought representation' (1993: 297). Therefore, a single linear cline cannot fully account for the interrelation between the linguistic properties of each mode and their textual functions.

Another problem with this scale model arises out of the paralleled clines of speech and thought presentation. The separation of these two clines by Leech & Short (2007 [1981]) and Semino & Short (2004) highlights their awareness of the differences in the presentation of speech and thought. However, placing the two clines in parallel also seems to suggest an underlying assumption that there is a correspondence between the ways in which speech and thought can be presented respectively. In other words, thoughts are treated as a verbal form. The problem of treating thought presentation modes on a par with speech

presentation modes has been pointed out by Fludernik, who stresses that consciousness is 'not exclusively a verbal domain' (1993: 304). Palmer (2002: 32; 2011: 207) also takes issue with the tendency to treat thoughts as merely inner speech, and he argues that verbalised mental discourse comprises only a small proportion of mind. Seen in this light, this scale model shows a restricted view of figural thoughts.

Disregarding the limitation of treating thoughts as inner speech, this scale model can indeed better accommodate those intermediary categories by viewing speech and thought presentation not as discrete categories but as a clinal phenomenon. Taking a corpus approach to speech and thought presentation, Short et al. (1996), Semino et al. (1997) and Semino & Short (2004) have found cases in which a sentence is ambiguous between different modes either on the same cline (for example, IT-FIT, FIT-FDT, NI-FIT and N-FIT) or across different clines (for example, FIS-FIT, FDS-FDT). Semino & Short (2004) divide these cases into two groups: one group involves cases of ambiguities between non-adjacent categories on the clines, and the other involves cases of ambiguities between adjacent categories on each cline. They claim that the cases of ambiguities in the first group result from different possible interpretations of the text and its text world, that is, whether to interpret a stretch of text as part of the narrator's discourse or as some form of speech and thought presentation, and thus do not put into question the validity of the scale model (2004: 197). The cases of ambiguities in the second group on the other hand, according to them, just lend support to the scalar approach to speech and thought presentation (2004: 197). We can see that their discussion

of these ambiguous cases again shows that they determine the mode of speech and thought presentation on a sentence basis. That Semino & Short (2004: 153) take those cases of ambiguity as 'specific phenomena' seems to indicate an underlying assumption that each sentence should correspond to one particular narrative mode. It is understandable that the construction of a corpus for the study of speech and thought presentation would require the tagging of each sentence. But confining the examination of presentation modes to sentential units leads to further restrictions to the investigation of consciousness presentation in general, which I will discuss later in this section.

While Semino & Short (2004) claim that the existence of intermediary categories of speech and thought presentation lends support to the scale model, it is those ambiguous categories that prompt Fludernik (1993) to come up with the following multi-category and multi-level model which involves nearly thirty different modes:

(A) **Pure narrative**— action, background description plus evaluative commentary by the narrator

(B) **Narrated perception**— description replaced by evocation of character's perception

(C) **Speech report/ psycho-narration**— the narrative's (frequently evaluative) rendering of utterances or feelings/thought processes

Intermediary forms between (A), (B), (C) and (D):

- narration with expressive elements
- *he hoped that; he supposed that*
- ambiguous sentences (between free indirect discourse and narrative)

- narrated perception turning into free indirect discourse

(D) Free indirect discourse

Intermediary forms between (D) and (E):

- indirect discourse continued by free indirect discourse
- indirect discourse without complementizer
- free indirect discourse with parenthetical
- indirect discourse with expressive elements
- *she asked would he come* (indirect question with inversion)
- German 'free' subjunctive form of indirect discourse

(E) Indirect discourse

Intermediary forms between (A), (B), (C) and (E):

- *that*-clause with perlocutionary verb
- description of illocutionary speech acts
- indirect discourse with consciousness verbs
- free indirect discourse with parenthetical

Intermediary forms between (D) and (F):

- ambiguous forms in first person present tense narrative
- free indirect discourse with unshifted tense/ pronouns
- incomplete sentences
- interjections

Intermediary forms between (E) and (F)

- 'slipping'
- indirect discourse without complementizer

Intermediary forms between (A), (D), and (F)

- sentences with non-finite verb forms
- verbless sentences
- exclamations
- gnomic present tense clauses

(F) Direct discourse (quoted and unquoted)

(Fludernik, 1993: 305)

Fludernik isolates these categories based less on formal criteria than on their textual functions and effects. Through an examination of a great number of texts, she notes that expressive elements can be contained in any forms of speech and thought presentation and even in sentences of narration, which can result in cases of ambiguities where a sentence can be classed as several modes just as listed above. Such cases would not be easily placed on a definite point on the clines of speech and thought presentation in the scale model. More importantly, the involvement of expressive elements can affect the mimetic effects created by different modes. Thus even those modes that are assumed to show more of the narratorial mediation may turn out to evoke figural subjectivity more strongly than those that are assumed to show more of character autonomy. Such complexity in the interrelation between formal features and textual effects puts into question the adequacy of a 'neat diegesis versus mimesis cline' (Fludernik, 1993: 286).

Fludernik's model is valuable in that it acknowledges the complexity of narrative texts and that it identifies different narrative modes according to their textual effects instead of mere formal criteria. Based on the evidence of large amounts of data, she shows forcefully that a cline of syntactic gradation or

purely formal variation cannot sufficiently deal with the non-formal textual effects such as faithfulness, directness, narrative empathy and irony. However, her discussion of the intermediary forms of speech and consciousness presentation also exposes the tendency to treat the presentation of speech and consciousness on a sentence basis. We can see that Fludernik's cases of ambiguity are often the result of sentences displaying features of two or more different modes.

As can be seen from the above survey of different models, the continued refinement of taxonomies indeed increases the accuracy of description of consciousness presentation techniques. A tripartite model would not have been able to fully register the complexity in the presentation methods and the nuances in textual effects. But at the same time, the tendency to view consciousness presentation modes on a sentence basis also becomes increasingly obvious along with the refining of existing models. Underlying different typologies of consciousness presentation modes seems to be a presumption that each sentence should correspond to one particular narrative mode. In fact, different modes of presentation are not necessarily divided by sentence boundaries. Sotirova (2013: 32; in press (a)) points out that consciousness presentation in the Modernist period displays a syntactic fusion of narrative modes. In other words, there can be free transitions between different modes even within a single sentence. That the fusion becomes prominent in the Modernist period, a time when narrative fiction is said to take an 'inward turn' (Kahler, 1973: 5; see also Edel, 1954: xi; Mahaffey, 2013: 36),

seems to indicate that this stylistic practice has a particular significance for the presentation of consciousness. As Sotirova (in press (a)) argues, the conflating of different modes of consciousness presentation manifests the Modernist attempt to break the constraints of 'the linearity and coherence of syntactic and discourse composition', the aesthetic aim of which is the achievement of verisimilitude of consciousness presentation by capturing simultaneously mental activities running at different levels of conscious awareness. However, the assumption that a particular narrative mode coincides with syntactic boundaries prevents previous researchers from recognising the stylistic effects of fusing different modes within a syntactic unit, as they tend to dismiss such fusions as exceptional, anomalous or marginal cases.

In the meanwhile, the sentence-based approach can easily result in the isolation of a certain presentation mode from its context. Consequently, how sentences of different narrative modes interact with one another does not receive enough attention. The restricted examination of sentential units out of context and the study of different presentation modes in isolation further lead to a reductive account of the effects created by different modes. For instance, psycho-narration or Internal Narration is considered as a mode which indicates the narrator's intervention. However, when this mode is used in a stretch of text in which the character's subjectivity is dominant, the narrator's intervention is much less noticeable. And Ehrlich (1990) explicitly points out the inadequacy of the sentence-based approach in accounting for point of view expressed in the free indirect mode. In her study, she shows that a sentence without any explicit markers of subjectivity can still be interpreted as evoking a

figural point of view when it is discoursally linked to a sentence that is clearly rooted in a character's consciousness. Her study strongly indicates that a discourse-based approach is needed in the study of consciousness presentation modes.

The most serious consequence of the sentence-based approach is that it tends to restrict the scope of investigation to individual consciousness. While studies reviewed in this section never emphasise the private nature of consciousness as those early researchers of stream-of-consciousness writing did, the focus on individual sentences easily limits the analysis to the portrayal of an individual mind, because it is often the case that an individual sentence presents the consciousness of only one character. Due to the constraints of the sentential approach, how narratives present multiple consciousnesses and especially the relationship between different consciousnesses is very likely to be overlooked. The restricted focus of investigation on individual consciousness is what makes Palmer criticise traditional narratological studies of fictional minds. He argues that these studies take only an 'internalist perspective' that 'stresses those aspects [of consciousness] that are inner, passive, introspective and individual' (2010: 39). I agree with Palmer that consciousness also contains those aspects that are social, public and interactive. How the socially-oriented interactive nature of consciousness is presented is under-explored in these taxonomic studies and needs further systematic investigation.

1.4 Free indirect style, the duality of viewpoints and multiple consciousnesses

By far, the most problematic narrative mode identified in previous studies of consciousness presentation has been *free indirect style*, the umbrella term that subsumes Cohn's (1966, 1978) category of *narrated monologue*, Free Indirect Speech/Thought in Leech & Short's (2007 [1981]) model and Free Indirect Discourse in Fludernik's (1993) categorisation as well as a list of other synonymous terms such as *style indirect libre* (Bally, 1912a, b), *erlebte Rede* (Lorck, 1921), quasi-direct discourse (Bakhtin, 1981 [1934-35]; Vološinov, 1973 [1929]), indirect interior monologue (Humphrey, 1954), substitutionary narration (Hernadi, 1972), represented speech and thought (Banfield, 1973, 1978, 1982), represented perception (Brinton, 1980) and empathetic narrative (Adamson 1994a, b). I adopt this umbrella term for the following reasons. First, as a term for the discussion of consciousness presentation, the word *style* does not carry the sense of verbality as the word *monologue* or *discourse* does. Second, unlike *thought* or *perception*, which designates only part of consciousness, the more general term does not suggest a restricted scope of investigation.[2] Free indirect style is a problematic mode because its linguistic makeup indicates that it accommodates two deictic systems: one belonging to the narrator and one belonging to the character. This peculiar feature has attracted the attention of numerous scholars ever since this presentation mode

[2] Adopting the categorisation proposed by Sotirova (2013) and Rundquist (2014), I take *free indirect style* as an overarching mode that includes three subcategories: (consonant) psycho-narration, represented perception and free indirect thought. These three subcategories share similar kinds of linguistic indices, but they present consciousness at different levels of awareness. Psycho-narration and represented perception render a character's inner states that are not necessarily articulated in his or her head; whereas free indirect thought tends to be used to present a character's more reflective and formulated thoughts.

was first identified around the turn of the twentieth century (see Pascal (1977) and Ginsburg (1982) for an overview of the early studies of free indirect style), and it has also given rise to the long-standing single vs. dual voice debate concerning the attribution of point of view in this mode. This section reviews the arguments of both sides of this debate. Although this debate is primarily concerned with the place of the narrator in relation to the character's voice in the mode of free indirect style, it has important implications for the current investigation, which is more interested in the presentation of characters' consciousnesses alone.

A strong advocate for the single-voice interpretation of free indirect style is Banfield (1973, 1978, 1982), who argues that this mode stems solely from the figural point of view as there is no linguistic evidence of the narrator's voice. The development of her argument starts with a comparison between direct speech and indirect speech under the framework of generative grammar. Through this comparison, Banfield isolates the following list of expressive elements which are allowed in the direct mode but banned from the indirect mode:

> (i) sentences which have undergone 'last-cyclic' or 'root' transformation, i.e. rules which apply only in independent clauses; (ii) certain 'expressive' elements and construction; (iii) 'incomplete' sentences, which can be nonetheless well-formed parts of an appropriate discourse; (iv) subjectless imperatives; (v) direct address or 'vocative' noun phrases; (vi) sentences differing in dialect or language

> from the introductory clause; and (vii) sentence adverbials predicated on the *I-you* relation ('addressee-oriented adverbs') (1982: 28)

For Banfield, these elements are markers of subjectivity (1982: 24). Free indirect style, according to her, contains some of these expressive features, and thus it is distinct from indirect speech, but at the same time, it is also different from direct speech, as it disallows the following features of the direct mode:

> (i) deleted (non-infinitival) or subjectless imperatives with an underlying *you*; (ii) direct address; (iii) indications of pronunciation; (iv) addressee-oriented sentence adverbials; (v) the present tense; (vi) the second person (Banfield, 1982: 113-121)

In her view, these features are associated with the communicative function of language, the essential of which is the *I-you* relationship. That free indirect style bans all markers of the communicative situation indicates, according to her, that this mode is not a form of communication, and thus there is no need to posit a speaker/narrator in it. And she introduces a new concept, SELF, to which all the expressive elements allowed in free indirect style are to be attributed. Therefore, in Banfield's paradigm, free indirect style embodies subjectivity but does not communicate it to anyone.

Banfield's rigorous syntactic analysis provides a thorough linguistic account of how free indirect style presents figural subjectivity. However, her exclusive reliance on syntactic criteria in the interpretation of point of view expressed in free indirect style leads to the neglect of contextual and pragmatic factors, which puts into question the credibility of not only her interpretation of

certain sentences of free indirect style but also her judgment of the acceptability of all types of discourse that she uses to support her argument. We can see again the tendency to take a sentence-based approach to speech and thought presentation, and this tendency limits Banfield's (1973, 1978, 1982) analysis of free indirect style to its formal properties only. Consequently, the sentential view prevents her from predicting, or makes it easier for her to dismiss, the possibility that the context of a sentence of free indirect style can evoke a different voice. Moshe Ron, who takes free indirect style as a type of 'embedded discourse', criticises Banfield as well as those who take similar syntactic approaches to free indirect style for the 'imposition of speakerlessness by force of either descriptive or prescriptive grammatical legislation' without acknowledging its framing context (1981: 18, 25). Brian McHale (1983) also points out that the neglect of context is one of the major problems that undermine the validity of Banfield's entire paradigm of speakerless sentences. Regarding in particular Banfield's argument that a sentence of free indirect style can only express one voice or one subjectivity, he raises counter examples which, when situated in context, can be readily interpreted as expressing more than one subjectivity (see McHale, 1983: 35-39). Therefore, Banfield's assertion that two voices cannot be perceived in a single sentence needs to be reconsidered.

With respect to the viewpoint attribution in free indirect style, Fludernik (1993) also argues for a single-voice interpretation of free indirect style, but contrary to Banfield (1982), Fludernik maintains that this voice is 'all the reporter's language, even if it appears to be the reportee's' (1993: 348). She

acknowledges that the expressive elements contained in sentences of free indirect style evoke figural subjectivity, but for her, the figural voice is only a fiction, resulting from the narrator's manipulation of language:

> the projection of subjectivity operates as a function of the reporter's language—though meant to signal the reported speaker's (or consciousness's) SELF mimetically, it is the reporter's language, his or her illocutionary intentions and the implicatures that s/he wishes to convey that determine the reporting. (Fludernik, 1993: 432)

Fludernik arrives at her conclusion by replacing the mimetic model with a schematic model of language representation. For her, what is operative in free indirect style, and virtually in any form of discourse report, is the mechanism of 'typification' or 'schematization', intended by the reporter to express his or her own attitude (Fludernik, 1993: 391). She takes examples such as hypothetical speech, condensed speech and speech report with explicit signal of typification as strong support for her argument that free indirect style presents only 'a *typical* or *schematic* image' of a speech or thought act (Fludernink, 1993: 392). The expressive elements and deixis contained in free indirect style that are aligned with figural subjectivity in her view are only formal devices or formulaic textual cues for the evocation of a voice of alterity, but the perceived figural subjectivity, she claims, is only an illusion on the readers' part. In fact, Fludernik (1993: 419) seems to deny the possibility that markers of subjectivity can be aligned with a character's immediate experience, as she maintains that people in real life rarely use emotional and expressive language for communication, especially at moments of heightened experience

(see also Sotirova (2011: 34) for her criticism of Fludernik's claim). Since Fludernik ascribes the evocation of figural subjectivity entirely to the intention of the reporter/narrator, her account inevitably appears reductive in explaining the empathetic construal of figural consciousness by readers. And regarding the frequently discussed effect of irony, the evidence for the mixing of different voices in free indirect style, Fludernik contends that such duality of voice only exists 'on a higher interpretative plane' (1993: 348). In other words, the ironic meaning is implied rather than linguistically encoded in the mode of free indirect style. While this account of irony takes into consideration contextual and pragmatic factors, by attributing the duality of voice to the interpretive level, it diminishes the linguistic complexity of free indirect style, that is, its incorporation of two distinct deictic systems.

If Banfield (1982), by ruling out entirely the narrator's voice, overlooks the fact that sentences of free indirect style are always incorporated into the narratorial frame, Fludernik (1993) can be seen as placing too much emphasis on the narratorial framing, since she takes the narrator's voice as overarching all represented discourse. Both fail to see that free indirect style, as a mode of discourse presentation, integrates two discourse situations. In this respect, Lieven Vandelanotte's (2009) treatment of this mode makes a progress from the single-voice account. While his approach to discourse presentation is also grammar-based, his focus of analysis is placed on the following two aspects: a) the syntagmatic relationship between the reporting clause and the reported clause, and b) the alignment of the deictic and expressive grammatical resources with either the current speaker/narrator or the represented

speaker/character. This focus allows him to take into view the two discourse situations embodied in all types of speech and thought presentation. He addresses the problem of voice in free indirect style by dividing this mode into two subcategories: *free indirect speech or thought* (FIST) and *distancing indirect speech or thought* (DIST). According to him, while these two forms share the same syntagmatic structure, that is, the 'juxtaposition' of the reporting clause with the reported clause (Vandelanotte, 2009: 52), they display different semantic and pragmatic features. The primary reason for him to distinguish between these two forms is their difference in terms of person deixis. According to Vandelanotte, there is a general principle guiding the choices of person deixis: pronouns are normally used when the referent is 'fully "accessible"' and identifiable to the speech participants, and proper names or descriptive noun phrases have to be used to introduce a new referent or re-introduce a referent after some break (2009: 143-144). Also, adopting Kuno's (1972: 164) and Reinhart's (1975: 161) account, Vandelanotte points out that it is a 'cultural convention' 'not to refer to oneself by means of one's proper name' (2009: 143). For him, although FIST is deictically linked to the current speaker/narrator, as reflected in the grammatical person, whether to choose a proper name or a pronoun to designate the referent is determined by the represented speaker/character (2009: 145-175). By contrast, in DIST, the choice of person deixis is determined by the current speaker/narrator (Vandelanotte, 2009: 145-175). Therefore, he argues, FIST involves two deictic centres in the construal of the current and represented speech situations,

but DIST construes the two speech situations only from the deictic centre of the current speaker.

Vandelanotte further draws a link between the above deictic construal of FIST and DIST and their 'grammatical semantics', that is, the '(re-)enactment' of the original/represented speech function, based on which he addresses the problem of voice in free indirect style (2009: 232). In his view, DIST does not re-enact the original speech act, since all resources are construed from the deictic centre of the current speaker. In DIST, it is the current speaker who appropriates and echoes someone else's previous discourse to express his or her own attitude and emotion. For him, this echoic semantics that links two different speech situations explains well the effect of irony, the strong evidence of dual voice (2009: 253). FIST, on the other hand, 'does not lead to a full "dramatic re-enactment" of the original speech act, because the deictic coordinates are not […] reset to those of the original speech event' (Vandelanotte, 2009: 233). The 'speech function re-enactment' in this form is 'partial', which results in the loss in FIST of the 'potential for "interactive" exchange with either a represented addressee or the current addressee' (Vandelanotte, 2009: 234). Thus the re-enacted speech functions in FIST are characterised as 'unidirectional' or 'self-expressive' (Vandelanotte, 2009: 234). And according to him, this 'self-expressive' nature of the re-enacted speech function in free indirect style 'leaves no room for any current speaker's interference beyond the alignment of the "basic" deictic resources, which do not bring in any expressivity or accessibility choices on the part of the current speaker' (2009: 250). In other words, FIST conveys solely the subjectivity of

the represented speaker/character but does not communicate it to any current addressee. Seen in this light, whereas Vandelanotte acknowledges the existence of dual voice in DIST, his account of FIST is not different from Banfield (1982): both see it as a univocal mode.

The proponents of dual-voice interpretation of free indirect style, contrasting the single-voice alternative, engage more fully with its linguistic complexity and pave the way for a deeper understanding of the polyphonic nature of this mode.

While the duality of voice in free indirect style has been discussed in several earlier studies (Cohn, 1966; Guiraud, 1971; Hernadi, 1972), it is through Pascal's (1977) discussion that the dual-voice hypothesis gained wider acceptance and also sparks more contentious debates among scholars. Reviewing theories of free indirect style put forward by German scholars who take this mode as directly communicating a character's experience, Pascal articulates his dissent by arguing that free indirect style 'always embodies a narratorial element, clearly proclaimed in the first place through the verbal tense and the pronominal forms' (1977: 25). He points out that the dual voice of the character and the narrator 'may be heard as a tone of irony, or sympathy, of negation or approval, underlying the statement of the character' (1977: 17). By emphasising the duality of voice in free indirect style, this account directs attention to the complexity in the operation of this narrative mode. It is never direct expression of figural subjectivity; its various effects are generated through the interaction between the narratorial and figural discourse, which is

embodied exactly in the linguistic construction of this mode. It is significant that Pascal stresses the presence of the narrator that functions together with the evocation of a character's voice in free indirect style, but his delineation of the narrator's position in this mode exposes his rather rigid view of dual voice. While he points out that the narratorial presence is communicated 'through the vocabulary and idiom; through the composition of the sentences and longer passages; and through the [syntactic] context' (1977: 25), he criticises the type of narrator who intrudes in texts of free indirect style by speaking in his or her own idiom and the type of narrator who borrows the figural idiom and speaks as a character in the narrative. In his view, the proper narrator in free indirect style has to be impersonal, whose presence can only manifest through the tense and person on the formal plane. The dual voice in Pascal's view, therefore, is only a syntactic construct.

Whereas Pascal's account of dual voice in free indirect style is at the syntactic level, Adamson (1994a) provides a strong semantic argument for the co-existence of different subjectivities in this mode. She approaches the mode of free indirect style not just through a linguistic analysis of its formal features but through tracing its linguistic origins as well. According to her, free indirect style may descend from two common practices in the everyday use of language: empathetic deixis and echolalic quotation. Empathetic deixis allows a speaker to project into the spatiotemporal position of another. Sometimes the deictic transfer is not complete, thus resulting in a mixture of empathetic and egocentric deixis, as in the following example: 'John will be sorry he wasn't at home today' (Adamson, 1994a: 198). In this sentence, the speaker 'combines

an adverb (*today*) which registers her present position with a tense (*was*) which describes the same time in the terms appropriate to the referent's (i.e. John's) future retrospection' (Adamson, 1994a: 198). In the case of echolalic quotation, the speaker repeats a certain speech fragment but at the same time indicates its origin in another speaker, as in the following example: '(I can't remember what John said this morning.) He wanted *what* for tea?' (Adamson, 1994a: 203). Adamson points out that this way of quotation allows for the simultaneous operation of two sentence modalities. In the above example, the echolalic quotation encodes the interrogative modality on the part of the quoting speaker (signalled by the intonation of question) and the declarative modality on the part of the quoted speaker (signalled by the word order). Both the empathetic deictic projection and the double modality manifest the fusion of two subjectivities in one sentence. These two practices of spoken discourse find their correspondence in free indirect style's incorporation of the character-oriented deixis and its retention of a character's expressive idiom and syntax within the narrative context, which explains well how this mode embodies double voices. Adamson's account indicates that dual voice is not just a syntactic construct but has its semantic explanation. Moreover, the fusion of different subjectivities within a single linguistic construction is not only possible, but also basic to language use.

The dual-voice interpretation of free indirect style is further supplied with a sociological and philosophical basis by Bakhtin (1981 [1934-35]). In Bakhtin's theory of the novel, free indirect style is a discourse form under the category of 'hybrid constructions', which is defined as:

> an utterance that belongs, by its grammatical (syntactic) and compositional markers, to a single speaker, but that actually contains mixed within it two utterances, two speech manners, two styles, two "languages", two semantic and axiological belief systems. (1981 [1934-35]: 304)

The two "languages", or the two voices sounding in this hybrid construction, are not mechanically mixed but are placed in a dialogic relationship, making ultimately 'a special type of double-voiced discourse':

> […] all the while these two voices are dialogically interrelated, they—as it were—know about each other (just as two exchanges in a dialogue know of each other and are structured in this mutual knowledge of each other); it is as if they actually hold a conversation with each other. (Bakhtin, 1981 [1934-35]: 324)

For Bakhtin, a hybrid construction, in which 'the division of voices and languages takes place within the limits of a single syntactic whole' (1981 [1934-35]: 305), is the fullest manifestation of dialogism, an inherent property of not only the novel as a genre but any language in use. Bakhtin considers the novel as the most dialogic genre because its discourse, incorporating a diversity of speech types and a variety of genres, mirrors the heteroglossic nature of language. According to Bakhtin, language is never unitary; instead, it is stratified into different social dialects, generic languages, and languages of different professions, generations and age groups. All these languages represent different social positions, values and world views and '[as] such they

all may be juxtaposed to one another, mutually supplement one another, contradict one another and be interrelated dialogically' (Bakhtin, 1981 [1934-35]: 292). The dialogical orientation of different languages is determined by the social situation of utterances. Bakhtin views an utterance not in terms of its referential meaning, as, for him, 'no living word relates to its object in a singular way':

> between the word and its object, between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an elastic environment of other, alien words about the same object, the same theme […] (1981 [1934-35]: 276)

An utterance does not exist on its own but has to take meaning and shape through its interaction with other utterances, either the utterance in the consciousness of the addressee or those of previous speakers directed towards the same object. As he points out:

> The word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgments and accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from others, intersects with yet a third group: and all this may crucially shape discourse, may leave a trace in all its semantic layers, may complicate its expression and influence its entire stylistic profile. (1981 [1934-35: 276])

Thus any utterance is saturated with different meanings and intentions. Each utterance embodies in itself a dialogic relationship between different world views. Free indirect style, as 'utterance within utterance' and 'utterance about

utterance' (Vološinov, 1973 [1929]: 115), adds a further layer to the dialogism of language.

The dual-voice hypothesis for the interpretation of the viewpoints expressed in free indirect style is also adopted by Oltean (2003), Rimmon-Kenan (1983), Sanders & Redeker (1996) and Toolan (2001 [1988]). Recent empirical studies also provide support for this stance. Sotirova (2006) and Bray (2007a), for instance, examine reader responses to free indirect style and their results show that some readers, although not all, attribute passages narrated in this mode to the viewpoints of both the character and the narrator. These studies indicate that the blending of voices and viewpoints in free indirect style is perceivable to at least some readers. The merit of the dual-voice stance lies in the fact that it acknowledges the co-existence of two voices or two evaluative systems within the confines of a single syntactic construction, which is rejected by all the scholars promoting a monologic treatment of free indirect style. I have pointed out in Section 1.3 that previous studies tend to treat consciousness presentation as sentential units. However, the dual-voice account of the mode of free indirect style indicates that even a single sentence can embody more than one subjectivity and point of view. The recognition of the double-voicedness of this mode also leads to the recognition of the multiple-voicedness of the discourse of the novel. If we adopt Bakhtin's view that the novel as a genre is most capable of incorporating 'heteroglossia' (1981[1934-35]: 291), it is easy to acknowledge that a novel of consciousness can present not just one individual mind but multiple ones, each from their own point of view but engaging in dialogical connections with one another. And it is

precisely the presentation of multiple consciousnesses and the interrelationship between them that has not received enough attention and is in need of a more detailed investigation.

1.5 Moving beyond the presentation of individual consciousness

The presentation of multiple consciousnesses has recently been examined by a group of researchers working outside the traditional narratological framework, among whom Palmer (2004, 2005, 2010) is the most representative. Palmer has strongly advocated a shift of focus in the investigation of fictional minds from the presentation of individual private consciousness to the presentation of consciousness as social, public and active (2004: 11; 2005: 429-430; 2010: 39). He contends that traditional narratological studies tend to 'give the impression that characters' minds really only consist of a private passive flow of consciousness' (2004: 59) and that 'the *social* nature of fictional thought has been neglected' due to 'the preoccupation with such concepts as free indirect discourse, stream of consciousness, and interior monologue' (2010: 39-40; Palmer's emphasis). I agree with Palmer that previous research does not give enough attention to the presentation of the social quality of consciousness, and I also think that it is important to investigate how narrative texts present those aspects of consciousness that are public, social and interactive in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of fictional minds. However, I do not think it is the engagement with the concepts of free indirect discourse and interior monologue or the interest in stream-of-consciousness writing that lead to the neglect of the social nature of consciousness. Palmer (2010), in an

attempt to redress the imbalance of research focus, looks at what he calls 'social minds' from a cognitive perspective, but in my view, his account is still far from providing an adequate analysis of this topic. Below I provide a summary and evaluation of his account, and I will argue that the investigation of social minds needs to be developed further, and along different lines.

Palmer points out that an important part of social minds is the capacity for 'intermental thought', which he defines as the kind of thinking that is 'joint, group, shared or collective, as opposed to intramental, or individual or private thought' (2010: 41). And thus he sets his focus of investigation on the presentation of this capacity of minds. Considering that this is a 'relatively uncharted area in the context of literary studies', he provides a typology of intermental thought, which includes the following five categories (2010: 46-48):

1. **Intermental encounters**. This is the minimal level of intermental thought, which occurs at random encounters with acquaintances or even strangers. This type of intermental thought allows one individual to conduct a successful conversation with another.
2. **Small intermental units**. This type of intermental thought occurs in stable relationships such as marriages, close friends and nuclear families in which one individual knows what another is thinking.
3. **Medium-sized intermental units**. This refers to intermentality that occurs in groups of people such as work colleagues and neighbourhoods where people think in the same way.

4. **Large intermental units**. This type of intermental thought occurs in a large group such as a whole town in which most people hold a consensus view on a particular topic or share the same ideology.
5. **Intermental minds**. This refers to intermental units that are well defined and long-lasting where so much successful intermental thought takes place that people in this group are acting as one.

Palmer admits that this is a very basic typology, but he hopes that it 'may be of some value' (2010: 46). It is, of course, valuable in that it raises the possibility of joint or shared thinking, but apart from that, this typology is also problematic in several respects. In the first place, there are no clear criteria for the distinction of different types of intermental thought. It seems that the first type is distinguished from the second based on the degree of closeness of the relationship; the second, third and fourth types of intermental thought are categorised according to the size of the group; and the last type is defined by the success and continuity of shared thinking. So it appears that different criteria are applied in the categorisation of the different types. Admittedly, the closeness of the relationship can affect the quality of intermental thinking, but the link is not direct and is by no means necessary. It is possible that complete strangers read each other's mind well and that long married couples can also suffer from failed communication. The size of the group is not directly linked to the quality of intermental thinking either. It turns the classification of social minds into a somewhat mechanistic exercise. Therefore, the typology does not really help with revealing the nature of intermental thought. It seems that the fifth type is defined by the quality of the shared thinking, but there is no

objective way of determining how much successful shared thinking has to take place for a group to be called an intermental mind.

Disputing the assumption that consciousness is entirely private and inaccessible, Palmer stresses the function of facial expressions, looks and gazes, bodily movements and actions in making one's mind public. In his view, the face, the look and other non-verbal signals of communication are important ways in which social minds communicate with each other, and actions are also informative about mental functioning. I do not deny that the mind is embodied. However, it is dissatisfactory that a large proportion of a book-length study of social minds is devoted to the discussion of faces, looks and actions whereas the presentation of thoughts and feelings per se is not thoroughly analysed.

Palmer claims that traditional narrative approaches cannot 'sink their teeth into' the study of social minds (2010: 67). He abandons traditional narratological accounts and draws on theories from neuroscience, psycholinguistics, psychology and philosophy of mind in his analysis. Theory of mind is an important analytical framework Palmer uses. He lists examples in which either an individual character anticipates the view of an intermental group or an intermental group tries to read an individual's mind. In his view, these examples show that the characters are applying theory of mind to construct others' thoughts. The analysis of these examples helps him to discuss the relationship between the intramental mind of an individual character and the intermental mind of a group, which facilitates the analysis of character relationships and the themes of the novels. However, his analysis is mainly

done in a quote-and-claim fashion. He throws a large number of quotes in as the evidence of mind reading between an individual and a group, but he does not examine how exactly the text presents and effects such mind reading. The lack of linguistic analysis or any interpretative close reading makes his account extremely descriptive and impressionistic.

Palmer justifies his lack of linguistic analysis by asserting that he focuses primarily on the content of fictional minds, that is, 'the story-level issue of the nature of the fictional minds constructed by the texts' instead of 'the discourse-level issue of the techniques used to represent consciousness in narrative' (2010: 17). Now the question arises as to how we can tackle the discourse-level issue of *how* social minds are linguistically presented. From what I see, this is exactly where traditional narratological studies can, in Palmer's words, 'sink their teeth' in, and most significantly, take the study of social minds a step further. Palmer discusses the examples in which intermental thoughts are presented without any regard to the modes of consciousness presentation. However, it is important to know in what mode the mind of a character is presented because this gives us much deeper insight regarding how the intermental thinking occurs and what is suggested by it. If it is the case that the narrator reports that a character reads another's mind or a group of people share the same thoughts, there is nothing remarkable about it, as it is almost common sense that people, real and fictional, can apply theory of mind to speculate on another's thoughts and inner states and that collective thinking exists in various groups. However, once we examine the modes of consciousness presentation, if we find that it is in free indirect style or interior

monologue, the more direct modes of rendering consciousness which readers usually attribute to the characters' viewpoints, that one character is thinking about the thoughts of another without the thoughts being verbally communicated, then we get an interesting case of consciousness exceeding the boundaries of an individual mind and the narrative text capturing such a process in an immediate manner. It is such cases of consciousness presentation that challenge in the extreme the assumption that consciousness is entirely private and impenetrable.

Palmer's (2010) study makes a valuable contribution to the study of fictional minds by directing attention to the presentation of consciousness not as isolated but as possessing intermental connections. But his un-linguistic discussion fails to account adequately for what he calls the social mind.

A more linguistically-based fruitful study of social minds is provided by Sotirova (2004, 2005, 2011), who examines the juxtaposition of different narrative points of view in the presentation of consciousness. Sotirova (2011), the book-length study in which she analyses juxtaposed viewpoints extensively, is primarily a response to the voice debate concerning the viewpoint attribution in free indirect style introduced in the previous section, but her study shows that the analysis of shifts in point of view can reveal how the intermental consciousness is presented in narratives. In the rest of this section, I will summarise her study and discuss its implications for the current investigation.

Adopting Bakhtin's idea that free indirect style reflects the dialogic nature of language through its incorporation of two deictic and modal systems within

a single syntactic construction, Sotirova (2011) aims to find out the linguistic correlates of dialogism in this narrative mode apart from deixis and modality. Unlike the majority of researchers of free indirect style who account for its operation on the sentential level, Sotirova takes a discoursal approach to explain the duality of voice and viewpoint in this mode. To be more specific, rather than looking at how the dual voice is incorporated within a sentence of free indirect style, she examines how different voices 'intersect *across* sentences of free indirect style' (Sotirova, 2011: 48; my emphasis). This discoursal approach allows her to locate the dialogism of this mode not only in the juxtaposition of the narratorial and figural viewpoints but also in the juxtaposition of viewpoints of two characters. And the analysis of these kinds of juxtaposition on the discoursal level guides her to place the focus of investigation on the linking devices that bridge different points of view.

Sotirova (2011) isolates three important discourse links that function to interconnect different viewpoints: referring expressions, repetition and sentence-initial connectives. She explains their functions of linking different viewpoints by drawing a parallel with their functions in actual conversation. The findings in discourse analysis provide her strong theoretical base: what the three discourse links share in common is their function in linking different speakers' utterances and building up the interaction between speakers. Sotirova (2011) argues that such functions of the three devices are mapped out onto the narrative texts when they are used across different narrative viewpoints. Thus, when the interpretation of a referring expression in one sentence relies on a preceding sentence stemming from a different point of view, or when

repetition occurs across clauses or sentences that anchor in different characters' consciousnesses, or when connectives are used at the points where the narrative viewpoint shifts from one character to another, '[t]heir ability to signal engagement with a conversational partner when used across turns in oral discourse is carried over into written discourse to create dialogic resonances between the viewpoints they link' (Sotirova, 2011: 188). However, unlike conversational practices where participants speak their thoughts aloud, the juxtaposition of viewpoints in the presentation of consciousness produces a silent dialogue between different minds. The ultimate narrative effect, as Sotirova appositely puts it, is 'to make characters aware of each other's thoughts and experiences and respond to them internally' (2011: 188). We can see from Sotirova's account that the intermentality of consciousness is conveyed in the way in which the text enacts shifts in point of view and still discoursally links juxtaposed viewpoints. This is why I believe that the narrative phenomenon of viewpoint shifts provides a promising starting point for investigating the presentation of consciousness as engaged in intermental connections. And I would argue that the linguistic correlates of viewpoint shifts are important means through which narrative texts present the social interactive nature of consciousness.

Illuminating as Sotirova's (2011) study is, it is not her primary aim to come up with a comprehensive list of linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts. Furthermore, it needs to be pointed out that the linguistic mechanisms that operate at the points of viewpoint shift are by no means restricted to the three devices identified in her study. It is the aim of this thesis to conduct a

systematic investigation of the linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts. The outcome of this investigation will on the one hand contribute to the study of fictional consciousness by revealing how narrative texts present social minds, and on the other hand, contribute to narratological studies in general by providing further insight into the effect of viewpoint shifts as a narrative technique.

1.6 The structure of the thesis

The main body of this thesis is structured in the following way:

Chapter 2 introduces the research data for the investigation. Two novels by Virginia Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*, are chosen as the key texts. I will explain why I choose this author as a suitable case for a systematic examination of shifts in viewpoint and why I focus on these two novels. Following that, I will review previous studies that investigate Woolf's manipulation of narrative point of view in order to identify both the gains and gaps in existing accounts and to argue for the need of a thorough examination of this narrative technique.

Chapter 3 approaches shifts in point of view from an empirical perspective. It reports the design and findings of an experiment that examines reader responses to this narrative phenomenon as further support for my argument that viewpoint shifts are worth investigating. The aim of this study is to see whether readers detect shifts in point of view and how viewpoint shifts affect their textual processing. This experimentalist research, by directing attention to the question of how shifts in point of view create the complexity perceived by

readers, leads to the text-based examination of the linguistic mechanisms of this narrative technique, which forms the central concern of the following four chapters.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine two categories of parentheticals: discourse parentheticals and attributing parentheticals. The digressive nature of parentheticals renders this construction an effective means for Virginia Woolf to break the constraints of textual linearity and subvert the convention of adhering to a consistent narrative viewpoint. Chapter 6 focuses on the use of connectives at the points of viewpoint shift. It verifies the validity of previous accounts of coordinating connectives and also expands existing studies by investigating the function of non-coordinating connectives in enacting shifts in point of view. Chapter 7 examines the pattern of viewpoint shifts across sentences and paragraphs by mapping the format of adjacency pairs onto the juxtaposition of different viewpoints. These four linguistic devices all function to facilitate viewpoint shifts, and more importantly, they allow the text to convey the inter-subjective connections between different consciousnesses.

Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by highlighting the findings of this research project and discussing its implications for both literary studies of Virginia Woolf and narratological studies of fictional consciousness.

Chapter 2 Virginia Woolf and consciousness presentation

2.1 Introduction: Why Virginia Woolf?

Virginia Woolf is an important writer of consciousness in the Modernist period. Both her novels and critical essays are frequently quoted in discussions of consciousness presentation. The following perhaps over-quoted extract from her essay "Modern Fiction" spells out most articulately her interest in the depiction of the inner world of characters:

> Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind receives a myriad impressions— trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms; […] Is it not the task of the novelist to convey this varying, this unknown and uncircumscribed spirit, whatever aberration or complexity it may display, with as little mixture of the alien and external as possible? (Woolf, 1968 [1925]: 189)

I want to stress that the significance of Woolf's writing resides not only in the fact that she takes consciousness as the subject matter by examining 'an ordinary mind on an ordinary day' but also in the way in which she presents consciousness in order to capture the very process through which the innumerable atoms fall on the mind. In fact, these two aspects are inseparable from each other. The subject matter informs the method that Woolf uses to present the consciousness of her characters, and the method in turn conveys her ideas about the nature of consciousness and self. These two aspects combine to

make Virginia Woolf a suitable case for a systematic investigation of shifts in point of view, the narrative phenomenon which, as I have proposed in the previous chapter, will afford us better insight into the linguistic presentation of social minds. The following two sub-sections discuss these two interrelated aspects: Section 2.1.1 will focus on the thematic level and Section 2.1.2 on the formal level.

2.1.1 Sealed-off consciousness or accessible minds

What does Woolf's writing reveal of her conception of self and consciousness? In previous studies of Virginia Woolf's novels, alienation and isolation are frequently-explored themes. According to the interpretation of many literary critics, individual selves in her novels are presented as separate from one another, and the barriers between different consciousnesses cannot be traversed. An early literary criticism of Woolf that centres on such themes can be found in Jeremy Hawthorn's study of *Mrs Dalloway*, in which he states that this novel is 'saturated with the problems of a society which embodies—and in that sense causes—alienation'(1975: 24). In his analysis, the city London is a place of estrangement, 'where most people are, and yet where least human contact can seem to take place' (1975: 66). Hawthorn notices that a recurrent scene in the novel is an individual character feeling alone in a crowded London street. For instance, Peter Walsh is depicted as overcome by 'the strangeness of standing alone, alive, unknown, at half-past eleven in Trafalgar Square' (*MD*: 56); and Septimus has the solitary experience 'which people go through alone, in their bedrooms, in their offices, walking the fields and the streets of London'

(*MD*: 92). According to Hawthorn, such a paradoxical experience of the city life is frequently written about because:

> it offers a perfect symbol of alienation, […] The individual in our society, like the isolated individual in the city, is surrounded by people with whom he has to relate, to whom he has to communicate, but who are essentially 'private', separate from him. (1975: 66-67)

Like an oyster, under the shell is 'a central irreducible core of identity' of an individual, and due to this separation, there is no way for others to know the true self (Hawthorn, 1975: 12).

The inaccessibility of the inner self is also noted by Dominic Scheck in his interpretation of *To the Lighthouse*. According to him, Virginia Woolf 'consistently evinces the impossibility of communicating the intimate knowledge of the mind' in this novel (2011: 208). He takes Lily's frustration in her attempt to experience Mrs Ramsay's interior thought as a supporting example. Sitting together with Mrs Ramsay, Lily yearns for access to her consciousness, as the following thought presentation expresses her desire:

> What device for becoming, like waters poured into one jar, inextricably the same, one with the object one adored? […] How, then, she had asked herself, did one know one thing or another thing about people, sealed as they were? (*TL*: 57-58)

But later in the novel, the presentation of Mrs Ramsay's thought indicates that Lily's desire cannot be satisfied: 'she [Mrs Ramsay] alone could search into her mind and her heart' (*TL*: 70). Sealed off in one's own interiority, according

to Scheck, the best sense of unity and connection one can get is 'a shared exteriority', which occurs when characters perceive the same object, such as the candle-lit table during the dinner, but such a communion is only an illusory one (2011: 212).

Therefore, for Hawthorn (1975) and Scheck (2011), it is almost impossible for any one individual consciousness to reach others in Woolf's novels; consciousness is sealed off and impenetrable. However, in my view, more careful consideration is needed before we opt for such an interpretation. It is true that there are scenes in Woolf's novels in which characters seal their internal world off or suffer from the failure in the attempt of knowing others' thoughts, but there are also scenes in which characters read others' minds with great ease. Consciousness is not necessarily always private and unreachable. On the contrary, I would argue that Woolf keenly probes the possibility that consciousness is accessible in her novels and that her narrative writing artistically captures the social interactive quality of consciousness.

Virginia Woolf's own critical essays can also give us some clue to her conception of consciousness. Although she is often grouped together with other writers of consciousness such as Henry James, Dorothy Richardson and James Joyce, it seems that she holds a unique view of consciousness, or at least a unique view of how consciousness is to be presented. It is true that Woolf acknowledges the achievements of her contemporaries and the merits of their writing. For instance, she credits Dorothy Richardson for her use of the 'psychological sentence of the feminine gender' to explore the depth of her protagonist's mind in *Pilgrimage*:

> [Richardson's sentence] is of a more elastic fibre than the old, capable of stretching to the extreme, of suspending the frailest particles, of enveloping the vaguest shapes. […] Miss Richardson has fashioned her sentence consciously, in order that it may descend to the depths and investigate the crannies of Miriam Henderson's consciousness. (Woolf, 1988: 367; originally written in 1923)

And she praises James Joyce for his attempt to depict the inner life of characters and his courage in discarding all the conventional methods:

> In contrast with those whom we have called materialists, Mr. Joyce is spiritual; he is concerned at all costs to reveal the flickerings of that innermost flame which flashes its messages through the brain, and in order to preserve it he disregards with complete courage whatever seems to him adventitious (Woolf, 1968 [1925]: 190)

However, she also expresses reservations about others' presentation of consciousness:

> Is it due to the method that we feel neither jovial nor magnanimous, but centred in a self which, in spite of its tremor of susceptibility, never embraces or creates what is outside itself and beyond?
>
> […] did not the reading of *Ulysses* suggest how much of life is excluded or ignored, and did it not come with a shock to open *Tristram Shandy* or even *Pendennis* and be by them convinced that there are not only other aspects of life, but more important ones into the bargain. (Woolf, 1968 [1925]: 191)

Woolf does not explain what exactly she refers to by 'what is outside itself and beyond' or what 'other aspects of life' and 'more important ones' are 'excluded or ignored'. But her comments indicate that what she finds dissatisfactory with other writers' works might be the sense of being confined within a single self or a single mind.

Angela Hague (2003) interprets the above comment by Woolf in terms of the relationship between the author and the characters. According to her, Woolf is emphasising 'the need to enter a fictive realm that can only be realized by escaping her own ego' as part of the intuitive creation of fiction (Hague, 2003: 218). Hague suggests that the breaking away from one's ego 'allows Woolf to fuse with the characters she creates […] so that she can fully bring to life other personalities in her fiction' (2003: 218). Here Hague is emphasising the empathetic connection between the author and the characters and the multiplicity of personalities. Daniel Ferrer (2014) also refers to Woolf's writing process and her creation of novels when interpreting her comment above, but unlike Hague (2003), he proposes to read Woolf's comment in relation to *Jacob's Room* (1922) and *Mrs Dalloway* (1925), the two novels that Woolf composed around and after the time she read *Ulysses*. In his view, Woolf's critical reading of Joyce in turn has a strong influence on her own fiction, and her novels represent her effort to address the problem that she perceived in Joyce's portrayal of minds:

> [T]he main weakness that Woolf identifies in *Ulysses* suggests, in a form of negative intertextuality, a direction for the development of her own style […] *Jacob's Room* will start in the opposite direction: instead

> of being shut up in the claustrophobic room of a particular mind, it will explore the space of a room, which is a locus of interaction between the mind and its environment, and in the following novel, *Mrs Dalloway*, she will develop her own characteristic technique, based on free indirect speech and the fluidity of borders between centres of subjectivity. (Ferrer, 2014: 35)

Woolf's decision to convey the interaction between the mind and its environment in *Jacob's Room* and the fluidity of borders between different subjectivities in *Mrs Dalloway* seems to suggest that she is interested in exploring the social aspects as opposed to the solitary private aspects of consciousness. And this is perhaps her design to make the self embrace 'what is outside itself and beyond' and to reveal 'other aspects of life'.

Several literary scholars have also challenged the argument that Woolf presents consciousness as solitary and inaccessible. Allen McLaurin points out that the isolation of one consciousness from another is 'not simply a given, matter of fact' for Virginia Woolf as well as other stream of consciousness writers of the Modernist period (1984: 32). He suggests that Woolf's presentation of group consciousness represents a different assumption that parallels the predominant assumption that consciousness is private and sundered from others. He draws a connection between Woolf's presentation of group consciousness and the idea put forward by the writer Jules Romains, a representative of the movement of Unanimism in French literature. In the review of Romains's book, Woolf wrote:

> What really interests him is the feelings of persons, not as individual characters, but as members of groups; what he delights and excels in doing is to trace the mysterious growth, where two or three are gathered together, of a kind of consciousness of the group in addition to that of each individual of the group. ("Les Copains", *Times Literary Supplement*, 7 August, 1913: 330; cited in McLaurin, 1984: 34)

This suggests, according to McLaurin, that Woolf is likely to share a similar interest in the exploration of group consciousness. For him, the presentation of the crowd's feeling about the passing motor car in *Mrs Dalloway* and the presentation of the interior monologues of a group of friends in *The Waves* are clear examples showing the affinity between Woolf's and Romains's idea of consciousness. The notion of group consciousness is important in that it emphasises the multiplicity instead of individuality of consciousness. Or put another way, it acknowledges that individuals can share the same subjective experience, thus countering the conceptualisation of consciousness as an isolated terrain.

Reading *To the Lighthouse* alongside the phenomenological view that consciousness is an embodied phenomenon, Justine Dymond (2001) draws attention to shared objects of perception depicted in this novel. For her, these serve to link consciousnesses of different characters, for example, when Lily Briscoe and William Bankes watch the waves, 'both felt a common hilarity, excited by the moving waves' (*TL*: 25). She also points out that the characters' consciousnesses interconnect 'in their focus on the central figure of Mrs Ramsay' (Dymond, 2001: 142). Dymond's interpretation is shared by Vera

Tobin, who states that scenes of joint attention are the 'platform' for Woolf to produce a narrative 'not just of consciousness, but interconsciousness' (2012: 52). According to her, in the scenes where the characters find themselves looking at the same object, their shared attention is presented as 'signifier of a fleeting but real connection between two minds' (Tobin, 2012: 54). However, both Dymond (2001) and Tobin (2012) note the characters' frequent struggle or failure in obtaining a real insight into another mind through joint attention. Most notably, Lily Briscoe expresses her frustration in failing to become 'one with the object one adored' (*TL*: 57). For Tobin, the depiction of such struggle and failure shows Woolf's 'interest in what she saw as the desperate and mostly doomed attempt to understand and connect to the minds of others' (2012: 52). By contrast, Dymond contends that, through the depiction of the characters' attempts to know another mind, the text still shows the orientation of one consciousness towards the other (2001: 143). I would support Dymond's contention and take a positive stance in the consideration of the portrayal of the possibility of knowing another mind. As a large number of textual examples in later sections and the chapters to follow will show, some characters in Woolf's novels, although not always, do succeed in obtaining intimate knowledge of other minds.

Patricia Waugh (2011) adopts the Darwinian idea of "open fields" in her reading of the Modernist presentation of fictional minds. According to her, literary criticism has thoroughly explored the sense of consciousness as inward and introspective; 'what has been rather more neglected is the idea of consciousness conveyed in Darwin's image of "open fields"', mind as

'orienting itself to its environments through affects and feeling, sensory response and reflection and in constant dialogue with its environment, including other minds, as well as itself' (Waugh, 2011: 132). And she points out that Woolf's presentation of Clarissa's consciousness in *Mrs Dalloway* exemplifies such a construal of consciousness. From the opening of the novel, Clarissa is presented as thoroughly immersed in her surroundings and actively negotiating the world. Waugh (2011) does not focus particularly on the interactions one mind has with others, but her view of consciousness as constantly engaged in a dialogue with its surroundings highlights its interactive nature.

