Understanding Bahrain's labour immigration policy-making process during labour markets reforms process 2002-2016: interest groups intermediation and policy networks

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Abstract

This thesis stems from interest in understanding the labour immigration policy-making in Bahrain by examining the role of different actors and considering how their involvement can produce changes to policy outcomes. The thesis examines the labour immigration policy-making process between 2002 and 2016. During this time, the Economic Development Board (EDB) initiated the labour market reform process (LMRP). The Labour market reform process introduced new policies to manage the immigrant labour in Bahrain after granting them work visas. Thus, this thesis will cover the discussion and negotiations in relation to the LMRP. This will include covering the formation of LMRP, the negotiation over the draft law on the regulation of the labour market annexed to the Royal Decree No. (25) for 2005, the negotiation over implementing labour market policies, and the adjustment of the reform outcomes after the Bahraini uprising in 2011.

The findings are based on data collected from 23 personal interviews with actors from different government, semi government organisations, and different interest groups. The research used several documents such as parliamentary and Shura minutes, media articles, and documents received from participants during field work.

The thesis builds its understanding of the role of different actors in affecting policy outcomes through the perspective of policy network analysis. The policy network is a framework for repeated interactions between different actors where the role of actors and context in affecting policy outcomes can be examined. The actors within the network may interact due to shared beliefs interests, or a need to access each other's resources. The policy network analysis approach has proved to be useful in highlining the role of different actors during the process.

The conclusion of this thesis provides a new narrative regarding the role of different actors. The literature that discusses the LMRP and the role of different

actors focuses on analysing the position and effects of different actors as shaped by the division of power within the ruling family. However, with the use of the policy network analysis, the thesis concludes that the capacity of actors to influence policy outcomes is not solely dependent on the internal power struggle within the ruling family. The need for businessmen to finance the labour market reform project was a source of influence over the policy outcome in 2005. The deal they made with the EDB continued to be influential after 2011. In, addition, the businessmen were able to influence job's localisations policies through its dialogue with Labour market regulatory authority as the two parties shared beliefs in less rigid localisation policies. The Parliament had its role in affecting the outcome through negotiation with the EDB over the inclusion of domestic labour as a tool to reform of the labour market. The MPs were influential in this matter as part of a trade-off process between the inclusion of domestic labour and other related issues of reforms.

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Table of Contents

Abstract 2

Chapter 1: Introduction 12

1.1 Introduction 12

1.2 The research objectives and questions 12

1.3 Structure of the thesis 14

Chapter 2: background to labour immigration policy-making in Bahrain 18

2.1 Introduction 18

2.2 background to labour immigration in Bahrain 19

2.2.1 Oil Booms and the increase number of immigrant workers from 1970s ... 20

2.3 The labour market policies after the influx of immigrant labour 21

2.4 what literature says about the relationship between state and interest groups in Bahrain after gaining independence in 1971 23

2.5 Political reforms in Bahrain 26

2.5.1 The post 1999 political factions within the ruling family: the rise of the Khawalid 28

2.5.2 economic policies initiatives by the Crown Prince: labour market reforms 31

2.6 Non-state actors who were mostly active during the labour market reforms.. 32

2.7 How literature describes the position of actors from the labour market reform process? 42

2.8 Conclusion 44

Chapter 3: Background to the Policy network analysis 47

3.1 Introduction 47

3.2 policy network analysis 47

3.2.1 From centric state to differentiated polity: the emergence of policy network in western countries 48

3.2.2 Different schools in Policy Network analysis: Governance and Interest group intermediation 51

3.2.3 Networks as a form of Interest group Intermediation: Background to the concept of policy networks 55

3.3 Criticism to policy network analysis 59

3.4 Policy network analysis in non-western context 61

3.5 How can we understand policy-process in non-democratic states? 63

3.5.1 The Rentier State Theory 64

3.5.2 Crony capitalism 74

3.6 Policy networks in comparison to other theories that explains the policy process 77
3.7 Conclusion 82
Chapter 4: Developing the analytical framework for this thesis 84
4.1 Introduction 84
4.2 Network formation and transformation 84
4.2.1 The structure/ agency debate 87
4.2.2 Structuration 89
4.2.3 Archer's morphogenetic approach 91
4.2.4 Networking as a strategic relational approach 94
4.3 reconciling structure and agency role in policy analysis: The dialectical approach to policy network analysis 97
4.3.1 Types of policy Networks and its potential correlation with policy outcomes 104
4.3.2 what form a policy outcome? 112
4.4 The role of ideas in policy network analysis 117
4.5 Conclusion 122
Chapter 5: Research design and methods 124
5.1 Introduction 124
5.2 Research strategy: an embedded single case study 124
5.2.1 Strength and weaknesses of the qualitative case study 126
5.2.2 Sampling 128
5.2.3 Access to the sample 129
5.3 Methods of data collection 131
5.3.1 Semi structured interviews 131
5.3.2 Elite Interviewing 132
5.3.3 The order of the interviews: from interest groups to government actors 134
5.3.4. Document Analysis 134
5.4 Data translation and presentation 140
5.5 Data analysis 141
5.6 Field work reflections 143
5.6.1 Reflections on the quality of the data gathered 144
5.7 Conclusion 148
Chapter 6: Introducing labour market Reforms 2002-2004 150
6.1 Introduction 150
6.2 Introduction of Labour Markets reforms in Bahrain: 2002-2004 151

6.3 The role of McKinsey & Company study and the perception of what causes unemployment in Bahrain and how to solve it: a shared policy principle 152

6.3.1 Ideas and beliefs of EDB, McKinsey & Company about reforming labour market regards developing countries: where does the ideas of reform come from? 158

6.3.2 The ILO report 161

6.4 Communicating the labour market reforms policy package to interest groups: an action to gain support 163

6.5 Policy outcomes (policy instruments and objectives) 167

6.6 Conclusion 169

Chapter 7: The role of different actors in the Labour market reform process 171

7.1 Introduction 171

7.2.1 The perception of positive and negative effect of Political reforms initiated by the king and the inclusion of interest groups in the process 172

7.2 Inclusion and exclusion of actors during the process 177

7.2.2 The composition of parliament and its effects on the inclusion and exclusion of actor's interest 177

7.2.3 Membership in parliamentary committee 180

7.2.4 Merchants relationship with cabinet 182

7.3 How to understand the interest and policy position of different actors during drafting the DLRM? 185

7.3.1 Government structure and division of power within the ruling family 186

7.3.2 Power struggle during drafting the DLRM: who determine economic policies? 191

7.3.3 Segmented labour market, class structure and citizenships right 194

7.5 Action of actors 204

7.5.1 The EDB and Crown Prince Court actions 205

7.5.2 The role of BCCI: playing by the rules of the game 209

7.6 Policy outcomes after discussing the DLRM 212

7.7 Conclusion 214

Chapter 8: The characteristics of labour market policy-making process during implementation phase 216

8.1 Introduction 216

8.2 factors affecting the implementation of monthly fees 217

8.2.1 BCCI's actions to delay implementation: a reaction to LMRA's decisions 218

8.2.3 The action of excluded interest after the application of fees 222

8.2.4 The BCCI perception about the effect of fees on businessmen, and the Bahraini economy 224

8.3 Factors affecting the implementation of free movement of immigrant labour 225
8.3.1 Agreement between interest groups regards the negative effect of free movement on the interest of businessmen 226
8.3.2 The action of BCCI after the implementation: Establishing the temporary quarter committee 229
8.3.3 the support of the Crown Prince and the King to the application of free movement 231
8.4 The characteristics of actor's interactions post 14th of February 2011 233
8.4.1 The 14th of February 2011 uprising 234
8.4.2 The participation of GFWTUB in 14th Of February revolution and its effect on their relationship with the government and BCCI: re alliance of political interest 235
8.4.3 the BCCI actions to change the procedures for applying the free movement and fees 237
8.5 Conclusion 241
Chapter 9: application of the policy network analysis, network formation and transformation 243
9.1 Introduction 243
9.2 labour immigration Policy network during LMRP 244
9.2.1 network formation and transformation between 2002-2016 246
9.2.2 The characteristics of the network at formation phase 247
9.2.3 The characteristics of the network during the legislative phase: drafting and discussing the DLRM between 2005-2006 252
9.2.4 The characteristics of the network during implementation phase 2006-2010 259
9.3 The characteristic of the network after the Bahraini uprising in 2011 262
9.3.1 How to explain the post 2011 actor's interactions 263
9.4 Types of policy network 269
9.5 Conclusion 272
Chapter 10: The dialectical relationships 273
10.1 Introduction 274
10.2. The dialectical relationships 274
10.2.1 The relationship between context and network 274
10.2.2 Network affected by context through actors resources and interest 275
10.2.3 The direct effect of context over network 278
10.2.4 Context affected by network 282
10.3 How can we understand Actor's actions 285

10.3.1 Actors and network's structure 286
10.3.2 Actors and the broader context: economic and political interest..... 291
10.4 The extent to which policy network characteristics explains policy outcomes 298
10.4.1 Policy principles 298
10.4.2 Policy instruments 299
10.5 Conclusion..... 305
Chapter 11: Conclusion and recommendations 306
11.1 Introduction..... 306
11.2. summary of the research findings 307
11.3 To what extent does the PNA explains the Labour immigration policy process in Bahrain..... 311
11.3.1 The strength of using policy network analysis to the Bahraini context . 312
11.3.2 Limitation of policy network analysis when applied to the Bahraini context..... 318
11.5 Recent changes in labour market policies in Bahrain..... 322
11.6 Recommendation for further research 323
Appendix 1: Breakdown of the interviews: participant position, interview date, and duration 325
Appendix 2 the general form for Interviews questions..... 328
Bibliography..... 331

List of figures

Figure 1: The Dialectical approach to explain the role of policy networks in determining policy outcomes……..101
Figure 2: adjusted ideational approach to policy network analysis based on Marsh and Smith dialectical model……..119
Figure 3: An illustration to the relationship between BCCI, Network structure and Broader context……268

List of Tables

Table 1 positions in the structure/ agency debate …… 88

Table 2 types and characteristics of policy networks ……106

Table 3 The documents that has been collected……136

Table 4 political societies that was part of parliament from 2002-2006 …….178

Table 5 political societies and parliamentary blocs that was part of parliament from 2006-2010……180

Table 6 Comparison between EDBs power before and after royal decree no 31 for the year 2005 regards establishing and organising the EDB……..178

Abbreviations

AAIS	Alasalah Islamic Society
AWNIS	Alwifaq National Islamic society
AWPB	Alwifaq Parliamentary Bloc
BCCI	Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry
BOD	Board of Directors
CP	Crown Prince
CPC	The Crown Prince Court
DLRM	Draft law on the regulation of the labour market annexed to the Royal Decree No. (25) for the year 2005
EDB	Economic Development Board
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
ILO	International Labour Organisation
LMRP	Labour Market Reform Process
LMRA	Labour Market Regulatory Authority
MCK	McKinsey & Company
MJN	Majlis Alnuwab
MWPS	The Migrants Workers Protection Society
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PM	Prime Minister
SHC	Shura Council
RST	Rentier state theory
FECSHC	The Finance and Economic Affairs Committee in the Shura Council

Arabic Terms

Al Jihat al ma'nia	The stakeholders
Aljihat al'ahlia almukhtasa	competent authorities
Majlis Alnuwab	The house of Representative
Shia	A branch of islam
shura council	The House of Consultative
Sunni	A branch of Islam

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This thesis focuses on the role of different actors starting from why they are part of some policy process, how they affect policy outcomes, and what explains the actions of those actors to affect such policy outcomes, and how their interaction can affect the final policy decisions. Such a field is understudied in Bahrain and the Gulf countries as well. There are very limited researches that follow the policy-making process to uncover the dynamics of it. Hence, there is significant ambiguity regarding policy-making processes, and generalisation of the drivers of such process.

The narrative that most Bahrainis adhere to is that the government/Al Khalifa policy ideas or interests are the drivers of policy outcomes. The government is perceived as one united cluster of people working to protect the interests of the ruling family (Khalaf, 1998). However, it is argued by this research that the government is fragmented and that policy outcomes do not always end the way that his highness desires. There is politics, negotiations, and actions by actors to affect the policy outcomes. It is important to disaggregate the policies to their content and to understand how each content were arrived to, with the potential to find sources of change other than the power of ruling family. As said by a former Minister of Labour in Bahrain: "*you have to fight because there are enabled forces within the society that refuses change, they don't want change*". The question of how to fight was asked by this thesis researcher, the Minister replied "by *reasoning, lobbying, and politics. Politics lobby is important*" (personal interview 22, 2016).

1.2 The research objectives and questions

The aim of the research is to explore the immigration policy-making process in the Kingdom of Bahrain between 2002 and 2016. Bahrain is a small island

located near the western shore of the Persian Gulf with a population of 1.424 million according to the 2016 census (Information & eGovernment Authority, 2017). The focus will be on how the actors, context, and policy network interact to produce the policy outcomes. To understand the labour immigration policy process in Bahrain, the role of different actors will be explored. In addition, the relationship between government and interest groups is discussed to understand the extent to which they interact with each other and why they need such interaction. Finally, the study focuses on contextual factors that affects the labour immigration policy process and policy outcomes.

The rationale for choosing this topic is traced back to three factors, first of which is the limited studies about the characteristics of Bahrain's immigration policy-making process. The literature regarding immigration policies in Bahrain focus mostly on the history of immigration to the gulf countries, the politics of migration and the labour market politics in Bahrain (Alshehabi, 2015., Khalaf, 2015., AlHasan, 2012, Valeri, 2013). Therefore, this research will cover the gap in the immigration literature by highlighting the policy-making aspects of it.

Second, the labour immigration policies in Bahrain exhibits some fundamental changes in the suggested period of the study. The reason for choosing the period from 2002 until the fieldwork in 2016 is in association with a reform process that started after appointing the Crown Prince of Bahrain as the chairman of the Economic Development Board in Bahrain. This was followed by several economic, labour market and education reforms in Bahrain. The labour market reforms in Bahrain continued to change over the period suggested by the researcher in association with changes within the economic and political context in Bahrain that expanded its effect to the relationship between different actors in the policy-making process. Accordingly, this period is significant as it is associated with changes in policies and the position of different actors within the realm of public policy-making in Bahrain and specifically in relation to labour market polices.

Third, there were political changes prior to the labour market reform process which resulted in fragmenting the state apparatus and legalised the establishment of interest groups. Such changes call for more investigation regards the role of different actors in the policy making process and the relationship with the state. As the argument about the state as the ultimate policy makers might not explain the immigration policymaking in Bahrain (Crystal, 2005, p.3-6). As a wide engagement of different state actors and interest groups in the policy process was noticed during the labour market reform process in Bahrain, which raises a question about the role of different actors during the process.

Considering these aims and rational for conducting this research, the research questions of this study are as following:

1- How are the labour immigration policies made in Bahrain?
2- How does the interaction between broader structural context, policy network structure and actor's actions affect the policy outcomes?
3- To what extent does the policy network analysis explain the labour immigration policy process in Bahrain?

1.3 Structure of the thesis

Chapter two reviews the literature about the development of labour immigration policies in Bahrain during the 20th century. The review provides a background to the policy-making process in Bahrain by reviewing the role of different actors and their relationship with the state. It traces the development of the Bahrain Chamber of commerce and industry (BCCI) and how its relationship with the government is disputed in literature. On one hand, the business community was viewed as exchanging resources with the ruling family, and such a relationship changed after the influx of oil. On the other hand, the businessmen exert influence over policy outcomes through their membership within the state apparatus. The other major interest groups such

as the trade unions had less effect over policy outcomes and a conflict relationship with the government through the years.

Chapter three reviews the literature regarding policy network analysis (PNA). The literature in regard to the PNA is divided broadly to discussion of networks as a manifestation of Interest group Intermediation, and networks as a form of governance. The discussion then compares the two schools to justify the uses of the network as a form of interest intermediation. The chapter continues with the discussion about the policy network within the intermediation school and how it was developed and the major contribution in it. The main limitation of the school is the issue regards the role of structure and role of agents. Finally, the chapter briefly explains how PNA is used in a non-western context.

Chapter four builds on the discussion in chapter four by discussing the analytical framework for this thesis. The framework is based on discussing how to overcome the limitation of the older version of PNA. The dialectical framework of Marsh and Smith (2000) is suggested as a solution to the structure/agency debate within the PNA. The limitation of the Marsh and Smith model is discussed, and consideration given to how literature dealt with such a limitation (Kisby, 2007).

Chapter five discusses the research design and methodology used in this thesis. The research states how the participants' sample was chosen and how access to the sample was gained. The first method of data collection is a semi-structured interview and the logic behind the order of interviews is explained. The second method for data collection was the document analysis. The chapter continues by explaining how data were analysed. The final part of the chapter provides some field work reflections such as reflections regarding the quality of data collected.

The next three chapters discuss the data collected from field work. The discussion divides the labour market reforms into four main periods where changes occurred to interactions between actors and policy outcomes. These

periods are: the introduction of the reforms between 2002 and 2004, the discussion of the draft law on the regulation of the labour market annexed to the Royal Decree No. (25) for the year 2005 (DLRM), the implementation of the reform between 2006 and 2010, and finally the post-2011 revolution policy outcomes. These chapters answer the first research questions by describing how the labour immigration policies are made in Bahrain by examining different contextual factors that affects the process and the role of different actors during the process.

Chapter six discusses the early introduction of labour market reforms as it was associated with the appointment of the CP of Bahrain as the chairman of the EDB. The EDB had economic vision about changing the structure of the economy from being reliant on the public sector to a private led economy, in association with these ideas and the facts regarding the high unemployment policy in Bahrain. The labour market reforms process was incepted, and different actors and experts became part of the formation of labour market policy package proposal. Among which was the McKinsey and Company (MCK) which it held beliefs about economy with the high added value jobs and to be away from cheap labour model shaped the beliefs of different actors and the policy outcomes.

Chapter seven reviews the interactions of actors during the discussion of the DLRM. The discussion was affected by the segmentation of power within the ruling family and the interest of MPs which is traced back to how class was formed in Bahrain after the influx of oil revenues in 1970s. These two elements were major contributors to the increased interactions between actors. Chapter eight reviews the role of actors during the implementation process and after the Bahraini revolution in 2011.

Chapters eight and nine applied the PNA to the labour market immigration policy-making. Chapter eight discusses why the interactions between different actors are considered to form a policy network. The chapter discusses the criteria of the network throughout the policy process until the field work from

2002 to 2016. Chapter ten shows the correlation between policy network and some policy outcomes during the reforms. The action of actors is understood to be reflected by their membership with the network as well. The changes in the network were outcomes to changes with the context that was fluctuating. These two chapters are important to answer how does the interaction between broader structural context, policy network structure and actor's actions affect the policy outcomes, and the extent to which the policy network analysis explain the labour immigration policy process in Bahrain.

Finally, chapter 11 provides the findings of the study. The role of different actors reflects their membership within the network, their structural position within the society and sometimes the skills of actors. In addition, actors were needed during the process for different reasons such as support to the reforms, or to finance the reforms. Such a need gives some actors the capacity to negotiate the policy outcomes. The chapter concludes with recommendations that a further research in the field of public policy and labour market policies are needed to understand the role of different actors and the nature of their relationship with the state.

Chapter 2: background to labour immigration policy-making in Bahrain

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature regarding labour immigration policies in Bahrain and how they historically evolved from 1919 until the 1990s. It highlights the factors that drove the labour immigrating polices at that periods. For instance, the increase in oil revenues and the growth of public sector created demands for more labour that wasn't met by the structure of the Bahraini labour market during that time. The discussion then examines the main policy tools to organise and manage the immigrant in Bahrain namely: localisation policies and the Kafala system. The localisation policy was the policy tool to replace the immigrant labour with a Bahraini labour, while the Kafala system is the rules that manage the mobility and entry of immigrant in the Bahraini labour market.

The second part of the chapter explains the literature that describes the relationship between state and society in policy-making processes after the 1970s. The discussion continued to explain the political reforms process in Bahrain in 2002 with the ascendance of New Amir to the throne. The political reforms were followed by labour market, economic and education reforms and changes in power structure between the ruling family. This will be followed by a description to different active actors after the reform process. These active interests are explained in relation to the labour reform process discussions that occurred after the political reforms in Bahrain. The main actors are the EDB chaired by the CP. The international consultation company MCK was employed by the EDB to study the labour market and provide information about it and policy recommendation. The other major player was the Majlis Al Nuwab (MJN), the Bahrain Chamber for commerce and Industry (BCCI). The BCCI relationship in the policy-making process is described in this chapter. They were historically significant actors through being part of different

governmental positions, through the chamber itself as a being consulted in matters related to public policies, and through informal channels with the ruling family. The other actors were the General Federation of workers' trade unions in Bahrain (GFWTUB) which historically had a contested relationship with the government of Bahrain.

2.2 background to labour immigration in Bahrain

The starting point of labour immigration to Bahrain was noticed in the 19th century by the British Colonial Rule (Alshehabi, 2015). Bahrain was under the protection of Britain from 1880-1971 (Gause, 1994, p1-19). The import of foreign workforce was administrated by the British administration who sponsored foreign workers. The foreign workforce was limited in number and they occupied administrative jobs and worked for the security forces (Alshehabi, 2015). According to Alshehabi (2015), "*the purpose of this first wave of migration was to strengthen the security forces through which the British maintained their control (i.e. mercenary forces*)" (p.6).

The discovery of oil in 1931 changed the nature of need to the presence of foreign workforce in the island of Bahrain. From 1931 until the 1950s, the immigrant workers mainly worked for the oil industry. The foreign workers that occupied administrative and highly skilled jobs were from the western countries and mostly from the United Kingdom. The Clarks and semi-skilled were mostly from the colonised Indian subcontinent. The employing of foreign workers in skilled and semi-skilled jobs was a condition within the oil concessions signed by the local ruler and local oil company. Hence, workers under the British ruler are preferred for these jobs. The unskilled workers were mostly Bahrainis; this was a condition set by the local rulers (Alshehabi, 2015). Foreign workers from India, the United Kingdom, Iran and Iraq were all dealt with by British political agents. Skilled workers were given work contracts while unskilled workers were not (Graham, 1935).

There was not a formal law during the 1930s and the 1960s. According to Albaharnah (1968), codified civil laws in Bahrain did not exist before 1956. The first codified labour act was in 1957, when the governor of Bahrain issued the labour ordinance. The only act that applied to immigrants in Bahrain was adopted in 1965. It is called Aliens (Immigration and Residence) Act. The act followed the Citizenship Act in Bahrain which was issued in 1963. The act has general criteria for granting residence to a foreigner, such as being able to support himself and his dependants, to submit a written permission to work in Bahrain. The act gives the governor of Bahrain the authority to cancel the license for the foreigner if he is deemed dangerous for the public interest.

2.2.1 Oil Booms and the increase number of immigrant workers from 1970s

The number of immigrant workers increased between 1950 and 1970 as a result of the flow of oil revenues from selling the extracted oil. The money was used to build state apparatus, the infrastructure, health sector, and education sector. The private sector grew as well, especially the goods importation sector and the construction sector. Therefore, the job market started to expand beyond the oil sector. Around 50 percent of immigrants were from the Arab countries (Alshehabi, 2015).

A further significant rise in the number of immigrant workers was associated with the 1973 oil boom. After gaining independencies in 1971, Bahrain and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries were receiving most of the oil revenues rather than sharing it with other international oil companies. Thus, a significant amount of capital was spent on building infrastructure and financing the new state institutions and universal welfare system (Alshehabi, 2015). Alshehabi (2015) suggests that the influx of temporary immigrants benefited the business sector and led them to rely more on immigrant workers. Employing citizens was not attractive because of the legal and material cost, while employing a foreign worker was more cost effective for employers due to the less legal obligations towards non-citizens.

The demographic structure in Bahrain is an explanatory factor regarding how immigration policies were shaped after the influx of oil revenue. In Bahrain, the demographic structure during all immigration periods is characterised as young population. However, the population number was small during 1971 as the total population was 216,078, with Bahrainis constituting 82.5 percent of them. The number of immigrant labours in Bahrain continued to rise throughout the years. Between 1970 and 2000, the immigrant labour comprised one third of the total population in Bahrain (Bel-Air, 2015). In 2013, the Central Information Organisation estimated the total population in Bahrain as 1.25 million, and Bahrainis constitute only 49 percent (Central Information organisation, 2001, 2013).

2.3 The labour market policies after the influx of immigrant labour

The immigrant labour policies were characterised by lax in issuance of work permit, yet restricted legal framework for controlling the immigrant once they enter the Bahraini labour market. The immigrant labours in Bahrain are to some extent controlled by the sponsorship system which does not give them the freedom to move to another employer. To limit the employment of immigrants in Bahrain, the government established localisation policies to reduce the dependencies on immigrant labour. This section explains the localisation policies in Bahrain as a tool to limit the number of immigrants and the Kafala system as a legal framework of labour immigration.

Localisation policies

The first private sector labour's law in Bahrain after independence was enacted in 1976, it demanded that employers have to prioritise citizens and then Arab nationals for employment. Localisation policies are defined as the policies that aim to "*the replacement of foreign workers with skilled and qualified local labour*" (Alsaid & Alfahdi, 2012). The first private sector law was amended in 1993; the literature reveals that the amendments were mainly within the framework of localisation policies. The amendments involve rigid policies on

employers who want to employ immigrant workers by prioritising the employment of Bahrainis. The amendments provided more control on the movements of immigrants within the labour market, but they also improved the protection of foreign workers (ILO, 2002, p.23). These amendments were as follows: first, to prohibit the employment of foreign workers without working permits. Second, penalise employers that employ a foreign worker when they do not need one. If the worker proved to be working for another employer, then the original employer's commercial registration will be cancelled, and his commercial activities suspended. The amendments that improve the protection of foreign workers are first, the cost of repatriating the foreign worker to their country after the contract expires must be paid by the employer. Second, the employment agencies must not charge fees on foreign workers (ILO, 1993).

Despite the strict control of the foreign worker movement in the labour market, the conditions under which foreign labour can access the country were not strict. There was no cap on the number of visas issued to skilled or unskilled immigrant workers. In 1994, the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs issued a decision about the conditions for obtaining work permits for foreign workers. To issue a work permit, employers must prove that they need foreign workers. Permits were only granted if the foreign workers were not in labour market competition with local workers (ILO, 1994). In addition, companies that employ foreign experts had to make an effort to "*appoint competent Bahraini "assistants" for such experts and train them in the latter's work*" (ILO, 1994).

Sponsorship system

The immigrant workers are controlled and monitored by the work permits sponsorship system (Kafala system). Sponsorship systems are the rules and procedures that govern the entry and mobility of foreign employees in the Bahraini labour market. All immigrant labours entering Bahraini must be sponsored by a citizen (Dito, 2015). The citizen sponsor is the one who requests

the issuance of these permits from the state. The work permits are then issued under certain requirements that must be met by the citizen (Dito, 2015).

The citizen, or employer in this case, has the power over the employee's mobility and residence situation. For instance, the employer ultimately decided if the foreign worker can move to another employer or leave the country before the end of the work contract. The sponsor is the one and only employer. Further, the workers cannot move to another employer unless they acquire a consent letter from the original employer. In addition, the sponsor holds the immigrant's passport and does not return it to the worker until the end of the working period (Khan & Taval, 2011, p.294).

In tracing the origin of the Kafala system, Anh Longva (1997) argues that tying the worker to one employer is a historic system which was used to organise labour during the pearling industry. The sponsorship system emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century as a cultural practice aimed at organising labour in the pearling industry. Through the pearling mode of production, the divers were an indentured servitude that is in debt for their employer who is the captain of the boat (Gardner, 2010, p. 20). The pearling industry was based on a loan system in which the divers receive a loan from the boat captain that will keep him in debt until the pearling season. After selling the pearls, the amount of the loan is deducted from the diver shares. The remaining amount of money that the divers receive was not sufficient to cover living costs; hence taking loans from the captain was the only way for them to survive. This cycle of debt was similar to being a slave not able to change the employer (Hussain, 2009).

2.4 what literature says about the relationship between state and interest groups in Bahrain after gaining independence in 1971

The argument within the literature is that state established immigration policies without consulting other actors. The literature that covers the state-society relationship presents the concept of rentier state to explain the state

relationship with different interest groups. Rentier state theory was introduced by Hossien Mahdavy in 1970 to describe the state society relation in Iran; it was then adopted by Beblawi and Luciani in 1987 in relation to GCC countries (Beblawi, 1987). Rent is the income gained by owning natural resources such as oil and mines. A rentier state is a state that is mostly dependent on the extract of natural wealth rather than producing it. A few people within these countries are engaging with the activities of extracting wealth; the others are recipient of that wealth. The government is the main recipients and distributor of rent (Beblawi & Luciani, 2016). Hence, they possess an economic and political power. Thus, the state is the "*prime mover of the economic activity*" (Beblawi, 1987,386). The rent is redistributed by the government, and the social and economic interests are organised in a way to gain part of the redistributed rent. The picture is that the government is at the top of the hierarchy and the rest are the clientele or rentier. A rentier is "*a member of a special group who, though he does not participate actively in the economic production, receive never the less a share in the produce and at times a handsome share*." (Beblawi, 1987, p.384).

The immigration policy-making was analysed based on such concepts of state-society relationship. The literature about immigration policies shows that the state is the unitary actor in policy-making**.** Khalaf (2015) argues that the state/ ruling family distinction does not exist in gulf monarchies, as he considers the state to be an "*instrument of the ruling families*" (P.45). The ruling family controls the spending of oil revenues - also called 'rent' - and that gives the state more power over society. Therefore, to understand immigration policies, we have to understand the interest of ruling families. Khalaf considers that immigration policies are being shaped with the aim of sustaining the power of the ruling families. He argues that "*migration has become a useful tool for social engineering, helping to reshape the GCC societies and redefine their social hierarchies*" (p. 40).

The situation of Arab immigrants is provided as an example of how the ruling families shaped immigration policies to meet their interests. Arab immigrants

to the gulf region were welcomed and even preferred over non-Arab immigrants (Alshehabi, 2015). This welcoming environment changed with the increased pan Arab ideology from 1958 as they were calling for a United Arabic State which threatened the gulf monarchies. Arab immigrants were considered as an importer of these radical ideas that calls for social and political changes. Hence, they were gradually replaced with south Asian immigrants (LOUËR, 2008, p. 33)

An alternative understanding to factors shaping the labour market policies is provided by Hasan (2015). Hasan's (2015) analysis of labour market policies in GCC countries suggests that policy instruments are chosen to "*reduce the distribution gap and political risks*" (p.152). Hasan (2015) applies a political economy approach to discuss the labour-intensive economy in GCC countries. He explains that the preferences of GCC countries for employing foreign workers are based on low cost and better productivity. He explains that "*available rent for unskilled workers is much higher than that of skilled workers and remains the most likely reason for the private sector's fascination with the unskilled migration workers*." (p.156). Such analysis explains why some actors (i.e. private sector) prefer immigrant workers but it does not explain the attempt for changing such situations in Bahrain between 2002 and 2011.

The rentier state theory and the cost benefit analysis do not provide sufficient understanding regarding the role of state and interest groups in policy-making, especially when it comes to the role of the business sector in Bahrain or other Gulf countries. For instance, Nosova (2016) argues that studying state /business relationship in Kuwait cannot be fully understood by applying the rentier state theory. According to her, rent partially determines the relationship between state and business. However, rent does not explain why some merchant families ally with the opposition against the government decisions. She concludes that there are other variables that explain the engagement of merchant families in political decisions such as the semi's parliamentary political system in Kuwait and relations with the ruling family. In addition, applying cost-benefit analysis to understand labour market policies

fail to capture the importance of cultural values, world views, programmatic beliefs and norms in determining the policy outcomes. For instance, actors act based on their beliefs on how domestic workers must be treated in a way that protects her from violence in society. Those actors think that denying the freedom of movement to domestic workers will protect her from sexual abuse by men (personal Interview 8, 2016).

2.5 Political reforms in Bahrain

Bahrain held its first parliament election in 1973. However, the parliament was dissolved in 1975 During that period, most of the opposition leaders were in exile. Bahrain declared independence on 15th August 1971 after the withdrawal of British troops (Gardner, 2010). After the independence, Shaikh Isa bin Salman Alkhalifa became the Emir of Bahrain until his death in 1999. Shaikh Khalifa Bin Salman Alkhalifa, the brother of Shaikh Isa, was appointed as the Prime Minister (PM) of Bahrain after their independence and still holds this position as of early 2019. During Shaikh Isa era, Bahrain witnessed significant political unrest where members of illegal opposition parties were detained. The newly established parliament in 1973 was dissolved in 1975 due to the opposition of members of parliament to pass state security law. The country was under the state security law until 1999 (Gardner, 2010). Trade unions were not allowed to be organised and to defend labour's rights, nor human rights non - governmental organisations (NGO). The only organised interest group that was allowed to work was the BCCI. There was no legal organised workers federation, except the labour committees established by the government (Khalaf, 1998., Bassiouni et al ,2011).

In 1999, the CP of Bahrain Hamad Bin Isa Alkhalifa, the nephew of the PM, ascended to power after the death of his father. He appointed his son Salman Bin Hamed Alkhalifa as the CP. The ruling prince led several political reform initiatives. Among these initiatives were returns of opposition members from exile, release of political prisoners and dissolution of the state security court,

the re-establishment of the parliamentary system, legalising political work and the establishment of civil societies (Wright, 2008).

Shaikh Hamad started a national dialogue with several interest groups and civil societies including the oppositions regarding the unsettled political situation in Bahrain. The national dialogue was accompanied by other actions by the Amir such as visiting Shia religious leaders in their homes (Wright, 2008). This was followed by a series of royal gestures dropping charges against Bahraini political oppositions. In 2002, Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Alkhalifa declared himself a king and introduced new constitution in Bahrain and two chambers body. The new constitution allowed the formation of trade unions and political parties. However, the new constitution was disputed by the opposition as not giving the parliament enough legislative power. The new legislative body consisted of 80 members, 40 elected members for the lower house and 40 members appointed by the king for the upper house (Crystal, 2005, p.3-6).

The political reforms by the King are understood as a way to strengthen the King's political position in comparison to the strong position of the PM. According to Wright (2008), these actions were to "*bolster the King's support-base in Bahraini society and to show that he had a genuine desire for reform. Popular social support in the early days of his succession was important to strengthen his own position vis-à-vis the powerful PM, Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa*." (P.2). Shaik Khalifa Bin Salman was an influential and powerful governmental actor during the era of shaikh Isa. The government and the economy were run by the PM during the era of Shaikh Isa. The Amir role was limited to a diplomatic and formal ceremonial tasks. This division of roles was informal; it was an arrangement between the two brothers, the Amir and the PM. This context was a driving force towards the populist agenda undertaken by the new Amir Shaikh Hamad. As Wright (2008) explains, "*Sheikh Hamad faced the challenge of how he could increase his own autonomy within the ruling tribe against the competing power circle of Sheikh Khalifa. The manner in which he sought to achieve greater autonomy was to gain popular*

support and bolster his position in Bahraini society by adopting a largely populist agenda" (p.2).

