The Triangular Relationship Between Beijing, Washington and Taipei: Strategies of Intergovernmental Organizations Since 1949

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the triangular Beijing–Washington–Taipei relationship through their performance in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and the strategies they have employed in IGOs since 1949 through empirical case studies of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the World Health Organization. These three case studies are analysed based on chronological order, and they represent the triangular relationship in different fields, including politics, economics, and public health. In IGO studies, neoliberal institutional scholars usually regard IGOs as the *product and platform* of cooperation among countries. Realists regard IGOs as a *tool* for global superpowers to maintain their hegemony. Through documentary analysis of the *motivation* and *position taking* of the three political actors in the case studies, it is found that IGOs also function as *leverage* in the triangular relationship and help political actors to implement their policies. Many previous studies of this triangular relationship have largely relied on the perspectives of either realism, which is characterized by national interests and power distribution, or liberalism, which is characterized by cooperation and interdependency but which disregards the roles of values and identity. By evaluating the multilayered factors in the three case studies in different historical scenarios, it is also found that *constructivist* factors can work when realistic factors play a fundamental role in the triangular IGO competition. This thesis thus constructs a compound theoretical framework that provides a comprehensive historical view of the dynamics of the triangular IGO competition. In addition, elite interviews serve as a supplementary method of data collection. The interviews provide more updated and diversified academic ideas to complete the thesis and inspire further discussions of the triangular relationship, as well as of the role of IGOs in future international order and relations.

Keywords: triangular relationship, IGO competition, leverage strategy, constructivism, national interests

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAPSO	Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AIT	American Institute in Taiwan
APACL	Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference
ARATS	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
ASL	Anti-Separation Law
ATC	Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CGP	Council of Government Procurement
CHF	Swiss Franc
CNA	Central News Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
Covid-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CPC	Communist Party of China
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CPTPP	Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
CSSTA	Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DSB	Dispute Settlement Body
DSM	Dispute Settlement Mechanism
DSU	Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
ECA	Economic Cooperation Agency
ECFA	Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
EDAC	Economic Development Advisory Conference
EU	European Union
FAPA	Formosa Association for Public Affairs
FIP	International Pharmaceutical Federation
FMPAT	Foundation of Medical Professionals Alliance in Taiwan
FMPRC	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GPA	Government Procurement Agreement
HFMD	Hand, Foot and Mouth Disease

IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICN	International Council of Nurses
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IHR	International Health Regulations
ILC	International Law Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
IO	International Organization
IRIS	Institutional Repository for Information Sharing
ITO	International Trade Organization
KMT	Kuomintang/Chinese Nationalist Party
MAC	Mainland Affairs Council
MFN	Most-Favored-Nation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
NAM	Non-aligned Movement
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	National Broadcasting Company
NCCU	National Chengchi University
NSC	US National Security Council
NSL	National Security Law
NSP	New Southbound Policy
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PHEIC	Public Health Emergency of International Concern
PNTR	Permanent Normal Trading Rights
PRC	People's Republic of China
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
ROC	Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SEATO	Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
SEF	Taiwan Strait Exchange Foundation
SOE	State-owned Enterprises
SSC	South-South Cooperation
TANs	Transnational Advocacy Networks
TECRO	Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office
TPKM	Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRA	Taiwan Relations Act
UIA	Union of International Associations

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UPO	Universal Postal Union
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
US-Taiwan FTA	US-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement
WHA	World Health Assembly
WHO	World Health Organization
WPR	Working Party Report
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

> *Taiwan has **no basis, reason or right to join the UN** and other international organizations that only sovereign states can join. Some forces headed by the **United States** have been colluding with the "Taiwan separatist forces", claiming to support Taiwan's "meaningful participation in the **UN system**", and the essence is to try to **create "two Chinas"**, **"One China, one Taiwan"** to achieve its political goal of "using Taiwan to control China". There is only one China in the world, and **the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China**.*
>
> *– State Council of the PRC, 2022.*[1]

> *We encourage all UN Member States to join us in supporting **Taiwan**'s robust, meaningful participation throughout the **UN system** and in the **international community**, consistent with our **'one China' policy**, which is guided by the **Taiwan Relations Act**, **the three Joint Communiques**, and **the Six Assurances**.*
>
> – Antony J. Blinken, US Secretary of State, 2021.[2]

> *Intergovernmental organizations, multilateral mechanisms and their affiliated institutions are **important platforms** for "global governance", and they are also **important channels** for the Republic of China (ROC) to **expand international space**, give back to the international community, and exert **its soft power.***
>
> *– Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ROC, 2022.*[3]

The three quotes above respectively from government statements of Beijing, Washington and Taipei illustrate their different and contentious stances on the Beijing–Washington–Taipei relationship[4] and the position of Taiwan in Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). Such conflicting scenario since 1949, now involving the two major powers in the world, leads to a great deal of public and academic concerns. *The Economist* (2021) commented that "Taiwan is the most dangerous place on earth".[5] The Taiwan issue has the potential to lead to serious military conflict (Hsieh, 2020). The

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1 The Taiwan Question and China's Unification in the New Era, see https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/twwt/twwtbps/202208/t20220810_10738763.html.

2 Supporting Taiwan's Participation in the UN System, see https://www.state.gov/supporting-taiwans-participation-in-the-un-system/.

3 Participation of IGOs, multilateral mechanisms and their affiliated institutions, see https://subsite.mofa.gov.tw/igo/cp.aspx?n=DED5DAB0D6C7BED6.

4 Terminological hints about the three political actors in this study: 1. Beijing, Washington and Taipei represent China (the People's Republic of China), the United States of America and Taiwan (the Republic of China), respectively. 2. In the case of the UN, Beijing had yet to be recognized by the UN before 1971, so the PRC is used for Chinese mainland or the CPC, the ROC for Taiwan, the KMT or Chiang Kai-shek regime.

5 'The Most Dangerous Place on Earth'. The Economist. https://www.economist.com/weeklyedition/2021-05-01.

political specificity of triangular relationships raises thorny questions regarding IGOs competition that are important in changing the substance of the triangle. To understand the complicated and ever-changing triangular relations of which the influence is diffused in wide range of global and regional political issues, zooming in to their performance in IGOs provides a concrete and feasible solution.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the strategic competition of IGOs between Beijing, Washington, and Taipei in the past 70 years. By combining dynamic triangular relations, the thesis will elucidate the motivation and factors of the competition, and based on previous theories, make new theoretical contributions through chronological research. The following two main points will be argued: (1) the factors affecting the triangular competition in IGOs are multilevel and include material and idealistic factors; (2) IGOs can be used as leverage by the three political actors to advocate for their interests.

The thesis contains nine chapters in total. The introduction of this first chapter is followed by a literature review and overview of the historical background on the triangular relationship and IGOs in Chapters 2 and 3. On the basis of understanding the triangular IGO competition through the literature review chapters, this study constructs a suitable theoretical framework and methodology in Chapters 4 and 5. Subsequently, Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are empirical chapters that take the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and World Health Organization (WHO) as case studies. Finally, Chapter 9 links the results of the three different cases to draw a cohesive conclusion.

IGOs are the product of cooperation between countries for greater economic or political benefits, and neoliberal institutionalism is an important theoretical basis for IGOs. However, following the defeat of the League of Nations and the outbreak of World War II, the functional attributes of IGOs were questioned. Neorealism holds that IGOs have gradually declined and become tools of the state, while neoliberal institutionalism insists that IGOs remain valid (see Keohane and Nye, 1973; Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981). Despite the constant debate about IGOs, they persist to this day as intervention variables that affect international power and politics (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, 2004). Since the end of World War II, IGOs represented by the UN have continued to play an indispensable role in international politics. Politically, they can affect the international legitimacy and status of a regime. Moreover, in economics, health, and culture, among other professional fields, IGOs have a huge impact on international multilateral economic and trade development, exchanges, and cooperation. IGOs themselves possess important value of political symbols and economy, and they are important tools and platforms for political actors in international interaction and competition. Owing to the domestic politics and unique triangular political structure, the three political actors attach great importance to their identity, status, and rights within IGOs. The Beijing–Washington–Taipei IGO itself contains competition, and IGOs are the medium through which the three political actors pursue their interests. The change of the tripartite status

of IGOs cannot be separated from the dynamics of the triangular relationship. Therefore, IGOs are a suitable entry point for exploring the changing dynamics in triangular relationships.

The research questions arise from reflection on how the dynamics in the triangular relationship have changed since 1949, as well as from the changes in the participation of the three actors in the IGO and key policies and principles (e.g., the One China principle and strategic ambiguity). The emergence of the Beijing–Washington–Taipei triangle is mainly related to the three actors' internal changes after WWII, including the replacement of the Kuomintang/Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in Chinese mainland (Pepper, 1999), the revelation of the Cold War, and 'the Pax-Americana/American peace – the era of American ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945' (Layne, 2012, p. 203). Although the triangular relationship has continued since 1949, the dynamics between the three parties has constantly evolved, and the strategic competition between IGOs is one way in which this occurs. Moreover, the power distribution within the triangle has also changed, which influences the position of the three parties involved. In the past few decades in particular, China's international status has changed significantly. As a result, Beijing has transitioned from being internationally isolated to being in an advantageous position.

In addition to changes in the international system, domestic politics also affected the past triangular relationship and the interaction of the three actors in IGOs. In cross-strait relations, serious political identity struggles have erupted in the past due to the struggle for regime legitimacy by the CPC and KMT. For China, a divided polity, the pursuit of national identity and the pursuit of international legitimacy are essentially overlapping and complementary (Kim, 2019). Subsequently, as Taiwanese identity developed after Taiwan's democratization, the issue of national identity became an important issue in cross-strait relations (see Chu, 2004). In Sino-U.S. relations, the Tiananmen Square incident, as a domestic political event in China, had an impact on Sino-U.S. relations and became one of the factors affecting the WTO negotiation process (see Lai, 2010). Domestic politics and foreign policy are interrelated and influence each other (Putnam, 1988).

In recent years, the new Cold War between China and the USA, the tension in the Taiwan Strait after Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the relationship between Taiwan and WHO, and Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan have all prompted this in-depth research on triangular relations. Moreover, the three parties involved are also constantly changing in the field of IGOs. Beijing is taking more action in IGOs (such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, AIIB), while Taipei has been insistent on searching for IGO opportunities. As the fulcrum of the triangular relationship, Washington also needs to carefully manage the competition between the parties on either side of the Taiwan Strait in IGOs with caution. In the triangular relationship, in addition to the emphasis on traditional material interests, such as

geopolitics and political interests, nonmaterial factors such as democratic values and Taiwanese identity have also been repeatedly promoted. These motivate the first research question of this study: How is the triangular relationship embodied in the IGO's competition, and what were the determining factors in the specific historical timeline?

Second, the three parties conducted several strategic confrontations in the previous competition of IGOs. The competition between certain prominent IGOs has had an influence far beyond the IGOs themselves. Thus, when attempting to elucidate how the three actors employ the IGOs, inspiration can be drawn from Anderson's (2014) broad application of leverage strategies in politics. By combining the realist definition of an IGO as a tool, IGOs' function and the performance of the three actors in the IGO competition, this thesis hypothesizes that the three actors regard IGOs as a tool of leverage. The empirical validation is accomplished by examining the human resources and financial contributions of actors in IGOs as indicators. Therefore, a more specific subquestion is proposed in this study: Do IGOs play a leverage role in the triangular relationship? The above two research questions can reveal the factors and strategies that affect the triangular IGO competition from the perspective of the motivation and behaviour of the three parties. Through the answers to the research questions, IGO competition and triangular dynamics are linked. This contributes greatly to an understanding of how the three parties compete among IGOs in different fields as well as the power dynamics of the triangular relationship over the past 70 years.

Although there have been many studies on IGO competition and these three political actors in the past (e.g., Li, 2006a; Kent, 1997; Kim, 2015), this research makes a new attempt based on these previous studies, which have mainly been in two forms: (1) from the perspective of bilateral competition – IGO competition across the Taiwan Strait (see Lindemann, 2014), China and the USA use IGOs to compete for international order (see Rapkin and Thompson, 2009; Rodrigues, 2018), or US–Taiwan relations (see Wang, 2016); and (2) from the perspective of a single research subject: Taipei's international space or the purpose of participating in IGOs (see Glaser, 2013); Beijing's strategy for IGO activities in Taipei or Washington's policy for cross-strait IGO competition (see Chao and Hsu, 2006), or the role of Washington as a fulcrum (see Dittmer, 2005a). There are also some studies on triangular relations, but none of them explore triangular relations from the perspective of IGOs, and they all adopt a single perspective (see Womack and Hao, 2015). These studies mainly focus on the political field and the value of treaties such as the One China principle (see Zhu, 2022) and Taiwan Relation Act (TRA; see Copper, 2019). Moreover, the *romantic triangle* represented by Wu (2005a) focuses on the stability and continuity of the structure of the triangular relationship itself.

This study aims to go further. Some adjustments have been made in the research format, object, and perspective, which is also what makes this thesis innovative. This study proposes that the competition between Beijing, Washington, and Taipei in IGOs is the

same as the triangular relationship, and the three actors cannot be viewed separately. The triangular IGO competition is a concentrated expression of different interests and conflicts. This study abandons the traditional approach of using IGOs to analyse bilateral relations or the behaviour of individual political actors, and, instead, it examines the triangular relations among the three actors as well. Furthermore, it is argued in this study that IGOs themselves still have high value and are closely linked to triangular relationships. Thus, this thesis adopts a chronological method based on case studies in different and specific historical scenarios. This will effectively make use of the materials of IGOs' strategic competition in different periods.

At the theoretical level, realists believe that IGO competition is the result of material factors such as national interests and rights, and that it is affected by the distribution of power (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981). However, the constructivist school represented by Wendt emphasizes the role of identity and value, and "identities are the basis of interests" (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). In past competitions, political actors have repeatedly used strategies such as identity, values, and lobbying to achieve their goals and gain a dominant position in the competition of IGOs. For example, in the triangular relationship, Taipei confronts Chinese nationalism in the name of democracy (Zhu, 2022). Most existing studies adopt a single theoretical framework to explain IGOs and triangular relationships and are dominated by materialist interest theories. However, the factors affecting triangular IGO competition are not limited to a certain aspect of materialism or idealism. New breakthroughs are necessary; for instance, to obtain a more comprehensive description of Sino-US diplomacy than was available in the 1970s, one cannot focus only on Sino-US summit diplomacy. Millwood (2022) demonstrates that diplomacy through cultural and scientific exchanges was crucial to the changing relationship between the Chinese and American societies and governments from 1969 to 1978. Chinese and American ping pong players, musicians, and scientists acted as diplomats and played a central role in the Sino-US rapprochement of the 1970s.

Therefore, in addition to traditional interest factors, this study takes identity and value systems into consideration, and it constructs a compound theoretical framework to address the materialistic and idealistic factors involved in triangular IGO competition. It assumes that triangular IGO competition is not only dominated by material interests but also largely promoted by idealistic factors such as identity and value. The compound theoretical framework has improved the existing theory and built a multilevel theoretical framework. Through this theoretical framework, this study rationally explains the complexity of triangular IGO competition, proves the objectivity of materialistic factors, and simultaneously takes into account the role of idealistic factors such as identity and value.

This study makes use of a qualitative case-study research methodology, and a cross-case analysis method is adopted for the consideration of three different cases. Documentary analysis is the primary method of data collection, supplemented by elite interviews. Elite interviews provide more updated and diversified academic ideas to

complete the thesis and inspire further discussions of the triangular relationship and the role of IGOs in the international system and international relations. The data obtained through elite interviews in this study are unique and valuable. The participants include scholars from different fields as well as IGO and government officials, and they answered a large number of specific questions related to this study. These viewpoints are combined to form a unique database, which provides a new perspective for the study of triangular IGO competition and presents complementary viewpoints and thoughts on research issues. Combined with close attention to current affairs such as the Covid-19 pandemic, it reflects people's current thoughts on the triangular IGO competition. It embodies the characteristics of this study advancing with the times and has guiding significance for practice.

In relevant previous research, most case study selection has been dominated by a single IGO case (see Hickey, 2006; Tubilewicz, 2012) or multiple cases within the same period (see Lindeman, 2014). In some cases, the IGO types are repetitive (see Harris, 2013). The carefully selected cases of the UN, WTO, and WHO in this study are the most representative organizations in the fields of politics, economics, and public health, which helps to increase the authority and diversity of the research results. In view of the differences in the various IGO fields, the breadth of the scope of case studies can be ensured through triangular IGO competition analysis of different fields and time periods. Meanwhile, IGO cases are analysed by chronological sequence, and a robust time-series correlation is established between them. Thus, through this case-selection approach, the study demonstrates the dynamics of the various stages of the triangular relationship and fills in the gaps in the chronological analysis of the triangular relationship dynamics in IGOs since 1949.

The UN case is in the political field, and the triangular relationship is understood through the competition between Beijing and Taipei for Chinese representation in the UN between 1949 and 1971. The CPC won the Chinese Civil War, and there have been significant changes in the political ecology of Chinese mainland. Owing to the Korean War and the allegiance between the PRC and the Soviet Union, the relationship between the PRC and the USA reached an impasse. This, coupled with the impact of the Cold War, isolated Beijing from the international community. However, through the pursuit of national sovereignty and interests, Beijing has continuously attempted to seize Chinese representation in the UN from Taipei. As a result, Beijing and Taipei launched a 20-year struggle for Chinese representation in the UN. As an ally of Taipei, Washington participated in the struggle throughout the process.

The WTO case describes the interaction of the three actors in economic and trade affairs. In this case study, Washington, as a signatory, maintained the pivotal status. In the background of the reform and opening up of Mainland China from 1979, as well as Taiwan's stable economic growth since the 1970s, both Beijing and Taipei wanted to join the WTO for economic and trade interests while disagreeing on political issues. To uphold the One China principle, Beijing wanted Taipei to join the WTO under Beijing's

sponsorship, preferably at the provincial level, like Hong Kong and Macau. However, Taipei found the proposal unreasonable. Even though their political stances seem quite conflicting, considering the economic and trade interests and Washington's pivotal role, the three parties continued negotiating on the agenda of Beijing and Taipei's accession to the WTO for 10 years, until Beijing joined the organization in 2001. After Taiwan joined the WTO as the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu (TPKM) in 2002,[6] in order to insist that cross-strait affairs are a domestic issue, Beijing avoided having discussions with Taipei on multilateral occasions (Cho, 2005), while the other side of the Strait had a completely different approach. The Mainland Affairs Council hopes that the WTO framework will provide a new channel for cross-strait dialogue and consultations and treat the two sides as independent and equal members of the WTO. From Beijing's perspective, Taipei's position is aimed at internationalizing cross-strait economic and trade relations and subsequently extending such internationalization to political relations (Cheng and Mo, 2008; Shao, 2001).

The WHO case study is an analysis of triangular IGO competition in the field of public health. WHO is a specialized agency under the UN which has political symbol in addition to its public health functions. As a result of the UN adopting Resolution UN2758 in 1971, which expelled Chiang Kai-shek's representative from the UN, Beijing replaced its seat in WHO at the 25th World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1972. Nevertheless, since 1997, Taipei has insisted on enjoying rights in WHO, a universal-value IGO (human rights and public health), competing with Beijing for greater international space. To maintain the status quo, Washington has maintained strategic ambiguity and deterrence to pursue its interests (Kastner, 2006; Chang-Liao and Fang, 2021). On the one hand, Washington supports Taipei's access to medical assistance from WHO, and on the other, it abides by the One China policy and does not want Taipei to join WHO as a country (US Department of State, 2018).[7] However, in recent years, public health emergencies of international concern (PHEICs) (e.g., severe acute respiratory syndrome, SARS and coronavirus, Covid-19) as well as humanitarian considerations have increased Washington's and the international community's focus on the relationship between Taipei and WHO. Taipei usually emphasizes humanitarianism and believes that participation in the WHA/WHO is its legal right, while Beijing is focused on national sovereignty and the possible political consequences of Taipei's accession to WHO as well as its impact on the One China principle.

To sum up, this thesis provides a historical review of the dynamics in the triangular IGO competition. By locating the cases of multiple IGOs, multidomain and multilevel research and analysis are presented. This reduces the time and field limitations of a single IGO case study and effectively expands the spectral range of IGOs as lenses to

[6] See https://subsite.mofa.gov.tw/igo/cp.aspx?n=26A0B1DA6A0EBAA2.
[7] The USA supports Taiwan's membership in international organizations that do not require statehood as a condition for membership. See https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/.

detect triangular relations. Each of the three case studies has its own characteristics. In the UN case, Beijing and Taipei employed a zero-sum-game competitive paradigm. The subsequent WTO case, as a functional organization, has more negotiating room than the UN and WHO. The three parties reached a compromise amid their differences and finally achieved coexistence in the WTO. The WHO case combines public health and politics, and the competition is full of uncertainty.

This study makes a significant theoretical and practical contribution to the study of the triangular relationship between Beijing–Washington–Taipei and their IGO competition since 1949 by introducing and improving analytical avenues, case selection, strategies, and theories. In the three case studies, the focus will be on the performances, motivations, and factors, as well as the results, of the competition strategies of the three political actors in each IGO in different periods throughout history. The three IGO cases in different periods also reflect the power dynamic of the three actors. This, combined with the compound theoretical framework, leads to breakthroughs in case practice. Beyond the realpolitik framework, this study explores the role of idealistic factors and demonstrates differences in their influence over time and across different types of IGOs. The next chapter will review the literature on IGOs and the triangular relationship.

Chapter 2: Literature Review – Triangular Relations

2.1 Introduction

The Beijing–Washington–Taipei relationship is, in fact, a reaction to changes in the overall international environment that ranged from direct military confrontation during the Cold War to status quo. The most important factor affecting the triangular relationship is developments at the systemic level, or global politics. This is what shapes Washington's policy towards Beijing and Taipei. However, domestic politics is also a factor. Under the combined influence of the international environment and the internal affairs of the three parties, a dynamic triangular relationship emerged.

Along with China's economic development and Taiwan's democratization, the status and development of this triangular relationship has been shaped by many new factors, giving rise to new views about the relationship itself. Still, the status quo has been stable for about 70 years and the relationship has clearly seen a large arc of continuity, as evidenced in the following: the ROC has always retained de facto control over Taiwan, the PRC has always claimed sovereignty over Taiwan, and the USA has always acted as an important pivot for the dynamics of the triangular relationship. Within this arc, there has clearly been a great deal of variation – including periodic crises.

This chapter investigates and analyses the triangular relationship from the perspectives of the three actors themselves. This chapter first provides some important historical background and landmark documents as a basis, followed by an in-depth literature review of the respective positions of the three parties. The main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the different positions and interests of Beijing, Washington and Taipei on the triangular relationship. Moreover, the internal views of the three parties are not monolithic, and have different concerns and camps on how to deal with the triangular relationship. At the same time, this chapter also sorts out the basic strategies and policy dynamic changes of the three parties to treat the triangular relationship. Through the above content, the internal motivation and practical needs that lead to triangular competition within IGOs are further demonstrated.

2.2 Beijing: A continuous aim of ending the complex relationship

Since 1949, Beijing has issued many statements and taken action many times with regard to the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty. These include the statement of the One China Principle and the corresponding 'one country, two systems' policy position, the Anti-Separation Law (ASL), and the National Security Law (NSL). Promulgated over the years, these statements and laws have become an important basis for Beijing's handling of the triangular relationship.

For Beijing, the Taiwan question is a key domestic issue representing a core interest that goes beyond sovereignty to involve territory, identity, and legitimacy (Chen, 1987). Taiwan should be represented only by local government, not a central government (Li, 2014a). Formal unification with Taiwan is an "important national goal for Beijing" (Chen, 2018a, p. 225). In 1949, under Mao Zedong, the official Chinese state news agency Xinhua published an editorial titled "The Chinese People Must Liberalise Taiwan".[8] The editorial concluded, "The Chinese people (including the people of Taiwan) will never tolerate the illegal encroachment on Taiwan or any other Chinese territory by US imperialism, and likewise absolutely cannot tolerate the KMT reactionaries using Taiwan as a base for their final struggle". This demonstrates Beijing's view of the USA as a 'spoiler', and belief that fragmentation of China across the Taiwan Strait falls in the best interests of the USA.

Beijing's policy has always been based on the One China principle, but this principle is not fixed for Taipei and Washington. Attix (1994), Lee (1996), and Chiu (2017) have questioned the validity of the One China principle, asserting that Taiwan enjoys complete sovereignty. The differences between Beijing and Taipei lie in the legitimacy of Taiwan as a state and the ability of the ROC to enforce its judicial sovereignty. This is because sovereignty is a unique configuration of national authority that is characterized by a government's domestic independence, as well as by legal and political insulation from foreign governments recognized by international law (Jackson, 2007). Krasner (2001) argued that the domestic sovereignty of Taiwan is indisputable, but its international legal sovereignty is uncertain because most countries do not recognize Taiwan's right to participate in inter-state affairs.

For Chinese leaders, the sovereignty of Taiwan is related to national self-esteem and survival – so no leader can appear weak or soft on the Taiwan issue (Swaine, 2004b and Pan, 2004b). Efforts to consolidate national identity, increase interest-based ties and enhance trust are important factors in promoting peaceful reunification across the Strait (Li, 2010a). In 1979, Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping adjusted the cross-strait

[8] See http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/szyw/200705/24/t20070524_11477163.shtml.

strategy in a 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan',[9] which became an important document for the interpretation of cross-strait relations. The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan emphasized the One China principle and opposed Taiwan's independence.[10] The 'one country, two systems'[11] formula was on the agenda, and possible arrangements were discussed. Beijing hoped that Chinese mainland and Taiwan could realize postal and air transportation as soon as possible so that compatriots on both sides of the Strait might have direct contacts, visit relatives and friends, travel, and carry out economic, cultural, sports and technological exchanges.

Since Deng Xiaoping and the steady progress launched by China's reform and opening-up era, cross-strait exchanges have increased and economic integration has become a booster for the triangular relationship to move towards cooperation over competition. Within this historical environment and driven by two nominally unofficial organizations, the Strait Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, the two sides reached an oral agreement on the One China principle in 1992.[12] Although parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have different interpretations of the 1992 Consensus, it remains an important cornerstone within cross-strait relations and ultimately promoted in-depth economic, political and cultural exchanges across the two sides (Xu, 2001).

For Beijing, economic interdependence will drive the progress of political issues across the Taiwan Strait. This belief is not unfounded; Saunders (2005, p. 984) pointed out that "Taiwan's growing economic dependence provides Beijing with influence and makes independence more difficult, thereby making Beijing more patient when seeking reunification". But while Beijing aims to attract Taipei to the mainland and achieve peaceful reunification through economic development, this approach does not rule out the use of force as a deterrent (Dittmer, 2005; Didier, 2018).

Indeed, military power plays an important role in the triangular relationship. For example, in the face of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's separatist activities (visited

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[9] At its Fifth Plenary Session on 26 December 1978, the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress adopted the policy position related in the message. See http://www.xinhuanet.com/tw/2019-01/02/c_1210028622.htm.

[10] The One China Principle holds that there is only one country of China in the world. The government of the PRC (the Chinese mainland) is the sole legal representative of China, which makes Taiwan an inalienable territory of China. See http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-07/29/content_18293.htm.

[11] Since the notion was first raised in 1979, the one country–two systems unification formula has not changed. The formula prescribes Taiwanese unification with the mainland under the One China principle that sees Beijing as the central government and Taiwan as a local special administrative region (SAR) – hence creating one country (China). After unification, the Chinese mainland would continue the practice of socialism while Taiwan would retain its capitalist system and enjoy a high degree of autonomy (hence two political/administrative systems). See NPC Standing Committee, Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, Beijing Review 1 (5 January 1979), pp. 16–17.

[12] Due to the "Three No's Policy – no contacts, no talks and no compromises" implemented by the KMT government, Taipei did not immediately choose to officially intervene in cross-strait affairs. Instead, it established an SEF with a private appearance to handle cross-strait affairs (Xu, 2001).

the United States in 1995), and Beijing launched military exercises to deter Taiwan. Ahead the 1996 crisis in the strait, Beijing had published the 'White Paper on the Taiwan issue and China's reunification on 1 September 1993' outlining China's position to the international community.[13] On 30 January 1995, Jiang Zemin put forward 'eight propositions'[14] for advancing the process of peaceful reunification with the motherland at a Chinese New Year tea party held by the Taiwan Affairs Office.

Mainland leaders have never renounced the use of force to unify Taiwan in their declarations (e.g., President Xi's 2019 speech on the 40th anniversary of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan).[15] Since the Straits crisis of 1996, Beijing has gradually increased its military budget and enhanced its combat capabilities (Pomfret, 2002). For their part, Taipei and Washington tend to view mainland's military modernization as "a destabilising effort to compel Taipei to accept unification on Beijing's terms" (Saunders, 2005, p. 981). Ross (2002, p. 49) believed that "interests, capabilities, and determination" contribute to how deterrence unfolds in the Taiwan Strait. The ongoing military modernization plan on the mainland has gradually increased the projection capability of China's military (Saunders, 2000a). Beijing's military analysts recognize the importance of military posture and displays of force, and often use this deterrence (*shengshi weishe* or *zaoshi weishe*) to demonstrate determination. Beijing's "military deterrence against Taiwan was effective" to some extent (Wang and Liu, 2004, p. 574). At the same time, many residents of the island of Taiwan understood that full independence would be likely to cause military conflict. Given this, they often opposed Taiwanese independence domestically.

Still, some analysts hold that Beijing is hardly obsessed with the use of force. Saunders (2005, p. 977) pointed out that Beijing was well aware of the high cost of using or threatening to use force, including the "international response and negative impact on Taiwan residents". Setting American military power aside, Beijing might have also recognized that the "rapid use of coercive military power would completely destabilise Taiwan, which means the effect of deterrence would also be greatly reduced" (Ross, 2002, p. 76). Perhaps for this reason, Beijing tried to policies of economic integration and united front during this period (Lampton, 2001).

An additional view worth noting is that the rise of nationalism in mainland China increases the instability of the triangular relations. The spread of nationalism and public opinion in general restricts the decision-making of Beijing's leaders (Bush, 2003). In

[13] The white paper states, "We deem it necessary here to further explain to the international community the Chinese government's position and policy on the One China principle". See http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/zylszl/baipishu/201101/t20110118_1700018.htm.
[14] Jiang's eight propositions. Please see https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cept/chn/zt/tai/t181591.htm.
[15] In his speech on 2 January, which was summarized by the outside world as "Xi's five points", the current Chinese president reserved the right to use force against Taiwan. See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/02/all-necessary-means-xi-jinping-reserves-right-to-use-force-against-taiwan.

fact, rising nationalism could push Beijing into making military decisions. Tucker and Glaser (2011) believed that Beijing confronts an array of long-term domestic issues that include social turmoil, corruption, income inequality, and environmental degradation, tarnishing the accomplishments of both the government and the Communist Party. As market reforms and local corruption have weakened belief in communism, Saunders (2005, p. 978) held the view that "Chinese leaders have tried to use nationalism to maintain elite and public support for their regime".

Meanwhile, the rapid increase in economic growth brought about by the reform effort launched in 1978 has helped create a sense of achieving a modern paradise and full national self-realization (Dittmer, 2005a). National pride and self-esteem have been boosted by rapid economic development (Lampton, 2007). For mainland Chinese, regaining Taiwan carries the *symbolic significance* of completing the national rejuvenation project (Saunders, 2005). Therefore, recovering Taiwan is a long-standing objective driven by "Chinese nationalism, irredentism and the domestic legitimacy of the CPC" (McKinney and Harris, 2021, p. 32).

China's development of new high-tech weapons furtherly strengthened the confidence of Chinese leaders when dealing with the Taiwan issue (Loeb, 2002). One analyst noted that Beijing's "acceleration of its' military modernisation efforts could increase the cost and risk of US intervention on behalf of Taiwan" (Saunders, 2005, p. 983). When Beijing developed the extreme military means that it possesses today, it also gradually adopted legislative means to express its authority over Taiwan to the outside world. The Hu Jintao era saw the passage of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law,[16] which firmly opposed any moves towards the independence of Taipei (Ji, 2006; Ross, 2006). The current Xi Jinping era has seen the adoption of the 2015 National Security Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. It is clearly stated that "safeguarding national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity is the common obligation of the people of the whole country, including compatriots in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan" (Central People's Government, the PRC, 2015).[17] Chou (2018) pointed out that President Xi has often linked the recovery of Taiwan with the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Beijing's desire for Taiwan's return to the mainland appears to be growing stronger.

As the triangular relationship develops, Beijing's foreign policy and attitude towards triangular relations have been changing. Shirk (2022) believed that China has overreached in international politics since Hu Jintao's second term and has been strengthened under Xi Jinping. This is due to the spillover effects of China's domestic

[16] Anti-Secession Law (ASL), Article 2, states that there is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, including Taiwan compatriots. See http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2005-05/08/content_5341734.htm.

[17] NSL, Chapter I, Article XI. See http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-07/01/content_2893902.htm.

politics, with Beijing's aggressive posture in international affairs and tight control over domestic society. Such behaviour threatens Taiwan and challenges the US economic, technological, and military leadership, creats a new Cold War situation between China and the US that is different from the US-Soviet Cold War. Doshi (2021) held the view that this is a long-term grand strategy carried out by China since the end of the Cold War, hoping to replace the US as the regional and global hegemony in a way without war.

At the same time, Basu (2020) pointed out that the world order has changed after Covid-19. China's challenge is more prominent. Its territorial claims (over Taiwan) and economic coercion are being implemented, and the power structure in the Indo-Pacific region is being reordered. Doshi (2021) found that China currently believes that the world order is under great changes that was unseen in a century, and sees the opportunity for an expansion strategy. The next decade will be crucial to whether China can replace its century of humiliation with a century of glory. The unification of Taiwan is a key component of this.

More importantly, cross-strait relations have also become more tense in recent years. Romberg (2017, p. 1) believed that after Tsai Ing-wen came to power, she refused to accept the 1992 consensus. Such behaviour "did not give Beijing a clear guarantee of non-independence." This means that the political foundation of the two sides across the Strait no longer exists, and cross-Strait relations have entered a new stage. Uncertainty is increasing in the triangular relationship; the window of opportunity for peaceful cross-Strait reunification is shrinking; and the probability of conflict is increasing (Zuo, 2021). Wu (2023) argues that facing the current uncertain situation across the Strait, Beijing seems to be increasingly inclined to use force to achieve reunification with Taiwan.

Under the dual influence of Sino-US competition and the Taiwan issue, the situation in the triangular relationship is becoming more and more tense. Chinese scholars and elites worry about a new cold war between China and the US (Zhao, 2019). McKinney and Harris (2021) believed that the Taiwan issue is not only a battle of wills between China and the US, but also involves China's position in East Asia and the world. Under such a tense situation, Zuo (2021, p. 568) suggested that China and the US should pursue a "culture of mutual restraint". Rudd (2022) also proposed a similar plan, arguing that through managed strategic competition, there is a way of coexistence that does not endanger the core interests of both parties, so as to avoid a geopolitical disaster.

These developments created dynamic shifts in the triangular relationship. For Beijing, taking back Taiwan by force will involve China's core domestic issues of "economic growth, domestic tranquility, secure borders, and regime legitimacy" (McKinney and Harris, 2021, p.32). This is an extremely risky move for Beijing, and there is no room for error. As Kagan (2020) pointed out, although Beijing has never renounced the use

of force to unify Taiwan, Chinese leaders are very cautious in choosing whether to retake Taiwan by force.

This section provides a review of policy history and various analysts' interpretations of the strategic aims of Beijing on the Taiwan issue. It highlights how the reunification of Taiwan is a core mainstream value of the mainland China government and its people. There may be some dissenting voices, but often drowned out by high-pitched nationalism. With the improvement of China's strength and the dynamic changes in the triangular relationship, Beijing has consciously adjusted its strategy. From a rational point of view, to avoid the major costs of conflict, peaceful reunification remains Beijing's first choice. However, the pessimistic perspective is that as the current competitive situation develops, the possibility that Beijing will choose to use force continues to increase.

2.3 Washington: The pivot in the triangular relationship?

After the KMT regime was defeated and fled to Taiwan to end the civil war on the Chinese mainland in 1949, Washington's role in the triangular relationship has unfolded under conditions of complex interdependence. More specifically, the USA has acted as "the consistent pivot of this triangle" (Dittmer, 2005b, p. 21).

The pivot point emerges from the fact that Taipei requires the support of Washington to maintain an independent existence, Beijing needs to pressure Taipei through Washington, and Washington needs to maintain a balance between the two in order to maintain the status quo. For the USA, Taiwan is an important interest in the relationship – but not Washington's most important interest overall. Other interests in the region and globally, as relevant to China and the USA, include the threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula, global climate change, and bilateral trade matters (Ross, 2002/2020; Gerald, 2011). This means that Washington plays an interesting role in the triangular relations both as an observer and as a participant (Shlapak, Orletsky, and Wilson, 2000).

Aside from practical interests, ideological ones have always been an important part of the triangular relationship. However, these interests have at times been interpreted differently by successive US presidents. Likewise, views of interests across the White House and Congress are not always entirely consistent. Thus, different policies and strategies have emerged in Washington's China policy. Three Sino-US Joint

Communiqués,[18] the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA),[19] and the Six Assurances[20] were all significant moves in Washington's 'dual-track policy'[21] towards China. When it comes to the dynamic triangular relationship, there are generally three different positions in Washington: pro-Taipei, pro-Beijing and strategic ambiguity.

The pro-Taipei position

Given the cooperative relationship between the KMT and Washington during World War II, voices of support for Taipei have never been silenced within Washington. To secure Taiwan's strategic protection, Taipei and Washington signed the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty. This policy remained in place until, facing the strength of Soviet posture, the White House eased relations with Beijing in the 1970s. But almost immediately, Taipei received support from the TRA and the so-called Six Assurances. *Geopolitics*, *American credibility*, *symbolizing democracy*, *a sense of moral obligation*, and *arms sales* are all important elements of the pro-Taipei position.

In terms of geopolitics, Taiwan is of great value to Washington (See NSC146/2, the US, 1953).[22] After 1979, this value is protected through the TRA, which ensures the arms sales to Taiwan that provide a security guarantee. While protecting Taiwan, these arms sales have cultivated relevant interest groups (Tucker and Glaser, 2011).

At the same time, whether the USA sells weapons to Taiwan has become a signal to Beijing and Taipei. The increase in US military sales to Taiwan means that the expansion of American military ties with Taiwan is accompanied by a fading of the strategic ambiguity that previously marked American policy. Lee, Paal, and Glaser (2011) believed that it is irrational to reduce arms sales to Taiwan as doing so would reduce Washington's deterrence capabilities. Taiwan would soon lose its ability to fight against the mainland and would be unable to wait for the arrival of Washington rescuers.

American credibility is another important factor ensuring that Washington cannot abandon Taipei. Lee, Paal, and Glaser (2011) pointed out that although failure to fulfil its commitment to Taipei could lead to a short-term friendship in the Beijing–

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[18] The three communiqués: the Shanghai Communiqué on 28 February 1972, the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on 1 January 1979, and communiqué on 17 August 1982. The United States formally acknowledged that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China" in all three communiqués.

[19] Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, 96th Congress, 1 January 1979, see https://www.ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/taiwan-relations-act/.

[20] American Institute in Taiwan, Six Assurances (1982). See https://www.ait.org.tw/declassified-cables-taiwan-arms-sales-six-assurances-1982/.

[21] Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology, Washington has maintained a strategic balance (Zhang and Eric, 2001).

[22] FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952–1954, CHINA AND JAPAN, VOLUME XIV, PART 1. See https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p1/d321.

Washington relationship, Beijing would respond to such appeasement with behaviors that gain more practical interests. Washington's credibility would be questioned by global allies and challenged by enemies. The impact of the loss of credibility would first emerge in the geopolitics of East Asia. Above all, the USA would disappoint its key regional ally Japan.

Given their economic, security and historical background, China-Japan relations remain marked by many points of conflict. American abandonment of Taiwan would cause Japan to worry about its geostrategic position in the region. Japanese doubts about American reliability would impact the US–Japan security alliance. Under this chain reaction, South Korea, which is increasingly dependent on China economically, could also abandon its alliance with the USA and seek out closer ties with China (Tucker and Glaser, 2011, pp. 32–33).

Since its successful Washington-backed democratization in the 1980s, Taiwan has become a symbol of democracy. Rigger (2013) and Saunders (2005) argued that Washington feels complex sentiments about the need to protect a democracy as well as moral obligation towards Taiwan. Taiwan's democratic transition is a useful example for Washington policymakers to sell US foreign policy. As Taiwan's democratization was achieved at the wishes of the USA, Washington also feels a sense of moral obligation to Taiwan. DeLisle (2010) argued that soft power is another crucial factor affecting the triangular relationship as American support for Taipei is based on a soft power calculus: whether Washington needs to maintain its democratic soft power to counter the threat of Beijing's increasing soft power.

Saunders (2005, p. 981) supported the view that "the democratisation of Taiwan...changed the basis of US support", creating a new positive foundation. The protection of Taiwan was redefined as protecting the democratic camp from the military threat posed by communist China. Taiwan's democratic values were now in line with the pursuit of democracy, human rights, and procedural justice in US domestic politics. It was not just the national government that attached importance to democratic values; the American people did, too. Taiwan is the "personification of political values which make it more attractive to the liberal-democratic world" (Rawnsley, 2012, p. 121). In contrast, Washington decisionmakers did not see the democratic changes they hoped would result from China's rapid economic development.

The strategically ambiguous position

During the 1970s, Moscow's offensive in the Cold War, the Vietnam war, the PRC-Soviet split and the development of nuclear weapons in China became important factors in the triangular relationship. These developments pushed Washington to begin to implement more flexible policies towards Beijing (Ge, 1998; Wu, 2000; Kissinger, 2011). Thus, in early 1972, the China–US Shanghai Joint Communiqué launched

Washington's official recognition of the One China principle and Beijing–Washington relations gradually eased over time.

The two actors subsequently issued two other communiqués in 1979 to 1982 to form three essential documents that established relations between China and the USA over the Taiwan issue. Although Washington and Beijing established diplomatic relations and the former officially severed diplomatic relations with Taipei, the USA did not completely abandon Taiwan. Washington and Taipei established an interactive framework based on the 1979 TRA, the so-called Six Assurances of 1982.

In effect, Washington had shifted from a unilateral pro-Taipei strategy to a bilateral one of strategic ambiguity. The purpose of strategic ambiguity is to deter Beijing from militarily taking back Taiwan and suppress Taiwan from politically declaring independence (Chen, 2009). The 1979 TRA stated that the USA would provide Taiwan with the means of self-defence, but the bill itself remained ambiguous on whether the USA would intervene militarily if the mainland attacked Taiwan (TRA, 1979).

The TRA thus became a sort of next best alternative to diplomatic and security relations between Washington and Taipei after 1979. On a fundamental level, it falls in line with America's complex security interests and commitment frameworks while also adapting to shifting stances tied to Washington's policy of strategic ambiguity (DeLisle, 2019). As a piece of domestic legislation that softens the Taiwan issue while protecting Taiwan, the TRA creates a legal basis for a lot of flexibility and ambiguity in the American strategic position.

Wu (2000) and Kissinger (2011) both believed that Washington proceeded more from a realist perspective to implement policies that were more favourable to the USA. The One China framework enabled Washington to enjoy "the economic and security benefits of cooperating with Beijing without paying the domestic and international political costs of abandoning Taiwan" (Saunders, 2005, p. 970). Strategic ambiguity also created a double deterrent for Beijing and Taipei: it deterred Beijing from a possible invasion while also containing Taipei's provocations (Bush, 2010). The purpose of Washington's China strategy was to converge conservative and cooperative policies from Beijing and Taipei to concur with American interests (Pan, 2003).

With China's increasingly assertive attitude and growing military power as new changes, some voices have called for Washington to change its strategic ambiguity. The widening gap in military power across the two sides of the Strait has increased Beijing's chances of successfully conquering Taiwan (Joseph, 2017; Chan, 2020; Schmitt, 2020; Yeh et al., 2020). As early as 2005, Saunders (p. 991) proposed how "facing the current development trend of the triangular relations, Washington will need to take a more assertive and intrusive action to resist unilateral efforts by Beijing or Taipei to alter the status quo" – a prescription that is only truer in the almost twenty years of development that have occurred since then.

Nevertheless, opponents believe that in the context of intensified competition between Beijing and Washington, Washington's shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity is more likely to trigger a cross-strait crisis. This is because the transformation of Washington's strategy is likely to make Beijing believe that Washington is supporting Taiwan independence (Dalei, 2020). In fact, strategic ambiguity has always had at least some level of clarity when it came to judging the trigger for conflict in the Strait.

This is because the dynamic of strategic ambiguity is one in which the USA sits in judgment on any crisis in cross-strait relations, essentially determining who is at fault and leaning in the direction of the party who is not at fault. It is unlikely, then, that Washington will abandon its strategic ambiguity as strategic clarity would lead to less flexibility. Uncertainty leads to restraint on both sides and as neither of the three parties' desires conflict, the policy works well.

At the same time, major changes in US policy can have a snowball effect. As in the 1970s when the USA changed its China policy, a change in Washington's strategic approach would impact the entire international diplomatic relationship. Therefore, it is more likely that Washington will retain room for policy implementation through strategic ambiguity, but not rule out some revised form of strategic ambiguity for calibration around the edges.

The pro-Beijing position

As bilateral relations between Beijing and Washington deepened and the mainland's strength continued to grow, voices supporting Beijing emerged in Washington. The primary positions in the pro-Beijing view relate to strategic burden, war costs and gains from cooperation. For this camp, the USA and China are the two most powerful nations. Their economic, political, military and trade relations impact most other nations around the globe, so it is vital to get the relationship right. But even as a rapid pace of development took hold on Chinese mainland, observers such as Yang (1999) and Gerald (2011) believed that the Taiwan issue still hindered further development of bilateral relations.

The pro-Beijing view posits that the relationship between Washington and Taipei is uncomfortable and dangerous (Owens, 2009; Gilley, 2010; Gerald, 2011; Glaser, 2011). The relationship between Washington and Beijing is more important, which means that maintaining Taipei is a strategic burden for Washington that will come at a high cost.

Beijing has always regarded the restoration of Taiwan as a key political goal and the sovereignty of Taiwan as the only issue that could potentially trigger a China–US war. That war could even be a nuclear war and even if it is conventional, the losses would be devastating. Writing in 1998, pro-Beijing analyst Freeman believed that the Taiwan issue no longer represented a core American interest and that Washington must ensure

peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Years later, Mearsheimer (2014a) echoed this position from a realist perspective. Believing that Washington would abandon Taiwan in the face of an increasingly powerful Beijing, he wrote, time is running out for the little island coveted by its gigantic, growing neighbour.

Harding (1999), Lieberthal (1998), and Nye (1998) all worried that Taipei's excesses would challenge cross-strait relations and unstable behaviour could make history repeat itself. In the three decades since the end of the Cold War, China has been moderately modernizing its nuclear arsenal (Zhao, 2020). An increase in nuclear weapons will further strengthen Beijing's negotiating position with Washington. If the USA still maintained its ability to defend Taiwan, it could inevitably lead to a race between conventional and nuclear arms. To avoid an out-of-control war, Glaser (2011, p. 86) believed that "the United States should abandon its commitment to Taiwan, which will eliminate the only tipping point for war between China and the United States, and lay a solid foundation for future China-US improvement".

In fact, cooperation gains with Beijing provided the bait that prompted Washington to make concessions on the Taiwan issue. Wu (2012) believed that Sino-US relations in the twenty-first century would pay more attention to core interests and expand common interests. Aligning with China over Taiwan would help Washington resolve its differences with Beijing on maritime rights, nuclear proliferation, cyber security, and the use of space. If Beijing's core interests were met, "other issues that are not directly related would be easier to reconcile between Beijing and Washington" (Tucker and Glaser, 2011, p. 24). At the same time, Gerald (2011, p. 10) pointed out how "Taiwan is now an economically successful democratic institution and is slowly becoming more aligned with the mainland, so the United States should also change its protectionist stance with Taiwan".

Facing China's rise, those who support cooperation with Beijing also recognize the inherent contradictions between China and the USA. The path to conflict between China and the USA may seem inevitable, but it is not irreversible. The views of the pro-Beijing camp have focused on different aspects over time and new elements of the triangle, but it has always been within Washington. In Ross's (2020) view, pragmatic leaders who focus on national interests can reduce conflicts and increase cooperation in Sino-US relations.

Washington's strategic choice: Abandoning ambiguity?

Regarding the settlement of the Taiwan issue, Americans "are adamant that resolution of the cross-strait impasse happens peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan, although the United States is uncommitted to any specific resolution" (Tucker and Glaser, 2011, p. 23). But this argument also seems somewhat unlikely as it is unclear whether Washington actually cares about either the peaceful reunification of the two sides or abandoning Taiwan's geopolitical interests.

This is because Washington's policy on the triangular relationship is constantly evolving. In the early 1970s, Washington shifted from firm (but not unconditional) support for Taipei to a balancer role (Dittmer, 2005). Delisle (2016) noted that each US president strikes his own balance among various values and interests in foreign policy. Triangular relations have thus changed over time. With the rise of China, complaints from neighbouring states (e.g., India, Japan and the Philippines) have become background noise to Washington's China policy. Taiwan has lobbied on Capitol Hill in the name of boycotting China and safeguarding democratic values. These whispers are flooding Washington's ears and the noise is working: current US President Joe Biden recently reiterated the concept of a "free and open Indo-Pacific"[23] and called for the West to prepare together for long-term strategic competition with China at the Virtual Munich Security Conference in 2021.[24] An anti-Beijing alliance thus seems to be forming and such a significant change could affect Taiwan's future strategic position for the USA.

Sino-US relations have undergone fundamental changes in recent years. Competition has almost become a synonym for it and affects the cross-Strait relations. In Hass's (2021) view, competition is the defining trait of the relationship between China and the US. Medeiros (2019) believed that the long-term structural drivers and short-term cyclical factors of Sino-US relations are making bilateral relations tenser. Among them, the possible conflicts triggered by the status of Taiwan are at the core of the US-China security competition. Starting from an economic point of view, Bergsten (2022) explained that the competition between China and the US is also related to their long-term systematic competition for leadership of the world economy.

In fact, Washington's China policy has a growing preference for competition. Chhabra, Doshi, Hass and Kimball (2021) showed that the US view of China has changed from a responsible stakeholder in the Bush era in 2005 to a strategic competitor in the Trump era. Zhang (2022, p. 805) pointed out that under the anarchic international order, Obama, Trump, and Biden have shown some "commonality and continuity" in their China strategies, that is, they all adopt competitive strategies toward China. However, Zhao (2022) explained that even though there is such a misplaced ideological hostility between China and the US, it is difficult to see that the China-US rivalry ends with the collapse of one side. As a result, ruthless competition and close cooperation will coexist among nations.

In the competition between China and the US, Lynch (2018) noted that Taiwan is an important bargaining chip in Washington's diplomatic strategy. As the threat from

[23] In November 2017 in Vietnam, US President Trump outlined a vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. See https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.

[24] Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference, 19 February 2021. See https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference/.

mainland China to Taiwan has grown, so has the importance of US military protection for Taiwan (Copper, 2019). In Herzinger's (2021) view, if Taiwan falls to China, a successful democracy will be wiped out, and China's increased geopolitical status in East Asia will come at the cost of undermining the US and its allies. Thus, McKinney and Harris (2021) held the view that Washington wants to maintain the status quo, and Beijing's challenge to the status quo could place Taiwan under the pre-1979 US defense umbrella.

Faced with the new dynamics of the triangle relationship, Mahnken, Babage and Yoshihara (2018) argued that Washington has realized that Beijing is isolating and weakening Taiwan in all aspects, and is preparing to retake Taiwan within 20 years. Washington has begun to face the global power competition from China both physically and psychologically (Vinodan and Kurian, 2021). Zuo (2021) argued that in the past few years, Washington has intentionally adjusted its relationship with Taipei in order to deal with challenges from Beijing. Both China and the US tend to increase threats and reduce reassurance. The old mechanisms for maintaining the status quo are crumbling, and new ones have yet to emerge. Rudd (2022) further illustrated that the degree of distrust between China and the US is deepening. Washington does not believe in China's self-proclaimed peaceful rise, and Beijing does not believe in the US's unintentional containment.

Wu (2023) believed that facing the current situation, Washington should adopt strategic clarity to reassure Taipei and deter Beijing at the same time. Regarding the deterrence strategy, Odell, Heginbotham, Lin, Sacks, Templeman, and Mastro (2021) pointed out that its purpose is to convince Beijing that retaking Taiwan by force will cause a serious economic crisis for the mainland, rather than absorbing Taiwan's advanced technology industries and achieve technological progress.

Washington's One China Policy is loosening. Zuo (2021) found that the US Congress was the main force pushing to re-examine the One-China Policy in the past, but now the views of the executive branch and Congress are getting closer. Cooper (2022) pointed out that the Biden administration has repeatedly broken through strategic ambiguity, stating that if Beijing uses force against Taiwan, the US will send troops to defend Taiwan. Washington has continuously strengthened its commitment to Taiwan, and the competition between China and the US has become increasingly fierce. In order to avoid further deterioration of the situation, Vinodan and Kurian (2021) suggested that Beijing and Washington can build a good relationship that benefits both China and the US and other countries around the world by focusing on common objectives such as global prosperity and growth.

Past research suggests that Washington's policy on the triangular relationship has been in flux and internally divided. It is unlikely that Washington will either abandon Taipei unconditionally or needlessly antagonize Beijing. Washington's strategic approach has only one real principle: that any change on both sides of the Taiwan Strait must unfold

under its control. The US thus opposes a unilateral change of the status quo. In effect, strategic ambiguity has been a dual deterrence approach that ensures China is less likely to use force to retake Taiwan and Taiwan's leaders are less likely to provoke a crisis that could lead to a war in the Strait. This means the triangular relationship is largely dominated by Washington policy, which itself is defined by three communiqués, the TRA and the Six Assurances. However, the status quo of the triangle relationship is currently heading towards an increasingly unstable trend with new dynamics.

2.4 Taipei: Caught in a dilemma between independence, unification, and the status quo

Dynamic changes in the triangular relationship have caused some dilemmas to emerge for Taiwan (Dittmer, 2005). First, Taiwan's political ecology and social structure have undergone tremendous changes in the developments that unfolded over the past half-century. Compared to the One China concept of the mid-century Chiang Kai-shek era, the 1992 consensus and other conceptualizations represented change. Then came Lee Teng-hui's special state-to-state relationship in 1999 and Chen Shui-bian's[25] One Country on Each Side in 2002. Democratization, identity and interdependence become important factors. Different voices, whether pro-independence, pro-unification or pro-status quo, infused different groups in Taiwan.

Along with the changes in Taiwan's political system, there are also changes in the identity of the people of Taiwan. The most notable ones are represented by local residents (*ben sheng ren*)[26] - the Pan-Green camp,[27] which are more inclined to support independence mainly owing to factors such as Taiwanese identity, democratization, and so on (see Anderson, 2006, Wachman, 2016; Kastner, 2018). Their rivals are residents from the mainland (*wai sheng ren*)[28] - the Pan-Blue camp,[29] which is more inclined to support unification mainly in light of a pan-Chinese identity and given how economic integration and guaranteed negotiation can achieve peaceful reunification (see Leng, 1996; Abramowitz and Bosworth, 2003; Tucker, 2002). The third part is that some rational Taiwan residents are more willing to support the status quo (see Chu, 2004; Wang and Liu, 2004; Rigger, 2006).

Under martial law (1949–1987)

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[25] Chen Shui-bian, the tenth and eleventh presidents of the ROC (2000-2008), from the DPP.
[26] *Ben sheng ren* refers to families that had lived on the island for centuries.
[27] The Pan-Green camp is a localist political coalition consisting of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Taiwan Statebuilding Party (TSP), the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), and the Taiwan Constitution Association (TCA).
[28] Mainly refers to mainlanders who fled to Taiwan following the KMT.
[29] The Pan-Blue camp refers to a loose political coalition in Taiwan consisting of the KMT, the People First Party (PFP), the New Party (CNP), and the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU).

From 1949 to the late 1980s, Taiwan's political system was dominated by the KMT. The ruling elite represented by Chiang Kai-shek emphasized their singular Chinese identity. Their most important goal was to counterattack the mainland and achieve cross-strait reunification. The legitimacy of the KMT's rule in Taiwan and the political dominance of mainland elites is based on Taiwan being part of China, thus, Taiwanese consciousness and society's quest for a separate international identity were long suppressed under the KMT regime (Chu, 2004). Local Taiwanese had limited opportunities within the political system and their tendency to separate from the mainland was likewise suppressed. This kind of oppression caused many nationalists in Taiwan to consciously define a discrete Taiwanese identity separate from Chinese identity and in opposition to the KMT dictatorship. Taiwanese identity is not a supplement to Chinese identity (e.g., local identity of Shanghai is under Chinese identity), but opposite.

The birth of the China–US Joint Communiqué in 1979 and Washington's turn to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing posed a crisis for the KMT government. The international situation had changed significantly. Taipei believed it was necessary to start adjusting policies to strengthen relations with the USA. Chiang Ching-kuo acknowledged that the basis of the US-backed Cold War against Red China had disappeared once Washington shifted ties from Taipei to Beijing.

The end of Taipei's diplomatic relations with Washington had put Taiwan at great risk. Democratization thus became an important way for Taipei to strengthen its ties with Washington. While Taiwan's democracy ultimately came from within, one of the external factors was that the USA grew less interested in supporting an authoritarian regime that was merely anti-communist.

Democratization: Different camps (after 1987)

In 1987, Taiwan embarked on a period of political liberation, but also one of profound contradictions. The Nationalist Chinese identity that ruled under the KMT diverged from the new identity that emerged after a wave of democratization. As Chiang Ching-kuo's successor, Lee Teng-hui began widespread promotion of Taiwan's democratization (Jacobs and Liu, 2007). Local residents called *ben sheng ren*, who were previously oppressed by ruling KMT elites (*wai sheng ren*) began to affect elections. Starting in 1990, a kind of ethnopolitical identification as Taiwanese began to gradually form. Soon, there was no interest in cross-strait reunification.

Economic integration seemed to bring Taiwan back to the dynamic economic track of the mainland. But a wave of nationalism lured voters to seek international recognition. The internal power achieved its first party rotation in the 2000 elections, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power.

The pro-independence position. After Taiwan's democratization, a notable change occurred in the liberation of different voices and wider promotion of independent voices. In this process, democratization, Taiwanese identity and support for independence are closely related. At the same time, they are also important factors affecting the One China principle, cross-strait and triangular relations (Kastner, 2018; Li, 2014a). The people who supported independence gradually formed the Pan-Green coalition that included politicians such as Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen.