Martha Nussbaum (1995) considers both the difficulty and possibility of knowing another mind conveyed in *To the Lighthouse*. According to her, Virginia Woolf 'depicts, repeatedly, both our epistemological insufficiency toward one another and our unquenchable epistemological longing' (Nussbaum, 1995: 732). She acknowledges that the sealed-off nature of consciousness is reflected on in Woolf's writing, but at the same time she points out that Woolf also expresses a positive attitude towards the attainment of knowledge of other minds. She explains that the problem with gaining access to other minds arises out of the conflict between the rapidity and complexity of the flow of consciousness and the insufficiency of language as a vehicle of expression. One's mind moves too rapidly to be fully dictated and operates too complexly to be clearly expressed. And the resulting difficulty is increased by people's resistance to be known by others for reasons of shame or desire for privacy. Nussbaum (1995) points out that these reasons for the problem of other minds

are repeatedly revealed in the thoughts of the characters. However, she continues to point out, Woolf's characters also succeed in knowing other minds. For example, Mr and Mrs Ramsay surpass the barriers of minds at the end of the first part of the novel: 'Their eyes met for a second; but they did not want to speak to each other. They had nothing to say, but something seemed, nevertheless, to go from him to her'; 'She had not said it: yet he knew.' (*TL*: 129, 134). Nussbaum (1995) explains that this communication of minds is possible because of long years of intimacy between the two characters and their mutual respect for the other's wish for privacy. The possibility of knowing another mind without verbal communication points to the philosophical question of the nature of consciousness and the relationship between different consciousnesses, which, in my opinion, is a significant aspect that Woolf explores in her presentation of consciousness. And this aspect also differentiates Woolf from many other writers of consciousness.

Most notably, Nussbaum points out that Woolf presents both the problem of knowing other minds and its "resolution" 'not only by overt statements inside the text, but also by the form of the text itself, in its manner of depicting both sealed life and communication' (1995: 732). She identifies the use of images as an important formal device. According to her, the sealed life is conveyed through various images of hiddenness, such as the image of thoughts and feelings hidden as if under veils, Lily's images of the loved person as a hive and as a secret treasure chamber (Nussbaum, 1995: 740-741). On the other hand, there are also images that suggest the accessibility of other minds. For instance, the image of the window 'suggests that people are not completely

sealed to one another', as 'there is opening, one can see through or see in, even if one cannot enter' (Nussbaum, 1995: 743). And the use of the image of shadowy walls to describe Mrs Ramsay's sense of Mr Ramsay's mind indicates that 'the barriers are never removed—but somehow the walls become more like a shadow than like substance', which also conveys the sense of accessibility (Nussbaum, 1995: 748). I agree with Nussbaum that Woolf explores the nature of consciousness not only through the content of her novels but also through the very form of her texts. Her manner of portraying consciousness reveals the relationship of one consciousness to another. But I also believe that the formal devices that Woolf employs to present the interrelation between different consciousnesses are not restricted to the use of images and symbols. Literary critics such as Nussbaum (1995) as well as those mentioned earlier have provided insightful comments on Woolf's presentation of consciousness, but they focus more on the theme and content of her novels than on the formal features of her texts. In order to obtain a better understanding of Woolf's conception of consciousness and subjectivity, in the next sub-section I will proceed to discuss the formal level of her novels.

2.1.2 Shifts in point of view as a formal device for rendering the interrelations between consciousnesses

In the discussion of Woolf's presentation of consciousness, Bonnie Scott comments that 'stream of consciousness takes multiple forms' in her writing (2011: 328). To be more specific, as she explains, '[it] comes of perceptual stimulus, moves among memories, and is diverted by thoughts of another character, sometimes flowing from mind to mind' (Scott, 2011: 328). What is

worthy of particular attention is the last point she makes: the diversion of one stream of consciousness by the thoughts of another character and the free flow from mind to mind. This comment points to a prominent feature of Woolf's novels: the narrative does not present just one character's stream of consciousness but multiple characters' streams of consciousness, and different streams are interwoven in intricate connections. Scott's (2011) comment echoes an early remark on Woolf's novels provided by Erich Auerbach:

> The essential characteristic of the technique represented by Virginia Woolf is that we are given not merely one person whose consciousness (that is, the impressions it receives) is rendered, but many persons, with frequent shift from one to another. (2003 [1953]: 536)

He calls this way of portraying fictional minds the 'multipersonal representation of consciousness' (2003 [1953]: 536). Auerbach's and Scott's comments both underline Woolf's endeavour to avoid confining the narrative within a single mind. While Scott (2011) does not specify what enables Woolf to present the free flow from mind to mind, Auerbach hints in the above comment at a key narrative technique that facilitates the 'multipersonal representation of consciousness': shifts in point of view. It is this technique that allows the text to move from one character's inner world to another, resulting in the interweaving of multiple consciousnesses.

What needs to be pointed out is that presenting multiple consciousnesses by switching between different characters' viewpoints is not a technique exclusive to Virginia Woolf's writing. Many other novelists have also adopted

multiple points of view in their narratives. The uniqueness of Woolf's method manifests in the fact that shifts in viewpoint occur frequently and rapidly. Comparing Virginia Woolf with several other important writers of consciousness, Anne Fernihough remarks:

> Of the writers discussed in this chapter [James Joyce, D. H. Lawrence, Dorothy Richardson, May Sinclair and Virginia Woolf], [Virginia Woolf] is the one who flits most readily and rapidly from one mind to another, often traversing three or four consciousnesses within the confines of a single page. (2007: 77)

And Sotirova also points out that it is 'Woolf's characteristic fingerprint to enact such shifts in quick succession, so that the effect on the reader is comparable to a vertiginous movement of the camera' (2013: 49). Such a radical design invites a further question: what are the functions and effects of rapid viewpoint shifts?

Lodge (2002) considers shifts in point of view as a mimetic strategy. With particular reference to Woolf's presentation of consciousness, he identifies the frequent viewpoint shifts as one of the devices that imitate the elusiveness of consciousness:

> By breaking up the formal 'railway line of the sentence', by the use of ellipses and parentheses, by blurring the boundaries between what is thought and what is spoken, and by switching point of view and narrative voice with bewildering frequency—by these and similar

> devices she tried to imitate in her fiction the elusiveness of the phenomenon of consciousness. (Lodge, 2002: 63)

Lodge's focus is still placed on individual consciousness. Rather than considering frequent shifts in viewpoint as a mimetic strategy for the presentation of individual consciousness, Adamson (1998) sees shifts in point of view as one of the Modernist practices that subvert the illusion of a unified credible subjective centre, the portrayal of which was a convention in nineteenth-century literature:

> Whereas nineteenth-century writers had attempted to overcome the condition of textuality to create the illusion of a personality speaking through the printed page, with a credible voice and a coherent point of view, the Modernists took over the techniques on which this illusion was constructed and deconstructed them. (1998: 674)

According to Adamson, literary language displays a tendency to drift towards orality since the Romantic period. One strategy to emulate orality is to evoke a speaking voice through the use of deictic, epistemic and emotive expressions. The comprehension of these expressions in conversation requires the addressee to share the same context with the addresser. While nineteenth-century writers employ these expressions to mimic the conversational situation and give readers an illusion that they share the same context with the speaking voice constructed in the text, Adamson suggests, Modernist writers emphasise the problem of this practice: the inclusion of these expressions in extreme quantities creates a strong degree of opacity, because readers lack the

immediate context. And the technique of viewpoint shifting is one way of exposing this problem, as it subverts any attempt to construct a coherent deictic centre. Therefore, for Adamson, enacting frequent shifts in point of view fits in with the general trend of development of Modernist stylistic practices, that is, with an attempt to simulate orality in literary texts, while at the same time, taking this stylistic practice a step further by subverting the techniques that create the illusion of a unified coherent speaking voice.

I agree with Adamson (1998) that the employment of the technique of viewpoint shifts endows Woolf's texts with an oral quality, because, as Sotirova's (2011) study introduced in the previous chapter shows, this technique renders different consciousnesses as if they were rejoinders in conversation. Moreover, in the light of Sotirova's study, I think that frequent shifts in point of view as an important aspect of the Woolfian style have more significance than subverting a unified subjective centre. This narrative technique points to the relation of one subjective centre to others. Frequent shifts in point of view would require readers to track multiple characters' consciousnesses so that they can get a clear picture of the narrative world. When a viewpoint shift takes place, the text prompts readers to look at the juxtaposed minds together. In other words, readers are invited to look at a character's consciousness not as isolated but in connection with another's speech, thought or perception. If this is the case, this narrative technique can guide readers towards identifying potential connections between different consciousnesses. In this light, I support Sotirova's argument that, by enacting

frequent and swift shifts in point of view, Woolf 'probes to the limit the possibilities of interactive human consciousness' (2013: 157).

I have argued in the previous section that Woolf not only takes consciousness as the subject matter of her novels but also keenly explores the aspects of consciousness that are social, interactive and accessible as opposed to private, individual and sealed-off. This is manifested in her 'multipersonal representation of consciousness'. Literary critics have noted this distinctive feature of Woolf's presentation of fictional minds, but they have not paid enough attention to the formal devices that allow Woolf to linguistically present permeable consciousnesses. I would argue, and I will provide textual evidence in the subsequent analysis to prove, that the narrative technique of viewpoint shifts plays an important role in this kind of consciousness presentation. And taking into consideration that Woolf is an author who practises shifts in point of view par excellence, I believe that her writing should offer ideal data for a systematic investigation of the linguistic correlates of this technique and at the same time illuminate the presentation of social minds in narrative fiction.

2.2 Choosing research data

Virginia Woolf employs shifts in point of view mainly in four of her novels: *Jacob's Room* (1922), *Mrs Dalloway* (1925), *To the Lighthouse* (1927) and *The Waves* (1931). This thesis will take *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse* as its main research data. The following discussion explains why these two novels are chosen.

Jacob's Room is generally considered as Woolf's first experimental novel. It is experimental in several senses. First, it is her first attempt to compose a novel that breaks away from the convention of providing eventful plots. The narrative turns inward to present the subjective experiences of characters. And unlike the short story "The Mark on the Wall" (1917), Woolf's apprentice work in which she explores consciousness presentation in the first-person context, *Jacob's Room* adopts third-person narration. She begins in this novel to employ a fusion of free indirect style and interior monologue to align the text with figural points of view. Second, this novel breaks the constraints of chronologically-sequenced and logically-chained narrative events. The entire novel is composed of fragments of thoughts and perceptions of various characters, which piece together the life of the protagonist. And this narrative structure is achieved through the technique of viewpoint shifts. However, while this technique allows Woolf to free her text from the restrictions of chronological ordering and cause-effect chains of narrative events, it also weakens the narrative structure of this novel. As David Daiches comments, '*Jacob's Room* shows the author having mastered a new technique for presenting experience', but it also lacks 'a means of integrating the impressionistic renderings of individual experiences into a satisfactory unity' (1945: 62).

It is in the subsequent novel, *Mrs Dalloway*, that Woolf's employment of the technique of viewpoint shifts becomes mature. Whereas Daiches gives the above negative comment on the effects of viewpoint shifts in *Jacob's Room*, he thinks that in *Mrs Dalloway* 'the unity of the work is emphasized rather than

(as in *Jacob's Room*) weakened by the continual shifts' (1945: 62). He points out an organising method which he considers 'a deliberate attempt […] to bring all tracts of experience explored into a single focus' in *Mrs Dalloway* (1945: 62):

> [Virginia Woolf] takes the two categories of time and space and uses them in almost regular alternation in order to effect transitions between different situations. […] after we have remained within one character's mind for some time, Virginia Woolf, bringing that character's reverie up to the present moment, reminds the reader of someone else who is pursuing his own train of thought at the same time. Thus we either stand still in time and move from character to character, or we stand still in space, remaining with one character and moving up and down in time with his consciousness. (1945: 64)

As can be seen from this comment, for Daiches, the category of time is an effective means of orchestrating shifts in point of view. A specific example he gives is the repeated description of Big Ben striking, which, according to him, facilitates the transition from one character to another and unites their diverse experiences. However, I think the unity of different points of view is achieved in a more complex way than merely through the fact that different characters are present at a single point in time. I would argue that the diverse experiences of individual characters are integrated into a satisfactory unity as the text conveys an inter-subjective connection between the characters by linking their viewpoints through various discourse ties. This argument can be supported

with a comparison of the following two extracts, taken from *Jacob's Room* and *Mrs Dalloway* respectively:

(1) 'Scarborough,' Mrs. Flanders wrote on the envelope, and dashed a bold line beneath; it was her native town; the hub of the universe. But a stamp? She ferreted in her bag; then held it up mouth downwards; then fumbled in her lap, all so vigorously that Charles Steele in the Panama hat suspended his paint-brush.

Like the antennae of some irritable insect it positively trembled. Here was that woman moving—actually going to get up—confound her! He struck the canvas a hasty violet-black dab. For the landscape needed it. It was too pale—greys flowing into lavenders, and one star or a white gull suspended just so—too pale as usual. The critics would say it was too pale, for he was an unknown man exhibiting obscurely, a favourite with his landladies' children, wearing a cross on his watch chain, and much gratified if his landladies liked his pictures—which they often did. (*JR*: 4)

This extract is taken from the opening scene of *Jacob's Room*, where Betty Flanders is writing a letter. The first paragraph focuses on Betty, and the text is a mixture of narratorial description of her actions and the presentation of her consciousness. We sense Betty's point of view most strongly in the presentation of her thought (*it was her native town; the hub of the universe. But a stamp?*), as the text records the sudden turn in the train of her thoughts from the reflection on her hometown to the search for a stamp. After the narratorial

mediation in the last sentence of the first paragraph (*all so vigorously that Charles Steele in the Panama hat suspended his paint-brush*), the second paragraph switches to Charles's point of view, established through the free indirect presentation of his thoughts. However, there is no strong connection between the two characters except the fact that Charles is observing Betty as an object of his painting, since Charles is presented as only reflecting on his own experience.[3]

Daiches points out that the primary function of this shift in point of view is that a minor character is introduced to give a fleeting impression of a major character, but at the same time, this shift also reveals the minor character as 'an independent person with a life of his own somewhere in the background' (1945: 58). Daiches further argues that this viewpoint shift presents the momentary impingement of one character's life on another. But if the shift, as Daiches comments, conveys the idea that 'the lives of different men shade imperceptibly into each other' (1945: 58), the viewpoint shift in the following extract from *Mrs Dalloway* conveys a more perceptible shading of one's inner life into another:

(2) 'How delightful to see you!' said Clarissa. She said it to every one. How delightful to see you! She was at her worst—effusive, insincere. It

[3] The opening sentence of the second paragraph is ambiguous with respect to the attribution of viewpoint. It can be interpreted as the narratorial description of the scene; alternatively it can also be interpreted as the free indirect presentation of Charles's perception, as the emotive adjective *irritable* strongly evokes his feelings. If the former interpretation is adopted, then the anaphoric link between the pronoun *it* in this sentence and its antecedent *his paint-brush* at the end of the previous paragraph is natural. If the latter interpretation is adopted, then this anaphoric link is rather odd, because it establishes a link between the narrator's discourse and the viewpoint of Charles. But in either case, there is still no strong link between Betty's and Charles's viewpoints.

> was a great mistake to have come. He should have stayed at home and read his book, thought Peter Walsh; should have gone to a music hall; he should have stayed at home, for he knew no one.
>
> Oh dear, it was going to be a failure; a complete failure, Clarissa felt it in her bones as dear old Lord Lexham stood there apologising for his wife who had caught cold at the Buckingham Palace garden party. She could see Peter out of the tail of her eye, criticising her, there, in that corner. Why, after all, did she do these things? Why seek pinnacles and stand drenched in fire? Might it consume her anyhow! Burn her to cinders! Better anything, better brandish one's torch and hurl it to earth than taper and dwindle away like some Ellie Henderson! It was extraordinary how Peter put her into these states just by coming and standing in a corner. He made her see herself; exaggerate. It was idiotic. But why did he come, then, merely to criticise? (*MD*, 183-184)

This extract is taken from the scene in which Clarissa is greeting her guests at the beginning of the party. This passage starts with the presentation of Clarissa's speech. It is only after several sentences, with the attributing signal *thought Peter Walsh*, that we realise that the text is anchored in Peter Walsh's consciousness. It is Peter who is observing Clarissa's actions and then forming his evaluation of her and the party. The free indirect presentation of Clarissa's speech here is embedded in Peter's free indirect thought and conveys his sarcastic attitude. Immediately after the establishment of Peter's point of view in the first paragraph, the second paragraph shifts to Clarissa's viewpoint, signalled by the mental verbs indicating her mental activities (*she **felt** in her*

bones, she ***could see***) and the cluster of sentences presenting her thoughts in free indirect style. However, the shift in point of view does not simply juxtapose the two characters' consciousnesses. By accommodating two narrative points of view in this short extract, the text brings them closer to one another. And most importantly, there are textual cues that link the two distinct viewpoints. Peter's negative evaluation of Clarissa (*She was at her worst—effusive, insincere*) corresponds to Clarissa's negative evaluation of her organisation of the party, her sincere effort to bring people together (*Oh dear, it was going to be a failure; a complete failure*). It seems that Clarissa immediately perceives Peter's evaluation, even when he is only standing at a distance. This is made explicit from Clarissa's thought presented in the free indirect mode: *She could see Peter out of the tail of her eye, criticising her, there, in that corner*. The distal deixis (*there* and *that*) not only indicates the physical distance, but also shows the emotional distance Clarissa feels towards Peter when she knows that he is criticising her, and this is enhanced even further through the emphasis created by the apposition (*there, in that corner*). Thus the text creates an impression that Clarissa knows well what Peter is thinking. And this impression is reinforced by another textual cue: the question Clarissa is raising in her head (*But why did he come, then, merely to criticise?*) seems like a direct response to Peter's regret for coming to the party (*It was a great mistake to have come. He should have stayed at home…*). In contradistinction to Extract (1) in which the newly introduced character through the viewpoint shift provides a fleeting impression of another character without having any interaction with her, the shift in point of view in this extract

functions to highlight how Clarissa is anticipating and speculating on Peter's thoughts and then is affected by them, although neither speaks their thoughts out loud and we know that they are at a physical distance from each other. Thus the text strongly conveys what Sotirova calls 'a sense of permeability between the characters' minds' (2013: 149).

As can be seen from the above analysis, whereas shifts in point of view in *Jacob's Room* function as a technique to break the constraints of chronological and logical development of plots but result in a mechanical juxtaposition of individual experiences, in *Mrs Dalloway*, Woolf handles this technique better by also making it work towards the presentation of the relationship between different consciousnesses. In many cases, when a viewpoint shift takes place, there are textual cues that create a link between juxtaposed viewpoints, the effect of which is that different characters' consciousnesses are placed in connection with each other. In this way, the narrative technique of viewpoint shifts becomes an efficient means of rendering the inter-subjective orientedness of consciousness. I am not claiming that all instances of viewpoint shifts in this novel function in this way, but I want to stress that this use is pervasive enough and thus merits detailed examination.

Virginia Woolf herself seems to be conscious of this method of consciousness presentation, as she comments in her dairy on her design when composing *The Hours*, which eventually became *Mrs Dalloway*:

> I should say a good deal about *The Hours*, & my discovery; how I dig out beautiful caves behind my characters: I think that gives exactly

> what I want; humanity, humour, depth. The idea is that the caves shall connect, and each comes to daylight at the present moment. (*Dairy*, 30 August, 1923; Woolf, 1978: 263)

The caves behind the characters stand for the various moments of their life, which again spells out Woolf's interest in the exploration of psychological depth; the metaphor of the connected caves seems to reveal more of Woolf's notion of consciousness. Mary Gillis interprets this metaphor as indicating how Woolf frees her text from the constraints of chronological structure (1996: 115). The connection of the caves is realised through the mingling of different moments when one's present sensation sparks off past memories or when reflections on the past bring about fresh thoughts about the present. However, there is another layer of meaning underlying this metaphor. J. Hillis Miller, on noticing 'the unusual degree of access the characters have in the present to one another's minds' in *Mrs Dalloway*, remarks that 'to the continuity between the present and the past within the mind of a given character there must be added a relative continuity from one mind to another in the present' (1982: 191, 192). Therefore, the connection of the caves can be seen as the linking of various moments of inner life unbound by clock time both within the consciousness of an individual character and among different characters' minds. As my analysis of Extract (2) has shown, the connection of caves can be seen from the correspondence between Clarissa's and Peter's minds. And it is my contention that shifts in point of view function as an efficient linguistic means of connecting the 'caves' behind the characters.

The technique of viewpoint shifts is employed in the same fashion in *To the Lighthouse*. Apart from the second part of this novel which presents the decay of the empty house once occupied by the Ramsay family and the guests, the narrative weaves in and out of various characters' minds with great ease. As Susan Dick comments, '[the] narrator moves again [as in *Mrs Dalloway*] freely among the characters, entering their minds' (1989: 48). This comment indicates their pervasiveness in this later novel. Mitchell Leaska makes a specific comment on the high frequency of viewpoint shifts and the resulting complexity of the text:

> In this manifold stream-of-consciousness novel, there may be as many as four or five shifts of point of view within a single sentence; and precisely where the shift occurs is often not easy to determine. Moreover, there are occasional passages which are presented simultaneously from more than one point of view (1970: 20-21).

A similar observation is made by Justine Dymond in his reading of the first part of *To the Lighthouse*: 'the narrative weaves in and out of several perspectives as the characters circle around the Angel in the House, Mrs Ramsay. Sometimes the shifts in perspective occur within a single sentence' (2001: 142). While Dick (1989) and Leaska (1970) only give a description of the textual pattern created by shifts in point of view, Dymond comments briefly on the effects of this narrative technique: after providing a textual example which enacts a shift in point of view within a sentence, she remarks that 'the consciousnesses of the characters interconnect within paragraph and sentences' (2001: 142). However, she only notes the surface connection

without exploring how exactly one consciousness is related to another through language.

Pamela Caughie also points out that there is 'seamless shifting from one consciousness to another' in *To the Lighthouse*, and for her, this technique functions together with other narrative strategies such as 'the rendering of a multitude of impressions that pass through a character's mind in an instant' and 'the compression of mind' to 'reveal reality and consciousness as fluid' (2006: 489). The description of the rendered consciousness as "fluid" is intriguing. To say that the rendering of numerous impressions passing through an individual mind reveals consciousness as fluid indicates that consciousness is continuous and constantly flowing. Also it indicates that the flow of consciousness is not bound by clock time or strict logic. However, to say that the shift from one consciousness to another also reveals consciousness as fluid seems to suggest that consciousness is no longer perceived as being isolated from others and that it is possible to traverse the boundaries of different minds. In this sense, Caughie's comment again indicates that the narrative technique of viewpoint shifts in *To the Lighthouse* functions to render the inter-subjective relatedness of consciousness.

The Waves (1931), published four years after *To the Lighthouse*, is another famous work of consciousness presentation produced by Woolf. This novel also enacts shifts in point of view to present multiple characters' thoughts and sensations, but it employs a considerably different stylistic technique from the preceding novels. In *Jacob's Room*, *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*, the narrative fuses free indirect style and interior monologue to render the inner

worlds of characters, which results in a realistic rendering of consciousness, ranging from inchoate mental states to reflective conscious thoughts. By contrast, in *The Waves*, characters' thoughts are presented in a mode that approximates dramatic soliloquies, or as Daiches terms the mode, 'stylized monologues' (1945: 99). This peculiar mode creates an impression that each character articulates his or her thoughts and perceptions in a highly formalised language. As a result, the text acquires a strong sense of artificiality. Such an effect sharply differentiates this novel from the preceding ones. Due to this difference, *The Waves* is not included in the current investigation.

Taking into account both the functions and effects of shifts in point of view in the above four novels, I will focus my subsequent investigation on *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*, in which this narrative technique is employed to probe the possibility of interactive consciousness and thus displays maximum complexity. My central concern will be with the linguistic mechanisms for the rendering of this kind of complex connection between minds.

2.3 Towards a systematic account of the linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts

In the foregoing discussion, I have argued that shifts in point of view play an important role in Woolf's presentation of consciousness. This narrative strategy prompts readers to view consciousness not as isolated but in connection with others. It creates the connections between different consciousnesses through various linguistic indices that link different viewpoints. Despite the significance of this narrative design, there are only a

limited number of theoretical accounts providing a detailed investigation of the linguistic indices of this technique. This section examines these accounts. On the one hand, it considers the problems with earlier attempts to investigate this narrative phenomenon; on the other hand, it tests the validity of recent advances in this line of research.

2.3.1 Earlier attempts

In his study of *To the Lighthouse*, Leaska points out the lack of linguistic investigation into the linguistic mechanism associated with the manipulation of multiple points of view:

> no single study offers a systematic or comprehensive method of analysis for determining how the manipulation of, and the stylistics associated with, multiple points of view function rhetorically to clarify the meaning of a work. (1970: 19)

Leaska (1970) sets out to fill this theoretical gap by examining the presentation of multiple viewpoints in this novel. However, he approaches the manifold consciousnesses by isolating the points of view of different characters and studying them separately. He compares different language aspects associated with each of the characters: the mean sentence length, the degree of complexity of the sentence structure (clausal components and clause embedding), lexical choices (Latinate words or native Anglo-Saxon words, content words or function words), verb density (the use of participles, gerunds and infinitives), and the use of personal pronouns and abstract terms. According to him, statistical analysis of these aspects shows that the language of Mrs Ramsay, the

omniscient narrator and Lily Briscoe displays a higher degree of complexity while the language used by Mrs McNab is much simpler, which corresponds to the class status of each character. In this way, the differences of linguistic features help to distinguish different viewpoints.

Leaska's effort is mainly devoted to the exploration of stylistic features associated with each of the multiple points of view, but he does not elaborate much on the linguistic mechanics of the manipulation of multiple viewpoints, especially linguistic features that facilitate shifts in point of view. Leaska's study provides a detailed analysis of the stylistic characteristics that differentiate the viewpoints of different characters, but his approach misses the significance of Woolf's complex manipulation of multiple points of view. The importance of multiplicity resides more in the connection and interaction of various points of view than in the fact that more than one individual viewpoint is presented, and it is precisely the connections and interactions of multiple points of view that are still in need for a full investigation and explanation.

After Leaska (1970) identifies the theoretical gap in the study of Woolf's language of consciousness presentation, in an article in 1991, Carol Torsello brings up the same issue again:

> What has not yet been explained is just what it is, linguistically, that Woolf does in her text which results in the subtle shifts in point of view perceived by the reader. (1991: 159)

It seems that even two decades later the problem of the lack of linguistic accounts of Woolf's handling of multiple points of view still exists. Torsello

(1991) attempts to address this problem in her analysis of *To the Lighthouse* under the framework of functional grammar. According to her, the narratorial voice remains constant while different points of view of the characters emerge out of the narrative (Torsello, 1991: 159). In order to see how this kind of manipulation is accomplished, she examines the thematic structure and the process types in the opening pages of this novel. She isolates the linguistic factors highlighting the narratorial voice and those that indicate the emergence of a character's viewpoint. For example, a mental process with a character as the agent is likely to indicate this character's viewpoint; whereas when a mental process is given the pattern of material process (for example, *James Ramsay… endowed the picture of the refrigerator… with heavenly bliss*), the narratorial control is more obvious (Torsello, 1991: 167). The isolation of these linguistic features affords us some new insights in understanding how textual organisation might affect our interpretation of point of view. What is most relevant to the current thesis is that she identifies several linguistic correlates of viewpoint shifts. I list these linguistic aspects below with her examples for illustration (see Torsello, 1991: 167):

a) 'disjunct clause', for example:

(3) The wheelbarrow, the lawnmower, the sound of poplar trees, leaves whitening before rain, rooks cawing, brooms knocking, dresses rustling—all these were so coloured and distinguished in his mind that he had already his private code, his secret language, though he appeared the image of stark and uncompromising severity, with his high forehead

> and his fierce blue eyes, impeccably candid and pure, frowning slightly at the sight of human frailty. (*TL*: 7)

In this example, the long list of noun phrases at the beginning reflects James's perceptions, especially the definite article *the* before the nouns *wheelbarrow, lawnmower* and *sound,* because these objects are not mentioned in the preceding text, which means that they are perceived by someone who is familiar with them, that is, James. Therefore, Torsello states, the first clause in this passage presents James's point of view. The following clause is introduced by the conjunctive *though*, which, according to her, introduces a disjunct clause. Torsello claims that 'the disjunct *though* becomes the signpost indicating a subtle shift in point of view' (1991: 164). She argues that the verb *appear* indicates an observer, in this context, Mrs Ramsay. Therefore, the second clause must be interpreted as presenting Mrs Ramsay's viewpoint, which validates her claim that the disjunct clause signals a shift in viewpoint, from James to Mrs Ramsay.

The isolation of this grammatical category by Torsello (1991) points to the influence of syntactic structure on the interpretation of narrative point of view. However, she only takes the identified syntactic structure as a marker of viewpoint shifts but does not explore how the enacted shift affects the interpretation of the characters' thoughts juxtaposed in this sentence.

b) 'shift from generalization to specification of character's immediate situation with demonstrative temporal reference *now*', for example,

(4) Such were the extremes of emotion that Mr Ramsay excited in his children's breasts by his mere presence; standing, as now, lean as a knife, narrow as the blade of one, grinning sarcastically, not only with the pleasure of disillusioning his son and casting ridicule upon his wife, who was ten thousand times better in every way than he was (James thought), but also with some secret conceit at his own accuracy of judgement. (*TL*: 8)

This passage starts with a general description of how Mr Ramsay affects the emotions of his children. For Torsello, the plural form *children's* instead of a singular form *his* or *James's* indicates such a generalisation, which underlines the narrator's point of view. After the semicolon, the narration switches to a specific time, *now*, that is, the moment when Mr Ramsay tells James that the weather will not be fine. The text then goes on to describe how Mr Ramsay is perceived in James's eyes. According to her, 'the comparative circumstance *as now* […] takes us from the narrator-controlling generalization, through the narrator-controlled comparison, into the *now* of the world of the characters' (Torsello, 1991: 165).

Here Torsello is examining the viewpoint shift from the narrator to the character. Her identification of the proximal deictic *now* in fact points to one of the most important indices of free indirect style in presenting figural subjectivity (see Adamson (1994a, b) and Nikiforidou (2010) for the discussion of the WAS + now construction). But she does not concern herself with the use of this narrative mode or with the Modernist-specific development of this narrative mode for the presentation of consciousness.

c) ‘marked thematization of a prepositional phrase anticipating the point of view of a character’, for example:

(5) To her son, these words conveyed an extraordinary joy. (*TL*: 7)

According to Torsello, a declarative sentence normally takes a nominal phrase as its unmarked theme, but in the above sentence, the prepositional phrase becomes the theme of the sentence. With this marked theme, ‘the narrator announces his intention to tell his readers about the effect of Mrs Ramsay’s words on the child’, and ‘James’s interior world becomes his subject matter’ (1991: 162). Therefore, the marked thematisation of this prepositional phrase anticipates the point of view of James.

The prepositional phrase in the above example is an attributing signal for the interpretation of point of view. The marked thematisation of this signal facilitates the reader’s assignment of point of view. However, as I will explain in detail later in Chapter 5, attributing signals are used in a complex manner in Woolf’s texts. Their position varies, and different positions affect the interpretation of viewpoint in different ways.

Overall, Torsello’s research shows that a detailed examination of the formal aspects of the text can bring out new dimensions for the study of Woolf’s manipulation of narrative point of view, but she examines only a limited number of examples taken from the first two pages of the novel, a sample of text that is too short to reveal convincingly any significant textual patterns. Moreover, the cases of viewpoint shifts that she looks at are mostly shifts from narration to free indirect style; only occasionally her examples

show a viewpoint shift between different characters enacted in a stretch of text that presents figural consciousness in a more immediate manner through free indirect style and interior monologue. The shifts between narration and free indirect style actually involve features (such as Torsello's *now*) already identified by scholars in the long tradition of theorising free indirect style. Most crucially, Torsello does not explore the functions or effects of either viewpoint shifts between the narrator and the character or shifts between different characters. As I have made the case so far and will provide a strong support through more textual analysis in later chapters, shifts in point of view and their linguistic correlates play a key role in the presentation of the interactive nature of consciousness. However, the significance of this narrative technique for the presentation of fictional minds is entirely unaddressed in Torsello's study. Therefore, what is needed is not only a scrutiny of the whole novel but also a careful examination of the function of the linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts in the presentation of consciousness.

Ehrlich (1994, 1995) considers the repetition of narrative events as a signal for viewpoint shifts. According to her, there is a kind of 'narrative iconicity' in terms of the temporal organization of narrative events (1995: 78). In other words, the narrated events should correspond to their chronological order of occurrence in (supposed) reality. What indicates a narrative event is a predicate in the simple past tense. Such a predicate functions to move the narrative forward. When the same narrative event is repeated, the convention of temporal iconicity in narrative is violated and the repeated event would seem redundant, since it does not serve to move the reference time of the narrative

forward. Ehrlich suggests that in order for the repeated event not to appear redundant, the repetition must be viewed as stemming from different viewpoints. In the second mention of the event, it is still new information but from a different point of view, a new source of consciousness viewing the same event. This is how the repetition of narrative events can be a signal for a shift in point of view. As in the following extract, the repeated mention of Charles Tansley's speech act (*he said*; *this was said*; *when he said*) shifts the narrative viewpoint from Charles Tansley to Lily Briscoe:

(6) Judging the turn in her mood correctly— that she was friendly to him now— he was relieved of his egotism, […] One of his uncles kept the light on some rock or other off the Scottish coast, he said. He had been there with him in a storm. This was said loudly in a pause. They had to listen to him when he said that he had been with his uncle in a lighthouse in a storm. Ah, thought Lily Briscoe, as the conversation took this auspicious turn, and she felt Mrs Ramsay's gratitude. (*TL*: 100; Ehrlich's example, 1995: 86, and part of the extract is omitted due to its length)

Diana Lambert (2011: 24) also identifies the repetition of narrative events as an important device that bridges different narrative viewpoints. She calls it 'a Transitioning Event' or 'a Transitioning Image', and according to her, it functions through the following formula:

> Character A' point of view>> Event/ Image occurs>> Character A experiences Event/ Image>> Character B experiences Event/ Image>> Character B's point of view (Lambert, 2011: 24)

Apart from the repetition of narrative events, Lambert (2011) also adds to this category the repetition of objects, such as the aeroplane, the motor car and the striking of Big Ben in *Mrs Dalloway*. She argues that the use of transitioning events and transitioning objects helps to make shifts in point of view 'smooth and invisible' (Lambert, 2011: 23).

Indeed, the use of repetition plays an important part in Woolf's manipulation of narrative point of view. But neither Ehrlich (1994, 1995) nor Lambert (2011) takes the further step to investigate the effects of repetition on the portrayal of consciousness other than signalling a viewpoint shift. Lambert (2011: 23) briefly mentions that the repetition of a narrative event or an object creates a connection between disparate viewpoints. However, her account is more general and impressionistic than linguistically based. She does not elaborate on this point to explain what kind of connection is created and how exactly it is created.

2.3.2 Recent advances

As introduced in the previous chapter, Sotirova (2004, 2005, 2011) isolates three linguistic devices that interrelate different points of view based on their interactive meaning derived from their use in conversational practice: repetition, referring expressions and sentence-initial connectives. While she derives her theoretical account from the analysis of Lawrence's writing, her

recent studies (Sotirova, 2007, 2013) show that these three linguistic devices are also employed in Woolf's novels. I have summarised her arguments in the previous chapter. This section will bring in textual examples isolated by her from Woolf's texts in which the use of the three devices mirrors their use in conversation to signal interaction. I summarise her analysis of the examples below to show how her theoretical account advances from previous studies. At the same time, I will point out how this account can be expanded and developed into a more comprehensive and systematic study of Woolf's handling of shifts in point of view.

According to Sotirova (2005, 2007, 2011, 2013), the function of repetition in conversation to link different speakers' utterances and signal the speakers' joint building of talk is carried over into narrative texts to facilitate viewpoint shifts. In the following extract, the lexical and syntactic repetitions create a link between different viewpoints and connect the characters' subjective experiences:

(7) That the fishing season was bad; that the men were emigrating. They **were talking** about wages and unemployment. The young man **was abusing** the government. William Bankes, **thinking** what a relief it was to catch on to something of this sort when private life was disagreeable, **heard** him say something about 'one of the most scandalous acts of the present government'. Lily was listening; Mrs Ramsay was listening; they were all listening. But already bored, Lily felt that something was lacking; Mr Bankes felt that something was lacking. Pulling her shawl round her, Mrs Ramsay felt that something was lacking. All of them

> bending themselves to listen thought, 'Pray heaven that the inside of my mind may not be exposed' […] (*TL*: 102; adapted from Sotirova's example, 2007: 15; 2013: 150)

In this scene, William Bankes wants to stop himself from thinking about his own life by listening to the conversation of other guests during the dinner. The mental verbs *thinking* and *heard* with William Bankes as the subject anchor the text in his point of view. After the presentation of his thoughts and perceptions, the sentence subject changes to other characters (*Lily was listening; Mrs Ramsay was listening; they were all listening*) and thus effects a viewpoint shift. According to Sotirova, the syntactic parallelism and the lexical repetition (*listening*) '[align] Lily with Mrs Ramsay, and with all the other characters in a shared experience of the same event—*they were all listening*' (2013: 151). In what follows, the exact repetition (*felt something was lacking*) again unites the characters in sharing the same feeling (Sotirova, 2013: 151). While each of the three characters is thinking to themselves and secretly musing that no one would know their thoughts, the identity of their thoughts and feelings emphasised through the use of repetition indicates that consciousness is not entirely isolated and private. And Sotirova comments on the permeability of consciousness conveyed in this extract:

> Woolf manages to suggest that the minds of the characters are permeable to others' experiences and responses by twice cutting across perspectives in successive clauses, by juxtaposing the different perspectives and uniting them and making them semantically equivalent through the use of repetition and parallelism. (2013: 152)

As pointed out in Section 2.1.1 in this chapter, McLaurin (1984) and Dymond (2001) have both noted Woolf's presentation of shared subjective experiences or group consciousness. For them, this aspect of consciousness presentation puts into question the impenetrable boundaries of individual consciousness. But their discussions mainly focus on the content of the texts. Sotirova (2013) draws attention to the very form of the texts by examining the linguistic indices of shared subjective experiences, in this case, repetition. And what is especially illuminating in Sotirova's account of repetition is that she does not merely take it as a formal trigger of a new narrative point of view as Ehrlich (1994, 1995) does. She considers this use as a way of showing the possible connections among different minds.

Referential links are, according to Sotirova (2013), another linguistic factor that helps to present the inter-subjective relatedness between different consciousnesses. In the following extract, the referential links in the form of pro-form and pronominal substitution connect the juxtaposed thoughts of the two characters when the narrative point of view shifts from one to the other:

(8) 'I often wish I'd got on better with your father', he said.

'But he never liked anyone who—our friends', said Clarissa; and could have bitten her tongue for thus reminding Peter that he had wanted to marry her.

Of course I **did**, thought Peter; **it** almost broke my heart too, he thought; and was overcome with his own grief, which rose like a moon looked at

from a terrace, ghastly beautiful with light from the sunken day. (*MD*: 45-46; adapted from Sotirova's example, 2013: 134)

Clarissa is about to mention that Peter wanted to marry her when she realises that this could upset him. So she repairs her words without finishing the intended sentence. What she leaves unsaid is revealed in the presentation of her thought in free indirect style. Curiously, as Sotirova points out, although Clarissa does not articulate her thought, when the text shifts to Peter Walsh's viewpoint in the third paragraph to present his thought in the mode of interior monologue, he seems to pick up on what Clarissa has left unsaid. This impression is created through the textual link of Peter's interior monologue to Clarissa's free indirect thought: the interpretation of the pro-form *did* and the pronoun *it* in Peter's interior monologue depends discoursally on Clarissa's unarticulated thoughts. In this way, the referential link bridges the two characters' viewpoints and conveys the interactive connection between them. The inter-subjectivity of consciousness is encoded in the formal features of the text.

Similar to the use of referential linking, as Sotirova (2007, 2013) makes clear, sentence-initial connectives also function to link different narrative points of view and place them in interaction, as in the following extract:

(9) Getting up she stood at the window with the reddish-brown stocking in her hands partly to turn away from him, partly because she did not mind looking now, with him watching, at the Lighthouse. **For** she knew that he had turned his head as she turned; he was watching her. She knew

> that he was thinking, You are more beautiful than ever. **And** she felt very beautiful. Will you not tell me just for once that you love me? He was thinking that, for what with Minta and his book, and its being the end of the day and their having quarrelled about going to the Lighthouse. **But** she could not do it; she could not say it. Then, knowing that he was watching her, instead of saying anything she turned, holding her stocking, and looked at him. **And** as she looked at him she began to smile, for though she had not said a word, he knew, of course he knew, that she loved him. He could not deny it. **And** smiling she looked out of the window and said (thinking to herself, Nothing on earth can equal this happiness)—
>
> 'Yes, you were right. It's going to be wet tomorrow.'
>
> She had not said it, but he knew it. **And** she looked at him smiling. **For** she had triumphed again. (*TL*: 133-134; Sotirova's example, 2007: 11-12; 2013: 141-146; part of the extract is omitted due to its length)

This extract conveys both Mrs Ramsay's and Mr Ramsay's consciousness, although, as Sotirova (2013: 142) points out, it is not entirely clear whether the sentences that reveal Mr Ramsay's thoughts originate directly from his viewpoint or they are Mrs Ramsay's reconstruction of her husband's mind. The prominent use of sentence-initial connectives creates a strong sense of dialogical exchanges between the two characters' consciousnesses. This sense gets the strongest when the narrative mode switches from free indirect style to interior monologue to reveal Mr Ramsay's thought (*Will you not tell me just for once that you love me?*). The direct question strongly evokes Mr Ramsay's

subjectivity. And when the text returns to Mrs Ramsay's response to this demand (*But she could not do it; she could not say it*), the sentence-initial *but*, through its semantic meaning of contrast and through its conversational overtones, links their thoughts 'as if they were engaged in real conversation' (Sotirova, 2013: 144).

Apart from the three linguistic features summarised above, my observations show that there are other important linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts that function to create connections between different characters' consciousnesses in Woolf's novels. The isolation of the above three devices can be seen as an initial step towards a systematic examination of the linguistic mechanisms of viewpoint shifts, but none of the scholars who have contributed to isolating these features had as their primary concern an exhaustive study of linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts. So, in all existing studies these indices crop up and are analysed in the course of investigating a different problem. Thus, a more thorough and fuller investigation of viewpoint shifts is needed and will hopefully illuminate most of the possible mechanisms through which this can be done in novels of consciousness.

My exploration of the linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts in this thesis follows a bottom-up approach. Instead of having a unified overarching theoretical framework, the examination is mainly text driven. I started with a line-by-line attribution of narrative viewpoint in order to identify where shifts in point of view take place. Markers of subjectivity (see Banfield, 1982: 28; reviewed in the previous chapter) and attributing signals such as *thought Mrs Ramsay* and *he wondered* are primary textual cues that aid viewpoint

attribution, but each sentence is also interpreted in its context, especially when there are no explicit markers of subjectivity or signals of viewpoint attribution. That this investigation starts from the sentence level does not mean that it is restricted to sentential units. I examine the patterns of viewpoint shifts both within sentences and across sentences. And even when examining individual sentences, I consider each sentence as a discoursal unit. Given that the two novels selected as my research data are not too long, it is possible to conduct this manual tagging and analysis.

After demarcating individual viewpoints, all textual segments that involve viewpoint shifts were extracted into a database, which is used as the basis for the establishment of the set of features that function as linguistic mechanisms of viewpoint shifts. This database includes lengthy textual examples, which, due to the space limitations, cannot be included in this thesis. Although my study is not quantitative in the sense of using computational tools or other ways of automatic tagging and calculating frequencies, I have conducted qualitative analyses, which I believe can shed light on the functions and effects of shifts in point of view as a particular narrative technique and which have some quantitative validity because they are based on annotating both novels in full.

On the basis of the database that I have created, the following linguistic features are isolated as important mechanisms of viewpoint shifts: discourse parentheticals, attributing parentheticals, adjacency pairs, connectives, and repetition.[4] Since repetition as a linguistic correlate of viewpoint shifts has

[4] In the two novels, there are some examples where shifts in point of view occur but no linguistic features stand out as clear mechanisms that enact the shifts or link different

been analysed in existing accounts (Ehrlich, 1990; Sotirova, 2005, 2011, 2013) and there is not anything more that my investigation can add to them, it is not analysed in this thesis. The remaining four linguistic features will be the focus of the subsequent chapters. The two categories of parentheticals mainly operate at the sentence level. The investigation of connectives expands Sotirova's (2004, 2011, 2013) account by broadening the scope from sentence-initial coordinators to both coordinating and non-coordinating connectives either in sentence-initial or mid-sentence position. The examination of the format of adjacency pairs is concerned with viewpoint shifts beyond the sentence level. In her analysis, Sotirova makes a fleeting comment that various discourse ties link different characters' consciousnesses in a manner that resembles adjacency pairs in conversation (2013: 136; 147). But she does not pursue the concept of adjacency pairs in depth either in terms of its formal varieties or in terms of its underlying operation principle; neither does she elaborate on how exactly the narrative text resembles this conversational pattern. My investigation of this feature will fill in this gap. Although I do not comment on each and every instantiation of a particular feature, I base my list of linguistic mechanisms on an exhaustive classification that takes into account all examples of viewpoint shifts in the two chosen novels. My analysis is thus qualitative in nature, but supported by a thorough scrutiny of texts.

So far, there is strong evidence of Woolf's practice of inscribing shifts in viewpoint in her texts. This is identified by literary critics who have an intuition for the shifts occurring without pinning down how and where

viewpoints, but there are not many such cases. Due to space limitations, these cases are not included in this thesis.

precisely they do occur. This is also commented on by more linguistically minded scholars, who, although not having as their primary focus the issue of identifying indices of viewpoint shifts, analyse a number of devices associated with such shifts through their exploration of other issues related to consciousness presentation. I have been arguing that the indices of viewpoint shifts need to be identified with greater precision and analysed in more detail in their own right. I have also put forward an argument about their importance to the presentation of consciousness. But is this importance only evident to the scholars who are trained in literary interpretation? In order to show that the study of viewpoint shifts is important and that viewpoint shifts have an effect on readers, therefore, in the chapter immediately following and before I proceed to analyse the linguistic mechanisms of viewpoint shifts, I will digress temporarily from texts to readers and take an empirical approach to shifts in point of view as further support for the argument that this narrative technique plays an important part in Woolf's presentation of consciousness. While shifts in point of view in Woolf's novels have been discussed by academic researchers, it is not clear how real readers actually respond to this textual phenomenon. Meanwhile, I have suggested earlier in Section 2.1.2 that frequent shifts in point of view may draw readers' attention to the juxtaposition of viewpoints and prompt them to look at one character's consciousness in relation to another. Thereby this narrative technique is likely to guide readers towards identifying the connections between different minds created by various textual links. However, such an assumption would be based on the condition that readers detect shifts in point of view or at least become aware of the

complexity of consciousness and viewpoint presentation. With the aim of finding out how shifts in point of view affect readers' textual processing, I conducted an experiment that studies reader responses to this narrative phenomenon, and the following chapter will report the design and results of this empirical research.

Chapter 3 An empirical study of shifts in narrative point of view

3.1 Introduction

Towards the end of the previous chapter, I have spelled out the need for an empirical study that examines how readers react to shifts in point of view in Woolf's novels. The following questions underpin the reader-response research that I conducted: Would readers detect shifts in point of view in Woolf's texts or perceive the complexity of narrative viewpoints? Would readers process texts with shifts in point of view differently from texts with a consistent viewpoint? In what ways do shifts in point of view affect readers' textual processing? This chapter answers these questions based on the findings of this empirical study.

The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 3.2 below will review existing empirical studies of point of view to see how findings in these studies can inform the current investigation. In Section 3.3, the design of this study will be introduced. Section 3.4 will summarise and analyse the results, and Section 3.5 will conclude this chapter by highlighting the findings of this study and discussing the implications for the central investigation of this thesis.

3.2 Empirical research on narrative point of view

Empirical research has already been conducted to investigate the effects of narrative point of view on readers. Studies have shown that narrative point of view can affect several aspects of reader responses. László (1986) shows that internal focalisation can influence readers' recall of the story elements.

Experiments carried out by Dixon et al. (1993) suggest that the manipulation of the degree of certainty in the narrator's point of view can affect readers' appreciation of a story. Other researchers have investigated how narrative viewpoint affects readers' emotive responses to the text. For instance, the study conducted by Dixon & Bortolussi (1996) shows that participants tend to evaluate a character more positively when his or her speech is presented in free indirect style; Bray (2007b) also reports that free indirect presentation of a character's thought can create empathy in readers, although the effect is not as pervasive as theorists have tended to assume. Van Peer & Pander Maat (1996, 2001) report the correlation between narrative point of view and readers' interpretation of characters' motives and behaviours. And Hakemulder & Koopman (2010) find that free indirect presentation of speech and thought can even affect readers' judgement of characters with an immoral attitude. All these studies indicate that readers are sensitive to point of view in their processing and interpretation of narrative texts.

Increasing attention is also drawn to the assignment of narrative point of view by readers. Sotirova (2006) and Bray (2007a) have investigated how readers assign point of view for texts written in free indirect style with the aim of testing the dual voice hypothesis in the interpretation of this narrative mode (see Section 1.4 in Chapter 1 for the review of the voice debate). The results of their studies show that readers' responses vary; there are results supporting both the single-voice and the dual-voice account. Although these studies do not offer a definitive solution to the theoretical controversies, the various responses shown in the results demonstrate the potential challenge posed to readers by a

narrative text that presents narrative point of view in a complex way such as through the mode of free indirect style. And a further question arises: what kind of challenge would be posed to readers when free indirect style fuses with other narrative modes and enacts shifts in point of view as in Woolf's texts?

An early study (Black et al., 1979) examines the effect of shifts in point of view on reading speed. The results show that participants read texts maintaining a consistent point of view faster than texts exhibiting a change in viewpoint, and they also rated texts with a consistent point of view higher in the degree of comprehensibility than those with a change in viewpoint. However, the texts used in that study are artificially made up specifically for an experimental purpose, which means, on the one hand, that these are not texts likely to be encountered by readers in their ordinary reading, and on the other hand, that the texts are too simplified compared with naturally occurring literary texts. The texts invented for their experiments are either single sentences or short extracts of three-sentence length, and the designers only manipulated the presentation of point of view by changing verbs of motion such as *come* and *go*. Millis (1995) makes an advance in that he uses a text taken from a published novel to examine readers' encoding and updating of narrative point of view during their reading process. In his study, participants were instructed to read the extract sentence by sentence while they controlled the pace of reading by pressing the advance key. And they were asked to read the same extract twice so that the experimenter could compare the differences in reading times. Millis (1995) reports that it took participants approximately 700 milliseconds longer to read sentences which introduced a perspective

change than sentences which did not. This, according to him, indicates that readers incorporate perspective in their processing of the text and update it as they read along. However, he points out, the difference in the reading time only holds for the first reading but not the second one, which suggests the possibility that readers have encoded perspective in the first reading and thus do not have to re-compute it again during the second reading. The focus of Millis's (1995) study is on shifts in point of view between the character and the narrator, but his study indicates that shifts in point of view indeed affect readers' processing of texts. A prominent aspect of the influence that viewpoint shifts have on readers, as findings in both Black et al. (1979) and Millis (1995) show, is that this narrative phenomenon is likely to slow down their textual processing.