Other main powers within the government are the king Hamad Alkhalifa and the PM Khalifa Alkhalifa. The King is the head of state and he holds executive powers. He appoints and dismisses the Council of Ministers. The King is the Supreme Commander of the Bahrain Defence Force and presides over the Higher Judicial Council. The PM serves as the Head of Government and the parliament cannot withhold confidence from him. However, they can withhold confidence from ministers by a two thirds majority. However, if the two thirds of the council of deputies cannot cooperate with the PM the issue is referred to the king. In this case, the king can either dismiss the PM or disband the parliament. The king in any other case has the power to disband the parliament (Bassiouni et al, 2011).

2.5.1 The post 1999 political factions within the ruling family: the rise of the Khawalid

Recent literature about the politics in Bahrain reveals that since 1999, there have been different competing strategies between royal family members or political wings (Gengler, 2013). The struggle between these wings was mostly around security issues in Bahrain. It is concerned with how the government should handle and resolve the Shia's political movements. Literature describes the division within the Alkhalifa family in different ways. There is the two-wing based division where they are divided in to a conservative wing and reformist wing. The conservative wing is led by the PM, while the reformist wing is led by the CP (Kinninmont, 2012). The king seems to be in between these two factions. However, Kinninmont (2012) considers that dividing the royal family in to two wings is too simplistic. There are other centres of powers within the family who are more active in security related issues. Kinninmont comments that the power struggle between the ruling family before 2011 was based around economic policies. Gengler (2013) discusses the division within the ruling family post 2011 uprising. The division within the ruling family is labelled by Gengler as 'the securitization of the 'shia problem' in Bahrain' (p.53). This division of

power is highly influential on affecting how the government dealt with Bahraini uprising in 2011.

To understand the royal division in Bahrain, a historical glance is given about the branch in the family labelled by scholars as Alkhawalid and the British administrative reforms. In 1999, King Hamad Bin Salman has empowered a faction of Alkhalifa who are now named as AlKhawalid. The Khawalid are the descendent of Khalid Bin Ali Al Khalifa who was the son of the seventh ruler of Bahrain shaikh Ali AlKhalifa. Khalid was the brother of Isa who all the subsequent rulers of Bahrain are his descendent. Khalid was the ruler of Rifaa (from 1869 to 1925) and he was owner of estates in Sitra and Nabih Salih both of which are inhabited by shia. According to Gengler (2013) Khalid was side-lined from throne by the British in 1869 when they selected his half-brother shaikh Isa bin Ali as the ruler of Bahrain.

By 1919 the British colonist in Bahrain started administrative reforms aimed at changing the Bahrain's tribal feudal system to a modern bureaucracy and to introduce legislations. The reforms resulted in division within the ruling family and the citizens as well. Due to the tribal feudal system the shia peasants were exploited to the benefit of owners of lands who were members of ruling family and their allied sunni tribes. Thus, the shia were pro reforms. Other factions within the society such Najdi merchants (from Najd at the centre of Saudi Arabia) and tribes like Aldawasir rejected the reforms as well as they had privileged benefits under the previous system. Those who opposed the reforms were allied with senior members within the ruling family such as shaikh Isa and his brother Khalid and his son Abdullah. The reforms and bureaucratisation were viewed as decreasing the authority of AlKhalifa. The most known proponent of the British reforms within the AlKhalifa family was shaikh Hamad the eldest son of the ruler shaikh Isa (Gengler, 2013).

The objection to reforms escalated, in 1923 Aldawasir attacked shia's village in the northern province of Bahrain and followed by another attack on a second

village within the same province. Shaikh Khalid as well was acting against the reforms. The explanation to his acts by Gengler (2013) is that "Shaikh *Khālid could expect in his lifetime to inherit a position of seniority and of authority vis-à-vis his half-nephew, thereby rectifying the historical accident by which he was side-lined from power more than fifty years earlier*" (p.60). Around the same time when Aldawasir were attacking shia's villages the sons of Khalid were attacking Sitra which is inhabited by Shia . They were raping women, killing people, and burning houses. The results of these actions were that the British administration force shaikh Isa to abdicate his throne to his son shaikh Hamad who was proponents of the administrative reforms. Shaikh Hamad brought the offending members of the royal family to trial, this was the first trial in the history of Bahrain against a royal family member. However, the sons of shaikh Khalid sought revenge against the people of Sitra who witnessed against them. Thus, resulting in a second wave of murders against the villagers. The sons of Khalid went through a second trial and were sentenced to death, but they fled the island (Gengler, 2013).

However, they eventually returned to Bahrain, but they remained outside the centre of power until 1999. With the ascendance of shaikh Hamad to the throne, the grandsons of Khalid were empowered. For instance, they are holding significant positions within the state and have been appointed in the following roles: minister of defence, royal court minister who is one of the main advisors to the king, and commander in chief for the Bahrain Defence Forces. The irony and the not well understood part of the Bahraini politics is that the Khawalid were against the liberal reforms undertook by the king (Gengler, 2013). Over the years the stake of khalid's descendent increased significantly within the government. The government's positions held by Alkhawalid branch have increased with time : Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs, "Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Royal Court for Follow-up Affairs, Head of the National Security Agency, Minister of State for Defence Affairs, Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, Head of King Hamad's Military Office, and Head of the Central Informatics Organization" (Gengler, 2013, p.66). They possess an extreme

perspective toward how to deal with the shia opposition, which has manifest itself after the 2011 uprising as will be explained in chapter eight.

2.5.2 economic policies initiatives by the Crown Prince: labour market reforms

Changes were not only in terms of politics; there was also the restructuring to the economy. In this period, the CP became the leader of economic reforms in Bahrain. Restructuring of the economy to a more private led one is deemed a priority to the political elite in Bahrain. In the last forty years, the Bahrain economy, like the other GCC countries, was dependent on oil revenues to finance the state expenditure and development projects. Unlike the other GCC countries, Bahrain's crude oil reservoir will run out within the next 15 years. This fact is behind the Bahraini aspiration to diversify its economy and to empower the private sector (EDB & CPC,2004a).

According to Alabsi (2016), the labour market reforms came as a response to the escalating unemployment issues in Bahrain. However, no one was able to stand on its accurate figures and statistics, which made it a source of concern for all Bahrainis. Hence, unemployment was considered the most important strategic issue in the country (Alabsi, 2016). The EDB decided to tackle the unemployment issue. The concern was how to solve unemployment when Bahrain is relying mostly on foreign workforce (Alabsi, 2016).

The concerns regarding the unemployment issues led to the establishment of the labour market reforms process which was also associated with other reform processes such as the economic and education reforms. In short, the reforms aimed at adjusting the deficiencies in labour market which was characterised by a great gap in cost and labour rights between Bahraini workers and immigrant labour. These adjustments aimed to enable Bahraini workers to compete equally with immigrant labour on the basis of qualifications and work competencies (EDB & CPC.,2004a, 2004b). The details of the project are

discussed in chapter six as the changes in labour immigration policies discussed in this thesis are part of this process.

The story behind the reform as based on the literature is different from the one provided by Alabsi (2016). For instance, Marc Valeri (2013) suggests that the labour market reforms were part of legitimising the new king. He says" the *labour market reform has been thought out at the highest level, as a key element of the new king's strategy of legitimization*." (pp32-33). There is no evidence of supporting or declining such an argument as Valeri has not provided the source of such analysis. These arguments analyse the labour market reform process (LMRP) as being affected by a division of power between the ruling family where the CP gained power to establish economic policies in Bahrain. This power was historically held by the PM sheikh Khalifa Bin Salman. The thesis shall reveal other aspects of the process rather than just being a tool to legitimise the position of the new king and CP.

2.6 Non-state actors who were mostly active during the labour market reforms

This section lists a description of different actors within the policy-making process in Bahrain in relation to labour market policies. There are changes in state and non-state actors in the policy-making process after the political reforms in 2001. Within the state, the new actor is the new CP who is the chairman of the EDB too. A new appointed Labour Minister Dr. Majeed Alalawi who was one of the opposition leaders in exile, as he returned from Britain in 2002 after the political reforms in Bahrain. He assumed his role as the minister of labour in 2002 until 2012 (Millington, 2009). The new actors outside the government are the national assembly with its two chambers, the GFWTUB that was established in 2002, political and civil societies.

Bahrain's civil society has long roots in history of the kingdom. It is described as the "*most developed and sophisticated in the Gulf*" (Kinninmont & Sirri, 2014, p.5). It was the first country among the GCCs to have trade unions and

women associations. Social and political clubs were established during the 1920s, 1930s, 1950s and 1960s (Kinninmont & Sirri, 2014., Aljamri, 1998), and the informal cultural settings (Majlis) were famous for conducting political dialogues. Majlis are "*regular social gatherings held in homes, which are also important political gatherings both in Bahrain and in Kuwait, where they are known as diwaniyat* "(Kinninmont & Sirri, 2014, p.5).

The National assembly between 2002-2010

The new legislative authority consists of a two-house national assembly. The upper house is the consultative council. It consists of 40 members appointed by the king. The lower house (Majlis Alnuwab) consists of 40 elected members. Any law passed by the MJN must be approved by the consultative house. This means that the consultative house "*exercises a de facto veto over the legislative process*" (Bassiouni et al, 2011, p.15). Once the law is passed by the consultative council, it has to be ratified by the king. The king has the right to return the law to the parliament for reconsideration. In this case, the amendments have to be approved by two thirds of the members for the law to be passed (Bassiouni et al, 2011).

There were seven societies in 2002 parliament. These were:

- The National Democratic Assembly (an opposition society with a left ideology)
- The Islamic forum (Sunni Islamic society, with six MPs, in addition to one independent MP)
- Alasalah (six MPs and supports one more independent)
- Almenber Alwatani Alislami Society (Muslim brotherhood ideology)
- Shura Society (pro-government society with two MPs)
- Rabita Alislami (a pro-government society with three MPs)

- National Charter Society (a pro-government liberal with one MP)

Alwifaq National Islamic society (AWNIS)

AWNIS was the main opposition group in Bahrain and was the largest political association that represented the mainstream Shia in Bahrain. Historically, this political groups are the inheritor to a political movement calling for the return of parliamentary life and political reforms in Bahrain. Alwifaq boycotted the 2002 elections with three others opposition parties to protest against the 2002 constitution. However, it participated in parliamentary elections in 2006 and won 17 parliamentary seats (Ismaiel, 2014). AWNIS prioritise tackling what they perceive as major issues in Bahrain. These issues are: the constitutional disagreement between AWNIS and the government, the political naturalisation, democracy, education, health care, housing, and the fight against poverty and low income (Alwifaq, 2009). AWNIS supported the changes to labour market polices yet disagreed with some of its details (Personal Interview 8, 2016).

Alasalah Islamic Society (AAIS)

AAIS is a political association that was founded in 2002. AAIS claims that it "*represents a large segment of Bahrainis who believe that the reform of society and the state is done by reference to the Book of Allah (god) and the Sunnah (teaching) of the Prophet*" (Alasalah Islamic Society, 2014). AAIS aims to achieve this goal. In addition, they claim that they aim to participates in the political, economic and social decision-making at in Bahrain in order to achieve the interests of citizens (Alasalah Islamic Society, 2014). AAIS was one of the opponents to the labour market reforms; they disputed the logic behind it and were the most political bloc in parliament that tried to push for changing some articles in relation to granting immigrant labour more rights.

The Economic Development Board

The EDB was established in 2000 and was called the Supreme Council for Economic Development (Official Gazette, 2000). The Supreme Council for

Economic Development was an extension of the cabinet. It was chaired by the PM, and it had nine board members who are ministers and experts. The appointment of those members was by the PM. In 2002 the king appointed CP Salman Bin Hamad Al Khalifa as the chairman of the newly named EDB. In which the CP appoints the members of EDB's Board of Directors (official Gazette, 2002). The Power of the CP and EDB changed in 2005 as the EDB economic policies became more enforceable on government agencies.

The EDB is a public agency that undertakes the tasks of strategic economic planning privatisation policies. Other responsibilities include the power to approve large investment projects, to be consulted in economic related projects, the selection of CEO of state-owned companies or the one that the state contributes a majority of the capital (Official Gazette, 2005). Currently, the EDB identifies its purpose as attracting foreign investment into Bahrain:" The *purpose of an economic development board is to guide each new or expanding company whether small or large, through every part of the process. EDB Bahrain can help you benefit from Bahrain's business infrastructure, find a location for your business, discover talent, navigate any legal requirements and more." (EDB, 2019).*

The McKinsey & Company (MCK)

The MCK is an international management consultation company. They define themselves as "*a global management consulting firm that serves a broad mix of private, public and social sector institutions. We help our clients make significant and lasting improvements to their performance and realize their most important goals* "(McKinsey & Company, 2018a). The MCK was the consultancy firm that collected Data about the labour market in Bahrain and produced its analysis and conclusion regards the limitations in the Bahrain economy and labour market. They recommended several policy tools to restructure the Bahraini economy and labour market as well (Alabsi, 2016).

According to Ausamah Alabsi (2016), McKinsey was chosen through a tendering process. The EDB submitted a tender in the tender board of Bahrain. The EDB

asked the consultation companies to write a proposal in regard to how to reform the labour market in Bahrain. The MCK bid was chosen because it was technically and financially superior over the other proposals (Alabsi, 2016).

Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI)

The BCCI was founded in 1939 under the name general trader's association (Bahrain British Business Forum,2015). Among different responsibilities, the BCCI was responsible for "*Advocating the interests of members and the private sector in the official authorities*" (BCCI, 2017). The literature shows that the BCCI had historical relationship with the Government/rulers of Bahrain. The basis of the relationship is disputed whether it was an interdependency relationship between the merchants and royal family or that merchants gave resources to the royal family without getting anything in return (Alrumaihi, 1973., Lawson, 1989., crystal, 1995., Khalaf, 1998., Peterson, 2007). Jill crystal (1995) explains ruler/merchant's relationships in gulf countries as being based on interdependence between the two before the influx of oil revenues. The relationship was based on the financial support of businessmen to ruling families; in return, the merchants received protection for their economic interest from the ruling families. Alrumaihi (1973) also argues that the largest merchants exerted economic/political power because they were the source of income to ruling families. The merchants paid customs duties which Al Khalifa depended on. In return, the merchant's families "*gained security and legitimacy while ruling families gained prosperity… merchant families support the ruling families because they have the most to lose from political or economic turmoil in terms of wealth and position"* (Peterson, 2007, p.10., 12).

The other part of the literature about the relationship between the merchant and the royal family claims that there was a one side dependency. According to Khalaf (1998), there was one side exchange of resources; the merchants were dependent on Al Khalifa rather than vice versa. He says, "*merchants' families of Bahrain, as well as tribal and communal notables have been dependant on the goodwill of al-Khalifa*." (p.3, 1998). The scenario of

interdependence changed after the increase in oil revenues where the rulers became financially independent from merchants (crystal, 1995). This situation mostly occurred in Kuwait and Qatar were the merchant abandoned their historical established rights in the policy-making process in return for a share in oil revenues (AlRumaihi, 1973). Valeri (2013) suggest that a similar scenario occurred to the relationship between merchants and ruling Families in Bahrain. Alrumaihi (1973) also explains such changes to the merchants/state relationship. He explains that the merchant families in Bahrain are commercially dependent on royal family. He states "*the granting of import licences and the setting up of agencies were rigidly controlled by the government for the benefit of the big merchants. Any newcomer wishing to enter a particular field faced a monopoly situation which was almost impossible to break*." (p.274).

However, Lawson's (1989) research on Bahrain describes that businessmen were able to influence the economic and social policies to some extent. Lawson's description of such a relationship was around the time the oil revenues were raised in Bahrain. He described that the top merchant elites are considered to be influential as they occupy public positions. These positions are important, yet it is considered by Lawson as "*junior partners of the senior sheikhs of the Al Khalifah*" (p.75). which means that business sectors do have a part in politics though limited in power and they are junior not senior member of government. For instance, Kamrava et al (2016) argue that the business sector's ability to engage in politics is limited in GCC countries and it depends on historically established relationships with royal families. The top government positions are dominated by ruling families:

"in *Bahrain and Saudi Arabia formal political engagement by business has been limited, constrained by the dominance of royal family members in top government positions. Thus, merchants' interests there have been pursued mainly through lobbying bodies such as chambers of commerce and industry, and through informal connections with ruling family members." (Kamrava et al, 2016, p.7)*

The richer merchants are influential through three main institutions: the central administration, the municipal council, the BCCI. The Amir and his close relatives were still at the top of some of these institutions (Lawson, 1989, p.76). The Ministers in Bahrain who were not members of the royal family were mostly members of rich Bahraini families. The members of prominent merchant families held different governmental positions as they were among the first generations of educated individuals in Bahrain. They held positions within the municipal councils that provide public services. The head of each municipal council was from Alkhalifa's family. The members of the council were chosen based on different criteria, for instance, ballots in some districts where nominees represented the richest merchant families, or by appointments in other districts in which prestigious people were appointed. The last institution that was considered by Lawson to represent a form of power within the political and social policy-making was the BCCI. The BCCI used to give the government advice and consent on any issues that touched their interest (Lawson, 1989). According to Lawson, "the *secretary of the chamber serves as a de facto member of the government, although he does not hold ministerial rank"* (1989, p.77).

The main limitation of the literature that discusses the basis of the relationship between merchants and royal family and how it affected the policy-making process is the lack of detail. There are no detailed studies of the role of actors in policy-making in Bahrain. The literature discusses such relationship historically before and after the influx of oil revenues, yet no specification is attached to such researches. For instance, there are no details of which type of policy-making fields were dominated by Alkhalifa, and which field witnessed the contribution of actors other than the royal family. An illustration of this point is found in Lawson's (1989) research that described the role of prominent merchant's family members. They were among the first generation of individuals who got a higher education abroad. Those members also occupied prominent governmental positions (Lawson, 1989). Lawson (1989) presents examples of ministerial posts held by educated merchants' family members

such as Yousef Al Shirawi who was the minister of development and industry. Yet there were no details of certain polices that were made during that time and how the policy outcomes were reached in relation to development and industry.

Recent literature regarding the role of businessmen in affecting policy outcomes and specifically in relation to the LMRP in Bahrain shows that their role is limited. The economics and labour market reforms were elite driven, and that businessman effect is limited (Valeri,2013). Valeri (2013) argues that the internal power politics within the Al Khalifa ruling family in Bahrain is a major explanatory factor for how economic reforms were implemented, especially between 2005 and 2010. Valeri's (2013) main proposition is that:

"the independent variable of the degree of proximity/independence of the business elite vis-à-vis the ruling elite decisively shapes the quality of reform. "(p.19). Valeri as well claim that "the Bahraini private sector is thus heavily dependent both on the balance of power within the royal family and on its good relations with the most influential individuals among the royal family" (p.23).

In addition, recent literature disputes the boundaries between state and business community. As cited in Hannieh (2011), the state and private sector are considered as one. He quotes the world bank interpretation of such a relationship: the private sector in the Gulf "*included mostly entrepreneurs either from the ruling families or close associates" and that the GCC's "political leadership (often their extended family members) are . . . large enough to develop the private sector country-wide*" (cited in Hannieh, 2011, p: 15). In general, the businessmen are represented in appointed chambers such as the SHC. The relationship with the MJN and shura council (SHC) is through formal joint committees and informal representation of BCCI in the Majlis. The formal relationship is through "*Providing legal opinion on law drafts and proposals addressed to the Chamber by the legislative authority in coordination with the committees relevant to the members.*" (BCCI, 2017). The ratio of representative of BCCI in SHC in 2006 was around 25 percent of the Majlis, (Valeri, 2013).

The General Federation of Workers Trade Unions in Bahrain

The GFWTUB was formally established in 2002. There is a long history for labour movement before 2002 with history of suppression and conflict with the government of Bahrain. The labour movements in Bahrain can be traced back to 1919 when the pearl divers demanded better work and living conditions. During the late 1930s and early 1940s, demands first became evident to establish a trade union for the Bahrain Petroleum Company (Khalil, 2012). The history of the movement is characterised by political contestation with the government, and the pushing for rights to be legally acknowledged as interest group.

The first formal labour law was an outcome of the first public mass movement in Bahrain between 1954 and 1956. It was organised by the higher executive committee (Alshehabi, 2013). The committee was an outcome to rising religious sectarianism and labour tension in Bahrain; due to such tension, several notable personals from both religious sect (Sunni and Shia) met and formed the committee. A higher executive committee was chosen to present the interest and demands of both sects. The demands were the establishment of: a legislative council, legal and civil codes, trade unions and a supreme court (Alshehabi, 2013). However, the committee was suppressed by the end of 1956 and some of its members were sent to exile instead at Helena's island.

Despite the suppression of the Higher Executive Committee, it was able to influence the promulgating of Bahrain labour ordinance of 1957. In 1955, labour strikes broke out and they demanded the "*prioritisation of Bahrainis for employment*" in the Bahrain Petroleum Company (Khalil, 2012). As an outcome, a committee was formed to discuss the labour law. The committee consisted of: representative from the British authority, the ruler of Bahrain, local employers, and member of the higher executive committee. In 1955, workers' rights to form trade unions were officially recognized and the Bahrain Labour federation was established (Khalil, 2012). The establishment of the federation was through the effort of Higher Executive Committee (Alshehabi, 2013).

However, after the suppression of the Higher Executive Committee the trade unions were weakened as well (Alshehabi. 2013). According to Khalil (2012), the British ruler at that time played a role in suppressing the labour movement: "*the Smith's government, the successor of Belegrave government, refused to work using the law and frozen the items related to the right of workers and professionals in forming their trade unions and Federations, and have launched a campaign of arrests and dismissals affected many trade unionists and national leaders*. "(p.2)

The movements of labour continued in Bahrain. In 1965, the Bahrain Petroleum Company fired 1500 Bahraini workers. This action by the company established the 1965 massive popular movement demanding the return of fired workers and the legalisation of the establishment of trade unions. The movement was suppressed, and its leaders were imprisoned. In 1972, another wave of labour strike demanded the establishment of trade unions and a trade union federation. After the establishment of the first parliament in Bahrain in 1974, the unionist sought to organise themselves in official unions. The outcome was the establishment of four trade unions in Bahrain. Again, political contestation in Bahrain did not allow the trade union to continue its work. In 1975, the parliament was dismissed, and the security law was enforced, thus union leaders were imprisoned again (Khalil, 2012., Abu Saffi, 2004).

From 1979, the government started to legalise some form of labour committees. In 1979, the government issued decrees to form consultative committees the permanent workers committee. In 1983 the general committee of workers was formed with the approval of the government. However, these steps were considered by the leaders of labour movements outside Bahrain as an attempt by the Bahraini government to give union legitimacy to this committee. The committee was considered as lacking the acceptable standards and conditions of free and independent trade union organisations (Abu Saffi, 2004)

The demands for the establishment of an independent general federation for trade unions in Bahrain continued throughout the 1990s. After the political reforms in Bahrain in 2001, the trade unionist drafted a law to organise the establishment of trade unions. In 2002, the king issued Decree-Law No. (33) of 2002 on the issue of the Trade Unions Law. The trade unions are still operating until today, yet from 2002 until now the changes in political circumstances in Bahrain have affected the relationship of the GFWTUB with other political actors among which are the government. The political context in Bahrain post-1999 assisted in authorising the organised labour. Before 2002, the labours organised themselves in the general labour committee. The general labour committee had no rights to strike or to be part of collective negotiations. Again, as will be explained in subsequent chapters, the relationship between the GFWTUB and the government declined after the Bahraini uprising in 2011 (personal Interviews 2 and 3, 2016).

2.7 How literature describes the position of actors from the labour market reform process?

The literature which discusses the LMRP mostly categorises actors as being broadly for or against the reforms (Alhassan, 2012., LOUËR, 2015a). For instance, Alhassan (2012) maps the interest groups on opposing ends of the spectrum. At one end, he listed the supporting groups for the reforms, namely: Government, AWNIS, GFWTUB, SHC, and foreign entities. The groups against as per Al Hassan were: vegetable sellers, butchers, fishermen, contractors, BCCI, small and medium businesses, the MJN. Alhasan (2012) categorisation was based on two aspects of the reforms: the monthly fees imposed on employers and the freedom given to immigrant workers to change employer. In relation to this, Alhasan concludes that the reform shows that:

"interest groups have positioned themselves in a manner that differs from how they are generally seen or thought to act in society. so, called "opposition" parties have been seen to side with the government and Bahraini labourers while the "loyalists," allied with the business owners and traders, represented the resistance against the sweeping reforms". (p.145)

Alhasan's categorisation regarding the for and against groups has several limitations. First, it was based on two aspects of the reforms: the fees, and free movement of labour. He ignored the power of the newly created authority and the discussion regarding it. In addition, he did not mention the issues related to domestic workers and what it means to the interest of actors. The discussions of the domestic workers reveal that actors' position is affected by perceived public interest rather than government division of power.

The final point relates to Al Hassan; s conclusion where he considers AWNIS and the government in one group versus the BCCI and the other groups. AWNIS did not ignore the interest of businessmen. Interviews with AWNIS members locate the interest they represent as between representing the interest of workers and businessmen as well (personal interview no 8, 2016). In addition, they objected some details of the policies discussed after passing the DLRM, such as the criteria that governs the movement of immigrant workers from one employer to another (Alayam newspaper, issue no 7578, 7th January 2010). Thus, their position from the reform is traced back to how class was structured in Bahrain after the influx of immigrant labour.

Such categorisation was mainly driven by the support of some actors to new power gained by the CP. Louër (2015b) refers to two main arguments: first, the participation of AWNIS in the 2006 election which was to some extent driven by the reforms initiated by the CP. For instance, Louër (2015a) analyses AWNIS participation in 2006 parliament as driven by the support to the Crown Prince's reform initiatives. According to her, "Many *of Alwefaq officials, including its general secretary Ali Salman, pushed to participate in the parliament as part of a strategy to consolidate Prince Salman's position.*" (p.10) Louër (2015b) argues that the support of Alwifq to the CP was to support him to gain more power over the PM; hence, the society decided to participate in the parliamentary election. Louër (2015b) explains that "*Its officials acknowledge that the ascent of the Crown Prince was instrumental in fostering this decision. Al-Wifāq leadership saw the young prince as able to outdo the older conservative factions, in particular the group aggregated around the Prime Minister*." (p.39).

The second point was in regard to AWNIS position in supporting the unemployment benefit. Awnis decision was in contrast to shaikh Isa Qassim's position from the unemployment benefit. Shaikh Isa Qassim is an influential shia cleric with power over Alwifaq's political decisions. The shaikh opposed the unemployment benefit because it was based on contribution from wages, and according to him Islam accepts taxation only on wealth and not wages (Louër, 2015b).

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the literature that discussed two main themes. The first is the characteristics of immigration policies historically and the driving forces of them. The second theme is the role of different actors in the policy-making process. The history of labour immigration policies in Bahrain and the driving forces for it changed throughout the time. However, it is mostly driven by the need for skills and the lack of such skills in the local labour market. The discovery of oil in Bahrain was the context that created more demand for skilled labour. The expansion of state apparatuses and development in Bahrain from the 1950s to the 1970s has contributed to a significant rise in the number of immigrants. This resulted in establishing the localisation policies to replace the immigrant labour with locals in the job market. The policies that govern the entrance of immigrants and their movement in the market were very rigid. Such rigid policies created a gap in cost and rights between the Bahrainis and immigrant labours, and the preference of non-Bahraini labours over Bahrainis by employers. Such a condition was one of the main factors for establishing LMRP in Bahrain from 2002 onwards.

The literature explains that the main policy-makers in relation to the labour market are the government. The BCCI is considered as a consultative to the government in relation to policy-making as well. However, the extent to which the BCCI contribute to policy outcome is not clear, as Lawson (1989) consider them as a de facto member of the government through their membership in government and their informal relationship with it. In recent years, the BCCI is

considered to be effective in affecting the outcome of policies in accordance with the power structure within the ruling family. However, there is no detailed research that follows the inception of policies and the changes that occurred to it and what exactly drives such change.

After the political reforms in Bahrain, several actors became part of the policy-making process. For instance, the labour unions are back to be legalised in Bahrain after a history of struggle and contentious relationship with the government. The parliament that was established in 2002 is an added actor to the process. The chapters that presents the field work data (chapter six to chapter ten) shows how those actors contributed to policy outcomes during LMRP. These chapters trace the establishment of labour market reform process and how policy content changes with the interactions of different actors during the process. Hence, it expands the narrative regards the LMRP from an outcome to the division of power between ruling family to how the policy network interacted with contextual factors and actor's actions

Chapter 3: Background to the Policy network analysis

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a review of the literature that discusses policy network analysis. The chapter provides the background for discussing the analytical framework in chapter five. The literature in regard to the PNA is divided broadly to discussion of networks as a reflection of Interest group Intermediation, and networks as a way of governance. The aim of such classification is to show why this research's analytical frameworks are based on policy networks as a form of interest intermediation and not as a form of governance. Each section shows the strength and weaknesses of each school. The chapter expands more in discussing the policy network as a form of interest intermediation because it forms the background for the discussions in chapter five. Finally, the chapter briefly explains how PNA is used in a non-western context.

3.2 policy network analysis

The chapter provides a description and background of the PNA. The literature regarding PNA can be categorised in different dimensions. It can be categorised into methods such as quantitative or qualitative, level of analysis, academic discipline, and country of origin (Borzel, 2011., Rhodes, 2017a). The literature in regards the PNA in this thesis is divided broadly to discussion of networks as a way of governance, and as an interpretation to interest group Intermediation. The aim of such classification is to justify why the analytical framework is based on PNA as a form of interest intermediation and not as a form of governance.

Once this justification is explained, the chapter briefly presents the background to the PNA within the interest group intermediation.

Typologies of PNA within the interest intermediation school are discussed briefly in accordance to its regional origin, namely, American literature and British literature. The reason for such distinction is to give a historical background to the development of policy network as a form of interest group intermediation. The policy network concept is traced back to the American literature and specifically to the concept of iron triangle which was criticised later on by Hugh Heclo who developed the concept of issue network. The British literature then expanded the concept of policy network to more than one form of network. The British literature provides the context for the development of the dialectical approach which is a main literature for this thesis analytical framework as discussed in chapter five.

3.2.1 From centric state to differentiated polity: the emergence of policy network in western countries

Before discussing the different categorisation of network and how to define it, the chapter shall briefly discuss why was it developed in relation to the political development in Western Europe and North America. Rod Rhodes provided his model of policy network because the pluralism and neo-corporatism theoretical perspectives were not sufficient to explain the different type of interactions between state or public sector with interest groups (Borzel, 2011). The pluralist perspective focused on the extent of competition between groups to influence policies which seems like a one direction relationship. While the Marxist perspective looked at the state as an outcome of capitalism system. Either way the relationship is one sided and does not give a chance to a two-way interactions or exchange of resources. Do state and non-state actors be linked in a reciprocal way? Policy network came to provide the alternative to these perspectives (Hill and Varone, 2017).

The changes from pluralism to policy network analysis is connected to how to view power and its distribution within the society. pluralistic perspective view power as fragmented between different actors within the society. The

fragmentation of power results in competition between groups if power was distributed equally. If power is unequally distributed the result will be a chaotic in which the government is pressured by different groups. The pluralist perspective view modern society as composing of "different interests, popular power is realised through group activity, the working of political parties and pressure groups or interest groups, each of which represents one of the many interests into which a developed society is split." (Schwarzmantel,1994, p.50, cited in Hill, 2013, p.28). Dhal (1963) argues that all groups within the society possess power to influence policy decisions and none of these groups are dominant. Government agencies as well are a pressure group with its own preferences. These groups may have access to a specific policy sector not all areas of public policies, thus power is non-cumulative.

The policy network analysis as will be explained in this chapter and the next chapter provided different type of interactions between state and interest ranging from closed policy community to open issue network. These different types of interactions reflect different degree of interdependence and integration between the different policy actors. The emergence of policy networks reflects the changes in policy process and the shift from hierarchal governance to a fragmented organisation a more web of interdependent actors who interact to affect the policy outcomes (Marinetto, 2003). Marinetto (2003) describe that the "government is fractured institution that is dependent on state and non-state actors beyond the centre." (p. 592).

The term differentiated polity is used in contrast to the term unitary state (Bevir, 2007, p.228). The characteristics of unitary state is as following: "identifiable polity with clear boundaries and with a sovereign will that formulates law." In contrast, differentiated polity characteristics is " fuzzy boundaries and by the flow of power and authority downward, upward, and outward… these flows of power has increased recently as a result of devolution, globalization, and contracting out." (Bevir, 2007, p.228). The differentiated polity consist of different interdepended government departments and agencies. It is characterised by limited "political integration and administrative

standardization" (Bevir, 2007, p.227). Each organisation within the network has different function. The network of actors as well involve social and political actors. They come together to exchange resources and the network is self-organised.

Within the British context a differentiated polity is set in contrast to Westminster model that consider the parliament as sovereign authority were the cabinet as the government, and the executive authority with neutral civil services. The differentiated polity conceptualise governance as fragmented by different centres. The state is hallowed out, the core executive still important and policy networks are important for policy process. This school reflects the effect of the EU and the new public management. Other definitions that is used to discuss differentiated polity is the disaggregated state or network polity especially when discussing the effect of global governance and the EU and that the differentiated polity power is diffused (Rhodes, 2017b).

The concept of differentiated polity can be ambiguous as how can we account for such differentiation or on what basis these players are not unitary? In addition, how does it happen, is its gradual change toward a differentiated state or is it a fundamental change in the type of rule? The literature provides two mains conceptualisations to the differentiated polity, one is based on functional differences. The functional accounts of differentiation look at the different institutions and their functional role. Hence, in this case the differentiated polity is an outcome of process related to specialisation within the government. The second definition to differentiated polity refer to "different interpretation, beliefs, or meanings that are often within an institution or practice…" (Bevir,2007, p.229). If we adopt this concept then we understand governance as the outcome of "contingent and competing actions inspired by distinct webs of belief" (Bevir, 2007, p.229). In this case the differentiated polity is not an outcome of recent changes to how government run itself with more specialised agencies and department it is as Bevir (2007) explain it "an abstract account of how we should think about all states, perhaps even all pattern of rule". (p.229)

Rod Rhodes (2017b) identifies several sources that led to differentiated polity in Britain other than the one mentioned by Bevir (2007). In addition to the new public management and the EU, Rhodes suggest privatisation and the alternative service delivery as a source for governmental fragmentation. In Britain the private sector expanded versus the public sector. The indicators used for such measurement is related to public administration such as the size of public employment, the public ownership of industry, and public spending (Rhodes, 2017). The alternative service delivery systems and agencies by contracting out which was introduced in Britain since 1963 and delivering services through either private organisations or public organisations other than the local government. The quasi market within the healthcare system is an example of such changes in which it has resulted in to a disaggregated civil service. The result will be fragmentation in which the service delivery is dependent on more than one organisation which is criticised by Rod Rhodes as weakening coordination, reducing efficiency and accountability (Rhodes, 2017b).