Kastner (2018) pointed out that the situation in the Taiwan Strait had become more complicated as the fundamental deterrence problem did not focus on defending the territory itself, as most security dilemma theories assume. Instead, it focused on the issue of Taiwan's political identity. Taiwanese identity is a function of historical and global factors (Chu and Lin, 2001; Ching, 2001). This includes Japanese colonial rule (1895–1945) and post-World War II political reconstruction. After World War II, the KMT ruled Taiwan – yet because Japan had governed Taiwan for 50 years, there was also a gap between the ruling KMT party and local residents.

Lai, Ramon and Wei (1991) pointed out that hostility between the ruler and the islanders eventually erupted in an uprising that led to the so-called 2/28 incident.[30] This incident deepened the internal division between mainlanders represented by the KMT ruling class and local Taiwanese (*ben sheng ren*) (Corcuff and Edmondson, 2002). Local politicians, initially from the non-KMT movement and later from the Democratic Progressive Party, successfully exploited demand to correct the political dominance of mainlanders to mobilize support for democratization and independence.

The Taiwan independence people formerly suppressed by the KMT combined democratization with human rights issues, attracting attention from US Congress. By linking democratization with the Taiwan independence movement, Taiwan independence forces become part of the mainstream; as an external factor, Washington then contributed to Taiwan's democratic process (Wachman, 2016).

As a local political party in Taiwan, the DPP characterized the KMT as an external political party in order to gain voter support. In the struggle for national identity, the opposition tried to "democratise through Taiwanese identity and stripped the legitimacy of the KMT" (Chu, 2004, p. 498). Through this process, power was redistributed the mainlanders to local Taiwanese elites (Chu, 1992). At the same time, these actions created confusion in the national identity of the Taiwan people and further adversely affected cross-strait relations.

[30] The 2/28 incident refers to the fierce government-civilian conflicts that broke out in various parts of Taiwan from February 27 to May 16, 1947, and was eventually suppressed by the KMT government by sending troops from the mainland. See https://www.228.org.tw/228_overview.php?sn=77.

Democratization and identity have a determinative impact on whether to observe the One China Principle, and the process of democratization had already led to structural changes in Taiwan's politics. Those in the Pan-Green coalition were prouder of Taiwan's democracy and more inclined to independence than those in the Pan-Blue (Gries and Su, 2013). In addition, Hughes (2013) pointed to the crisis of national legitimacy triggered by epic changes in the international system since the late 1970s as an important factor that subsequently stimulated the desire of Taiwan residents to establish an independent nation.

After the DPP came to power, consciousness grew of a Taiwan identity separate from that of China (Anderson, 2006). In Taiwan, the party system and voter response to it are shaped by a powerful determinant of national identity: the China factor. This factor exists alongside three conventional factors of party identification, issue orientation, and candidate evaluation to shape voting patterns (Achen and Wang, 2017). The core issue of cross-strait relations, then, is identity politics: Taiwanese identity versus Chinese identity.

As democratization made Taiwanese identity stronger, one of the easiest ways to get votes in an election was through identity politics. In the past, the interests of the elite ruling class of KMT mainlanders opposed those of the ruled class of mostly Taiwan local people. Although a common culture plays a vital role in cross-strait relations, the KMT's dictatorship and democratization process in Taiwan jointly shaped the lived experience of the island's residents (Hughes, 2013).

Pan (2004a) offered two points of contrast to illustrate Taiwanese nationalism. For the older generation, Taiwanese identity was a reaction against the KMT's dictatorship and its enforced Chinese identity. For the younger generation, Taiwanese identity means a natural place of birth and growth. It is only through analysis of nationalism and identity changes in Taiwan and the mainland, then, that we can fully understand the paradox of economic convergence and political differences across the Straits (Li, 2014b).

In addition to the historical and systemic influences, Taiwan's political parties and leaders also play an important role – although Saunders (2005, p. 974) claimed that "if the actions of political leaders reflect mainstream public opinion, then Taiwan's leaders should not be held responsible for the promotion of independence". On the other hand, neither historical roots nor systemic changes can directly change group identity (Brass, 1991; Breuilly, 1993). Even if the leader's behaviour reflects public opinion, the role of the leader in this process cannot be ignored. Taiwan's elected leaders are often motivated to arouse Taiwanese identity and the people's desire for self-determination, because these highly emotional symbolic questions help them occupy the moral high ground. Mainly during elections, these issues (along with cross-strait issues) help to "divert voters' attention from the sluggish economy and unfulfilled promises of political reform" (Chu, 2004, p. 490). Taiwanese identity thus became a campaign tool in Taiwan's internal politics.

Although Taiwan and Chinese mainland share many cultural similarities, the politicization of the Taiwanese identity has seen it become a kind of ethnic and political identity – a national identity. The identification of the Taiwanese has led to the emergence of ethnic conflicts within Taiwan, and this ethnic conflict has further changed domestic politics. Such changes affect the Taiwan government's attitude towards the mainland and the USA, becoming a destabilizing factor in the triangular relationship. Essentially, national identities are not inborn, but rather are socially and politically constructed sentiments that are subject to change and manipulation – especially under the intensive mobilization of political elites at times of regime transition (Chu and Lin, 2004).

Along with Taiwanese identity comes more radical rhetoric and actions by Taiwan's leaders. In 1993, Taipei began working to join the UN. For international recognition, economic development and diplomatic breakthroughs, Lee began to implement a pragmatic diplomacy (*wu shi wai jiao*) with the purpose of establishing a new framework to distinguish itself from the mainland (Wang, 2002). The activities included so-called vacation,[31] dollar and tycoon diplomacy (Chen, 2002). At the end of Lee's term of office in 1999, he accepted an exclusive interview with the Voice of Germany and suddenly proposed a 'two-state theory' (*liang guo lun*), stating that Taiwan and Chinese mainland are "special state-to-state relations", which caused a political storm across the Strait (BBC, 2020).[32] Lee's actions broke "the ambiguous space" in the triangular relationship and received much attention from Washington and Beijing (Hu, 2003, p. 139).

Lee Teng-hui's successor, Chen Shui-bian from the DPP, continued to promote Taiwan separatism and proposed "One Country on Each Side" (*yi bian yi guo*) on 3 August 2002, at the 29th annual meeting of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations.[33] He initiated the constitutional reform project in 2003 to conquer issues with good management and establish the foundation for democracy and the rule of law; at the same time, the project made Taiwan a sovereign and independent democratic country by formulating a new constitution (Li, 2006). Chen thus followed the path of Lee Teng-hui, adopting a "creeping independence and provocative brinkmanship to redefine the direction and purpose of change" (Dittmer, 2005b, p. 87). Chen's radical remarks and activities created a grim strategic situation in the Taiwan Strait. As a result, Chen was often portrayed in the international media as a provocative and unrealistic figure seen

[31] *Vacation diplomacy* as an instrument of foreign policy has taken many forms, including the summit and funeral varieties. For Taipei, vacation diplomacy is a way of engaging in informal relationships with governments that have no intention of breaking their ties with Beijing. By Michael Leifer, 11 February 1994. See https://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/11/opinion/IHT-taiwana-studied-exercise-in-vacation-diplomacy.html.


[32] On Lee Teng-hui's death: Taiwan's 'Mr Democracy' once triggered a cross-strait crisis due to sovereignty. See https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-53577869.

[33] For details, please see "One Country on Each Side" on the website of the Central People's Government, http://www.gov.cn/test/2006-04/26/content_266068.htm.

as “an irresponsible adventurer bent on independence” (Sullivan and Lowe, 2010, p. 619).

Voices supporting Taiwan independence have increased and the Taiwan people’s sense of identity with China is declining. As Figure 2.1 Taiwan polls shows below, it seems that from the beginning, the one country, two systems formula was not compelling for Taiwan residents. The percentage of people who do not accept the formula has always been above 70%. Taiwan, the weakest participant in the triangular relationship, has also had the potential to detonate it. Johnson (2005) thus asserted that Taiwan’s future belonged to those who wanted to separate from China, because this would challenge Beijing’s bottom line (One China principle) and lead to war.

Figure 2.1: (Taiwan) Mainland Affairs Council, Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China (2008/03) [34]



The pro-unification position. Voices supporting reunification also exist in Taiwan. They are represented by the KMT-led blue camp led that believes the 1992 consensus should be adhered to on both sides of the strait. This group of people mainly migrated to Taiwan with the KMT after 1949, so their position emphasizes the “common culture, language, heritage, Chinese identity, economic integration interests and cooperation of both sides of the strait” (Ross, 2006, p. 142). During the period of KMT rule that lasted from 1940 to 1988, Taipei insisted on consolidating its identity as the sole legitimate representative of China (Zuo, 2012).

In this regard, Chu (1992) identified a fundamental conflict between the coalitions of pro-independence and pro-reunification in terms of two seemingly irreconcilable sentimental claims about Taiwan’s national status and the Taiwanese people’s identity:

[34] See https://ws.mac.gov.tw/001/Upload/OldFile/public/MMO/MAC/9703e_8.gif.

Taiwanese nationalists advocate for an independent Taiwanese identity and seek permanent separation from China, while Chinese nationalists oppose the move towards Taiwanese independence and support eventual reunification with China.

In fact, the benefits of economic integration have always supported the views of those in favour of reunification or at least friendly cross-strait relations. Economic integration between the mainland and Taiwan has deepened expensively since the reform period began on the mainland in 1979 – despite Taipei enacting policy and administrative barriers to limit economic dependence on the mainland in the form of successive "*jie ji yong ren* (no haste, be patient) and *ji ji kai fang* (active opening, effective management) policies to limit investment in the mainland. However, cross-strait integration had already occurred, and these policies were "often avoided or ignored by Taiwan companies" (Saunders, 2005, p. 983).

Abramowitz and Bosworth (2003) believed that Taiwan was integrating into the mainland economy, cross-strait relations were getting closer, and the possibility of peace was likewise increasing. Taiwan's localization seemed to be mainly reflected in the national identity and independence/unification question, while its influence on cross-strait economic policy decisions was limited (Wu, 2001). Tucker (2002) pointed out that Taipei was choosing between political and economic priorities. Growing economic dependence and integration with the mainland alongside changing perceptions of Taiwan's needs and interests could enable Taiwan to achieve reunification in the near future.

Roy (2004) gave an account of the then-status of the two sides of the strait, which indicated that the developing prosperity of the cross-strait economy strongly supported Taiwan's sustained economic health and political survival. Roy also noted, however, that over-reliance on economic relations with the mainland had caused political splits in Taiwan. Tung (2003) held a different view, believing that even if economic exchange between the mainland and Taiwan developed rapidly, the mainland would not be able to use economic leverage to achieve its political goals regarding the Taiwan issue: Taiwan was not vulnerable enough to be affected by mainland economic sanctions.

Still, economic interdependence between the mainland and Taiwan had "cultivated some objective needs, making political elites' strategic choices become more complicated" (Chu, 2004, p. 511). Although cross-strait trade politically embarrassed the Taiwan government, it provided an economic opportunity that was irresistibly attractive to commercial interests. Cross-strait trade and investment thus served as a fulcrum by which societal interests moved an unwilling state (Leng, 1996).

On the other hand, Taiwan leaders and security analysts were conscious of the potential dangers of excessive economic dependence on the mainland (Saunders, 2005). Chen (2012) argued that before the Ma Ying-jeou administration, Taiwan policymakers believed that cross-strait economic relations would threaten Taiwan. For this reason,

their previous economic restrictions aimed partly at helping delineate the border between Taiwan and the mainland to help strengthen Taiwan's independent identity.

Still, the 2010 'Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)'[35] further integrated the two sides of the Strait. There was a view that the then-ruling Ma Ying-jeou government ignored "potential political threats at the strategic and political levels between Taiwan and the mainland" (Tucker and Glaser, 2011, p. 30). Rowen (2015) noted that the too-close interaction between the two sides of the strait had actually encountered great resistance in Taiwan; the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) was opposed by the 2014 Sunflower Movement that saw the agreement permanently shelved.

In the end, economic integration did not reduce political crises as expected. Zweig (2002) observed that Taipei's cooperation with the mainland in the face of substantial economic benefits did not prevent Taipei from pursuing a strategy of gradual independence. As a result, the level of distrust and hostility between Beijing and Taipei increased over time. Although the scope and intensity of cross-strait exchanges had rapidly expanded, domestic support for political unification in Taiwan declined and the proportion of Taiwanese residents who considered themselves Taiwanese rather than Chinese rose (Rigger, 2006). Hu (2013) believed that under the influence of the economy, personal and social contacts, and the role of international actors (particularly the USA), there would be a continuous circulatory dialogue – but no transformative breakthrough.

Cross-strait cooperation provides another critical support point for reunification. Despite Beijing and Taipei's often competitive attitude in the international community, cooperation is still possible. With positive interactions between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping, the mainland and Taiwan reached a diplomatic truce (Wang, 2016). To maintain Ma's reputation in the island's re-election, Beijing rejected the proposal to establish diplomatic ties with Panama and Paraguay. Given close economic integration, cooperation and cultural exchanges between the two sides of the strait, optimistic views believe that there is still hope in the eventually reunification of the strait.

The status quo maintenance position. The third position in Taiwan is the non-inclined camp known as rational voters. Taiwan's general public opinion still has a relatively pragmatic side when comparing major interests and strategic strength. This thinking is still in the mainstream public opinion and over the decades, it has not changed much.

In fact, the tilting of rational voters in favour of either independence or unification affects Taiwan's future course of action (Wang and Liu, 2004; Chu, 2004). These people are neither willing to accept Beijing's one country, two systems formula, but


[35] See https://www.mac.gov.tw/public/data/051116322071.pdf.

they also worry about the war damage caused by independence. In Chu's (2004, p. 484) opinion, the number of support unified or independent voters is not enough to give enough support to any elected leader; but while the existence of many rationalists can alleviate conflict between the two poles in the short term, "it could shift the political equilibrium in either direction based on changing external conditions" in the long term. Niou (2004) further supported this view by drawing on studies of conditional preferences. For Niou, the gap between Taiwanese ethnic consciousness and support for independence is artificial. This is because Taiwanese who prefer independence are generally threatened by the mainland, yet studies also show that many Taiwanese (including many who accept both peace and independence) can also accept reunification under certain conditions.

These rational voters may symbolize their identity as either Taiwanese or Chinese. Rigger (2006, p. 10) argued that although people often associated the promotion of independence with Taiwanese identity, Taiwanese identity does not mean pro-independence as ethnic consciousness may not mean "the same thing to all groups in Taiwan". Through an analysis of four stages of political generations among Taiwan residents, Rigger puts forward the view that young Taiwanese people tend to be pragmatic and flexible. For them, loving Taiwan does not mean hating the mainland. So long as Beijing does not adopt measures that ignite hatred among Taiwanese, there is no reason for Taiwan residents to refuse to accept more profound exchanges and interactions.

The position that supports maintenance of the status quo thus remains popular and significant for Taiwan's future choices. As the polls shown in Figure 2.2 below demonstrates, the status quo position is still mainstream.

Figure 2.2: (Taiwan) Mainland Affairs Council, Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Relations in the Republic of China (2008/03), "Unification or Independence?"[36]



The influence of Taiwan's domestic politics on the triangular relationship should not be overlooked, because its leaders will have to declare independence under pressure if the voters demand it. At the same time, political camps in Taiwan are very sensitive to the issue of Taiwan's 'dignity'. For instance, in his 2008 inaugural speech, Taiwanese leader Ma Ying-jeou said that "Taiwan needs to be safe and prosperous, but also needs dignity".[37] Taipei is vigilant about the possibility of being 'suppressed', 'dwarfed', 'localized', and 'marginalized' alongside worry about being swallowed up verbally (*kou tou tun bing*). The issue of dignity between the two sides of the strait is "not only about values, but also involves to the political positioning of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan's international status, cross-strait social systems and lifestyles and other sensitive political issues" (Li, 2015, p. 3).

But, in the process of reconstructing Taiwan's identity, the denial of Chinese identity and the rise of Taiwanese identity has led to identity confusion among the people of Taiwan. Taipei's self-identification influences its struggle for diplomatic recognition in the field of IGOs. This adds to the complexity of the triangular relationship, making disputes more difficult to resolve (Zuo, 2012). Meanwhile, the people of Taiwan still maintain a strong sense of identity with Chinese ethnicity and culture. But owing to the DPP's manipulation of identity politics and Beijing's equating of Taiwanese and

[36] See https://ws.mac.gov.tw/001/Upload/OldFile/public/MMO/MAC/9703e_1.gif.

[37] For details, please see http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/newsid_7400000/newsid_7409800/7409804.stm.

Chinese identity or culture with recognizing Taiwan as part of China, Chinese identity has become antithetical to Taiwanese identity.

Keng and Schubert (2010) believed that Taipei's behaviour could be seen as a strategy of salami slicing moving towards the direction of de jure independence. If public opinion supported this policy direction more, elected officials would likely have no other choice. However, Rigger (2006, p. 59) believed that "the fate of Taiwanese nationalism depends on Beijing". So far, the people of Taiwan have refused to accept Taiwan's nationalist logic; they have refused to treat China as an enemy that Taiwan should isolate. But if Beijing behaves like an enemy, their views may change. The gradual creep of Taiwan's independence movement (led by democratization and the growing strength of Taiwanese identity) effectively created the most unstable trend in domestic politics because it "challenged China's bottom-line position and the US policy of opposing unilateral efforts by either side to challenge the status quo" (Saunders, 2005, p. 989).

To sum up, Taiwan's domestic views on cross-strait political relations are divided. Taiwan separatists advocate for independence while others think Taiwan and the mainland should be reunified sooner or later. In opinion polls, however, there is usually a majority or near-majority who believe that the status quo is likely the best option for Taiwan (Wu and Hsieh, 2016).

2.5 Conclusion

The triangular relationship emerged from the joint actions of Beijing, Washington, and Taipei. It has been further influenced by the strategic interactions and domestic political dynamics of the three parties. Taiwan's internal processes (including democratization and identity creation) are significant in shaping cross-strait relations, which indirectly affect the development of triangular relations (Chu, 2004; Wu, 2005).

The overall framework is shaped in accordance with hard power politics, which means that cross-strait relations are ultimately subject to Sino-US relations. The strategic ambiguity adopted by Washington has deterred conflict between Beijing and Taipei over the past 40 years. Thus far, the status quo has maintained the stability of the triangular relationship despite Beijing's and Taipei's dissatisfaction with it. In Sino-US relations, the Taiwan issue is more of a competitive symptom than a cause for tension. Washington and Taipei share similar democratic values and ideologies, have a high degree of mutual recognition, and are less threatening to one another, creating the basis for common interests and partnership. Taipei uses American value of democracy to bridge its emotional distance from Washington (Li, 2008). Beijing implements the carrot and stick model (economic integration and military deterrence) to interact with Taipei.

This dynamic and stable complementary state affords the triangular relationship a certain degree of flexibility as it includes a grey area, i.e., strategic competition without crossing a red line, owing to each of the three parties considering their own interests and costs. This means that the triangular relationship exists in a restricted dynamic state. To support this point, this chapter has reviewed the relevant literature on the triangular relationship. Views and perceptions of the triangular relationship are not consistent and considerations span a range of interests. Such differences in identities and values lead to conflicts of interest, which is the cause for triangular competition in IGO settings.

At the same time, there are differences in how each of the three actors perceives the triangular relationship. Their internal views are not monolithic, as the triangular relationship itself is constructed by milestones and existing/emerging factors. The next chapter reviews the literature on the role of IGOs, describing the relationship between the IGOs and the triangular relationship.

Chapter 3: Literature Review – IGOs and the Triangular Relationship

3.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature on IGOs and the triangular competition in IGO settings. The first part of the chapter reviews the origin and classification of international organizations (IOs) and explains why IGOs were chosen as the setting through which to examine the triangular relationship. The purpose of this section is to provide sufficient information about IGOs to facilitate the understanding of the role of IGOs in the international politics and the triangular relationship.

The second part links IGOs with triangular relationships, and reviews the literature on the triangular competition within the IGOs. The value of this section is to demonstrate the relationship between the three political actors and IGOs and their attitudes towards IGOs. On this basis, the competition among the three parties in IGOs and the dynamic changes of the triangular relationship are further linked and discussed.

Through a review of how IGOs have long played a role as both a tool and a platform in international politics, this study argues that they carry a strong utility value to Beijing, Washington, and Taipei. The roles of Beijing, Washington, and Taipei among IGOs are changing, especially between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing has gone from being isolated by the international community to being an active participant and leader of IGOs. Corresponding to this is Taipei, which held the UN China seat in the early days of the triangle relationship, and is now marginalized by the international community. As a fulcrum, the adjustment of Washington's China policy has played an important role in the triangular IGO competition. Changes in the competition and participation of the three political actors in IGOs follow synergistic changes in the triangular relationship. Competition in IGO settings thus effectively becomes a microcosm for the larger dynamic triangular relationship.

3.2 International organizations (IOs)

The international community is composed of countries and IOs, which together constitute a vibrant international society. Lall (2017) evaluated the role of IOs in terms of achievement goals, cost-effectiveness, and responsiveness to diverse stakeholders to show that IGO performance varies on account of moral constraints and independent operational ability. In brief, IOs are mainly used as collective coordinators and group activists on the international stage. The following sections discuss the functions of organizations of various natures.

3.2.1 Different perspectives in theorizing IOs

Selznick (1957) believed that in certain specific economic and political situations, IOs took on an institutional form with some rules and regulations and an objective purpose for their existence, and thus provide a rational administrative tool. This approach analyses the practical significance of IOs and aims to aims to describe the purpose of IO.

With the advance of theoretical research into IOs, Duverger (1972) provided a more detailed definition of IOs as follows: an international organization is, in a sense, a public institution that plays a role in dealing with international relations; it generally takes the form of an institution in the international community; and the collective form or basic structure of such institutions is formulated by law and human traditions. Duverger lists the essential elements that define IOs, such as rules, regulations, staff, levels of administration, and so on. Such a definition carries a practical appeal as it is more specific than the ones used in previous theories. Duverger set out some necessary elements and forms constituting an international organization that later became essential reference points. His analysis, which standardised the category of IO in accordance with objective conditions, was a significant development in the definition of IOs.

In 1977, Gerbet more concerned with the purpose of IOs, defining IOs by linking government groups or social groups in a permanent organization. By Gerbet's definition, an IO ensures that all groups can express their desire to defend common interests and tackle important international issues (1977).

Following this, Judge (1995) then argued that IOs must meet the following essential characteristics:

1. Regarding the organization's members, three or more states are required to participate and contribute to the budget. Each participant must have independent voting rights, and one member cannot control the organization.

2. Regarding the organization's staff, there should be corresponding rules and regulations to govern members' election of management and officials as well as a long-standing work centre. Those officials cannot all come from the same country; the IO must show that it is an independent entity and can appoint its own officials.
3. Regarding operations, there should be evidence that the IO's current activities are practical.

Archer (2001) further listed three elements that are most indispensable for IOs: membership, goals, and structure. For him, an IO is defined as "a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental or non-governmental) from two or more sovereign states to pursue the common interest of the membership; it covers a wide range of institutions even if profit-making associations are excluded" (Archer, 2001, p. 35).

Judge, Archer, and Duverger's views all coincide to some degree. Although they explain IOs from different angles, all three determine the specific requirements for IOs both in terms of behavioural objectives and in terms of practical operations. Their definitions can be understood as standardizing IOs with a focus on operational processes and objective conditions. Although the listing of specific elements places clear limits on the definition of IOs, this particularity can be conducive to understanding IOs from the perspective of the organization itself.

The official definition of IOs

Before the specific definition of an IO was made official, it underwent a process of evolution. The early International Law Commission (ILC)[38] defined an IO simply as an institution operating between different countries – essentially the same definition as an IGO. Such a definition is flawed, however: IGOs are just one sub-category of IOs and should not be understood as definitive of the entire category. In 2011, the ILC adopted a draft article on the responsibility of IOs and, at the same time, adopted the following definition of an IO: an organization established by a treaty or some other instrument governed by international law that possesses an international legal personality. The ILC further states that "international organizations may include members, in addition to states, other entities".[39]

Another important element is that this definition does not require IOs to be established by forms such as treaties. It does require the IO's international legal personality to be distinguishable from that of members, which is conducive to the realization of its

[38] The ILC was established by the General Assembly in 1947 to undertake the mandate of the Assembly under Article 13 (1) (a) of the UN Charter. See http://legal.un.org/ilc/.
[39] UN, *Report of the International Law Commission* (UN GAOR, 66th Sess, Supp. 10 A/66/10, 2011), p. 54.

obligations. Even so, Bouwhuis (2012) has pointed out that the ILC itself has stated that its definition is not intended as a definition for all purposes.

Still, the ILC's definition of IOs is the most representative of the various definitions in existence. First, the ILC is part of the UN and, as such, its definition is more authoritative. Second, the ILC's definition is brief, clear, and universally relevant. Unlike the definitions of IOs from Judge, Archer, and Duverger, the ILC's definition does not impose a multitude of restrictions. Rather, it follows the development of the times in recognizing the diversity of IOs. This definition is in line with the development status of IOs and conducive to the combination of theory and practice.

The ILC's definition has some features in common with Gerbet's definition, which express the purpose of IOs more clearly. Whereas the ILC defines the identity of IOs, Gerbet defines the value of IOs – both crucial aspects of a full definition. Thus, this thesis has opted to combine the ILC's with Gerbet's definition to construe the IO as follows: an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing an international legal personality. IOs serve the purpose of linking government groups or social groups in a permanent organization.

3.2.2 The classification and function of IOs

Within the broad category of IOs, organizations are usually classified in accordance with their functions. In 1950, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) formulated an official definition to distinguish IGOs and INGOs. By this definition, only international organizations that are established by sovereign states through agreements are IGOs – the rest are International Non-governmental Organizations or INGOs (ECOSOC, Resolution 288). Although Judge (1978) further divided IOs into three sub-categories (IGOs, INGOs, and multinational enterprises), this study adopts ECOSOC's classification. This is because from a functional point of view, multinational enterprises are a different form of INGO.

IGOs

Among the categories of IOs, IGOs play an indispensable role. *The Yearbook of International Organizations (2009)* defines an IGO as "an organization based on a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of nation-states, including three or more nation-states as parties to the agreement and possessing a permanent secretariat performing ongoing tasks".[40] The most striking feature of IGOs is that sovereign states are their leading members. However, IGOs also accept non-sovereign-state members in some exceptional cases (such as at the Universal Postal Union).

[40] See 2.1 Inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), https://uia.org/archive/types-organization/cc.

IGOs can be further subdivided into intercontinental and regional types, depending on whether the representatives are government staff or national leaders (Klepacki, 1973). Thomas et al. (2008) emphasised interactions within IGOs and the likelihood that such interactions can produce collective results. For them, IGOs are entities created with sufficient organizational structure and the autonomy to provide formal, ongoing, multilateral processes for decision-making between states, along with the capacity to execute the collective will of their members.

From the perspective of the function of IGOs, Russett et al. (1998) and Boehmer, Erik and Timothy (2004) illustrated how IGOs can reduce inter-state conflicts and promote peace. Research on the network impact of IGOs by Lupu and Greenhill (2017) showed that members of IGO clusters can reduce conflicts. The authors argue that there are IGO clusters in the international community and that the structural effects of the IGO network between them can reduce the probability of conflicts between members. There are not just direct connections between IGOs and states. Owing to the existence of IGO networks, there are also indirect connections.

IGO networks still play an active role in the economic arena. Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005) linked IGO networks to trade and showed that when relations between two states are improved via IGO networks, trade between the two countries increases. IGO networks can also affect domestic economies. For instance, Cao (2009a) noted that the dynamics of IGO networks could lead to the integration of domestic economic policies.

Bearce and Omori (2005) observed that IGOs further allow state leaders to interact regularly, which can also result in specific types of cooperation – an advantage that states outside the organization cannot obtain. At the same time, Pevehouse and Russett (2006) found that densely democratic IGOs are far more likely to engender peaceful relations between members than more homogenous IGOs. IGOs can have such a significant impact on conflicts because IGO function can shape crisis bargaining. Babbitt (2012) showed that IGOs can have an impact on conflict prevention and can be understood as a form of preventive diplomacy.

As an international factor shaping domestic politics, IGOs can affect domestic political progress, primarily in the form of democratization (Pevehouse, 2002). Chapman and Reiter (2004) showed that in democracies, citizens are more worried about the risks of national policies than government policymakers because the average citizen does not know enough about foreign policy. Citizens first judge the quality of leadership decisions based on responses from IGOs, then decide whether to support them. Benjamin (2018) argued that IGOs can affect domestic public views of a state's foreign policy and thus indirectly affect the state's foreign policy decision-making.

Recent studies have shown that IGOs play a corresponding role in cross-border knowledge transfer and innovation, in addition to having a political and economic

influence. Jandhyala and Phene (2015) argued that links between a state and a learning-oriented IGO could positively affect national innovation. In terms of the constructivist institutional socialization, Bearce and Bondanella demonstrated in 2007 that IGOs could lead to the convergence of member states' interests to generate more common interests. More recently, Greenhill (2020) found that IGOs can shape public opinion in some specific situations. These studies all indicate that IGOs have a significant influence on various fields, that they are interrelated, and that they interact with each other.

Tsai (2017) pointed out that the degree of influence that IGOs exert on different polities and people of different cultures varies significantly according to the country's political system, religious belief system, and so on. Boyle (1985) argued that owing to the regularity of IOs, the legal rights granted to members, and IGO subordination to IOs, international law promotes the emergence of IOs alongside serving as their foundation. In international politics, the IGO has its functionality and influence. Given the potential closeness of an IGO's ties to a state's foreign strategy, it makes sense to study strategic decision-making at the national level from the perspective of IGOs.

INGOs

There are some commonalities between IGOs and INGOs: both have qualified groups subject to voluntary participation, well-regulated operational mechanisms, regular meetings for communication and consultation, and long-lasting, stable secretariats to complete related functional tasks (Bennett, 1977). According to the official definition and in contrast to IOs established by sovereign states through agreements (IGOs), all other IOs are INGOs (ECOSOC, Resolution 288). The Union of International Associations[41] has supplemented the definition of INGOs to construe them as "any non-profit, legal, transparent, and open membership organization with a presence in more than one state" (UIA, 2001/2002).

The functions of INGOs lie mainly in three areas: the provision of professionalism (extensive experience in its field), the supervision of government agencies, and the protection of human rights. The functions of INGOs are often consistent with the purposes for which they were established; through professionalism, they can contribute to the development of these fields. For example, Tarlock (1992) pointed out that environmental protection INGOs positively impact the establishment and implementation of global environmental protection solutions.

INGOs also assume a supervisory role as they are able to operate independently without government interference. Keck and Sikkink (1998) theorized that INGOs have

[41] The Union of International Associations (UIA) is a research institute and documentation centre based in Brussels. See https://uia.org.


transnational advocacy networks through which they exert pressure on state governments to change their behaviour. However, the operational independence of INGOs cannot be guaranteed under a hegemonic international system.

Although human rights are included in the professionalism of INGOs, human rights issues are also strongly linked to politics; in fact, protection of human rights and humanitarian issues is one of the primary functions of INGOs (Murdie and Bhasin, 2011). Fearon (1995) and Murdie (2009) both argued that INGOs could be manipulated by states to become a channel affecting public opinion (e.g., on human rights issues) or to create some impact on a country or on the global political economy. But, on the whole, the primary function of an INGO is as a sort of non-profit, non-governmental organization, and its influence on the outside world is limited.

3.2.3 Selecting IGOs instead of INGOs

The various definitions and descriptions of IOs, IGOs, and INGOs surveyed in this chapter reveal distinctions in their forms and relationships with other entities. The category of IOs includes both IGOs and INGOs (see Figure 3.1). This research focuses on national strategy and use IGOs – rather than IOs – as the lens of study for the following three reasons. First, IGOs provide important platforms and tools for states to participate in international affairs. Second, the functions of IGOs and INGOs are different: IGOs can have an impact on state sovereignty and international status. In contrast, INGOs are nominally independent of the government and are not likely to reflect competition among states. IGOs thus have more research value.

Figure 3.1: The structure of IOs



Third, the purposes of each are different. The main goal of an IGO is to solve interstate problems; the subject of its services is the state. INGOs serve multiple categories of subjects, including multinational enterprises. In most cases, there is not much direct contact between INGOs and the government. Accordingly, this thesis has chosen IGOs as a more specialised medium for research into interstate relations. Crucially, IGOs carry strong political symbolism with attributes that allow us to gain more political information from the interactions of member states.

3.3 IGOs and the triangular relationship

The triangular relationship is complicated, and diplomatic struggles have occurred since 1949. Diplomacy has many different components that can be invoked through a range of avenues. IGOs are just one pathway for diplomacy. But, as important players in the international community, IGOs continue to appear in the triangular disputes. This has led to inextricable relationships between IGOs and the triangle of Beijing, Washington, and Taipei.

3.3.1 The relationship between IGOs and states

The purpose, operating mechanism, and functions of IGOs are the main lens through which to explain the relationship between IGOs and states. Bennett (1977) stressed the importance of IGO relevance to government and their increased influence on international affairs. The primary purpose for establishing IGOs is to enable, facilitate, and strengthen cooperation or exchanges between sovereign states and to create a platform for states to participate in management. Wallace and Singer's (1970) pointed out that IGOs must comprise more than two member states legally recognized in the international community and relevant agreements must be signed between them. Thus, the essence of IGOs lies in their close ties with governments. Becoming a member of IGOs is one of the signs that a sovereign state has gained international recognition and can legally participate in international affairs (James, 1999).

Functionalists observe that as IGOs operate within the international system, their role effectively undertakes collective action. The emergence of IGOs is generally attributable to the asymmetric distribution of resources and other assets (such as information, transaction costs, and ethical considerations) across states. Organizations are required to mediate between states and solve relevant problems. But although states initially established IGOs for the collective benefit of nations, the establishment of such an organization is typically aimed at obtaining certain benefits its creators; should the organization fail to achieve the desired outcome, there is no reason to establish or join it (Lall, 2017).

States have been often more concerned about their interests within these organizations than the organizations themselves. After the First World War, for example, the USA

proposed establishing the UN-precursor League of Nations – but, in the end, Washington opted not to join the League. The reasoning was that US strength was not sufficient to rival that of the UK and France, which would have made it impossible to achieve the outcomes America desired from belonging to the League. Claude (1966) identified the task of collective legitimization as one of the elements comprising the political functions of the UN. As a result, the UN has been used politically as the arbiters of agreeing or rejecting state claims to sovereignty. IGOs with different functional attributes have become a place where states compete for international interests.

In recent years, as international (or global) constitutionalism has become a buzzword in the international community, IGOs have gained a more powerful function. Because IGOs act as potential entities of international law enforcement (e.g., the International Court of Justice), they have the potential to take on the role of global governors. Dillon, Ilgen, and Willett (2009) pointed out that although there is no formal international constitution in the international community, some international regulations already have constitutional functions. Ravndal also noted, "IGO membership discussions both reflect and shape broader norms of the international system. IGOs play a key role in the constitution of the international system" (2019, p. 2). As can be seen from the functions of IGOs that their roles and value to states are enormous. There is a close relationship between states and IGOs. Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine that the IGO could be used as a tool for different states to compete for power and pursue their interests on the international stage.

3.3.2 The three actors and the IGOs

One element of international diplomacy involves participation in IGOs, which is relevant to both Beijing's and Taiwan's competition in IGO settings. One of Beijing's diplomatic goals is to build itself into a powerful country, while one of Taipei's diplomatic goals is to expand its international voice or space to ensure international political legitimacy (Chan, 1997). In Delisle's (2016, p. 550) definition, international space mainly refers to "membership or other participation in international organizations, various levels of engagement with other international institutions and multilateral mechanisms, formal diplomacy and less formal but substantially strong state relations, and Taiwan's prominence on the regional or global stage in a broader, invocation of international norms". In contrast, Washington continues to correspond to the triangular IGO as a fulcrum. At the same time, the attitudes and activities of the three actors towards IGOs have evolved alongside the development of the dynamic triangular relationship.

Beijing's changing role in IGOs

Beijing's attitude towards IGOs has shifted from refusal to join to active participation (Kim, 2015; Wang, 2000). In the early days of the establishment of the PRC, owing to

opposition to imperialism, revisionism, and reactionaries, Beijing saw IGOs as instruments of Western imperialism and hegemonism (Wang, 2000). Kim (2015) has argued that during the Mao Zedong era, China refused to join IGOs out of concern for imperialist penetration. In the 1960s, for example, Beijing decried the UN in a *People's Daily* article:

> What kind of thing is the UN? It is the tool for US imperialism (the number one overlord) and the Soviet revisionist ruling clique (the number two overlord) to press ahead with neo-colonialism and big-nation power politics.[42]

It was not until the 1980s that Beijing began to use IGOs to realize national interests, use its position in the UN to change the international system, and attempt to reform the international system. In the 1980s, China's Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian affirmed the UN contribution to maintaining peace, preventing and easing conflicts, accelerating decolonization, and promoting international cooperation (Shichor, 1991).

In terms of shifts in Beijing's strategic approach to Taipei in IGO settings, Kim (1992) pointed out that Beijing's active participation in IGOs aimed to weaken Taipei's status. Beijing still wanted to return to the status of a great power on the international stage. As early as 1980, Hsiung and Kim argued that China's integration into global society was conducive to preventing Taiwan's independence and playing an increasingly important role in global economic trade.

China's changing strategy for dealing with IGOs has had some positive and long-term impacts. Jacobson and Oksenberg (1990) explained that China's role in the global economy was conducive to improving its economy and maintaining the legitimacy of its regime both at home and abroad. Saich (2010) argues that after 1990, Beijing believed that participating in IGO activities could help the development of China's economy – and therefore began to pursue IGO membership. Zhao (2007) held that China's active participation in IGOs after 1990 was also related to resisting American hegemony and promoting the development of multi-polarity within the international order.

Robinson and Shambaugh (1995) argued that China's active participation in the primary purpose of IGOs enhanced China's international image and status (showing China as a responsible state among developing countries). Greater contributions to the international community were also conducive to maintaining regional stability and strengthening the role of IOs. Medeiro (2009) believed that China's acceptance of the existing international order was a last resort to avoid isolation from Western countries; Beijing wanted to be accepted as a member of the international community and to start engaging with the international system.

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[42] People's Daily, 10 January 1965 and 8 July 1967, respectively.

From 1949 to 1970, China was excluded from IGOs and Beijing viewed IGOs from the perspective of an outside. Since 1971, Beijing has gradually shifted from limited participation in IGOs to occupy a leadership role. In his article on the relationship between China and IOs, Johnson noted that American scholars generally believed that the Chinese role on the international stage had shifted from "the system's opponents to system reformers to system maintainers" (2001, p. 48). From a more psychological perspective, China realized a transformation from a 'victim mentality' of the past to a 'great power mentality' by participating in international affairs more widely (Swaine, 2004a). After the Cold War, China's participation in IGOs gradually changed from passive inaction and free-riding to an active – even leading – role (Tao, 2010).

Saich (2010) pointed out that while China has benefited from joining IGOs, there have also been some conflicts. First, China joined IGO activities as a latecomer, which means that Beijing did not participate in the drafting process of the rules of IGOs. Western procedures are implemented in IGOs, reflecting Western interests. Second, Western countries led by the USA put forward demands for human rights and political reform when China actively joined IGOs. On the one hand, they actively engaged with China, but, on the other hand, they put pressure on China.

China's political and economic strength and international influence are constantly improving. Basu (2020, p.161) believed that Beijing hopes to demonstrate Chinese wisdom through the Belt and Road Initiative to provide Chinese solutions for "global governance and shape the grand design of Pax-Sinica centered on China". In terms of roles, Chen and Zhang (2020, p.440) held the view that China has transformed from a "revolutionary order-challenger to a reformist order-shaper". Chhabra, Doshi, Hass and Kimball (2021) held a similar view, the global impact of China's rise is increasing, China is no longer just a rising power, it has become a real global actor.

In short, the relationship between China and IGOs generally has the following four characteristics:

1. international political interests are an important reason why Beijing participates in IGOs activities;
2. IGO participation is closely related to the development of China's comprehensive power;
3. addressing the issue of Taiwanese sovereignty within the field of IGOs is an important goal for Beijing;
4. China has adopted different strategies/aims for participation in IGOs, and this has caused its role to change.

The value of IGOs to Washington

In the post-World War II era, Pax-Americana rested on three pillars: "Western values, military alliances, and the United Nations institution" (Basu, 2020, p160). Liu (1995) pointed out that IGOs are an important way in which the USA maintains its hegemony,

and Washington has generally tended to regard the UN as a tool to maintain its hegemonic status. For instance, Ni and Wang (2000) argued that the USA adopted a repressive strategy against emerging countries after the Cold War. More specifically, Luck (2010) demonstrated how Washington exerted influence over the UN reform process through contributions to the UN. Men (2006) conducted a comparative study on the hegemony of the USA and the UK, concluding that American hegemony needs to be supported by the international system. Maintaining hegemony through the international system requires the support of many US-led IGOs.

In terms of the interaction between the triangular relationship and IGOs, Washington is important to Taipei's international space and broader issues of security in Taiwan. Political and strategic support from the USA remains a uniquely important prerequisite for Taipei's relatively secure position in the international system and its autonomy from Beijing (Delisle, 2016). For instance, Washington does speak for Taipei in IGOs such as the WHA, and support some IGO activities implemented by Taipei (Lee and Ma, 2022). Zuo (2021) pointed out that Washington has taken a series of countermeasures against Beijing's strict prevention of Taiwan's participation in relevant international organizations, such as the passage of the 'Taiwan Assurance Act'[43] in 2019. Chen (2016) has argued that the USA is Taiwan's best choice to help Taiwan participate more in the international community and reassess the One China principle.

While Washington's efforts to help Taiwan participate in the international community may intensify confrontation with China, there are also some benefits to US interests. Glaser, Bush, and Green (2020, p.35) pointed out that Washington's promotion of Taiwan's participation in international organizations is beneficial to the United States, which can "leverage Taiwan's contribution to international public goods, reduce Taiwan's isolation and increase voice or vote is generally in the interests of the United States". At the same time, for the USA and its allies, Washington's supportive move can strengthen the building of coalitions with like-minded countries. Under US leadership, these allies could join Washington in joint actions aimed at expanding Taiwan's participation in key international organizations.

Another noteworthy issue is that for a long time, US policy did not support Taipei's application to join IGOs with statehood requirements (See US Relations with Taiwan)[44]. This further clarifies the purpose of US foreign policy towards IGOs: the relationship between the USA and IGOs is mainly conducted to protect America's vested interests and maintain the existing hegemonic order. The Beijing–Washington–Taipei relationship and the Taiwan issue are part of international politics, and Washington has

[43] US Congress (2019). S.878 - Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019. See https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/878/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22taiwan+assurance+act+cotton%22%5D%7D&r=1&s=1.

[44] U.S. Relations With Taiwan, U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/.

chosen to maintain its balancing role over the past few decades to safeguard national interests.

Taipei's goals in IGOs

For Taiwan, IGO membership is crucial to the legitimacy of Taipei's claim to sovereignty. Taipei's IGOs activities are an important means of expanding the scope of its international space (Rao, 2012). In the eyes of other governments, Taipei's pursuit of IGO membership was seen as a step to strengthen its political legitimacy after engaging in a political battle with Beijing over the representation of China at IGOs (Chan, 1997). Li (2006) pointed out that whether it was President Lee Tenghui's 'pragmatic diplomacy'[45] or the DPP's 'new internationalism,'[46] what Taipei had in common with IGOs was a willingness to internationalize the Taiwan issue. Taiwan's efforts to participate in IGOs have involved seizing every opportunity to play a role on the world stage and advocate for freedom to act independently from Beijing (Cho, 2005).

Li (2006) described how, as economic issues increasingly dominated the global agenda, Taiwan decided to use its economic advantages to obtain diplomatic benefits in the late 1980s. But, at the same time, Li observed that Taiwan's IGO strategy was closely related to domestic politics as well as to external factors. In the face of dynamic internal factors, such as the voice of the people, Taipei needed to adopt some IGO actions quickly, Beijing needed to adapt quickly, and Washington needed to respond quickly. Yet Taiwan's ability to participate in the international community remained tightly linked to Taipei–Washington and Taipei–Beijing relations.

Earlier, Hickey (2006) argued that while Taiwan's foreign policy decision-making remains an extremely complex and convoluted process involving many important variables, the importance of external factors, particularly seismic shifts in global politics and the role of China and the United States, cannot be ignored as features that have long exercised an extraordinary degree of influence over the island's foreign relations.

Wang, Lee, and Yu (2011) argued that Taiwan wanted to gain some international space by improving relations with the mainland. However, Taiwan's participation in IGOs is related to fundamental differences between Taipei and Beijing on the issue of island sovereignty. Burgoyne (2020) pointed out that the success of Taipei's participation in IGOs depends on whether Beijing can successfully block and other countries' perceptions of Taipei's participation in the organization.

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[45] Strengthening bilateral relations with Taiwan's allies; establishing and advancing substantive relations with non-hostile countries; actively participating in IGOs and activities.

[46] DPP, White Paper on Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, 28 November 1999. See http://www.taiwandocuments.org/dpp02.htm.

Regarding the reluctance of IGOs to recognize Taipei, Chan (1997, p. 442) asserted that "this is not because Taipei is not interested in joining these organizations, nor because IGOs are not interested in making Taiwan a member, but because of Beijing's political pressure. Huang (2020) believed that because the activities of Taiwan's IGOs are restricted by Beijing, the rights of the people of Taiwan on the international stage have not been taken care of and represented.

Taiwan has been on the margins of mainstream international society for a long time, so Taiwanese officials and people naturally feel dwarfed, isolated, and oppressed. Such a state of mind among officials and people in Taiwan could become a tool for the de-Sinicization of Taiwan independence forces, thus endangering Beijing–Washington–Taipei relations. Taipei's participation in IGOs is thus a complex and multifaceted issue that could involve a mix of political and functional purposes. From the above literature, we can know that IGOs are an important way for Taipei to expand its international diplomatic space and gain international legitimacy. Second, whether Taipei can successfully participate in IGOs is influenced by both domestic political changes and external forces from Beijing and Washington.

3.3.3 Dynamic triangular relations and IGO competition

Dynamic changes within the triangular relationship and triangular competition in IGO settings are complements. The domestic motivators of IGO competition also change during this evolutionary process: Taiwanese identity, the conceptualization of Taiwan independence (see Sullivan et al., 2011), nationalism on the mainland, economic integration, Washington's China policy, Beijing–Washington relations, and military deterrence have all affected the triangular relationship.

In 2004, Chu (p. 485) predicted that two trends would emerge from the triangular relationship: "the first is a China-US war; the second is economic integration of the mainland and Taiwan, China-US reconciliation, and disappearance of the Taiwan issue". A pessimistic view of the triangular relationship believes that domestic politics are occupying a more salient role in decision-making in Beijing, Washington and Taipei, making compromise more complicated and strengthening policy positions as a result (Long, 1993). Growing concern for domestic audiences makes it impossible to "formulate flexible agreements that can serve the interests of all actors in the triangular relations" (Saunders, 2005, p. 986). Huang (2020) pointed out that the competition between the two sides in IGOs stems from the political and legal struggle between Beijing and Taipei. Therefore, under such fuelling, Taipei will strengthen competition in IGO settings and accumulate more elements for international de jure independence.

The 2008 financial crisis triggered changes in global power relations. Wang (2015) claims that although the Taiwan issue had always been a factor of instability in the Asia-Pacific region, tensions between China and the USA could be abating owing to a process of power transfer from the latter to the former. The optimistic view is that

tensions in the triangular relationship will likely be resolved or at least maintain the status quo. As long as the USA does not want a war, then Beijing has reason to believe that Washington will adopt preventive diplomacy. Beijing's leaders have also become "more tolerant on the strait issue" over time owing to the continuing development of China's national power (Chu, 2004, p. 495). China's power and its influence in the international community and IGOs is growing, enabling Beijing to calmly deal with Taipei's international activities.

In terms of military force, it is not feasible for Chinese leaders to use military measures in the Strait given high costs and low returns (Biddle and Oelrich 2016; Beckley, 2017; Roy, 2017). Instead, an unconventional hybrid approach has become a better choice for Beijing (Tsang, 2010; Ayson and Pardesi, 2017; Ong, 2018). In past military operations, Beijing has aimed to achieve its military goals of deterring Taiwan while avoiding the direct use of force to avoid encountering the bottom line of the USA (Mazarr, 2015; Green et al., 2017). However, Hass, Glaser and Bush (2023) believed that Washington is anxious about China's increasing military capabilities to threaten Taiwan, and worries about whether the United States still has the ability to prevent attempts to unify Taiwan by force.

Faced with a triangular strategic situation, some scholars have put forward various plans for resolution. These include Harding's modus vivendi (1999), Nye's three-part package (1998), and Lieberthal's 20-to-30-year agreed framework (2005). The primary content of these plans revolves around a promise from Taipei not to declare independence and a promise from Beijing not to use force. Considering reality and cost, the best solution to the Taiwan issue remains for Beijing, Washington, and Taipei to discuss a peaceful settlement without underestimating the possibility of war (Charney and Prescott, 2000; Ren, 1997; Waldron, 2016; Chu, 2004). Hickey (2023) further pointed out that Washington and Beijing, as two external actors, have long played crucial roles in Taipei's foreign policy from 1949 to 2021. Judging from the current situation, China and the United States may continue to have a huge influence on the Taiwan Strait in the next few years. Therefore, Chou (2018) believed that Taipei should define its political interests, positions and strategies, and the most important thing is to maintain the balance of Beijing-Washington-Taipei relations. Hass, Glaser, and Bush (2023) suggested that to maintain Washington's influence in the Taiwan Strait, the United States should unswervingly strengthen Taiwan's economic vitality, political autonomy, military readiness, and dignity and respect on the world stage.

In recent years, the triangle relationship has continued to change dynamically. With Tsai Ing-wen in power, Taipei has stepped up its efforts to meaningfully participate in the international community, a struggle with Beijing for diplomatic recognition and attendance in IGOs (Burgoyne, 2020). Chou (2018, p.138) pointed out that in response to the violation of the one-China principle by the Tsai Ing-wen administration, Beijing has "implemented unilateral legislation on Taiwan through various means" in recent years. At the same time, Beijing has intensified its efforts to isolate Taiwan from the

international community and influence Taiwan's domestic politics. Regarding Beijing's countermeasures against Taipei, Burgoyne (2020, p.319) held a similar view, arguing that "Beijing restricts Taiwan's international space through its influence on IGOs, intending to leave Taiwan with no choice but to agree to reunification". In this regard, Huang (2020) argued that Taipei's recognition of the 1992 consensus is one of the factors affecting whether Taipei can meaningfully participate in IGOs.

On the whole, the triangular relationship is both dynamic and relatively stable. Factors that have emerged since the onset of the relationship include Taiwanese identity, growing nationalism on the mainland, and the strength of military deterrence; all of these have increased the probability of dynamic shifts. Still, the relationship itself is contained within the constructs of the China–US Joint Communiqué, the US–Taiwan Relations Act and the 1992 Consensus. Within this dynamic relationship, IGO competition emerged as an important way for the three actors to promote their interests.

3.4 Conclusion

The triangular IGO competition is closely related to the functional value of the IGO itself and the particularity of the triangular relationship, and the two complement each other. As a type of IO, IGOs are highly politicized and have close ties with states. As important participants in international politics, IGOs unquestionably have functional influence. But, at the same time, the history of the development of IGOs reveals that IGOs do not exist in the international community as completely independent actors. Sovereign states do not create IGOs in order to compete with themselves. In addition to maintaining the goals established by the organization itself, the essence of the state's participation in IGO affairs centres on securing national interests and legal rights. Therefore, strategic competition between Beijing, Washington, and Taipei has emerged naturally in the field of IGOs.

The Beijing–Washington–Taipei relationship itself is complex, and IGO competition is part of the dynamism of the triangular relations. Radical change in the relationship between China and IGOs was led by a considerable shift in Beijing's attitude towards IGOs (from disgust to active embrace). Washington maintains the regular operation of the world order through IGOs, so triangular relations are also part of its global interests. But unlike the grand sentiments that Beijing and Washington hold, the relationship between Taipei and IGOs is characterized by a desire for political legitimacy.

With the triangle, two main contradictions have gradually surfaced. First, in cross-strait relations, Taipei's participation in IGOs involves political symbols and substantive functions of IGOs. Second, Beijing and Washington have different views on the issue of Taipei's participation in IGOs and the triangular relationship. These two contradictions are not isolated. Instead, they are intertwined. Within IGO settings, the three actors all push in different directions: Washington and Taipei push in the same

direction with varying degrees of zeal, while Beijing is heading in the other direction. This sets the stage for a race. In the past few decades have seen Beijing, Washington, and Taipei have launched a series of strategic competitions related to over IGOs. The status of the three actors has changed alongside the competition.

IGOs have their functional attributes, and the dynamics of the triangular relationship and the internal politics of the three parties are inextricably linked to the triangular IGO competition. Just as Huang (2020) believed that the current reasons and explanations for the exclusion of Taiwan by IGOs are insufficient. These reasons put too much emphasis on political interests and ignore the desire and actual needs of the Taiwanese people to participate in more IGOs on the moral level. Facing the complexity of triangular IGO competition, this study proposes two preliminary hypotheses: 1. Triangular IGO competition is affected by diverse factors, which belong to different types. 2. IGOs have their functional properties and three actors will take advantage of IGOs.

This chapter has reviewed the relevant content of IGOs and triangular competition in IGO settings to argue that there is a connection between the triangular relationship and their behaviour in IGOs. Within the Beijing–Washington–Taipei triangular structure, the three actors each have different goals for participating in IGOs. This leads to conflicts of interest that promote triangular IGO competition. The following chapter constructs the theoretical framework for this study with the aim of providing a theoretical answer to the phenomenon of triangular IGO competition.

Chapter 4 – Theoretical Framework for Triangular IGO competition

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to build a suitable theoretical framework based on past theories, incorporating triangular relationship dynamics and the interaction of the three political actors in IGOs. The value of IGOs is of great importance to the three parties, especially those on either side of the Taiwan Strait. Since 1949, the two sides have engaged in fierce competition over the issue of IGO representation, which in turn affects the triangular relationship. Given the hidden political symbolism, economic interests, and functions behind different IGOs, this thesis argues that the way in which the three parties use IGOs to compete can be characterized as a leverage strategy. At the same time, the triangular IGO competition includes two distinct elements. The first element is the triangular relationship and the IGOs themselves, while the second is the fact that triangular IGO competition is affected by more than a single level of factors (interests, values, and identity). Therefore, this study proposes a compound theoretical framework as an appropriate approach to understanding the triangular IGO competition.

This chapter first reviews the three mainstream theories (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) for understanding IGOs and the triangular relationship, then builds a compound theoretical framework on this basis. Next, it introduces Anderson's leverage strategy (2014) to define the behaviour of the three actors using IGOs. Finally, it states two hypotheses – regarding triangular IGO competition factors and IGO leverage – that emerge from the integration of the leverage strategy with the compound theoretical framework. Specifically: Hypothesis 1. In addition to materialist factors, idealist factors are also important sources of influence affecting the triangular IGO competition. Hypothesis 2. IGOs play an important leverage role. Their ability to leverage the IGO is determined by their human resource and monetary contributions to the IGO.

4.2 Theoretical foundations: Mainstream IR understandings of IGOs and the triangular relationship

4.2.1 Liberalism and IGO competition

Liberalism has had an important influence on the emergence, development, and function of IGOs. In 1918, US President Woodrow Wilson (who inherited classical liberalism) put forward a fourteen-point plan for the establishment of the League of Nations under the idea of organized peace (Wilson, 1918) – and thus the early relationship between liberalism and IGOs was born. The subsequent outbreak of World War II demonstrated the incapacity of the League of Nations and also frustrated classical liberalism. By the 1960s, the international community was preoccupied by many new issues that included nuclear weapons, economic globalization, and global environmental challenges. IGOs and the global order were adapting to the changing times. The emergence of the concept of global politics and its integration into international rules by IGOs marked the onset of neoliberalism, which gradually shaped the world.

Neoliberal institutionalism and the value of IGOs

With the revival of liberalism in the 1970s, the institutional school gradually came to occupy the mainstream of neoliberal thought and the role of IGOs in the international community was re-interpreted. Keohane and Nye (1973) put forward two new key concepts about IGOs and international rules in their seminal book *Power and Independence*:

1. States are not the only international actors. In addition to states, IGOs have emerged as new actors in the international community.
2. The effectiveness of military means as a tool of foreign policy is getting lower and lower. In international society, international regulations influence the behaviour of states.

The emergence of the new neoliberal institutionalism concept of complex interdependence led to a reevaluation of the positioning of IGOs in international relations. In terms of their role, Keohane and Nye amended the realist view that the role of the IGO is weak and entirely dominated by state and military power. Instead, neoliberal institutionalists suggested that in the relationship between the IGO and the state, the IGO played an active role.

The two ways that IGOs participate in international politics are as “arenas and as members of transgovernmental coalitions” (Keohane and Nye, 1974, p. 55). IGOs are not just a response to state preferences, but are (or can be) themselves influential

participants with the ability to act independently in international politics (Cox, 1969). Keohane and Nye (1973) also emphasized that interdependence does not necessarily mean cooperation; conflicts among states remain under certain conditions.

The Beijing–Washington–Taipei relationship is a typical case of conflict despite interdependence. At the global level, cooperation is still a significant trend in China–US relations (e.g., mitigating climate change and economic recovery). But the two sides still have differences in the areas of trade, the issue of Taiwan, democracy, cybersecurity and human rights (James, 2021).[47] In cross-strait relations, economic integration has created a good atmosphere of cooperation – but it has not prevented the two sides from conflict over issues related to sovereignty and identity.[48] Keohane and Nye's theory explains well how even if Beijing, Washington, and Taipei cooperated in certain areas, they could still compete in IGO settings. Interdependence further provides an important way of understanding the stability of the structure of the triangular relationship.

Neoliberal institutionalists emphasize state and non-state actors (e.g., IGOs) in international social activities (Holsti, 2004). As states gradually strengthened their interactions and efforts at exchange, a universal culture emerged of state responsibilities as members of the global order. Participating in IGOs created a "rational and responsible image for a state and helped legitimise its status in global society" (Li, 2006, p. 613).

Nye (1990) further proposed the concept of soft power to show that hard power alone does not solve all the problems of global governance; hard power must be combined with a corresponding soft power. Neoliberal institutionalists do not deny the strength of the influence that major powers exert on international relations. Rather, they believe that the international institution is a set of coherent and interrelated (formal or informal) rules; these rules stipulate the role of actors, limit their activities and affect the formation of their expectations (Keohane, 1989, Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Krasner, 1983). As a type of international institution, the IGO plays a functional role in global politics.

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[47] On the coexistence of competition and cooperation in Sino-US relations, see the example of US President Joe Biden calling Chinese President Xi Jinping on 9 September 2021: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/09/readout-of-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-call-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/s.

