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At the End of Empire

Frank Murphy, Paul V. McNutt, and the American

Decolonization of the Philippines



1933-1947

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Abbreviations

- American Historical Collection AHC
- American Legion AL
- Bell Trade Act (1946) BTA
- Bentley Historical Library BHL
- Bretton Woods System BWS
- British Library BL
- Chinese Communist Party CCP
- Dutch East Indies DEI
- Frank Murphy Papers FMP
- Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act (1933) HHCA
- Indian Office & Private Papers IO
- Jones Act (1916) JA
- Joseph Ralston Hayden Papers JRHP
- Manuel A. Roxas Papers MARP
- Manuel L. Quezon Papers MQP
- Military Assistance Agreement (1947) MAA
- Military Bases Agreement (1947) MBA
- Paul V. McNutt Papers PVMP
- Philippine Communist Party PKP
- Philippine Rehabilitation Act (1946) PRA
- Record Group RG
- Sergio Osmeña Papers SOP
- Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934) TMA
- United States Army Forces in the Far East USAFFE

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Introduction

Imagining Independence: Empire, Decolonization, and U.S.-Philippine History

The mood was palpable in Manila on 15 November 1935. After thirty-seven years of colonial rule, the United States had set the Philippines on the path to independence by establishing an autonomous commonwealth and promising sovereignty within ten years. In front of the city's Legislative Building, a vast crowd of half a million Filipinos gathered to observe this first step towards independence.[1] The entire event was imbued with a feeling of congratulation. In the final session of the Philippine Legislature, the last U.S. Governor General, Frank Murphy, paid homage to the fruits of American colonialism bestowed on the Filipino people, declaring: 'with a large and growing population, expanding industry and agriculture, easy communication and increasing wealth, a government financially stable and sound, an enlightened press, and an informed and patriotic citizenry, the sinews of statehood and the elements of a strong national life have been provided.'[2]

Murphy's statement neatly embodied the intellectual rationale that guided America's empire in the Philippines. A tutelary colonialism, rendered in Western ideas of modernity and development, would prepare the Filipino people for self-government and gift them the blessings of liberal-capitalist democracy.[3] Notions of progress were tied to Western attributes of governmental responsibility, which construed nation-building as a process of transformation from a primitive, backward culture into a society premised on Enlightenment ideas of rationality, reason, and ordered economic, political, and social development. The social engineering projects that enveloped America's colonial regime culminated in a vision of modernity that was normative and universal, providing a timeline for independence intimately connected with American understandings of what constituted an effective, modern state.[4] These assumptions had

[1] Memorandum on the Inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, undated, Box 26, MQP.
[2] Message of Governor General Frank Murphy to the Philippine Legislature in Its Final Session, 14 November 1935, Roll 103, FMP.
[3] David C. Engerman & Corina R. Unger, 'Towards a Global History of Modernization', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 33, no. 3 (2009), pp. 375-385. Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2006). David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 2010).
[4] Leia C. Anastacio, Foundations of the Modern Philippine State: Imperial Rule and the American Constitutional Tradition (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2016). Paul D. Hutchcroft, 'The Hazards of Jeffersonianism: Challenges of State Building in the United States and its Empire', in Alfred W. McCoy & Francisco A. Scarano, eds., Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State (Madison, W.I.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), pp. 375-389. Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,

been the guiding hand of American policy since President William McKinley's call for 'benevolent assimilation,' and underlined American images of independence throughout its colonial regime.[5] As a result, notions of progress, maturity, and development were contrasted with culturally orientalised representations of Filipino inertia, insolence, and infantilism.[6] Indeed, the idea of the Philippines being cartographically oriental but culturally occidental helped spur the developmental attitude that underscored American imperialism in the islands.

Over ten years later, as the dream of independence was about to become a reality, Murphy's vision for the Philippines remained contested. The sense of accomplishment that pervaded the Commonwealth obscured the chaos and confusion that surrounded it. During these transformative years, the global economic calamity of the Great Depression and the wider turn away from liberal-capitalist democracy left many American policymakers fearing for America's "experiment" in Asian nation-building.[7] The continental calls for Pan-Asian solidarity that flourished in the inter-war years expressed a feeling of disenfranchisement amongst dependent peoples, and a belief that developmental promises espoused by colonial powers like the United States had fallen short.[8] This disquiet was only compounded by World War II, as the islands' occupation by Japan promised a new vision of independence under the racialized rhetoric of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In the harrowing battle to retake the Philippines, American policymakers continued to fear for the legacy of their imperial enterprise.[9] The rapid onset of Cold War rivalries forced independence into the global limelight, framed as it was as a construction of leadership against competing models of development offered by communist rivals like the Soviet Union.[10] Indeed, as the United States lowered the Stars and Stripes for the final time on 4 July 1946, there was a sense America still had to answer for the actions of its empire. Japan's occupation left the islands in a state of ruin, and the

2006). Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison, W.I.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

[5] Stuart C. Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (London, U.K.: Yale University Press, 1982).

[6] Henry L. Stimson, 'First-Hand Impressions of the Philippine Problem', *Saturday Evening Post*, 19 March 1927, pp. 6-142. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London, U.K.: Penguin, 2003). Said, Culture & Imperialism (London, U.K.: Vintage Books, 1994).

[7] Message of Governor General Theodore Roosevelt to the Ninth Philippine Legislature, 16 July 1932, Box 18, MQP. Address of Senator Millard E. Tydings to the Philippine Constitutional Convention, 22 December 1934, Roll 99, FMP.

[8] Sven Saaler & Christopher W.A. Szpilman, eds., Pan-Asianism, A Documentary History: Volume 2, 1920-present (Plymouth, U.K.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), pp. 115-160.

[9] Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area, 2 August 1944, Box 42, JRHP. Anon, 'It Wasn't All Altruism', *Saturday Evening Post*, 6 June 1942, p. 100. Speech of Hon. Millard E. Tydings of Maryland in the U.S. Senate, 27 November 1944, Box 93, FMP.

[10] Lord Killearn, Special Commissioner in Southeast Asia, Telegram No. 41 from Manila Reporting Presentation of Credentials, 5 July 1946, IO, BL, RG IOR/Q/21/11. Broadcast in the 'Our Foreign Policy' Series, 5 July 1947, Box 22, PVMP.

fledgling state was far from secure in its position of sovereignty. As the first U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, Paul V. McNutt, noted only five months after independence, 'we stand in the role of a parent whose child has come of age… but that does not end our responsibility, nor our interest.'[11]

Just as Murphy's statement embodied the intellectual rationale that guided America's decolonization of the Philippines, McNutt's proclamation captured the feeling of responsibility that endured after independence. Although formally at the end of empire, the United States continued to shape the direction of Philippine society, collaborating with the same Filipino partners the Spanish had invested in centuries earlier. This reality was not lost on observers. One British diplomat sent to witness the inauguration of the republic noted the achievement of independence with sanctimonious satisfaction.[12] In denouncing the authenticity of Philippine nationhood, the diplomat declared, 'in spite of all the mutual protestations and compliments on the achievement of independence, I seemed to sense an air of unreality about their proceedings.'[13]

'Unique among the nations of Asia,' Alfred McCoy notes, 'the Philippines has raised its flag to declare national independence not once, but four times – a frequency which is but the most obvious sign of the complex and often compromised struggle for Philippine national independence.'[14] This staccato series of fits and starts towards independence demonstrates not only the complicated narrative of Filipino nationalism, but also the myriad ways independence was envisioned by different actors. Using two critical American policymakers, Frank Murphy and Paul V. McNutt, as an axis to explore evolving American perceptions of Philippine independence, this thesis situates America's decolonization of the Philippines within a dynamic, transnational context. It utilises a comparative biographical approach to examine the ways American ideas of nation-building were constructed and contested by policymakers like Murphy and McNutt, and how these notions were interpreted and challenged by competing local, colonial, and international actors.

[11] Remarks by Ambassador Paul V. McNutt at the Democratic Women's Club, 2 December 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[12] Lord Killearn, Special Commissioner in Southeast Asia, Telegram No. 41 from Manila Reporting Presentation of Credentials, 5 July 1946, IO, BL, RG IOR/Q/21/11.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Alfred W. McCoy, 'The Philippines: Independence without Decolonization', in Robin Jeffrey, ed., Asia: The Winning of Independence (London, U.K.: Macmillan, 1981), p. 26.

Previous scholarship on U.S. imperial history has focused on the intellectual rationale that guided America's acquisition of the Philippines, articulating the role of culturally produced norms like race, religion, and gender in garnering intellectual capital for America's imperial enterprise.[15] In contrast, there has been a dearth of literature concerned with how intellectual and cultural convictions were used to justify America's decolonization of the islands. By examining the ways Murphy and McNutt adapted and repurposed such intellectual assumptions during the islands' decolonization, this project sheds new light on the history of American nation-building in the Philippines, focusing on the underexplored dimensions of local resistance to U.S. imperial policy and its reception amongst the outside world. In doing so, this thesis aims to unpick the contested nature of Philippine decolonization, moving away from binary analyses between metropole and colony and offering an account of independence that interacted with the wider world.[16] It utilises the islands' international significance as a forerunner for post-war Asian decolonization, and probes the tension between individual agency and impersonal structures to determine the ways American actors like Murphy and McNutt looked to influence the course of Philippine independence.

Critically, then, this thesis asks new questions of how the United States envisioned its pacific dependency in relation to the wider world, and how Murphy and McNutt's ideas of empire intersected with the major challenges to American foreign policy during this period. Positioning the United States as a nation 'among nations' has been an important scholarly attempt to avoid the oft-misinterpreted idea of an exceptionalist America.[17] As such, the history of American empire has been well grounded in the larger context of a Western imperial tradition, where the uniqueness of colonial interactions were preached as justifications for control.[18] Building on such scholarship, this thesis examines the ways U.S. imperial

[15] Paul A. Kramer, 'Race-Making and Colonial Violence in the U.S. Empire: The Philippine-American War as Race War', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 30, no. 2 (April 2006), pp. 169-210. Paul T. McCartney, 'Religion, the Spanish-American War, and the Idea of American Mission', *Journal of Church and State*, vol. 54, no. 2 (June 2012), pp. 257-278. Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (London, U.K.: Yale University Press, 1998).
[16] For a critical discussion of this historiographical insulation, see Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, & the Philippines (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), pp. 23-26.
[17] Thomas Bender, A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History (New York, N.Y.: Hill & Wang, 2007). Andrew Preston & Doug Rossinow, eds., Outside In: The Transnational Circuitry of U.S. History (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2017). Ian Tyrrell, Transnational Nation: United States History in Global Perspective since 1789 (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007). Tyrrell, 'American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History', *American Historical Review*, vol. 96, no. 4 (October 1991), pp. 1031-1055. Akira Iriye, 'The Transnational Turn', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 31, no. 3 (June 2007), pp. 373-376. Michael Adas, 'From Settler Colony to Global Hegemon: Integrating the Exceptionalist Narrative of the American Experience into World History', *American Historical Review*, vol. 106, no. 5 (December 2001), pp. 1692-1720.
[18] Paul A. Kramer, 'Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910', *Journal of American History*, vol. 88, no. 4 (March 2002), pp. 1315-1353. Julian Go, Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Go & Anne Foster, eds., The

discourses interacted with the major historical events surrounding Philippine independence. After all, the United States suffered consistent roadblocks in implementing its vision of an independent Philippines. This study's time frame (1933 to 1947) constitutes the critical bookends in the islands' separation from the United States, a period that saw some of the most seismic events of the 20th century directly challenge American attempts at decolonizing the archipelago. For instance, the onset of the Depression inspired a dramatic reassessment of American images of independence. As demonstrated in chapter one, Philippine freedom was intimately tied to American understandings of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, where the islands underwent the transition from colony to commonwealth as a product of the economic prostration and international uncertainty that surrounded it. In contrast, the onset of Cold War rivalries propelled America into the world like never before, where ideas of leadership in the global battle against communism forced another recalibration of independence. As evidenced in chapter two, attempts to sell America's "experiment" in Asian democracy sought to position American imperialism as a boon in the Cold War battle for hearts and minds. Indeed, what is most compelling about Murphy and McNutt is how their time in the islands intersected with the wider historical dramas that underscored their decision making.

At its heart, this is a study in comparative intellectual biography, asking how Murphy and McNutt's lives informed America's decolonization of the Philippines. Yet, what are the tangible benefits of studying these figures? Often, scholars look to impersonal forces to answer for historical trends. The role of culture in diplomatic history has decentred realist interpretations of diplomacy by emphasising culturally produced norms as motivating factors in formulating foreign policy.[19] Yet, these are processes forged by personal interaction, by individual actors that brought to bear their own personalities, predilections, and opinions. Recent attempts to humanise history have been enormously helpful in exploring the motivations that underscore foreign policymaking.[20] On this point, however, there is a need to explain why individual agency is so important for exploring American imperialism in the Philippines.

American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003). Joseph M. Fradera, 'Reading Imperial Transitions: Spanish Contraction, British Expansion, and American Irruption', Colonial Crucible, pp. 34-62.

[19] On the cultural turn, see James W. Cook, 'The Kids Are All Right: On the "Turning" of Cultural History', *American Historical Review*, vol. 117, no. 3 (June 2012), pp. 746-771. Choice cuts from this trend in U.S. diplomatic history include; Kramer, The Blood of Government. Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012). Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood.

[20] Theodore A. Wilson, 'Introduction: Individuals, Narratives, and Diplomatic History', in J. Garry Clifford & Theodore A. Wilson, eds., Presidents, Diplomats, and Other Mortals: Essays Honouring Robert H. Ferrell (Columbia, M.O.: University Press of Missouri, 2007).

Once deemed the backwater of intellectual enquiry, biographical studies have flooded the literature on American foreign policy.[21] Reflective of the cultural turn in diplomatic history, these new biographies have embraced cultural norms to better illuminate their subject's intellectual and emotional parameters.[22] This emerging literature has moved away from episodical accounts of the life and times of their subjects, opting to treat their lives as part of a wider understanding of a particular place or time. As a result, there is no shortage of engaging biographies for presidents like F.D.R., Harry S. Truman, or Lyndon B. Johnson.[23] Likewise, those influential actors that surrounded them; George F. Kennan, Edward Lansdale, and Henry Kissinger.[24]

Yet, what happens to the individuals who fall through the cracks; those characters that neither defined an era nor were definitive examples of it? These actors, best described as 'secondary figures,' held important offices, worked in presidential cabinets, and undertook overseas missions to support or distort the actions of presidents, policymakers, democracies, and despots.[25] Their lives intersected with the historical dramas that surrounded them, and their careers were integrative of the larger figures they worked for and against. Both Murphy and McNutt fall within this category. Neither have received sustained academic interest.[26] Yet, together and apart they offer tantalising avenues for exploring the evolution of American imperialism in the Philippines.

Murphy and McNutt were critical actors in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Prior to his appointment as Governor General in 1933, Murphy served as Mayor of Detroit, where he worked with F.D.R. to wrestle his home-state of Michigan from Republican hands during the 1932 presidential election.

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[21] David Nasaw, 'Introduction: AHR Roundtable on Historians and Biography', *American Historical Review*, vol. 114, no. 3 (June 2009), pp. 573-578.
[22] Andrew J. Rotter, 'Foreign Relations Biography and the Cultural Turn', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 32, no. 5 (November 2008), pp. 773-778.
[23] Frank Costigliola, Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013). Elizabeth E. Spalding, The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism (Lexington, K.Y.: University Press of Kentucky, 2006). Randall Woods, L.B.J.: Architect of American Ambition (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2006).
[24] John L. Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011). Jonathan Nashel, Edward Lansdale's Cold War (Boston, M.A.: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005). Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2007).
[25] Dean J. Kotlowski, 'You're Writing about Whom?: Studying Political and Policy History through the Lives of Secondary Figures', *Tidsskrift for Historie*, vol. 8 (2014), pp. 79-96.
[26] Of the two, only McNutt has received recent scholarly attention, thanks entirely to the work of Dean J. Kotlowski. See Kotlowski, Paul V. McNutt and the Age of F.D.R (Bloomington, I.N.: Indiana University Press, 2015). Murphy has enjoyed a fastidious account of his life and times, due to the work of labour historian Sidney Fine. See Fine's three-volume biography, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years (Ann Arbor, M.I.: University of Michigan Press, 1975), Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years (London, U.K.: University of Chicago Press, 1979), and Frank Murphy: The Washington Years (Ann Arbor, M.I.: University of Michigan Press, 1984).

McNutt was a crucial conduit for both Roosevelt and Truman. Having served as governor for his home-state of Indiana, McNutt was chosen by F.D.R to replace Murphy as American High Commissioner to the Philippines, a new position created as the highest American authority in the Commonwealth. After World War II, he was drafted by Truman to return to the islands, serving as first ambassador to the new republic.

Murphy and McNutt's relationships with these administrations made them critical figures within the American political scene. Both were considered as potential leaders of the Democratic Party, as well as being touted for the presidency.[27] Their impact was felt locally, nationally, and across the Pacific, where they acted with significant authority to direct American policy. Murphy utilised his successes as a Depression-era mayor, gaining national attention lobbying for federal relief in urban centres. His interpretation of the New Deal held particular relevance to his time in the islands, where he tempered ideas of social reform against the darkening economic situation and international uncertainty that accompanied it. McNutt, too, drew inspiration from his experiences. He forged a political career through the American Legion (AL), eventually serving as national commander from 1928 to 1929. This experience encouraged a sense of internationalism in McNutt's thinking that emphasised American leadership within the theatre of nations. His time as High Commissioner only reinforced this outlook during the Cold War, as he projected Philippine freedom as an example of America's magnanimity towards postcolonial states against a backdrop of increasing ideological rivalry and global denunciations of empire.

The decision to rest this study on a comparative biographical approach stems from the transitory nature of the two character's importance to Philippine independence, and the ways they offer competing yet coalescing ideas for how America approached empire in the islands. Comparative biographies have offered excellent avenues for understanding the peculiarities of particular periods of time, asking how their subjects interacted to inform or interrupt a historical moment.[28] Building on such scholarship, this project positions Murphy and McNutt's time in the Philippines within a comparative context, asking not only who they were as individuals, but how their approaches exemplified the variant directions of U.S. independence

[27] Anon, 'Vice President Polls 50% of Party Vote', *Washington Post*, 21 May 1939, p. 1.
[28] Douglas B. Craig, Progressives at War: William G. McAdoo and Newton D. Baker, 1863-1941 (Baltimore, M.D.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). Lois W. Banner, Intertwined Lives: Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and their Circle (New York, N.Y.: Alfred Knopf, 2003). Ron Robin, The Cold War They Made: The Strategic Legacy of Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2016).

policy. For Murphy, the severity of the Depression and the international uncertainty that surrounded it eventually overshadowed his agenda, couched as it was by the sense of hubris that coloured his decision making. McNutt also held his work in high esteem. Yet, his ideas of selling American colonialism to the wider world were ultimately absorbed into a broader policy framework, advanced in later years under the auspices of public diplomacy. The question as to how and why these figures adopted the policies they did, and the ways their legacies informed and interrupted American empire, occupies a critical space in this thesis. Holding Murphy and McNutt in comparison opens avenues for exploring the divergent ways America decolonized the Philippines, and asks how these policymakers' ideas aligned with America's imperial legacy in the islands.



Fig. 2: McNutt (left) and Murphy (right). BHL.

The story of America's decolonization of the Philippines can benefit from a biographical approach. Yet, there is still something to be said for the extent to which an analysis of Murphy and McNutt amounts to more than the sum of their parts. The real allure of biography is putting such characters on 'big hooks,' assimilating their lives and careers into larger historical themes.[29] In this respect, Murphy and McNutt's time in the Philippines poses theoretical questions surrounding decolonization, imperialism, and transnationalism. Yet, it is not enough to position them within such theoretical methodologies. In order to understand America's decolonization of the Philippines, it is important to delineate the varying interpretations of decolonization, and arrive at a definition that will place the case studies within a wider intellectual framework. Secondly, the idea of imperialism must be defined if a succinct understanding is to be offered of how Murphy and McNutt projected imperial ideas in the Philippines. Finally, this thesis uses the concept of transnationalism as an important methodological framework. Yet, what does transnationalism mean in this context; how does it relate to imperialism as an analytic for studying empire? Together, these themes provide a framework for exploring this thesis. Before embarking on analysis, it is important to articulate their interconnectivity as a means for exploring American empire.

Decolonization does not remain a constant in terms of how we understand its processes. Indeed, as Prasenjit Duara argues, 'there are remarkably few historical studies of decolonization as a whole,' which 'is not entirely surprising because it is neither a coherent event… nor a well-defined phenomenon.'[30] A basic definition is a 'process whereby colonial powers transferred institutional and legal control over their territories and dependencies to indigenously based, formally sovereign, nation-states.'[31] Still, this understanding hinges on the formal process of transferring sovereignty. Yet, as in the case of America's decolonization of the Philippines, achieving sovereignty rarely heralded the end of metropolitan influence. Sometimes, new leaders like the Philippines' Manuel Roxas struggled to assert themselves on the international stage, falling back on imperial relationships to bolster legitimacy as a functioning state.[32] Others, such as Burma's U Nu, looked to forge a path free from the hand of metropolitan actors.[33]

[29] Kotlowski, 'You're Writing about Whom?', p. 87.
[30] Prasenjit Duara, 'Introduction: The Decolonization of Asia and Africa in the Twentieth Century', in Prasenjit Duara, ed., Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2004), p. 1.
[31] Ibid., p. 2.
[32] Radio Interview between Roxas & Richard Harkness for NBC, 16 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Joint Statement of McNutt and Roxas, 22 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[33] Michael Charney, 'U Nu, China and the Burmese "Cold War": Propaganda in Burma in the 1950s', in Yangwen Zheng, Hong Liu & Michael Szonyi, eds., The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2010), pp. 41-58.

However, this approach had its own shortcomings, as postcolonial elites faced the prospect of providing for their populations without the assistance of imperial powers. In this sense, decolonization manifested as a process of transformation - simultaneously concerned with economics, politics, security, society, and culture - that determined national identities against competing ideas of societal ordering.

What emerges, then, is a feeling that decolonization cannot be confined to formal constructions of transferring sovereignty. As with America in the Philippines, imperial powers had no intention of allowing their influence to subside. Instead, they looked to new methods of domination compatible with interactions between nominally independent states. In the case of Britain's Commonwealth of Nations, this meant relinquishing formal control for a stake in more pertinent places of postcolonial society, such as the national economy or defence.[34] Yet, the intersections between metropole and colony were often further distorted, as new nations adopted metropolitan ideas on a socio-cultural level. The incorporation of the nation-state as a vehicle for imperial expansion has received deserved scholarly attention for its relevance to American empire.[35] Yet, the need for a concerted definition of imperialism remains crucial. After all, if imperialism is essentially the process of territorial expansion, then can the nation-state be considered a facet of imperial policy? On this point, the work of Paul Kramer holds particular relevance to this thesis.

Kramer's work on U.S. imperial history helps illuminate the interactions between empire and decolonization. As suggested in the pathfinding *Power and Connection*, 'the imperial refers to a dimension of power in which asymmetries in the scale of political action, regimes of spatial ordering, and modes of exceptionalizing difference enable and produce relations of hierarchy, discipline, dispossession, extraction, and exploitation.'[36] Within this definition, the contours of decolonization and imperialism overlap around hierarchies of power; the ways nations like America looked to decolonization as a process of expansion rather than contraction. For the Philippines, this process manifested as protracted periods of negotiation,

[34] William R. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization (London, U.K.: I.B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 451-588. Yusuf Bangura, Britain and Commonwealth Africa: The Politics of Economic Relations, 1951-75 (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1975). Rob Johnson, British Imperialism (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003), pp. 200-203.

[35] Antoinette M. Burton, ed., After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and Through the Nation (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003). Linda Basch, Nina G. Schiller & Christina S. Blanc, eds., Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 1994). Jeremy Adelman & Stephen Aron, 'From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History', *American Historical Review*, vol. 104, no. 3 (June 1999), pp. 814-841.

[36] Paul A. Kramer, 'Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World', *American Historical Review*, vol. 116, no. 5 (December 2011), p. 1349.

where American actors like Murphy and McNutt utilised the imperial hierarchies afforded to them in order to enforce their visions of an independent Philippine society. The problem was such ideas were rarely passively received. Indeed, the most striking by-product of decolonization was the way such processes enmeshed the societies that imperialism brought tougher. In this sense, ideas of independence were rarely one-way streets. On the contrary, images of nationhood were envisioned by numerous actors; elite and popular, colonial and metropolitan, national and non-national. Here, the analytic of transnationalism has been helpful in unpicking the binaries of a nation-state perspective. At this point, however, a more succinct explanation of transnationalism is needed, if only to illuminate its relevance to this thesis.

Emerging in the 1990s as a product of the enhanced awareness of globalisation, transnationalism has been defined and redefined by scholars eager to address America's place in the world.[37] On a functional level, transnationalism is best described by Akira Iriye as 'the study of movements and forces that have cut across national boundaries.'[38] Yet, this definition is quickly problematic given the looseness of its parameters.[39] Indeed, debates over transnationalism have opened up methodological quandaries around space, scale, and saliency.[40] For some, such as Michael McGerr, transnationalism represents a historiographical detour, where the bonds of historical interaction are minimised and simplified to allow unhelpful comparisons to be produced.[41] For others, such as Paul Kramer, Doug Rossinow, or Andrew Preston, transnationalism represents a pertinent scholarly tool for exploring the historical circuitry of goods, people, ideas, and practices.[42]

Critically, Patricia Clavin argues transnationalism is 'first and foremost about people: the social spaces they inhabit and the ideas they exchange.'[43] Connecting with the biographical approach, this thesis utilises transnationalism not as a historical container, but as a methodological tool. The vignettes in this study concern themselves as much with how Murphy and McNutt's ideas were received as with how they were achieved. Imperial powers like Britain, Japan, and the Soviet Union looked at the Philippines with

[37] Patricia Clavin, 'Defining Transnationalism', *Contemporary European History*, vol. 14, no. 4 (November 2005), pp. 1441-1464.
[38] Akira Iriye, 'Transnational History', *Contemporary European History*, vol. 13, no. 2 (May 2004), p. 213.
[39] Michael McGerr, 'The Price of the "New Transnational History"', *American Historical Review*, vol. 96, no. 4 (October 1991), pp. 1056-1067.
[40] For a thorough study of the field, see Pierre Yves Saunier, Transnational History (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013).
[41] McGerr, 'The Price of the "New Transnational History"', pp. 1056-1067.
[42] Kramer, The Blood of Government, pp. 7-18. Kramer, 'Power and Connection', pp. 1348-1391. Andrew Preston & Doug Rossinow, 'Introduction: America within the World', Outside In, pp. 1-18.
[43] Clavin, 'Defining Transnationalism', p. 3.

their own agenda, and reflected on American actions as cause for congratulation and concern.[44] Other postcolonial elites interpreted the islands' decolonization as bellwether for U.S. policy.[45] Murphy and McNutt, too, moved beyond the archipelago to evidence the successes of America's imperial enterprise, and observed other powers as indicators for the path of independence.[46] This study adds to the literature on transnational and U.S.-Philippine history by emphasising the contested nature of decolonization as an imperial discourse, imagined simultaneously on local, colonial, and global levels. In doing so, it utilises transnationalism to probe the tension between individual agency and official structure. It connects biographical and imperial histories by exploring the circuitry of imperial ideas between metropole and colony, and analyses the ways Murphy and McNutt's ideas intersected with local, colonial, and global voices to enhance or interrupt independence.