3.2.2 Different schools in Policy Network analysis: Governance and Interest group intermediation

Two main interpretations regarding the PNA are the school of governance and the other one is policy network as a form of interest group intermediation (Adam & Kriesi, 2007, Borzel 1997, Peterson, 2003, Rhodes, 2006., Galey & Young, 2014). The differences between the two schools are in how to interpret policy networks. The interest intermediation school apply the concept as a "*generic concept which applies to all kinds of relations between public and private actors*." (Borzel,1997, p.3). The policy network is understood as a mediator between the public and private sector in which it can be policy specific subsystem in national or international policy-making (Galey & Young, 2014); on the other hand, the governance school apply the term as a form of governance which is "*only characterise a specific form of public-private interaction in public policy (governance), namely the one based on non-hierarchical co-ordination, opposed to hierarchy and market as two inherently*

distinct modes of governance" (Borzel,1997,p.3). The governance school interpret policy network as "*as a necessary solution to collective action problems where political resources are shared across a loose coordination of private and public actors*." (Galey & Young, 2014, p.8).

The concept of policy network within the interest group intermediation was widely applied in research to examine the following: the role of the private sector, civil sector in policy-making process, exchange relationship between different actors, formal and informal relationship between public, private and civil actor, to study sectoral and sub sectoral policy-making process (Borzel, 1997). In addition, the policy network concept as an interest intermediation is used to understand how the policy outcomes were decided. This point is achieved through establishing a link between network structure and policy outcome, though the network structure is not the only variable that affect policy outcomes.

The concept of governance refers to "*self-organizing, interorganizational networks*." (Rhodes, 2017a, p.165). The characteristics of governance are as following: Interdependence between organisations, repeated interactions between network members, interactions are regulated by the role of the game, and a notable degree of autonomy from the state (Rhodes, 2017a, 2017b). These characteristics entail that public administration goes beyond the central government. The public sector cannot deliver and implement policies without coordination with other organisations. Therefore, the central government needs other actors in which networks are established to deliver policies as the state is dependent on other actors. In such a case, power is not concentrated; it is dispersed between many actors (Bevir, 2011).

The governance school came as a development of policy network and pressure groups (Bevir, 2011). The pressure groups and policy network literature faced two challenges. The first challenge was in response to the rise of neoliberalism entailed changes within the public sectors. These changes were the marketisation of public sector by contracting out services to private sector. The

unintended consequence of neoliberalism was the spread of networks. Rhodes (1997) argues that Neoliberalism created new governance by spreading networks and fragmenting public sector. The second challenge was the rise of rational choice theory (Bevir, 2011). This literature challenges the policy network theory on the grounds of its structural focus and neglecting the micro level of analysis (Dowding, 1995).

There are a wide number of topics covered by the network governance literature. These topics are as follows: networks as self-coordination system between public and private sector (Borzel, 1998), The focus on assessing the performance of network "*in terms of equity, democracy, goal-attainment, productivity, stability, conflict resolution, learning capacity, and so on*. "(Sørensen & Torfing, 2007, p.235), the macro level topic in regard to the relationship between state and society and the changing role of the state (Fawcett & Daugbjerg, 2012). Other topics are the influence of trust on network, and the effect of network management on governance network and policy outcomes (Klijn et al, 2010 a., Klijn & Edelenbos, 2010b). The focus of the network governance school is different from this research interest except the topics related to the dynamics of the policy process.

The network governance school is criticised by the metagovernance school and the decentred governance. Metagovernance is" an *umbrella concept that describes the role of the state and its characteristic policy instruments in the new world of network governance*" (Bevir, 2013: 56). The metagovernance try to bring the government back to the policy analysis sphere (Bevir, 2013). The state plays a steering role within organisations and networks. These organisations implement public policies and provide services. The government governs these organisations. These organisations have a good degree of autonomy from the state (Rhodes, 2017b).

Lewis and Marsh (2012) argue that metagovernance is the form of governance that exists in some countries, and the network governance is used as rhetoric. They wrote about the Rudd government's rhetoric in Australia. The Rudd's

government use the rhetoric and narrative of participatory democracy during big reforms. Lewis and Marsh (2012) described such activities as an aspect of metagovernance which is "*the use of the discourse of network governance and increased participation in the policy-making process in order to mask the continued role of hierarchy and, indeed, help legitimise decisions that emanate from a political system underpinned by a hierarchical conception of democracy*." (p.15).

The decentred governance criticises both the network governance and the metagovernance for attaching specific feature to governance such as trust. This school of thought focuses on bottom up analysis which is based on studying the beliefs/practices of street level bureaucrats and citizens. According to Rhodes (2017b), the decentred governance approach "*own interpretations of events, not external causes such as a global financial crisis. It explores the diverse ways in which such situated agents change the boundaries of state and civil society by constantly remaking practices as their beliefs change in response to dilemmas."* (p. 18). This school minimises the role of the state by considering the state as a reflection to the actions and beliefs of actors and civil society. The state is a reflection of diverse actors; hence, there is no unified or monolithic state. Policy outcomes are reached through interactions within a policy network (Rhodes, 2017a).

None of the former concepts regarding governance suits this research. Policy network governance school and the decentred governance claim that the state has less action in the policy process. The metagovernance, on the other hand, references the state like a unified organisation that affects and steers the policy process, though the state does not only steer the process as public officials may campaign for certain policies as well (Rhodes, 2017b). This research needs a flexible approach to the role of actors involved within the policy-making process. The approach needs to consider the different sources of power that actors possess, their actions, and potential influence of different government actor and interest groups who may not possess the same perspective in regards the best policy outcomes.

Hence, the choice of the policy network as a form of interest group intermediation is more suitable. As it focuses on government and interest group relations, thus giving the researcher the chance to question the type of relationship that exists between the government and interest groups in each policy sector or sub sector. The policy network as a form of interest intermediation gives the researcher the chance to understand the nature of dependencies between actors or mainly why they came together and why they are interacting (exchange of resources shared interest), and the extent of such interdependencies (Sacli, 2011). The Interest intermediation school considers ideas and policy advice as well as part of the contextual analysis which may affect the relations between actors (Kisby, 2007., prince, 2007).

The PNA within the interest intermediation school is more interested in studying how the policy outcomes originated, and the relationship between outcomes network structure and network interactions. In addition, it discusses the effect of inclusion and exclusion of actors in the policy-making process (Fawcett & Daugbjerg, 2012). The interest intermediation school perceives networks as a meso level relationship that affects and affected by context (macro level) and interpersonal relations or the micro level (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992., Marsh & Smith 2000, Toke & Marsh, 2003). Within the micro level, the researcher examines the role of individual actors or organisations to affect policy outcomes. The Macro level or the exogenous factors are concerned with power structure, inequality and other contextual factors that are perceived as influential. The meso level which is the network is examined to establish a link between network and the policy content. The next section presents more details in relation to PNA within the interest intermediation literature.

3.2.3 Networks as a form of Interest group Intermediation: Background to the concept of policy networks

As discussed earlier the PNA emerged as an alternative to pluralism and corporatism views on interest group intermediation. Pluralism views the political system as open and power as highly dispersed among the different

groups within the society (Smith, 1995). The policy-making process is more dominated by the pressure groups. Pluralism is criticised for downgrading the role of the state in the policy-making process (Smith, 1990). An alternative explanation to policy-making was developed by corporatism which views power as distributed between the state and interest groups only. Corporatism emerged as a reflection to the engagement of trade unions and business elites in the policy-making in the 1960s and 1970s (Grant,1985). Corporatism is different in its approach to policy-making as it recognises the role of the state while pluralism downgrades such a role (Smith, 1990). However, corporatism is criticised for not adding much to pluralism because it does not explain how power is distributed between state and other groups in the society (Jordan, 1984). In addition, both schools seem to provide a general conceptualisation for the relationship between interest groups and government. This relationship might differ according to the policy sector and hence there might be different typologies of this relationship.

Other concepts emerged within the American literature such as the iron triangle and subgovernment to overcome the pluralism and corporatism limitations in explaining interest intermediation in policy-making process. The sub government actors are the interest groups, the government and bureaucratic agencies who are considered to be engaged in the policy-making (Jordan, 1990). Ripley & Franklin (1980, p. 8–9) define subgovernments as "*clusters of individuals that effectively make most of the routine decisions in a given substantive area of policy*" (cited in Rhodes, 2017a). The emphasis is mainly on actors that has working relationship with the government. The member of subgovernment are the "*members of the House and/or Senate, members of Congressional staffs, a few bureaucrats and representatives of private groups and organisations interested in the policy area"* (Rhodes, 2017a, p.38). Such a relationship can be described as an 'iron triangle' which means "*a closed and stable relationship between an interest group(s), a Government Agency and a US congressional committee. All participants have compatible goals and their activities are mutually supportive"* (Jordan & Schubert, 1992,

p.21). The focus on the legislative actor in the US literature makes it less applicable to countries in which the legislator plays a minor role in policy-making (Marsh, 1998). Waarden (1992) considers that iron triangle, issue network and other forms of state -private sector's relations such as clientelism as all forming different types of networks.

The iron triangle concept is criticised by Hugh Heclo (1978) as being incomplete. He argues that the iron triangle focuses only on the most powerful in a certain policy field and ignores the networks of influence that affect the exercise of power. As a result, Heclo introduced the concept of issue networks that are characterised by multiple actors with no restriction on access to the networks (Jordan, 1990). Heclo did not disregard the iron triangle, but he acknowledged that the iron triangle reflects the policy-making in the US during the 1950s and the 1960s only (cited in Marsh, 1998). The American literature is considered as successful in introducing the concept of network (Jordan, 1990). Yet it did not provide a coherent model to be utilised for this study. In contrast the British literature that will be discussed in the next few pages expanded Heclo's concepts of issue network with a more coherent set of ideas (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992., Marsh & Smith, 2000).

The British literature provides multiple approaches to the study of policy networks (Wright, 1988., Jordan, 1990., Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, Marsh & Smith, 2000). They all agree that policy networks are a cluster of organisations as defined by Benson (2000). The definition of policy networks is based on Benson's (2000) definition for policy sector which is "*a cluster or complex of organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies"* (p.192). Resource dependencies are a central element for policy networks analysis in the British literature. Each organisation within a policy network depends on other organisation for certain resources. However, there are several points where the researchers (Wright, 1988., Jordan, 1990, Marsh & Rhodes, 1992, Marsh & Smith., 2000,) disagree upon such as the older version of the literature either emphasis on agency and interpersonal relations

(Wilks & Wright, 1987 as cited in Marsh & Rhodes, 1992) or structural characteristics of the network (Rhodes, 2017a), while Marsh and Smith (1996, 2000) stress that individuals might be involved in policy-making besides organisations and suggest including structure and agency in the analysis (Marsh & Smith, 2000). A brief illustration for each model and the differences is provided below.

The Rhodes model suggests an exchanged based relationship between the central and local government in Britain. He argued that networks are structures characterised by different dimensions such as membership, resources and interdependencies (Rhodes, 1990). Rhodes suggested different type of policy network along a continuum. At one end of the continuum, there is a highly connected network which form a policy community. At the other end, there is a loosely integrated cluster which forms an issue network. Along the two end there was other networks such as professional, producer, and intergovernmental network (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992b). Rhodes recognises that there are potentially more forms of policy networks between the extreme ends.

Wilks & Wright (1987) stresses on the interpersonal relations as the main level of analysis which make it more similar to the American literature (cited from Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). They also differ from Rhodes in terms of looking at networks to be disaggregated according to sub sectors. Wilks & Wright (1987) argument is derived from the differentiation between the concept of community and the concept of networks. They argue that networks and community are not the same. Policy community might not form a policy network, and the policy process can only occur within one policy community (cited from Rhodes & Marsh, 1992).

The mentioned literature had two main general themes of differences: first, what constitutes a network or what a network is made of, and the second point is the role of structure verses agency in relation to network analysis which will be discussed in the next sections. In terms of the first dimension, Ripley and

Franklin (1980) believed that networks were a cluster of actors from formal institutions. For Benson (2000), a network is based on resources exchange between organisations and changes to such interdependence are a source of change to the network (cited in Rhodes, 2017a). Benson's (2000) definition was adopted by Marsh and Smith (2000) where they added individuals as an actor who may possess resources as well. A more comprehensive definition was provided by Rhodes (2006). Rhodes' definition is based on connection beyond resources interdependencies. For instance, Rhodes, (2006) defines policy network as "*formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policy-making and implementation. These actors are interdependent, and policy emerges from the interactions between them"* (Rhodes, 2006, p.426). This definition is more comprehensive as it links actors together based on different dimensions and not solely on resources interdependence, shared beliefs and interests are factors that link those actors together. Hence, it will be adopted by this thesis.

3.3 Criticism to policy network analysis

Policy networks analysis is criticised on different grounds. First, policy network is a metaphor that lacks an explanatory power (Dowding, 1995., Borzel, 1998). Borzel (1998) criticises the concept of network; he says, "*the concept of policy networks as a specific form of governance does not constitute a proper theory"* (p.263). The PNA were useful in describing the policy-making process but failed in explaining it. Dowding (1995) suggests that to overcome this issue, researchers must use the sociological network analysis which applies quantitative methods to the study of policy networks. The quantitative data is about the characteristics of actors and the nature of the relationship between them. The quantitative approach to PNA needs a significant amount of data. Marsh and Smith (1996) criticised such an approach because collecting the type of data needed is difficult "*quantitative approach such as that used by Knoke and Laumann is unlikely to justify the time and expense involved*" (p.24). However, Marsh and Smith (1996) view such an approach as expensive and it

takes a long time to be fulfilled unless there are enough resources to be used for quantitative data collection.

The second point is that the Rhodes model focuses on network structure is criticised by Dowding as underestimating the interpersonal relations in PNA. Dowding (1995) suggests that the focus of the analysis must pay attention to the characteristics of the participants in the policy process and the relationships between the actors. Similarly, Knoke (2016) criticises it because the approach "*downplayed the significance of interpersonal relations and presented a static, unidirectional relation between policy networks and policy outcomes*." (p.6). Dowding (1995) argued that focusing on the structure of the networks and neglecting to focus on what happen within those networks will not explain the policy outcomes. The closed or open structure of the network explains nothing in relation to the policy outcomes. Hence, the policy networks studies should be about the nature of interactions between actors and resources exchange within the network (Dowding, 1995). According to Dowding (1995), the Rhodes and Marsh's approach "*fail because the driving force of the explanation, the independent variables, is not the networks characteristics per se but rather characteristics of components within the networks. These components explain both the nature of the networks and the nature of the policy process"* (p.137).

A third point is that the policy network literature does not discuss how policy network emerges (Hay, 1995). Similarly, Hay and Richards (2000) criticise the PNA literature for not explaining the formation and transformation of policy network. They argue that networks are not static structures. Networks change with time as it takes different forms. Hence, the PNA must put more "*emphasis on the evolution and transformation of network structures…. "and "their flexibility and adaptability to changing external circumstances and the processes by which common strategic agendas are shaped and reshaped*" (Hay & Richards, 2000, p.2).

The problems presented above in relation to agency vs structure criticism to policy networks were resolved through the dialectical approach to policy analysis and the strategic relational approach (Marsh & Smith, 2000, Hay & Richards, 2000). First, the division between the structural approach to PNA and the agency focused approach to policy-making process is resolved through dialectical approach to PNA (2000). The approach which will be discussed further later in chapter five claims that policy process and policy outcomes must be analysed with a focus on both structural elements of network as well as the interpersonal relationships. The approach provides three levels of analysis macro, meso, and micro to overcome the limitations in policy network literature were either structure or agency are emphasised. The macro level is aimed to analyse the exogenous factors that affect the formation and the characteristics of the network. The meso level is the network which is a structure that eliminates or provides opportunities for policy actors. The micro level analyses the actions of actors in relation to their membership within the network or the society. The dialectical approach suggested by Marsh and Smith (2000) was then adjusted by Kisby (2007) and is discussed in chapter five.

3.4 Policy network analysis in non-western context

As the sources of literature related to PNA are from a region other than GCC region or similar polity, the literature reviewed to study the PNA covered countries other than western countries. This literature is supportive to the idea of applying network analysis to policy-making in non-western context (Jaffar, 2013., Zheng et al, 2010., Groenleer et al, 2012., Moyo & Modiba, 2013., Liu, 2011., Santa, 2010). Zheng et al (2010) find that despite the hierarchical state system in China, the policy network was able to identify the characteristics of the health insurance reform process. Through the lens of PNA, they found that the health insurance reforms in China is characterised by fragmented decision-making process. According to Zheng et al, (2010) "*in spite of the idea that the state system is strongly hierarchical, coordination is still an important and problematical issue. Actors do engage in competitive activities, even if this is played out less openly than being discussed in public*." (p.412).

However, Zheng et al (2010) argue that the PNA does not provide the full story about the policy-making in China. The policy network approach does not consider the cultural characteristics of the Chinese system as a variable that matters for policy-making. The central committee of the Chinese communist party is fundamental actor for important decisions and policy reforms. The committee acts as a parallel hierarchy to governmental bodies, and this committee exists inside the government to monitor the compliance. This feature of the Chinese political system makes the dynamics of interactions different from western democratic countries. Such interaction must be acknowledged in the Chinese policy-making literature. The other aspect that is considered as cultural is the informal personal relations between high officials. This relationship is based on loyalty and friendship and it is important for the policy-making process.

There are two limitations to Zheng et al (2010) criticism to the application of policy network approach in China. The fact that there might be informal linkage between different actors is acknowledged by important policy networks authors such as Rhodes. Rhodes' (2006) definition for policy networks acknowledges the importance of both the formal and informal linkage between actors. In addition, Zheng et al (2010) were not clear about how to categorise the central committee of the Chinese communist party. By categorisation, the researcher of this thesis means whether it is considered as an actor within the policy network or if it is an outsider actor or even another network that could be part of the broader context. This distinction is important because if it is another network then it might act as a variable that could affects the structure of policy network (Marsh & Smith, 2000).

The following shortcoming of PNA is identified when applied to a non- western context. First, the model does not reflect the effects of historical and institutional factors on the development of policies (Liu, 2011). Second, the division of policy actors between private, governmental and civil society do not fit with some non-western countries like China. The independence of civil society and the private actors from the government is questionable. In the case

of China, for example, some NGOs are GONGOs which refer to nongovernmental organisations that are organised by the government. Liu (2011) suggests "*Over-dependence on the government makes the analysis of other actor's independent attributes or behaviours (e.g. Preference) very difficult*" (p.180). Third, using network theory does not highlight the importance of other processes such as globalisation or liberalisation on the policy outcomes (Santa, 2010).

Despite the above limitations, the PNA is helpful to understand the dynamics between state and other non-state actors within a non-western contest (Moyo & Modiba, 2013. Zheng et al, 2010. Groenleer et al, 2012). This conclusion is attributed to the following reasons. First, the policy network analyses are useful for complex policy-making because of its multiple levels of analysis (Santa, 2010, p.312). Second, networks can be found in policy sectors despite the historical characteristics of non-participation in such policy such as the case of education policy in Zimbabwe (Moyo & Modiba, 2013). Third, the interactions between state and non-state actors are limited but not absent in non-democratic countries (Groenleer et al, 2012).

3.5 How can we understand policy-process in non-democratic states?

As discussed in chapter two that democratisation process in Bahrain started in 2001 after over twenty years of political oppression and contestation between the opposition and the government. The political reforms itself that was introduced by the king resulted in majority of the Bahraini citizens supporting and voting for a national action charter to modernize the political system in Bahrain and to re-establish the parliamentary system. The new constitution in Bahrain was adopted in 2002, yet it was disputed by the major political oppositions in Bahrain namely Alwifaq Islamic Society. The disagreement was based on power distribution between the national assembly two chambers: Shura council and Nuwab Council. This disagreement from the opposition side resulted in boycotting the parliamentary elections in 2002.

This section shall explain different theoretical models and concepts applied for studying GCC countries and other middle eastern countries and economies that depends on natural resources as main input for state revenues. The first perspective is the rentier state theory (RST) which was briefly mentioned in chapter two. The discussions focus over the development of the RST literature over the years. It emphasises how the literature perspective about state-society relationship has changed, and it presents the importance of connecting state security system and the oil rents to explain Bahraini's post 2011 actor's interactions. This will be followed by an explanation to the concept of crony capitalism which emphasis on merchants-states relations.

3.5.1 The Rentier State Theory

The rentier state theory is one of the theories used in analysing state- society relationship in oil rich Arab Gulf states and other economies that are dependent on unproductive earned incomes (Gray, 2011). The RST seeks to provide explanation for the lack of democracy in states where the economy is dependent on natural resources. The RST as well discuss the relationship between stat-society and governance within these countries. This section demonstrates the changes that occurred to how RST literature analyse the political economy in GCC and other countries since the 1980s.

The classical RST

The RST literature has changed since its first development by Hussain Mahdavy in 1970s about the pre-revolutionary Iran, then adopted in the 1980s by Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani. Gray (2011) explains different phases of development to the literature of RST and he introduces a third phase labelled as 'late rentierism' (p.1). The first phase of RST that discusses the Arab countries and democratisation was in the 1980s and early 1990s. The classical RST that was introduced by Mahdavi and Luciani suggest that the state as an allocator of rent is free from society pressure. Thus, the stat is independent from the influence of interest groups due to its financial sufficiency and that the absence of taxation system enhances the autonomy of the state from other

actors in society. The state in this case does not seek support or legitimacy from society as long as they share part of the wealth with the society (Gray, 2011). Hence, weak democratisation is an output of the economic dependence on oil rents (Luciani, 1990., Ross,2001., Crystal, 1995). Though Luciani (1994) suggests that fiscal crisis can create a motive for political reforms.

The rent allocation mechanism was thought to be an intrinsic character of rentier state in which it hinders the establishment of an active interest groups. The state is independent from society by allocating the rents through public sector and business projects given to merchant's elites. Thus, the state does not need actions to gain legitimacy as the society acceptance to its government is being "bought off" by share of rent (Gray, 2011, p.6).

All state is performing an allocative function, yet rentier state mainly and only an allocative state not a production based domestic economy (Luciani, 1990). The rentier states that does not raise a domestic income are free from the effect of social actors in the allocation process of rents. Luciani (1990) suggested that as "*long as the domestic economy is not tapped to raise further income through domestic taxation, the strengthening of the domestic economy is not reflected in the income of the state and is therefore not a precondition for the existence and expansion of the state*. "(pp 71-72).

The early RST literature linked taxation system with democratisation. The argument is that within the production states the society which contributes to the economy through taxation system, has a stake in approving the allocation system chosen by the government. Thus, for the state to be able to raise taxes the government needs legitimacy from the society they rule. However, the links between taxation and representation is more complicated and not direct, yet the existence of such system raises the questions of democracy (Luciani, 1990). Luciani (1990) explains this inventible relationship as that people will *"be induced to coalesce according to their economic interest, and those groups that find no way to influence the decision-making process in their favour claim appropriate institutional change*" (p.73). Luciani (1990) suggests that unequal distribution of rent is not enough to motivate people around certain interest

and to encourage them to change the current political institutions. Those individuals within the society who do not benefit from the rent will try to manoeuvre to acquire personal advantages (Luciani, 1990, p.74).

The early phase of RST was considered as insufficient to explain why oil rents hinder democracy or to explain the effect of globalisation on cities like Dubai. The first phase of RST was making general conclusion about the effect of oil on the state behaviour and relations with the society without referring to specific political context or other factors such as cultural influence (Rosser, 2006, Gray,2011, Niblock & Malik, 2007). For instance, Rosser (2006) critics the concept of resource curse within the literature that discuss the effect of natural resources abundant on development outcomes, the poor economic policy-making and authoritarianism. The curse of over dependence on income from natural resources is thought to be the main reason for economic deficiency and lack of democracy. This conclusion neglects the effects of institutions, social forces and political or economic context in determining outcomes in resource rich countries (Rooser, 2006., Mohaddes et al, 2019). According to Rosser (2006) *"the basic problem with the literature is that researchers have been too reductionist – they have tended to explain development performance solely in terms of the size and nature of countries' natural resource endowments.*" (p.3).

The Second phase: questioning the state autonomy

The RST literature that emerged during the 1990s and 2000s showed that the state does react to societal pressure and should take in to account the historical dynamics within each state. The state is not totally independent from society as predicted by the early version of the RST. For instance, Niblock & Malik (2007) show that in Saudi Arabia society interest hindered the adequate implementation of radical reforms. The reform process was not free from effect of vested interest as the suggested reforms witnessed extended negotiations and postponement (Niblock & Malik, 2007).

The state is responsive to pressure from society to ensure its long-term survival even if it has to avoid democratisation as stated by classical RST (Gray, 2011). The state is threatened by revolution or opposition from society. For instance, the Saudi Arabia's economic reforms and development policies is driven by pressure from society. The state responds to such pressure to protect the rulers and ensure a continuous legitimation for their power (Jones,2010). Other than the pressure from society over government's decisions, the state's officials or elites such as princes and clerics are influential as well (Niblock & Malik, 2007).

In some cases, rent from oil can act as a mediator in fragmenting state apparatus. Thus, the state moves from being a centric state to a fragmented state in which such fragmentation can impact the policy outcomes (Hertog, 2010). The state is not autonomous at least from the effect of different networks within the state. This fragmentation of state apparatus is different from the one that occurred in western Europe countries as explained earlier in this chapter. In the Gulf countries the potential fragmentation of state may take different outlook from the formal and functional disaggregation that occurred in Britain. Although functional disaggregation is introduced in some countries such as Bahrain. For example, the labour market reform process discussed in this thesis resulted in creating new specialised governmental agencies.

Hertog (2010) explained the fragmented bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia. Within the royal level there was a central power yet the clients below the ruling family and state institutions and bureaucracy are fragmented. According to Hertog (2010) "individual organizations tend to communicate upward with the political patrons rather than laterally with other bodies." (p.249). Hertog (2010) explains that such cliental network and the fragmentation of bureaucracy is sustained by the oil surplus. This resulted in lack of integration and communication failure between these organisations (Hertog, 2010).

The fragmentation of state apparatus is possible in the Arab Gulf states. Yet it might not be a result of resources interdependence nor governance. In this case fragmentation is not a result of different functional role undertaken by

these organisations. For instance, the fragmented bureaucracy within the Saudi state is layered, the royal family possess central power, but the groups and webs connected to the royal family is fragmented (Hertog, 2010). This system is more unique to the Saudi case. According to Hertog (2010) "*the depth and quality of fragmentation as well as its causes and consequences appear rather specific in the Saudi case and are best explained with reference to its rentier status- or more precisely, to the specific use to which the Al Saud regime has historically puts its oil money." (p.269).*

The rentier states can be fragmented and can be affected by class interest as well or beliefs of actors within the state. The assumption of RST that class interest is non-existent is disputed. Niblock & Malik (2007) suggest that state autonomy can be challenged internally by actors within the government itself. Niblock & Malik (2007) argue that state autonomy is "*constrained by interest that are internal to the state itself. State officials, politicians, or ruling family members may, through personal interests of one kind or another, frustrate the pursuit of policies which are in the country's wider developmental interest*" (p.19). In addition, beliefs and determinations of powerful actors in creating a new economic structure can as well exist in rentier state and motivates policy actors (Niblock & Malik, 2007). According to Niblock & Malik (2007) actors with key positions within the state influenced the economic policies by forming "*alliance within the state structure which redirects economic policies*" (p.19). Thus, rentier state mechanism may not always direct the policy-making process.

Another, Criticism to classical RST demonstrates that rentier states and its institutions existed before the influx of oil revenues. Thus, the historical aspects of the state must be incorporated in to the analysis of rentier states (Moore, 2004). For example, Schwarz (2008) discussed the political economy of state formation in rentier states. He considers that the rentier states took a different path of development in comparison to European countries. The European countries dependence on society was an outcome of the necessity in war time to extract money out of society to finance war. This was accompanied by the

establishment of accountability, transparency and what Charles Tilly label as the 'civilisation of government' (cited in Schwarz, 2008, p.599). While this process was absent from the Arabic rentier states, in these countries*" Rentier states display a particular path to state-formation that by and large defies the European path of state-formation: natural resource dependence (mainly oil dependence) has created weak states that are autonomous from societal demands and that do not rely on domestic taxation. "(p. 604).*

The Late Rentierism

The literature about RST go further and argues for a third phase of RST. Gray (2011) label it as the 'late rentierism ' (p.1). Gray (2011) accepts the second phase addition to the classical RST in terms of the importance of pre rent historical specification of each country, the existence of state-society relationship, the Importance of type of rent earned by these states in analysing the differences between rentier states. Yet, these suggestions can explain the specific characteristics of each state beyond rent but must provide an explanation that considers the effects of rent (Gray, 2011, p.19). The rentier states in Gray's perspective are still valid as these states continues to feed their budget with revenues from rent. Yet they have other non-rent aspects in their economic policies or foreign relations and that they interact with the society. Thus, the late rentierism try to explain the states policies that was developed to face unemployment pressure and other aspects during a high not low rent.

The late rentierism acts within a new rentier states context which is described by these factors: globalisation, development policies, employment and population pressure. The rentier states have responded to globalisation economically and politically. Economically through trade liberalisation and attracting foreign direct investment, politically by introducing political reforms to face strategic and security pressure. In association with globalisation is the increase in population which creates the need to face the increased unemployment pressure within the rentier states. Hence, the late rentierism

assumes that states are pressured to respond to such threats by providing prestigious jobs to its citizens.

The remarks of Gray about the association between globalisation, population pressure and unemployment was with reference to the Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has witnessed increased pressure from unemployed youth. The solution by the government was to meet the expectation of these youth in prestigious well paid jobs. The other threats to rentiers state is from the conservative Islamism. Their threats is higher when there are dissatisfied youth. Islamist movements critics the response of state to globalisation and that the state had neglected its internal problems . According to Gray (2011) this has led rentier states to respond to the societal pressure and to meets their demands. This response is a mechanism used by the state to reduce the threats of Islamist movement that challenges the state and the legitimacy of the ruling family.

Gray (2011) argues as well that the rentier state has arrived in to maturity as they are considering a long term goals. These states are strategically acting by initiating economic reforms. These reforms are aimed at the regime surviving in the long term and to protect the state from political upheaval . Gray (2011) provides the Bahraini uprising in 2011 as an example that the rentier Arab states are not immune from such pressure with reference to Bahrain's specific socioeconomic factors that led to this uprising.

However, understanding reforms as a survival mechanism for these countries does not answer why they chose specific paradigm for reforms. This paradigm which will be explained in chapter six aimed at liberalising the labour market, less regulation and more power to market forces. These choices were disputed among interest groups .Thus, if the rentier states will use reforms to mitigate any risk of political upheaval then you would expect them to introduce policies that will be accepted by interest groups and the public. In addition, those reforms were unique in comparison to neighbouring gulf countries were the public sector is the main employer of citizens. In Bahrain the reforms were associated with a plan to make the private sector the main employer of citizens

which means less rent redistribution through the employment in public sector (EDB & CPC, 2004b).

Gray (2011) provides seven characteristics of the state in late rentierism. First the state is responsive but not democratic. They are responsive to maintain the political stability of their regimes. Thus they initiate consultative interaction with the society. The result is that the state responses to society for matters that are considered significant for society. Gray (2011) suggests that this is an inventible outcome to the popularity of technology and mass communication that increase the threats of popular uprising.

The second feature that Gray suggests is that rentier state are now open to globalisation but with restrictions. The state does not allow changes that could threaten the state's authority or the religious group that support the state such as the situation in Saudi Arabia. Restriction on social reforms that could challenge the conservative perspective within the kingdom is restricted (Gray 2011). However, recent changes in Saudi Arabia may not be within the arguments line provided by Gray. As more social freedoms are presented that challenges the conservative wahhabi clergyman in the kingdom (Ulrichsen & Sheline, 2019).

The third feature expressed by Gray is the existence of an active economic and development policies. The classical rentier states literature assumed that the state does not need economic policies. These states only need expenditure policy or plan (Luciani, 1990). Gray (2011) argues that Rentier states have developed such policies and that they exhibits features of neo- rentierism: " *late rentier state seeks out development opportunities because of the rentier-like political outcomes that may accompany economic development and diversification*." (p.29).

The fourth feature suggested by Gray (2011) is that despite diversification attempts the rentier states are still dependent on natural resources. The Rentier states are energy driven and natural resources continues to form a substantial percentage of GDP and export income (Gray, 2011). However, the more recent literature on Gulf states gives new insight in regards to the status of economic diversification. For instance, Shehabi (2019a) argues that the

economic base of the GCC states are diversified through non-oil economic activities and their sovereign wealth funds. Yet, the diversification of the economic base has not contributed to the diversification of export or the sources of public revenues in states like Kuwait (Shehabi, 2019a, 2019b). Paterson as well (2009) suggests that Bahrain is already in 'post-oil economy'. He considers that the main problem toward diversification in Bahrain is political obstacles.

The last three features by Gray that qualify the rentier states to be in the late rentierism phase is the: active and innovative foreign policy , entrepreneurial state capitalist structure, and a long term state thinking. Classical RST literature assumed that these states do not need foreign polices due to less reliance on economic policies. However, this proofed to be wrong as rentier states do engage internationally to protect their interests. In relation to the sixth point, the state in the Arab Gulf states are successfully running major public companies in the hydrocarbons sector, and other major sectors are state owned. The last point of long term thinking is demonstrated through plans for economic diversification and non-rent income (Gray, 2011).

Gray remarks are interesting in that they further the discussion of RST with the changes that occurred to the rentier states. Three main points illustrate why is Gray's late rentierism is not sufficient to analyse the Bahraini case. First, the seven elements that he provides does not explain why certain policy outcomes are chosen. For instance, Gray argues that drawing policies and strategies by state shows the state long term thinking. Such argument explains why rentier states may adopt policies or draw strategies but it does not answer why they adopt strategy A and not Strategy B. The questions within this thesis try to answer why Bahrain has chosen these policy options and why they changed and to understand the relationship between agency and structure in setting such policies.