[48] For economic cooperation, see the official website of the Bureau of Foreign Trade, Taiwan, Total Cross-Strait Trade, https://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/List.aspx?nodeid=1375. In July 2021, for instance, Taiwan's total trade volume was $70 billion; mainland China accounted for 32.1% of Taiwan's foreign trade at $22.47 billion. For political differences, see "Taipei Issues Statement on Chinese President Xi's 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan'", 2 January 2019, at https://www.president.gov.tw/NEWS/24002. The Tsai administration emphasized that it did not endorse the 1992 Consensus defined by Beijing as 'one country, two systems'.

In line with this neoliberal institutionalist understanding, this thesis argues that the strategic trilateral competition in IGO settings is due to the following three theoretical premises:

1. IGOs play an important functional role in international politics.
2. The rules and institutions of IGOs are functional.
3. The strength of political actors is not the only determinant of international politics.

International institutions have weakened the distribution of power in global politics, thus building a more open, complex, and diverse international structure. For this reason, national power is no longer the only factor determining international politics (Keohane and Nye, 1987). Instead, IGOs and other institutions can also use their functions to exert corresponding influence.

Neoliberal institutionalism provides theoretical support for the international activities of weak powers such as Beijing (from 1949 to 1971) and Taipei (after 1971), offering them a hope of success in their international struggles. Hard power does not determine everything in international politics. At the same time, do powerful states not compete over manipulating institutions (e.g., maintaining the international order, constructing an advantaged position and safeguarding international interests)?

Still, neoliberal institutionalism has its limitations in the face of triangular IGO competition. Its scope of explanation is limited to the functions of IGOs, and it is more about explaining the trilateral activities from the value of the IGOs themselves. This means it cannot account for the internal motivations of the three actors, such as in the pursuit of national political identity on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and in terms of US policy towards China. Neoliberal institutionalism is even less able to explain why the three parties could not cooperate in the fields of the IGOs despite conditions of interdependence.

4.2.2 Realism and IGO competition

Realism offers an important theoretical basis for understanding status quo triangular relations and IGO competitions; it holds that the core point of the international system is the anarchy of the international community of states (Holsti, 2004). Thus, international relations are long-term struggles between sovereign states over power, interests and goals (Martin and Simmons, 1998). The twin defeats of the League of Nations and the outbreak of World War II proved that idealism was a failure and

predicated the emergence of realism. Morgenthau's 'six principles of realism'[49] (1948) then laid the foundation for realism after World War II.

However, Morgenthau's realism ignored the study of international economic relations, and his definitions of power and interests were vague. In 1979, Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* developed classical realism into neo/structural realism. In neorealism, power is not an end but a means to maintain national security. The goal of the state is not to maximize its strength, but to prevent other states from continuously increasing their power (Waltz, 2001).

Neorealism includes different genres, such as defensive, offensive and neoclassical realism. Defensive neorealists believe that the anarchic nature of the international system encourages states to adopt defensive and moderate policies (Waltz, 1979). International anarchy punishes aggression rather than rewards it (Snyder, 1991). In contrast, offensive realism holds that the purpose of the state is to protect its *survival* – of which power is the primary element. The anarchy of the international community makes it impossible for states to know how much power can be guaranteed, so they pursue power indefinitely (Mearsheimer, 2001).

Neoclassical realism is unique in that it incorporates domestic variables, such as state institutions, elites, and social actors, that affect the power and freedom of foreign policy decision-makers (Rose, 1998; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell, 2016). Neoclassical realism suggests that a state's behaviour in the international system can thus be explained by intervening systemic variables, including ideology, personality, perceptions, misunderstandings and other factors that affect foreign policy (Rose, 1998). In terms of the triangular relationship, internal factors such as nationalism on the mainland, the identity of the younger generation in Taiwan, a high unemployment rate in the USA, and the rotation of leaders/heads of state all have an important impact on trilateral IGO strategies and triangular relations.

IGOs: both functional and instrumental within the neoliberal and neorealist debate

For neorealists, IGOs are "a vital means of accessing international regimes" (Kent, 1997, p. 519), and the use of IGOs by the state is objective. Realists see IGOs as a state-manipulated machine as the state is difficult to politicize in pursuit of their policy goals. The norms and rules of the machine may restrict some behaviours of the state, but the machine itself is passive (Waltz, 1979). Neorealism recognizes the use of institutions by states, and that the most powerful states in the international system maintain their power in international politics by creating and shaping institutions (Evans and Wilson, 1992). Mearsheimer (1994, p. 7) further pointed out in the article *The False Promise of International Institutions* that IGOs are used by the state as mere tools, and that the

[49] For details on the six principles of realism, see Morgenthau, Thompson, and Clinton (1985, pp. 4–15).

institution appears to have "minimal influence on state behaviour". Sovereignty belongs to the state, and there is no higher ruling body in the international system, no government over government (Inis, 1964). On this basis, IGOs are defined as mere instruments of governments.

The thesis acknowledges the neoliberal understanding of the role of IGOs, but IGO competitions between actors are more often a manifestation of neorealism. Power politics still plays a vital role in today's world. The IGO is a manifestation of power distribution as well as the instrument of a political game. The distribution of power across states constitutes the basic controlling mechanism of the international system, meaning shifts in power distribution bring about changes in the system (Gilpin, 1981). This is consistent with changes in competitive relations across and within IGOs caused by fluctuations in the power distribution across Beijing, Washington, and Taipei over the past few decades.

IGOs often play a platform role in the operation process, showing functionality in the professional field and a certain degree of independence. However, IGOs are still inherently subject to influence from various forces and are essentially tools created by states to serve states. Neorealism can account for why Beijing, Washington and Taipei pursued their interests in IGOs, using them as a political tool. However, neorealism fails to respond to the ideological values and identity factors within triangular competition in IGO settings, and it cannot to explain some trilateral decision-making oriented by immaterial interests. To illustrate, Beijing wants to reclaim Taiwan at all costs; Washington did not choose to give up an alliance with Taiwan despite growing material interests in cooperation with Beijing; and Taipei did not give up its claim to Taiwanese identity despite Beijing's preferential policies. Clearly, some of the decisions of the three parties do not completely align with material interest-oriented realism.

4.2.3 Constructivism and IGO competition

Given the influence of identity politics on cross-strait relations alongside the differences in political systems and ideologies between China and the USA, constructivism offers an important perspective on how to understand idealistic factors in the triangular IGO competition. The emergence of constructivism in international relations correlated strongly with the collapse of the Soviet Union, as neither neorealism nor neoliberalism predicted the outcome of the Cold War. Constructivism is more flexible than realism when it comes to grasping changes in the real environment of international relations (Snyder, 2004). It holds that various rules are constructed and integrated into a system of order, which then forms society. Therefore, international society is not "liberal anarchy but a world of influential, polyarchy, rule by a few who manipulate symbols and apply violence" (Onuf, 1989, pp. 232–233). In his 1996 book *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Katzenstein

argued that "the interests of states are not determined by material factors alone, as realists would have us believe or by economic rationalism; rather, international and domestic cultural environments influence the behaviour and identity of states" (p. 461).

Wendt (1995) proposed the concept of the social construction of identities, which explained differences in behaviour from the ideational viewpoints of the actors. For constructivists, beliefs, expectations and interpretations are inescapable when thinking about international affairs. Ultimately, the importance of constructivism lies in the fact that is reveals how a single materialist position is untenable (Hurd, 2008). The core assumption of constructivism is that identity, norms and culture all play an important role in international politics. This argument provides a theoretical basis for some idealistic elements in the triangular IGO competition, which are discussed in depth below.

Identity-interests-behaviour in triangular IGO competition

Identity and values appear repeatedly in the triangular competition unfolding in IGO settings. From the perspective of constructivism, international politics has a social structure in addition to its material structure. This social structure comprises three elements: "shared knowledge, material resources and practices" (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). Accordingly, Wendt (1999) proposed two core tenets of constructivism:

1. the social structure of international politics is shaped by the mainstream views of human society rather than driven by material forces; and
2. the changes that appear on the social stage are affected by identity and interests, not nature. In an international environment, interests are constructed through social interaction.

Wendt thus replaces the materialist identity with a constructivist one, advancing a process of social construction along with the combination of identity and interests. For him, state behaviour is determined by ideological beliefs, collective norms, and social identity (Ringmar, 1997).

Constructivism's attention to norms, beliefs, knowledge and understandings can account for IGOs (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986). This is because IGOs can create "social knowledge through bureaucratic and sociological institutionalist method models" (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, p. 699). Such social knowledge defines common international tasks (e.g., development) and creates new interests (e.g., human rights). This method of common value construction also exists in the triangular IGO competition. For instance, Taipei's persistent attempts to enter IGOs aim at the performance of identity – an effort to construct Taiwan's identity in the international community. Beijing's declaration of the One China principle reflects Beijing's understanding of Taiwan as falling under the mainland's sovereignty. Washington, too, often considers humanitarian and democratic values with IGO competitions.

If the identity of actors is not fixed, then the structure of the international system is also changing. In the triangle, Washington's identity shifted from anti-communist to champion of democracy. Taipei's identity shifted from Chinese to a growing Taiwanese one. On the surface, Beijing's identity as a central ruler has not changed significantly, but its understanding of China–US and cross-strait relations is constantly changing. States have many institutional identities (e.g., as sovereigns or leaders of the free world). Commitment to the salience of a particular identity varies, but each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor it is grounded in (Holsti, 1970). Actors acquire an identity of relative stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about the self by participating in collective meanings.

Regarding the relationship between knowledge and behaviour, Wendt (1992) believes that intersubjective understandings and expectations shape identities and interests; this means all involved parties collectively define the situation, which in turn affects the behaviour of the parties. The core of Wendt's constructivism is called cultural choice, which is different from Waltz's structural choice and Keohane's institutional choice (Qin, 2001). In the Beijing–Washington–Taipei competition, how the three actors view their own and each other's identities will determine their interests.

Clearly, constructivism does not provide a perfect account and so far, there is no systematic theory for the emergence and development of conceptual identities. Moreover, triangular IGO competition cannot ignore material factors such as political and economic interests. But constructivism provides a path for analysis of IGO competition in terms of immaterial interests. Especially at the micro-level of triangular IGO competition, constructivism can better analyse the intrinsic motivations of the three actors from the standpoint of identity and values.

4.2.4 The compound theoretical framework for triangular IGO competition

Realism can provide an important account for Beijing–Washington–Taipei relations, and there is no doubt that materialist capacity and power distribution underlie the basic structure of the triangular relationship. The formation of the triangular relationship and the status quo are all grounded in realist relations, and interests are an important consideration in foreign policy decision-making. Looking back at the triangle relationship since 1949, almost every major turning point has something to do with realist interests and power. For example, the Korean War and the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the US in 1979. These conflicts and cooperation based on national interests and strengths ultimately shaped the basic political structure of the triangular relations for a long period of time.

Meanwhile, neoclassical realism's understanding of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign strategies is in line with the triangular IGO competition. This study, therefore, takes into consideration the interplay of domestic politics and international

relations. There is a two-level game between diplomacy and domestic politics, and the two influence each other (Putnam, 1988). Specifically, at the national level, domestic groups benefit by pressuring the government to implement favourable policies, while politicians gain power through their support. At the international level, governments maximize their ability to meet domestic pressures while minimizing the impact on international developments.

Liberal institutionalism is the theoretical basis for the emergence of IGOs as an actor in the international system. The functional attributes of IGOs provide important reasons for the three-party to compete in IGOs. The sovereignty, rights, interests, international legitimacy, international status, and international influence implied by the seats of IGOs are extremely important to Beijing, Washington, and Taipei. For example, from 1949 to 1971, when the KMT and the CPC competed for political identity and international legitimacy, the political symbolic significance of IGOs such as the UN was self-evident for both sides of the Taiwan Strait. It was about regime survival and rights. Similarly, as a functional tool, IGOs can help Washington maintain the post-war international order and further consolidate the interests and rights of the US.

Finally, constructivism's analytical structure centred on identity and knowledge is an effective way to explain the Beijing–Washington ideological competition and conflicts in cross-Strait about political identities. In the complex and special Beijing-Washington-Taipei relations, the constructivist perspective can effectively explain their internal connections among identities, interests and behaviours. Second, identity and value can also link domestic politics to IGO competition. For example, the attitude of Taiwanese politicians towards IGOs will affect the number of votes they get in elections, which reflects the perception of the identities of Taiwanese politicians and people. Identity, interest and behaviour complement each other, effectively demonstrating the transformation from concept to practice.

At a practical level, these theories have provided important paths for researchers. For instance, Chan (2004) used the three different theoretical perspectives to discuss the relationship between China and the WTO.[50] Lindemann (2014) used neoclassical realism to focus on Taiwan's domestic variables (e.g., the opposition of Pan Blues and Pan Greens, Taiwan's distinct cultural identity), opening up the black box of IGO competition across the Taiwan Strait. In short, they each have their strengths and weaknesses. The first research question of this study explores what factors affect triangular IGO competition. To better explain the multiple aspects shaping the

[50] In Chan's case, neorealist national interests, material capacity, and American sanctions account for China's compliance with WTO rules. Liberal institutionalism sees the WTO's TRM and dispute settlement mechanism for multilateral coordination. Social constructivism believes in the impacts of capacity building and epistemic communities on China; constructivists emphasize the importance of shared knowledge and common understanding in shaping national behaviour.

competition, this study adopts a compound theoretical framework based on realism and liberalism and combined with constructivism.

Understanding triangular IGO competition at multiple levels

Triangular IGO competition is based on the Beijing–Washington–Taipei relationship, but only in part. At the materialistic level of triangular relations, American power, Taiwan's ability to defend itself and the mainland's ability to unify Taiwan are the structural factors that determine the direction of the triangular relationship. Beyond that and on an idealistic level, America's democratic values, Taiwanese identity, Chinese nationalism, American willingness to help defend Taiwan, Washington's attitude toward Sino-US relations, and Beijing's willingness to reclaim Taiwan all define the conceptual dimensions of the triangular relationship. In Washington's eyes and in terms of values and identity, Taiwan serves as a flag – a template for the USA to promote the democratization of the mainland. The power of ideas is remarkable, and these are all factors that cannot be explained by materialist theory.

In triangular IGO competition, the three actors' motivation to use IGOs involves a mix of both material and ideational elements that include:

1. The functional role of IGOs; the legal status conferred by the IGOs, and the individual IGO's impact on the international system.
2. The creation of information and ideas and conceptual competition.
3. The pursuit of interests, identity and national sovereignty.

Beijing emphasizes the One China principle in IGOs, so peaceful coexistence between Beijing and Taipei violates sovereign exclusivity in IGOs (Li, 2006). Scholars (e.g., Goodman and Segal, 2013; Zhang and Austin, 2014; Kornberg and Faust, 2005) have pointed out the role of IGOs in China's national goals and interests, i.e., China's sovereignty, international status and strategic independence. As a status quo-oriented power, Washington is interested in ensuring the stability of the post-war global system created mainly by the USA, and Washington maintains the overall goal of preserving hegemony (McNeil, 2003). For Taipei, IGO membership is an important task. The ultimate goal of Taiwan's entry into IGOs is to gain international political legitimacy (Chan, 1997).

The triangular relationship is indeed constrained by the material level, just as the dual deterrence between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait created by US strategic ambiguity is based on strong military power. But in the IGO competition between Beijing, Washington, and Taipei, competition between the two sides of the strait over identity and the differences in Chinese and American values has never ended. Immaterial interests also account for an important portion of the competition.

Washington's rapprochement with Beijing in 1971 was not entirely attributable to a change in identity, and it was mixed with more materialist interests against the Soviet Union (Yang, 2022). But it is worth noting that in the 1970s and under the Cold War pattern of US–Soviet hegemony, the USSR became the most important threat in Washington's eyes. This perception affected America's national security. After the Zhenbao Island crisis, Beijing was also aware of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Facing down the bigger threat of Moscow, both Beijing and Washington reassessed their relationship and redefined each other's identities as potential partners instead of absolute enemies. Identities and interests can be transformed "by intersubjective dynamics at both the domestic and systemic level – of the identities and interests through which those incentives and worlds are created" (Wendt, 1994, p. 394).

Meanwhile, the three communiqués on the Sino-US détente indicate a flexible policy based on the premise of shelving identity and value disputes; Washington's ultimate purpose was to hope that Beijing would make more changes in the future, drawing the values and identities of each side closer together (Wu, 2000; Kissinger, 2011). Identity can be constructed in different contexts, changing in flow. For example, the Clinton Administration saw China as a strategic partner while the George W. Bush Administration turned China into a strategic competitor for a while. But after the events of 9/11, cooperation between China and the USA strengthened again.

This thesis argues that given the material basis for the triangular relationship, how Beijing, Washington, and Taipei define it is an important factor – and their definitions are related to their respective identities. Further, the triangular relationship can be divided into a combination of three pairs of bilateral relations: cross-strait, Beijing–Washington and Taipei–Washington. So, the triangle is closely tied to how Beijing and Taipei define the strait relationship, in addition to how Washington defines the relationship between Beijing and Taipei.

The triangular relationship changes dynamically depending on whether the bilateral relations are in a state of confrontation or cooperation. In characterizing the respective bilateral relations of Beijing, this thesis identifies the Washington–Taipei relationship as an alliance based on the Sino-US Mutual Defence Treaty and the TRA. The Beijing–Taipei relationship is linked to the ruling party in Taiwan. Most of the cases involve confrontation (such as during the DPP era) and a few cases involve limited cooperation (e.g., the KMT era, the 1992 Consensus). This thesis agrees with most scholars' (e.g., Yan, 2010; Ross, 2020) characterization of the Beijing–Washington relationship: that cooperation and competition (based on the three joint communiqués) coexist.

Going a step further, the trilateral competition for IGOs is also tied to the specificity of identity within the triangular relationship, the CPC versus the KMT (the struggle for Chinese orthodoxy), communist versus capitalist identity, and the democratic identity shared between Washington and Taipei after the 1990s. In the case of the UN, for instance, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait competed over the orthodoxy of Chinese

identity; China's appeal for representation at the UN was based on Beijing's perception of its status as the central ruler of China (Beijing unified mainland China and wants to gain international recognition) (Swaine, 2004b). Washington helped the KMT defend its UN seat owing to its identity as an ROC-ally since World War II along with its identity as anti-communist – a collective identity requirement for the USA linked to American credibility in Asia (Lee, Paal, and Glaser, 2011).

In the triangular IGO competition, the special situation of the triangular relationship, the international system, internal evolution and other aspects work together to show dynamic changes. The truth is intricate and not so absolute; issues are not at all black and white. IGOs are not just a platform for cooperation as presupposed by liberalism, but also a tool for triangular competition. Values and identity are on continuous displayed in the triangular IGO competition, which is not just affected by interests. As materialist theories (realism and liberalism) can only explain part of the reason for the triangular IGO competition, the constructivist social knowledge and identity perspective become indispensable. Constructivism can contribute to the shortcomings of materialist theories in a triangular IGO competition. Material conditions, such as the distribution of power and interests, constitute the basis for the triangular relationship – but idealistic factors such as identity and values are the internal motivations advancing the triangular IGO competition.


Therefore, this study constructed a compound theoretical framework to analyse triangular IGO competition involving multi-level factors. The theoretical framework encompasses three important elements in the study: the distribution of power and interests within the triangular relationship, the role of IGOs, and the identities and values in the triangular competition over IGOs.

Materials and ideas, structure and process are two scalars (Keohane, 1988). The overall framework for the compound theory is built on the two layers of ontological materialism and idealism. Materialism attaches great importance to the direct effect of material factors on the behaviour of actors, while idealism emphasizes the role of ideas and how material elements produce meaning through conceptual aspects (Keohane, 2005). From an ontological point of view, both realism and liberalism belong to materialism because both realist interests and liberal institutions can be materialized. Constructivism is classified as idealism with ideas about identity and values as the core (Keohane, 1988; Qin 2003).

This study argues that triangular relations and IGOs play a fundamental role in determining external structures. Therefore, the first layer of the compound theoretical framework is constituted by the materialist ontology of neorealism (power and interests) and neoliberal institutionalism (functions and institutions). Next, considering the role of idealistic factors such as values in triangular competition, this study takes idealism as the second layer above materialism. This second layer analyses the triangular IGO

competition through the core of constructivist identity/value-interest-behaviour theory. Figure 4.1 below shows the theoretical framework:

Figure 4.1: The structure of compound theoretical framework



Although the triangular relationship has changed dramatically with the ebb and flow of relations between the three parties, elements of identity and values have always run through it. In the triangular relationship pattern based on the material capacity of the three actors, the issue of identity and value of constructivism has always triggered trilateral competition from within. Under the guidance of a theoretical framework that locates constructivist identity as the core, this thesis analyses the identity positioning of the three parties to the IGO competition through the UN, WTO, and WHO cases – even as it simultaneously analyses their respective interests, goals and strategies in relation to dynamic changes within the triangular relationship. The degree of identity salience affects the strategic implementation of IGO competition. The distribution of ideas influences the behaviour of actors who compete in IGOs, which in turn affects the structure of the triangular relationship. The identities of Beijing, Washington, and Taipei determine their interests, and different interests lead to their IGO behaviour.

The thesis recognizes the restrictive role of hard power in IGO competition: materialism largely determines the outcome of the competition. At the same time, constructivism significantly impacts actor behaviour (e.g., the strength of Beijing's willingness to risk everything to retake Taiwan). In the report of Eleventh National Congress of the CPC, (1977), Beijing stated that China and the USA have different social systems that embrace different ideologies. Their fundamental differences ensure that Taipei and Washington establish a deeper bond in the name of shared values. In addition, the internal dynamics of the three players (party rotation, the individual personalities of leaders, etc.) also impact identity and ideology, further affecting IGO competition. This aspect will be considered in the case analysis, which creates a bridge between internal factors and the international system.

The compound theoretical approach is not perfect; however, an important breakthrough in the framework is recognition of the materialist basis for the triangular relationship alongside a constructivist analysis of the triangular IGO competition. The particularities of the triangular relationship are combined with the comprehensiveness and coherence of the chronological narrative across the different fields of the IGO cases. The compound theoretical framework features a rebalancing of the roles that materialism and idealism play in IGO competition. Such an approach can reveal the multi-level factors affecting triangular IGO competition.

4.3 The IGO leverage strategy and triangular IGO competition

Although the compound framework provides theoretical accounts for the factors of the triangular IGO competition, it still needs to account for why the three actors chose IGOs on a practical level. Behind the changes in IGO rights lies the following: the recognition of national sovereignty, shifts in Cold War patterns, the dynamics of the PRC–US relations, and the cross-strait situation. The strategy of the three parties is extended through IGOs, with some additional effects. For example, the change of China's representation at the UN in 1971 caused the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan to lose its legitimacy and diplomatic space in the international community almost entirely. Like a lever, the change in the UN seat thus created a series of collateral effects. For this reason, the second research question asks whether the three actors are consciously using IGOs as leverage tools.

4.3.1 Definition of leverage in IGO competition

In Anderson's (2014, p. 2) definition of leverage strategy, the strategic use of specific resources brings about certain results, and "the core strategy used in this process can be summarised as leverage". These are five elements to leverage: "the load to be lifted, the force applied or effort, the beam that carries the force, the fulcrum on which the beam pivots, and the interaction of all these elements" (Dees, 2014, p. 85). Anderson (2010) believes that although not all instances of power involve leverage, leverage is best understood as a form of power. The notion of leverage is used as a resource in political negotiations to accomplish a set goal. The core argument of resource leverage is getting the most from the least (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994).

In the triangular IGO competition, IGOs become a leverage tool and political actors can use relatively small forces or resources to leverage more benefits. The trick with leverage is to turn "a small amount of power into a large one" (Dees, 2014, p. 84). This thesis defines leverage strategies as the process of Beijing, Washington, and Taipei using specific resources or means to achieve goals strategically through IGOs. The resources used by the three actors include (but are not limited to) money, manpower, and regulations. Their specific means are foreign aid, identity construction, diplomatic competition, lobbying, interest alliances, propaganda, and knowledge construction.

This means that the lever used by the three parties also varies, as it can be leveraged through material interests and power or through idealist identities and values.

4.3.2 The value of IGO leverage

Why do political actors compete for IGO leverage? Abbott and Snidal (1998, p. 8) suggest that states consciously use "IGOs to reduce activity costs, create information, ideas, norms and expectations, legitimise or illegalise specific ideas and practices, and improve their capabilities and power in the international community". Thus, the state can achieve goals that cannot be achieved on a decentralized basis by exploiting the centralization and independence of IGOs. As the gap between the state and IGOs grows narrower, the state can use leverage to transform its influence in IGOs into hard or soft power (Xie, 2011). Moreover, in some cases, "IGOs can develop the common norms and practices to help define or redefine states themselves" (Abbott and Snidal, 1998, p. 29).

In current world politics, even the USA cannot wholly ignore IGO leverage. IGOs themselves not only perform their function, but can also bring political actors the unique reward of accessing to multilateral international institutions. Appropriate use of IGOs can enhance the legitimacy of a superpower's global activities and reduce policy backlash and strategic costs. If China wants to strengthen its voice in the field of international military security by building military bases overseas like the USA, for example, the international community will respond strongly (as in the case of China's Djibouti base in Africa).[51] However, there is less resistance when China sends peacekeepers through the UN – but in fact, this act can also achieve the purpose of China's overseas military training and safeguarding of overseas interests.

On the application and value of leverage

In his 2014 book *Leveraging: A Political, Economic and Societal Framework*, Anderson offered a profound demonstration of the massive potential for the application of leverage frameworks to political science. In our world, people, businesses, and governments all use various leverage forces to accomplish their goals. Anderson (2010) points out that almost every country needs to use creative leveraging strategies to promote their national or regional interests. International competition is constant, and "true contextualisation of development and diplomatic work within the architecture of national policy allows for an increase in constructive leverage" (Alpher, 2014, p. 136).

[51] Countless reports and articles have been written about China's base in Djibouti, and Western Europe and the USA are full of concern. For example, see China's New Military Base in Africa by Michael Tanchum, https://ecfr.eu/article/chinas-new-military-base-in-africa-what-it-means-for-europe-and-america/.

The role of leverage can not only increase the power of negotiation, but also enhance functional impact.

Kissinger (2014) once pointed out in *Diplomacy* that European balance-of-power politics in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries were affected by leverage. Vachudova (2001) argued that Western European countries should use the possibility of EU membership as a lever to promote democracy in Eastern Europe. Resources, too, can be used as leverage: although energy interdependence between Russia and Europe is decreasing, EU–Russia energy relations are an excellent example of the use of resource leverage to secure interests (Casier, 2013).

In *The Politics of Leverage in International Relations*, Friman (2015) explores how actors can increase their influence over their goals through leverage. He argues that in the politics of leverage, a combination of naming, shaming and sanctions can achieve better results than without the use of leverage. Given the widespread application of leverage strategies combined with IGO functions and political symbols, IGO leverage carries sufficient appeal to political actors.

The leverage of IGOs can be exerted through the power of political actors. Nye (1990) distinguishes soft from hard power, or the use of leveraged resources (culture and identity) and the use of traditional economic and military power to defeat opponents. In *The Clash of Civilisations*, Huntington (2000) theorizes that countries from different civilizations will strive to control international institutions and organizations in order to maintain their cultural interests. IGOs have some valuable functions (e.g., the extension of national legitimacy and rights) in international politics. They are seen as a way for states to conserve costs by achieving more say in IGOs to fulfil their strategies.

Moreover, IGO leverage can reduce resistance against the implementation of their international activities. ‘Moral leverage’ and ‘material leverage’ can help weaker groups have a more significant impact than their power would otherwise allow, enabling them to directly impact stronger groups (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). In terms of soft power, for example, Beijing has adopted a policy of political solidarity since the 1950s. Political solidarity promotes a common identity with the developing world or Global South, bringing these states closer together. Nye’s soft power theory indirectly supports the role of identity construction, the developing world/Global South identity created by Beijing and the democratic label assumed by Taipei; these identities have more or less helped the IGO competition on both sides of the strait. Compared with hard power, soft power is more involved with leveraging relationships or conceptual approval.

Anderson (2010, p. 9) also believes that although sometimes it seems that “we often use hard power traditional military and economic strategies, we should use leveraging resources and use soft power public diplomacy strategies”. As the philosopher Thomas Hobbes said in 1651, reputation is power. Such factors (reputation and identity) also

influence the effectiveness of leverage – just as America's commitment to Taiwan and its upholding of democratic values are closely tied to America's reputation among allies and power around the world.


The lever tool itself is morally neutral, but the social practice that constitutes the lever may not be so (Dees, 2014). As IGO leverage, WHO is inherently unbiased and can be exploited by any political actor. Yet when Taipei uses the health security of Taiwan's 24 million residents to leverage WHO, that behaviour is morally biased. Even though the international community knows that Taipei's actions are politically motivated, it still extends the moral high ground (humanitarianism) to Taipei. Thus, values themselves can be a means of leverage. Value evaluation is inseparable from human behaviour and is an important leverage tool.

Briefly recapitulated, the application of IGO leverage can be achieved through both materialist and idealist elements. The leverage of IGOs has value to both minor and major powers, and political actors can exert both soft and hard power over others. At the same time, given the complexity of international relations as well as uncertainty about various factors and the success of various leverage strategies, these actors do not always achieve a positive result.

4.3.3 The link between leverage strategies and theory

The above introduction to leverage strategy systematically described the process of strategic competition between different political actors through IGOs, and explained how states with varying degrees of power can subtly use IGOs to gain benefits. As shown in Figure 4.2 below, forces on the lever are applied by political actors while the loads are their goals. The force exerted on IGO leverage can be applied through the hard power of the leverage users themselves – or through a shared identity or their use of human resources, monetary contributions and regulations. IGO strategies are the fulcrums as political actors formulate IGO strategies on a different basis for each IGO.

Figure 4.2: IGO leverage




For example, Beijing emphasizes the legitimacy of its control over mainland China at the UN while Taipei uses the legal process of dispute settlement at the WTO and emphasizes humanitarianism at WHO. Such arguments form a fulcrum of support for political actors to leverage IGOs. A suitable strategy can form a reliable fulcrum and achieve the effect of using IGO leverage. In contrast, an unrecognized starting point as an IGO strategy will be questioned.

IGOs are levers. But different IGOs are limited by their own properties and functions, so they have different leverage effects. IGOs themselves are not a monolith and they each have different functions and membership bodies (Chan, 1997). Thus, additional membership requirements and conditions can make IGOs sensitive to politics in various ways. For example, the political leverage of the UN is greater than that of the WTO, because the WTO is an organization with a primarily economic function. At the same time, the effect of IGO leverage is affected by the dynamics of the international situation and the triangular relationship, which varies across time. Action at a favourable time can trigger the leverage effects of an IGO more easily and conserve resources. For example, Taipei's leverage of WHO in times of SARS and Covid-19 is more visible than usual. As the operational tool of this research, leverage aims to demonstrate the actor's strategy and behaviour effectively.

On the basis of the above-mentioned compound theoretical framework and leverage strategy, this study believes that there is a connection between the two (see Figure 4.3). At the beginning in 1949, the three parties initiated the triangular IGO competition for various reasons that included as identities and interests. The rights and functions of IGOs ensure the tool was used by all three parties, as political actors see the potential in leveraging IGOs.

Within the process, actors combine their own resources and advantages to leverage IGOs in different fields through different paths. The cases of the UN, WTO, and WHO included in this research are identified as a political, economic and humanitarian lever, respectively, given each IGO's attributes. In light of the compound theoretical framework, this study argues that IGO competition is shaped by both materialistic and idealistic factors, which further correspond to Nye's hard and soft power. Such a connection lays the foundation for this study to explain the relationship between the leverage behaviour of the three parties using IGOs and the theory behind it.

Figure 4.3: Schematic of the compound theory and IGO leverage strategy in the triangular IGO competition



In the UN, WHO, and WTO cases, Beijing, Washington, and Taipei use a diverse set of strategies across different eras and changing interests. Regarding the measurement of the performance of the competition, this thesis adopts three resource indicators based on the various relationships between Beijing, Washington, and Taipei and IGOs. The first category, the *financial and human resource contributions* of political actors to IGOs, includes two important test indicators. These two indicators are both reliable and concrete, which are the important verification objects of hypothesis 2 in this study.

In addition, *the regulation of IGOs* is used as a supplementary indicator to take into account the range of IGO participation levels across the three political actors. Although both Beijing and Washington are currently members of the UN, the WTO, and WHO, Beijing was not at the UN from 1949 to 1971, while Taipei was expelled from both the UN and WHO in 1971 and 1972 respectively. Lack of official representation in IGOs means that a political actor cannot make monetary and human resource contributions to the organization.

In view of their accessibility (non-organization members can use relevant rules through legal procedures), then, this study uses IGO rules as a supplementary indicator. But owing to its inability to be specific, this indicator will be used only to help this study better demonstrate the leverage properties of IGOs, and not as a specific indicator to verify hypothesis 2. The process of verification process through supplementary indicators will demonstrate the use of IGOs by three actors through important rules, such as the UN, WHO, and WTO Charters, etc., that are wielded for competition.

Given existing literature and the compound theoretical framework, this study finds that IGO competition involving Beijing, Taipei, and Washington can be approached from different theoretical perspectives. This study thus argues that triangular IGO competition is neither purely a matter of realist interests and power struggles, nor just one of just idealist identities and values. The traditional view emphasizes the importance of material interests, but this study believes that idealistic factors are also important. When Beijing sought out African countries for votes at the UN, for instance, it promoted the identity of the then-developing world, emphasizing political solidarity rather than national interests. In another example, Taipei exploits the public health function of WHO to emphasize humanitarianism. In the triangular IGO competition, the transformation from public health functionality to humanitarian values has been realized, and Taipei has gained more sympathy and attention from Washington and the international community.

Another important part of this research involves IGO leverage. In IGO cases, the introduction of leverage strategies helps us better understand how these three actors use IGOs. A major reason why political actors are willing to use IGO leverage is that leverage tends to benefit its creators (Dees, 2014). The characteristic of an IGO to centralize power and information to a high degree makes IGOs vital to the construction of identity, protection of rights and dissemination of propaganda by political actors. There have been many competitions among the three parties surrounding IGOs, and these competitions have had far-reaching consequences.

This study believes that the use of IGOs by the three parties is a purposeful leverage behaviour, and that the benefits outweigh the inputs. At the same time, this study pays attention to the importance of monetary and human resource contributions when considering factors affecting IGO leverage. One reason is because as non-profit public organizations, IGO operations rely on member contributions. Another reason is because the officials in IGOs come from various states and regions around the world, and the relationship between officials and their home countries is not simply cut off when working. International competition is in full swing from all aspects, and to some extent, these two factors influence the policies and decisions of IGOs. Therefore, this thesis puts forward two coherent hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 1.** In addition to materialist factors (realism and liberalism), idealist factors (constructivism) are also important sources of influence affecting the triangular IGO competition.

- **Hypothesis 2.** IGOs play an important leverage role. In each IGO case, the power of three parties is fixed; their ability to leverage the IGO is determined by their human resource and monetary contributions to the IGO.

The above two assumptions are reasonable, they are based on the combing of previous literature, and they are responses to research questions. As the content of the three case studies meets the conditions for verifying these two hypotheses, they can provide sufficient evidence.

4.4 Conclusion

IGO competition is a manifestation of a three-player game, not the ultimate goal. Abbott and Snidal (1998) point out that only by combining liberalism, realism, and constructivism can we have a comprehensive understanding of the role of IGOs. Past research is important to theorizing IGOs and triangular relationships, but this study wants to focus more on the different layers of influential factors and the reasons why each of the three actors have exploited the IGO competition. Past theories and research have given this research an important springboard, enabling this study to construct a compound theoretical framework. At the same time, the introduction of the leverage strategy is an innovative move that can change the perception of the triangular IGO competition. The leverage strategy better explains the role of IGOs and defines the behaviour of three actors using the IGOs, which is a novel element of this research.

In short, the IGO leverage strategy is an important way for the three actors to achieve their ends. In the cases of the UN, WTO, and WHO, the relative advantages of the three actors differ. The three skilfully lever IGOs based on the international environment and advantages of the actors. The triangular IGO competition is a superimposed phenomenon formed on the basis of triangular relations and IGOs. Use of an IGO as a prism to observe the triangular relations cannot ignore the properties of the IGO and the political reality of the triangular relationship. Thus, the theoretical framework of this research combines the two basic paradigms of materialism and idealism. Its essence is based on the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist understandings of triangular relations and IGOs, respectively. It then includes the constructivism of identity as a theoretical perspective for analysis of the positions of the three political actors. Through observation of the UN, WTO, and WHO empirical cases, it centres the strategy, factors, and results of the triangular IGO competition. From here, the next chapter introduces the research methodology for study.

Chapter 5: Methodology

5.1 Introduction

One important factor affecting the research results is the development of an appropriate methodology to explain the IGO strategy as it relates to triangular relations. Chapter Five discusses the research methodology, which should not be assessed as an isolated element but rather in light of its ability to advance the research project as a whole. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and illustrate how the research methodology is applied in this study.

This chapter first demonstrates the importance and universality of the case study method in the field of international relations. Subsequently, considering the complexity of triangular relationships and the functional diversity of IGOs, this study takes qualitative case studies as an effective way to analyze triangular IGO competition. For 70-year-long triangle relationships, the case study enables a consciously focused analysis of key historical events and turning points. Through careful selection of cases (the UN, WTO and WHO), on the one hand, this study ensures the presentation in a chronological order, and on the other hand, conducts an in-depth analysis of the cases to show the interaction between the three political actors. Through case studies, it helps us further understand the internal motivations of triangular IGO competition, as well as the power dynamics of the overall triangular relationship.

The following discussion divides the research methodology into five parts, describing each in detail: methodological approach, case selection, data collection, methods of analysis and evaluation of methodological choices.

5.2 Methodological approach: Qualitative case studies

This research is based on qualitative case studies. The value of the research is realized by answering the following research questions:

1. How does the triangular relationship embody in IGO competition, and what factors took the determining effect within a specific historical timeline?
2. Whether the three actors are consciously using IGOs as leverage tools?

By definition, a case study is a qualitative approach to research in which the "investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and reports), and reports a case description and case-based themes" (Creswell and Poth, 2016, p. 73). Case study is a valuable research methodology that is suitable for many types of research, including in the field of International Relations (IR) (Tellis, 1997). It is a good choice for early researchers at appropriate scales, given limited resources and access to organizations (Rowley, 2002). This is because case studies can help overcome such limitations by providing a demonstration in more detail (Lijphart, 1971). Following the research questions investigated here, this study involves a lengthy historical timeframe and a wide range of triangular relations and IGO strategies. This means that it is particularly important to narrow the scope and capture key information.

In addition, case studies are effective for gathering and interpreting in-depth insights into specific phenomena. They are "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (Yin, 2009, p. 23).

Case studies have many merits, including those mentioned above, making them a reliable and suitable method for this particular study. There are many IGO competitions within the triangular relationship that has existed between Washington, Beijing and Taipei from 1949 onwards. By adopting a case study method, the complexity of the research is minimized. As long as the selected cases are representative, the effectiveness of the research should be guaranteed.

In general, there are five types of case studies: (1) exploratory, (2) descriptive, (3) illustrative, (4) explanatory and (5) experimental research (Collis and Hussey, 2013). This study employs exploratory cases as it tries to find different levels of factors affecting triangular IGO competition through three cases of IGOs. As this research aims to reflect the dynamic changes of the triangle relationship through the IGO prism, the use of case studies can help to elicit concrete, contextual and in-depth knowledge of such relations.

5.3 Case selection: The United Nations, World Trade Organization and World Health Organization

When using the case study approach, case selection is crucial. Rowley (2002, p. 19) states that:

> case selection must be determined based on research purpose, questions, propositions, and theoretical background, and there are other constraints that affect case selection. For example: accessibility (whether the required data can be collected from the case of an individual or organization), resources (whether resources can be used to support travel and other data collection and analysis costs), and time available (if time is limited, choose a small object rather than trying to study the entire organization).

But when selecting cases, this study encountered two issues with representation. This section thus explains how the study responded to the following related questions. First, why does this study interpret the IGO competition as based on Beijing–Washington–Taipei relations? Second, why is the case of the UN, WTO and WHO relevant?

In response to the first question, there are many events in the world concern IGOs, state sovereignty and international status competition. For example, there have been longstanding conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya and Palestine regions. The key element of this thesis is the study of IGOs as an important entry point for examining the competition between Beijing, Washington and Taipei. Since 1949, the Beijing–Washington relationship has unfolded through stages of confrontation, connection and competition. It has evolved in many aspects, such as through shifts in power dynamics and the reconstruction of the world order. Dynamic changes obscure the direction of the triangular relationship even as the Taiwan issue has grown to become an uncertain factor in Sino-US relations. From the perspective of the value of IR research, the uniqueness and complexity of this triangular relationship make it an important research subject in the discipline of IR today.

IGO strategies are part of foreign policy. From a practical point of view, it is currently a good time to study changes in Chinese foreign policy. Specifically, recent years have seen Beijing take a more active role in IGOs (e.g., AIIB). At the same time, China has experienced rapid economic growth. In the 45 years of reform and opening up that have passed since 1978,[52] China's GDP expanded to become the second largest in the world. These elements have had a major impact on Beijing's foreign policymaking. From a historical perspective, China has undergone huge changes as it has moved from an

[52] In 1978, the third plenary session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC closed in Beijing, and China entered a new historical period of economic reform and opening up.

observer in IGOs to a participant, then to an initiator or creator in recent years (Johnston, 2001; Medeiros, 2009).

The triangular relationship between Beijing, Washington and Taipei is one of the most intuitive examples of these changes. In this case, China's every move in IGOs could involve competition with the USA and the cross-strait political issue. In terms of IGO strategy, then, the case of Beijing–Washington–Taipei relations carries unique research value, while extensive archival material provides a solid foundation for research. Mixed analysis of this triangular relationship and classic IGO cases involving the three actors will enable correlations to emerge.

In response to the second question, the selection of IGO cases in this study is mainly based on five considerations: representativeness, time series, differences in field of action, degree of participation and organizational nature. In terms of representativeness, the three selected cases together include the most representative IGOs of their respective fields. As a result, they are closely involved in the triangular relationship that has unfolded over the past 70 years. At the same time, these cases are also presented in chronological order. This study starts by considering the time series of the triangular relationship, then pieces together a coherent linear analysis of the period from 1949 through individual case studies that ensure the longitudinal depth of the research.

In addition, this study accounts for differences across the fields in which IGOs are involved; it does so by selecting three case studies that cover the three main fields – politics, economics, and public health – in order to expand the horizontal scope of the study. More importantly, from the perspective of the participation and status of the three parties in these IGOs, these three case studies present a dynamic process. In the case of the UN (1949-1971), Washington and Taipei existed within the organization whereas Beijing was excluded. In the WTO case (1986 to present), the three parties finally realized the coexistence within the organization. In the case of WHO (competition started in 1997), China and the USA are members of the organization, whereas Taiwan is not.

Furthermore, the functions and political implications of the three IGOs themselves are quite different. The UN is the most representative IGO with the most prominent functions and political symbolism. For instance, it is the UN that decides whether a political actor can legally occupy a seat in other IGOs. The WTO has an economic function that does not focus on the legal sovereignty of member states, so the three parties currently enjoy the same membership rights. WHO is a specialized agency of the UN and has a political aspect, but it is also a public health organization that deals with humanitarian issues. Taipei's appeal for membership is thus more practical as health security of people will help Taipei gain support from Washington and international society.

These IGO cases from different fields of action, unfolding in different time periods and with different membership configurations, ensure the diversity of case selection. At the

same time, they collectively reveal the comprehensive evolution of the triangular relationship over time.

Case 1: Politics – Beijing as a challenger to the Washington–Taipei alliance at the UN (1949–1971)

The PRC was established in Beijing in 1949, and the two sides of the Taiwan Strait fought fiercely from 1949 to 1971 over the right to represent China in the UN. In this case, the Washington–Taipei alliance took the lead at an early stage. During these two decades, the ROC enjoyed China's representation in the UN. As a latecomer to the UN, Beijing consistently challenged the Washington–Taipei alliance to secure the UN seat.

Huang (2016) discusses how the Chiang Kai-shek government's decision to integrate into mainstream international society was a wise one in WWII. Integration helped the ROC government to gain international support; it was only with the support of the USA that the ROC held formal membership status at the UN for 22 years. But over time, the PRC gained increasing international support through alliances with developing countries.

In 1971, Beijing's assumption of Taipei's permanent seat at the UN and the expulsion of Taiwan as a UN member state was a successful endeavour of Beijing's strategic influence within IGOs following the establishment of the PRC in 1949. This strategic approach is worth a closer look, not only because of the representativeness of China in the UN, but also because Beijing, Washington and Taipei's IGO strategies appear to be linked to competition among these three parties.

Case 2: Economics – economic interests and political disputes at the WTO (1986 to present)

Beijing and Taipei began to apply for GATT/WTO membership in 1986 and 1992 respectively. The three parties engaged in a long tug-of-war before Beijing and Taipei eventually gaining membership status at the WTO. Faced with many intervening factors involving the founding member of USA, China launched a 15-year negotiation process for WTO admission. At the same time, there were also political differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. In the end, the three parties compromised in the face of huge economic interests; Beijing and Taipei successively joined the WTO with Washington's tacit approval in 2001.

The case of the WTO presents a very different situation from that of the UN and WHO. In a departure from the other two cases, the WTO appears to extend membership rights to Taipei that are nearly equal to those of Beijing and Washington. In fact, the WTO is one of the few IGOs in the world wherein the three parties coexist. As a sort of economic United Nations, the WTO is also highly representative.

Still, the three-way competition did not dissipate once Beijing and Taipei became a

member. China's burgeoning economy and Taipei's use of WTO rules has exacerbated the three-way conflict and competition has continued to emerge. As a supranational forum for disputes over sovereignty and national interests, the WTO offers fertile ground for an examination of strategic three-way competition in an economic organization.

Case 3: Public health – humanitarianism and political intentions at WHO (1997 to present)

In 1972, the 25th World Health Assembly (WHA) resolution restored Beijing's legitimate seat at WHO. During the period from 1972 to 1997, Taipei did not pursue WHO membership or WHA observer-ship. But, in 1997, Taipei began to apply to participate in the WHA/WHO under various names. Competition between Beijing and Taipei on the issue of Taiwan's WHO membership thus commenced.

From the perspective of international legitimacy, Beijing occupies a dominant position over the Washington–Taipei alliance with regard to safeguarding its own interests at WHO. Some scholars have wondered whether the people of Taiwan should be considered the representatives of Taiwan rather than the Taiwanese authorities, which would allow the people to obtain real benefits (Cheng et al., 2019). Meanwhile, the government of Taiwan uses WHO to exaggerate humanitarianism and see WHO as a point of breakthrough into the international space.

Despite Beijing's preponderance of international legitimacy, voices in the international community have never ceased calling for the protection of Taiwan's health security (e.g., in light of SARS and Covid-19). The competition over Taiwan's participation in WHO/WHA thus continues and is worth exploring in closer detail.

In sum, the three cases of the UN, WTO and WHO ensure the *diversity*, *continuity*, *relevance* and *effectiveness* of research into IGO strategy and the triangular relationship.

5.4 Data collection: Archival research, secondary data collection and elite interviews

Archival research and secondary data collection

This research uses archival records, secondary sources and elite interviews to collect data. The research process should encompass multiple sources of evidence, including "documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observations, and artifacts" (Rowley, 2002, p. 23). This thesis mainly collects materials from documents and archival records. Elite interviews are used as supplementary data. Documents could include letters, memoranda, agendas, administrative documents, newspaper articles, or any document that is germane to the investigation.

Data for this study were collected using the following six channels:

1. existing secondary literatures in English and Chinese;
2. documents and archives on the government official websites of Beijing, Washington and Taipei;
3. documents and archives in the UN, WTO and WHO digital library;
4. public speeches by heads of state from the three parties;
5. newspaper content; and
6. interviews with elites.

The materials acquired from the above data sources provide an important record for the analysis of relevant IGO strategies and triangular relations. Specific materials are outlined in more detail below.

Documents and archives

- **Beijing**. The database of the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes Chinese foreign policy documents that include records of important speeches, declaration gazettes, treaty documents, and a history of both Chinese diplomacy and diplomatic figures.[53] The official website of the State Council Information Office includes a White Paper that provided an important reference for observing China's domestic politics.[54]

- **Washington**. Historical documents accessible via the website of the State Department provided important sources of information for analysis of US foreign policy.[55] Specifically, the following resources were collected and analysed: State Department references for foreign relations; online documentary materials published by the National Security Archive at George Washington University and the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project; papers and public diplomatic statements that can be traced through speeches and other documents at US presidential libraries; reprinted versions in the Public Papers of the Presidents (available online through the American Presidency Project); the Foreign Office files for China at the Library of Congress;[56] videos on US-China foreign policy; principles and policies of US government concerning China; an assessment of US-China relations by the Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project; and books on China released by the Federal Research Division.

- **Taipei**. Reports and other documentation on foreign policy guidelines, foreign

[53] https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/.
[54] http://www.scio.gov.cn/32618/34463/index.htm.
[55] https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.
[56] https://www.loc.gov/search/?in=&q=foreign+policy+to+China&new=true&st=.

policy, and "instances of PRC interference with the ROC's international presence" accessed via the official website of the ROC government[57] provided important sources of insight. Some information on actual activities and foreign aid policy was provided in a key White Paper titled *The Partnership for Progress and Sustainable Development*. Documents and materials from the Taiwan Legislative Yuan were also useful.

To collect primary data, I conducted fieldwork in Taiwan from August to September 2019. More specifically, I participated in a summer session at National Chengchi University (NCCU) that enabled me to collect materials from the NCCU library. This included information from library archives, relevant theses and the Taiwanese publication of various relevant books. Data were generally collected from these materials through legal downloads, reading and note-taking. At the same time, I gained a great deal of first-hand insight into viewpoints presented in exchange courses and lectures by Taiwanese scholars. My understanding was thus informed not only by an examination of materials, but also by in-person interactions with IR scholars active in Taiwan.

IGOs

- **United Nations (UN)**. Case data were collected directly from official documents that included the *Annual Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly, Discussions in General Assembly of Chinese Representation in the UN* and *General Assembly Resolutions* from 1949 to 1971 through UN Digital Library.[58] The monetary contributions and information on officials are obtained from the UN official iLibrary database[59].

- **World Trade Organization (WTO).** Case data were sourced from the WTO's official database [60] and the GATT documents collection at the Stanford University-GATT Digital library.[61] This includes GATT documents from 1947 to 1994, the operating rules of the WTO, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, information on member states and their monetary contributions, information on officials, meeting documents, and the legal text of WTO agreements.

- **World Health Organization (WHO).** Case data were gathered from the official WHO website and Institutional Repository for Information Sharing (iris), which includes information on the WHO Constitution, dispute

[57] https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/Content_List.aspx?n=218D65026C0F1D37.
[58] https://www.un.org/en/sections/general/documents/; https://digitallibrary.un.org/?ln=en.
[59] https://www.un-ilibrary.org/search?value1=budget&option1=all.
[60] https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/docs_e.htm;
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/budget_e.htm.
[61] https://exhibits.stanford.edu/gatt.

mechanisms, their monetary contributions, information on officials and organizational management.[62] The case also references historical records of meetings at the WHA and the executive board stored in the WHO database[63].

Elite interviews

Interviews with elites are a key tool of qualitative research (Richards, 1996; Blakeley, 2012; Englander, 2012) that typically consist of structured or semi-structured questions (Berry, 2002). This method of primary data acquisition is tailored to the purpose of the study by design, then conducted with purpose as the key criterion (Aberbach and Robert, 2003). Regarding the use of elite interviews, Tansey (2009, p. 5) states that "they can be used to corroborate the content of other sources; to identify the thoughts of a group of people; make inferences about a larger population's characteristics or decisions and reconstruct an event".

However, owing to individual perspectives and other differences, interviews naturally show significant variation across the responses of interviewees. The selection of respondents based on their level of access to the research subject and what they could feasibly know can facilitate consistency across interviews, making it easier to draw conclusions. Although the definition of "elites" is debatable, some scholars define elites as a group of people with a lot of power or those who are distinguished from ordinary people in terms of social status (Harvey, 2011). This thesis tends to follow Burt's (1992) definition in which the term "elites" refers to those with important social networks, social capital and strategic positions in a social structure – and who naturally have more influence. In terms of this study, elites are defined as scholars, researchers and government officials who carry influence within the sphere of the triangular relationship and IGOs.

In terms of their advantages, elite interviews have been the primary method of data collection for political science and policy research and can produce data that are both highly reliable and valid (Phillips, 1998; Beamer, 2002). The complexities of policy and politics can be investigated through unique data generated from elite interviews (Dexter, 2006). Another advantage of elite interviews is that they can help us to understand the differences in perspectives of people in positions of authority, which is important for grasping the comprehensiveness of the social world (Odendahl and Shaw, 2002).

Richards (1996, p. 200) argues that the interviewers of elites have the following advantages:

[62] https://apps.who.int/iris/; https://www.who.int/about.
[63] https://apps.who.int/gb/c/index.html.

1. They can help interpret reports and documents, especially researchers who can get in touch with authors of relevant articles.
2. Respondents can help explain the personalities involved in relevant decisions and outcomes, by extension.
3. Respondents may provide information that is not available elsewhere or not yet published.
4. Interviewers have access to accompanying benefits, such as helping to build a network of contacts and helping the interviewer to understand the basic situation and atmosphere of the research field.

In short, elite interviews offer "a rich, cost-effective component in research design, providing a valid and unique source of data for research purposes" (Beamer, 2002, p. 95).

On the other hand, elite interviews have certain drawbacks. For instance, the validity of collected data is tied to "the interviewer's research design, and poorly prepared or poorly structured interviews may generate poor information and thus lead to the existence of biased perceptions of respondents" (Beamer, 2002, p. 86). Regarding the elites themselves, Richards (1996) points out that respondent reliability can be questionable owing to age and the timing of historical events. Respondents from different places can also express different views of the same event. The relatively weak position of the interviewer in the face of elite interviewees can further lead to an inability to control the direction of the interview.

Moreover, there are various potential problems with the format of elite interviews. First, elite interviews are affected by the quality of the relationship between the interviewer and the respondents. The interviewers can only "collect high-quality data if they gain the respondents' trust" (Harvey, 2011, p. 437). Second, data is limited by the type of respondents. Systematic errors can be introduced when researchers gain access to only certain types of respondents (Goldstein, 2002). Elite respondents also typically have sufficient experience in subtly avoiding a question if they choose to do so, which could affect the data collection (Berry, 2002). Despite the above flaws, the flexibility of elite interviews allows the interviewer to adjust each interview accordingly and often avoids the need to compensate for flaws (Harvey, 2011).

The purpose of elite interviews is to delve into elite attitudes, values and beliefs. To maximize effectiveness, the design of elite interviews should take into account the openness of the questions, as closed-ended questions should be avoided. Aberbach and Rockman (2002) note that the interviewee's degree of understanding, response, and acceptance of the research topic all affect the effectiveness of the interview. Responsiveness will determine the validity of the interview, and elites are generally reluctant to be limited to closed-ended questions.

Elite interviews usually rely on semi-structured and a limited number of open-ended questions as the basic method of choice (Berry, 2002). Adopting a semi-structured

approach ensures flexibility in the interview while assisting with the development of the discussion, ensuring that all relevant topics are covered (Richards, 1996). Interviews with experts and elites associated with the triangular relationship and the IGOs in this study followed the traditional semi-structured interview format in order to obtain the full range of benefits of elite interviews.

For Holt (2010), the remote interview format is not as effective at shortening the distance between interviewee and interviewer as hand-shaking, eye contact, body language, and business card exchanges. But, owing to the impact of the Covid-19 outbreak during the research period, the research was unable to conduct face-to-face interviews with respondents. This study thus had to adopt a remote interview method. Despite the above-mentioned disadvantages, remote interviews can greatly improve efficiency and reduce costs.

Regarding the length of elite interviews, Harvey (2011) points out that the background and characteristics of the interviewees and interviewer, along with the content of the interview itself, can all influence decision-making. If the interview is longer than one hour, the probability of respondent rejection to an invitation greatly increases. To ensure that the interviews proceeded smoothly, 45 minutes was chosen for the interview length – reducing the probability of rejection while ensuring sufficient time to complete the conversation as fully as possible.

Selection criteria

Interviews were conducted by non-probability sampling according to research needs. The interview criteria were consistent, but constrained by the availability of interviewees. The following ten selection criteria are listed below in order from the most basic standard to the most ideal standard, or significance from low to high. The first five selection criteria are the basic conditions that respondents had to meet. The final three criteria marked with an asterisk are of highest significance when selecting a respondent.

More specifically, the objective selection criteria are as follows:

- **Education:** Respondents should have a good academic education at a university level, as this can influence the responses to the interview questions.
- **Position:** Respondents should have a position as either a scholar, researcher, professor, or government or IGO official.
- **Research field:** Respondent research should focus on the triangular relationship or the IGOs.
- **Availability:** Respondents should be accessible.
- **Information validity:** Respondents should be able to provide information that can be used in dissertation research.
- **Number of publications:** Refers to whether respondents have published more

than five articles or a monograph in the field of triangular relations or IGOs.

- **Publication quality:** Refers to whether respondent publications (relevant articles and books) were published in top journals or top university presses.[64]
- ***Think tank experience:** Refers to whether respondents have worked for think tanks serving the government, either in the past or present.
- ***Government experience:** Refers to whether respondents have worked for government (as officials and diplomats), either in the past or present.
- ***IGO experience:** Refers to whether respondents have worked for the IGOs (i.e., the UN, WTO or WHO), either in the past or present.

Candidate rating

In line with the above selection criteria, a rating code was created to rank potential candidates according to three different scales (Tiers 1–3):

- **Tier 1.** Refers to respondents who met seven or more of the 10 selection criteria listed above.[65]
- **Tier 2**. Refers to respondents who met six of the above criteria, or the minimum qualifications for selection.
- **Tier 3**. Refers to respondents who met fewer than six of the selection criteria. These respondents were not placed in the candidate pool.

Regarding candidate selection, some additional clarification is required. Interviews with elites provided supplemental data for the archival research and represented contingency planning for my inability to actually travel to mainland China, the USA or Taiwan for fieldwork owing to the Covid-19 pandemic. From the onset of the global pandemic in March 2020, it became too difficult for me to collect data through physical fieldwork. Even in 2022, different provinces in mainland China were implementing strict lockdown measures and Taiwan maintains strict entry policies. Clearly, there are far more than 15 experts and analysts in this field – but in the fourth year of study after the epidemic, I was unable to interview a larger number of respondents in a short period of time.

Given the two-fold impacts of real-time conditions (constraints on time and resources) and as an auxiliary method, I was compelled to select interviewees according to more

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[64] For instance, *Contemporary China*. It should be pointed out here that some well-known Chinese scholars publish in Chinese in top domestic journals in China, such as *Taiwan Yan Jiu* (Taiwan Studies). *Taiwan Studies* is an academic journal sponsored by the Chinese Academy of Social Science Taiwan Research Institute. It is a core journal of Chinese humanities and social sciences and a source journal of the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index (CSSCI). For details, please see http://cass.cssn.cn/baokanchuban/qikanjiansuo/t/taiwanyanjiu/.