In a recent study, Sotirova (in press (b)) investigates readers' processing of viewpoint shifts in a text from *Mrs Dalloway* that involves the presentation of more than three characters' speeches and thoughts. The narrative point of view shifts among different characters, and sometimes the shifts occur even within a single sentence. Participants in this experiment were given the chance to read through the passage to familiarise themselves with the text, and then they were asked to identify 'whose viewpoint (or voice) is expressed throughout the text' (Sotirova (in press (b)). They were instructed both to write down the name of the narrative participant whose viewpoint the text is aligned with for each line of the text and to demarcate the viewpoint boundaries. Results of this experiment show that readers do identify shifts in narrative viewpoint. In fact, they perceive a lot of viewpoint shifts. As Sotirova (in press (b)) notices, almost every sentence could initiate a shift in point of view for at least one

participant. It is possible that the participants became over-sensitive to the interpretation of point of view when they were assigned the task of viewpoint attribution. However, as Sotirova remarks, 'the high number of shift boundaries suggests that in a text with rapid shifts in the narrative viewpoint, readers struggle to maintain continuity in their interpretations' (in press (b)). While the initial aim of Sotirova's study is to find out how readers assign narrative point of view and where they locate the boundaries between different viewpoints in a text difficult in terms of viewpoint presentation, the struggle of the participants in assigning narrative viewpoints shows the high demand a text with viewpoint shifts places on them.

Sotirova's (in press (b)) study can be seen as a qualitative approach to the processing of viewpoint shifts. In comparison, the current study combines both quantitative and qualitative approaches in the investigation. It aims to find out:

a) Whether readers detect shifts in point of view in a narrative text;
b) Whether readers process texts with shifts in point of view more slowly than texts with a consistent point of view;
c) Whether readers find texts with shifts in point of view more difficult than texts with a consistent point of view.

3.3 Experiment design

3.3.1 Material

One passage was selected from *To the Lighthouse* (see Passage 4 in Appendix 1). This passage presents two characters' speech and thought, with the narrative point of view shifting between the two characters. For the purpose

of comparison, another three passages with a consistent narrative point of view were also selected: one from the same novel (see Passage 3 in Appendix 1), the other two from Jane Austen's novel *Sense and Sensibility* (1811) and Katherine Mansfield's short story "Life of Ma Parker" (1922) respectively (Passage 1 and 2 in Appendix 1). The four passages are of similar length, each containing around 260 words. Despite the fact that these passages were presented to the participants out of context, the participants were expected to still be able to get a general idea of the narrative events in the texts, as the plots are quite simple—each passage presents one or two characters' thoughts and feelings regarding a certain matter.

All of the four passages are mainly in the mode of free indirect style, but they represent different stages in the development of this mode: Passage 1 from Jane Austen exemplifies free indirect style when it first became mature in the English novel while the remaining three demonstrate the evolution of this style in the Modernist period. The differences manifest both on the lexico-grammatical level and in terms of the transition between the mode of free indirect style and other narrative modes. Passage 1 displays a more formal style, as it contains more abstract lexis and subordinating constructions, whereas the other three passages tend to use simpler syntax and less abstract vocabulary, which brings the text closer to spoken language. Passage 1 starts with a sentence of psycho-narration conveying the character's non-verbal inner states, which serves as an introduction to or a framing for the subsequent free indirect presentation of her more reflective and formulated thought; the other three start with sentences of free indirect style, but there are free transitions between free

indirect style and interior monologue as the text progresses. The free transition between different narrative modes is consistent with Sotirova's observation of the disintegration of narrative modes in Modernist writing (2013; in press (a)). The conflation of different narrative modes is likely to create greater ambiguity in the interpretation of point of view. Thus, although the four passages all employ free indirect style as the dominant narrative mode, there is variation in the degree of complexity among them regarding the manipulation of point of view. I think such variation would enrich the findings of this empirical study.

3.3.2 Participants

Thirty-eight students/staff participated in this study, among whom 26 were studying for a Bachelor's degree or had obtained one as their highest education degree, and 12 were enrolled on postgraduate degrees. 17 of the participants were studying or had studied subjects related to English language and literature, and the remaining 21 had not. Only one participant had taken the Narratology module and had learned about free indirect style, two participants reported to have a vague notion about free indirect style, and the rest had not taken any narratology or stylistics courses and did not know about free indirect style. One participant had read Austen's *Sense and Sensibility* and still remembered it well, and another two participants had read it before but did not remember it well. One participant had read Woolf's *To the Lighthouse* and still remembered it well. No participants had read the selected short story written by Mansfield. Therefore, the knowledge that participants had about both the notion of free indirect style and the passages was not likely to be a crucial factor that could lead to significant differences in the reader responses in general. The survey of

participants' reading practices shows that nearly one third of the participants read novels fairly frequently: 12 participants reported to read one novel per week on average, 18 participants read one novel during one to three months on average, and eight participants read one novel in half a year on average or less frequently than this.[5]

3.3.3 Procedure

All participants at the start of the study were informed that they would be reading four narrative passages on the computer screen. They were told that these passages would be displayed on the screen one at a time and that they could control the pace by pressing the spacebar to advance from one passage to the next. Also, all participants were instructed to read these passages as naturally as they could and at their normal speed of reading, just the way in which they read novels at home. And they were informed that they did not have to memorise anything but had to make sure that they understood what was going on in the text. The computer recorded the reading time of each passage in milliseconds. After finishing reading these passages, participants were guided to read the same passages again to answer the question: whose point(s) of view is each passage narrated from? All participants were told that there were no right or wrong answers to this question. The reading time of each passage was also recorded by the computer. After they assigned the narrative point(s) of view for all four passages, the participants were given a questionnaire to rate each passage between 1—6 both in terms of difficulty in

[5] The current study has not examined whether the frequent and non-frequent readers respond to shifts of point of view differently. The reading frequency is surveyed to gather background information about the participants to aid the explanation of their responses, for instance, some may find all the passages very easy.

comprehension and in terms of difficulty in the viewpoint attribution (1=very easy, 6=very difficult) (see Appendix 2 for the questionnaire). Following the rating, the participants were also given the chance to mark out any parts of the passages that they found difficult or confusing and write down any comments.

The decision to let the participants assign narrative viewpoint for the whole passages instead of sentence by sentence was made based on the consideration of naturalness in the reading process. It might sound paradoxical to speak of naturalness in the experimental situation. Reading several non-related passages out of context on a computer screen and answering a questionnaire after reading are by no means natural, but this experiment tries to reduce the influence of the experimental situation as best as it could. While it is possible that readers encode narrative point of view as they read along, it is not certain whether readers specify the narrative viewpoint in each and every sentence they read (Hall, 2008: 27). At the same time, the interpretation of narrative point of view is a dynamic process. Readers might revise their viewpoint attribution after reading the subsequent text. This is why the current study investigates participants' attribution of point of view based on their interpretation of the whole passages. Asking the participants to identify the narrative point of view in each sentence would be an easy way to examine whether they detect shifts in viewpoint and where in the text they perceive the shifts, but it seems to go against the natural way of reading, and readers might become over-sensitive to the presentation of point of view especially when facing a difficult text and thus perceive more shifts than they do when they are less conscious of the viewpoint presentation.

Although the measure of reading times cannot reveal whether readers perceive shifts in viewpoint or where they perceive the shifts, it can still reflect readers' processing of the text. It has been pointed out that 'one virtue of using reading times is that they provide an on-line measure of processing, which is difficult to gauge from off-line tasks' (Millis, 1995: 251). As introduced in the previous section, an early study by Black et al. (1979) has shown the correlation between reading speed and shifts in point of view in the case of invented texts. If readers have to register shifts in point of view in the selected passage in the current study, this processing effort is likely to be reflected in longer reading time.

The rereading task was set up so that the experiment could examine the reading times both when readers were reading for general comprehension and when they were prompted to read for the specific task of assigning narrative point of view. The processing of point of view can be one factor that affects the reading time when readers encounter a text for the first time, but there are also other factors that can slow down the reading process. However, when asked to assign narrative viewpoint for each passage, participants will be concentrating on this particular task. Thus the second reading can target specifically the processing of point of view and the reading time can be a reflection of viewpoint interpretation. Meanwhile, readers might have already identified the narrative viewpoint(s) in each passage from their first reading, and the second reading would offer a chance for them to check again to either confirm or revise their interpretation of narrative point of view. As participants had already familiarised themselves with the passages, the time of the second

reading was expected to be shorter than the first reading in general. However, if they struggle to specify the viewpoint, the second reading could also take longer than the first reading. As the results of this experiment show, there are indeed such cases. Regardless of whether the second reading takes longer than the first, if participants have difficulty in assigning point of view for any of the selected passages, it is likely that the difficult passages would take the longest among the four. There is also the possibility that some participants recognised the complexity of the shifts in viewpoint but finished assigning the viewpoints fast. This is why participants were also asked to rate the selected passages in terms of difficulty in comprehension and difficulty in viewpoint attribution.

Combining quantitative and qualitative methods, the comparison of reading times in both readings, together with participants' attribution of viewpoint and their rating of difficulty, should be able to reveal how they process the presentation of viewpoint in the selected passages, and especially how they respond to shifts in narrative viewpoint.

3.4 Results and analysis

3.4.1 The attribution of narrative point of view

As can be seen from Tables 1—4, the answers for the attribution of point of view in Passage 1, 2 and 3 show a great degree of unanimity, with more than 60% of the participants assigning the texts to the viewpoint of Elinor, Gran and Mrs Ramsay respectively. By contrast, with respect to Passage 4, while there are still more participants who give the answer that the text is narrated from both Lily's and Mr Ramsay's point of view, this answer is not as predominant

as in the case of the other three passages, with 42.1% giving this answer and another 57.9% providing a variety of other answers.

Table 1. The attribution of point of view in Passage 1 (Austen: *Sense and Sensibility*)

Attribution	Elinor	Elinor in 3rd person	3rd person narrator	Other
Number of participants	23	3	5	7*
Percentage	60.5%	7.9%	13.2%	18.4%

*(3: Edward; 2: a friend of Elinor; 1: Lucy; 1: Elinor refers to the viewpoint of her mother, sisters and Fanny)

Table 2. The attribution of point of view in Passage 2 (Mansfield: *Life of Ma Parker*)

Attribution	Gran	Gran in 3rd person	3rd person narrator	Other
Number of participants	23 (including 2 participants who think some part shifts to Lennie)	2	5	8*
Percentage	60.5%	5.2%	13.2%	21.1%

*(2: Lennie; 2: a grandchild; 2: someone related to Gran; 1: Lennie's mother; 1: Gran's deceased husband)

Table 3. The attribution of point of view in Passage 3 (Woolf: *To the Lighthouse*)

Attribution	Mrs Ramsay	Mrs Ramsay in 3rd person	3rd person narrator	Other
Number of participants	28	3	4	3*
Percentage	73.7%	7.9%	10.5%	7.9%

*(1: a close friend of Mrs Ramsay; 1: someone not present in the text; 1: a family friend)

Table 4. The attribution of point of view in Passage 4 (Woolf: *To the Lighthouse*)

Attribution	Lily and Mr Ramsay	Lily	Mr Ramsay	Lily and Mr Ramsay in 3rd person	3rd person narrator	Other
Number of participants	16 (including 5 participants explicitly pointing out the shift)	3	7	3	6	3*
Percentage	42.1%	7.9%	18.4%	7.9%	15.8%	7.9%

*(1: a friend of Lily; 1: ambiguous narrator; 1: someone not present in the text)

The fact that assigning multiple viewpoints to Passage 4 is the predominant answer shows that the phenomenon of viewpoint shifts is recognised by a good number of participants, and in fact, this phenomenon is quite prominent for some of them, as five have explicitly pointed out the shifts in point of view. However, this is not the case for every participant; a large percentage of participants also failed to identify the multiplicity of viewpoints. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that shifts in point of view have no influence on these participants. While in the cases of the other three passages, the majority of participants mainly need to decide whether to assign a passage to the viewpoint of a character or the narrator or both, more choices open up for them regarding the viewpoint attribution in Passage 4. The more varied answers in the assignment of viewpoint shown in the results are highly likely to be a consequence of the shifts, as there are both participants who attributed this passage to Mr Ramsay's point of view and participants who attributed it to Lily's point of view. In addition, one other participant assigned

the passage to an ambiguous narrator, which may also be explained by this particular narrative feature of Passage 4.

What can be concluded from the above results is that, although not all the participants recognised the viewpoint shifts in Passage 4, the varied answers provided by them can be seen as strong evidence that the inconsistency in narrative viewpoint has caused confusion for a significant number of participants. The contrast between Passage 4 and the other three passages in terms of the degree of unanimity in participants' answers for viewpoint attribution effectively suggests that shifts in point of view are a disturbing factor in the processing of texts. In the next section, I will examine whether this conclusion can be verified by the results of ratings given by participants both in terms of difficulty in comprehension and difficulty in viewpoint attribution.

3.4.2 The rating of difficulty

In order to assess the difficulty in comprehension of each passage, the participants were asked the following question:

> Which text did you find easier to read and understand? Please rate each text from 1—6 in terms of difficulty of comprehension (1= very easy; 6= very difficult).

Table 5 is a summary of the results.

If the mean rating (total score / number of participants) is examined, none of the four passages is considered difficult to comprehend by all the participants (for a scale from 1 to 6, if the rating of 1 means very easy and 6 means very difficult, a mean rating above 3.5 would be seen as the statistical

indication that readers feel the text difficult to comprehend). This is understandable, since all the participants are native speakers of English with a higher education degree. If the total score is examined, it can be seen that Passage 4 gets the highest score in terms of difficulty in comprehension.

Table 5. The rating of difficulty in comprehension

Rating / Number of participants	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mean rating	Total score
Passage 1	10	10	8	5	5	0	2.6	99
Passage 2	9	14	11	3	1	0	2.3	87
Passage 3	15	17	4	2	0	0	1.8	69
Passage 4	8	9	11	5	5	0	2.7	104

However, there are various factors that can make a passage difficult for its readers. If the high rating of difficulty in Passage 4 is caused solely by the shifts in point of view, then the fact that Passage 1 gets a score close to that of Passage 4 cannot be explained. The reason why participants read Passage 1 slowly probably lies in the fact that its language is more difficult compared with the other three Modernist passages. It contains several long sentences with multiple layers of subordination (for example, *He had been blameable, highly blameable in remaining at Norland after he first felt her influence over him to be more than it ought to be.*). Also it includes several abstract nouns, such as *resentment*, *indignation*, and *tranquillity*. These words are derived through nominalisation. In other words, a clause denoting a 'process' (Halliday: 1985: 102) (*she resented such behaviour; she was indignant; her mood was tranquil*) is coded as a noun. Thus such words would require more processing effort theoretically. In addition, some expressions in this passage are rather formal, for example,

feigned a regard for her, *deprived himself of all the chance*, and *regain tranquillity*. The language of Passage 4, in comparison, is much simpler. Syntactically it contains more coordination, and many of the clauses are short. Lexically, there is less nominalisation, and several words are repeated (for example, *The Lighthouse! The Lighthouse!*; *would have done something, said something*). Due to these factors, Passage 4 should be easier to comprehend than Passage 1. However, the statistical data does not suggest so.

A comparison of Passage 4 with Passage 3 is helpful in seeking an explanation for the difficulty of comprehension in Passage 4. Among the four passages, Passage 3 gets the lowest score, and it is considerably lower compared with the score of Passage 4. Meanwhile, the highest rating of Passage 3 is 4 in terms of difficulty in comprehension, and only two participants gave this rating; contrastingly, the highest rating of Passage 4 is 5, and five participants gave this score and another five gave the rating of 4. This is significant, since these two passages are from the same novel. One major difference between Passage 3 and Passage 4 is that the former is narrated from a consistent point of view whereas the latter shifts point of view more than once. Therefore, the shift in viewpoint is likely to have caused this difference in the ratings of these two passages.

What remains to be found out is whether participants actually consider the attribution of point of view in Passage 4 more difficult than the other three passages. In order to assess the difficulty in the viewpoint attribution of each passage, the participants were asked the following question:

Which text did you find easier in terms of interpreting and assigning the narrative point of view? Please rate each text from 1—6 in terms of difficulty of viewpoint attribution (1= very easy; 6= very difficult).

Table 6. **Difficulty in the attribution of point of view**

Rating / No. of participants	1	2	3	4	5	6	Mean rating	Total score
Passage 1	14	11	6	4	3	0	2.2	85
Passage 2	4	12	11	7	2	2	2.9	111
Passage 3	15	15	6	2	0	0	1.9	71
Passage 4	7	9	9	6	6	1	2.9	112

Table 7. **Percentage of participants rating passages as difficult in viewpoint attribution**

Rating	1—3	4—6
Passage 1	81.6%	18.4%
Passage 2	71.1%	28.9%
Passage 3	94.7%	5.3%
Passage 4	65.8%	34.2%

Table 6 shows the results of the ratings provided by the participants regarding the difficulty in viewpoint attribution. Again, judging by the mean rating, none of the four passages is considered difficult in the attribution of point of view by the participants in general. However, if the total scores of the passages are compared, Passage 2 and 4 stand out. This is more obvious in the comparison of the percentages of participants who rated the passages at 4 and above (Table 7). It can be seen that more than one third of the participants

found Passage 4 difficult in terms of assigning the narrative point of view. Passage 2 also gets a relatively high percentage of participants who considered it difficult in the viewpoint attribution, especially compared with Passage 3.

The attribution of point of view in Passage 2 is difficult mostly because the passage contains one instance of the use of first person pronoun *my dove*, which is the term that Gran uses to address her grandson Lennie in the short story. The occurrence of the first person in the third-person context is confusing to the participants. In addition, there is one sentence (*She's had a hard life, has Ma Parker*) included in quotation marks, which, in fact, is Gran recalling other people's comments about herself. Reading the whole short story, readers would easily identify this quotation as an instance of direct speech embedded in free (in)direct thought, but as the participants were reading out of context, this sentence turned out to be challenging. Several participants have marked out these two places.

Passages 3 and 4 again form a sharp contrast in that the former gets the lowest total score and the latter gets the highest in terms of difficulty in viewpoint attribution. The highest rating of Passage 3 is 4, and there are only two participants who gave it this rating; but Passage 4 was rated by one participant at 6, six participants gave it the rating of 5, and another six gave it the rating of 4. This contrast again points to the fact that Passage 3 is narrated from a consistent point of view whereas Passage 4 contains shifts in viewpoint.

So far, the overall result is roughly consistent with the hypothesis that passages involving shifts in point of view tend to be more difficult to

comprehend and more difficult for readers to determine the narrative viewpoint. The rest of this section will examine the length of reading times in order to determine if these ratings are reflected in them.

3.4.3 Reading time

There are two participants who forgot to press the spacebar to stop the timing for particular passages, and their reading times are excluded from the data. Therefore only the reading times of 36 participants are considered valid. For each participant, a mean reading speed of each passage is calculated (reading time / word number), and the reading time of each passage is counted by milliseconds/100 words for ease of comparison (see Appendix 3). As participants have different reading speeds in general, the comparison of reading times is made separately on each participant's data. That is, only the reading times of the four passages by the same participant are compared to see which passage a particular participant reads the most slowly; the reading times of the same passage by different participants are not compared.

Table 8 shows the number of participants with the lowest reading speed for each passage. In the first reading, there are 20 participants who spent the longest reading Passage 1 among the four passages, and 11 participants whose reading speed of Passage 4 is the lowest. Two participants read Passage 2 the most slowly and three participants read Passage 3 the most slowly. This is roughly consistent with the result of the rating of difficulty in comprehension given by the participants. In other words, the result from the comparison of the reading times and the result from the comparison of ratings show that Passage

1 and Passage 4 are relatively more difficult than the other two passages for readers in terms of general comprehension. Apart from the linguistic features which may have caused the difficulty in comprehension mentioned earlier (Section 3.4.2), Passage 1 demanded the slowest processing from many participants probably also because this was the first passage that the participants read in this experiment and they needed some extra time to adjust themselves to the reading process. The fact that the number of participants who read Passage 1 the most slowly decreased considerably in the second reading seems to support this point.

Table 8. Number of participants with the lowest reading speed for each passage

	First reading	Second reading
Passage 1	20	7
Passage 2	2	12
Passage 3	3	4
Passage 4	11	13

In relation to Passage 1, of the 20 participants who read it the most slowly, 13 participants rated it the highest among the four passages regarding the difficulty in comprehension; one participant gave the same rating for all the four passages, and thus no distinction is made; another participant rated Passage 1 the second highest among the four; and the remaining five participants gave it a lower rating than other passages. The fact that these five participants spent more time reading Passage 1 but did not find it difficult to comprehend might be due to the complexity in the syntax or the adjusting

effort mentioned above, or both. Still, there is good evidence that reading speed can be used as a measure of difficulty.

In relation to Passage 4, all of the 11 participants who read Passage 4 the most slowly also gave it the highest rating, although, as is also the case with the rating of Passage 1, it is not necessary that this passage is the only one that gets this rating. Yet the combination of the longest reading time and the highest rating can indicate that Passage 1 and Passage 4 are relatively more difficult to comprehend than the other two passages.

As the participants had already familiarised themselves with the text from the first reading, the complexity of the syntax and lexis should no longer be a main factor affecting the speed of reading. Moreover, as the second reading is exclusively for the task of assigning narrative point of view, the reading time should be able to reflect the participants' processing effort on this task. According to the results in Table 8, in the second reading, there are 13 participants, for whom Passage 4 demanded the slowest processing, and 12 participants whose reading speed of Passage 2 is the lowest. Seven participants read Passage 1 the most slowly and another four participants read Passage 3 the most slowly. This again roughly corresponds to the ratings given by participants regarding the difficulty in the attribution of viewpoint. That is to say, the result from the comparison of the reading times and the result from the comparison of the ratings of difficulty in viewpoint attribution indicate that Passage 2 and Passage 4 are more difficult than the other two passages for the participants to determine the narrative point of view.

Another correlate of the difficulty in viewpoint attribution is the time difference between the two readings by each participant. As mentioned earlier, it was predicted that participants would be likely to read much faster the second time, since they had already obtained a general comprehension of the passages from the first reading. And some participants may have already had an answer to the question concerning the narrative point of view, which would have further shortened the time of the second reading. However, the research data shows that this is not always the case. Three participants spent more time in their second reading of all four passages than their first reading. This does not necessarily suggest that these participants did not process the narrative point of view in their first reading; it is possible that the task of viewpoint attribution prompts them to consider the texts more carefully, which resulted in the prolonged time in their second reading. However, there is no definitive explanation for this time difference. Apart from these three participants, two participants spent longer in their second reading of Passage 1 than the first reading; six participants spent longer in their second reading of Passage 2; one participant read Passage 3 more slowly the second time; and five participants read Passage 4 more slowly the second time. These cases of slowing down on particular passages in the second reading can also indicate that Passage 2 and Passage 4 are relatively more difficult than the other two passages for the participants to determine the viewpoint attribution.

That Passage 4 is the one that takes longer processing time in both readings is strong evidence that shifts in point of view demand more processing

effort from participants, which again shows the challenge of this narrative phenomenon to readers.

The relationship between the reading time and the rating of difficulty in the viewpoint attribution is more complicated when the cases of individual participants are examined. Individual responses to Passage 2 and Passage 4 are discussed separately below to provide a clearer view of this relationship.

Passage 2:

Among the 12 participants who read Passage 2 the most slowly when determining the narrative point of view, six rated it the highest in difficulty among the four passages; four rated it the second highest; and another two gave it a lower rating than other passages. Of the six participants with both the slowest reading and the highest rating of difficulty, four assigned Gran's viewpoint to the text, including three explicitly reporting confusion. Another one thinks the passage is narrated by someone related to Gran, the person who is saying *my dove*. The remaining one attributed this passage to the third-person narrator, but did not give any comments or explanation. Of the four participants with the slowest speed and the second high rating of difficulty, three also reported confusion. Of the two participants who read this passage slowly but did not rate it as difficult, one attributed the text to the narrator's point of view, with no explanation given; the other assigned Lennie's point of view to the text, probably due to a misunderstanding of the text, as Lennie is dead in the story and thus is not likely to be the source of viewpoint. The parts of the text marked out by the participants who reported confusion include:

(1) *Ah, that's what she wants to do, my dove. Gran wants to cry.*

(2) *"She's had a hard life, has Ma Parker."*

This indicates that, in spite of the differences in the viewpoint attribution, what causes the difficulty in the interpretation of narrative point of view is the insertion of the interior monologue (indicated by the use of the first-person pronoun and the present tense) into a sentence of free indirect style and also the embedding of one character's direct speech in another's thought. Readers' confusion in the interpretation of the embedded speech might be due to the lack of context, but their confusion caused by the conflation of narrative modes reveals how this Modernist practice increases the complexity in the presentation of point of view.

Passage 4:

Among the 13 participants who read Passage 4 the most slowly when determining the narrative point of view, eight rated it the highest among the four passages in terms of difficulty in viewpoint attribution; three gave it the second highest rating; one gave the same rating to all the four passages, so there is no distinction; and another one gave it the lowest rating among the four passages.

For the eight participants who both read Passage 4 the most slowly and rated it the most difficult in viewpoint attribution, there seem to be different reasons for this rating. Four of them have attributed this passage to both Lily's and Mr Ramsay's viewpoints, and the recognition of this multiplicity is likely to be the reason why they found the attribution of point of view in this passage

more difficult than the other three passages, to all of which they have assigned a single point of view. Another four participants have attributed Passage 4 to a single point of view (two to the narrator, one to Mr Ramsay and one to Lily), but they have all reported confusion. While assigning the third-person narrator's viewpoint to Passage 4, one participant marked out the text where the first person pronoun and direct thought is used (*why, thought Mr Ramsay, should she look at the sea when I am here? …What's that got to do with it? he thought impatiently. …all except myself, thought Lily, girding at herself bitterly, who am not a woman, but a peevish, ill-tempered, dried-up old maid, presumably.*); another participant commented:

> It is third person, an outside voice, but this outside voice also has insight into the two characters' feelings and there are points where it is told from their point of view.

For these two participants, the mixing of the characters' thoughts with the third-person narration is challenging. The participant who attributed Passage 4 to Lily's point of view has marked out the text where Mr Ramsay's direct thought is presented (*… thought Mr Ramsay, should she look at the sea when I am here? The Lighthouse! The Lighthouse! What's that got to do with it?*) and described this part as confusing in point of view. Another participant, although assigning Mr Ramsay's point of view to Passage 4, seems to have recognised the shift in viewpoint, as he commented:

> It was hard to decipher the narrative point of view. In parts I thought it was Lily and others Mr Ramsay. It felt like it was switching between the two.

Seen in this way, both the recognition of the shifts in viewpoint and the failure in recognising it have led to a high rating of difficulty. Yet the other five participants who read Passage 4 the most slowly but did not rate it high in difficulty have all recognised the multiplicity in viewpoint, as all have attributed this passage to Lily's and Mr Ramsay's viewpoints, and three of them have explicitly pointed out the viewpoint shifts. One possible explanation is that the shifts in viewpoint indeed slow down their reading speed, but they have no difficulty in recognising the shifts.

It is also interesting to examine the cases of participants who read Passage 4 fairly quickly but still gave it a rating of 4 or above. None of these participants read this passage before, and no one had any knowledge of free indirect style. Their reading frequency is one novel per month on average or less frequently, thus not particularly frequent readers. Two of these participants attributed the text to the third-person narrator and gave no explanation. Sotirova (in press (b)) has suggested that readers seem to opt for the narrator's voice when they are in doubt about the narrative point of view. That these two participants rated this passage as difficult while assigning it to the narrator's point of view might be explained in this way. Another participant thinks the text is narrated from an ambiguous narrator's point of view. By contrast, this participant has attributed Passage 1, 2 and 3 to Elinor's friend, Lennie's mother

and a family friend of Mrs Ramsay respectively. This answer is intriguing in that it reveals the empathising effect of the free indirect style in the reader's interpretation of narrative point of view. This participant did not attribute the text to a character's point of view, but not to an omniscient third-person narrator either. Instead, he/she thinks that it is someone related to the character. This shows that the mode of free indirect style reduces the distance between the character and the narrator. Yet this participant thinks that Passage 4 features an ambiguous narrator, possibly because the shifts in point of view hinder the possibility of locating a fixed perspectival centre. There is also one participant who aligned the text with Lily's friend, but did not give any explanation. Another participant assigned Lily's viewpoint to the text, but also commented that the text changes perspective too often. Also, there is one participant who seems to have detected both the dual voice of narrator and character and the shift in points of view, as he/she commented:

> While it is a third person narrator, the narrator switches between revealing the thoughts and emotions of Mr Ramsay and Lily.

These cases seem also to indicate the correlation between the multiplicity in viewpoints and the difficulty in assigning narrative point of view perceived by the participants, even though they read the passage fairly quickly.

I sum up the overall patterns in these individual cases of reader responses to Passage 4 in order to make it clearer how shifts in point of view affect the reading process. There are both participants who recognised the complexity of viewpoint presentation in Passage 4 and participants who didn't. In the former

cases, while their ratings of difficulty vary, they tend to spend longer reading this passage, which means that this feature slows down their processing. In the latter cases, while not all of them read this passage slowly, they tend to give it a high rating of difficulty in terms of viewpoint attribution, which indicates that shifts in point of view may have caused confusion in their interpretation.

3.5 Concluding remarks

This study has investigated reader responses to shifts in narrative point of view combining both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The empirical data gathered from this study has shown that more than 40% of the participants have recognised the multiplicity of viewpoints in the passage taken from *To the Lighthouse* involving viewpoint shifts, with some explicitly pointing out the shifts. On the other hand, while the assignment of multiple viewpoints is the predominant answer among the participants, the degree of unanimity in readers' attribution of narrative point of view is lower than that in reader responses to passages with a consistent point of view. This indicates from a different perspective that shifts in point of view in Woolf's texts are disturbing to a significant number of participants and cause confusion in their interpretations. The challenge of viewpoint shifts to the interpretation of narrative point of view is reflected in the ratings provided by the participants in this study. The passage with viewpoint shifts in this experiment was rated high in terms of both difficulty in comprehension and difficulty in viewpoint attribution, which suggests that most participants have sensed the complexity in Woolf's presentation of point of view. Reading times are another reflector of how Woolf's employment of viewpoint shifts affects reader responses. The fact that

more participants slowed down at the passage with viewpoint shifts both when they were reading for general comprehension and when they were reading to determine the attribution of viewpoint suggests that this narrative phenomenon requires more processing effort from participants. And these participants spent longer reading this passage probably because they had to register the shifts and track multiple points of view as they read. Combining the results of viewpoint attribution, ratings of difficulty and reading times, I think it is reasonable to argue that shifts in point of view indeed pose a challenge for a majority of participants.

Lisa Zunshine, who takes a cognitive approach to narrative texts, states that 'certain aspects of Woolf's prose do place extraordinarily high demands on our mind-reading ability' (2003: 278). Results obtained from this empirical study strongly suggest that shifts in point of view can be one of such aspects. However, in my view, that this narrative technique places a high demand on readers' textual processing should not be seen as a negative effect. The empirical finding that shifts in point of view cause difficulty in the reading process does not necessarily mean that this narrative design would reduce readers' appreciation of the text. This finding points to the importance and necessity to investigate this narrative phenomenon carefully so that we can uncover why shifts in point of view are difficult to process and why authors employ the technique of viewpoint shifts. Perhaps just as Zunshine (2006) argues, an important reason why narrative texts attract numerous readers resides in the fact that they keep pushing to the limits readers' 'mind-reading' capacity. In Woolf's narratives, the disturbance or confusion perceived by the

participants is likely to create a foregrounding effect. In other words, shifts in point of view probably draw readers' attention to the juxtaposition of viewpoints. By inviting readers to look at the juxtaposed presentation of different characters' speech, thought and perception, the text guides them towards noting the connection between different consciousnesses, which, as I will explain in the following chapters, is created through the linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts.

Chapter 4 Discourse parentheticals

4.1 Introduction

I have argued in Chapter 2 that the narrative technique of viewpoint shifts plays an important part in Woolf's exploration of the social interactive nature of consciousness. Her employment of this technique in *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse* does not create a mere juxtaposition of different viewpoints. Rather, there are textual links that place juxtaposed viewpoints in connection. In this way, shifts in point of view and the linguistic correlates of this technique function to convey the connections between different consciousnesses. From an empirical perspective, Chapter 3 has shown that the complexity of the arrangement of points of view resulting from this narrative technique can be perceived by many readers and that this technique can have a disturbing effect on the textual processing. And I have suggested that the perceived complexity or disturbance is likely to draw attention to the juxtaposition of viewpoints and thus guide readers to see the interconnections of consciousness created by textual links. In the following four chapters, I will examine how exactly shifts in point of view are enacted and how juxtaposed viewpoints are linked together.

The current chapter will be focusing on a particular linguistic construction: parentheticals.[6] This construction is often considered as secondary, insignifi-

6 Parentheticals are also referred to as parenthesis in other studies (see Adamson, 1998; Tartakovsky, 2009). However, the term parenthesis is ambiguous in that it can refer to both the punctuation of brackets and the rhetorical device of inserting a segment of text into another (Lennard, 1991: 1). For the purpose of clarity, this study chooses the term parenthetical to refer to the stretch of text which is inserted in the on-going narrative.

cant elements, a mere digression from the main discourse. However, as the following analysis will show, this construction is one of the important means by which Virginia Woolf enacts shifts in point of view and renders the connections between different characters' consciousnesses.

This investigation is partly inspired by Blakemore (2009). In her article, she makes an excellent summary of the functions of parentheticals in relation to the presentation of narrative point of view:

> a represented thought may be interrupted by a parenthetical in which the narrator attributes the source of the represented thought. […] there are also other types of pragmatically integrated parentheticals which interrupt a passage of represented thought but which seem to reflect the narrator's consciousness rather than that of the character whose thoughts are being represented. There are also parentheticals which are part of a represented thought but which interrupt a passage of description in the narrator's own voice. And there are parentheticals which interrupt a passage of represented thought but which seem to reflect the consciousness of another character.
>
> (Blakemore, 2009: 134)

These various functions of parentheticals are a manifestation of the potential that this construction has in fusing different narrative viewpoints. However, Blakemore does not elaborate on these uses of parentheticals. Her focus of research is to see how parentheticals can be used by the author to achieve the optimal relevance by creating a sense of mutuality between the reader and the

character, and between the reader and the author. It is not her research interest to examine how parentheticals function in particular texts and what stylistic significance such a construction can have particularly with respect to shifts in point of view. This is exactly what the current chapter will investigate.

In Section 4.2 below, the definition and categorisation of parentheticals will be introduced first, and the linguistic features of parentheticals will be discussed in order to explain why this construction can facilitate shifts in point of view and the presentation of multipersonal consciousnesses. In Section 4.3, detailed textual analysis will be provided to show how parentheticals are used by Virginia Woolf to manipulate the viewpoints of characters. Section 4.4 concludes this chapter with a discussion of how the analysis of parentheticals can illuminate Woolf's presentation of consciousness.

4.2 Parentheticals: definition, categorisation, and syntactic and pragmatic insights

4.2.1 Definition

Most definitions of parentheticals emphasise that this construction displays syntactic independence from the host syntactic structure. In other words, a parenthetical does not play any syntactic role in the structure of the host clause. For example, Espinal offers the following definition for parentheticals:

> [Parentheticals are] independent syntactic structures within another syntactic structure […] considered in isolation, there is nothing particular which identifies a parenthetical: they must obey all the

> independently motivated syntactic principles relevant in a given language, and they can be either full sentences or sentence fragments.
>
> (1991: 727-728).

Similarly, Biber et al. define a parenthetical as:

> an interpolated structure […] a digressive structure […] which is inserted in the middle of another structure, and which is unintegrated in the sense that it could be omitted without affecting the rest of that structure or its meaning. (1999: 1067)

While Espinal's definition focuses mainly on the structure of parentheticals—a parenthetical can be a full sentence or a sentence fragment, the definition given by Biber et al. points to the structure of the host clause—the host clause stands complete without its parenthetical. Both definitions emphasise the syntactically un-integrated nature of parentheticals. In a recent theoretical account, Dehé & Kavalova also consider the syntactic independence as a defining feature of parentheticals:

> parentheticals are expressions that are linearly represented in a given string of utterance (a host sentence), but seem structurally independent at the same time. They have been argued to interrupt the prosodic flow of an utterance, introducing intonational breaks and featuring prosodic properties different from those of their host. (2007:1)

What is different in this definition is that it accentuates the contradiction between the syntactic un-integration and the linear continuation.

The above definitions show that the syntactic independence of parentheticals has been unanimously acknowledged by linguists. However, since a parenthetical does not play any syntactic role in the host sentence construction, one question arises as to why it still appears in the linear structure. A functional definition of parentheticals can provide an explanation for this question. The following is the definition given by Nosek:

> [A parenthetical is] a dependent satellite part of the utterance, wedged into a non-compact primary (frame) utterance from which it differs. [A parenthetical] expresses a secondary communication… and a commentary. (1973: 100)

Unlike the previous definitions which describe parentheticals as syntactically *independent*, this one defines a parenthetical as *a dependent satellite part*. By *dependent*, Nosek means the semantic and pragmatic relation between a parenthetical and its host instead of their syntactic relation. It emphasises the function of parentheticals as the speaker's comment on, or as an addition to, the host clause. Normally a parenthetical does not convey independent meaning; rather, its interpretation relies on a reference to a certain part of the host clause. The pragmatic and semantic relation between a parenthetical and its host is also pointed out by Ziv (1985). For him, parentheticals often operate as 'modification' (Ziv, 1985: 189). A parenthetical can modify the epistemic force of the utterance by strengthening or weakening it, or a parenthetical can modify the speech act performed in an utterance. For example:

(1) a. The Labour Party will lose power in the foreseeable future, *I am told.*
(Ziv, 1985: 182)

b. Is he coming, *do you know*? (Ziv, 1985: 186)

In (1a), the parenthetical weakens the epistemic force of the clause to which it is attached. With the parenthetical attached to it, the host clause is not a pure statement, but is a report by the speaker. The speaker is stating being told about the prediction expressed in the host clause without committing himself/ herself to the truth or correctness of this prediction. In (1b), the host clause originally is the speaker's request for an answer from the hearer, but the parenthetical softens the questioning tone by suggesting that the speaker does not assume the hearer knows the answer but is just soliciting the hearer's opinion. In this way, the speech act of the host clause changes from seeking definite knowledge to soliciting opinion from the hearer through the use of the parenthetical. Therefore, seen from a functional perspective, although parentheticals display syntactic independence, it is the semantic relation and the pragmatic meaning that hold a parenthetical and its host together.

To make a brief summary, a parenthetical is an independent structure inserted linearly into its host. It does not play any syntactic role in the construction of the host sentence, but has semantic and pragmatic relation with its host. Parentheticals contribute to the entire structure by producing semantic and pragmatic meanings. As the later sections will demonstrate, parentheticals, when employed in literary texts, can produce particular stylistic effects: in the case of Virginia Woolf, this linguistic construction becomes a preferred device for her manipulation of consciousness presentation. Before discussing how parentheticals function in literary texts, the next section will introduce the

formal variations of parentheticals. A categorisation of parentheticals will be made for the clarity and convenience of the later analysis.

4.2.2 Forms and categorisation of parentheticals

As mentioned in Espinal's (1991) definition in the previous section, parentheticals can be sentence fragments or full sentences. The fact that parentheticals enjoy syntactic independence allows a degree of flexibility in the forms they may take. As Dehé and Kavalova point out, parentheticals are 'a motley crew' (2007: 1). There are a surprising number of forms that are considered as parentheticals. Some of them are completely detached from the host construction, while some display a relatively closer connection to the host construction. The forms generally discussed under this term include (parentheticals are italicised):

i) Non-restrictive relative clauses:

(2) John, *who lives in London*, is travelling to France.

ii) Content clauses/ appositive clauses:

(3) a. The excuse she gave—*that there had been a traffic jam*—was ridiculous.

iii) Adverbial clauses:

(4) a. *As you probably know*, I won't be here next week.

b. *Stated briefly*, there is no quick solution to the problem

iv) Comment clauses:

(5) The solution, *it seems*/ *I believe*, is an easy one..

v) Reporting clauses:

(6) a. She was very happy, *he said*.

b. Next year, *John announced*, I will move to London.

vi) Verbless clauses:

(7) The visitors, *most of them students*, were rather surprised.

vii) Other clauses (interpolated coordination; amalgamation):

(8) a. He is, *or at least he was*, a great actor.

b. He called John—*he is one of his best friends*—to find out what had happened.

c. What is obvious—*and we have eye-witness reports*—is that they were killed. (Blakemore, 2009: 130)

d. John will finally marry—*I should imagine (but that's his lookout) he will have a church wedding*—next Sunday. (Espinal, 1991: 727)

e. He gave this *I prefer not to know how awful* paper.

viii) Phrasal units:

(9) a. Annie Lennox, *my favourite pop singer*, has a new song out.

b. The chairman, *angry at the delay*, demanded a full report.

c. *Frankly*, I don't know what to say about this.

d. *In brief*, the film has been a great success.

ix) Question tags:

(10) Mary is coming tomorrow, *isn't she*?

x) Vocatives and interjections:

(11) a. Today's topic, *ladies and gentlemen*, is astrophysics.

b. *Damn*, we've missed the train.

xi) Discourse markers:

(12) John, *you know*, is not going to come tonight.

(Examples are adapted from Kaltenböck, 2007: 29-31, unless specified otherwise.)

The large range of forms that parentheticals can take leads to a problem in the theoretical accounts for such constructions: all books and articles devoted to this subject appear to discuss the same phenomenon called *parentheticals*, but the examples they include display different forms. Syntacticians constrain their research mainly to parenthetical constructions that still show a relatively closer syntactic connection to the host, such as non-restrictive relative clauses, appositions and reporting clauses; researchers in the field of semantics and pragmatics are more concerned with those that have a stronger influence on the interpretation of the host clause such as sentence adverbials and comment clauses; those who examine the use of parentheticals in literary works choose parentheticals that show stylistic salience. To make the following discussion clear, making a categorization of parentheticals would be beneficial.

The above examples of parentheticals are mostly taken from spoken discourse data. Functionally, they can all be seen as editing in-progress for the content expressed in the host clauses. A speaker uses a parenthetical to interrupt his/ her utterance because he/ she thinks that the meaning is not clear without the parenthetical. A parenthetical is used to change the epistemic force of its host or the emotion conveyed through the host, to correct the speech act performed in the host clause, or to add additional information in order to make the meaning complete. The speaker is engaged in a process of revising and editing when producing his/ her utterance.

There is also a different kind of parenthetical. When analysing parentheticals used in literary writing, Tanya Reinhart (1975, 1983) identifies a different function performed by reporting clauses. She finds that reporting clauses used in written narrative as parentheticals can restrict the attribution of point of view in the host clauses. She compares a sentence containing a parenthetical with a sentence of indirect speech and thought to illustrate this point:

(13) a. Oedipus believed that his mother wasn't his mother.

b. *His mother was not his mother, Oedipus believed.[7] (Reinhart, 1983: 173; her judgment of acceptability)

According to Reinhart, there is no contradictory meaning in (13a) because the point of view of the sentence is to be attributed to the reporting speaker. However, in (13b), the main clause has a contradictory reading because the parenthetical restricts the viewpoint attribution to the parenthetical-subject. Therefore, she distinguishes two kinds of parentheticals: speaker-oriented and parenthetical-subject oriented. Banfield (1982: 81) makes a similar distinction regarding the function of parentheticals: discourse parentheticals and narrative parentheticals. According to her, a discourse parenthetical is to be attributed to the viewpoint of the quoting speaker, and such parentheticals are the same as Reinhart's speaker-oriented parentheticals; a narrative parenthetical restricts the viewpoint attribution to the quoted speaker, and it equals Reinhart's parenthetical-subject oriented parenthetical. In my view, Reinhart's

[7] Sentences that are ungrammatical or unacceptable are marked by *. The same applies to later examples.

parenthetical-subject oriented parentheticals or Banfield's narrative parentheticals are different from other parentheticals because they do not function to, as Ziv states, 'strengthen or weaken the force, or specify the form, of the speaker's attitude to the content of the expression with which they occur' (1985: 182), or as Biber et al. claim, express 'additional information' (1999: 137). Rather than modification or editing, they function primarily as an attributing device, indicating the source of the represented speech or thought or perception, and directing the assignment of point of view. In order to distinguish these two kinds of parentheticals, I will adopt Banfield's term *discourse parenthetical* to refer to those that indicate the user's modification in the progression of the discourse. For those parentheticals that function to specify the source of the represented speech or thought, I will use the term *attributing parenthetical* instead of Banfield's *narrative parenthetical* to emphasise their function of signalling the attribution of point of view.

While discourse parentheticals are marked off by a change in pitch and tone in spoken discourse, in written discourse, they are usually marked off by punctuation such as commas, dashes and brackets. Attributing parentheticals are typically composed of a verb of consciousness and a noun phrase, sometimes followed by other modifying elements such as participial clauses and prepositional phrases. The use of parentheticals in spoken discourse may be affected by the pressure from the speech situation, that is, the speaker does not have enough time to organise information and arrange sentence structure (Wichmann, 2001). In written narratives, when a writer has plenty of time to revise his or her language, parentheticals are obviously used for other purposes.

In the case of Virginia Woolf, I contend that an important function of parentheticals is to manipulate the presentation of multiple narrative points of view.

With regard to the presentation of point of view, both discourse parentheticals and attributing parentheticals can display complexity in introducing and combining different viewpoints. And due to the differences between the two categories of parentheticals in terms of their function and behaviour, I will discuss them separately: the rest of this chapter will focus on discourse parentheticals, while attributing parentheticals will be discussed in the next chapter.

Before moving on to the analysis of textual examples demonstrating how parentheticals affect the presentation of point of view, I would like to add two more aspects to the categorisation of parentheticals to explain why this construction can be an effective means of presenting multiple viewpoints, and also to explain why such a syntactic construction deserves attention.

4.2.3 Linguistic evidence for the syntactic independence of parentheticals

Parentheticals are described as syntactically independent in the definitions introduced in Section 4.2.1, and researchers have been trying to provide linguistic evidence for this description. Espinal (1991) shows that parentheticals cannot be the focus of *it*-cleft sentences or be questioned, for example:

(14) a. *It is confidentially that John committed suicide.

b. It is deliberately that John committed suicide.

(15) A: Beth is, honestly, my worst neighbour.

B: How is that?

A: *Honestly.

(Espinal, 1991: 729)

It has been proposed by some theoreticians that parentheticals may function as adverbs (Jackendoff, 1972). Espinal's analysis rejects such proposals. The fact that a parenthetical cannot be the focus of an *it*-cleft sentence or be questioned shows that it does not play any syntactic role in the host construction, at least not as an adverb.

Also, according to Espinal (1991), adding or deleting certain constituents in either the host or the parenthetical won't affect the meaning of the rest of the structure. For instance,

(16) a. *Frankly*, we must leave before 5 o'clock.

b. *Frankly*, we must leave for the station before 5 o'clock.

(17) a. The mechanic, *who incidentally is an excellent person*, hasn't repaired the car yet.

b. The mechanic, *an excellent person*, hasn't repaired the car yet.

(Espinal, 1991: 730)

In (16a, b), adding a prepositional phrase to the host clause does not affect the meaning of the parenthetical; in (17a, b), the meaning of the host clause does not change after some information is deleted in the parenthetical. These

examples verify again the syntactic independence of parentheticals from their hosts.

In addition, adopting the study by McCawley (1982), Espinal (1991) argues that parentheticals do not go under the scope of VP anaphora:

(18) John talked, *of course*, about politics, and Mary did too. (=Mary talked about politics too; ≠ Mary talked too; ≠Mary talked, of course, about politics too) (McCawley, 1982: 96; Espinal, 1991: 731)

In this example, the pro-form *did* anaphorically refers to the verb phrase *talked about politics*. Although the parenthetical *of course* is inserted in the middle of the verb phrase, it is not part of it.

Based on these observations, Espinal (1991) concludes that parentheticals are independent grammatical constituents from the host structure. Burton-Roberts (1999) comes to the same conclusion after comparing non-restrictive relative clauses and restrictive relative clauses. According to him, non-restrictive relative clauses, unlike restrictive relative clauses, do not come within the scope of the main clause: specifically, a non-restrictive relative clause does not form part of the reported clause; it does not fall within the scope of negation of the host clause; and it is not bound in terms of referential expressions. The following are Burton-Roberts's examples to illustrate the three points respectively (1999: 34-35):

(19) a. John said that the receivers who had done a good job should be dismissed.

b. John said that the receivers, *who had done a good job*, should be dismissed.

(19a) is an instance of indirect speech and *who had done a good job* is part of the words of the reported speaker; whereas (19b) is a piece of indirect speech which is interrupted by a non-restrictive relative clause as a parenthetical and the words *who had done a good job* belong to the current speaker instead of the reported speaker.

(20) a. None of the authors who had any imagination remained with them.

b. *None of the authors, *who had any imagination*, remained with them.

In (20a), the restrictive relative clause *who had any imagination* defines the preceding noun *authors*. This sentence has an implicature: not all the authors remained with them and not all the authors have imagination. In (20b), the implicature is: all the authors left them and all the authors have imagination.

(21) a. John $_i$ gets on best with those firms who employ him/ *John $_i$ frequently.

b. John $_i$ gets on well with those firms, *who employ him/ John $_i$ frequently*.

In (21a), the second *John* is within the restrictive relative clause, which holds a binding relation between the first *John* in the preceding clause and the second *John* in the relative clause. In a non-restrictive relative clause, as in (21b), such binding does not exist.

The linguistic evidence provided by both Espinal (1991) and Burton-Roberts (1999) verifies the description that parentheticals are syntactically

independent from their hosts. The syntactic independence gives a parenthetical a degree of freedom for it to digress from the host construction. Indeed, parentheticals are often considered as a digression or an aside from their host. Fludernik states that parentheticals provide 'a second topic nucleus' (1993: 162). Biber et al. categorise parentheticals as 'a digressive structure' (1999: 1067). Similarly, Adamson describes a parenthetical as 'a peculiarly transgressive construction', 'the most disruptive of juxtapositional constructions' and 'the extreme form of parataxis' (1998: 595; 638). As will be shown in later sections, Virginia Woolf experiments with this digressive nature of parentheticals and uses this construction to insert new points of view into the on-going narrative.

4.2.4 Using parentheticals as a stylistic choice

Although parentheticals are a syntactic category, the use of parentheticals can be a deliberate stylistic choice made by the speaker or writer (Blakemore, 1991; 2005). According to Blakemore, on the one hand, parentheticals are used to achieve the optimal relevance. In other words, parentheticals are used to help the hearer to recover more easily the intention of the speaker so that optimal relevance can be achieved at the least cost of processing effort. For example,

(22) A helicopter, a HELICOPTER—and here was me who'd never even flown in an ordinary plane—would come and pick me up at… (from *Stargazing: memoirs of a young lighthouse keeper*, by Peter Hill, abridged by Laurence Waring; cited in Blakemore, 2005: 1176)

In this example, the speaker is expressing his excitement when he gets to know from a letter that he will be picked up by a helicopter. As explained by Blakemore, the repetition of *a helicopter* plus an intonational stress conveys the speaker's excitement and encourages the hearer to develop his or her own assumptions about what is special about helicopters to the speaker, and the parenthetical 'refines this search in the sense that the hearer will be encouraged to imagine the prospect of travelling in a helicopter for someone who has never flown in any kind of plane at all' (2005: 1176). The parenthetical and its host make a collective contribution to communicating the speaker's thoughts.

On the other hand, using the parenthetical in the above example also produces a stylistic effect. In (22), according to Blakemore, the parenthetical creates 'the impression that reader/hearer is reading—and processing—the letter with the author and in this way sharing his excitement' (2005: 1176). Such a stylistic effect would be lost if the parenthetical is replaced by a separate sentence as follows:

(23) I hadn't even flown in an ordinary plane and they were sending a helicopter to pick me up. (Blakemore 2005: 1176).

The insight that the use of parentheticals is a deliberate stylistic choice made by the speaker/author is significant to the study of parentheticals in literary language, a type of language marked by high stylistic salience. And this is one of the reasons why the use of parentheticals is worth our attention.