Second, Gray suggests that the rentier state is responsive to societal needs and that's why they create weak legislators. He argues that the state wants to appear open to actor's involvement by issuing consultative relationship with society, but at the same time to protect its authority (Gray, 2011). This

argument does not explain the differences in the outcome of consultation processes. In addition, it does not answer why negotiations over some policies may be prolonged. The argument provided by Gray about why the rentier states initiate consultation processes does not explain the other features of actor's interactions such as the frequency of interactions, integration between actors or what explains actor's actions to protect their interest

Third point that is significant to explain the Bahraini case study but not mentioned by Gray is the link between the rentier state and the power of national security system. Despite the sates tendency for political and economic reforms, its ability to reverse such initiatives and decrease reform's outcomes through strict national security system are a major factor that persist in some Gulf states. In chapter nine an illustration to Bahrain post 2011 policy network can explain the effect of tight national security system over policy process. Thus, connecting oil revenues to state's ability to repress political movements is an important factor to analyse the post 2011 actor's relations in the kingdom of Bahrain.

There are different mechanism that connect oil with authoritarianism. Ross (2001) argued that there are three mechanism that connects oil rents to authoritarianism namely: rentier effect, repression effect, and modernisation effect. The rentier effect is as explained in relation to state-society relationship in which the state spending on welfare and other services reduces the pressure for democratisation. The repression effect is the building of internal security forces by the government. The links between repression and income from natural resources is found in literature that explains why some dictatorship persist and that states financial capacities from rent assist in repression (Acemoglu et al, 2010, Young, 2009, DeMeritt and Young, 2013). As the elites in non-democratic states uses the inflow of natural resources to feed the growing military apparatus (Acemoglu et al, 2010). The modernisation effect slowdown of social change which can result in slowing down the demands for democracy.

However, in 2009 Ross changes his perspectives regards oil and repression. He considers that repression is an outcome of other factors other than oil. He explains that Gulf Countries such as "Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia, do so to protect themselves against external threats from their neighbours, and internal threats from terrorist groups." (p.16). The explanation provided by Ross for the increased spending on enhancing state's security ability is misleading. Bahrain's Historically has used its security apparatus to repress the ongoing demands for democratisation. These demonstrations were peaceful not terrorist. For instance, in 2011 with the Arab uprising the government of Bahrain punished the protesters who were mostly shia (Faramarzi, 2011, p.41. Lynch 2012, p.138).

Recent literature continues to refer to Bahrain's ability to repress opposition as an outcome to oil rents that is used to finance security apparatus. Those apparatus employ foreign workers who are then becomes part of the citizens suppressions and security crackdown (Ezrow & Frantz, 2011, p.258). Brownlee et al (2015) suggest that the ability of state apparatus in Bahrain to perform the crackdown on protesters reflects the capacity of petrodollar state to repress its citizens without external powers. Hence, the case of Bahrain "*gives primary causal weight to the domestic variables of hereditary rule and petrodollars, rather than to the actions of external power*." (Brownlee et al, 2015, p.87). The military apparatus in Bahrain are united behind the ruling family. These apparatus employs the dominant sunni and sunni foreigners from different countries. The kingdom has even offered citizenship to the foreign workers in the military (ICG, 2011, p.7). These activities are "*amalgam of rentierism and personalism yielded political division*" (Brownlee et al, 2015, p.90).

3.5.2 Crony capitalism

The analysis of state-business relationship in the middle east discuss the existence of crony capitalism. Crony capitalism is an economic system were the business class benefit from the state power in allocating resources. Crony capitalism can be practiced through grants, tax exemption, reducing or overcoming legal barriers and other forms of favouritism provided by a state

actor (Rubin, 2016). The business sector thrives through rent seeking behaviour not a risk based economic activities. According to Luciani (2013) crony bourgeoisie are “a bourgeoisie whose fortunes are contingent on access to the holders of political power and preferential treatment.” (p.269).

The mechanism that led to the establishment of crony capitalism may differ from one country to another. There is no sufficient knowledge within the literature about crony capitalism in the middle east. Or of which is how these clientele network differs between different countries or do crony capitalism differ between different sectors of the economy, and the questions of mechanism that connects business sector/firms to crony capitalism (Diwan et al, 2019). In addition, political cronies tend to be more apparent in some sectors such as: service sector, “banking, real-estate, tourism, distribution, natural resources, and telecommunications sectors… these sectors were often selectively opened in the wake of liberalization through discretionary licenses, which were typically awarded to political insiders.” (Diwan et al , 2019, p.6). Thus, this section will present literature that discuss the relationship between cronies and government and the rule of private sector in relation to different MENA states. The discussion is divided based on the state- business relations after the Washington consensus, and state- business relations shaped by the influx of oil rent.

The selection of crony capitalists is assumed to be based on matters of loyalty and security rather than the extent to which they will contribute to the economy (Luciani, 2013).The state- private sector relationship in the Arab world is analysed as being based on the importance of regime security and not on the private sector importance for economic management (Henry and Springborg, 2010). In such relationship the state supports the trustworthy businesses and draw its support to business that are pro opposition (Diwan et al, 2019).

This meant that although liberalisation and reduced role of public sector took place, yet the state found other ways to control the market (Diwan et al, 2010).

For instance, in Egypt and Jordan the public spending declined yet "*political expediency continued to shape the market"* (Diwan et al, 2019, p.3). Those firms that are connected to powerful elites win "*favours that allow them to earn return far above market returns*" (Haber, 2002, cited in Diwan et al, 2019, p.6). Thus, within such system the connections and the network between the ruler and the private sector are important for the continuation of the authoritarian regime such as the case in Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Tunisia (King, 2009).

Rent seeking and corruptions are a result to the existence of such patronage network. The economic reforms that occurred in some MENA countries were affected by such corruption. The economic reforms that resulted from the Washington consensus were deformed as the unregulated market has not resulted in competitiveness or social justice. The reforms were implemented in a way to benefit the capitalist such as land owners. Hence, these countries need to reduce political patronage through the introduction of competition legislations to govern the market, enhance competition and to reduce monopoly power (cited in King , 2009).

In Arab resource rich countries, the clientele/ patron network is discussed in the classical RST and the recent literature as well (for instance Hertog, 2010). The clientele and patronage network in middle east play an important role in how certain actors gain access to material and non-material goods (Elvira et al, 2018, and Ayubi 1995). Clienteles are very important to the patron because "*Very often they act as a support base and a control mechanism for establishing the legitimacy of the government. Such clientelist strategy is also the balance of social forces. The state elites always try to develop countervailing political forces in order to neutralize the force threatening the legitimacy of the state. In the process, the force to be used as countervailing is patronized by the state.*" (Sarker,2008, p.1420). The reason for the existence of such network is that they act as a: political support, votes, social balance in front of opposing forces, and for social control (Sarker,2008,p.1420).

The revenues from rent assisted in establishing such relationship in the Arab Gulf States. The state has created such network by giving the businessman an

access to stock ownership in companies, awarding of public contracts, financial gains from being members of corporate boards. The relationship between state and businessman can have other informal mechanism such as family lineage and clan history through marriage alliances (Kamrava et al, 2016). Kamrava et al (2016) suggest that "*These factors combine to make the private sector not just a client of the state, but one of its main sources of support. By serving as a critical link between the epicentre of power and successive social strata, the private sector underpins state authority*" (p.10).

This thesis does not observe the exact nature of exchange between the business sector and government. Yet, the manifestation of this relationship is added to the discussion of BCCI's political stance in 2011 and how they were part of the escalated sectarian retaliation strategy used by the government to punish the protesters. The thesis as well explain how the political stance of BCCI has changed it interactions with trade unions. The post 2011 events accelerated the BCCI's ability to influence the policy outcomes in comparison to pre 2011 policy process which was characterised by increased interactions between actors and a prolonged discussion and negotiations over the recommended policies.

3.6 Policy networks in comparison to other theories that explains the policy process

This section explains why the author prefers the policy network approach over other theoretical frameworks that explains the policy process. These frameworks are the advocacy coalition approach and multiple streams approach. The main variables that are examined whiten these approaches are the distribution of power among actors. The reasons for not choosing the multiple streams and the advocacy coalition approach are for considering the policymaking process as relatively open. The two models do not account to some policies that occur within close communities. As explained in the previous section that understanding the nature of the policymaking community and who is included and excluded is important to answer the research questions. Hence

any theory that does not consider such issues will not serve the purpose of the study.

The author of this thesis finds that considering power discrepancy between actors will be more relevant to the Bahraini political system. The political system in Bahrain does not reflect the pluralistic system. The advocacy coalition and multiple streams are based on a pluralistic view of political system. This means that the groups within the society possess equal powers to some extent. Hence, government in such system is more open and neutral and any existing network will be open as well. This view ignores institutional barriers to an inclusive policymaking. Therefore, policy network is preferred for its ability to detect the open and closed policy networks and for acknowledging the importance of resources available to actors.

The multiple streams framework

The multiple streams framework developed by kingdom view the policy process as chaotic and ambiguous and unpredictable process. Kingdon's model describes the process as non-linear and more complex than expected. Kingdon asserts that the policy process is irrational and dynamic (Zahariadis, 2003). The multiple streams framework is based on five main elements (Kingdon, 2011). The first three elements are what kingdon's call the 'streams' which are: problem streams, policy streams and politics streams. Actors belong to these streams where they interact with each other. The fourth theme is the windows of opportunities which are the "*opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions or to push attention to their special problems*" (Kingdon, 2011, p.165). The fifth element is the policy entrepreneurs who invest their resources to advocate a policy. The interactions between different actors occur in each stream. The policy entrepreneurs can be an actor from pressure groups, civil servants and politicians.

The streams are independent from each other until a policy window opens and bring the streams together. At this stage the policy entrepreneurs become active in advocating new policy outcomes. The problems stream occurs when

policy makers or policy advocates consider an issue as a problem in need for solution. This consideration may occur when a crisis or events raise the problem to the attention of the policymakers. Thus, considering an issue as a problem that needs a solution is a consideration by specific groups and may not catch the attention of all the active actors. Such a problem must be transferred in to a public problem to get the attention of people in power. To achieve this outcome, policy entrepreneur usually takes the role in transforming the problem to public sphere (Birkland, 1997). The policy streams are the stream were policy ideas are developed by different groups. Some of these ideas then will shape the policy proposal, the other ideas will be dismissed. In this phase of the process the policy entrepreneur skills and incentives are important in pushing the policy proposal to the government's agenda (Kingdon, 1995).

The political streams are the stream were the policymakers assess how receptive is the national mood. They assess if the policies are accepted by the political parties and interest groups in order to push the proposal to turn in to formal policy (Kingdon, 1995). This stream is very important for the policy proposal to arrive in to government's agenda as the consensus between actors is reached through bargaining (Jenkins, 1995). During the political streams Policy entrepreneur can be very influential if they have links in governmental bodies. If the interest of the person who works in government organisation meets the interest of the entrepreneur, then the problem can easily reach the policy agenda.

Those three separated streams at a certain critical time will merge together by the policy entrepreneurs. If one stream is missing, then the solution to the problem might not reach the agenda. Once they are coupled the opportunity for the policy proposal to be alive is enhanced and the policymakers may pay more attention to such issue (Zaharidis, 1999, 2007). To push for the actualisation of the policy proposal the critical time will be what kingdom call the policy window. The policy window is an opportunity that open and then close. This opportunity gives the policy advocates the chance to push for policy change. The window can be predictable or unpredictable such as scheduled

changes in certain policies. At this time the entrepreneurs become very active in investing time, money and skills to push for change (kingdom, 1995). In general, the policy entrepreneur can be active in all policy phases (Houston & Richardson 2000; Lindquist et al. 2010).

The advocacy coalition

The advocacy coalition approach is similar to policy network approach in stressing the importance of inter organisational relationship for explaining policy process (John, 1998). Yet each one of them brings its own perspective to understand the bases of this relationship (Smith, 2000). The advocacy coalition's unit of analysis is the policy subsystem which is the group of actors who interact with each other (Sabatier and Smith, 1999). Hence, the advocacy coalition focuses on agency rather than structure. The advocacy coalition stresses the importance of learning and belief systems as a mechanism for change and put less attention to the importance of resources and interdependency between actors. The process of competition between different actors with different beliefs provides policy learning to actors. In addition, the advocacy coalition considers the access to policymaking as open sphere for competition between belief systems (Smith, 2000). According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) the advocacy coalition approach describe the policy process as "*people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers) who (1) share a particular belief system – i.e. set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions – and who (2) show a non-trivial degree of co-ordination over time*." (p:138)

The Advocacy Coalition frame view all phases of the policy process from formation until implementation to be open access to actors or the 'Advocacy Coalition'. Those Coalition represents actors from different institutions and that they share similar beliefs (Sabatier, 1999). The coalition reflects a good degree of consensus between actors over the required policy options. The coalition can reflect a dominant actors or minority coalition (Nohrstedt, 2011). The Coalition then will attempt to affect governmental or other institutions to

adjust the behaviour of people and the conditions related to the problem or issue of concerns. These attempts are aimed to actualise the coalition's belief system. (Hill & Varone, 2017).

The Advocacy Coalition focuses on three elements to explain the policy process: the coalition politics, policy change and policy learning (Pierce et al, 2017). The first element which is the advocacy coalition have shared beliefs and their actions are coordinated. The policy coalitions compete to influence the policy outcomes in a policy subsystem. The subsystems consist of actors from different backgrounds representing the public and private sectors, those actors share the concerns over a policy issue in which they attempt to influence the policy outcomes in relation to the issue of concerns (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999). These different coalitions can come together when they have a shared belief, though this shared belief may differ to some extent. For instance, shared beliefs can represent different aspect about the policies and not all aspect of it.

The policy changes that will occur reflects the winning coalition's belief system and conflict that arises from competing coalitions (Pierce & Weible, 2016). Those coalitions may have a different perspective about the policy outcomes. These changes can be major which reflects a change in the actor's belief system in which the definition of the problem and the policy goals has changed. The non-major policy changes reflect a change in the perspective about the best policy instruments to fulfil the established policy goals (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Policy change as explained by the Advocacy Coalition Theory are either bottom up or top-down. The bottom up changes led by the coalition occurs for four main reasons: an event outside the policy subsystem that the coalition take advantage from to push for policy change, or an event internal to the policy subsystem, policy learning by the coalitions members, and negotiations over policies between coalitions members (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). A policy broker will play an important role in bringing different coalitions together. The policy brokers try to decrease the level of conflict by suggesting compromises over the different beliefs and strategies presented by different coalition.

Finally, the Advocacy Coalition theory studies the process of policy learning which could facilitate policy change as well as the changes in Coalition's beliefs. The policy learning means "*enduring alterations of thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and which are concerned with the attainment or revision of the precepts of the belief system of individuals or collectives"* (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993, p.42).The changes in the beliefs can be regards: defining the problem and its causes, and strategies for change (cited in Pierce et al, 2017).

3.7 Conclusion

The first section of this chapter served three aims. First, it showed why the researcher chose to base its research on the school of interest intermediation rather than the policy network governance school. Its second objective was to trace back the origins of PNA within the interest intermediation school and to show its limitations. Third, it wanted to show how the PNA was used in a research within a non -western context.

The comparison between the policy network governance and interest intermediation schools reveals three main advantages of the later over the earlier in relation to guide the empirical enquiry of this research. The interpretation of network within the interest intermediation school gives more flexibility to the potential relationship between government and interest groups, it opens the question in regards the extent to which they exchange resources and possess shared interest; thus, the potential of a diverse type of relationship. The governance school focus on different topics such as trust and to solve coordination issues between actors. Thirdly, the majority of the literature in relation to governance school assumes that the state role has diminished to a steering role, except the metagovenance which provide another argument in this perspective. This does not suit the Bahraini case w here state actors were still active in the formation of the policy content.

The second aim of this chapter is to discuss the early literature within the policy network within the interest intermediation school. This literature and its limitation lay the background to the analytical framework that will be discussed in the next chapter. The main limitations that were identified within the early versions of the PNA within the school of interest intermediations are: the focus of either interpersonal relations (Wilks & Wrights model) or the focus on network structure (Rhodes model). The second limitation is that the early version of literature does not explain the different phases that the networks goes through as it lacks a theoretical basis to the formation stages or expansion of the network. Hence, the next section builds on these limitations based on structure vs agency debate, the dialectical approach which try to reconcile the debate over the relationship between structure and agency within the policy network literature, and a discussion of Hay and Richards approach to policy network which provides more analysis to the different phases that show networks dynamics.

Finally, the revision of literature related to PNA in non-western polity is found to be effective in explaining the policy processes. The policy dynamics within a network of actors is applied to different forms of interactions within different policy sectors. In general, it is useful when applied to understand the dynamics with a policy process. The policy networks help in identifying the relevant context related to formation and changing in the set of actors interacting and the interpersonal relations as well (LIU, 2011).

Chapter 4: Developing the analytical framework for this thesis

4.1 Introduction

The analytical framework for this thesis is developed from the revision of an early version of PNA within the interest intermediation school's literature. Hence, it builds up from its main limitation that was discussed in chapter four. The first limitation is in regard to the formation of the network and how it changes through the policy process. The second main limitation is in regard to relationship between agency and structure during policy process. The first two sections of this chapter address these two main limitations by discussing the formation and transformation of networks. Next the chapter discuss agency / structure debate, which leads to the discussion of the dialectical approach that was developed partially as a reply to the criticism of PNA in regard to agency/structure debate. The limitation and strengths of the dialectical approach is presented. The next sections address how to overcome some of limitations in Marsh and Smith (2000) approach through accompanying it with other literature in PNA. The discussions start with older literature provided by Marsh and Rhodes regards the properties of policy network. This discussion is then followed by examining how to establish a link between policy network and policy outcomes. Finally, the chapter explore the role of ideas as a contextual factor that can affect the network and actors during policy process.

4.2 Network formation and transformation

One of the PNA limitations discussed in the previous chapter was that it does not explain how policy networks form and transform its characteristics and potentially its effect over actor's actions, context and policy outcomes. Due to this limitation and other issues within the literature, Colin Hay (1995, 1998) developed a strategic relational approach that deals with networks as a

dynamic structure that takes different shapes through the policy process. Hay gives more attention to the formation and transformation of policy networks, while the other PNA approaches discussed in the previous chapter give less attention to how networks emerge and change. Hay (1998) explained four different stages of networking, namely: "*pre - network stage, network formation, networking as practice, and network termination*" (p.45). Hay and Richards (2000) added other layers to these stages. These are the network failures which precede the network termination and network realignment as the last phase in the network cycle. These stages reflect changes in the shape of the network, structures, practice and procedures.

The different networking phases are associated with election cycle. The pre network stage is the stage were "*the opposition party consults with a range of actors including interest groups, think-tanks and academics on issues and policy areas in formulating a programme for government*" (Hay & Richards, 2000, p.6). Formation stage or modification is characterised by: recognising that working with different organisation is needed for collective action, the importance of pooling different resources to enhance strategic capacities of network members, recognising network feasibility (i.e., geographical feasibility to save time and cost), establishing network characteristics (Hay,1998). Another illustration to this phase is provided by Hay & Richards (2000), in which they associated this stage with newly formed government which will reshape a pre-existing network. Hence, some actors might be added to the network and others are removed. In some cases, a new network may be established; this might be associated with issue networks to deal with exceptional cases like war based demands. The next phase which is the network as practice is characterised by: several consultation meetings between interest groups and governments actors (Hay & Richards, 2000). Network transformation stage can be an outcome to formal adoption or implementation of policies. It is often associated with the legislative phase or through strategic learning of actors within the network "*as they revise their goals in the light of changing perceptions of what is feasible and desirable* (Hay & Richards, 2000). The

Network failure is when the network perceived as no longer serving its purpose. It is more likely that network termination occurs in issue network than other type of networks. The Network realignment where the policy network takes new policy directions. The network realignment is usually affected by changes in context such as new government (Hay & Richards, 2000).

There are two main limitations of the different stages of networking presented by Hay and Richards (2000). The first limitation is in regard to being specific to polity and party based political systems. The formation of the network is associated with the opposition arriving in to power which means the election context is the main factors for such change. Yet, other researcher like Marsh and Smith (2000) found an association between policy formation and other type of contexts like war for example. Marsh and Smith (2000) discussed the formation of the genetically modified crops policy network. They found that the network forms as an outcome to both exogenous factors and the decisions of actors. The external context, namely World War Two, affected the interest of actors as the war required increase in food production. The government were not able to achieve this outcome by itself. The context explains the formation process partially as the actions of actors and strategic learning were factors as well. These factors affected the network and policy outcomes especially in institutionalising the network even after the war was over. Marsh and Smith's case study is important to show how the formations of a network can be achieved even when it's not associated with the election cycle. In short, context changes might create shared interest and increase the need for other actors, the decisions of actors who interpret the context are a factor to understand the formation process. The future changes within the network is understood as affected by different factors such as: changes in context, policy outcomes, and network interactions.

The second limitation is that the stages provided by Hay and Richards might not be found in all cases and they are not limited. Sacli (2011) found two other stages from her case study about environmental policies in Netherlands. These stages are network stabilisation and stagnation. Network stabilisation is found

when actors agree on policy outcomes and when the interactions within the network become a common practice. Network stagnation occurs when the interactions are less often and agreement on policy outcomes is not reached. Thus, the networking stage may vary from the typology of Hay and Richards as it depends on the uniqueness of each case study. The fact that these different stages varies between different case studies was acknowledged by Hay and Richards (2000). They describe such perspective as "*Although a series of stages are identified (heuristically) and although these stages are presented in a chronological order, we posit not inevitable logic or process driving networks from one stage to the next. The strength and utility of the model, we suggest, rests on an empirical observation: a succession of transitory stages which often combine to form a cyclical process."* (p.6)

Due to such limitations, the researcher suggests explaining the changes within the network in relation to the interaction between the external environment or the context with the structure of the network, actor's actions and potentially policy outcomes as suggested by Marsh and Smith (2000). Marsh and Smith's perspective in regards formation of network and changes within it can be reduced back to how we can understand structure/agency debate. The relationship between those two concepts is important to PNA especially in an attempt to understand the correlations between external factors, Network, actors' actions and policy outcomes. The network is dynamic as explained by Hay (1995) and once we understand its relationship to other factors then we could analyse how it change or by using Hay and Richards (2000) terminology: network transformation, failure, termination and realignment.

4.2.1 The structure/ agency debate

Part of the debate about the role of PNA stems from the debate over the relationship between agency and structure (Dowding, 1995, Borzel,1998). The rational approach towards the analysis of policy networks focus on actor's choices and actions (Dowding, 1995). In contrast, Rhode and Marsh's earlier version of PNA emphasises the role of Network's structural element. Such

debate paves the path for the development of PNA through the introduction of advanced version of Marsh and Rhodes (1992) model. For instance, Marsh and Smith (2000) suggested a dialectical approach to PNA, and Hay and Richards (2000) argued for a strategical relational approach. We will discuss the dialectical approach and the strategical approach later on in this chapter.

Understanding the constraints and opportunities provided by the context and how agents operate within such an environment are one of the objectives of this research. Dealing with policy-making process and how policy content is decided means asking questions about the role of actors or agency and how it relates to context and networks. Hay (1995) comment on the importance of structure/agency topic, he says" *Every time we construct, however tentatively, a notion of social, political or economic causality we appeal…to ideas about structure and agency*". (p.189). There are various positions regard the relationship between structure and agency. These positions are summarised in table 2 (P.88). Hay (1995) distinguished between different theoretical positions on the basis of being structure centred verses agency cantered, and simple view of structure-agency versus dialectical view of structure-agency. These perspectives are structuralism, intentionalism, structuration theory, critical realism (such as Morphogenesis approach) and strategic-relational approach. The strategic relations approach will be discussed later on as part of the PNA literature.

Table 1: positions in the structure/ agency debate

	insider account (agency-centred)	outsider account (structure-centred)
simple view of structure-agency	intentionalism	Structuralism
dialectical view of structure-agency	structuration theory	critical realism

		strategic-relational approach

Taken from (Hay, 1995, p.193, 2002, p.102)

The schools that provide a simple view of structure/agency debate are structuralism and intentionalism. Structuralism perspectives privilege the role of structure in the structure/agency debate. In that sense actors are only the bearers of social and political events. So, structure is deterministic of actor's actions (Hay, 1995,2002). The shortcoming in this model is in not considering the motivation, intentions and actions of actors as part of explaining to social outcomes. In contrast, intentionalism focuses on agency, social and political practices. Hence structure is the outcome of intentional agents. The intentionalism fails to consider constraints and opportunities provided by structural factors. They neglect that individuals or agents acts in a situation where they lack information and knowledge, and where they might produce unintentional outcomes (Hay, 1995,2002). Both perspectives are not suitable for my research questions that seek an understanding to the role of actors, network and context in determining the policy outcomes.

4.2.2 Structuration

Giddens structuration theory provides a perspective where both agency and structure matters in the analysis of social and political events. It aims to bridge the rigid separation of structure and agency (Hay, 1995). Giddens (1979) argued that structure is the medium for social actions and the outcome of those actions. Structure for Giddens consists of rules and resources. Those rulers and resources exist as a memory traces in people's mind. Giddens define structure as *"structural property, or more exactly, structuring properties providing the 'binding' of time and space in social systems. I argue that these properties can be understood as rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems. Structures exist paradigmatically, as an*

*absent set of differences, temporally 'present' only in their instantiation, in the constituting moments of social systems"(*Giddens, 1979, p. 64.). Rules could be routines, habits, procedures or conventions. Resources are the power relations between actors; they are either allocative or authoritative. Allocative resources have a material features such as production. Authoritative resources *"involve command over people"* (Whittington, 2015, p.148). According to Giddens, the more resources an actor possess the more capacity to practice agency (Whittington, 2015).

Giddens considers that agency consists of the following features: reflexive monitoring of actions, rationalisation and motivation. The agents possess knowledge and hence they can be reflexive. Actors are reflexive as they monitor the actions of others; for example, actors monitor what others say in a conversation and they reply in accordance to such conversation. The rationalization of actions means providing reasons for what we do (Giddens, 1984). These tasks of reflexivity, rationalisation and motivation occur in two different levels of awareness: discursive and practical consciousness and the unconscious part (Allan, 2013). Discursive reflexivity involves aspects such as providing reasoning and explanation, whilst practical reflexivity is knowing how to achieve certain things in life, and finally the unconscious part of reflexivity. Giddens (1984) explains that discursiveness is "*What actors are able to say, or to give verbal expression to, about social conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action; awareness which has a discursive form"* (p. 374).

Giddens's structuration theory is not without shortcoming. He gives agents a generous amount of freedom in acting (Archer, 2010, Hay, 1995, Carlstein, 1981). Giddens give all individual the capacity to act even when social constrains are heavy. He says, *"the most seemingly 'powerless' individuals are able to mobilise resources so as to carve out spaces of control with respect to their day-to-day lives and in respect of the activities of the more powerful"* (Giddens, 1979, p.256). Giddens associated actions with transformative capacity, but what if that transformative capacity does not exist? What if actors act without transforming the situation? Archer suggests that Giddens is giving

agents the power to transform structures at any phase in a given sequence, she believes that Giddens concept about agency "*amplifies voluntarism and minimizes constraint"* (2010, p.233). The next section provides another / alternative discussion over agency/structure debate from the one provided by Giddens. The discussions are based on Archer's morphogenetic approach which gives more attention to structural constrains/ opportunities on actor's actions.

4.2.3 Archer's morphogenetic approach

Other than Giddens, Margret Arche's morphogenetic approach is an attempt to reconcile the separation of structure and agency in social debate. Archer argues that structures exist separated and independent from agents. These structures limit or enable an agent's actions Archer, 2010). Structures exist autonomously which means they are different from agents and culture as well. It has a causal effect on agent's action, yet this effect does not exist all the time. Hence, structures are pre condition to actions but not deterministic as agents can be innovative or they continually learn from their experience (Archer, 2000). The interplay between structure and agency is based on three phase cycle. At time 1, the structure predates the agent's actions and is independent from it. This structure is the outcome of the dead people or actors in the past. The structure at this stage condition the actions of actors in a future date. Social interactions occur between time 2 and time 3, at this time agents are active in advancing their interest by interacting with others. The final stage is the outcomes of the social interactions which may result in reshaping the structure or not changing it, the cycle then starts again (Archer, 1995).

Archer's argument about the independency of structure is supported by examples where structures takes long time to change. Archer refers to the Castro's literacy campaign as an example to demonstrate her points about how structures are independent and predates actors. The Castro example is about the post revolution Castro's policy to eradicate illiteracy in Cuba. Castro's method to achieve the policy was through 'each one teaches one' (Archer,

1995). According to Archer, assuming that teaching one person by another person will take up to one year. The policy will then be 95 percent successful five years later. In this case the preconditioning structural properties are those related to pre-revolution educational system. Those structural properties condition what can be achieved through Castro's educational policy. This means you cannot make the whole population literate in one year, because there was only 5 percent educated people in Cuba before the revolution, and this fact condition the extent to which the actions of current individual succeed in achieving the intended outcomes of eradicating illiteracy. Thus, the pre-conditioning structural properties of the pre-revolution educational system will not change fast; it will take up to five years to change it. According to archer "*all structures manifest temporal resistance and do so generically through conditioning the context of action' (*1995:77). Hence *"those who were literate initially were not responsible for their distribution in the population"* (Archer, 1995:78).

For Archer (2003), both agency and structure have powers. Structure have emergent properties (i.e. the proportion of female to male in society is an emergent power for demographical structure) with causal power that enable or constrain actors. Yet this emergent property if not activated will not be influential on agent's actions. Archer considered that if emergent properties has to exercise causal power on agent it has to *"stand in a relationship "(2003, p.5).* Relationship means a relationship that *"aids the achievement of some specific enterprise"* (Archer, 2003). An enterprise could be something like a project. A project is a tool or device that people use to achieve certain objectives. This project is initiated by human agency. Agency that in a certain context decided to take the opportunity provided by the context to initiate the project. Those environmental enablers would not have a causal power over agents without the intension and action of agents to use them. This is why we could say that people missed an opportunity that was open to them at some point.

Archer's concepts are criticised from different perspectives. Hay (1995) and Piiroinen (2014) argued that we do not need to separate structure and agency in order to study them. What we need is *"analytical distinctions between structures and agency, but only analytical distinctions, which can be made between any terms or vocabularies that can be said to have different meanings"* (Piiroinen, 2014, p.89). Hay's (2002) criticism of Archer's approach relates to the temporal separation of agency and structure. He considers structure and agency as co-constitutive not separated by time. Hay and Richards' strategic relational approach is discussed in the next section in which the distinctions between structure and agency are dealt with as an analytical concept.

Another criticism is that Archer is not clear about the present relationship between structure and agency (Healy, 1998). According to Healy (1998), *"This is a very confusing and unhelpful way to speak of the relationship between social structures and individuals. It makes us believe in social structures whose existence in the present is entirely independent of the people who make up society, which is impossible"* (p.518). Similarly, Dave Elder-Vass (2007) rejected Archer's arguments that structures are independent from actors because they were structured in the past. The current social structure at present is not separated from people who establish it. It is a matter of current relationships rather than one inherited from the past.

Margret Archer's precondition structures and their effects on agency are useful for the analysis of data and answering this thesis research questions. They are useful to understand the process concerning the LMRP. In addition, it will help to answer the research question "How does the interaction between broader structural context, policy network structure and actor's actions affects the policy outcomes? "which is concerned with understanding agency and structural relationship in determining the policy outcomes.

Several antecedent structural factors that affected the LMRP were identified such as government structure and division of power within the ruling family, the composition of upper and lower house, labour market regulatory

framework, economics, labour market, and skills structures, the historical relationships between, merchant families and the ruling family, and class structure. The cultural antecedents that were identified during the field work were: MCK's economic model, actor's beliefs that the immigrant workers are not an immigrant but rather a foreign, expat and temporary workers, Mckinsey & company's analysis about the Bahraini's labour market and finally programmatic beliefs about how to solve unemployment issues in Bahrain. These antecedent structural factors are important to understand because they facilitated or constrained the actions of actors in their attempts to influence the policy outcomes of LMRP. Yet they were not influential without activation by actors, who acted by taking an opportunity of what they considered as a good environment to advance their interest or new ideas.

4.2.4 Networking as a strategic relational approach

The earlier discussion in relation to Archer's morphogenetic approach was criticised by Hay (1995, 2000) and Piiroinen (2014) as the distinction between structure and agency is an analytical not real. Hay (1995,2002) argued for a co-constitutive relationship between agency and structure. According to Hay, "*neither agents nor structures are real, since neither has an existence in isolation from the other; their existence is relational (structure and agency are mutually constitutive) and dialectical (their interaction is not is not reducible to the sum of structural and agential factors treated separately).*" (2002, p.127). Hay (2002) also disagreed with Giddens's arguments that you cannot study structure and agency at the same time because they are the two sides of the coin. Instead, Hay considered that *"the coins is not just a two side it is two metals in the alloy from which the coin is moulded"* (Hay, 1995, p.200). According to Hay strategic social actors act in a context that is 'strategically selective', and networks are a reflection to actor's strategic actions.

Hay (1995) viewed agents as conscious, reflexive and strategic. The strategic actions of actors reshape the structure and enhance the strategic learning of actors. This yields to a change in an actor's preferences and how he/she views

their interest. Hence, structures have no independent causal power. Hay (1995) defined strategy actions as the "fusion of *strategy* and *intention* informed by knowledge of structured context" (p.190). Actors have motivations and intentions to act but these intentions are not free from the structured context. Actors have knowledge about the structured context which set the parameters for their actions. They act strategically which means the intention of actors are aimed at a certain end such as the selection of policy objectives and policy instruments. Hence agency is an outcome of strategy and intensions. Marsh and Smith (2000) agreed with Hay's that actors' actions reflect strategic calculation not a rational choice. They add strategic learning to the actor's actions which means actors reflect on past actions to learn from it, other terms they used is 'strategic calculation' but no definition was provided by Marsh and Smith.

Based on the above, Hay developed a strategic rational approach towards PNA. Hay and Richards (2000) emphasised that the dynamics of the network reflects the actor's strategic action to the changing context. Thus, they put an actor's actions as the main driver of the changes on network dynamics. They consider that:

"such a strategic approach to networking (reflecting the inherently strategic content of networking itself) places greater emphasis on the evolution and transformation of network structures at the core executive level, their flexibility and adaptability to changing external circumstances and the process by which common strategic agendas are shaped and reshaped in the light of perceived success or failure" (p.2).

Marsh (2010) criticised Hay's perspective as over emphasising agents, he says that in the strategic relational approach "*It is agents choices which are important and structures (which don't exist independently anyway) only affect agents to the extent that they recognize them and purposefully choose to be influenced by them"* (pp218-219). Hence, agency matters because they have the power to influence choices, while structure does not exert power. For this case study, it is not possible to consider structure as only analytical tool. Antecedent structural context had proven to be related to the early and

privilege inclusion of actors in discussion policy content related to this case study. Hence structure was a source of inclusion despite if agents used it or not. For instance, in 2004 the BCCI was consulted by the government over a draft of law related to labour market reforms. The BCCI were surprised that the draft of law was already written and submitted by EDB to the government which entail that the BCCI did not know it was with the government; hence, no action by the BCCI was recorded to be included in this early level of discussion (FECSHC, 2006, p.274). Rather, the only explanation is that there is a historical relationship between the government and the BCCI in which the BCCI were always consulted for related matter.