[65] An exception was made in Tier 1 for academics who may not have had the required number of publications, but who had previous experience working in governmental thinktanks or IGOs. This tier still captures the ideal interviewees as these candidates may still have the best understanding of the government decision-making process or specific processes within the work of IGOs.

flexible – but still reasonable – criteria. The triangular relationship is dynamic and, as a supplementary method of data collection, elite interviews can still bring an up-to-date perspective to this study.

Interview data collection

This study collected data from a total of 15 respondents who are scholars, diplomats, thinktank researchers or government officials. Respondents were classified according to the orientation of their perspective (whether from China, Taiwan, or the USA) as shown in their body of work, with at least five respondents in each territorial group. The research fields of selected scholars are relevant to Beijing–Washington–Taipei relations, while selected government and IGO officials either have worked or are currently working in relevant governments or IGOs.

Interviews were completed between December 2021 and June 2022. The idea was to collect data by interviewing subject matter experts, analysts or practitioners with the aim of discovering insights or opinions not previously published. Interviews were mainly conducted through remote video calls, although a small number were conducted face-to-face. Each interview lasted for approximately 45 minutes to one hour and each was recorded with the consent of the interviewees.

Traditionally, interview data collection is mainly divided into digital or handwritten recordings – both of which have their own advantages and disadvantages. Audio recordings can affect the candour of respondents (Fenno, 1986) and cause them to become nervous or more conservative in their responses (Blakeley, 2012). At the same time, a recording allows the interviewer to focus on the interview, maintain a high level of attention and provide an accurate record of what was said. Research shows that interviewers can enhance respondent willingness to impart information by building mutual trust, increasing empathy and demonstrating care (Kezar, 2003). Handwritten records pose little threat to respondents, but they also require researchers to be multitaskers, to have excellent handwriting capabilities, and to possess a superior memory that can supplement and improve the data as necessary to prevent the loss of key information (Blakeley, 2012).

In order to ensure the accuracy of the interview content and prevent the loss of key information, interview data were collected by audio recording. The interview was transcribed using Iflyrec software, then followed by manual corrections for actual conditions. To protect the interests of the respondents and the legitimacy of the interview, this research passed an ethical review (REC02 Checklist and Declaration and REC03 Ethical Review Form) at the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, on 3 November 2021. The interviews and the collection of interview data were then authorized by the interviewees.

Selection criteria for interview data

Interview data can be contaminated in many ways, which makes the selection of interview data an important element. First, respondents could exaggerate their roles and contributions. Second, respondents could have underlying reasons or personal motives that influence their responses; such influence could affect the veracity of the data (Dean and Whyte, 2017).

Although some data contamination is inevitable, setting corresponding standards before using the data can effectively limit it. To ensure the validity of the data, this study aims to identify whether or not respondents might have ulterior motives (Seidman, 2006). This study selected interview data through three technical evaluation methods proposed by Beamer (2002, p. 93) to ensure validity:

1. Determine whether the interview data conforms to or contradicts mainstream academic articles and newspapers;
2. Aim for mutual verification, which is possible between respondents with different identities and viewpoints;
3. Compare the collected data with the views of other scholars in the research field, researchers and government officials to ensure the research has a more balanced understanding of the research topic.

To ensure that respondent views were more reasonable and representative, the interview data included men and women from different age groups. This study also established the objective selection criteria listed earlier with the aim of obtaining representative and reliable opinions from scholars with different research focuses.

The interviews afforded three distinct advantages to this thesis:

1. The 15 elite scholars and thinktank analysts had no direct interaction. The thesis created a forum to bring together the views of scholars from three different strategic perspectives (that of Beijing, Washington or Taipei).
2. Although these interviewed scholars have published many articles and some of their views are quoted in the thesis, the interviews captured many unpublished arguments and views. This contributes some novel perspectives on contemporary triangular relations.
3. The articles published by elite scholars had their own research purposes and questions that could not fully address the research questions of this thesis. The interviews were better able to connect the views of elite scholars to the research questions of this thesis. In conducting the interviews, this thesis is tailored to the background of each elite scholar and the purpose of this research. This leads both to more accurate answers and to a better overall understanding.

Interview data extraction

The extraction and use of interview data was carried out in three steps. First, the interview data were transcribed verbatim with only minor revisions to some points that were clearly unrelated to the interview question. The verbatim approach has the advantage of showing the respondent's real thought process, as well as some personal expression (Poland, 1995).

Second, to facilitate data extraction after transcription, this thesis classified the interview in terms of the three cases of the UN, WTO and WHO. Data were identified and sorted by reference to the document analysis. In this process, the interview data are combined with the research questions through reading comprehension, summarizing the interview text and extracting valuable viewpoints.

Third, this thesis incorporates interview data into writing primarily through summaries, paraphrases or quotations. Rather than relying on a single approach, the thesis uses a three-pronged approach to deal with interview data. In terms of expressing the overall perspective of the study, the study summarizes the interview data. For a specific or complex problem or idea, this research paraphrases the respondent's viewpoint to make it as easy to understand as possible. Finally, in some specific contexts, the thesis quotes a passage from the respondent's response to restore the memorability, specificity or authenticity of language. When directly quoting an interviewee's words, the study provides the necessary background and commentary to contextualize the quotation. Through this extraction and use, this research has been able to link the interview data with the research topic and effectively respond to the research questions.

Lastly, there are certainly limitations on archival research and interviews. Interviews are limited by factors that include the number of respondents, respondent statements of content reliability and sampling methods (Tansey, 2009). On the other hand, they also have corresponding advantages. Once the interview data are extracted, collection is completed by piecing together data from archives, literature and interviews across the three IGO cases. One major advantage of this mixed-methods approach is that it ensures that the data are both more comprehensive and more targeted. These diverse data not only enable an understanding of the history and current situation referenced in the research questions, but also adds detail to the triangular relations and IGO competition captured in case studies.

5.5 Methods of analysis: Cross-case analysis

Qualitative case studies can be distinguished by the size of the sample (number of cases). There are generally three types of qualitative case studies: the single instrumental case study, the collective or multiple case study, and the intrinsic case study. In a single instrumental case study, researchers focus on one concern and then select a single case with a boundary to illustrate the problem. In a multiple case study, a question is posed

but researchers select multiple case studies to illustrate the problem (Stake, 1995). In an intrinsic case study, the case is "preselected as its particularity is of specific interest" (Parker, 2016, p. 223).

Given the number of and differences across cases, this study employs a cross-case method of analysis. By definition, cross-case analysis is a longitudinal analysis of several cases or a single case at different times. Alternatively, it could involve several cases at different times that are related to one another through common themes established by the researchers (Ryan, 2012). Cross-case analysis carries advantages in that a good cross-case comparison can examine data in different ways. This offsets the undesirable trend of using limited data and a disconfirming environment to draw conclusions (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Cross-case analysis further enables the investigation of a theoretical question (e.g., what are the theoretical foundations of strategic triangular competition in IGO settings?). The use of multiple case studies can investigate different aspects of the case background more comprehensively, significantly improving the effectiveness of the study (Eisenhardt, 1989). This nature of cross-case analysis prompts researchers to be attuned to subtle differences and similarities across cases. Through such analyses, this study identifies commonalities and distinctions across the three cases to draw incisive conclusions.

By identifying IGO cases from different time periods with different strategic elements for analysis, this study makes a breakthrough in cross-case analysis. Emerging from largely sequential time periods during the past century, the cases subtly build a complete chronological framework to open a new research window. The common theme of the three cases is competition within IGOs, but each captures different strategies, objectives and fields. Influential factors are explained through discussion of strategic approaches used by Beijing, Washington and Taipei at the UN, WTO and WHO.

Past research has not made such an attempt in the field of triangular relations, which means something new can emerge from such study. The process of cross-case analysis can further force researchers to go beyond the initial impression of technology and look at the evidence from multiple perspectives (Eisenhardt, 1989). Through such analysis, the multifaceted and dynamic nature of triangular competition in IGOs can be revealed.

5.6 Evaluation of methodological choices

There are always debates about the representativeness of the case study method. On the one hand, such a research design has its flaws. Given the paucity of research subjects, many may wonder, "How can you generalize from a single case?" (Yin, 2009, p. 21). Selecting the number of cases, whether single or multiple, also poses an inherent challenge in qualitative case research. If multiple cases are selected, how many should

there be and why? The case study approach can further be limited by the researcher's preconceptions (Eisenhardt, 1989).

On the other hand, the case study approach has some demonstrable advantages. For one, case study is an empirical research method used to answer "why" and "how" questions (Yin, 2009 and Stake, 1995). A suitable case study is very useful for expounding the application of theory and answering research questions, which is why this method is commonly applied in political science, law, psychology and other disciplines (Creswell and Poth, 2016). Situated in the discipline of political science, this thesis falls within the applicable field of the case study method.

Furthermore, Zainal (2007, p. 1) argues that "case study methods can help researchers go beyond the quantitative statistical results and understand the behavioural conditions through the actor's perspective". Through data collection, the researcher is able to describe the case in detail, including historical conditions, events and other factors (Stake, 1995). These advantages of the case study method are well suited to analysis of triangular relations.

Finally, the case study approach enables researchers to explore issues ranging from the most microscopic to the most macroscopic political phenomena. An analysis of the strategic behaviour of Beijing, Washington and Taipei in IGO settings can provide an in-depth understanding of the three actors' strategies and motivations. Case analysis will refine and strengthen the display of the research subject in different cases.

Comparative case studies can be used to better analyse the differences across situations (Eckstein, 2000). This study adopts a multi-case comparison method based on the selection of three representative cases. In particular, it focuses on turning points (a key point that leads to some significant change in the status quo). Such case selection and design make it easier to compare the results and provide innovative insights. In addition to the advantages of the case study design, the use of archival research and interview method for data collection also make the research more comprehensive. Archival research plays an important role in understanding current and historical events, conditions and practices. Interviews can further capture both first-hand and more targeted insights about past and present triangular relations from scholars and officials.

Through investigation of historical and contemporary documents originating from the three parties, the research can cover a wide range of content. What is more, archival materials in both Chinese and English can help to position opinions on IGO competition within different perspectives and effectively broaden the scope of this research.

By examining classic cases (the UN, the WTO and WHO) in the IGO analysis and the above-mentioned data, the cross-case analysis method will play its role in qualitative research. After all, multiple-case analyses "increase the probability that investigators capture novel findings that may exist in the data" (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 541). Detailed

analyses and summarization of different cases enable the discovery of the mechanisms and factors shaping strategic decision-making of the three actors in IGO settings. Despite limitations and possible shortcomings, then, cross-case analysis as an overall research methodology fits with the research topic.

5.7 Conclusion

This study uses case studies to analyse the strategic competition between Beijing, Washington and Taipei in IGO settings, exhibiting the interactions between internal competition in specific IGOs and an external triangular relationship. Cross-case analysis of the UN, the WTO and WHO expands on findings discussed in previous studies. The result can strengthen the relationship between phenomena and concept in relevant theories.

Through cross-case analysis, this study contributes to the study of the strategic development of IGOs through a chronological analysis of the three cases, linking IGO competition to changes in triangular relations. All in all, the proper adoption of case studies in this research does not simply yield in-depth observations and results. It also strengthens the coherency and consistency of the theoretical and empirical analyses. The next chapter presents the first case study of the UN.

Chapter 6 – The UN case study

6.1 Introduction

This chapter is the first empirical case study chapter of this research, and its main purpose is to show the multi-level factors in the competition process and the leverage effect of the UN. As the most authoritative and politically influential IGO in the world, the UN is a highly politically sensitive platform for Beijing, Washington and Taipei. A twenty-year rivalry unfolded at the UN between 1949 and 1971 – not just within the smaller triangular relationship of Beijing–Washington–Taipei, but also within the larger triangular relationship of Beijing–Washington–Moscow. In 1971, Beijing's assumption of Taipei's seat at the UN was a landmark event that re-shaped triangular relations. This chapter argues that a constructivist identity and values (e.g., anti-communism) played an important role in UN competition and that the turning point in UN membership in 1971 was not just a manifestation of a materialist distribution of power. At the same time, the UN also provided an important IGO lever for Beijing to break out of international isolation.

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part explains the basic elements of triangular competition at the UN, including the value and function of the UN itself, a review of the historical background for the early triangular relationship, the identities of the three parties, and a strategic analysis of their competition. The second part advances the case further, focusing on the test of hypothesis 1 on the role of idealistic factors in competition and hypothesis 2 on the UN lever. This step is mainly carried out through the analysis of the turning point in 1971 and indicators of the human resource and monetary contributions of political actors to the UN. Through the analysis, this chapter shows the interaction and competition of the three political actors at the UN, as well as the resulting changes in the triangular relationship and even the international order.

6.2 Early triangular relations and competition at the UN

Between 1949 and 1971, the triangular relationship was closely linked to the changing dynamics of the Cold War. This meant it was subject to the bipolar pattern of relations that existed between the two global powers: the USA and the USSR. As the Cold War escalated, tensions emerged at the heart of Beijing–Washington–Taipei relations. The competition between Beijing and Taipei for China's seat at the UN formed part of a confrontation between the two great power camps (the USA and USSR). Each party pursued their own interests in line with their individual values and identity.

6.2.1 The value of the UN

Founded on 1 January 1942, the UN is the largest IGO in the world today[66] and provides an important political platform in international society (UN, 2013). It is also the organizational foundation of the post-World War II international system and order (Zhang, 2021). In 1945, a group of delegates from the ROC composed of members of the KMT, or Chinese nationalist party, and a representative of the CPC, Dong Biwu, went to San Francisco to sign the UN Charter (CPPCC, 2015).[67] At the time, the "ROC was recognized by the UN as the only legitimate government of China and as one of the permanent members of the Security Council" (Chapter V of the UN Charter, Article 2).

The UN Charter stipulates that "only states can be members of the UN" (Chapter 2: Articles 3–6). UN membership thus confers legitimacy to ruling regimes in international politics. The use of UN seats in power politics was hardly confined to cross-strait relations, as it was a common issue during the Cold War era. Disputes were generally encapsulated by the following two questions: which countries should be seated at the UN? And how many seats should each country have? For instance, the USSR originally requested a seat for each of its 15 republics. After Washington objected, Moscow settled for 3 seats – one each for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

In the case of China, the CPC in Beijing controlled an absolute majority of the population and territory after 1949. However, the KMT in Taipei continued to occupy the UN seat for China with support from the USA. This means changes in the triangular relationship cannot be understood without considering dynamics at the UN, as the UN itself had a major impact on the international legitimacy of both PRC and ROC. The

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[66] On 1 January 1942, representatives of 26 allied countries fighting the Axis powers met in Washington and signed the UN Declaration to express their approval of the Atlantic Charter. This document formally adopted the name proposed by President Roosevelt, United Nations, for the first time (The history of the UN, 1942).

[67] The CPC Central Committee appointed Dong Biwu to participate in the group. This became part of the basis for the Beijing government's request to return to the UN. The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. http://cppcc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0507/c34948-26962893.html.

issue of the representation of China at the UN became an inherent source of conflict between Beijing and Taipei.

6.2.2 Early triangular relations: The origin of the issue of China's representation at the UN

In 1949, the CPC did not completely wipe out the KMT in the Chinese civil war that lasted from 1945 to 1949. Instead, the nationalists fled the mainland to claim the island of Taiwan, declaring it the ROC. Thus, the Beijing–Washington–Taipei triangular relationship began to emerge.

The USA saw the KMT's withdrawal from the mainland as a trigger event that led Washington to begin re-examining the China policy it had employed from 1944 to 1949. On 5 August 1949, the State Department published an analysis of Sino-US relations (referred to as the "China White Paper") (FRUS, Document 1443, 1949).[68] The White Paper publicly criticized the corruption of Chiang Kai-shek's government, blaming the failure of US strategy in China on the KMT (FRUS, 1949). US Secretary of State Dean Acheson encouraged Washington to politically abandon the island of Taiwan. Acheson believed that as long as Taiwan was controlled by the KMT, it was destined to fall into the hands of the Communist Party of China (Cohen, 2019).

A National Security Council document (No. 48) reveals that the USA hoped that Japan would replace Taiwan as the primary actor helping to stabilize Asia, and proposed the creation of the Pacific Island Defence Circle (FRUS, 1949). On 5 January 1950, US President Truman published a statement on Taiwan indicating that "the US government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa, but the US government proposes to continue under existing legislative authority the present Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA) program of economic assistance" (Truman, 1950, p. 11). Abandonment of the KMT was thus a significant change in Washington's China policy at the time, as the country maintained a hesitant attitude towards Beijing.

The Beijing–Moscow communist union vs. the Taipei–Washington anti-communist alliance

Owing to inherent contradictions in the political systems and ideologies of the two superpowers, the capitalist USA and the communist USSR had opposing views on how to structure the post-war world. As an important power in the Far East, China's internal affairs became an arena for the global power struggle between the USA and the Soviet Union. The signing of the "Sino-Soviet Friendship Alliance Mutual Assistance Treaty"

[68] See https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d1443. This thesis abbreviates FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES to FRUS.

on 14 February 1950 consolidated the dominant position of the Communist Party in mainland China. At the same time, the successful detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 shocked Washington. With the onset of the Korean War in 1950, the so-called McCarthyism began to flourish in Washington.[69] This played an "important role in shaping US policy toward China and Asia in general" (Clubb, 1969, p. 23).

Under these international conditions and within this domestic atmosphere, the US National Security Council published a document (NSC-68) on 7 April 1950 stating the policy aim of limiting communism to China's southern border in order to prevent spread to Southeast Asia. In 1950, general MacArthur's also started to emphasize the importance of the defence system in East Asia claims that Taiwan is an unsinkable aircraft carrier (Schaller, 1989). This laid the foundation for the USA to contain the expansion of the Communist bloc led by the USSR.

The Korean War: The consolidation of US opposition to the PRC

In June of 1950, the Korean War broke out. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) supported North Korea (DPRK), while UN Command forces led by the USA subsequently entered the conflict on the side of South Korea (ROK). The conflict was seen as the first-and-only direct military conflict between the forces of the PRC and the USA. The global expansion of communism and the outbreak of the Korean War drove the relationship between Beijing and Washington to a nadir. After the National Security Council met on 25 and 26 June 1950, policymakers made four decisions regarding American troops in Korea (Acheson, 1970):

NSC Four decisions:

"1. The US decided to send troops to support South Korea; 2. The US Seventh Fleet should be sent to the Taiwan Straits to insulate Taiwan from any military action launched by the PRC. This neutralized the Taiwan Strait and also prevented the ROC from launching operations against the mainland; 3. The US military presence in the Philippines should be strengthened; 4. Increased US assistance should be provided to French forces fighting a colonial war in Indochina" (Acheson, 1970).

- June 25 and 26, 1950, NSC Meeting

At the UN Security Council, the USA proposed the 1950 Resolution S/RES/82 and S/RES/83 on the Korean War in the absence of the Soviet representative. The Security Council subsequently adopted Resolution No. 84 deciding to deploy the UN Command, a multinational military force created to support South Korea. At the same time,

[69] Joseph Raymond McCarthy (14 November 1908 – 2 May 1957) was a US Senator from the Republican Party. He was the originator of McCarthyism, a practice that actively opposed communist China by making unfounded accusations of subversion or treason against Americans suspected of being communists.

President Truman commented on Taiwan's international status, saying that it had not been determined. This implies that in the American view, Taiwan was not part of the PRC as Beijing claims.

By late 1952, fighting on the Korean peninsula had reached a stalemate. On 27 July 1953, the Korean Armistice Agreement was officially signed and the war was finally over – but not before it completely extinguished the hope of cooperation between the PRC and the USA. The number of American casualties, which was around 54,000, (US Department of Defense),[70] had swayed domestic opinion. The political fallout from the Korean War fuelled hostilities between Beijing and Washington. In order to contain the spread of communism, senior policymakers in Washington were ready to repurpose the KMT (Klein, 2003).

American credibility in Asia: Protecting the KMT regime

The frustrating stalemate of the Korean War added to the sense that the USA and its messaging were not only on the defensive, but steadily losing ground (Klein, 2003). American policymakers realized the importance of an anti-communist strategy for the Far East. Washington's changing attitude towards the Chiang Kai-shek government in Taipei signalled a new effort to limit the spread of communism across Asia, which was then linked to the credibility of the American effort to combat communism on a global scale through the Western bloc. If the hearts of Asians were not drawn to the West's position, the West could suffer further setbacks. One interviewee, identified as No. 13 (Interview with a professor, advised Washington on China policy, 2022), affirmed this strategic approach:

> I believe that Washington's attitude towards Asia's development after World War II had been going with the flow, but that changed when the DPRK attacked the ROK in 1950. Meanwhile, the US government kind of admitted that exiting Asia was impossible and that if the United States did nothing, then communism would continue to expand. Washington was certainly influenced by the European experience, where the USSR established satellite states in areas it occupied after the war. So, the United States really changed its position and had to defend the ROC.

On 7 May 1951, the National Security Council issued another policy document (NSC 48/5) advocating for the continuation of the mission of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, providing assistance to Taiwan, and supporting the KMT's rule (FRUS, 1951). Under changing circumstances, Washington had begun to readjust its China policy and a new policy document, entitled "US Policy Toward Communist China" (NSC 166), was published on 19 October 1953.

[70] https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/app/conflictCasualties/korea/koreaSum.

U.S. Policy Toward Communist China:

"Regarding Taiwan and the mainland, the US continued to express its support for the KMT. The US determined to steadfastly prevent Beijing from resuming its seat at the UN and strengthened support for the KMT's rule in Taiwan."

-*NSC* 166, October 19, 1953

To maintain the Taiwan Strait situation, Washington promulgated: "maintenance of the security of Formosa, independent of communism, as an essential element within the US Far East defence position (NSC 146/2, 1953, p. 308).[71] Then, Washington signed the China-US Joint Defence Treaty with the KMT government. Under superimposed factors that included ideology, credibility and the Korean War, Washington become Taipei's reliable friend at the UN. Thus, Washington firmly "opposed seating Communist China at the UN" (FRUS, 1953, p. 161).

6.2.3 Positioning and strategy of the three competing parties at the UN

In the UN competition, the three parties adopted different IGO strategies to secure their interests. The following content will analyse the strategies adopted by the three actors from their respective starting points, paving the way for the verification of hypothesis 1 concerning the materialist and idealist factors shaping triangular competition at the UN.

Beijing: The success of a weak power's counterattack

Beijing's obsession with China's representation at the UN was not related only to material interests, but also to issues of national identity. In a constructivist view of international relations, identities provide the basis for state interests (Wendt, 1992). China's representation at the UN became an important interest and identity symbol after the Communist Party consolidated power on the mainland. The Communist Party firmly believed that the nationalists, or KMT, should not continue to occupy the Chinese seat at the UN. When initially confronting the Washington–Taipei alliance, Beijing was a weak power. In order to gain international recognition, Beijing became active both inside and outside the UN. This section will analyse Beijing's position alongside the specific path taken to obtain UN representation.

[71] United States Objective and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government.

A barrage of complaints to the UN. The first and most direct way for Beijing to secure the Chinese seat at the UN was to send a continuous stream of telegrams and applications to the UN headquarters demanding the expulsion of Taipei and the restoration of Beijing's rightful seat. A series of eight telegrams and one draft resolution present Beijing's position, which can be summarized as declining to accept the KMT as a representative of the Chinese people to the UN (for specific details, see Appendix A[72]). In another case, Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai repeatedly called the Secretary-General of the UN and the president of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to "affirm that the Government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the Chinese people"[73].

From a realist perspective that centres on the distribution of power, Taipei and Washington occupied positions of power by virtue of their status within the UN. Beijing's position was much less powerful than that of the US-led Western bloc. Beijing's strategy of directly complaining to the UN may appear weak, as complaints are easily ignored. But from a constructivist perspective on values and identity, it takes on new significance. This is because Beijing's approach was likely to attract the attention of audiences outside the UN. In the process, Beijing demonstrated how its values differed fundamentally from those of Washington. Beijing also clarified its (communist) identity as distinct from Washington, a champion of capitalism. A clear identity has a boosting effect on gaining support from countries of the same faction.

Second, Beijing conveyed to the outside world a sense that the issue of Chinese representation at the UN was not yet properly addressed in the hope that the international community would pay attention. Beijing thus proclaimed its identity as Chinese and a legal right to UN status to the world. As a state actor outside the UN, Beijing was expressing to the international community the political will to resist the Washington-Taipei alliance that claimed the Chinese seat at the UN by flooding the UN headquarters with cablegrams.

Requesting help from the USSR. Beijing regarded Moscow, the leader of the Eastern bloc of countries unified through communist ideology, as a source of assistance at the UN Security Council. The identity of the socialist regime of USSR bloc had a major impact on the close ties between the early Soviet Union and the PRC, and the attributes of the same camp were an important driving force. As an ally of Beijing at the UN Security Council in the early 1950s, Moscow submitted seven draft resolutions on the topic of ensuring the PRC's status as China's representative to the UN (for details, see Appendix B[74]).

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[72] Analysis of the Annual Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly, PRC's activities, 1949-1971

[73] See https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/wjs_674919/2159_674923/t8976.shtml.

[74] Analysis of the Annual Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly, the USSR to PRC, 1949-1950


But the relationship between the USSR and China was two-sided, and Sino-Soviet relations began to break down amid a series of contradictions between ideology and practical interests (e.g., Anti-Soviet Revisionism). Faced with divisions in the communist camp, Beijing realized that Moscow was an unlikely route to securing the Chinese seat on the Security Council. At the same time, Beijing saw other flaws in the more general Security Council approach. Rather than joining the UN as a new country, Beijing appealed to replace Taipei in China's seat at the UN Security Council. Although the one-vote veto exercised by permanent members of the Security Council could not be used by Taipei, given its status as a party to the dispute, the USA had free rein to do so.


As an ally of Taipei, then, Washington's disapproval ensured that Beijing's request to the Security Council had far from the desired effect. This was due to UN regulations, which are discussed in more depth in the leverage of regulation section below. Given these twin factors, Beijing abandoned its strategy to access to the UN through the Security Council. Instead, it turned to the General Assembly to seek out interactions with developing countries.

Beijing's strategy of political solidarity. In the competition over the representation of China at the UN, the decolonization and national independence movement played an important role in advancing Beijing's position. This is because the expansion of decolonization had a major impact on global geopolitics.

The central theme of decolonization was the creation of self-governing nation-states (Hargreaves, 2014). This marked both an administrative and political change (Betts, 2012). In 1977, Delavignette defined decolonization as a rejection of the civilization of the white man (Betts, 2012). The movement coalesced with the onset and evolution of the Cold War, which meant newly independent countries were joining the UN and each acquired an equally weighted vote at the General Assembly (for a map of the spread of decolonization, see Figure 6.1 below). This opened up more possibilities for Beijing to secure votes in favour of its position at the UN.

Figure 6.1: Map of world politics in 1945 and today[75]





[75] In 1945, UN membership comprised only 51 nation-states. Today, it comprises 193. https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html.

Beijing's strategy towards newly independent countries, and especially African countries, was influenced by a variety of factors. First, Beijing saw the African bloc of nations as occupying a central position in the decolonisation movement because it was active around issues of revolution, anti-colonialism and "Third World" unity (Yu, 1965). Beijing's strategy thus conformed to the political context of the time. In 1955, the Asian-African Bandung conference[76] set the stage for Beijing to appear before the international community and launch a new conciliatory phase in Chinese diplomacy by engaging with newly independent countries (Jones, 2005). The participating countries all shared experiences with anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, leading to the emergence of a common set of values against the West (Kahin, 1956; Dirlik, 2015).

The Bandung Conference saw the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" policy advocated by Zhou Enlai gain recognition from newly independent countries (Asian-African Solidarity, FMPRC).[77] Beijing's display of independence in foreign affairs prompted newly independent states to envision the possibility of the PRC emerging as a regional power in Asia rather than simply remaining a vassal state of the Soviet Union (Jack, 1955). Beijing thus adopted a general policy of striving to expand a united international front and promote the national independence movement, simultaneously establishing official diplomatic relations with some Asian and African countries (Zhang, 2007). As a result, the Conference marks the beginning of Beijing's recognition of the role that newly independent states could play in helping the Community Party gain international recognition (e.g., UN representation) and confront its enemies (Yu, 1988).

Second, the Bandung Conference gave rise to the Non-Aligned Movement or NAM. Once again, newly independent African nations occupied an important position among states with developing economies that were not politically aligned with either the Western or Eastern blocs during the Cold War (Harris and Worden, 1986). The participation of newly independent nations in Bandung marked a major shift in global politics and contributed to the emergence of the so-called Global South[78] as an actor.

The politics of the Global South became increasingly important on the international stage, especially for non-Western countries such as the PRC (Dirlik, 2007; Gray and Gills, 2016). The Bandung spirit was further developed as the cornerstone of south–south cooperation (SSC), which aimed to advance cooperation among states considered

[76] A total of 26 countries, including six African countries, participated in the Bandung Conference (Asian-African Conference) in 1955. At the close of the meeting, there were 10 communiqués that were collectively called "the Spirit of Bandung". See https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/wjs_674919/2159_674923/200011/t20001107_7950042.shtml.

[77] See https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/historytoday_674971/t57525.shtml.

[78] The term Global South generally refers to countries located in Africa, Asia, Oceania, Latin America and the Caribbean that are classified by the World Bank as low- or middle-income (Mahler, 2017).

part of the Global South (Power, Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2012).[79] This spirit embodied a policy of non-intervention and non-alignment, which challenged global inequalities while reducing the economic and political dependence of developing countries on developed ones (Braveboy-Wagner, 2009).

Third, Beijing's strategy of developing friendly diplomatic relations with African countries to gain support in the UN was a pragmatic reflection of the changing international political landscape. Beijing's diplomatic activities in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s were related to border conflicts, the Taiwan issue and relevant political interests (Larkin, 1973). The Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 is an important turning point. Initially, India and the PRC shared common values in terms of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. In a joint statement issued in 1954 by the Prime Ministers of the PRC and India, India defended the ideas of Asian nationalism, anti-colonialism, and shared values with China. Between 1956 and 1959, India proposed A/3338, A3663, A3851 and A4139 four draft resolutions on the PRC's assumption of the Chinese seat at the UN.

But after 1959, Beijing effectively achieved direct jurisdiction over Tibet, the Dalai Lama went into exile in India, and Sino-Indian conflict intensified. Under the influence of India's forward policy[80], the Sino-Indian border conflict broke out in 1962. Aware of Beijing's strategic advantage in the conflict, the USA and the Soviet Union both favoured India out of their respective Cold War concerns (Devereux, 2009; Wang, 2016). As a result, Sino-Soviet relations subsequently deteriorated further. Beijing had consolidated its borders by force at the expense of India, an important potential ally (Devereux, 2009). Confronting an unfavourable international situation, Premier Zhou Enlai turned his attention to Africa, paying three visits between 1963 and 1965 that aimed at expanding foreign relations and assisting the revolutions of states emerging from under colonial rule.[81]

In terms of tools used to gain support from African countries, Beijing relied on a shared Third World identity along with anti-imperialist and anti-colonial ideology. Beijing also used material aid to consolidate relations with emerging African countries in order to gain votes at the UN. Foreign aid has always been an important part of China's

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[79] In the UN definition of south–south cooperation (SSC), it is carried out through a broad framework of collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains. See https://www.un.org/en/observances/south-south-cooperation-day.

[80] The forward policy: On 2 June 1960 the Army H.Q. told the Western Command (covering the Ladakh sector) that the Government's policy was one of "maintaining our positions firmly on our side of the international border under our control at present. So far as the 'disputed areas' are concerned, the status quo that has existed for some time is to be maintained" (Noorani, 1970, p. 137).

[81] Zhou Enlai visited 10 African countries: Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. See https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/wjs_674919/2159_674923/200011/t20001107_7950081.shtml.

African policy and, under the values outlined in the 'eight principles'[82], economic and technical assistance became a way for Beijing to establish and maintain friendly relations with African nations (Wang, 2008).

Since 1957, Beijing has assisted more than 45 African countries; in doing so, it has gained some positive returns (Brautigam, 1998). By financially and diplomatically supporting the national liberation movement of the Nasser government in Egypt during the Suez crisis, for instance, Beijing's determination to helped Africa was affirmed to anti-colonial African states (An, 2008). In return, Beijing began to gain approval from the Organization of African Unity (OAU),[83] laying the foundation for more African support in the future. States have many institutional identities and with these identities comes commitment (Holsti, 1970). OAU membership thus obliged African states to support Beijing's return to the UN.

Meanwhile, Beijing emphasized its shared identity and expectations with the developing world through foreign aid work (Chaponnière, 2009). The Chinese style of mutually beneficial aid is different from the Washington-led Western aid system characterized by intervention in development, and initially emerged as a new model for SSC. As both the PRC and African nations were on the periphery of the global political arena, they support each other both materially and in terms of shared values. Compared with Washington, Beijing is more flexible and effective at implementing foreign aid, owing in part to the Chinese political system. Political strings attached to foreign aid from Western countries are often conditioned by largely domestic political actors (e.g., US Congress) on certain topics (human rights or democracy). In contrast, Beijing's foreign aid is often more directly related to diplomatic goals (e.g., UN representation).

Although the principle of empathy and mutual benefit based on sincerity underpinned Sino-African relations from 1956 to 1979, Beijing's foreign aid to Africa took on a strong political colour (Luo and Liu, 2007; Davis, 2007; Chen, 2009). Given a shared identity as a developing country, shared anti-imperialist and anti-colonial values and material foreign aid, Beijing's strategy of political solidarity won the support of post-colonial Africa – effectively ushering the PRC into the international arena. By 1971, 60.5% of newly independent African countries had chosen to establish diplomatic relations with the once-isolated Beijing. When China was admitted to the UN, the total

[82] The "eight principles" were officially published in the joint communiqué between the government of China and the Republic of Mali on January 21, 1964. Please see http://history.mofcom.gov.cn/?datum=%e5%af%b9%e5%a4%96%e7%bb%8f%e6%b5%8e%e6%8a%80%e6%9c%af%e6%8f%b4%e5%8a%a9%e7%9a%84%e5%85%ab%e9%a1%b9%e5%8e%9f%e5%88%99.

[83] The now-defunct OAU was an international organization established in 1963 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, by 37 independent African nations to promote unity and development, defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of members, and eradicate all forms of colonialism. See https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/organisation-african-unity-oau.

number of countries recognizing the PRC stood at 70 (see Appendix C[84]). This provided Beijing with more diplomatic space to develop in the international community.

According to Wendt's (1995) explanation, material resources can acquire the meaning of human action only when embedded in a shared knowledge structure. The PRC and African states belonged to the camp of developing countries that had the same experience of being oppressed by colonialism and Western imperialism. The political development of China had broken the shackles of colonialism and imperialism in a sense, enabling shared knowledge of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism with African countries and building trust between the two sides. Beijing's two-track approach of shared values and materiality successfully wooed African allies, winning hearts and minds. In a relatively disadvantaged international environment, the support of these African countries was a crucial point for Beijing to use the UN lever.

Obtaining European support in the competition for Chinese representation. Beijing's success at securing votes from Western Europe in the competition for China's UN seat is intriguing. After World War II, the relationship between Western Europe and the USA became interdependent. The USA offered political and economic help with recovery to Western Europe; in the face of a Soviet threat, Western European countries have relied on military protection from the USA ever since. But economic and military interdependence did not necessarily achieve a high degree of trust between Western Europe and the USA. During the Cold War, the two superpowers – the USA and the Soviet Union – acted as though on two ends of a seesaw. Contention and compromise between them flipped back and forth. Washington did not communicate each of its foreign policy decisions with its European allies (Huo, 2005). Thus, US-European relations have always been accompanied by frictions and quarrels in addition to cooperation and compromise.

Influenced by Western European economic and global strategic considerations, the PRC-Western Europe relationship is very different from the PRC-US relationship. Although Washington saw Beijing as an antagonist, Western European countries (such as the UK and France) exercised an independent China policy (Huo, 2005). In January 1950, for instance, Norway, Denmark and other Western European countries recognized the PRC.

This was because the developed countries of Europe did not want to depend overly much on the USA. In particular, they wanted to maintain independent foreign policy positions. Positive relations between the PRC and West Europe had the potential to yield significant economic benefits to both parties in the future due to their complementary economies. Western European states realized the potential for the PRC's development and emergence as an important player in the international political

[84] Independent African countries that established diplomatic relations with the PRC, 1949-1971.

arena (Shambaugh, 2004). In terms of global strategy, Western European nations had interests in Hong Kong and Macau (Shambaugh, 1992).

At the same time, Western European countries were not as opposed to communism as the McCarthyism in Washington. Once the old dream of internationalism was shattered by conflicting national interests, European socialists had nowhere to go in Europe as a minority and they were deeply divided internally (*The Atlantic*, 1951). Meanwhile, Premier Zhou Enlai was reviewing the potential for friendly relations with Western Europe in the 1960s (FMPRC, 2009). In order to break free from international isolation, Beijing called on other powers to set aside political differences in order to unite all forces that can be united. The USSR posed a common threat to both Western Europe and the PRC and, facing down the Sino-Soviet border crisis, leaders in Beijing believed that "they could unite Western Europe, and mobilize it as a worldwide anti-Soviet united front" (Shambaugh, 1992, p. 106).

In short, the Western world was not monolithic on the issue of China's representation at the UN. Western European powers, such as the UK, France, and West Germany, were more sympathetic to Beijing regarding the UN seat. This approach to Beijing was a combination of both pragmatism and idealism. Meanwhile, Beijing tied the attitudes and votes of Western European countries (in terms of China's representation at the UN) to bilateral relations, making their support a prerequisite for Beijing's willingness to consider establishing diplomatic relations with these countries, such as in the establishment of PRC-UK relations.[85]

Compared with Beijing–Washington relations, Beijing–Europe relations were not so sensitive. Western European countries have no actual military deployment and strategic intentions towards Taiwan, and remaining colonies (e.g., Macao and Hong Kong) still required Beijing's cooperation. In the face of Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship in Taiwan, the maintenance of Taipei's representation of China at the UN represented a commitment by Washington to the KMT government, and Western Europe had no such obligation.

Constructivist opposition to the Soviet Union's shared values, potential trade benefits at the material level and concerns about colonies altogether prompted Western European to vote on UN Resolution 2758 in favour of Beijing. The affirmation of European states was an important factor in Beijing's return to the UN. In the end, pro-Beijing votes from European states (Among them, Eastern European states also

[85] On 6 January1950, the UK announced its recognition of the PRC. However, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the UK was shelved after the UK voted to abstain from Beijing's proposal to replace the KMT at the Security Council on 13 January 1950.

contributed significant votes) accounted for one-third of the total votes[86] and the 83.9% support rate within Europe was the highest among the six continents.

Washington: A power connection with Taipei

During the Cold War, the USA implemented a policy of isolation to Beijing that was influenced by both ideological disputes and political interests. In the smaller triangular relationship of Beijing–Washington–Taipei, which falls under the influence of the larger Beijing–Washington–Moscow triangular relationship, the KMT became a beneficiary of Cold War competition. The USA played the role of a powerful guardian of the KMT government at the UN, largely owing to Washington's collective goal (anti-communism) and identification of its individual role (alliance with Taiwan).

Some countries received US backing for reasons that had nothing to do with political systems. The vast majority of these were not pro-democracy, but anti-communism (e.g., US-backed dictatorships, such as the Chilean government). Helping the KMT regime retain China's representation at the UN maintained the balance of American interests in the Far East and demonstrated the credibility of the USA to the world (Lee, Paal and Glaser, 2011). As interviewee No. 15 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) pointed out, "the US helped the KMT, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines at that time because doing so was against communism".

A resolute attitude in the Security Council and General Assembly. The permanent members of the Security Council have a special voting power known as the "right to veto" (within the Security Council voting system).[87] According to the Annual Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly, the USA resolutely opposed the Soviet Union's proposal in the Security Council to restore Beijing's representation of China at the UN. In the draft resolution (S/1443) proposed by the USSR in 1950, Moscow explicitly stated that "the KMT group should be excluded from the Security Council. If the Council does not take appropriate measures, the USSR delegation will not participate in the work of the Council until the KMT representative is excluded" (A1361).

Trygve Halvdan Lie, the first Secretary-General of the UN, believed that the withdrawal of the USSR would diminish the authority of the UN and affect the efficiency of its subordinate organizations (*FRUS*, 1950). He thus suggested to Washington that the

[86] Votes were tallied from 23 European states: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Ukraine, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.

[87] The creators of the UN Charter selected five countries – China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United Kingdom and the United States – to receive the status of permanent members states at the Security Council. It was agreed by the drafters that if any one of the five permanent members cast a negative vote in the 15-member Security Council, the resolution or decision would not be approved. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/voting-system.

issue of China's representation should be resolved immediately to avoid the exit of the USSR. However, the USA did not concede ground. On the contrary, the American view was that "the USSR had disregarded rule 17 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure" (A/1361, 1950).

Beijing also attempted to enter the UN through the General Assembly. However, draft resolutions proposed by other states were also blocked by the USA and its allies. In order to secure the KMT's seat in the UN, the USA led the creation of a special committee to consider China representation. After the committee was established, Washington adopted a strategy of moratorium discussion from 1950 to 1960, ensuring that plans to restore China to the UN seat were continuously postponed. But after 1960, as newly independent Asian and African states were joining the UN, some countries began to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC (Cao, 2009b). Gradually, the distribution of votes in the General Assembly shifted away from pro-American countries to pro-PRC countries. For this reason, Washington proposed listing China's representation as an important question in 1961. General Assembly Resolution 1668 then listed China's representation as an 'important question' requiring a two-thirds majority to change (for more details of US discussions at the UN, see Appendix D[88]).

Important question:

In the United Nations Charter, Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: "recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1 (c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions".

- (UN Chapter, Chapter IV).

Dual representation. From 9–11 July 1971, US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger paid a secret visit to the PRC. Kissinger told Zhou Enlai that Nixon had decided that the USA would support Beijing in obtaining the China seats at the UN General Assembly and Security Council that year, but did not agree with the action of expelling the KMT delegation from the UN (Xiong, 2006). In July 1971, the Nixon Administration together with the Tanaka Kakuei Cabinet in Japan once again raised the important question to the 26th UNGA and made the case for dual representation.

[88] Analysis of GA resolutions about representation of China, 1950-1970.

On 2 August 1971, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers issued the "Statement on the Question of China's Representation in the United Nations", stating that Washington "opposes any action to expel the ROC, or otherwise deprive it of its representation in the UN" (Szulc, 1971). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC issued a response on 20 August, pointing out that restoration of the legitimate rights of the PRC at the UN and the expulsion the Chiang Kai-shek government were two inseparable aspects of the same issue. Beijing would never agree to a two-China or one China-one Taiwan situation at the UN (FMPRC).[89] When Rogers was later asked if he had received "any indication from Beijing or Taipei that they were ready to sit down with each other at the UN", he replied that neither side was willing (Szulc, 1971).

Overall, American strategies were effective in blocking Beijing from the UN for 20 years. Interests are part of the process of identity construction (Hopf, 1998), and shared anti-communist ideals had a huge impact on US policy in terms of the competition over China's UN seat. Although Washington (a democratic government) and Chiang Kai-shek's Taipei (an authoritarian government) in the 1960s did not have a common political identity, they shared the common goal of breaking free from communism. The US–Taiwan alliance formed under the twin influences of China's interests and Cold War patterns along with an anti-communist identity formed under the ethos of McCarthyism in Washington provided a steady stream of internal motivations for Washington's China policies. Interviewee No. 08 (Interview with a researcher at Taiwan Academica Sinica, 2022) stated that:

> Even when the US began to engage with China in 1971, Washington first put aside the ideological issue before the two sides could begin to engage. Secondly, Washington's manipulation of UN rules and influence over other countries' votes is a combination of material ability and anti-communist values. Washington took full advantage of its comprehensive strength and capitalist leadership to secure the KMT government's status in the UN.

Taipei: A resolute defence of Chinese representation at the UN

Even after the nationalists retreated to Taiwan in 1949, KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek was convinced that he represented the authentic Chinese identity and the KMT still represented China at the UN until 1971. In Chiang Kai-shek's mind, Taiwan assumed the identity of the Chinese regime and the KMT and CPC were "incompatible with each other (*han zei bu liang li*)".[90] Throughout the period of martial law that lasted from 1949 to 1987 under the KMT in Taiwan, its top politicians understood themselves as the sole

[89] Please see https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cohk/chn/topic/zgwj/wjlshk/t8976.htm.
[90] Established in 1949 after the government of the Republic of China retreated to the island of Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek insisted to the international community that the ROC in Taiwan was the only representative for China. For him, the CPC on the mainland was a rebel group.

international representatives of Chinese identity for the entire region. If there had been an identity within Taiwan different from that advocated by the KMT government, it was suppressed by authoritarianism (Chu, 2004). Interviewee No. 15 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) confirmed:

> At that time, Taipei didn't wait for the mainland to exert diplomatic pressure. When other countries admitted to the other side, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo would immediately cut off diplomatic relations.

In the UN competition, Chiang Kai-shek's government used its representation at the UN to respond strongly. For instance, KMT delegates proposed two draft resolutions (A/1361 and A/1873) against a cablegram (S/1921) from the PRC and two other draft resolutions (S/1443 and S/1732) from the USSR. From 1951 to 1960, and due to external factors, such as the Korean War, Taipei and its allies responded to Beijing's efforts with moratorium discussions and claiming PRC non-compliance with the UN Charter prerequisite that membership can only be extended to peace-loving nations.

But as support for Beijing began to grow in the early 1960s, Taipei and Washington began to "change tactics and erect barriers within the UN" (Hickey, 1997, p. 1031). Outside the UN, the KMT government primarily relied on lobbying Washington and developing relations with the newly independent countries.

Lobbying in the United States. Although issues related to representation of China were discussed every year at the UN from the 1950s, pro-ROC forces prevailed owing to the influence of the USA (Li, 2015). For the KMT, recognition and assistance from the USA was an important source of support in defending its representation at the UN. As a result, lobbying Washington became an important tactic within the Chiang Kai-shek government's strategy to resist Beijing's re-entry into the UN.

Lobbying itself is an "important component of the US political system" (Blanes, Draca and Fons-Rosen, 2012, p. 3731). Lobbying strategy is defined as an activity used to influence legislators or public officials for or against proposed legislation or policy ideas. As an informal diplomatic tool, lobbying can used by the government of a country to influence political elites or public opinion in another country with the aim of making the foreign policy of the target country beneficial to it (Howe and Trott, 1977). The term 'lobbying group' refers to organizations that retained a common attitude, purpose and plan for ensuring Taipei was in a position to influence US government agencies, legislators and executives (Xin, 2004). Carter (1995, p. 187) argued that in the absence of consistent presidential leadership, Taiwan lobbyists seemed "able to prevail in shaping US policy on this fundamental issue in the Far East".

A China bloc[91] within US Congress and a lobbying group outside it formed two important elements of support for Chiang Kai-shek's government (Chen, 2014). Unlike pro-KMT interest groups outside Congress, the China bloc within Congress exerted direct influence over the formulation of US foreign policy (Guan, 2006). Senator William Fife Knowland[92] promoted a strong anti-communist stance and believed that American failure to oppose communism in the Far East would jeopardize US national security. Knowland issued a statement against Beijing's entry into the UN, calling on the Truman government to play an international leadership role by using its veto power at the Security Council to oppose the UN's admission of the PRC (Congressional Record, 1950).[93]

At this period of time, the anti-communist McCarthy era began to shape prevailing public opinion in the USA against the CPC. This was a catalyst that pushed Washington to commit to military intervention in Taiwan and finally prompted the USA to implement a pro-Taipei policy (Shi, 1995). Interviewee No. 05 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) confirms that lobbying has helped Taiwan immensely, saying, "I believe that pro-Taiwan voices in Congress are the result of ideology, practical interests and Taiwan's lobbying". During the Korean War, such lobbying efforts came to encompass an extensive network of diverse individuals (in the form of well-funded KMT Chinese officials allied with right-wing American political elites) whose interests converged around the goal of overthrowing Chinese communism and maintaining the US–Taiwan military alliance (Blackwell, 2010).

The success of these lobbyists was closely linked with the KMT's use of constructivist anti-communist ideology and the pragmatic interests of the USA in the Far East. The KMT government promoted shared values of liberal democracy, Christianity and anti-communism in the USA (Shi, 1995). Under the dictatorship of martial law imposed by the KMT government, Christianity and anti-communism became an important value system connecting Taipei and Washington at the time. In the fierce anti-Communist climate at the time, "the KMT lobby messages were found with wide support, and critics of the lobby exposed themselves to harsh censure from pro-Chiang advocates" (Blackwell, 2010, p. 49). As stated by interviewee No. 5 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022), "lobbying for Taiwan has a legitimation to obtain internal politics, which is more in line with the so-called political correctness of the United States".

[91] The China bloc refers to a small group of senators and deputies in US Congress who urged Washington to support the KMT regime in the 1940s and 1950s.
[92] William Fife Knowland (26 June1908 – 23 February 1974) was an American politician and leader of the Republican Party as well as a representative of the China bloc.
[93] The President's News Conference, 5 January 1950. https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/3/presidents-news-conference.

After a lengthy period of lobbying, the image of Taiwan as a friend and partner to the USA was imprinted on many US government officials and members of Congress, helping to shape American policy toward China (Li, 2008; Blackwell, 2010).

Taipei's efforts in Africa. During the Cold War, Taipei made huge efforts to garner support from African countries (Sim, 1971). As the wave of post-colonial independence progressed, the ROC aimed to grasp the emerging international power generated by the independence movement in order to consolidate its own international status. Beijing's diplomatic activities in Africa disturbed Washington and Taipei owing to worries that the activities might pose an ideological threat to the newly independent African countries (Cooley, 1965). The competition between Beijing and Taipei turned into a zero-sum game on the African continent (Yu, 1963). The Operation Vanguard[94] foreign aid approach adopted by the KMT government between 1960 and 1970s opened up Taipei's dialogues with African countries (Tseng, 2008).

Chiang Kai-shek's government hoped to gain more international legitimacy and diplomatic status for Taipei through its diplomatic activities in Africa. With the encouragement of the USA, Taipei was actually persuading Africans to believe that international communism posed a threat to them (Munro, 1963). Initially, Taipei was concerned about retaining political dignity; Chiang Kai-shek believed that seeking diplomatic assurances from African countries would undermine the legitimacy of its great power status, repeatedly denying that the aid was related to the UN seat. But as Africa's votes at the UN grew increasingly crucial, securing these votes became an important goal of Taipei's aid program (Slawecki, 1963; Sim, 1971).

But Taipei did not have an advantage in Africa over Beijing, which won support from several key African organizations. The PRC participated in the founding of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) in 1957, the year of Ghana's independence, which proved a landmark event in Africa. From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, the PRC provided strong support for the revolutionary movements and independent liberation movements in Africa, and AAPSO became an important vehicle for Beijing's relations with Africa (Jackson, 1995 and West, 2014). Beijing strengthened its ties with major guerrilla groups in Africa through AAPSO, providing weapons assistance to the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and other organizations (Larkin, 1973). This process gradually shaped friendly relations between the African organizations (OAU and MPLA) and Beijing. The PRC's assistance enabled these revolutionary organizations to grow in power over time, paving the way for solidarity between member countries and Beijing in the international community.

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[94] Operation Vanguard for ROC assistance in Africa consisted of the following three elements: (1) invitations to outstanding Africans to visit Taiwan and learn about Taiwan's agricultural methods; (2) hosting seminars for African agricultural experts; and (3) dispatching technical agriculture teams to Africa (Lin and Myers, 1994).

In contrast, Taipei was not a member of any such Asian-African Group or African organizations in general – so African countries did not assume any sort of collective responsibility for Taipei (Bailey, 1965). Taipei's dilemmas in Africa were also related to African distrust of former colonial countries and the lack of a shared anti-imperialist and anti-colonial identity with Taipei. The liberation movement in Africa was against white minority rule (Gibson, 1972), for example, while Taipei maintained friendly diplomatic relations with white-ruled South Africa.

Facing Asian-African internationalism, and as part of the fight against Beijing, Taipei co-sponsored the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (APACL) with South Korea and the Philippines to counter the Bandung platform for Asian unity and post-colonial national liberation (Chen, 2020). Chiang Kai-shek's government strove to integrate its struggle for so-called representational legitimacy into the Asian and African ideological struggle against the West. In terms of security, the KMT government proposed joining the same military alliance as South Korea and the Philippines to build a sort of Eastern NATO[95] in Asia that might curb the expansion of communism. But owing to British and French opposition to Taipei participation in the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Chiang Kai-shek government failed (FRUS, 1954).

Chiang Kai-shek always believed that the ROC government was the sole legal representative for the whole of China, making the struggle for identity an important part of the competition at the UN (Sigrid, 2012). Taipei effectively blocked efforts to change the representation of China, both inside and outside the UN, by appealing to anti-communist philosophies, Christianity, and strategic interests in the Far East to lobby Washington for both ideological and practical interests. At the same time, Taipei also appealed to African countries through chequebook diplomacy and agricultural aid.

In 1950, the KMT government was maintaining diplomatic relations with 38 countries, including the USA and its Western allies. By 1969, Taipei's diplomatic relations reached a record high of 69 states. Between 1949 and 1971, with the exception of Japan, a total of 16 emerging states established official ties with Taipei – 10 of which were newly independent countries arising from the wave of African independence. Although Taipei lost access to China's seat at the UN in 1971, Taipei's strategy of using a combination of constructivist values and realist interests (buoyed by Taipei's relatively dominant position within the UN) effectively created obstacles for Beijing.

An analysis of the positions of the above-mentioned parties shows that the three actors used a diverse range of strategies to achieve their aims at the UN. In the UN competition, each adopted their own strategy in line with their own identity, political and economic

[95] Influenced by Trumanism and the international situation, Washington signed the 1954 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Treaty) with Britain and Australia to limit the expansion of communism in Asia.

strengths, interests, internal conditions and the international situation. The diversity of these strategies suggests that realist and constructivist approaches coexist in a triangular UN competition. In Beijing's UN strategy, for instance, continuous references to a shared identity with developing countries and common values of anti-imperialism, national independence and anti-colonialism become an important ideological tool for gaining support. Taipei also wielded anti-communist values to lobby Washington for support. Washington also cares about credibility, which is an idealistic factor, in addition to interests. The constructivist connotations embedded in the strategic approaches of the three parties to the triangular competition at the UN seems to imply that material factors are not the only ones affecting such competition.

6.3 The UN competition and leverage

The UN case reveals the early stages of a triangular IGO competition, where Taipei and Washington shared membership in an IGO and Beijing was excluded. This is different from the WTO and WHO cases. As the weaker party in the competition, Beijing's successful return to the UN is of special significance and lasting importance. Here, the UN seems to have played an important leverage role. Given the above analysis of the positions of the three parties, the following section will test hypothesis 1 (the role of idealistic factors in tripartite competition) by analysing the turning point in 1971 and relevant factors. After identifying the external factors shaping the events of 1971, this chapter will assess the ability of the three parties to leverage the UN from an internal perspective on the organization.

6.3.1 The 1971 turning point

Beijing's assumption of China's seat at the UN in 1971 was a major turning point resulting from a game that was not limited to three parties. The first analysis focuses on the voting choices of African countries. African countries played an important role in the 1971 UN vote and their individual positions varied in line with specific interests. Some countries supported Beijing, while others supported Taipei. In the competition for African countries, the 1955 Bandung Conference was a landmark event in international diplomacy; it marked the rise of the PRC alongside a post-colonial Asia and Africa (Shimazu, 2014). At the time, Beijing's diplomatic offensive involved building a shared identity among developing countries. Upholding the principle of peaceful coexistence was seen by Beijing as a weapon to weaken the relationship between Washington and its key allies (Zhang, 2007).

Acting from a shared identity as developing countries, African states supported Beijing by helping the PRC break the international blockade imposed by anti-communist powers, restoring the PRC's legal seat at the UN and backing Beijing's quest for the unification of Taiwan with Chinese mainland (Wang, 2013). A declaration at the first

NAM Summit (Belgrade Conference) in 1961, for instance, called for developing countries to unite and fight for the PRC's seat at the UN (FMPRC, 2022).[96] Beijing's diplomatic efforts to build peaceful coexistence and a united front in the mid-1950s confirms the constructivist identity hypothesis (Zhang, 2007).

Of course, the forces leading to the turning point in 1971 did not unfold overnight, nor were they solely attributable to the influence of anti-imperialist and anti-colonial values after the Bandung Conference. By the 1960s/1970s, the unifying role of the Bandung spirit had diminished amid leadership changes, the Cold War, geoeconomic shocks and changes in the nationalist orientations of the Third World (Vinacke, 1965; Tan and Acharya, 2008; McCann, 2019). Beijing's efforts in Africa thus shifted to more pragmatic policies (Shinn, 2019). For instance, the TAZARA (or Uhuru) Railway,[97] which China started to build in 1967, is held as a model of SSC. The construction of this infrastructure was a major contribution to the economic and political struggle against white colonialism in southern Africa (Larkin, 1971; Monson, 2009; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012). In response, Tanzania and Zambia voted for Beijing in the 1971 UN2758 resolution. Interviewee No. 05 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) confirms this, saying:

> I believe that Beijing emphasizes the developing country status of countries in the Global South, and the fact that it is important to have a political solidarity. In addition, China has actually provided assistance to African countries since Mao Zedong (despite China's economic difficulties at that time), acting in political solidarity.

Meanwhile, its rival Taipei maintained aid to African countries through agricultural aid and chequebook diplomacy. The PRC's economy at the time was not strong and with a per capita GDP lower than that of sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 6.1 below), Beijing was unable to conduct dollar diplomacy with all African countries.

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[96] See https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/gjs_673893/gjzz_673897/bjmyd_673955/ gk_673957/.

[97] Tanzania and Zambia gained independence in 1964. The project was rejected for financing by the World Bank and the Soviet Union successively. Beijing hoped to emerge from diplomatic isolation by helping the project gain political support from these two African countries. On 5 September 1967, the three governments signed the Agreement on the Construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway.

Table 6.1: Comparison of GDP between China and sub-Saharan Africa 1960 and 1970[98]

GDP per capita in China and Sub-Saharan Africa (1960 and 1970, data from World Bank)		
Year	1960	1970
The PRC	89.52 USD	113.16 USD
Sub-Saharan Africa	117 USD	207 USD

When Resolution 2758 came into effect in October 1971, Beijing had established diplomatic relations with 20 African countries while Taipei had established relations with 21 (FMPRC data).[99] African countries thus did not act as a bloc; instead, their votes at the UN were fragmented.

Table 6.2: Votes on UN Resolution 2758, by country (in Africa)[100]

UN Resolution 2758 African countries' voting options		
Attitude	African Countries	Votes number
Pro-Beijing	Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Congo (Brazzaville), Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, Equatorial Guinea, Togo, Rwanda and Burundi	26
Pro-Taipei	Central Africa, Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo), Lesotho, Gabon, Liberia, Malagasy (Madagascar), South Africa, Malawi, Swaziland, Gambia, Dahomey (Benin), Niger, Chad, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire)	15
The data comes from UN Data and is organized by the author.		