Some researchers have examined how parentheticals are employed as a stylistic device in other contexts. For example, Richard Badenhausen (1997)

discusses T. S. Eliot's use of parentheticals in the Clark lectures as a speaking tactic. According to him, some of Eliot's parenthetical words express 'his inferior academic status', which allows him, a young lecturer at that time, to appease any suspicions from the learned audience in Cambridge (1997: 62). Also, since a parenthetical is usually set as a short digression from the main topic or an aside, Eliot makes his own point in parentheticals without providing detailed explanations or grounded arguments (Badenhausen, 1997: 63). This is, as Badenhausen points out, to make an impression that his speech is full of provocative insights (1997: 63). More prominently, according to him, Eliot uses parentheticals to establish a sense of authority. This is accomplished by adding as parentheticals some seemingly 'extemporaneous' comments, or mentioning a long list of examples, such as the names of great philosophers, which imply a broad base of knowledge but in fact are never elaborated upon by Eliot (Badenhausen, 1997: 64-65).

Eliot's use of parentheticals demonstrates how this construction can function in the language of lectures. Parentheticals can also generate important stylistic effects in poetic language. The stylistic effects of parentheticals are exploited to the full by E. E. Cummings in his poems. Roi Tartakovsky (2009) makes a thorough examination of Cummings's use of parentheticals. According to him, one function of parentheticals is to convey a sense of protection or intimacy. As a parenthetical is often graphologically marked off by brackets, it indicates enclosure and protection. He also points out another function of parentheticals in Cummings's poems: to create multiple layers of

discourse and heteroglossia. The following poem is the example which Tartakovsky uses to illustrate this function:

(24) “but why should”
the
greatest
of
living magicians (whom
you and I
some
times call
april) must often
have
wondered
“most
people be quite
so (when flowers) in
credibly
(always are beautiful)
ugly”

(Cummings, 1991: 738; cited in Tartakovsky, 2009: 233)

In this poem, there are two speakers, the quoted speaker, also referred to by *april* and *the greatest of living magicians*, and the quoting speaker, *I*. Three instances of parentheticals are included. Words in the first pair of brackets are easily identified as the narrator’s explanation. The last two parentheticals are

included within the quotation marks, which creates ambiguity in identifying the speaker of the words inside the parentheticals. Included within the direct quote, these words (*when flowers always are beautiful*) could be interpreted as part of the presented speech. However, they are not syntactically connected to the quoted speech. Since the words in the first parenthetical belong to the quoting speaker, it is likely that the words in the latter two instances also belong to the quoting speaker. Therefore, these words can be interpreted as the insight of the quoting speaker, either as he is articulating his own opinion or arguing on behalf of the quoted speaker. In this way, the parentheticals fuse different voices.

The function of parentheticals to fuse different voices can also manifest in narrative texts. Roben Morrissey considers parentheticals as 'marked forms of heterogeneity' (1988: 51). According to him, parentheticals can be 'the stage on which the drama of the relation between the *narrateur* and the *narrataire*, between the author and the reader, is acted out' (Morrissey, 1988: 53). As will be shown in the coming section, using parentheticals to insert different voices into the text is crucial in *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse* to generate the complexity of multiple points of view. But instead of fusing the voices of the narrator and the narratee as Morrissey's (1988) discussion indicates or fusing the voices of the quoting speaker and the quoted speaker as discussed in Tartakovsky (2009), parentheticals in Woolf's texts fuse different characters' voices and consciousnesses.

The studies reviewed in this section make it clear that parentheticals are not simply a digression from the host construction. Rather than stand as a

secondary insignificant element resulting from the lack of editing time under the pressure of speech situations, this linguistic construction has stylistic significance in both spoken and written discourse. A parenthetical and its host make a joint contribution to the creation of particular textual effects.

4.3 Discourse parentheticals in *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*

As elucidated in Section 4.2.3, a discourse parenthetical has a loose syntactic connection to its host. This feature makes this construction a potential device to enact a digression from an established point of view. Also, it has been pointed out in Section 4.2.4 that discourse parentheticals are stylistically significant. A discourse parenthetical and its host collaborate to create a certain stylistic effect. In this section, I will examine in detail how Virginia Woolf employs parentheticals in *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse* and what stylistic effects are created through the use of this linguistic construction in the presentation of consciousness.

4.3.1 From a marker of orality to stylisation

In the two chosen novels, discourse parentheticals are mainly used within passages that present figural consciousness. This use puts into question the usual assumption that discourse parentheticals are a phenomenon exclusively occurring in speech situations. Those who hold this assumption seem to suggest that there is a clear distinction between written discourse and spoken discourse, or between everyday language and literary writing. However, there are studies showing the resemblance of literary writing to spoken discourse.

Tracing the historical evolution of written language from the 17th century to the Modernist period, Biber & Finegan (1989) argue that there is a shift from 'literate style' to 'oral style' in the language of fiction. By 'literate', they refer to 'language produced in situations that are typical for writing', while oral style refers to 'language produced in situations typical of speaking' (Biber & Finegan, 1989: 493). That literary language is shifting towards a more oral style indicates that the distinction between written language and spoken language is gradually becoming less clear than assumed.

Biber & Finegan's (1989) finding that Modernist writing exhibits features of orality is elaborated upon by Adamson (1998). She provides a list of features indicating how poetic and fictional writing in the Modernist period drifts towards orality or 'radicalises' the techniques of orality (1998: 597). These features include: 1) incorporating non-standard varieties of language; 2) presenting 'polyvocalism' by juxtaposing and mixing languages of different social classes and professions, languages of different registers and languages of preceding canons; 3) using loan words and coined words, and tolerating taboo words and the logic of non-standard English; 4) breaking the rules of metre and rhyme; 5) breaking the standard syntax by adopting 'parataxis' instead of 'hypotaxis'; 6) changing the attitude towards the use of metaphors (Adamson, 1998: 598-678).

Seen in this light, the use of discourse parentheticals can be viewed as another attempt to break the standard syntax typical of the literary language in order to mimic spoken discourse. In the following two extracts from Woolf's narrative text, the discourse parentheticals severely interrupt the syntactic

progression of the host sentences, rendering the texts similar to spontaneous discourse:

(25) a. At the recollection—*how she had stood there, how the girl had said, 'At home the mountains are so beautiful,' and there was no hope, no hope whatever*, she had a spasm of irritation, and speaking sharply, said to James… (*TL*: 33)

b. 'Oh, coffee!' said Mrs Ramsay. But it was much rather a question (*she was thoroughly roused, Lily could see, and talked very emphatically*) of real butter and clean milk. (*TL*: 112)

The resemblance of these two extracts to ordinary speech will become more obvious when we compare them with some of the previous examples of parentheticals from the spoken discourse data (repeated below and renumbered for ease of reference):

(26) a. The excuse she gave—*that there had been a traffic jam*—was ridiculous. (Kaltenböck, 2007: 29)

b. John will finally marry—*I should imagine (but that's his lookout) he will have a church wedding*—next Sunday. (Espinal, 1991: 727)

In these two examples, the speakers suspend the on-going clause and add other information: the parenthetical in (26a) is an explanation for the word *excuse*, and the parenthetical in (26b) elaborates on the word *marry*. After the interpolation, the suspended sentence continues. Similarly, the parentheticals in (25a) and (25b) also serve as an explanation for or addition to the preceding parts of the sentence. In (25a), the inserted clauses explain what is being

recollected; in (25b), the parenthetical provides additional information about Mrs Ramsay's speaking manner. After the parentheticals, the interrupted sentences resume.

This comparison shows that (25a) and (25b) indeed resemble ordinary discourse. However, a close scrutiny of these two extracts also leads us to see that Woolf takes the stylistic practice of simulating orality even further. Compared with (26a), in which the parenthetical is a single clause, the parenthetical in (25a) is more complex. It contains multiple clauses, one of which also embeds a clause of direct speech in it. And the logical connections of these inserted clauses are rather loose, even with the connective *and*. Although linguists such as Espinal (1991) point out that discourse parentheticals can be either full sentences or sentence fragments due to their syntactic independence from the host, the discourse parenthetical in (25a) is much longer than spoken discourse examples. This long parenthetical greatly postpones the completion of the host structure, which places a higher demand on readers, since they have to keep track of the meaning of both the suspended host clause and the interpolated clauses. Meanwhile, the parenthetical in (25a) differs from the parenthetical in (26a) with respect to the degree of syntactic integration, even though both can be seen as an apposition. The parenthetical in (26a) is a subordinate clause to its host, marked out by the complementiser *that*; by contrast, there is no grammatical device that links the parenthetical in (25a) to the head noun *collection*. Even if the first two clauses can still be seen as subordinating to the head noun, the *and*-clause cannot. In fact, the *and*-clause has switched from the mode of embedded direct speech in the preceding clause

to free indirect thought. This syntactic disintegration plus the change of narrative mode would probably further increase the demand of processing effort on readers. In (25b), the parenthetical disrupts the syntactic continuity of the host even more severely, since it occurs in the middle of the noun phrase *a question of real butter and clean milk* so that this phrase is interrupted before its prepositional modifier. Even in spoken discourse, which is often described as fragmented, digressive and under-edited, this kind of phrasal discontinuity does not occur frequently. As can be seen from the spoken discourse examples in the previous section ((1)—(21)), most of the parentheticals are inserted at a natural boundary, either between phrases or between clauses. The parenthetical in (26b) above is already quite unusual as an example of everyday speech, but the phrasal units in the host construction are still intact.

Apart from radicalising orality on the syntactic level, Extracts (25a) and (25b) exhibit a particular feature of Woolf's writing. As mentioned earlier in Section 4.2, both Banfield (1982) and Reinhart (1983) consider discourse parentheticals as speaker-oriented. And Ziv (1985), who focuses on the semantic and pragmatic functions of this linguistic construction, also claims that a discourse parenthetical is its speaker's modification to the modality or speech act of the host. Thus according to these scholars, normally there is no disruption to the consistency of the speaker's point of view when a parenthetical insertion occurs in spoken discourse. However, this is not the case with the discourse parentheticals in (25a) and (25b).

In Extract (25a), the passage presents a scene in which Mrs Ramsay is trying to measure the stocking against James's leg and at the same time

recollecting the words of a maid whose father has cancer. The thought of illness and suffering upsets her. While the host clause (*at the recollection she had a spasm of irritation*) can be seen as narratorial description of Mrs Ramsay's inner state, the discourse parenthetical presents her thought more mimetically in the free indirect mode: the use of the past perfect form (*had stood, had said*) instead of the simple past tense establishes Mrs Ramsay as the deictic centre, and the emphasis through repetition (*no hope, no hope whatever*) conveys a strong emotion, which evokes her subjectivity. Thus this discourse parenthetical facilitates a switch from a less immediate narrative mode to a more direct one and a shift from the narratorial to a figural point of view.

If the shift in point of view in (25a) is not salient, since the narrator is closely aligned with Mrs Ramsay in the rendering of her inner state, the discourse parenthetical in (25b) enacts a viewpoint shift in a more striking manner. This extract presents a scene in which Mrs Ramsay is talking with the guests about the British cooking. It starts with Mrs Ramsay's direct speech and then changes to free indirect speech. The speech presentation aligns the text with Mrs Ramsay's point of view. In addition, the text preceding (25b) has already established Mrs Ramsay as the dominant consciousness, which also orients the attribution of viewpoint in this extract to the same character. However, the discourse parenthetical inserts into the sentence Lily's thought and perception presented in the mode of free indirect style. The evaluative adverbs *thoroughly* and *emphatically* and the intensifier *very* spell out Lily's impression of Mrs Ramsay. This more immediate rendering of Lily's subjectivity establishes her point of view in the discourse parenthetical. The

attributing parenthetical (*Lily could see*) makes this viewpoint attribution more explicit. In this way, the discourse parenthetical enacts a viewpoint shift from Mrs Ramsay to Lily. Contrasting the theoretical prediction that a discourse parenthetical does not disrupt the consistency of point of view, Woolf's employment of this linguistic construction makes it impossible to assign a single and definite viewpoint to the sentence. If we take Banfield's (1982) and Reinhart's (1983) argument that a discourse parenthetical is speaker-oriented, in (25b), the speaker of the host would be Mrs Ramsay, but the discourse parenthetical cannot be attributed to Mrs Ramsay, as it introduces Lily's perception and evaluation. By inserting Lily's thought and perception in the middle of Mrs Ramsay's free indirect speech, this discourse parenthetical enables the text to present two characters' subjectivities within the confines of a single sentence.

Most significantly, Lily's thought and perception is inserted right in the middle of one of Mrs Ramsay's utterances. As I have pointed out above, this parenthetical insertion severely disrupts the syntactic continuation of the host structure, as it breaks a phrasal unit in the host. The high processing demand placed on readers by such disrupted syntax is further increased now that readers have to encode the shift in point of view enacted by this discourse parenthetical. With the discourse parenthetical inserting Lily's thought and perception even before the completion of a phrasal unit of Mrs Ramsay's utterance, the text enhances the sense of simultaneity between Mrs Ramsay's speaking and Lily's perception of her: Lily senses Mrs Ramsay's excitement when Mrs Ramsay is speaking. In other words, the discourse parenthetical

allows Woolf to present through the form of the text how Lily speculates on Mrs Ramsay's psyche while listening to her speech. And that Lily senses Mrs Ramsay's inner states even before she finishes her utterance highlights her intense sensitivity towards Mrs Ramsay's mind.

As the above analysis shows, Virginia Woolf's use of discourse parentheticals is not merely a marker of orality indicating that literary language is moving towards spoken language; rather it has gone through a process of what Adamson calls 'stylisation':

> a linguistic feature is simultaneously generalised and conventionalised in the discourse type in which it occurs, with the result that it may increase in frequency but *simultaneously alter in function or value* (1998: 594; my emphasis).

Woolf employs discourse parentheticals to simulate orality, but at the same time, she also makes this construction function in her texts as an effective linguistic mechanism enacting shifts in point of view. By using discourse parentheticals in this way, Woolf not only breaks the standard syntax but also subverts the convention of adhering to a unified narrative point of view. Most significantly, whereas in spoken discourse, a discourse parenthetical and its host function together to produce the meaning that a speaker intends to express, in Woolf's texts, a discourse parenthetical and its host function together to allow different subjectivities to co-exist even in a single sentence. In this way, the form of the text highlights the interactive orientedness of one consciousness

towards another. This is how the use of discourse parentheticals contributes to the presentation of multipersonal consciousnesses.

4.3.2 Discourse parentheticals and multipersonal consciousnesses

In the previous section, I have argued that discourse parentheticals have gone through a process of stylisation and become a particular device for Virginia Woolf to manipulate shifts in point of view. In her texts, the function of discourse parentheticals extends beyond that of being a marker of orality. Functioning as a linguistic mechanism of viewpoint shifts, this construction conveys the inter-subjective orientedness of consciousness. In this section, I will examine in greater detail how discourse parentheticals enact shifts in point of view and how they contribute to the 'multipersonal representation of consciousness' (Auerbach, 2003 [1953]: 536).

In *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*, discourse parentheticals affect the interpretation of narrative point of view in different ways. In some cases, discourse parentheticals are inserted in the middle of a sentence, with or without punctuation marks. In other cases, a discourse parenthetical occurs at the end of a sentence or after a complete sentence, marked off as a parenthetical by a pair of brackets. In the former cases, different narrative viewpoints are interwoven together via discourse parentheticals; in the latter cases, discourse parentheticals function to neatly juxtapose different points of view. In what follows, I will discuss these two uses of parentheticals separately and examine their effects on the presentation of consciousness.

4.3.2.1 Discourse parentheticals and the intertwining points of view

The function of discourse parentheticals to enact shifts in point of view from one character to another has to do with the immediacy of the narrative modes. In the two chosen novels, a discourse parenthetical usually occurs in a stretch of text that presents consciousness in free indirect style or interior monologue, the more immediate modes that we tend to attribute to a figural subjectivity instead of the narratorial mediation. As a digressive construction, a discourse parenthetical suspends the presentation of one character's consciousness. However, instead of presenting a digression that this character makes when he/she is speaking or thinking, a discourse parenthetical inserts a different character's speech, thought or perception. Thereby an established viewpoint cannot be sustained in the interpolation. As in the following extract, the discourse parenthetical inserts Sally's free indirect speech in the middle of Peter's utterance, which is also presented in the free indirect mode, and in this way, the parenthetical insertion effects a shift in point of view:

(27) When one was young, said Peter, one was too much excited to know people. Now that one was old, fifty-two to be precise (***Sally*** *was fifty-five, in body, she said, but her heart was like a girl's of twenty*); now that one was mature then, said Peter, one could watch, one could understand, and one did not lose the power of feeling, he said. (*MD*: 212)

This parenthetical insertion may serve to present the actual situation: Sally interrupts Peter's speech when he mentions his age. However, it severely interrupts the linear and successive presentation of Peter's speech, and in this

way creates difficulty for the demarcation of different points of view. As this passage starts with the free indirect presentation of Peter's speech, the text seems to be aligned with his point of view. Then a likely interpretation of the discourse parenthetical is that Sally's speech is filtered through Peter's consciousness. Peter is speaking while at the same time reflecting on what Sally says. In this way, the discourse parenthetical here produces an instance of an embedded viewpoint. The narrative viewpoint shifts from Peter to Sally in the parenthetical, but this shift is only a partial one as Peter's viewpoint still maintains a dominant position. This simple speech presentation in fact captures how Peter interprets Sally's words. Sally interrupts Peter when he suggests that being fifty-two is old, and her words imply that the increase of one's age does not mean getting old or feeling old. Peter understands her implication well, which is why he changes his diction from *one was **old*** to *one was **mature*** when he resumes his utterance. By rendering Sally's speech as filtered through Peter's consciousness, this discourse parenthetical directs readers to see how Peter perceives Sally's words, even though this extract only presents their conversation in a straightforward way.

In the above extract, the inserted utterance in the discourse parenthetical belongs to a character who is participating in the represented scene. In the extract below, the discourse parenthetical inserts a piece of remembered speech:

(28) 'Look, look, Septimus!' she cried. For Dr. Holmes had told her to make her husband *(who had nothing whatever seriously the matter with him but was a little out of sorts)* take an interest in things outside himself. (*MD*: 23)

In this scene, Septimus and his wife Rezia are sitting in Regent's Park when an aeroplane flies over. The way the discourse parenthetical is used here is again comparable with one of the spoken discourse examples listed earlier (repeated and renumbered below):

(29) John, *who lives in London*, is travelling to France.

In this example, the discourse parenthetical is a non-restrictive relative clause. Grammatically, it modifies the antecedent *John*; and semantically and pragmatically, it allows its speaker to add more information about the subject of the utterance. This parenthetical insertion and its host combine to express the speaker's meaning. In Extract (28), the discourse parenthetical is also a (non)-restrictive relative clause, which modifies the antecedent *her husband*. However, whereas in (29), the words in both the discourse parenthetical and the host sentence are uttered by the current speaker, which establishes a consistent point of view, in (28), the viewpoint attribution is more complex due to the conflation of different presentation modes. The entire extract moves from Rezia's direct speech to her free indirect thought, which anchors the text in her point of view. The host of the discourse parenthetical is Rezia's free indirect thought, which embeds an instance of indirect speech reporting what Dr Holmes says. The discourse parenthetical inserts more of Dr Holmes's words, but rather than present his speech in the indirect mode, the inserted clause switches to the mode of free indirect style. The intensifier *nothing whatever* conveys a reassuring tone and perfect confidence, which is highly indicative of Dr Holmes's voice. Also the evaluative description *a little out of sorts* conveys his neglectful attitude when examining Septimus's illness. In

other words, while the host sentence is Rezia's paraphrase of Dr Holmes's words from her viewpoint, the discourse parenthetical introduces Dr Holmes's speech into the text more immediately from his point of view. Therefore, unlike the spoken discourse example in which the parenthetical does not disrupt the consistency of viewpoint in the whole utterance, Woolf's employment of this linguistic construction in the above extract enacts a shift in point of view. Meanwhile, as the presentation of Rezia's consciousness is dominant in this extract, this viewpoint shift is again a partial one. Dr Holmes's speech is filtered through Rezia's consciousness. On the one hand, the embedding of Dr Holmes's free indirect speech in Rezia's thoughts produces a verisimilar presentation of her consciousness: Rezia explains to herself why she asks her husband to look at the aeroplane and at the same time recalls the doctor's exact words. On the other hand, by inserting Dr Holmes's speech in the middle of Rezia's thought through the discourse parenthetical, the text also shows how the authority of the doctor influences her: Rezia trusts his diagnosis or relies on him to help her husband recover. Analogous to the spoken discourse example in which the parenthetical and its host make a collective contribution to the expression of the speaker's meaning, the discourse parenthetical in (28) functions together with its host to convey the thematic meaning in this extract. Rezia's innocence indicated in the host structure contrasts with the neglectful attitude of the doctor rendered in the parenthetical insertion, which foreshadows the tragic ending that awaits the young couple.

In the above two examples, discourse parentheticals trigger a partial shift in point of view by inserting a different character's speech into the presentation

of another character's consciousness. A new narrative viewpoint is established, but it is established as embedded in the dominant consciousness. Extract (27) demonstrates the case of heard speech, whereas (28) instantiates a case of remembered speech. In an earlier discussion of Woolf's presentation of consciousness, Humphrey points out that discourse parentheticals are employed to 'control the representation of consciousness movement' or to present 'a shift of levels of consciousness' (1954: 58, 59). To some extent, the embedding of one character's speech in the presentation of another's consciousness through a discourse parenthetical can be seen as 'a shift of levels of consciousness', as the insertion indicates a digression in the flow of consciousness when a character's focus of attention moves to another's speech. But Humphrey also states that such a shift is not an extreme one (1954: 59). He does not develop his exploration further to see whether discourse parentheticals can be used to indicate any "extreme shift" from one consciousness to another. In fact, as can be seen from the analysis of Extract (25b) in the previous section, Woolf pushes even further the stylistic practice identified by Humphrey, as there are cases in which discourse parentheticals shift the text entirely to a new point of view so that two characters' consciousnesses come under the narrative focus at the same time. Used in this way, discourse parentheticals manage to interweave multiple points of view within a short stretch of text. And this use is not unusual in the two chosen novels.

Similar to (25b), the discourse parenthetical in the following extract effects a shift in point of view by introducing to the text a different character's reaction to the character whose viewpoint is established in the host:

(30) Lady Bruton stood by Miss Parry's chair, a spectral grenadier, draped in black, inviting Peter Walsh to lunch; cordial; but without small talk, remembering nothing whatever about the flora or fauna of India. She had been there, of course; had stayed with three Viceroys; thought some of the Indian civilians uncommonly fine fellows; but what a tragedy it was—the state of India! The Prime Minister had just been telling her (*old Miss Parry huddled up in her shawl, did not care what the Prime Minister had just been telling her*), and Lady Bruton would like to have Peter Walsh's opinion, he being fresh from the centre, and she would get Sir Sampson to meet him, for really it prevented her from sleeping at night, the folly of it, the wickedness she might say, being a soldier's daughter. (*MD*: 197)

This extract mainly centres on Lady Bruton, who comes to talk to Peter Walsh and Miss Parry at the party. The narratorial mediation might be obvious at the beginning, since the description of Lady Bruton's actions and appearance seems to suggest an external point of view. As the speech presentation mode changes from the more indirect Report of Speech Act (*inviting Peter Walsh to lunch, remembering nothing whatever about the flora or fauna of India*) to the more immediate presentation of her speech in free indirect style, Lady Bruton's point of view gets increasingly prominent. The discourse parenthetical (*old Miss Parry huddled up in her shawl, did not care what the Prime Minister had just been telling her*) disrupts Lady Bruton's speech in the middle. The inserted sentence introduces a new grammatical subject, Miss Parry, which is also the experiential subject of the mental process (*did not care*), and the use of the past

perfect form (*had just been telling*) instead of the simple past tense also establishes Miss Parry as the deictic centre. In this way, the discourse parenthetical establishes Miss Parry's viewpoint. Such a shift in point of view not only switches the narrative focus to Miss Parry in the parenthetical, it also affects the attribution of narrative viewpoint in the surrounding text. Once Miss Parry's viewpoint is established, what at first appears to be the narratorial description of Lady Bruton (*a spectral grenadier, draped in black*) now seems more like Miss Parry's perception. Therefore, it is not clear from which exact point Miss Parry's viewpoint cuts in.

Similar to Extract (25b) in which the discourse parenthetical records the process through which Lily speculates on Mrs Ramsay's mind while listening to her conversation with the guests, by bringing in Miss Parry's thought via the discourse parenthetical, the text draws readers' attention to Miss Parry, who is observing Lady Bruton as she talks. Moreover, the juxtaposition of points of view through the parenthetical here captures the subtle interaction between the two characters' conciousnesses. The presentation of Lady Bruton's speech evokes her subjectivity; but at the same time, the parenthetical enables readers to see how her speech is perceived by Miss Parry. Lady Bruton shows her concern for India in a rather exaggerated way through the exclamation in her speech (*what a tragedy it was—the state of India!*), underlying which is her pride for her participation in political affairs as a woman. But Miss Parry, who must have sensed Lady Bruton's intention, does not engage herself in this conversation. The quoting of Lady Bruton's exact words in her thought (*the Prime Minister had just been telling her*) conveys Miss Parry's sarcastic

attitude towards Lady Bruton. A comedic effect is created through the contrast of the two characters' consciousnesses: while Lady Bruton is passionate in her talk and eager to express herself, Miss Parry is not interested at all. Lady Bruton seems to have sensed Miss Parry's attitude too, as when the text resumes the presentation of her speech, she is shown to have turned to Peter Walsh to avoid the embarrassment of being ignored by Miss Parry.

In the following extract, the discourse parenthetical marks a shift to a new point of view even without any explicit attributing signal:

(31) [1] But he himself remained high on his rock, like a drowned sailor on a rock. [2] I leant over the edge of the boat and fell down, he thought. [3] I went under the sea. [4] I have been dead, and yet am now alive, but let me rest still, he begged **(he was talking to himself again—it was awful, awful!)**; and as, before waking, the voices of birds and the sound of wheels chime and chatter in a queer harmony, grow louder and louder and the sleeper feels himself drawing to the shores of life, so he felt himself drawing towards life, the sun growing hotter, cries sounding louder, something tremendous about to happen. (*MD*: 75)

In this scene, Septimus is sitting in Regent's Park when Rezia comes to him. This extract mainly presents Septimus's consciousness through a fusion of free indirect style and interior monologue. Sentence [1] presents in free indirect style his hallucination of lying on a rock. The switch of the narrative mode to interior monologue from Sentence [2] onward mirrors the change in his conscious states from having a vague illusion of lying on a rock to formulating clearer thoughts, albeit his thoughts are irrational. With the change of pronoun

from *I* to *he*, the latter part of Sentence [4] switches back to the mode of free indirect style to present his feelings and perceptions. But the evaluative adjective *queer* and the accumulation of clauses resulting in a long adverbial clause (see the underlined part) are strongly indicative of Septimus's hallucinatory mentality. And the cluster of comparative adjectives (*louder and louder*, *hotter*, *louder*) and the series of progressive participials (*drawing*, *growing* and *sounding*) convey his experientiality. In the middle of the presentation of Septimus's consciousness is inserted an independent sentence.

I would like to draw another parallel between Woolf's text and spoken discourse and compare the above extract with the following sentence:

(32) He called John—he is one of his best friends—to find out what had happened. (Kaltenböck, 2007: 29)

In this sentence, the speaker makes a digression in the middle of his/her utterance and adds a separate sentence. This discourse parenthetical is syntactically detached from the host but pragmatically linked to it in that the parenthetical insertion is the speaker's explanation to what he/she mentions in the host sentence. In (31), the discourse parenthetical is paratactically juxtaposed with the host as well, and in a sense, it is also pragmatically connected to the host, as it provides a different description of Septimus's action: he is begging someone in his hallucination vs. he is talking to himself. And both discourse parentheticals include evaluative adjectives; however, while the adjective *best* in (32) is undoubtedly the speaker's evaluation, the evaluative adjective *awful* as well as the description of the scene in (31) cannot be attributed to Septimus's point of view, because, in a hallucinatory state,

Septimus is unlikely to be able to reflect on his own mental condition. Based on the context, the parenthetical insertion has to be interpreted as the representation of Rezia's thought and perception in the mode of free indirect style, although there is no explicit attributing signal. The progressive form of the verb (*was talking*) points to Rezia's perception, and the adverb of frequency *again*, the repetition of the evaluative adjective *awful* and the exclamation also firmly align the text with her point of view. In this way, a shift to a new viewpoint occurs in the discourse parenthetical again. By juxtaposing the two characters' subjectivities through the discourse parenthetical in this extract, the text accentuates how Septimus's behaviour elicits strong emotions in Rezia. But on the other hand, unlike Extracts (25b), (27) and (30) in which the parenthetical insertions highlight the process through which one character speculates on another's psyche, the discourse parenthetical in (31) above rather shows the boundaries between the two characters' consciousnesses. Rezia cannot know what is on her husband's mind, nor is Septimus aware of his wife's suffering because of his illness. The isolation of one's consciousness to others rendered through this discourse parenthetical perhaps just accentuates the destructive effect of shell shock, of which Septimus is a victim.

To sum up, the discourse parentheticals discussed in this subsection function to enact a shift in point of view in the middle of a sentence. The parenthetical insertion severely disrupts the continuity of a consistent unified narrative viewpoint, as it forces the readers to revise their attribution of point of

view in the middle of a sentence. In extreme cases, Woolf's use of discourse parentheticals even breaks a phrasal unit in the host structure. It becomes difficult to demarcate different points of view based on the sentence boundaries, or even on phrasal constituents within clauses. Just as Sotirova comments:

> This swift reorientation of the perspectival focus is an emblematically Woolfian technique which demonstrates how an analysis seeking to confine each sentence to a single perspective falls short of paying Woolf's mastery of consciousness presentation its fair due. (2013: 138)

And as I have mentioned previously in Section 4.2.4, a discourse parenthetical and its host make a collective contribution to communicating the meaning of a sentence (see Blakemore, 2005). In the above textual examples, a discourse parenthetical and its host function collaboratively to allow a single sentence to present different subjectivities. The use of discourse parentheticals to insert one character's speech, thought and perception in the middle of the presentation of another's consciousness enhances the sense of simultaneity in different characters' mental activities. This linguistic construction allows the narrative text to record how one character anticipates and speculates on another's mind or how one character's speech and action affect another character's thought and feeling. By interweaving different characters' points of view through discourse parentheticals, the text conveys the inter-subjective orientedness of consciousness.

4.3.2.2 Discourse parentheticals and the juxtaposition of points of view

In the textual examples analysed in Section 4.3.2.1, discourse parentheticals interrupt the continuation of the presentation of one character's consciousness and insert a different character's speech or thought. The narrative point of view changes momentarily in the middle of a sentence. After the parenthetical insertion, the original viewpoint resumes. However, the interruption of viewpoint has already raised readers' awareness of the existence of another perceiving consciousness. The discourse parentheticals show how one character's consciousness is oriented towards another. The text interweaves distinct viewpoints together, which adds to the complexity of the narrative structure and enriches the reading experience.

The discourse parentheticals that will be discussed in this sub-section function in a different way. Instead of interrupting the on-going sentence structure, they occur at the end of a sentence, or appear as a separate chunk of text alongside another independent sentence. Such parenthetical insertion does not produce the kind of viewpoint shift discussed so far, nor does it create a severe disruption to the linearity of the syntax; rather, when a discourse parenthetical introduces into the text the presentation of a different character's consciousness, the text shifts completely to the newly established viewpoint. Different viewpoints are set in a neat juxtaposition instead of interwoven together, as in the following extract:

(33) [1] For with overpowering directness and dignity the clock struck three; and she heard nothing else; but the door handle slipped round and in came Richard! [2] What a surprise! [3] In came Richard, holding out

> flowers. [4] She had failed him, once at Constantinople; and Lady Bruton, whose lunch parties were said to be extraordinarily amusing, had not asked her. [5] He was holding out flowers—roses, red and white roses. [6] (***But*** *he could not bring himself to say he loved her; not in so many words.*) (*MD*: 129)

Previous to this scene, the text has revealed that Clarissa is annoyed by all the trivial happenings of the day: the preparations for her party, the unexpected visit by Peter Walsh, and her reflection on her relationship with her husband. Now, as she sits alone in the drawing room, Richard's arrival gives her a big surprise. The sight of her husband holding flowers triggers her various memories, both memory of events that have long passed and events that have happened only in the morning. The text oscillates between Clarissa's perception (Sentences [1], [3] and [5]) and her thoughts (Sentences [2] and [4]) presented through a mixture of interior monologue and free indirect style. The text conveys her complex emotions: her surprise mixed with regrets for what has happened in the past and the dissatisfaction with Lady Bruton's lunch invitation as well as her confusion after seeing the flowers. While the presentation of Clarissa's consciousness firmly aligns the text with her viewpoint, the last sentence, as an instance of a discourse parenthetical, switches to the presentation of Richard's thought and thus introduces a new point of view. Such a viewpoint shift generates a dramatic effect. The sentences preceding this discourse parenthetical seem to build up high expectation on the part of Clarissa: she is confused by the current scene and waiting for Richard's explanations. However, what is presented in the

discourse parenthetical does not meet such an expectation; on the contrary, it presents Richard's failed attempt to express his love. The dramatic contrast is further strengthened by the connective *but*. This connective generates two-fold meanings here: a) it indicates Richard's inner struggle—he wants to tell Clarissa that he loves her, but he is too shy to say it; b) it 'dialogically' links Richard's struggle with Clarissa's thought (Sotirova, 2004, 2011), rendering his thought as a response to Clarissa's expectation.

The use of the discourse parenthetical not only enacts a shift in viewpoint from Clarissa to Richard, by juxtaposing the two characters' consciousnesses, it reveals much about the relationship between them. Living with mutual respect as they do, they do not have a deep enough communication about their thoughts and feelings. Although they are aware of what the other wants, they seldom openly express their concern for the other's need. The use of brackets without attaching the parenthetical to the preceding sentence seems to be the textual embodiment of such isolation; but the juxtaposition of the two characters' consciousnesses also underlines the correspondence in their thoughts: while Clarissa expresses her regret in her thought (*she had failed him*), Richard is ashamed for not being able to bring himself to say that he loves her.

Whereas the discourse parenthetical in (33) presents a scene of failed communication, this linguistic construction creates an impression of shared thinking in the following extract:

(34) No doubt it was forgotten now, her book on the orchids of Burma, but it went into three editions before 1870, she told Peter. She remembered him now. He had been at Bourton (**and** he had left her, Peter Walsh remembered, without a word in the drawing-room that night when Clarissa had asked him to come boating). (*MD*: 196)

This extract presents a scene in which Peter Walsh and Miss Parry are having a conversation. The first sentence presents Miss Parry's speech in the mode of free indirect style. It is not clear whether the following two sentences are the continuation of her speech or the presentation of her thought. In either case, the text is still aligned with Miss Parry's point of view. However, starting from the parenthetical, it is obvious that the text has shifted to Peter Walsh's viewpoint, since it is his thought that is presented here. The attributing parenthetical *Peter Walsh remembered* verifies the viewpoint attribution. Thus, once again, the discourse parenthetical introduces a new consciousness. Such a shift produces a special effect: it seems that Miss Parry's thinking is passed on to Peter. The conversation between Peter and Miss Parry brings back the memory of a past event at Bourton, but this remembered scene unfolds through the two characters' viewpoints. In this way, a sense of joint thinking is created. This sense is further reinforced by the use of the connective *and*, which renders Peter's thought as the continuation of Miss Parry's recollection.

As parentheticals are generally perceived as an aside or a digression from the main discourse, this construction gains more flexibility in terms of both the form the inserted clause/sentence takes and the content included in it. In the following extract, the discourse parenthetical allows the text to move beyond

the current scene, that is, the conversation between Peter and Sally, to include other characters that are not under the focus of narration:

(35) And the marriage had been, Sally supposed, a success? And that very handsome, very self-possessed young woman was Elizabeth, over there, by the curtains, in red.

(*She was like a poplar, she was like a river, she was like a hyacinth, Willie Titcomb was thinking. Oh how much nicer to be in the country and do what she liked! She could hear her poor dog howling, Elizabeth was certain.*) She was not a bit like Clarissa, Peter Walsh said. (*MD*: 206-7)

In this example, Willie Titcomb's and Elizabeth's thoughts are inserted in the middle of the conversation between Sally Seton and Peter Walsh through the discourse parenthetical. So the text moves from Sally to Willie Titcomb, to Elizabeth, and finally to Peter, just as in a film a camera moves between different groups of characters. In this case, there is less intermingling of narrative viewpoints. The discourse parenthetical directs readers' attention from the characters under the current narrative focus to those that have been in the background scene. The insertion of two new points of view within the conversation between Peter and Sally probably serves to increase the sense of simultaneity in the thoughts and experiences of characters. Sally, Peter and Willie Titcomb are all looking at Elizabeth and thinking about her, but the thought of each is affected by their own concern: for Sally, Elizabeth indicates the success of Clarissa's marriage; Peter is always thinking about Clarissa and

now he looks at Elizabeth in relation to her; in the case of Willie Titcomb, it is likely that he is falling in love with Elizabeth. When all three characters are focusing on Elizabeth, she does not have any interest in anyone at the party or care about what other people think about her at all. The deliberate juxtaposition brings different viewpoints closer to one another, and also sets them in contrast to reveal more character information. What is more, the discourse parenthetical allows Woolf to break the constraints of textual linearity and present multiple consciousnesses simultaneously.

In short, the discourse parentheticals discussed in this subsection juxtapose different viewpoints. The arrangement of points of view does not result in the presentation of intersected consciousnesses which is effected when a discourse parenthetical is inserted in the middle of a sentence, but it still subverts the conventional practice of adhering to a unified coherent narrative point of view. This use of discourse parentheticals also serves to reveal information about the characters' psyche and the relationship between different characters.

4.4 Concluding remarks

Literary critics have noted the use of parentheticals in Virginia Woolf's novels, but few have given this linguistic construction enough attention. Hermione Lee remarks that parentheticals are 'a way of making more than one thing happen at once' (1992: x), an insight shared by Susan Dick (2000: 61), who states that Woolf uses parentheticals to 'create "the sense of reading the two things at the same time" (*D3*, 106)' when she discusses Woolf's decision to announce the death of Mrs Ramsay and other facts through parentheticals in *To the Lighthouse*. Similarly, Helen Southworth argues that parentheticals are

one of the grammatical figures adopted by Woolf 'to create an impression of temporal simultaneity' (2004: 189). It is significant that all these critics emphasise multiplicity and simultaneity underlying Woolf's use of discourse parentheticals, but none of them has discussed the use of this linguistic construction in connection with the effect it has on shifts in point of view and the presentation of multiple consciousnesses in Woolf's narrative.

In this chapter, I have shown how the use of discourse parentheticals allows Virginia Woolf to shift the narrative viewpoint from one character to another. The textual examples analysed in the previous sections demonstrate her characteristic employment of this linguistic construction and its essential role in facilitating the presentation of multiple consciousnesses.

The employment of discourse parentheticals can be viewed as fitting in with the Modernist stylistic practice of simulating orality in literary texts (Adamson, 1998), as my analysis in this chapter has shown that many of the textual examples from the two chosen novels display a resemblance with discourse parentheticals in oral speech. However, the use of this device is radicalised by Woolf in that its function extends beyond that of being a marker of orality. A discourse parenthetical becomes an effective linguistic mechanism enacting a viewpoint shift from one character to another. As discussed in Section 4.2, a discourse parenthetical has a loose connection to the host structure. Such a loose connection gives this construction the freedom to digress from its host. Nonetheless, a discourse parenthetical is pragmatically bound to the host, as they combine to express the intended meaning. Perceived as a digressive construction, discourse parentheticals signal a change in the on-

going discourse. However, instead of a change in topic, discourse parentheticals in Woolf's texts enact a change in narrative viewpoint. And a discourse parenthetical functions together with its surrounding text to present different consciousnesses simultaneously.

The textual examples have indicated that the use of discourse parentheticals is a deliberate stylistic choice made by Virginia Woolf. As a pioneer of Modernist writing, she has challenged the traditional methods of writing passed down to her from her predecessors. She criticises what she calls the 'materialist' writers for adhering to 'a formal railway line of sentence' (*Letters* 3: 135). It is fair to say that the parenthetical insertion effectively breaks up the formal railway line of sentence. In fact, discourse parentheticals break up not only the linear syntactic structure of a sentence, by adding a new consciousness in the same sentence, this linguistic device also undermines a unified coherent narrative viewpoint.

The linguistic makeup of a discourse parenthetical endows this construction with a paradoxical nature: it both fragments the discourse and establishes connections. Syntactically, a discourse parenthetical is disintegrated, but it is linearly inserted in the host construction. In *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*, this device breaks up a coherent narrative viewpoint, and yet, by accommodating more than one point of view within the same sentence boundaries, it brings different viewpoints closer to each other. While in conversation, the speaker and the hearer need to 'hold suspended in memory the part of the utterance leading up to the [discourse parenthetical], in order to be able to pick this up again' after the parenthetical insertion (Biber et al., 1999:

1067), in the narrative text, readers have to bear in mind the established points of view both outside and inside of a parenthetical. In this way, the use of discourse parentheticals enhances the sense of multiplicity and simultaneity in the presentation of consciousness. Most importantly, the very fabric of the text seems to suggest that one consciousness is not entirely isolated from another, but is always in connection with others.

Chapter 5 Attributing parentheticals

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I have divided parentheticals into two categories: discourse parentheticals and attributing parentheticals. In general, a discourse parenthetical indicates a digression from or a process of modification to the on-going discourse and can affect the interpretation of the meaning of the host sentence. An attributing parenthetical functions in a different way. It does not affect the semantic content or the pragmatic meaning of the host; rather, it serves to specify the source of the represented consciousness and to direct readers' attribution of point of view. The previous chapter has examined how discourse parentheticals are used in *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*: Virginia Woolf draws on the digressive nature of this linguistic construction to shift narrative viewpoint from one character to another so that a short stretch of text or even a single sentence can accommodate more than one character's consciousness. By doing so, she manages to break the convention of adhering to a single unified narrative viewpoint and thus create a sense of simultaneity and multiplicity in her presentation of consciousness. This chapter will focus on the use of attributing parentheticals. As the following analysis will show, attributing parentheticals function as another linguistic mechanism to enact shifts in point of view and facilitate the presentation of multipersonal consciousnesses.

An attributing parenthetical frequently occurs in sentences of consciousness presentation, although its occurrence is not compulsory.

However, Virginia Woolf seems to show a particular preference for this device. As Cohn comments, Woolf 'dots her texts with the phrase "he (she) thought"' (1978: 64). And Fludernik gives the following a remark on Woolf's frequent use of attributing parentheticals:

> Even in Dickens [attributing] parentheticals do not occur as pervasively as in V. Woolf, who probably over-uses the device, playing with juxtapositions of [attributing] parentheticals and truncated free indirect discourse (1993: 160).

Indeed, attributing parentheticals pervade the texts of *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*. A detailed investigation will be worthwhile to help reveal what functions these attributing parentheticals perform and what effects they produce in the novels.

Before starting the discussion and analysis in this chapter, it is necessary to clarify a terminological issue. In the literature on discourse presentation, the general term for the device under current discussion is *parenthetical*, and another related term is *reporting clause* (sometimes also *introductory clause* (Noh, 2000), *Narrator's Report of Speech/Thought/Writing* (Semino & Short, 2004), *framing clause* or *inquit* (Toolan, 2001[1988])). A reporting clause has the same construction as a parenthetical: a noun/noun phrase + a verb of speech/ consciousness, and both function to specify the source of the represented discourse. However, a reporting clause tends to be regarded as the main clause to the subordinated reported clause, whereas a parenthetical tends to be seen as a digression from the host structure, which is the represented

speech or thought without any syntactic hierarchical relation to it. Due to the difference in the syntactic status, the use of *reporting clause* tends to suggest the dominance in the text of the narrator's point of view; it is the narrator who is reporting a character's speech or thought or mental states. The use of *parenthetical*, on the other hand, downplays the narrator's voice and emphasises the figural viewpoint, which fits in better with the situation of the two chosen novels, as the texts are mainly the representation of characters' consciousnesses in the more immediate modes of free indirect style and interior monologue. And I will use the term *attributing parenthetical* to refer to the attributing devices in *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse* to distinguish it from discourse parentheticals discussed in the previous chapter. The attributing devices to be considered as attributing parentheticals include both the typical construction of Noun/ Noun phrase + Verb of speech/ consciousness as in (1) and also the clause/sentence equivalents as in (2)— (4):

(1) There was something perhaps wrong with the design? Was it, she wondered, that the line of the wall wanted breaking, was it that the mass of the trees was too heavy? (*TL*: 209)

(2) How would you like that? she asked, addressing herself particularly to her daughters. So she added, rather differently, one must take them whatever comforts one can. (*TL*: 9)

(3) A charming woman, Scrope Purvis thought her (knowing her as one does know people who live next door to one in Westminster) (*MD*: 4)

(4) It was unthinkable, it was detestable (so he signalled to her across the table) that Augustus should be beginning his soup over again. (*TL*: 104)

In Extract (2), instead of being inserted in the middle or at the end of the sentence, the attributing signal occurs at the sentence start. In Extract (3), the attributing parenthetical in fact results from the pre-positioning of the sentence object (*Scrope Purvis thought her a charming woman*). In Extract (4), different from the typical construction of Noun/ Noun phrase + Verb of speech/ consciousness, the attributing device also includes a proform *so*, and this attributing parenthetical is also marked out as a discourse parenthetical. However, taking into account the attributing function, I will consider all three examples and the like as attributing parentheticals. In addition, in the two chosen novels, the typical construction of parentheticals is often followed by modifying elements such as non-finite clauses, for example:

(5) But it would be a mistake, **she thought**, thinking how they walked off together, arm in arm, past the greenhouse, to simplify their relationship. It was no monotony of bliss—she with her impulses and quicknesses; he with his shudders and glooms. (*TL*: 215)

(6) But she's not married; she's young; quite young, **thought Peter**, the red carnation he had seen her wear as she came across Trafalgar Square burning again in his eyes and making her lips red. (*MD*: 58)

In the Lancaster Speech, Thought and Writing Presentation Corpus (Culpeper, et al., 2008), modifying constructions such as the underlined parts here are considered an independent part from the attributing parentheticals and tagged separately: in (5), *she thought* would be tagged as NRT (Narrator's Report of Thought), and the following clause would probably be tagged as IT (Indirect Thought); in (6), *thought Peter* would be tagged as NRT, and the

following clauses would probably be tagged as N (Narration)[8]. However, these modifying elements are clearly bound in a syntactic relation to the preceding attributing parenthetical. The non-finite clause in (5) shares the subject with the attributing parenthetical, and the non-finite clause in (6) functions as a modifier to the preceding clause *thought Peter*. Due to the syntactic binding, I prefer to treat the modifying constructions as part of an attributing parenthetical. Another reason for this treatment lies in the fact that adding modifiers such as participial clauses after the typical construction of an attributing parenthetical is a frequent practice of Virginia Woolf. As Sotirova also points out, the 'use of non-finite clauses, immediately attached to an attributing parenthetical is typical of Woolf's style' (in press (a)). And such modifying elements, as the later discussion will show, can have a strong influence on the interpretation of narrative viewpoint.

The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 5.2 will start with a review of existing studies of attributing parentheticals, and then it will discuss how Woolf's use of attributing parentheticals poses a challenge to existing theoretical accounts. After that, Section 5.3 will narrow the focus down to the investigation of how Virginia Woolf employs attributing parentheticals to manipulate shifts in point of view in *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse* and how viewpoint shifts enacted by this linguistic mechanism contribute to the presentation of multipersonal consciousnesses. Section 5.4 concludes this

[8] The non-finite participial clauses following the attributing parenthetical in Extract (6) present the character's perception and sensation, which may be considered as *represented perception* by other scholars (Brinton,1980; Sotirova, 2013; Rundquist, 2014). In this way, these modifying elements are aligned more closely with the figural point of view, which also lends support for my proposal to reconsider the status of attributing parentheticals and the modifying elements that follow.

chapter, emphasising the role of attributing parentheticals in conveying the connections between different characters' minds.

5.2 Whose point of view is expressed in an attributing parenthetical?

While it is commonly agreed that an attributing parenthetical contributes to the interpretation of its host by specifying the viewpoint to which the host sentence/clause is to be attributed, whose viewpoint is expressed in an attributing parenthetical is a question that has escaped attention from the majority of researchers. Extensive discussion of this matter can only be found in Banfield (1978, 1981, 1982), whereas other researchers merely give brief comments on it. This section will review these studies in order to assess both the merits and disadvantages of viewing attributing parentheticals as character-based or narratorial in origin, and, more importantly, to see how the current research can illuminate further the significance of this construction for our understanding of consciousness presentation.

5.2.1 Existing studies of attributing parentheticals in relation to narrative point of view

A widely-held assumption about attributing parentheticals is that this construction represents the narrator's point of view. The overall argument for this assumption is that it is the narrator who is using attributing parentheticals to tell readers whose speech or thought is being presented. Another factor that leads to this assumption may be that in many narrative texts, an attributing parenthetical is often followed by descriptions of a character's body language or comments on the represented speech or thought, which is generally

considered as being provided by an omniscient narrator external to the figural consciousness (see Mahlberg & Smith (2012) on 'suspended quotation'). For example, Leaska regards the underlined part in the following extract as 'an editorially omniscient "stage direct"' (1970: 53):

(7) 'It's due west,' **said the atheist Tansley**, holding his bony fingers spread so that the wind blew through them, for he was sharing Mr. Ramsay's evening walk up and down, up and down the terrace. (*TL*: 9)

This is an instance of direct speech. With the verbatim reproduction of the character's utterance and the quotation marks, the represented speech and the following *inquit* formula are more clearly set apart so that there is also a clearer separation of voices and viewpoints. In cases like this, it is more plausible to have the narrator's voice inserted, providing an evaluation of the character or what is said, even though I do not think the epithet *atheist* and the repetition *up and down* are necessarily the narrator's evaluation in the above extract.

While Leaska (1970) discusses the status of attributing parentheticals in the case of direct speech, Reinhart (1975, 1983) comments on the use of this device in the mode of free indirect style (her original term is 'sentences containing parentheticals'). According to her, an attributing parenthetical such as the one in the following extract is 'an assertion of the speaker' conveying his or her 'interpretation, evaluation or description of the manner of the parenthetical-subject's speech act, which is represented in the main clause' (1975: 156; 1983: 188):

(8) Oh, that they should begin so early, **Mrs Ramsay deplored** (*TL*: 12; Reinhart's example).

Leech & Short consider attributing parentheticals in the direct mode as the 'evidence of the narrator's presence' (2007 [1981]: 258), and with respect to the occurrence of an attributing parenthetical in free indirect style, they tend to take this kind of case as ambiguous between Indirect Speech/Thought and Free Indirect Speech/Thought (2007 [1981]: 258, 267).

Without distinguishing different narrative modes, Torsello points out that when attributing parentheticals contain an element of interpretation, such as *she added* instead of simply *she said*, the narratorial point of view is prominent (1991: 167). The assumption that an attributing parenthetical points to the narrator can also be found in Falzon, who claims that this attributing device notifies readers of the suspending or the ending of a character's speech and 'lead[s] them back to the narrative of the story where the narrator can again take over the narration' (1998: 355). Therefore, according to these researchers, the occurrence of an attributing parenthetical signals a viewpoint shift from a character to the narrator.