Another criticism to Hay's concept about the relationship between structure and agency is that if actions to be succeeded in realising its intentions, it has to be based on strategic assessment of the related context. This means that actors have to be conscious about such structure. Yet actors may sometimes act without knowing all the information about the relevant context (Marsh, 2010). According to Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus, individuals might be affected by structures without knowing or being conscious about such effect (cited in Marsh 2010). Habitus means the "*socially acquired and culturally embodied systems of predispositions, tendencies or inclinations. These are 'deep structural' propensities, involving both classification and assessment and they are embodied in all aspects of our life including the way we walk, talk, sit and eat"* (Marsh,2010, p.220).

Marsh (2010) suggests alternative perspective to Hay's concepts about structure and agency which is based on considering them as separated ontologically and not just analytically as Hay suggested. Marsh (2010, p.219) provides six points to map the relationship between structure and agency which are viewed as dialectical and iterative:

- Structures are the contextual environment that the agents are situated within, these structures might be material or ideational
- Actors have preferences or objectives to fulfil

- Actors interpret the context which is both structural and strategic
- Yet, structures effect agents but they might not be conscious about such structure
- Actor's actions change the structure
- The new context is then the structure to agents and other cycle of interactions begun

Marsh's (2010) perspective is different from Hay's strategic relational approach to reconciling agency and structure in three dimensions. Both structure and agency possess causal power, yet this power is not independent from each other. Hence, it is the interactions and the two way effects between both elements that keeps structure and agency independent. The relationship is dialectical and continues in which the structure either constrain or facilitate the action of actors. the actions of actors change the structure that provide new or adjusted context with different opportunity and constraints. Third, structure can affect actors without the actors being aware of such effect.

4.3 reconciling structure and agency role in policy analysis: The dialectical approach to policy network analysis

Marsh and Smith (2000) developed a dialectical approach to PNA partially as a reply to Dowding criticism that was discussed in chapter four. Dowding critics PNA on the structure of the network rather than agency (Fawcett & Daugbjerg, 2012). Marsh and Smith (2000) on the other hand criticised Dowding for focusing on agents more than the structure of the network that shape the bargaining process. They acknowledge that individuals within a network are strategically calculating subjects. Yet, the preferences of these actors are shaped by the network structure. Hence, there is a dialectical relationship between structure of the network and the agent's strategic calculation. Dialectical relationship means "*an interactive relationship between two variables in which each affects the other in a continuing iterative process*" (Marsh & Smith, 2000, p.5).

The dialectical approach provides three levels of analysis macro, meso and micro. The macro level is about the broader context political, economic or knowledge structure that affects the networks structure and the resources available to each actor. The meso level raises questions about the type of interactions within the networks and the structure of the networks. This meso level "*acts as a constraint and / or opportunity on/for its members*" (Marsh & Smith, 2000, p.5). The micro level deals with the individual's actions within the networks.

There are three dialectical relationships within the network. These relationships are between the following variables: network and actors, network and broader context, network and policy outcomes. These relationships are iterative and continuous and are central to this thesis analytical framework. In order to understand the policy process, we should understand these three dialectical relationships. However, it is not necessary that each relationship is important in each policy areas (Toke & Marsh, 2003).

The first relationship is between the structure of the network and the actors within the network. The structure of the network, whether it is defined by the shape of the network or other characteristics, will influence the options available to actors. but how the shape of network came about? Is it an outcome of endogenous factors such as the pattern of resources dependencies (Dowding, 1995), or there are other factors within the context such as inequality within the society and discrimination based on class and gender. Such factors may result in excluding certain interest and hence affecting the overall characteristic of the network. The answer may lie on both sides as exogenous factors to the network can have a two sided relationship with the network and actions within the network may also change the structure of the network. Figure 1 in page 101 shows the relationship between these variables.

To understand the relationship between the broader context and network, the analysis will look for the following potential relationships as suggested by Marsh and Smith (2000):

- the direct two way relationship between context and network structure
- the indirect effect of context over network through actor's resources
- the indirect two way relationship between context and actor's actions

which is mediated by actor's resources or actor's perceived interest

The actions and position of actors within the network cannot be understood without unpacking the properties of actors or agency. Marsh and Smith (2000) referred to the following actor's properties: Interest and preference, resources, discursive construction of opportunities and constrains imposed by network structure on agent's action, skills and strategic learning. These properties can be linked to the network structure or might be independent from it but affect the network interaction (this happened for the genetically modified crops case in Toke and Marsh (2003) case study). The influence on an actor's action as per Marsh and Smith dialectical approach stems from six directions: the network structure, indirect effect of the contextual factors through actor's resources, policy outcomes, innate skill, actor's Skills and actors learning. Hence, the analysis unpack the actions of actors that are explained by the membership of network and actions that are explained by other factors. Hence the researcher will analyse the actor's actions as follows:

- action of actors that are understood through membership in the network(i.e. constraints and opportunities created by the network)
- actions of actors that are linked to the broader context via actor's resources or other properties (Marsh and smith only mentioned that the effect of broader context is exert via actor's resources, yet this conclusion is challenged in the empirical work such as in Sacli (2011).
- actions of actors that are explained by policy outcomes, actor's skills and actor's learning

The second relationship is between the networks and the broader context. A change in the external environment might affect the interest of actors and resources distribution. These changes eventually will reshape the nature of the

network by excluding/ including new actors or empowering other actors within it. Any exogenous factor that might affect the shape of the network is mediated through the interpretation of actors (Marsh & Smith, 2000). Marsh and Smith gave an example to class and gender within the context that is likely to affect the network structure. The network structure in this case will show patterns of inequality based on class and gender. Marsh and Rhodes focus on four main contextual factors namely: Economic, ideology, political and knowledge-based. Marsh and smith (2000) add other networks to the contextual factors. This relationship will be analysed through the following components:


- Constrained and opportunities identified from data as constituting a contextual structure
- How context changes as an outcome to changes in the network

The third relationship is between the policy network and the policy outcomes. Marsh and Smith's model is the only model that gives attention to such a relationship. It should be noted that policy outcomes in this context do not mean the success or failure of the policy to achieve its end aims. It means the policy produced as an outcome to the interactions of different actors. It recognises that the policy produced might affect the type of interests included in the network or the bargaining power of members by three channels. The first one is through the policy outcomes which may enhance the social position of certain groups within the society. For example, the British industrial relations policy in the 1980s limited the bargaining power of the Trade Unions in some policy networks. Hence the role of such group within any network might change. The second route is when policy outcomes influence the agent's learning process about which strategies works and which one doesn't work. Thus, actors change their strategies or their tactics in advancing their interests within the network. The third way is when the policy outcomes affect the broader social structure which limits the power of certain groups in the society

(Marsh & Smith, 2000). The third dialectical relationship will be analysed through the following components:

- How the shape of the network affected is linked to policy outcomes
- How the policy outcomes affect the policy network

Figure 1: The Dialectical approach to explain the role of policy networks in determining policy outcomes



Source: Marsh and Smith. 2000, p: 10

Marsh and smith's model are not devoid of limitations. Four main limitations are identified in the following discussion. First, the model does not distinguish between the individuals and organisations as actors. The distinction is important because the strategic calculation of actors within the network is based on the strategic values of actor's organisation. The author of this paper suggests focusing on groups not on individuals to understand the actor's resources and their position within the network. However, it should be noted that the literature considers ministers with exception. A Minister can act in a self-interested manner to protect his own political position. Hence, members of a network can be either individuals or groups (Toke & Marsh, 2003). In

addition, Marsh and Smith's model emphasised mostly on insider's role and neglect the outsider's actors which can be significant as well (Toke & Marsh, 2003).

Second, the model is related to the characteristics of network's structure. These characteristics are not specified clearly. For example, in the older version of policy network literature, the shape of the network that can be recognised by the number of members, type of integration, the exchange of resources and power were explicitly discussed (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992., Daugbjerg 1997). In contrast, Marsh and Smith's model suggested other general characteristics "*Networks involve the institutionalisation of beliefs, values, cultures, and particular forms of behaviour*" (p. 6). In addition, the other variables are the shape of the network, the rules of the game and the world views of actors. The rules of the game "*influence political behaviour*" (Lowndes, 1996, p.183). Marsh and Smith have not specified if these characteristics are generalisable or used only for their own case study about agricultural policies. All of these characteristics were not mentioned in the study conducted subsequently by Toke and Marsh (2003) except for the shape of the network.

A third limitation is that the model does not provide explanation for the cases where some of the iterative relationship between network and the model component does not exist. For example, what if policy outcomes don't affect the network structure?. for instance, Raab (2001) noted that not all these relationships are equally important throughout the full policy-making process. The existence of relationship in both directions between the components of the dialectical model depends on the nature of the case study under research.

The final point is the criticism to the dialectical model is provided by Kisby (2007). He criticised Marsh and Smith dialectical model for not paying enough recognition to the role of policy ideas in policy-making. According to Bleich (2002) "*Integrating ideas into policy-making analysis greatly enhances our understanding of policy outcomes*" (p.1054). Toke and Marsh's (2003) application to the dialectical model on studying policy changes in the British

genetically modified crops paid more attention to the role of ideas than Marsh and Smith (Kisby, 2007). Toke and Marsh (2003) mentioned the effect of dominant discourse as it "operates as a key structural constraint" (p.239) on actors in genetically modified crops policy-making process. The actors who were against the dominant discourse were excluded from the policy-making process (Toke & Marsh, 2003). More illustration about the role of ideas is discussed in the next section.

Despite these limitations to Marsh and Smith's model, we can utilise it to study the LMRP in Bahrain especially that some of the limitations were addressed by other literature that will be discussed later on in this chapter (Kisby, 2007 dealing with the role of ideas, Daugbjerg, 1997 network properties). First the distinction between organisation or individuals actors is that as obtained through the interviews in which in most of the cases actors presented their organisation with some exceptions to indications MPs who had other preferences not subscribed to an organisation. The second and third criticism will be further discussed in section 4.3.1and 4.4 as there are other sources of literature that expands on the topics related to the types of policy networks and its criteria, and the role of ideas as structure. Finally, Raab observation in regard to the different dialectical relationship that may not exist, the author of this thesis considers it as a conclusion to be derived from discussion of this thesis' findings.

The usefulness of Marsh and Smith's approach is that it facilitates a comprehensive explanation to the policy-making process. According to different policy researcher, the policy-making process is too complex to be investigated through one level of analysis (Kim & Roh, 2008., Dye, 1992, Evans, 2001). The author of this essay is inclined to believe that the dialectical approaches will allow the consideration of different causal variables that affected the policy outcomes in Bahrain. Hence, the dialectical method provided by Marsh and Smith is the best model to be utilised in the research. This is due to the fact that if policy network used only the meso level analysis then the analysis of policy-making will be very limited and descriptive (Evans,

2001). Hence, the analysis of the process will take in to account the three dialectical relationship explained above, these are the relationship between network and actors' action, the relationship between network and context, and the relationship between network and policy outcomes.

4.3.1 Types of policy Networks and its potential correlation with policy outcomes

It is important to classify the type of the network to understand the relationship between policy outcomes and networks (Marsh, 1998). The network typologies within the literature differ according to different criteria and dimensions (Jordan & Schubert 1992., Waarden, 1992., Atkinson & Coleman 1989., Rhodes, 1995., Daugbjerg, 1997., Marsh & Smith, 2000, Howlett, 2002). As explained earlier, Marsh and Smith (2000) mentioned some characteristics of the network. These characteristics were institutionalisation of beliefs, values cultures, behaviour, the rules of the game and the world views of actors. Marsh and Smith were criticised for not specifying if these characteristics can be used in other case studies. Hence the researcher of this thesis reviewed other researches that analysed the relationship between the type of network and the policy outcomes to conclude which dimensions to consider when analysing the properties of policy network. However, they all agree (Jordan and Schubert 1992., Waarden, 1992., Atkinson & Coleman 1989., Rhodes, 1995., Daugbjerg, 1997., Marsh & Smith, 2000, Howlett,2002) that policy networks entail power dependency relationships between public and private actors (Borzel, 1997). Classifying networks is highly debated and problematic issue within the PNA. There is no general acceptable model that could work for all cases. It is developed continuously based on the empirical case studies (Hewlett, 2002). The presentation of different literature will follow the chronological order starting with Atkinson and Colman (1989), Waardan (1992), Marsh and Rhodes (1992), Daugbjerg (1997), Howlett (2002), Adam and Kreisi (2007), and Turrini et al (2010).

Atkinson and Colman's (1989) dimensions of policy networks depends on three factors: the extent to which state is autonomous from industrial interest, the concentration of power, and the level of mobilisation of business interest. They use these three factors to create eight types of policy networks. A highly mobilised interest group is characterised by the following: one association representing the interest group, represent most of the firms in certain sector, they have good capacity to generate information, have the ability "to bind member firms to agreements negotiated with the state" (p.53). For instance, if the state autonomy is high and the mobilisation of business interest is low then the policy network will be directed by the state. The Atkinson- Colman typology of policy network is criticised as being unclear whether these criteria are conditions for policy network formation or properties of network structures. A second criticism is that Atkinson and Coleman model is based on network structure and no attention was given to actor's strategies (Waarden, 1992)

Waarden (1992) provides a more comprehensive typologies of networks based on seven dimensions. These dimensions are "*actors, function, structure, Institutionalisation, rules of conduct, power relations and actor strategies*" (p.32). Actors' dimension is determined by the number of participants in the policy-making process and their characteristics. An actor's characteristics are specified by the interest they represent and the resources they will contribute to the process. The function of the network such as consultation, negotiations, coordination cooperation in policy-making. The structure of the network depends on the following: membership, type of membership (open or close, voluntary or compulsory), pattern of linkage, and type of coordination, nature of the relationship (conflictual, competitive, and cooperative). The degree of institutionalisation is about the formal characteristics of the network and its stability. The rule of the game can be defined by "the role perceptions, attitudes, interests, social and intellectual educational background of the participants actors" (Waarden, 1992, p.36). The final dimension is power relations which is considered as a reflection to the size of organisation, degree of centralization or fragmentation.

Based on these dimensions, Waarden (1992) suggests eleven types of networks. These networks are: statism pantouflage, captured statism, clientelism, pressure pluralism, sectoral corporatism, macro corporatism, state corporatism, sponsored pluralism. Parental relations, iron triangle, and issue networks. Waarden's (1992) model is very detailed; such details might not be found in each case study. In addition, his model is complicated and the distinction between each type of network is not easy as you could find mixed characteristics between for example statism pantouflage and captured statism.

A more comprehensive typology that is not too complicated or simplistic is suggested by Marsh and Rhodes (1992). They suggested a flexible typology to policy networks. Marsh and Rhodes classify policy networks according to different dimensions namely, the exchanged resources, membership, interests, frequency of interaction, values and power. Marsh and Rhodes (1992) suggested a continuum that ranges between ideal type of policy community and issue networks, where there are potentials for other networks to exist in between (see table 2, page 106). A policy community is a more homogeneous group than the issue networks. It is characterised by a frequent interaction, close relationship between the members in which some other groups can be excluded without much interactions with the parliament. In addition, they have shared values and views on the policy, and the power is distributed evenly. In contrast the issue networks are more heterogeneous with a large number of members, conflicted interests, variable access to networks and unequal share of power and resources (Marsh, 1998). The distinction between policy community and issue networks proved to be useful when applied in researches. It is useful because it helps to answer why some groups were excluded and how this exclusion affects the policy outcomes (Nunan, 1998).

Table 2: types and characteristics of policy networks (Cited in Marsh and Rhodes, 1992, p.187)

Dimension	Policy community	Issue Networks

Membership: No. of participants	Very limited number, some groups consciously excluded	Large
Types of interest	Economic and/ or professional interests	different types of interest
Integration: frequency of interaction	Frequent interactions	interactions fluctuate over the time
Continuity	Membership, values and outcomes are stable throughout the time	membership fluctuates over the time
Consensus	member share world's view	they have conflicted perspectives
Resources: Distribution of Resources within networks	All participants have resources	Some participants have resources and might be very limited. The relationship between actors is mostly consultative
Distribution of resources within participating organisations	Hierarchical	it varies between actors
Power	balance of power and positive-sum game	Unequal power and zero-sum game

There are other networks between the issue networks and policy community. For example, these networks are the professional, intergovernmental and producer networks. Professional networks are almost similar to policy community but serve the interest of professionals. They are characterised by vertical independence. The intergovernmental networks have limited membership and limited interdependence. The members represent the organisations of local authority. The producer networks serve the interest of producers and have a fluctuating membership with a limited interdependence (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992).

Marsh and Rhodes's (1992) approach attempted to link the type of the policy network to policy outcomes. While the other type of categorisation such as Waarden (1992), Atkinson and Coleman (1989) were descriptive. Marsh and Rhodes (1992) approach suggest that the type of policy networks can explain the continuity or changes in policy's outcomes. They claim that the membership of the network and the characteristic of the network shape the policy outcomes. The network involves exchange of resources and power dependence which is significant feature of the network. The nature of resources distribution among the members of the networks explains why some members are more powerful than others. Hence the different patterns of resource dependencies explain why we have different types of networks. Thus, the different shapes of policy networks have a significant impact on the nature of the policy outcomes. A tight policy networks for example can constrain the policy agenda and result in policy continuity. While a professional network dominated by one set of interest will yield policies that serve the dominated interest (Daugbjerg & Marsh, 1998).

The Marsh and Rhodes typologies are not without limitations. The criteria they presented might not be generalisable to or cases or there are other criteria that is not mentions by Marsh and Rhodes. Other researchers in policy networks analysis suggested that some characteristics of policy network structure might be more relevant to policy outcomes such as ideologies and institutional structure of the network (Smith, 1993). Hence, not all the characteristics of

policy network as suggested in table 2 on page 106 is relevant in all cases. Smith (1993) points out that the ideologies of a community policy networks and the institutional structures restricts the range of policy solutions. According to Smith (1993, P.71) "*Policy is limited to what is acceptable to the consensus within the policy community. The policy community is effectively a means of excluding certain policy options. In issue networks, by contrast, 'policy outcomes are likely to be more varied . . . [because] . . . it is much easier for groups to get alternative policy options onto the agenda" (cited in* Daugbjerg, 1998, p. 278*).*

Daugbjerg (1997) argued that Marsh and Rhodes are mistaken in regarding resources as a property of the networks. Resources must be regarded as a property of the actors. He also argued that the distinction between the properties of the network's structure and the actor's properties are not clear. Therefore, Daugbjerg provided other classifications for the dimensions based on structure/agency distinction. The dimensions for the network's structure are three properties as follows: membership which includes number of actors and type of interest represented, type of integration whether is it based on bargaining, consultation or negotiation and the frequency of interactions, institutionalisation which is about consensus on policy or conflict over policy and procedures. Actor's properties are the interpersonal relations within the networks, interest, skills, information, and other types of resources (Dowding, 1995).

When testing the models empirically, the exact classifications of policy networks might not match Marsh and Rhodes' model. For example, Smith (1993) concluded that some characteristics of policy community and issue networks were not found in his empirical research. In addition, a researcher might find two tiers within one policy networks, such as a core member and a peripheral one. Actors can move between the peripheral and core network if they enhanced their strategic actions (Sacli, 2011). Other descriptions of core and peripheral actors are dividing them in to discourse community and interest network. Discourse community is the core network which determines the type

of policy and interest network is the peripheral one (Howlett, 2002). Empirical testing of the model suggests that it is easier to find policy community and issue networks than finding the other type of networks within the continuum (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). In general, the limitation of using a continuum is that many networks with various characteristics can be found at some point along the continuum (Rhodes, 2017a).

A more recent literature that attempted to establish a link between network properties and policy outcomes were provided by Howlett (2002). His model is more simplified than Waarden, Marsh and Rhodes (1992), and Daugbjerg (1997). Howlett (2002), summarises the characteristics of policy networks in two variables: ideas and actors. He argues that a simple model with two variables "*lie behind fundamental policy dynamics*" (p.247). Such model avoids the complexity of providing several variables that are unclear and confusing. Howlett model suggests four types of policy networks based on presence or absence of both new actors and ideas. These are Closed subsystem which is characterised by not being receptive to new ideas and actors. In contrast, the open subsystem is receptive to both new ideas and new actors. In between, there is the contested subsystem which is only open for new ideas, and the resistant subsystem that is open to new actors. This model is too simplistic to be applied as there are other variables that shape network structures other than ideas and number of actors. The model does not answer why actors get together in the first place and how it relates to actor's resources, interdependency and the distribution of power.

The other recent literature that discuss the network typology and link it to policy outcome was provided by Adam and Kreisi (2007). They suggest two main dimensions to policy networks: the distribution of power, and the type of interaction. The first-dimension deals with who possess power, is it shared or concentrated. The second dimension is about the "*degree of cooperation among actors and actor coalitions"* (p. 134). The focus on two dimension neglects the other criteria that might characterise the network such as cohesion or policy preferences. Adam and Kreisi choose those two criteria

basically for considering them as the most important for policy network to function. However, other forms of typologies presented earlier showed that other criteria are important as well (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992).

The other recent literature in regard to the relationship between network and outcome is focused on network as a tool for public management and it examines the role of network structural characteristics in terms of achieving network goals or network outcomes. According to Turrini et al, 2010) network effectiveness is measured by: Integration which means how the network is coordinated, size and composition which is defined as "*The number of members who join a network and the degree of heterogeneity of network members might influence its effectiveness*" (Turrini et al,2010,p.541). The third characteristic is formalisation and accountability in relation to formal rules, organising meetings, and decision-making procedures. The fourth characteristic is the network inner stability it is regards how long network managers and members spend in being members. These characteristics are explaining network that is defined as a tool for public policy management and not as a way for interest intermediation. Hence, it does not fit with this research.

All the previous discussed literatures had different dimension some of them focused on two to three dimensions such as Adam and Kreisi (2007), Turrini et al (2010), Howlett (2002), Daugbjerg (1997), and Atkinson and Colman (1989), other on four dimensions and more such as Marsh and Rhodes (1992), and Waarden (1992). Marsh and Rhodes (1992) typology is more comprehensive to all the characteristics that was mentioned and stressed out by different literature such as Daugbjerg (1997). The Marsh and Rhodes network dimensions will be applied in this thesis, and any more prominent features will be stressed out during discussions. As Howllet points out (2002) deciding which element is a feature of network structure is based on empirical case studies. According to Howlett "*Unfortunately, there is no generally accepted model of subsystem structure, as there has been a distinct penchant in the literature for*

incompatible ad hoc categorizations to be developed inductively from the results of empirical case studies" (p.247).

In addition, Marsh and Rhodes' typology is flexible and open to more variation of policy networks. It can be confusing to locate the policy network in between the extreme or ideal sides of the continuum (policy community and issue network). It is unlikely to find networks that match the exact ends of Marsh and Rhodes's continuum. Yet it is an important analytical framework for PNA as the type of network will help in analysing how the network is connected to policy outcomes.

4.3.2 what form a policy outcome?

As mentioned earlier in the previous section, an important aspect of this thesis is to link policy network with policy outcomes. Therefore, identifying what form a policy outcome will contribute to the analytical framework for this research. Daugbjerg (1998) suggested that public policies consist of two components: policy Instruments and policy objectives. These instruments and objectives can be in different forms: general or broad policies with imprecise terms, or specific policies with precise terms, other are not explicitly expressed. Salamon and Lund (1989) consider policy instruments as "a method through which government seeks a policy objective." (cited in Daugbjerg, 1998, p. 279). Daugbjerg *(1998) critics this definition as "being too general and using it can result in a "Loss of precision"* (Daugbjerg, 1998, p.279). Similarly, Cairney (2015) defined policy instruments as "*tools used by governments to pursue a desired outcome. Examples include economic tools (taxes, spending, incentives), and regulations (voluntary, legal)"* (p. 1). Daugbjerg (1997) suggested an alternative definition for policy instruments, he define it *as "a political means of bringing about a certain behaviour among individual members of the target group through learning, compulsion or the use of economic incentives* "(Daugbjerg 1997, p. 34). Such definition means that determining policy instruments is a political process (Howllet & Ramish, 1993, Daugbjerg, 1998). Hence, it is not a rational evaluation of policy instruments which requires technical assessment

to policy tools. In this case policy makers will evaluate different policy instruments based on relative cost and efficiency to overcome market failure (Howllet and Ramish, 1993).

Policy instruments and objectives are sub divided in two different categories to understand how policy instruments and objectives are chosen. A very broad categorisation for policy instruments is provided by Lowi (1972); these categories are distributive, redistributive, regulatory and constituent policies (cited in Daugbjerg, 1998). Daugbjerg (1998) criticised Lowi's approach as very broad to assist the researcher to "*understand choices among policy instruments*" (p.280). There are different typologies of policy instruments within the literature, yet it is hard to agree on one type of typologies because each policy area deals with different type of policy problems (Daugbjerg, 1998). Daugbjerg (1998) defined policy instruments as political methods for ensuring certain behaviours through learning, compulsion and economic incentives suggest three generic categories for policy instruments. These categories are economic, legal or voluntary. Vedung (1997) defined economic policy instruments as involving "*either the handing out or taking away of material resources, be they in cash or I kind. Economic instruments make it cheaper or more expensive in terms of money, time effort, and other valuables to pursue certain actions*" (p.21). The economic category is sub divided into positive and negative policy instruments. Vedung (1997) explained these two sub categories: *"In the positive case, a material resource is handed over to the agent, whereas in the negative case the individual or organisation is deprived of some material resource"* (cited in Daugbjerg, 1998). The legal instruments can be divided in to 'prohibitions and prescriptions' (Vedung ,1997). Subdividing the legal instruments is considered unnecessary by Daugbjerg (1998), he claims that such subdivision does not produce "*significantly different distributive outcomes*." (p.280). The informative instruments are cost less and aims for advice. Daugbjerg (1998) adopted Vedung economic subcategories instruments, regulatory instruments and adds to it informative instruments.

Based on such instruments Daugbjerg developed a policy continuum which ends with low cost policies at one end and high cost policies at the other end.

Daugbjerg attempted to link between the type of policy instruments and the policy network. The first element to consider is the policy principles to link between policy instruments and policy network. Policy principles that are adopted by a member of a network "*define what should be the content of public policy" and "the principles underpin the choice of policy*" (Daugbjerg, 1997, p.129).For instance, market principles versus state responsibility for the economy are principles that can be changed with the changes of actors involved in the decision making process (Daugbjerg, 1997). Policy principles define the role of actors, especially the role of the state in certain policy sector. In addition, policy principles may ensure that policy network members will be the one who controls the direction of policies in the future. A policy community with shared view tend to adhere to the same principles and will solve new policy problems with the same old principles. In contrast issue networks with wide number of members will tend to result in different policy principles. More specifically, a policy community tend to result in low cost policy outcomes. In contrast issue networks are more likely to suggest a high cost policy instrument (Daugbjerg, 1997).

A member of the Network in the formations stage will set policy principles that constrain or facilitate the pursuit of specific interest. Daugbjerg (1997). Thus, the main influence of the policy principle is serving the dominant interest within the network and any ideas supported by network members are reduced to such interest. An agreement on policy principles between members means that they all support the interest that the policy principle will serve. Daugbjerg (1997) says: "*A consensus on policy principles reflects the fact that network members have a shared view on the broader economic, social and political objectives which the policy should forward*." (p.284).

In general, Daugbjerg (1997) typologies is precise in terms of connecting the type of policy outcome with the type of policy network. The proposition of the

links between type of network and type of policy outcomes is that environmental policy network will introduce low cost policies in a policy community network. This correlation is due to the domination of certain interests, namely the produces and their government allies are the main members of the network. In other words, the less the interest representation in a network the more the outcome to serve such interest. In issue network the interest is more diverse and hence the outcomes might not benefit the producers.

The discussion of policy instruments and policy principles by Daugbjerg (1997) and Vedung (1997) as well is not without limitations. There are three points to be illustrated in this matter. Daugbjerg's (1997) case study is specific to environmental policy-making and might not be perfectly suitable to labour market policies. There are two main points to be illustrated in this matter. First, there is the typologies of policy instruments, and second is linking each policy outcome with specific network characteristics. In regard to the first concern, it is impossible to find a universal categorisation of policy instruments (Vedung, 1997). However, the typologies that Daugbjerg (1997) provided for policy instruments are founded in fields other than the environmental policies (Daugbjerg,1997, Vedung, 1997, Bressers' et al,1998). For instance, Bressers' et al (1998) divided policy instruments in two categories based on their characteristics: normative appeal, and proportionality. Policies that are characterised by normative appeal are regulations-based instruments and persuasive public information. They both aim to control behaviour. Proportionality instruments are like the economic instruments which either takes resources away from individuals or they increase their resources. Bressers' et al's (1998) case studies were about different sectors namely: agriculture environment and economic affairs in two different policies in USA and Dutch.

In terms of linking specific network to specific typology of policy outcome, it is hard to generalise because it depends on who the members of the policy network are. The propositions of Daugbjerg is highly correlated to

environmental case studies especially in the cases were the producers interest allies with government representative in policy community and produce policies that are friendly to such interest. This means it all depends on the type of interest that dominate during the policy-making process. This opens the possibility for other types of correlation depending on the type of interest domination or even ideas.

The second limitation is that the typologies of policy instruments did not take in to account the selection of implementing organisation(s). According to Bressers et al (1998), the selection of implementing organisation (s) is significant to the analysis of policy network and the choices of policy instruments. He argues that "*Strictly speaking, these considerations (considering which organisation will implement the policies) do not involve a specific instrument characteristic. But the choice can be an important factor in determining whether and how the instruments work in practice*." (p.225). For example, a strongly cohesive and interconnected network will likely choose an organisation from the network to implement the policies. This means that a strong connected network will try to reproduce the same policies through the same actor by ensuring that the implementation organisation is part of the network. However, if power was considered in the analysis of the network structure then the selection of the implementer will correspond with differences in power within a network. The greater the power of the government in a network, the more it will push for policy instruments that will give it the power to implement the policy (Bressers et al, 1998, p.221).

The third limitation is the focus on interest as the main driver for choosing policy principles that constrain or facilitate the pursuit of certain interest. Some policy principles and the instruments chosen based on such principles are an outcome of beliefs in certain economic model rather than to deter certain interest or chosen due to persuasion and arguments. The role of ideas as a separate structure that might affect the policy outcomes is discussed in section 4.4. Kisby (2007) argued that "ideas can have an independent influence on

policy outcomes" (p. 78). Therefore, not all ideas are reduced to materiel aspects such as interest.

Another source affecting the choice of policies is priming. This concept means that actors use persuasion to affect the other members of the decision-making process. Hence, bargaining and resources dependency are not the only explanations to policy outcomes. Thus, arguments are used to defend a certain perspective during the process. Hindmoore (2009) argued that for priming to be effective, there must be enabling circumstances for it. In his case study, he founds three main factors: decision makers are forced to take decisions in an environment of uncertainty, government's own independent policy capacity. Finally, excluding of actors, while giving others the opportunity to be part of decision-making process which means denying other groups from challenging the narrative defended by the actors exclusively involved in the process. This argument means that bargaining and resources is not the sole explanation for how an actor can affect outcomes. Resources do explain why an actor was included in the process, so it is partially explanation to its effect on outcome. However, policy outcome cannot be explained solely by resources dependency. Succeeding in convincing the other member other network through argument is a source of influence over policy content as well (Hindmoor, 2009).


The above discussion will assist in categorising the policy discussion that occurred between 2002 and 2016. The content of the policies will be understood according to policy principles and policy outcomes. The policy principles are important to this thesis especially when discussing the policy at formation stage where the role of government and LMRA was planned to change. This last point will be helpful to track the changes that occurred to the characteristic of the policy instrument alongside the changes in the characteristics of the network.

4.4 The role of ideas in policy network analysis

Kisby (2007) suggested an adjusted model to dialectical approach based on ideational perspective. Kisby (2007) argued that ideas can exert an independent influence over policy outcomes. This is not to deny the influence of materiel aspects over policy outcomes, but both ideas and material structure must be examined to study policy outcomes (Kisby, 2007). These ideas are independent from power, interest and institutions. Ideas can even precede interests by helping actors to define their interest (Bleich, 2002). Bleich (2002) considered that ideas can "*help (actors) them interpret which problems are the most pressing and most in need of solutions"* (p.1055). Therefore, Kisby added ideational context as an independent variable next to the structural context in Marsh and Smith's dialectical model. The ideational context exerted its influence over the policy process through programmatic beliefs which policy network structure and the network interactions as shown in figure no 2 (p.119). These programmatic beliefs provide "*the ideational framework within which programmes of action are formulated*" (Berman, 1998, p. 21). The additions of Kisby to Marsh and Smith's model are highlighted by the bold two ways arrows. In summary, these changes:

- Ideational context with a two way relationship with structural context
- Ideational context can exert influence over network structure through programmatic believes, the relationship is iterative
- Ideational context can exert influence over network interactions through programmatic believes, the relationship is iterative
- Structural context influences programmatic beliefs, the relationship is iterative
- Structural context affects actors learning, it is a two way relationship
- Actors' resources and actors learning are dialectically related.

Figure 2: ideational approach to policy network analysis based on Marsh and Smith dialectical model



(Adapted from Marsh & Smith, 2000, p.10).
Bold lines indicate boxes and arrows added to the Marsh and Smith model.

There are three important topics to be discussed about the role of ideas: first what are ideas? Second, the relationship between ideas and other contextual factors, third how ideas exert influence over policy outcomes. Ideas consist of different variables such as: norms, cultures, world view beliefs, frames, and models (Bleich, 2002). Bleich defined frames as "*a set of cognitive and moral maps that orients an actor within a policy sphere. Frames help actors identify problems and specify and prioritize their interests and goals"* (p.1063). Bleich (2002) suggested that frames draw cognitive map by including definitions,

metaphors and symbols. This cognitive map guide actors to define public problems and solutions. Berman (1998) categorised political ideas into two groups: ideologies and policy positions. Ideologies are world views, they are "too broad to be useful" and the Policy positions "may be too narrow to be interesting" (Berman, 1998, p. 21). A third form of ideas that is more useful for studying public policies is programmatic beliefs (Berman, 1998). They are "*abstract; systematic and coordinated; and marked by integrated assertions, theories, and goals*" (Berman, 1998, p. 21). These programmatic beliefs provide "*the ideational framework within which programs of action are formulated*" (Berman, 1998, p. 21). Specifying what constitute ideas for this thesis is selected to serve the data collected during field work. Bleich's (2002) definition is more comprehensive to the concept of ideas. He considers norms as a driving force; in contrast, Berman definition is too narrow and does not reflects values and norms of actors. That is not to say that the concept of programmatic belief is not useful for this thesis, especially for analysing the role of Mckinsey's report in LMRP

There are two different perspectives regarding the relationship between ideas and other contextual factors: the first one suggests that ideas exert independent effects over policy outcomes, the second one proposes that ideas are not an independent structure. For instance, Berman (1998) argued that ideas are independent from other contextual factors such as interest. These beliefs or frameworks lead actors to choose policies that they think will assist them in achieving policy goals. Bermen (1998) compared between policy programmes of the German Social Democratic Party and the Swedish Democratic Party. Both parties hold the same ideology, yet their programmatic beliefs and ideational framework where different. She concluded that the differences in ideas account for the different policy outcomes implemented by similar ideological political parties. She concludes that actors follow "*the particular ends posited as paramount by the ideas they hold*" (Berman, 1998, p. 30).