Table 6.2 above shows that of a total of 42 African countries, 26 voted in favour (pro-Beijing) while 15 voted against (pro-Taipei) and 1 abstained. In terms of the total distribution of votes on UN Resolution 2758, there were 35 pro-Taipei votes. Africa thus accounted for more than 40% (15 votes) of the total pro-Taipei votes. The 63.4% of pro-Beijing rate for the Resolution in Africa was far lower than that in Europe. But African countries are important as it was only by securing their support that Beijing could secure two-thirds of the overall vote.

It is worth noting that, with the exception of five African countries that were absent from the vote on Resolution 2758, 70.5% of the African Independent Movement countries voted in favour of Beijing (see Appendix E for details).[101] Compared with

[98] Data: China, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN; and sub-Saharan Africa, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ZG.
[99] See https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/2193_674977/200812/t20081221 _9284708. shtml.
[100] Data: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/654350?ln=en.
[101] Analysis of votes of the representation of China in the UN, 1950-1971.

Taipei and Washington, newly independent African countries were more likely to agree with Beijing's position under the combined influence of anti-imperialist and anti-colonial values along with the principle of SSC. Voting patterns among African countries were a collective outcome of Beijing's ideology-based diplomacy, chequebook diplomacy, and support from African organizations.

Second, the turning point in 1971 emerged partly as a result of adjustment in US policy towards China. In the 1970s, the USA expended its resources on the Korean and Vietnam wars. The American economy experienced stagflation and Nixon faced difficulties both at home and abroad. At the time, the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict predicated the dawn of a major adjustment in US foreign policy under Nixon and Kissinger in response to shifts in the US-Soviet balance of power; for the first time, Beijing was also willing to draw on Washington to guard against Moscow (Yang, 2022). Interviewee No. 06 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) affirmed the impact of the above-mentioned international environment on Washington's China policy, saying:

> Due to the situation of the Cold War and the Vietnam War in 1970s, the US chose to unite with the PRC, which was a lesser threat, and deal with the Soviet Union, which was a greater threat.

Washington's China policy under Truman was highly ideological in the aftermath of the Korean War. As McCarthyism prevailed in domestic politics, the USA grew increasingly irrational in its anti-communist stance. But after Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency,[102] he faced a wave of domestic opposition to the Vietnam war and lost his chance at re-election. The American public was tired of the Cold War and domestic politics were moving away from the excesses of McCarthyism. This gave Nixon the opportunity for rapprochement with Beijing to weaken Moscow and get out of the quagmire of the Vietnam War. Thus, the ideological element of Washington's China policy was effectively thrown out the window. After all, the foreign policy of any country is hardly linear and static. America's China policy is not always constructivist and ideological. Instead, it is dynamic – both ideological and pragmatic.

The Sino–US–Soviet triangle was an important factor shaping the competition over China's representation at the UN. The trade-offs of other policies all gave way to considerations emerging from this larger triangular relationship. Interviewee No. 3 (Interview with a professor, more work Beijing perspective, 2022) holds a similar view, further pointing out that "in terms of Nixon's visit to China in 1971 and some acquiescence to China's UN representation, the overall strategic framework is Sino-US relations – within which the Taiwan issue is only one component".

[102] Lyndon Baines Johnson served as the 36th President of the United States from 1963 to 1969.

Washington aimed to isolate Moscow, and the best way to do so was rapprochement with Beijing. These two storylines unfolded at the same time, and Beijing's efforts combined with Washington's actions led to the turning point in 1971. If Washington had not decided to adopt a strategic change that eased relations with Beijing in order to isolate Moscow, Beijing would most likely have not entered the UN in 1971. On this, interviewee No. 14 (Interview with a professor, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) introduced another perspective by observing that "the ROC regime, which does not really control mainland China, occupied an important seat in the UN to form the Big Five (permanent members of the UN Security Council) – which is not normal in itself. This is a manifestation of political asynchrony". The two triangles, Beijing–Washington–Taipei and Beijing–Washington–Moscow, had interacted since 1949 and finally intersected in 1971.

In short, the triangular competition at the UN led to the following three influential factors. First, countries emerging from colonialism and imperialism shared a common denominator of poverty and underdevelopment (Wright, Myrdal and Singh, 1995). Shared values (anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism) and identity (as a developing country) helped Beijing to gain support their support at the UN.

Second, changes in Washington's strategic approach to the dynamic US–Soviet balance of power during the Cold War triggered a snowball effect that had a profound impact on political relations with East Asia and even the future development of the world order.

Third, the foreign policy of Western Europe and the USA was not monolithic. Some Western European countries established diplomatic relations with the PRC well before the restoration of Beijing's UN seat. To a certain extent, their attitudes had spill-over effects that spurred newly independent countries and their former colonies in Asia and Africa to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing as well (Xiao, 1995). After France established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1964, for example, some French-speaking African countries (the Republic of Congo and Benin), followed in kind.

This analysis thus finds that Beijing's success at the UN resulted from a combination of factors. First, the motivations of the three actors are all from the perspective of realists, and interests, national security and rights become the core of competition. Second, the identity and value of constructivism is very important in the competition process. It is an important factor in strengthening the Washington-Taipei alliance to compete against Beijing in the UN for 20 years. Finally, all three actors have been competing within the framework of the UN. The UN is a product of liberal functionalism, and its functionality and political symbols are one of the reasons for the tripartite competition. Liberal elements are also included in the triangular UN competition. These factors spanned two different levels of approaches – materialism and idealism – to combine political interests, rights, geopolitics, the international landscape, ideology and identity. The analysis thus confirms hypothesis 1 about the factors of triangular IGO competition by concluding that the turning point in the

triangular UN competition resulted from the joint influence of material and idealistic factors.

6.3.2 The leverage of the UN

More than two-thirds of interviewees agreed that the UN is both a platform and an important political tool for different powers. The main purpose of this section is to test hypothesis 2, which is about the impact of human resources and their own financial contributions to the organization on the use of the UN leverage. As Beijing was not a member of the UN during the period from 1949 to 1971, it was unable to make either human or financial contributions to the organization. In contrast to these contributions, UN regulations are openly accessible to all. This means that the three parties could use UN regulations as leverage to secure their own positions. Therefore, the use of UN regulations serves as a proxy indicator that helps to explain Beijing's efforts to leverage the UN despite not having membership in the organization itself.

Leverage toolkits: regulations and financial/manpower contributions in the UN case

UN Regulations. UN regulations provide principles that all parties to the competition over China's representation at the UN could access. By definition, they serve a determinative function for how a state can obtain and maintain representation at the UN. As a challenger, Beijing could enter the UN through two regulatory pathways: one was as a formal member and the other was as a formal representative (of China).

The pathway to obtaining UN membership is laid out in Articles 4 of the UN Charter:

> The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be affected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Non-procedural resolutions must be approved by at least 9 of the 15 members of the Security Council, with none of the 5 permanent members voting against it (p. 78).[103]

The pathway to formal representation involved returning (as a founding member) to the UN and replacing the KMT in China's seat. Some UN member states submitted the issue of the PRC's return to the UN as a proposal to the General Assembly, which then either conducted substantive discussions or voted on it. The question of representation does not appear in the UN Charter and is instead governed by the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly. Rule 29 stipulates that:

[103] See https://legal.un.org/repertory/art24.shtml.

> If the eligibility of any representative to attend the conference is raised by the participating countries, the Credentials Committee shall report, and the General Assembly shall decide.[104]

Considering various factors such as the One-China principle, Beijing opted for the second route and used its allies in the UN to put forward proposals for the return of the PRC to the UN at both the Security Council and the General Assembly. UN statistics from 1950 to 1971 show that through allies, Beijing put forward at least 21 draft resolutions on the restoration of PRC representation in the General Assembly.


However, none of these draft resolutions were passed until 1971. Under American influence, the Taipei–Washington alliance interpreted UN rules on moratorium discussion and important questions to restrict Beijing. But while these rules did have some effect on their use by the UN, it was only cosmetic. This thesis argues that how the two sides secured votes (from African and European countries, among others) through conceptual and substantive competition outside the UN was more important.

Financial contributions. As a non-profit organization, the UN requires membership dues to be paid in the form of maintenance costs. Monetary contributions are thus highly likely to become an influential factor when it comes to the outcome of competitions within the UN itself. Figure 6.2 below shows the proportion of UN membership fees paid by the USA and the ROC from 1946 to 1971. From a starting point in 1946, the US fell from a high of 49.89% to 31.57% in 1970 while the ROC fell from a high of 6% in 1949 to 4% in 1970 – both showing a downward trend overall.

On the other hand, the USA has maintained a budget contribution ratio different from that of ordinary member states since the establishment of the UN. This means that a reduction in US membership dues is most likely to affect the daily operations of the UN. In the first session in 1946, the USA paid an astonishing 49.89% of total dues. In contrast, the UK paid 10.50%, the Soviet Union 6%, France 5.5%, India 3.75% and the ROC 2.75% (UN Rep. A/80).

[104] See https://www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/.

Figure 6.2: The contribution of Member States to the regular budget of the UN (the US and the ROC, 1946-1970. Data are from the UN database, collated by the authors)



[105]

As the ROC was a developing country at the time, the KMT's contribution further represented a relatively outsize proportion. In 1949, the KMT government paid 6% of the total financial contribution to the UN – the same as France and the fourth largest contribution among all members. Even in 1970, after the KMT government had already been in exile in Taiwan for more than 20 years, the ROC's contribution still ranked sixth overall at a 4% rate (see Table 6.3 below).

Table 6.3: Top 6 contributors of monetary funds to the UN, 1970

UN Money Contribution in 1970 (UN Rep. A/8411)						
Country	The US	The USSR	France	The UK	Japan	The ROC
Percentage	31.57%	14.18%	6%	5.9%	5.4%	4%

The proportion of ROC's monetary contribution to the UN is a reflection of the value that Chiang Kai-shek's government attached to UN. The massive size of the KMT regime's contribution to the UN is highly disproportionate to the tiny territory that it has controlled since 1949. The KMT ostensibly invested massive financial resources to consolidate its status at the UN and continues to make a monetary contribution on the basis of its claim to legitimacy as a representative for the whole of China. Pointing to Taipei's outsize contributions to the UN, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers showed that Taiwan had met the obligations of UN membership well (Szulc, 1971).


As Figure 6.3 shows below, Beijing replaced Taipei as the representative of China to the UN in 1971 and assumed the obligation of China's membership fees. The proportion of the American contribution to the UN budget dropped to 25% after 1974 from 31.52%

[105] Data from UN official database, see https://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/honourroll.shtml.

in 1971, and this proportion remained in place until 2003 (since 2004, the US proportion has dropped to 22% – but Washington has always maintained the highest contribution rate among all member states).

In contrast, the Chinese contrition shows an opposite trend. Between 1971 and 2000, China's contribution to the UN budget dropped from 4% to 0.74%. But since 2001, China's budget contribution ratio has risen rapidly to 15.25% in 2022, ranking second among all member states (UN Rep. A/76/11). Unlike the USA, which gradually reduced its share of UN funding, China is seeking more influence by increasing its share (BBC, 2019).[106]

Figure 6.3: The contribution of Member States to the regular budget of the UN (the US and the PRC, 1971-2022. Data are from the UN database, collated by the authors)



All three parties thus showed a strong interest in leveraging financial contributions to the UN when they had the ability or perceived need to do so. Monetary contributions can more or less affect the operations of the UN as well as the perception of the international community. Thus, Washington's ability to successfully manipulate the outcome of the two resolutions was likely to have been closely linked to both the strength of its national power and corresponding monetary contributions to the UN.

Manpower. By human resources, this study means the number of officials that each state contributed to the UN in a senior capacity that could have impacted the outcome of the triangular competition. Regarding the role of UN human resources, the UN has six functional agencies: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Secretariat (UN Charter, 1945). This thesis disregards the leaders of the

[106] https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-50083620.

following three agencies as human resource indicators for this study, given their leadership election process and functional irrelevance. First, the appointment of the presidency of the Security Council adopts a rotation system that is not subject to influence. Second, the 11 territories of the Trusteeship Council were unrelated to Beijing–Washington–Taipei relations and ceased functioning on 1 November 1994. Third, the function of the ECOSOC is to promote sustainable development from the three levels of economy, society and environment. The ECOSOC's the main purpose is to promote cooperation. Thus, this study focuses on the President of the General Assembly, the President of the International Court of Justice and the Secretary-General from 1949 to 1971 as research indicators for the human resources of the UN.

Table 6.4: Human resource contribution of the PRC, USA and ROC (1949-1971)[107]

Number of senior officials from the PRC, the US and the ROC in major UN agencies (1949-1971, Data sourced from the UN Digital Center and collated by the authors.)				
Actors	The President of the General Assembly	The President of the International Court of Justice	The Secretary-General	In total
The PRC	0	0	0	0
The US	0	1	0	1
The ROC	0	0	0	0


As Table 6.4 shows, none of the three parties contributed many senior officials to the UN during the period from 1949 to 1971. First, the PRC was excluded from the UN throughout and was therefore unable to contribute senior officials. Second, the USA has served as the president of the International Court of Justice only once (Green Haywood Hackworth, 1955-1958); no other agencies have officials from the USA. Finally, the ROC contributed no officials to senior positions under direct UN oversight.

To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the influence of senior UN officials on the triangular competition, this thesis further analyses data indicators of the leaders of the three agencies mentioned above, which are no longer limited to the three parties. Between 1949 and 1971, there were 36 senior officials from 31 countries. Each

[107] Data from the websites of official UN agencies, see https://www.un.org/sg/zh/content/former-secretaries-general.

participating country had at least one senior official. The country with the most senior officials was Norway with three, followed by Pakistan and Chile with two each (for more detailed data on human resource contributions to the UN, see Appendix F).[108] Figure 6.4 below provides a coloured map to show the nationality ratio of senior UN officials in the aforementioned positions.


Figure 6.4: Coloured map of regional distribution of the UN senior officials (1949–1971)



The share of senior officials can be further classified according to the status of developed and developing countries.[109] This thesis finds that the proportion of senior officials in the UN from developing countries is larger than that from developed countries, accounting for about 65% (see Figure 6.5 below). This means that the developed Western countries, led by the USA, did not occupy a dominant position in the administration of the UN (1949–1971).

[108] Human resource of the three UN agencies, 1949-1971.
[109] Classification of developed and developing countries. The UN, Country classification. Data sources, country classifications and aggregation methodology. See https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf.

Figure 6.5: Proportion of senior UN officials from developing countries and developed countries (1949–1971)



Considering that 1971 was a turning point for the three actors, this study expands the analysis of the UN administration situation. Based on the division of administrative functions of UN senior officials, the analysis should cover senior officials such as Deputy Secretary-General, Chef de Cabinet and Under-Secretary-General for Policy. However, these senior officials are all affiliated with the Senior Management Group (SMG). The cabinet was not established until 1997 as part of UN reforms[110]. Therefore, they could not be included in the human resource analysis for the 1971 key points. Secondly, the UN Digital Database provides detailed data on human resources only from 2017 (see UN CEB)[111]. Therefore, the analysis of 1971 in this study will analyze the accessible data, and the human resources object after expanding the scope of analysis includes the President of the General Assembly and the President and Vice-President of the ECOSOC.

Firstly, the 1971 General Assembly President was Adam Malik from Indonesia. After learning in September 1971 that his presidency of the 26th General Assembly was almost a foregone conclusion, Malik made a special detour to Hong Kong as he travelled to New York to attend the conference; there, he expressed his willingness to support Beijing in the competition over Chinese representation at the UN (Xiong, 2021). This implies that when diplomats from developing countries with a favourable view of Beijing assumed leadership positions in relevant UN agencies, they may have influenced the outcome of the competition itself.

Secondly, according to the archived records of the ECOSOC[112], Mr. Rachid Driss (Tunisia) was the president in 1971, and there were 3 vice-presidents: Mr. João Augusto de Araujo Castro (Brazil), Mr. Costa Caranicas (Greece) and Mr. Károly Szarka

[110] A/52/L.72, United Nations Reform, see https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N97/372/33/PDF/N9737233.pdf?OpenElement.
[111] https://unsceb.org/hr-nationality.
[112] https://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/pdf/ecosoc_bureaux_history.pdf.

(Hungary). Obviously, none of these senior officials came from either of the PRC, the USA and the ROC. The three actors could not make direct use of human resources. This study combines the vote on Resolution 2758 (on the restoration of the PRC's seat in the UN) and human resources for further analysis. The results showed a *yes* vote from the president's home country Tunisia. The three vice presidents' home countries voted differently, a *no* vote from Brazil, an *absentee* vote from Greece and a *yes* vote from Hungary.

Such voting preferences are well-documented. Tunisia, as an African country and developing country, and Hungary, a socialist country in Eastern Europe, shared values and identities exist between them and Beijing. As for Greece and Brazil, they are also considering their own interests and identities. First, they belong to the capitalist camp; second, Latin America is within the sphere of influence of the USA. These senior diplomats in the UN system cannot cut off the connection with their homeland, and these human resources may indeed become one of the factors affecting the voting results.

But when comparing these data with the historical record, the role of human resources in the tripartite UN competition is not so clear. One reason is because between 1949 and 1971, Washington and Taipei had no absolute advantage in human resources at the UN – but they still effectively hindered Beijing's access to China's representation. Another reason is that while Beijing was not a UN member and contributed no human resources before 1971, developing countries still accounted for 65% of senior UN officials. At the same time, Indonesian Foreign Minister and General Assembly President Adam Malik suggested a link between human resources and Chinese representation.

While the above observations may seem contradictory, they could all be true. On the one hand, Washington and Taipei may not have contributed significantly to the human resources of the UN yet still retained the ability to block Beijing. On the other hand, the human resource advantage of developing countries at the UN could have also potentially influenced the outcome of China's representation at the UN. This thesis believes that result is a manifestation of the limited contribution to the human resources of the UN. It is a factor, but not a key factor.

Overall, the second half of hypothesis 2 regarding the impact of the three actors on the utilization of organizational capacity by human resources and monetary contributions to the UN does not seem to hold completely. This is because the ability of the three parties to leverage the UN was not solely determined by monetary and human resource contributions; activities outside the UN also had a major impact on the outcome of competition. The PRC was not only weaker than the USA and the ROC, but also excluded from the UN throughout the period 1949–1971. Although the human resource contribution from the Taipei–Washington alliance was not dominant in terms of

developing versus developed countries, Taipei (with Washington's help) successfully fended off Beijing's representation at the UN for about 20 years.

Meanwhile, Beijing could not make direct monetary and human resource contributions to the UN. Although Beijing did not seem to be at a disadvantage when coupled with the contribution of the developing country camp to the UN's human resources, Beijing had no direct access to these human resources. If it wanted to tap into them, it needed to mobilize developing countries through diplomatic relations.

Clearly, Beijing's activities outside the UN were key to the victory in 1971: the victory was not fully determined by monetary and human contributions to the UN, but also related to shared values and foreign aid. In this vein, the victory was also tied to the larger international situation, which was influenced by the triangular Washington–Beijing–Moscow relationship. But while monetary and human resource contributions were not decisive in the UN competition, this thesis argues that they still had some impact on the dynamics leading to the outcome.

6.3.3 The analysis of UN competition

The effect of UN leverage

On 25 October 1971, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, proposed by Albania and Algeria, which called for re-establishing Beijing's representation of China at the UN.

Resolution 2758, XXVI：

"Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the UN and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council"

-1971

Despite its weaker position, Beijing eventually wrested representation of China from Taipei. Table 6.5 below lists the distribution of votes:


Table 6.5: Distribution of votes on UN Resolution 2758[113]

Voting Summary of the UN Resolution 2758 A/PV. 1976 (25 Oct. 1971)				
Yes	**No**	**Abstentions**	**Non-Voting**	**Total voting membership**
76	35	17	3	131

Votes Recording of Resolution 2758 (*Data from the UN Digital Library*)

Figure 6.6 below shows that in votes on this issue held between 1950 and 1971, Beijing was able to accrue 38 more, indicating a positive trend. For the same period, the number of votes favouring the Taipei–Washington alliance appears relatively stable with a slight downward trend.

Figure 6.6: Changes in the number of votes on UN Chinese representation, 1950–1971 (*Data from the UN Digital Library*[114])



Diplomatic relations with Taipei began to decline after Beijing regained China's seat in the UN (Tubilewicz, 2012). Interviewee No. 3 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) notes that "as a political lever to leverage the international community, the representation of the UN has a huge impact both domestically and internationally". Following the KMT's loss of China's UN seat, spillover effects continue to spread. The change led to Taipei's international isolation and identity crisis. Countries around the world begun to stop recognizing the ROC, leading to the collapse of the ROC's legitimacy and its status as a legal representative of China (Zuo, 2012). Interviewee No. 15 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) affirms this, saying, "I think the withdrawal of the ROC from the UN in 1971 was an avalanche and a diplomatic disaster for the ROC".

[113] See https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/654350?ln=en.
[114] See https://research.un.org/en/docs/unvoting/ga.

Beijing replaced Taipei as representative of China at the UN ushered in a new era of triangular relations. Beijing has received a series of benefits, such as strengthening its international status and emerging from under an international blockade. This confirms hypothesis 2 on the leverage effect of the UN.

The theoretical analysis of the UN case

Overall, this chapter finds that several factors affect triangular UN competition. They include *political interests (sovereignty), the Cold War, foreign aid, anti-imperialist/anti-colonialist/anti-communist sentiment,* and *American credibility*. The factors span two levels of approaches: material and conceptual. This result confirms the compound theoretical framework in this study. The first level of the triangular UN competition is established by materialist political interests, changes in the distribution of power caused by the Cold War, and foreign aid. On top of this, idealist identity and value factors such as anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, anti-communism and American credibility all play a role. The UN rivalry is a microcosm of the early triangular relations. The basic form of the triangular relationship provides the basis for the UN competition, which was determined by the political, economic and military power of the three actors.

In the case of the UN, in which the competition is dominated by political struggles, both materialistic and idealistic factors in the compound theory play different roles at different time stages. Specifically, the competition from 1949 to 1971 was strongly dominated by the Cold War situation, in which the idealistic element was important. The impact of ideological differences between Beijing and Washington on bilateral relations peaked under the influence of the Korean War and the expansion of communism. In addition, Washington's attitude towards Beijing is also closely related to the interests of American leaders and domestic politics. For example, there was a rising wave of anti-communism in American domestic politics which was superimposed on Taipei's lobbying of Congress. Besides, the political groups in the US pursued their interests by putting pressure on the government. During the confrontation of the Cold War, any weakness towards Red China would be attacked. More emphatically, the leader might even be expelled. The realist interests of US leaders and Beijing's political divisions with Washington combined to fuel Washington's support for Taipei in the UN and thwarted Beijing through strategies such as the *moratorium discussion* and *important question*.

However, the pattern of the Cold War and the relationship between Beijing, Washington and Moscow were not constant. The Soviet Union's offensive attitude against the US and the border conflict between the PRC and the Soviet Union brought a turning point in the confrontation between Beijing and Washington. In the early 1970s, Beijing and Washington began to try to engage and gradually downplay their ideological differences for the sake of more pressing materialistic political interests and

national security. Therefore, at the turning point of the UN case in 1971, the materialist factor played a fundamental role even though this could not deny the influence of the idealist factors on Beijing, Washington, and Taipei in the UN competition over the past 20 years.

The factors in the entire UN competition process and the strategies adopted by the three political actors cover both materialistic and idealistic levels. Foreign economics, military and agricultural aid, and dollar diplomacy constitute materialist strategies; political solidarity, lobbying, and the construction of a common identity constitute idealist strategies. These different types of strategies emerged simultaneously and did not proceed in isolation. Finally, the purposes of the three actors in the UN case were also consistent with the assumptions of the compound theory. In addition to the material and political interests obtained by the three parties, their purposes also involved the pursuit of an orthodox Chinese identity on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and Washington's maintenance of its credibility.

Therefore, this chapter proves that the compound theory is consistent with the UN competition of the three political actors. The factors, strategies, and goals of them all had materialistic and idealistic considerations.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter effectively responds to two research hypotheses through the use of the UN as a case study. The research confirms hypothesis 1, which claimed that the cause for triangular competition at the UN was not strictly tied to competing material interests, but also to factors linked to identity and ideology. The identity of a developing country identity alongside anti-imperialist and anti-communist values played an important role in Beijing's ability to gain support from other countries. They provided the basis both for Washington and Taipei to prevent Beijing from joining the UN and for Beijing to emerge from international isolation.

In terms of hypothesis 2, this chapter verifies the leverage of the UN as an IGO as Beijing achieved greater international influence by securing representation of China at the UN. However, the impact of monetary and human resource contributions on the ability to utilize the UN was not successfully tested as the data do not fully conform with the historical record. The contributions of the three parties do not show a strong positive correlation with their ability to utilize the UN. However, Beijing's strategy outside the UN was notable; the PRC was unable to contribute either manpower or funds until 1971, but was still able to change the status quo at the time. When the strength of the three parties is largely fixed, indicating that financial contributions and human resources to the UN do not play a decisive role in a state's ability to utilize of the UN's capacity. The outcome of the triangular UN competition is related more to the game between the three parties outside the UN, and the internal resources of the UN are only a part of it.

As a product of liberal institutionalism, the UN plays an important platform role in the international community. The political connotations of international legitimacy and sovereignty contained in the organization itself make it a leverage tool for the three actors. The UN provided an opportunity and a stage for Beijing to carry out multilateral diplomacy, break away from international isolation and improve the external environment (Zhang, 2021). Obtaining representation at the UN was a surface-level achievement; behind it lay a larger political competition between different camps and the deeper meaning of Beijing's return to the international stage by leveraging the UN. Once the issue of China's representation at the UN was concluded and as the economic and political ecology developed on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the two parties took a strong interest in becoming GATT members in the 1990s. While the case of the UN looked at competition in the field of politics, the next chapter explores triangular competition at the WTO in the field of economics and further along the chronological timeline.

Chapter 7 – The WTO case study

7.1 Introduction

Also known as the Economic United Nations (governing 97% of world trade), the WTO carries international political and economic influence that is important to all three actors. After 1971, the triangular IGO competition entered a new stage. Beijing has restored Chinese representation at the UN and gained a firm foothold in the international community. The competition between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait at the UN political field has basically come to an end. Therefore, the WTO, as a representative organization in the economic field, has become another arena for trilateral competition. The purpose of this chapter is to firstly demonstrate the influence of materialistic factors and idealistic factors on the WTO competition. Secondly, through the analysis of key events, explain the role of WTO economic levers in the competition.

Following more than 10 years of applications from both sides of the strait, China and Chinese Taipei joined the WTO on 11 December 2001 and 1 January 2022, respectively. WTO membership requirements are different from those of most other IGOs in that the WTO does not limit membership to nation-states. Nonetheless, the fact that Beijing, Washington, and Taipei simultaneously hold full membership status in the WTO is still the result of trilateral compromise driven by economic benefits. This chapter argues that although there are some constructivist implications in the triangular competition over WTO, the core factors driving the process were realist economic and trade interests. Within the competition, the three parties consciously used WTO leverage tools to achieve other goals.

The first part of this chapter summarizes the functions of the WTO, the background of the triangular relationship as relates to the WTO, and the positions of the three actors. The second part understands the strategies and reasons behind the triangular competition by analysing the stages through which it unfolded. Finally, the thesis examines the impact of human resource and monetary contributions from the three actors on their ability to leverage the WTO itself.

7.2 Beijing, Washington, Taipei, and the WTO

7.2.1 The function of the WTO

The predecessor of the WTO was the Secretariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was created in 1948. Under the framework of the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, together with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the founding states signed the GATT in October 1947. At the time, the government of the ROC signed alongside 23 founding states, which included the USA and the UK, as the official representative of China. With the development of global trade through rounds of negotiations, the Multilateral Trade Organization Agreement was reached in November 1993 (Uruguay Round). Following the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement, the WTO was formally established on 1 January 1995.[115] The GATT coexisted with the WTO throughout 1995, then ceased to exist as an IGO.

The new WTO's functions were laid out in the Marrakesh Agreement as follows:

1. The WTO shall promote the implementation, management and operation of this agreement and multilateral trade agreements.
2. The WTO shall provide a forum for trade negotiations among its members and provide a framework for implementing the results of such negotiations.
3. The WTO shall administer the DSU[116] in Annex 2 to this Agreement.
4. The WTO shall cooperate with the IMF and the IBRD and their affiliated agencies as appropriate (1995, Article 3).

As the most important economic organization in the world, the WTO's membership criteria are different from IGOs such as the UN and WHO. The GATT hoped to further advance its economic and trade function and mission by not making membership dependent on state status (Charter of the ITO, 1948). The purpose of this was to enable governments with less than or incomplete sovereign status to become members (Cho, 2005). So while Taipei was deprived of the right to join many IGOs after losing China's seat at the UN, the functional nature of WTO membership criteria ensured the organization would be full of opportunities. Article 12 of the Marrakesh Agreement provides a detailed explanation of WTO accession requirements:[117]

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[115] The Marrakesh Agreement established the WTO (United Nation Treaty Series, No. 31874). Please see https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm.

[116] Dispute Settlement Understanding, see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm.

[117] See https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm#:~:text=Article%20XII,-Accession&text=Any%20State%20or%20separate%20customs,between%20it%20and%20the%20WTO.

Article XII of Marrakesh Agreement:

1. ***Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy*** *in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto. 2. Decisions on accession shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial Conference shall approve the agreement on the terms of accession by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the WTO. 3. Accession to a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement.*

-1994

7.2.2 Triangular relations and the WTO

The relationship between the three parties and the WTO is dynamic and competitive, focused on the issue of seats on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Unlike with the USA, which was a founding member of the GATT/WTO, Beijing and Taipei's seats are uniquely aligned to political changes within China.

This is because despite being a founding member of the GATT, the KMT government had to withdraw in 1950 generally owing to its loss of the Chinese civil war and flight to Taiwan (Tucker, 2002). Specific reasons for KMT withdrawal from the GATT are as follows:

1. The majority of ROC products subject to preferential GATT tariffs originated from the mainland, while only a few originated from the island of Taiwan. Remaining in the GATT would therefore be detrimental to Taiwan's economy (Damrosch, 1992).
2. The ROC received a notice that the GATT would not impose a favourable tax rate on Taiwan.
3. In 1950, the volume of Taiwan's foreign trade was very small. Even if there were no GATT at all, Taipei could obtain preferential tariffs through bilateral agreements with major trading partners (Ma, 1997).
4. The ROC government "lost control of mainland and was therefore unable to fulfil its GATT obligations on the mainland" (Charnovitz, 2006, p. 404).

As the ROC retained a seat at the UN, Taiwan applied for and obtained observer status in the GATT in 1965. It was not until 1971 that Taiwan lost its seat in the UN. The

following year, the GATT decided it would comply with the "UN's political decision",[118] and Taiwan's observer status was revoked (Chan, 1994).

With Taiwan's economic take-off and democratization and out of corresponding economic and political considerations, Lee Teng-hui decided to apply for GATT membership on 1 January 1990. The membership application was submitted under Article 33, under the "separate custom of TPKM".[119] The Chinese Taipei[120] Working Group was then established in 1992, and Taiwan became an observer at the GATT. At the time, the chairman of the Council of the GATT stated that all parties agreed there is only one China, and that the issue of Taipei's membership should be finalized after the entry of Beijing (1992 Chairman statement).[121] Ultimately, this meant that Taipei's accession to the WTO was postponed by 11 years (Hsieh, 2005).

Washington played an important role in Taipei's accession to the WTO and proved an important supporter of Taipei. US Congressional support for Taiwan's application was provided in H.R. 4444,[122] a bill that extended the status of permanent normal trade relations to China after China's accession to the WTO. Section 601 of Public Law 106-286[123] stipulates that following the WTO General Council's approval of China's application, the US representative to the WTO should immediately submit a request for Taiwan's accession and the USA should be prepared to actively counter any efforts to prevent Taiwan from joining.

Since 1986, Beijing had shown keen interest in joining the GATT/WTO as its national project of reform and opening-up progressed (Zhao, 2011). At the same time, it had to deal with some thorny issues. First, Beijing needed to address relations with Washington. Second, Beijing needed to examine relations with Taipei in the WTO. These issues were difficult to navigate. Taiwan is a focal point of Sino-US relations and it is in the interest of Washington, to some extent, to resolve differences through peaceful cooperation between Beijing and Taipei. Still, Washington questioned how this increasing interdependence between cross strait would affect Beijing's treatment of

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[118] See WTO, Guide to GATT law and practice 877 (1995).
[119] The separate custom of TPKM, the official name that Taiwan assumed at the WTO. Historical Minutes of Taiwan's Application to Join GATT/WTO. See https://www.trade.gov.tw/cwto/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeID=354&pid=312950&dl_DateRange=all&txt_SD=&txt_ED=&txt_Keyword=&Pageid=0.
[120] Chinese Taipei refers to Taiwan.
[121] WTO, Guide to GATT law and practice 1017-1018 (1995): "All contracting parties acknowledged the view that there is only one China ... and many contracting parties, therefore, agreed with the view of the PRC that Chinese Taipei, as a separate customs territory, should not accede to the GATT before the PRC itself . . . The Council should examine the report of the Working Party on China and adopt the Protocol for the PRC's accession before examining the report and adopting the Protocol for Chinese Taipei, while noting that the working party reports should be examined independently."
[122] H.R. 4444, October 2000, passed the Senate overwhelmingly by a vote of 83 to 15. With passage, China was granted PNTR (the status of permanent normal trade relations) status.
[123] Sec. 601 of Accession of Taiwan to the WTO, Normal Trade Relations for the PRC, on 10 October 2000, Public Law 106-286. See https://www.congress.gov/106/plaws/publ286/PLAW-106publ286.pdf.

Taipei. Would Taipei's acceptance of Beijing's 'one country, two systems' formula ultimately strengthen or weaken the status of China's central government?

Uncertainty meant that Beijing grew more willing to use economic integration to achieve peaceful reunification (Willy, 2000; Morrison, 2005). The mainland and Taiwan have long been natural trading partners owing to their geographical, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural proximity (Kong, 2004). But commercial relationships were often overlooked as a source more likely to change the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland than frequently discussed diplomatic and military approaches (Mastel, 2001). Yet history suggests that cross-strait economic integration could eventually lead to a situation similar to the Western European Common Market (Cheng, 1998) that emerged from the impact of the Schumann Plan on Franco-German relations. Established by the Paris Agreement of 1952, the European Coal and Steel Community managed important materials and successfully limited the outbreak of war by strengthening economic cooperation. Political differences between France and Germany that could not be resolved militarily were eventually bridged through economic interdependence.

Thus after 1986, both sides of the Taiwan Strait had a strong interest in GATT/WTO. Competition between the three parties for cross-strait applications for WTO accession emerged mainly during the Jiang Zemin, Clinton, and Lee Teng-hui eras in China, the USA, and Taiwan, respectively. Table 7.1 below lists the presidential terms of the leaders of the three parties throughout the period of WTO applications from both sides of the Taiwan Strait:

Table 7.1: Presidential terms of the leaders to the WTO competition

Term of the tripartite leaders in the WTO competition period, since the 1990s		
Beijing	**Washington**	**Taipei**
Jiang Zeming （1989-2002）	W. J. Clinton（1993-2001）	Lee Tenghui (1988-2000)
Hu Jintao （2002-2012）	G. W. Bush（2001-2009）	Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008)
Xi Jinping （2012 to present）	B. H. Obama II (2009-2017)	Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016)
	D. J. Trump (2017-2021)	Tsai Ing-Wen(2016 to presnet)
	J. R. Biden Jr. (2021 to present)	

Through a difficult series of negotiations, the USA and China concluded their bilateral agreement in late 1999. In late spring of 2000, the US Senate passed the China Permanent Normal Trading Rights (PNTR) bill by a vote of 83 to 15. This effectively addressed the major obstacle of US opposition to China's WTO accession and China officially joined the WTO on 11 December 2001. Chinese Taipei followed, becoming a

WTO member on 1 January 2002 as a separate customs territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (TPKM) in accordance with GATT Article 33.[124]

After more than ten years of competition and compromise, the two sides of the strait successfully joined the WTO independently. This paved the way for future competition within the WTO.

7.2.3 Positions of the three parties to the WTO

The period that lasted from 1986 to 2001 was an important stage in the GATT/WTO negotiations between the three actors. The triangular WTO process of cross-strait membership shifted in line with the dynamics of the triangular relationship. This section analyses the factors affecting triangular competition over the WTO from the perspective of the identities and strategic starting points of the three actors. In doing so, it responds to hypothesis 1 about the influence of idealistic factors on WTO competition.

Beijing's motives and principles

Beijing's position in the WTO competition was largely determined by changing economic and political considerations. Over time, Beijing's attitude towards the WTO underwent a dramatic shift from indifference to active application. In the 1970s, Beijing saw the GATT as a club of rich countries and chose a policy of no application and non-recovery. But in the 1980s, attitudes changed among Chinese leaders who realized that joining the GATT would bring economic benefits as they learned about reform experiences through visits to countries such as Hungary (Chen and Ugrosdy, 2019).

From an economic viewpoint, Beijing needed the WTO at that time. To begin, China was already an important player in international trade before joining the WTO (Wang, 2003; Prasad and Rumbaugh, 2003). Beijing had begun to open up its economy in the late 1970s and had taken steps to end diplomatic isolation in the early 1980s, replacing Taipei at the IMF and World Bank (Adhikari and Yang, 2002). At the same time, China was shifting from a centrally planned to a market economy.

This launched a series of policy transformations and follow-up measures. First, China launched a reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 1992 with the goal of establishing a modern enterprise system (e.g., Zhu Rongji's SOEs reform). Then, in 1994, Beijing began decentralizing trade, reducing tariffs, and advancing a dual exchange rate. With the deepening of reforms, China's trade grew strongly: exports

[124] The text of GATT Article 33 identifies the ROC as a government acting on behalf of a separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for under the GATT. See https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art33_gatt47.pdf.

grew from $10 billion in 1978 to $278 billion in 2000 as China jumped from the 30th to the 6th largest trading nation in the world.

The share of foreign trade in China's GDP also increased, growing from 10% at the beginning of the reform era to about 40% by the late 1990s (Adhikari and Yang, 2002). The increasingly outward-looking economy, along with a surge in foreign direct investment inflows (FDI, US$47 billion in 2000), spoke to rapid Chinese integration into the global economy (Prasad and Rumbaugh, 2003).

Beijing thus hoped to increase its interests and role in global trade by joining the WTO (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004). The share of Chinese exports to the markets of developing countries had grown significant, making those markets an important export destination (Prasad and Rumbaugh, 2003). For instance, China's exports to the USA rose from $3.9 billion in 1985 to $100 billion in 2000 and $125 billion in 2002 as trade volumes expanded rapidly.[125]

To mitigate uncertainties in foreign trade, the WTO extends the benefit of increased access to overseas markets. Other WTO member states would give China permanent favourable trade status (as a Most Favoured Nation or MFN), which would be an important step towards normalizing trade relations (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004). With help from the WTO, the USA extended permanent MFN status to China, removing a major source of uncertainty between the two countries (previously, China's MFN status had to be renewed annually by US Congress). Textile and clothing quotas were phased out under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)[126] while other quotas were phased out according to an agreed-upon timetable. In contrast, exclusion from the WTO would have ensured very slow growth of the share of China's dominant industry (apparel products) in the American market (Wang, 2003).

Beijing also saw the utility of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) for protecting its own trade interests, participating in multilateral negotiations on trade rules and future trade liberalization, and limiting the scope of unilateral anti-dumping protections imposed by other WTO members on its products (Adhikari and Yang, 2002).

At the same time, WTO membership was conducive to the continuous advancement of China's domestic economic and structural reforms (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004). Chinese leaders realized that if the rapid economic growth of the 1980s and 1990s was to be sustained, external impetus was needed to overcome domestic obstacles, further reform and protect trade interests (Adhikari and Yang, 2002).

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[125] Data from U.S. Census Bureau, 1985, 2000 and 2002, Trade in Goods with China, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#1985.

[126] For details, please see WTO legal texts Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/16-tex_e.htm.

Another economic reason driving Beijing's WTO accession was the benefit that it would bring to Chinese consumers and overall economic efficiency (Adhikari and Yang, 2002). The accumulation of physical capital in China would increase and provide job growth (Wang, 2003). As the economy grew, the real purchasing power of Chinese households would increase. Finally, WTO membership would enable Beijing to rebuild China's image in the international community following the Tiananmen Square incident (Fewsmith, 2007).

Economic motives were not just limited to considerations of China's benefit. Closer economic ties after WTO accession would also carry significant benefits for cross-strait relations. After joining the WTO, Beijing will break "Taipei's three Nos policies, because the three Nos policies constitute trade discrimination and violate the rules of the WTO", and Taipei will have to give up (Lai, 2001, p. 251). Enhanced direct cross-strait trade and communications would stabilize the relationship between the mainland and create mutual benefits, perhaps even laying the foundation for political integration. Even before both sides of the Taiwan Strait joined the WTO, Beijing had already adopted 'preferential policies (*hui tai zheng ce*)' to attract investment from Taiwanese businesses and become the largest destination for outward investment (for detail, see Appendix G).[127]

In fact, it was WTO rules and regulations that prompted Taipei to loosen restrictions on mainland investment from domestic businesses, which meant that membership would almost certainly accelerate the pace of cross-strait economic integration (Kong, 2004). Beijing believed that securing support from Taiwanese businessmen would be crucial to the success of peaceful reunification across the Strait and China's overall economic modernization (Tubilewicz, 2012). "The same language and low labour costs" afforded by the WTO would further attract this businessmen (Mastel, 2001, p. 50). More opportunities in the mainland would in turn encourage businessmen in Taiwan to pressure Taipei into recognizing the One China principle.

The business community had become a powerful advocate for improving cross-strait relations as Taiwan businessmen often invested in the mainland over the wishes of Taipei. This provided both economic and political benefits to Beijing. For one, it was conducive to the economic reform project on the mainland as Taiwan's investment helped increase employment and develop export industries. For another, increasing economic interaction with mainland would likely "make Taiwan dependent on the mainland market, thus providing Beijing more leverage in achieving its reunification goal" (Hsieh, 2005, p. 1209). Interviewee No. 09 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) affirms Beijing's awareness of these strategic benefits, saying, "I believe that Beijing has long adopted a strategy of pressing

[127] Appendix G: Taiwan external investment data.

government with business. Under Taiwan's democratic system, Taiwan businessmen can indeed have a strong impact on the government".

Politically, Beijing sticked to the One China principle. Chinese Premier Li Peng's letter to Director-General Dunkel[128] and all WTO signatories affirmed that the PRC was the sole legal government of China and Taiwan was part of China; for this reason, the mainland must join the GATT before Taiwan and Taipei's application must be approved by Beijing (Feng, 2006). Beijing did not oppose Taipei's economic and cultural ties to foreign countries, but vigorously opposed Taipei's attempt to create two Chinas through the WTO. Interviewee No. 14 (Interview with a professor, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) confirms this approach, saying, "Especially at an organisation as important as the WTO, Beijing wants to minimise the political significance it brings to Taipei".

Beijing held that Taipei's entry into the GATT as a separate customs territory should be similar to the model of Hong Kong and Macau, and under a one-China framework (Cho, 2005) – that is, 'the one country, four seats model (*yi guo si xi*)' that conforms to the One China principle. If Taiwan joined the WTO as a separate customs territory, "this fact would become crucial for defining Taiwan's status in the WTO and the relationship between the mainland and Taiwan within the framework of the WTO" (Mo, 2003, p. 164). In other words, Taiwan would not gain status as a sovereign state through negotiations with Beijing or any other WTO member (Kong, 2004).

Given a need for overall economic development, Beijing began to try to join the WTO in earnest in the 1980s. At the same time, Beijing remained wary of Taipei. Politically, Beijing's "accession to the WTO earlier than Taipei also helped the mainland occupy a more favourable position in the WTO" (Prime, 2002, p. 6). In the long run, accession to the WTO would facilitate China's rise in world trade and help ensure that benefits were widely distributed (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004).

But in addition to these positive impacts, China faced some risks (Fewsmith, 2001; Prime, 2002). As a defender of democracy, the USA could impose broad sanctions on China on related issues (Hur, 2018). In such a scenario, Beijing would suffer relative to the growth of the importance of the American market to China. Beijing would likely have to compromise with Washington on trade, non-proliferation of weapons, and human rights (Yi, 1994). Importing cheaper agricultural products from abroad could also harm domestic agricultural sectors and for China, which would mean further widening of an already massive urban-rural income gap (Li and Zhai, 2000; Prasad and Rumbaugh, 2003).

[128] Arthur Dunkel GATT Director-General, 1980 to 1993, Former Director-General, see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/ad_e.htm.

In short, Beijing's push for the WTO agreement was a combination of factors. As Lai (2001) pointed out, China's top leaders (Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji) believed that joining the WTO will improve trade conditions, consolidate domestic reform achievements, increase international interaction, and promote cross-strait economic and political integration. At the same time, to reduce domestic resistance, the exclusive decision-making circle of top Chinese leaders bypassed opposing forces. Overall, Beijing adopted an attitude of active participation in the WTO for pragmatic economic interests while maintaining the red line of the One China principle to sustain its political identity.

Washington's goals

Washington played a crucial role in both Beijing and Taipei's WTO accession, influencing the application process on both sides. Then-US President Clinton framed his position on the WTO membership of both parties in terms of three elements: economic and trade interests, the trilateral relations, and political values. Above all, Washington wanted to gain the economic benefits resulting from Beijing and Taipei's entry into the WTO. At the same time, Clinton needed to balance the triangular relationship to ensure that the existing form would not be undermined by WTO mechanisms. As well, Washington hoped China's economic engagement with the world would advance democratic reforms domestically.

Washington's pursuit of economic and trade growth should be understood in the context of a liberal market economy and globalization:

1. In terms of systems and tariffs, both Beijing and Taipei would be obligated to fulfil a commitment to adopt broad and deep trade liberalization measures intended to bring their trade regimes in line with WTO rules. Implementing liberalization measures would mean a substantial reduction in tariff and non-tariff barriers across all economic sectors of one of the world's largest and fastest growing markets (Wang, 2003; Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004).
2. In terms of industries, China's accession to the WTO would involve opening up key sectors that previously had either no foreign participation or domestic marginalized – especially the telecommunications, financial, insurance, agricultural and service sectors. Continued improvements in the predictability and transparency of China's business environment would gradually reduce key barriers that had long undermined foreign investor confidence. Also, increased tourism would further benefit partner countries (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004).
3. In terms of trade, WTO membership would open up the massive Chinese market. This would not just promote China's continued growth, but also benefit its trading partners in the long run (Adhikari and Yang, 2002). Even in the short to medium term, the advanced economies and the most developed developing economies would all benefit. This would mainly be attributable to growth in

capital and technology-intensive product exports to China; increased trade and investment opportunities in China's service sector; and improved access to China's agricultural markets (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004).

Washington's expectations were met as US exports of goods to China rose from $3.86 billion dollars in 1985 to $19.2 billion dollars in 2001 and $22.2 billion in 2002.[129]

In triangular terms, Washington needed to avoid Lee Teng-hui's use of WTO membership to pursue independence and Jiang Zeming's potential use of the WTO to unduly expand China's economic power. Although Taipei had become a GATT/WTO observer in 1992, it has to wait until Beijing joins before it can officially become a member. Washington welcomed Taipei's membership but also wanted Beijing to join in order to maintain a stable triangular structure in the triangular relations. Washington had chosen to abide by UN Resolution 2758 and recognize the One China policy, but American officials also worried that growing economic ties between Taiwan and the mainland could undermine Taiwanese autonomy (Morrison, 2005).

Although senior officials in Washington considered these factors, Washington nonetheless chose to accept Beijing's membership bid in the face of the massive trade benefits that China's entry into the WTO would generate. Interviewee No. 06 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) confirms this, saying: "The United States was generally supportive of China's participation in the WTO at that time, because Washington did not predict China's economy to be so strong 30 years later".

In terms of Taipei's entry to the WTO, Washington saw it in line with the needs of the free market as Taiwan already occupied an important position in global trade (the 20th largest economy in the world in 2000). At 106th Congress 2d Session, H. CON. RES. 330[130] was passed. The bill clearly stated that the United States supported Taiwan's accession to the WTO in consideration of its own interests:

1. Whereas over 20 percent of Taiwan's imports consist of United States goods representing the 8th largest market for United States exports.
2. Whereas in February 1998, Taiwan completed a landmark bilateral World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement with the United States providing market access for United States goods and services.
3. Whereas in May 1998, pursuant to the bilateral agreement with the United States, Taiwan proceeded to lower tariffs on more than 1,000 items.

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[129] US Census Bureau, Trade in goods with China in 1985, 2001 and 2002, see https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html.
[130] The U.S. Government Publishing Office, Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the accession of Taiwan to the World Trade Organization (WTO), see https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-106hconres330ih/html/BILLS-106hconres330ih.htm.

4. Whereas Taiwan has completed bilateral negotiations with all 26 WTO member countries requesting such negotiations and Taiwan's membership in the WTO is required to ensure full implementation and benefits of these agreements.

Washington's promotion of Taiwan's entry into the WTO will reduce trade barriers and promote economic ties between the two sides. Interviewee No. 06 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) points out:

> At that time, Taiwan's economy had become known as one of the four Asian Tigers[131], and it had already been integrated with Western economies to a certain extent. However, because of the One China principle, it was impossible for Taipei to enter the WTO before Beijing.

Washington's support for Taipei at the WTO was also politically symbolic. After June 1989, human rights, trade and nuclear non-proliferation became the top three issues in Sino-US relations (Liang, 2002). With the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, the global situation underwent tremendous change and the direction of Sino-US relations was blurry. In the early 1990s, when the China–US WTO negotiations stalled, Washington stepped up its efforts to negotiate with Taipei over the WTO.

As the fulcrum of the triangular relationship, Washington used conflicts between Beijing and Taipei as well as WTO tools to demand concessions in areas such as market access. The WTO accession issue between the mainland and Taiwan thus evolved from a competition between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to a competition over interests between China and the USA (Yan, 2011). The entry of both sides of the Taiwan Strait into the WTO was not only an economic matter, but one that marked a major development in Sino-US relations.

Still, the USA remained cautious when it came to political issues related to Taiwan's participation in the WTO. This is because to some extent, Washington preferred that the WTO not become a venue for political struggles. Instead, it should remain an IGO that economic entities can join. Interviewee No. 03 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) confirms this, saying, "For Washington, the WTO is an important tool for the USA to promote the free trade on a global scale, and Washington does not want to hinder WTO's smooth operation for political reasons".

Aside from massive material economic interests and trilateral considerations, Washington also maintained a view that aligned with a constructivist perspective on China's entry into the WTO: through WTO cooperation, it hoped that China and the West could be more homogeneous (in promoting democracy and human rights) overall

[131] The Four Asian Tigers refer to the four rapidly developing economies in Asia from the late 1960s to the 1990s: Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong. See https://cn.weforum.org/agenda/2017/04/e3e3224d-e9ef-40e4-beca-6735afc5db37/.

(Wu, 1996). Constructivism is an essential element of Washington's policy towards China and Beijing's participation in the WTO, and constructive engagement with China is based on constructivist premises (DeLisle, 2018). Compared with other socialist countries of the era, China's reforms since 1979 were more progressive (Liang, 2002). In particular, during the honeymoon period of Sino-US relations and Washington had political incentives for encouraging Beijing to apply. Interviewee No. 13 (Interview with a professor, advised Washington on China policy, 2022) says:

> The United States wanted to cooperate with China and hoped that China would join the WTO. Because the United States believed that the richer China was, the more Chinese people would enjoy a stable life and the more opportunities they would have to prosper. By that point, China would become a country that wanted to play the same game as other countries.

In terms of Beijing and Taipei's accessions to the WTO, Washington was open to both applications primarily owing to considerations for trade interests, free markets, and a wave of globalization. But the Clinton administration did not just prioritize a free market economy; it also prioritized democracy and human rights, especially after 1989 Tiananmen incident. For instance, Clinton's 28 May 1993 executive order linked the extension of MFN status to China with Beijing's efforts to address human rights issues (Wu, 1996).

Overall, Washington has consistently aligned itself with its capitalist and democratic identity interests in triangular relations at the WTO. These jointly shaped its position, with economic and trade interests taking priority and supplemented by value interests. Of course, ensuring the stability of the triangular political structure was also an important consideration for maintaining the interests of the fulcrum of the triangular relationship. The accession of Beijing and Taipei would provide the strongest stimulus to global economic growth, and real GDP growth in all developed countries (along with most developing countries) would also increase (Wang, 2003). As an analyst at a US government think tank says, (Interview, No. 12, 2022), "The United States, like any other country, focuses on its own interests first and foremost in the WTO".

Taipei's breakthrough

Pursuing full membership at the WTO was an important milestone for Taipei, both economically and politically. With the take-off of Taiwan's economy, Taiwan had become an important economic power in international trade (Wang, 2003). But once Taipei had lost its seat at the UN in 1971, the expansion of its international rights and interests had failed to keep pace with its economic development and Taipei's trade activities were subject to growing discrimination.

Around the same time, a series of oil crises in the 1970s triggered a global economic crisis. The willingness of international capital to invest in Taiwan declined and

Taiwan's international trade was affected. As Taipei was not a member of the GATT, it had no means to protect its international trade. Joining the GATT was thus a pragmatic response in line with economic interests. The Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 had isolated Beijing from the West, creating an opportunity for Taipei to propose joining the GATT in 1990.

Taipei hoped to obtain institutional guarantees from the GATT through the process of foreign trade. At the behest of its trading partners, Taiwan had largely aligned its trading system with the WTO. The USA was an important trading partner and, as Taiwan's economic growth accelerated, had forced Taipei to adopt many of the GATT rules – yet Taiwan itself was unable to enjoy the status of a GATT member (Morrison, 2005; Todd, 2004).

Under such circumstances, Taipei was eager to join GATT/WTO and obtain access to MFN status and the trade DSM in order to conduct foreign trade on a level playing field. Taipei also hoped to participate directly in the formulation of international trade rules and represent its own economic interests. Therefore, the cost of Taiwan's accession to the WTO was relatively small. On the contrary, joining the WTO would increase Taipei's ability to benefit from international trade and political gains (Winkler, 2013).

Taipei further hoped to maintain its competitiveness in global trade by continuously stimulating its economic development from the outside through the GATT (Chang and Goldstein, 2007; Yang, 2007). Taiwan's economy would be enhanced by further economic and trade reforms driven by WTO accession and efficiency gains from increased foreign trade and investment (Morrison, 2005).

Finally, the WTO regulatory mechanism reassured Taipei by facilitating the supervision and development of the cross-strait economy. The realization of cross-strait direct trade would increase GDP on both sides by 3% and increase the total trade volume by $10 billion (Wang, 2002). Facing twin pressures from Taiwanese businessmen and mounting economic problems, Taipei announced at the Economic Development Advisory Conference (EDAC) in 2001 that it would abandon the 'no haste, be patient' policy to help revitalize the economy.

Shortly afterward, in late 2001, the "Executive Plan for the Implementation of Investment in the Mainland was promulgated, and the policy of active opening and effective management was adopted" (Kong, 2002, p. 753). Taipei relaxed restrictions on investment in the mainland, established "direct trade, transportation and postal services to the mainland, and gradually allowed the mainland to invest in Taiwan" (Morrison, 2005, p. 5). By 2002, the mainland overtook the USA as Taiwan's largest export market. Investment reached $25.5 billion, accounting for 48.3% of Taiwan's foreign investment (Wang, 2003).

Aside from these enormous economic benefits, WTO membership held "considerable political and diplomatic value to Taipei" (Mastel, 2001, p. 53). The difference in views on WTO membership between Beijing and Taipei was the driving force behind cross-strait competition. Owing to the democratization of Taiwan in the 1990s, Taiwan and the mainland were increasingly seen as having independent and different destinies. The public's attitude towards this was divided. The majority of "Taiwan residents did not advocate formal independence; the same number of people opposed placing Taiwan under Beijing's control" (Mastel, 2001, p. 46). Taipei's efforts to join the WTO thus involved political considerations (Hsieh, 2005). The first general election in 1996 after Taiwan's democratization pushed Taiwan to want to be more visible on the international stage. By politicizing and internationalizing trade issues, Taipei could demonstrate autonomy and independence from Beijing. Joining the WTO enabled Taipei to gain considerable prestige and membership in a very important IGO.

Taipei's accession to the WTO could further expand substantive diplomatic relations. Before joining the WTO, 90% of Taiwan's trade involved countries it did not (and could not) maintain diplomatic relations with. Joining the WTO would facilitate Taipei's contacts with diplomats from other countries (Chang, 1994). The WTO has close ties with other IGOs such as the IMF, so Taipei's WTO entry would help expand its diplomatic channels as well (Chang and Goldstein, 2007).


Taipei recognized that it could play a key minority role in the WTO, which is conducive to getting out of diplomatic isolation. In a WTO dispute between two members, other interested parties (e.g., Japan and the USA) can join the dispute. Taipei could also deal, directly and equally, with Beijing through WTO mediation procedures (Charnovitz, 2006). Taipei looked forward to direct engagement with Beijing on the international platform of the WTO as it would elevate cross-strait relations to an international level (Tsai, 2002).

The three parties thus competed and compromised on the basis of major economic interests at the WTO. Although Beijing and Taipei failed to reach an ideal answer to the issue of Taiwan's accession, neither side was willing to give up the economic and trade dividends brought about by joining the WTO (Chang and Goldstein, 2007). So, the process of China's WTO accession negotiations with the USA and other Western countries continued on and off for 15 years (Kazer, 2001).

Sino-US relations are full of contradictions in many areas, such as ideological divergences and institutional differences, but in the end, both chose to cooperate with each other. This speaks to the strength of their individual economic motives. During the final stages of negotiation, both Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Prime minister Zhu Rongji showed deep investment in the process – even organizing ministerial meetings in the early hours of the morning to resolve negotiation issues (Zhao, 2011). Both countries were eager for the economic benefits of cooperation that could potentially overcome their differences.

In the context of globalization, the essence of the three-party WTO process was about international trade and the modernization of domestic trade and financial markets in order to link with the international market. Figure 7.1 below shows the rapid development of trade between China-USA and Chinese mainland-Taiwan, with the economy and trade becoming the primary force affecting trilateral WTO issues.

Figure 7.1: 1995-2000 Trade Volume (Unit: US$ million, data from US Census Bureau and Customs of PRC, analyzed by the author)



In terms of the positions of the three parties, Beijing minded that Taipei joined the WTO as a separate entity, but nonetheless joined the WTO to promote the process of reform and opening up and achieve economic development. Washington had lofty expectations of promoting democracy through the economy, but focused more practically on the massive economic benefits brought about through the WTO. Taipei had both economic and political expectations, but chose a political compromise in order to join smoothly.