Banfield (1982) remarks as well that the occurrence of attributing parentheticals is a condition for a viewpoint shift to occur, but under such a condition, the point of view shifts from one character to another rather than from a character to the narrator. She describes this condition as follows:

> Shift in point of view: SELF and NOW may change in referent in a sequence of Es when the new E is coreferential with a demonstrative in

> an argument (subject or object) of a verb of consciousness or communication. The new SELF is coreferential with the subject of the consciousness verb or the subject or indirect object of the communication verb. (1982: 102)

In other words, a sequence of Es (Expression, a construction that is higher than a clause-level S and cannot be embedded, for example, a sentence/clause of direct speech or free indirect speech) is not necessarily aligned with a consistent deictic centre; when an explicit attributing parenthetical is present, a shift in viewpoint may take place. This is the case in the following example:

(9) 'I met Clarissa in the Park this morning,' **said Hugh Whitbread**, diving into the casserole, anxious to pay himself this little tribute, for he had only to come to London and he met everybody at once; but greedy, one of the greediest men she had ever known, **Milly Brush thought**, who observed men with unflinching rectitude (*MD*: 116-117; Banfield's example, 1982: 101)

According to Banfield, the viewpoint shift in this passage takes place from one conjoined E to another. The string of words before the semicolon is the first conjoined E, which presents Hugh's point of view; the rest of the passage forms the second E. The second E is an instance of represented thought [free indirect style], which is coreferential with the omitted demonstrative in the parenthetical: *(so/thus) Milly Brush thought*. The appearance of this attributing parenthetical effects a shift in viewpoint from Hugh Whitbread to Milly Brush.

It is important that Banfield (1982) points out the function of attributing parentheticals in triggering a shift in point of view from one character to

another; however, in Woolf's novels, the way attributing parentheticals function to enact viewpoint shifts is not as simple as Banfield has asserted. As the later textual analysis will demonstrate, Woolf's use of attributing parentheticals plays an important role in her presentation of multiple consciousnesses. Banfield's account is rather reductive considering the significant effects produced by this device in the enactment of viewpoint shifts.


Lambert (2011) makes a similar claim to Banfield's when she points out that the use of *...thought* in *Mrs Dalloway* can clarify transitions from one inward point of view to another, although she only gives a general interpretive description instead of conducting strict syntactic analysis as Banfield does. And Lambert limits her observation and analysis to the use of *...thought* and thus neglects other attributing parentheticals. Neither does her research touch on the issue of viewpoint presentation in this attributing device. Besides, just like Banfield, she does not go further to investigate how attributing parentheticals can complicate the transition between viewpoints and what stylistic significance this device can have for the presentation of fictional minds.

I will analyse the stylistic effects generated by attributing parentheticals in later sections. For now I will concentrate on the issue of viewpoint presentation in attributing parentheticals because this issue is closely related to readers' interpretation of narrative viewpoint and their perception of the whole narrative structure in a novel. As only Banfield (1978, 1981, 1982) offers a detailed explanation on this matter, the rest of this section will devote more space to the discussion of her account in order to see how it can benefit the current study.

While researchers such as Reinhart (1975) and Torsello (1991) tend to assume that attributing parentheticals mark the narrator's viewpoint, Banfield holds the opposite opinion (1978: 308; 1982: 42-52, 189-196). She claims that 'the parenthetical has no SELF' (1982: 190).

Banfield comes to the above conclusion by following strict syntactic analysis under the framework of generative grammar. When explaining the linguistic formation of parentheticals that accompany direct speech or free indirect speech, she adopts the proposal by Emonds (1976): two Es, the latter containing a verb of consciousness or communication and a proform complement coreferential with the former E, undergo a process of transformation through which the proform is deleted and the rest of the second E (a surface S, which is a lower class than E and is embeddable) is moved to a position under the first E and becomes a constituent of it. The following diagrams (Banfield, 1982: 44, 51) illustrate this process and show the derivation of (10b) and (11b).


(10)



a. No, John came later than Sue. I think so.
No, John came later than Sue. He said so.

b. No, John came later than Sue, I think.
No, John came later than Sue, he said.

(11)



I would go a step further so$_i$ Mr Bloom insinuated I would go a step further Mr Bloom insinuated
The man's heart grew heavy thus$_i$ she read aloud The man's heart grew heavy she read aloud

a. I would go a step further. So Mr Bloom insinuated. b. I would go a step further, Mr B insinuated.
The man's heart grew heavy. Thus she read aloud. The man's heart grew heavy, she read aloud.

This syntactic analysis of parenthetical formation is crucial to Banfield's account of the assignment of point of view to attributing parentheticals. An attributing parenthetical, in Banfield's paradigm, is analysed as 'a surface S and not an E', which means that it cannot contain any expressive elements (Banfield, 1982: 44). Since the parenthetical S is conjoined to the preceding E, the speaker of the parenthetical S is deprived of expression of subjectivity. As she has stated in an earlier article, 'parentheticals formation robs the parenthetical of its point of view' (1978: 306). This is how she arrives at the conclusion that there is no SELF in an attributing parenthetical or that there is no independent point of view established in it. As an attributing parenthetical does not express any point of view, to Banfield, there is of course no need to assign to it the narrator's voice.

Banfield provides further evidence to show that there are no syntactic indicators of the narrator's point of view in attributing parentheticals:

i) There cannot be exclamations in attributing parentheticals, for example:

(12) Was it not odd, (*yes) she reflected. (Banfield, 1982: 190)

ii) The adverbs in attributing parentheticals cannot convey information presenting the narrator's knowledge but unknown to the parenthetical subjects. For example:

(13) He was more in love with her than she had supposed, Emma (*falsely) concluded. (Banfield, 1982: 190)

iii) Parentheticals tolerate no true negation:

(14) No, he wouldn't go, she didn't *realize/ know/ say. (Banfield, 1982: 191)

iv) Factive verbs function differently in attributing parentheticals:

(15) Frank Churchill was in love with her, Emma realized. (Banfield, 1982: 192)

According to Banfield, factive verbs in attributing parentheticals do not indicate facts or truth, but rather they only indicate the personal thoughts and beliefs of a character. Reading the above sentence, we conclude that Emma thinks Frank Churchill is in love with her but not that this is really true in the narrative.

v) Evaluative adjectives in attributing parentheticals are unlikely to be assigned with their figurative meaning. For example:

(16) Yes, she was miserable, the poor girl answered. (Banfield, 1982: 194)

Banfield claims that, in the above sentence, the preferred reading cannot assign the adjective *poor* with its figurative meaning without being forced, although she does not explain why.

Banfield states that all the above features absent in attributing parentheticals are indicators of subjectivity, the interpretation of which would require a centre of consciousness, a point of view. Without expressive elements indicating a distinct viewpoint, she claims, '[attributing] parentheticals are neutral with respect to point of view' and 'there is no evidence that descriptive statements such as "she said" or "she thought" of which parentheticals are one case should be considered the expression or assertion of a narrator's point of view' (1982: 194).

While pointing out that attributing parentheticals cannot contain any syntactic markers of subjectivity that suggests a narrator's point of view, Banfield (1978, 1981) introduces the notion of unreflective consciousness to explain the viewpoint presentation in attributing parentheticals:

> the parenthetical, despite the fact that it syntactically resembles pure narration, should be considered *as part of the representation of the third person's unreflective consciousness*. (Banfield, 1978: 307; my emphasis)

She adopts this notion from Kuroda's (1976) categorisation of different levels of consciousness. *Non-reflective* or *spontaneous* consciousness is distinguished from *reflective* consciousness (Banfield, 1981: 64). The former indicates that we know or are aware of something without fully registering

this kind of awareness, while the latter indicates that we know that we know something, or in Banfield's words, reflective consciousness indicates 'a knowledge of knowledge', 'a knowledge turned back upon itself' (1981: 64). And she speculates that 'the parenthetical itself may fall within the jurisdiction of non-reflective consciousness' (1981: 73). In other words, an attributing parenthetical such as *he thought* or *Mrs Ramsay felt* describes a mental process which forms part of a character's consciousness without the involved character fully realising this process. The character thinks about something without being actively aware that he or she is *thinking*. Seen in this light, an attributing parenthetical can be aligned with a character's point of view.

Banfield's analysis is rigorous, but not without problems. When judging whether a sentence expresses a point of view, Banfield relies purely on the linguistic evidence of expressivity or subjectivity and completely ignores the role of the context in affecting readers' interpretation of narrative viewpoint. The rigidity of syntactic analysis points to a problem with her account of attributing parentheticals. Her proposal that an attributing parenthetical is derived as a result of parenthetical transformation is problematic because, in some cases, the way an attributing parenthetical fits into a sentence makes it difficult to retrieve the "original" sentences before they undergo the process of parenthetical transformation. For instance:

(17) But she's extraordinarily attractive, **he thought**, as, walking across Trafalgar Square in the direction of the Haymarket, came a young woman who, as she passed Gordon's statue, seemed, **Peter thought**

> (susceptible as he was), to shed veil after veil, until she became the very woman he had always had in mind; […] (*MD*: 57)

In this scene, Peter Walsh comes across a woman when he is walking across Trafalgar Square after leaving Clarissa's house. The presentation of his thought and perception and the description of his actions are interwoven in this part of consciousness presentation. Banfield's syntactic transformation can be applied to the first attributing parenthetical *he thought*:

The original: [$_{E}$ But she's extraordinarily attractive]. [$_{E}$ So [$_{S}$ he thought]].

Transformed into: [$_{E}$ But she's extraordinarily attractive, [$_{S}$ he thought]].

For the second attributing parenthetical *Peter thought*, it is difficult to determine which part of the sentence is the object of the mental verb *thought* since all the words are syntactically connected via layers of subordination and parenthetical insertion. Examples of this kind put into question the validity of her explanation that attributing parentheticals are derived from syntactic transformation. Thus it seems that the use of attributing parentheticals should be viewed as a pragmatic and stylistic phenomenon.

5.2.2 Woolf's attributing parentheticals as a particular challenge to existing accounts

As mentioned in the previous section, attributing parentheticals are frequently employed by Virginia Woolf. However, the high frequency of employment is not the only factor that makes Woolf's use of this device salient. Attributing parentheticals in Woolf's texts seem to have acquired a different function apart from specifying the source of the represented consciousness and describing the speaking manner or actions of a character,

accompanying the discourse represented in the host. In this subsection, I will show the complexity of Woolf's use of attributing parentheticals.

While a primary function of an attributing parenthetical is to specify the speaker or the subject of consciousness and to provide information about a character's appearance and actions, this attributing device often functions in an intricate way in Woolf's text. In the following extract, the attributing parenthetical, followed by a non-finite participial clause, allows for a seamless transition from the description of the character's action to the presentation of this character's thought in the mode of free indirect style:

(18) 'There's Peter Walsh!' **she said**, shaking hands with that agreeable sinner, that very able fellow who should have made a name for himself but hadn't (always in difficulties with women), and, of course, old Miss Parry. Wonderful old lady! (*MD*: 197)

In this scene, Lady Bruton comes to meet Peter Walsh and Miss Parry at the party. Although the participial clause describes Lady Bruton's action (shaking hands with Peter Walsh and Miss Parry), it is infused with lexical items that are indicative of Lady Bruton's subjectivity: the epithets (*that very agreeable sinner*; *that very able fellow*), the negation (*who should have made a name for himself but hadn't*) and the intensifiers (*very*; *always*) all spell out her evaluation of Peter Walsh. And the repetition of the distal deictic *that* is also charged with her emotions. These linguistic indices of figural subjectivity contained in the clause subordinated to the attributing parenthetical put into question the attribution of this device to an external narrator. And towards the end of this sentence, the inserted discourse parenthetical (*always in difficulties*

with women) and the discourse marker *of course* render her thought as approximating inner speech. This blurring of the boundaries between the objective description of a character's action and the presentation of the character's subjective experience again prevents an interpretation in which the character information is mediated through the narrator. At the same time, it also raises the question of whether we should simply take an attributing parenthetical as a mere signal for the assignment of point of view.

The tendency to dismiss an attributing parenthetical as simply a signalling device becomes even more problematic in the following extract, where this construction occurs three times in successive sentences, all specifying the same source of consciousness:

(19) Minta Doyle and Paul Rayley had not come back then. That could only mean, **Mrs Ramsay thought**, one thing. She must accept him or she must refuse him. This going off after luncheon for a walk, even though Andrew was with them—what could it mean? except that she had decided, rightly, **Mrs Ramsay thought** (and she was very, very fond of Minta), to accept that good fellow, who might not be brilliant, but then, **thought Mrs Ramsay,** realising that James was tugging at her to make her go on reading aloud the Fisherman and his Wife, she did in her own heart infinitely prefer boobies to clever men who wrote dissertations; Charles Tansley for instance. Anyhow it must have happened, one way or the other, by now. (*TL*: 61-62)

In this scene, Mrs Ramsay is reading a story to her son James while thinking about whether Minta and Paul will be engaged. Her consciousness is mainly

presented in the mode of free indirect style. The clusters of modal expressions (***could*** *only mean*, ***must***, *what* ***could*** *it mean*, and ***must have*** *happened*) stress Mrs Ramsay's certainty; the evaluative lexis such as the epithet *that good fellow* and *boobies* express her affection of Paul Rayley; and the emphases (***very, very*** *fond of Minta,* ***did*** *in her own heart* ***infinitely prefer*****)** also convey her fondness of the two young people. These linguistic indices strongly evoke her subjectivity and thus align the text with her point of view. In sharp contrast with the widely held assumption that attributing parentheticals belong to the narrator, in this extract, the narratorial intervention is considerably supressed, as Mrs Ramsay's subjectivity is prominent. Even the third attributing parenthetical, which is followed by a participial clause making reference to an external event (James tugging at Mrs Ramsay to make her go on reading the story) rather than Mrs Ramsay's thought, seems to show little of the narratorial intervention, because the description of this event is headed by the mental verb *realising*, which indicates Mrs Ramsay's mental activity. In other words, this external event is also relayed from her point of view. The focus on Mrs Ramsay's thoughts and feelings has already made the viewpoint attribution in this passage clear enough, which leads to the question why attributing parentheticals are repeatedly used here.

Cohn provides an illuminating comment on this kind of repetitive use of attributing parentheticals:

> In modern psychological novels, when thinking verbs are found at all in the immediate vicinity of interior monologues, they are used less in a functional than in an incantatory manner. […] These redundancies

> serve merely as a kind of phrasal emphasis, and have little in common with the routine inquit formulas of pre-Joycean days. (1978: 64-65)

This comment is significant in that it identifies the changes in the use of attributing parentheticals in the Modernist presentation of consciousness. As can be seen from the above extract, the attributing parentheticals do not seem to suggest the presence of an omniscient narrator who is an external observer of the character and a guide for readers' viewpoint attribution. This supports Banfield's argument that attributing parentheticals do not establish the narrator's point of view. But the question remains as to what functions the three attributing parentheticals perform here in this extract. Cohn's description, *an incantatory manner*, *a kind of phrasal emphasis*, is rather vague as an explanation for the use of this construction.

Sotirova also notes Woolf's tendency to use attributing parentheticals, and for her, the repeated use of this device such as in the above extract 'does not add vital information about how to attribute the discourse and thus puts into question this commonly held assumption about the function of parentheticals (Fludernik, 1993)' (in press (a)). According to Sotirova (in press (a)), Woolf's attributing parentheticals function to '[break] the syntactical coherence of the free indirect or free direct discourse and [necessitate] a digression'. In this sense, the function of attributing parentheticals is similar to that of discourse parentheticals discussed in the previous chapter: both initiate a digression from the host structure. In the above extract, the attributing parentheticals digress from the presentation of Mrs Ramsay's thoughts to the presentation of her emotions and perceptions.

The second attributing parenthetical is followed by a discourse parenthetical (*(and she was very, very fond of Minta)*), which presents Mrs Ramsay's affection for Minta in free indirect style; the third attributing parenthetical is followed by a non-finite participial clause (*realising that James was tugging at her to make her go on reading aloud the Fisherman and his Wife*), which brings in the presentation of her perception in the mode of psycho-narration. In this way, the text manages to present different levels of consciousness of the character. More importantly, the parenthetical insertions allow the text to capture how the character is thinking. Rundquist (2014) suggests that different modes of consciousness presentation can indicate different degrees of verbality and awareness of a character's conscious experience. According to him, psycho-narration renders a character's non-verbal mental activities of a lower degree of reflectiveness, whereas free indirect thought tends to present a character's reflective thinking. In addition to the distinction of different levels of consciousness and degrees of verbality, I want to emphasise the importance of the interruption of textual linearity by the attributing parentheticals. As Sotirova (in press (a)) points out, Woolf's deliberate interruption of syntactic linearity and conflation of different narrative modes '[make] a gesture towards extreme mimeticism in the presentation of consciousness'. The stylistic effect of her techniques resides in the 'simultaneous capturing of concurrent states, thoughts, and perceptions of the character' and 'the layering of experience as more conscious and articulable and less conscious and pre-verbal' (Sotirova, in press (a)). In the above extract, the parenthetical insertions enhance the simultaneity in the presentation of different levels of consciousness. To be

more specific, the second attributing parenthetical and the subsequent discourse parenthetical represent the situation where Mrs Ramsay is conjecturing what has happened to Minta and at the same time feeling that Minta is adorable; and the insertion of the third attributing parenthetical and the subsequent participial clause manage to show how Mrs Ramsay notices her son's movement at the same time as she continues thinking about Minta and Paul. Therefore, the repeated use of attributing parentheticals breaks the constraints of syntactic linearity so that the text is able to reproduce the simultaneity of various mental activities in Mrs Ramsay's consciousness.

What further complicates the use of attributing parentheticals in Woolf's narrative text is that, apart from establishing the viewpoint of the parenthetical subject, they can also lead to the establishment of a different character's point of view:

(20) Yes, he thought, it is a terrible waste of time. The children were dropping in still. 'I wish one of you would run up to Roger's room,' **Mrs Ramsay was saying**. How trifling it all is, how boring it all is, he thought, compared with the other thing—work. (*TL*: 97)

William Bankes regrets coming to have dinner with the Ramsay family. This extract centres on his consciousness. In the middle of his thought is inserted a piece of speech presentation. The attributing parenthetical (*Mrs Ramsay was saying*) makes it explicit that the preceding speech belongs to Mrs Ramsay, who is speaking to one of the maids. However, as the surrounding text is anchored in William Bankes's inner world, this piece of speech presentation seems to be also relayed from his point of view. And the attributing

parenthetical is most likely to form part of his thoughts. A linguistic factor that strongly supports this interpretation is the progressive form of the verb of speech. According to Fludernik (1993: 198) and Toolan (1983), the non-finite progressive form has a 'perceptual' quality in it. In other words, this form indicates the presence of a perceiving consciousness. Seen in this light, the progressive form of the verb of speech (*was saying*) highlights the impinging of Mrs Ramsay's words on William Banke's consciousness.

As can be seen from all three textual examples cited above, Woolf's use of attributing parentheticals challenges the widely held assumption that attributing parentheticals attest to the presence of a narrator. In this sense, my analysis supports Banfield's argument that attributing parentheticals do not necessarily establish the narrator's point of view. On the other hand, unlike Banfield (1981, 1982), I examine the function of an attributing parenthetical in its context instead of relying solely on syntactic criteria and treating it in isolation. I take attributing parentheticals as an important component in the presentation of consciousness that has a variety of functions exceeding that of signalling the source of represented discourse. An attributing parenthetical can help to present the simultaneous mental activities in the consciousness of the parenthetical subject, and it can also signal that one character's viewpoint is embedded in another's represented speech or thought.

After drawing attention to the complexity surrounding the interpretation of narrative point of view in attributing parentheticals in Woolf's narrative texts, the following section will come back to the central question of this

chapter: how Virginia Woolf employs attributing parentheticals to trigger shifts in point of view.

5.3 Attributing parentheticals and shifts in point of view

In a narrative text which contains frequent shifts in point of view such as Woolf's, attributing parentheticals as a signal for the viewpoint attribution become extremely important for readers to identify whose consciousness is presented and to track different streams of consciousness. However, the way attributing parentheticals function to guide readers in the identification of narrative viewpoint varies and this can sometimes still cause problems of interpretation. In *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*, attributing parentheticals function in three different ways with respect to shifts in viewpoint: a) an attributing parenthetical appears immediately after the point of view changes so that readers can easily follow the shift; b) an attributing parenthetical is delayed when a viewpoint shift has already occurred, which causes momentary ambiguity in readers' interpretation of narrative viewpoint; c) an attributing parenthetical triggers a viewpoint shift through the modifying elements following it, which enables one single sentence to present more than one consciousness. The next three sections will analyse the three situations respectively.

5.3.1 Attributing parentheticals and rapid viewpoint shifts

In the two chosen novels, the text can focus on the presentation of one character's inner world across several pages so that readers are aligned with a fixed narrative viewpoint. However, at other times, the text shifts from one

character's viewpoint to another within a short stretch of text or even within a single paragraph, as in the following extract:

(21) 'Well, Ellie, and how's the world treating you?' he said in his genial way, and Ellie Henderson, […] said that many people really felt the heat more than the cold.

'Yes, they do,' said Richard Dalloway. 'Yes.'

But what more did one say?

'Hullo, Richard,' said somebody, taking him by the elbow, and, good Lord, there was old Peter, old Peter Walsh. He was delighted to see him—ever so pleased to see him! He hadn't changed a bit. And off they went together walking right across the room, giving each other little pats, as if they hadn't met for a long time, **Ellie Henderson thought**, *watching them go, certain she knew that man's face*. A tall man, middle aged, rather fine eyes, dark, wearing spectacles, with a look of John Burrows. Edith would be sure to know. (*MD*: 186)

This extract starts with a conversation between Richard Dalloway and a guest at the party, Ellie Henderson. After a short exchange of phatic words, there comes an awkward moment as Richard cannot think of any topic to discuss with Ellie Henderson. The third paragraph presents Richard's thought in free indirect style, and it is likely that from this point readers assign Richard's point of view to the text. Richard's viewpoint is sustained in the subsequent text through several linguistic indices that underline his subjectivity. First, the vague pronoun in the attributing parenthetical (*said somebody*) firmly aligns the text with Richard's viewpoint by rendering his confusion after hearing

someone greeting him but failing to recognise the voice. Second, the immediate transition to free indirect thought, signalled by the expletive (*good Lord*) and the repetition (*old Peter, old Peter Walsh*), makes a more direct rendering of his surprise and excitement. The continuation of the mode of free indirect style for the presentation of his speech seems also to indicate the continuity of his point of view. However, the consistency of narrative point of view is suddenly interrupted when a new attributing parenthetical occurs (*Ellie Henderson thought*). The description of the actions of Richard and Peter (*off they went together walking right across the room, giving each other little pats, as if they hadn't met for a long time*) seems to suggest an external observer, and a careful reader might attribute it to the narrator. But the rapid shift from Richard's point of view to the viewpoint of the minor character Ellie Henderson is unlikely to be predicted. The attributing parenthetical quickly helps readers adjust the interpretation of narrative point of view, but the viewpoint shift is rather abrupt. Nevertheless, the comparative *as if* syntactically subordinates Ellie Henderson's thought to the preceding clauses (*off they went together walking right across the room, giving each other little pats*), which are further linked to the presentation of Richard's thought in the previous sentence by the connective *and*. In this way, it is not easy to separate the two characters' viewpoints established in this extract. The occurrence of this kind of rapid and less-predictable viewpoint shift is perhaps one important reason why the words "fluid" and "free flow" are frequently used by critics when describing Woolf's style.

The rapid viewpoint shifts are even more prominent in the following extract, in which the text moves among three unrelated characters. While the viewpoint shift in the previous extract does not create a clear connection between the characters present in the scene apart from emphasising Ellie as an observer of others' speech and actions, shifts in point of view in this extract point to the inter-subjective connections even among strangers:

(22) Ah, but that aeroplane! Hadn't Mrs. Dempster always longed to see foreign parts? She had a nephew, a missionary. It soared and shot. She always went on the sea at Margate, not out o' sight of land, but she had no patience with women who were afraid of water. It swept and fell. Her stomach was in her mouth. Up again. There's a fine young feller aboard of it, **Mrs Dempster wagered**, and away and away it went, fast and fading, away and away the aeroplane shot; soaring over Greenwich and all the masts; over the little island of grey churches, St. Paul's and the rest till, on either side of London, fields spread out and dark brown woods where adventurous thrushes hopping boldly, glancing quickly, snatched the snail and tapped him on a stone, once, twice, thrice.

Away and away the aeroplane shot, till it was nothing but a bright spark; an aspiration; a concentration; a symbol (**so it seemed to Mr Bentley**, vigorously rolling his strip of turf at Greenwich) of man's soul; of his determination, **thought Mr Bentley**, sweeping round the cedar tree, to get outside his body, beyond his house, by means of

> thought, Einstein, speculation, mathematics, the Mendelian theory— away the aeroplane shot.
>
> Then, while a seedy-looking nondescript man carrying a leather bag stood on the steps of St. Paul's Cathedral, and hesitated, for within was what balm, how great a welcome, how many tombs with banners waving over them, tokens of victories not over armies, but over, **he thought**, that plaguy spirit of truth seeking which leaves me at present without a situation, and more than that, the cathedral offers company, **he thought**, invites you to membership of a society; great men belong to it; martyrs have died for it; why not enter in, he thought, put this leather bag stuffed with pamphlets before an altar, a cross, the symbol of something which has soared beyond seeking and questing and knocking of words together and has become all spirit, disembodied, ghostly— why not enter in? he thought and while he hesitated out flew the aeroplane over Ludgate Circus. (*MD*: 27-31)

It is not unusual for an author to change narrative point of view and present different characters' consciousnesses, but there are several peculiar points concerning Woolf's design in this extract. First, the characters involved in this extract are minor characters, who never appear again in the later text. The last character, the man at the Cathedral, is not even given a name in the text. Nonetheless, each of these characters comes under the narrative focus when his or her thought is presented in detail. Second, while the three characters are strangers to one another, the movement of the aeroplane serves to link them together (see the underlined part). The presentation of their consciousnesses

shows that each character has a life of their own, with unique experiences and emotions, but the shared perception of the aeroplane creates a connection among them. The rapid shifts in point of view among unrelated characters push to the extreme Woolf's stylistic practice to break the convention of presenting a unified coherent viewpoint. This design emphasises the notion of simultaneity and multiplicity of consciousness. Moreover, by subverting a unified point of view yet still linking the multiple viewpoints, the text invites readers to consider the connections between different minds. In this extract, these characters represent people living within the same period of time, five years after the end of the First World War and situated at precisely the same moment in time, but in different locations around London. The aeroplane as a link of the three characters' viewpoints seems to be added with a symbolic meaning: the shared perception of this object becomes a symbol of shared social experience. As introduced in Chapter 2, literary scholars (Dymond, 2001; Tobin, 2012) have pointed out the significance of the presentation of shared perceptions for the understanding of the nature of consciousness in Woolf's novels—it functions to convey the connections between different consciousnesses. Adopting this interpretation, I would stress that the rapid shifts in point of view in the above extract enhance the inter-subjective connections by highlighting the sense of simultaneity in the characters' joint attention to the aeroplane in this scene. The frequent shifts severely interrupt the consistency in point of view, but by linking different points of view through the repeated description of the object that engages different characters' attention, the text promotes an alternative way of viewing the relationship

between different subjectivities: there is no absolute isolation between individuals.

5.3.2 Delayed attributing parentheticals and ambiguity in the interpretation of viewpoints

In the above section, I have demonstrated how attributing parentheticals are used to produce rapid shifts in point of view. In this case, attributing parentheticals function in a more direct way: an attributing parenthetical either introduces a new source of consciousness or occurs immediately after the presentation of a different character's consciousness so that readers are well informed of the change in viewpoint. The swift viewpoint shift creates the impression of the free flow from mind to mind. Unlike the above examples, the attributing parentheticals that will be examined in this section are postponed. It is possible that readers make a wrong interpretation in the viewpoint attribution, and after the occurrence of an attributing parenthetical, they have to revise their interpretation. In other words, when readers assume that a certain character's viewpoint is sustained across several sentences or paragraphs, the text has already shifted to a new source of consciousness. This is the case with the extract below:

(23) Calmly and competently, Elizabeth Dalloway mounted the Westminster omnibus.

Going and coming, beckoning, signalling, so the light and shadow which now made the wall grey, now the bananas bright yellow, now made the Strand grey, now made the omnibuses bright yellow, **seemed to Septimus Warren Smith** lying on the sofa in the sitting-room;

> watching the watery gold glow and fade with the astonishing sensibility of some live creature on the roses, on the wall-paper. Outside the trees dragged their leaves like nets through the depths of the air; the sound of water was in the room and through the waves came the voices of birds singing. Every power poured its treasures on his head, and his hand lay there on the back of the sofa, as he had seen his hand lie when he was bathing, floating, on the top of the waves, while far away on shore he heard dogs barking and barking far away. (*MD*: 152-153)

In the text preceding this extract, Elizabeth Dalloway is walking down the Strand. A large proportion of the text is devoted to the presentation of her perceptions and thoughts. The first paragraph in this extract is still focusing on her by describing her action. As Elizabeth's point of view has been established, this viewpoint attribution is likely to be sustained as there is no explicit signal suggesting a change in point of view. What is tricky about the second paragraph in this extract is that it plays with this kind of 'interpretive obstinacy' (Fludernik, 1993: 280, 443; Mey, 1999: 33, 203). The first sentence in the second paragraph displays a rather complex syntactic structure. It contains an instance of left-dislocation (*Going and coming, beckoning, signalling*) and a long relative clause modifying the head noun phrase (*the light and shadow*) so that the main verb and its object are delayed. The progressive aspect of the non-finite verbs and the paralleled description of changing colours of different objects suggest a perceiving consciousness, but it is not clear who is the experiencing subject. Readers might easily attribute these words to Elizabeth's perception before reaching the attributing signal (*seemed to Septimus Warren*

Smith). Only then would they realise a shift in viewpoint has occurred. This shift creates both a sense of abruptness and a kind of connection. In *Mrs Dalloway*, Elizabeth Dalloway and Septimus Smith do not even know or meet each other. So the transition from one to the other, even with a paragraph break, will probably still be the least expected. However, it is precisely this unexpected transition that links the two characters together. It seems that Virginia Woolf is deliberately imposing a connection between these two distinct characters. That Septimus's perception can be misinterpreted as Elizabeth's seems to create an illusion that the two characters are having the same perception. This shift interrupts the cohesion of the text by breaking the coherence of point of view, but a different sense of connection is achieved between the two characters' minds. Meanwhile, such an unexpected viewpoint shift even reinforces the impression of free flow between consciousnesses.

Leech & Short also discuss the effect of delayed attributing parentheticals (2007 [1981]: 267, 273). They make the following observation:

> [T]he inversion of the reporting and reported clause […] makes the reported clause look at first sight like a central example of FIS. […] in cases where there are more positive features indicating freeness in the reported clause, the sudden appearance of a reporting clause in a communicatively dynamic position at the end of the sentence, after what the reader has taken in as an obviously central example of FIS, can be quite striking:
>
> What department did she want? Elizabeth interrupted her.
>
> (Leech & Short, 2007 [1981]: 267)

In Extract (23) above, the occurrence of the attributing parenthetical is striking not because it affects the identification of the mode of consciousness presentation or the degree of narratorial intervention, and I do not agree that the occurrence of an attributing parenthetical changes in any way the interpretation of the surrounding text as free indirect style. The attributing parenthetical in (23) is striking because this delayed attributing parenthetical triggers a shift in viewpoint, a shift that is unexpected.

In the previous example, the syntactic complexity postpones the occurrence of the attributing signal and thus produces momentary ambiguity. In the extract below, the attributing parenthetical also occurs late, and this time the use of pronouns increases the risk of misinterpretation:

(24) She [Lily] had done the usual trick—been nice. She would never know him. He would never know her. Human relations were all like that, she thought, and the worst (if it had not been for Mr. Bankes) were between men and women. Inevitably these were extremely insincere. Then her eye caught the salt cellar, which she had placed there to remind her, and she remembered that next morning she would move the tree further towards the middle, and her spirits rose so high at the thought of painting tomorrow that she laughed out loud at what Mr. Tansley was saying. Let him talk all night if he liked it.

‘But how long do they leave men on a Lighthouse?’ ***she asked***. He told her. He was amazingly well informed. And as he was grateful, and as he liked her, and as he was beginning to enjoy himself, so now, ***Mrs. Ramsay thought,*** she could return to that dream land, that unreal but

> fascinating place, the Mannings' drawing-room at Marlow twenty years ago; where one moved about without haste or anxiety, for there was no future to worry about. She knew what had happened to them, what to her. It was like reading a good book again, for she knew the end of that story. (*TL*: 101)

Lily Briscoe helps Mrs Ramsay break the awkward silence during the dinner by speaking to Charles Tansley. Then Charles begins to talk about his own sailing experience. The first paragraph in this extract is composed of the free indirect presentation of Lily's consciousness when she is listening to his talk. In this way, the text establishes Lily's point of view. The second paragraph continues to depict this scene. We get a piece of direct speech and more of free indirect thought, but only pronouns are used to refer to the characters involved here. The masculine pronoun clearly refers to Charles Tansley, and the feminine pronoun will easily be aligned with Lily, since she is the closest anaphoric referent. Therefore readers are likely to interpret the description *amazingly well informed* as Lily's evaluation of Charles. The viewpoint attribution in the following sentence becomes problematic. The connective *and* seems to indicate the continuation of Lily's point of view, but the emotive adjective *grateful* and the mental verbs (*liked* and *enjoy*) as well as the reflexive pronoun *himself* seem to convey Charles's subjectivity. This ambiguity of viewpoint attribution is cleared up with the occurrence of the attributing parenthetical *Mrs Ramsay thought*. However, this attributing signal does not point to either Lily's or Charles's viewpoint. Rather, it establishes the viewpoint of Mrs Ramsay, who is not mentioned so far in this extract. The

sense of unsettlement with respect to the assignment of point of view is not eased by the occurrence of this attributing signal, as such a viewpoint shift is less likely to be expected. Now even the viewpoint attribution in the preceding sentences has to be re-adjusted. It is no longer clear whether the presentation of Lily's speech and thought and Charles's mental states originates directly from their viewpoints or it is Mrs Ramsay who is listening to their conversation and reconstructing their thoughts and feelings in her mind. The continuous use of pronouns to refer to Lily Briscoe and Charles Tansley makes all interpretations possible. If we take the presentation of Lily's and Charles's speech and thought as filtered through Mrs Ramsay's consciousness, this unexpected shift in point of view rather highlights Mrs Ramsay's effort in anticipating and speculating on the other two characters' minds, but blurs the boundary between Lily's (potentially also Charles Tansley's) and Mrs Ramsay's consciousness.

5.3.3 Free modifiers accompanying attributing parentheticals and shifts in point of view

In Section 5.3.1, I have examined how attributing parentheticals are used to signal a viewpoint shift so that readers can easily identify different characters' consciousnesses. This attributing device functions in a different way in the examples shown in Section 5.3.2: an attributing parenthetical gets postponed when a shift in point of view has already taken place so that readers might temporarily misinterpret the text and have to readjust the viewpoint attribution after the occurrence of an attributing parenthetical. Yet what the attributing parentheticals in these two sections share in common is that they all point to a single source of consciousness, that is, the consciousness of the

parenthetical subject. The attributing parentheticals that will be analysed in this section are more complex: they often suggest more than one character's consciousness. This kind of attributing parenthetical makes the interpretation of point of view an intricate task.

That an attributing parenthetical can point to multiple sources of consciousness is made possible by its linguistic makeup. Previous extracts have already exemplified Woolf's practice of adding modifying elements such as a participial clause after the typical construction of an attributing parenthetical in order to provide more information about the parenthetical subject. Christensen (1967) calls these modifying element *free modifiers*. Free modifiers can either modify the preceding clause as a whole, or modify a certain part of it (Pixton 1990). Syntactically, free modifiers do not form independent and complete sentences. They are set off from the preceding clause by punctuation such as commas or semicolons, but are included within the same sentence boundaries so that an attributing parenthetical and its free modifiers form an integral unit. Banfield (1981, 1982) and also those who maintain that attributing parentheticals belong to the narrator have avoided discussing the status of these modifying constructions, but this avoidance prevents them from providing an adequate account of the complexity of this attributing device, not to mention the effects a complex attributing parenthetical can produce on the presentation of multiple consciousnesses. As some extracts in the previous sections (Extracts (6), (18) and (19)) have shown, free modifiers following an attributing parenthetical, in the form of non-finite participial clauses most typically, are often charged with expressive lexis. Sometimes, these expressive

elements are to be attributed to the parenthetical subject; at other times, they have to be interpreted as belonging to a different character rather than the parenthetical subject. In the former case, an attributing parenthetical still points to a single consciousness, whereas in the latter case, an attributing parenthetical indicates more than one consciousness. The extract below provides a clearer illustration since it contains attributing parentheticals of both types:

(25) [1] 'Such expeditions,' **said Mr Ramsay**, scraping the ground with his toe, 'are very painful.' [2] Still Lily said nothing. [3] (She is a stock, she is a stone, he said to himself.) [4] 'They are very exhausting**,**' **he said**, looking, with a sickly look that nauseated her (he was acting, **she felt**, this great man was dramatising himself), at his beautiful hands. [5] It was horrible, it was indecent. (*TL*: 166)

The Ramsay family is setting out to go to the lighthouse at last after ten years' delay. Before leaving, Mr Ramsay comes to talk with Lily in hope that she will show him sympathy. The two attributing parentheticals in this extract (see the underlined part) are both followed by free modifiers. As to the first one in [1], it is a brief description of Mr Ramsay's action. Some readers might simply interpret it as narratorial description. Alternatively, it can still be interpreted as aligned with Mr Ramsay's point of view, since the beginning of this extract mainly presents his speech and thought. And the progressive aspect of the verb (*scraping*) can also be seen as transcribing Mr Ramsay's experience from his viewpoint. Interpreted in either way, the text still focuses on the parenthetical subject. However, the second attributing parenthetical is different. The free modifiers that follow it not only provide a description of Mr Ramsay's actions

and appearance; there are several expressive elements in the modifying construction that are not likely to be attributed to the parenthetical subject. The evaluative adjective *sickly* adds a strong emotional slant to the description, and the verb *nauseated* indicates a psychological reaction. But neither can be Mr Ramsay's perception of himself. These words are evocative of Lily Briscoe's subjectivity. In addition, within the free modifier, there is a discourse parenthetical (*he was acting, she felt, this great man was dramatising himself*), which, with another embedded attributing parenthetical, explicitly spells out that Lily is the source of consciousness here. Besides, the disjointed syntax also gives a vivid rendering of Lily's mental activities: her perception, emotions and thoughts all come at once in her mind. In this way, the attributing parenthetical (*he said*) makes it clear that Mr Ramsay is the source of the presented speech (*They are very exhausting*), but also that the speech presentation is at the same time embedded in Lily's perception, signalled through the free modifiers. And it is in this attributing parenthetical that the narrative viewpoint begins to change. At the beginning of this passage, Mr Ramsay's point of view is dominant through his direct speech in Sentence [1] and direct thought in Sentence [3]. The second sentence is ambiguous in terms of point of view. It appears to be a sentence of narration, indicated by the simple past tense; but it can also be interpreted as Mr Ramsay's observation of Lily Briscoe, especially because this sentence is followed by the presentation of his thought in the direct form, and the adverb *still* underlines Mr Ramsay's expectation that Lily would say something. So, on the whole, the text is aligned with the viewpoint of Mr Ramsay. From Sentence [4], as the attributing parenthetical with its free

modifiers evokes Lily's consciousness, a shift in viewpoint is enacted. This viewpoint shift enacted by the attributing parenthetical allows a single sentence to mix Mr Ramsay's speech and action with Lily's perception and thought. It effectively shows how Mr Ramsay's actions are perceived by Lily, and this rapid shift of viewpoint guides readers towards noting how Lily sees through Mr Ramsay and knows exactly his intention—to elicit sympathy from her by dramatising himself. The use of this attributing device syntactically links Mr Ramsay's and Lily's consciousness and furthermore sets their thoughts in a dramatic relation: Mr Ramsay expects sympathy from Lily, which Lily knows well, but she refuses to do it.

The attributing parenthetical with free modifiers in the following extract also enacts a shift in viewpoint, and this shift again highlights how one character's speech influences another's thought and feelings:

(26) He had made a definite contribution to philosophy in one little book when he was only five and twenty; what came after was more or less amplification, repetition. But the number of men who make a definite contribution to anything whatsoever is very small, **he said**, pausing by the pear tree, well brushed, scrupulously exact, exquisitely judicial. Suddenly, as if the movement of his hand had released it, the load of her accumulated impressions of him tilted up, and down poured in a ponderous avalanche all she felt about him. That was one sensation. Then up rose in a fume the essence of his being. That was another. She felt herself transfixed by the intensity of her perception; it was his severity; his goodness. (*TL*: 28-29)

In this scene, Lily Briscoe and William Bankes are talking about Mr Ramsay. The beginning of this extract establishes William Bankes's viewpoint through the presentation of his speech first in free indirect style and then in the free direct mode. The attributing parenthetical *he said* makes the viewpoint attribution more explicit. The participial clause as a free modifier to the attributing parenthetical provides a description of his action and appearance. While the text seems to still focus on William Bankes, the highly evaluative adjectival cluster (*well brushed, scrupulously exact, exquisitely judicial*) is indicative of Lily's consciousness by spelling out her impression of Mr Bankes. In this way, the attributing parenthetical specifies the source of the preceding speech on the one hand, and on the other hand, it brings in Lily Briscoe's point of view through its free modifiers. After the establishment of Lily's viewpoint, even William Bankes's speech seems to be filtered through Lily's consciousness. Thus there is no clear line between the two characters' viewpoints. By interweaving the two characters' viewpoints within the confines of a single sentence, the text emphasises how Lily's emotions are affected by William Bankes's speech.

The above two examples demonstrate how an attributing parenthetical triggers a viewpoint shift via the free modifiers following it. Such a shift is unlikely to be expected due to the interpretive obstinacy which usually influences readers' interpretation of narrative point of view, but readers can easily adjust their viewpoint attribution after the attributing signal. The loose syntactic structure plays an important part in facilitating shifts in point of view. As can be seen from the previous examples, the free modifiers following an

attributing parenthetical are often composed of several short clauses or phrases. These phrases and clauses are frequently juxtaposed without any conjunctions; thus the relations between these syntactic units are not explicit. Sometimes, one construction is inserted in the middle of another one so that the linear structure is severely interrupted and the syntactic binding force is reduced. The 'interrupted syntax' and 'associative connections'(Adamson, 1998: 596) give free modifiers a degree of freedom to digress from the head and from each other, not just in terms of topic, but also in terms of narrative viewpoint. The loose syntax increases the flexibility of the language in that it is not easy to predict when a new source of consciousness will be inserted. In the following example, the fact that Peter Walsh's consciousness is involved in the presentation of Sally Seton's speech and action is only made clear in the last five words in the attributing parenthetical:

(27) He was rather shrivelled-looking, but kinder, she felt, and she had a real affection for him, for he was connected with her youth, and she still had a little Emily Bronte he had given her, and he was to write, surely? In those days he was to write.

'Have you written?' **she asked him**, spreading her hand, her firm and shapely hand, on her knee in a way **he recalled**.

'Not a word!' said Peter Walsh, and she laughed.

She was still attractive, still a personage, Sally Seton. But who was this Rosseter? (*MD*: 205-206)

The presentation of Sally's thoughts in the free indirect mode in the first paragraph and her direct speech at the beginning of the second paragraph

establish her point of view. Following the attributing device (*she asked him*) is the description of her action: spreading her hand on her knee. Although the emphasis of the hand through the repetition (*her hand, her firm and shapely hand*) is indicative of a perceiving consciousness, it is not until the last few words *in a way he recalled* that it becomes explicit that the description of the hand belongs to Peter's perception and reflection. After the attributing parenthetical brings in Peter's consciousness through its free modifier, the narrative focus shifts to Peter and the subsequent text brings in his direct speech and free indirect thought. Woolf could have only let Peter's viewpoint cut in after the paragraph break with the direct presentation of his speech. This would not have altered the narrative events in this scene. However, the shift in point of view would not have been as subtle as the original version. The charm of the original text resides exactly in the delicate way in which one character's consciousness can be linked with another's.

What is most significant about the attributing parentheticals in Extracts (25)—(27) is that this seemingly simple attributing device allows a single sentence to evoke more than one figural viewpoint, which poses a strong challenge to both the theoretical assumption that an attributing parenthetical signals a viewpoint shift from a character to the narrator and Banfield's (1982) argument that one sentence can only express a single viewpoint. This way of using attributing parentheticals produces a similar effect to the use of discourse parentheticals discussed in the previous chapter: it highlights both the viewpoint of the character who is thinking or speaking and the viewpoint of another character who is listening to, or observing, this character. Thus a sense

of simultaneity is created. The simultaneous presentation of multiple consciousnesses is even more obvious in the following example as the attributing parenthetical is inserted in the middle of a character's speech:

(28) 'Oh, that is Ellie Henderson,' said Sally. Clarissa was really very hard on her. She was a cousin, very poor. Clarissa was hard on people.

She was rather, said Peter. Yet, **said Sally**, in her emotional way, with a rush of that enthusiasm which Peter used to love her for, yet dreaded a little now, so effusive she might become— how generous to her friends Clarissa was! (*MD*: 209-210)

At Clarissa's party, Sally and Peter are having a conversation regarding how Clarissa treats other people. In this extract, the last sentence presents Sally's speech in the free indirect mode. The attributing parenthetical in the middle of this speech presentation is again comprised of several short, loosely-connected phrases and clauses. The two prepositional phrases (*in her emotional way, with a rush of that enthusiasm…*) still exhibit grammatical dependence on the preceding clause *said Sally* in that they modify the verb *said*. The last clause in this interpolation (*so effusive she might become*) is simply juxtaposed with the preceding words. There is no explicit connective to show the relationship between the juxtaposed structures, but judging from the context, the disintegrated clause is an explanation for the preceding text: Peter dreaded a little *because* Sally might become so effusive. The combination of these phrases and clauses through free association without any explicit connectives results in a more immediate rendering of Peter's thoughts and feelings. The intensifier *so* and the inverted structure of the clause are also strongly evocative

of his subjectivity. And the proximal temporal deictic *now* grounds the narration in the moment of Peter's perception and thought. In this way, Peter's subjectivity is evoked through this attributing device and becomes dominant towards the end of the interpolation which has become unmistakably Peter's thought presented in free indirect style. While the attributing parenthetical and its free modifiers evoke Peter's viewpoint, the whole interpolation is surrounded by Sally's free indirect speech. Therefore, within the same sentence, we get both Sally's free indirect speech and Peter's perception and free indirect thought. We experience Sally's emotion, and at the same time we seem to stand together with Peter and feel how he is feeling about Sally. The way in which the text links the two characters' points of view shows how Sally's emotion underlying her words is perceived by Peter and elicits a response from him. More significantly, by interrupting the linear progression in the presentation of Sally's speech, the attributing parenthetical accentuates the simultaneity between Sally's speaking and Peter's anticipation of Sally's emotional changes. And the exclamation in Sally's speech shows that Peter has correctly anticipated the fluctuation of Sally's emotions: she becomes effusive again.

As a free modifier displays a loose syntactic relation to its head, there is almost no restriction as to what can appear in this construction. Sometimes, a free modifier following an attributing parenthetical can embed another attributing parenthetical, and thereby bring in a new point of view. For example:

(29) What damned rot they talk, **thought Charles Tansley**, laying down his spoon precisely in the middle of his plate, which he had swept clean, as

> if, **Lily thought** (he sat opposite to her with his back to the window precisely in the middle of view), he were determined to make sure of his meals. Everything about him had that meagre fixity, that bare unloveliness. But nevertheless, the fact remained, it was impossible to dislike any one if one looked at them. She liked his eyes; they were blue, deep set, frightening. (*TL*: 93)

In this scene, Mrs Ramsay and William Bankes are talking about writing and receiving letters when the dinner just begins, and Charles Tansley is listening to them. The attributing parenthetical *thought Charles Tansley* explicitly specifies the source of the free direct thought at the beginning of this extract and anchors the text in the consciousness of Charles Tansley. Following this attributing parenthetical is a participial clause describing his actions. Moving from the interior view of the thoughts of Charles Tansley to an exterior view of his actions, it seems that the narrative shifts from the figural to the narratorial viewpoint. However, another attributing parenthetical *Lily thought* appears after the description of Charles Tansley's actions, which forces readers to revise their viewpoint attribution. What on first reading seems to be the narratorial description now turns out to be more plausibly interpreted as Lily's thought and perception. A shift in point of view from Charles Tansley to Lily Briscoe is effected with double attributing parentheticals. If we take out the second attributing parenthetical *Lily thought*, the syntax of the sentence is still intact:

(30) What damned rot they talk, *thought Charles Tansley,* laying down his spoon precisely in the middle of his plate as if he were determined to make sure of his meal.

Revised in this way, the narrator is likely to become the most prominent candidate for the source of viewpoint. But in the original version, with the second attributing parenthetical inserted after the subordinating conjunction *as if*, the interpretation is entirely altered: Lily's point of view is established. However, it remains unclear how much of the sentence should be attributed to Lily's viewpoint; it is difficult to decide where the boundary between the two characters' viewpoints lies. Since the conjunction *as if* subordinates the latter part of the sentence (*he were determined to make sure of his meal*) to the former part, the attributing parenthetical (*Lily thought*) straddling the two parts relates to both. Is all the description of Charles Tansley's action (*laying down his spoon precisely in the middle of his plate*) Lily's observation which leads to her thought (he does so *as if he were determined to make sure of his meal*), or is it the case that Charles Tansley is aware of his own action and this description still originates from Charles's point of view? Since the participial clause shares the same subject (*Charles Tansley*) with the first attributing parenthetical, it is likely that Charles Tansley's point of view will be sustained. However, the insertion of the second attributing parenthetical clearly indicates that Lily is observing Charles's actions, so Lily's subjectivity must be involved as well. It seems that the best interpretation would be that two points of view overlap in these words. The parenthetical-within-parenthetical construction establishes two different viewpoints but makes them seamlessly dovetailed.

Curiously, the above example is dumped in a footnote by Banfield when she deals with other linguists' suspicion that there can be cases in which one sentence represents two characters' points of view (1978: 295; 1982: 293-294). She admits that this example 'does contain representations of the distinct points of view of two characters', but she claims that 'the existence of this sentence does not suggest the revision of "1 E/1 SELF", but rather, of the definition of an E' (1978: 295; 1982: 294). In other words, she considers this example not as one sentence accommodating two different viewpoints, but as two sentences presenting two viewpoints successively. And Banfield tries to justify her claim as follows:

> The sentence above is so interpretable [one sentence expresses two characters' distinct points of view] because its syntax allows the clause beginning "as if […]" to be treated as an independent E with respect to this principle [1E/ 1 SELF] for the determination of point of view, and for no other reason. (1978: 295)

Banfield's logic seems to be: because one E can only contain one SELF, so when two SELFs can be detected in one E, this E has to be treated as two Es; and this treatment is allowed for by some unspecified syntactic factors. I will leave the logic of her argument aside and focus on her recourse to the syntactic justification. Banfield does not pinpoint what is peculiar about the syntax that allows for a special treatment of this sentence. As I have already stated, the linguistic constructions following an attributing parenthetical as its free modifiers are often loosely connected, which allows for a kind of freedom for digression, but they are still within the same sentence boundaries. Instead of

considering the part of the sentence following *as if* as an independent E, I see it as connected with the preceding words. And this analysis can show more clearly how Virginia Woolf breaks the linearity of the sentence and disrupts the coherence of narrative viewpoint. By conflating two points of view within the same sentence, the text seems to be highlighting the fact that even when one character is just thinking to himself, others can always at the same time speculate on his mind.

The extract below enacts a viewpoint shift in the same way by embedding one attributing parenthetical in another:

(31) 'Do you write many letters, Mr Tansley?' **asked Mrs Ramsay**, pitying him too, **Lily supposed**; for that was true of Mrs Ramsay—she pitied men always as if they lacked something—women never, as if they had something. He wrote to his mother; otherwise he did not suppose he wrote one letter a month, said Mr Tansley, shortly. (*TL*: 93)

This extract is also taken from the dinner scene: Mrs Ramsay is talking with Charles Tansley. The first attributing parenthetical (*asked Mrs Ramsay*) clearly points out that the direct speech in the opening sentence of this extract belongs to Mrs Ramsay. Following the attributing parenthetical is a participial clause as a free modifier. The verb *pitying* suggests a mental process, which is easily interpreted as an expression of Mrs Ramsay's inner states. Therefore, we are likely to assign Mrs Ramsay's viewpoint to this part of the sentence. However, another attributing parenthetical (*Lily supposed*) appears immediately, which forces us to revise our interpretation. Now it is not clear whether Mrs Ramsay really pities Charles Tansley or this is just Lily's supposition. Considering that

Mrs Ramsay always shows sympathy to men, we can say that the participial clause is a description of Mrs Ramsay's mind, but Lily's point of view is arguably involved as well. Therefore, the parenthetical-within-parenthetical construction once again intersects different viewpoints. Again, this viewpoint shift captures the process through which one character attempts to read another's mind based on the observation of his or her speech.