Another strand to this study's transnational analytic concerns the disparities in Filipino responses to American policy from elite and popular perspectives. Here, the distinction is made between transnational and international analyses. Where international histories revolve around the container of a nation-state, transnationalism looks to forces that move beyond or below the terrain of inter-state relations.[47] As Giles Scott-Smith has noted, by decentring the state as the 'prime adjudicator of diplomatic legitimacy,' transnational histories repudiate the traditional notion of diplomacy as the preserve of elite politics.[48] Filipinos understood their relationship with colonialism in diverse and contested ways. For those elites enticed by the allure of American nation-building, the challenge was how to accept and adapt the path to independence presented by the American colonial regime.[49] For those outside this social bracket, visions

[44] Lord Killearn, Special Commissioner in Southeast Asia, Telegram No. 41 from Manila Reporting Presentation of Credentials, 5 July 1946, IO, BL, RG IOR/Q/21/11. Ikehata Setsuho & Lydia N. Yu-Jose, eds., Philippines-Japan Relations (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003). Telegram from Dean Acheson to McNutt Relaying Soviet Communique on Suppression of the Huks, 9 April 1947, Box 8, MARP.
[45] Memorandum from Burma Office to Foreign Office on Statement by U Saw on Philippine Independence, 5 July 1946, IO, BL, RG IOR/M/4/2459.
[46] Quoted in Anon, 'Murphy Urges High Spiritual and Moral Issues in Special Session', *Manila Bulletin*, 1 May 1934, p. 7. Radio Address by High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt before GI Forum, 20 January 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[47] For debates over differentiations between transnational, global, and international history, see Akira Iriye, Global and Transnational History (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013).
[48] Giles Scott-Smith, 'Introduction: Private Diplomacy, Making the Citizen Visible', *New Global Studies*, vol. 8, no. 1 (2014), pp. 1-7.
[49] Michael Cullinane, Illustrado Politics: Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908 (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003). Statement of Sergio Osmeña, Acting President of the Senate of the Philippine Islands, House of Representatives Committee on Insular Affairs, 3 February 1932, Box 93, FMP. Public Domain Footage, President Roxas Philippines meets Truman and gives speech thanking America Newsreel, 6 May 2012 [video], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4oOE3iYn1RU&list=PLmaMb1AQ91bIz8p_f5Y-jiKh15WpUi7x9&index=41 (accessed 23 November 2015).

of statehood developed around alternative images of independence divorced from Western and elite Filipino assumptions of what constituted an effective state.[50] These groups interacted to forge the path to independence, and looked beyond the islands' borders for inspiration and support.[51]

The study adds to imperial and transnational histories by repudiating the traditional assertion that imperial ideas were exported onto a blank canvas, where malleable local actors were perceived as passive observers to Western policy.[52] The ways Filipinos received, repurposed, and resisted American ideas helps illuminate the ways imperial policy was constrained by factors outside of the metropole. In paying attention to elite and popular responses to American colonialism, this thesis looks to indigenous actors as an active voice in shaping imperial policy. It utilises transnationalism to stress the fluidity of national identities in a colonial context, and connects historical understandings of decolonization and imperialism by stressing nation-building as a process imagined by both coloniser and colonised.

Like any academic endeavour, this thesis is grounded by its parameters. Despite spanning the period between 1933 and 1947, the analysis makes only fleeting references to events in between Murphy and McNutt's appointments. As a result, the text hovers briefly over the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, and omits a concerted analysis of World War II as a catalyst for independence.[53] In part, this stems from the nature of a biographical approach. The years between 1933 and 1947 represent not only the critical period in the evolution of American independence policy towards the Philippines, but also the key era in which the two statesmen operated. The problem with a biographical approach is it inevitably leads to a focus built around the trajectory of the two characters' careers, thereby downplaying the significance

[50] Reynaldo C. Ileto, Payson and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910 (Manila, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979). Motoe Terami-Wada, Sakdalistas' Struggle for Philippine Independence, 1930-1945 (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2014). Alfredo B. Saulo, Communism in the Philippines: An Introduction (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2002).

[51] Statement of Quezon for use in Japan-Philippines supplement devoted to promotion of friendly relations between the two countries, 18 June 1934, Box 82, MQP. Speech by Manuel Roxas on the Threat of Revolution in Central Luzon, 19 November 1946, Box 18, MARP. Translated article entitled 'Appealing to the Japanese People', undated, Box 19, JRHP. Statement by Mateo del Castillo & Luis Taruc sent to the President of the Philippines, Manuel Roxas, on the stand of the Hukbalahap, 17 August 1946, Box 18, MARP.

[52] Stanley Karnow's In Our Image (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1989) is the strongest example of this historiographical mishap. Karnow's analysis, as critical as it is of American colonial policy in the Philippines, suggests that Filipino nationalism was a stunted affair, subsumed by the greater might of American imperialism. For incisive critiques of Karnow's analysis, see E. San Juan, Jr., After Postcolonialism: Remapping Philippines-United States Confrontation (New York, N.Y.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 73-80. Reynaldo C. Ileto, 'Orientalism and the Study of Philippine Politics', *Philippine Political Science Journal*, vol. 22, no. 45 (2001), pp. 1-32.

[53] Reynaldo C. Ileto, 'World War II: Transient and Enduring Legacies for the Philippines', in David Koh Wee Hock, ed., Legacies of World War II in South and East Asia (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2007), pp. 74-91. Ileto, 'Wars with the U.S. and Japan, and the Politics of History in the Philippines', in Kiici Fujiwara & Yoshiko Nagano, eds., The Philippines and Japan in America's Shadow (Singapore, NUS Press, 2011), pp. 33-56.

of the period in between their tenures and the shifting historical contexts within it. Yet, the reason for examining these particular figures falls crucially on the ways their ideas were both enigmatic and emblematic of the period. Murphy and McNutt's policies towards the Philippines interacted with critical events like the Depression and the Cold War to hasten and halt independence. Examining the ways these historical developments ebbed and flowed through the colonial discourses surrounding the islands offers new and exciting ways for exploring the tension between individual agency and impersonal structures. Despite its restrictions, the biographical approach remains crucial for understanding the evolution of American independence policy towards the Philippines. As scholars look to negotiate the tension between individual agency and structural systems, this thesis offers an approach that looks to marry the two.[54]

In essence, this thesis asserts that from 1933 to 1947, the United States decolonized the Philippines against a historically divined mission to provide the islands with an Americanised vision of statehood. Working as conduits for Washington's policy, Murphy and McNutt arrived in the islands to oversee this critical period of decolonization. Whilst there, they undertook their own programmes of reform, framed within their personal experiences, that looked to answer for the perceived flaws of Filipino society. The problem was these ideas were often filtered through the interpretive lenses that surrounded them. Global events like the Depression and Cold War intimately informed America's decolonization of the Philippines, as actors like Murphy and McNutt were forced to temper their visions against the realities of an increasingly fractured world. The challenges these events presented created a narrative of Philippine nationhood firmly connected to the world around it, as Filipinos embraced, reinterpreted, and rejected these contested images of independence. By exploring the history of American nation-building in the Philippines, this project sheds light on the role of imperialism in shaping the world today. Given the contemporary climate of local resistance to Western interventions in regions such as the Middle East, this story is more pertinent than ever, offering an opportunity to illuminate the present by looking back to the past.[55]

[54] Kevan Harris & Brendan McQuade, 'Notes on the Method of World-System Biography', *Journal of World-Systems Research*, vol. 21, no. 2 (2015), pp. 276-286.
[55] Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 204-239. Elisabeth Leake, The Defiant Border: The Afghan-Pakistan Borderlands in the Era of Decolonization, 1936-1965 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 237-254. Pauline Park, 'The WWI Middle East: Western Intervention and Modern-Day Political Conflict', *Global Tides*, vol. 11, no. 3 (2017), pp. 1-9.

Chapter One

Solving the 'Philippine Problem': Frank Murphy, the Great Depression, and the Creation of the Philippine Commonwealth, 1933-1936

'Having found democracy good for herself. America believed it was good for the people of the Philippines.'[56]

Frank Murphy

On 1 May 1934, Frank Murphy took to the stage to address a crowded session of the Philippine Legislature. The special assembly had been convened in Manila to consider the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934) [TMA], a piece of legislation that promised to 'provide for the complete independence of the Philippine Islands' following a transition period of ten years under a commonwealth government.[57] During his address, Murphy appealed for calm as he touched on the factors that overshadowed the debate. Murphy declared, 'the recent and prevailing economic disturbance in the United States… has brought to the fore an apparent conflict of interest between certain economic groups… [in the U.S. and the Philippines].'[58] The Great Depression brought disquiet to the United States and much of the world. By 1934, a capitalist crisis of global proportions had begun to take shape. As Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. (then Governor General of the islands) noted in a 1932 address to the Philippine Legislature, 'never before has there been a recorded depression such as this, from which to all intents and purposes the entire civilized [sic.] world is suffering… economic factors have become intensely intricate, and isolated economic self-sufficiency among nations no longer exists.'[59]

A turn away from liberal-capitalist democracy ran parallel to the deterioration of the global market. At the time, political theorists pointed to a 'deep and natural dissatisfaction' with the political order established after World War I.[60] Across the globe, nations were fighting to keep afloat as economic hardship and political insecurity coalesced towards alternative visions of political organisation. In 1930 alone, six

[56] Message of Governor General Frank Murphy to the Philippine Legislature in Its Final Session, 14 November 1935, Roll 103, FMP.
[57] Anon, 'The Tydings-McDuffie Act', in Robert A. Smith, ed., Philippine Freedom: 1946-1958 (London, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 300.
[58] Quoted in Anon, 'Murphy Urges High Spiritual and Moral Issues', p. 7.
[59] Message of Governor General Theodore Roosevelt to the Ninth Philippine Legislature, 16 July 1932, Box 18, MQP.
[60] Michael Oakeshott, 'Introduction', in Michael Oakeshott, ed., The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1939), p. xi.

Latin American states turned towards military dictatorship. Europe, too, was witnessing a shift away from democracy, as numerous newly formed states fell to despotism after the collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. Asia was no different. The Taishō period of Japanese democracy was beginning to come under attack, particularly after the fall of the Inukai cabinet in 1932. In China, civil war between Mao Zedong's Red Army and the nationalist Kuomintang threatened the stability of the region, as both forces fought for autocratic control of a unified Chinese state. Reflected in more introspective terms, the turn towards authoritarianism was embraced by many of the era's leading thinkers. Intellectuals in both the East and West demonstrated an affinity for differing political structures. The rise of Soviet communism, Japanese militarism, and German and Italian fascism coalesced in the minds of prominent figures like Lawrence Dennis and Giovanni Gentile as signalling the death knell for liberal thought and practice. As Gentile gleefully noted in prose written for Benito Mussolini, 'all the political experiments of our day are anti-liberal.'[61]

The creation of the Philippine Commonwealth was inexorably linked to such fears. Connected to his assessment of the Depression, Murphy touted a fear of foreign domination and local radicalism in the Philippines that was reflected in references to peoples turning their backs on 'principles of democracy and self-government' in favour of despotism and military conquest.[62] During this period, outside threats from nations such as Japan loomed large in the American mindset as the Philippines saw the establishment of numerous radical organisations intent on overturning the established political order in the islands.[63] In 1930, the Philippine Communist Party [PKP] (discussed in chapter two) formed with the express intention of implementing a communist government in the archipelago. Meanwhile, Pan-Asian organisations aimed at upending American influence in the islands began to come to fruition, the most notable being the Sakdalista Party (discussed in part three of this chapter) in 1933.

Using Murphy as an axis to explore the global ramifications of the New Deal, this chapter examines the creation of the Philippine Commonwealth against an international atmosphere of economic catastrophe

[61] Benito Mussolini, Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions (New York, N.Y.: Howard Fetig, 1935), p. 10. Giovanni Gentile, 'The Philosophic Basis of Fascism', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 6, no. 2 (January 1928), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/italy/1928-01-01/philosophic-basis-fascism (accessed 5 May 2017).
[62] Quoted in Anon, 'Murphy Urges High Spiritual and Moral Issues', p. 7.
[63] Annual Philippine Constabulary Report on Peace Conditions, 1930, Box 25, JRHP.

and political insecurity. Situated within a growing literature that positions the New Deal in a dynamic, global context, it offers a transnational account of the Philippine Commonwealth.[64] In particular, the chapter follows the innovative approach put forward by Kiran Patel, whose recent text on the global history of the New Deal provides the intellectual foundation for this chapter's thesis.[65] As such, it poses new questions of how the F.D.R. administration extended its thinking on the Depression to nations outside the United States, and how this initially domestic policy grew outwards to inform American perceptions of empire in the Philippines. After all, what is most telling about Murphy's time in the Philippines is how he left his mark on a wider historical drama: the advance of the Great Depression and its impact on the United States and the world.



Fig. 3: Portrait of Murphy. AHC.

Best known as a justice of the Supreme Court, the leitmotif of Murphy's career came after his time in the islands. In this sense, his tenure as Governor General has flown under the radar of biographers keen to address the importance of secondary figures. Murphy presents a fascinating and hitherto underexplored case study for assessing the global implications of the New Deal. Growing up in Midwestern Michigan, Murphy spent much of his early life and career in the urban confines of Detroit. A man for whom the plight of working people had long held fascination, Murphy exhibited a vein of liberal thought emblematic to the era in which advances in social welfare would dampen the appeal of radical alternatives to liberal-capitalism.[66] As a policymaker, his relationship with F.D.R. was complicated and fraught with frustration, as two ambitious and idealistic statesmen sought to temper their visions for reform against the political exigencies that framed their decision making.

[64] Kiran K. Patel, The New Deal: A Global History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016). John A. Garraty, The Great Depression: An Inquiry into the Causes, Course and Consequences of the Worldwide Depression of the Nineteen-Thirties as seen by Contemporaries and in the Light of History (San Diego, C.A.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986). Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1998). Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (London, U.K.: Liveright, 2013).
[65] Patel, The New Deal.
[66] Katznelson, Fear Itself, pp. 12-20.

Prior to his appointment, Murphy knew close to nothing about the Philippines and its relationship with the United States. Yet, by the time he resigned in 1936, Murphy had overseen one of the most pivotal periods in the American decolonization of the islands. Amid economic adversity and global insecurity, the United States initiated one of the earliest examples of a Western power relinquishing control of a Third World people. Defined within an orientalist prism, statesmen like Murphy looked to this historical moment as evidence for the universality of American ideas.[67] Indeed, the developmental promise of American empire framed the Commonwealth as a reflection of the 'large and unselfish' record of American nation-building in the Philippines.[68]

This first wave of Philippine decolonization was directly supervised by Murphy, who served as a conduit between American legislators and Filipino leaders. Yet, Murphy's own predispositions frequently collided with the creation of the Commonwealth. His idealism, buttressed by an Irish-American heritage and inherent empathy for self-determination, was tempered by a bellicosity and sense of hubris that underscored his policymaking. During his tenure, Murphy relied on his experiences as an urban New Dealer acclimatised to industrial notions of social reform. This understanding of the New Deal frequently clashed with Filipino ideas of how to achieve a functioning, modern state, as both popular and elite actors sought to embrace or reject this Americanised vision of independence.

What is it that makes Murphy's career in the Philippines worthy of such specific study? The answer lies not only in the pivotal timing of his tenure, but also in his value as a case study for examining the ways the Depression and New Deal influenced American perceptions of empire in the Philippines. The Great Depression catalysed a crisis in American plans for independence. Resting on a historical obligation to grant sovereignty to the Filipino people, the movement for Philippine freedom began to gather steam just as the world plunged into the darkest throes of the Depression. At home, isolationists and imperialists argued over how best to answer the 'Philippine problem.'[69] Many wanted rid of a troubling and distant drain on America's resources, whilst others argued the islands presented an opportunity to advance American ideas

[67] Inaugural Address of Governor General Frank Murphy, 15 June 1933, Box 92, FMP.
[68] Address of Senator Millard E. Tydings to the Philippine Constitutional Convention, 22 December 1934, Roll 99, FMP.
[69] Stimson, 'First-Hand Impressions of the Philippine Problem', p. 6.

of social development.[70] In the Philippines, political leaders feared for the future of their nation, as anxieties over Japanese militarism intersected with growing calls for Asian solidarity and America's own troubling economic position.[71] Faced with increasing local and domestic demands for Philippine sovereignty, F.D.R. and his administration inherited the party plank of independence at an incredibly inopportune time. This perfect storm forced the hand of the United States, instigating a process of decolonization that would last until after World War II. The challenges Murphy faced as a colonial administrator were integrative of the challenges F.D.R. and his administration confronted during the inter-war years. Murphy worked to combat these insecurities in the Philippines, often leaning heavily on his experience as a New Deal Democrat. Demonstrating how domestic policy flows outwards to inform foreign policy, Murphy sought to transplant his understanding of the New Deal and apply it to Philippine society, often to the detriment of the islands' development.[72]

Beginning with an account of U.S.-Philippine relations prior to Murphy's tenure, part one explores the role of the Depression in advancing calls for Philippine independence. It analyses Murphy's appointment in relation to F.D.R.'s thinking on the Philippines, and asks how his appointment intersected with a global vision of the New Deal. Part two addresses Murphy's tenure as Governor General in the context of the Depression and New Deal; demonstrating how Murphy responded to these events, how they influenced his opinions of Philippine sovereignty, and how Filipino actors reacted to his programme of reform. Finally, part three analyses the competing ways Filipinos responded to Murphy's actions, examining the gap between elite Filipino understandings of American empire and popular resistance to Murphy's miniature New Deal. In doing so, this chapter contextualises Murphy's tenure through the interpretative prism of the Depression and New Deal, analysing how this period in modern American history grew outwards to effect American perceptions of imperialism in the Philippines.

[70] Hearings before the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs in the United States Senate, 15 January 1930, Box 383, MQP. Minority Report submitted by Mr. Bingham from a minority of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, 29 May 1930, Box 383, MQP.
[71] Ibid. An Address entitled 'Economic Nationalism' delivered by Hon. Guillermo Gomez, Under-Secretary of Finance, at the Convocation Exercises of the Jose Rizal College, 23 March 1934, Box 81, FMP. A speech entitled 'The Problems of Philippine Independence' by Hon. Pedro Guevara, Resident Commissioner from the Philippines, in the U.S. House of Representatives, 4 January 1934, Box 46, MQP.
[72] Joseph A. Fry, 'Place Matters: Domestic Regionalism and the Formation of American Foreign Policy', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 36, no. 3 (June 2012), pp. 451-482.

Part One

Before turning to an analysis of Murphy's Philippine New Deal, it is important to understand the atmosphere that facilitated the opening of the independence debate. Murphy's tenure coincided with a dramatic paradigm shift in American understandings of the Philippines. The Depression forced many Americans to look inwards, and issues of empire seemed peripheral to those struggling to answer the burning economic anxieties of the day.[73] Yet, domestic concerns surrounding trade, employment, and immigration often coalesced to inform American understandings of independence.[74] These anxieties had a tendency to flow outwards, affecting the relationship between metropole and colony by drawing the debate over Philippine sovereignty towards American concerns of economic security.[75] For Filipino leaders, this economic anxiety detracted from envisioning independence as a moral issue.[76] In order to navigate the complexities of the debate, both Filipinos and Americans were forced to address the impact of the Depression on advancing the case for independence.

Since the United States' annexation of the Philippines in 1898, every administration, whether Republican or Democrat, had adopted the platform of eventual independence. As President Herbert Hoover famously noted, 'independence for the Philippines at some time has been directly or indirectly promised by every President… the problem is one of time.'[77] Under the Jones Act (1916) [JA], the Wilson government cemented the Democratic position on independence by promising sovereignty 'as soon as a stable government can be established therein.'[78] Going further than any previous legislation, the act declared 'it has always been the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands.'[79] This policy was the first guarantee of freedom from the American state, and mimicked the approach of other Western powers after World War I. The British in India, for example, used a similar tactic of coupling devolved government with promises of independence to dampen the demands for

[73] Statement of Ralph Horr, Representative in Congress from the State of Washington, House of Representatives Committee on Insular Affairs, 5 February 1932, Box 93, FMP. Statement of Edward Bruce on Behalf of the Chambers of Commerce of San Francisco, C.A., Portland, O.R., and Tacoma, W.A., 30 January 1932, Box 93, FMP.
[74] Ibid. Statement by Patrick J. Hurley, Secretary of War, to Hon. Hiram Bingham, Chairman of the Committee on Territories on and Insular Affairs, 15 May 1930, Box 19, JRHP. Statement of Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State, before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, 22 May 1930, Box 383, MQP.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Speech of President Quezon before the Commission of Independence, 17 December 1932, Box 41, MQP. Speech of Manuel Quezon before the Philippine Legislature, undated, Box 25, MQP.
[77] Quoted in Manuel Roxas, Philippine House Speaker, on Columbia Institute of Public Affairs, 6 January 1933, Box 19, JRHP.
[78] Anon, 'The Jones Act', Philippine Freedom, p. 283.
[79] Ibid.

freedom that were emanating from its colonies after the war.[80] The problem was such promises were often devoid of any tangible timeline, keeping the idea in flux for many dependent peoples during the period.

Whilst the years following the JA garnered greater autonomy for the Philippine Legislature, little progress was made in turning independence into a reality. In the 1920s, a decade of Republican rule staggered the progress of independence. Throughout this period, successive independence missions were sent to the U.S. Congress to formulate a specific date for the archipelago's independence.[81] Yet, each plea fell on deaf ears in the United States. In a reply to one independence mission, President Calvin Coolidge argued, 'although they have made wonderful advances in the last quarter century, the Filipino people are by no means equipped, either in wealth or experience, to undertake the heavy burden which would be imposed upon them with political independence.'[82]

Coolidge's statement, couched as it was in rhetorical understandings of Philippine development, obscured a more self-interested rationale for retaining the islands, one that illustrated the attitudes of the Republican Party and, indeed, many Americans during this period. Buoyed by the economic opulence of the era, consecutive Republican administrations were reticent to address independence for fear of damaging American access to Philippine markets.[83] Despite the global slump in agricultural commerce that began following World War I, the Philippines continued to enjoy duty-free exports of agricultural products such as sugar, copra, hemp, and tobacco into the United States.[84] This reciprocal free trade proved fruitful for Filipino producers and American investors alike. Fearful of losing access to this market, Filipino and American businessmen set to convincing Congress of the economic benefits of retaining the archipelago.[85]

The outbreak of the Depression catalysed a change in stance amongst Americans interested in the 'Philippine problem.'[86] Reacting to the slump in agrarian markets, agricultural lobbyists in the United States

[80] Anon, 'Government of India Act', 1919, https://archive.org/stream/govtofindiaact19029669mbp/govtofindiaact19029669mbp_djvu.txt (accessed 5 May 2017).
[81] Frank H. Golay, Face of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946 (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2010), pp. 201-302.
[82] Coolidge's Reply to the Philippine Independence Mission, 21 February 1924, Box 19, JRHP.
[83] Ibid. President Harding's Reply to the Philippine Independence Mission, 5 July 1922, Box 35, MQP. Speech by Manuel Roxas, Philippine House Speaker, on Columbia Institute of Public Affairs, 6 January 1933, Box 19, JRHP.
[84] Philippine Local Autonomy, Committee on Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, 30 April 1924, Box 93, FMP.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.

began to press for independence as a way of reducing competition from duty-free Philippine products.[87] Meanwhile, organised labour (particularly on the West Coast, where Filipino immigration had become a point of contention) urged independence along equally self-interested lines. Arguing cheap Filipino labour was undercutting the working American's ability to find employment, unions such as the American Federation of Labor [sic.] rallied supporters in Congress to push for independence to restrict Asian immigration to the continental U.S.[88]

It was within this atmosphere that the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act (HHCA) [1933] was introduced. Sponsored by Missourian senator Harry B. Hawes, the act was written as a direct response to the domestic pressures surrounding independence. Allowing the Philippines 'to adopt a constitution and form a government' under a transitory commonwealth, the act satisfied many of the grievances aired by the American farm and labour lobbies.[89] However, despite its suitability for American interests, reaction to the HHCA was mixed across the Pacific. Having passed the U.S. Congress despite a presidential veto that highlighted the islands' unpreparedness both economically and politically, the act was sent to the Philippine Legislature for ratification. The principal Filipino authors of the bill, Sergio Osmeña and Manuel Roxas (then acting Philippine Senate president and House speaker respectively), emphasised the 'noble purpose' of American actions in attempting to secure the bill's passage.[90] However, Manuel Quezon (then head of the dominant Nacionalista Party and the leading figure in Philippine politics) argued fervently for rejection. In urging the bill's dismissal, Quezon played on the depression-era interests associated with the act.[91] Attacking his rivals for forsaking the 'categorical instructions' of 'independence or nothing,' Quezon belittled those who allowed 'selfish interests' to dictate the course of Filipino freedom.[92] Quezon's opposition produced furore in the United States, with many viewing it as a sign of disingenuity amongst Filipino calls for independence.[93]

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[87] Shirley Jenkins, 'The Independence Lobby', in Daniel B. Schirmer & Stephen R. Shalom, ed., The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance (Boston, M.A.: South End Press, 1987), pp. 55-58.
[88] Statement of Ralph Horr, Representative in Congress from the State of Washington, House of Representatives Committee on Insular Affairs, 5 February 1932, Box 93, FMP.
[89] Ninth Philippine Legislature, Third Session, Concurrent Resolution No. 46, 17 July 1933, Roll 98, FMP.
[90] Statement of Sergio Osmeña, Acting President of the Senate of the Philippine Islands, House of Representatives Committee on Insular Affairs, 3 February 1932, Box 93, FMP.
[91] Speech of Manuel Quezon in U.S. Congress on Philippine Independence, 1931, Box 5, MQP.
[92] Speech of President Quezon before the Commission of Independence, 17 December 1932, Box 41, MQP. Speech of Manuel Quezon before the Philippine Legislature, undated, Box 25, MQP.
[93] Speech of Manuel Quezon Regarding the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, 11 March 1933, Box 41, MQP.

This was the mood that greeted Murphy on his arrival in Manila on 15 June 1933. The debate over the HHCA was raging, and the U.S. Congress threatened to close the issue if nothing was achieved in Manila. In appointing Murphy to handle the transition from colony to commonwealth, Roosevelt cited the Michigan man's service in support of his presidential campaign, and his astute handling of the Detroit mayorship as evidence of his executive abilities.[94] Yet, Roosevelt's appointment was more than just political patronage. Indeed, Murphy's nomination rested on several pertinent issues, both real and imagined. What possessed F.D.R. to appoint Murphy as Governor General? Why did an urban New Dealer with such a lack of experience in colonial affairs inherit one of the most critical positions in the American imperial regime at a time of such importance for the Philippines? The answers to these questions are crucial for understanding Murphy's motivations as a colonial administrator, as well as the ways Murphy's appointment exemplified Roosevelt's approach to Philippine independence and the global New Deal.