Through analysis of the identities and positions of the three parties, the WTO case only partially verifies hypothesis 1 about the role of idealist factors in competition, which is not as important as materialist factors. Although idealistic values and political identities interrupted the process of cross-strait accession to the WTO, the three actors still reached a compromise thanks to material economic interests. Ultimately, this led to their coexistence at the WTO.

7.3 The WTO competition and leverage

Once the political disputes of the triangular relationship were integrated into the WTO, it was no longer a simple multilateral economic organization. The US-led distribution of structural power dominated the process of WTO membership applications involving

both sides of the Taiwan Strait, ensuring the coexistence of both struggle and compromise.

7.3.1 Understanding triangular competition at the WTO

The triangular competition at the WTO can be divided into two stages. The first stage is the application stage (1986–2001) for both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The second stage is after Beijing and Taipei entered the WTO (after 2001). This subsection shows the diverse factors that affected triangular WTO competition through different sub-cases within these two stages, with the aim of further testing the assumption about the role of idealistic and materialistic factors in competition expressed in hypothesis 1.

The application period (1986-2001)

Within the process of joining the WTO, disagreements and conflicts were inevitable. Taipei became a GATT observer in 1992, so disputes were concentrated in Beijing–Washington and Beijing–Taipei relations.

In China–US negotiations, Chinese representative Shi Guangsheng believed there were at least three sources of political interference (Zhao, 2011). The first was the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, for which the USA and Western allies imposed economic sanctions on China. One means of doing so involved preventing China from returning to the GATT. Interviewee No. 13 (Interview with a professor, advised Washington on China policy, 2022) affirms this view, saying, “Americans were shocked by the outbreak of the Tiananmen incident”.

The events at Tiananmen Square in 1989 changed China’s open and outward-looking international image, magnifying the political and ideological differences between China and the USA (Zhu, 2005). Washington sanctions and efforts to block China from joining the GATT were based on considerations for human rights and democratic values. In the face of this serious situation, Beijing leaders regarded the restoration of GATT membership not only as a negotiation to restore international economic status, but also as an important political move to break the Western sanctions against China.

A second major political intervention occurred between 1998 and 1999. When US President Clinton visited China in June 1998, he was under pressure from domestic opposition to China’s entry into the WTO and unable to sign any agreement. In April 1999, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited the USA with a package plan in an attempt to promote China’s WTO accession and Sino-US trade relations. Clinton misjudged the situation in Congress, which led to the failure of the bilateral agreement.

The third intervention involved the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia by the USA on 8 May 1999, which interrupted the WTO negotiations. American actions stirred up anti-Western nationalism in China (Butler, 1996), which expressed

dissatisfaction with Western dominance in international politics (Li, 1997). In May 1999, anti-Western sentiment in China reached a peak and Chinese people gathered at the US embassy and consulate in China to protest. Protesters chanted slogans that included 'protect sovereignty, protect peace' and 'The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Nazis' (BBC, 2019)[132].

In general, protestor sentiments were shaped by three sources of influence:

1. Since 1991, China had begun to implement 'patriotic education',[133] which emphasized the humiliating experiences that China had suffered from Western aggression since the First Opium Wars in 1840.
2. After 1989, the anti-Beijing tendencies of Western media prompted Chinese intellectuals to create works that expressed national pride and carried anti-Western sentiments (Breslin, 2004).
3. The rapid rise of China's economy gave Chinese people a new self-confidence. At the same time, America's tough stances on Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights issues contributed to the rise of anti-Western nationalism in China (Xu, 2000).

As nationalistic public sentiment increased, Beijing needed to respond strongly to Washington by disrupting the WTO process. The crisis was not fully dealt with until September at the APEC summit in Auckland, at which it was decided to restart WTO negotiations on the condition that China would be granted unconditional MFN status (Zhao, 2011).

In terms of Beijing–Taipei relations at this stage, Beijing asked Taipei at the conclusion of WTO accession negotiations in 2001 to make several changes to the text of the Working Party Report (WPR).[134] The proposed amendments were mainly related to Beijing's political demands: the 'one country, two systems' formula should be included in the WTO documents for Taiwan's accession; the accession document should include a declaration that Taiwan is not a sovereign state; the titles of Taiwan's representatives and officials after accession should not contain any sovereignty-related terminology; Taipei should not organize ministerial meetings; and no other minister aside from the Minister of Economy should participate in the WTO.

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[132] Tracing back the memories of the 20-year bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia by NATO, by Kevin Ponniah and Lazara Marinkovic, May 2019, see https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-48184816.

[133] In 1991, the Central Committee of CPC promulgated the Notice on the Extensive Development of Cultural Relics and the Education of Patriotism and Revolutionary Traditions. In 1993, the State Education Commission issued the Outline of China's Education Reform and Development to promote patriotic education. In 1994, the Central Committee issued the Outline for the Implementation of Education in Patriotism.

[134] The WPR refers to the report submitted by the working group to the General Council/Ministerial Conference after completing its authorized work. See Handbook on Accession to the WTO: Chapter 4.

On the other side of the strait, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian decided not to make any concessions to China's political demands. Pursuit of the WTO membership and 'name' was part of Taipei's larger strategy of using IGO tools to secure international interests and effectively break through diplomatic isolation (Lindemann, 2014). Instead, Chen gave instructions that revolved around the name, status and rights of Taiwan within the WTO, telling representatives to minimize Taiwan's name changes and prevent the ROC's status and rights from being affected. But in the face of political realities, Taipei eventually had to compromise by omitting or modifying 33 sensitive words (e.g., President, executive, yuan, and national security) in the WPR draft (Lindemann, 2014).

In addition to the WPR terminology dispute, the name of Taipei's representative at the WTO headquarters in Geneva became another instance of cross-strait dispute. Beijing tried to lobby to block Taipei's preferred title, insisting on calling Taiwan a Representative Economic Office in line with the name of Hong Kong at the WTO (BBC, 2003).[135]

Despite continuous disputes throughout the process of application, all parties settled on pragmatic compromises. In 1992, for example, Beijing agreed to remove 90% of import restrictions (e.g., licensing requirements, quotas and controls) within five years to obtain Washington's commitment to support China's application to join the GATT (Liang, 2002). However, Beijing's early application enthusiasm did not help China join the GATT in 1994 and thus become an original member of the WTO. Instead, China did not successfully join until 2001. This was mainly attributable to the following reasons:

1. The impact of US domestic politics on China's accession to the WTO, in which supporters, opponents and moderates emerged. The supporters were advocates and beneficiaries of free trade, represented by large enterprises and related government departments of the US economy. The opposition consisted of human rights and labour activists, environmental and citizen's groups, conservative members of Congress and supporters of the China threat theory. Moderates in the middle were sensitive to the interests and concerns of different groups, trying to bridge the gap between the two extremes by emphasizing the economic and security implications of China's WTO entry without ignoring the concerns for human rights and the environment (Zhu, 2000).
2. By 1994, China's economic and trade growth had caused the West to begin to view China as a threat to other exporter countries.
3. Conservative forces formed by vested interests and bureaucracy within China.

[135] Taiwan Defiant on Resisting Chinese Pressure for WTO Name Change, BBC MONITORING, 27 May 2003.

The factors above ensured that negotiations between the two sides proceeded intermittently. In the early days of Jiang Zemin and Clinton's administrations, domestic support was very important and any concession to ideological opponents would become a point of attack for other internal factions. In the USA, as a Democratic president, for example, Clinton faced a Republican-controlled Congress, so Clinton was unable to show weakness when negotiating with Beijing (Liang, 2002). In China, both Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji had been attacked by nationalist and conservative leaders for 'selling out the country' and being weak to the USA (Fewsmith, 1999). Facing domestic political pressure after China failed to join the GATT in 1994, Beijing withdrew from the negotiating table. In 1995, Beijing re-established its position that China needs the WTO and the WTO needs China (Liang, 2002).

The USA tended to use bilateral negotiations to pry open Chinese markets and force Beijing to make concessions. Beijing was at a disadvantage in negotiations with Washington owing to a massive disparity in economic strength and China's dependence on Western markets. Beijing needed to make concessions to sign a bilateral deal with Washington that would clear the most important obstacle to China's entry into the WTO. But Chinese leaders also needed to accommodate domestic conservative forces and nationalism to avoid being labelled as weak (Fewsmith, 1999).

Likewise, Washington's China policy had elements of both change and compromise, which majorly impacted the 1999 China-US bilateral agreement. In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the continued rapid growth of the Chinese economy in the early 1990s prompted Washington to conduct a post-Cold War security assessment. The focus was mainly on two aspects. One was the United States' concern that China would surpass the United States to become the world's largest economy in the future; the other was that Beijing's "political system, international ambitions, attitudes towards arms proliferation, human rights and business practices" were inconsistent with Washington's ideology, a potential conflict exists (Lai, 2010, p.76). The Clinton-era Secretary of State, Warren Christopher,[136] sought to use economic pressure to force China to take human rights measures (Eline, 1994). After the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, he had begun to believe that the USA should promote China's integration with the international system rather than confront China's growing nationalism. China had effectively become an important trading partner to the USA, so it was not in American commercial interests to place human rights at the centre of US policy towards China (Liang, 2002).

Cross-strait politics has also made pragmatic compromises in the face of trade interests. Beijing initially strongly opposed Taipei's GATT application in the form of a TPKM separate customs independent of China, fearing that Taipei could use this to create a

[136] Warren Minor Christopher (27 October 1925 – 18 March 2011) served as the 63rd Secretary of State during US President Clinton's first term.

‘one China, one Taiwan’ through the WTO (Cho, 2005). However, Beijing’s plans for Taiwan to join the WTO as part of China failed and Taipei, with Washington’s support, eventually joined alone in the form of the TPKM.

If Beijing declined to accept political compromise, Washington had threatened to refuse to normalize trade relations with China (Winkler, 2013). To secure trade relations with the USA and join the WTO, Beijing had to accept political concessions above its own bottom line (the One China principle) on the issue of Taiwan’s accession to the WTO. After all, Beijing had economic interests at stake and sufficient internal motivation to join the WTO. On a functional level, the WTO is mainly concerned with trade issues. Therefore, “when Taiwan’s status in the WTO was determined as a separate customs territory, there was no need for Beijing to treat Taipei’s membership as it does in other IGOs” (Kong, 2004, p. 97). But while Taipei and Beijing may have appeared to hold equal status as WTO members, they remained politically asymmetrical. Interviewee No. 14 (Interview with a professor, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) observes that “this is largely in accordance with Beijing’s wishes, that is, let Taipei understand that even if you are in the WTO, you are not completely equal politically”.

Overall, the WTO application process was affected by many factors. For example, 1996 was an election year in the USA and Washington emphasized a more pro-Taipei attitude (e.g., by approving a visit from Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to Cornell University). In that same year, a missile crisis broke out on both sides of the Taiwan Strait during Taiwan’s first democratic election. Various domestic departments in China had their own interests (e.g., the State Council’s institutional reform project of 1998), and this bureaucracy created internal resistance that influenced the negotiations (Liang, 2002). In the process of China’s application to join the WTO, the international distribution of power related to the main external threats of the domestic regime affects the leverage and relationship between China and the USA at the WTO negotiations. The leaders of China and the United States were engaged in a power game at home and abroad. Domestic and international considerations of leaders on both sides influenced their “domestic calculations and international strategies” (Lai, 2010, p. 87). But economic and trade interests have always been the cornerstones of the trilateral negotiations. Successful entry into the WTO from both sides of the Taiwan Strait alongside coexistence with Washington shows that all three parties chose to compromise in terms of political ideology and values in the face of massive material economic interests.

Compromises took different forms. First, given “difficult transitional challenges and strong domestic opposition, the tenacity of Chinese leaders for fifteen years to promote WTO accession was remarkable” (Prime, 2002, p. 3). Second, Taipei accepted accession to the WTO in the name of the ‘Separate Customs Territory of TPKM’ (abbreviated as Chinese Taipei) – indicating that “Taipei had to compromise with economic interests and political realities” (Hsieh, 2005, p. 1199). A former IGO official (Interview with No 1, more work on Taipei perspective, 2021) confirms this, saying,

"Out of consideration of Taiwan's complicated international political status, the use of this name would avoid political issues involving sovereignty. The title was just a compromise when the two sides joined the WTO". Finally, Washington also stopped overemphasizing value issues such as human rights in the later period of Beijing's accession to the WTO. Washington remained the fulcrum of WTO applications from both sides of the strait, leaning as needed. On a fundamental level, materialistic economic and trade interests motivated all three parties.

Competition within the WTO (2001–present)

Since 2002, points of conflict (aside from normal trade frictions) in the triangular relationship at the WTO emerge mainly from cross-strait political issues. Although Washington has no intention of turning the WTO's role as an economic and trade organization into a cross-strait political arena, Taipei still aims to differentiate itself from Beijing through political terminology at the WTO.

On the nameplate of the WTO mission, official envelopes, letterhead, and business cards, for example, Taipei printed the word Taiwan in TPKM in capital letters while the remaining words *Penghu*, *Kinmen* and *Matsu* were all abbreviated as 'pkm' in lowercase letters. The Chinese version on Taiwan's WTO business card even uses the name *Zhonghua Minguo* (the ROC) instead of Chinese Taipei as stipulated by the WTO (Winkler, 2008). On this, interviewee No. 2 (Interview with a Chinese think tank researcher, more work on Beijing perspective, 2021) points out, "There are actually many politicized factors behind the WTO economic disputes. No matter the reason that Taipei gives for a dispute, its motives are political and Beijing will never concede to these motives".

The purpose of Taipei's struggle with Beijing at the WTO is to obtain more diplomatic space within the international community (Kong, 2004). For this reason, Beijing does not concede in disputes over political terminology. For example, Beijing held up "a WTO negotiating conference, arguing that the required documents submitted by Taipei, issued by its Ministry of Economic, illegally contain the Republic of China insignia" (Skanderup, 2004, p. 6). Interviewee No. 3 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) observes, "I think Taipei's actions in the WTO are speculative in Beijing's eyes".

Next, the Blue Book and GPA will be used as examples to describe Beijing and Taipei's obsession with political competition in the WTO that goes beyond trade considerations.

The Blue Book case. One example of continued competition over identities and interests across the Taiwan Strait is the so-called Blue Book dispute between Beijing and

Taipei.[137] After cross-strait accession to the WTO, Taipei attempted to use the political terms in the Blue Book to demonstrate the differences between Taiwan and the mainland (Winkler, 2013). In response, Beijing argued that Taipei has ulterior motives. Once Supachai Panitchpakdi took over as WTO Director-General from Michael Moore in late 2002, Taipei was required to comply with a 1992 Chairman's Statement requiring a change of terminology (Skanderup, 2004). In 2003, Supachai issued five requests to TPKM that focused on sovereignty-related content, such as "name in the official WTO directory, the use of sovereign neutral terminology (avoiding terms such as state or country) and diplomatic title" (Snyder, 2003, p. 3).

Taipei was disappointed with Supachai's requests. Taipei believed that as Secretary General of the WTO, Supachai had an obligation to not support the position of a particular government or interfere with the legal status of a member (Charnovitz, 2006). In Taipei's view, Supachai had been influenced by Beijing, using the 1992 presidential statement to pressure Taipei to change its name and violating the assurances of former Director- General Michael Moore and the WTO itself. However, in March 2005, Taipei was forced to compromise on the title of its WTO representative in the face of international realities and pressure from Beijing (Chen, 2005).

When the new edition of the Blue Book was finally published in late June 2005, after a delay of more than two years, the official titles of Taipei officials at the WTO had been revised in accordance with Beijing's request and without approval from Taipei (Bishop, 2005 and Winkler, 2008). Some politicians within Taiwan expressed dissatisfaction, believing this undermined Taiwan's status at the WTO (Chen, 2005; Chang, 2006).

The GPA case. The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) is a legally binding agreement under the WTO framework that came into effect on 1 January 1996. It aims to mutually open up government procurement markets among its parties. The GPA is a plurilateral agreement within the framework of the WTO, meaning that not all WTO members are parties to the Agreement (WTO's definition).[138] Cross-strait competition over the GPA illustrates the blending of material economic interests with political terminology.

In March 1995, Taipei applied to join the GPA. In subsequent negotiations over Taipei's application for WTO membership, joining the GPA was formulated as one of the conditions for Taipei's accession to the WTO (WTO, WT/MIN (01) /4, 2001). The GPA dispute between Taipei and Beijing then broke out at a meeting about Taiwan's accession to the GPA in February 2002.

[137] The Blue Book refers to the WTO's internal phone book (Winkler, 2008).
[138] For details, see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm.

As a GPA observer during this meeting, Beijing opposed Taipei's mention of the term 'central government entities' in the GPA along with the listing of these entities. Instead, Beijing asked Taipei to revise relevant names before joining the GPA. Beijing feared that Taipei's inclusion in the GPA with such political terminology would indicate that Taiwan was not part of China. In April 2002, Beijing sent a letter to Martin Loken, Chairman of the GPA Committee, to express dissatisfaction with the language of sovereignty used in the Taipei's GPA accession documents given that such language did not comply with the 1992 Chairman's Statement (WTO, GPA/M/18).

Beijing proposed three requirements for Taiwan's entry into the GPA: compliance with relevant political terminology; acknowledgement that Chinese Taipei is not a sovereign entity; and the indication of TPKM in front of each political entity (Yang, 2009). Interviewee No. 02 (Interview with a Chinese think tank researcher, more work on Beijing perspective, 2021) states:

> I believe that Beijing's attitude had symbolic significance. In any case that violates the One China principle, Beijing had to convey a firm attitude to the outside world. On the one hand, this was to maintain domestic nationalist sentiments and suppress forces for independence in Taiwan; on the other hand, it was to express Beijing's attitude to Washington, so as not to refute Washington's future cross-border behaviour due to its own compromise.

Since 2002, major signatories of the GPA – the USA, Canada, Japan, and the EU – have acted as mediators to resolve GPA conflicts across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing demanded the addition of a statement that Taiwan's terminology did not apply to sovereignty, and stipulated the nomenclature of Taiwan's GPA accession documents. In a subsequent Council of Government Procurement (CGP) decision, decision, a separate customs territory was added to the GPA, the relevant terminology was formalized, and it was recognized that the language in use did not refer to sovereignty (GPA/87, 2006).

However, Taipei was reluctant to accept joining the GPA at the expense of the language of sovereignty (Yang, 2009). It was not until Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008 that cross-strait relations improved and the two sides agreed to add a footnote of GPA/87 to Taipei's WTO accession document under the coordination of all parties[139]. The CGP then approved Taipei's application on 9 December 2008.

Compared with Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou solved this problem with a more pragmatic attitude while insisting on political demands. Participation in the GPA is, of course, in the interests of Taiwan, but sovereignty terms and language in official WTO documents was not conducive to Taiwan's interests. Taiwan's aim of joining the GPA

[139] The footnotes do not explicitly refer to the CGP decision, but allude to related documents (GPA/87).

required careful balancing between the benefits of functional participation and the protection of sovereignty (Lindemann, 2014).

Taipei used the WTO and GPA as either tools to seek international legal sovereignty or platforms to present an image of itself as a state (Winkler, 2008). After both sides of the Taiwan Strait joined the WTO to resolve economic and trade issues, each paid more attention to political or legal (as relates to sovereignty) symbolism. For each, attention to terminology and language was an act of self-identification – the result of the twin influences of identity and interests.

Identity can create specific interests and preferences in domain-specific action choices (Hopf, 1998). Names or terms can be strongly political, with different terminology highlighting differences in political or legal status that in turn can connect with sensitive issues such as rights and sovereignty. As the central government of China, Beijing saw itself as the preserver of national unity. Taiwan's terminology, then, should express the relationship between a central and local government rather than "two parallel governments" at the WTO (Kong, 2002).

In general, the positions of the three parties shifted across the two stages of triangular competition at the WTO (the application stage and within the WTO itself). These shifts were tied to changes in the power and demands of the three parties. Multi-layered sources of influence, such as economic interests, human rights, democracy, nationalism, and political identity, all emerged at different stages. However, the idealistic source emphasized in hypothesis 1 was only one part of the triangular WTO competition – one that did not assume the same importance as materialistic sources.

Indeed, constructivist expectations were of secondary importance in a triangular WTO relationship dominated by economic and trade interests. Realist economic interests played an important fundamental role in the WTO case, promoting the accession of both sides of the Taiwan Strait and maintaining the coexistence of the three parties in the WTO. Washington played a coordinating role between the two sides in the dispute over political terminology and sovereignty in the WTO. Beijing had become more powerful and influential after its accession to the WTO and, if Taipei were to increase its international participation, it had to accept compromises under the relevant conditions (Lindeman, 2014).

7.3.2 The leverage of the WTO

This section verifies hypothesis 2 on the leverage effects of the WTO itself and indicators affecting the ability of each party to use leverage. The WTO case differs significantly from the UN and WHO cases in terms of participation. Because it is the IGO where Beijing, Washington, and Taipei all coexist, Taipei is able to exercise its legal rights within the WTO (including making monetary and human resource contributions).

Leverage toolkits: regulations and financial/manpower contributions in the WTO case

WTO regulations: The WTO dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) is not simply an important legal tool for Taipei to engage in trade disputes, but also a vehicle for Taipei to realize its political intentions (Hsieh, 2005). Whenever Beijing was deemed to have violated its WTO obligations to Taipei, Taipei could bring Beijing to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) (Daniel, 2006; Mastel, 2001). Interviewee No. 14 (Interview with a professor, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) affirms this, saying, "I believe this is the nature of the regime, which is important because Taipei does not have many opportunities to find fully equal footing with Beijing".

Within the body of internal rules, the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) is an important one for Taipei. The DSM was designed as a central element for providing security and predictability within the multilateral trading system. The dispute mechanism itself is hosted by the DSU. The institution of the DSB was created to resolve disputes initiated by WTO members and has compulsory jurisdiction over them. The specific process is as follows:

> The General Council convenes as the DSB to deal with disputes between WTO members. The DSB has authority to establish dispute settlement panels, refer matters to arbitration, adopt panel, Appellate Body and arbitration reports, maintain surveillance over the implementation of recommendations and rulings contained in such reports, and authorize suspension of concessions in the event of non-compliance with those recommendations and rulings.[140]

According to Article 12 of the WTO Agreement,[141] all WTO members (including separate customs territories) have the right to use the DSM and each WTO member participating in the dispute settlement procedure is treated equally. For trade, the effective resolution of "trade disputes between WTO members is critical to maintaining the successful functioning of the WTO" (Mo, 2003, p. 147). But within the triangular relationship, the WTO DSM is an important coercive tool for Taipei to force Beijing into negotiations on the same level.

Although "Taiwan did not join the WTO as a member of the state Taipei still wanted to support its political claims through litigation against Beijing" (Hsieh, 2005, p. 1218). Taipei thus utilized the WTO DSM to position Beijing in a dilemma. On the one hand, use of this mechanism helped settle cross-strait trade disputes and thereby promoted the development of cross-strait economic and trade relations. But on the other, Beijing was fully aware that use of the DSM enabled Taipei to strengthen its image as a political

[140] For details, see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_body_e.htm.
[141] For details, see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm.

entity equivalent to Beijing, appearing to the outside world as though on 'equal footing' (*ping qi ping zuo*).

Aiming to avoid this embarrassing situation, Beijing did not want to use the DSM to resolve cross-strait trade disputes (Kong, 2002). However, Beijing's refusal to negotiate with Taipei would violate Article 4 of the DSU. This would enable Taipei to further request the establishment of an expert group to continue resolving trade disputes in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU. Although "Beijing was worried that cases between the mainland and Taiwan may create the impression of two countries, Beijing could not deny the compulsory jurisdiction of the WTO DSM" (Hsieh, 2005, p. 1218).

The DSM thus allowed Taipei to present itself to the international community while gaining support from Washington and others. From the point of view of one American think tank analyst (Interview with No. 12, 2022):

> Chinese Taipei is a member of the WTO, and I think it's really about making sure Taipei gets the agreements it signed. Any move by Beijing would be disrespectful to the rules of WTO governance. So, I do think Washington has to be able to defend Taipei because its membership is treated like any other, no more and no less.

For this reason, Beijing worried that handing over the initiative on the trade issues with Taiwan to the WTO would lead to foreign interference with China's internal affairs, thereby promoting Taiwan's independence (Hsieh, 2005). Beijing also believed that Western powers could favour Taipei in the dispute settlement process. Beijing had reason to believe that Taipei's continuous expansion of diplomatic space was driven by the aim of independence and thus responded accordingly (Yang and Cheng, 2001). Interviewee No. 13 (Interview with a professor, advised Washington on China policy, 2022) agrees with this view, noting, "I believe that Taipei uses the WTO mechanism because it puts Taipei and Beijing on an equal status. The WTO is the ideal platform, and any WTO member, big or small, is equal in the WTO mechanism".

Beijing could not accept a stature parallel to Taipei in the WTO. Tang Shubei (2002), then-Executive Vice President of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, clearly stated that Beijing had no intention of resolving cross-strait trade disputes through the WTO DSM and would instead handle them on a case-by-case basis through negotiations under the One China framework. After all, an internal affair – as opposed to an international issue – did not need help from the WTO DSM (Kong, 2002; Mo, 2003; Cho, 2005).

Even though some of Taiwan's trade restrictions on the mainland violated WTO rules, Beijing chose to suffer economic and trade losses rather than resolve cross-strait issues through the WTO in order to avoid recognizing Taiwan's distinction from the mainland (Hsieh, 2005; Charnovitz, 2006). Beijing's rigid attitude towards the One China

principle was “a natural response to the aggressive actions taken by the Taiwan separatists to defend China’s national unity” (Mo, 2003, p. 166).

But such a response also led to Beijing occupying a passive position in international public opinion. In the eyes of Taipei and its supporters, the One China principle could not supersede the DSB’s jurisdiction over cross-strait trade disputes. As both Beijing and Taipei are WTO members, both are subject to the mandatory jurisdiction of the DSB. Beijing thus could not prohibit Taipei from submitting disputes to the DSB. Interviewee No. 12 (Interview with a senior policy analyst at Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2022) observes the following:

> I think Taipei’s use of the WTO mechanism is a very effective method. I do agree with Taiwan that simply making bilateral adjudication, especially when Beijing does not recognise Taiwan as a separate entity, is unequal dispute settlement.

As for disagreement over whether trade disputes were a domestic or international issue, Taipei believed that they were already an international issue. Interviewee No. 11 (Interview with a former diplomat, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) affirms this, noting:

> Both Beijing and Taipei are already part of the WTO. So the most logical thing to do is to use the WTO mechanism to resolve trade disputes. I think it’s a bit unfair to Taipei for Beijing to try to treat it as a domestic issue, because it’s not a domestic issue.

In general, Taipei tries to use WTO rules to internationalize trade relations across the Straits and achieve parity with Beijing in the WTO. The underlying reasons have always revolved around the One China principle, and political identity/status (but not to a point that completely rules out the economic interests at stake in a trade dispute). Beijing has had to strike a balance between abiding by its WTO membership obligations and upholding the One China principle (Cho, 2005). Legitimate use of WTO regulations is prerequisite for Taipei to gain public support for procedural justice in the international community, and the two complement each other. Meanwhile, Washington and some other WTO members had made clear that “the WTO would not be used as a political forum for both Beijing and Taipei to discuss the policy issues of the One China principle or Taiwan’s independence” (Kong, 2002, p. 758).

As far as current relations are concerned, the impact of usage of WTO rules as a leverage tool is limited. The 1992 Chairman’s Statement established Taiwan’s status as a separate customs territory. But Taipei’s use of WTO rules for leverage can indeed embarrass Beijing politically, enabling the international community to hear Taipei’s voice and secure the support of international public opinion.

Financial contributions. The WTO derives most of the income for its annual budget from member contributions. Member contribution amounts are established according to a formula based on share of international trade. Table 7.2 below lists the amounts for China, the USA, and Taiwan (TPKM/Chinese Taipei) starting in 2002, the year that contributions began from both sides of the Strait:

Table 7.2: WTO financial contributions from China, the USA, and the TPKM, 2002–2020[142]

Member's contributions to the WTO Annual Budget 2002-2020 (Unit: CHF)						
Actor	China		United States of America		TPKM (Chinese Taipei)	
Year	Percentage	Contributions	Percentage	Contributions	Percentage	Contributions
2002	2.97%	4,224,633	15.72%	22,342,383	N/A	N/A
2003	3.16%	4,852,390	15.90%	24,452,662	2.03%	3,123,678
2004	3.26%	5,228,175	15.75%	25,259,391	2%	3,210,565
2005	3.60%	6,024,726	15.80%	26,445,852	1.95%	3,259,278
2006	4.09%	7,102,593	15%	26,767,170	2%	3,289,878
2007	4.73%	8,528,625	15%	26,807,860	2%	3,489,065
2008	5.34%	9,496,302	14.11%	25,094,574	1.85%	3,285,813
2009	5.90%	11,070,546	13.50%	25,313,222	1.80%	3,386,108
2010	6.45%	12,223,876	12.96%	24,550,028	1.75%	3,305,030
2011	6.88%	13,363,954	12.42%	24,135,946	1.67%	3,248,696
2012	7.29%	14,156,698	12.19%	23,687,113	1.60%	3,122,401
2013	7.70%	15,047,635	11.71%	22,891,095	1.57%	3,065,440
2014	8.14%	15,921,520	11.41%	22,298,730	1.55%	3,032,205
2015	8.62%	16,850,145	11.31%	22,114,960	1.54%	3,006,790
2016	9.17%	17,927,350	11.24%	21,974,200	1.53%	2,991,150
2017	9.59%	18,756,270	11.24%	21,968,335	1.54%	3,000,925
2018	9.84%	19,237,200	11.38%	22,251,810	1.73%	3,378,240
2019	10.10%	19,737,680	11.59%	22,660,405	1.73%	3,384,105
2020	10.30%	20,142,365	11.69%	22,855,905	1.68%	3,286,355
Data comes from WTO Secretariat budget reports. Collected and processed by the author.						


Between 2002 and 2020, contributions from the three parties changed to varying degrees (see Figure 7.2 below). The change in Beijing's contribution is the most obvious. From the lowest value in 2002 when it first joined, accounting for a 2.97% share (or 4,224,633 CHF, $4,591,690) of total member contributions, it rose sharply to peak at 10.30% in 2020 (or 20,142,365 CHF, $21,892,434). In that time, China rose from the tenth largest contributor overall in 2002 to second only to the USA.

In contrast, the USA has maintained a contribution value above 10% throughout the same period to rank first in terms of overall contributions. Its peak year was 2003, at 15.90% (or 24,452,662 CHF, $26,405,965). But given the proportionate increase in the

[142] Contribution amounts are determined according to each member's share of international trade (%) based on trade in goods, services and intellectual property rights for the last five years for which data is available. Please see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/contrib11_e.htm.

share of China's contribution, the US share follows an overall downward trend dropping from 15.72% in 2002 to 11.69% in 2020.


Figure 7.2: WTO contributions from China, the USA, and TPKM (Chinese Taipei), 2002–2020. Data from WTO Secretariat budget reports, collected and processed by the author.[143]



For TPKM (Chinese Taipei), the overall change is not large – but is still declining slightly. In 2003, Taipei's contribution peaked at 2.03% to rank 15th among all members. As of 2020, its contribution value had dropped to 1.69% to rank 17th overall. Figure 7.3 shows the proportionate share of total monetary contributions to the WTO from all three parties at the beginning and end of this period:

[143] The WTO Secretariat and budget (between 2022-2020), WTO Secretariat budget, please see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/budget_e.htm.

Figure 7.3: Comparison of the monetary contribution ratio of members in 2003 and 2020



Financial contributions to the WTO reflect changing dynamics between the three actors. Whether in terms of trade volume or monetary contribution, China is more important to the WTO than TPKM and the gap between China and the USA is gradually narrowing. Combined with the results of cross-strait competition cases in the WTO, Beijing has indeed achieved a better result in most competitions (e.g., the GPA case).

When discussing issues related to the Taiwan Strait, the WTO did take Beijing's feelings into consideration. In the WTO budget contribution report, for instance, almost all members are sorted in alphabetical order with one exception: China and Chinese Taipei are not listed side-by-side in alphabetical order according to convention. Instead, they are listed far apart, and Chinese Taipei is usually listed next to Switzerland (The only exception was in 2003– the year the WTO adopted the separate custom of TPKM as the name of Chinese Taipei at the WTO). This is a way to avoid confusing the outside world with the names of both sides of the strait, and the first thing to ensure is China's image (there is only one China). This finding confirms hypothesis 2 of this study: that in a WTO where all three parties exist, financial contributions can be used for leverage.


Manpower. Another important indicator for leveraging IGO competition is the human resource contributions of the three actors. According to the organizational structure of the WTO, the Director-General and Deputy Director-General are the core senior officials. Therefore, this research surveys the nationality of senior officials at the WTO Secretariat between 2002 and 2020. As Table 7.3 shows, China and the USA have a place in almost every session of the Secretariat's constituent officials.

Table 7.3: WTO Secretariat constituent officials, 2002–2021

Composition of Senior Officials of the WTO Secretariat (2002-2021)		
Year	**Director General**	**Four Deputy Director-General**
Since 2021 June	Ngozi O. I. (Nigeria and the US)	Jean-Marie P. (France), Anabel González (Costa Rica), Angela Ellard (the US) and Xiangchen Zhang (China)
Sept. 2013 - June 2021	Roberto Azevêdo (Brazil)	Yonov F. A. (Nigeria), Karl Brauner (Germany), David Shark (the US) and Yi Xiaozhun (China)
Oct. 2005 - Sept. 2013	Pascal Lamy (France)	Alejandro Jara (Chile), Valentine S. R. (Rwanda), Rufus H. Yerxa of (the US) and Harsha V. S. (India)
2002-2005	Supachai P. (Thailand)	N/A
Data collected from the WTO database, and produced by the author. Please see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/exdgs_e.htm.		

Figure 7.4 below shows of the distribution of human resource contributions to the WTO across the USA and China. The USA ranks first in the proportion of WTO officials at 18.8%, while China accounts for 12.5%. In the almost two decades since 2002, the WTO Secretariat has had a total of 16 Director Generals and Deputy Director Generals – three from the USA, two from China, and none from Taiwan.


Figure 7.4: Nationality ratio of senior officials of the WTO Secretariat Percentage (2002-2021) - made by the author



From the perspective of global trade and economy, China is still defined as a developing country; Beijing maintains good relations with developing countries and claims to represent them. Figure 7.5 below divides the nationality of senior WTO officials into developing and developed countries to show a total of 10 senior officials from developing countries and six from developed countries led by the USA. From a statistical perspective, this means that Beijing's mobilization capacity in the WTO is greater than Washington's. Interviewee No. 05 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) confirms this, saying:

> A Chinese diplomat told me that China currently has more than 100 votes in IGOs, and most of the supporters for China are developing countries. The basic votes of the United States mainly come from its allies and European countries. There are only more than 60 votes, which is far from being able to compare with China.

Figure 7.5: Regional Distribution of Senior Officials of the WTO Secretariat (2002-2021) - made by the author.



In addition, 2001 was an important point in the triangular WTO competition, and Beijing and Taipei joined the WTO one after another. This study thus conducts a deeper and broader analysis of WTO human resources in 2000-2001. Mike Moore (New Zealand) was Director-General when Beijing and Taipei joined the WTO, and his term was 1999-2002. The information on the Deputy Director-General displayed in the WTO official database only provides personnel information from the Director-General Pascal Lamy period (2005-2013), so this research cannot obtain information on the WTO Deputy Director-General in 2000-2001. In order to understand as much as possible the human resources in the critical period of 2000-2001, this study expanded the human

resources objects to chairpersons of the WTO bodies. The Councils and Committees that these chairpersons come from include important WTO bodies[144] such as Trade Policy Review Body and Council for Trade in Goods.

According to data analysis, there were a total of 67 chairpersons during 2000-2001;[145] among them, there were two from Hong Kong, China, Mr Harbinson, who served as the chairperson of the Dispute Settlement Body in 2000 and the General Council in 2001; and Mr Mak as the chairperson of the Committee on Government Procurement in 2000. Statistics show that none of the chairpersons are from the United States or Taiwan. Further analysis is carried out according to the classification of developed countries and developing countries, of which 29 are chairpersons from developed countries, and the remaining 38 are chairpersons from developing countries. This evidence shows that during the critical period of 2000-2001, although WTO Director-General Moore was from New Zealand, a developed country, senior officials from developing countries had a numerical advantage (56.7%) in the WTO. Combined with Beijing's constant emphasis on its developing country status, the distribution of human resources in the WTO during the critical period (2000-2001) has shown some correlation with Beijing's successful accession.

Human resource contributions to the Secretariat from Beijing and Washington indeed ensure that the voices of both actors are heard in the WTO – at least to a certain extent. For example, the appointment of the WTO's Director-General from 1999 to 2005 underscored the division between the Global North and Global South camps at the WTO. New Zealand's Mike Moore and Thailand's Supachai rounded out the top two candidates. Moore was backed by the USA and countries from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), while Supachai was backed by many developing countries. North and South finally compromised and selected two candidates to serve as Director-General: Moore's term lasted from 1999 to 2002, while Supachai's term lasted from 2002 to 2005 (UNCTAD, 2014).[146] The two WTO leaders represented their respective interest groups during their tenures.

The indicators of financial and manpower contributions demonstrate Beijing's investment in the WTO competition, which is evidence of Beijing's strategic advantage over Taipei at the WTO. Although Taiwan-ally Washington occupies the first position, the USA at least superficially does not support Taipei's use of the WTO as a platform for political gains. Instead, Washington prefers that the WTO exert its functional attributes to gain economic benefits. The case thus affirms hypothesis 2 that financial and human resource contributions to the WTO impact the ability of the parties to use the WTO.

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[144] https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/current_chairs_e.htm.
[145] Data details see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/former_chairs_95_02_e.pdf.
[146] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) secretariat (2014), UNCTAD AT 50, A SHORT HISTORY. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/osg2014d1_en.pdf.

Interestingly, Beijing has not tried to expel Taipei from the WTO despite China's development and gradually gain an overwhelming advantage over Taiwan. This is related to the following three reasons:

1. WTO rules and regulations have a protective effect on Taipei. As a great power, Beijing cannot drive away a weak power at will as Article 15 of the Marrakesh Agreement specifies that members can apply to withdraw from the WTO on their own.[147] However, the WTO has not set up specific expulsion procedures. In theory, a two-thirds majority is required to create an expulsion procedure at the WTO while a three-quarters majority is required to strip membership – a process that is extremely difficult.
2. Beijing has a constructivist vision of cross-strait relations and believes that maintaining economic exchanges with Taiwan through the WTO mechanism will be of great help to cross-strait social and political integration.
3. As an organization, the WTO has an economic function. Also, Washington plays an important role at the WTO and Beijing cannot dominate everything.

7.3.3 The analysis of WTO competition

The effect of WTO leverage

The WTO is an important economic organization that promoted economic and trade growth in each of the three parties while helping them achieve their respective goals in some non-economic fields. For Beijing, WTO membership made it easier for China to trade with the world and thus achieve rapid economic growth. Additionally, the WTO provided important leverage within cross-strait economic integration. This is because during the WTO negotiations, Beijing and Taipei accepted the option of MFN treatment in Article 13 of the WTO Charter. The two sides granted each other MFN treatment, which greatly supported economic integration of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

In 2001, the year before Beijing and Taipei joined the WTO, the volume of business investment in the mainland from Taiwan was $2.8 billion; in 2002, the first year of joint WTO membership, the volume of business investment rose to $6.7 billion (data from MAC).[148] Nearly 90% of Taiwan's increase in exports could be attributed to trade with the mainland (Wang, 2003). Extending the timeline from 1991 to 2008, Taiwan's total investment in the mainland amounted to $75.5 billion, accounting for 57.13% of total outward investment and making the mainland the top destination (same data from MAC). Economic integration also had a pacifying effect on cross-strait relations: the

[147] Article XV – Withdrawal. See https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm.
[148] Investment from Taiwanese businesses to the mainland. https://www.mac.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=15F9C17AD897B71A&sms=231F60B3498BBB19&s=6D9CF65F1E0DDA38.

more the two sides traded, the less likely that military disputes would arise (Weede, 2010).

Another impact of leveraging the WTO was the homogenization of cross-strait regulations. The WTO agreement is a principle and norm widely accepted by the international community, and it is fully applicable to cross-strait trade relations. The homogenization of laws across the strait made it easier for the two sides to deal with each other, creating more opportunities for contact and cooperation. Interviewee No. 7 (Interview with a professor, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) says,

> I could not see the downside of cross-strait economic exchanges. While it is uncertain whether economic integration will promote political reconciliation, I saw it as a good opportunity to promote educational, cultural and economic exchanges between the two sides.

The integration of cross-strait economic relations and joint accession to the WTO had positive long-term impacts in the long term, but political differences remained (Prime, 2002). In the early days, Beijing had constructivist expectations, hoping to promote the ultimate goal of cross-strait reunification through economics, trade and investment from Taiwanese businesses. But this constructivist utility changes across different periods of cross-strait interaction, with less and less political interference from Taiwan businessmen over time (Lee, 2011). Meanwhile, the people of Taiwan have formed their own identity and it is difficult to force them to give up their political identity through economic integration. Interviewee No. 8 (Interview with a researcher at Academia Sinica, 2022) confirms this, saying, “I believe that cross-strait economics or trade and cross-strait politics are two parallel lines in some places. Cross-strait politics are very tense, but the economy continues to move forward”.

Washington used its economic strength and dominant position to force Beijing and Taipei into compromise over some political and economic issues in the WTO application process. However, China’s entry also created economic shocks in the USA while initial political expectations failed to materialize as expected (at least so far). Economically, the reform and opening-up policy can be superimposed on the dividends brought about by joining the WTO and China’s position in the global economy has soared to the second largest. But China’s rapid economic development did not achieve the political democratization expected by Washington.

Meanwhile, China’s exports grew so fast that the scale, magnitude, and speed overwhelmed traditional trade adjustment mechanisms, leading to permanent job losses in Western countries (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2021). Geopolitical and geoeconomic concerns have emerged in the USA over whether reliance on China and global supply chains is a vulnerability. Structural economic issues in Sino-US trade were not fully resolved through multiple rounds of the 2018 trade war negotiations, so competition and cooperation will coexist in the future (Wang, 2020). As interviewee

No. 13 (Interview with a professor, advised Washington on China policy, 2022) points out, "The United States considers both democratic ideology and economics in formulating foreign policy, and economic theory is very powerful in influencing the thinking of US policymakers".

A major success of pragmatic diplomacy after Taipei was stripped of UN member membership in 1971, accession to the WTO extended double leverage – both economic and diplomatic – to Taiwan. Economically, access to the WTO was a demonstration of respect for Taiwan's economic development that built a bridge to the global market. Taiwan secured important procedural rights that could provide a "model window for Taiwan's performance in world affairs" (Charnovitz, 2006, p. 425). Politically, Taipei reached places that its diplomats could not through commercial and trade links within the WTO framework (Mastel, 2001). The WTO was not only the guarantor of Taiwan's trade with other parts of the world, but also an important breakthrough point for Taipei to integrate into the international community. This is confirmed by an analyst from an American think tank (Interview, No. 12, 2022), who says: "I think it is political, as the WTO is one of the very few IGOs where Taiwan has a completely independent legitimate standing from China, and they want to use it".

As a competition unfolding over the past 30 years or so, the triangular game at the WTO presents different symptoms at different stages. The influence of the WTO far exceeds the function of an economic organization, and it has long been an important leverage tool for the three parties. The WTO case thus confirms hypothesis 2 about the leverage role played by IGOs.

The theoretical analysis of the WTO case

The triangular WTO competition is in line with the compound theoretical framework based on materialism for this research. Specifically, material factors headed by *political* and *economic interests* played the most important role. Hard power determined the outcome of the three actors' WTO competition. On this basis, idealist factors such as *political terminology, identity, democratic values, human rights, political system/ideology and nationalism* played more minor roles in the WTO negotiation process. At the same time, *internal political obstacles* such as Chinese bureaucracy and nationalism, the US Congress's concern for human rights, and Taiwan's first democratic election in 1996 together greatly impacted the triangular WTO competition. As Putnam (1988) argued, these domestic political factors had been taken into consideration by leaders because leaders needed to balance other domestic political players.

Among the following five important events that affected triangular WTO competition, the three political actors were simultaneously influenced by both material and idealistic factors. The two aspects complemented each other. The events are the

Tiananmen incident in 1989, the Third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 and the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999.

Furthermore, the purposes of the three political actors joining the WTO were also multi-layered. While Beijing hoped to obtain huge economic benefits and consolidate material benefits such as domestic reforms, it also hoped to promote cross-Strait social and cultural exchanges and achieve political integration through cross-Strait economic integration. Washington's primary consideration was still China's huge market, but it also aimed to promote China's democratization process. Taipei's accession to the WTO could safeguard its trade interests, increase its own international space and demonstrate its political identity different from Beijing in the international community.

Although the triangular WTO competition involved multi-level factors, it is still necessary to pay attention to the decisive role of material factors. For example, in a functional IGO like the WTO, where Beijing's relationship with Taipei is relatively stable, China still avoids using the DSM. It prefers to suffer economic losses rather than bringing Taipei back to the DSM. It can be explained from a realist perspective. From a realist perspective, the Taiwan issue is a political issue involving sovereignty, territory and legitimacy. It is Beijing's core interest, and economic interests are secondary. Therefore, to avoid creating a scenario of two parallel governments, Beijing chooses to bear a certain amount of economic losses instead of internationalizing cross-Strait trade disputes. Realist politics, economic and trade interests are the main themes of the WTO competition, although some constructivist implications appeared as additional expectations. As a former IGO official (Interview, No. 01, 2021) stated, "The WTO doesn't operate in isolation. In some ways, it is a political question of how Beijing wants things to go".

7.4 Conclusion

The triangular WTO case stems from the three parties' emphasis on economics and trade. The three parties need for each other provides the economic basis for their coexistence at the WTO. China has gradually gained an advantage in the WTO, but regionalism has become a new trend in recent years and both WTO functions and global trade have been impacted (Liu, 2021). The Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, the successor to the US-backed TPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) were born in 2018 and 2020, respectively. China has been eager to adopt these free trade agreements (FTAs) as a national strategy to achieve economic development and lead the international trading system (Jung, 2022). In September 2021, Beijing formally submitted an application to join the CPTPP to replace Washington's role in the region and lead the global trading system. Taipei followed suit, applying to join a week later.

For its part, Taipei has signed only a few FTAs and Taiwan's economy is in a crisis of marginalization (Chou, Hsu, and Yang, 2019). Taipei pursues the signing of FTAs such

as the CPTPP to obtain economic benefits and reduce economic dependence on mainland China, and also as a major breakthrough in diplomacy (Liu, 2021). But following American withdrawal from the TPP, the possibility of Taipei's smooth entry into the CPTPP was reduced: Taipei does not have formal diplomatic relations with any of the 11 CPTPP member states. This is not only an economic issue, but also related to Taiwan's unique diplomatic status and Beijing (Liu, 2021). Although China is not yet a member of the CPTPP, China's rapidly growing economic power means that its influence in the international community is steadily rising and will affect Taipei's ability to join the CPTPP. CPTPP is becoming a new round of WTO-like competition.

This chapter finds that economic interests played a decisive role in trilateral decision-making and that idealistic elements, such as democratic values and political identity, did not play as important a role as material ones. Washington did not completely reject Beijing's accession to the WTO over value conflicts, and Taipei did not give up WTO membership over its official status as TPKM. This means the WTO case only partially validates hypothesis 1 about the existence and role of idealistic and materialistic factors in competition. The triangular WTO competition includes not only materialistic factors, but also idealistic ones. At the same time, these latter factors do not carry the level of importance assumed in hypothesis 1.

Regarding hypothesis 2 on the role of WTO leverage, this chapter verifies that the WTO was consciously used by the three actors as leverage to expand their influence and achieve some additional goals. Beijing's influence on Taipei's political terminology at the WTO validates the second half of hypothesis 2, namely, that human resource and financial contributions help improve a member's ability to utilize the WTO itself. Beijing's absolute advantages in human resources and financial contributions made the WTO more supportive of Beijing's opinions in the Blue Book dispute and GPA cases.

Although this chapter demonstrates that human and monetary contributions to the WTO correlate positively with competitive outcomes, it does not deny the combined effect of the following factors:

1. The guiding significance of UN Resolution 2758 on the conduct of the WTO (Taipei lost its international recognition).
2. Taipei joining the WTO in the name of the TPKM special customs territory.
3. The influence of China's power distribution as a global economic power.
4. The WTO serves an economic and trade function and Washington pays more attention to pragmatic economic interests over political struggles.

Beijing was often the winner in the end result, but Taipei used the WTO as leverage to make its voice heard. Taipei's actions embarrassed Beijing both in terms of reputation and international law. The coexistence of the three parties in a hybrid form of states and a separate customs territory is a compromise yielded from the interaction of material economic interests and political identities. Competition is ongoing, but the three-way

structure in the WTO has stabilized. With the continuous outbreak of public health crises, triangular competition at WHO is eye-catching. The next chapter delves into the WHO case, showing how the three parties interacted in the field of public health.

Chapter 8 – The WHO case study

8.1 Introduction

After Beijing replaced Taipei as the representative of China to the UN in 1971, Taipei lost its seat at WHO in 1972. Taipei had no way to gain seats in IGOs, with memberships limited to nation-states, and it gradually became passive at an international level. However, Taipei did not give up and actively explored the international space under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui, achieving successful coexistence with Beijing at the WTO in 2001. The WHO, an IGO that combines public health with political attributes, became another important point of breakthrough into the international arena in the eyes of Taipei. Given the structure of the triangular relationship, human rights and global health security, Washington also played a role in Beijing–Taipei competition at WHO. The purpose of this chapter is to reveal the situation of triangular IGO competition in the field of public health by analyzing the interaction between Beijing, Washington and Taipei on WHO issues. On this basis, further explore the various factors that may affect the triangular WHO competition. The entire analysis revolves around how the three actors view the relationship between Taiwan and WHO, and demonstrate the strategies in the competition process.

The first part of this chapter discusses and analyses WHO's functions along with the background and positions of the three parties. The second part goes further into the WHO case study to explore the triangular competition in two sub-cases on SARS and Covid-19. The chapter concludes with a discussion and verification of actor ability to leverage WHO, particularly through human resource and financial contributions. This chapter argues that triangular WHO competition is a phenomenon involving a multi-level array of factors that include political interests, pragmatic medical interests, and humanitarian values. Despite the diversity of factors in the WHO competition, political interests remain the most salient for all three actors. Second, the role of WHO leverage has been verified, and the human resources and financial contributions of political actors to WHO have a certain impact on the competition.

8.2 Triangular relations and WHO

8.2.1 The function of WHO

When the international community was preparing to establish the UN in 1945, an important element was the corresponding creation of a global health organisation. In this context, the WHO Constitution came into force on 7 April 1948 as one of the specialised agencies of the UN.[149] There are nine principles in the preamble to the Constitution[150] that provide guidelines for WHO activities. For instance, Constitution Article 2 states: "The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of every human being's fundamental rights without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition". The article 2 conveyed to the world the universal and humanitarian vision established by WHO, which later became an important focus of triangular WHO competition.

WHO's discussion and decision-making body is the World Health Assembly (WHA), which convenes in Geneva in May of each year. There are 194 member states and the main function of the WHA is to determine organisational policies. As a specialised agency of the UN, there are two types of memberships: full membership and associate membership (Chapter III of the WHO Constitution). Members of the UN are free to choose whether to become a member of WHO (Constitution, Article 4); however, non-member states of the UN can be approved for WHO membership via a WHA voting resolution. Article 6 of the WHO Constitution stipulates that WHA voting resolutions of a new member are required during the application process, and applicants must receive over half of the votes to become member states. In addition, the WHA permits observer status for non-voting parties without the status of a nation-state. There are two ways to become an observer: 1) through an invitation letter issued by the WHO Director-General; or 2) through a WHA resolution.

8.2.2 Triangular relations and WHO

The ROC has been a member of WHO since the establishment of the latter in 1948. After Beijing replaced Taipei in China's seat in the UN, the third meeting of the WHA in 1972 gave rise to a resolution on the restoration of China's WHO representation. The WHA held that following UN Resolution 2758, the PRC's rights in WHO should be restored and Beijing should become the sole legal representative of China

[149] They are the WHO, WMO, WIPO, ITU, ILO, IMF, UPU, FAO, ICAO, IMO, IFAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNWTO, IBRD, IDA, IFC, ICSID, MIGA and World Bank. For details, please see: https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/funds-programmes-specialized-agencies-and-others/index.html.

[150] For details, see the WHO Constitution, available at: https://www.who.int/about/governance.

(WHA25.1).[151] With that, Taipei lost all powers and seats in WHO. Official communication between Taipei and WHO ceased and Taiwan health officials began to interact with WHO indirectly – often through unofficial channels (Chen, 2018b).

Cross-strait confrontation in IGOs since 1971 has mainly involved competition over Taiwan's judicial sovereignty (Tubilewicz, 2012). At the same time, the political ecology within and outside Taiwan experienced great changes after 1971. The KMT's rule in Taiwan was threatened when Washington began to favour Beijing in the 1970s with the aim of securing advantage in its Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union. Once the international community recognised that the PRC was the only legal government of China, the KMT's claim to China's sovereignty lost its legitimacy both domestically and internationally (Yeh, 2002). A domestic democratisation movement further affected Taiwan's social and political environment, gradually reshaping the internal power structure. After Chiang Ching-kuo's death, an independent-minded Lee Teng-hui began to pursue more international space.

Although one of the specialised agencies of the UN, WHO has its own peculiar characteristics. It is not merely an international public health organisation; instead, it also carries political attributes (given a membership body limited to sovereign states). As a platform that connects political factors to health issues, its political sensitivity is relatively low and it has become Taipei's main focus for the expansion of its international space (Jin, 2017). The WHA's agenda conveniently offers a loophole that Taipei can exploit: the Secretary-General can use an invitation letter to invite a health entity to participate in the meeting. Although participation in WHO is generally limited to legally recognised nation-states, Taipei can participate in the WHA without clarifying its own sovereignty through this channel. Interviewee No. 10 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) affirms this, saying, "I believe based on such flexibility, the Taiwan government has been aiming at the WHA as a major target since the early 1990s".

8.2.3 The three parties' strategic stance on WHO

The WHO triangular competition began in 1997 when Lee Teng-hui applied for an observer seat at the WHA in the name of the 'Republic of China'. Beijing had coexisted with Washington at WHO for 25 years at this point, and its role had become one of a dominant defender (as compared with Beijing's role at the UN and WTO) in the WHO competition. In terms of cross-strait relations, the WHO issue marked the beginning of a new era characterised by "partnership and competition, affection and antipathy, increasing trust and lingering apprehension" (Tubilewicz, 2012, p. 705). The following sections analyse the three actors' positions on the WHO issue to explore the factors affecting the competition.

[151] See https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/91916.

Taipei's motivations

After Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988, Taiwan's democratisation process advanced under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui. In 1989, Lee Teng-hui expressed his desire to join the UN to Harvey Julien Feldman,[152] the US deputy representative to the UN. Feldman responded that Lee should start from UN-adjacent organisations or agencies and gradually expand Taiwan's participation in UN work. At a conference on 9 March 1989, Lee Teng-hui pointed out that Taiwan's international activities had been highly limited under the UN structure since 1971. Taipei's most important task was to work out how to break through this structure (Jacobs and Liu, 2007). Interviewee No. 03 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) agrees with this historical account, recalling:

> After Taiwan was expelled from the UN, it actually had a change in UN policy. There is no way to go back to the General Assembly now, so Taiwan tried to focus on some things in the UN system such as functional IGOs (WHO). This was just an alternative way to achieve its goals, and the change was rooted in a desire to enter the UN and striving for so-called international diplomatic space.

Alongside shifts in Taiwan's internal political ecology triggered by democratisation, Taipei gradually strengthened its desire to participate in WHO affairs – partly in response to the growing willingness of the public to participate in international health activities (Chang, 2011a). For politicians, the possibility of such participation provided a political bargaining chip in the island's elections.

As WHO has characteristics not found in other IGOs, it provided a breakthrough platform for Taipei's foreign policy (Chen, 2017). Under a policy of expanding international diplomatic space, pursuit of WHA observer status became Taipei's goal (Li, 2008a). If the application for observer status at the WHA were successful, Taiwan would further be protected to some extent by the organisation (Interviewee No. 09, a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022). Thus, after Taipei first applied to attend the WHA in 1997, it did so relentlessly every year for the next 25 years.

Taipei's enthusiasm for WHO had much to do with Taipei's anticipation of the establishment of a UN working group on the issue of Taiwan's UN membership. For Taipei, attending the WHA would create a sort of admission ticket, partly as the issue of public health is not limited to national boundaries. But given the nature of health issues, Taiwan would also obtain additional benefits through international competition.

[152] American diplomat Harvey Julien Feldman (25 June 1931–24 February 2009) promoted the establishment of American Institutes in Taiwan.

Interviewee No. 10 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) affirms this, saying:

> Participating in the WHA has significantly improved Taiwan's international prestige and participation in international health affairs. Taiwan's director of health can communicate with other health officials on the same level. Participation in the WHA is of substantial help to Taiwan, and it is not just a product in name.

Taiwan's politicians generally claimed that Taiwan's participation in the WHA was mainly intended to address the health of 24 million people and therefore linked to human rights (Chen, 2018b). Taiwan's exclusion from WHO would run counter to WHO goal of achieving the highest possible standard of health for all, undermine the principles of international cooperation, and potentially create a loophole in the global health system (Hickey, 2006). Interviewee No. 15 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) agrees with this view, saying, "I think it is mainly humanitarian, because you have 24 million people. If you exclude Taiwan's voice, who will handle public health in Taiwan?"

However, politicians were concerned with political identity as well. Taipei has paid close attention to the status or title of Taiwan's participation in WHO activities. Taipei's focus falls on these because name and form are important means for Taipei to gain international sovereign legitimacy through WHO (Tubilewicz, 2012). Interviewee No. 9 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) points out:

> In my opinion, if Taipei really felt that it was very important to contribute and receive health information via participation in WHO affairs, then the Taiwan government should accept the One China principle. If Taipei doesn't accept this, it proves that the most important thing is not participation but public refusal to recognise the One China principle.

Taiwan's medical system is advanced. This means Taipei's participation in the WHA does not just secure support from WHO; Taiwan's itself can also give back to WHO (Lee and Kuo, 2020). In a speech titled "Overseas Chinese Communities Go to Geneva to Support Taiwan's Participation in WHA Activities", Tsai Ing-wen emphasised how Taiwan's advanced medical and health achievements and capabilities could contribute greatly to the maintenance of global health. In other words, Taiwan and WHA need each other (*Taipei Times*, 2022).[153] Interviewee No. 10 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) agrees with this claim, noting:

[153] For details, see Taiwan, WHA need each other: Tsai, May 23, 2022, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2022/05/23/2003778647.

1. Taiwan's medical system is at the leading level in the world;
2. Taiwan's medical professionals have many international friends to rely on for support;
3. It is easier to win the approval of other countries for issues such as medical treatment, hygiene, and human health.