Hay (2002) criticised such a perspective as over emphasising the role of ideas which denies the existence of other factors or reality beyond ideas. Similarly, Kisby criticised the sole focus on ideas to explain policy outcomes. He argued for an approach that considers the role of ideas as well as material context in studying policy outcomes. Kisby (2007) criticised Berman for "*overemphasise the importance of analysing political problems simply as linguistic concerns rather than appropriately contextualising ideas and situating an analysis of particular questions in the real, material world*" (p.82). A comprehensive approach would combine the ideational and the material aspect of the context. Hence, the policy analyst would have to consider the relationship between ideas and different types of interest and how such interest constraints actor's actions to pursue their intentions (Hay, 2002, p. 166). In addition, programmatic beliefs might not exert influence in some cases. Ideas must be examined whenever they prove to be influential on policy outcomes without being affected by other structures. Hence the importance of ideas on policy outcomes and their relations with other structures are an empirical matter (Kisby, 2002). Toke and Marsh (2003) regarded ideas or discourse as a rhetorical device used to support structural interest. The policy discourse does not determine policy outcomes but justifies it. The genetically modified policy network was dominated by members that support the interest of biotechnology interest. They supported the commercialisation of genetically modified food technology, such outcome satisfies the economic interest of biotechnology companies (Toke & Marsh, 2003).

Even if ideas came to existence as an independent force, their effect and survival is not without contestation with other form of structures. For instance, Hall (1989) argued that Keynesian ideas had more potential to be effective over policy outcomes in countries *were economist were policy oriented and had close contact with politicians*" (cited in Berman, 2007, p.7). He concluded that *"If the Keynesian case demonstrates that ideas have a real power in the political world, it also confirms that they do not acquire political force independently of the constellation of institutions and interests already present there*." (Cited in

Berman, 2007, p.7). Hence, this thesis deals with ideas as a structure that are not dependent from other structures such as interest. This position is chosen to match the data found during the field work. Different ideas about unemployment policies were dealt with in relation of how it will affect the business sector.

The third element is how ideas affect policy outcomes. Haas (1992) suggested that experts play a significant role in the dissemination of ideas. These experts are what Haas calls the 'epistemic communities. They are a "*network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area*" (Haas, 1992, p. 3). Haas (1992) argued that regards the importance of spreading ideas that "*the diffusion of new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of behaviour and prove to be an important determinant of international policy coordination*" (p.2).

In contrast, Hall (1993) gave more focus to ideas in policy-making than Haas. He emphasised the role of social learning on the development of policies. Hall argued that a paradigm shift occurs when policy goals alter through ideological shift. Such a paradigm shift occurred in the UK's economic policies that shifted from Keynesian to Monetarist economic policies (Cited in Kisby, 2007). According to Hall, policy actors "were not simply seeking to advance their own interests, they play of ideas was as important to the outcome as was the contest for power" (Hall, 1993, p. 289). However, Kisby (2007) considers that Hall principal focus is on how institutions promote ideas rather than the focus on ideas themselves (taken from Kisby, 2007). In a similar vein, Marsh and Smith (2000) paid attention to strategic learning by actors in affecting policy outcomes rather than ideas.

4.5 Conclusion

The main analytical framework that is adopted in this thesis is based on discussing the limitations of policy network analysis literature that was

discussed in chapter four. The two main limitations were in relation to how policy networks change with time. The second limitation is regarding the relationship between structure and agency in which earlier literature focused more on either agency or network's structure. The dialectical approach to policy analysis is suggested by this chapter as an analytical framework to reconcile the structure/agency debate.

The dialectical framework for policy analysis suggests that both structure and actor's actions interact to produce certain policy outcomes. The dialectical approach examines the relationship between the different components of the process namely: external context, policy network, actors' interactions, and policy outcomes. Each dialectical relationship consists of different components to analyse. The first relationship between network and context is through understanding the following: the direct two way relationship between context and network structure, the indirect effect of context over network through actor's resources. Additionally, the indirect two way relationship between context and actor's actions which is mediated by an actor's resources or an actor's perceived interest. The second dialectical relationship is between network and actors is understood through: action of actors that are understood through membership in the network(i.e. constraints and opportunities created by the network), actions of actors that are linked to the broader context via actor's resources or other properties (Marsh and smith only mentioned that the effect of broader context is exerted via an actor's resources, yet this conclusion is challenged in the empirical work such as in Sacli (2011), actions of actors that are explained by policy outcomes, actor's skills and actor's learning. Finally, the dialectical relationship between network and policy outcomes is about understanding how the network affected the policy outcomes and vice versa. In addition, the analysis will take in to account the role of ideas in relation to LMRP. As suggested by Kisby that beliefs may exert an independent influence over choosing policy tools.

Chapter 5: Research design and methods

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the methodology used to achieve the aims of the study and will reflect on the field work. The first part is about the methodology and the methods used for data collection, namely semi structured interviewing and document analysis. The second part of the chapter will provide details of what was achieved in the field work and a reflection about the data collected. In addition, the researcher shall reflect on how the data collected might affect the research questions.

5.2 Research strategy: an embedded single case study

The research is based on a case study research design. Choosing a case study design is related to the topic being studied which is about labour immigration policy-making process in Bahrain. This topic is a contemporary phenomenon which can be understood within a particular social setting (Denscombe, 2010, Yin, 2014). Yin (2014) defines a case study as "*an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the "case") in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident*" (p.16).

According to Yin (2014), there are five types of single case studies, namely critical, extreme, revelatory, common, and longitudinal. The critical case study aims at providing a critical test of a theory. The extreme study is about unique cases. The third one, revelatory is about a case study that has not been studied before. The common case study is to study an event that occurs in an everyday

situation. The longitudinal case study is about studying the same phenomena at two different times. The case study research design is chosen because Bahrain presents a unique case within the labour immigrant receiving countries. The policy context in Bahrain (demography, political system, history, and economics) determines the uniqueness of Bahrain as a case study.

Case study design has several limitations. First, they are not generalisable to a population because they do not provide a representative sample. However, the conclusion about the characteristics of immigration policy-making in Bahrain can be used as a basis to study other policy-making areas within the same context. A second concern is the unmanageable level of effort, as it takes a long time and provides very long documents (Yin, 2014).

The single case study will be embedded with multiple units of analyses. The single case study is the Bahrain labour immigration policy-making process between 2002 and 2016. It is embedded because the author chooses three levels of analysis within the case study, micro, meso and macro. The macro level is about the broader context political, economic or believes that affects the networks structure and the resources available to each actor. The meso level which the networks are raises questions about the type of interactions within the networks and the structure of the networks. This meso level "*acts as a constraint and / or opportunity on/for its members"* (Marsh & Smith, 2000, p.5). The micro level deals with the individual's actions within the networks. Hence, the collection of data for this research covered questions about the broader context, the networks which is the meso level and the actors within the network.

There is another rationale for choosing the embedded single case study over the holistic case study. First, a holistic case study does not fit the purpose of the research which aims to examine specific phenomenon in in-depth detail. The holistic studies are usually conducted at an abstract level. Another problem with the holistic case study is that it is more flexible which means a shift in the focus of research may occur during the field work. However, the embedded

design may shift the focus of the study from the original unit of the analysis to the sub units (Yin, 2014).

5.2.1 Strength and weaknesses of the qualitative case study

This thesis main aim is to explore the labour immigration policy-making process in the Kingdom of Bahrain with the focus on network interactions, actor's actions, context and policy outcomes. These research interests requires an in-depth investigation of a certain policy process. The researcher is interested in three level of analysis namely: meso level that captures the interactions, the micro which are actors and their actions, and the macro the context and the external factors affecting and being affected by actor's actions and network interactions. The qualitative research in this case is more suitable to understand the perception of actors in relation to policy process rather than quantitative research design (Devine, 1995, 2002). The emphasis within qualitative research is on aspects of understanding the meaning and perception of actors and their interpretation of events "much of qualitative method's challenge or offering to dominant non-qualitative strands of political science lies in the centrality of meaning, context and history." (Vromen, 2007, p.252)

Due to the in depth focus of this research in which the findings are based on a certain policy field, not all the findings are generalizable to all the other policy subsystem. In general, generalisability is not always a goal for qualitative researchers who aims to gain an in depth understanding of the issue under investigation "Researchers also tend to focus on a single or very few cases or examples when they use qualitative analysis to be able to gain an in-depth understanding of their research subject. Thus, generalizability over many cases is rarely a goal of qualitative analysis." (Vromen, 2007, p.255).

The qualitative research enables the researcher to look back at an event that led to the development of a certain policy or yielded an outcome. For instance, Mahoney add Gortez (2006) suggest that qualitative researches have an advantage over quantitative research in which that they enable researchers to

explain outcomes in specific individual cases. This perspective fits with the aims of this thesis. The qualitative research design enabled the researcher to explain the policy process and how policy outcomes were decided.

The case study approach used has several advantages to approach the aims and objectives of this thesis. First, studying a case study that incorporate different level of analysis (meso, macro and micro) enables researchers to provide a holistic understanding to the policy processes and relationships within it (Denscombe, 2014). Thus, the case study in this thesis focused on several elements to explain why and how the policy outcomes came about. A complex policy process which is affected by the interactions of structure, agency and network over a decade of time is viewed as a whole when studied in depth. According to Denscombe (2014) "The case study approach works well here because rather than deal with 'isolated factors' it takes a 'holistic' view of what is going on. It views the case as a whole, in its entirety, and is thus able to discover how the many parts affect one another." (p.65).

However, the issues of generalisability are questioned. As explained earlier that generalisability is not always obtained from an in-depth qualitative research. This case study is about Bahrain labour immigration policy process and there are many variables that is unique to the Bahraini case study in comparison to other Arab Gulf Countries. The uniqueness is due to different factors such as the political history in Bahrain and political movement and activism that was presented in chapter two. In addition, to the limited natural resources in Bahrain in comparison to other GCC states (United Nations, 2009). Thus, the findings regard the characteristics of the policy process that is explained in chapter six to ten in which actors were needed to support the project may not be found in other gulf countries. However, not all the findings are unique to the Bahraini case study. The discussions in regards how the development of class in Bahrain since the influx of oil revenues is as well a factor that shaped the segmented labour markets in other GCC countries (Hanieh, 2010). In addition, the findings from this case study can be used by policymakers to advance the negotiations over future policy changes with interest groups. For instance,

section no 7.3 and 10.3.2 reveals how actor's perception regards the economic and social benefit of domestic labour was a reason for rejecting changes to increase the hiring cost of those workers. One of the arguments is that those workers are a matter that affects the interest of Bahraini families and not the overall economy. Those domestic workers are perceived as an enabler to Bharani women in the labour market and to other related family matters (Interview 23, 2016). Such arguments show how the state, or the private sector are not yet playing important role in supporting child care, and that hiring a domestic labour is the solution to such problem. This finding is worthy of consideration on other countries as well, thus adjusting the cost and rights of domestic labour is a matter that the GCC states struggle and share similar dependence over it.

5.2.2 Sampling

The researcher used non-probability sampling. Although some of the actors involved in the immigrant policy-making are known, there are some unknown actors. Non-probability sampling can be criticised as biased because it gives more chance for a researcher's discretion in selecting participants. In addition, the non-probability sampling limits the generalisability of the findings. Yet it can be very suitable for this research because participants were selected based on their relevance and expertise in the process of policy-making (Denscombe, 2010, 25).

The main sampling technique that was used for this project is the purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is based on choosing the sample based on their relevance and knowledge about the researched topic (Denscombe, 2010, 35). The researcher already knew some information about the relevant actors and about their role in policy process. Hence, those actors were the starting point for data collection.

The researcher used the snowball sampling as well. The researcher asked the informants to refer her to other potential participants, especially when interviewing government actors. Researching policy development requires the

knowledge of someone who is an insider to the process (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). The non-governmental actors are already known; hence, the purposive sampling is used as the main sampling technique.

There is a drawback to this approach of sampling. The investigator had to ensure that the suggested participants are actually relevant to the research. The concern from using the first interviewee to guide the investigator to other informants is what Dexter (2006) describes as "*the worst thing that can happen is to be referred to some interviewee who insists on taking the investigator under his wing and adopting him as a protégé"* (p.43). To avoid this issue, the researcher verified the role of potential participants in the policy-making (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). Dexter (2006) suggests that social position and the experience of the informants must be taken into account to verify the role of participants.

5.2.3 Access to the sample

The author of this report identified several potential organisations that have been involved in labour immigration policy development in Bahrain before starting the field work. They were identified through reading the literature about labour immigration policies in Bahrain. The first few interviews were with members of parliament and members of the GFWTUB. From the first few interviews, the researcher questioned the names of people participating in the policy discussions. The names were then traced down to acquire their contact details. Contact details were obtained from the following sources: internet, journalist, interviewee, researcher's acquaintances. The internet search was helpful to get in touch with some MPs as their details are available through the parliament website. The other method was through two journalists; one is the researcher's friend and the other one is a former co-worker. They helped with obtaining most of the contact details. The participants also provided the researcher with names and contact details for other potential participants. Finally, the researcher's acquaintances in Bahrain such as the general secretary

of the progressive democratic tribune (communist party in Bahrain) were helpful in providing more contact details.

In some cases, the researcher informed the participants regarding how their contact details were acquired, especially when the contact details were obtained from a mutual acquaintance or from one of the participants. This was helpful to gain some of the participants' trust. In these cases, some of the participants did not even question the details of the research during the short phone call with them prior to the interview. Although this was helpful in order to gain easy and quick access to some participants, there were some pitfalls to it. At least one of the participants thought that the subject of the interview related to his current role as the chairperson of the GCC commercial arbitration centre. As a result, the researcher had to explain her project in detail before the interview.

The participants were contacted by phone, email, WhatsApp and text messages as well. The researcher called them on the phone to introduce herself and her project and to ask for their email address in order to send the participant an information sheet. Some of the participants preferred to be contacted by WhatsApp or a text message. In these cases, the author could not send the participant the information sheet in advance, so she only sent information about the topics that were to be discussed in the interview. The downside to this method of contact is that the researcher has to ensure that the participants understand all the aspects related to the research before starting the interview. This means at least ten minutes of explanation before the actual interview starts and that was time consuming for the interviewee who usually has a limited amount of time.

No gatekeepers were used in the field work. Before starting the PhD, the researcher proposed gatekeepers to be contacted to access the potential participants. The researcher found that recruiting potential participants by approaching them through direct contacts via email and phone was much easier than expected. The researcher accessed the government officials by

generating appointments from the officials' secretary. An official letter with the university logo was sent to them. This route to gain access to government officials was applied in different research in Bahrain alongside the personal network route as well (Ali, 2010).

5.3 Methods of data collection

This section reviews the methods of data collection, and their relevant strengths and weaknesses. The methods for data collection are the semi structured interviews and document analysis. Using multiple sources of data collection is one of the features of case study inquiry (Yin, 2014, p.17). This section will also discuss elite interviewing and the order of the interviews.

5.3.1 Semi structured interviews

The interviewing style was semi structured interviews in which the interviewer guides the interview but allows for probing. The interviewer uses a set of questions that reflects the researcher's key areas of interest. Semi structured interviewing is chosen because it provides flexibility, and it enhances the ability to explore a range of topics (Irvine, 2012). The interviewer has the flexibility to ask follow-up questions or to seek clarification from the interviewee (Irvine, 2012, p.292). The flexibility within the semi structured interviews includes changing the order of the questions (Denscombe, 2010, 175). Flexibility is important to the proposed research as there were different actors interviewed and each one of the actors could add different knowledge to the research. Hence, the researcher needed the flexibility to reorder the research questions according to the particular actor. However, semi structured interviews are challenging; they are time consuming, and they require good interviewing skills and focused attention (Denscombe, 2010).

On the basis of flexibility and exploring a range of topics, the other interviewing methods were eliminated as a choice for this research. The structured interviews use standardised questions and structured presentation of the question does not allow the flexibility that is required in this project. However,

in the unstructured interviewing the interviewee forms a connection between the events and the phenomena, and this gives more understanding for the participant's viewpoint (May,2010, p.136). This method meets the flexibility aim of this research. However, it gives less option for the investigator who wants to explore a range of issues. In addition, it limits the ability of researcher to redirect the interview to the issue that the interviewer wants to discuss.

5.3.2 Elite Interviewing

The interviews were conducted with some elites or people in important positions. It is not easy to give a precise definition to elites (Welch et al, 2002, Mikecz, 2012). Elite is defined by Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary as a "*social group considered to be the best or most important because of their power, talent, wealth etc"* (Hornby et al, 1989, p. 391). Yet this definition does not give specific criteria to decide who is an elite and who is not, especially in terms of time factor as some elites might no longer be an elite in the future. As Mikecz (2012) describes, "*Elites are dynamic and heterogeneous, as people can gain and lose elite status over time. "Status and seniority" can "turn up as short-lived elements" (*p. 485). Harvey (2011) argues that elites are not necessary in a powerful position or have a high-status job, but elites are the people who "*are better able to exert influence*" (p.433). While in the business corporate world the definition of elites is more precise, an elite is defined as *"an informant (usually male) who occupies a senior or middle management position; has functional responsibility in an area which enjoys high status in accordance with corporate values; has considerable industry experience and frequently also a long tenure with the company; possesses a broad network of personal relationships; and has considerable international exposure"* (Welch et al, 2002, p. 613).

According to these definitions, the researcher interviewed ten elites, among whom two had retired from their jobs when the interviews were held. Those elites present government actors and business executives who also hold other positions such as being a member of the Bahrain consultative council and

members of the BCCI. The decision for considering them as elites is related to their significant influence in the policy-making process and the powerful position they are or were occupying.

Elites interviewing has some drawbacks as some decisions were made around 6-8 years ago which means that lapses in memory can affect the type of information that the investigator will get and some of the informants were retired. In addition, the investigator must be aware of who is being interviewed. This information includes the interviewee position within the organisation and their political background. Some of the elites who were interviewed are no longer working in the public sector and their new position must be taken in to account (Tansey, 2007, p.10). In addition, the researcher must be informed on the level of participant access to the event (the process of decision making). Finally, the interviewer must track the reliability of participants through ensuring that they were part of the process (Davies, 2001, p.77).

In order to be prepared for interviewing elites, the researcher tried to be knowledgeable about the elite's background such as their career, and their position from the policies under research. This was done through using the search engines, reading media statements from them and even asking other participants about some of the elite's role in the policy-making process. By doing this, the researcher was more confident when approaching some of the elite's participants who helped in conducting good interviews. In addition, the media search proved to be useful in tailoring some of the interviews questions to fit certain elites.

In order to gain access to some of the elites, the researcher used a formal university head letter that was sent to them prior to the interview. The reason for using a formal headed letter was to make the researcher look more professional. According to Welch et al (2002), emphasising a researcher's affiliation with an academic institution help in gaining access to elites. In non-elites interviewing, proving professional credentials were not important. The

case was different with elites; therefore, the formal letter was sent to them in addition to a participant's information sheet.

5.3.3 The order of the interviews: from interest groups to government actors

The researcher started interviewing non-state actors before the government actors. The purpose of this was to use some of the information from the interest groups for interviewing the government and former government officials. This order proved to be helpful in gaining more information about the policy details and process in other researches and this research as well (Sacli, 2011). The information was then used in interviewing the government actors. This gave the researcher more confidence in interviewing the government elites as she felt she already knew details about the policy process and outcomes. The negative side of this order is that one of the former government officials started questioning the researcher about what other participants had said. The researcher informed him that she was not allowed to mention what others had said to her during the interview as the information is supposed to be used for academic research only.

5.3.4. Document Analysis

The second method of data collection is document analysis. The importance of documents for the research is described by May (2011) as "Documents*, read as the sedimentations of social practice, have the potential to inform and structure the decisions which people make on daily and longer-term basis; they also constitute particular readings of social events*" (p. 192). Most of the document analysis were conducted after the field work. This assisted the researcher to gain insight into potential links between a certain event and the policy-making.

The relevant documents are read with the aim to discover meaning and patterns. The researcher does not intend to quantify the findings from document analysis or to find out numerical relationships between variables. As

May (2011) suggests, documents ‘*”do not simply reflect, but also construct social reality and versions of events”* (p.164). That means documents does not just reveals what they say but also what they don’t say (May 2011). Hence, researchers must approach documents with suspicion to assess what is recorded. As Said (2004) argued that “*you should always assume that officials representing a position, administrators, people who have authority and power over other, et cetera, are all involved in keeping their places and their authority intact. It is therefore the role of the intellectual, at least as I see it to keep challenging them, to name names and cite facts*” (p. 420). This could be done with documents rather than challenging officials face to face when interviewing them. This point will be explained later in this document when the researcher reflects on her relationship with participants.

The documents are divided in terms of their accessibility. John Scott (1990) suggests four categories for these documents according to its accessibility: open published, open archived records, restricted, close. Open published reports are, for example, acts of parliament and legislations; they are published in the newspaper and available online. Open archived records are records that are accessible, but we need to ask for them as they are usually stored in public archives or public offices. Restricted papers are the official papers that require permission to access from the monarch. Finally, the closed documents like the registration of births and marriage certificates. They are usually closed because of formal laws to protect such documents. The documents that the researcher collected, the source and type of documents are all summarised in table 3 page 136.

Table 3: The documents that has been collected

Document title	Source	Type of document
Confidential: Reforming Bahrain's labour market: The case for change, workshop with labour unions 15 September 2004	Obtained from the chief in editor of Alwasat newspaper. A document produced by MCK (a consultancy company hired by the government to study the labour market in Bahrain and to suggest policies)	Closed with no formal laws to protect them
Confidential: Reforming Bahrain's labour market: policy package proposal workshop with labour unions 15 September 2004	Obtained from the chief in editor of Alwasat newspaper. A document produced by MCK	Closed with no formal laws to protect them
Report about labour market reforms in Bahrain 5 September 2004	Obtained from the chief in editor of Alwasat newspaper. A memorandum sent to the participants in labour reforms workshop that is held by the EDB and the CPC	Closed with no formal laws to protect them

A report about understanding the challenges of labour market in Bahrain. 23 December 2003	Obtained from the chief in editor of Alwasat newspaper. A document produced by MCK (a consultancy company hired by the government to study the labour market in Bahrain and to suggest policies)	Closed with no formal laws to protect them
Diagnosing Bahrain's economy: where do we stand? Economic reform workshop 24 February 2005	Obtained from the chief in editor of Alwasat newspaper. The document produced by the EDB and the CPC	Closed with no formal laws to protect them
Bahrain reform Initiative update: updates on Bahrain reforms in labour market, economic, education and training reform	Obtained from the chief in editor of Alwasat newspaper. The document produced by EDB and distributed to other stakeholders such as interest groups.	Closed with no formal laws to protect them
Reforming Bahrain's labour market: Summary of workshop presentations, 24 September 2004	Obtained from the chief in editor of Alwasat newspaper. The document produced by the EDB and the CPC	Closed with no formal laws to protect them

Parliamentary Minutes related to some laws for the years 2006-2012	From the parliamentary library, obtained by permission from the parliament general secretary. Another source was a former member of parliaments.	Open archived records
Upper Parliament- SHC minutes for the years 2006-2012	from the consultative council website	Open published reports
Papers presented by the trade unions in conferences	from GFWTUB	Open archived records
A memorandum of understanding between the GFWTUB and the Bahraini chamber of commerce and industry	from GFWTUB	Open archived records
The chamber of commerce studies and visions in relation to what work best for the Bahraini labour market	The Bahraini chamber of commerce and industry	Open archived records
working papers for the second general summit for the GFWTUB	from GFWTUB	Open archived records

Bahrain 2030 economic vision	EDB website	Open published reports
BCCI comments on LMRA regards the increases in work visa fees	The Bahraini chamber of commerce and industry	Open archived records
Order No. (71) of 2007 With Respect to Work Permits for Foreign Workers in the Public Sector	LMRA website	Open published reports
Decision No. (76) (2008) with regard to regulations of work visas of foreign employees except the category of domestic servants	LMRA website	Open published reports
Order No. (4) of 2013 Amending Some Provisions of the Order No. (76) of 2008 with regard to Regulations of Work Visas for Foreign Employees Except Domestic Servants Category	LMRA website	Open published reports
Act no. (19) (2006) with regard to the regulation of the labour market	LMRA website	Open published reports

The National Labour Market Plan	LMRA website	Open published reports

5.4 Data translation and presentation

All of the interviews were conducted in Arabic except two. The main issue with translation is that the process of translation can affect the actual meaning. According to Temple and Young (2004), "*people using different languages may construct different ways of seeing social life*" (p.164). The researcher found what Temple & Young said about the translation is accurate and match her experience. She had this issue when she was thinking in Arabic through the data collected; she found it hard sometimes to translate it to English and keeping the same cultural meaning.

Hence, the researcher coded the transcriptions and the documents in Arabic to minimise the loss of meaning in the coding stage. The translation was used only for the data that is quoted. The translation was conducted mostly by the researcher. According to Temple and Young (2004), it is recommended that the researcher does the translation. The researcher in this case can regard the process of translation as part of the analysis and check the validity of interpretation. Even though the researcher is the translator, there might be an unavoidable loss of meaning if the exact equivalence of the meaning does not exist.

The researcher did not use a translator. There are two main pitfalls of hiring a translator. The first one is related to the violation of a participant's confidentiality. The translator, who should be a Bahraini, might recognise the participant's name by reading the transcription. Bahrain is a tiny island where people live in close geographical areas and can know each other easily. In the case of this research, most of the participants are public figures. They can be known easily by the translator. This issue cannot be avoided as the translator

has to read the full text before partially translating it. According to Larson (1991), the translator must comprehend the source text before translating it. This means the translator should read the whole text before translating any part of it.

The second issue arises from the loss of meaning because the translator is not immersed in the topic of research. The translator is an interpreter as well, this means "*when faced with a communication task such as a statement or conversation, processes the vocabulary and grammatical structure of the words while considering the individual situation and the overall cultural context of the source language*" (Esposito, 2001, p.570). According to Larson (1998), the translator then conceptualises the meaning of the statements according to the vocabulary and grammatical structure of the other language. Hence, the meaning of the participant's statements is reconstructed in new cultural context (Larson, 1998).

The data that was collected through interviewing is presented without the participant's name. None of the participant's requested to be anonymous, yet the researcher prefers to keep its participants anonymous at this thesis as some of participants still hold an elite role within the government or recently elected as a member of parliament. However, the name and professional position of actors is revealed if referring to data collected from documents that is available to public such as the parliamentary minutes or media content.

5.5 Data analysis

The investigator recorded the interviews with each participant's permission by using a Dictaphone. The first step after transcribing the interviews was providing summery of the findings by reading over the interviews. The short summery was a preliminary summary of the findings. This was followed by coding data based on each interview 's question. The codes were then sorted out in accordance to different themes. The themes "captures something important about the data in relation to the research question and represents

some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set." (Braun & Clarke,2006, p.10). The size of the themes does not make it more prevalent over other themes, but it is about how important the theme is for the research questions. However, some themes became more apparent or revised later on through the process of writing.

Before coding the researcher has conducted different steps to familiarise herself with the data. The reading of the interviews then organising the data in to grids. These grids represented each question separately from the other questions. The grids were helpful to check if there was missing data as if some participants have not answered the question fully or provided a short answer without enough elaboration. After organising the answers in to grids the researcher started to read the answers all over again and to highlight the part of what answers the questions of the interview with one colour in addition to writing an initial code for these answers. The initial coding was descriptive to some extent. The data that was interesting but does not answer the question was highlighted by another colour. These data were interesting because it was relevant to the policy process under investigation and to the general aim of the project. Yet it does not fit with the interview's question which it answers were coded at that time. These data were then incorporated and coded were relevant.

The coding that started within the grids then was moved to new word page were each code was filled with the text from the highlighted passage and some of the codes or categories were merged together. The process involved clustering the codes "clustering involves comparing & contrasting each quote with all the other quotes ... to unite quotes with similar meaning and separate quotes with different meanings" (cited in Gratton & Jones, 2004, p.223). In this way the researcher was able to view the codes itself with all the passages that fits within the code. In addition, the researcher was able to visit the grids whenever required as the copied text under each code was labelled with the name of the grid to ease the referral with initials to indicate the source of the text. In general, the original grids were then revisited several times during the

process of analysis and writing the thesis to check for potential exemption of data or data that are relevant but was neglected or were considered as ordinary and irrelevant.

The codes that were driven from the data grids were renamed as the initial codes within the grids were descriptive. The coded text was then given sub codes as well. For instance, when asking participants about their perspective on what was the role of the national Bahraini environment on developing the foreign labour policies? they had different answers and these answers were then divided and coded based on the relevance of the answer to the question. Once the answers were distributed and given a code then it was divided in to sub codes: i. e positive indicating that the context provided an opportunity for actor's actions, and negative perspectives indicating that the context was viewed as limiting their actions. Once these codes are chosen then the most prevalent one was the one affected the actor's actions (actions or inaction) during the policy process. The established code for each question then were re-examined for potential links between them, for instance the questions about the actor's actions in relation to certain policy outcomes was linked with actor's perception of the context and such elaboration were sometimes made in answering another question. New codes were introduced as the documents that was received from field work were then reviewed.

5.6 Field work reflections

This section presents three main topics regarding the field work experience. First, it presents what happened between January 2016 until April 2016. Second, the section discusses the quality of the data gathered. Third, it discusses how the field work affects the research questions.

The field work started at the end of January 2016 and continued until the middle of April 2016. During this time frame, 39 potential participants were contacted, of whom 23 agreed to participate. Appendix 1 (p: 286) shows the breakdown of the groups presented in the study. All the interviews were conducted in places chosen by the relevant participant; these places were in

the workplace, coffee shops near their place of residence, or organisation's headquarters.

5.6.1 Reflections on the quality of the data gathered

There are six main issues that influenced the quality of data. These issues are: the extent to which the informants participated in the policy process, the memory of the participants, the political position and occupational position, the researcher- participant relationship, the nature of relationships within the ruling family in Bahrain, and the freedom of speech in Bahrain.

Role of participants in the policy process

As the topic of the study is related to the policy-making process in Bahrain, the researcher had to question the role of the participants in the process and the organisation they belonged to. This was the second question she asked, though most of the time she knew in advance the role and organisational position of the participants. This knowledge about participants was gained through undertaking an investigation about the participant. The investigator has Googled their names to understand their organisational positions. In addition, she questioned the other participants about who there were in the policy discussions.

She has done so because Davies (2001) suggested that before considering the information to be reliable the information must be obtained from the person who witnessed the decision-making process. Information that is based on hearsay is not acceptable. Some participants gave the researcher some information based on hearsay. Some of the participants commented on the strategies used by other groups. For example, the Salafist group used to attend the PM's Majlis every Sunday which a way is to communicate with the PM. Majlis means the place of sitting which is an informal saloon; it is a cultural thing, as they open their house weekly to guest who comes for chatting and to drink tea. Hiba Khodr (2014) defines the Majlis as "*used to describe various type of traditional gathering in the Arab Gulf countries*" (p.279).

The memory factors

The second point is related to the memory of the informants. In asking some specific questions about what happened through the discussion process and how the policy outcome came about, the answer was sometimes "I don't remember the exact details". Some of the potential informants that were contacted declined to participate because some of the policies referenced were discussed ten years ago. In some cases, the memory loss by one participant was offset by the good memory of other participants.

Political and occupational positions

The political and occupational position of some of the participants affected how critical and open they were in their answers. The researcher met with former MPs from the biggest opposition parties in Bahrain namely Alwifaq Islamic Society. The answers she got from them were similar to the general view of the society about the regime in Bahrain and how undemocratic the system and hence the policy process was. In contrast, others who were appointed by the king of Bahrain in the upper parliaments were referencing the political reforms held by the king and how it enhanced the voice of interest groups in the policy-making process.

Some of the elites that were interviewed, especially the one who are still in public job positions, gave statements similar to the public relation version of the events. In order to tackle this issue, the researcher made the questions more personal. This was suggested by Thomas (1995) as the more personalised questions you ask to the elites, the more open they are in their answers. Laurila (1997) suggests that "*adapting the questions to the informant's experience arouses personal interest and shows the researcher's engagement with the research topic*" (p.410). However, this wasn't the case with the interviews held with some elites. What made some of the elites open up is their political background. The interviews held with elites that worked as consultants to the CP during labour market reforms were more open than elites that were

working for the Ministry of Labour. The first group of participants were considered by some other participants as the pro CP group while the other ones are not.

The researcher- participant relationship

In contrast to what Edward said about the intellectual role to challenge the officials, the researcher found her role in the field work was all about getting access to participants and collecting data. The position of the researcher or her ideological position was not revealed during the interview. This was important to keep a good rapport between the researcher and the participant. Neutrality during the field work was very important to encourage the participant to speak and not to commence a debate with the researcher. This was done because several participants commented on what is written in the participant's information sheet. The comments were all about addressing the foreign workers in Bahrain as immigrants. For some participants, the immigrant workers must be addressed as foreign or expats workers. In these cases, the researcher let the participant express his opinion. She found that objection to the word immigrant is part of their perspective on what type of policies work best for organising immigrant labour in Bahrain.

Another aspect where the researcher hindered her own opinion is related to the political situation in Bahrain and its effects on policy process and actor's relationship and its role within the policy-making process. She left the participants to express themselves without positioning herself with the opposition or with the government. The importance of such action is to gain the trust of the participants. If the researcher revealed her opinion about the current government in Bahrain, then the government or pro government actors may not allow her to interview them. Hence, she used a formal language when addressing the royal family government figures (i.e., His Royal Highness Prime Minister Prince Khalifa bin Salman Alkhalifa).

However, this position was known to some participants as they knew the researcher personally in advance. In this case, the researcher position and the

personal rapport increased the trust between the researcher and the participants. Those participants are two former members of parliament. They represent two different opposition groups. They both revealed some aspects about the policy process that was not revealed by other MPs. They used the sentence 'to be honest' more than one time when they were speaking about their experience with the CPC.

The nature of relationships within the ruling family in Bahrain

From the data collected, one can conclude that the members of the royal family are fundamental actors for important decision making. The PM Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman Alkhalifa and the CP Salman Bin Hamad Alkhalifa were very important figures for decisions related to labour market policies. Yet the relationship between them seems to be more rivalry in nature than cooperative. The CP, for example, supported imposing high fees on migrant labour to be paid by the employers (the fees were up to £138) while the PM's intervention in the decision making reduced the amount to only £18.