Murphy was by no means an obvious choice for a colonial proconsul. Charming and oratorical, the bushy-haired Irish-American began his career in law, where he worked as a jurist in Detroit's Recorder's Court. His reputation as a reformer was cemented through markedly progressive attitudes on race and labour. As a young jurist, he presided over the murder trials of Dr. Ossian Sweet, earning national credibility and strong support within Detroit's growing black community.[95] Cutting his teeth as mayor of Detroit during the darkest days of the Depression, Murphy was a politician focused almost exclusively on urban issues. At the time, Detroit was a microcosm for how industrialised cities could suffer under an economic downturn.[96] When Murphy took office in 1930, over 100,000 workers were unemployed in the city.[97] Underneath this economic adversity were deeply entrenched socio-political and racial tensions.[98]

During his time as mayor, Murphy developed and implemented an intellectual philosophy heavily predicated on New Deal notions of economic security and governmental intervention in social welfare. As

[94] Anon, 'Murphy Given Manila Plum', *Los Angeles Times*, 8 April 1933, p. 2.
[95] Sweet was a black physician who, after purchasing a home in a white neighbourhood, defended it from a white mob with the help of several friends.
[96] Scott Martelle, Detroit: A Biography (Chicago, I.L.: Chicago Review Press, 2012). Heather A. Thompson, Whose Detroit?: Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern American City (London, U.K.: Cornell University Press, 2001). Nicholas Pizzolato, Challenging Global Capitalism: Labor Migration, Radical Struggle, and Urban Change in Detroit and Turin (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013).
[97] Roger Daniels, 'Murphy, Frank', in John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes, eds., American National Biography, Volume 16 (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 129.
[98] During the Great Migration, African Americans flocked to Detroit, increasing the city's diversity exponentially. Meanwhile, native-born Americans came to the burgeoning industrial hub in droves. Martelle, Detroit, p. 85.

a founding member (and first president) of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, Murphy became the nation's leading spokesperson for federal relief in urban centres.[99] Espousing an anthropological interest in the ways government could improve the lot of ordinary citizens, Murphy was infatuated with the plight of what he deemed 'the submerged majority.'[100] His public relief policies leant heavily on this philosophy. As mayor, Murphy initiated a concerted campaign for federal relief. Previously, local government agencies and private organisations shouldered the burden of providing for the desperate and destitute of the city.[101] Under Murphy, however, arguments that looked to expand the mechanisms of government into the cities took precedent, eventually leading to the Municipal Debt Adjustment Act (1934) being passed by Congress on the basis of Murphy's lobbying.[102] Lost in the flurry of Roosevelt's early New Deal policies, Murphy achieved other notable successes in reducing unemployment. The Wage-Work Plan provided family bread-winners with the opportunity to earn the equivalent of their welfare allowances through labour initiatives and white-collar work.[103] Such interventions made Murphy one of the first New Deal Democrats to come to national prominence, being marked by one commentator as a 'New Dealer before the New Deal.'[104]

On the surface, Murphy's appointment centered on pragmatic reasons. An intensely ambitious man, Frank viewed his mayorship as a stepping stone to higher office.[105] His shrewd handling of the crisis in Detroit made him a popular figure both locally and nationally.[106] Roosevelt's opinions of Murphy wavered between ambivalence, admiration, and suspicion. Recognising his popularity as a Democrat in a staunchly Republican state, Roosevelt was keen to solicit Murphy's support if he was to wrestle Michigan from Republican hands.[107] Yet, Murphy's ambition worried Roosevelt.[108] Although of nominal importance when considered against the overwhelming domestic impetus of Roosevelt's presidency, the Governor Generalship was nevertheless considered a pivotal position within the presidential cabinet. Previous holders found it to be a springboard for higher office, as it offered an opportunity to expand one's credentials in

[99] Daniels, 'Murphy, Frank', American National Biography, Volume 16, p. 129.
[100] Quoted in ibid., p.128.
[101] Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years, p. 340.
[102] Woodford Howard, Mr. Justice Murphy: A Political Biography (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 53.
[103] Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years, pp. 334-335.
[104] Quoted in Richard T. Ortquist, 'The Perils of Victory: Michigan Democrats in the Wake of 1932', *Michigan Historical Review*, vol. 17, no. 2 (autumn 1991), p. 27.
[105] Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, p. 2.
[106] Ortquist, 'The Perils of Victory', p. 28.
[107] Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, pp. 207-219.
[108] Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years, p. 451.

foreign affairs whilst also exhibiting executive experience.[109] The sense of importance surrounding the position concerned Roosevelt. In one respect, he wanted Murphy out of the way, and an eight-thousand-mile trip to Manila certainly offered such an opportunity. Yet, F.D.R. was also keen to ensure Murphy did not excel in a post that would increase his popularity.[110] In the end, Roosevelt opted to send Murphy to Manila precisely because of the economic chaos caused by the Depression.[111] Given his successes in alleviating the economic burdens of Detroit, sending Murphy out of his comfort zone would ideally stunt any popular support from spiralling into a concerted challenge to the presidency. In this respect, Murphy's appointment appeared to be a shrewd piece of political manoeuvring. In one fell swoop, F.D.R. was able to remunerate an ally for his work in the election whilst simultaneously ridding himself of a potential rival.

More than his practical reasoning, F.D.R.'s appointment of Murphy was indicative of his approach towards the Philippines during the early years of the Depression. Traditionally when historians look at F.D.R.'s presidency, they see a man whose sense of internationalism framed his decision making.[112] After all, Roosevelt's experience of the world predisposed him to viewing the U.S. position as one of global significance.[113] During this period, interventions in Latin America under the auspices of the Good Neighbor [sic.] policy cemented F.D.R's reputation as an outwardly looking president desperate to be active in the world.[114] Yet, whilst interventions in Latin America proved feasible for his administration, in part because it harkened the Monrovian spirit of backdoor diplomacy, interventions outside of the Americas proved considerably harder to level in Congress and amongst the public. During the early years of the Depression, F.D.R.'s attention was invariably forced closer to home. As such, the Philippines rarely held the attention

[109] William Howard Taft went from the Philippines to the presidency after serving as the first American Governor General of the islands. Henry Stimson served as Governor General during the 1920s, going on to serve as Secretary of State under President Hoover.
[110] Hayden to Fugate, 8 April 1933, Roll Mf609, JRHP.
[111] Hester to Hayden, 17 November 1934, Box 11, JRHP.
[112] David F. Schmitz, Franklin D. Roosevelt and a World in Crisis, 1933-1941 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac, 2007). David K. Adams, 'The Concept of Parallel Action: F.D.R.'s Internationalism in a Decade of Isolationism', in Daniela Rossini, ed., From Theodore Roosevelt to F.D.R.: Internationalism and Isolationism in American Foreign Policy (Staffordshire, U.K.: Keele University Press, 1995), pp. 113-130. David Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the Second World War (Chicago, I.L.: Ivan R. Dee Publishers, 2001).
[113] Graham Cross, The Diplomatic Education of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1882-1933 (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012). Franklin D. Roosevelt, 'Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 6, no. 4 (July 1928), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1928-07-01/our-foreign-policy-0 (accessed 01 May 2017).
[114] Patel, The New Deal, pp. 145-160. Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 15-40. Lloyd Gardener, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison, W.I.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 47-63. Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York, N.Y.: Owl Books, 2007), pp. 33-39.

of the president during the darkest days of the Depression.[115] Although F.D.R. backed the longstanding Democratic commitment to independence, as an issue it held very little weight with the majority of Americans, whose principal interests centred on their own economic hardships.[116] As a result, Roosevelt was happy to see the issue at least partly devolved to other authorities.[117] Thus, it was Congress, the War Department, and most importantly, the Governor General that would take the reins of Philippine freedom during this period.

Due to F.D.R.'s preoccupation with the Depression, Murphy's appointment rested more on what he *would not* do in the islands rather than what he would do. Being the first Democratic government to administer the Philippines since the Wilson administration, Roosevelt was keen to appoint a governor sympathetic to Filipino aspirations.[118] His endorsement of independence demanded an appointment that aligned with his administration's position, whilst also avoiding the Depression-era stresses on immigration, trade, and employment that were shaping the debate. Already a champion of progressive causes, Murphy concurred with the president's position, suggesting it was the duty of the United States to confirm 'the noble and unselfish purposes of the American people.'[119] In contrast to his contemporaries, who viewed independence as either a certain disaster or a boon to U.S. interests, Murphy offered a distinct middle-ground between idealism and practicality that was testament to his own character.[120]

In accepting the position, Murphy voiced his admiration for F.D.R., and the Democratic Party's work in furthering the cause of Philippine freedom.[121] Murphy also suggested his heritage made him an ideal candidate. A Roman Catholic (the dominant religion in the islands due to Spanish colonialism) of Irish ancestry, Frank was moulded by the precepts of his family's history. According to stories passed down from generation to generation, the Murphys were a radical clan. His father had been involved in a failed Fenian uprising in 1866, for which he was briefly jailed.[122] Frank himself did little to dispel the legend that his great-

[115] Golay, Face of Empire, pp. 323-330.
[116] Kotlowski, Paul V. McNutt, p. 206. Anon, 'Philippine Independence', *Saturday Evening Post*, 5 September 1931, p.22. R.A. Smith, 'Philippines Weigh Price of Freedom', *New York Times*, 22 April 1934, p. 159.
[117] Golay, Face of Empire, pp. 331-345.
[118] Hayden to Parker, 14 January 1933, Box 11, JRHP.
[119] Quoted in Anon, 'Murphy Calls for Unity', *New York Times*, 1 May 1934, p. 16.
[120] Report to President Hoover by Secretary of War Hurley Bemoaning Philippine Independence, 11 January 1933, Box 19, JRHP. Address by D.R. Williams at Commonwealth Club of California urging rejection of Philippine independence, 24 July 1930, Box 20, JRHP. Hearings before the Committee on Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, First Session, January & February 1932, Box 93, FMP.
[121] Anon, 'Philippines Head Visits Here', *Los Angeles Times*, 17 May 1933, p.1.
[122] Howard, Mr. Justice Murphy, pp. 1-2.

grandfather was hung by the British for sedition.[123] Frank's life-long fascination with Irish nationalism stemmed from his upbringing. As he recalled, he had been raised 'on the history of Irish struggles for independence,' and this experience as a young man came to influence his perceptions of other struggles for self-determination.[124] Whilst serving in the Philippines, Murphy relished in telling Filipino leaders of his 'Irish extraction.'[125] He claimed his heritage was one of 'oppression,' and his views on self-government were as consistent in the Philippines as they were 'in the case of Ireland.'[126] This understanding of the Philippines fed into Murphy's personality as an intensely sentimental man. His searing ambition was couched within a need to see his actions as being inherently noble and self-sacrificing.[127] The Governor Generalship therefore appealed to Murphy, as there was little more effacing than helping a new nation come into being. He came to see his appointment as one of considerable importance, reflected in his hubristic approach towards the islands.[128] For him, the position was far from a dismissal to the political periphery, but an opportunity to advance his own ideas of government in an exciting new context.

Crucially, Murphy was not a passive observer to a wider administrative policy. The leeway Roosevelt granted to the Governor General's office facilitated Murphy's bold tenure.[129] His opinions, and the opinions of his office, were held in high esteem at the White House.[130] This bridge between the Roosevelt administration and Murphy's governorship demonstrated Roosevelt's disengagement from Philippine independence. Murphy's appointment rested more on his credentials as a New Deal Democrat than as a colonial proconsul. His power was devolved from his time as mayor, where he characteristically matched idealism with a hard-headed ability to manage contrasting factions and ideas. In this sense, he made an ideal choice for Governor General, as the post required a level of sympathy that could be mitigated with practicality.

F.D.R.'s decision to send Murphy to the Philippines offers interesting avenues for exploring the modalities of American power during the New Deal, and the ways these structures informed America's

[123] Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years, p. 1.
[124] Quoted in ibid., p. 11.
[125] Quoted in Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, p. 38.
[126] Quoted in ibid.
[127] Ibid., p.2.
[128] Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years, p. 451.
[129] Anon, 'President Praises Murphy's Regime', *New York Times*, 2 May 1935, p. 12.
[130] Ibid.

empire in the islands. Roosevelt's approach to Philippine independence reflected the ambiguity of his colonial policy, which stressed anti-colonialism only when it was pertinent to do so.[131] Ultimately, Roosevelt supported Philippine independence, despite his disengagement. However, *if* sovereignty was to be granted, the Philippines needed to exhibit the strengths of American influence rather than its weaknesses. This policy rested on similar approaches adopted by the F.D.R. administration in other overseas territories such as Puerto Rico, where the malleability of American influence provided fertile ground for testing new policy.[132] Much like Murphy, F.D.R. viewed such territories as being particularly significant to America's global image.[133] In contrast to the ruthless imperial expansion of Germany or Japan, America was offering a benevolent image of empire that worked to enhance the mechanisms of government rather than reduce them. In this sense, Murphy's tenure was emblematic of the anthropological interests that advanced American development programmes during the New Deal. The problem was these programmes often failed to attune to the localities for which they were intended. As demonstrated in the following section, Murphy's vision for the islands rested more on advancing his own ideas than recalibrating such policies to fit within a Philippine mould. Often, this disparity lead to tension between Murphy's office and local actors in the Philippines, as the archipelago hurtled towards independence in an atmosphere of global uncertainty and economic prostration.

Part Two

In his inaugural address as Governor General, Murphy focused on responses to the Depression.[134] Despite acknowledging the Philippines constituted a 'primarily agricultural' economy and thus had not suffered in the same way as 'highly industrialized [sic.]' nations, Murphy nevertheless felt it 'important for us to analyse carefully and realistically our situation and our prospects.'[135] Previous Governor Generals had acknowledged the wide ranging implications of the Depression, though little had been done to combat the

[131] Justus D. Doenecke, 'The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: An Ambiguous Legacy', in Justus D. Doenecke & Mark A. Stoler, eds., Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign Policies, 1933-1945 (New York, N.Y.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 52-58.
[132] Patel, The New Deal, pp. 160-167. Michael R. Rodriguez, A New Deal for the Tropics: Puerto Rico during the Depression Era, 1932-1935 (Princeton, N.J.: Markus Weiner Publishers, 2010), pp. 3-22.
[133] Franklin D. Roosevelt, 'Remarks in San Juan, Puerto Rico', 7 July 1934, *American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14722 (accessed 31 January 2018).
[134] Inaugural Address of Governor General Frank Murphy, 15 June 1933, Box 92, FMP.
[135] Ibid.

islands' rapidly declining revenues.[136] Murphy, however, planned to place the issue front and centre. In doing so, Murphy harkened the spirit of the New Deal as a vehicle for uplifting the Philippine economy. 'In this new enterprise,' Murphy stated, 'our great President Franklin D. Roosevelt has already led the way… we should follow this stirring and inspiring example.'[137]

Although there was little cause for the public relief policies Murphy had championed in Detroit, Frank spent much of his time as Governor General executing a sweeping programme of economic and social reform in preparation for the archipelago's independence. This miniature New Deal (often stylised as such by the press) was treated as something of an anthropological experiment by Murphy.[138] In one of the first meetings with his staff, Frank concentrated on the 'inextricably interwoven' economic conditions between America and the Philippines.[139] He proposed a programme of fiscal frugality, along with stressing the need for cultivating 'self-reliance' on the part of Filipino leaders.[140] The Depression instigated a sense among American policymakers that economic stability was the soundest way to avoid political insecurity.[141] Murphy was no different. By stressing the 'economic uncertainty in the countries of the Orient and around the world,' Murphy hoped to stimulate an 'institutional interest' in the economy of the islands.[142]

The brunt of Murphy's miniature New Deal hinged on social welfare and relief policies for the labouring classes of the archipelago. Creating the islands' first Department of Labor [sic.], Murphy instigated a vast swathe of social programmes ranging from urban slum clearance to an eight hour work day for labourers in Manila.[143] Using his veto power liberally, Murphy streamlined the Philippine Legislatures' expenditures and channelled them into his own pet projects.[144] His public health campaigns engaged with families living in congested urban centres, and public education drives were increased in an attempt to 'educate and enlighten' Filipino families to the danger of poor sanitation and epidemic disease.[145]

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[136] Message of Governor General Dwight F. Davis to Ninth Philippine Legislature, 16 July 1931, Box 93, FMP. Message of Governor General Theodore Roosevelt to Ninth Philippine Legislature, 16 July 1932, Box 18, MQP.
[137] Inaugural Address of Governor General Frank Murphy, 15 June 1933, Box 92, FMP.
[138] Vicente F. Barranco, 'T.R. and Murphy Give Labor New Deal', *Philippine Herald Year Book*, 23 September 1933, pp. 34-48.
[139] Report on Fifth Meeting of Cabinet of Governor General Frank Murphy, 24 July 1933, Roll 98, FMP.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Katznelson, Fear Itself, pp. 12-20.
[142] Ibid. Quoted in Fine, Frank Murphy: The New Deal Years, p. 67.
[143] Robert A. Smith, 'Slums of Manila to Be Cleaned Up', *New York Times*, 8 April 1934, p. 8. Smith, 'Gov. Murphy Urges Broad Social Plan', *New York Times*, 19 August 1934, p. 2. Vicente A. Pacis, 'Murphy – P.I. Benefactor', *Philippine Herald Year Book*, 1 November 1935, pp. 19-24.
[144] Anon, 'Murphy Balances Philippine Budget', *New York Times*, 9 December 1934, p. 29.
[145] Smith, 'Gov. Murphy Urges Broad Social Plan', p. 2.

For Murphy, such policies were the lynchpin of his administration. As he proudly boasted on several occasions, 'social and health services are the most progressive in the Orient.'[146]

In implementing his miniature New Deal, Murphy undercut many of the Philippines' cultural norms regarding the role of the state in alleviating social ills. Traditionally, Filipinos leant on the long-established *pariente* (translated from Spanish as "relative") system of familial responsibility to tend to the needs of the economically and socially desperate.[147] For many American observers, the perceived inertia amongst Filipinos to alleviate the conditions of the lowest strata of society represented an innate incapacity to develop an effective, modern state.[148] Emblematic of the orientalist image of the islands espoused by figures such as Murphy, this representation of Filipino social mores centred on images of regression.[149] In Murphy's view, the Philippines needed a New Deal in social welfare, fashioned on American ideas of good governance, to offset the inherently backward systems in place prior to America's arrival.[150] The reluctance amongst ordinary Filipinos to advance such reforms appeared to confirm these suspicions, albeit unfairly. Due to arriving at the eleventh hour of American colonialism, many of Murphy's ideas failed to translate into tangible policy. His attempts at clearing the slums of Manila never truly left the drawing board, as local resistance persistently stalled the process.[151] Likewise, the islands' Department of Labor [sic.] never truly fulfilled its potential. Aside from filing numerous reports on worker unrest in the archipelago, the department took little action to instigate lasting change.[152]

Nevertheless, Murphy received deserved credit for bringing issues of social responsibility into the limelight of Filipino politics. His desire to 'institute something of the freshness, optimism and directness of the Roosevelt administration' garnered praise on both sides of the Pacific.[153] Roosevelt noted something of himself in Murphy, praising the Governor for 'doing remarkable work' before the islands' independence.[154] Such praise was characteristic of Roosevelt's approach to New Deal projects in overseas territories. As in

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146 Quoted in Anon, 'Philippines' Ruler Visits City', *Los Angeles Times*, 15 February 1935, p. 1.
147 Paul A. Rodell, Culture and Customs of the Philippines (Westport, C.T.: Greenwood Press, 2002), pp. 122-132.
148 Cristina Evangelista Torres, The Americanization of Manila, 1898-1921 (Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 2010), pp. 103-135.
149 Smith, 'Slums of Manila to Be Cleared Up', p. 8. Smith, 'Gov. Murphy Urges Broad Social Plan', p. 2. Report on Fifth Meeting of Cabinet of Governor General Frank Murphy, 24 July 1933, Roll 98, FMP.
150 Ibid.
151 Smith, 'Slums of Manila to Be Cleared Up', p. 8. Annual Report of the Governor General of Philippine Islands for Calendar Year 1934, 17 February 1935, https://archive.org/details/annualreportofgo1934phil (accessed 09 May 2017).
152 Ibid.
153 Anon, 'Frank Murphy, Getting Settled in Palace, Might Be Last Governor', *Detroit Free Press*, 18 June 1933, p.4.
154 Quoted in Anon, 'President Praises Murphy's Regime', p. 12.

Puerto Rico, F.D.R. was keen to exhibit the positive changes being made by U.S. officials.[155] Situating their significance in a global context paid hindrance to the superiority of American colonial rule. Yet, much like Murphy's New Deal in the Pacific, this tropical New Deal saw little in the way of systemic change.[156] Ironically, as the Philippines experienced its own New Deal in preparation for independence, in Puerto Rico such policies were envisioned as reasons to maintain American authority.[157]

Murphy's miniature New Deal was paternalistic and pedagogical. He envisioned himself as an enlightened administrator, whose principal mission was to steer the Philippines towards a more egalitarian society.[158] His successes as Governor General exemplified a growing curiosity with the ways government could improve the lot of ordinary citizens. Yet, often these programmes fell short of achieving any tangible changes. By channelling expenditures into his own pet projects, Murphy neglected many of the more pressing, systemic issues that blighted Philippine society.[159] Rather than focusing on issues that had long been a source of contention in the islands, Murphy opted to treat his programme as an extension of his time in Detroit. As a result, little progress was made in areas that demanded the most attention. Agricultural reform, land tenancy, and rural disparity with urban workers all received a dearth of consideration in favour of Murphy's own projects.[160] These misplaced attempts at reform reflected orientalist images of the Philippines that stressed the islands' inability to develop an effective state without the guiding hand of America. For Murphy and his staff, Philippine independence was inexorably interwoven with American ideas of good governance.[161] Any attempts at instigating a social welfare programme had to be generated from a domestic source. In essence, the argument centred on the belief that what was good for America had to be good for the Philippines.

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[155] Franklin D. Roosevelt, 'Remarks in San Juan, Puerto Rico', 7 July 1934, *American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14722 (accessed 31 January 2018).
[156] Patel, The New Deal, pp. 160-167.
[157] Ibid., pp. 164-165.
[158] Report on Fifth Meeting of Cabinet of Governor General Frank Murphy, 24 July 1933, Roll 98, FMP. Inaugural Address of Governor General Frank Murphy, 15 June 1933, Box 92, FMP.
[159] Anon, 'Murphy Balances Philippine Budget', p. 29.
[160] Annual Report of the Governor General of Philippine Islands for Calendar Year 1934, 17 February 1935, https://archive.org/details/annualreportofgo1934phil (accessed 09 May 2017).
[161] Report on Fifth Meeting of Cabinet of Governor General Frank Murphy, 24 July 1933, Roll 98, FMP.

Despite his failure to concisely address the systemic issues in Filipino society, Murphy remained a popular figure within the Filipino "illustrado" class.[162] To the elite, he embodied the modern statesman; an altruistic figure, concerned with the welfare of the masses but hierarchically attuned to the sensibilities of the upper class. In particular, figures such as Quezon were quick to court the handsome young bachelor to cultivate a sense of credibility amongst peers and observers. Quezon admired Murphy's sense of social justice, often praising the young Governor for his predisposition towards helping those less fortunate than himself.[163] Many of Murphy's programmes were adopted by Quezon, albeit rhetorically, and much of his rhetoric permeated into the discourse of Filipino politicians. As Quezon himself noted, 'we are indebted to him… for his interest in awakening the public conscience to the most elemental claims of social justice.'[164]



Fig. 4: Quezon (left), Murphy (centre), and Osmeña (right) meet in Malacañang. BHL.

[162] Translated from Spanish as the "enlightened ones," the emergence of the illustrado class in Philippine society can be traced to the Spanish occupation of the islands. Educated abroad, often in Spain or other European metropoles, the children of wealthy, landowning Spanish mestizos came to form a distinct intellectual stratum in Filipino society characterised by monopolies on landowning, wealth, and political power. This intelligentsia dominated the colonial politics of the islands, eventually being adopted by American colonialists as the natural conduit between the colonial regime and Filipino masses. For analyses on the origins and development of the Filipino elite, see Dante C. Simbulan, The Modern Principalia: The Historical Evolution of the Philippine Ruling Oligarchy (Quezon City, Philippines: University of the Philippines Press, 2005). Alfred W. McCoy, ed., An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines (Madison, W.I.: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). Temario C. Rivera, 'American Impact on Elite Continuity in Post-War Japan and the Philippines', The Philippines and Japan in America's Shadow, pp. 57-75.
[163] Speech in Honour of the Governor General, 22 January 1935, Box 47, MQP.
[164] Manuel Quezon, 'Speech of His Excellency Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippines on the Role of U.S. High Commissioner in American-Philippine Relationship', in Philippine Commonwealth Office of the President, ed., Messages of the President: Volume 2, Part 1 (Manila, Philippines: Bureau of Printing, 1937), p. 29.

It was assumed by many in Manila that Murphy's programme of reform would offer meaningful and lasting change for the Philippines.[165] Yet, by the end of his tenure as Governor General, Murphy's policies were all but forgotten as the islands careered towards independence. Murphy himself certainly could not have envisioned such a rapid reversal in fortune. After all, his policies enjoyed support on both sides of the Pacific.[166] Yet, as with many ideals of American independence policy, such high-minded ideas inevitably clashed with the harsher political exigencies that facilitated them. As Murphy began implementing his reforms, the U.S. Congress reopened the case for Philippine freedom, predominantly off the back of an ever-growing labour lobby determined to see Asian immigration quashed.[167] Aside from the domestic aspect, international events also signalled a turn away from Murphy's miniature New Deal. Calls for Asiatic solidarity began to sound louder in the minds of many Asian peoples during this period.[168] Quezon himself addressed these ideas when he travelled to Japan in 1934.[169] Alarm bells were raised in Washington, and an emphasis on Philippine security quickly replaced concerns of reform, as exhibited by General Douglas MacArthur's assignment as Field Marshall of the Philippine Army in 1936.[170] This change in focus irked Murphy, who could only watch as the powers and prerogatives of his position were stripped away.[171]

Ultimately, it was legislative action that marked the end of Murphy's miniature New Deal. On 24 March 1934, the U.S. Congress passed the TMA, legislating the end of American colonialism and starting the archipelago on the path to independence. Negotiated by Quezon, the act copied almost verbatim the previous agreement reached in the HHCA. The principal difference between the two was that Quezon had negotiated it, thus allowing him to return to the Philippines as the triumphal saviour of Filipino freedom. As Roxas argued somewhat sardonically on Quezon's return from the United States, 'I shall vote for this resolution, because by the testimony of its own authors, the Independence Act is merely a re-enactment of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Law.'[172]

[165] Pacis, 'Murphy – P.I. Benefactor', pp. 19-24.
[166] Ibid. Anon, 'President Praises Murphy's Regime', p. 12.
[167] Patel, The New Deal, p. 173.
[168] Saaler & Szpilman, eds., Pan-Asianism, A Documentary History, pp. 115-160.
[169] Statement of Quezon for use in Japan-Philippines supplement devoted to promotion of friendly relations between the two countries, 18 June 1934, Box 82, MQP. Address delivered in Tokyo by Quezon, 21 April 1934, Box 46, MQP.
[170] Message of Quezon to National Assembly, 25 November 1935, Roll 103, FMP. Golay, Face of Empire, pp. 350-354.
[171] Memorandum, Murphy to Secretary of War, 23 September 1935, Roll 101, FMP.
[172] Quoted in Anon, 'Roxas Insists New Law is Simply Old Measure under Fresh Name', *Manila Bulletin*, 2 May 1934, p. 5.