To achieve its WHO goals, Taipei needs to secure sufficient international recognition and support. In the WHO competition, then, Taipei has relied on two strategies to gain such support: lobbying and health diplomacy. Given Taiwan's own alliance with the USA and Washington's dominant position in the international system after World War II, the USA became the target of Taipei's lobbying. For example, the Formosa Association for Public Affairs (FAPA) lobbied US Congress to advocate for Taipei's participation in both WHO and UN activities (Chen, 2008).

Under lobbying from Taipei and out of humanitarian concerns, the US State Department issued press guidelines on the Taiwan-WHO case, stating that Taiwan should be included in the UN agency to facilitate the timely dissemination of important health information (Hickson, 2003). Taiwan lobbying groups are also effective at lobbying members of Congress. For instance, Representative Ted Yoho and Senator James M. Inhofe put forward two bills in support of Taiwan as a WHA observer.[154] Ted Yoho's website[155] published a 2019 article, titled "US Bill on Taiwan WHO observer Status Passes the First Hurdle" and written by Chiang Chin-yeh and Chung Yu-chen, in a show of support for Taiwan.

In addition to official lobbying, Taiwan NGOs also intend to promote Taiwan's entry into WHO. Medical staff and related associations, particularly the Foundation of Medical Professionals Alliance in Taiwan (FMPAT), have carried out such activities since 1995 (Tsai, 2004). FMPAT continues to lobby international medical institutions, such as the World Medical Association (WMA) and the World Federation of Public Health Associations (WFPHA), to support Taipei's interaction with WHO (WMA, 2006). Lobbying is effective, with the WMA becoming a reliable ally of Taipei, while both the International Council of Nurses (ICN) and the International Pharmaceutical Federation (FIP) provide public support for Taipei (Chen, 2018b).

Taipei's official activities further include health diplomacy through cooperation with friendly states, who use their status as sovereign states to speak for Taipei in some international forums and conferences (Herington and Lee, 2014). Infectious disease control and prevention is a key element of the relationship between Taipei and WHO.

[154] Bills H.R.237 and S. 249 directed the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan in the WHO, and for other purposes. For details on H.R.237, see https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/237/all-info?r=3&s=1. For details on Bill S. 249, see https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/249.

[155] See https://yoho.house.gov/media-center/in-the-news/us-bill-on-taiwan-who-observer-status-passes-first-hurdle.

From the perspective of health services and research, Taipei argues that Taiwan's exclusion from WHO is unfair; it not only treats people in Taiwan unequally, but also undermines the global health system. Taiwan has a wealth of knowledge and experience in health-related fields and knowledge in these fields can help the world's medical response when facing potential threats to global public health (Chen, 2020a).Overall, Taipei's current official attitude towards WHO can be captured in the following three points: "health is a universal human right, epidemic prevention has no borders and Taiwan can make substantial contributions to global health" (Executive Yuan, 2020).[156]

As with elsewhere, the title of Taipei's participation in WHO is a point of contention. In past applications, Taipei has mainly used three political names: the Republic of China (Taiwan), Taiwan and the Health Authorities of Taiwan. In 2007, during the second term of the Chen Shui-bian government, for instance, Taipei applied to become a 'member state' of WHO in the name of Taiwan (RTI, 2020).[157] Lin and Lin (2002) believe that Beijing's interference was an important cause for Taipei's narrowed international space. This is because the international political terminology used to refer to Taiwan and its WHO membership carry important political connotations; both sides of the Taiwan Strait regard the competition as a struggle for national sovereignty and dignity. Interviewee No. 13 (Interview with a professor, advised Washington on China policy, 2022) confirms, "I don't think there's any doubt that Taiwan wants to be in WHA and gain that kind of visibility in order to be able to a have a distinct image and presence in the organisation".

Beijing's One China Principle at WHO

Beijing's focus on Taipei at WHO is preoccupied by the One China principle, along with Taiwan's title and courtesy issues (Jin, 2017). As a specialised agency of the UN, WHO accepts only members with the status of sovereign states. According to Beijing's statement on Taiwan-related issues at the 75th WHA, the One China principle could not be challenged at WHO (Taiwan Affairs of the State Council, 2022).[158] As a part of China, Taiwan would be ineligible to join WHO on its own. Instead, Beijing wanted Taipei to join the mainland delegation to the WHA as a Chinese province. This is because the mainland understands the desire of the Taiwanese people to participate in the WHA. Beijing believes that under the One China principle, Taipei's participation can be resolved through negotiations requiring Taipei to acknowledge Taiwan as part of Chinese territory (Li, 2008a). Interviewee No. 03 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) believes that:

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[156] See "Taiwan has the right to participate in the WHA", *Major Policies*, at https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/5A8A0CB5B41DA11E/8cd79a63-cba2-4435-84e5-94f66d5b2e51.
[157] Today, 13 years ago, the first application for WHO membership as "Taiwan" was rejected, 148:17. See https://www.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/2064008.
[158] Details see http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/bmst/202205/t20220526_12438626.htm.

> This is very obvious. What Taiwan wants is not to attend the WHA. Taiwan actually wants to have a political identity. Sha Zukang, head of the Chinese WHO delegation, once said that health issues are very important – but for any sovereign country, the integrity of sovereignty is more important. The One China principle is both a bottom line and a strategy. Above this red line, there is greater flexibility to make many technical concessions. For example, the Chinese delegation proposes changing the WHO regulations to protect all countries in the world from being harassed by diseases, or ...to protect all people in the world. This would then include Taiwan and reduce political differences.

But Taipei acts contrary to the need to address health problems by refusing to recognise the One China principle and trying to expand its international influence. As a foreign policy objective, observer status offers the potential means to acquire membership in other IGOs and regain recognition and legitimacy as a sovereign state over a given duration (Herington and Lee, 2014). Thus, Beijing believes that Taipei's interest in official participation at the WHA is driven by public health and political goals: the conflict is a sovereignty dispute in the guise of concern for public health. Interviewee No. 10 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) observes that "allowing Taiwan to join the Chinese delegation group looks like a compromise in the eyes of Beijing and a surrender in the eyes of the people of Taiwan".

Regardless of whether Taipei is represented by the KMT or DPP, it seeks out an independent delegation for entry into any IGO just to prevent Beijing from representing Taiwan. The government of the ROC hopes that it can represent Taiwan and if it joins the delegation from Beijing, this will mean a loss of diplomatic rights. Such an outcome would also invoke significant backlash from Taiwan's medical community. If any Taiwanese leader accepted these terms, their administration could collapse. Interviewee No. 7 (Interview with a professor, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) agrees with this argument, saying, "I believe that this is to some extent downgrading Taipei to second class, and Beijing will not agree if the positions were reversed".

While Taipei wants to internationalise its relationship to WHO, Beijing sees the dispute as a domestic matter. Chinese diplomat Wang Guangya stated in 2008 that Taipei's desire to participate in various IGO activities was a domestic issue that should not be influenced by external forces.[159] Diplomatic recognition is one of the foundations of contemporary national systems (Rich, 2009). Beijing sees the meaning behind claims about Taiwanese public health in line with Interviewee No. 10 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022), who says, "Taipei's participation in the WHA is to gain international space and to have an official delegation that can

[159] Wang Guangya, ambassador of China to the UN (2003–2008).

attend in an official capacity. This is a straightforward way for Taipei to break out of Taiwan's diplomatic dilemma".

Shaped by considerations for political and core interests, Beijing's primary goal is to ensure that Taipei cannot change its diplomatic status through WHO. Given the possible political consequences of Taipei's WHO-related activities, Beijing has long maintained a high degree of vigilance and has emphasised that Taipei has no right to independently participate in WHO-related affairs. As Interviewee No. 11 (Interview with a former diplomat, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) notes, "it would be a breakthrough if Beijing loosened its grip on Taipei's WHA-related activities, and Taipei could make a more formal effort".

Washington's interests

The effectiveness of Taipei's activities in WHO is strongly linked to support from the US government (Lindemann, 2014). Some politicians in Washington subject to lobbying from Taipei have shown support for Taiwan's position. Washington is generally a strong supporter of Taipei's international activities, and it played the role of a facilitator of Taipei's initial application to the WHA (Chang, 2011a). The 1994 "Taiwan Policy Review" instructed the USA to support Taiwan's participation in appropriate international organisations such as WHO. Washington does so with the belief that Taiwan's human rights are at stake.

The US National Conference passed Joint Resolution 334 in 1998, marking the first expression of support for Taiwan's attendance at the WHA. The Bush Administration then signed the bill in 2000. Under the bill's guidance, the US government developed a plan to help Taiwan obtain WHA observership. In this regard, Interviewee No. 8 (Interview with a researcher at Taiwan Academia Sinica, 2022) points out, "The United States is insightful, and Washington will maintain a certain degree of strategic ambiguity. But in essence, there will also be some clear policies, including support for Taiwan's entry into the WHA, and arms sales".

In 2001, President Bush signed H.R. 428 to express American support for Taipei's participation in international organisations, including WHO.[160] At the WHA in 2001, the USA publicly declared support for Taiwan's participation in WHO affairs. By 2002, Washington had passed H.R. 2739 as the basis for continued support for Taipei's activities in WHO.[161] In 2003, the American representative to WHO proposed assisting public health entities in order to help Taipei obtain support from WHO. In 2004, US

[160] See 107th Congress, H.R. 428, Concerning the participation of Taiwan to the WHO, https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ10/PLAW-107publ10.pdf.
[161] See 107th Congress, H.R. 2739, To amend Public Law 107-10 to authorize a US plan to endorse and obtain observer status for Taiwan at the annual summit of the WHA in May 2002 in Geneva, Switzerland, and for other purposes, https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/2739?s=1&r=58.

Representative Steve Chabot put forward a draft proposal titled "To Address the Participation of Taiwan in the World Health Organization" in Congress.[162] The House of Representatives passed a bill (H.R. 4019) authorising the executive branch to support Taiwan's participation as an observer at the WHA in May of the same year.[163] This marked the first time that the USA publicly voted for Taiwan in WHA.

The Taiwan question is a major of point of conflict affecting China-US relations. Diplomatic recognition is thus the most sensitive issue in cross-strait relations. In the rivalry between Beijing and Taipei, the signals of conflict span economic, political, social, and military levels (Job, Laliberte, and Wallace, 1999). The USA believes that human rights and health issues should be a higher priority than political disputes, so Washington hopes Beijing will make concessions on WHO issue. On the other hand, the three parties and the international community understand that the issue between Taiwan and WHO is not just about human rights, and Washington's support for Taipei is often full of political signalling. Interviewee No. 5 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) affirms this, saying,

> Washington understands that supporting or not supporting Taipei in WHO means confrontation and suppression. Therefore, everyone takes into account the diplomatic symbolic meaning, international influence, and international image of these IGOs.

Overall, the WHO disputes are not just about health and hygiene. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait want to present a specific version of China to the international community. As a former IGO official (Interview, No. 1, 2021) explains:

> WHO is not a single context, it is not an island; instead, it is influenced by the wider context of this triangle. The United States has insisted on this ambiguity, which has long been a US stance. Taiwan wants to be seen, and people here want to be seen in some way. It wants to be part of the international discussion. It wants meaningful participation. But Beijing's position is that if the door is opened a little bit, there is a fear that it could lead to more things happening. In this triangle, IGOs are another way of embodying that relationship.

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[162] Representative Steve Chabot (Rep.), see https://www.congress.gov/member/steve-chabot/C000266?r=1&searchResultViewType=expanded.

[163] H.R. 4019 authorizes the Secretary of State to (1) initiate and instruct the US delegation to implement a plan to endorse and obtain observer status for Taiwan at the annual World Health Assembly summit in Geneva, Switzerland; (2) introduce a resolution in support of observer status for Taiwan at such summit. It also directs the Secretary to report annually on US efforts to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the WHA held yearly by the WHO (Text: CR H2215). See https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/4019/all-info?r=1&s=10.

The version of reality that Beijing wants to present is one in which the effective unity of the Chinese nation has only been temporarily disrupted. Because Taiwan is not a sovereign state, it can only rely on Beijing for participation in the WHO matters. Washington continues to maintain strategic ambiguity, unwilling to abandon the status quo while also wanting to use Taiwan's relevant human rights or humanitarian issues as leverage against Beijing. Taipei's position is that the political fracture across the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is a long-standing situation and the international community should not blindly support Beijing's version of the Chinese story: Taiwan is not under China and the people of Taiwan have a right to participate in the WHO affairs.

The above-mentioned trilateral positioning provides abundant evidence that the key to the triangular WHO competition lies in the different starting points of the three parties. These starting points are not singular, but incorporate multiple considerations (political and medical functions alongside human rights). The political objectives of Taipei's stance reveals WHO's role as a leverage tool. Taipei's ability to lobby Washington under the banner of humanitarianism and gain active support is a manifestation of the shared values of constructivism in the WHO competition. Taipei insists on a political identity different from that of mainland China when participating in WHO-related activities, indicating that it would rather give up the pragmatic medical function of WHO and service to public health than sacrifice political interests.

Similarly, in order to maintain its identity as a central government, Beijing is highly politically sensitive and precautionary about Taipei's participation in WHO-related activities. For Beijing, this is a necessary step to ensure that its own political interests are not violated. Washington maintains strategic ambiguity by considering shared values without ignoring political realities: on the one hand, it supports Taipei's promotion of humanitarian values; on the other, it supports the current triangular political structure.

From the standpoint of this trilateral analysis, the WHO case partly contradicts hypothesis 1, which states that idealistic factors play an important role in IGO competition. Although idealistic factors have a certain influence on the positions of the three parties, the standpoints of the three parties centre around materialistic political interests.

8.3 The WHO competition and leverage

The triangular WHO competition is multi-layered. WHO does not just play the role of a purely functional medical and health organization. Instead, it has evolved into a political lever within the Beijing–Washington–Taipei political struggle. Indeed, Interviewee No. 14 (Interview with a professor, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) affirms that "the WHA case is a microcosm or one of the most developed cases

of the general phenomenon of triangular competition between functional and political symbols in IGOs".

8.3.1 Understanding triangular WHO competition

The tripartite conflict of political interests and values arising from the relationship between Taipei and WHO is central to understanding triangular competition at WHO. In terms of the relationship between Taipei and WHO, Beijing's stance necessarily invokes the One China principle. Taipei's shelving of Beijing's stance reveals that Taipei's motives are not purely about obtaining health support. Washington recognises the humanitarian values that Taipei champions in the WHO competition, but has concerns about its political intentions. As Interviewee No. 10 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) says:

> Taiwan's relationship with WHO has never been a health issue; it's a political issue. It became a health issue because the Taiwan government wanted to make it a health issue to give other governments reason to support Taiwan in attending the WHA.

Public health crises provide an important window into how Taipei transformed its relationship to WHO. After hand, foot and mouth disease (HFMD) broke out in Taiwan in 1998 – and 78 children died from this infectious disease – public health crises became the focus of domestic public attention (Lin et al., 2003). The below analysis of the most representative public health crises, SARS and Covid-19, enable verification of hypothesis 1 on the role of idealistic factors in the WHO case.

The 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis

SARS was an important public health crisis that supported Taipei's use of humanitarianism to seek support from Washington and the international community for its participation in WHO-related activities. The spread of SARS to Taiwan in March 2003 resulted in 81 deaths (Hsieh, Chen, and Hsu, 2004). Internal political pressure in Taiwan intensified after this public health incident, pushing Taipei to seek out greater integration into global health infrastructure. The incident brought health rights to the forefront of public awareness in Taiwan and political disputes between the two sides of the Strait centred on WHO.

Ellington, Melnik, and Shattuck (2020, p. 50) claim that unlike other WHO members, "Taipei was handicapped in addressing the problem. This was because of a lack of prompt access to WHO". Chen Shui-bian himself slammed Beijing's restrictions on Taiwan's health system stemming from the SARS epidemic, which he said positioned Taiwan as a gap in global health security (Hickey, 2006). The emphasis on how Taiwan's exclusion from WHO creates security risks put Beijing in an embarrassing

position in the international community. Given Taipei's claims and the SARS pandemic itself, Beijing faced a number of accusations and pressures from the international community (Chang, 2010).

Still, Rich (2005) argued that the DPP government blamed Beijing for the rapid spread of SARS in Taiwan partly to meet the island's electoral needs. In effect, the DPP used the threat of SARS to strengthen a 'Taiwanese identity' distinct from the mainland. This created a feeling of abandonment among Taiwan residents, which in turn spread dissatisfaction with the mainland. Chen Shui-bian saw an opportunity in the SARS crisis and expanded the conflict between Taiwan and the mainland to the international arena (Shen, 2004).

Worldwide concerns about a possible global SARS pandemic eventually paved the way for Taipei to change its relationship with WHO (Shuchman, 2019). Chen Shui-bian (2007) believed that given the impact of the SARS epidemic and mounting international pressure, Beijing had to consider Taipei's right to directly access WHO support. From Beijing's perspective, this was an opportunity to solve Taiwan's public health security crisis and improve cross-strait relations. Thus, Beijing allowed WHO to send experts to Taiwan (Jin, 2017).

Out of consideration for public health in Taiwan, Beijing gave Taiwan officials the opportunity to participate in WHA and WHO technical meetings as part of the Chinese delegation group (Gao, 2005). Facing a public health crisis and international humanitarian pressure alongside a desire to demonstrate goodwill towards the people of Taiwan, Beijing chose to back down. Still, Beijing took steps to prevent some Taipei officers from politicising their activities with WHO by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2005. This agreement effectively limited WHO contacts with Taiwan officials to conditions approved by Beijing.

The 2019 coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic

Sparked by the Covid-19 global public health crisis that unfolded in 2020, disputes over Taiwanese medical rights and trilateral political divisions have intensified. Beijing and Washington blamed each other during the pandemic, and the political rivalry over Covid-19 (the origin of the virus, anti-epidemic policy, and vaccine politics) continues to play out. WHO is no longer a mere health security organisation; it is now integrated with global politics. Between 16 and 30 March 2020, US President Trump called Covid-19 'the Chinese virus' or 'kung flu' more than 20 times (*BBC,* 2020).[164] In Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen named Covid-19 the 'Wuhan pneumonia/*Wuhan feiyan'* (Noah,

[164] For details, see "President Trump calls coronavirus 'kung flu'", *BBC*, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-us-canada-53173436.

2020). Taipei's political rhetoric on Covid-19 is in line with Washington's, implicating the coexistence of politics and the virus in the triangular relationship.

Taiwan's successful protection of public health during the epidemic was praised by the international community, and 'mask diplomacy' become a breakthrough point for Taipei. Taipei initially donated 10 million masks to the USA, Europe, and other diplomatic allies during a time of global shortage. Subsequently, under the New Southbound Policy (NSP), Taipei pledged to donate one million masks to South and Southeast Asian countries identified in the policy (*Taiwan News*, 2020).[165] Taipei has assisted many countries around the world by providing medical supplies such as masks and important epidemic prevention information, thereby launching a public relations offensive and advancing soft diplomacy. As a result, Taipei gained more support for its participation in WHO activities and strengthened informal bilateral relations. But Interviewee No. 03 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) notes how "in Beijing's eyes, Taipei's mask diplomacy is nothing more than a political money game. What Beijing really cares about is Taipei's relationship with Washington and the European Union".

DeLisle (2020a) claims that given the failure of many developed countries and the dire prospects for Covid-19 in the developing world, Taiwan – as a rare and effective example – can play an outsize role far beyond its strength, thereby enhancing its international status. Taipei promised to show its achievements to foreign audiences and expressed its willingness to share expertise and lessons learnt. In November 2020, the slogan 'Taiwan can help' appeared for the first time at the Plaza des Nations in Geneva; Taipei began to publicise it on different occasions, determined to actively cooperate with the international community on Covid-19 (Office of International Cooperation, 2020).[166] As a Washington-based government think-tank analyst (Interview, No. 12, 2022) points out:

> Taiwan has some very creative, interesting, and effective ways to deal with Covid-19, and I think the world has a lot to lose by not having Taiwan involved in the conversation. In the face of the health crisis, the WHA should be more about cooperation, and the world needs the skills and assets brought by Taiwan.

Taipei's international disaster relief and humanitarian assistance is disproportionate to its tiny geographical size, and it has sent masks and other equipment to alleviate the global situation. Statements about Taiwan's model of combating Covid-19 are heavily

[165] For details, see "Taiwan to Donate 1 Million Face Masks to New Southbound Policy Countries", *Taiwan News*, 7 April 2020, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3911703.
[166] For details, see Office of International Cooperation, https://covid19.mohw.gov.tw/en/cp-4789-53866-206.html.

promoted on Taiwan's 'foreign affairs websites'.[167] By July 2020, Taiwan had donated over 51 million masks worldwide to over 80 countries, including the USA (Jay, 2020). Interviewee No. 7 (Interview with a professor, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) observes:

> The international community supports Taipei's voice in the WHA for two reasons. One is that it helps Taiwan's healthcare system. The second is that they are very advanced, and they also have a lot of contributions. Despite the existence of irresponsible politicians who want to use the WHA to elevate the government, Taipei should still be in the WHA just like the Knights of Malta.

During more recent stages of the Covid-19 crisis, Taipei effectively used its own advantages to increase international influence and attract international attention. At the same time, the USA was also going head-to-head with China over the pandemic. On 20 June 2021, for example, US national security adviser Jake Sullivan issued a stern warning that China would face "isolation in the international community if the country does not cooperate with further probes into the origin of the coronavirus pandemic" (*Fox News*, 2021)[168]. During the G7 leader summit 2021, US President Joe Biden entreated other heads of state to pressure China into allowing a transparent investigation of the origins of the pandemic. Sullivan stated that:

> The president reserves the right, through our own analysis, our own intelligence community's efforts that he has directed, and through other work that we will do with allies and partners, to continue pressing on every front until we get to the bottom of how this virus came into the world and who has accountability for that (*Washington Examiner*, 2021).[169]

On 18 May 2022, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken proposed that WHO invite Taiwan to participate in the 75th WHA as an observer, noting that "viruses do not respect borders and health for all" (Blinken, 2022).[170] Although Taiwan ultimately failed to participate in the WHA meeting, Washington nonetheless demonstrated support for Taipei.

The biopolitics caused by Covid-19 evolved into a "realm of competition, confrontation, nationalism – or more generally localism – and games of power" (Kloet, Lin, and Chow, 2020, p. 635). Differences in strategic approaches to public health, such as mask

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[167] For details, see https://en.mofa.gov.tw/theme.aspx?n=2294&sms=0&s=87.

[168] For details, see https://www.foxnews.com/politics/jake-sullivan-china-coronavirus-origin-investigation-g-7-fox-news-sunday.

[169] For details, see Jake Sullivan says administration will take no immediate action on China until there is 'international consensus', https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/biden-administration-to-rely-on-international-support-before-taking-potential-action-on-china.

[170] For details, see "Taiwan as an Observer in the WHA", PRESS STATEMENT, https://www.state.gov/taiwan-as-an-observer-in-the-world-health-assembly/

diplomacy, vaccine politics, a zero-clearing policy, and coexistence with the virus, have consistently magnified the gaps between East and West. The pandemic and its political background have given Taipei a better and imminent reason to resume participation in the WHA and expand contacts with WHO, despite deep-rooted and emerging obstacles hindering this process. The devastating crisis created an opportunity for Taipei to benefit from its ability to protect public health while enhancing Taiwan's international status. As Interviewee No. 08 (Interview with a researcher at Taiwan Academia Sinica, 2022) states,

> Taipei's use of WHO is a very useful strategy. It is difficult to make an argument for which one place should be excluded from WHO. In fact, health is an issue that the whole world should pay attention to. The second is that it is easy to attract the attention of the people in Taiwan. They feel it is unfair that they cannot participate in WHO. Most people agree that the practical application of health issues will be stronger and have a greater impact on the public. On the one hand, the WHO issue is international, and on the other hand, it is internal. Another point of view is that the political nature of health is not so extensive. The two sides are still exploring the flexible space between them, so that they can reach some consensus.

But although there were actually quite a few countries who supported Taipei's participation in the WHA during the epidemic, the mainland did not relent. According to *Xinhuanet* in May 2021:

> Beijing believes that this is a political trick played by some certain states. Its essence is to politicize the health issue of Covid-19 and interfere in China's internal affairs through the Taiwan issue. The Taiwan authorities demanded to participate in the WHA under the pretext of the so-called gap in the international epidemic prevention system, but they are using the epidemic to engage in political manipulation and use the epidemic to seek independence (*yi yi mou du*).[171]

Thus, Taipei was still unable to participate in the WHA meetings of May and November 2020.

The biggest problem with Taipei's current participation model is efficiency. The lack of direct communication channels between Taipei and WHO creates an information gap (Chen, 2017). Neither Taipei nor WHO can obtain the latest information from each other in a timely manner, which threatens the vital interests of the people of Taiwan. At the same time, Taipei is telling the international community that Taiwan acts in accordance with international rules, providing transparency and cooperation. In this

[171] For details, see http://www.xinhuanet.com/2021-05/24/c_1127486765.htm.

sense, Taiwan is acting in full compliance with system norms but is still not permitted to join. As Interviewee No. 14 (Interview with a professor, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) notes, “This is akin to a normative contest”.

There are some differences between the SARS and Covid-19 cases, but their essence is similar. Their differences lie mainly in the scale of the two public health crises, the political climate and China’s political, economic and military strength. For one, the proliferation of SARS was far less widespread than that of the global Covid-19 pandemic. For another, the three parties did not strengthen their cooperation during the pandemic owing to an increasingly tense political climate (Mitsumoto, 2020). However, the nature of both crises is no longer purely health matter as both were shaped by political factors.

The three parties had different interests and maintained their own opinions. Political identities, actual medical needs, internal politics, humanitarian values, and epidemic prevention policies all constitute the diverse elements of WHO competition. The onset of the crises became a catalyst that intensified the triangular WHO competition, igniting debates on human rights and political interests. But in the two cases of SARS and Covid-19 detailed above, Beijing and Taipei refused to compromise over sovereignty issues and the outbreaks were politicised between Beijing and Washington.

The evidence suggests that national interests are central to the WHO competition, although value factor also plays a role in the competitive process. Even in a public health crisis, humanitarian values are unable to upset political realities; for this reason, the results do not effectively test hypothesis 1 about the role of idealistic factors. In fact, the materialist factor still occupies a decisive position in the WHO competition. The three actors adopted different epidemic prevention policies and response mechanisms even as distinctions in their political systems were magnified during the public health crisis. Mistrust among them deepened and although the effects of the pandemic are winding down globally, frosty trilateral relations have yet to thaw.

Humanitarianism versus political interests

The above two sub-cases reveal whether the relationship between Taipei and WHO is a humanitarian or political issue through the focus of attention from all parties. Humanitarianism and the public health crisis play a central role in health diplomacy. Public health events are an important means for promoting the concept of health without national borders. For its part, Taipei highlighted the trans-boundary nature of health risks to leverage more influence (Herington and Lee, 2014). Taiwan portrayed a ‘victim image’ to the international community, putting international pressure on Beijing. Taipei used health grounds as the basis for a lofty-sounding argument in its application to participate in the WHA, but emphasised its official delegation status. Interviewee No. 10 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) points out that “in fact, standing on the international stage is what the Taiwan government really wants”.

In addition to international benefits, the topic of Taiwan and WHO carries political currency within Taiwan. Although Lee Teng-hui knew that Taipei's application to the WHA had a low probability of success and would anger the mainland, the act could generate enormous support from the Foundation of Medical Professionals Alliance in Taiwan; the DPP further generated significant public support for independence (Tubilewicz, 2012). Interviewee No. 08 (Interview with an expert at Taiwan Academia Sinica, 2022) confirms:

> I think one of the aims of the Taiwan government is to increase domestic support. All major countries support Taiwan's participation in the WHA, and only the mainland suppresses it. This is a good 'selling point' that can strengthen a negative view of the mainland in Taiwan. The second aim is that, in fact, Taiwan is also seeking international breakthroughs.

Taipei's use of suppressive psychology is related to Lee Teng-hui's exaggeration of the sorrow of the people of Taiwan, or 'sad politics'.[172] Taipei's political motivation is to make both the international community and the people of Taiwan realise that it is unreasonable to exclude Taiwan from the international health system through this process. Interviewee No. 09 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) states that:

> Taipei actually enjoys being suppressed by Beijing as it proves to the people of Taiwan that Taiwan is being suppressed, strengthens the gap with the mainland, and creates more resistance. In addition to political interests, there are psychological factors.

As Lee Teng-hui described, "this tactic is a potential means of leveraging participation in IGOs and, in time to gain recognition and legitimacy as an independent state" (Herington and Lee, 2014, p. 6). Taipei's pursuit of political interests such as international recognition stems more from concern for Taiwan's identity, which implicates the underlying interests and primary purpose of Lee Teng-hui's activities in WHO: to return to the UN, establish a de facto independent sovereignty, and obtain an international legal personality (Yeh, 2002; Niu, 2007). There is also the view that both the DPP and KMT governments were more pragmatic in the WHA case as neither tried to gain recognition in international jurisprudence.

Taipei's political aims exist, but Beijing also ignores the humanitarian needs of the people of Taiwan for political interests. This political competition is not simply a

[172] Taiwan has suffered long-term colonial rule by the Netherlands, Japan, and other foreign nations throughout history. Over time, Taiwan's local sense of grief was formed. As Taiwan's democratic system and party politics developed, a 'culture of sadness' and politics formed an interactive relationship. A large number of DPP members popularise a kind of exaggerated tragicism, which is then reflected in Taiwan's suppression by Beijing in the international community (Li and Sun, 2006).

unilateral one played by Taipei; Beijing is also obsessed with it. Beijing insists on representing Taiwan in systems such as WHO, but Beijing has not succeeded in controlling Taiwan and has no access to Taiwan's medical information. Interviewee No. 14 (Interview with a professor, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) affirms such a characterisation, saying, "Both sides are playing the status game".

In Beijing's view, the only way for Taipei to participate internationally is to accept Beijing's version of China. As Interviewee No. 08 (Interview with an expert at Taiwan Academia Sinica, 2022) points out, "Beijing said you need to negotiate with me and it must be under the One China principle. This issue is actually still a deadlock, but it is clear that Taipei will continue to test the matter". Taipei's position is that if it joined the Chinese delegation, then it would seem Taiwan is fundamentally moving in the direction of China having a single government – even though Taipei now insists that China is two different governments. A former IGO official (Interview, No. 1, 2021) agrees, noting, "I believe Taipei's reluctance to accept offers from Beijing has something to do with the terms and names, which may have had a demeaning effect on Taipei".

Taipei's relationship to WHO is thus highly politicised and cannot be separated from current China-US disputes (Zhang and Savage, 2020). A deterioration in China-US relations could lead to a boost in Washington's support for Taipei at WHO – a product of the US government's highly transactional practice of foreign policy (Shattuck, 2020). Within the context of the epidemic, Washington has frequently expressed its position on the relationship between Taipei and WHO in humanitarian terms, emphasising that "it is unreasonable to exclude the people of Taiwan from the world health system, and Washington supports Taiwan's participation in the WHA as an observer" (Pompeo, 2020 and Blinken, 2022).[173] Washington's support for Taipei is closely related to shared values, as opposed to the value conflicts between China and the USA. In the triangle, Washington and Taipei are in the same group while Beijing is excluded. Interviewee No. 08 (Interview with an expert at Taiwan Academia Sinica, 2022) confirms this, noting that "in the rivalry situation between the United States and China, one of the most important excuses is the so-called value system".

When it comes to the benefits of IGOs to the USA, Washington actually wants to moderate the relationship between Beijing and Taipei in the field of IGOs given positive feedback from Taipei's participation in IGOs. To illustrate, interviewee No. 11 (Interview with a former diplomat, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) points out, "I don't think it's right for Beijing to try to link IGOs to the discussion of statehood

[173] Michael Richard Pompeo served under President Donald Trump as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 2017 to 2018 and as the Secretary of State from 2018 to 2021. For details, see https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/us-china-clash-looms-taiwans-invite-global-health-meeting/ and "Taiwan as an Observer in the World Health Assembly", https://www.state.gov/taiwan-as-an-observer-in-the-world-health-assembly/.

as that's a separate topic. Beijing should consider the positive benefits to the international community of including Taiwan in the WHA and other organisations".

While blocking Taipei's participation in WHO-related activities lies in Beijing's core interest of safeguarding Chinese sovereignty, public health crises such as SARS and Covid-19 alongside US interference effectively put Beijing in an awkward position (Chien, 2003; Collins, 2020). The discourses on humanitarianism and global health security in Taipei and Washington offer a rationale for improving the relationship between Taipei and WHO. As interviewee No. 7 (Interview with a professor, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) says, "I admit that some DPP members do want to gain benefits other than health through the WHA. But Taiwan's issue with the WHA is above all global health: it's good for everyone and it's good for the mainland as well".

Bremmer (2020) believes that politics and health should be distinguished from one another. Respecting China's diplomatic sensitivity is one element, while caring about the health of nearly 24 million people in Taiwan is another. Interviewee No. 11 (Interview with a former diplomat, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) emphasises this point, stating, "I believe that all this is the result of Beijing's unilateral politicisation of the relationship between Taipei and WHO … It is not a political organisation like the UN; it is a functional organisation".

But the humanitarian purpose of WHO has not been able to break the cross-strait political deadlock. In the eyes of the parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, political factors (including political status and terminology) take priority over humanitarian and health rights. Washington has been ambiguous, advocating humanitarianism while trying to avoid undermining the triangular status quo. The failure of Taiwan's application for the WHO membership in 2007 had already shown that making a strong claim to sovereignty would only make WHO members more hesitant to support Taipei – even those who had long supported Taipei (Chen, 2018b). In fact, Interviewee No. 10 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) points out that "the more Taipei can avoid sensitive sovereignty issues, the more likely it is to win support from other countries".

Confronted with the dilemma of humanitarian and political interests, both sides of the strait had to reduce their respective political goals in the WHO affairs. At the same time, Washington needed to ensure that Taipei would not exploit its relationship with WHO as an independent international attribute. The key issue in cross-strait differences was whether Taipei would actually care about medical and health conditions in Taiwan over wasting resources on political goals (Li, 2008a). A Chinese government think tank scholar (Interview, No. 2, 2021) points out that:

> From Beijing's perspective, Taipei's application to participate in the WHA has a strong political aim of dividing China's national sovereignty. Although subjectively speaking, when it comes to the WHO issue, Taipei does not

> necessarily rank this so-called political purpose first – but it definitely has a political purpose. For the United States and its so-called humanitarian support for Taiwan, I think this is normal. Humanitarianism may be a factor affecting relations between countries, but I think it is difficult for Taipei to expand its influence through shared humanitarian values.

Based on the above in-depth analysis of the relationship between humanitarian and political interests, this thesis identifies the following characteristics:

1. The triangular WHO competition is not just a humanitarian matter, but also a political one in which Taipei seeks the legitimacy of international sovereignty through WHO.
2. Humanitarianism is an important shared value through which Taipei receives international support from Washington and others.
3. In the triangular WHO competition, actors place more emphasis on political than on humanitarian interests.
4. Taipei's promotion of humanitarianism has both external and internal impacts. Externally, this tactic creates an important potential breakthrough point in Taiwan's current international status. Internally, it provides a point of contradiction that arouses disgust with Beijing among the Taiwanese public.

Hypothesis 1 of this study presupposes that idealist and materialist factors are equally important in WHO competition. However, Taipei did not give up its pursuit of international legitimacy for Taiwan's sovereignty in order to obtain WHO medical resources for public health and safety. Whether in terms of motives or influence, idealistic factors such as humanitarian values did not play an important role in the WHO competition as presupposed in hypothesis 1. This thesis does not deny that Beijing, Washington, and Taipei consider humanitarian interests, but relative to their core political interests, humanitarian ones appear weak.

8.3.2 The leverage of WHO

The purpose of this subsection is to test hypothesis 2 – the leverage effect of WHO in triangular competition. The WHO competition combines political elements and goals in parallel to health issues. In Taipei's eyes, the specific characteristics of WHO make it a high-quality lever to achieve many internal and external effects. The pursuit of WHA observer status was a manifestation of Taipei's implementation of an internationalisation policy during its economic development in 1992. In November 1997, the DPP issued a white paper titled "Foreign Policy for the 21st Century" that clearly stated Taipei would pursue participation in international organisations (Hickson, 2003). That same year, Lee Teng-hui began to argue, on humanitarian and scientific grounds, that international health cooperation should not be constrained by broader political issues (Herington and Lee, 2014). As Interviewee No. 3 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) states,

> Taipei's long-term emphasis on IGOs, with the help of its excellent medical talent pool, has been working in the WHO field. Its understanding of the political significance of IGOs predates Beijing, and it sees WHO as a lever to use.

Leverage toolkits: regulations and financial/manpower contributions in the WHO case

In terms of the Beijing–Washington–Taipei relationship and WHO, Beijing and Washington exist within the organisation and have established advantages such as voice and legitimacy. In contrast, Taipei exists outside WHO and can really only seek out Washington's support or exploit the rules of the WHO charter. Interviewee No. 3 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) notes that "regulations, monetary contributions, and human resources used to influence IGOs are all...strategies that will determine who has a voice in WHO".

WHO regulations. The WHO rules provide a viable opportunity for Taipei to participate in WHO-related activities. Taipei's priority is to become an observer at the WHA, which is held every May. Although WHO itself does not have observer seats, the WHA does accept attending entities on an observer basis.

Rules of Procedure of the WHA:[174]

> "Notices … The Director-General may invite States having made application for membership, territories on whose behalf application for associate membership has been made, and States which have signed but not accepted the Constitution to send observers to sessions of the Health Assembly". (*Sessions of the Health Assembly, Rule 3)*

Taipei uses WHO member states who have diplomatic relations with Taiwan to submit a supplementary agenda item calling for the admission of Taiwan as an observer to the WHA. Specific cases occurred in April and May 2018, when Taipei's diplomatic allies (e.g., Belize, Tuvalu, and Eswatini, as well as another 12 WHO member states) submitted a proposal for a supplementary agenda item "inviting Taiwan to participate in the WHA as an observer" (*Taipei Times*, 2018).[175]

The rules thus offer Taipei an opportunity to participate in the WHA without clarifying its legal status. Entities with various legal statuses are included in the list of observers to the WHA, such as the Vatican, the Palestinian Authority, the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the South Centre Organisation, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. However, such proposals from Taiwan are usually

[174] See https://apps.who.int/gb/EDG/pdf_files/Ref-docs/rules-of-procedure-en.pdf.
[175] See Lu Yi-hsuan, "Fifteen allies back WHA observer status", *Taipei Times*, 22 May 2018, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/05/22/2003693491.

rejected by the General Committee on the grounds that WHA Resolution 25.1 in 1972 established the PRC as the sole representative of China within WHO (*WHA59*, 2006).

Taipei's use of WHO's leverage is based on the protection of a basic human right to health under Article 2 of the WHO Charter. Article 2 implies that all human beings should set aside political ideologies and disputes when dealing with global public health. This position is supported by recognition of human rights in general and provides an important basis for Taiwan's ability to gain sympathy from the US-led Western world. Human rights issues have always been one of the core elements of Western criticism of Chinese government. When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited the USA for a summit, for instance, Obama used human rights issues to pressure Beijing to act (Wilson, 2008). Taipei's understanding of the sensitive points in the relationship between China and the Western world enables Taipei to make better use of the differences between Beijing and the West to achieve its own goals.

Next, Taipei questioned the implementation target of Resolution WHA25.1 (see below). Taipei believed that the resolution only addressed the issue of cross-strait representation in WHO, not the health of Taiwan's 24 million people. What WHO expelled was Chiang Kai-shek's government before Taiwan's democratisation, and that government did not represent Taiwan residents. In a 2022 *Central News Agency* (CNA) report, Taipei claimed that "only the democratically elected government of Taiwan can represent the people of Taiwan in WHO; the health and human rights of the people of Taiwan are protected by the Taiwan government of the ROC, and the Chinese government has neither the right nor the ability to do so".[176]

> WHA25.1 Representation of China in the World Health Organization
>
> Recalling the ….in all organizations related to it;
>
> "Noting … recognize the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only Government having the right to represent China in the World Health Organization, Decides to restore all its rights to the PRC … to the WHO, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the WHO."
>
> Third plenary meeting, 10 May 1972.

Another point of view in Taipei is that the WHO Charter and the existence of WHA observers show that WHO is more of a functional organisation, which means that state

[176] See Huang Yashi, "WHA Vetoes Taiwan Observers", *CNA*, 23 May 2022, https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202205230342.aspx.

sovereignty is not prerequisite for participation in WHO affairs. Accordingly, McNeil (2003) claimed that Taiwan's lack of inclusion in WHO amounted to medical apartheid.

In 2005, Taipei took advantage of new International Health Regulations (IHRs) at WHO. The IHRs were adopted by the WHA in 1961, but it was not until 1995 that the WHA decided to start revising the IHRs in light of the increasingly global spread of disease and travel. The new version of the IHRs requires countries to report disease outbreaks and, in order to improve the efficiency of contact between countries and WHO, requires each signatory to establish an IHR Focal Point[177]. This was a rare opportunity for Taipei, which actively lobbied for Article 3 and Article 65 of the IHRs in order to qualify as a contact point (Yang, 2010). In terms of Article 3, Taipei wanted to join the universal application principle. In terms of Article 65, Taipei proposed (through the representative of Nicaragua) allowing independent health systems to join. For Taipei, IHR created a channel through which it believed it could gradually begin to participate directly in the WHO affairs.

Beijing "disagreed and pointed to a memorandum it negotiated with WHO in May 2005 that requires China's consent before WHO has any direct contact with Taiwan" (Fidler and Gostin, 2006, p. 93). In 2005, China signed a memorandum with WHO to define the relationship between Taipei and WHO in the form of rules that stated:

> Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2005
>
> Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between the WHO Secretariat and China. The MOU specified that Taiwan not be allowed to participate under the names "Taiwan" or the "ROC"; if Taiwan was invited, then the PRC must approve in advance all communications between the WHO and Taiwan, and all communications between the WHO and Taiwan must be conducted through contacts in China, not Taiwan.

Beijing also submitted a statement to WHO in 2007 noting that the Chinese Ministry of Health was the only point of contact for the IHRs in China. It emphasised that the IHRs covered the whole territory of China, which includes the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions as well as the province of Taiwan (Central People's Government, 2007).[178] China thus re-regulated the relationship between Taiwan and the IHR on the basis of the 2005 MOU on Taiwan Status, which clarified that Taiwan's

[177] The Regulations define a National IHR Focal Point as "the national centre, designated by each State Party which shall be accessible at all times for communications with WHO IHR Contact Points under these Regulations". See https://www.who.int/teams/ihr/national-focal-points#:~:text=The%20Regulations%20define%20a%20National,Contact%20Points%20under%20these%20Regulations%22.

[178] See http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2007-05/14/content_614312.htm.

inclusion in the IHR did not change Taiwan's status in WHO as a province of China. It further pointed out that as a province, Taiwan could not become a party to the IHR.

These memorandums between China and WHO Secretariat forms the principles for all interactions between WHO and Taipei, and these MOUs together set out the scope of Taipei's participation in WHO activities (Chen, 2018b). China intended to cooperate with WHO on behalf of Taipei and serve as a bridge to convey information while demonstrating sovereignty over Taiwan.


For a long time, then, the rules have been a useful tool for leveraging WHO. All three parties have worked hard to find suitable support point for their positions through the rules. But given Beijing's inherently dominant position and strength in WHO, use of the rules by Taipei in particular was unable to change the status quo within WHO.

Financial contributions. The monetary contributions of WHO members is an important indicator that can directly affect the day-to-day operations of the organisation. Taipei is not a member of WHO, so Taiwan makes no direct monetary contributions. But Taipei has its ally Washington in WHO. Hickey (2000) noted that the USA could use its dominance over the WHO budget to influence the organisation to formulate policies. Washington's threat to withhold the WHO contributions in 1989, for example, successfully blocked the membership application from the Palestine Liberation Organisation (Mingst, 1992).

According to data released by WHO Institutional Repository for Information Sharing (IRIS)[179], China's contributions have increased significantly. From 1972 to 2021, the share of contributions from China and the USA to the overall WHO budget followed opposite trends (see Figure 8.1 below). The American share decreased from 30.84% in 1972 to 22% in 2021, while the Chinese share increased from 3.61% to 12.01% for the same period. Although the USA has always been the top contributor, China now ranks second. It is worth noting that China's share dropped to its lowest point of 0.76% in 1995, but began to rise rapidly in 2000 and beyond.

[179] For source data, WHO budget, see https://apps.who.int/iris/.

Figure 8.1: Scale of assessment of the WHO budget (the USA and China, 1971–2021)



With the increase in China's contributions to WHO, Beijing's voice and status at the organisation were strengthened. The establishment of a dominant position helped Beijing better exploit WHO tools to address Taipei's demands. But, at the same time, China has also faced accusations from the West with the outbreak of SARS and Covid-19, given its direct relationship with WHO. For example, *The New York Times* published an article in November 2020 accusing China of swaying WHO investigation into the origin of the new coronavirus (Selam et al., 2020). In August 2021, *The Times* published another article titled "China, the WHO and the Power Grab that Fuelled a Pandemic" that claimed China was pursuing power within WHO, which was appointing China's candidate for Director-General – and that when the Covid-19 virus emerged, WHO leadership prioritised China's economic interests by enabling the spread of the virus (Jonathan and George, 2021).

China's increasingly prominent status and contributions to the organisation were bound to attract more attention from the West. As China competed with the USA, Western allies could provide an international voice of support for Taipei to exert influence over Beijing. Regardless, China was becoming more and more important to WHO, giving Beijing an advantage on issues related to Taipei and WHO itself.


Manpower. In addition to concerns about rules and monetary contributions, the composition of WHO's internal staff also became a cause for concern in the competition at WHO. Since the establishment of WHO in 1948, the term of the Director-General has been limited to five years (except in special circumstances). As shown in Table 8.1 below, successive Director-Generals have come from different countries and regions.

Table 8.1: List of WHO Director-Generals by nationality, from 1948 to the present[180]

Director-General of the World Health Organization (Since 1948)	
Year	Director-General of WHO
1948–1953	George Brock Chisholm (Canada)
1953–1973	Dr Marcolino Gomes Candau (Brazil)
1973–1988	Dr Halfdan Theodor Mahler (Denmark)
1988–1998	Dr Hiroshi Nakajima (Japan)
1998–2003	Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway)
2003–2006	Dr Lee Jong-wook (South Korea, died suddenly on 22 May 2006, two years before the end of his five-year term)
2007–2017	Dr Margaret Chan (Hong Kong, China)
2017 to present	Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus (Ethiopia)

Among them, one (Dr Chan) has been from China and none has been from the USA, although a majority (62.5%) are from developed countries, see Figure 8.2 below.

Figure 8.2: Proportion of the WHO Director-Generals from developing countries and developed countries, from 1948 to the present



[180] For source data, see https://www.who.int/director-general/who-headquarters-leadership-team.

In the Beijing–Washington–Taipei competition at WHO, then, the election of Dr Chan from Hong Kong as the WHO Director-General worried Taipei and Washington even though Taipei was not a member. Taipei naturally saw its own WHO activities as more restricted. Dr Chan, who has a Chinese background, was further attacked by the Associated Press during her tenure, which accused her of spending far more on business travel than on public health programs (*NBC News*, 2017).[181]


Apart from Dr Chan's tenure as WHO Director-General, the Covid-19 epidemic period has become an important stage of the triangular WHO competition (2020-2022). During this three-year period, Taipei's allies have repeatedly invited Taiwan to participate in the WHA to fight the pandemic. Therefore, this study conducts a more in-depth analysis of WHO human resources during this important period. The analysis objects include a total of three categories, they are WHO Director-General, senior officials of the Secretariat and WHA President.

WHO Director-General Dr Tedros is from Ethiopia. He visited China in the early stage of the epidemic and expressed his support for Beijing. Therefore, Western countries headed by the United States hyped up and carried out verbal attacks. For example, Collins (2020) pointed out that the Covid-19 epidemic also saw Dr Tedros, a Director-General from an African country, face accusations from Western countries calling him a "spokesperson for China". However, the results show that despite criticism from Washington and Taipei, the Director-General has not compromised on Taiwan-WHO relations due to Covid-19 and US pressure.

For senior officials of the WHO Secretariat, Figure 8.3 shows the regional composition of the leadership team at WHO headquarters in Geneva. From 2017 to 2022, for instance, there were a total of 20 members; two were from the USA (Dr Samira Asma and Mr Stewart Simonson) and one was from China (Dr Ren Minghui); the rest were from all over the world. While the regional makeup of these senior officials is not decisive, these officials are influenced to some extent by the policies of their home countries. Such a pattern gives China and the USA a certain advantage in the allocation of personnel in WHO.

[181] See "WHO Spends More on Travel Than on AIDS, Malaria", *NBC News*, 22 May 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/who-spends-more-travel-aids-malaria-n762896.

Figure 8.3: 2017–2022 WHO headquarters leadership team regional composition



As the third human resource, the WHA president has experienced WHA 73, 74 and 75 during 2020-2022. These three presidents were Keva Bain (Bahamas), Dechen Wangmo (Bhutan) and Ahmed Robleh Abdilleh (Djibouti)[182]. These three WHA presidents were all from developing countries. Except for Bhutan, the other two countries have established diplomatic relations with China.

President WHA73 was from the Bahamas. China and the Bahamas established diplomatic relations in 1997. Beijing stated that since the outbreak of Covid-19 in 2020, China and the Bahamas have actively carried out anti-epidemic cooperation (FMPRC, 2023)[183]. Dechen Wangmo is from Bhutan. Bhutan's diplomacy is constrained by India and has no diplomatic ties with any of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Therefore, the nationality of the president of WHA74 has little reference value for the triangular WHO competition. The President of WHA 75 was from Djibouti. China has a close relationship with Djibouti, and even China's only overseas military base was deployed in this country in 2017. While there is no direct evidence that WHA presidents would enhance Beijing's ability to use WHO because of his home country's close ties to China, Taiwan has been unsuccessful in participating in the WHA during the pandemic (2020-2022).

In fact, human resource competition is ubiquitous at WHO. As one scholar (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, No. 3, 2022) points out:

[182] For source data, see https://www.who.int/about/governance/world-health-assembly.

[183] See https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/bmz_679954/1206_680056/sbgx_680060/.

> I think human resource competition plays out in some tactics at a micro level. An anonymous Chinese diplomat in Geneva explained how to solve the problem of Taipei wanting to enter the venue when the WHA is held every year. WHO staff use a very simple method, which is to check passports. You can only enter the building with such an identification document, so Taiwan officials cannot enter. This is a particularly simple way, but you have to play the game through human resources. The game is not just played at a high-level position, such as the that of the Secretariat of an international organisation or using such serious means. Instead, it plays out through very mundane tactics and can be addressed through a good relationship with a security guard.

At WHO, Chinese and American manpower contributions are part of the competition. Beijing is increasing the training of international civil servants to meet China's growing international responsibilities in IGOs (Li, 2018). The three parties are thus engaged in a political wrestling match over the WHO affairs, and the toolkits they use are important. Interviewee No. 10 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) affirms this, saying,

> When the WHA is held in Geneva every year, diplomats from the three parties run around negotiating with various delegations. Many times, what we see on the surface is actually a game that has been completed in private through various toolkits.

The data indicate that Beijing has an advantage over Taipei in monetary and human resources contributions to WHO. From the outside, Taipei can indeed make good use of the WHO rules about humanitarian obligations. But judging from the current competition results, Beijing firmly controls the situation within WHO. This responds to hypothesis 2 on whether monetary and human resource contributions to WHO can influence an actor's ability to leverage WHO.

At the same time, Taipei's participation in WHO activities is affected by many factors and Beijing has not achieved a monopoly in WHO. Influential factors include goodwill/approval in terms of the image and credibility of Beijing towards Taipei (Tubilewicz, 2012); expansive domestic support for Taiwan's WHO-related activities; and strong international support for Taiwan's participation (Lindemann, 2014). Faced with such a situation, Taipei's odds of success are enhanced by depicting its participation in WHO as serving a functional purpose rather than meeting a political need (Delisle and Cozen, 2009).

8.3.3 The analysis of WHO competition

The effects of WHO leverage

The triangular WHO competition is a multi-layered combination of political and humanitarian interests, and WHO has played an important leverage role. For this reason, Beijing remains sceptical of Taipei's motives for applying to the WHO/WHA. As one former IGO official (Interview, No. 1, 2021) puts it, "I would say everything is political. Any government decision has political implications or is driven by political considerations".

Under such circumstances, Beijing adopted different attitudes towards Taiwanese leaders with different political inclinations. After Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008, the relationship between Taipei and Beijing improved. Ma proposed a diplomatic truce, selecting WHA observer status as the IGO target and terminating a membership application to the UN to increase the success rate of acquiring WHA observer status (Shih, 2008). Taipei's failure to make substantial progress in the WHA would challenge the credibility of Ma's foreign policy, causing the KMT to face enormous political pressure from the DPP and the public. Beijing thus decided to agree to invite Chinese Taipei to participate in the 62nd WHA as an observer to satisfy both sides of the Taiwan Strait in 2009 (Chen, 2018b). Then-Director-General Margaret Chan issued an invitation letter to Taiwan's Director of Health, Ye Jinchuan. This marked the first time since 1972 that Taipei had participated in the meeting; Taiwan regarded the breakthrough as a successful example of global health diplomacy.

The move was actually far more significant than the previous easing of trade and economic restrictions (*The Economist*, 2009). Cabestan and DeLisle (2014) point out that cross-strait relations have often adopted a framework of *economics first, politics later* or *easy first, difficult later*. Economic integration across the Taiwan Strait has advanced rapidly. But resolving the WHA issue meant that cross-strait relations would shift from economics to politics, so the new relationship between Taipei and WHA is very important. Beijing's acquiescence to Taipei's observer status meant relaxing its long-held position that Taiwan has no independent standing on which to participate in the sovereign state-only UN and its subsidiary bodies (DeLisle and Cozen, 2009).

At the same time, Beijing took several measures to maintain its predominance in WHO. First, Beijing learned from the WTO model and took the initiative to modify the rules of WHO – changing the criteria for observers from international health organisation entities to regional ones. Secondly, it limited the permanence of Taiwan's seat by ensuring that it had be approved annually by Beijing (Chen and Cohen, 2020). This would largely limit Taipei's use of WHO as a stepping stone to joining the UN.

Taipei's participation in the WHA had a leverage effect. Western governments and media led by the USA expressed support for Taiwan, ensuring that participation would

enable Taipei to quickly obtain information on global health issues, improve defence measures against major global epidemics, and expand Taipei's diplomatic space (Tubilewicz, 2012). For Taipei, this support and approval set an example for Taiwan's potential participation in other UN-related activities. Successful breakthrough in WHO, a specialised agency of the UN, would be likely to have a positive impact on Taiwan's bid to host the UN (Chen, 2017). During Ma Ying-jeou's tenure, Taipei was invited to be an observer at the WHA under the name of Chinese Taipei no less than eight times (Chen and Cohen, 2020). Taipei thus achieved the double promotion of issuing statements and bilateral meetings by participating in the WHA (Chen, 2018b). This greatly elevated Taipei's voice in the international community and extended access to WHO leverage.

But not everyone in Taiwan was satisfied with Taipei's new relationship with WHO. The DPP believed that both Chinese Taipei and the WHA observer status were the outcome of compromise; further, WHA observer status was only a small part of the DPP goal of expanding Taiwan's international status (Herington and Lee, 2014). After the 2016 election, Tsai Ing-wen refused to accept the One China principle. With that, Beijing rescinded its invitation to Taipei to attend the WHA for eight consecutive years (Chen and Cohen, 2020). Differences in the treatment of the Tsai Ing-wen and Ma Ying-jeou administrations at the WHA reveal Beijing's influence. As Interviewee No. 13 (Interview with a professor, advised Washington on China policy, 2022) says,

> The WHA is seen in Taiwan as something they can realistically wish to attend, at least sometimes. The WHA was more of a real political issue, and Taipei was trying to figure out how to get in. But Beijing has sufficient influence in this matter. When Beijing wants to reward Taiwan's leaders, they will allow Taipei in; when Beijing wants to punish Taiwan's leaders, Beijing will say no.

A similar situation emerged in the field of civil aviation. Fuelled by Ma Ying-jeou's endorsement of the 1992 Consensus, relations between Beijing and Taipei warmed more than ever and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) invited Taipei to its 2013 Assembly. Once Tsai Ing-wen came into power, conflict over the One China principle and corresponding disputes grew worse and Taipei was subsequently denied attendance at the ICAO Assembly. The decision created sympathy for Taipei and international pressure for Beijing (Ralph, 2016).

Beijing favoured KMT rule over that of the DPP in Taiwan. The KMT is generally more conservative than the DPP but more importantly, it is "more amenable to business, political, and cultural ties with Beijing" (Ellington, Melnik, and Shattuck 2020, p. 52). With the Covid-19 outbreak after Tsai Ing-wen came to power, Beijing showed a tougher attitude – suggesting that cross-strait relations are an important factor affecting the relationship between Taipei and WHO. WHA73, which resumed after the pandemic,

was held online from 9-14 November 2020. Taipei used its allies to mention Taiwan and Covid-19 at this WHA, hoping to attract global attention (Liang, 2020).

Taipei's efforts to obtain WHA observer status had expanded its influence, but long-term concerns about status quo cross-strait relations have hindered progress (Herington and Lee, 2014). Beijing can make concessions, but only if Taipei acknowledges its provincial status (Hickson, 2003). Taipei's access to WHO has been limited because it requires Beijing's permission to participate in WHO's technical meetings (Shuchman, 2019). Beijing's influence is changing as China is stronger than before, and the effectiveness of international pressure on Beijing is gradually diminishing. Interviewee No. 10 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) agrees, saying, "I think in the face of the strength of Beijing's mobilisation and control in WHO, Taipei may not be able to use the WHA to expand its participation".

The WHO case has demonstrated its leverage effect in that it has produced far more functions beyond strictly public health at various times. Interviewee No. 12 (Interview with a senior policy analyst at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2022) affirms this, saying, "I believe that Taipei is using specific agencies like WHA as IGO leverage, and they know to elevate those specific organizations to be effective. It would draw attention to its very unique status and garner support for greater inclusion." These evidence and arguments about WHO triangular competition validate hypothesis 2 on the role of WHO levers and actors' contributions of human resources and money to WHO.

But the underlying triangular relationship is based on realism. So as Beijing's political and economic strength continues to develop, it is less and less likely that Taipei will be able to exert pressure on Beijing through Washington and the international community to affect its relationship with WHO.

The theoretical analysis of the WHO case

There have been various factors in the triangular WHO competition including *international status, political interests, public health interests, public health crises, humanitarianism, identity,* and *domestic politics*. Realist political interests remain at the core of the WHO triangular competition. The influence of domestic politics follows the criterion of realism. For example, Taiwan's internal politics is one of the key factors that lead to Taipei's reluctance to compromise. The Taiwan leaders' concerns on internal politics stemming from the high election vote are embodied in the WHO issues internationally. It has become a way for some Taiwanese politicians to gain electoral support.