The textual examples in this section show how attributing parentheticals, together with the free modifiers attached to them, affect the interpretation of narrative viewpoint. In the hands of Virginia Woolf, this linguistic construction has become a zone of voice mixing and viewpoint mingling. An attributing parenthetical with free modifiers attached to it allows the text to move freely from one character's consciousness to another in a way that cannot be easily predicted. This is made possible by the loose syntactic combination between a free modifier and its head and between different components in the modifying construction. Meanwhile, the text no longer follows a unified coherent narrative viewpoint; on the contrary, one character's speech or thought is presented together with another character's observation and perception. Therefore, simultaneity and multiplicity of points of view break the constraints of syntactic linearity.

So far, this section has examined three ways in which attributing parentheticals enact shifts in point of view in *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*. In the cases analysed in Section 5.3.1 and Section 5.3.2, this linguistic construction brings in the consciousness of the parenthetical subject, which is juxtaposed with another character's speech, thought or perception

presented in the preceding text. There might be momentary ambiguity in the attribution of point of view, but the attributing signals can help readers to draw relatively clearer boundaries between different characters' viewpoints. A prominent effect created through such viewpoint shifts is an impression of free flow from one consciousness to another. At the same time, the text highlights the simultaneity in the thoughts and experiences of different characters either when they perceive the same objects or events or when one character is observing others' speech and actions. The sense of simultaneity becomes stronger in the cases examined in Section 5.3.3, where an attributing parenthetical together with the free modifiers attached to it establishes both the viewpoint of parenthetical subject and a different character's viewpoint within the confines of a single sentence. In these cases, as the free modifiers following an attributing parenthetical are syntactically bound to it, the viewpoint established in the free modifiers is thus also rendered as syntactically dependent on the viewpoint established by the attributing parenthetical. And this syntactic dependence of one viewpoint on another creates a strong sense of consciousnesses being interconnected. Through this use of attributing parentheticals to trigger shifts in point of view, the text captures the process through which one character speculates on another's consciousness while observing his or her speech and actions.

5.4 Concluding remarks

This chapter has focused on a seemingly simple narrative technique: the use of attributing signals to help readers identify the source of a represented consciousness. As the textual analysis in this chapter shows, Virginia Woolf's

employment of attributing parentheticals poses a challenge to both the commonly held assumption that this linguistic construction establishes the viewpoint of an omniscient narrator and an alternative view that an attributing parenthetical belongs to a character's (the parenthetical subject) unreflective consciousness. Most significantly, attributing parentheticals in *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse* function as an effective linguistic mechanism that enacts shifts in point of view, which allows Woolf to present multiple characters' minds within a short stretch of text, even within a single sentence.

Similarly to discourse parentheticals, attributing parentheticals allow Virginia Woolf to subvert the convention of adhering to a unified consistent point of view and to break the constraints of the linearity of syntactic progression. The text no longer revolves around an individual character's point of view from which the narrative events are relayed; multiplicity and simultaneity become the new method of consciousness presentation. A comment provided by Leonard Woolf on *To the Lighthouse* is especially illuminating in explaining the significance of the presentation of multiple points of view:

> It seems to me impossible to read *To the Lighthouse* and not see that, beneath the surface of events and the kaleidoscope of thoughts and dialogue, the subject of the book, the pivot of the novel, is the most important and complex relations of human beings and the most profound problems of human existence (1970: 10-11)

For him, the narrative technique of establishing multiple points of view produces 'the delicate art exploring human experience and human associations' (Woolf, L., 1970: 10). It seems that the same can be said of the textual effect of *Mrs Dalloway*. By accentuating the simultaneity of different characters' subjective experiences, Woolf's text counters the presumption of the isolation of an individual consciousness and points to the potential connections between different minds. The inter-subjective connections manifest in joint perceptions of different characters and in the processes through which one character observes another's speech and action and tries to infer what is on his/her mind. The significance of attributing parentheticals resides in the fact that, by enacting shifts in point of view, they make it possible for the text to *linguistically* present joint perceptions of different characters and the processes of inter-mental thinking. In other words, the connection between different consciousnesses is encoded in the linguistic form of the text itself.

Chapter 6 Connectives

6.1 Introduction

The use of parentheticals discussed in the previous two chapters can be seen as a process of fragmentation: Virginia Woolf employs this construction to break the constraints of the linearity of syntax. This chapter can be seen as focusing on a process of linking and integration: it looks at how Woolf uses connectives to bind clauses and sentences that present different consciousnesses.

Recent studies (Sotirova, 2004, 2007, 2011, 2013), as introduced in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, have isolated connectives as important linguistic correlates of viewpoint shifts. But these studies have mainly focused on the use of coordinating connectives in the sentence-initial position. As I will show in this chapter, Virginia Woolf's employment of this linguistic device is more complex, as both coordinating and non-coordinating connectives can co-occur with shifts in point of view. This chapter expands existing accounts by examining different categories of connectives and comparing their functions and effects in presenting the interactive quality of consciousness.

In Section 6.2 below, I will first review existing studies of connectives in relation to the interpretation of narrative point of view, and then supply more textual examples of Woolf's use of coordinating connectives as further consolidation of recent theoretical accounts put forward by Sotirova (2004, 2007, 2011, 2013). Section 6.3 and 6.4 will be devoted to the examination of non-coordinating connectives. Section 6.5 concludes this chapter by comparing

the functions of different categories of connectives in Woolf's presentation of consciousness.

6.2 Connectives and the interpretation of narrative viewpoints: a review of existing accounts

Connectives such as *and* and *but* have been considered as markers of free indirect style and indicators of figural subjectivity, especially when they are used sentence-initially (Brinton, 1980: 367; Fludernik, 1993: 236). This is due to the high frequency of connectives in spoken discourse. As Sotirova explains, 'the strong oral overtones that they bring to a narrative passage make readers interpret it as stemming from the character's perspective rather than the narrator's' (2011: 95).

Ehrlich (1990) provides an important study of connectives in relation to the interpretation of narrative point of view. According to her, connectives are one means of sustaining an established point of view across sentence boundaries (1990: 40-57). She bases her argument on the role of connectives in creating textual cohesion. This account directs attention to readers' intuitive expectation of textual continuation in the presence of cohesive devices. As explicit markers of cohesion, connectives always prompt readers to identify the connections in the text, or at least to try to establish certain connections. This fact is crucial in that it is an important factor in readers' meaning-making process. And writers can make use of this feature to create particular stylistic effects, which is exactly what Virginia Woolf does in her texts. I will come back to this point later.

Ehrlich's (1990) analysis is confined to the presentation of an individual character's speech and thought. Sotirova (2004, 2011) has challenged her account by pointing out that connectives such as *and* and *but* can occur at the points where an established viewpoint cannot be sustained. Drawing on theories from discourse analysis, Sotirova explains this use of connectives in the light of conversational practices. According to her and discourse analysts, the coordinators *and* and *but* are often used to start a conversational turn. By using these connectives, a speaker takes the stage of talking and indicates the relevance of his/ her discourse to the on-going conversation. Thus these connectives acquire an interactive meaning, as Sotirova comments:

> […] connectives are interactionally significant. They signal the commitment of the current speaker to the joint building of ideas and they help acknowledge the interlocutor's point of view. (2004: 225)

Mapping the turn-taking patterns in conversation onto shifts in point of view in narrative texts, Sotirova proposes a dialogical analysis of this use of connectives—connectives link distinct viewpoints and make them 'stand in juxtaposition like rejoinders in dialogue' (2004: 225-226). The ultimate effect of this use of connectives in consciousness presentation, according to her, is that the text renders characters' minds as dialogical. In other words, characters seem to be aware of each other's thoughts and engage in an inter-mental dialogue.

Sotirova (2007, 2013) has applied this dialogical account to a few examples of Woolf's use of connectives at the points of viewpoint shift. I have

reproduced one of these examples together with her analysis previously in Chapter 2. In the rest of this section, I look at two more extracts from each of the chosen novels to further verify the validity of this account.

The extract below presents a brief interaction between Mr Ramsay and his daughter Cam on their trip to the lighthouse:

(1) [1] Well, if Cam would not answer him, he would not bother her, Mr Ramsay decided, feeling in his pocket for a book. [2] ***But*** she would answer him; she wished, passionately, to move some obstacle that lay upon her tongue and to say, Oh, yes, Frisk. [3] I'll call him Frisk. [4] She wanted even to say, Was that the dog that found its way over the moor alone? [5] But try as she might, she could think of nothing to say like that, fierce and loyal to the compact, yet passing on to her father, unsuspected by James, a private token of the love she felt for him. (*TL*: 184)

Previous to this scene, Mr Ramsay loses his temper because Cam could not read the compass. Later he realises that he should not have got angry with her, and he tries to make peace by asking about Cam's dog. Cam, on the other hand, has agreed with her brother James that they should fight against Mr Ramsay's tyranny, but now that she feels the love of her father, she does not know what to do and remains silent. The first sentence in this extract establishes Mr Ramsay's viewpoint through the presentation of his thought in free indirect style, which is made explicit by the attributing parenthetical *Mr Ramsay decided*. Sentence [2] moves on to present Cam's inner world, as the shifted modal verb *would* and the mental verb *wished* indicate Cam's intention to talk

to her father, and the direct presentation of her held-back words (*Oh, yes, Frisk*) further accentuates her supressed eagerness to do so. In this way, the narrative viewpoint shifts from Mr Ramsay to Cam at Sentence [2]. Prefaced by the contrastive connective *but*, Cam's thought seems like an immediate response to Mr Ramsay, an impression reinforced by the correspondence between Mr Ramsay's thought (*well, if she would not answer him*) and Cam's (*but she would answer him*). This viewpoint shift juxtaposes the two characters' consciousnesses, and the connective *but* places them in a dialogical connection. Such a link allows the text to show how Cam's consciousness is oriented towards her father's mind: Cam knows that Mr Ramsay is thinking that she is unwilling to answer him, and she knows that her silence will hurt her father's feeling. She explains why she cannot answer him in [5], but only has this dialogue with her father in her mind.

The dialogical effect generated through the use of connectives is even more apparent in the following extract:

(2) [1] 'Poor Ellie Henderson,' said Richard—it was a very odd thing how much Clarissa minded about her parties, he thought.

[2] **But** Richard had no notion of the look of a room. [3] However—what was he going to say?

[4] If she worried about these parties he would not let her give them. [5] Did she wish she had married Peter? [6] But he must go.

[7] He must be off, he said, getting up. [8] **But** he stood for a moment as if he were about to say something; and she wondered what? [9] Why? [10] There were the roses.

[11] ‘Some Committee?’ she asked, as he opened the door.

[12] ‘Armenians,’ he said; or perhaps it was ‘Albanians.’

[13] **And** there is a dignity in people; a solitude; even between husband and wife a gulf; and that one must respect, thought Clarissa, watching him open the door; for one would not part with it oneself, or take it, against his will, from one's husband, without losing one's independence, one's self-respect—something, after all, priceless.

(*MD*: 131)

This extract presents a short conversation between Clarissa and Richard Dalloway about the preparation of the party. The first sentence establishes Richard’s viewpoint through the direct presentation of his speech and the free indirect presentation of his thought. Sentence [2] is ambiguous due to the lack of explicit indicators of viewpoint attribution. It can be a sentence of psycho-narration revealing Richard’s inner state, but it can also be Clarissa’s thought, especially because the sentence immediately after this one is strongly indicative of her point of view through the free indirect presentation of her thought. In this way, the connective *but* at the beginning of Sentence [2] links two different viewpoints, contrasting Richard’s and Clarissa’s attitudes toward the party. Richard appears to be sharing a concern with Clarissa about the guests of her party by commenting on Ellie Henderson, but Clarissa knows that her husband is not interested in the party. The connective *but* prefacing Clarissa’s thought spells out her disappointment and complaint. Sentences [4] – [6], judging from the content, present Richard’s thought in the free indirect mode, and thus the text shifts back to his point of view. Placed after Clarissa’s

question (*what was he going to say*), this viewpoint shift makes Richard's thought almost like a response to her. The free indirect presentation of Richard's speech in [7] is likely to sustain his point of view. However, the comparative *as if* in the subsequent Sentence [8] seems to suggest Clarissa's perception and speculation, and the following questions *what? Why?*, signalling the mode of interior monologue, draw readers closer to her inner world. In this way, the connective *but* in Sentence [8] co-occurs with a viewpoint shift and links the two characters' viewpoints together. Similar to the previous extract, the orientation of one consciousness towards another is underlined through the link created by the connective. While Richard is haunted by the question whether Clarissa wishes to marry Peter, Clarissa senses that something is troubling his mind. After the brief conversation exchange presented in Sentences [11] and [12], the last paragraph presents Clarissa's thought in the mode of interior monologue. Intriguingly, this thought presentation is also introduced by a connective (*And*). The effect is that Clarissa seems to be still reasoning with someone even when she is left alone now.

It is interesting that this extract lends itself easily to a conversion into a dramatic dialogue. But in fact, there are only four short conversational turns in the whole passage. In a drama script that retains only direct speech, this scene would probably be presented as follows:

Richard: Poor Ellie Henderson.

[A long pause] I must be off.

Clarissa: Some Committee?

Richard: Armenians.

It becomes obvious that the actual conversation in this scene is extremely brief. However, reading the original text, we sense rich interactions between Richard and Clarissa. Both of them are thinking about each other and both are concerned about their relationship; yet neither speaks openly. The connectives linking their different viewpoints play an important role in creating the dialogical texture and this linguistic device functions to highlight the intense sensitivity one character has towards the other.

The analysis of the above extracts shows the validity of the argument that Sotirova (2004, 2011) has made by mapping the function of sentence-initial connectives in conversation onto the function of connectives used at points of viewpoint shift. It enables us to see beyond the linguistic form and gain a better understanding of the character relations. However, her account has focused on coordinators alone (mainly *and* and *but*). Yet Virginia Woolf's experiment with connectives does not stop here. As the subsequent analysis will show, the way she employs connectives is far more innovative. Aiming for a better account of Virginia Woolf's presentation of consciousness, the following two sections will investigate her use of connectives other than coordinators at the points of viewpoint shifts. Section 6.3 below will focus on the use of the connective *for*, the grammatical status of which is ambiguous between coordinators and subordinators; and Section 6.4 will examine how connectives that show more of the subordinating function operate in relation to viewpoint shifts. Comparison will be made between these two categories, and at the same

time, both will be compared with the use of sentence-initial coordinators *and* and *but*.

6.3 The connective *for* in *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*

The connective *for* is pervasive in *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*. Enrique Alcaraz Varó (1983) has noted Woolf's frequent employment of this connective in his study of *Mrs Dalloway*. According to him, in the first two sections of the novel, an average occurrence of this connective is three per page (Alcaraz Varó, 1983: 213).[9] Reiko Ikeo (2009, 2014) compares the frequency of *for* used as a connective in *To the Lighthouse* with its frequency in the fiction section of the B-LOB Corpus (Brown-Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus): *for* appears 167 times in *To the Lighthouse*, which contains 69,199 words; whereas in the corpus, it appears 165 times out of a much larger number of words, 254,526 in total. This sharp contrast shows that the connective *for* is "overused" by Virginia Woolf. I have also counted the frequency of *for* used as a connective in *Mrs Dalloway*, which is of similar length (64,063 words) to *To the Lighthouse*, and this connective appears 163 times. The high frequency of occurrence of this connective in both novels indicates that Woolf is making a deliberate choice, or at least the preference for this connective is a particular writing habit of hers, which forms a curious case for investigation, given its prominence in passages representing character consciousness.

The syntactic status of the connective *for* is not clear. The question whether to categorise it as a coordinator or a subordinator is still under debate.

[9] There are in fact no section numbers in the novel; the division of sections is only indicated by a wide space between the lines.

While Peeling (1950) and Harber (1955) argue that *for* denotes a coordinating relation between clauses, many other linguists consider it a subordinating connective (Altenberg, 1984; Carter & McCarthy, 2006; Wilson, 1952). Taking a midway position, Andreas Jucker points out that *for* is 'a clause connector occupying an intermediate stage between parataxis and hypotaxis right from the beginning of its existence' (1991: 218-219). Similarly, Olga Fischer traces the ambiguous syntactic status of *for* back to the early Middle English period, during which it could be used either as a subordinator to introduce a clause of reason that has a close connection to the main clause, or as a coordinator to introduce a loosely connected clause which 'amplifies or explains the reason for a statement contained in the main clause' (1992: 291). While categorising the connective *for* as a subordinator, Quirk et al (1985: 927-928) admit that it has a more coordinator-like quality compared with typical subordinators.

Apart from the ambiguous syntactic status, linguists have pointed out that the connective *for* in present-day use normally features in formal or literary styles (Carter & McCarthy, 2006; Carter, McCarthy, Mark, & O'Keeffe, 2011; Denison, 1998: 295). According to a corpus study carried out by Altenberg, the connective *for* is entirely absent in the London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English (LLC) (1984: 39-44). Therefore it is unlikely that this connective would be expected to be used with pragmatic functions typically found in conversational contexts. Due to its conventional associations with written style, its presence would suggest coherence and clear logical connections. However, as the following analysis will show, this is exactly where Virginia Woolf experiments with its meaning and function.

Before starting the analysis of textual examples concerning the function of *for* at points of viewpoint shift, Section 6.3.1 below will first discuss the linguistic properties of *for* in detail so that we can compare Virginia Woolf's employment of this connective with its wider use in language. It is hoped that a more in-depth explanation of her use can be derived from its pattern of usage as noted by linguists.

6.3.1 The linguistic characteristics of the connective *for*

The connective *for* is considered as a marker of causal relation. It is used to introduce clauses of reason and explanation. A synonym of *for* is *because*, a subordinating connective which tends to be used more frequently in both spoken and written discourse. This subsection will compare the use of *for* with the use of *because* both in terms of their semantic meanings and in terms of their syntactic behaviour in order to make clear the linguistic characteristics of *for*.

Linguists distinguish three kinds of causal clauses: 'external' ('cause based in the external reality'), 'internal' ('cause based in the speaker's reasoning'), and 'rhetorical' ('cause based in the speech act') (Lenker, 2007: 198; see also Traugott, 1992: 252). The subordinator *because* can be used to introduce all three kinds of causal clauses (Lenker, 2007: 198; Morreall, 1979; Traugott, 1992: 252). For example, in the following sentence, *because* suggests the physical causation of the event described in the main clause:

(3) The flowers are growing so well because I sprayed them. (Lenker, 2007: 198)

In the following example, the *because*-clause introduces the speaker's reasoning for his statement expressed in the main clause:

(4) Alma is probably sick, because she didn't show up for work.

(Morreall, 1979: 232)

Unlike the above two examples in which the *because*-clause explains the situation described in the main clause, in the following example, *because* introduces a clause which provides an explanation for the speech act indicated in the main clause:

(5) Percy is in Washington, because he phoned me from there. (Lenker, 2007: 198)

The emphasis of this sentence is placed on the speaker's speech act—making a statement—instead of the actual content in the main clause, and the *because*-clause provides an explanation for the speech act.

While *because* can be used in all the above three kinds of causal relations, this is not the case with the connective *for*. It seems that *for* is normally used to indicate internal causes and ground of reasoning rather than suggest true physical causation or an objective cause-effect relation (Lenker, 2007: 198). Since the ordinary use of *for* is to denote cause based in the speaker's world of reasoning, it is endowed with a strong sense of subjectivity.

The subjective colour of the connective *for* is also one aspect that Virginia Woolf experiments with. As subsequent analysis will demonstrate, she often uses the connective *for* to introduce clauses which present a new phase of thought in a character's mind. This use generates the impression of the free

flowing thoughts within a character's consciousness, but the logical relation between the causes that the connective *for* links is often implicit.

With respect to the syntactic behaviour, as mentioned previously, while *because* is a typical subordinator, linguists hold different opinions regarding the syntactic status of the connective *for*. Indeed, syntactic tests show that the connective *for* shares similarities with both coordinators and subordinators. For instance, similar to coordinators, it is impossible to make a cleft sentence with *for*, but it is possible with a subordinating connective:

(6) a. I couldn't invite Viola to our house, for Mother snobbishly refused to receive her.

b. *It is for Mother snobbishly refused to receive her that I couldn't invite Viola to our house.

(7) a. She cried a little because she was frightened.

b. It is because she was frightened that she cried a little.

This seems to separate the connective *for* from subordinating conjunctions. However, this connective also shows resemblances with subordinators. For instance, as in the case of subordinate clauses, the subject in the *for*-clause must be kept, but this does not apply to the subject in the clause introduced by typical coordinators:

(8) *He understood the joke, for Ø laughed.

(9) He laughed, but Ø didn't understand the joke.

(Examples (6)—(9) are taken from Vallee (2003); for the comparison of the connective *for* with coordinators and subordinators, see also Quirk et al., 1985: 921-925.)

As the above syntactic tests have demonstrated, the syntactic status of the connective *for* is difficult to determine. Nonetheless, there is agreement on its common use. Unlike *because*, which can introduce a clause of reason either before or after the main clause, a *for*-clause is normally used after the clause to which it provides explanation (Altenberg, 1984: 29; Huddleston & Pullum, 2002: 1321; Vallee, 2003; Weiner & Simpson, 1989; Denison, 1998: 295). For example:

(10) Because/ *For he was exhausted, he went to bed. (Huddleston & Pullum, 2002: 1322)

Nancy Wiegand (1982) explains this syntactic behaviour of *for* by tracing the historical development of this word. According to her, *for* was originally used in Old English as a preposition, the cohesive function of which depends on its combination with a demonstrative pronoun to form a prepositional phrase which indicates a cause-result relation. This demonstrative pronoun has a deictic function to index the clause of cause, which may either precede or follow the clause of result. As this demonstrative pronoun can clearly signal the clause of cause, the position of the *for*-phrase is flexible in relation to both the clause of cause and the clause of result. However, the unmarked position of the clause of cause is second and immediately following the *for*-phrase. In the early Middle English period, the demonstrative pronoun in this prepositional phrase was dropped, and the cause-result relation had to be signalled only by

the unmarked syntactic position of the causal clause. In this way, *for* evolves into a conjunction introducing a causal clause to explain an event or a state expressed in a preceding clause.

Michael Vallee (2003) seeks an explanation for the syntactic behaviour of the connective *for* with a corpus approach: he compares the features of the clauses that both precede and follow this connective. According to him, the clause preceding the connective *for* tends to convey a sense of uncertainty or invalidness, or in his terms 'unstability'. Such unstability is manifested through the frequent occurrence of modal expressions in them. By constrast, the clause introduced by *for* always conveys a sense of certainty by referring either to common knowledge or events that have taken place. The following example provides an illustration:

(11) Public transport is so cheap that its cost could virtually be ignored, and, indeed, it must literally be so by many in Budapest, for the trams are usually so packed that it would be impossible to collect the fares even if the customers were anxious to pay. (Corpus Lob, B21 54, cited in Vallee, 2003: 6)

Based on such observations, Vallee asserts that the connective *for* does not denote a cause-effect relationship between clauses as its synonym *because* does. Rather, it indicates a statement-justification relation between the clauses it connects. To be more specific, the situation in which the connective *for* is used is likely to be the following: a speaker makes a statement or asserts a certain

opinion, which needs further justification and explanation, and then the speaker adds a *for*-clause to explain why he or she makes the statement.

The above analyses help to explain why the *for*-clause usually follows instead of preceding the clause for which it provides an explanation. As textual examples in later discussion will show, this syntactic behaviour is also important in the interpretation of Woolf's use of *for*. Since a *for*-clause functions to explain the statement that is made in the preceding clause, it creates a backward linkage. That is to say, it can be a strong signal of textual continuation. When it comes to the attribution of point of view, readers would probably expect the continuation of an established viewpoint, and when such an expectation is thwarted, the cohesive function of this connective still prompts readers to link the *for*-sentences with the preceding text and to identify the nature of the connection.

To briefly sum up, semantically, the connective *for* denotes a process of reasoning and self-justification instead of marking a physical causal relation; it is grounded in the speaker's subjective world rather than the objective reality. Syntactically, this connective displays both coordinating and subordinating features, but it is normally used to introduce a clause which provides an explanation for the statement expressed in the preceding text and thus signals a link to it. In addition, its association with written style leads to an expectation of logic and coherence in the text where it occurs. Section 6.3.2 below will explore how these features are effected in Woolf's texts.

6.3.2 The connective *for* and the arrangement of narrative point of view

When discussing the function of connectives as a syntactic signal of subjectivity in free indirect style, Fludernik remarks that one of the most frequent connectives is *for* (1993: 236), but she does not provide any explanation why this connective enjoys this preference. She might be alluding to the fact that the indication of a causal relation grounded in the speaker's inner world makes this connective a preferred device to present the associative nature of consciousness, but she seems to be making an over-generalisation here, as further quantitative research is still needed to see whether the connective *for* is indeed used pervasively in all passages of free indirect style apart from Virginia Woolf's texts. In the case of Woolf, in spite of the remarkably high frequency of employment mentioned earlier, so far there have been few studies that provide an extensive analysis of this connective in association with shifts in point of view in Woolf's text, but it is beginning to draw attention from researchers.

In her investigation of Woolf's experiments with the presentation of consciousness, Sotirova briefly comments that the connective *for* links different characters' minds 'as if the characters share exact knowledge of what the other is feeling' (2007: 13; 2013: 145). It is significant that she has identified the inter-subjective connection indicated by this connective, but she does not provide a detailed explanation for this effect.

A relatively more elaborate account can be found in Ikeo (2009, 2014), who points out that the connective *for* can be used to introduce a character's

consciousness right after the presentation of another character's mind. She gives the following example for illustration:

(12) […] What she disliked was his narrowness, his blindness, she said, looking after him.

'A bit of a hypocrite?' Mr. Bankes suggested, looking, too, at Mr. Ramsay's back, ***for*** was he not thinking of his friendship, and of Cam refusing to give him a flower, and of all those boys and girls, and his own house, full of comfort, but, since his [Mr Bankes's] wife's death, quiet rather? Of course, he had his work... All the same, he rather wished Lily to agree that Ramsay was, as he said, 'a bit of a hypocrite.' (*TL*: 52)

This extract presents a scene in which William Bankes and Lily Briscoe are talking about Mr Ramsay. According to Ikeo, after the presentation of Mr Bankes's direct speech (*A bit of a hypocrite?*), the content of the text indicates that the cluster of clauses introduced by the connective *for* (*was he not thinking of his friendship, and of Cam refusing to give him a flower…he had his work*) belongs to Lily. Therefore, this passage presents two characters' utterances and inner states simultaneously. While the shift in point of view is swift, Ikeo claims, the connective *for* here acts as 'a subtle marker of the viewpoint shifting' (Ikeo, 2009: 20). For her, this connective does not function as a causal subordinator; rather, its function is more like that of the adversative *but*, but it does not convey a strong sense of contrast as *but* would do. In this way, it makes the shift in viewpoint 'unobtrusive' (Ikeo, 2009: 20).

What needs to be pointed out is that Ikeo's (2009) interpretation of this extract is rather problematic. The viewpoint attribution is not as simple as she has suggested. It is true that the direct presentation of Mr Bankes's speech establishes his viewpoint, but the subsequent attributing parenthetical and the participial clause (*Mr. Bankes suggested, looking, too, at Mr. Ramsay's back*) can be seen either as the narratorial description, or as Mr Bankes's perception and awareness of his own action. With respect to the clauses introduced by the connective *for*, there is no explicit signal that the text belongs to Lily's thought, and the content of the text is not telling much either, because this stretch of text can be interpreted as Mr Bankes's thought as well. What perhaps supports Ikeo's interpretation that the *for*-clauses are to be attributed to Lily's point of view is that her viewpoint has already been established at the beginning of this extract in the free indirect presentation of her speech. In this case, the text does not entirely shift to Mr Bankes's point of view when his speech is presented. Instead, Mr Bankes's speech is registered on Lily's consciousness and we get a case of embedded point of view. After hearing Mr Bankes's utterance, Lily reconstructs his thought in her mind. Regardless of the ambiguity in the viewpoint attribution, Ikeo's (2009) analysis here is still brief. She stops short of exploring the stylistic effects produced by the connective *for* and the possible reason behind Woolf's choice of this word. Also, she does not concern herself much with the semantics and pragmatics of this connective. Semantically, the connective *for* indicates an illative or explanative relation between the clauses it introduces and the preceding text: Mr Bankes makes the evaluative comment that Mr Ramsay is a bit of a hypocrite *for* he is dissatisfied

with his friendship with Mr Ramsay and with his own life (implicitly expressed in the *for*-clauses). More importantly, if we accept Ikeo's interpretation that a shift in viewpoint from Mr Bankes to Lily occurs with the clauses following the connective *for*, then the explanatory meaning of *for* has to be established across two different points of view. It is Lily who is providing the explanation for William Bankes's speech and action. Ikeo (2009) is right in pointing out that the connective *for* does not function as a causal subordinator. In fact, this connective can be omitted without affecting either the content or the cohesion of the text. Rather than indicate a strict causal relation, this connective seems to function to emphasise Lily's thinking and reasoning process. She is trying to make sense of Mr Bankes's speech and behaviour by reconstructing his thought in her own mind. The connective *for* marks out the link between Mr Bankes's speech and action and Lily's thought, and by doing so, it makes explicit the process through which Lily makes inferences about Mr Bankes's psyche based on his words and physical behaviour.

The review of Ikeo's (2009) account shows how we can better explain Woolf's use of the connective *for* by paying attention to the interrelation between its semantic meaning and linking function and the multiplicity of points of view. As can be seen from the above analysis, the use of this connective aims more at accentuating Lily's attempt to speculate on Mr Bankes's mind than establishing a strict logical relation between the clauses it links.

To obtain a deeper understanding of how the semantic meaning and the linking function of *for* in Woolf's text differ from its standard use, I will first

examine how the connective *for* is used when associated with a consistent narrative point of view in the hope that this examination will shed light on its use at the points of viewpoint shift.

6.3.2.1 The connective *for* in texts with a consistent narrative point of view

As mentioned in Section 6.3.1, the connective *for* is associated with a strong sense of subjectivity, since it is often used to denote a speaker's reasoning instead of the objective reality. This subsection will show that Virginia Woolf enhances this subjective colouring by adding to this connective a further function: to link a character's thought segments and render the free flow of consciousness.

In many cases in Woolf's text, the connective *for* displays a broader scope on which it exerts its semantic force. In the following extract, the use of *for* does not make much sense if its semantic scope is confined to the two clauses it links. In fact, here *for* does not link only the two neighbouring clauses; it functions on the discoursal level rather than on the clausal level:

(13) She pierced the pincushion and laid her feathered yellow hat on the bed. The sheets were clean, tight stretched in a broad white band from side to side. Narrower and narrower would her bed be. The candle was half burnt down and she had read deep in Baron Marbot's memoirs. She had read late at night of the retreat from Moscow. **For** the House sat so long that Richard insisted, after her illness, that she must sleep undisturbed. And really she preferred to read of the retreat from Moscow. He knew it. So the room was an attic; the bed narrow; […] (*MD*: 33-34)

This extract oscillates between Clarissa's perceptions and thoughts when she comes to her bedroom. Seeing the half-burnt candle and the book, she remembers that she has stayed up late the previous night. Isolated from the context, there is no logical connection between the *for*-sentence and the one preceding it: that her husband insists she sleep undisturbed does not explain the fact that she stays up to read. A close examination can show that *for* indicates a subtler linking in Clarissa's thoughts. Clarissa's perception that her bed becomes increasingly narrower is not the objective reality; this description expresses her feeling of loneliness and isolation. This feeling can also be sensed in her thought that she reads alone at night. Such a feeling results from her dissatisfaction with her relationship with her husband, which is implicitly suggested through her recollection of her husband's words in the *for*-sentence. Therefore, the logic of the connective *for* resides in several consecutive sentences (see the underlined part). It links her perception of her narrow bed, her memory of her reading, and her reflection on her relationship with her husband.

This behaviour of the connective *for* is comparable with the use of *because* as a discourse marker. Deborah Schiffrin has observed that in oral narrative, *because* can be used by a speaker to introduce a story to support or justify an opinion he or she has just put forward (1987: 133; 195). The structure of the narrative can be summarised as:

Opinion

Because [the story]

In this case, *because* functions as a marker of a discourse unit which consists of a series of sentences and is subordinated to a larger unit. Analogously, *for* in the above extract can be said to mark a thought unit which is linked with another one. To be more specific, in Extract (13), the sentence introduced by *for*, the subsequent sentence introduced by the continuative *and*, and the last sentence introduced by the conclusive *so* clearly form an intact thought unit. This unit is linked to the preceding one, which is composed of several sentences presenting Clarissa's perception and memory. In this way, the basic use of the connective *for* to mark the progression of reasoning is extended, with a new function to mark the progression of a character's thought.

The use of *for* to convey the sense of flowing consciousness is also manifested in the following extract, in which this connective is employed to indicate how a character's attention is directed to different things at the same time:

(14) Ah yes—so she breathed in the earthy garden sweet smell as she stood talking to Miss Pym who owned her help, and thought her kind, ***for*** kind she had been years ago; very kind, but she looked older, this year, turning her head from side to side among the irises and roses and nodding tufts of lilac with her eyes half closed, snuffing in, after the street uproar, the delicious scent, the exquisite coolness. (*MD*: 13-14)

This extract mainly presents Clarissa's actions and perceptions after she comes into the florist shop. Following the brief thought report (*thought her kind*), the connective *for* introduces Clarissa's free indirect thought. However, the clauses introduced by *for* first repeat the previous thought report and then change the

topic from the kindness of Miss Pym to her aging. This connective does not introduce any explanatory or illative meaning if we examine it carefully. In other words, the semantics of this connective is less prominent here. On the other hand, while this extract mainly focuses on Clarissa's actions and her perceptions of the flowers, *for* introduces a brief free indirect presentation of Clarissa's thought about Miss Pym. In this way, *for* facilitates a switch in the mode of consciousness presentation, but more importantly, it helps to mark different levels of mental awareness running simultaneously in Clarissa's mind: she is appreciating the flowers in the shop, and at the same time she is thinking about Miss Pym. This link represents the free association in the character's consciousness, but still renders the leaps in thought as ordered, due to the indication of logic and cohesion inherent in the connective *for*.

So far, the analysis has shown that the connective *for* functions to chart the flow of consciousness but still creates the sense of continuity and coherence. In fact, two of Virginia Woolf's most important critics have noted the unique effect of this connective in Woolf's text. David Daiches remarks that *for* 'does not indicate a strict logical sequence', but 'does suggest a relationship which is at least half-logical'(1945: 71). Hermione Lee provides an even more pertinent description when stating that the connective *for* has a function of 'making a leap in thought seem like a progression' (1977: 93). More intriguingly, in some cases, the connective *for* can even make leaps in thought seem like a conversation one character has with himself:

(15) He sat down beside her, and couldn't speak. Everything seemed to race past him; he just sat there, eating. And then halfway through dinner he

> made himself look across at Clarissa for the first time. She was talking to a young man on her right. He had a sudden revelation. 'She will marry that man,' he said to himself. He didn't even know his name.
>
> **For** of course it was that afternoon, that very afternoon, that Dalloway had come over; and Clarissa called him 'Wichham'; that was the beginning of it all. (*MD*: 66-67)

This extract starts with Peter's recollection of a past scene at Clarissa's home in Bourton. Similar to its use in the previous two extracts, the connective *for* here marks different thought units belonging to Peter: his memory presented in the first paragraph and his retrospective reflection presented in the second paragraph. The use of the progressive *was talking* in the first paragraph and the use of the direct thought *she will marry that man* enhance the immediacy of the scene. As the vivid memory of the past scene unfolds, Peter seems to be taking the perspective of his past self at that particular remembered time. But after the connective *for*, instead of the viewpoint of Peter's past self (as he is re-experiencing the past scene), we get the viewpoint of the "older" Peter who is recollecting that scene while sitting in Regent's Park. The repeated distal deixis (***that*** *afternoon,* ***that*** *very afternoon;* ***that*** *was the beginning of it all*) contrast the immediacy conveyed in the first paragraph and indicate the long temporal gap between the recalled time and the moment of recollection. The paragraph break makes the juxtaposition of the two perspectives more obvious. The connective *for* then links two perspectives, and its explanatory meaning endows the text with an argumentative tone. The sentences preceding *for* are a description of a feeling or an instinct on the part of the past self—Peter knew

instinctively that Clarissa would marry Richard; and the sentences introduced by *for* are a comment or a confirmation on the part of the present self—he realises that his instinct in the past was correct.

The analysis of Extracts (13)—(15) demonstrates how the connective *for* is used to mark different thought units or different levels of consciousness in a character's mind. In this sense, this connective functions in a similar fashion to discourse markers that chart the discourse structure. As mentioned previously in Section 6.3.1, the connective *for* displays features of both subordinating connectives and coordinating ones. Perhaps it is just its similarity to coordinators that allows it to have such a discoursal function. At the same time, its subordinating features and its inherent explanatory meaning associate this connective with the notion of logic and strict clausal connections. Therefore, when it is used to link different thought units, it creates the impression that the represented consciousness is continuous and coherent, even if it is not.

6.3.2.2 The function of *for* in linking different points of view

Woolf's experiment with the connective *for* in the presentation of figural consciousness is pushed further when it co-occurs with shifts in point of view. As illustrated in Section 6.3.2.1, the connective *for* is endowed with a discoursal function to mark different thought units, but now these different units belong to different characters.

We have already seen in the discussion of Extract (12) that the connective *for* links Lily Briscoe's thought with William Bankes's speech. This use makes explicit Lily's effort in inferring what is on Mr Bankes's mind, but there is not

much indication in that extract as to whether Lily's speculation is correct or not. This connective in the following extract also co-occurs with a viewpoint shift, and this time it draws attention to the correspondence between different consciousnesses:

(16) [1] He wanted urgently to speak to her now that James was gone and she was alone at last. [2] But he resolved, no; he would not interrupt her. [3] She was aloof from him now in her beauty, in her sadness. [4] He would let her be, and he passed her without a word, though it hurt him that she should look so distant, and he could not reach her, he could do nothing to help her. [5] And again he would have passed her without a word had she not, at that very moment, given him of her own free will what she knew he would never ask, and called to him and taken the green shawl off the picture frame, and gone to him. [6] **For** he wished, she knew, to protect. (*TL*: 72)

Mr Ramsay is taking a stroll outside while Mrs Ramsay is sitting by the window meditating on the matter of life and death. He wants to speak to her, but feels that she would not want to be interrupted. This extract opens with the presentation of Mr Ramsay's inner world. The words *urgently* and *at last* in [1] indicate his eagerness to talk to his wife. On the other hand, the repeated use of negative expressions in [2]—[4] (*But; no; would not interrupt; without a word; could not reach her; could do nothing*) emphasises his feeling of distance and frustration. Seeing Mrs Ramsay's sadness, he wants to help but feels himself useless. All these inner struggles of Mr Ramsay are presented mainly in free indirect style in the first four sentences, which firmly aligns the text with his

point of view. The viewpoint attribution in Sentence [5] is ambiguous among Mr Ramsay, Mrs Ramsay, and the narrator. This sentence can be interpreted as originating from Mr Ramsay's viewpoint, as the subjunctive mood *would have passed* reveals his intention. However, the mental verb in *she knew* and the verb *gone* with its deictic meaning suggest a transition to Mrs Ramsay's viewpoint. Or, this sentence can be seen as the narratorial intervention which helps to reveal the minds of both characters. While it is ambiguous whose viewpoint dominates the fifth sentence, it is in Sentence [6] that readers clearly perceive a switch to Mrs Ramsay's viewpoint. The clause *she knew* in [6] can be interpreted either as an attributing parenthetical, which specifies the source of the presented consciousness, or as a discourse parenthetical, which forms part of Mrs Ramsay's thought and expresses her certainty, but both interpretations establish her subjectivity.

The use of the connective *for* seems natural in this extract, as it introduces an explanation to the preceding text: Mrs Ramsay went to him, *for* she knew he wished to protect. However, when taking into consideration the viewpoint shift, we can see this connective creates another link: it places Mr Ramsay's inner struggles and Mrs Ramsay's understanding of her husband in connection. Ikeo (2014) has also discussed this extract, and she remarks that the use of *for* 'facilitates viewpoint shifting between two characters whose inner states are understood by each other' and that it 'generates a mirror effect in which one character's emotions are resonated and reflected off another character' (2014: 343). The presentation of Mr Ramsay's thought reveals that he wishes to help when he notices his wife's sadness. When the text shifts to Mrs Ramsay's point

of view, we see immediately that Mrs Ramsay is aware of what her husband is thinking, even when he is only strolling silently outside. Ikeo (2014) provides a pertinent comment by pointing out the correspondence between the two characters' consciousnesses; however, she also argues that the use of *for* makes the viewpoint shift more implicit. Ikeo (2014) arrives at this conclusion out of a comparison between the connective *for* and *but*. According to her, when linking different characters' speeches and thoughts, the connective *but* indicates a strong psychological distance between the characters because of its contrastive meaning; whereas in the case of *for*, the distance is reduced. And for her, it is the 'empathy with which the husband and wife sense each other's thoughts and predict their partner's actions' that 'makes the *implicit, gradual* shift of the viewpoint possible' (2014: 342-343; my emphasis). I agree with her that the use of this connective indicates the intense sensitivity each character has towards the other. However, I would argue that the connective *for* makes the viewpoint shift more striking instead of making the shift implicit, and that it is the use of this connective at the point of a viewpoint shift that highlights Mrs Ramsay's knowledge of her husband's thoughts. I have pointed out the ambiguity in the viewpoint attribution in Sentence [5]. It does not require much explanation if we ascribe this sentence to the narratorial mediation. However, if Sentence [5] is to be attributed to Mrs Ramsay's point of view, Sentence [6] would be interpreted as Mrs Ramsay's self-explanation, and this self-explanation would underpin her awareness that her offer is not an expected action for her husband. That is, Mrs Ramsay speculates that Mr Ramsay does not think that she would speak to him at the moment. Alternatively, if Sentence

[5] is to be attributed to Mr Ramsay's point of view, then the use of the connective *for* would render Mrs Ramsay's thought in [6] as a direct response back to him explaining why she offers a walk with him. Compared with Extract (15) in which the connective *for* produces a dialogical effect by linking two different perspectives of the same character, the dialogical linking would be more striking here, since it becomes the link between two minds, and in this way it accentuates the inter-subjective relatedness of Mrs Ramsay's consciousness to her husband's mind.

In contrast with the above extract in which the connective *for* shows the emotional bonds between Mr and Mrs Ramsay, this connective in the following extract produces a different kind of inter-subjective orientedness. It draws attention to the contrast between Lily Briscoe's and Charles Tansley's attitudes:

(17) 'Do you write many letters, Mr Tansley?' asked Mrs Ramsay, pitying him too, Lily supposed; for that was true of Mrs Ramsay—she pitied men always as if they lacked something—women never, as if they had something. He wrote to his mother; otherwise he did not suppose he wrote one letter a month, said Mr Tansley, shortly.

For he was not going to talk the sort of rot these people wanted him to talk. He was not going to be condescended to by these silly women. He had been reading in his room, and now he came down and it all seemed to him silly, superficial, flimsy. Why did they dress? He had come down in his ordinary clothes. (*TL*: 93)

We have seen part of this example in the previous chapter. In this scene, Mrs Ramsay and Charles Tansley are having a short conversation during dinner.

The first paragraph of this extract can be interpreted as mainly centring on Lily's consciousness. After Mrs Ramsay's direct speech, the attributing parenthetical (*Lily supposed*) re-anchors the text in Lily's viewpoint. This re-anchoring foregrounds Lily's role as the listener and observer of the exchange between Mrs Ramsay and Charles Tansley. After the first sentence, we get more information about Charles through the presentation of his speech and thought, but what is noteworthy is that Charles's speech and thought are presented in two parts separated by a paragraph break. It is clear that the second part, the free indirect presentation of his thought, establishes his point of view. The evaluative expressions (*the sort of rot*, *silly*, *superficial*, and *flimsy*) and the direct question (*why did they dress?*) strongly evoke Charles's subjectivity. However, the first part, the presentation of his speech, is less definite in terms of viewpoint attribution. This piece of speech is presented in the free indirect mode, and this mode, as Leech & Short (2007 [1981]) suggest, reduces the immediacy of the presentation compared with direct speech. Meanwhile, since Lily's viewpoint has been established in the preceding sentence, the less immediate speech presentation in these circumstances generates the effect that Charles's speech is filtered through Lily's consciousness. In other words, the text presents Charles's speech from Lily's point of view. It is Lily who perceives Charles's speech, and the description *shortly* seems to be her impression.

If we accept this viewpoint demarcation, then we can see that, similar to the case in Extract (16), the connective *for* links two characters' minds. The semantic meaning of this connective encourages an interpretation that Charles

is responding to Lily's perception and thought. Lily has got an impression that Charles speaks *shortly*; on the other hand, Charles seems to have sensed what Lily is thinking and explains why he is not giving more explanations. When the shift in point of view is registered, we can see that what the connective *for* links is not only the two adjacent sentences; the two characters' consciousnesses, which are presented in the two paragraphs, are placed in contrast: while Lily is considering Mrs Ramsay's opinion that men are inferior to women (*she **pitied men** always as if **they lacked something**—women never, as if they had something*), Charles thinks the opposite (*he was not going to talk **the sort of rot** these people wanted him to talk. He was not going to **be condescended to** by these **silly women***).

Another interesting case regarding the use of the connective *for* at the point of viewpoint shift is raised by Tim Parks (2007) in his discussion of the following extract taken from the opening page of *Mrs Dalloway*. It depicts a scene in which Clarissa Dalloway is on her way to the florist shop and a man in the neighbourhood, Scrope Pervis, watches her from across the street.

(18) She stiffened a little on the kerb, waiting for Durtnall's van to pass. A charming woman, Scrope Purvis thought her (knowing her as one does know people who live next door to one in Westminster); a touch of the bird about her, of the jay, blue-green, light, vivacious, though she was over fifty, and grown very white since her illness. There she perched, never seeing him, waiting to cross, very upright.

For having lived in Westminster—how many years now? over twenty—one feels even in the midst of the traffic, or waking at night,

> Clarissa was positive, a particular hush, or solemnity; an indescribable pause; a suspense (but that might be her heart, affected, they said, by influenza) before Big Ben strikes. There! Out it boomed. First a waning, musical; then the hour, irrevocable. The leaden circles dissolved in the air. (*MD*: 4)

The first paragraph of this extract mainly presents Scrope Purvis's consciousness. The first sentence can be interpreted as his perception. Then the text moves to his thoughts and impressions, signalled by the attributing signal (*Scrope Purvis thought her*). The narratorial voice seems to be mixed in it, but on the whole, the text is aligned with Scrope's viewpoint. The second paragraph, after a momentary ambiguity in the viewpoint attribution due to the rather postponed attributing parenthetical (*Clarissa was positive*), establishes Clarissa's subjectivity. Yet the use of the connective *for* to introduce Clarissa's thought right after the presentation of another character's consciousness leads to the following questions: as a marker of connectivity, what kind of link does it create and how does it make sense in this context? And Parks questions the validity of the use of *for* here:

> Here Clarissa stopped by the kerb, it seemed, to let a van pass, not because she felt any particular hush (an unlikely feeling as a van passes). What then is her feeling of that hush supposed to be explaining? Why this gesture of logical connection with the previous passage, this 'For', if there is no connection? (2007: 121)

A possible explanation might be that the connective *for* links the second paragraph in this extract to some earlier text. In other words, it signals the

resumption and continuation of Clarissa's thought presented before the momentary shift to Scrope Purvis's point of view. However, the text that precedes this extract is Clarissa's recollection of Peter Walsh's words and actions in Bourton years ago, which bears no connection with her thoughts and perceptions here. Therefore, the link created by the connective *for* seems to still reside in these two paragraphs, that is, between the two characters' consciousnesses.

Another point put forward by Parks (2007) is that *for* in this extract is used at the paragraph-initial position. This is also the case with Extract (17). As pointed out in Section 6.3.1, a *for*-clause normally follows the clause for which it offers an explanation. Therefore, this connective signals a close link between the clause it introduces and the preceding text. Since *for* is used after a paragraph break, the textual continuity is disrupted. However, the cohesive function of this connective and its inherent explanatory meaning still prompt readers to assume that there is a link between the two paragraphs. Hence, the paragraph-initial use of *for* is of a paradoxical nature. Just as Parks remarks:

> As suggested earlier, one might choose to call this fragmentary, in the sense that it splits off something that could have remained in the previous paragraph. But one might equally say that this use of an explanatory conjunction to open a paragraph creates a very strong connection with the previous paragraph. This is particularly and perplexingly the case in places where it is not clear that an explanatory 'for' is justified, in the sense that what follows in the new paragraph

> cannot easily be understood as an explanation of what proceeded. (2007: 121)

Parks proposes an interpretation of the function of this peculiar use of *for* as follows:

> Is it that, while generating a sense of fragmentation by breaking a paragraph around an explanatory 'For', Woolf, precisely in then making the 'For' inexplicable from a logical point of view, also generates a second impression of the interconnection of everything (or at least in Clarissa's mind)? (2007: 121)

Parks puts forward his opinion tentatively. I think he has made a good point when he states that this connective generates an impression of interconnection. However, he has not taken into consideration the issue of narrative point of view. The connective *for* not only creates a link between the two neighbouring paragraphs due to its cohesive function, but also interrelates the two distinct viewpoints juxtaposed here. Now the explanatory meaning inherent in this connective seems to invite readers to view Clarissa's feeling of *a particular hush or solemnity* and *an indescribable pause* as an explanation for Scrope Pervis's perception that Clarissa stops by the kerb and stands *upright*. In this way, the use of this connective again points to the connection between different minds, similar to the case of Extract (17). However, in Extract (17), that Charles can have knowledge of Lily's thoughts and attitudes is easier to explain, since they know one another and they are having dinner together in that scene. In comparison, the linking function of this connective is pushed to

its extreme in this extract, since it is difficult to explain how Clarissa can sense another person's perception of her, especially when this person has little interaction with her except that they happen to live on the same street. More intriguingly, after establishing the connection between the two viewpoints, we can find more indicators of the inter-subjective correspondence. While Scrope Pervis is thinking that living in Westminster for a long time allows him to know the neighbours (*knowing her as one does know people who live next door to one in Westminster*), a similar thought occurs to Clarissa that a long-term residence in this area makes her familiar with everything here, even the atmosphere before Big Ben strikes. It might be just a coincidence that the idea of Westminster appears in the presentation of both characters' consciousnesses, but the connective *for* seems to encourage readers to acknowledge the relatedness.

6.3.3 The connective *for* and the inter-subjective orientedness of consciousness

As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, Virginia Woolf keeps experimenting with the standard use of the connective *for*. In narrative texts with a consistent point of view, this connective can be used to function in a similar fashion to discourse markers to demarcate the different thought units within a character's mind and chart the progression of a character's thoughts. At the same time, its semantic meaning helps to invest a sense of logic or at least pseudo-logic to the flow of consciousness. In texts which involve shifts in point of view, the function of *for* as a discourse structuring device is radicalised, as now it links different thoughts stemming from different minds and thus

suggests the connections between them. Its explanatory or illative meaning creates the impression that one character is reasoning with another in their minds or trying to speculate on another's thinking. In this sense, it conveys the inter-subjective orientedness of consciousness, an effect similar to that of the sentence-initial *and* and *but* as pointed out by Sotirova (2004, 2011, 2013).