The passing of the TMA marked a series of setbacks for Murphy. With independence looming, he had little time to finalise his social reform programme, meaning much of the groundwork went to waste in favour of preparation for inaugurating the Commonwealth. It also left him with little leverage over Quezon and the Philippine Legislature. Compounding Murphy's sense of helplessness was Roosevelt's request that he stay on as High Commissioner. The High Commissioner position marked a significant negation of his responsibilities.[173] The hasty manner in which the TMA was passed left little time for a thorough delineation of the role's parameters.[174] As a result, Murphy was left to construct the strictures of the office practically on his own.

Such lack of oversight inevitably led to tension between Murphy and Washington. Roosevelt's unwillingness to act on the parameters of the High Commissioner position bothered Murphy, whose sense of self-importance often coloured his decision making.[175] The TMA was passed hurriedly, and with a lack of engagement from Murphy and his staff.[176] This suggested Washington's lack of interest in Philippine freedom, as well as Roosevelt's own disengagement from the Commonwealth. Such a position rankled Murphy, who viewed the commissionership as a demotion that effectively reduced his importance.[177] The creation of the role also strained his relationship with the Filipino elite. In particular, with Quezon. After winning the 1934 Senate elections against Osmeña, Quezon became the undisputed heavyweight of Filipino politics and a certainty for leader of the Commonwealth. Although the relationship between the two was predominantly cordial, the vagueness of the High Commissioner position often led to friction.[178]

In May 1934, Murphy wrote to superiors in the War Department with a scathing critique of the High Commissioner role.[179] Aside from chastising the lack of preparation, Murphy argued it was 'of the upmost importance that the position, status and authority of the High Commissioner be clearly defined, established and understood' before surrendering control to Quezon and his government.[180] During his tenure as Governor General, Murphy enjoyed supreme authority over the Philippine Legislature. His

[173] War Department Memorandum to Frank Murphy on Role and Parameters of High Commissioner, 1935, Roll 100, FMP.
[174] Golay, Face of Empire, pp. 326-327.
[175] Memorandum, Murphy to Secretary of War, 23 September 1935, Roll 101, FMP.
[176] Golay, Face of Empire, pp. 326-327.
[177] Murphy to Cox, 21 May 1934, Roll 99, FMP.
[178] Ibid. Memorandum, Murphy to Secretary of War, 23 September 1935, Roll 101, FMP.
[179] Murphy to Cox, 21 May 1934, Roll 99, FMP.
[180] Ibid.

reform programme relied on such control, and his ability to veto legislation played an important part in galvanising material support. As High Commissioner, however, his authority was greatly diminished. What little direction had been given concentrated on observing the transition to independence and reporting back to Washington.[181] For Murphy, this was not enough. Having vetoed almost a third of all bills passed in the Philippine Legislature, Murphy was far from convinced of the Filipino ability to direct the islands' development.[182] Fears of 'embarrassment' and 'confusion' blighted his perception of the position, colouring his outlook for the creation of the Commonwealth.[183]

In attacking the High Commissioner position, Murphy demonstrated the sense of bellicosity that often tainted his decision making. As Governor General, his social welfare programme was of unquestionable importance. As High Commissioner, however, such ambitions were negated in favour of advancing the transition to independence. An overly sentimental man, Murphy was obsessed with the importance of what he was doing. The High Commissioner position offered little in the way of advancing his own agenda in the islands. By pursuing definite clarifications of his own post's importance and emphasising America's sovereignty over the archipelago, Murphy opened himself up to criticism on both sides of the Pacific.[184] His insistence on acting with the same authority of his previous office alienated many Filipinos, whilst garnering substantial reproaches in Washington.[185]

Superiors at the War Department monitored developments ruefully. Roosevelt's own opinions were made strikingly apparent. In a statement for the press on the passing of the TMA, Roosevelt remarked, 'where imperfections or inequalities exist, I am confident that both can be corrected after proper hearing and in fairness to both peoples.'[186] The message from Washington was clear. The Commonwealth would go ahead, regardless of any outlying issues, and any lingering reservations were to be side-lined in favour of preparation for independence. This dissonance between Murphy and his superiors in Washington exemplified the evolving power dynamic between Murphy and Roosevelt. At first, Murphy's authority was

[181] War Department Memorandum to Frank Murphy on Role and Parameters of High Commissioner, 1935, Roll 100, FMP.
[182] Anon, 'Filipino Trade in Mix-Up Again', *Los Angeles Times*, 28 January 1934, p. 25.
[183] Murphy to Cox, 21 May 1934, Roll 99, FMP.
[184] Anon, 'Tangle on Rights Irritates Manila', *New York Times*, 12 November 1935, p. 12. Woodford Howard, 'Frank Murphy and the Philippine Commonwealth', *Pacific Historical Review*, vol. 33, no. 1 (February 1964), pp. 60-65.
[185] Regulation of Relations between Government of the Philippine Commonwealth and Foreign Consuls, 25 November 1936-22 July 1937, FRUS, 1937, Volume 1: General, pp. 980-990, http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1937v01/reference/frus.frus1937v01.i0028.pdf (accessed 15 December 2015).
[186] Statement to U.S. Congress by F.D.R., 2 March 1934, Box 46, MQP.

all-encompassing, reflecting the traditional hierarchies of power in a colonial relationship. Yet, as the instigation of the Commonwealth began to blur this division of authority, Murphy's influence started to fade in the face of more pressing priorities. For the first time during his stay in the islands, Murphy's actions were not receiving administrative approval.[187]

Quezon was quick to chastise Murphy's opinions on the High Commissioner role. Though, he did so carefully to avoid public tension between the two. Without mentioning Murphy directly, Quezon reprimanded his hardening stance by arguing 'no American official from the President of the United States down to the High Commissioner has any authority, powers, prerogatives, or privileges in the government of the Commonwealth except those granted in the Independence Law.'[188] A harshly worded memorandum to the War Department echoed his public statements.[189] For Murphy, the situation bordered 'upon the absurd.'[190] As Governor General, Murphy enjoyed a privileged position in the Philippine government. No longer able to determine policy, Frank fell into a period of intense frustration. With his social programme floundering and his authority waning, Murphy felt there was little room for his agenda. In the end, the passage of the TMA marked the end of Murphy's programme of reform.

Murphy's miniature New Deal influenced American perceptions of Philippine independence in several pressing ways. Fundamentally, it exemplified the ways the Depression expanded outwards to inform America's empire in the Philippines. Far from being a solely domestic problem, the internationalisation of the New Deal demonstrated the interconnectivity between metropole and colony by drawing the Philippine independence debate towards issues of American economic security. Secondly, Murphy's tenure offers avenues for understanding how the global New Deal was implemented in different national circumstances, and how such policies fell within the broader understanding of Roosevelt's international outlook. Roosevelt approached empire in a confused and contradictory way. Opportunities for advancing anti-imperialism were often undercut by political and strategic requisites that reflected the precarious economic and international situation that confronted his administration.[191] In this respect, F.D.R.'s approach to Philippine

[187] Anon, 'Tangle on Rights Irritates Manila', p. 12. Howard, 'Frank Murphy and the Philippine Commonwealth', pp. 60-65.
[188] Press Statement of Manuel Quezon, undated, Box 85, MQP.
[189] Memorandum to Secretary of War Regarding Subordination of High Commissioner Role, December 1935, Roll 102, FMP.
[190] Murphy to Dern, undated, Roll 101, FMP.
[191] Doenecke, 'The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: An Ambiguous Legacy', Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign Policies, pp. 52-58. Christopher D. O'Sullivan, F.D.R. and the End of Empire: The Origins of American Power in the Middle East (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012).

independence was characteristic of his distant approach to empire during this period. Although theoretically attractive as an indication of America's authenticity in supporting self-determination, the practicalities of Philippine independence made a concerted and consistent campaign for genuine sovereignty difficult given the harsher exigencies that framed the debate.

Murphy approached independence in an equally self-serving manner. Much like F.D.R., he sincerely believed in the need to provide the Philippines with an Americanised vision of governmental responsibility, not least because of the orientalist image of the islands being unable to furnish one through its own social mores.[192] For many in Washington, a successful transition to commonwealth status would signal the magnanimity of American actions in a time of seemingly unrelenting expansion and cruelty.[193] Yet, Murphy's personal experiences as mayor of Detroit predisposed him to issues of industrial labour. His time combatting the industrial unrest in the city guided his actions as a colonial administrator, ultimately underscoring his perceptions of what the Philippine state should emulate. This failure to understand and address the particular localities that stunted such programmes was symptomatic of the wider approach to reform in other U.S. territories during the period, as exhibited in the case of Puerto Rico's tropical New Deal.[194] In this sense, Murphy's failures were far from unique. On the contrary, they presented a continuation of social welfare policies being fundamentally unattuned to the localities for which they were intended. This inertia on the part of American policymakers to address the local needs of reform rested as much on orientalist understandings of Filipino society as it did on the political urgency of the Depression. Often, and as we shall see in the final section of this chapter, such assumptions helped galvanise popular dissatisfaction with American policy, as the strata of Filipino society left behind by American colonialism began a period of resistance that would shake the faith in America's noble enterprise in nation-building.

[192] Inaugural Address of Governor General Frank Murphy, 15 June 1933, Box 92, FMP. Murphy to Cox, 21 May 1934, Roll 99, FMP. Report on Fifth Meeting of Cabinet of Governor General Frank Murphy, 24 July 1933, Roll 98, FMP.
[193] Address of Senator Millard E. Tydings to the Philippine Constitutional Convention, 22 December 1934, Roll 99, FMP.
[194] Patel, The New Deal, pp. 160-167. Rodriguez, A New Deal for the Tropics, pp. 21-25.




Fig. 5: Revellers line the steps of the Legislative Building to witness the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. AHC.

Part Three

The Philippine Commonwealth was inaugurated on 15 November 1935 amongst considerable fanfare. Seventeen American senators, a host of foreign dignitaries, and over half a million Filipino revellers lined the steps of the Legislative Building to witness the Philippine flag being raised in parallel with the Stars and Stripes.[195] In his final address as Governor General, Murphy applauded the progress of the Philippine state.[196] His suggestion, that the Commonwealth presented a historical continuation of America's benevolent approach to empire, was apparent in the sense of immodesty that coloured his address. As Murphy noted, 'having found democracy good for herself. America believed it was good for the people of the Philippines.'[197]

[195] Memorandum on the Inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, undated, Box 26, MQP.
[196] Message of Governor General Frank Murphy to the Philippine Legislature in Its Final Session, 14 November 1935, Roll 103, FMP.
[197] Ibid.

Although Murphy was proud of his accomplishments as Governor General, the path to the Commonwealth was far from harmonious. Despite Murphy's miniature New Deal, the Philippines remained a hotbed of discontent. Only six months before the inauguration, the Philippines suffered its largest insurrection since America's pacification of the islands. On the night of 2 May 1935, in the small of town of Cabuyao (thirty miles south of Manila), a ragtag group of four hundred people gathered before the town hall to denounce the Commonwealth and demand immediate and unconditional independence.[198] Armed with a handful of shotguns, daggers, and bolos, the revolutionaries occupied the hall in anticipation of a firefight with authorities. Far from an isolated incident, similar uprisings were taking place across Luzon.[199] In total, over two thousand people participated in the revolt, estimated to be a fraction of the full force.[200]

The majority of participants belonged to an organisation known as the Sakdalista Party (literally translated from Tagalog as "to accuse"). Formed in October 1933 and headed by Benigno Ramos, an ex-aide to Quezon and a long-time critic of the Americanisation of the islands, the Sakdalistas were a visceral outgrowth of the discontent amongst many Filipinos towards the American colonial government and the Filipino elite. Ostensibly, the group's mission was immediate independence under a fully autonomous Filipino government. Yet, underlying this goal was a persistent ideology of Pan-Asianism, reflective of growing calls for Asian solidarity across the continent.[201]

Despite being subsumed by the Japanese imperial government as a justification for continental expansion during World War II, understandings of Pan-Asianism were not static, as fluid and contested visions developed across Asia and, indeed, within Japan itself.[202] Having been espoused intermittently during the European colonial expansion of the 19th century, the concept began to solidify in Asian intellectual discourses during the early decades of the 20th century, where visions of Asian solidarity became

[198] Department of the Interior Report on the Sakdalista Uprising of 2 May 1935, 5 June 1935, Roll 100, FMP.
[199] Ibid.
[200] Report on the Political, Economic, and Social Background of the Filipino People Reviewed in Relation to the Sakdal Uprising of May 2 1935, 21 May 1935, Box 25, JRHP.
[201] For thorough discussions of Pan-Asianism's genesis and growth as an intellectual concept, see Saaler & Szpilman, 'The Emergence of Pan-Asianism as an Ideal of Asian Identity and Solidarity, 1850-2008', Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, pp. 1-44. Prasenjit Duara, 'The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism', *Journal of World History*, vol. 12, no. 1 (2001), pp. 99-130. Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2007).
[202] Ibid. For an account of China's influence in directing Pan-Asianism, for example, see Craig A. Smith, 'China as the Leader of the Weak and Small: The *Ruoxiao* Nations and Guomindang Nationalism', *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review*, vol. 6, no. 2 (November 2017), pp. 530-557.

increasingly united around an opposition to the global Western order imposed after World War I.[203] Influential texts like Okakura Tenshin's *Ideals of the East* (1903) interacted with discussions of Pan-Asianism amongst thinkers and political leaders such as China's Sun Yat-sen, India's Raja Mahendra Pratap, and the Indonesian nationalist leader Mohammed Hatta.[204] This helped solidify distinct visions of Pan-Asianism within a diverse array of movements across Japan, China, India, and Korea, as well as amongst Southeast Asian nations such as the Philippines.[205]

Although far from an entirely Japanese phenomenon, during the 1930s Pan-Asianism became a particularly vocal rallying cry for Asian solidarity in the country, where it served as the critical ideological underpinning of Japanese exceptionalism and leadership amongst Asian states.[206] Ramos himself repeatedly looked to Japan as a natural leader for Pan-Asianism, and consistently sought material support and ideological inspiration from Japanese Pan-Asianists.[207] Having travelled to Japan in 1934, Ramos remained in the country for over four years to court the government and spread Sakdalism to a wider audience.[208] Although he failed to achieve any official support from the Japanese government, his propaganda tours were effective in tapping into the Pan-Asian sentiment that was sweeping the nation.[209] The outbreak of the Manchurian Crisis in 1931, along with the fall of the Inukai cabinet in 1932, signalled the end of Japanese parliamentary democracy. During these years, Japanese militarism took its first steps towards instigating the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, a propaganda concept grounded in racialized notions of Asiatic solidarity and Japanese exceptionalism that would guide Japanese expansion during World War II. Ramos was heavily inspired by such ideas. Calling on the concept of the 'Philippines for the Filipino,' Ramos

[203] Saaler & Szpilman, 'The Emergence of Pan-Asianism', Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, pp. 1-17. Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia, pp. 93-126.
[204] Okakura Tenshin, Ideals of the East (Berkeley, C.A.: Stone Bridge Press, 2007). Roger H. Brown, 'Sun Yat-sen: Pan-Asianism', Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, pp. 75-86. Sven Saaler, 'Raja Mahendra Pratap: Indian Independence, Asian Solidarity, World Federation', Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, pp. 107-114. Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia, pp. 178-179. Mavis Rose, Indonesia Free: A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta (Jakarta, Indonesia: Equinox Publishing, 2010).
[205] Saaler & Szpilman, 'The Emergence of Pan-Asianism', Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, pp. 20-26. Brij Tankha, 'The Greater India Society: Indian Culture and an Asian Federation', Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, pp. 93-96. Sven Saaler, 'Japan, Korea, and Pan-Asianism: The Dōkōkai', Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, pp. 63-68. Sven Matthiesen, Japanese Pan-Asianism and the Philippines from the Late Nineteenth Century to the End of World War II (Leiden, Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, 2016).
[206] Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan's War, 1931-1945 (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007). Bruce E. Reynolds, ed., Japan in the Fascist Era (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004). Sven Saaler & Victor J. Koschmann, eds., Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2007).
[207] Translated article entitled 'Appealing to the Japanese People', undated, Box 19, JRHP. Terami-Wada, Sakdalistas' Struggle for Philippine Independence, pp. 35-112.
[208] Ibid., pp. 49-111.
[209] Ibid., pp. 49-51.

reimagined Japan's nationalist doctrine for a Filipino context, simulating pro-Japanese Pan-Asian movements in India and Malaya, the DEI, and French Indochina.[210]

Murphy and his staff were shocked that such a large rebellion could have taken place at a time of great opportunity for the Philippines.[211] Not only was independence in sight, but a broad programme of social engineering promised to bring the Philippines into the thrusts of modernity. Such misunderstandings of the Sakdal's motivations spoke to cultural myopia advanced under the American regime. For Murphy, the cornerstone of social development was in the mechanisms of government, where he had met success in courting the Filipino elite towards American ideas of social responsibility. In contrast, the Sakdalistas evidenced the popular disengagement with Murphy's miniature New Deal. Although Murphy had suffered scrapes with figures such as Quezon, for the most part he enjoyed a privileged position within the elite strata of Filipino society. Meanwhile, for those Filipinos left wanting under the American flag, a radical alternative made sense given the inability of the American regime to enhance their prospects.

In the aftermath of the uprising, Murphy and his staff scrambled to understand why so many Filipinos joined the Sakdalistas in revolt. Arguing most combatants were poor, illiterate, and ignorant tenant farmers from predominantly rural areas, their conclusion was the participants had been duped by 'radical leaders,' who took advantage of their depressed condition to 'induce the people to resist the government.'[212] As the report argued:

> '[the participants] are simple barrio folks, ignorant of political matters, and easily swayed by emotional appeals however illogical such appeals may be… the people were told that the seizure of municipal governments would be easily accomplished and that they would receive assistance from outside forces. Many were led to believe that the armed forces of the government were in sympathy with them and that they could overthrow the government without encountering opposition.'[213]

[210] Translated article entitled 'Appealing to the Japanese People', undated, Box 19, JRHP. Saaler & Szpilman, 'The Emergence of Pan-Asianism', Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, pp. 1-44. Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia, pp. 161-190.
[211] Report of Committee Appointed by Acting Governor General Hayden to Investigate Uprisings of May 2 1935, 18 May 1935, Box 25, JRHP.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Ibid.

To some extent, the report was accurate in depicting the causes of the revolt. Officials noted the Sakdal's association with Pan-Asian organisations in Japan, and claimed support for the rebellion within the Filipino government was a key motivator for the uprising.[214] However, Murphy's staff still fell short of the mark when assessing the potency of the Sakdal's message, evidencing the orientalist lens through which they operated. The American colonial regime had done little to combat the inherent societal divisions in place since the Spanish acquisition of the islands.[215] Instead, American officials were eager to co-opt the assistance of Filipino elites, viewing the illustrado class as the natural conduit between American authority and the Filipino masses.[216] As such, the traditional hierarchies in Filipino society remained practically unchanged since the days of the Spanish regime.[217] This disparity between elite and popular actors produced a dichotomised nationalism in the Philippines. On one hand were elites such as Quezon, Roxas, and Osmeña, whose close association with Western colonialism positioned them as a vanguard for Filipino nationalism. On the other side were those disconnected from the authority of the Filipino elite; people for whom the benefits of American colonialism had failed to trickle down into their communities. The Sakdals represented a political manifestation of the latter group. Unified in their distaste for the traditional dynamics of Filipino society and their courting of colonial powers, supporters of the Sakdal movement generated a reactionary nationalism based on combatting the deeply entrenched societal divisions at play in Filipino society.

American officials were aware of the problems surrounding the social divisions in the Philippines years before Murphy's arrival. For the islands' peasantry, little progress had been made during the American regime. Following America's pacification of the islands, land acquired from the Spanish was sold to those Filipinos deemed intellectually and economically worthy. Rather than redistribute the land, American officials chose to continue the Spanish practice of selling land exclusively to the so-called "mestizo" class; Filipinos whose heritage could be traced back to either Spanish or Chinese ancestry. This practice, known as the *encomienda* system during the Spanish regime, generated a cooperative local elite for whom

[214] Ibid.
[215] Jeffrey M. Riedinger, Agrarian Reform in the Philippines: Democratic Transitions and Redistributive Reform (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 16-22. Kramer, The Blood of Government, pp. 150-152.
[216] Ibid.
[217] Ibid.

collaboration with occupying forces brought social and economic advantages.[218] In contrast, the Filipino peasantry was unable to break out of this inherent cycle of deprivation due to the mestizo monopoly on landholding and political power.[219] This lopsided social system provided a fertile breeding ground for peasant dissatisfaction. As one American official noted in 1931, 'we are keeping the mestizo exploiters in power, much as the Spaniards did. Present leaders know the danger of revolt if our protection to them [is] withdrawn.'[220]

Murphy first became aware of the Sakdalistas during the 1934 senate elections. During the campaign, Sakdalista candidates made a positive showing in many of the rural provinces of Central Luzon.[221] Initially supportive of an opposition to the monolithic Nacionalistas, Murphy soon grew apprehensive of the Sakdalistas' growing support amongst the peasantry and their increasing interest in Japanese expansion.[222] Such opinions were reinforced by the group's propaganda efforts. In an open letter penned by Ramos, the Sakdalistas criticised the American colonial regime and its Filipino counterparts, suggesting nothing was 'more disgraceful to the Filipinos' than the islands' control under a 'white race.'[223] Arguing the creation of the Commonwealth constituted a 'scheme to maintain American sovereignty over the Filipinos,' Ramos directly courted the assistance of the Japanese government.[224] 'We pray for the happiness of all Oriental peoples,' declared Ramos, 'the Japanese people will come forward and help us to realise our purposes.'[225]

In the American mindset, Ramos' appeal to Japan coalesced with historically entrenched anxieties of Japanese expansion. Since America's colonisation of the archipelago, U.S. policymakers feared the intentions of the Philippines' most powerful neighbour.[226] Whenever the issue of foreign aggression was brought to the fore, the finger of blame was inexorably pointed towards Japan.[227] During the early years of American sovereignty, a policy of neutralisation was debated in an attempt to guarantee the Philippines'

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[218] Pauline Eadie, Poverty and the Critical Security Agenda (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 63-64. Luis H. Francia, A History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos (New York, N.Y.: The Overlook Press, 2010), pp. 65-67.
[219] Aurel Croissant & Philip Lorenz, 'Philippines: People Power and Defective Elite Democracy', *Comparative Politics of Southeast Asia*, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68182-5_8 (accessed 19 March 2017), pp. 215-216.
[220] Reeves to Hayden, 16 January 1931, Box 10, JRHP.
[221] Memorandum to Provincial Commander, Tabayas Regarding Sakdalista Meeting, 10 July 1934, Box 359, MQP.
[222] Terami-Wada, Sakdalistas' Struggle for Philippine Independence, p. 45.
[223] Translated article entitled 'Appealing to the Japanese People', undated, Box 19, JRHP.
[224] Ibid.
[225] Ibid.
[226] Kramer, The Blood of Government, pp. 20-23.
[227] Insert for *Americans against Independence* entitled 'The Jap Menace in Islands is Seen', 27 June 1920, Box 62, MQP.

territorial sovereignty.[228] Yet, this idea was quickly dismissed as it would require the United States to surrender any special trading privileges.[229] Following Japan's entry into World War I, the issue of Philippine sovereignty underwent a renewed sense of optimism. Japanese admission into the League of Nations and the signing of the Washington naval treaties and Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) presented an image of Japan that was more amenable to discussion. During this period, Japanese immigration to the islands increased rapidly, whilst trade between the two nations grew to constitute the archipelago's second biggest trading partner (behind the United States).[230] By the end of the decade, rapid growth in Japanese influence in the islands produced renewed anxieties amongst both Filipino and American observers. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria proved to be the nadir of cooperation in the triangular relationship between the three states. As one American observer argued in 1934, 'let us not be deceived by the repeated declarations of the Japanese that they are not interested in gaining control of the Philippines… it is strategically vital if she is to carry out her announced plan to dominate the Far East.'[231]

Such fears of Japan's intentions in the Philippines directly informed the Murphy administration's response to the Sakdal rebellion, evidencing culturally entrenched ideas of Japanese aggression that reinforced the American orientalist image of the islands. Investigations into the Pan-Asian sentiment of the Sakdalistas were carried out following the uprising, with the American ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, providing a report to Murphy's office.[232] Grew noted Ramos' association with Pan-Asian organisations in Tokyo.[233] Despite acknowledging the Sakdalistas were not 'well provided' with funds, Grew's assessment stressed Ramos' affiliation with numerous Pan-Asian organisations based in Japan.[234] In reality, Grew's analysis was considerably exaggerated. Ramos had travelled to Japan to curry favour with the government. Yet, he was unsuccessful in gaining any official support for the Sakdalistas and their cause. What patronage Ramos did secure was purely rhetorical, and the organisations that backed his stance were so vehemently

[228] Lydia N. Yu-Jose, 'Philippine, American, and Japanese Relations as Seen Through the Issue of Neutralization, 1900-1939', Philippines-Japan Relations, pp. 47-80.
[229] Ibid.
[230] Lydia N. Yu-Jose, Japan Views the Philippines, 1900-1944 (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), pp. 67-72. Yu-Jose, 'Philippine, American, and Japanese Relations as Seen Through the Issue of Neutralization, 1900-1939', Philippines-Japan Relations, pp. 47-80.
[231] Anon, 'Armstrong Says Real Issue Here Not Capacity to Govern but Case of Defense Against Foreign Rule', *Manila Bulletin*, 28 August 1934, p. 1.
[232] Grew to Hayden, 13 May 1935, Box 19, JRHP.
[233] Ibid.
[234] Ibid.

militaristic they offered no new evidence of a Japanese-brokered conspiracy to oust America from the archipelago.[235] Nevertheless, the apparent connection between Ramos and Pan-Asianism was enough to generate a resurgent fear amongst Murphy and his superiors as to the dangers of Japanese expansion for an independent Philippines.[236]

Publicly, Murphy and Quezon downplayed the rebellion. Newspapers on both sides of the Pacific stressed the transient nature of the revolt, and the lack of preparation that accompanied it.[237] Murphy himself characterised the uprising as 'of a provincial character,' and 'not a major political challenge to the fulfilment of the present independence act.'[238] Yet, in private the outbreak generated considerable anxiety amongst American officials over the ability of the Filipino elite to maintain stability.[239] Due to the rebellion, Murphy pushed for stronger American controls of the Commonwealth.[240] The timing of the uprising, planned to coincide with a plebiscite to ratify the Commonwealth constitution, gave Murphy a reason to doubt Quezon's authority. Moreover, the persistent rumours that Japanese arms were being shipped to the Philippines to aid the Sakdal cause lent credence to Murphy's increasingly aggressive stance on American authority.[241] In a series of letters sent to a colleague in the United States, Dr. Joseph Ralston Hayden (Murphy's Vice-Governor and America's foremost authority on the Philippines) wrote of the breakdown in order should the United States surrender its sovereignty.[242] Arguing both Murphy and Quezon's lives were under threat, Hayden detailed Murphy's belief that revolution was afoot in the islands.[243] Hayden concurred with Murphy's assessment, suggesting the passage of American authority would lead to revolution and domination under Japan.[244] His own conclusion painted a particularly bleak picture: 'we put a group of Filipinos in virtually complete control of the government where they will operate a system that exploits the common man and where they will have to [be] maintained by American bayonets!'[245]

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[235] Terami-Wada, Sakdalistas' Struggle for Philippine Independence, pp. 49-50.
[236] Grew to Hayden, 13 May 1935, Box 19, JRHP.
[237] Montano D. Nazario, 'Central Luzon Won Over from Sakdals, *Philippine Herald*, 11 May 1935, pp. 1-4. Anon, 'Philippine Rebels Are Held in Check', *New York Times*, 4 May 1935, p. 1.
[238] Quoted in Anon, 'Murphy Calls Outbreak of Minor Importance', *Washington Post*, 3 May 1935, p. 3.
[239] Hayden to Reeves, 7 October 1935, Box 41, JRHP.
[240] Hayden to Reeves, 17 September 1935, Box 41, JRHP.
[241] Memorandum for the Adjunct General, Manila Regarding Rumours of Japanese Involvement in Sakdal Rebellion, 20 July 1935, Box 359, MQP.
[242] Hayden to Reeves, 7 October 1935, Box 41, JRHP.
[243] Hayden to Reeves, 29 September 1935, Box 41, JRHP.
[244] Hayden to Reeves, 7 October 1935, Box 41, JRHP.
[245] Hayden to Reeves, 12 October 1935, Box 41, JRHP.