Understanding the inter relationship within the ruling family is important to acquire a full grasp of the policy-making process in Bahrain. However, it was not easy to understand the interrelationship between the royal family members in Bahrain without having access to them. The researcher did not find contacts to reach those who were involved. In addition, not many names were mentioned during the interviews from the royal family except the CP, PM and a former undersecretary of the Minister of Labour. The lack of understanding of such a relationship will be a main limitation to this study. This is especially because these interrelationships can act as a parallel hierarchy to governmental bodies. However, the researcher can still infer about such a relationship from the data collected during the field work.

The freedom of speech in Bahrain

The last point is related to the current political situation in Bahrain where the freedom of speech is restricted. This issue affected the willingness of some

participants to speak critically about the role of some Bahraini figures such as the PM's role in the policy process. Although the questions were not enforcing them to talk critically, even a regular question (e.g. how about the CP role or the Prime Minister?). Some of the answers the researcher got are that they were supportive, with not much information provided in relation to this. For example, one of the participants who resigned from the upper house after the Bahraini popular uprising seemed reluctant and hesitant about doing the interview. He asked the researcher about how long she would record the interview and what the interview questions would be. He also enquired about the researcher before coming to the interview from the trade unions members that had been interviewed before him. He knew she met them because he asked about it on the phone. After the interview, the researcher asked him to sign the consent form; he said, 'yeah it's ok I didn't say anything that I don't usually say'.

5.7 Conclusion

The chapter reviewed the research design for this thesis. The researcher chose the semi structured interviewing and document analysis. The researcher used a snowball sampling were every participant was asked to provide names of actors who they interacted with during the policy-making process. Most of the names provided during the field work was contacted for interviewing, only 23 agreed to participate. The order of the interviews started with non-state actors before the government actors. The purpose of that order was to use some of the information from the interest groups for interviewing the government and former government officials.

The chapter discussed the field work reflections. The researcher kept a daily journal of her reflection after each interview. The problem faced the researcher during the field work was in these topics. First, the memory factor in which some researcher forgets details of the policy process, this aspect was solved with reviewing several documents collected from the field work. Second, the political and occupational positions affected how participant explain their role

and perspective regarding the policy process. The nature of relationships within the ruling family in Bahrain is an issue that affected the process yet not much is known about such a relationship. The freedom of speech in Bahrain in which some participants seems were less willing to speak critical about the process.

Chapter 6: Introducing labour market Reforms 2002-2004

6.1 Introduction

According to the literature referenced in chapter two, the LMRP was introduced as an extension to political reforms in Bahrain. The argument within the literature is that reforms were a tool for legitimising the role of the new king (Valeri, 2013). This chapter traces back the introduction of labour market reforms in Bahrain. In which the unemployment issue and the concepts on how to solve it are characteristics for the establishment of the reforms. This is in addition to the importance of linking the labour market reforms to the restructuring of the Bahraini economy as a way to shift it from public based economy to private led economy. Thus, this chapter provides the foundation for how the labour immigration policies were made in Bahrain from 2002 onward. In addition, it discusses the role of ideas provided by the MCK and the EDB as restricting the available policy options.

The labour market reforms are driven by a strong belief in a certain economic model namely a more liberal economy. Hence, the chapter focuses on the role of MCK's study and the perception of what causes unemployment in Bahrain and how to solve it. The discourse used by MCK constrained the available policy options to solve unemployment issue in Bahrain. The other diagnosis and solution to restructure the labour market were not considered. For instance, the ILO (2002) recommendation to the unemployment issue in Bahrain preceded the MCK study, yet it was not influential during LMRP.

This chapter argues that the reforms process is driven by beliefs in new economic model rather than perceiving it as merely a tool for legitimising the new king and the power of the CP. The legitimising of the EDB's power to

initiate the economic policies does not explain the initiation of the reforms, it only partially explains the actions of the EDB during the reforms. The strategies used by the EDB to promote and communicate the labour market reforms is understood as needed because: labour market reforms ideas were new to the society, the changing powers context lead the EDB to increase its interactions with different actors within the country to gain support; these interactions were aimed both to show that the former polices were not yielding the expected outcomes. Hence, dramatic changes in polices are needed, second to gain support for reforms that is within the context of political power shift to the CP as a leader to economic projects in Bahrain.

6.2 Introduction of Labour Markets reforms in Bahrain: 2002-2004

The idea to reform the labour market started to form around a political and social problem which was the high unemployment rate among Bahrainis (Personal Interviews no 3, 14, 17, 2016). The unemployment issue in Bahrain and the needs to restructure the economy to a private led economy were the main issues that triggered the LMRP. The labour market reform project was part of a wider economic reform project which was based on reforming the labour market, the education system and the economy. The reforms aimed to transform the Bahraini economy to knowledge-based economy that is led by private sector and depends on highly skilled labour (EDB & CPC, 2004a).

Historically, the public sector was the main employer for Bahrainis. They were attracted to it because of the benefits it provides for employees. The public sector was growing fast from the 1970s onwards due to oil revenues. The vast majority of workers in the public sector were Bahrainis; they were around 90 percent just before the introduction of labour market reforms in 2004 (EDB & CPC, 2004a, 2004b). The jobs provided by the public sectors started to slowdown (EDB & CPC, 2004a). If the public sector will no longer be the main employer for Bahrainis in the future, then the private sector will have to take this role. Yet statistics showed that two thirds of the jobs that were created in

the private sector went to non-Bahraini workers (EDB & CPC, 2004a). At that time, the unemployment rate among Bahrainis was 12 percent. The expected number of Bahrainis that will enter the labour market in the next 10 years were 100,000 new job seekers. This was the condition of labour market before the labour market reform project (EDB & CPC, 2004a). This structure of labour market and the economy were the issues that made the reforms necessary (Personal Interviews, 3, 14,17,20,21, 2016).

EDB and CPC proposed a project to reform the deficiencies within the labour market after consulting with MCK, different actors from other governmental organisations and experts. The proposed changes to the labour market were in the following aspects: Labour market access, relationship between employer and employee, and market governance. In terms of labour market access the policies will address policies to enable Bahrainis to compete with low cost labour, how foreign labour access the Bahraini market, and how can access to labour market ensure that Bahraini wages increase over time. In terms of the relationship between employers and employee polices will cover: the rules and conditions of hiring and firing employees, incentives for Bahrainis to enter the private sectors, enhancing the work conditions for foreign labour. Finally, is to change the governance of labour market by focusing on: how policies are made, how to enhance the enforcement of laws, and how to enhance the administration of the labour market (EDB & CPC., 15 September, 2004c).

6.3 The role of McKinsey & Company study and the perception of what causes unemployment in Bahrain and how to solve it: a shared policy principle

The interviews with the members of the LMRP and the documents introduced by the EDB, McKinsey & Company, and CPC uses similar discourse. The discourse focuses on three main elements; the first dimension is the economic model in Bahrain in 2002 which is not able to provide enough jobs for Bahrainis. Second, the economic model must be comprehensively changed to enable the private sector to be the engine for economic growth and to enable Bahrainis to

be the best choice for employer. The third aspect is to reform the structure of the labour market to ensure that Bahrainis can compete in the labour market (EDB& CPC., 2004a., 2004b,2004c)

The actors interviewed, and the documents provided during consultation process showed shared policy principles. These principles are summarised as following: First, market-based mechanism to regulate the labour market. This means less government intervention in labour market especially in determining Bahrainisation quota. Second, decrease bureaucratic procedures in relation to labour market through creating a new organisation for any labour related transaction. In relation to bureaucratic procedure, MCK study criticized the long bureaucratic procedure to employ foreign workers which can take about one year. The reason for such a long period is the bureaucratic procedures in which the application to issue a visa has to go through three different government organisations, namely: the ministry of labour and social affairs, the department of immigration, the ministry of commerce (Alabsi, 2016). The third principle is the division between the economic and political decision in Bahrain in which the government and cabinet is responsible for the political decision and the EDB is responsible for the economic decision. In relation to the segmentation of the work of government between the political and the economic sphere, the former consultant for political affair who worked for the CP said:

"we wanted to free the economy from the politics, through establishing an authority (referring to labour market authority) where we have economic specialists who study the labour market and its data, and in light of which we decide the labour market policy, including fees" (Interview 18, 2016).

During the first stage of the process, actors believed that they have to eliminate the cost/ right gap between labour immigrants and Bahrainis. The EDB, and CPC beliefs were that the economy should be restructured to depend less on cheap labour and start to form a knowledge-based economy (EDB& CPC., 15 September, 2004a). This economy which is supposed to be led by the private

sector instead of the public sector should be able to accommodate the new job seekers by providing more medium and high skills jobs. EDB and CPC claim that the option to expand public sector and increase its expenditure to create new jobs as non-preferred option. Their claim is due to their perception that increasing jobs in public sector will not increase the countries total wealth. Therefore, the option is to support and expand the private sector (EDB& CPC, 2004a).

This belief was informed by the study conducted by MCK to assess the labour market in Bahrain. MCK was recruited by the EDB and CPC for the purpose of reforming the Bahraini economy and other projects in relation to the economic reforms (Alabsi, 2016). The MCK studied the labour market and drew the policy recommendation. They believe that flexible labour market and developing the local workforce are the solution to end the reliance on cheap immigrant workers. According to Kito De Boar, the former director and John Turner (2007) a former consultant in McKinsey's Dubai office, these solutions will "*encourage private companies to invest in labour-saving technologies and to create higher-value-added jobs*." (p.5). These beliefs presented in different papers written for McKinsey quarterly which is like a journal that "combines powerful insights from McKinsey with ideas from other world-leading experts and practitioners" (Mckinsey & company, 2018b).

The study conducted by MCK to assess the labour market in Bahrain concluded that the current economic model and the structure of labour market cannot solve the problem of unemployment in Bahrain. The study under the name of "*challenges to Bahraini labour market*" revealed that 100,000 Bahraini will inter the labour market in the next ten years (EDB & CPC, 2004a). If the problem of the labour market is not solved, the unemployment rates will significantly rise. They found that the public sector in Bahrain is unable to employ enough Bahrainis. The public sector grew slightly between 1992 and 2002 and jobs created by this sector were slightly above 2 percent. Hence it was not able to provide enough jobs for new job seekers. The public sector has to expand by more than 8 percent yearly to employ the new job market entrants. This means

more public expenditure has to be spent by public sector on wages. (EDB & CPC, 2004a).

The discourse used by the EDB and MCK was influential on two aspects: first in shaping how actors think about the causes of unemployment problem in Bahrain, and on the range of available policy instruments to solve the problem. Members of the LMRP' at the beginning of the process showed very high consistency in supporting MCK diagnosis to the economic and labour market problems in Bahrain (EDB & CPC, 2004a). They also supported the solutions suggested by MCK. The political consultant employed for LMRP expressed that he is not an economic expert, yet he was conducting meetings with actors in order to persuade them to support the LMRP. Meeting up with the civil societies were part of the job that the political consultant was appointed for. His job was to communicate the ideas of the reform to civil actors (Personal Interview 18,2017). The former consultant for political affair support to the diagnosis and solution of MCK reveals that his appointment as the political consultant in the CPC was influential for him to adopts the rhetoric of the reforms. He wouldn't perform his prescribed job if he would communicate the ideas of the reform without being supportive to it (Personal Interview 18,2017).

In addition, the former Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Majeed Al-Alawi expressed the same beliefs presented by the MCK report. He warned that the labour market in Bahrain is currently suffering from serious distortions, pointing out that the continuation of the labour situation could lead to the presence of more than 100 thousand unemployed at the beginning of the next decade (Alshehabi & Almehari, 2004). The minister pointed to a field study conducted by MCK. According to him the study proves the importance of comprehensive reforms in the labour market (Alshehabi & Almehari, 2004)

The discourse about the causes of unemployment in Bahrain used at the early stage of the process eliminates other factors that causes unemployment and the methods to resolve during subsequent stages. The other indications of causes of unemployment in Bahrain other than the criteria of the unemployed

or the structure of the labour market were not part of the dominant discourse. The discrimination based on religious sector was not mentioned as a cause of the unemployment issue in Bahrain; political actors such as AWNIS considers other factors that causes unemployment in Bahrain such as the illegal political naturalisation in Bahrain which aims to change the demographic structure from being dominated by Shia to Sunni domination (Alekri, 2005). AWNIS vision towards reducing unemployment includes eliminating the causes of political tension in Bahrain. In their vision regards solving unemployment they state that:

"The political tensions are taken as an excuse to close the door of employment in the ministries of the state, as an argument to impede the economic movement in the country, in addition to causing many cases such as lack of interest in work, and forced the other to work at the least required academic certificate, or loss of study" (Alwifaq Islamic Society, 2005,p.2)

During the early stage of LMRP, the actors prioritised some solutions over the others. The first step suggested by the MCK was to reform the labour market, the second reform is the economy, and the third reform process is the educations and training (EDB & CPC, 2004a). They prioritised labour market reforms to achieve the two objectives because they consider the structure of the labour market as an obstacle: first, it doesn't enable Bahrainis to compete with immigrant labour. Second, the laws of labour market are rigid for the private sector in a way that deters the growth of this sector. the EDB expressed this concern in the workshop pre reading under the title *Reforming Bahraini's labour market:*

"this is especially true for low skill Bahrainis who efforts are frequently frustrated by the structure and dynamics of the labour market. On the one hand, making Bahrainis the employees of choice require enabling them to compete on level playing field with expatriates. On the other hand, making the private sector the engine of growth require that they have the flexibility to manage their employees in ways that will support increasing productivity and performance. Bahrain's current labour market stands in the way of both of these objectives." (EDB & CPC, 2004a, p.5).

The suggested reforms for the labour market are to adjust two main problems within the market which are reducing cost and legal gap between foreigners and Bahrainis (Alabsi, 2016., EDB & CPC, 2004a). Such a perception about the best solutions towards labour market issues and what to reform were not agreed upon; however, the early stage of the process set those parameters and priorities that continued throughout the process. For instance, skill gap between the foreign workers and the local workers was perceived by BCCI members as a main factor for not employing Bahrainis Employers and representative of BCCI expressed that skill gap and work competencies are the main issue to unemployment in Bahrain (Personal Interview 4, 2016). Hence, they rejected some of the policy recommendations because it was based on inaccurate analysis of the problems faced by labour market. A former member of BCCI's BOD expressed this point, he says:

"The *financial cost may have an effect on the decision-making process by choosing the national workers or foreign workers. It is not the basis of the choice of the employer. The employer wants employees to do their required jobs in excellent way, so whenever a citizen finds such a service from national employees then he (the employer) will not abandon employing Bahrainis as long as they adhere to work's principles, …so cost will not change anything*" (Personal Interview 5, 2016).

In a personal interview with former MP from AWNIS (2016) explains the same concerns about the effect of Bahrainis skills and lack of demands from employers. In addition, he mentions the lack of loyalty to employers as an issue among Bahraini workers, he says:

"Perhaps the university education cannot meet the need of the labour market …this is one of the factors, and the founder of the business is forced to look for the foreign worker, ….. it seems that many institutions are not attracted to employ the national workers, because they retain the secrets of work for themselves, they (businessmen) don't want to sells them to other Bahraini, if the worker is Indian then it is ok (it is ok to show Indian the secrets of business), but Bahraini taught him archery every day, and when he got good at it he throw an arrow at me" (personal Interview 8, 2016)

Concurrently, there was some agreement regarding the project objectives and some policy tools such as training Bahrainis to meet the labour market

demands and relaxing the Bahrainisation rigidity. For instance, a former member of Alwifaq parliamentary bloc (AWPB) describes AWNIS position from the reforms as "we were supportive the CP initiatives, yet we had some other perspectives regards the law, but we generally supported the reforms" (Personal Interview 8, 2016).He explains that the support stems from the support to the ideas of the reforms that Bahrainis will be prioritised in the labour market through educating and training them to compete in the labour market without imposing a Bahrainisation rate.

6.3.1 Ideas and beliefs of EDB, McKinsey & Company about reforming labour market regards developing countries: where does the ideas of reform come from?

Does the reform proposal provide solutions that are free from material or other forms of political interest? As suggested by literature that the labour market reforms are tools of political legitimisation (Valeri, 2013).? Or do these ideas present the beliefs of the EDB and MCK on how to approach economic issues? The analysis to these question dependents on two main themes. First, the rhetoric used by the Crown Prince during the reform, second, ideas and beliefs of MCK regarding developing countries that are dependent on low skilled work force.

Who do we want to be as a Bahrainis? Was a question asked by the CP in his speech to an audience when presenting the labour markets reforms? The speech reveals four main themes in regard to how we can understand the programmatic beliefs of the EDB (Alwasat Newspaper, 24th September 2004, issue no 749). These changes are as said by the CP "our *old concepts and our economic policies are based on the history which its pages have been turned off …. The future must be different, the Bahrainis must have priority, the economy must be activated, and our education system must be developed to the highest standards*" (Alwasat Newspaper, 24th September 2004, issue no 749). The speech presents the ideas to reform and these ideas are based on: a national interest in solving unemployment as the CP is not satisfied to find that

for every eight Bahraini there is one unemployed nor that the average income is low, believes in development through enhancing education that serve the requirement of the private sector, a belief in market based economy by supporting the private sector to be the main source of economic growth in Bahrain (Alwasat Newspaper, 24th September 2004, issue no 749).

The holistic picture is that the CP believes that to solve unemployment issue and ensure that Bahrainis live well, they have to create a different type of economy. This economy shall have the ability to create highly paid jobs. At the same time, the government have to affect the supply side by enhancing education and restructure the labour market. Hence, this beliefs in a certain type of economic model and such believe is the source for the ideas that will be presented to reform the labour market. According to the CP:

*"We must support the private sector and make it the engine of economic growth. This requires changing the skills that are currently dependent on it. It also requires the abolition of restrictions that restrict its freedom, impede its growth, and we need to overcome dependence on others. And prioritize investment to support productivity "(*Alwasat Newspaper, 24th September 2004, issue no 749)

The second point is McKinsey & Company's perspective regarding the economies that depend on low skilled labour. Reviewing articles written by the MCK prominent employees reveals their beliefs regarding how developing countries can advance their economies (Farrell et al, 2004., Kito De Boar et al, 2007). They believe that economies of developing countries must develop beyond cheap labour. They advise middle income countries such as Brazil, Poland, Portugal and south Korea to "remember a fact of economic life: no place can remain the world's low-cost producer forever—even China will lose that title one day" hence the solution is to "focus on creating jobs that add higher value." They provide such solution as the only solution for development "Only if more productive companies with higher-value-added activities replace less productive ones can middle-income economies continue down the development path. "(Farrell et al, 2004). These advices were written by members of MCK, Diana Farrell is the director of the McKinsey Global Institute,

Antonio Puron is a director in McKinsey's Mexico City office, and Jaana Remes is a consultant in the San Francisco office.

MCK members who were active in Bahrain reforms referred to Farrell et al articles regards moving away from cheap labour-based economy. For instance, Kito de Boar who was the director of McKinsey's Dubai office referred to the study of Farell et al (2004) in his article regarding GCC countries labour market and his advice was regarding "*Creating better-paying, higher-value-added jobs is a challenge that many emerging markets must undertake*" (Kito De Boar et al, 2007). De Boar and Turner from MCK (2007) believe that the labour markets of GCC are running in the opposite side from other countries around the world. They consider that the adequate policies to run the labour market is to have a *"tight immigration policies but create flexible labour markets" (p.6).* Hence the GCC countries should do the following *"tighten immigration policies in order to wean employers from this dependence on foreign workers. Another step would be to increase the cost of foreign labour—for instance, by levying a tax on those who employ them. Such taxes would help governments manage the inflow of cheap foreign labour and encourage private companies to invest in labour-saving technologies and to create higher-value-added jobs*" (De Boar and Turner, 2007, p.7). Quoting kito de Boer believes is considered important actor as the former LMRP steering committee member referred to Mckinsey company under the name of "Mckinsey Kito DE Boer" (Alabsi, 2016, p.21).

MCK believes that Bahrain will not be able to solve its unemployment issue if it continues to rely on public sector for creating jobs (EDB & CPC, 2004a). The policy paper provided by MCK about the challenges that faces the Bahraini Labour markets provides quotes from international organisations that supports the neoliberal approach in solving the economic challenges (EDB & CPC, 2004). These organisations are the world bank and International Monetary fund. The report quotes IMF criticism to the economic model of GCC in which the public sector "*Has reached its practical level because the total cost of wages has reached excessive levels cannot continue to rise*" (cited in EDB & CPC, 2004a).

In short, the suggested policy content by the EDB and MCK is traced back to beliefs held by those organisations on the best economic model to pursue an active economy that is able to create high paid jobs. There is no specific interest that was pursued by the EDB other than their beliefs that such economic model will be the saver for the economy. The project of labour market and other reform projects adopted by the EDB were motivated by a belief in change and reform of the economy, education and labour market. Thus, the ideational context that motivated the EDB is believed to be independent from other structural position. Especially that it will be shown in chapter seven and eight that the reforms were generally disagreed upon by different stakeholders such as BCCI, AAIS and small and medium businessmen. They were protesting against its implementation. Therefore, how would it be a source of political legitimization when it is highly disputed?

6.3.2 The ILO report

McKinsey & Company's diagnosis to the labour market issues and policy ideas were not new, yet influential because the CP himself with his new position as the chairman of the EDB gave such ideas the chance to be fulfilled. McKinsey & Company's description to the issues faced by the Bahraini labour market was recognised by ILO's studies in 2001-2002. The ILO had previously provided more social oriented solution to unemployment problem in Bahrain (ILO,2002). There is not much known about the outcomes of ILO's advice influence over Bahrain's national employment policies. According to ILO (2003), "*The degree of influence the ILO's advice can have on a specific national policy is difficult to determine*" (p.30), due to lack of clear indicators.

In 2002 the Ministry of Labour and social affairs in Bahrain requested from the ILO to help in "*developing an integrated and inter-disciplinary framework to address the current policy priorities related to employment and labour market strategies, reform of the labour law and social protection in Bahrain and proposing a programme for action for the short and medium-term*" (ILO,2002, p.5). The ILO diagnosed the problem of unemployment of Bahrain as following

"*The root causes of unemployment of national workers are thus imbedded in the employment policies and labour market interventions followed in the oil boom period. The use of the public sector as a soft option for guaranteeing privileged employment for national workers, and its impact on the private sector have given rise to labour market rigidities and distortions which have stifled employment growth for nationals*" (ILO,2002, p.29). ILO's conclusion is similar to the one provided by McKinsey & Company's research. Yet the solution provided by ILO was somehow different. The ILO suggested a more social oriented solution.

The ILO suggested similar actions that were then encouraged by MCK such as: focusing on creating high value jobs, Knowledge based economy, developing Bahraini human resources, updating the legal and regulatory framework. The focus that was different from MCK are: promoting the freedom of association in order to enable workers to engage in policy discussions, ensure that employers implement workforce nationalisation or Bahrainisation by imposing a ratio or quota on employer to employee Bahraini workers (ILO, 2002). ILO supports the regulation of foreign workers through both demand and supply side. The supply side solutions will be through enhancing the control of ministry of labour and social affairs which will be the only entering point to foreign workers. In the demand side they suggested increasing cost and taxes, strict qualification requirements, maximum employment duration, transfer of workers and family members, introducing minimum wage and finally removing all labour market segmentation based on gender, or nationality, sector (ILO, 2002).

Despite the similarity between ILO's policy recommendations and the one provided by McKinsey & Company, there is no evidence that McKinsey used ILO's recommendations as a source for its own analysis. The MCK referred to different sources of data in the consultation paper that was used to presents its finding regards the obstacles faced by labour market in Bahrain, among which were interviews, team analysis, social insurance organisation, and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in Bahrain (reports to participants in the

consultation workshop regards reforming labour market in Bahrain, 2004). The report produced by MCK, EDB and CPC referred mostly to different organisations around the world such as: IMF, Work Bank, the economic research forum for the Arab countries, economic experts from different organisations and universities (EDB & CPC, 2004a). The report did not quote or referred to the ILO report that was produced after an interdisciplinary mission in Bahrain between 2001 and 2002 under the title: Employment, social protection and social dialogue, an interdisciplinary policy framework for promoting decent work in Bahrain (ILO, 2002).

There is no evidence of direct contribution by the ILO in the LMRP despite their involvement in suggesting policies and conducting researches during 2001-2002. There were no mentions of ILO's report as being part of the context that affected the LMRP. The ILO direct involvement in setting the parameters for labour market policies were related to issues of decent work to labour, the unemployment insurance, the private sector labour law and enhancing the role of trade unions in policy-making and promoting freedom of association, organising workshops and training. The ILO contribution was through technical assistant, and drafting legislation, (ILO,2004, 2006a, ILO 2008, ILO., 2010). The exceptional direct contribution of the ILO was in the third stage of the policy-making where actors where discussing the Kafala system in Bahrain. The ILO contribution was through empowering actors in the tripartite consultation process through: "Provided technical assistance and training to tripartite constituents on labour rights to promote fundamental principles and rights at work." (ILO,2010, p.21).

6.4 Communicating the labour market reforms policy package to interest groups: an action to gain support

As stated earlier in this chapter, the labour market reforms came up with new and different type of polices from the one that was used before. In addition, it was promoted by a new agency the EDB which is chaired by the CP a new actor within the policy-making other than the government. Hence, the

communications initiated by the EDB with different stakeholders aimed at promoting such framework to gain support from actors. In these consultations, the EDB presented the deficiencies of economic policies in Bahrain and how the public sector role must be re-examined. Hence, it is both showing that the need for new economic framework to follow, and that EDB is the agency to establish the new economic era in Bahrain. Thus, even if legitimising the work of EDB is a reason for increasing such interactions, yet not the only contextual factors. The new ideas presented which are in contrast to business sector interest is another reason for initiating such interactions.

The pre reforms consultation workshops

The interactions between the EDB, the political and civil actors in Bahrain regards economic and labour market reforms started with consultation workshops. The pre labour market and economic reforms consultation workshops started few months after the appointment of the CP as the Chairman of the Bahrain EDB. There were two workshops about the challenges faced by the Bahraini economy, the role of the private sector and the role of public sector (Bahrain News Agency, 2003). These seminars and workshops were aimed at consultation and exchanging perspectives with interest groups about the Bahraini economy and labour market (Aljamri, 2003). Between December 2002 and November 2003, the CP met with different interest groups in a workshop to discusses the challenges faced by the Bahraini economy (Aljamri, 2004., Alwasat Newspaper, 12 December 2002, issues no 98). The CP asked the participants to present their ideas about the restructuring of the labour market and the different ways in which the private sector could be employed to recruit the unemployed (Aljamri, 2004).

On 23rd September 2004, the EDB held a multi stakeholder consultation workshop under the title of labour market reforms. The attendance in the workshop were around 150 individuals representing ministers, MPs and council of representative, businessmen, trade unions members, intellectuals, members of political parties, journalists, international experts in the topic and

the former Saudi Labour Minister. The workshop aimed at presenting the findings of the study conducted by Mckinsey & Company. They also presented the suggested policies to reform the labour market (EDB & CPC, 2004a., 2004b., 2004c).

Communicating the policy package widely to the public and politicians aimed to create acceptance for the policy package that was neither enforced nor adopted by the government or parliament. There are three main factors behind the consultation workshops: first, interactions with interest groups to get them to understand what the project is about and to gain their support was important. The misunderstanding that accords among the interest groups about the new policy tools was one of the reasons to reject such polices (Personal Interview 4, 2016). Second, the reforms were at a time of political changes were new prince gained power to affect economic policies in the country; hence, he will have to gain support from the public. Finally, the reforms affect the interest of actors such as business interest.

The labour market reform project which claims representing the public interest come in to contrast with business sector interests and not much in favour of the PM and other members of the cabinet. Members of the cabinet doubt the success of LMRP. For instance, the former Minister of commerce Ali Saleh Alsaleh said about the policy recommendations "*it is a painful solution, we hope it doesn't affect the economic situation, they should be implemented with consensus, I am optimistic because things are handled transparently*, *but it's too early to say what is the best solutions are. Because the urgent solutions may have negative effects,*" (Alwasat, 2004, issue no 749).

The idea that labour market reforms are purely economic rather than political matters was given as a reason to invite the political parties that boycotted the parliamentary elections in 2002. According to the former political consultant at the CPC that initially the opposition parties that boycotted the parliamentary elections in 2002 were excluded from the invitation list (Personal Interview 18, 2016). However, the former political consultant suggested to the CP to invite

them to participate in the workshop. He gave the following reasoning for their participation in the workshop *"they are (the parties that boycotted the parliamentary election) boycotting the political process, that's their own decision and we don't have any relation to it, we don't work politics, we work economics* "(Personal Interview 18, 2006). The CP followed the political consultant's suggestion and invited the four political parties to the consultation workshop. The political consultant in this case worked within the job role that he holds which a political consultant is appointed for labour market reform project. The engagement of the political parties that boycotted the parliamentary elections in 2002 is one of the factors that led them to re assess the political process in Bahrain and to participate in 2006 parliamentary elections (Personal Interview 18, 2006).

In addition to presenting the findings of Mckinsey & Company's study, the workshops presented the deteriorated economic situation in Bahrain; the only solution to overcome it is through supporting the Crown Prince's initiative. During the workshop, the organisers presented a documentary movie that showed how impoverished some areas in Bahrain. The short movie showed houses that are about to collapse. Why would a royal family member do that? Is there an indirect criticism in it of government's work that is headed by his father's uncle? He went further and criticised the work of the government, he said:

*"I understand how many of you feel about how some economic problems have been addressed by some bodies. This method has often been characterized by randomness and inconsistency. Solving a problem has often created more problems. This is due to changing trends without adequate consultation or care. As a result, clarity was lost, and confidence lost. Too often the symptoms of the problems have been addressed, leaving their roots untreated. Today we see only a few sectors in Bahrain's economy that achieve the desired success. The fact is that the vast majority of employers and private sector workers are dissatisfied with the current situation. We must put an end to all this and end this situation." (*Alwasat, issue no 749, 2004).

6.5 Policy outcomes (policy instruments and objectives)

Mckinsey & Company's recommendations about the challenges facing labour market and another report about the challenges facing the Bahraini economy shaped the perception of actors regarding what should be done to reform the labour market and the economy as well. Those beliefs were characteristics of the first stage of the LMRP as it created cohesion between its actors and minimum disagreement existed among the cluster that worked on steering the project and promote it.

The policy recommendations are divided into three clusters: labour market access, relationship between employer and employee, and labour market governance. The labour market access for foreign workers were considered as "lax immigration rules" with little restrictions on total number of immigrant workers, low fees for work permits and little selection according to skills and qualification (EDB & CPC, 2004a,2004b,2004c, 2004). The second cluster is the rigid rules to create employments for Bahrainis such as strict hiring quotas, restrictive rules for terminating employment. In terms of governance, the problem was diagnosed as that labour market is being tightly controlled through government intervention and lengthy administrative process (EDB & CPC, 2004a,2004b,2004c). Hence, the following recommendations were proposed to tackle these issues:

- Eliminate Bahrainisation target (economic incentive)
- Implement new termination process for all employees and create new labour court
- Create a system of labour fees and quota ceiling for immigrant workers to restrict the supply of non- Bahraini labour
- Subsidise basic work training for Bahrainis and enhance incentives for Bahrainis to work in the private sector (economic incentives)
- improves mobility for immigrant worker to allow them to change employers (negative economic incentive)

- Raising working standards for all employees by implementing ILO's international standards (regulations)
- The formation of new labour market Authority that will act as a one stop shop for managing the labour market administration (economic incentive because it saves time)
- The formation of labour fund
- Developing DLRM (regulations)

These policy recommendations are designed to meet two main objectives. The first is to restructure the Bahraini economy from being reliant on public sector to a one driven by the private sector. The public sector is no longer able to accommodate the new job seekers. Hence the private sector must be encouraged to grow in a direction that enables it to create jobs in the market for medium and highly skilled job seekers. Second objective is to make the Bahrainis the preferred employees for private sectors. To ensure that the second objective is met, Bahrainis must be able to compete with immigrant workers. Hence, the cost, right and skills gap must be reduced between Bahrainis and foreign workers (EDB & CPC, 2004a).

Finally, an important aspect of policy recommendation was prioritising the labour market reforms as a first step before conducting the education and economic reforms. The EDB and MCK argues that labour market reforms are the first step to achieve the two key objectives of making Bahrainis the best choice for employers and making the private sector the engine of the economy. Starting with labour market reforms was a disputed by interest groups such as the BCCI. According to the BCCI, there must be a time gap between the economic reforms and the labour market reforms. The reforms must prioritise the restructuring of the economy before restructuring the labour market. The reason for that is that once the economy is transferred to a private led which is dependent that is capital intensive, then the demand in the labour market will change (BCCI, 2004a).

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter showed that the LMRP was initiated as part of a wider process of restructuring the economy and in association with the deficiencies within the labour market that was perceived as a reason for higher unemployment rate in Bahrain. Hence, it is affected by a believe system in certain economic model, in this case, a more liberal economic model which call for a greater role to the private sector and a regulatory role to the public sector.

The arguments over which policy tools are to be used for restructuring the labour market have been put forward by the studies conducted by McKinsey & Company. The studies' recommendations were informed by former beliefs of MCK regarding how developing countries can advance their economies which is through high skilled jobs and to be away from cheap labour economic model. The study and beliefs of MCK would not be as influential without being employed and supported by the EDB and CPC. The authority held by the EDB is a source for conducting such activities in addition to its financial abilities. The studies and information dismissed by MCK affected how policy process members think about the unemployment issue and the solution towards restructuring the labour market. It created cohesion and support to the policy package provided by the consultation company. The policy recommendations were not representative of all interest groups' perspective as they were only consulted occasionally to discuss the policy recommendations.

The new policy tools required that the EDB communicate it to the wider stakeholders. The communication is aimed at explaining the logic behind choosing such tools, and to show how these policies will be a successful solution in comparison to current policies. Hence, the communication with stake holders showed the deficiencies of the former economic and labour polices implemented in Bahrain. This rhetoric is understood as: portraying the EDB as the leader to reforms was to gain support and, to convince actors for the needs for change in accordance with the new suggested economic model

that can be in contrast to some actor's interest. The next chapter will further explain how the new ideas were contested based on the challenge out provide for the power of the cabinet and the interest of different groups within the society.

Chapter 7: The role of different actors in the Labour market reform process

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter showed how the LMRP was initiated. It is traced back to 2002 when the CP was appointed as the EDB chairman. The role of unemployment issues as a concern and the beliefs in a new economic model were a driving force for initiating the project and the establishment of the first policy draft.