Regarding Woolf's use of the connective *for*, Alcaraz Varó comments that it imparts to the text an 'artificial or bookish tone' (1983: 214). This comment takes into account the association of this connective with written or literary style, but, as can be seen from the previous analysis, Woolf's use of this connective rather mimics oral style instead of assigning a bookish tone to the text. Nevertheless, the genre association of the connective *for* and its particular syntactic features do influence readers' interpretation of the relation between different viewpoints linked by this connective. Despite its syntactic resemblance with coordinators, the connective *for* also displays subordinating characteristics. This subordinating tendency creates a closer bond between the clauses/sentences linked by this connective. What is more, while the semantic content of *and* and *but* is rather backgrounded when they coordinate conversational turns or link different narrative points of view, the semantic meaning of the connective *for* is still apparent, which prompts readers to establish a logical connection in the text. And its association with written style even enhances the expectation of logical connections. Therefore, compared with the cases in which the sentence-initial *and* and *but* co-occur with shifts in point of view, the connective *for* builds up a stronger link between different

viewpoints. And the inter-subjective orientedness of consciousness derived from this link becomes more pronounced.

6.4 Subordinating connectives and the link between consciousnesses

The previous section has examined the use of the connective *for* and its stylistic effects in consciousness presentation. As this connective still displays features of coordinating conjunctions, it has also acquired the discoursal function of coordinating different points of view and framing them in an interactional relation, which is similar to that of the sentence-initial *and* and *but*. This section will focus on Woolf's use of connectives that show subordinating features. It is not that subordinating connectives are absent in spoken discourse, but they do not seem to have the pragmatic function of organising conversation and expressing interactional intentions as sentence-initial coordinators do. How this kind of connective operates in the presentation of multipersonal consciousnesses in Woolf's texts will be the central concern of this section.

The following extract presents a scene in which Mrs Ramsay is thinking about the negative side of the world when her husband notices her. These two characters are presented as thinking to themselves, but the linking construction *so… that* skilfully connects their thoughts:

(19) [1] She returned to her knitting again. [2] How could any Lord have made this world? she asked. [3] With her mind she had always seized the fact that there is no reason, order, justice: but suffering, death, the poor. [4] There was no treachery too base for the world to commit; she

> knew that. [5] No happiness lasted; she knew that. [6] She knitted with firm composure, slightly pursing her lips and, without being aware of it, ***so*** stiffened and composed the lines of her face in a habit of sternness ***that*** when her husband passed, though he was chuckling at the thought that Hume, the philosopher, grown enormously fat, had stuck in a bog, he could not help noting, as he passed, the sternness at the heart of her beauty. [7] It saddened him, and her remoteness pained him, and he felt, as he passed, that he could not protect her, and, when he reached the hedge, he was sad. [8] He could do nothing to help her. [9] He must stand by and watch her. (*TL*: 71)

After the brief description of Mrs Ramsay's action in Sentence [1], Sentences [2]—[5] almost exclusively focus on her consciousness through the free indirect presentation of her thoughts. The direct question in Sentence [2] and the contrasting clusters of words in [3] (*no reason, order, justice: but suffering, death, the poor*) spell out her negative attitude, and the repeated emphasis with the demonstrative *that* (*she knew that*) in [4] and [5] conveys her strong emotion. In contrast with the highly conscious and reflective thinking presented in these sentences, the former part of Sentence [6] seems to depict her less reflective consciousness, which is made explicit through the narratorial description (*without being aware of it*). The series of phrases and short clauses describing Mrs Ramsay's appearance (*with firm composure, slightly pursing her lips, stiffened and composed, in a habit of sternness*), although indicating a transition from the interior to the exterior, can still be linked to her pessimistic thoughts. Seen in this way, the text is possibly still anchored in Mrs Ramsay's

point of view; but a viewpoint shift seems also to begin to take place. After the linking construction *so…that*, the presentation of Mrs Ramsay's inner world quickly gives way to the presentation of her husband's consciousness. The mental verb *noting* directly points to Mr Ramsay's mental activities, and the subsequent sentences continue to reveal more of his thoughts and feelings, signalled by verbs of consciousness *saddened*, *pained* and *felt*. But the swift re-orientation of narrative point of view is rather salient. Underlying the transition from Mrs Ramsay's consciousness to Mr Ramsay's in terms of the narrative point of view is the process of Mr Ramsay sensing his wife's sadness by looking at her remotely and being affected by her mood. With the *so… that* construction bridging the two viewpoints, the text creates an almost iconic effect: it seems that Mrs Ramsay's sadness passes on to her husband and is immediately perceived by him. On the syntactic level, the *so…that* construction imposes a connection between the two clausal units it links; on the semantic level, as this construction indicates a cause-result relation, it places Mrs Ramsay's and Mr Ramsay's consciousnesses in a causal relation; and on the thematic level, it accentuates the relatedness between the two characters' minds. In other words, Woolf's way of linking narrative points of view can be seen as the linguistic embodiment of the inter-subjective orientedness of consciousness.

Similarly, the subordinator *till* in the extract below brings two different viewpoints together. This passage also mixes the presentation of the characters' thoughts and inner states, but the shift in viewpoint is more clearly marked out by the attributing signal immediately after this connective:

(20) [1] What passes for cookery in England is an abomination (they agreed). [2] It is putting cabbages in water. [3] It is roasting meat till it is like leather. [4] It is cutting off the delicious skins of vegetables. [5] 'In which,' said Mr. Bankes, 'all the virtue of the vegetable is contained.' [6] And the waste, said Mrs. Ramsay. [7] A whole French family could live on what an English cook throws away. [8] Spurred on by her sense that William's affection had come back to her, and that everything was all right again, and that her suspense was over, and that now she was free both to triumph and to mock, she laughed, she gesticulated, ***till*** Lily thought, How childlike, how absurd she was, sitting up there with all her beauty opened again in her, talking about the skins of vegetables. [9] There was something frightening about her. [10] She was irresistible. [11] Always she got her own way in the end, Lily thought. (*TL*: 110)

In this extract, Mrs Ramsay is talking with the guests about English food. After the presentation of the conversational exchange in the first seven sentences, the text begins to reveal more of Mrs Ramsay's inner feelings and thoughts. The verb phrase *spurred on* in Sentence [8] discloses her mental states, and the strings of the parallel coordinated structures *and that*…convey the increase in Mrs Ramsay's sense of relief and satisfaction. In this way, the text draws readers close to Mrs Ramsay's inner world. Interestingly, after the subordinator *till*, the attributing parenthetical *Lily thought* occurs and shifts the narrative viewpoint from Mrs Ramsay to Lily Briscoe rather abruptly. Readers are jerked out of Mrs Ramsay's mind, and as Lily's consciousness is presented in free indirect style, signalled by the exclamative constructions (*How childlike, how*

absurd she was) and non-finite progressives (*sitting up there, talking*), the text brings readers immediately into her mind. The main reason that this viewpoint shift is unexpected probably lies in the fact that it occurs within a single sentence, and after a cohesive device. The subordinator *till* is a strong signal of consistency and textual continuation, but the shift in viewpoint produces a degree of discontinuity. On the other hand, however, such an abrupt shift of narrative viewpoint produces a foregrounding effect. It effectively draws attention to Lily's role of a listener and observer here in this scene, and it highlights the fact that she is speculating on Mrs Ramsay's mind while watching her. Mrs Ramsay has hoped to achieve a sense of union through the dinner, and now she feels her conversation with the guests has helped her to achieve this goal. And all such anticipation, relief and contentment of Mrs Ramsay seem to be known by Lily, an impression produced by the way Mrs Ramsay's consciousness is linked to Lily's. Moreover, it also yields an interesting point if we consider the way the connective *till* links the two characters' consciousnesses in connection with its semantic meaning. According to the OED explanation, this connective denotes 'the continuation of an action or state' up to the time expressed by the *till*-clause, usually with the implication that 'such action or state ceases and a different or opposite one begins'; also, this connective can indicate 'the ultimate result or outcome of a continued action or state' (OED Online). In the above extract, Mrs Ramsay's action of laughing and gesticulation is likely to continue when Lily forms her thoughts about her. If Lily's thoughts are to be viewed as the outcome of Mrs Ramsay's action, then the connective *till* shows how Lily's observation of Mrs

Ramsay's speech and action leads to her further reflection on Mrs Ramsay's psyche. Lily's knowledge of Mrs Ramsay's inner world might be just based on her observation of Mrs Ramsay's physical behaviour; however, as the connective *till* facilitates the transition from Mrs Ramsay's point of view to Lily's, it seems also to create a direct link between Mrs Ramsay's inner states and Lily's thoughts.

The connectives in the above two extracts are shown to bridge different viewpoints. More significantly, the way they facilitate the transition between distinct viewpoints highlights the process through which one character senses another's thoughts and feelings. Such a use of linking devices manifests again in the following extract. This time it is the relative pronoun *which* that manages to link distinct points of view, contrasting different attitudes held by the three characters in the passage and capturing the subtler interactions underlying their conversation:

(21) [1] And Miss Brush went out, came back; laid papers on the table; and Hugh produced his fountain pen; his silver fountain pen, ***which*** *had done twenty years' service,* he said, unscrewing the cap. [2] *It was still in perfect order; he had shown it to the makers; there was no reason, they said, why it should ever wear out*; **which** was somehow to Hugh's credit, and to the credit of the sentiments which his pen expressed (so Richard Dalloway felt) as Hugh began carefully writing capital letters with rings round them in the margin, and thus marvellously reduced Lady Bruton's tangles to sense, to grammar such as the editor of the Times, Lady Bruton felt, watching the marvellous transformation, must

> respect. [3] Hugh was slow. [4] Hugh was pertinacious. [5] Richard said one must take risks. [6] Hugh proposed modifications in deference to people's feelings, **which**, he said rather tartly when Richard laughed, 'had to be considered,' and read out 'how, therefore, we are of opinion that the times are ripe . . . the superfluous youth of our ever-increasing population . . . what we owe to the dead . . .' **which** Richard thought all stuffing and bunkum, but no harm in it, of course, and Hugh went on drafting sentiments in alphabetical order of the highest nobility, brushing the cigar ash from his waistcoat, and summing up now and then the progress they had made until, finally, he read out the draft of a letter **which** Lady Bruton felt certain was a masterpiece. [7] *Could her own meaning sound like that?* (*MD*: 120-121)

In this extract, Hugh Whitbread and Richard Dalloway are helping Lady Bruton draft a letter to *The Times*. The narrative viewpoint shifts among the three characters. In the first sentence, the three successive short clauses describing Miss Brush's actions without any conjunctions (*went out, came back; laid papers on the table)* seem to suggest a perceiving consciousness. The verb *produced* and the emphasis through repetition *his fountain pen; his silver fountain pen* are not without subjective colour, as they cast a sarcastic tone. There is no explicit attributing signal indicating whose viewpoint the text is aligned with, but the text can be attributed to Lady Bruton and Richard, who, as we know from the context, are watching Hugh. Right after the presentation of such perceptions, the relative pronoun *which* integrates Hugh's free indirect speech into the text, but its function does not seem to be merely grammatical.

Hugh must know that Richard Dalloway and Lady Bruton are watching him. He might have sensed their suspicious attitude towards the quality of his writing, and that is why he reassures them, quite oddly though, by pointing out the credibility of his pen. By using the relative pronoun *which* to introduce a relative clause instead of using an independent sentence (*Hugh produced his fountain pen; his silver fountain pen.* [*It/this*] *had done twenty years' service, he said*), the text creates a stronger link between the sentence components and thus reinforces the link between the perception of the pen and Hugh's speech. While it is true that when *which* introduces a non-restrictive relative clause, the connection between the relative clause and its antecedent is much looser than in the case of restrictive clauses (Denison, 1992: 286), still the connection in Sentence [1] is striking enough, as this is rather an unexpected way to introduce a segment of speech into the text. It can be argued that this linking device underlines Hugh's sense of the others' attitude towards him and his intention behind his words. How Hugh's words are perceived by the other two characters is revealed immediately in the subsequent text when the second *which* brings in Richard's thoughts (*which was somehow to Hugh's credit, and to the credit of the sentiments which his pen expressed*), indicating that Hugh's words achieve the intended effect. However, the hedging *somehow* still shows Richard's uncertainty whether he truly believes Hugh and whether he should interpret Hugh's words in this way. And Richard's uncertainty contrasts with Lady Bruton's complete trust in Hugh, which is revealed in the same sentence when the narrative point of view changes again to present her thought (*to grammar such as the editor of the Times, Lady Bruton felt, watching the*

marvellous transformation, must respect).[10] In this way, the relative pronoun *which* and the way it binds the presentation of the three characters' speech and thought disclose the psychological interaction among the three characters. The shifts in point of view help readers to see the different attitudes held by the three characters, and the way different viewpoints are linked invites them to establish connections among them.

The same mechanism operates in Sentence [6]. After a summary of Hugh's speech act (*Hugh proposed modifications in deference to people's feelings*), the first occurrence of *which* brings in his direct speech after the probable interruption by Richard's laughing (*he said rather tartly when Richard laughed*). Hugh's speech here conveys his disagreement with Richard and also his protest against Richard's laughing. Immediately after the presentation of Hugh's speech, this relative pronoun is used again to introduce Richard's consciousness presented in free indirect style (*which Richard thought all stuffing and bunkum, but no harm in it, of course*), as made explicit by the attributing signal *Richard thought*. And this relative clause helps to express Richard's evaluation of Hugh and his speech. Still in the same sentence, the third *which* enacts another shift in point of view from Richard to Lady Bruton, and she is presented as still admiring Hugh's writing (*which Lady Bruton felt certain was a masterpiece. Could her own meaning sound like that?*). That the third *which* introduces a *restrictive* relative clause can lead to the interpretation that this is still Richard's viewpoint: he thinks that Lady Bruton will feel that the letter is a masterpiece. However, the free indirect presentation of her

[10] The phrase *such as* also functions as a connective in this sentence, linking Lady Bruton's viewpoint with Richard's.

thought in Sentence [7] signals a shift to her point of view. Thus it is reasonable to say that the *which*-clause brings in Lady Bruton's consciousness. By repeatedly using the relative pronoun *which* to bring in different narrative viewpoints, the text manages to present the three characters' contrasting thoughts together in one sentence. Of course, the contrasting attitudes, especially Richard's and Lady Bruton's attitudes towards Hugh, are expressed most obviously through the evaluative lexical items such as *marvellous* and *stuffing and bunkum*, but the way this relative pronoun brings together the presentation of the three characters' consciousnesses is peculiar enough to invite readers to look beyond the brief conversational exchange to uncover the hidden dialogue among their minds.

What makes the reading of this passage even more complex is that the attribution of narrative viewpoint is a rather dynamic process. Readers have to continuously revise their interpretation of viewpoints as a result of the frequent shifts. At the same time, even with the attributing signals such as *Richard thought* explicitly specifying the source of the presented consciousness, ambiguity remains. For instance, despite the quotation marks that indicate the mode of direct speech, some of Hugh's words are missing in Sentence [6], which generates the impression that his speech is filtered through a perceiving consciousness, but it is not clear whether it is filtered through the mind of Richard, who lacks patience to listen, or through the consciousness of Lady Bruton, who may not hear it clearly due to Richard's laughing. The relative pronoun *which* complicates the text by integrating multiple relative clauses in it and thus fragmenting the linear syntax; besides, the use of the parenthesis—

(so Richard Dalloway felt)— adds another level to the syntactic hierarchy. Then after reading the whole passage, it is not clear whether the presentation of the three characters' speech and thought is directly from their own point of view, or the presentation of both Hugh's and Lady Bruton's consciousnesses is embedded in the mind of Richard, who is listening to their words and speculating on their minds and at the same time doing his own thinking.

The intertwining thoughts presented in Extract (21) are noted by Zunshine (2003), who analyses the text drawing on cognitive findings on "theory of mind". She remarks that this passage presents multiple levels of nested 'intentionality', that is, the tracking of a mind within a mind within a mind. To be more specific:

- Hugh *wants* Lady Bruton and Richard to *believe* that because the makers of the pen *think* that it will never wear out, the editor of the *Times* will *respect* and publish the ideas recorded by this pen. (Fourth level)
- Richard *is aware* that Hugh *wants* Lady Bruton and Richard Dalloway to *believe* that because the makers of the pen *think* that it will never wear out, the editor of the *Times* will *respect* and publish the ideas recorded by this pen. (Fifth level)
- Richard *suspects* that Lady Bruton indeed *believes* that because, as Hugh *says*, the makers of the pen *think* that it will never wear out, the editor of the *Times* will *respect* and publish the ideas recorded by this pen. (Fifth level)

- By inserting a parenthetical observation ("so Richard Dalloway felt"), Woolf *intends us to recognize* that Richard *is aware* that Hugh *wants* Lady Bruton and Richard to *think* that because the makers of the pen *believe* that it will never wear out, the editor of the Times will respect and publish the ideas recorded by this pen. (Sixth level)

(Zunshine, 2003: 280)

Zunshine's analysis aims to explain how readers can disentangle the nested levels of intentionality and thus gain pleasure from such a reading process. She does not specify what makes it possible for Woolf to successfully present, *linguistically*, such complex embedding of intentionality within such a short passage. I want to argue that it is the way in which the clauses stemming from different viewpoints are syntactically integrated into the text that enhances the sense of multiple-layered intentionality. Or put another way, it is the textual fabric that cues readers to recognise the inter-subjective connections between different consciousnesses. And the relative pronoun *which* plays a crucial role in it, as this connective creates multiple layers of syntactic subordination in this extract, which is iconic of the embedding of one consciousness within another.

What needs to be made clear is that the connectives discussed in the above three extracts in this section are not recurrent linking devices in Woolf's texts, but the way they function points to a new dimension for the study of connectives in relation to shifts in point of view. As subordination indicates a stronger clausal link, the inconsistency of point of view within a single sentence becomes more pronounced when a connective with a subordinating function is used at the points of viewpoint shift. More significantly, the

syntactic embedding is iconic of the embedding of one consciousness within another. Now we have seen that, to render the inter-subjective connection between different consciousnesses, Virginia Woolf is much more experimental with connectives than previous studies have suggested. Rather than merely drawing on resources from spoken discourse, she continues to challenge the standard use of connectives in her presentation of multipersonal consciousnesses.

6.5 Concluding remarks

While connectives share the cohesive function of binding clauses together, the clausal link signalled by different connectives varies with regard to how strong the link is. Some connectives hold conjoined clauses in a rather loose connection, whereas others indicate a strong clausal binding. Traditional grammar draws a distinction between coordinating and subordinating connectives. The former designate coordination, in which the conjoined clauses have equal syntactic status; and the latter designate subordination, in which the two linked clauses are considered to be asymmetric in their syntactic status, with one clause dependent on the other or being a component of it. Pragmatic studies also seem to acknowledge the different clausal links created by coordinating and subordinating connectives respectively. For instance, when investigating the semantic meaning coded in connectives and the inferential meaning they evoke, Mauri & van der Auwera speculate that coordinating connectives create 'underspecified' clausal linkage, 'leaving a lot to inferential enrichment', whereas subordinating connectives create 'highly specified' clausal linkage' (2012: 382). Admittedly, even within the category of

subordinators, some create a clausal link that is more likened to coordination. But subordinating connectives in general tend to suggest a stronger link between clauses than coordinating ones due to the syntactic binding. Apart from syntactic constraints, there are also other aspects of connectives that affect the degree of connectedness between clauses. Langacker remarks that interclausal relations may vary based on the 'contentfulness' and 'objectivity' of the connectives (1987: 428-429). For instance, for the connectives *after*, *while* and *if*, 'the interclausal relationship is not only highly prominent (being profiled) but also fairly contentful, involving such objectively constructed notions as temporal anteriority, temporal inclusion, and conditionality' (Langacker, 1987: 428). The dimension of 'contentfulness' together with the syntactic status of connectives can shed light on the analysis of Woolf's use of different categories of connectives discussed in this chapter.

In section 6.2, I have introduced the dialogical account of connectives put forward by Sotirova (2004, 2011, 2013) and examined its application in Woolf's employment of this linguistic device. Sotirova's studies have mainly focused on the coordinators *and* and *but*, especially when they are used in sentence-initial position. According to her, these two connectives link different points of view in a similar manner to the way they link conversational turns, and this use creates the effect that the boundaries of different consciousnesses seem to be penetrable, with one character's thoughts resonating with another's. In Section 6.3 and 6.4, I have expanded Sotirova's studies by examining Woolf's use of connectives that are closer to the subordination pole. My analysis has shown that connectives with subordinating features can also link

different viewpoints, and they also draw attention to the inter-subjective orientedness of consciousness. Now one further question to ask is how strong the links created by different categories of connectives are.

Semantically, the connective *and* is considered as having 'little if any intrinsic content' (Langacker, 2009: 352). Due to the void of its semantic content, the clausal link created by the connective *and* can be said to be rather weak. Compared with *and*, the connective *but* has 'the additional implication that the second conjunct runs counter to expectations engendered by the first', but as a coordinating connective, it also indicates the juxtaposition of 'coequal elements' (Langacker, 2008: 411). In Woolf's text, what further weakens the semantic meaning of the connective *and* and *but* is that when they link different points of view, their function resembles that of discourse markers in that they help to coordinate the presentation of different characters' consciousnesses. In other words, their pragmatic function in discourse organisation plays a more dominant role than their semantic function. Seen in this light, the connectives *and* and *but* in narrative texts do not exert much semantic force into the link between different viewpoints.

In comparison with *and* and *but*, while the connective *for* in Woolf's texts can also function at the discoursal level to demarcate different thought units, as pointed out previously in Section 6.3, its semantic meaning is more prominent. The inherent explanative or illative meaning of *for* specifies the inter-clausal relation, even though sometimes the logical relations are only implicit. Thus when this connective places different points of view in juxtaposition, it creates a stronger link than sentence-initial *and* and *but*. Moreover, the conventional

association of the connective *for* with written style reinforces the expectation of logic and connection. On the other hand, however, the connective *for* still shares similarities with coordinators. Therefore the discontinuity of narrative point of view and the juxtaposition of different consciousnesses at the presence of this connective are not as challenging or disturbing as with other subordinating connectives, which is the case with *so… that* and *till* discussed in Section 6.4. Semantically, the connective *so…that* denotes a cause-result relation between the linked clauses, and the connective *till* signals a temporal relation. This kind of specified clausal relation enhances the connection between the clauses linked by these two connectives. Using these connectives at the points where the narrative viewpoint shifts is more striking on the one hand, as it counters the readers' expectation of consistency of viewpoint, and on the other hand, this use underlines the connection between juxtaposed viewpoints more strongly. With respect to the relative pronoun *which* as a linking device, although it does not have any inherent semantic meaning, its interpretation is highly dependent on the main clause. And this dependency also creates a closer link between the *which*-clause and the main clause, compared especially with the sentence-initial coordinators *and* and *but*.

When investigating the historical development of literary language, Adamson (1998) points out that writers' attitudes towards the use of connectives and the connectivity of clauses change over time. According to her, 'it was a commonplace of eighteenth-century criticism […] to equate a "good writer" with a "close reasoner" and to see a "pertinent use of connectives" as the index of both' (Adamson, 1998: 633). However, using connectives strictly

and precisely implies that the ideas that are expressed have been 'pre-analysed into a hierarchy of importance' (Adamson, 1998: 632). To solve this problem, writers began to choose simple juxtaposition or coordinators frequently used in conversations, such as *and* and *but*, over strict subordinators. This was done in order to simulate oral style, so that the text renders a sense of spontaneity and also a sense of intimacy to readers. The employment of coordinating connectives in Woolf's novels can be explained in this way to a certain extent. However, the employment of sentence-initial coordinators to link different narrative points of view indicates that these connectives do not function merely as a 'style marker' of orality, but have undergone the process of 'stylisation' (Adamson, 1998: 594), as they are added with the artistic function of conveying the inter-subjective orientedness of consciousness.

Moreover, the analysis of the use of the connective *for* and other connectives with a subordinating function in the previous sections shows that Virginia Woolf takes this process even further. These connectives produce similar effects to sentence-initial *and* and *but* in creating a link between different characters' consciousnesses. But due to their syntactic properties, shifts in point of view at the presence of these connectives are more striking, as they violate readers' expectation of consistency and continuity. The semantic meaning inherent in these connectives helps to create a stronger link between juxtaposed points of view, and thus more forcefully express the connection between different consciousnesses.

Chapter 7 Adjacency pairs

7.1 Introduction

In the three preceding chapters, we have seen the focus of investigation of viewpoint shifts gradually expands from the syntactic level to the broader discoursal level. Discourse parentheticals and attributing parentheticals enact shifts in point of view due to their loose syntactic connections to the host construction. By allowing a single sentence to accommodate different viewpoints, parentheticals accentuate the simultaneity in the subjective experiences of different characters and direct attention to the process through which one character speculates on another character's thoughts and feelings. Connectives operate both within a single sentential unit and across different sentences, and they create links between different viewpoints through their semantic and pragmatic functions. This chapter also sets its focus of investigation on the discourse level and it looks at the patterns of viewpoint juxtaposition across sentences and paragraphs. Whereas parentheticals and connectives do project a link between different viewpoints and consciousnesses, that link is not as strongly apparent as the one created by the linguistic mechanism that will be the focus of this chapter—the format of adjacency pairs. This format is the least expected linguistic device to be found in texts presenting consciousness, because it is exclusively associated with spoken discourse. It is very challenging to see this kind of linguistic organisation which pertains to turn taking in conversation mapped onto viewpoint shifts and the juxtaposition of different characters' consciousnesses.

In her study of Woolf's novels, Sotirova comments that sometimes there are 'exclusively conversational links between inner discourses [of characters]' that 'make them sound like "adjacency pair parts"' (2013: 172). The extract below is one of her examples that displays most prominently such a conversational pattern:

(1) As usual, Lily thought. There was always something that had to be done at that precise moment, something that Mrs Ramsay had decided for reasons of her own to do instantly, it might be with every one standing about making jokes, as now, not being able to decide whether they were going into the smoking-room, into the drawing-room, up to the attics. […] Where, Lily wondered, was she going so quickly?

Not that she did in fact run or hurry; she went indeed rather slowly. She felt rather inclined just for a moment to stand still after all that chatter, and pick out one particular thing; the thing that mattered; to detach it; separate it off; clean it of all the emotions and odds and ends of things, and so hold it before her, and bring it to the tribunal where, ranged about in conclave, sat the judges she had set up to decide these things. (*TL*: 121-122; cited in Sotirova, 2013: 147-148; part of the text is omitted due to its length)

In this scene, Mrs Ramsay and her guests begin to leave when the dinner is over. The first paragraph of this extract centres on Lily's thoughts and perceptions, and the attributing parentheticals (*Lily thought*; *Lily wondered*) clearly signal her point of view. According to Sotirova, the shift to the new paragraph marks a shift to Mrs Ramsay's point of view, although there is

momentary ambiguity in the first sentence of the second paragraph regarding the attribution of point of view. As she points out, it is the second sentence of this paragraph, *She felt rather inclined just for a moment to stand still after all that chatter*, that gives a clear signal that the text has switched to Mrs Ramsay's viewpoint (2013: 148). Once this viewpoint shift is recognised, the pattern of the juxtaposition of the two characters' subjective experiences becomes clear. As Sotirova describes:

> […] the first sentence stemming from Mrs Ramsay's consciousness is conversationally oriented towards Lily's final thought in the form of a question. The way Mrs Ramsay registers how fast she is moving comes as a response to Lily's slight irritation that she had left them so quickly. (2013: 148)

In this way, the two characters' thoughts are framed as question and answer, a typical type of adjacency pairs.

This analysis is illuminating in that it indicates the potential of the format of adjacency pairs in coordinating different points of view. However, apart from using this concept to describe the effect in some examples of Woolf's presentation of multipersonal consciousnesses, Sotirova (2013) does not explore this sequencing format in depth either in terms of its formal varieties or in terms of its underlying operation principle. Hence her analysis stops short of revealing the full significance of this conversational pattern for Woolf's presentation of the interactive quality of consciousness. In this chapter, I will show that the format of adjacency pairs is another effective linguistic

mechanism for orchestrating shifts in point of view in *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse*. And I will argue that the notion of intersubjectivity underlying this sequencing device allows the text to place different characters' consciousnesses in the most interactive relation.

The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 7.2 will first introduce the concept of adjacency pairs and its formal varieties in conversation. It is hoped that the linguistic accounts of this sequencing device can afford us a fresh insight into the investigation of Woolf's arrangement of narrative viewpoints. Section 7.3 will map this conversational pattern onto shifts in point of view and explore the effect of this sequencing format in the presentation of consciousness. Section 7.4 furthers the investigation by examining how the use of the format of adjacency pairs to link different points of view contributes to the presentation of character relationships. Section 7.5 concludes this chapter by comparing the function of the format of adjacency pairs with the other three linguistic correlates of viewpoint shifts investigated in the previous three chapters.

7.2 Adjacency pairs in conversation

The concept of adjacency pairs was developed by the conversation analysts Harvey Sacks and Emanuel Schegloff in the 1960s and 1970s. In their effort to provide a formal account of the organisational features of naturally occurring conversation, they notice that many conversational actions occur in pairs, such as greeting exchanges, summons and answer, and question and answer. Thus the concept of adjacency pairs is developed as an analytic tool for

such paired actions. An adjacency pair is defined as a sequence of two utterances which are adjacently placed and are produced by different speakers (see Sacks, 1995: 521; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973: 295). The two utterances are called *first pair part* and *second pair part* respectively. However, being adjacently positioned and uttered by different speakers is not a sufficient condition for adjacency pairs. An important defining feature is that the two pair parts are 'relatively ordered' and 'discriminatively related' (Sacks, 1995: 521). That is to say, there are rules specifying which part occurs first and which follows the other, and, given the first pair part, only certain utterances can qualify as the second pair part. For example, a question should precede the answer to it, and after the question, the second speaker is supposed to provide an answer instead of using a greeting as a response to it. Apart from greeting—greeting, summons—answer and question—answer, other types of adjacency pairs which are frequently seen in conversation include assessment—agreement/disagreement, invitation—acceptance/declination, offer—acceptance/declination, request—granting/rejection, and accusation—admission/objection. The following extracts serve to illustrate these types of adjacency pairs:

Greeting—greeting and phatic exchanges:

(2) R: Hello.

C: Hello Rob. This is Laurie. How's everything.

R: ((sniff)) Pretty good. How 'bout you.

C: Jus' fine. (Schegloff, 1979: 47)

Summons—answer:

(3) A: John?

B: Yeah?

A: Pass the water wouldja? (Levinson, 1983: 310)

Question—answer:

(4) Les: Uh didyuh get yer garlic tablets.

Mum: Yes I've got them (Raymond, 2003: 942)

Assessment—agreement/disagreement

(5) J: T's—tsuh beautiful day out isn't it?

L: Yeh it's jus' gorgeous… (Pomerantz, 1984: 59)

Invitation—acceptance/declination:

(6) A: Uh if you'd care to come over and visit a little while this morning I'll give you a cup of coffee.

B: hehh Well that's awfully sweet of you, I don't think I can make it this morning .hh uhm I'm running an ad in the paper and- and uh I have to stay near the phone.

(Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 58)

Offer—acceptance/declination:

(7) Mark: Want s'm more milk? ((gazing at glass he's filling))

Kim: Mm mm. ((with small head shake))

(adapted from Stivers, 2013: 193)

Request—granting/rejection:

(8) Child: Could you .hh could you put on the light for my .hh room

Father: Yep (Levinson, 1983: 307)

Accusation—admission/objection:

(9) Colin: you wer-j's (0.2) y'know sort-of (.) blanking her out I dun understan' you

Mum: I'M NOT BLANKIN' 'ER OUT I'M BUSY

(adapted from Dersley & Wootton, 2000: 385)

Adjacency pairs as defined above may appear to be a conversational phenomenon that is extremely trivial in content and rigid in form. However, they are in fact the basic building blocks for turn taking and the construction of conversation. Sacks states that adjacency pairs function 'in key places in the overall structural organization of conversation' and 'at the core of the turn-taking system' (Sacks, 1995: 525). The format of adjacency pairs plays such an important role in conversation based on its operation principle. The basic rule of operation for adjacency pairs is this: if an utterance is produced as a first pair part, then on its first possible completion the speaker should stop and a next speaker should start to produce a second pair part (Sacks, 1995: 527). With an operating principle such as this, the format of adjacency pairs becomes 'a normative framework for actions which is accountably implemented' (Heritage, 1984: 247). This function of adjacency pairs is also noted by Wooffitt, who states that 'there is a normative relationship between the turns that constitute paired sequences' (2005: 32). On the one hand, the production of a first pair part obliges a next speaker to respond to it. An absence of such a response is marked and will become a source of further inferences to be made

by the producer of the first pair part. For example, Davidson (1984) reports that a speaker of an invitation, an offer or a request may interpret the silence after his/her turn as indicating a possible rejection from the addressee. On the other hand, a first pair part projects a 'prospective relevance' by setting constraints on what qualifies as a felicitous second pair part (Schegloff, 2007: 14), and the second pair part in return displays its speaker's understanding of the prior turn and shows retrospectively to the first speaker whether the constraints are responded to or not. In cases where a next speaker fails to make a proper response, accounts or explanations are often provided, or, alternatively, the prior speaker will draw inferences from this failure and make further repair to the first pair part accordingly. (For similar discussions regarding the normative function of adjacency pairs, see Levinson (1983: 306) on 'conditional relevance'; Clark (1992: 151-164) on the 'presentation and acceptance phase of contributions'.)

The following dialogue between a child and his/her mother will serve to illustrate this normative function of the format of adjacency pairs:

(10) Child: Have to cut the:se Mummy.

(1.3)

Child: Won't we Mummy

(1.5)

Child: Won't we

Mother: Yes.

(Atkinson & Drew, 1979: 52)

The child's proposal to *cut these* forms a first pair part, which projects an approval/disapproval in the next turn. The absence of response, signalled by the pause after the initial proposal, is marked, as it violates the expectation that the first pair part should be responded to, which is why the child asks again to prompt an answer. At the same time, this absence also becomes a source for the child to make further inferences regarding this interaction. The truncated tag forms of his/heer prompts (*won't we Mummy*, *won't we*) indicate that the child did not take the non-response as his/her mother's failure in hearing the proposal; otherwise he/she would have repeated the initial utterance. The child probably took the pause as indicating a lack of time or interest for response from his/her mother, so he/she prompted twice until succeeding in soliciting a felicitous second pair part from his/her mother, an approving *yes*.

While adjacency pairs have a strong sequencing power as illustrated above, to say that an adjacency pair is a basic interactional unit of conversation is by no means to suggest that the rich conversational exchanges can be reduced to a rigid accumulation of neat two-part pairs uttered by alternate speakers or that adjacency pairs are the only organising format of conversation. And it is easy to find conversations which do not proceed strictly in accordance with the definition of adjacency pairs. The two pair parts are not necessarily adjacently placed, just as in Extract (10) the completion of the proposal—approval pair is delayed. Also, the basic two-turn pair can be expanded according to different conversational situations. For instance, pair expansions can be caused by misunderstanding. As in the extract below, the answer to the initial question is

provided after two inserted turns due to the second speaker's misinterpretation of the first speaker's intention:

(11) Mother: Do you know who's going to that meeting?
Russ: Who.
Mother: I don't know.
Russ: Oh::. Probably Missiz McOwen ('n detsa) en
Probably Missiz Cadry and some of the teachers.
(0.4) and the coun[sellors.

(Schegloff, 1988: 57-58)

In this dialogue, Russ's mother is going to attend a school meeting and she asks Russ who else is going. Her question forms a first pair part, but is not followed by an answer as a second pair part. Instead, Russ misunderstands his mother and takes her question as a 'pre-announcement' (Schegloff, 2007: 37) for sharing new information, and he expresses his interest in listening through an echo question (*who*). His mother's response suggests that the initial question is simply a request for information, after which Russ provides an answer. In this way, only after a sequence insertion is the question—answer pair completed.

While the expansion of the question—answer pair in the above extract is not intended by the initial speaker, the request—granting pair is expanded in the extract below out of the speakers' deliberate choice for strategic reasons:

(12) C: Hullo I was just ringing up to ask if you were going to
Bertrand's party

R: Yes I thought you might be

C: Heh heh

R: Yes would you like a lift?

C: Oh I'd love one

(Levinson, 1983: 343)

The first speaker wants to ask for a lift from the second speaker. However, a request is usually considered as a dispreferred act, because it imposes an obligation on the recipient; and on the other hand, a request can get a rejection, which is also dispreferred. For these reasons, the first speaker did not make a request directly. Rather, he/she uses a 'pre-request' to first check whether the forthcoming request is likely to succeed in order to avoid a dispreferred rejection (Levinson, 1983: 357). Besides, a pre-request is strategic in that it can potentially solicit an offer in the next turn and thus pre-empt the need to actually articulate a request (Schegloff, 1979: 49; Taleghani-Nikazm, 2006: 26). The pre-request in this dialogue, whether the second speaker is going to the party, is well recognised by the second speaker, which is manifested in his/her offering a lift (Line 5). Yet before he/she makes this offer, the second speaker also asks about the 'preparatory condition' (Cooren, 2005: 22) for it by making sure the first speaker is also going to the party (Line 3). After the confirmation by the first speaker (Line 4), the second speaker makes an offer as a response to the potential request, which the first speaker accepts. Such an expansion through a pre-sequence enables the first speaker to get a preferred response even without expressing explicitly his/her intention.

Another form of pair expansion can be realised in cases where one of the two pair parts is completed by two speakers in their joint effort. Such cases can be found in Lerner's (1996) discussion of 'anticipatory completion'. Lerner points out that sometimes in conversational exchanges, one speaker will attempt to complete another's turn. For instance:

(13) Cathy: nothing if you're sure,
Ron: well honey
(0.5)
in dis world, really truly.
(.)
Cathy: you can't be sure.
Ron: No, you really ca:n't.

(adapted from Lerner, 1996: 312)

In this extract, Cathy is talking with her father Ron about the decision of not getting married. In the first line, Cathy is making a statement that nothing would be wrong with getting married if a person is sure about his or her feelings. Ron's words in the next turn preface a disagreement, indicated by the hesitation and delay. Before Ron has actually finished his sentence, Cathy makes an anticipatory completion in Line 6. In this way, the second pair part in the statement-disagreement pair is completed collaboratively by the two speakers. The function of this anticipatory completion, according to Lerner (1996), is to facilitate face work: Ron's last turn becomes an agreement with Cathy without having to articulate a disagreement.

Examples such as Extracts (12) and (13) have started the debate as to whether the notion of adjacency pairs is sufficient enough to describe the sequence organisation of conversation (Levinson, 1983: 304-306; Ventola, 1987: 97; see also Tsui, 1991 for the discussion of the three-part exchange as the basic sequential unit). However, the concept of adjacency pairs, as Heritage points out, 'does not command our attention as a statement of empirical invariance', nor 'is the concept properly viewed as describing an empirical generalization' (1984: 246). Rather, it provides a basis to explain conversation participants' expectations, interpretations and evaluations of the conversation sequences (Tsui, 1991). Underlying this sequencing format is the interactional and social nature of conversation. Hutchby & Wooffitt remark that an adjacency pair is the mechanism for conversation participants to display 'their ongoing understanding and sense-making of one another's talk' (2008: 44). This is also echoed in Sidnell's comment that adjacency pairs allow for 'a framework of understanding that is constructed and sustained turn-by-turn' (2009: 223). The above extracts have illustrated how the format of adjacency pairs shapes the progression of conversation. Just as the question—answer pair with an inserted sequence in (11) shows the interactive process in the case of misinterpretation, the expanded request—granting pair in (12) shows how both speakers interpret each other's intention and opt for smooth communication, and the anticipatory completion in (13) manifests one speaker's prediction of the other's coming turn. In an adjacency pair, a speaker produces the first pair part based on his/her intention, evaluation of the conversation situation and anticipation of the possible response from the next speaker. This first pair part

manifests its speaker's explicit request for a response. More crucially, it not only prompts the next speaker to speak, it also becomes a source of inference for the second speaker to interpret any implicature behind its surface meaning; the second pair part is carried out based on the second speaker's inference from the prior turn, and this pair part also becomes a source of inference for the first speaker to anticipate and evaluate the other's turn. As Heritage points out, the format of adjacency pairs embodies 'an architecture of intersubjectivity' (1984: 254). The success of conversational exchanges depends on the mutual understanding of the participants and their joint effort in facilitating the achievement of their mutual understanding. As will be shown in the coming sections, the intersubjectivity displayed in adjacency pairs is crucial to the analysis of Woolf's arrangement of narrative point of view.

To sum up, adjacency pairs function as an efficient sequencing device in conversation in that they can coordinate turn taking and shape the form of conversation. At the same time, adjacency pairs take flexible forms, as the basic two-part pair can be expanded in various ways. The reason for pair expansions can be simply to clear up misunderstanding, or for the 'avoidance of problematic responses to a base [first pair part]', such as rejections to invitations, offers, requests or news-tellings. (Schegloff, 2007: 57). The essence of adjacency pairs is the underlying intersubjectivity between speakers. The next section will examine how these features of adjacency pairs can or cannot be mapped onto the juxtaposition of different narrative viewpoints.

7.3 Mapping adjacency pairs onto the juxtaposition of points of view

Sotirova's analysis of Extract (1) has shown how the text relates Lily Briscoe's viewpoint with Mrs Ramsay's by framing the two characters' consciousnesses as a question—answer pair. Such an arrangement of narrative viewpoints conveys the orientedness of Mrs Ramsay's consciousness towards Lily's thought. The intersubjectivity underlying the format of adjacency pairs is mapped onto the presentation of multipersonal consciousnesses in the narrative text. Put in a different way, by placing Lily's and Mrs Ramsay's viewpoints in an interactive relation that mimics a common conversational pattern, the text creates the inter-subjective connection between the two characters.

If the adjacency-pair format as a sequencing device for the juxtaposition of viewpoints in Extract (1) is clouded by a degree of ambiguity in the attribution of point of view, since the second pair part, *Not that she did in fact run or hurry; she went indeed rather slowly*, can also be interpreted as a continuation of Lily's thought due to its syntactic dependence on the preceding sentence, the interactive pattern is more obvious in the following extract, as the demarcation of viewpoints is clearer:

(14) [1] Elizabeth rather wondered whether Miss Kilman could be hungry. [2] It was her way of eating, eating with intensity, then looking, again and again, at a plate of sugared cakes on the table next them; then, when a lady and a child sat down and the child took the cake, could Miss Kilman really mind it? [3] Yes, Miss Kilman did mind it. [4] She

> had wanted that cake—the pink one. [5] The pleasure of eating was almost the only pure pleasure left her, and then to be baffled even in that! (*MD*: 142)

This extract depicts a scene in which Elizabeth and Miss Kilman are having tea together. Different modes of consciousness presentation are used at the beginning: Sentence [1] is in the mode of indirect thought, but the adverb *rather* also conveys Elizabeth's subjectivity. Sentence [2] is a clearer case of free indirect style, signalled by the fragmented syntax. The use of the non-finite progressives (*eating with intensity, looking*) and the indicators of sequence and repetition (***then*** *looking,* ***again and again*** ... ***then***, ***when***...) mark Elizabeth's second-by-second observation of Miss Kilman, and the direct question at the end of Sentence [2] (*could Miss Kilman really mind it?*) is almost like a transcription of her conscious thought. Both Sentence [1] and [2] serve to reveal what is going on in Elizabeth's mind and thus align the text with her point of view. Following the free indirect presentation of Elizabeth's thought, the subsequent text immediately switches to Miss Kilman's thought. The mental verbs (*mind, wanted* and *baffled*) reveal the psychological states of Miss Kilman; also, the emphasis (*did mind it*), the apposition and the distal deixis (***that*** *cake— the pink one*) and the exclamative (*to be baffled even in that!*) express her vexation when the child takes the cake. As Miss Kilman's thought is presented right after Elizabeth's thought, and the mode of free indirect style increases the immediacy of the thought presentation, the text creates the impression that Miss Kilman is directly answering Elizabeth's question. What especially reinforces this interpretation is the confirmative *yes* in [3], which can

be compared with the conversational exchange in Extract (4), in which the second speaker's *yes* marks a direct response to the first speaker's question. In this way, in a similar fashion to Extract (1), the viewpoint shift here resembles the conversational practice where two speakers engage in a question—answer interactive pattern.

The above analysis shows that the way in which the viewpoint shift is enacted in Extract (14) resembles the sequencing format of conversations; however, dissimilarities also stand out. Different from conversational practices where the first speaker is explicitly eliciting a response from the second speaker, the above extract is a representation of consciousness, as it is unlikely, judging from the content of these sentences, that Elizabeth and Miss Kilman are actually having this conversation or articulating their thoughts out loud as such. While it is a default operation rule in conversation that the first pair part prompts the next speaker to produce a response, when Elizabeth forms the question in her mind in the above extract, she would not be expecting that Miss Kilman would answer it. This is also the case in Extract (1): when Lily is wondering why Mrs Ramsay leaves so quickly and where she is going, she would not be anticipating a response from Mrs Ramsay. Nonetheless, as is the case in Extract (1), the way in which Elizabeth's and Miss Kilman's viewpoints are juxtaposed together invites readers to recognise or to establish a connection between their minds. As can be seen from Extract (14), the referring expression *the cake* in Elizabeth's perception corresponds with *that cake—the pink one* in Miss Kilman's thought, and there is also neat correspondence between the emphasised verb phrase *really mind it* in Sentence

[2] and *did mind it* in [3]. Such correspondence is highly suggestive that Miss Kilman knows exactly what Elizabeth is thinking.

As noted in Section 7.2, a basic two-part adjacency pair can be expanded according to the conversation situation. To a certain extent, the juxtaposition of Mr Ramsay's and Lily Briscoe's points of view in the following extract resembles the pattern of an expanded request—rejection pair. This is manifested in the presentation of both characters' speech and thought:

(15) [1] And then, and then—this was one of those moments when an enormous need urged him, without being conscious what it was, to approach any woman, to force them, he did not care how, his need was so great, to give him what he wanted: sympathy.

[2] Was anybody looking after her? he said. [3] Had she everything she wanted?

[4] 'Oh, thanks, everything,' said Lily Briscoe nervously. [5] No; she could not do it. [6] She ought to have floated off instantly upon some wave of sympathetic expansion: the pressure on her was tremendous. [7] But she remained stuck. [8] There was an awful pause. [9] They both looked at the sea. [10] Why, thought Mr. Ramsay, should she look at the sea when I am here? [11] She hoped it would be calm enough for them to land at the Lighthouse, she said. [12] The Lighthouse! [13] The Lighthouse! [14] What's that got to do with it? he thought impatiently. [15] Instantly, with the force of some primeval gust (for really he could not restrain himself any longer), there issued from him such a groan that any other woman in the whole world would have done something, said

> something—all except myself, thought Lily, girding at herself bitterly, who am not a woman, but a peevish, ill-tempered, dried-up old maid, presumably. (*TL*: 165)

In *To the Lighthouse*, Mr Ramsay is portrayed as a character who always wants sympathy from women. In this scene, coming back to the long-abandoned house and planning to fulfil Mrs Ramsay's wish to go to the lighthouse eventually, Mr Ramsay is again overwhelmed by his strong need for sympathy when he sees Lily. Sentence [1] in this extract can be seen as a mixture of psycho-narration and free indirect thought. The verbs *urged* and *wanted* point to Mr Ramsay's psychological states; and the two short clauses (*he did not care how, his need was so great*) can be seen as psycho-narration, but due to their parenthetical status and greater expressivity, they can also be seen as a more mimetic rendering of his subjectivity in the mode of free indirect thought. The lack of connectives between the two clauses conveys his urgent feeling and the intensifier *so* emphasises his strong desire. In addition, the proximal deixis *this* anchors the text in the very moment when Mr Ramsay approaches Lily Briscoe. In this way, the first sentence establishes Mr Ramsay's point of view. As much as Mr Ramsay wants sympathy from Lily, there is no way that he could directly ask for it. Similarly to what has been demonstrated earlier in Extract (12) in which the speaker uses a pre-request to elicit an offer from the hearer, here, to make Lily show him sympathy, Mr Ramsay asks her if she is well treated, which is presented in Sentence [2] and [3] in the mode of free indirect speech. But the verb *wanted* in [3] is very telling of his intention by echoing the same word in his thoughts in [1]. Mr Ramsay appears to be caring

for Lily, but in fact he is only expecting Lily to give a thought to what *he* wants. The following text switches to Lily's point of view first through a direct presentation of her speech in [4] and then free indirect presentation of her thought in [5]—[7]. On the surface, Mr Ramsay's questions in [2]—[3] and Lily's reply in [4] form a simple phatic exchange similar to the *how-are-you* sequence in Extract (2) in Section 7.2, despite the fact that Mr Ramsay's speech is presented in the free indirect mode:

Mr Ramsay: *Was anybody looking after her? Had she everything she wanted?*

Lily Briscoe: *Oh, thanks, everything.*

It appears that Lily is simply taking Mr Ramsay's utterance as phatic questions expressing kindness and that she gives a preferred polite reply. However, Lily's thoughts presented in Sentences [5] and [6] reveal another layer of interaction behind the audible verbal exchange. Mr Ramsay's pre-request is in fact well recognised by Lily. The proform *do* and the pronoun *it* in [5] obviously create an anaphoric link to the preceding text and refer to the granting of Mr Ramsay's request—*to give him what he wanted: sympathy*. Meanwhile, the negative particle *no* at the beginning of [5] signals a rejection, thus rendering this sentence as the second pair part to the first pair part, that is, Mr Ramsay's request for sympathy. Although Mr Ramsay never articulates this request, this anaphoric expression in Lily's free indirect thought shows that she is fully aware of Mr Ramsay's intention in his starting this conversation. This is made more explicit in Sentences [6] and [7]: the modal verb phrase *ought to have floated off* suggests Lily's awareness of Mr Ramsay's request and

expectation, the metaphor *some wave of* ***sympathetic*** *expansion* is even more specific, and the adversative *but* expresses her inner struggle. Also fitting in the pattern of adjacency pairs is the pause reported in [8]. The presentation of Lily's thought in the subsequent text shows that she is going to make a dispreferred sequence: a rejection to the request. And it is a common practice in conversation that a dispreferred sequence is delivered after some delay and followed by explanations as to why the preferred action cannot be provided (Heritage, 1984: 266; Levinson, 1983: 307).

The viewpoint attribution is ambiguous in Sentences [8] and [9]. The affective adjective *awful* can be seen either as revealing Lily's regret in failing to grant Mr Ramsay's request or as revealing Mr Ramsay's frustration after anticipating Lily's rejection, or both. After this momentary ambiguous viewpoint attribution, the attributing parenthetical *thought Mr Ramsay* in [10] re-anchors the text in his consciousness. The direct thought *why should she look at the sea when I am here* can be seen as Mr Ramsay prompting for a response to his request. In this sense, it resembles the conversation example in Extract (10), in which the child repeats his/her question to elicit a response from his/her mother. Sentence [11] brings in Lily's speech. The free indirect mode renders it possible that her speech is relayed from Mr Ramsay's viewpoint; however, positioned immediately after Mr Ramsay's unarticulated question, her speech seems like a direct response to it. Moreover, the pronoun *it* in Lily's speech (*She hoped it would be calm enough for them to land at the lighthouse*) refers to *the sea* in Mr Ramsay's unarticulated thought in [10],

which again indicates Lily's awareness of Mr Ramsay's consciousness. Yet once again Lily pretends that she has not recognised Mr Ramsay's request.

In a similar way to the conversational practices where speakers take turns to speak, Sentences [12]—[14] shift back to Mr Ramsay's point of view. The exclamations (*The Lighthouse! The Lighthouse!*) and the direct question (*What's that got to do with it?*) convey his frustration in not getting what he wants. The pronoun *it* in [14] again refers to the request: *to give him what he wanted*. Thus it creates a backward linkage to Mr Ramsay's thought in [1] and Lily's thought in [5], and helps to integrate this sentence into the whole request sequence.