The Sakdal rebellion provides a telling example of the shortfalls of Murphy's miniature New Deal, and the ways in which indigenous actors resisted American developmental policies during the Depression. For Murphy and his staff, the 2 May rebellion demonstrated the Filipino people failing to recognise the blessings of occidental civilisation being bestowed on them.[246] The conclusions drawn in Manila and Tokyo stressed historically racialized ideas of Filipino ignorance and Japanese aggression as motivators for the revolt.[247] In reality, the Sakdal's popularity stemmed from the dissonance between American images of independence and the realities that accompanied it. The rebels' popularity amongst rural peasants demonstrated Murphy's own disparity between industrial and agrarian reform. For Murphy, the cornerstone of social welfare belonged in the cities. Here, industrial advances were tempered with progressive labour legislation and an institutional interest in the relationship between labour and capital. Unfortunately, this interest failed to migrate outwards into the provinces. As such, the successes of Murphy's programme were limited to Manila and other urban centres. As a result, much of the lopsided societal systems in the islands remained unchanged. The landholding elite continued to dominate the economic interests of the archipelago, whilst the illustrado class maintained their hegemony over the political system.

Much like Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories, popular discontent manifested as rejections of the global New Deal. As with the Philippines, Puerto Rican nationalists viewed such policies as an attempt to insulate American power rather than a paternalistic programme of development.[248] Often, this discontent would boil over into violence. Like the Sakdalistas, Puerto Rican nationalists began an armed conflict in 1935 against American rule.[249] In other empires, too, social reform was met with increased resistance, as the British discovered in their attempts at instigating social reform in its Caribbean colonies during this period.[250] In this sense, the Sakdal's rejection of Murphy's New Deal formed part of a broader, global trend, where metropolitan ideas of reform were popularly rejected by colonial subjects in favour of continued agitation for independence.

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[246] Department of the Interior Report on the Sakdalista Uprising of 2 May 1935, 5 June 1935, Roll 100, FMP. Report on the Political, Economic, and Social Background of the Filipino People Reviewed in Relation to the Sakdal Uprising of May 2 1935, 21 May 1935, Box 25, JRHP.
[247] Ibid. Grew to Hayden, 13 May 1935, Box 19, JRHP.
[248] Patel, The New Deal, p. 165.
[249] Ibid.
[250] Jason C. Parker, My Brother's Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962 (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 16-26.

Conclusion

There are two overarching assertions that illuminate this chapter's thesis. The first has argued the Great Depression generated a dramatic reassessment of American independence policy in the Philippines. Faced with increasing domestic and local agitation, F.D.R. and his administration looked to settle the "Philippine problem" by placing the archipelago on the path to independence. This decision was predicated on American interests in trade, employment, and immigration, which cohered to create an image of independence that intersected with America's response to the Depression. Serving as a conduit for Roosevelt's global New Deal, Murphy arrived in the archipelago to oversee the transition from colony to Commonwealth. Whilst there, he undertook a programme of social reform that lent heavily on his personal experiences as a New Deal Democrat. Having pioneered a New Deal philosophy as Mayor of Detroit, Murphy worked to transplant this intellectual rationale and apply it to Philippine society. His programme rested on orientalist assumptions that the Philippines needed a cohesive social welfare system fashioned on New Deal notions of economic security and governmental involvement in public welfare. Together, these issues cohered to create an image of the Philippines that was filtered through the interpretative prism of the Depression and New Deal, where American ideas of social development often clashed with the indigenous factors that facilitated them.

Secondly, by examining the discrepancy between elite and popular understandings of Murphy's Philippine New Deal, this chapter has argued that competing nationalisms in the islands looked to either embrace or reject the American narrative of independence. On one side were figures from the Filipino elite, who co-opted Murphy's image of an independent Philippines to secure and maintain the ongoing assistance of the United States. On the other side were popular movements such as the Sakdalistas. These organisations sought to reject the American vision for the Philippines, and the Filipino elite's grasp over their society. Leaning heavily on the growing Pan-Asian sentiment sweeping the continent, the Sakdalistas championed a vision of the Philippines free from Western dominance. The failed 2 May uprising represented a visceral pronunciation of this ambition. As such, Murphy's miniature New Deal can be viewed as an elite, top-down response to the creation of the Philippine Commonwealth, more in tune to the vagaries of American domestic policy than the development of the Philippine state. Ironically, then, the New Deal as an intellectual concept, grounded as it was in American domestic politics, made independence

for the Philippines more likely. Yet, its practical application under Murphy served to further entrench the societal divisions at play in the archipelago, highlighting the gap between elite and popular images of independence and making the transition to sovereignty considerably more difficult.

Chapter Two

The Perfect Place to 'Win Friends and Influence People': Paul V. McNutt, the Cold War, and the Fledgling Philippine State, 1945-1947

'The people of the Philippines are our ambassadors in the Orient. We dare not lose that faith. We cannot afford to destroy it by our own inaction.'[251]

Paul V. McNutt

In May 1947, Paul V. McNutt returned to the United States after resigning as first ambassador to the newly independent Philippines. Travelling by way of South Asia and Europe, McNutt reflected on his time in the islands in a memorandum circulated across the State Department.[252] Musing on the significance of American policy in the archipelago, McNutt suggested a 'lack of appreciation and understanding of our relations to the Philippines' amongst the decolonizing world.[253] Asia after World War II was a continent in flux. The European metropoles, exhausted and bankrupt from the toll of war, struggled to reassert their authority as nationalist movements across the continent revitalised their resistance to Western rule.[254] In South Asia, Indian demands for independence from Britain resulted in the partition of the subcontinent and a humanitarian catastrophe.[255] In Burma, British forces returned to find calls for independence at fever pitch.[256] In the DEI, Japan's occupation spurred a revival of national imperatives against Dutch rule.[257] In Indochina, too, French authorities resumed their colonial administration amidst a concerted effort to establish a Vietnamese state.[258] Having witnessed the ferocity of calls for self-determination during his travels, McNutt stressed the importance of portraying American actions as 'designed to enable the countries

[251] NBC Radio Broadcast by Paul V. McNutt, 23 February 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[252] Memorandum by the Counselor (Cohen) to Brigadier General Marshall S. Carter, 16 May 1947, FRUS, 1947, Volume VI, The Far East, Document 897, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d897 (accessed 14 November 2015).
[253] Ibid.
[254] Martin Thomas, Bob Moore, & L.J. Butler, Crises of Empire: Decolonization and Europe's Imperial States, 1918-1975 (London, U.K.: Hodder Education, 2008). Ronald H. Spector, In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 2008). David D. Newsom, The Imperial Mantle: The United States, Decolonization, and the Third World (Bloomington, I.N.: Indiana University Press, 2001). Mark T. Berger, The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization (New York, N.Y.: Routledge-Curzon, 2004). Kuan-Hsing Chen, Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2010).
[255] Paul M. McGarr, The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States, and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945-1965 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 9-25. Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 1-7.
[256] Cecil Hobbs, 'Nationalism in British Colonial Burma', *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. 6, no. 2 (1947), pp. 113-21.
[257] Robert J. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-1949 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981). Andrew Roadnight, United States Policy towards Indonesia during the Truman and Eisenhower Years (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002).
[258] Anthony Short, 'France and Vietnam: The Inevitable War', in Phil Melling & John Roper, eds., America, France, and Vietnam: Cultural History and Ideas of Conflict (Aldershot, U.K.: Avebury, 1991), pp. 32-55.

aided to safeguard and promote their own… independence.'[259] In closing the gap between American ideas and their understanding amongst the postcolonial world, the United States would exhibit its benignity by keeping unstable or emerging states from becoming 'satellites of any power.'[260]

McNutt's implication - that the world was watching the Philippines - appeared particularly prescient given the amount of interest in the islands' independence. Western powers like Britain viewed Philippine freedom ruefully, conscious of the implications it could have for galvanising resistance to Western rule.[261] Colonial elites looked on with congratulation and contempt. For some, such as Burma's U Saw, independence confirmed the noble enterprise of American empire.[262] For others, like India's Jawaharlal Nehru, it was a mixed blessing, given the lack of leeway granted to the islands in forging their own path to statehood.[263] Indeed, the principal point of attack from America's emergent rival, the Soviet Union, was the promise of modernity bestowed upon the Philippines was a sham, and the virtues of communism as a developmental project offered a remedy to the exploitative doctrines of capitalism and Western imperialism.[264] Leaders like North Korea's Kim-Il-Sung took this vision to heart.[265] Others such as Nehru borrowed from both, forging a "third way" between the developmental binary of liberal-capitalism and communism that was enveloping the globe.[266]

As with the creation of the Commonwealth, the formation of the Philippine state was intrinsically connected to the wider anxieties that surrounded the islands. Indeed, the sense of insecurity that guided American policy towards the Philippines during the Depression appeared remarkably analogous to the fears that occupied the minds of American policymakers after the war. Much like Japan and the threat of fascism ten years earlier, the spectre of communism loomed large in the American mindset as emerging rivals like

[259] Memorandum by the Counselor (Cohen) to Brigadier General Marshall S. Carter, 16 May 1947, FRUS, 1947, Volume VI, The Far East, Document 897, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d897 (accessed 14 November 2015).
[260] Ibid.
[261] Tomlinson to Bevin, 25 July 1946, IO, BL, RG IOR/Q/21/11.
[262] Memorandum from Burma Office to Foreign Office on Statement by U Saw on Philippine Independence, 5 July 1946, IO, BL, RG IOR/M/4/2459.
[263] Ajit S. Rye, 'A Survey of Philippine-India Relations in the Post-Independence Period', *International Conference on Asian History*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 5-10 August 1968, pp. 271-285.
[264] Telegram from Dean Acheson to McNutt Relaying Soviet Communique on Suppression of the Huks, 9 April 1947, Box 8, MARP.
[265] Kim Il Sung, 'For the Establishment of a United Party of the Working Masses: Report to the Inaugural Congress of the Workers' Party of North Korea', 29 August 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/123864 (accessed 26 January 2018).
[266] Christopher J. Lee, 'Between a Moment and an Era: The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung', in Christopher J. Lee, ed., Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives (Athens, O.H.: Ohio University Press, 2010), pp. 5-19. Quỳnh N. Phạm & Robbie Shilliam, eds., Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonial Visions (Lanham, M.D.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).

the Soviet Union looked to expand communist influence into Asia.[267] In the Philippines, the prospect of insurgency under the Hukbalahap highlighted a wider anxiety over communist influence in nationalist movements across the continent.[268] The principal difference, however, was that American policymakers no longer debated *whether* they would take an active role in confronting these threats. The outcome of World War II propelled the United States to the head of the global power strata. With this security came a feeling of superiority that helped construct the narrative of leadership that imbued American policymaking during the Cold War.[269]

In this sense, McNutt's opinions of Philippine independence reflected a wider administrative awakening to the inevitability of decolonization as an impending reality. Yet, with this awakening came a new dilemma, one that aligned with America's proclivity for viewing the Cold War as a battle of leadership against competing models of development. The problem coalesced around one question: how could America exhibit its support for developing nations whilst maintaining alliances with Western powers to check the growth of communism? According to McNutt, the answer lay in America's own dependencies, where the malleability of American influence offered opportunities not afforded elsewhere. Stylised as a 'Marshall Plan for the Far East' by McNutt and the press, the United States looked to position the Philippines as a uniquely American selling point for wooing postcolonial states.[270] Here, American ideas could be accepted, directed, and ultimately projected to the world under the auspices of a veiled neutrality. McNutt envisioned the Philippines as the perfect place to 'win friends and influence people' precisely *because* of its position as an American dependency, where the islands could serve as a neutral arbiter for American intentions in the Third World.[271] This quasi-neutralism, though certainly not of the variety that emerged at Bandung, sought to demonstrate how American ideas were not only endorsed by developing nations, but also encouraged.

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[267] Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State, 21 October 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 715, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d715 (accessed 8 December 2015).
[268] USAFFE Memorandum on the Hukbalahap, 3 March 1945, Box 42, JRHP. Statement of U.S. High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt before the Senate Finance Committee, 2 April 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Press Release from the Office of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippines on agrarian unrest in Central Luzon, 29 January 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[269] Andrew Preston, 'Monsters Everywhere: A Genealogy of National Security', *Diplomatic History*, vol. 38, no. 3 (2014), pp. 498-500.
[270] Peter Edson, 'A Marshall Plan for the Far East', *Dunkirk Evening Observer*, 12 July 1947, p.5.
[271] Paul V. McNutt, 'America's Role in the Orient', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 258 (July 1948), p. 55.

Using McNutt as a lens to explore the connections between decolonization and the Cold War, this chapter positions the creation of the fledgling Philippine state against a backdrop of evolving ideological rivalries and nascent nationalist imperatives. Built around the budding literature on decolonization and the global Cold War, it offers a transnational vision of Philippine independence.[272] It uses as its axis what is now referred to as public diplomacy, an attempt to purvey a certain narrative or image that aids and informs wider policymaking decisions.[273] In doing so, it asks new questions of how the Truman administration looked to imperial ideas fashioned in the Philippines for use in the wider world, and how these ideas intersected with the Cold War battle for hearts and minds. Fundamentally, it asks how this superpower conflict grew conceptually and geographically to inform American perceptions of imperialism in the Philippines. Indeed, much like Murphy, McNutt's tenure is best understood within the historical confines that underscored his decision making: the onset of Cold War and the crisis of empire that accompanied it.

As a figure of scholarly enquiry, McNutt has undergone something of a resurgence. Though, like Murphy, his position remains that of a secondary figure. McNutt is a character who helps illuminate the advancement of American ideas into the world. A native of Indiana, McNutt was an archetype of the Cold War liberal, a man for whom American power and prestige could be channelled into influence across the globe. An ardent internationalist, McNutt exhibited an understanding of America that privileged action and esteem over isolation and self-interest. His career went from local to global; serving in positions like Governor



Fig. 6: Portrait of McNutt. AHC.

[272] Odd A. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Christopher E. Goscha & Christian F. Ostermann, eds., Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2009). Leslie James & Elisabeth Leake, eds., Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence (London, U.K.: Bloomsbury, 2015). Jason C. Parker, 'Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Post-Columbian Era', in Robert J. McMahon, ed., The Cold War in the Third World (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 126-129.

[273] Hart, Empire of Ideas. Jason C. Parker, Hearts, Minds, Voices, U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2016). Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1997).

of Indiana and Philippine High Commissioner (discussed in part one). This illustrious career made him a stalwart of the political scene, during which time he served two of the era's most captivating presidents: Roosevelt and Truman. As a policymaker, his opinions frequently clashed with his superiors, as both leaders looked to position his experience to suit their needs.

Like Murphy, McNutt entered his initial service in the Philippines with little understanding of America's legacy in the archipelago. Yet, his return to the islands proved to be one of the most enduring facets of his career. Between 1945 and 1947, the United States finalised its decolonization of the Philippines whilst assuring the nation's complicity as an ongoing partner. Within an atmosphere of hardening ideological tension and growing demands for self-determination, Washington used Philippine independence as bellwether for its support for nationalist movements. McNutt was an active motivator in projecting this alliance, overseeing the legislation that guided the Philippines' development as an independent state (discussed in parts two and three).

As with Murphy's legacy, however, the intersections between McNutt's ideas and the exigencies that facilitated them were not always harmonious. McNutt relied on the Filipino elite to evidence the success of his policy. The problem was these same elites often manipulated McNutt's image of Philippine statehood to suit their needs, creating what Nick Cullather has aptly called 'illusions of influence' to consolidate their authority.[274] Redrawing Cullather's analysis, this chapter envisions such illusions as extending beyond the realm of elite-level policymaking. Illustrated by the advance of the Hukbalahap, McNutt viewed the onset of insurgency in the islands as evidence of a grander turn towards communist subversion in Asia.[275] In doing so, he exhibited a long-held American tendency in the Philippines to overlook the local, systemic factors that catalysed resistance to American ideas. Illustrative of the power of local agency to inform, interrupt, and enhance wider foreign policy decisions, McNutt sought to combat the Huk threat by tying it to America's wider interests in combatting communism.[276] As a result, he compounded the local factors that blighted images of the Philippines as a neutral arbiter for American policy.

[274] Nick Cullather, Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippines Relations, 1942-1960 (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 1994).
[275] Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State, 8 September 1946, FRUS, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 698, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d698 (accessed 10 December 2015). Broadcast in the 'Our Foreign Policy' Series, 5 July 1947, Box 22, PVMP.
[276] Statement by Ambassador Paul V. McNutt on the Signing of the Military Assistance Agreement, 22 March 1947, Box 12, PVMP.

The chapter begins by examining the role of World War II in catalysing a recalibration in U.S.-Philippine relations, and a broader transition in American understandings of decolonization. It examines McNutt's appointment in the context of an emerging Cold War, and assesses how his nomination intersected with the Truman administration's developing understandings of imperialism. Part two focuses on McNutt's tenure; analysing his role in directing the post-war Philippine rehabilitation programmes, illustrating how these projects illuminated America's evolving approach to imperialism, and asking how they were presented to the wider world. Finally, part three looks at the challenges McNutt faced in Manila. In particular, the popular resistance to American rehabilitation in the Philippines, and the role of the Hukbalahap in informing and undermining America's vision of independence. In doing so, this chapter contextualises McNutt's ambassadorship through the prism of a global Cold War, asking how this invariably bipolar conflict evolved to inform American imperialism in the Philippines.

Part One

Prior to examining McNutt's vision for the Philippine state, it is vital to understand the context that facilitated his arguments. Like Murphy's tenure, McNutt's time as ambassador intersected with a recalibration in American understandings of independence. During the transferal of sovereignty, the United States confronted a concerted backlash against colonialism, where nationalist movements used the chaos of war to assert their independence.[277] These movements differed greatly dependent on regional circumstances, colonial affiliations, and ideological imperatives. Yet, often their ideas enmeshed to create a vision of Asia free from Western dominance. Racial solidarity, anti-Western policy, and ideological adherence to communism painted an anxious picture for American policymakers concerned with Philippine sovereignty.[278] In order to legislate for independence, both U.S. and Filipino actors were forced to address the intersections between Philippine freedom and the global crisis of empire that accompanied it.

[277] In Indonesia and Indochina, leaders such as Sukarno and Ho Chi Minh used Japan's defeat to declare national independence. George Kahin, 'Sukarno's Proclamation of Indonesian Independence', *Indonesia*, Vol. 69 (2000), pp. 1–3. Ho Chi Minh, 'Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic Of Viet-Nam,' 2 September 1945, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietdec.htm (accessed 20 December 2015).
[278] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent), 6 December 1945, FRUS, 1946, Volume IX, The Far East: China, Document 30, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v09/d30 (accessed 20 December 2016). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 13 May 1947, FRUS, 1947, Volume VI, The Far East, Document 114,

Economically, materially, and physically devastated, the Philippines teetered on the edge of anarchy following Japan's expulsion. In part due to the devastation wrought during America's reoccupation, Manila, aside from the Polish capital of Warsaw, suffered greater amounts of destruction and loss of life than any other Allied capital.[279] Politically, too, the islands lay in ruins. In August 1944, Manuel Quezon succumbed to illness whilst exiled in the United States. This left a void in the Filipino executive that was incredibly hard to fill. Even more alarming was the lack of individuals deemed capable of taking his place. The debate over collaboration was raging, and Roosevelt's insistence that those who cooperated with Japan 'must be removed from authority and influence' proved problematic given the scale and scope of collaboration across the islands.[280] Meanwhile, the threat of revolution continued to grow. Emboldened by an increasing popularity, the Huks consolidated their gains in the rural heartlands of Central Luzon. Attempts to force units to disarm were met with resistance, and clashes between Huks and U.S.-Philippine forces yielded deadly results.[281]

This situation was hardly unique to the Philippines. Japanese expansion animated Asian resistance to Western imperialism.[282] Yet, the wanton devastation that accompanied the end of war also left many wondering what had been accomplished.[283] During the conflict, Washington relied on the Rooseveltian rhetoric of fighting a war for freedom to secure the backing of dependent peoples.[284] Yet, such support was often unforthcoming, as numerous nationalist movements like the Indonesian Nationalist Party and Indian National Army looked to Japan as a means of ridding the continent of Western influence.[285] Such perceptions were compounded by American race relations, where the wartime internment of Japanese Americans, and the prejudicial treatment of African Americans, made the developing world acutely aware of the gap between American rhetoric and reality.[286] Although undoubtedly the world's great economic and

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d114 (accessed 27 November 2016). NBC Broadcast by Paul V. McNutt on 'The Future of the Philippines', 23 February 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[279] Werner Gruhl, Imperial Japan's World War II, 1931-1945 (London, U.K.: Transaction, 2007), pp. 94-97.
[280] Quoted in Edgar Snow, 'The Philippines Cry for Help', *Saturday Evening Post*, 16 March 1946, p. 14.
[281] Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (London, U.K.: University of California Press, 1977), p. 116.
[282] Hock, ed., Legacies of World War II in South and East Asia. Ken'ichi Goto, Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World (Athens, O.H.: Ohio University Press, 2003), pp. 77-106.
[283] Gruhl, Imperial Japan's World War II, pp. 89-105.
[284] Doenecke, 'The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: An Ambiguous Legacy', Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign Policies, p. 54.
[285] Nicholas Tarling, Nationalism in Southeast Asia: 'If the People Are With Us' (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2007), pp. 129-134. Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 87.
[286] Greg Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2001). Neil A. Wynn, The African American Experience during World War II (Plymouth, U.K.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).

military power, the United States suffered from something of an image problem amongst Asia's colonial peoples.

If there was one place, however, where Washington felt it did not have an image problem, it was in the Philippines, where paradoxically American colonialism was perceived as a boon for the population's loyalty.[287] Japanese attempts at inciting Filipinos into a racialized war against the West fell predominantly upon deaf ears.[288] Following Japan's invasion, numerous guerrilla forces were set up to aggravate Japanese authority. The formation of pro-American units created a link to the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), the military command headed by General MacArthur tasked with retaking the Philippines. On the other side were popular self-defence units (comprised of peasants in rural areas) such as the Hukbalahap. These guerrillas shared distinctly different views over the shape and direction of Philippine society.[289] Yet, they ultimately collaborated in ridding the islands of Japanese militarism.[290] For Americans concerned with the crisis of empire in Asia, this perception of resistance offered tantalising opportunities to reassert a benevolent image of American imperialism.

Washington used images of Filipino resistance as testament to the sanctity of American colonialism.[291] The reasons for this were apparent in American perceptions of the Philippines during the war. In 1944, a report prepared by USAFFE highlighted the disparities in collaboration and resistance across Asia.[292] Officers acknowledged 'Japanese exploitation of racial prejudice' met 'some success' in occupied areas.[293] Yet, according to the report, the 'Japanese anti-white' programme 'failed to alienate Filipinos from loyalty to the United States.'[294] In the American view, this devotion stemmed from the belief that 'America is the Philippines' best and safest long-time friend.'[295] In contrast to other occupied regions, where Japan was met with affection, America was to find a 'loyal population', where the venture of independence proved

[287] Anon, 'It Wasn't All Altruism', p. 100. Speech of Hon. Millard E. Tydings of Maryland in the U.S. Senate, 27 November 1944, Box 93, FMP. Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area, 2 August 1944, Box 42, JRHP.
[288] Inaugural Address of his Excellency José P. Laurel, President of the Republic of the Philippines, 14 October 1943, Box 21, JRHP.
[289] Maria F.S. Tan, Highlights of Philippine History, Volume I: War and Reconstruction (1941-1947) (Quezon City, Philippines: Pantas Publishing, 2015), pp. 22-27.
[290] Ibid.
[291] An Announcement for the International News Service by Paul V. McNutt, Undated, Box 10, PVMP. President Roosevelt's broadcast to the Philippines, 13 August 1943, Box 23, MQP.
[292] Basic Military Plan for Psychological Warfare in the Southwest Pacific Area, 2 August 1944, Box 42, JRHP.
[293] Ibid.
[294] Ibid.
[295] Ibid.

the American 'respect for the rights of Oriental peoples.'[296] This suggestion irked European allies, who grew increasingly tired of insinuations that Filipino resistance was evidence for America's compassionate form of colonialism.[297]

Despite American pronouncements suggesting otherwise, the dichotomy between collaboration and resistance in the Philippines was equally as blurred as it was across Asia. If anything, American iterations of Filipino resistance did more to entrench culturally parochial perceptions of the islands, reflected in the orientalist image of a 'little brown brother' that were reinforced in American discourses of the Philippines during World War II.[298] In reality, and as with many of Japan's acquisitions during the war, a collaborative government was formed. Under the leadership of José P. Laurel, then Associate Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, Japan granted independence to the Second Republic on 14 October 1943. Many of the islands' elite opted for collaboration over imprisonment or execution.[299] Others were undoubtedly enticed by the sense of Asiatic solidarity that underscored Japanese rhetoric. Indeed, as Reynaldo Ileto has persuasively argued, Filipino elites like Laurel sincerely believed in the power of the Second Republic to free the Philippines from Western exploitation, and utilised Japan's occupation to bring a resurgence of Asiatic pride amongst Filipinos.[300] Popular groups such as the Ganap Party, organised by Sakdalista-founder Fidel Ramos, assisted in such campaigns. Although, they represented a minority within the population, and were ironically treated somewhat suspiciously by the Japanese themselves.[301]

[296] Ibid.
[297] Morley to Evans, 21 October 1942, IO, BL, RG IOR/L/I/1/820.
[298] Anon, 'It Wasn't All Altruism', p. 100.
[299] Conference between President José P. Laurel and Ambassador Murata, 5 February 1944, Box 42, JRHP.
[300] Ibid. Ileto, 'Wars with the U.S. and Japan', The Philippines and Japan in America's Shadow, pp. 33-56.
[301] Terami-Wada, Sakdalistas' Struggle for Philippine Independence, pp. 165-197.





Fig. 7 (above): Press shot for the U.S. Army, entitled 'A Young Filipina brings a tattered U.S. flag out of hiding.' AHC.

Fig. 8 (left): Filipino guerrillas brandishing an American flag in a press shot for the U.S. Army. BHL.