With its medical functions, the WHO also conforms to neoliberal institutionalism's description of IGOs. On this basis, constructivist identity and humanitarian values can have a certain influence on the triangular competition. This is in line with the

explanation of the compound theoretical framework in this study, which holds that the triangular IGO competition is affected by a range of factors spanning multiple levels.

New dynamics have recently emerged in the triangular relations. The bilateral relations between China and the US have entered an era of major change. Beijing and Washington have reached a deadlock, which has created new dynamics for Taipei to exploit (Yeung, 2019). The emergence of a global public health crisis also caused Taipei's efforts to resonate to a certain extent internationally, as the WHO needed Taiwan even more. Interviewee No. 12 (Interview with a senior analyst at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2022) endorses the argument, noting, "This is not just about a place to increase Taiwan's international visible standing; there is a symbiotic relationship between the WHO and Taiwan".

Epidemic prevention measures implemented against China at the borders of the US and other Western countries were another manifestation of China-US relations. In December 2022, Beijing abandoned its Zero Covid policy and gradually opened its borders to reconnect with the world. But Western countries that have been open for a long time began to implement Covid-19 restrictions on Chinese travellers. For instance, Washington announced that it would begin to implement entry restrictions on Chinese travellers at the border starting 28 December 2022, requiring a negative test certificate for Covid-19 (BBC, 2023).[184] On 3 January 2023, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning responded, saying:

> Some countries have adopted some excessive measures to restrict the entry of Chinese travellers, which is unacceptable. We are against attempts to manipulate epidemic prevention and control measures to achieve political goals. We will take corresponding measures … in different situations.[185]

China and the US embarked on a diplomatic war of words over border epidemic prevention measures. Clearly, public health and the pandemic have become part of the triangular political competition, with priorities changing alongside the dynamics of the triangular relationship. Taipei's policy for IGOs has always revolved around gaining space to participate in international activities without compromising sovereignty claims (Lindemann, 2014). Taipei's appeal for WHA observer status is a smart move, but it also harms Beijing's core interests. In this regard, Interviewee No. 14 (Interview with a professor, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) points out:

> Taipei is shrewd about pushing into those IGOs where it can make the best substantive claims. Because being excluded from WHO has real and substantial consequences, Taiwan can honestly say that tolerance is important.

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[184] For details, see https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-64143235.
[185] For details, see https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202301/t20230103_11000238.shtml.

> But it also means that tolerance then opens the door for Taiwan to engage with UN-affiliated professional organizations. This is a status attribute in the international system. So, Taiwan is essentially playing the functional interest card to get some symbolic games. Of course, this also includes competition with Beijing. Part of Taipei's international strategy is to accumulate as many attributes of statehood as possible, including meaningful participation or observer status in UN-related organisations, full membership, and more.

Therefore, from the perspective of the compound theory, the motivations and strategies of the three parties in the WHO competition are multi-layered. Taipei's motives include the dual attributes of the pursuit of political interests/identity and medical resources. Beijing's decision is mainly based on the political interests of the One China Principle. At the same time, it also considers its preferences for the different political parties in Taiwan. Washington has voiced concerns that Taiwan could become a global health security vulnerability and hence advocated humanitarian values. In terms of strategies, Taipei continues to use ideal values such as humanitarianism and democratic values to lobby the US. During the epidemic, it also conducted pragmatic mask diplomacy. In addition to continuing to emphasize its international legal status, Beijing uses materialistic ways of contributing human resources and money to WHO. Washington has been emphasizing the health rights of the people of Taiwan and exerting political pressure on Beijing amid the public health crisis by collaborating with its allies.

In short, the evidence shows that the triangular WHO competition conforms to the compound theory consisting of idealistic and materialist considerations. However, the weights of idealistic factors and materialistic factors are different. Material factors are still fundamental for the outcome of the competition. When dealing with cross-Strait political issues, Beijing shows its abidance by the principle of realism to protect its core interests. For example, Beijing's invitation to Ma Ying-jeou to participate in the WHA and its refusal to invite Tsai Ing-wen's government shows that political reasons are key to whether Taipei secures the right to participate in the WHA. Such dynamic changes show that political interests are more significant than humanitarian ones.

8.4 Conclusion

The case of WHO reveals the nature of the triangular political struggle in the field of public health. This study finds that the triangular WHO competition was affected by multi-level factors including materialistic political interests and medical resources alongside idealistic humanitarianism. The dual functions of the WHO, which serves both a medical function and as a political symbol, is the root cause for the coexistence of humanitarian values with political interests. On the one hand, Taipei hopes to use humanitarianism as a breakthrough to achieve the effect of leveraging WHO, ensuring that the international community hears Taipei's voice in relation to WHO. In fact, Taipei's health diplomacy has been partially successful. Use of WHO provisions and

support from the international community has enabled Taipei to participate in more technical meetings of WHO and expand its participation in the WHA and IHR (Lindemann, 2014). Taipei has also used WHO to pursue additional political interests, which tests hypothesis 2 to show WHO playing an important leverage role. Constructivism did play a part in Taiwan's behaviour, as Taipei's humanitarian values gained support from Washington and the international community.

But although humanitarianism was repeatedly referenced in the triangular WHO competition, it did not fundamentally change the competition pattern centred on political interests. On the other hand, then, Taipei supplanted public health needs with political interests (rights and status), and Beijing refused to allow Taipei's participation in order to maintain national sovereignty. Washington also took advantage of the relationship between Taipei and WHO alongside politicisation of the Covid-19 epidemic. The evidence thus suggests that triangular WHO competition is not simply a public health issue. On the surface, parties on both sides of the strait have emphasised their concern for the health rights of the people of Taiwan but, in practice, they are unwilling to make political concessions. All three actors are following a code of realism, wherein political interests are prioritised over public health concerns. Beijing's focus falls on the One China principle, while Taipei's concern centres on the political status of its participation in the WHA/WHO. The phenomenon of WHO case thus partly negates hypothesis 1's prediction that idealism and materialism play the same role in the triangular IGO competition. In the WHO case, idealistic factors play a limited role in the WHO competition and cannot occupy the same important position as materialistic factors.

The WHO issues have long been politicised and become tools of competition. Beijing occupies a dominant position, and a status quo of humanitarianism with political intentions is clearly unacceptable to Beijing. At the same time, Beijing's effective control over the WHO situation is positively correlated to its predominance as a top financial and human resource contributor to WHO. This affirms the second half of hypothesis 2 for factors affecting actors' ability to use IGOs to leverage, which holds that monetary and human resource contributions can impact an actor's ability to utilise WHO. This thesis does not deny the international legitimacy gained by Beijing when it obtained the China seat at the UN in 1971 or the impact of the massive gap in the political and economic strength of Beijing and Taipei on their respective abilities to use WHO. But even though Taipei has powerful allies like Washington, the number of supporters is not sufficient to open the door for Taiwan's participation in the WHA absent support from Beijing (Chen, 2018b).

Having completed the case analysis of three different types of triangular IGO competition in politics, economics, and public health, the thesis now turns to the conclusion. The next chapter compares and summarises the findings to respond to the research questions.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

This study illustrates that the triangular IGO competition has been dynamic and multilayered since 1949. The conflict between the two parties on either side of the Taiwan Strait plays a critical role in their IGO competition, which affects the stability of the triangular relations between Beijing, Washington, and Taipei (Yuan, 2011). It involves international legal issues of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and it is a matter of practical political interests (Wang, 2015). The conflict regarding sovereignty between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait lies in the fact that they do not recognize each other's sovereignty but cannot deny each other's governance (Lin, 2012). Moreover, with the democratization of Taiwan and the rise of Taiwanese identity, Taiwan's self-identification conflicts with the Chinese government's definition of Taiwan. When Taipei attempts to seek further political advancement through IGOs, Beijing will be on high alert (Leng, 2011). These activities are closely linked to Taiwan's international space, which is a highly sensitive political issue. It involves China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, Taiwan's status in international law, and the political relationship between the two sides, which in turn affects the triangular relationship (Rao, 2012).

Washington plays an important role in the IGO competition of Beijing and Taipei, and it even intervenes directly in some cases. The allegiance between Washington and Taipei is essential to maintaining the status quo between a weak challenger (Taipei) and a major power (Beijing) (Wu and Hsieh, 2016). Washington achieves extended deterrence in the Taiwan Strait through strategic ambiguity. If Washington's support for Taipei is unrestricted, and neither China nor the USA suppresses Taipei's excessive behaviour in IGOs, it will inevitably have a snowball effect, which will further encourage Taiwan officials to act in ways that go beyond the bottom line (One China principle). Interviewee No. 12 (Interview with a senior analyst at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2022) confirmed that: "the US policy toward China will have spillover effects in IGOs, and it really has to stand by China. But at the same time, it must defend Taiwan's interests and ensure that Taiwan is protected".

For now, Beijing accepts Taiwan's participation in IGOs only in an appropriate capacity and with a proper name under the One China principle (Zeng, 2015). In order to maintain the triangular status quo, Washington also recognizes the One China policy. However, on the other hand, Washington is a staunch ally of Taipei. The USA has the ability and willingness to limit China's rise and provide support for Taipei's activities in IGOs to restrain China (Lindemann, 2014). Therefore, the triangular IGO competition is produced from the joint action of such diverse factors and contradictions.

The answers to the research questions centred on triangular IGO competition factors and leverage through three IGO cases. It has been argued in this study that IGO competition has been closely linked to the triangular Beijing–Washington–Taipei

relations since 1949. IGO competition is influenced by diverse factors, and all three political actors consciously use IGOs as leverage to pursue their interests. Furthermore, because there are multilevel factors involved, the compound theoretical framework is an appropriate approach for understanding triangular IGO competition.

9.1 Case Study Analyses: the UN, WTO, and WHO

Through the integrated comparative analysis of three cases in different fields, this study has identified the characteristics of triangular IGO competition at different levels. At the level of seat obtainment in IGOs, dynamism is an important feature. In 1949, Washington and Taipei were member states of the UN, GATT, and WHO, while Beijing was excluded from these IGOs. This situation has changed dramatically, and Beijing replaced Taipei in China's seats at the UN and WHO in 1971 and 1972 respectively. Therefore, Taipei has been excluded from the UN and WHO until now. In 2001, Beijing and Taipei joined the WTO as China and TPKM respectively and currently co-exist in the WTO with Washington. As the actor that has undergone the most obvious changes in IGO affairs, Beijing has gone through four stages: initial participation, limited participation, full participation, and leading participation (Zhang and Wang, 2020).

With the changes in the participation of the three parties in the IGO, the roles of the three parties have also changed. Combining the different time periods and attributes of the three cases, their IGO roles show diversity and fluidity. Beijing's transformation from a challenger to a leader in the international order, especially Beijing has made great benefits in the battlefield of cross-strait competition for international space, and successfully constricted Taipei's participation in IGOs (Burgoyne, 2020). The continuous rise of China and the relative weakness of the USA have allowed China to gradually reshape the WTO and other international economies, laws, and institutions (Delisle, 2018). China has become an important leader in international institutional strategies, using its strong economic power to increase its influence on institutions such as the UN (Basu, 2020). Compared with Beijing and Taipei, Washington's role has not changed significantly. The USA remains a fulcrum in the triangular IGO competition and has greater strength and leadership than China (Delisle, 2018). Taipei loses in this competition, from vested interests to revisionism. It has lost its diplomatic space and the international legitimacy of its sovereignty in most of the IGOs in the world because they currently accept the One China principle (Zheng, 2009).


China's influence on IGOs has rapidly increased in recent years, and it has successfully moved from joining IGOs to establishing its own institutions. In China's construction strategy for utilizing IGOs, IGOs are being used as tools of Beijing's "political construction to shape regional order in the economic and security spheres" (Doshi, 2021, p.13). At the same time, facing the current complicated international situation, Beijing has taken a firmer stance in international affairs. Under President Xi Jinping, China has

come up with a new motto of 'dare to struggle (*gan yu dou zheng*)' (Gill, 2022). China is increasingly using multilateral, regional, and bilateral IGOs to address socioeconomic, diplomatic, and national security issues related to China's interests (Dossani, Hu and Curriden, 2021).

Changes in the IGO roles of the three actors are related to their IGO strategies, which have similarities and differences within different contexts. The layouts of the three actors in the three cases are characterized by different national interests, motivations, and international politics. Therefore, they combine their own resources and interests and adopt different approaches. For example, in the case of the UN, Beijing chose the strategy of political solidarity with the developing world, while Taipei chose to lobby Washington. However, similarities also exist. In the case of the UN, Beijing adopted a strategy of constant protests and applications for the opportunity to obtain China's UN seat. In the case of WHO, Taipei adopted a similar strategy after 50 years to attract the attention of the international community and used the same strategy in different situations at different times.

Delving deep into the microlevel of the three IGO cases, triangular IGO competition reflects different characteristics and results owing to differences in organizational attributes. The UN mainly functions as an organization that sets the global political agenda. It has strong political attributes and symbols, and it involves core interests such as the legitimacy of international sovereignty, so there is little room for compromise among the three actors. Beijing replaced Taipei in the UN in 1971 through a zero-sum game. Next, the WTO is an economic and trade organization, and its membership does not require statehood. Therefore, the three actors could finally reach a compromise based on economic interests and realize the coexistence of the three parties. WHO is a functional public health organization and a specialized agency of the UN, and its membership requires statehood. Such an organization with both public health and political attributes complicates the competition. It not only creates certain room for negotiation but also involves sensitive political interests. With regard to functional attributes, and from health and humanitarian perspectives, Taipei should be allowed to enter. However, as a specialized agency of the UN, it has political symbols. Taipei's separate action in WHO would run counter to Beijing's One China principle and could serve as a basis for Taipei's fight for de jure independence in the international community. Overall, political interests far outweigh differences on economic or public health issues. The attribute classification of the three IGOs is shown in Figure 9.1 below.

Figure 9.1: The attribute classification of the three IGOs



Therefore, from Taipei's perspective, the challenger to the current order, these three IGOs have different meanings. The purpose of Taipei's participation in IGOs is to return to the international community and achieve the goal of double recognition of Beijing and Taipei by the international community, which means one China and two equal governments (Wang, 2016). In the case of the UN, the UN seat has the most significant symbolic and political meaning in terms of national sovereignty. Beijing's attitude is reasonably the most unnegotiable, which makes it most difficult for Taipei to join. Thus, based on the current international political situation, for the current Taiwan government, its competition in the UN has changed from an early substantive competition to a symbolic competition. Compared to the UN, WHO is a pragmatic topic with both a glimmer of hope and uncertainty. Concerning Taipei's claims about humanitarianism, medical needs, and health vulnerabilities, Washington will put some pressure on Beijing. Such claims also embarrass Beijing to some extent. Among the three IGOs, Taipei is in the best position in the WTO. Taipei already co-exists with Beijing and Washington in the WTO, which has been an important international platform for Taipei. The three actors are on an equal footing in the WTO, because this is a nonstate matter. By concluding the political attributes of the three IGOs, there is a positive correlation between the extent of the political symbolic meaning of the WTO, WHO, and the UN and the difficulty of Taipei realizing its goal in these three IGOs. From the WTO and WHO to the UN, the degree of difficulty for Taipei to join increases in order.

With regard to the triangular IGO competition since 1949, the policy continuity of the three actors has been different. Since 1949, Beijing's position based on the One China principle has never changed. There have been commonalities in China's IGO strategies at various stages, which reflects the inheritance between these strategies (Zhang and Wang, 2020). Washington's policies have undergone certain adjustments, but it still maintains a certain degree of continuity. Washington adjusted its policy on China in the 1970s, shifting from supporting Taipei to Beijing. However, it has essentially

maintained the status quo of the triangular relationship since 1949 through strategic ambiguity through the three China–US joint communiqués, the TRA, and the Six Assurances. In contrast, Taipei's policies have undergone significant changes. From 1950 to 1970, Taipei had strong international support, and the KMT occupied the Chinese seat in IGOs such as the UN, emphasizing its Chinese identity. However, since 1988, Taipei has realized its chasm with Beijing due to the continuous loss of diplomatic relations. Furthermore, in the process of democratization, Lee Teng-hui began to break away from the One China principle of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, started to advocate China's dual representation (the birth of a special state-to-state relationship), and promoted pragmatic diplomacy (Hickey, 2006). Lee Teng-hui emphasized that Taiwan's desire for international space stems not only from a functional need to enhance Taiwan's traditional and nontraditional security, but also from a requirement to meet the needs of the emerging Taiwanese nationalism that arose from Taiwan's democratization (Tubilewicz, 2012). Sovereignty conflicts across the Taiwan Strait have shifted from the representation of China's sole legitimate government to Taiwan's legal status. Interviewee No. 9 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) affirmed this: "from a long-term perspective, the policies of the US and China are very consistent, but the strategy has changed. Taiwan's policies and strategies are constantly changing".

Overall, IGO competition is not isolated; rather, it is influenced by multiple factors and has synergistic effects with the triangular relationship, such as the Beijing–Washington–Moscow triangular relationship in the 1970s, the restoration of Beijing's seat in the UN in 1971, and President Nixon's visit to China in 1972. For now, Washington expresses support for Taipei's meaningful engagement with nonstate IGOs, which is consistent with its strategic ambiguity. The IGO competition is the epitome of the triangular relationship, and the changes in the status of the three actors in the IGO respond to the power dynamics in the triangular relationship.

9.2 Research Findings

Supported by the three case studies, this study yields corresponding results to questions and hypotheses regarding IGO leverage, triangular IGO competition factors, and a compound theoretical framework. First, from these three cases representing political, economic, and public health IGOs respectively, it is found in this study that the factors affecting the triangular IGO competition are multilayered. IGOs are products of neoliberal institutionalism, and the dynamics of the triangular relationship play out on different platforms and in different settings. Triangular IGO competition is an international political phenomenon that incorporates multiple elements. The analysis of IGO competition must be based on triangular relationships and consider the strategies of the three actors in different IGOs.

The Taiwan issue is an important factor leading to the particularity of the triangular IGO competition. It involves ethnic politics, national unification, ideological confrontation, and international power struggles (Wu, 2000a). Identity and value play a role in the triangular IGO competition, and Taipei is selling democracy to the USA (Zhu, 2000a). Compared with the mainland, Taiwan's hard power is far behind. Therefore, Taipei must use its underdog image and soft power to gain the favour of the international community (Wang and Lu, 2008). Moreover, Taiwanese identity and China's perception of sovereignty form two parallel lines, which leads to intensified cross-strait competition and risk (Chang, 2018). Taiwan's name in IGOs is not only a matter of literal expression but also an important political issue related to the One China principle and the future of cross-strait reunification (Yuan, 2011).

Beijing believes that Taipei needs to use an appropriate title and identity to participate in IGO-related activities, because Taiwan's political terminology is closely related to its identity and political status. A proper name for Taiwan in IGOs will help closely bind the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and forge a unified image of China in the international arena (Rao, 2012). In Taiwan, the concept of sovereignty is integrated into democracy, freedom, equality, and self-determination. Taipei's efforts in the IGO are not only aimed at achieving its political goals in the international community but also attracting domestic votes, as many Taiwanese residents hope to see Taiwan's global participation (Chen, 2015). Therefore, in order to construct a comprehensive theoretical framework to understand cross-strait relations, it is necessary to incorporate cross-strait interactions, internal politics, and the international system into one theoretical framework (Wu, 2000a).

US foreign policy cyclically sways between "realist geopolitics and moral idealism" (Zhu, 2000b, p. 95). Washington's support for Taipei's IGO activities includes not only practical considerations, such as economic interests, geopolitics, and strategic security, but also considerations of maintaining US credibility and constructing democratic values (Shen, 2000; Xie, 1995). Washington has continuously emphasized the importance of values, while Taiwan's leaders have promoted Taiwan's international status by emphasizing Taiwan's democratic achievements and allegiance to Washington (Delisle, 2016). Taipei is considered a like-minded ally by Washington, who considers Taiwan a vibrant democracy. This means that the triangular IGO competition should have both a realistic and constructivist perspective. As interviewee No. 13 (Interview with a professor, advised Washington on China policy, 2022) said: "I am really hesitant to support realism to explain the triangle because, in my opinion, every movement is unique and it denies human agency".

Further sublimating and classifying these factors at the theoretical level, this study theoretically verifies the multilevel nature of the triangular IGO competition factors. The triangular IGO competition not only includes materialistic interests and strength but also idealistic factors such as identity and value, which must be examined from a constructivist perspective. The diversity of factors proves that when understanding

triangular IGO competition, the role of various factors must be examined as much as possible. This result is consistent with the multi-level compound theoretical framework, which is constructed in this study. The main factors for each case are shown in Table 9.1:


Table 9.1: Main factors in the results of the competition between Beijing, Washington, and Taipei in the UN, WTO, and WHO

IGO Cases	Main Factors
UN (international political organization)	Political interests (sovereignty), Cold War, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, anticommunism, credibility, and foreign aid
WTO (international economic organization)	Economic interests, political terminology, democratic values, nationalism, and internal political obstacles
WHO (international public health organization)	Public health interests, humanitarianism, human rights, identity, international status, public health crises, and Taiwan's internal politics

On the other hand, the role of idealistic factors in the results of the triangular IGO competition is limited, and it does not play as crucial a role as assumed in hypothesis 1. Taipei and Washington are often portrayed as democratic allies, yet US foreign policy is largely based on self-interest. Although the US supports a democratic and prosperous Taiwan under the influence of Taipei's lobbying, it will not allow Taipei to provoke cross-strait conflicts (Zhu, 2000a). Triangular IGO competition cannot be divorced from the reality of power distribution, and Taipei's path to joining IGOs requires the support of both Washington and Beijing (Hickey, 2000). Under the interference of Washington, Beijing must also occasionally be guided by realism and compromise some situations that violate the One China principle in the IGO competition. Because Beijing is not willing to risk the deterioration of economic relations with the US-led Western countries (China's main economic partners) in the absence of large-scale armed conflicts (Lee and Pfaltzgraff, 1995).

To sum up, even though constructivism provides an important perspective for understanding the influence of idealistic factors, such as identity and value, on tripartite IGO strategies, the three political actors exhibit more materialistic motivations in their competition, and the actual distribution of power and national interests constitute the basic structure of triangular IGO competition, as shown in Figure 9.2:

Figure 9.2: The structure of factors



In addition to the above findings, the results of the study reveal that the three actors consciously leverage IGOs. Beijing used the political leverage of the UN to return to the world stage and gain international legitimacy of its sovereignty, Washington used the WTO's economic leverage to intervene in the economies and politics on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and Taipei used the WHO's humanitarian leverage to speak for itself and gain international support to achieve its political interests. Regarding the use of IGO leverage, interviewee No. 9 (Interview with a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, 2022) agrees: "I believe that the behaviour of IGOs in Taipei is all leveraging with political purposes. The most important thing is to prove the existence of Taiwan".

Such results are consistent with the hypothesis 2 regarding IGOs as leverage. Moreover, in response to hypothesis 2 regarding the ability to leverage IGOs, this thesis has demonstrated the role of political actors in monetary and human resource contributions to IGOs in depth. The results suggest that the three actors' financial and human resource contributions to IGOs are positively correlated with their ability to utilize IGOs. While there are some doubts about the UN case, the WTO and WHO results affirm the hypothesis 2 of monetary and human resource contributions that are made in order to leverage the IGO. Contributions of money and human resources can help actors better leverage IGOs in most cases. In recent years, China has strengthened the training of personnel in international organizations to achieve the filling of human resources in IGOs, so as to gain more sway in the international community (Yuan, 2011). As an analyst of a US government think tank (Interview with No. 12, 2022) pointed out: "the influence of IGOs is all related to power, and it's talking about money. How much financial funding you provide will give you a greater voting power, a bigger seat".

However, it was also found in this study that the role of these two internal factors in certain periods is limited. Triangular IGO competition is part of the world order, and its results are also related to external factors. For instance, in the case of the UN, Beijing was not a member of the UN (1949-1971), and Washington and Taipei's financial and

human resource contributions to the UN clearly have an absolute advantage, but Taipei's UN China seat was still replaced by Beijing. This result does not mean that the contribution of money and human resources is ineffective for leveraging IGOs, but that its effectiveness is limited in the face of changes in the larger international trend of the Cold War pattern; the larger Washington–Moscow–Beijing triangle had changed.

9.3 Future Triangular IGO Competition and Summary

The triangular IGO competition remains dynamic and it is affected by multilevel factors. The ability of international powers such as Washington to obstruct Beijing's global impact is weakening as China's national strength and domestic confidence grows (Pu, 2018). Beijing proposed that if Taiwan wants to achieve its goal in IGOs, it should abide by the following:

(1) the One China Principle;
(2) cross-strait communication first and submission of applications to IGOs second;
(3) classification in political and economic IGOs;
(4) solutions that are dependent on each case; and
(5) upholding of the principle of maintaining the status quo (Wang, 2015b).

It can be expected that China will increasingly use IGOs to accomplish national goals. For example, the AIIB is part of China's geoeconomic strategy, which focuses on using economic means to promote and defend national interests and produce favourable geopolitical outcomes (Blackwill and Harris, 2016). Participation in IGOs is an important part of the expansion of Taipei's diplomatic space (Yuan, 2011). The growing asymmetry of power across the Taiwan Strait has increased anxiety and distrust among Taiwan's policymakers and citizens. Politically sensitive issues such as national identity, sovereignty, and Taiwan's legitimacy will continue to exert a significant influence on the scope, pace, and depth of cross-strait cooperation. Continued tensions between the USA and China will also affect Washington's attitude towards Taipei's IGO activities, where the United States–Taiwan Democratic Alliance plays a role. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly stated that "Taiwan's meaningful participation in the UN system is not a political issue, but a pragmatic one" (BBC News, 2021).[186] Even in Washington, there are growing voices who want to move from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. Therefore, with the dual impact of China–US competition and cross-strait political tension, the triangular IGO competition may intensify in the future.

However, although China and the USA have differences on the Taiwan issue, democracy, and human rights, they have clear common interests on many others,

[186] https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-59073975.

including the North Korean nuclear issue, terrorism, global warming, and stability in the Middle East, which makes China–US relations dynamic and resilient. Taiwan has democratic values, geopolitical attributes, and high-tech industries such as microchips, while China has a huge market. China and the USA have significant common economic interests. As two major players in global affairs, China and the USA have gradually realized "the importance of cooperation and the danger of conflict in the era of globalization and deepening interdependence in the past crisis" (Zhu, 2005, p. 8). Judging from past cross-strait relations and the current situation, Taipei will not manage relations with IGOs in full accordance with Beijing's wishes in the future. As interviewee No. 14 (Interview with a professor, more work on Washington perspective, 2022) pointed out: "the activities of IGOs in Taipei are intertwined with substance and symbolism. Admittedly, Taiwan is trying to look at talk, walk, speak, like a state, fully like a state".

However, in the Beijing–Washington–Taipei relationship pattern, "Taipei's foreign political and economic affairs are restricted" (Leng, 2011, p. 381). Washington will suppress Taipei at critical moments to maintain the status quo of the triangular relationship. Interviewee No. 6 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) explained: "for leaders in Washington, they need to find a way to control Taipei and not let it get out of control, because if it gets out of control, it will bring disaster to all three parties". Therefore, the status quo of the triangular relationship will be maintained until China surpasses the USA, and the triangular IGO competition will continue for the foreseeable future.

Based on a multitude of studies on Taiwan's participation in IGOs, China–US relations, cross-strait IGO competition, and Taiwan–US relations, this study uncovered a subsection of triangular IGO competition. Even though this study was disrupted by the sudden Covid-19 pandemic during a critical period of the research, it nevertheless made significant contributions in this field through elite interviews and other channels. There remains room for further improvement in future research on triangular IGO competition. Other scholars can build on this research and use this case study to analyse the phenomenon in different ways, or to examine how other political actors have used its strategies in similar situations and discuss whether other IGO competition is similar to the cases in this study.

In terms of specific research concerns, future research must pay attention to the internal dynamics of Chinese mainland, the USA, and Taiwan. As the separation between the parties on either side of the Taiwan Strait endures, Taiwanese identity will develop further and play a greater role. Interviewee No. 5 (Interview with a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, 2022) said:

> I listened to the opinion of a well-known scholar in the blue camp in Taiwan. He said that his own children's identification with the Chinese nation is getting weaker and weaker. Because they were born in blue camp families,

> they originally had a strong identity with the Chinese nation. However, as the generation of their children and grandchildren gradually grow older, their Chinese identification is getting lower and lower. Between mainland policy or cross-strait policy, the impact on Taiwan's political identity is mainly time. Beijing's policy is less than Taipei's policy, and Taipei's policy is less than time.

The improvement of China's hard power will lead to increased conflicts of interest between the East and the West, and political differences in political systems will exacerbate ideological differences. Identity and value determine interests, which will have a negative impact on the triangular relations. Therefore, future research on triangular IGO competition should make use of the compound theoretical framework employed in this study and focus on further layers and factors. Moreover, in the practice of triangular IGO competition, Beijing should proceed from the perspective of constructivism when formulating IGO policies related to Taipei, so as to better understand the hearts and minds of the people of Taiwan and increase the flexibility of cross-strait relations.

Another topic worth pondering is the value of IGOs in the modern world. The war between Russia and Ukraine has continued for over a year, regardless of the fact that the UN passed the 'A/RES/ES-11/1' resolution as early as 2 March 2022.[187] The Eleventh Emergency Special Session of the UNGA adopted resolution 'A/ES-11/L.7' on 23 February 2023 (more than two-thirds of the total votes were cast in favour), again demanding that Russia immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from territories within Ukraine's internationally recognized borders and calling for a cessation of hostilities.[188] However, these resolutions were ignored by Russia and did not stop the war. The definition of IGOs by neoliberal institutionalism is being challenged, and IGOs are revealing their weaknesses.

However, almost simultaneously, China released its report titled 'US Hegemony and its Perils', pointing out that the USA uses its control over international organizations to coerce other countries in serving its political and economic strategies (20 February 2023).[189] This statement hints at the functionality of IGOs. Major powers can use IGOs to "shape the international system and maintain or improve their own power" (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom, 2004, p. 6).

Therefore, the role of IGOs in different cases is different, and it is affected by various factors such as power distribution and domains. The original idea of IGOs was neoliberal institutionalism, which was aimed at giving all countries a platform.

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[187] A/RES/ES-11/1, see https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3965290?ln=en.
[188] A/ES-11/L.7, see https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N23/048/58/PDF/N2304858.pdf?OpenElement.
[189] https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230220_11027664.html.

However, the reality of international politics is cruel. IGOs are used as a tool when different countries aim to serve their own interests. The role of IGOs will change along with the dynamics of international politics, and it has the attributes of both a platform and a tool.

In international politics today, political actors mainly leverage IGOs, and the function of IGOs weakened to a certain extent. Within the context of the current triangular relationship between Beijing, Washington, and Taipei, IGOs provide Taipei with an avenue to participate in the international community, but it has simultaneously become a tool that threatens the status quo. However, IGOs also retain some of their independence and still strive to promote cooperation and maintain international conventions. The role of IGOs oscillates between promoting cooperation and exacerbating conflict. There is no doubt that the UN, WTO, and WHO have made great contributions to international politics, economies, and public health, such as the UN's peacekeeping, the WTO reducing of tariff barriers, and WHO's restrictions on viruses such as Ebola. Moreover, WHO has become an avenue for Taipei to expand its diplomatic space, and the IMF, NATO, and AIIB are the instruments used by Washington and Beijing to protect their interests. To some extent, IGOs do not have any attributes in themselves, it depends on how most important actors (states) in the international community define and use it. It can be a platform for fostering cooperation and justice or a self-serving tool. Therefore, the value of IGOs must be viewed dialectically. The outcome of future triangular IGO competition is uncertain, and there remains room for flexibility.

This study has shown various characteristics of IGOs in different periods along with their internal political and economic development as well as changes in the international arena. The current tipping point in the triangular IGO competition will be influenced mainly by the two parties on either side of the Taiwan Strait. There are irreconcilable conflicts of interest, but the three actors do not want war to erupt. Thus far, neither Beijing, Washington, nor Taipei has the certainty or ability to change the status quo in any way, whether through unification by force or international de jure independence through IGOs, without incurring huge costs. From a pragmatic perspective, it is suggested that all three actors reduce their excesses, strengthen communication, create negotiation conditions, and increase flexibility in the IGO field. The three actors should put aside irreconcilable political disputes, focus more on the real needs of the people (whether it pertains to public health or international participation), and prevent IGO competition from fuelling triangular tensions.

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Interviews

Interview with No. 1, a former IGO official, more work on Taipei perspective, through Microsoft Teams, 4 December 2021.
Interview with No. 2, a professor and Chinese government think tank researcher, more work on Beijing perspective, through WeChat, 19 December 2021.
Interview with No. 3, a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, through Wechat, 20 January 2022.
Interview with No. 4, a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, through Wechat, 13 March 2022.
Interview with No. 5, a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, through Wechat, 15 March 2022.
Interview with No. 6, a professor, more work on Beijing perspective, through Zoom, 23 March 2022.
Interview with No. 7, a professor, more work on Washington perspective, through Zoom, 5 April 2022.
Interview with No. 8, a professor and a researcher at Academia Sinica, more work on Taipei perspective, through Zoom, 7 April 2022.
Interview with No. 9, a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, through Zoom, 7 April 2022.

Interview with No. 10, a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, through Google Meet, 8 April 2022.
Interview with No. 11, a professor and former diplomat, more work on Washington perspective, through Zoom, 30 May 2022.
Interview with No. 12, a senior policy analyst at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, more work on Washington perspective, face to face, 18 June 2022.
Interview with No. 13, a professor and advised Washington on China policy, more work on Washington perspective, face to face, 19 June 2022.
Interview with No. 14, a professor, more work on Washington perspective, through Zoom, 13 July 2022.
Interview with No. 15, a professor, more work on Taipei perspective, through Google Meet, 29 July 2022.

Appendices

Appendix A: The analysis of the Annual Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly, PRC's activities, 1949-1971

Year/Document	Sponsor	Types	Contents	The UN Reactions	US and ROC	Result
1949.11.18 / A1361	PRC	Cablegram (A/1123)	The delegation under Mr. T. F. Tsiang and held that it could not represent China and had no right to speak on behalf of the Chinese people in the United Nations.	The PRESIDENT then pointed out that the matter under discussion had not been included in the provisional agenda for that meeting and that the Council should pass on to other business.	Against	×
1949.12.29 / A1361	USSR/Ukrine	458th meeting of Security Council	The USSR delegation had supported the position taken by the PRC	The PRESIDENT pointed out that the matter under discussion had not been included in the provisional agenda.	Against	×
1950.01.08 / A1361	PRC	Cablegram	The KMT delegation in the Council was illegal, should be expelled from the Council	No responses	Against	×
1950.01.10 / A1361	USSR	459th meeting of Security Council, Draft resolution (S/1443)	The KMT group be excluded from the Council. If the Council did not take appropriate measures, the USSR delegation would not participate in the work of the Council until the KMT representative was excluded.	Decision: The President's ruling was upheld by 8 votes to 2 (USSR, Yugoslavia), with one abstention (India).	Against	×
1950.01.17 / A1361	Yugoslavia	462th meeting of Security Council, Draft resolution (S/1448/Rev.1)	Considering the serious objections raised against the validity of the credentials of the present Chinese representative to the Security Council.	One vote in favor and 1 against, with 3 abstentions (India, Norway and the UK).	Against	×
1950.01.20 / A1361	PRC and Yugoslavia	Two Cablegrams from PRC and were circulated as offical documents of the Security Council (S/1462) by Yugoslavia	PRC protested against the continued presence of the KMT representative in the Security Council.	S/1466 by PRESIDENT (The memorandum stated the the primary difficulty in the current question of the representating of the Member State in the UN was that the question of representation had been linked up with the question of recognition by Government of Member States.	Against	×
1950.07.13 / A1361	USSR	A letter (S/1603)	1. Pouinted out the resolution of 27 June is illegal and the US destoried the peace. 2. KMT group is unlawfully occupied China's seat. 3. The action of "Prevent an attcak on Formosa" consituted outright agression against China and a gross violation of the Cairo and Potsdam agreements.	No responses	Against	×
1950.08.24 / A1873	PRC	Cablegram (S/1715)	PRC stated that 27 June President Truman had announced the decision to prevent by armed force the liberation of Taiwan by the PLA, Seventh Fleet had moved toward the Strait of Taiwan, and contingents of the USAFhad arrived in Taiwan. That action was a direct armed agression on the territory of China and a total violation of the UN Charter.	No responses	Against	×

1950.08.28 / A1873	PRC	Cablegram (S/1722)	PRC proposed that, in the interest of the peace and security of Asia and the world, the Security Council should condemn the US forces agression in Korea for those acts, and should withdrawal of all US forces from Korea, to prevent an aggravation of the situation and to facilitate the peaceful settlement of the Korean question by the UN.	It was agreed that the agenda item should be amended to read: " Complaint of bombing by air forces of the teorritory of China".	Against	×
1950.08.29 / A1873	USSR	492th meeting of Security Council, Draft resolution (S/1732)	Invite PRC to attend Security Council meeting	The PRESIDENT considered that the matter could be put to the vote immediately. The PRESIDENT'S ruling **was upheld,** the challenge having failed to secure the affirmative votes of seven member. There were 4 votes in favour, 4 against (ROC, Cuba, Ecuador and the US), and 3 abstentions. **Failed**	Against	×
1950.08.30 / A1873	PRC	Cablegram (S/1743)	PRC charged that US military aircraft had again flown over Chinese territory, on 29 August, and had killed or wounded a number of people.	No responses	Against	×
1950.08.31 / A1873	USSR	Provisional agenda of 493rd meeting of Security Council, Draft resolution (S/1745)	Based on PRC Cablegram S/1722 and 1743	By 8 voted to 3 (China, Cuba and Egypt), the Security Council decided to include the item, as amended, in its agenda.	Against	×
1950.09.02 / A1873	USSR	497th meeting of Security Council, Draft resolution (S/1757)	Based on Cairo Agreement, Taiwan is a part of PRC	The Council decided, by 8 votes to 1 (USSR), with 2 abstentions. **Failed**	Against	×
1950.09.10 / A1873	PRC	Cablegram (S/1776)	PRC is the sole legal government representing Chinese people and as the accuser in the case, his government has the right and necessity to send its delegation to attend and join the Security Council.	No responses	Against	×
1950.09.11 / A1873	USSR	Draft resolution (S/1759)	Before considering the substance of the question, the Council should invite the representative of PRC.	Failed to secure the affirmative votes of seven members. There were 6 votes in favour, 3 against (China, Cuba and the US) and 2 abstentions. **Rejected.**	Against	×
1950.09.24 / A1873	PRC	Cablegram（S/1808）	Condemned the US bombing in the urban area of Antung, Chinese territory.	No responses	Against	×
1950.11.28 / A1873	PRC	527th meeting of Security Council, Draft resolution (S/1921)	Condemning US Aggression in mainland China and Taiwan	**Rejected** by 9 votes to one (USSR), with one member not participating in the voting.	Against	×
1971.10.26 / A8702	UN Secretary	S/10378 and S/10382	Recognizing that representative of the PRC are the only lawful representatives of China to the UN and that PRC is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council	No rights		

(*Data from the UN Digital Library)*

Appendix B: The analysis of the Annual Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly, the USSR to PRC, 1949-1950

Year/Document	Sponsor	Types	Contents	The UN Reactions	The US and ROC	Result
1949.12.29 / A1361	USSR/Ukrine	458th meeting of Security Council	The USSR delegation had supported the position taken by the PRC	The PRESIDENT pointed out that the matter under discussion had not been included in the provisional agenda.	Against	×
1950.01.10 / A1361	USSR	459th meeting of Security Council, Draft resolution (S/1443)	The KMT group be excluded from the Council. If the Council did not take appropriate measures, the USSR delegation would not participate in the work of the Council until the KMT representative was excluded.	The President's ruling was upheld by 8 votes to 2.	Against	×
1950.01.17 / A1361	Yugoslavia	462th meeting of Security Council, Draft resolution (S/1448/Rev.1)	Considering the serious objections raised against the validity of the credentials of the present Chinese representative to the Security Council.	One vote in favor and 1 against, with 3 abstentions.	Against	×
1950.07.13 / A1361	USSR	A letter (S/1603)	1. Pointed out the resolution of 27 June is illegal and the US destoried the peace. 2. KMT group is unlawfully occupied China's seat. 3. The action of "Prevent an attcak on Formosa" consituted outright agression against China and a gross violation of the Cairo and Potsdam agreements.	No responses	Against	×
1950.08.29 / A1873	USSR	492th meeting of Security Council, Draft resolution (S/1732)	Invite PRC to attend Security Council meeting	The PRESIDENT considered that the matter could be put to the vote immediately. There were 4 votes in favour, 4 against. **Failed**	Against	×
1950.08.31 / A1873	USSR	Provisional agenda of 493rd meeting of Security Council, Draft resolution (S/1745)	Based on PRC Cablegram S/1722 and 1743	By 8 voted to 3, the Security Council decided to include the item, as amended, in its agenda.	Against	×
1950.09.02 / A1873	USSR	497th meeting of Security Council, Draft resolution (S/1757)	Based on Cairo Agreement, Taiwan is a part of PRC	The Council decided, by 8 votes to 1 (USSR), with 2 abstentions. **Failed**	Against	×
1950.09.11 / A1873	USSR	Draft resolution (S/1759)	Before considering the substance of the question, the Council should invite the representative of PRC.	**Failed** to secure the affirmative votes of seven members. There were 6 votes in favour, 3 against and 2 abstentions. Rejected.	Against	×

(*Data from the UN Digital Library)*

Appendix C: Independent African countries that established diplomatic relations with China, 1949–1971

China-Africa diplomatic relations（1949.10.01-1971.10.25）				
Different types of African States	**Countries**	**Independent Date**	**Diplomatic relations with China**	**Vote UN Resolution 2758**
First type: Independent between 1949-1971 and build diplomatic relations with China (23 states in total).	Egypt	1953.06.18	1956.05.30	Y
	Sudan	1956.01.01	1959.02.04	Y
	Tunisia	1956.03.20	1964.01.10	Y
	Morocco	1956.04.07	1958.11.10	Y
	Ghana	1957.03.06	1960.07.05	Y
	Guinea	1958.10.02	1959.10.04	Y
	Mali	1960.06.20	1960.10.25	Y
	DR Congo	1960.06.30	1961.02.20	N
	Somalia	1960.07.01	1960.12.14	Y
	Benin	1960.08.01	1964.11.12	Absence
	Central African	1960.08.13	1964.09.29	N
	Rot Congo	1960.08.15	1964.02.22	Y
	Nigeria	1960.10.01	1971.02.10	Y
	Mauritania	1960.11.28	1965.07.19	Y
	Sierra Leone	1961.04.27	1971.07.29	Y
	Cameroon	1961.10.01	1971.03.26	Y
	Burundi	1962.07.01	1963.12.21	Y
	Algeria	1962.07.03	1958.12.20	Y
	Uganda	1962.10.09	1962.10.18	Y
	Kenya	1963.12.12	1963.12.14	Y
	Tanzania	1964.04.26	1964.04.26	Y
	Zambia	1964.10.24	1964.10.29	Y
	Equatorial Guinea	1968.10.12	1970.10.15	Y
	Ethiopia	Uncolonized	1970.11.24	Y
Second type: Independent between 1949-1971, but **didn't** build diplomatic relations with China in that time (16 states in total).	Libya	1951.12.24	1978.08.09	Y
	Togolese	1960.04.27	1972.09.19	Absence
	Madagascar	1960.06.26	1972.11.06	N
	Gabonese	1960.07.15	1974.04.20	Absence
	Niger	1960.08.03	1974.07.20	N
	Côte d'Ivoire	1960.08.07	1983.03.02	A
	Chad	1960.08.11	1972.11.28	N
	Upper Volta	1960.08.15	Diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1961, derecognized on 24.05.2018	N
	Senegal	1960.06.20	1971.12.07	Y
	Rwanda	1962.07.01	1971.11.12	Absence
	Malawi	1964.07.06	2007.12.28	N
	Gambia	1965.02.18	1974.12.14	N
	Botswana	1966.09.30	1975.01.06	Y
	Lesotho	1966.10.04	1983.04.30	N
	Mauritius	1968.03.12	1972.04.15	Y
	Eswatini	1968.09.06	Diplomatic relations with Taiwan on 06.09.1968	Absence

Appendix D: Analysis of GA resolutions about representation of China, 1950-1970

GA Resolutions of the US to prevent China from restoring UN representation in 1950-1970					
Year	Session/Votes	Resolution	Plenary or Cttee.	Topic	Contents
1950.09.19	5th	A/RES/490 (V)	Plenary	Question of the representation of China in the General Assembly	The representative of Taiwan shall be seated in the General Assembly with the same rights as other representatives.
1950.11.05	5th,36-5-2	A/RES/501 (V)	Spec. Cttee on Representation of China	Question of the representation of China in the General Assembly	In present circumstance, it had been unable to make any recommendation on the question of the representation of China
1952.10.25	7th,42-7-11	A/RES/609 (VII) A	Cred. Cttee	Credentials of representatives to the 7th session of the General Assembly	Decides to postpone for the duration of 7th session consideration of all proposals to exclude the representative of the Government of ROC and seat representatives of the PRC.
1953.09.15	8th,44-10-2	A/RES/800 (VIII), the US postponed	Plenary	Question of the representation of China in the General Assembly	Decides to postpone for the duration of 8th session consideration of all proposals to exclude the representative of the Government of ROC and seat representatives of the PRC.
1954.09.21	9th,43-11-6	A/RES/903 (IX)	Plenary	Question of the representation of China in the General Assembly	Decides to postpone for the duration of 9th session consideration of all proposals to exclude the representative of the Government of ROC and seat representatives of the PRC.
1954.10.21	9th,45-0-8	A/RES/807 (IX) A	Cred.Cttee	Credentials of representatives to the 9th session of the General Assembly	Adopted resoultion A/2752 (about represention of China).
1955.09.20	10th,42-12-6	A/RES/990 (X)	Plenary	Question of the representation of China in the United Nations	Decides to postpone for the duration of 10th session consideration of all proposals to exclude the representative of the Government of ROC and seat representatives of the PRC.

1956.11.16	11th,47-24-8	A/RES/1108(XI)	Gen.Cttee	Representation of China in the United Nations	Decides not include in the agenda of its 11th session the additional item proposed by India A/3338 and decides not to consider the question of Chinese representation.
1957.09.24	12th,47-27-7	A/RES/1135(XII)	Gen.Cttee	Representation of China in the United Nations	Decides to reject the request of India A/3663, and not to consider any proposal about the representatives of China.
1958.09.23	13th,44-28-9	A/RES/1239(XIII)	Gen.Cttee	Question of the representation of China in the United Nations	Decides to reject the request of India A/3851, and not to consider any proposal about the representatives of China in the 13th session.
1959.09.22	14the,44-29-9	A/RES/1351(XIV)	Gen.Cttee	Question of the representation of China in the United Nations	Decides to reject the request of India A/4139, and not to consider any proposal about the representatives of China in the 14th session.
1960.10.08	15th,42-34-22	A/RES/1493(XV)	Gen.Cttee (General Committee)	Representation of China in the United Nations	Decides to reject the request of the USSR A/4474, and not to consider any proposal about the representatives of China in the 15th session.
1961.12.15	16th,61-34-7	A/RES/1668(XVI)	Plenary	Representation of China in the United Nations	In accordance with Article 18 of the Charter, that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question.
1965.11.17	20th,56-49-11	A/RES/2025(XX)	Plenary	Representation of China in the United Nations	Recalling further its decision in resolution 1668 on 15.12.1961.
1966.11.29	21st,66-48-7	A/RES/2159(XXI)	Plenary	Representation of China in the United Nations	In GA resolution 2025 of 17.11.1965, was affirmed as remaining vaild.
1967.11.28	22nd, 69-48-4	A/RES/2271(XXII)	Plenary	Representation of China in the United Nations	Affirms again that resolution 1668, 2025 and 2159 remain valid.

1968.11.19	23rd,73-47-5	A/RES/2389(XXIII)	Plenary	Representation of China in the United Nations	Affirms again that resolution 1668, 2025, 2159 and 2271 remain valid.
1969.11.11	24th,71-48-4	A/RES/2500(XXIV)	Plenary	Representation of China in the United Nations	Affirms again that resolution 1668, 2025, 2159, 2271 and 2389 remain valid.
1970.11.19	25th,66-52-7	A/RES/2642(XXV)	Plenary	Representation of China in the United Nations	Affirms again that resolution 1668, 2025, 2159, 2271 and 2500 remain valid.

(*Data from the UN Digital Library)*

Appendix E: Analysis of votes of the representation of China in the UN, 1950-1971

Year	Sponsor/Draft resolution	Votes (N-Y-A)	Outcome
1950.09.19	India, A/1365	33-16-10	Reject
1950.09.19	USSR, A/1369	38-10-8	Reject
1950.09.19	USSR, A/1370	38-11-8	Reject
1951.12.07	Byelorussian, A/1996	39-7-4	Reject
1953	USSR, A/2490	without vote	Reject
1954.09.21	USSR, AL.176	without vote	Reject
1955	USSR, AL.194	without vote	Reject
1956.11.16	India, A/3350	47-24-8	Reject
1957.09	India, A/3663&A/3670	43-29-9	Reject
1958.09.23	India, A/3926	44-28-9	Reject
1959.09.22	India, A/4214	44-29-9	Reject
1960.10.08	USSR, A/4520	42-34-22	Reject
1961.09.18	USSR, A/4874	Failed to obtain the two-third majority	Reject
1962.09.17	USSR, A/5218	56-42-12	Reject
1963.09.16	Albania, A/5498	57-41-12	Reject
1964.11.19	Albania, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Indonesia, Romania, A/5761	without vote	Reject
1965.08.27	Albania, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Conga (Braz.), Cuba, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Romania, A/5971	47-47-20	Reject
1966.08.30	Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, the Congo (Braz.), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Romania, and Syria, A/6391	46-57-17	Reject
1967.09.08	Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, the Congo (Braz.), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Romania, and Syria, A/6831	45-58-17	Reject
1968.09.16	Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Braz.), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Romania, Syria, and Southern Yemen, A/7222	44-58-23	Reject
1969.09.08	Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Braz.), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Romania, Southern Yemen, Syria, Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia, A/7652	48-56-21	Reject

1970.08.14	Albania, Algeria, Cuba, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, People's Republic of the Congo, Romania, Southern Yemen, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia, A/8043	51-49-25	Reject
1971.10.15	Albania, Algeria, Burma, Ceylon, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Nepal, Pakistan, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the People's Republic of the Congo, Romania, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia, A/8470	35-76-17	Adopted

(*Data from the UN Digital Library).*

Appendix F: Human resources of the three UN agencies, 1949-1971

President of the UNGA (1949-1971)		
Year	**Name**	**Nationality**
1949	Carlos P. Romulo	Philippines
1950	Nasrollah Entezam	Iran
1951	Luis Padilla Nervo	Mexico
1952	Lester B. Pearson	Canada
1953	Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit	India
1954	Eelco van Kleffens	Netherlands
1955	José Maza Fernández	Chile
1956	Rudecindo Ortega (es)	Chile
1956	Wan Waithayakon	Thailand
1957	Leslie Munro	New Zealand
1958	Charles Malik	Lebanon
1959	Víctor Andrés Belaúnde	Peru
1960	Frederick Boland	Ireland
1961	Mongi Slim	Tunisia
1962	Muhammad Zafarullah Khan	Pakistan
1963	Carlos Sosa Rodríguez (es)	Venezuela
1964	Alex Quaison-Sackey	Ghana
1965	Amintore Fanfani	Italy
1966	Abdul Rahman Pazhwak	Afghanistan
1967	Corneliu Mănescu	Romania
1968	Emilio Arenales Catalán	Guatemala
1969	Angie Brooks	Liberia
1970	Edvard Hambro	Norway
1971	Adam Malik	Indonesia

President of the International Court of Justice (1949-1971)		
Year	**Name**	**Nationality**
1946-1949	José Gustavo Guerrero	El Salvador
1949-1952	Jules Basdevant	France
1952-1955	Arnold McNair	United Kingdom
1955-1958	Green Hackworth	United States
1958-1961	Helge Klæstad	Norway
1961-1964	Bohdan Winiarski	Poland
1964-1967	Percy Spender	Australia
1967-1970	José Bustamante y Rivero	Peru
1970-1973	uhammad Zafarullah Khan	Pakistan

The Secretary-General of the UN (1949-1971)		
Year	**Name**	**Nationality**
1946-1952	Trygve Lie	Norway
1953-1961	Dag Hammarskjöld	Sweden
1961-1971	U Thant	Burma

Nationality ratio of senior officials of the UN		
State	**number**	**Type**
Philippines	1	Developing country
Iran	1	Developing country
Mexico	1	Developing country
Canada	1	Developed country
India	1	Developing country
Netherlands	1	Developed country
Chile	2	Developing country
Thailand	1	Developing country
New Zealand	1	Developed country
Lebanon	1	Developing country
Peru	2	Developing country
Ireland	1	Developed country
Tunisia	1	Developing country
Pakistan	2	Developing country
Venezuela	1	Developing country
Ghana	1	Developing country
Italy	1	Developed country
Afghanistan	1	Developing country
Romania	1	Developing country
Guatemala	1	Developing country
Liberia	1	Developing country
Norway	3	Developed country
Indonesia	1	Developing country
El Salvador	1	Developing country
France	1	Developed country
United Kingdom	1	Developed country
United States	1	Developed country
Poland	1	Developing country
Australia	1	Developed country
Sweden	1	Developed country
Burma	1	Developing country

表13 我國對外投資統計—國家(地區)別

Table 13 Taiwan Approved Outward Investment by Country (Area)

單位(Unit)：百萬美元(US$million), %

期間 Period / 地區 Area	1991-2008年			2009年1-4月 Jan.-Apr. 2009			累計 Cumulation		
	件數 Cases	金額 Amount	比重 Percentage by Amount	件數 Cases	金額 Amount	比重 Percentage by Amount	件數 Cases	金額 Amount	比重 Percentage by Amount
中國大陸 Mainland China	37,181	75,560.46	57.13	99	1,204.51	68.64	37,280	76,764.96	57.28
英屬中美洲 British Central America	1,939	21,714.79	16.42	14	217.32	12.38	1,953	21,932.11	16.37
美國 USA	4,650	9,375.09	7.09	17	58.16	3.31	4,667	9,433.25	7.04
新加坡 Singapore	414	5,369.14	4.06	3	25.61	1.46	417	5,394.75	4.03
香港 HK	967	3,010.29	2.28	12	32.21	1.84	979	3,042.50	2.27
越南 Vietnam	379	2,101.69	1.59	4	73.79	4.20	383	2,175.48	1.62
巴拿馬 Panama	60	1,188.54	0.90	1	2.00	0.11	61	1,190.54	0.89
日本 Japan	450	1,173.10	0.89	5	11.81	0.67	455	1,184.91	0.88
泰國 Thailand	279	1,713.26	1.30	0	0.41	0.02	279	1,713.67	1.28
菲律賓 Philippines	124	514.92	0.39	0	13.50	0.77	124	528.42	0.39
南韓 Korea	134	485.98	0.37	2	3.51	0.20	136	489.49	0.37
德國 Germany	137	154.36	0.12	0	9.42	0.54	137	163.79	0.12
其他地區 Others	1,945	9,890.35	7.46	23	102.68	5.85	1,968	9,993.04	7.46
合計 Total	48,659	132,251.97	100.00	180	1,754.93	100.00	48,839	134,006.90	100.00

註：細項數字不等於合計數係四捨五入之故。

資料來源：我國經濟部投資審議委員會。

Note：The figures are not added up to the total due to rounding up.

Source: Investment Commission, MOEA,ROC.

表10 臺商對中國大陸投資金額統計

Table 10 Taiwan Investment in Mainland China

單位 (Unit): 百萬美元(US$million), %

期 間 Period	經濟部核准資料 Approved by Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC			中國大陸對外公布資料 Official Data from Mainland China				
	件數 Cases	金額 Amount	平均每件金額 Average Amount	項目 Projects	協議金額 Contracted Amount	平均每件金額 Average Amount	實際金額 Realized Amount	資金到位率(%) Realization Ratio
1991-1992	501	421.15	0.84	9,807	8,253.53 (含1991年以前) (include data before 1991)	0.84	1,894.10	22.95
1993*	9,329	3,168.41	0.34	10,948	9,964.87	0.91	3,138.59	31.50
1994	934	962.21	1.03	6,247	5,394.88	0.86	3,391.04	62.86
1995	490	1,092.71	2.23	4,847	5,849.07	1.21	3,161.55	54.05
1996	383	1,229.24	3.21	3,184	5,141.00	1.61	3,474.84	67.59
1997*	8,725	4,334.31	0.50	3,014	2,814.49	0.93	3,289.39	116.87
1998*	1,284	2,034.62	1.58	2,970	2,981.68	1.00	2,915.21	97.77
1999	488	1,252.78	2.57	2,499	3,374.44	1.35	2,598.70	77.01
2000	840	2,607.14	3.10	3,108	4,041.89	1.30	2,296.28	56.81
2001	1,186	2,784.15	2.35	4,214	6,914.19	1.64	2,979.94	43.10
2002*	3,116	6,723.06	2.16	4,853	6,740.84	1.39	3,970.64	58.90
2003*	3,875	7,698.78	1.99	4,495	8,557.87	1.90	3,377.24	39.46
2004	2,004	6,940.66	3.46	4,002	9,305.94	2.33	3,117.49	33.50
2005	1,297	6,006.95	4.63	3,907	10,358.25	2.65	2,151.71	20.77
2006	1,090	7,642.34	7.01	3,752	—	—	2,135.83	—
2007	996	9,970.55	10.01	3,299	—	—	1,868.45	—
2008	643	10,691.39	16.63	2,360	—	—	1,898.68	—
累計至2008年 Accumulated to 2008	37,181*	75,560.46*	2.03	77,506	—	—	47,659.68	—
2009年1-4月* Jan.-Apr. 2009	99	1,204.51	12.17	594	—	—	495.54	—
較上年同期增減比例(%) Rate of change compared to same period of last year	-76.44	-62.58	—	-18.74	—	—	-23.62	—
累計至2009年4月止 Accumulated to Apr. 2009	37,280 *	76,764.96*	2.06	78,100	—	—	48,155.22	—

註: 1. * 為含補辦。
2.成長率係指較上年同期增減比例。
3.細項數字不等於合計數係四捨五入之故。

資料來源：1.我國資料係根據經濟部投資審議委員會。
2.中國大陸對外公布資料係根據「商務部」統計之外商直接投資金額。

Note: 1.* includes the number of the registration of previously unregistered investments.
2.Growth rate is the year-on-year growth rate.
3.The figures are not added up to the total due to rounding up.

Source: 1.Investment Commision, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC.
2. Ministry of Commerce, PRC.