The former part of Sentence [15] seems to sustain Mr Ramsay's point of view through the presentation of his feelings and thoughts in a fusion of psycho-narration (*some primeval gust*) and free indirect thought (*for really he could not restrain himself any longer*; *any other woman in the whole world would have done something, said something*). But after the dash, another attributing parenthetical *thought Lily* jerks readers into Lily's mind. Mr Ramsay's groan can be seen as his further prompt for an expected response from Lily, which is well understood by her. This time, Lily has to deal with the request by making a rejection and offering an account why she cannot give Mr Ramsay what he wants (*who am not a woman, but a peevish, ill-tempered, dried-up old maid, presumably*). The modal adverb *presumably* marks out another instance of inter-subjective thinking by spelling out Lily's speculation on Mr Ramsay's evaluation of her. Another interesting point is that the presentation of Mr Ramsay's thought and feeling and the presentation of Lily's

direct thought are accommodated within the same sentence. The effect is that Lily is making an 'anticipatory completion' (Lerner, 1996; see Extract (13) in Section 7.2 above) to Mr Ramsay's turn, which again indicates that Lily has already recognised Mr Ramsay's intention. However, unlike the conversational instance where all participants conduct verbal communication, Mr Ramsay's request and Lily's rejection are never articulated. In fact, the actual dialogue between Mr Ramsay and Lily Briscoe is extremely brief, composed of only four short sentences ([2], [3], [4] and [11]), 27 words in total if we count the exact number. Yet the text produces a strong dialogical effect. Lily and Mr Ramsay seem almost to be engaging in a conversation, expressing their feelings and thoughts to the other. And it is the use of the format of adjacency pairs to orchestrate the shifts in viewpoint that endows the text with such interactive characteristics and reveals the undercurrent concealed by their seemingly casual and polite conversation. More importantly, such carefully designed presentation of the two characters' consciousnesses prompts readers to see the interaction between their minds.

As the above analysis of the passages from Woolf's novels demonstrates, the format of adjacency pairs not only effectively enacts shifts in point of view, it also invites readers to take a fresh look at the nature of subjectivity. Virginia Woolf maps a highly interactive and dialogical verbal pattern onto the presentation of unarticulated consciousness. In doing so, she seems to be challenging the assumption that individual consciousness is inaccessible to others. This interactive pattern guides readers to notice the correspondence between different viewpoints, which further indicates the knowledge one

character has of another's mind. The very form of the text embodies the intersubjectivity in the encounter between different characters in which one comes to be aware of another's intention and senses how he/she is perceived in another's eyes.

7.4 Adjacency pairs, character relationships and the inter-subjective orientedness of consciousness

This section concentrates on the presentation of consciousnesses of different groups of characters: couples and opponents. It expands the current investigation by examining how the format of adjacency pairs creates a link between those characters and how such a link can help readers to gain a better understanding of the character relationships.

It is a commonplace in critical studies of *To the Lighthouse* to discuss in juxtaposition the masculine and feminine characteristics of Mr Ramsay and Mrs Ramsay. For instance, Laura Doyle points out the distinction between Mrs Ramsay's 'intercorporal kinship with' and 'powerful connection to the world of objects' and Mr Ramsay's 'division of inner and outer worlds' (1994: 52). Focusing on the semantic associations of lexical items in this novel, Adolphs & Carter's (2002: 18) study contrasts Mrs Ramsay's 'uncertainty and negativity' with Mr Ramsay's 'strength and certainty'. And Paul Brown (2009) states that Mrs Ramsay's holistic vision of reality is opposed to Mr Ramsay's compartmental one. In these studies, emphasis is placed more on the disparities between the two characters than on their connections. However, as the following extract shows, while the format of adjacency pairs dramatises the psychological confrontations between Mrs Ramsay and her husband and thus

increases the tension of the scene, this sequencing device also points to the inter-subjective connection between them:

(16) [1] Then, realising that it was because she admired him so much that she was waiting for him to speak, she felt as if somebody had been praising her husband to her and their marriage, and she glowed all over without realising that it was she herself who had praised him. [2] She looked at him thinking to find this shown in his face; he would be looking magnificent… [3] But not in the least! [4] He was screwing his face up, he was scowling and frowning, and flushing with anger. [5] What on earth was it about? she wondered. [6] What could be the matter? [7] Only that poor old Augustus had asked for another plate of soup—that was all. [8] It was unthinkable, it was detestable (so he signalled to her across the table) that Augustus should be beginning his soup over again. [9] He loathed people eating when he had finished. [10] She saw his anger fly like a pack of hounds into his eyes, his brow, and she knew that in a moment something violent would explode, and then—but thank goodness! she saw him clutch himself and clap a brake on the wheel, and the whole of his body seemed to emit sparks but not words. [11] He sat there scowling. [12] He had said nothing, he would have her observe. [13] Let her give him the credit for that! [14] But why after all should poor Augustus not ask for another plate of soup? [15] He had merely touched Ellen's arm and said:

'Ellen, please, another plate of soup,' and then Mr Ramsay scowled like that.

> [16] And why not? Mrs Ramsay demanded. [17] Surely they could let Augustus have his soup if he wanted it. [18] He hated people wallowing in food, Mr Ramsay frowned at her. [19] He hated everything dragging on for hours like this. [20] But he had controlled himself, Mr Ramsay would have her observe, disgusting though the sight was. [21] But why show it so plainly, Mrs Ramsay demanded (they looked at each other down the long table sending these questions and answers across, each knowing exactly what the other felt). (*TL*: 103-104)

During the dinner, Mrs Ramsay is thinking how pleased Mr Ramsay will be if he knows that she is praising him, then she suddenly notices that he has put on an angry face. Following this is a series of argumentative exchanges, although neither of them actually speaks a single word aloud. Greatly contributing to such dialogical and argumentative texture is the use of the adjacency-pair format to facilitate the viewpoint shifts between the two characters. The pattern of adjacency pairs can be sensed even when the text is still anchored in an individual point of view. Mixing together Mrs Ramsay's thoughts (*realising that…*; *thinking to find this shown in his face*; *he would be looking magnificent*), her feelings (*she felt as if…*; *she glowed all over…*) and actions (*she looked at him*) through a fusion of psycho-narration and free indirect thought, Sentences [1] and [2] convey Mrs Ramsay's happiness and satisfaction. While Sentences [3] and [4] are still relayed from Mrs Ramsay's point of view, Mr Ramsay's psychological state is revealed through Mrs Ramsay's perception of him. And the perceived sulkiness in her husband counters her expectation that *he would be looking magnificent*. Mrs Ramsay seems to be having a conversation with

herself, expecting and then being disappointed. The change of narrative mode in Sentence [3] to interior monologue (*But not in the least!*) takes readers straight into Mrs Ramsay's inner world and accentuates the drama of her emotions.

The conversational pattern becomes more obvious from Sentence [5] onward with the text frequently cutting across the two characters' viewpoints. Sentences [5]—[7] sustain Mrs Ramsay's point of view through the free indirect presentation of her thought, signalled by the direct questions and the affective expressions (*on earth*, *poor old Augustus*). The narrative point of view shifts to Mr Ramsay in Sentence [8], which is made clear by the attributing parenthetical *so he signalled to her across the table*. This viewpoint shift does not produce any discontinuity; instead, the format of adjacency pairs helps to establish a strong link between the juxtaposed viewpoints, as Mr Ramsay's and Mrs Ramsay's consciousnesses are framed as question—answer and accusation—admission. To be more specific, Sentences [5]—[7] bring forward Mrs Ramsay's questions and accusation: at first she does not know what makes her husband angry; and when she finds out the reason, she is rather disappointed. *Only* and *that was all* express her dissatisfaction with Mr Ramsay getting angry over a trivial incident. The presentation of Mr Ramsay's thought in [8] can be interpreted as his response to Mrs Ramsay's accusation, with the expressive adjectives *unthinkable* and *detestable* spelling out his feelings, and Sentence [9] offers his further explanation as to why he is getting angry. In this way, the juxtaposition of Mrs Ramsay's and Mr Ramsay's viewpoints mirrors the paired conversational turns:

Mrs Ramsay: *What on earth was it about? What could be the matter? Only that poor old Augustus had asked for another plate of soup—that was all.*

Mr Ramsay: *It was unthinkable, it was detestable that Augustus should be beginning his soup over again. He loathed people eating when he had finished.*

This juxtaposition resembles the conversation example of accusation—objection listed earlier in Extract (10) (repeated and renumbered below for ease of reference):

(17) Colin: you wer-j's (0.2) y'know sort-of (.) blanking her out I dun understan' you

Mum: I'M NOT BLANKIN' 'ER OUT I'M BUSY

Facing Colin's accusation, his mother first denies it, and then gives her explanation. In the exchanges between Mr and Mrs Ramsay, Mr Ramsay admits that he minds Augustus's asking for another plate of soup, but he also gives explanations to justify himself (*He loathed people eating when he had finished*). It is not clear whether Mrs Ramsay is confronting her husband or just complaining to herself, but when the text shifts to Mr Ramsay's point of view in [8], her accusation is obviously responded to by him. The interactive nature of the conversational pattern enhances the relatedness between the two characters' minds. The reference to the same event but with different affective tones in [7] and [8] (***poor old*** *Augustus has asked for another plate of soup* vs. *Augustus* ***should*** *be beginning his soup* ***over again***) indicates that Mr Ramsay

knows perfectly well what his wife is thinking, but that he holds a different attitude towards this event.

Sentence [10] shifts back to Mrs Ramsay's viewpoint, as the pronoun *she* becomes the subject of the mental verbs *saw* and *knew*. Also, the exclamation *thank goodness* clearly shows Mrs Ramsay's relief, and the verb *seem* indicates an observing consciousness. Her viewpoint is probably sustained in [11], as the deictic *there* suggests a distance from Mr Ramsay. The viewpoint attribution is not clear in Sentence [12]. It can be interpreted as Mrs Ramsay's thought about her husband: based on her reflection (*he had said nothing*), she concludes that *he would have her observe*. However, this sentence can equally be seen as the presentation of Mr Ramsay's thought originating from his point of view: sensing his wife's worries that he would lose his temper, Mr Ramsay reassures her that *he would have her observe*, and this assurance is repeated later in the presentation of his thought in [20] *(Mr Ramsay would have her observe*). Interpreted in either way, the text shows one character's sensitivity towards the other's mind. If this latter interpretation is adopted, Sentence [12] can be seen as another response from Mr Ramsay to his wife's worries expressed in Sentence [10]:

Mrs Ramsay: *she knew that in a moment something violent would explode, and then—*

Mr Ramsay: *he had said nothing*; *he would have her observe.*

Mrs Ramsay's point of view becomes dominant again in Sentences [13]—[15]. Sentence [13] expresses her satisfaction with Mr Ramsay's control of his

emotions through the exclamation: *Let her give him the credit for that!*. But the next sentence shows another turn in her mood. Mrs Ramsay's complaint and accusation resume with her direct question in [14], and she summarises the incident (*he had merely touched Ellen's arm… and then Mr Ramsay scowled like that*) in [15] to support her accusation. In the next paragraph, Sentences [16] and [17] maintain Mrs Ramsay's viewpoint. But the paragraph break is noteworthy. It seems to suggest there is a gap between Mrs Ramsay's accusation in [14]—[15] and the repetition of her accusation in [16]—[17]. There could be a momentary silence or non-reaction on the part of Mr Ramsay; and, not getting any response from her husband, Mrs Ramsay presses again. In this sense, this stretch of text again reflects the normative function of the format of adjacency pairs: the absence of a second pair part becomes a source of inference for the first speaker to take a further action to elicit a response. The connective *and* at the beginning of [16] signals an enhanced tone in her accusation. What is also interesting is the use of the verb *demanded* here. It is a verb of communication, and is usually found in association with speech presentation (see Semino & Short, 2004: 237, 239). In the discussion of parenthetical verbs in free indirect speech and thought, Banfield points out that '[where] there is an explicit [attributing] parenthetical, the choice of verb determines whether the represented sentence is interpreted as speech or thought' (1982: 76). Thus it is surprising that this verb is used to describe the manner of thought in this extract. Besides, the semantics of this verb indicates an open request for a response. Therefore the use of this verb of communication reinforces the dialogic tone in this "thought exchange". Sentences [18]—[19]

switch back to Mr Ramsay's point of view, which is made explicit by the attributing parenthetical *Mr Ramsay frowned at her*. Again Mr Ramsay's thought in [18] and [19] is introduced into the text as an explanation of Mrs Ramsay's accusation in [16] and [17]:

Mrs Ramsay: *And why not? Surely they could let Augustus have his soup if he wanted it.*

Mr Ramsay: *He hated people wallowing in food. He hated everything dragging on for hours like this.*

The demonstrative *this* refers to Augustus having another plate of soup and thus links [19] back to Mrs Ramsay's thought in [17]. Sentence [20] is also to be attributed to Mr Ramsay's thought, as the adjective *disgusting* is clearly his evaluation. The connective *But* at the beginning of [20] conveys both Mr Ramsay's concession and his mild protest against his wife's unrelenting accusation. And this thought is met with Mrs Ramsay's further scolding in [21] (*But why show it so plainly*), as the attributing parenthetical *Mrs Ramsay demanded* clearly signals a shift back to her point of view. And again, the verb of communication *demand* enhances the conversational effect.

In this extract, the adjacency-pair format provides the base for the silent but dramatic exchanges between Mr and Mrs Ramsay. Although neither of them speaks out loud, this sequencing device creates the effect that they are constantly confronting each other and responding to each other's thoughts. Most importantly, similarly to the previous extracts (1), (14) and (15), the inter-subjective connection between the two characters is accentuated by this

innovative way of viewpoint linking. The recognition of such patterns can help readers to notice how each of them can sense the fluctuations in the other's emotions and how they speculate on and anticipate each other's thoughts. While the format of adjacency pairs in the previous extracts helps to show one character's awareness of a second character's consciousness, the repeated employment of this sequencing device in this extract suggests the mutual understanding of the two characters. Sitting at the opposite ends of the long dinner table, Mr and Mrs Ramsay are shown in the text to be able to gain knowledge of each other's minds. Most remarkably, their mind-reading is based not merely on judgments of the facial expressions or external behaviour of the other (cf. Palmer (2010) introduced in Chapter 1); rather, they seem to be directly addressing one another in their minds, as the free indirect mode and the more direct interior monologue help to spell out their consciousnesses, which are framed in a highly dialogical pattern through the adjacency-pair format. And what is even more noteworthy is that their inter-mental dialogue lasts for a considerable length, involving several exchanges. It is not the case that only one of them is aware of the other's thoughts. Instead, each is able to decipher the other's thoughts and then make a response, which elicits further feedback from the other. Virginia Woolf herself seems also conscious of this interactive pattern, as she adds a narratorial comment in the discourse parenthetical at the end of this extract to confirm this dialogical pattern (*they looked at each other down the long table sending these questions and answers across*) and acknowledge the relatedness between their minds (*each knowing exactly what the other felt*). The recognition of this interactive pattern allows readers to

attain a better understanding of the relationship between Mr and Mrs Ramsay: in spite of their different worldviews, they can still have a strong connection with each other. It is their shared deep love that makes it possible for them to conduct the silent communication recorded in the above extract.

Not only does the format of adjacency pairs help to create the rich dialogue conducted silently by the Ramsay couple, who love each other despite holding different attitudes towards life, this format also highlights the inter-subjective relatedness between Clarissa Dalloway and Miss Kilman, each holding a repulsive attitude towards the other. In spite of their hostile relation, they are portrayed as knowing the other's thinking quite well. As can be seen in the following extract, even without seeing each other, the two characters sense the other's presence. The presentation of their thoughts mimics both the assessment—agreement (Extract (5)) and the accusation—objection (Extract (9)) interaction in conversation:

(18) […] As a child, she [Elizabeth] had had a perfect sense of humour; but now at seventeen, why, Clarissa could not in the least understand, she had become very serious; like a hyacinth sheathed in glossy green, with buds just tinted, a hyacinth which has had no sun.

She stood quite still and looked at her mother; but the door was ajar, and outside the door was Miss Kilman, as Clarissa knew; Miss Kilman in her mackintosh, listening to whatever they said.

Yes, Miss Kilman stood on the landing, and wore a mackintosh; but had her reasons. First, it was cheap; second, she was over forty; and did not,

> after all, dress to please. She was poor, moreover; degradingly poor. Otherwise she would not be taking jobs from people like the Dalloways; from rich people, who liked to be kind. Mr Dalloway, to do him justice, had been kind. But Mrs Dalloway had not. She had been merely condescending. She came from the most worthless of all classes—the rich, with a smattering of culture. (*MD*: 134-135)

Clarissa Dalloway is taking a rest in her room when her daughter Elizabeth comes in to tell her that she is going to the Army and Navy Stores with Miss Kilman. The first paragraph establishes Clarissa's point of view through the free indirect presentation of her thoughts about the changes in her daughter over the years. The following paragraph continues to trace the flow of her consciousness: seeing her daughter and then the half-open door, figuring out immediately who is outside, and picturing the image of Miss Kilman. Judging from the content, the third paragraph presents Miss Kilman's thought and thus the narrative point of view shifts from Clarissa to Miss Kilman, but the emphatic interjection *Yes* at the beginning of this paragraph binds the two distinct viewpoints.

The presentation of Clarissa's thought in the second paragraph (*and outside the door was Miss Kilman, as Clarissa knew; Miss Kilman in her mackintosh, listening to whatever they said*) can be seen as her assessment of Miss Kilman. It expresses Clarissa's criticism; she despises Miss Kilman's lack of taste in clothes and accuses her for disregarding the code of behaviour of her social circle. The interjection *Yes* shapes Miss Kilman's thought as an agreement with Clarissa's assessment, enhanced by the echoing of her thought

(*outside the door was Miss Kilman* vs. *Miss Kilman stood on the landing*; *Miss Kilman in her mackintosh* vs. *wore a mackintosh*). But this assent is only to introduce Miss Kilman's defensive argument through the *Yes … but…* construction. The accusation—objection pattern again invests a dialogical tone to the text, and at the same time, it functions to highlight the inter-subjective connection between the two characters' consciousnesses. While Clarissa knows without looking that Miss Kilman is standing outside wearing a mackintosh, Miss Kilman senses what Clarissa is thinking at the moment with the same ease. Clarissa is only thinking to herself about Miss Kilman, but her thought seems to have reached out to Miss Kilman and elicited a response from her.

When discussing the theme of identity and class stratification in *Mrs Dalloway*, Catherine Mintler remarks that '[d]espite the ambivalent nature of their thoughts about and physical encounter with each other, Woolf creates scenes in which Clarissa and Kilman experience a moment in which each hovers on the verge of feeling sympathy for the other' (2008: 138). According to her, this is shown in the influence each is exerting on the other's feelings: Clarissa feels uncomfortable as Miss Kilman's dressing reminds her of her class, and Miss Kilman feels resentful because Clarissa makes her feel ashamed of her shabby appearance and elicits her feeling of rejection from society. It might not be accurate to say that Clarissa and Miss Kilman have moments of near-sympathy for each other, but certainly a kind of inter-subjective connection exists between them. Apart from the descriptions of these two characters' inner states that reveal how one is affected by the other,

Woolf's design to frame Miss Kilman's and Clarissa's consciousnesses as adjacency pairs can be seen as the textual reflection of such relatedness.

The same inter-subjective connection is displayed in the extract below in the format of adjacency pairs again. This time this sequencing device creates a strong link in the juxtaposition of Miss Kilman's consciousness with both the consciousness of Elizabeth and that of Clarissa Dalloway. The dialogical tone gets even stronger as more exclamative constructions and even the pronoun of direct address (*you*) are involved. It seems that they are directly confronting each other:

(19) [1] Elizabeth said she had forgotten her gloves. [2] That was because Miss Kilman and her mother hated each other. [3] She could not bear to see them together. [4] She ran upstairs to find her gloves.

[5] But Miss Kilman did not hate Mrs Dalloway. [6] Turning her large gooseberry-coloured eyes upon Clarissa, observing her small pink face, her delicate body, her air of freshness and fashion, Miss Kilman felt, Fool! [7] Simpleton! [8] You who have known neither sorrow nor pleasure; who have trifled your life away! [9] And there rose in her an overmastering desire to overcome her; to unmask her. [10] If she could have felled her it would have eased her. [11] But it was not the body; it was the soul and its mockery that she wished to subdue; make feel her mastery. [12] If only she could make her weep; could ruin her; humiliate her; bring her to her knees crying, You are right! [13] But this was God's will, not Miss Kilman's. [14] It was to be a religious victory. [15] So she glared; so she glowered.

> [16] Clarissa was really shocked. [17] This a Christian—this woman! [18] This woman had taken her daughter from her! [19] She in touch with invisible presences! [20] Heavy, ugly, commonplace, without kindness or grace, she know the meaning of life! (*MD*: 136-137)

This scene takes place after the one depicted in the previous extract. Each of the three paragraphs in this extract can be seen as focusing on one character's consciousness. In the first paragraph, Elizabeth is described as running upstairs with the thought that her mother and Miss Kilman hate each other. When the text changes its narrative focus to Miss Kilman in the second paragraph, we see that Elizabeth's thought is countered by the revelation of Miss Kilman's inner state in [5] (*But Miss Kilman did not hate Mrs Dalloway*). This correspondence between the two characters' thoughts will not be easy to explain without assuming Miss Kilman's awareness of Elizabeth's consciousness. Of course, an alternative interpretation is to simply take the first sentence of the second paragraph as the narrator's comment. But the verb phrase (*did not hate*) is still indicative of Miss Kilman's subjectivity, especially when the whole paragraph is centred on her consciousness, and an attribution of the text to the narrator's voice would seem to me a reductive reading and render the text flat. Moreover, the sentence-initial connective *But* adds to the text a dialogical tone, with its semantic and pragmatic meaning of contrast which pairs Elizabeth's and Miss Kilman's consciousness as statement—negation. The interactive pattern becomes more obvious in the juxtaposition of Miss Kilman's consciousness and Clarissa's in the rest of this extract. The expressive and evaluative interjections in [6] and [7] (*Fool! Simpleton!*) spell out Miss Kilman's

contempt of Clarissa. And the evaluative expressions in the presentation of Clarissa Dalloway's thought in [20] (*Heavy, ugly, commonplace, without kindness or grace*) seem to be a direct response from her. Miss Kilman accuses Clarissa in [8] of trifling her life away and knowing nothing about sorrow or pleasure, and Clarissa answers back in [20] with the exclamation *she know the meaning of life!*, which expresses her disbelief in Miss Kilman's ability to understand the true meaning of life. The accusation—objection pattern in the arrangement of the shifting viewpoints here enhances the confrontation between Miss Kilman and Clarissa Dalloway. And most importantly, it enables readers to see how one character's consciousness is perceivable to another.

As the foregoing analysis shows, the format of adjacency pairs as an effective linguistic mechanism of viewpoint shifts serves to suggest a strong link between different characters. Whether it is between characters who are intimately related and can guess each other's thoughts accurately or it is between characters who are socially distant and do not share emotional connections on the surface, a silent yet dramatic dialogue is created in the text as those characters' thoughts are neatly paired as question—answer, accusation—admission/ objection, assessment—agreement and statement—negation. These patterns of the juxtaposition of different consciousnesses are strikingly similar to those of the allocation of conversational turns in everyday communication noted by pragmaticians and discourse analysts in their studies. This direct correspondence between viewpoint shifts in consciousness presentation and turn taking in conversation most forcefully conveys the intense sensitivity different characters possess towards each other's minds.

7.5 Concluding remarks

This chapter has examined how the adjacency-pair format is used by Virginia Woolf to facilitate shifts in point of view. As introduced in Section 7.2, adjacency pairs are an effective means in daily conversation of coordinating conversational turns and guiding the production and interpretation of spoken discourse. Semantically, the function of the first pair part is to explicitly seek information by producing a certain type of speech act, such as a question or an offer, which is responded to by the second pair part; pragmatically, the format of adjacency pairs has a sequencing function to allocate conversational turns to alternate speakers. The semantic and pragmatic function of an adjacency pair makes it perhaps the most interactive sequencing device in the construction of conversation. Essential to this sequencing device is the intersubjectivity existing between conversation participants, as adjacency pairs display their anticipation, interpretation and evaluation of each other's turn and their corresponding modification of their own turn. The textual examples in this chapter have shown that this highly interactive conversational pattern is mapped on the juxtaposition of different characters' consciousnesses. Through this mapping, the text conveys the inter-subjective connections between different characters' minds as those characters are portrayed as possessing direct knowledge of others' thoughts and feelings.

Compared with the linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts discussed in previous chapters, namely, parentheticals and connectives, the format of adjacency pairs is probably the most powerful one that links different consciousnesses. Discourse parentheticals and attributing parentheticals create

a link between different viewpoints mostly through syntactic arrangement that holds within sentence boundaries textual segments which present different consciousnesses; and connectives link different minds through their discoursal function of signalling textual connections and the pragmatic function of indicating an interactive commitment to the creation of talk. However, none of these devices places the juxtaposed points of view in a relation as interactive as the format of adjacency pairs does. When two characters' consciousnesses are framed in the pattern of adjacency pairs, the text creates either the impression that the first character is explicitly inviting the second to respond, or the impression that the second character has picked up on the first one's thought and makes a response to that exact thought. In addition, when parentheticals and connectives function as linking devices, the connection created by these linguistic constructions between different minds is often one-sided, that is, the text highlights one character's knowledge of another's thoughts and feelings; in comparison, in the case of adjacency pairs, the text can display characters' mutual understanding of each other's thoughts and extend a silent exchange of thoughts across several turns or shifts between two consciousnesses, which challenges most strongly the assumption that consciousness is private and inaccessible to others.

Although it is probably beyond anybody's expectation that the format of adjacency pairs, which is a sequencing device strictly associated with turn taking in naturally occurring conversation, should be used in the presentation of consciousness, this chapter has shown that there are quite a few instances of this format in Virginia Woolf's narrative texts. Mapping the format of

adjacency pairs onto consciousness presentation is very striking because, more strongly than any of the other linguistic devices, it suggests the direct knowledge of another mind through first an expectation on the character who initiates the silent exchange that he/she would receive some kind of response and then the corresponding response that another character indeed provides. It is most clear in this kind of example which uses the format of adjacency pairs that Virginia Woolf implies the transparency of the minds of different characters. Such a radical way of linking distinct viewpoints and consciousnesses has not been attested in any other author's writing of consciousness to my knowledge, which is perhaps one important factor that wins Woolf a distinctive position in the Modernist movement and in particular in the novel of consciousness.

Chapter 8 Conclusion

The presentation of fictional minds has always been an engaging topic for researchers in the fields of narratology and stylistics not just because it provides rich data for the exploration of narrative techniques but also because it can afford us fresh insights into the nature of consciousness. Traditional narratological and stylistic studies such as Humphrey (1954), Cohn (1978) and Leech & Short (2007 [1981]) have mainly concentrated on the presentation of consciousness as private and individual but have not given enough attention to the social interactive quality of fictional minds. Recent advances in the study of fictional consciousness display an important research interest in social minds, but apart from a very limited number of theoretical accounts (see Sotirova, 2011, 2013), studies in this respect (see Palmer, 2010) lack the rigour of detailed linguistic analyses which has been a merit of the more traditional narratological approaches. This thesis set out as a response to the call for the study of social minds by systematically analysing the linguistic means of presenting multipersonal consciousnesses. It chose to use the concepts and models developed by stylistic narratological studies that base their findings in a thorough analysis of linguistic features, and in this way, it addressed the problem of lacking linguistic support in the investigation of social minds. At the same time, it further developed existing linguistic accounts of the presentation of interactive consciousness.

Taking *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse* as key research data, this investigation set its focus on a particular narrative technique—shifts in point of

view, because this technique allows a stretch of text to present multiple characters' consciousnesses with complex interweaving of voices. While previous studies (see Adamson, 1998) point out that enacting frequent shifts in point of view exemplifies the Modernist practice of both simulating orality in literary language and subverting the illusion of a unified coherent speaking voice, my analysis of shifts in point of view in this thesis has shown that this narrative technique not only subverts the establishment of a consistent coherent point of view but also works towards rendering the inter-subjective connections between different consciousnesses.

From an empirical perspective, I have shown in Chapter 3 that the narrative technique of viewpoint shifts has a strong influence on readers' textual processing. The reader response experiment that I conducted strongly suggests that this technique tends to place high demands on readers, which is reflected in either longer processing time or the reports of perceived difficulty in determining the attribution of viewpoints. This alerts us as researchers to the fact that viewpoint shifts need to be analysed more thoroughly so that we can find out why this narrative phenomenon poses the perceived difficulty and what aesthetic values are underlying it. I have argued that this kind of high processing demand is likely to direct readers' attention to the juxtaposition of different viewpoints and prompt them to view one character's consciousness in connection with another's speech, thought and perception. In this sense, shifts in point of view may guide readers towards identifying connections between different minds. Through my analysis of the linguistic mechanisms of viewpoint shifts, the difficulty resulting from this narrative technique has been

thoroughly unravelled, and the function of this narrative design has been explained in relation to the presentation of fictional minds.

The linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts analysed in Chapters 4—7, namely, discourse parentheticals, attributing parentheticals, connectives and adjacency pairs, function at different levels of text to facilitate the presentation of multipersonal consciousnesses. The two categories of parentheticals allow the text to shift to a different point of view based on their digressive nature, and they contribute to the presentation of multipersonal consciousnesses through their pragmatic function—a parenthetical and its host combine to express the meaning of a sentence. Discourse parentheticals and attributing parentheticals create a link between juxtaposed viewpoints mostly by allowing different subjectivities to co-exist within the confines of a single sentence. Connectives operate both within sentential units and across sentences, and they link different viewpoints through their cohesive function and also semantic force in some cases. Adjacency pairs function beyond the sentence level, and this sequencing format bridges different viewpoints based on its pragmatic function of building up interactions between conversational participants. While operating in different ways, what these four linguistic mechanisms share in common is that they effectively break the constraints of textual linearity and help the text to highlight the simultaneity in different characters' subjective experiences or capture the process through which one character anticipates, evaluates and reacts to another's thoughts and inner states. In other words, the very form of the text comes to embody the social orientedness of fictional minds.

From a literary standpoint, focusing specifically on Virginia Woolf's novels, this thesis sheds particular light on her conception of consciousness and especially the relationship between different consciousnesses by exploring how she employs the narrative technique of viewpoint shifts to convey the inter-subjective orientedness of consciousness. Contrary to some literary critics' interpretation that Woolf portrays consciousness as isolated and impenetrable, I have argued that Woolf keenly explores in *Mrs Dalloway* and *To the Lighthouse* the possibility that consciousness is interactive and accessible. It is not that previous scholars have never noted the socially oriented nature of consciousness in Woolf's works. However, most of these scholars have only discussed this aspect of consciousness presentation on the thematic level. Few have analysed how the social interactive quality of fictional minds is linguistically presented in the narrative text. My analysis of the linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts provides strong text-based evidence for the argument that consciousness in Woolf's novels is not always isolated or sealed but is engaged in interactive connections with others.

From a narratological standpoint, this thesis makes a noteworthy contribution to the study of shifts in point of view as a particular narrative technique. Despite its high stylistic value, this technique in its own right has not been thoroughly analysed. Whereas some researchers have investigated the phenomenon of viewpoint shifts, they have done it with different aims rather than uncovering its linguistic mechanisms. My study is thus valuable to our understanding of how this narrative technique functions in literary texts. Given the fact that Virginia Woolf is considered to be the author who practises this

technique most radically (Fernihough 2007: 77; Sotirova, 2013: 49), the linguistic features isolated in this thesis based on the evidence of two of her mature novels probably give us the most comprehensive set of linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts that has so far been analysed. There may still be other ways of enacting shifts in point of view, but it remains to be further investigated.

This thesis also has significant implications for the narratological study of fictional minds in general in terms of potential directions for future investigation, research approaches and theoretical resources.

A detailed and systematic examination of the linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts has helped me to probe deeply into the presentation of the social quality of consciousness by Virginia Woolf, but it has also pointed to the need to read beyond Woolf to appreciate other writers' stylistic practice in the portrayal of fictional minds. As the presentation of consciousness is an essential component of narrative fiction, it is worth examining whether the social quality of consciousness manifested in Woolf's novels is also explored by other novelists in both the Modernist period and other stages of the development of this genre[11]. If social minds are portrayed in other novels, it will be of great value to investigate how exactly they are portrayed. I have made the case that the narrative technique of viewpoint shifts is a crucial means by which Woolf renders the interactive connections between different

[11] As introduced in Chapter 1, Sotirova's (2011) study, while primarily being a response to the voice debate surrounding the narrative mode of free indirect style, has shown that consciousness is portrayed as dialogical in D. H. Lawrence's novels. Herman (2011) provides a historical and diachronic view on consciousness presentation, but does not focus specifically on the presentation of social minds.

minds and thus challenges the assumption that consciousness is isolated and impenetrable. But this technique only becomes prominent in Modernist fiction. It will be worth finding out: a) whether this stylistic design is adopted or adapted in novels of earlier or later periods and b) whether there are other ways apart from the technique of viewpoint shifts for novelists to portray social minds. If the presentation of social minds is absent in either pre- or post-Modernist novels, it will also be interesting to investigate why there is such an absence, as this may reveal changes in the conceptualisation of the nature of consciousness.

My study forcefully shows that traditional category-based approaches to the investigation of consciousness presentation are highly valuable to the study of social minds because they give us all the tools to discriminate between different levels of conscious awareness that can be represented through language and they also allows us to carry out analysis which discriminates between different characters' consciousnesses. As can be seen from the preceding chapters, shifts in point of view as an effective technique for rendering social minds operate in texts that present figural consciousness in the more immediate modes of free indirect style and interior monologue. This is how the text creates the effect that characters seem to be directly communicating their thoughts and inner states and thus challenges the assumption that consciousness is never accessible to others. It is through the analysis of narrative modes that we can explain how social minds are portrayed and how they interact with each other. But on the other hand, traditional stylistic approaches also need to be improved in order to better assist the

research of the presentation of social minds. By taking a discoursal view on the presentation of consciousness, I have shown the benefit and necessity of breaking away from the limitations of the sentence-based investigation that has been dominant in previous narratological studies.

Meanwhile, my examination of the linguistic indices of viewpoint shifts demonstrates the fruitfulness of a thorough *linguistic* account in the investigation of fictional minds. It is through the analysis of the linguistic features of the text that we can clearly elucidate how exactly the social quality of consciousness is captured through language rather than merely through the content and theme of the narrative. The scrutiny of language details allows us to make a stronger and more convincing argument than purely literary critical studies that tend to be descriptive and impressionistic.

Furthermore, my analysis shows the relevance and importance of the studies of spoken discourse to the investigation of consciousness presentation. As already exemplified in some existing studies, literary language can be fruitfully analysed along the lines of spoken discourse. While literary language is obviously much more elaborate, there are practices in the discourse of everyday interaction that are replicated in the language of consciousness presentation. Literature on discourse analysis, which has been used to inform our understanding of the narrative mode of free indirect style (see Adamson, 1994a; Sotirova, 2011, 2013), has also been an underlying theoretical base for my study. Drawing on findings in studies of discourse and mapping patterns of everyday interaction onto narrative texts are important because they allow us to

see the dialogical nature of discourse underpinning the presentation of fictional minds and then to draw the conclusion of interactive consciousness. Rather than just looking at a literary work in its own right and considering writers as some creators of imaginative language as traditional literary critics have done, I have demonstrated in this thesis that we can draw a link between everyday discourse and literary language. The application of theories of discourse to the analysis of language in literature can show how a writer such as Virginia Woolf, who is generally considered as representative of high Modernism and whose language is regarded as extremely literary, still uses certain mechanisms of everyday language, which, although not manifested so much on the lexical level, are still perceivable in the way different viewpoints are connected. And these mechanisms are very effective, as there is often strong evocation of spoken dialogue and the presence of two speaking voices when a reader comes across the presentation of two consciousnesses interconnected with each other.

Consciousness in fiction, due to its richness and complexity, will constantly fascinate researchers. And it is my belief that a thorough linguistic analysis that makes use of the category-based models of consciousness presentation and draws on studies of discourse is the best way to illuminate our understanding of fictional minds and enhance our appreciation of literary texts.

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Appendix 1 Texts for the Empirical Study of Shifts in Point of View

Passage 1

Her [Elinor] resentment of such behaviour, her indignation at having been its dupe, for a short time made her feel only for herself; but other ideas, other considerations, soon arose. Had Edward been intentionally deceiving her? Had he feigned a regard for her which he did not feel? Was his engagement to Lucy an engagement of the heart? No; whatever it might once have been, she could not believe it such at present. His affection was all her own. She could not be deceived in that. Her mother, sisters, Fanny, all had been conscious of his regard for her at Norland; it was not an illusion of her own vanity. He certainly loved her. What a softener of the heart was this persuasion! How much could it not tempt her to forgive! He had been blameable, highly blameable in remaining at Norland after he first felt her influence over him to be more than it ought to be. In that, he could not be defended; but if he had injured her, how much more had he injured himself! If her case were pitiable, his was hopeless. His imprudence had made her miserable for a while; but it seemed to have deprived himself of all chance of ever being otherwise. She might in time regain tranquillity; but *he*, what had he to look forward to? Could he ever be tolerably happy with Lucy Steele? could he, were his affection for herself out of the question, with his integrity, his delicacy, and well-informed mind, be satisfied with a wife like her—illiterate, artful, and selfish?

Passage 2

But at the thought of crying it was as though little Lennie leapt in his gran's arms. Ah, that's what she wants to do, my dove. Gran wants to cry. If she could only cry now, cry for a long time, over everything, beginning with her first place and the cruel cook, going on to the doctor's, and then the seven little ones, death of her husband, the children's leaving her, and all the years of misery that led up to Lennie. But to have a proper cry over all these things would take a long time. All the same, the time for it had come. She must do it. She couldn't put it off any longer; she couldn't wait any more... Where could she go?

"She's had a hard life, has Ma Parker." Yes, a hard life, indeed! Her chin began to tremble; there was no time to lose. But where? Where?

She couldn't go home; Ethel was there. It would frighten Ethel out of her life. She couldn't sit on a bench anywhere; people would come arsking her questions.[12] She couldn't possibly go back to the gentleman's flat; she had no right to cry in strangers' houses. If she sat on some steps a policeman would speak to her.

Oh, wasn't there anywhere where she could hide and keep herself to herself and stay as long as she liked, not disturbing anybody, and nobody worrying her? Wasn't there anywhere in the world where she could have her cry out—at last?

[12] The word "arsking" is the original spelling and was presented to the participants without correction.

Passage 3

Oh, but she [Mrs Ramsay] never wanted James to grow a day older or Cam either. These two she would have liked to keep for ever just as they were, demons of wickedness, angels of delight, never to see them grow up into long-legged monsters. Nothing made up for the loss. When she read just now to James, "and there were numbers of soldiers with kettledrums and trumpets," and his eyes darkened, she thought, why should they grow up and lose all that? He was the most gifted, the most sensitive of her children. But all, she thought, were full of promise. Prue, a perfect angel with the others, and sometimes now, at night especially, she took one's breath away with her beauty. Andrew—even her husband admitted that his gift for mathematics was extraordinary. And Nancy and Roger, they were both wild creatures now, scampering about over the country all day long. As for Rose, her mouth was too big, but she had a wonderful gift with her hands. If they had charades, Rose made the dresses; made everything; liked best arranging tables, flowers, anything. She did not like it that Jasper should shoot birds; but it was only a stage; they all went through stages. Why, she asked, pressing her chin on James's head, should they grow up so fast? Why should they go to school? She would have liked always to have had a baby. She was happiest carrying one in her arms. Then people might say she was tyrannical, domineering, masterful, if they chose; she did not mind.

Passage 4

No; she [Lily] could not do it. She ought to have floated off instantly upon some wave of sympathetic expansion: the pressure on her was tremendous. But she remained stuck. There was an awful pause. They both looked at the sea. Why, thought Mr. Ramsay, should she look at the sea when I am here? She hoped it would be calm enough for them to land at the Lighthouse, she said. The Lighthouse! The Lighthouse! What's that got to do with it? he thought impatiently. Instantly, with the force of some primeval gust (for really he could not restrain himself any longer), there issued from him such a groan that any other woman in the whole world would have done something, said something—all except myself, thought Lily, girding at herself bitterly, who am not a woman, but a peevish, ill-tempered, dried-up old maid, presumably.

Mr. Ramsay sighed to the full. He waited. Was she not going to say anything? Did she not see what he wanted from her? Then he said he had a particular reason for wanting to go to the Lighthouse. His wife used to send the men things. There was a poor boy with a tuberculous hip, the lightkeeper's son. He sighed profoundly. He sighed significantly. All Lily wished was that this enormous flood of grief, this insatiable hunger for sympathy, this demand that she should surrender herself up to him entirely, and even so he had sorrows enough to keep her supplied for ever, should leave her, should be diverted […]

Appendix 2 Questionnaire

Attribution of narrative point of view:

Passage 1:

Whose point(s) of view do you think the text is narrated from? Please write your answer below.

_____

_____

_____

Passage 2:

Whose point(s) of view do you think the text is narrated from? Please write your answer below.

_____

_____

_____

Passage 3:

Whose point(s) of view do you think the text is narrated from? Please write your answer below.

_____

_____

_____

Passage 4:

Whose point(s) of view do you think the text is narrated from? Please write your answer below.

_____

_____

_____

Questions:

1. Which text did you find easier to read and understand? Please rate each text from 1—6 in terms of difficulty of comprehension:

	1= very easy ⟷ 6= very difficult					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Passage 1						
Passage 2						
Passage 3						
Passage 4						

2. Which text did you find easier in terms of interpreting and assigning the narrative point of view? Please rate each text from 1—6 in terms of difficulty of viewpoint attribution:

	1= very easy ⟷ 6= very difficult					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Passage 1						
Passage 2						
Passage 3						
Passage 4						

3. Are there any parts of each text you find confusing in terms of narrative point of view? Please highlight them if there are any.

Reader's background:

1. What is your subject? _____

2. What is your degree? _____

3. Have you taken any courses in narratology or stylistics?

_____

4. Have you learned about Free Indirect Discourse/ Free Indirect Style? _____

5. Have you read any of the passages before? Please choose the description that best fits your reading experience for each passage:

Passage 1: _____ Passage 2: _____ Passage 3: _____ Passage 4: _____

A. I never read it before.
B. I read it a long time ago but don't remember the passage well.
C. I read it a long time ago and still remember it well.
D. I read it recently and remember it well.

Please write down the name of the author or the novel if you remember:

Passage 1: _____

Passage 2: _____

Passage 3: _____

Passage 4: _____

6. How often do you read novels?

A. one novel a week on average or more frequently than this
B. one novel a month on average
C. one novel in three months on average
D. one novel in half a year on average or less frequently than this

Other: _____

7. If you have any further comment concerning your reading experience or the test, please write it here:

Thanks very much for your participation!

Appendix 3 Reading Time and Rating of Difficulty

Participant		Reading Time (millisecond)				Mean Time (millisecond/100 words)				Difficulty in comprehension				Difficulty in attribution			
		P 1 (262)	P 2 (253)	P 3 (260)	P 4 (254)	P 1	P 2	P 3	P 4	P 1	P 2	P 3	P 4	P 1	P 2	P 3	P 4
1	1st reading	56268	47284	64470	72605	21476.34	18689.33	24796.15	28584.65	1	2	2	3	1	2	1	3
	2nd reading	80821	75482	79282	78777	30847.71	29834.78	30493.08	31014.57								
2	1st reading	237863	78561	88819	83380	90787.41	31051.78	34161.15	32826.77	5	2	2	3	3	3	2	2
	2nd reading	50536	101270	47255	17074	19288.55	40027.67	18175	6722.047								
3	1st reading	78676	60253	77070	71715	30029.01	23815.42	29642.31	28234.25	4	5	3	2	2	3	2	2
	2nd reading	47626	41067	41034	35993	18177.86	16232.02	15782.31	14170.47								

4	1st reading	54729	50096	56347	56953	20888.93	19800.79	21671.92	22422.44	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2
	2nd reading	51635	83573	65213	61724	19708.02	33032.81	25081.92	24300.79								
5	1st reading	118783	165202	104012	123567	45337.02	65297.23	40004.62	48648.43	1	3	1	1	2	3	2	2
	2nd reading	101343	65151	39396	156040	38680.53	25751.38	15152.31	61433.07								
6	1st reading	114035	105470	102770	93938	43524.81	41687.75	39526.92	36983.46	3	2	1	2	3	4	1	2
	2nd reading	86620	80248	55023	40926	33061.07	31718.58	21162.69	16112.6								
7	1st reading	77013	63703	62238	97096	29394.28	25179.05	23937.69	38226.77	2	3	1	3	1	2	1	3
	2nd reading	8437	43467	9481	45286	3220.229	17180.63	3646.538	17829.13								

8	1st reading	124252	82340	100409	117999	47424.43	32545.45	38618.85	46456.3	3	1	2	3	2	3	2	2
	2nd reading	32934	67508	43602	38249	12570.23	26683	16770	15058.66								
9	1st reading	50884	47954	52369	35376	19421.37	18954.15	20141.92	13927.56	1	3	3	5	1	6	2	1
	2nd reading	37074	41415	19120	20874	14150.38	16369.57	7353.846	8218.11								
10	1st reading	75002	63890	60314	80624	28626.72	25252.96	23197.69	31741.73	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	2
	2nd reading	23899	32743	34283	21340	9121.756	12941.9	13185.77	8401.575								
11	1st reading	97561	95824	78114	97888	37237.02	37875.1	30043.85	38538.58	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	3
	2nd reading	21942	27110	12704	80718	8374.809	10715.42	4886.154	31778.74								

12	1st reading	52598	50207	44470	36321	20075.57	19844.66	17103.85	14299.61	3	2	1	1	5	6	2	3
	2nd reading	24026	134255	11278	20739	9170.229	53065.22	4337.692	8164.961								
13	1st reading	98403	74354	85301	61828	37558.4	29388.93	32808.08	24341.73	2	1	1	1	3	2	1	1
	2nd reading	57975	75250	16292	19727	22127.86	29743.08	6266.154	7766.535								
14	1st reading	98111	87731	85740	77361	37446.95	34676.28	32976.92	30457.09	1	2	1	5	1	4	1	2
	2nd reading	96837	78808	84857	108144	36960.69	31149.41	32637.31	42576.38								
15	1st reading	89120	67107	78379	88046	34015.27	26524.51	30145.77	34663.78	3	3	2	5	1	2	1	3
	2nd reading	22141	44497	9328	26274	8450.763	17587.75	3587.692	10344.09								

16	1st reading	68263	50540	58541	51205	26054.58	19976.28	22515.77	20159.45	3	1	2	1	2	4	2	4
	2nd reading	56661	27996	31847	35673	21626.34	11065.61	12248.85	14044.49								
17	1st reading	60066	56726	56056	50348	22925.95	22421.34	21560	19822.05	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	3
	2nd reading	70207	62427	81382	77247	26796.57	24674.7	31300.77	30412.2								
18	1st reading	89679	64517	70654	58510	34228.63	25500.79	27174.62	23035.43	3	3	1	2	3	3	1	1
	2nd reading	78463	73935	13833	40057	29947.71	29223.32	5320.385	15770.47								
19	1st reading	103943	75720	74438	66738	39672.9	29928.85	28630	26274.8	1	3	1	1	1	4	1	1
	2nd reading	11848	80131	15535	23134	4522.137	31672.33	5975	9107.874								

20	1st reading	67291	61372	92674	71352	25683.59	24257.71	35643.85	28091.34	4	1	1	3	1	1	1	1
	2nd reading	16456	14276	19359	6539	6280.916	5642.688	7445.769	2574.409								
21	1st reading	95805	95643	112464	111011	36566.79	37803.56	43255.38	43705.12	4	2	2	4	4	5	3	4
	2nd reading	99430	81526	85569	79317	37950.38	32223.72	32911.15	31227.17								
22	1st reading	52599	48173	54821	57711	20075.95	19040.71	21085	22720.87	2	3	2	3	1	1	1	1
	2nd reading	51227	46411	51623	53069	19552.29	18344.27	19855	20893.31								
23	1st reading	57392	53187	59544	60419	21905.34	21022.53	22901.54	23787.01	2	1	1	2	5	3	3	3
	2nd reading	73240	71478	45518	47826	27954.2	28252.17	17506.92	18829.13								

24	1st reading	132601	93044	124862	143433	50611.07	36776.28	48023.85	56469.69	5	2	2	5	3	4	3	6
	2nd reading	33295	63250	26817	117311	12708.02	25000	10314.23	46185.43								
25	1st reading	81818	64100	57015	72244	31228.24	25335.97	21928.85	28442.52	4	3	2	2	2	4	2	2
	2nd reading	36455	65355	33834	50258	13914.12	25832.02	13013.08	19786.61								
26 *	1st reading	108139	91540	105613	109389	41274.43	36181.82	40620.38	43066.54	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	3
	2nd reading	50332	64659	#	24953	19210.69	25556.92	#	9824.016								
27	1st reading	122601	90384	111884	76606	46794.28	35724.9	43032.31	30159.84	4	2	2	3	5	3	2	4
	2nd reading	140971	224308	142789	223167	53805.73	88659.29	54918.85	87861.02								

28	1st reading	67444	60245	64043	65309	25741.99	23812.25	24631.92	25712.2	1	1	4	1	1	2	1	5
	2nd reading	38621	58891	53535	64678	14740.84	23277.08	20590.38	25463.78								
29	1st reading	91707	72303	90360	85800	35002.67	28578.26	34753.85	33779.53	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	4
	2nd reading	22979	28105	29317	50775	8770.611	11108.7	11275.77	19990.16								
30	1st reading	90808	61224	78085	100188	34659.54	24199.21	30032.69	39444.09	3	2	1	4	2	3	2	5
	2nd reading	56179	69007	55462	63898	21442.37	27275.49	21331.54	25156.69								
31	1st reading	140520	80693	105937	85964	53633.59	31894.47	40745	33844.09	5	2	2	4	4	2	3	4
	2nd reading	121316	32131	63861	86321	46303.82	12700	24561.92	33984.65								

32	1st reading	70931	74891	68617	68805	27072.9	29601.19	26391.15	27088.58	2	1	4	3	1	2	4	5
	2nd reading	62102	61795	66897	55815	23703.05	24424.9	25729.62	21974.41								
33	1st reading	66616	83414	95090	69400	25425.95	32969.96	36573.08	27322.83	1	1	1	1	2	3	3	4
	2nd reading	36461	169273	51871	47985	13916.41	66906.32	19950.38	18891.73								
34	1st reading	106754	81899	92427	77957	40745.8	32371.15	35548.85	30691.73	5	4	2	3	1	2	1	5
	2nd reading	14204	42234	18135	48922	5421.374	16693.28	6975	19260.63								
35 *	1st reading	79550	65316	85602	103560	30362.6	25816.6	32923.85	40771.65	2	4	3	5	3	5	4	5
	2nd reading	22684	18234	17101	#	8658.015	7207.115	6577.308	#								

36	1st reading	86222	74809	76746	82903	32909.16	29568.77	29517.69	32638.98	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1
	2nd reading	62195	77621	71133	98905	23738.55	30680.24	27358.85	38938.98								
37	1st reading	101439	79096	86541	91876	38717.18	31263.24	33285	36171.65	2	3	1	4	2	3	1	5
	2nd reading	26236	37786	33491	51380	10013.74	14935.18	12881.15	20228.35								
38	1st reading	91117	72458	85531	86621	34777.48	28639.53	32896.54	34102.76	5	4	2	4	4	2	2	3
	2nd reading	62755	27595	27968	76250	23952.29	10907.11	10756.92	30019.69								