Undoubtedly, it was the Huks who presented the greatest challenge to America's positive affirmations of colonialism. Under the leadership of Luis Taruc, a long-time labour organiser and influential member of the PKP, the Huks waged a war of attrition against Japan.[302] Yet, this was a group not solely interested in armed struggle. The Huks were envisioned as the military wing of a social movement.[303] Huk units organised self-defence groups in each barrio they liberated, as well as executive committees and municipal councils to regiment ordinary life amongst the peasantry.[304] In Taruc's words, such institutions were 'historical products of the people's struggle to preserve their lives, properties, and their mode of living from Japanese fascists and their puppets.'[305] To American forces, they were a nuisance that delayed the reoccupation of the archipelago. Though Taruc insisted the Huks remained united in their stand against fascism, the perception was quickly created that tension between guerrilla groups formed part of 'an incipient class war' in Central Luzon.[306]

This was the situation McNutt inherited as he took up his old position as High Commissioner in September of 1945. The threat of revolution was growing, and the islands' insecurity threatened to puncture positive declarations of American colonialism cultivated during World War II. In choosing McNutt to return to the Philippines, Truman stressed his experience as a colonial administrator familiar with the circumstances of the islands.[307] Yet, as with Roosevelt's appointment of Murphy, Truman's decision rested on more than political exigency. Less than ten years earlier, McNutt had called for America to retain the Philippines, urging a 'realistic re-examination' of independence in light of the darkening international atmosphere.[308] What motivated Truman to reappoint McNutt? Why would he opt to send a man who viewed independence for the Philippines as a mistake to oversee the most critical period in the islands' decolonization? McNutt's transition from imperialist to neo-imperialist reveals not only the evolution of American perceptions of the Philippines during World War II, but also the ways a Cold War mindset helped direct this policy in the post-war world.

[302] Memorandum on the Organization of the Hukbalahap, September 1946, Box 18, MARP.
[303] USAFFE Memorandum on the Hukbalahap, 3 March 1945, Box 42, JRHP.
[304] Memorandum from Luis Taruc to Douglas MacArthur & Sergio Osmeña, 13 February 1945, Box 42, JRHP.
[305] Ibid.
[306] Ibid. Russell Brines, 'Guerrillas Form New Force in Many Issues Confronting Islands', *Associated Press*, 7 April [no year], p. 1.
[307] Harry S. Truman, 'The President's News Conference', 6 September 1945, *American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12357 (accessed 14 June 2017).
[308] Address by Paul V. McNutt, 14 March 1938, Box 16, PVMP.

As America's chief emissary to the Philippines, McNutt was a logical choice for Truman. The silver-haired Hoosier served as High Commissioner from 1937 to 1939, inhering the position from Murphy. Like Murphy, his appointment was something of a shock to the foreign policy establishment.[309] Yet, unlike his predecessor, McNutt's interest in foreign affairs was considerably more rounded. The years following World War I crystallised a sense of internationalism in McNutt's thinking. As state then national leader of the AL, he admonished pacifists, communists, and other groups for whom American interests were seemingly not paramount.[310] His criticism of the 1920s disarmament movement demonstrated his infatuation with preparedness, and his unremitting belief in the primacy of American actions formulated a rich vein of internationalism that stayed with him throughout his career.[311]

An internationalist mentality formed the cornerstone of McNutt's intellectual matrix, intimately informing his understanding of the United States and its place in the world. An outwardly mobile worldview also helped Roosevelt appoint him as High Commissioner.[312] Yet, F.D.R. soon had reasons to regret the decision. McNutt developed an opinion of independence that jarred with the administration's position. Having been in the archipelago for under a year, McNutt delivered a controversial radio address urging a 'realistic re-examination' of independence.[313] The reasons for McNutt's position were complex. He decried the dangers of Japan, using the country's occupation of Manchuria as an argument for retention.[314] Likewise, his criticism of American economic policy in the islands looked to frame his argument in a practical context.[315] Yet, underscoring these expedient ideas was a persistent tone of imperial hubris, accentuated by his heartfelt endorsement of American policy in the islands. As McNutt argued, 'the Philippines is an outpost of decency and peace… the only sure outpost for Americanism in the Orient.'[316] This belief in the nobility of American imperialism intersected with his arguments for retention, reflecting the orientalist image of the archipelago espoused since America's pacification of the islands. Like Murphy, McNutt saw the successes of America's "experiment" in Asian democracy as being drawn from the islands' symbiosis

[309] Anon, 'McNutt's Stay Here to be Short', *Philippine Herald*, 18 February 1937, p. 1.
[310] Speech of Paul V. McNutt on the Organized Reserves and the Warning Gesture of Pacifism, undated, Box 24, PVMP.
[311] McNutt to W.J. Patterson, 17 November 1928, Box 4, PVMP. Address of Paul V. McNutt entitled 'Between Two Oceans', undated, Box 24, PVMP.
[312] Kotlowski, Paul V. McNutt, pp. 202-204.
[313] Address by Paul V. McNutt, 14 March 1938, Box 16, PVMP.
[314] Ibid.
[315] Ibid.
[316] Ibid.

with American ideals.[317] His attempts to reconcile this vision with the reality that faced the Philippines was testament to his character as a bullish, assertive figure unafraid to adopt policies that did not suit his superiors. For McNutt, surrendering control at this juncture meant failing to prepare the Filipino people for self-government under the mould of an Americanist democracy.[318] The economic insecurity and threat Japan posed to independence was simply unacceptable at a time of such uncertainty.[319]

McNutt's approach to independence was symptomatic of the fluctuating imperial relationship between the United States and the Philippines during the inter-war years. The disintegration of the international system put the already precarious Commonwealth in a dangerous position. In the United States, calls to surrender the Philippines grew louder, predominantly due to the islands' supposed indefensibility.[320] In the Philippines, arguments over how the nation would defend itself produced renewed anxieties as to the prospects of sovereignty without U.S. protection.[321] In this atmosphere, McNutt's arguments for retention helped bridge the gap between Depression-era understandings of the Philippines and the shifts that occurred as a result of World War II. McNutt's speech was practical and poetic, harkening the imperial spirit of American benevolence as much as the hard-headed pragmatism of a New Deal Democrat. It served as a reaffirmation of U.S. interests in Asia at a time when many Americans were looking to insulate themselves from an increasingly fractured world.[322] McNutt's arguments for retention were more reflective of an internationalist mentality that garnered greater credence after the war. In contrast to many of his peers, who were imbued with an isolationism that looked to draw America back from the Pacific, McNutt was promoting an active image of America, one that aligned with the position of global leadership that formed the cornerstone of American policymaking during the Cold War.[323]

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[317] Ibid.
[318] Ibid.
[319] Ibid. Notes prepared by H.E. Yarnell, Admiral, U.S. Navy Commander in Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, for McNutt on the Sino-Japanese Conflict, 10 January 1938, Box 10, PVMP.
[320] Speech by John W. Haussermann on the Philippines and the International Situation in the Orient, 22 February 1939, Box 20, JRHP. James G. Wingo, 'Japs in the Philippines', *Review of Reviews*, February 1937, pp. 41-43.
[321] Anon, 'Romero Backs McNutt Plan', *Manila Bulletin,* 18 March 1938, p. 1. Anon, 'Roxas Endorses Dominion Government', *Philippine Herald*, 29 April 1938, p. 2.
[322] Gerald P. Nye, 'Is Neutrality Possible for America?', in John N. Andrews & Carl A. Marsden, eds., Tomorrow in the Making (New York, N.Y.: Whittlesey House, 1939), pp. 420-35. Justus D. Doenecke & John E. Wilz, From Isolation to War: 1931-1941, 4th edition (Oxford, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons, 2015).
[323] Anon, 'War Risk Seen in Defense Plan for Philippines', *Philippine Herald*, 20 December 1937, p. 1. Anon, 'Armstrong Says Real Issue Here Not Capacity to Govern but Case of Defense against Foreign Rule', p. 2.

McNutt suffered for taking on Roosevelt. The tension between the two was acute, and McNutt's ambitions of climbing the ladder towards the White House were frustrated by the sense of disdain that fuelled perceptions of him in Roosevelt's cabinet.[324] During the war, McNutt took on the mantle of the War Manpower Commission, a position he did not enjoy or excel in.[325] In this sense, McNutt's first stint as High Commissioner appeared to be the death knell of his public career. It would take the cessation of war to catalyse a renewed interest in McNutt, by which time a new president had entered the White House.

The transfer of power in Washington signalled a grander pivot in the policies America pursued towards the world. Scholars have repeatedly pointed out the discordances between Roosevelt and Truman's foreign policies.[326] Roosevelt was a worldly, East Coast elitist. He thrived on ambiguity, and used his deft hand in diplomacy to mediate between stakeholders during World War II.[327] In contrast, Truman was a parochial Midwesterner with a penchant for simplicity.[328] He viewed the world in no-nonsense, black and white terms, and used the lens of history to elucidate simple solutions to complex problems.[329] Inhering the mantle of American leadership forged under Roosevelt, Truman used his blunt persona and decisive style to advance the division of the world along ideological lines. His early forays in foreign policy during negotiations at Potsdam helped usher in the 'Iron Curtain' that fell over Europe, as Soviet premier Joseph Stalin looked to consolidate his nation's gains in Eastern Europe and the Eurasian peripheries.[330]

The hardening of Cold War tensions held profound ramifications for the struggles of dependent peoples. From Italy to Iran, Poland to the Philippines, new leaders and nationalist movements looked to the polarity of East and West to answer for their national development.[331] In Washington, the Truman

[324] Roosevelt to McNutt, 1 March 1937, Box 9, PVMP. Reeves to Hayden, 20 April 1938, Box 41, JRHP.
[325] Kotlowski, Paul V. McNutt, pp. 341-374.
[326] Wilson D. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1995).
[327] Mark A. Stoler, 'The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: Flawed, but Superior to the Competition', Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign Policies, pp. 113-183.
[328] Spalding, The First Cold Warrior. Arnold A. Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 2002).
[329] Ibid.
[330] Winston Churchill, 'Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill Declares an Iron Curtain has Descended Over Europe', 5 March 1946, in Dennis Merrill & Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914 (London, U.K.: Wadsworth, 2010), pp. 195-197.
[331] Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 86-90. Roger E. Kanet, 'The Superpower Quest for Empire: The Cold War and Soviet Support for 'Wars of National Liberation', *Cold War History*, vol. 6, no. 3 (August 2006), pp. 332-333. Michael E. Latham, 'Introduction: Modernization, International History, and the Cold War World', in David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele & Michael E. Latham, eds., Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (Boston, M.A.: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), pp. 1-7.

administration looked to capitalise on the Rooseveltian rhetoric around decolonization to advance the cause of American leadership.[332] That McNutt held an important place in instigating this policy shift was apparent in his reassignment to Manila. Yet, McNutt's appointment did not occur in a vacuum. The reasoning behind Truman's decision reveal not only the emerging contours of a global Cold War, but also the ways this foreign policy mindset helped guide America's decolonization of the Philippines.

The Truman administration confronted Philippine independence in a markedly different atmosphere to that which confronted Roosevelt during the inter-war years. The United States was on the back foot with the Philippines during the 1930s. In this respect, Roosevelt looked to the Commonwealth to answer invariably domestic problems. After World War II, however, the United States had firmly taken on the mantle of global responsibility. No longer cowed by the Depression, Truman and his administration looked assertively outside the Western hemisphere to promote American ideas onto a global stage.[333] The onset of Cold War, and the crisis of empire that accompanied it, provided the legitimacy for a confident, outwardly looking foreign policy that couched American hegemony as a construction of leadership. In this sense, the Philippines appeared to be the vanguard of America's decolonization policy.[334] As an American client-state, the islands offered an opportunity to demonstrate the universal applicability of American ideas. This attempt to hold the archipelago as a bastion of decolonization forced a change in American understandings of the Philippines. Direct control was no longer an option. Instead, Washington would encourage Filipino freedom, knowing it conformed to the ideals America wanted to espouse.[335]

That McNutt concurred with this administrative awakening was apparent in his dramatic reversal of opinion.[336] No longer advocating retaining the Philippines, McNutt's position evolved during World War II. Assessing the impact of the Japanese occupation on behalf of Truman, McNutt was struck by the wholesale destruction of the Philippines.[337] What concerned him, however, was not only the islands' precarious situation, but also the dissatisfaction it generated. The wanton devastation that accompanied the

[332] Department of State Press Release on the Roosevelt Administration's Foreign Policy Positions, 21 March 1944, Box 8, MQP. Directives of President Truman concerning the Philippine Islands, undated, Box 43, MARP.
[333] Hart, Empire of Ideas, pp. 107-131. Parker, Hearts, Minds, Voices, pp. 16-17.
[334] Paul V. McNutt, 'Democracy on Trial in the Orient', V*ital Speeches of the Day*, vol. 12, no. 12 (April 1946), pp. 362-366. NBC Broadcast by Paul V. McNutt on 'The Future of the Philippines', 23 February 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[335] Harry S. Truman, 'Statement by the President Concerning Philippine Independence', 5 May 1945, *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12246 (accessed 30 May 2017).
[336] Report on the Philippines by Paul V. McNutt, 1946, Box 12, PVMP.
[337] Ibid. Kotlowski, Paul V. McNutt, p. 384.

war painted a harrowing picture for many in Asia.[338] McNutt was quick to acknowledge this, suggesting the Filipino experience was far from unique.[339] He feared for American prestige against a backdrop of economic hardship and political disorder.[340] If nothing else, McNutt reasoned, the Philippines could be the still point of an unstable continent, one that could challenge the argument propagated by rivals like the Soviet Union that post-war deprivation was best offset by a revolutionary model of communist development.[341] This would require not only heavy U.S. involvement, but also a level of cooperation and cohesion between America and its allies. In this sense, McNutt accepted the need for independence to exhibit the legitimacy of ongoing interest in the islands.

McNutt's decision to return to the Philippines offers tantalising evidence for how a Cold War mindset helped steer America's post-war decolonization policy, and the ways this nascent foreign policy influenced American imperialism in the Philippines. The Truman administration was keen to deliver on the legacy of American colonialism.[342] The islands' experience during World War II made a successful transition to sovereignty even more vital in the context of America's position as guardian of the 'free peoples of the world.'[343] Despite the imminence of independence, it was important to project positive affirmations of American actions to counter the argument that America itself was taking on the reins of Western imperialism.[344] McNutt's policy-reversal reflected a wider administrative awakening as to the importance of positive assertions for American actions overseas. Washington exhibited its position of leadership as testament to American universality. In Europe, images of assistance under the Marshall Plan were coupled with proclamations of American benevolence.[345] Similarly, in policies such as the Point Four programme, where assistance to developing countries was offered in an understanding of mutual cooperation, the crux of the problem was how to ensure such assistance was positively received by others.[346] In this sense, Philippine independence appeared to be a pivotal weapon in the burgeoning battle for Asian hearts and

[338] Gruhl, Imperial Japan's World War II, pp. 69-105.
[339] An Announcement for the International News Service by Paul V. McNutt, Undated, Box 10, PVMP.
[340] Paul V. McNutt, 'Democracy on Trial in the Orient', V*ital Speeches of the Day*, vol. 12, no. 12 (April 1946), pp. 362-366.
[341] Ibid.
[342] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 3 February 1947, FRUS, 1947, Volume VI, The Far East, Document 78, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d78 (accessed 20 November 2016). Harry S. Truman, 'Statement by the President Concerning Philippine Independence', 5 May 1945, *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12246 (accessed 30 May 2017).
[343] Harry S. Truman, 'The Truman Doctrine Calls for Aid to Greece and Turkey to Contain Totalitarianism', 12 March 1947, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II, p. 202.
[344] Parker, Hearts, Minds, Voices, pp. 16-17.
[345] Hart, Empire of Ideas, pp. 123-129.
[346] Parker, Hearts, Minds, Voices, pp. 29-40.

minds. Amidst an international atmosphere of uncertainty, where new nations looked to the polarity of East and West to affirm their national aspirations, the Philippines had an important role to play in convincing the world that America was the right team to get behind.[347] Yet, as suggested in the next section, this policy had its shortcomings, as figures like McNutt were forced to temper their image of an independent Philippines against the realities of a nation on the verge of disintegration.

Part Two

The principal mission facing McNutt was economic rehabilitation, and his focus was on securing two pieces of legislation deemed critical to the islands' success.[348] The first, entitled the Bell Trade Act (1946) [BTA], was sponsored by Missourian congressman C. Jasper Bell, and written by McNutt, his staff, and Carlos Romulo, a key figure in the Osmeña cabinet and the newly elected Roxas government. It centred on aiding the islands' economic recovery through trade, and offered special bilateral trading privileges in return for American access to Philippine natural resources.[349] The second, named the Philippine Rehabilitation Act (1946) [PRA], was authored by Maryland senator Millard B. Tydings (father of the bill that created the Commonwealth) and edited by McNutt. It provided the Philippines with funds for starting its journey as an independent state, legislating $120 million for the reconstruction of infrastructure, $100 million for military equipment, and $400 million to revitalise the economy.[350] Despite the precarious nature of the Philippine government, McNutt felt optimistic for the islands' future. In his words, rehabilitation presented a 'tremendous opportunity' to 'demonstrate to the entire Pacific world democracy-in-action [sic.].'[351] Here, American economic might could validate the neutralist vision of the Philippines as an arbiter for American policy in Asia, and exhibit the developmental promise of liberal-capitalism to the watching world.

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[347] Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 86-90. Kanet, 'The Superpower Quest for Empire', pp. 332-333. Latham, 'Introduction', Staging Growth, pp. 1-7. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 13 May 1947, FRUS, 1947, Volume VI, The Far East, Document 114, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v06/d114 (accessed 27 November 2016). Broadcast in the 'Our Foreign Policy' Series, 5 July 1947, Box 22, PVMP. Statement of U.S. High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt before the Senate Finance Committee, 2 April 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[348] Report on the Philippines by Paul V. McNutt, 1946, Box 12, PVMP.
[349] Anon, 'Summary, Bell Trade Act', The Philippines Reader, pp. 88-90.
[350] Renato Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past (Quezon City, Philippines: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1999), p. 202.
[351] Address of Paul V. McNutt to the Manila Rotary Club, 10 January 1946, Box 22, PVMP.

Like the social engineering projects undertaken by Murphy, McNutt's ambitions in rehabilitating the Philippines centred on developmental goals. The notion that the islands needed to remain firmly embedded within the liberal-capitalist marketplace after independence lent credence to the package's importance as an indicator for American intentions in the Third World.[352] After all, the United States fought hard to refashion the economic order after World War II. Under the Bretton Woods system (BWS), the creation of financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank focused on making America the guarantor of international capitalism.[353] In this sense, Philippine rehabilitation served several pertinent goals. It redrew the Philippine economy into an American mould, built on vast sums of private capital that would reenergise the islands' creaking export market.[354] It also served as an indication to new, observant nations as to what to expect from an American aid package.[355]

This attempt to recast American empire as an informal project of assistance spoke to the broader transition in American understandings of imperialism. In American eyes, the Philippines were a unique beneficiary for economic aid. The islands had been an outpost of American policy throughout the colonial regime, and offered opportunities to advance the cause of American leadership by demonstrating the developmental promise of American capital.[356] Interestingly, other nations struggling with the toll of war were encouraged to enter the global marketplace under the mould of the American-sponsored BWS, encouraging private enterprise and tariff reductions to regulate the flow of capital between states.[357] The Philippines, meanwhile, were given an exclusive package of bilateral trade and investment. This deal, portrayed as a just reward for Filipino loyalty against Japan, secured the archipelago's position within the U.S. orbit whilst demonstrating the power of American capital to lift emerging nations out of economic deprivation.[358] Yet, it also articulated the imperial lens that underlined American understandings of the Philippines. The notion that the islands were unable to compete in a global marketplace without American

[352] Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 18 April 1947, Box 39, MARP. Statement of U.S. High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt before the Senate Finance Committee, 2 April 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[353] Andrew L. Yarrow, Measuring America: How Economic Growth Came to Define American Greatness in the Late Twentieth Century (Amherst, M.A.: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010). Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006).
[354] Text of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act with proposed amendments, undated, Box 39, MARP. Philippine War Damage Survey by War Damage Corporation, 15 November 1945, Box 9, SOP.
[355] Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 18 April 1947, Box 39, MARP.
[356] Ibid.
[357] Frieden, Global Capitalism, pp. 254-263.
[358] Speech by Paul V. McNutt entitled 'The Philippines – A Challenge to American Business', 19 May 1947, Box 22, PVMP.

assistance helped propagate rehabilitation as an extension of America's paternalistic promise to uplift the archipelago.[359]

McNutt sold rehabilitation within this developmental mentality. He viewed American policy as globally significant, emblematic of attempts to foster a sense of friendliness and cohesion between dependent peoples struggling with the economic hardships that accompanied the end of World War II.[360] In doing so, McNutt relied on his internationalist understanding of America's place in world affairs. He looked to the Philippines as testament to the compassionate form of colonialism other imperial powers should emulate, and projected the cordiality in which America conducted its relationship with the Philippines as an indicator for the synergy between their interests.[361] Indeed, one of the first missions McNutt undertook upon his return was to accompany the newly elected Roxas to Washington, where the pair commenced a whirlwind tour to discuss rehabilitation with Truman.[362] The trip encompassed radio broadcasts, film reels, and public meetings, broadcast alongside propaganda efforts in an attempt to project rehabilitation as an indicator for American intentions in Asia.[363]

The relationship between Roxas and McNutt deserves attention, as it highlights the imperial perceptions McNutt exhibited towards the Philippines, as well as the ways a Cold War mentality informed his actions. The sense of affability that coloured their relationship was symptomatic not only of the collaborative colonial structures cultivated under Western imperialism, but also the way elites like Roxas used these relationships to their advantage. After all, McNutt did much to assist Roxas' ascension to the presidency in the pivotal elections of April 1946. Between the two candidates, Roxas and Osmeña, McNutt viewed Roxas as a stronger proposition for enhancing America's prospects.[364] Privately, Paul preferred Roxas as both a statesman and a friend, viewing him as more capable and energetic than the ageing and

[359] Ibid. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 18 April 1947, Box 39, MARP.
[360] Address of Paul V. McNutt to the Manila Rotary Club, 10 January 1946, Box 22, PVMP. NBC Broadcast by Paul V. McNutt on 'The Future of the Philippines', 23 February 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[361] Introductory Remarks by Paul V. McNutt, 15 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[362] Public Domain Footage, President Roxas meets Truman and gives speech thanking America Newsreel, 6 May 2012 [video], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4oOE3iYn1RU&list=PLmaMb1AQ91bIz8p_f5Y-jiKh15WpUi7x9&index=41 (accessed 23 November 2015).
[363] Ibid. Radio Address by High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt, 30 March 1946, Box 22, PVMP. Radio Address by High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt, 20 January 1946, Box 22, PVMP. NBC Broadcast in the 'Our Foreign Policy' Series, 5 July 1947, Box 22, PVMP. NBC Broadcast by Paul V. McNutt on 'The Future of the Philippines', 23 February 1946, Box 22, PVMP. Message of President Roxas, Delivered by Ambassador Romulo at the Institute of International Affairs, 9 January 1947, Box 12, PVMP. Remarks by Paul V. McNutt Broadcast on WINX, 2 December 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[364] Kotlowski, Paul V. McNutt, p. 382.

diminutive Osmeña.[365] A lasting friendship was forged during McNutt's first stint as High Commissioner.[366] Late nights debating, drinking, and playing poker helped endear Roxas to McNutt as a capable and authoritative figure in Filipino politics.[367] This friendship helped Roxas create a public perception of influence. Roxas played on his connection to influential figures like McNutt, demonstrating his self-styled persona as a likeable leader with strong credentials and considerable influence.[368] In comparison to the frail and infirm Osmeña, whose government had been ineffective in alleviating the Philippines' post-war woes, Roxas portrayed himself as the more concrete choice.[369]

McNutt's proclivity for Roxas stemmed from more than personality. During the election, Osmeña accepted the support of the Huk-fronted Democratic Alliance, a confederation of trade unions and peasant organisations endorsed by the PKP. This alliance worried American officials, including McNutt, who viewed Osmeña's candidacy as extreme.[370] In affirming his support for Roxas, McNutt looked beyond the locality of the election to the wider chaos that was engulfing the region. Everywhere around Southeast Asia, uncertainty was rampant. In China, the battle for legitimate governance was engulfed in the ongoing quagmire of the Chinese Civil War. During American attempts at mediating a resolution in the brief ceasefire that occurred following the war, U.S. Special Envoy to China George C. Marshall reinforced American sympathies for self-determination through U.S. policy in the Philippines.[371] Yet, for many American officials, the agitation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was seen as an influence, both ideologically and materially, for the unrest in the islands.[372] Aside from the situation in China, the return of colonial rule in regions like the DEI helped spark protracted fears over instability, where the certainty of Western influence was far from secure.[373]

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[365] Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, pp. 186-187. Kotlowski, Paul V. McNutt, pp. 381-382.
[366] Ibid.
[367] Roxas to McNutt, 12 March 1947, Box 8, MARP.
[368] Speech of Manuel A. Roxas on his candidacy as President of the Commonwealth, 22 March 1946, Box 11, MARP. Anon, 'Philippine Rivals in Final Vote Plea', *New York Times*, 21 April 1946, p. 26.
[369] L. Dan Romine, 'Civil War Predicted in the Philippines', *Washington Post*, 14 July 1946, p. 2.
[370] Insert for *Collier's* Magazine by Paul V. McNutt, 29 April 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[371] Minutes of Meeting between General Marshall and General Chou En-Lai, 3 June 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume IX, The Far East: China, Document 500, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v09/d500 (accessed 20 December 2015).
[372] Statement of U.S. High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt before the Senate Finance Committee, 2 April 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Press Release from the Office of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippines on agrarian unrest in Central Luzon, 29 January 1946, Box 11, PVMP. USAFFE Report on the Hukbalahap, 3 March 1945, Box 42, JRHP.
[373] Nicholas Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia, and the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 173-175. McMahon, Colonialism and Cold War, pp. 137-167.

Within this context, McNutt's attempts at securing a friendly face in the Philippine executive appeared critical. His attraction to Roxas spoke to the imperial lens in which he operated, as well as the sense of insecurity that coloured his perceptions of post-war Asia. In addressing the urgency of the election, McNutt conflated the importance of creating a stable government with the sense of chaos and confusion that blighted the region.[374] His support for Roxas was constructed on Western orientations of good governance.[375] In the minds of policymakers like McNutt, Roxas was the perfect encapsulation of a postcolonial leader. His youthful demeanour, Western emulations of speech and dress, and incessant overtures towards Western styles of government made him an attractive prospect for advancing American ambitions.[376] In contrast, Osmeña was perceived as a parochial figure, easily swayed by emotional arguments and ignorant of the dangers that surrounded the Philippines.[377] That Roxas was envisioned as the concrete choice to steer the Philippines' development was emblematic of the qualified form of nationalism that American policymakers were keen to cultivate.[378] The Philippines were exclusively America's dependency. This sense of unilateral security offered an opportunity to enforce a purely American vision of economic development, framed within the promise of modernity that underscored American imperialism in the islands.

This understanding between Roxas and McNutt assisted attempts at selling rehabilitation to Truman, the United States, and the wider world. The discussions in Washington were supervised by McNutt, who stressed Roxas' indication 'by word and deed' to 'follow American pattern[s] of government and retain closest ties with us in all matters.'[379] In advocating rehabilitation, McNutt articulated the image of veiled neutrality, enhanced by a desire to see the Philippines succeed in order to evidence the

[374] NBC Broadcast by Paul V. McNutt on 'The Future of the Philippines', 23 February 1946, Box 22, PVMP. Paul V. McNutt, 'Democracy on Trial in the Orient', V*ital Speeches of the Day*, vol. 12, no. 12 (April 1946), pp. 362-366.
[375] Ibid.
[376] Public Domain Footage, President Roxas meets Truman and gives speech thanking America Newsreel, 6 May 2012 [video], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4oOE3iYn1RU&list=PLmaMb1AQ91bIz8p_f5Y-jiKh15WpUi7x9&index=41 (accessed 23 November 2015).
[377] Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, p. 187. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Lockhart) to the Under Secretary of State (Grew), 26 February 1945, FRUS, 1945, Volume VI, The British Commonwealth & Far East, Document 878, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v06/d878 (accessed 20 January 2018). Radio Letter from Paul V. McNutt to Sergio Osmeña on allegations of "Terroristic Practices" during Philippine Presidential Election, 12 April 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[378] United States High Commissioner in the Philippines (McNutt) to Richard R. Ely, 14 June 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 668, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d668 (accessed 8 December 2015).
[379] Ibid.

developmental promise of American capital.[380] This understanding rested on the ability of figures like McNutt to cultivate collaborative imperial relationships with Filipino elites. McNutt stressed Roxas' loyalty to American visions of development, presenting them as testament to the universality of American policy.[381] Roxas was more than happy to cooperate, in part because of his awareness that failing to garner support from the United States would spell disaster for his government. In a broadcast shared with McNutt, Roxas spoke directly to these assumptions, claiming 'the temper of our minds and our beliefs is almost identical to yours.'[382] Utilising the imperial perceptions that guided American actions in the Philippines, Roxas positioned rehabilitation as the natural end-point for America's benevolent colonialism.[383]

McNutt aided Roxas by rallying the U.S. Congress to accept the terms of rehabilitation. Roadblocks continually stalled the issue, all whilst the islands teetered on the brink of anarchy.[384] In a letter sent to Osmeña, Romulo wrote of the 'disturbing' attitude amongst American statesmen towards rehabilitation.[385] Complaining of a tendency to side-track rehabilitation in favour of aiding Europe, Romulo bemoaned the resilience of U.S. policymakers to grant economic assistance.[386] This attitude was emblematic of congressional approaches to Philippine rehabilitation. The early years of the Cold War were invariably focused on Europe, where widespread political turmoil and economic prostration threatened immediate American security.[387] Concentrating on this perceivably more important theatre, many legislators took Filipino loyalty for granted.[388] This rested partly on the fact the Philippine government was already reliant on American assistance. Yet, it also demonstrated the orientalised perceptions of the islands as loyally

[380] Press Release from the Office of the United States High Commissioner on Manuel Roxas' visit to Washington, 6 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Joint Statement of McNutt and Roxas, 22 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[381] United States High Commissioner in the Philippines (McNutt) to Richard R. Ely, 14 June 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 668, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d668 (accessed 8 December 2015). Press Release from the Office of the United States High Commissioner on the Outcome of the Philippine Presidential Election, 14 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[382] Quoted in Public Domain Footage, President Roxas Philippines meets Truman and gives speech thanking America Newsreel, 6 May 2012 [video], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4oOE3iYn1RU&list=PLmaMb1AQ91bIz8p_f5Y-jiKh15WpUi7x9&index=41 (accessed 23 November 2015).
[383] Statement by President-Elect Manuel A. Roxas, 11 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[384] Romulo to Osmeña, 28 August 1945, Box 8, SOP.
[385] Ibid.
[386] Ibid.
[387] David W. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America, and Postwar Reconstruction (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 1992). Mark Mazower, Jessica Reinisch & David Feldman, eds., Post-War Reconstruction in Europe: International Perspectives, 1945-1949 (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2011).
[388] Memorandum for the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission by Harry B. Hawes, 19 April 1945, Box 92, FMP. Philippine War Relief Report on Field Operations for the Year 1946, 31 December 1946, Box 39, MARP.

dependent on the United States. Indeed, assumptions of loyalty placed Philippine rehabilitation at an initially low ebb, constructed as they were on expectations that the Philippines would always wait for America.[389]

McNutt relied on the Cold War context of advancing American leadership as a persuasive argument for rehabilitation. In several speeches before Congress, he noted the dangers of allowing dissatisfaction to fester in the Philippines.[390] He argued 'to turn a deaf ear to their needs' would make 'us shameless in the eyes of the world,' and suggested the Soviet Union was looking to American neglect in the islands as evidence of false leadership.[391] His focus on how rehabilitation would be received by the world lent credence to the package's value as a signifier for American intentions in Asia. The concoction had the desired effect. Congress approved the terms of the PRA in April 1946 in conjunction with the BTA. Together, the policies were heralded as a triumph for American leadership, and mirrored the expansion of capital to foster strategic gains in Europe and elsewhere across the globe.[392] As one congressman argued, 'it will save us money, like this Greece and Turkey bill, all through Asia, if the Filipinos are able to make a go of it, with no domination but friendly assistance from the United States.'[393]

Whilst Roxas and McNutt were successful in garnering support for rehabilitation in America, the issue of how such pronouncements were received amongst the postcolonial world presented the greatest challenge in their attempts at positively projecting rehabilitation. Soviet strategies framed Philippine rehabilitation as emblematic of the faux-independence the islands were to receive, and the qualified form of nationalism Washington was keen to replicate.[394] In India, Iran, and Egypt, countries McNutt himself would visit on his journey home, suspicions of American interests blighted perceptions of the islands' rehabilitation.[395] Likewise, in nations around Southeast Asia, understandings of American policy centred on imperialist attempts to assert economic hegemony over prostrate populations.[396]

[389] Roxas to Hawes, 14 September 1945, Box 7, MARP. Roxas to Truman, 3 July 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[390] Statement of Paul V. McNutt before House Ways and Means Committee, 15 February 1946, Box 22, PVMP. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 18 April 1947, Box 39, MARP. Statement of U.S. High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt before the Senate Finance Committee, 2 April 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[391] Statement of Paul V. McNutt before House Ways and Means Committee, 15 February 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[392] Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 18 April 1947, Box 39, MARP.
[393] Ibid.
[394] Charles B. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 301-303.
[395] Kotlowski, Paul V. McNutt, p. 403.
[396] Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 92. Parker, Hearts, Minds, Voices, p. 30.

In confronting the schism between American policy and its understanding amongst dependent peoples, McNutt and his staff looked to the willingness of Filipino elites to endorse American ideas in order to demonstrate the authenticity of calls for U.S. involvement. It was publicly reinforced that the Filipino people courted America, and ongoing interest in the islands stemmed from a desire to see self-determination prevail in Asia.[397] Roxas himself bemoaned those who 'direct the national attention… at fancied fears of imperialistic aggression.'[398] McNutt concurred. Denying the 'selfish advantages' of American economic interests, he claimed the only benefit America hoped to gain was 'the respect and friendship of the peoples of the Orient.'[399] As Paul argued, it was the Philippines that looked to America, couched within a historical understanding of gratitude that fostered determination for democracy and liberal-capitalism.[400]

McNutt's approach garnered some results. Burma's U Saw paid homage to the American approach to the Philippines, suggesting it was a fulfilment of the 'Atlantic Charter undertaking' espoused during the war.[401] He argued America had 'earned the gratitude of the world' by aiding the Philippines, and heralded the American approach to decolonization as a 'noble example' for the European powers.[402] Such assertions naturally irked Western allies. The British were aware the American standing amongst its dependent peoples failed to match that of its own prestige. As one diplomat lamented, 'public opinion in Burma is all too apt to take American propaganda about the Philippines at its face value.'[403]

Such pronouncements were exactly the kind of attitude statesmen such as McNutt wanted to engender. The opinion in dependencies across the world was that the legitimacy of colonial control was fast eroding, and the United States was keen to be on the right side of the debate, if only to quell suggestions that America itself was acting imperiously.[404] In this sense, rehabilitation was held as a distinct success, not only for maintaining the developmental vision of American imperialism in an independent Philippines, but

[397] Statement of Paul V. McNutt on Passage of Tydings Bill, 30 April 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Radio Interview between Paul V. McNutt & Barnet Nover, 10 April 1946, Box 22, PVMP. Joint Statement of McNutt and Roxas, 22 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[398] Inaugural Address of Roxas, 28 May 1946, Box 2, MARP.
[399] Ambassador McNutt's Speech before the Philippine Bar, 8 May 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[400] Ibid.
[401] Quoted in Memorandum from Burma Office to Foreign Office on Statement by U Saw on Philippine Independence, 5 July 1946, IO, BL, RG IOR/M/4/2459.
[402] Ibid.
[403] Morley to Wilson-Young, 5 February 1946, IO, BL, RG IOR/M/4/2459.
[404] Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 86-90. Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State, 7 November 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 716, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d716 (accessed 24 July 2017).

for projecting that influence in a way that endeared other dependent peoples to look favourably on America's record in the islands.[405]

McNutt's approach to rehabilitation was practical and idealistic. He viewed the U.S. relationship with the islands as globally significant; a way for America to demonstrate its magnanimity in dealing with post-war economic prostration that offered an alternative to communist models.[406] Yet, such ideas for enhancing American prestige were persistently underlined by an imperial hubris indicative of American orientalist images of the islands. Like Murphy, McNutt viewed Filipino inability to answer for the islands' economic chaos as arguments for intervention.[407] For McNutt, America stood in the role 'of a parent' whose 'child has come of age.'[408] As such, McNutt prided himself on evidencing the integration of American ideas into the Philippine government. The problem was this was a position endorsed only by a section of Filipino society. Rehabilitation was restricted to private capital and investment.[409] The aid reinforced a government rife with corruption and mismanagement.[410] For those in the barrios, promises of economic alleviation meant little, as power was kept in the hands of landowners who already wielded positions of authority. The result was a fractured vision for the independent Philippines. On one side were elites like Roxas; illustrados eager to accept American aid as it guaranteed the status quo of Filipino society to remain in their favour. On the other side were groups such as the Huks, a movement that rejected American involvement in the islands' economic development.[411] This disparity spoke to the dichotomised nationalism that existed in the Philippines, and reflected the dissonance between American perceptions of development and the ways they were received by indigenous actors. Ironically, rehabilitation helped stir local agitation against intervention, despite being heralded as an indicator for American engagement with Asia.[412]

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405 Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 18 April 1947, Box 39, MARP.
406 Partial Text of Statement by High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt before the Senate Finance Committee, 4 April 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Joint Statement of McNutt and Roxas, 22 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
407 Remarks by Paul V. McNutt at the Democratic Women's Club, 2 December 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
408 Ibid.
409 Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, pp. 193-195. Stephen R. Shalom, 'Philippine Acceptance of the Bell Trade Act of 1946: A Study of Manipulatory Democracy', *Pacific Historical Review*, vol. 49, no. 3 (August 1980), p. 501.
410 William J. Pomeroy, The Philippines: Colonialism, Collaboration, and Resistance (New York, N.Y.: International Publishers, 1992), p. 153.
411 Statement by Mateo del Castillo & Luis Taruc sent to the President of the Philippines, Manuel Roxas, on the stand of the Hukbalahap, 17 August 1946, Box 18, MARP. Memorandum from Luis Taruc to Douglas MacArthur & Sergio Osmeña, 13 February 1945, Box 42, JRHP.
412 Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 18 April 1947, Box 39, MARP. Press Release of Statement from Paul V. McNutt urging President Truman to pass the Bell Trade Rehabilitation Bill, 27 January 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Menguito to Roxas, 21 February 1947, Box 34, MARP.

McNutt's understanding of the Cold War influenced American perceptions of Philippine independence in several pertinent ways. Fundamentally, it demonstrated how the conflict evolved to incorporate decolonization as a constructive facet of U.S. policy, and how images of Philippine independence became indicators of American intentions in the Third World. The globalisation of the Cold War demonstrated the symbiosis between metropole and colony by drawing Philippine rehabilitation into a broader, abstract debate over how to engage the hearts and minds of Asian peoples. McNutt's opinions of rehabilitation help illuminate why the islands were considered such a useful selling point for enticing emerging states into the Western orbit. Despite his reservations, McNutt wanted independence for the Philippines. The Filipino people were, in his words, 'our ambassadors in the Orient.'[413] To start the islands' on a sound financial footing would demonstrate the ennoble nature of American policy, and highlight the benefits of modernity forged under liberal-capitalism. As with other Cold War hotspots, the utilisation of American capital to demonstrate the universality of American policy made considerable sense. After all, the Soviet Union had already found the centre for advancing its own model of development under the satellites of Eastern Europe.[414] Yet, McNutt's own predisposition for viewing American actions in a Cold War context ultimately blighted his attempts at securing genuine sovereignty for the Philippines. McNutt neglected the consequences of tying the islands so closely to the United States. In doing so, he exhibited a long-held American tendency to overlook local, systemic issues in favour of presenting a cohesive image of American diplomacy to the outside world. Paradoxically, then, the neutrality that McNutt wanted to create for the Philippines, couched as it was in native endorsements of American policy, was actually stripped away by policies of his own making.

[413] NBC Broadcast by Paul V. McNutt, 23 February 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[414] Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 29-72.



Fig. 9: McNutt sits alongside Roxas, Elpidio Quirino, and MacArthur to observe the inauguration of the Philippine Republic. Left to right: Roxas, McNutt, Quirino, MacArthur. AHC.

Part Three

America's rehabilitation of the Philippines tied the two nations together like never before, as the islands confronted independence with a muddled perception amongst the outside world. Whilst U.S. diplomats were instructed to highlight independence as an example of leadership, the Philippines entered the theatre of nations with the perception of an American lapdog in the minds of many dependent peoples.[415] Allies like Britain looked at independence with smug satisfaction, arguing 'independence for the Philippines is largely for external show.'[416] Other powers took a more caustic tone. Having refused to recognise the new republic, *Pravda* (the official newspaper of the Soviet state and a vital propaganda organ of the Kremlin) released an article belittling Philippine independence and suggesting America had manufactured the nation's liberty to further its imperial ambitions.[417] American observers were not blind to such slurs.[418] Indeed, and as evidenced in this final section, the gap between America's vision for the

[415] Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives Abroad, 18 July 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 686, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d686 (accessed 8 December 2015).
[416] Memorandum for Governor of Burma Regarding Status of the Philippines, IO, BL, RG IOR/M/4/2459.
[417] Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State, 21 October 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 715, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d715 (accessed 8 December 2015).
[418] Ibid.

Philippine state and the realities in which it operated served to undermine the position of leadership actors like McNutt were keen to cultivate, as native resistance to U.S. policy threatened to puncture positive affirmations of American empire.

Undoubtedly, the greatest obstruction to positive images of Philippine independence was the growing tenacity of the Hukbalahap. Formed during World War II, the Huks were a physical manifestation of the dichotomised nationalism that existed in the islands.[419] The group's aims centred on an agrarian, socialistic vision of Philippine society, free from foreign domination and socially attuned to the Filipino masses.[420] This philosophy bore some similarities to other revolutionary socialist movements in Asia. Most notably, it was the Maoist CCP that provided the greatest inspiration for Taruc and his cadre of fighters.[421] Taruc held a lifelong fascination with agrarian socialism.[422] As such, he lent heavily on the Maoist ideology, espousing similar notions of dismantling feudalism, rooting out imperialism, and pursuing class struggle against the political elite.[423] His emphasis on agrarianism as the centre for class struggle was apparent in his infatuation with land reform.[424] Yet, Taruc was first and foremost a nationalist. His interest in socialism was born out of local factors like land tenancy, feudalism, and class divisions in Filipino society.[425]

After independence, McNutt and his staff placed a renewed emphasis on defeating the Huks.[426] In doing so, they conflated the group's emergence with a wider narrative of communist subversion across Asia.[427] For McNutt and many in Washington, the natural antidote to containing the threat of revolution was maintaining an assertive American military presence on the continent.[428] The problem, as with much

[419] USAFFE Memorandum on the Hukbalahap, 3 March 1945, Box 42, JRHP.
[420] Statement by Mateo del Castillo & Luis Taruc sent to the President of the Philippines, Manuel Roxas, on the stand of the Hukbalahap, 17 August 1946, Box 18, MARP.
[421] Memorandum for Roxas on the Capability of the MPC to Deal with the Huks, 19 August 1946, Box 18, MARP.
[422] Luis Taruc, Born of the People (New York, N.Y.: International Publishers, 1953). Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger: The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1967).
[423] Mao Zedong, 'Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army', 10 October 1947, in Bob Blaisdell, ed., The Communist Manifesto and Other Revolutionary Writings (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2003), pp. 259-264.
[424] Statement by Mateo del Castillo & Luis Taruc sent to the President of the Philippines, Manuel Roxas, on the stand of the Hukbalahap, 17 August 1946, Box 18, MARP. Memorandum from Luis Taruc to Douglas MacArthur & Sergio Osmeña, 13 February 1945, Box 42, JRHP.
[425] Ibid. Taruc, Born of the People. Taruc, He Who Rides the Tiger.
[426] Telegram from Philippine Ambassador to Joaquin Elizalde relaying McNutt's position on the Huk Threat, 4 September 1946, Box 3, MARP. Speech by Paul V. McNutt on rehabilitation and agrarian unrest in Central Luzon, 27 November 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[427] Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State, 8 September 1946, FRUS, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 698, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d698 (accessed 10 December 2015). Broadcast in the 'Our Foreign Policy' Series, 5 July 1947, Box 22, PVMP.
[428] Speech by Paul V. McNutt on the Significance of America's Military Mission in the Philippines, 8 September 1946, Box 22, PVMP. Memorandum for the Ambassador from A.M. Jones, Office of the Chief United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of the Philippines, 6 March 1947, Box 12, PVMP. Radio Address by High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt before GI Forum, 20 January 1946, Box 22, PVMP.

of America's post-war policy in Asia, was how to do so without rousing the wrath of newly independent peoples. In this respect, the Philippines offered the perfect solution. Already envisioned as a bastion of American engagement with Asia, the battle for extending military assistance to the islands took up much of McNutt's ambassadorship.[429] His arguments focused on making the archipelago into a bulwark against communist expansion, and he did so by relying on the Filipino elite to endorse such ambitions.[430] Unfortunately, this approach had its drawbacks, as elites like Roxas looked to American military might to consolidate their monopoly on power.[431]

McNutt's understanding of the Huks was symptomatic of the cultural myopia that blighted American responses to Philippine radicalism. As in the case of Murphy and the Sakdalistas, McNutt's office failed to address the systemic factors that facilitated Huk expansion. As early as 1945, American officials were focused on the importance of outside assistance, conflating continental calls for revolution with the situation in Central Luzon.[432] Though the Soviet Union bore some suspicion, more pertinent to American and Filipino observers was the influence of the CCP.[433] A historical source of agitation, perceptions of China in the American and Filipino mindset had long coloured accusations of subversion.[434] During the 19th century, a distinct class of Chinese merchants developed a foothold in the islands' economy, intermarrying with natives to create a mestizo culture reminiscent of the Spanish mestizo community in the islands.[435] The influence of Chinese settlers in the economic, political, and social life of the Philippines

[429] NBC Broadcast by Paul V. McNutt on 'The Future of the Philippines', 23 February 1946, Box 22, PVMP. Radio Interview between Paul V. McNutt & Barnet Nover, 10 April 1946, Box 22, PVMP. Kotlowski, Paul V. McNutt, pp. 392-399.
[430] Elizalde to McNutt, 30 October 1946, Box 3, MARP. Joint Statement of McNutt and Roxas, 22 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Radio Address by High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt before GI Forum, 20 January 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[431] Edelstein to McNutt, 22 October 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Radio Interview between Roxas & Richard Harkness for NBC, 16 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Informal Memorandum from Roxas to McNutt on Military Bases & Assistance Agreements, 29 July 1946, Box 8, MARP.
[432] USAFFE Report on the Hukbalahap, 3 March 1945, Box 42, JRHP.
[433] Jason Ridler, 'The Fertile Ground of Hell's Carnival: Charles T.R. Bohannan and the U.S. Army's Counter Intelligence Corps' Investigations of War Criminals, Collaborators, and the Huk, in the Philippines, 1945-1947', *Defense & Security Analysis,* DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2016.1269391 (accessed 10 July 2017), pp. 15-29. Memorandum for Ricardo De Leon, Personal Secretary of the President, on Interceptions from Chinese Mainland, 6 September 1946, Box 8, MARP. Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to Secretary of State, 8 September 1946, FRUS, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 698, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d698 (accessed 10 December 2015).
[434] Teresita Ang See, 'Dimension of Economic Success: The Chinese in the Philippines', in Richard T. Chu, ed., More Tsinoy Than We Admit: Chinese-Filipino Interactions Over the Centuries (Quezon City, Philippines: Vibal Publishing, 2015), pp. 423-425. Milagros C. Guerrero, 'The Political Background', More Tsinoy Than We Admit, pp. 121-125.
[435] Ibid. Edgar Wickberg, 'The Chinese Mestizo in Philippine History', More Tsinoy Than We Admit, pp. 173-213.

produced a brazen anxiety towards China and its diaspora, despite the Chinese community representing only a small percentage of the islands' total population.[436]

Often, tensions on the mainland would spill over to the Philippines. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, Chinese communities separated into economic, political, and ideological ranks.[437] During the war, these divisions became more apparent, as Chinese guerrillas divided along similar lines to Filipino forces.[438] That Roxas was keen to perpetuate historical anxieties of Chinese subversion was apparent in the information his government relayed to McNutt's office. Confidential informants maintained 'Chinese communists… are the ones supporting and giving aid to the Huks.'[439] Mainland intercepts claimed the CCP were providing arms to the rebels.[440] McNutt and his staff acted on such information. In a letter to the Secretary of State, McNutt insisted 'Chinese communist groups' were 'cooperating closely with [the] Hukbalahap.'[441]

For McNutt, the rise of the Huks was more indicative of the subversive nature of communism than popular Filipino disenfranchisement with rehabilitation.[442] Here, the group spoke to poor, ignorant, and emotional peasants who looked to the foreign-dominated Huks as a panacea for prosperity under communism.[443] In reality, the Huk's popularity stemmed from the dichotomised vision of development that blighted the Philippines. In contrast to the illustrado class, who maintained their authority through collaborative arrangements with colonial powers, the peasantry had been historically isolated from progress through protracted processes of neglect. This disenfranchisement provided abundant sources of social dissatisfaction. Like the racialized rhetoric of the Sakdalistas, the Huks looked to alternative models of development to answer for the failures of American colonialism. For the Huks, it was the guiding hand of

[436] Eadie, Poverty and the Critical Security Agenda, pp. 65-70. Li Yuk-Wai, 'The Chinese Resistance Movement in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation', More Tsinoy Than We Admit, p. 367.
[437] Yuk-Wai, 'The Chinese Resistance Movement in the Philippines', More Tsinoy Than We Admit, pp. 367-385.
[438] Ibid. Tan, Highlights of Philippine History, p. 154.
[439] Anon to Roxas, 29 July 1946, Box 18, MARP.
[440] Memorandum for De Leon on Interceptions from Chinese Mainland, 6 September 1946, Box 8, MARP.
[441] Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State, 8 September 1946, FRUS, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 698, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d698 (accessed 10 December 2015).
[442] Press Release from the Office of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippines on agrarian unrest in Central Luzon, 29 January 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[443] Statement of U.S. High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt before the Senate Finance Committee, 2 April 1946, Box 11, PVMP.

agrarian socialism that directed the struggle, mirroring many insurgencies in Southeast Asia and across the world that focused on agrarianism as the root of revolution.[444]

After independence, Roxas and his government analysed their prospects for defeating the Huks. In a report by the Philippine military, commanders warned the lack of any regular army or modern equipment made handling the threat close to impossible.[445] Compounding the situation was Roxas' increasingly despotic behaviour. Fumbled military incursions into Central Luzon provoked fears of outright extermination amongst the peasantry, ironically galvanising support for the Huks.[446] Roxas was quick to acknowledge the importance of outside support if he was to successfully defeat the insurgency.[447]

In the debates over military assistance, Roxas repeatedly used 'illusions of influence' to secure assistance in defeating the Huks.[448] He relied on the susceptibility of figures like McNutt to conflate the regional trend towards communist revolution with the situation in Central Luzon, and neglected the popular dissatisfaction with rehabilitation that helped generate support for the rebels.[449] In doing so, Roxas helps repudiate the traditional historical assertion that imperial dynamics were a product of one-way streets.[450] Roxas confronted the Cold War with his own agenda, and utilised the imperial structures around him to his own advantage. In this sense, the debates over America's military presence were driven by Roxas, who exploited the islands' importance to U.S. policy in Asia to gain economic, political, and military support.

The principal issues governing America's military relationship with the Philippines centred on access to military bases and military assistance. In particular, the Military Bases and Military Assistance Agreements (1947) [MBA and MAA respectively] were deemed critical for the islands' security.[451] The treaties were formulated by the departments of State, War, and Navy, along with a delegation of Filipino

[444] Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 94-95. Adam Fforde, The Agrarian Question in North Vietnam, 1974-79 (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2017).
[445] Memorandum for Roxas on the Capability of the MPC to Deal with the Huks, 19 August 1946, Box 18, MARP.
[446] Tan, Highlights of Philippine History, p. 158.
[447] Speech by Manuel Roxas on the Threat of Revolution in Central Luzon, 19 November 1946, Box 18, MARP. Radio Interview between Roxas & Richard Harkness for NBC, 16 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Informal Memorandum from Roxas to McNutt on Military Bases & Assistance Agreements, 29 July 1946, Box 8, MARP.
[448] Cullather, Illusions of Influence.
[449] Statement of U.S. High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt before the Senate Finance Committee, 2 April 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Speech by Manuel Roxas on the Threat of Revolution in Central Luzon, 19 November 1946, Box 18, MARP.
[450] Kramer, 'Power and Connection', pp. 1351-1352.
[451] Edelstein to McNutt, 22 October 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Radio Interview between Roxas & Richard Harkness for NBC, 16 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Speech by Paul V. McNutt on the U.S. Military Presence in the Philippines for NBC, Box 11, PVMP.

representatives supervised by Roxas.[452] McNutt served as the conduit between the stakeholders.[453] The MBA focused on securing American access to military reservations across the archipelago, and agreed on unreserved access to over ninety facilities.[454] The MAA concentrated on cooperation, agreeing to provide military aid and equipment to the Philippine government.[455]

In many ways, the Philippines' military modernisation was an adjunct of the developmental policies pursued by the United States after World War II. Ostensibly about security, the MBA and MAA were framed as a project of informal assistance. Yet, they also served to rectify lingering American reservations over the islands' suitability as an independent state. One of the greatest oversights in American colonialism was the lack of emphasis placed on Philippine security. This omission spoke to the orientalised lens American policymakers operated under. The notion that the Philippines would require U.S. military might to protect the archipelago was one that imbued American thinking on Philippine security throughout the colonial regime.[456] As a result, little emphasis was placed on creating a durable Filipino fighting force capable of protecting the islands after independence. Such perceptions were highlighted by the American approach to defence during the Commonwealth, where American actors like MacArthur were given control of the islands' defences.[457] As the threat of invasion drew closer, MacArthur focused on assimilating what little fighting force the Philippines had into an American mould.[458] The subsequent Swiss-style neutralisation policies discussed in Washington appeared to acknowledge the lacklustre effort to furnish the Philippines with a functioning military.[459]

McNutt addressed these shortcomings by presenting America's military interests in the Philippines within a Cold War context. His arguments focused on securing a bulwark against communist expansion in Asia, and he underlined American military intervention as a defensive measure designed to assist the islands

[452] Kotlowski, Paul V. McNutt, p. 401.
[453] Ibid.
[454] Anon, 'Military Bases Agreement', 14 March 1947, The Philippines Reader, pp. 96-100.
[455] Anon, 'Military Assistance Agreement', 21 March 1947, The Philippines Reader, pp. 100-103.
[456] Philippine Local Autonomy, Committee on Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, 30 April 1924, Box 93, FMP. Statement by Patrick J. Hurley, Secretary of War, to Hon. Hiram Bingham, Chairman of the Committee on Territories on and Insular Affairs, 15 May 1930, Box 19, JRHP. Address by Dr. Joseph Ralston Hayden at the Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 12 July 1937, Box 9, FMP. Anon, 'Armstrong Says Real Issue Here Not Capacity to Govern but Case of Defense Against Foreign Rule', p. 1.
[457] Richard Bruce Meixsel, 'Manuel L. Quezon, Douglas MacArthur, and the Significance of the Military Mission to the Philippine Commonwealth', *Pacific Historical Review*, vol. 70, no. 2 (May 2001), pp. 255-292.
[458] Ibid. Alan Schom, The Eagle and the Rising Sun: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1943 (London, U.K.: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), pp. 199-218.
[459] Golay, Face of Empire, pp. 190-195.

in maintaining territorial integrity.[460] McNutt stressed Filipino endorsement of such polices as repudiations of imperial exploitation. He argued the two nations were collaborating to ensure the 'mutual defense [sic.]' of the Pacific, and the agreements were reached in an atmosphere of equal opportunity.[461] This approach was reflective of McNutt's overall stance on the Philippines. His need to couch American imperialism in an image of veiled neutrality spoke to his desire to present American policy under a benevolent guise.

Despite the hard-headed pragmatism that characterised McNutt's approach to the Philippines, his arguments remained underscored by imperial perceptions. In the context of America's military presence, he urged Americans to envision the agreements as a new 'Pacific frontier,' harkening the spirit of westward expansion as much as the Cold War practicalities of maintaining military might in Asia.[462] Such rhetoric was typical of Paul's penchant for hubris. He looked at America's legacy as one of paternalistic guidance, and delighted in regaling audiences of America's achievements in Philippine modernity.[463] In trips to China and Japan, he spoke of 'alien' lands with an unabated interest in the 'great Philippine experiment.'[464] These perceptions helped sell heavy expenditures to American audiences.[465] The acquisition of bases, and the military assistance it included, were framed as natural continuations of a historically divined policy to expand American might westward.[466]

Roxas played on the imperial perceptions of figures like McNutt as much as the Cold War context that facilitated them. In meetings with the President, he urged Truman to consider the issue as part of a 'broad Pacific defense [sic.] problem.'[467] In public, he reaffirmed the Philippines welcomed American bases, arguing they were no more an infringement of sovereignty than 'the United Nations council sitting in New York infringe[s] on the sovereignty of the United States.'[468] Roxas used McNutt's own predispositions to further arguments for assistance. Interestingly, the pair opted not to enter formal talks.[469] In casual memoranda, Roxas stressed the sense of uniqueness that surrounded America's military policy in the

[460] Edelstein to McNutt, 22 October 1946, Box 11, PVMP. Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State, 7 November 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 716, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d716 (accessed 24 July 2017).
[461] Radio Address by High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt before GI Forum, 20 January 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[462] McNutt, 'America's Role in the Orient', p. 53.
[463] Radio Address by High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt before GI Forum, 20 January 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[464] Ibid.
[465] Ibid.
[466] Speech by Paul V. McNutt, undated, Box 8, MARP.
[467] Edelstein to McNutt, 22 October 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[468] Radio Interview between Roxas & Richard Harkness for NBC, 16 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP.
[469] Informal Memorandum from Roxas to McNutt on Military Bases & Assistance Agreements, 29 July 1946, Box 8, MARP.

Philippines.[470] He worked with McNutt to keep from putting the agreements before the Filipino people, playing on the paternalistic lens that guided America's actions to sanction 'an unprecedented relationship' in military coordination.[471] Roxas' reasoning was shrewd. His reluctance to put the agreements under public scrutiny acknowledged the infringements of sovereignty the bills presented. In this sense, it was Roxas - not McNutt - pushing hardest for a benevolent image of America's military presence. He knew putting the agreements in a congressional forum would raise questions of sovereignty, and ultimately endanger American assistance should it be construed as imperialistic.

The reception to Philippine-American military cooperation amongst the wider world was mixed. For allies like Britain, the agreements were a double-edged sword. The bases were seen as another source of American hypocrisy; to be used as leverage in attempts by Washington to browbeat London over its own colonial policy.[472] Yet, even typically caustic British diplomats recognised the value of an assertive American military presence in Southeast Asia.[473] In Burma, officials were anxious of the 'more dramatic inroads' that America had made in fashioning its postcolonial influence.[474] Other powers looked on more ruefully. Soviet diplomats criticised the maintenance of American bases.[475] Yet, ultimately the installations did more to cement Stalin's belief that the atmosphere was far from ripe for communism to expand in the region.[476] Amongst the minds of dependent peoples, America's military presence sparked intense periods of criticism. As McNutt journeyed home, he found the issue to be a principle point of attack for the 'growing impression' that America was acting imperiously.[477] Ironically, the bulwark against communism the bases were meant to provide ultimately fuelled leftist sentiment, couched as it was in perceptions of militaristic domination.

The emergence of the Huks provides compelling evidence for the shortfalls of American rehabilitation. For McNutt and his staff, the Huks reflected a regional turn towards communist

[470] Ibid.
[471] Ibid.
[472] Extract from Telegram from the Secretary of State for Burma to His Excellency the Governor of Burma, 2 May 1947, IO, BL, RG IOR/M/4/2988.
[473] Ibid.
[474] Ibid.
[475] Telegram from Dean Acheson to McNutt Relaying Soviet Communique on Suppression of the Huks, 9 April 1947, Box 8, MARP.
[476] Nicholas Tarling, Southeast Asia and the Great Powers (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2010), pp. 116-118.
[477] Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State, 7 November 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 716, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d716 (accessed 24 July 2017).

subversion.[478] Conclusions drawn in Manila and Washington stressed the group's adherence to communism, and focused on the influence, both materially and ideologically, of foreign movements as motivators for their rise.[479] In reality, the Huks presented a historical continuation of popular resistance to American images of modernity. The guerrilla's popularity amongst the peasantry spoke to the inherent divisions in Philippine society, and demonstrated the dissonance between American ideas of decolonization and their practical manifestations. For McNutt, the importance of America's relationship with the Philippines extended beyond the archipelago. Yet, this internationally expansive policy failed to address the pressing societal issues that damaged American attempts at portraying the Philippines as a neutral arbiter for U.S. intervention in Asia. As a result, policies designed to entice other emerging nations into the American orbit actually served to consolidate an inherently lopsided system of social division in America's own Asian "experiment."

Conclusion

There are two overlapping arguments that constitute this chapter's thesis. The first has argued the emergence of a global Cold War intimately informed America's decolonization of the Philippines. Confronting a continental trend towards resistance to Western rule, the United States looked to position Philippine independence as bellwether for its support for nationalist movements. This position was born out of World War II, where the instigation of American leadership was tarnished by issues of domestic race relations and inertia over European colonialism. These issues cohered with American imperialism in the Philippines, being filtered through the interpretive prism of the Cold War to provide a positive affirmation for American commitment to self-determination. Working as a conduit for the Truman administration's expansion of the Cold War, McNutt returned to the Philippines to oversee the islands' rehabilitation. His recasting of development as a project of informal assistance operated under the agenda of veiled neutrality, where he utilised the imperial structures around him to enforce an inherently American vision of the Philippine state. This approach reflected his own disposition for viewing America's place in the world within

[478] Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State, 8 September 1946, FRUS, Volume VIII, The Far East, Document 698, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d698 (accessed 10 December 2015). Radio Address by High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt, 20 January 1946, Box 22, PVMP.
[479] Ibid. Telegram from Dean Acheson to McNutt Relaying Soviet Communique on Suppression of the Huks, 9 April 1947, Box 8, MARP. Memorandum for the Philippine Secretary of Justice on the Status of the Hukbalahap, 30 August 1946, Box 18, MARP.

a dynamic, global context. Imbued with a sense of internationalism that framed American policy as a construction of leadership, McNutt worked to present Philippine rehabilitation as an exemplar of Washington's benignity in the Third World. In doing so, he relied on the susceptibility of the Filipino elite to sanction American ideas, often conflating their endorsement with the Filipino people at large.

This perception of independence was interpreted and challenged from elite and popular perspectives in the Philippines. As with the creation of the Commonwealth, competing nationalisms battled over the direction of Philippine development. The historical alliance between the American colonial regime and Filipino elite predicated the Roxas administration to accept ongoing American intervention in return for cementing their own authority. This dynamic reflected an 'illusion of influence,' whereby Filipino elites exploited the colonial structures around them to their own advantage.[480] In contrast, popular disenfranchisement with Philippine rehabilitation helped foster radical alternatives. Leaning on the growing sentiment for communist revolution in Asia, the Huks worked to create a socialistic vision of the Philippines. Yet, this turn towards insurgency was ultimately forged in the fractured images of independence that blighted Philippine nationalism. Like the Sakdalistas ten years earlier, the Huk rebellion was facilitated by local dissatisfaction with the promise of American development. These modes of resistance - couched as they were in broader, global trends - were always inherently local in nature, and reacted organically to the wider contours of resistance that enveloped the region.

[480] Cullather, Illusions of Influence.

Conclusion

The Aftermath of Empire

America's decolonization of the Philippines did not occur in a vacuum. On the contrary, independence was imagined in numerous contested ways by a myriad of local, colonial, and international actors. The history of Philippine independence is therefore a history of cause and effect, a dynamic story of nationhood in which rhetoric and reality clashed to advance the cause of independence. For the United States, rhetorical visions of enlightened approaches to empire looked to American ideas of social ordering to evidence the occidental education Filipinos were to receive. This ambition highlighted Philippine modernity as a path intertwined with preparation for self-government. The culturally entrenched images of the Philippines being 'occidental by training' helped negate the feelings of frustration that imbued America's colonial enterprise.[481] That the infantilised Filipino was unable to grasp the benefits of American colonialism lent credence to the orientalised image of the islands as reliant on the paternalistic guidance of the United States. Interestingly, then, even the failures of American empire were presented as successes. The failure of the Commonwealth to compete without America; the failure of losing the islands to Japan; and the failure to let the Philippines forge its own path after independence were all heralded as indicators for America's "unique" approach to imperialism.[482]

In reality, it was the temporal boundaries of the islands' decolonization that frustrated American ambitions in the Philippines, inevitably colliding with the major challenges to U.S. foreign policy during this period. Independence was filtered through a number of interpretive prisms, conjoining with the intellectual rationale of tutelary colonialism to produce a vision of the Philippines intimately informed by the world around it. The global descent into economic calamity during the Depression was an important motivator in both reaffirming and repudiating American approaches to empire. Murphy's proclivity for New Deal notions of social welfare helped propel a developmental project contained within America's own domestic agenda. Reacting to the global turn away from liberal-capitalist democracy, Murphy worked to engrain an

[481] Speech by Paul V. McNutt entitled 'The Philippine Background', 18 October 1945, Box 22, PVMP.
[482] Address by Paul V. McNutt, 14 March 1938, Box 16, PVMP. Anon, 'It Wasn't All Altruism', p. 100. Radio Interview between Paul V. McNutt & Barnet Nover, 10 April 1946, Box 22, PVMP. Joint Statement of McNutt and Roxas, 22 May 1946, Box 11, PVMP.

Americanised vision of social welfare in Philippine society, one that would counter calls for Asiatic solidarity by presenting American imperialism as a benign, positive force.

The onset of the Cold War propelled Philippine independence into the eyes of the world like never before. Amidst the ashes of World War II, the United States fashioned a vision of the Philippine state that emphasised Western, capitalist models of modernity over competing systems of development offered by rivals like the Soviet Union. This strategy looked to negate the power of post-war economic deprivation as a method for expanding communist influence by positioning the Philippine experience of empire as testament to America's compassionate approach to decolonization. McNutt's rehabilitation projects helped secure the islands' position as a bastion of liberal-capitalism in Asia, at a time when many postcolonial elites were focused on how best to pursue their own national development.

These differing ventures, influenced as they were by the global events that surrounded them, were always intrinsically connected to the rhetorical vision of American empire. The Philippines were America's "experiment" in Asian democracy; a project in modernity that apotheosised the American way of life as normative, rational, and universally applicable. Global challenges like the Depression and Cold War interacted with this interpretation of the Philippine state, and served as both causes and constraints for advancing the American vision of an independent Philippines.

This is the legacy of America's decolonization of the Philippines. But what of the legacies of those figures that helped bring it into being? The role of individual agency in projecting American imperialism has been a critical line of analysis. Indeed, the ways Murphy and McNutt accepted, adapted, and advanced Philippine independence has illuminated the contested contours of the islands' decolonization. Yet, comparing the impact of Murphy and McNutt's legacies deserves attention. After all, if the principle of empire was predisposed for figures like Murphy and McNutt - couched as it was in historically divined assumptions of Western superiority - how could their legacies truly differ? This tension between individual agency and impersonal forces could occupy the minds of foreign relations biographers in further research, particularly as scholars approach new methods that look to marry the two.[483] On this point, however, there

[483] Harris & McQuade, 'Notes on the Method of World-System Biography', pp. 276-286.

is cause to reflect on the similarities and disparities between Murphy and McNutt's approach to nation-building, and ask to what extent their policies were determined by factors outside their control.

Murphy and McNutt's legacies offer excellent evidence for the sense of 'cacophony and coalescence' that underscored American approaches to decolonization.[484] Both worked to engrain their visions of an independent Philippines, and both viewed independence as intertwined with American understandings of modernity. Still, neither viewed their country's relationship with the Philippines in black and white terms, nor did they isolate their visions from the world around them. For Murphy, the intellectual rationale of the New Deal helped justify his approach to the Commonwealth. Yet, most of his ideas failed to develop into concerted policy. Ironically, it was impetus of the Depression that would be his undoing, as economic prostration and fears of foreign aggression overshadowed his agenda. In this sense, Murphy's own predispositions were a double-edged sword. His passion for reform, emblematic as it was of the domestic atmosphere that surrounded him, initially amplified his ambitions. Yet, his downfall was also a product of structural forces, determined by local dissatisfaction and the domestic turn towards isolation.

For McNutt, on the other hand, the interactions between his ideas and the structural legacies they created were some of the strongest aspects of his career. The tone that has captured America's postcolonial relationship with the Philippines has been predicated on ideas of informal influence.[485] The groundwork for this approach was constructed during McNutt's work to secure Philippine compliance in the Cold War. Perhaps this policy was equally as impersonal; an organic and inevitable product of imperialism adapting to the dissolution of formal colonial bonds? Yet, McNutt was a man who remained remarkably true to his principles. Indeed, his initial arguments for retaining the Philippines reflected not a contemporary call to pull America back from the Pacific, but a vision of the United States as an active voice in determining the future of Asia. This mindset was only reinforced by the onset of Cold War, as McNutt projected essentially the same ambitions under the auspices of informal assistance. In this sense, it is no stretch to suggest McNutt's tenure casts a longer shadow over the legacy of American imperialism in the Philippines.

[484] Jason C. Parker, 'Cacophony and Coalescence: Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Rise of the Tiers-Monde', *America in the 'Asian Century' Conference*, Nottingham, U.K., 14 March 2017.
[485] Anon, 'U.S. National Security Directive on Policy Towards Marcos', The Philippines Reader, pp. 321-326. George W. Bush, 'Remarks to a Joint Session of the Philippine Congress in Quezon City, Philippines', 18 October 2003, *American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63501 (accessed 14 January 2017).

Although both men made their mark on the islands, it was McNutt who secured the country's complicity as an ongoing partner by helping to maintain the Philippines' trajectory within the U.S. orbit.

The outcome of World War II and the projection of American leadership under the Cold War help explain why McNutt's policies thrived where Murphy's failed to survive. Murphy's work was something of an afterthought in America's development of the Philippines, a project of social engineering that grew due to the complicated and constrained relationship between the two nations during the Depression. Like many in the F.D.R administration, Murphy was keen to exhibit positive responses to the economic prostration that enveloped the United States and much of the world. The problem was this was a policy brought about not by choice but necessity, as Roosevelt inherited a commitment to the Commonwealth as a product of increasing local and domestic agitation for independence. As the Depression worsened and the international atmosphere darkened, there was little interest in constructing a social welfare system in the Philippines, as both nations retracted into settling the economic and geopolitical anxieties that surrounded them.

In contrast, the policies pursued by McNutt were firmly embedded in an assertive new outlook for American foreign policy, one that would eventually be absorbed into a broader policy framework under the auspices of public diplomacy.[486] For McNutt and, indeed, many in the Truman administration, the aftermath of World War II made American leadership all the more vital, as new and emerging nations faced the prospect of independence amidst competing ideas of development. Attempts to hold the Philippines as a bastion of American engagement with Asia were predicated on a belief that the United States would now take the lead in guiding decolonization across the continent, if only to avoid the spectre of communism gaining a foothold in nascent states. The rehabilitation policies pursued by McNutt under the rubric of informal assistance came to be the cornerstone of this new approach, as Washington looked to the Philippine experience of empire as testament to the promise of modernity offered by liberal-capitalism.

In many ways, then, it is hard to deny McNutt's vision for an independent Philippines did not come to fruition. Since independence, the islands have maintained a consistent and compact fraternity with its former coloniser.[487] During the Cold War, America had no more reliable alliance than with the Filipino

[486] Hart, Empire of Ideas, pp. 71-106. Parker, Hearts, Minds, Voices, pp. 65-91.
[487] Sharon Delmendo, The Star-Entangled Banner: One Hundred Years of America in the Philippines (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2004). Rabindra Sen, 'Philippines-U.S. Special Relationship: Cold War and Beyond', *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, vol. 9, no. 1 (2005), pp. 85-92.

elite, who consistently offered support, both materially and rhetorically, for American engagement with Asia.[488] Compounded continental tensions after the "loss" of China and the onset of war in Korea helped cement this symbiosis, as Philippine presidents from Ramon Magsaysay to Ferdinand Marcos offered the islands as a springboard for intervention.[489] Aside from a blip in the 1980s, when the Filipino people ousted Marcos under the 1986 People Power revolution and temporarily annulled American access to military bases, this alliance has remained overwhelmingly positive, even as the pressures of new global struggles like the War on Terror threatened to open the fissures of dissent.[490] It was only in August 2017 that Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte named the islands a 'humble friend' of the United States, despite repeated overtures towards lessening the archipelago's dependence on American economic and military aid.[491]

The question as to why this is the case remains puzzling. After all, the tense and tender relationship between the two nations can be viewed as somewhat analogous to the histories of other Asian dependencies who experienced decolonization during the same period. The British, for example, maintained a durable and informal influence over former colonies like India, even as such states were quick to distance themselves from former metropoles.[492] Indeed, the structures of governance that remained in place after Indian independence borrowed heavily from the British Raj, despite leaders such as Nehru promising a path to statehood free from the hand of imperial actors.[493] Moreover, much like the Philippines, processes of decolonization manifested not only in negotiation, but also in instances of horrific violence. The onset of the Huk rebellion spoke to this contested view of Philippine independence, much in the same way as the Malayan Emergency or the division of Vietnam articulated the differing visions of statehood that emanated from other Asian dependencies during the Cold War.[494] In this respect, the reasoning behind the

[488] H.W. Brands, Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 227-344.
[489] Ibid.
[490] Ben Reid, 'Bush and the Philippines after September 11: Hegemony, Mutual Opportunism, and Democratic Retreat', in Mark Beeson, ed., Bush and Asia: America's Evolving Relations with East Asia (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2006), pp. 145-161. James A. Tyner, Iraq, Terror, and the Philippines' Will to War (New York, N.Y.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
[491] Quoted in Karen Lema, 'I'm your humble friend, Philippines' anti-U.S. leader tells Tillerson', *Reuters*, 7 August 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tillerson-asia-philippines/im-your-humble-friend-philippines-anti-u-s-leader-tells-tillerson-idUSKBN1AN1X7 (accessed 8 August 2017).
[492] McGarr, The Cold War in South Asia, pp. 55-118.
[493] Ted Svensson, Production of Postcolonial India and Pakistan (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2013), pp. 36-46.
[494] Anthony Short, In Pursuit of Mountain Rats: The Communist Insurrection in Malaya (Singapore: Cultured Lotus, 2000). T.N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Mark A. Lawrence, 'Recasting Vietnam: The Bảo Đại Solution and the Outbreak of the Cold War in Southeast Asia', Connecting Histories, pp. 15-38.

Philippines' place in the U.S. informal empire appears confused. It will take a history that traces this phenomenon back to the source to understand why the islands remain so firmly within the American orbit.

The reasoning for the Philippines' paradoxical relationship with the United States stems from the inherently dichotomised nationalism that exists in the islands. This bi-nationalism, reflective of the systemic, socio-cultural divisions at play in Filipino society, created two competing yet coalescing narratives of the Philippine state. On one hand were the illustrado class. These actors were the mouthpiece for Western imperialism, and worked to consolidate and enhance the positions of power afforded to them. For the Filipino elite, visions of modernity provided by Western imperialism created a collaborative intelligentsia intertwined with the islands' path to independence. Despite being utilised as a method of domination by the Spanish and American regimes, this relationship entrenched illustrado influence over decolonization, given the metropolitan reliance on such elites to serve as a conduit between the metropole and the masses. On the other side were those Filipinos insulated from the mechanisms of power. Popular groups like the Sakdalistas or Hukbalahap understood their relationship with Western imperialism as one of subjugation and extraction. These movements, different as their ideologies were, coalesced around a bottom-up vision of Philippine society untainted by elite associations with Western powers. Their relationship with broader, regional forces - the Sakdals and Pan-Asianism, the Huks and revolutionary socialism – were always informed by the local factors around them.

Of course, this is a phenomenon not necessarily unique to the Philippines. One need only look at other Asian states such as Burma (now Myanmar) or Vietnam to see how local constructs of class, caste, and social hierarchy permeated the imperial structures around them.[495] Yet, the salient difference between such states and the Philippines is this narrative has never truly been challenged in the archipelago. The dynastic elite that dominate the political life of the Philippines remains unchanged to this day, reminiscent of the structures of authority cultivated under Western imperialism.[496] Where nations like Vietnam have experienced profound revolutionary change, the internal hierarchies of Filipino society have remained

[495] N. Ganesan & Kyaw Yin Hlaing, eds., Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity (Singapore, ISEAS Publishing, 2007). A. Terry Rambo, Searching for Vietnam: Selected Writings on Vietnamese Culture and Society (Kyoto, Japan: Kyoto University Press, 2005).
[496] Croissant & Lorenz, 'Philippines: People Power and Defective Elite Democracy', pp. 213-254.

remarkably static, even during periods of political turmoil like the People Power revolution.[497] Moreover, for those regions like the Korean peninsula or South Asia, superpower interest has ebbed and flowed between the periphery and core of strategic interests.[498] The Philippines has never experienced this disparity, given its consistent centrality to American engagement with Asia.[499] As such, the narrative of Philippine nationhood remains predicated on Americanised visions of good governance, and cultural representations of the islands remain embedded within a bi-national framework. One need only read the descriptions put forward for observers - a 'land apart' from Southeast Asia, a place where East meets West - to see the dichotomy that underscores the islands' identity as a sovereign state.[500]

The genesis of this bi-nationalism traces its roots to the tumultuous time in which the Philippines achieved independence. As American visions of Philippine statehood developed, so too did Filipino understandings of what an independent Philippines could and should emulate. For the Filipino elite, this meant adhering and adapting to the American image of nationhood created during the turbulent process of decolonization. For Quezon, Osmeña, or Roxas, the challenge of independence was how to manufacture a freedom simultaneously independent and intertwined with America. For those outside the illustrado class, there was little call for continuing a relationship built on extraction and exploitation. This vision of independence was built on an almost mythologised vision of autonomy, one that emphasised popular visions of independence as constructions of sovereignty against a history of outside intervention. Faced with a choice between the two, it was no surprise Murphy and McNutt opted for continuing an alliance with the illustrado elite. After all, to deny their position at the head of Filipino society was to deny the imperial heritage they helped create.

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[497] David G. Marr, Vietnam: State, War, and Revolution, 1945–1946 (Berkeley, C.A.: University of California Press, 2013), pp. 499-568. David W.P. Elliott, The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930-1975 (London, U.K.: Routledge, 2016). Simbulan, The Modern Principalia. McCoy, An Anarchy of Families. Rivera, 'American Impact on Elite Continuity', The Philippines and Japan in America's Shadow, pp. 57-75.

[498] William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). Gi-Wook Shin, One Alliance, Two Lenses: U.S.-Korea Relations in a New Era (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford University Press, 2010). McMahon, Cold War on the Periphery. McGarr, The Cold War in South Asia.

[499] Delmendo, The Star-Entangled Banner. Sen, 'Philippines-U.S. Special Relationship', pp. 85-92. Reid, 'Bush and the Philippines after September 11', Bush and Asia, pp. 145-161.

[500] Anon, 'Introducing Philippines', *Lonely Planet*, undated, https://www.lonelyplanet.com/philippines/introduction (accessed 13 September 2017). Ishaan Tharoor, 'Map: Where the East and the West Meet', *Washington Post*, 28 April 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/28/map-where-the-east-and-the-west-meet/?utm_term=.73b1ebf10bda (accessed 12 September 2017).

In this sense, the story of Philippine-American interaction between 1933 and 1947 offers salient lessons for understanding the current climate of local resistance to Western intervention in Asia, where the Philippines still suffers from popular resistance to outside intervention and elite associations with foreign powers.[501] Although in many ways successful, the story of American nation-building in the Philippines is one predicated on an imperial understanding of how to achieve lasting change. Murphy and McNutt, individuals who viewed empire as a constructive, positive force, looked only to the islands' elite as motivators for nation-building. Indicative of a historical tradition amongst U.S. policymakers to neglect and negate the importance of popular forces in informing policymaking ambitions, this approach has seen America suffer disastrous consequences in other forays into Asia. One need only recall the spectre of Vietnam, and American support for the Bảo Đại solution, for ample evidence of how this policy mishap would continue to haunt American engagement with Asia during the Cold War.[502] Going forward, as America and the Philippines face new threats together at home and abroad, there is hope that a new generation of diplomats will look to the locality of American actions to understand why they are embraced or rejected. As America's decolonization of the islands attests, even a perceivably noble ambition can be tarnished by a failure to understand the impact of such policies on the people at which they are aimed.




Fig. 10: Filipinos protest American influence over the Philippines during the 1960s.

[501] Alan R. Luga, Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao, Philippines (Charleston, S.C.: Bibliobazaar, 2012). Jason T. Osleson, Protracted Peoples' War in the Philippines: A Persistent Communist Insurgency (Monterey, C.A.: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).
[502] Lawrence, 'Recasting Vietnam', Connecting Histories, pp. 15-38.

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- Sergio Osmeña Papers

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British Library, London, United Kingdom

- Indian Office & Private Papers

United States

Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, United States

- Frank Murphy Papers
- Joseph Ralston Hayden Papers

Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, United States

- Paul V. McNutt Papers

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