This chapter discusses the role of different actors in the process by discussing the phase of drafting the law in relation to regulating the labour market (DLRM) annexed to the Royal Decree No. (25) for 2005. The role of different actors in the process is divided into three themes: how they access the process (inclusion/exclusion of actors), what explains their position form the reforms, and actions of the BCCI and EDB during the drafting of the DLRM. Interest group had different access points during different time of the process. Among these were the political reform process, the composition of parliament, membership in parliamentary committee, and merchants' relationship with the cabinet.

The chapter then discusses the interest and policy position of different actors during drafting the DLRM in which it correlates with two main contextual factors. The first factor is the effect of government structure and division of power within the ruling family. The second factor regards the role of segmented labour market, class structure and how it affects the interest of different actors. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the actions of BCCI and EDB during the discussions of DLRM, as not all the actions are understood in relation to contextual factors. Some actions are a reaction to the strategies

used by other actors during the process or skills of experts. Finally, the chapter presents the policy outcome after passing the DLRM by the parliament.

7.2.1 The perception of positive and negative effect of Political reforms initiated by the king and the inclusion of interest groups in the process.

The political reforms initiated by the king in 2001 are perceived as a positive change that led to other reforms such as labour market (Personal Interview 11, 2016). The way that the reforms affected the labour market is through: the perception of actors in relation to the political process in Bahrain as a positive environment for interest intermediation and increased the inclusiveness of actors in the process of policy-making. A former member of SHC commented on how the public opinion was engaged with labour market discussions openly without fears, he said:

"The political reforms led by king Hamad affected the willingness of people to discuss labour issues. Before the reforms people were discussing labour issues between themselves, after the reforms they found a place to raise this issue with MPs and media. The political reforms opened the door to many discussions among which was the labour market reform." (Personal Interview 23, 2016)

From the perspective of participants in the LMRP, the democratic transition in Bahrain was important for the inclusion of more members in the process (Personal Interview 17, 2016). Those actors present different organisations and political positions. They were from GFWTUB, oppositions political parties, and the EDB. They expressed that the dialogue between the authority and actors was real because the government/royal family had real intention for including other actors in the policy process (Personal Interview 3, 2016). The CP himself expressed this perspective about the reform process that he supported. He said (2007):

"Democracy is an evolutionary process that we firmly believe in. At times debate prolongs the process, but it ensures the inclusion of everyone in society. Gone are the days when you simply decree something and then expect it to happen. What we have to do is reach out to the community, argue the merits of certain policy

ideas, accept the challenges that come back at us, and respond in a manner that brings more people on board." ((De Boar and Kalkman Interview with Crown Prince, 2007, *p.4)*

Thus, the reforms were an opportunity for some actors to advance their position in the decision-making process. In this new political environment, actors like the labour's committee felt more confident to negotiate its position in political life. Their understanding of this new political context led them to try to advance their interest through drafting and negotiating a law to organise trade union work in Bahrain (Personal Interview 6,2016). According to a member of GFWTUB "*the negotiations (over the draft of law promulgating the trade unions work under the decree no 33 for year 2002) were real"* (Personal Interview 6, 2016).

In September 2001 the labour committee proposed a draft of a law to the government to organise the work of trade unions in Bahrain. They drafted the law with the assistance of the international labour organisation. This happened after they met with the prince of Bahrain Shaikh Hamad bin Salman Alkhalifa (now a king). In this meeting, they discussed the trade unions freedom and the rights to organise. The proposal was discussed between the labour committee and the minister of labour and his consultants until June 2002. The government proposed a new draft of the law which was completely different from the one proposed by the labour groups and the ILO. The new proposal was rejected by the labour committee; however, after negotiations between the government and the labour committee, the government responded to the labour committee's criticism and adjusted the law accordingly. In 2002, the government issued the law to organise trade unions in Bahrain. One of the articles that they fought for was giving the rights to non-Bahraini workers to join trade unions and to be elected as board members in the unions as well. Their good position in the negotiation is attributed to the new era of a more open political life (Personal Interview 6 and 3, 2016). The actions of trade unions in 2001 reveal that they strategically acted to advance their interest during a positive political context.

The members of the GFWTUB perceived their relationship with government agencies as effective. According to a member of GFWTUB's general secretariat, "*the GFWTUB was able to establish itself (in the decision making process), partially not fully though, there was communication with the government side represented by the ministry and also with the political leadership, there were periodic meetings, and after each re-election of the General Secretariat and after each conference we will have a quick meeting with the King and the PM and then also with the Ministry of Labour and the official bodies, the doors were open with the majority of ministers, there was official meetings and the delivery of memos and discussions in many times"* (personal Interview no3 , 2016).

The political reforms and the new procedural process introduced with the new parliament gave actors legal resources for inclusiveness in the process. The inclusiveness of actors in the policy-making process cannot be reduced for the introduction of parliamentary life in Bahrain or for legalising the interest groups to be formed. The perceptions of some actors towards such a process reveal that the political reforms were limited. Interest groups that are engaged with defending or protecting immigrant labour understood such a limitation of the political process in Bahrain. Engagement with politics and raising rights-related issues were allowed yet limited. Such perception about the political process in Bahrain limited the actions of actors such as the Migrant Workers Protection Society (MWPS).

The experience of the newly established Migrant Workers Protection Society reveals the two side of the political reforms in Bahrain. On one hand, it was an opportunity for new actors to organise themselves in Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO); on the other hand, the reforms were not completed to make actors free to pursue their goals by challenging the established norms regarding immigrant workers. Migrant Workers Protection Society was established in 2005, four years after the political reforms in Bahrain (Personal Interview 17, 2016). A board member of MWPS, describes their role as:

"to provide support to migrant workers in terms of assistance with following up with their cases, and really trying to change over what they have, a voice with the different authorities whenever there is, and interactions needed with those authorities like the police stations and LMRA". (personal interview 17, 2016).

The inception of MWPS in the time of political reforms in Bahrain was perceived by its member as an opportunity to establish a cooperation relationship with different parties that deals with immigrant workers (Alwasatnespaper,11 June 2005). The relationship between the MWPS and the government take a consultative form and they provide services to immigrant workers. The role of the society has changed positively through the time. The individuals that established the society in 2005 were not even sure they would be allowed to operate (Personal Interview 16,2016). The society is the only society of its kind in the whole of the GCC that is registered as an NGO. A member of MWPS'S BOD explains that:

"*in 10 years, we reached a point now where the government does hold us in high regards that's number one, they refer to us constantly for recommendations, they include us quiet a lot of discussions and from the outcome we are noticing that somebody is taking notice were not openly commanded for the work we do".* (Personal Interview 16,2016).

However, the society does not involve itself in any political activities and they do not make political statements (Personal Interview 16,2016). According to a member of MWPS'S BOD," we *have learned along the way that we are quite sure that we will not involve politically and making statements for the sake of making statements*" (Personal Interview 16, 2016). The strategy of not involving in politics kept the society active and effective especially that the government is not hostile toward them. According to a member of MWPS'S BOD:

"we are not antagonizing anybody, that's our main aim and but whatever we have done, one thing none of us hold any formal qualifications and it has never asked by the government how you are going to run the society, so that's saying a lots for us" (Personal Interview 16, 2016*).*

The perception of the society about the political environment reveals that the best way for them to be effective in helping and protecting immigrants is by keeping a good relationship with the government and not to be involved with politics. Thus, they prefer actions that will have an impact upon the immigrant workers such as protecting them from violence and raising awareness among them. The early activities of the society in 2005 were fundraising activities to support the victims of violence against the domestic labour in which there was a representative of different governmental and diplomatic personals (Alwasat Newspaper, 11 June 2005). This was the actions of MWPS where they understand the political limits in Bahrain, they would not engage in political activities that challenge the government. The decision was to be in cooperation with the government to protect immigrant labours.

Such a perception of the society and the activities that they were involved in explains why they were mostly consulted by MPS for issues related to domestic workers and not the cases related to other categories of workers. For instance, in 2007, the MJN started to rethink the articles included in law no 19 of 2006 regards regulating labour market. It was regarding the punishment of the immigrant workers who escape from employers and those who hide them (Shura council service committee, 2009). In addition, they were approached by the legal department of the MJN in issues related to domestic workers (Personal Interview 17, 2016).

They were not consulted in issues that the domestic workers are excluded from. For example, there were no exchange of views between them and the MJN nor the SHC for the draft law amending article 25 paragraph A of Law no. 19 of 2006 on the regulation of the labour market. This bill was submitted by the MJN in 2011 (Shura Council, 2011b). The amendment was directly in relation to immigrant labours rights in changing employers. Hence, the society established itself in the area of protecting vulnerable immigrant workers. In return, the MJN and the government as well are engaging them in such issues (shura council service committee, 2009).

7.2 Inclusion and exclusion of actors during the process

This section discusses three contextual factors that affected the inclusion and exclusion of actors during the process. The first is the perception of positive and negative effects of political reforms initiated by the king and the inclusion of interest groups in the process. The perception of the opportunity provided by the new political environment led some actors to institutionalise their existence. For instance, the trade union activist succeeded in advancing a law to legalise the establishment of trade unions. Similarly, activist in relation to immigrants' rights took advantage of the political reforms in Bahrain and found the immigrant workers protection society. However, these changes in the political context were perceived as limited and hence actors were cautious regarding their actions. The second structure for inclusion and exclusion is the parliament which was found in 2002 after the political reforms by the king. Third, the membership in parliamentary committees such as the financial and economic committee or service committee. The final factor is the relationship between merchants and government gave them an exclusive early access to the process

7.2.2 The composition of parliament and its effects on the inclusion and exclusion of actor's interest

The membership in parliament affected the discussion of the DLRM. The effect of the composition of parliament was through determining who will be included in the discussion. Those included will then present their political and economic interest during discussion. Those excluded meant their interest is excluded as well unless they had other channels for inclusion.

AWNIS that was more tolerant towards the LMRP boycotted the first parliamentary sessions. Hence, most of the parliament members were pro government. Such a context affects the inclusion and exclusion in the discussions of labour market reform policy-making process. It affected the extent to which the EDB needed to be active in convincing MPs and interest

groups regarding its policy position. The parties that boycotted the parliamentary elections in 2002 had rare access to the process between 2002 and 2006 (Personal Interview 8, 2016). The only opportunity they had was through the general consultation workshop that was held in 2004.

The first parliamentary elections held on the 2nd of October 2002 resulted in six political parties gaining seats in parliament. Twenty two elected members of parliament were affiliated with political parties and eighteen presented themselves as independent. The breakdown of these parties is found in table no 4 in page no 178. A number of independent MPS were businessmen who were against labour market reforms project. They had doubts about its success as they considered it might harm the Bahraini Economy (Parliamentary minutes, 18th October 2005, 3rdh December 2005).

Table 4 political societies that was part of parliament from 2002-2006

Political party	**The ideology of the political party**
Islamic Forum	Islamic society, with six MPs and supports an independent MP
Alasalah	Fundamentalist Sunni Islamist society with six MPs and supports an independent MP.
Shura Society	pro-government Islamist society with two MPs
Rabita Alislami	Pro-government Shia society with three members
National Charter Society	Pro-government liberal, has one MP

National Democratic Assembly	Communist ideology, has two MP

Source: taken from the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. (2002)

The composition of Parliament which was not supportive of the reforms meant that the CP will have to advance his interest through strategic actions. The new CP who has not established his political alliances with different interest groups had to lobby within the parliament to pass several new laws that is necessary for LMRP to start (De Boer and Kalkman, 2007). The team employed by the EDB and the court of the Crown Prince (CPC) met with different parliamentary blocks formally and informally to convince them about the importance of the reforms (Personal Interview 18, 2016). The process, actions and alliances that they had to build shows that the power to make major reforms in Bahrain is not centralised within one player. The CP expressed how hard the process was, he says:

"*We have had to compromise, work hard, and lobby. And we had to hold our breath a couple of times as the measure was going through parliament. Change is not easy and usually takes longer than you expect. But you should never be discouraged, as it is worthwhile in the long run.*" (De Boer and Kalkman, 2007).

The structure of parliament members changed after the boycotting political parties participated in the 2006 elections. The decision of AWNIS to participate in 2006 elections was analysed by some actors as being affected to a small extent by the labour market reforms and other reforms which gave AWNIS (the largest political society in Bahrain) a positive indicator about the political process in Bahrain (Personal Interview 18, 2016). Such a perception is

supported by literature that discusses the labour market reforms in Bahrain (Louër, 2015a). AWNIS gained 17 seats in parliament in 2006 (Abdullah, 2006). Even though the composition of parliament changed in 2006, the influence of pro-government parties and independents MPs was effective in limiting the LMRP's policy outcomes. Table no 5 (p.180) shows the breakdown of the political societies and parliamentary blocs in the parliament from 2006-2010.

Table 5 political societies and parliamentary blocs that was part of parliament from 2006-2010

Political party	**The ideology of the political party**
Alasalah	Fundamentalist Sunni Islamist society has 5 MPs
Future bloc	Four Pro government MPs,
Independents	7 MPs
Alwifaq Alislami	Shia opposition party. Had 17 MPs
Almenber Alwatani Alislami Society	Muslim brotherhood, 7 MPs

Source: taken from (Abdullah, 2006. Alwasat Newspaper, issue no 1564, dated 17 December 2006, Almaskati, 2006)

7.2.3 Membership in parliamentary committee

The membership in specialised committees in parliament gives its members an exclusive access to discuss drafts of laws in detail with different stakeholders. After submitting the DLRM to parliament, it was referred to a joint committee of two main committees in parliament namely: the economic &financial issues committee with services committee. Those committees are responsible for discussing such issues. Hence, MPs who are part of these committees had

access to the process through specialisation in such issues. The joint committee was chaired by Jehad Bukamal who a Board member of the BCCI and its financial secretary for is its 26th session that started in November 2005 (Alwasat, 2005). Other members were Abd Alnabi Salman from the Democratic bloc, Jassim Abd Alaal (Independent businessman and previous MP), Ali Ahmed (Muslim Brotherhood), Othman Sharif (BCCI), Isa Abu Alfateh (AAIS), Abd Al Aziz Al Meer from (Muslim brotherhood) (Abu Safwan, 2002). The composition of the committee represents different type of interests and ideological background. They did not have a rigid perspective against the labour market reforms. The MPs who were aggressively against the reforms such as Ebrahim Busandel and the leader of AAIS bloc Ghanim Al Buainain were not part of the committee though other members of AAIS bloc was part of the committee as well (The Finance Affairs and Economical Committee and Services Committee in the Parliament, 2005).

The Economic & Financial issues Committee held three meetings to discuss the draft of law. The Services committee held four meetings to discuss the project, and there was only one meeting jointly. Both committees met with the following actors: The Legal Department in the Parliament, the CPC, the Ministry of Labour and the EDB. They also received written comments from BCCI, the Bahrain Centre for Research and Studies, the Legal and Legislative Department, the Bahraini Economic Society, the Bahraini Businessman Society. (The Finance Affairs and Economical Committee and Services Committee in the Parliament, 2005, p.179). All these interactions were held over a short time span between June- July 2005.

Most of the outcomes were agreed between actors, and no major disagreement was presented at that stage. The joint committee outcome was in favour of EDB's perspective as the changes made to the DLRM were not significant. There were no changes to the power of the newly suggested LMRA in terms of determining fees over immigrant workers or drawing the national labour strategy. The committee agreed with EDB and CPC about the importance of applying the law to immigrant domestic workers, and the

importance of free movement of labour. However, such agreement was not welcomed by the majority of the MPs, especially from the side of AAIS bloc who had rare representation in the joint committee (The Finance Affairs and Economical Committee and Services Committee in the representative council, 2005).

The disagreement about the joint committee's outcome led to the establishment of temporary committee. The establishment of such committee was suggested by the leader of AAIS bloc Ghanim Al Boinein. The actions by AAIS led them to have more prominent position during the discussions. The temporary committee aimed to discuss some controversial articles. These articles were about the power of the LMRA, the domestic workers issue, the role of MPs and cabinet in monitoring the work of the authority. The members of the temporary committee were from the following blocs: four from independent bloc, one from AAIS, one from Almenber Alislami bloc, two from Islamic bloc, one from democratic bloc, and one not affiliated with any bloc (Parliamentary minutes, 3rd^{h} December 2005)

The interactions between MPs increased after the establishment of this temporary committee. The temporary committee held seven meetings and two meetings with the EDB. Almost half of the MPs participated in some of the committee's meetings, nine of which are members of the committee and seven other MPs who attended the meetings (FECSHC, 2005). The results of these meetings were a significant change to the DLRM. Changes were in the following aspects: the power of the newly suggested LMRA, the extent that the newly established authority will be controlled by the Minister, the inclusion and exclusion of domestic workers (Parliamentary minutes, 21st March 2006).

7.2.4 Merchants relationship with cabinet

The CPC and the Ministry of Labour has drawn the draft of law to regulate the labour market without consulting with any interest groups (The Finance Affairs and Economical Committee and Services Committee in the Parliament, 2005, p.274). However, the EDB cannot proceed without having to be engaged with

other actors who because of their historical relations with the government of Bahrain will inevitably be consulted in economic related matters. In February 2005 the office of the PM informed the BCCI about the draft law on the regulation of the labour market and requested their opinion to be written and sent to the office of the PM (The Finance Affairs and Economical Committee and Services Committee in the Parliament, 2005, p.274). Such a consultation process is informal; there is no constitutional, legal or written agreement for it. Such a consultation procedure has always been present in history. According to the former executive chairman of BCCI that *"since 1939 the BCCI's been supporting the state as a consultative institution" (Personal Interview 4, 2016).*

The BCCI in this case had a privileged access to the decision-making process before presenting the DLRM to parliament. Despite such early access to the process, BCCI's effect over the draft law was limited to the explanatory note of the law. The explanatory note determined the total work permits fees would be BD 600 charged every two years and the monthly fees would be BD 75. This was later on scrapped from the explanatory note before referring the project to the Parliament. The suggestion was made by the BCCI to lower the work permits fees for BD 300 every two years and for monthly BD 10 in which it can gradually increase up to BD 30 in the following five years (The Finance Affairs and Economical Committee and Services Committee in the Parliament, 2005, p.277). The BCCI's suggestion was effective. The government changed the explanatory note about the fees to "The *Government intends to reform the labour market through the imposition of such fees in a flexible and gradual manner and the ability of the national economy to absorb the project*" (The Finance Affairs and Economical Committee and Services Committee in the Parliament, 2005, p 376).

The relationship between the government and businessmen is more established in comparison to other interest groups. They have 12 joint committees with twelve different governmental ministries, agencies and departments. In addition to one joint committee with one civil association namely the GFWTUB (BCCI,2017). They do not have a joint committee with the

office of the PM though there are communications between them through letters (BCCI ,2017). According to a former member of BCCI's BOD l, the role of the BCCI in the policy-making is " *the BCCI is a consultative organisation… it works toward giving a voice to the private sector and delivering the point of view of that sector to the decision makers in the state, though this voice wasn't always heard by the state, yet in many cases takes in to account the BCCI point of view, the biggest proof for that are the joint committees between the BCCI and the state , this proof that the state wants to hear the point of view of the private sector" (Personal Interview 5, 2016).*

In addition, businessmen constitute half of the cabinet where they exert influence through it (Personal Interview 22, 2016). The BCCI uses their connections with the PM to dispute policies that do not represent their interest. They communicate directly with the PM's office when disputing certain policies that affects their interests. The BCCI requests meetings with the PM or send letters to his office (Personal Interviews 4, 5, 7, 2016). The relationship between the chamber and the PM was a two way relationship. The PM himself is interested in listening to the opinion of the Businessman (Personal Interview 4, 2016). According to the former CEO of the BCCI said that "*The PM visited the BCCI without a prior arrangement to his visits. It was a sudden visit. He said to us I want to listen to the opinion of the BCCI in a logical and scientific way.*" (Personal Interview 4, 2016). This visit was during the LMRP, and the topic of discussion was about the policy recommendations suggested by the EDB and MCK.

The relationship between the PM and the BCCI's member extended to be a social one. The PM visited the chairman of the BCCI in his house to congratulate him on his health recovery (The Office of the Prime Minister, 2004). The relationship extends to the extent that the PM choose the designs of the new building of the Chamber in 2003 (BCCI, 2003). This social relationship did not exist between the BCCI chairman and the CP.

7.3 How to understand the interest and policy position of different actors during drafting the DLRM?

This section discusses the position of different actors during the DLRM discussion through tracing them back to perceived political, economic and public interest. These perceived interests are linked to two main contextual factors: the division of power between the government actors, and how class structure was developed in Bahrain. To understand the link between these perceived interests of actors and these two contextual factors, the policy contents will be divided in to two groups based on the policy principles presented by the DLRM. First, the power and authority of the newly created labour market organisation. Second, the policy tools for restructuring the labour market which touch upon the interest of business owners and the public members through changing policies related to immigrant workers. The two categorisations are aimed to unpack the source of disagreement between different actors during drafting the DLRM, and even making sense for discussing the action of BCCI and EDB in section 7.5.

The first category of policy content within the DLRM is in relation to the power and authority of the newly created labour market organisation. The discussions over it were to some extent affected by the nature of power division within the ruling family and how each actor perceive the meaning of such division. One group of actors such as the BCCI, AAIS, Almenber al Islami supported that fees must be determined by the Cabinet (Parliamentary minutes, 19th session, 21st March 2006., and Parliamentary minutes, 17th session, 7th March). As discussed earlier, AWNIS supported the transition of some power to the CP because they believed the CP is able to achieve more for public good than the PM (LOUËR, 2015b). While the BCCI supported that cabinet determine the fees as they believe that economic matters should be in the hand of the cabinet (Personal Interview 4, 2016), the only analysis to such A position is that their interest is preserved more with the cabinet rather than the CP.

The second group of policy details is the one related to economic and perceived public interest of actors or public. These are traced back to how the labour market was segmented during 1970s and the development of class structure. Most of the stakeholders involved during the process had some aspects of rejection to the proposed restructuring policy tools such as free movement of labour, amount of fees or how it will be implemented, the effect of these policies on the public who relied on domestic workers for childcare or elderly care. Hence such matters were not solely affected by division of power within government. Other major factors such as class structure, perceived economic and social interest were major factors for decision regards these suggested policy tools. Among those actors were AWNIS which is categorised as a supporter to the LMRP (AlHassan, 2012).

7.3.1 Government structure and division of power within the ruling family

The power politics and competition between the ruling family affected the LMRP in Bahrain. This context was effective in changing the resources of elites within the royal family and affecting the position of interest groups from the labour market reforms. A few months before commencing the LMRP in Bahrain, a new division of power within the Bahraini government took place. This division of power was through segmenting the government by appointing the CP as the chairman of the EDB instead of the PM. The CP Shaikh Salman Bin Hamad Alkhalifa was appointed the Chairman of the Bahrain EDB in 2002. The King of Bahrain considered the new fragmentation as important to accelerate the economic performance of the country (Aljamri, 2003). In an interview with king Hamad Bin Salman Al Khalifa by the press in 2003, he says in relation to the new government order:

"The *most important step taken by me is handing over the file of the economy to son Salman with the aim of seeking to raise the level of our economy to the ranks of high status countries. We have separated the political decision from the economic decisions. The political decision requires a consensus of those responsible for the matter and this takes longer time. The economy does not tolerate delays and needs a quick decision. Currently we have the mechanism*

of the EDB, and its decisions are separate from the Council of Ministers. "(Aljamri, 2003)

The EDB is responsible for "*formulating the Kingdom's economic development strategy and attracting foreign direct investment into Bahrain"* (EDB, 2016). The chairman of the EDB holds the power to appoint the EDB's board of directors (Official Gazette, 2002). However, the decisions of the EDB must be approved by the cabinet before the implementation phase (Official Gazette, 2000). This power granted to EDB changed in 2005 and 2009 but is not affected directly by the LMRP or other reforms such as education reform.

Further changes were made in May 2005 just few months after the drafting the DLRM by the EDB. The changes were major as they gave the EDB more power over determining the economic policies in Bahrain and it also changed the relationship between the EDB and the Cabinet. These changes were as following: the EDB become in a coordination relationship with cabinet rather than being directly administrated by it, the EDB have been granted the power to draw economic policies that are binding to ministries, the power to choose CEO's for companies owned by the government or has shares in it, the power to draw economic strategies, the power to give approval on large investment projects (Official Gazette, 2005, 2000). Table 6 on page no 187 provide a comparison between the power of EDB before and after the changes of May 2005.

Table 6: Comparison between EDBs power before and after royal decree no 31 for the year 2005 regards establishing and organising the EDB.

Power and authorities of the EDB	Before May 2005	After May 2005
The relationship between EDB and Cabinet	The EDB under the administration of the Cabinet	The President of the Council shall have a coordinating relationship in the work

		of the Council with the PM
Power of implementation of policies	The decisions of the EDB, after being approved by the Council of Ministers, shall be binding on the Ministries and administrations of the State	The decisions of the EDB, are binding on the Ministries and administrations of the State without having to be referred to council of ministries
Power to choose CEO's of companies owned by government	Not part of EDB's role	The selection of heads of state-owned companies and those in which the state contributes by a majority of the capital and the nomination of government representatives in companies in which the contribution is less than that, in coordination with the Council of Ministers

power to draw economic strategies	Was the role of Ministry of Finance and National Economy but the EDB had the role to suggest economic policies	Promotion of economic issues and the tasks of strategic and sectoral economic planning and privatization controls, which were the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and the national economy
Power to give approval on large investment projects	Not part of EDB's role	Approval of large investment projects in accordance with the regulations established by the Council
Consultation on related drafts law	Not part of EDB's role	The EDB's opinion shall be taken in the draft laws relating to the powers entrusted to it

Source: (Official Gazette, 2005,2000)

This division of power was an opportunity to the EDB and a constrains over their abilities to implement their economic and labour market vision. It was an opportunity because the CP gained new authorities that will assist him to draw and implement strategies in relation to Bahraini economy. However, this new

power created rivalries with other established governmental actors such as the PM. A former member of AWPB considered this rivalry as a restrictive to the policy process (interview 8, 2016). According to him the: "*process is not smooth in a way that leads the country to its best, this is one of the main problems in the Bahraini economy, which is that the legislative authority that supposed to push for economic legislations is governed by the different power centres within the ruling authorities, there are different perspectives within the ruling authority, one side of it believes in the economic vision which is the EDB, the other side (he means the PM) is afraid that his empire will be affected from these procedures"* (Personal Interview 8,2016). Similarly, the CEO of Mumtalakat, member of the EDB Talal Alzein expressed that The EDB and the government has different perspectives in accordance to economic policies, he said:

" We want one vision, one decision, one strategy and all those involved in national action agree on the need to harmonize efforts in a coherent manner. This requires that those entrusted with the implementation of the economic reform strategy be allowed to do what has been agreed upon" (Alwasat, 14th January 2008).

The effect of the composition of parliament and the division of power within ruling family are linked together. According to a former MP representing AWNIS in parliament that their actions toward supporting the Crown Prince's reform proposals were limited due to *"the influence that come from outside the parliament and influenced how MPs react to the policies for reforming the labour market" (Personal Interview 8, 2016)*. The division between the CP and the PM affected the division inside the parliament. In addition, such divisions were reflected during the discussion of the DLRM. Most MPs rejected the economic authorities granted to the suggested LMRA. The disagreement over the LMRA's authority and other issues in relation to economic interest of businessmen and MPs that will be discussed in section 7.3 led the EDB and CPC to seek support from MPs and interest groups outside the parliament.

The direct relationship between the PM and MPs of AAIS for example or Muslim brotherhood is not found in the data due to non-response of former MPs of

these blocs for interviewing request. However, the data collected from reviewing media's content, statements by AAIS's member and actions undertaken by them during the reforms and after reveals that the position they held resonate with the position of the government. For instance, they refused the power held by the proposed LMRA to determine the fees, they regard it as an authority to the cabinet. AAIS bloc adopted the fisherman demand regards the abolishing of foreign labour fees imposed on them (LMRA, 10th March 2009). Similarly, the PM visited the fisherman and promised to find solutions to problems that was caused by the fees.

In addition, the member of AAIS and Muslim Brotherhood were awarded high positions within the government after the uprising in 2011. AAIS and Almenber Alwatani Alislami gained seats in SHC (i.e. Adel Al Mawadah appointed in SHC in 2014) and gained government positions in the years that followed the uprising (Alwasat, 2014). Ghanim Al Boianan the president of AAIS was appointed in the following governmental positions in the years that proceeded the LMRP: In 2012, he was appointed as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, in 2015 he was appointed as an advisor to the Royal Court for Shura and House of Representatives Affairs (Bahrain News Agency, 2015), similarly Almenber president Salah Ali was appointed as Minister of State for Human Rights in 2012 (Bahrain News Agency, 2012). In return, these societies showed full support to government in time of need especially during 2011 uprising in.

7.3.2 Power struggle during drafting the DLRM: who determine economic policies?

The changes to EDB's power and granting it wider responsibility over economic issues in Bahrain came at the same time were the Parliament was discussing the DLRM. The parliament and the BCCI were trying to hold on to the PM as the main authority to determine the final fees charged on immigrant labour and the national labour market strategy. This tendency to support the economic power of the cabinet was reflected in BCCI's written perspectives about the

DLRM, and BCCI's Board members perspectives about their role in the Labour marker Regulatory Authority (Personal Interview 7, 2016).

On the 18th of May 2005, the BCCI resubmitted its vision regards the DLRM. The written opinion was upon the request of Economic and Finance Committee in the Parliament. The BCCI expressed its dissatisfaction with article 4A which gives the LMRA the power to determine the national labour market strategy; the BCCI considers that such strategy can be suggested by the LMRA but must be approved by the council of Ministries. The BCCI argued that: *"This is because the National Labour Market Plan is linked to and influenced by the economic development plans approved by the Government, and for the Government to be aware of the Authority's plans for the labour market" (*FECSHC, 2006, p285). Similarly, with any fees to be charged over immigrant workers must be approved by the cabinet. The BCCI asserted that the cabinet is the responsible government body over economic planning; such an assertion came 10 days after the issuing of legislative decree that gave the EDB more power over determining economic policies (FECSHC, 2006, p285).

BCCI's perspective about the role of LMRA and the cabinet in relations to labour market policies is reflected by BCCI's representative in LMRA's Board of Directors. In an interview with the representative of BCCI in the LMRA's BOD, he considers that policies related to labour are the responsibility of the Council of Ministries. His perception to the role of LMRA's board of director is that it only implements policies and does not devise them. Regarding BCCI's role in the LMRA's Board of directors, he says:

"We usually represent traders in the board of directors., we are not involved in determining policies such as employment , Bahrainisation rate and its percentage, these issues are the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour, we don't have any role in determining it, our role is to discuss the LMRA's budget, and LMRA's projects, and issues that people are facing such as delays in transactions or bureaucracy… As for policies, the policies are explicitly set by the state, we are just a labour market regulator" (Personal Interview 7, 2016)

The BCCI rejected the power granted to LMRA by arguing that such power contradicts the Bahraini constitution. According to BCCI's former chief

executive officer "*The authority to impose fees in the first project was not by the PM, but the EDB, we objected, we said that it is not permissible, originally not constitutionally permissible, when the government want to impose fees it must be a decision of the Council of Ministers, …this is a safety valve"* (Personal Interview 4, 2016). The interesting point is that BCCI conflated EDB with LMRA. BCCI perception reveals how the government is fragmented which means the EDB and LMRA are considered under the same authority which is the CP. This perception comes despite the fact that the Minister of labour is the chairperson of LMRA's Board of Directors, and the BCCI has a representative in both LMRA and EDB's Board of Directors.

MPs also disputed the power granted to the suggested LMRA. The MPs associated the power of determining labour policies by the cabinet with the power of parliament to question such policies. Hence protecting the power of cabinet over labour policies means protecting the power of Parliament. For instance, MPs presenting Almenber Alislami bloc (Muslim Brotherhood) suggested that the national plan on the labour market that will be developed and implemented by LMRA must be approved by the cabinet before implementation (Salah Ali the leader of Muslim brotherhood bloc, Fourth ordinary session minutes, 18th October 2005). Salah Ali argued that the Bahraini constitution gives the cabinet the responsibility to draw such policies and that the parliament will be able to monitor the work of the cabinet:

*"Because it is the legislative authority that deals with the executive authority represented by the Council of Ministers and because the Constitution in Article 47 / A said: "The Council of Ministers takes care of the interests of the state and sets the general policy of the Kingdom." This is a general policy for the Kingdom. I am requesting the addition of a paragraph "to be approved by the Council of Ministers." If approved by the executive authority, then it is accountable and accountable to the legislative authority in the future "(*Parliamentary minutes, *18th October 2005, p 50).*

MPs ensured that even when there is conflict between the interest of LMRA and what they call "state directions", the council of Ministers will be the final decision makers to resolve any disputes. The temporary committee decided to change the nature of the relationship between the minister and the LMRA

Board of Directors during dispute cases. The original draft law proposed an internal mechanism to solve any contradiction that may occur in LMRA's policies if it contradicts government policies. The minister must communicate this issue by writing a document to the LMRA's Board of director. Subsequently, the LMRA's Board of Directors have the chance to study the document and implement the minister's suggestions if it does not contradict the LMRA's responsibilities. However, this was changed by MPs to suggest that the cabinet must also be involved during the dispute (FECSHC, 2006, p.350,). In addition, the minister can be questioned by the MPs about the work and decisions of LMRA (FECSHC, 2006, p.350,).

Eventually, the adjustment to the draft of law in relation to the LMRA's power was made after negotiations with EDB. The EDB adhered to the request of MPs in order to pass the law as quickly as possible. EDB adjusted several articles to ensure that the MPs (mainly the ones representing Alasalah and Almenber blocs) fears about monitoring LMRA by the MPs is met. According to Yousef khalaf, the Legal Affairs Advisor at the EDB:

"There was a fear that this body would not be subject to political responsibility by the parliament. I think that many guarantees have been added so that the Minister has full authority to supervise the work of the Commission. Therefore, this body is subject to the Minister responsible for its work for political oversight in the House of Representatives." (Parliamentary minutes, 18th October 2005, p.30)

7.3.3 Segmented labour market, class structure and citizenships right

After gaining independence in 1971, Bahrain and other GCC countries were receiving most of the oil revenues rather than sharing it with other international oil companies. Thus, the significant amount of capital was spent on building infrastructure and financing the state new institutions and universal welfare system (Alshehabi, 2015). The expansion of state apparatus and welfare resulted in increased labour demand for public sector. The public sector was more attractive to citizens with higher wages, lower working hours and secured work related benefits. The private sector relied mostly on immigrant labour. Alshehabi (2015) suggests that the influx of temporary

immigrants benefited the business sector and led them to rely more on immigrant workers. Employing citizens was not attractive because of the legal and material cost, while employing a foreign worker was more cost effective for employers due to the less legal obligations toward non-citizens.

As explained in chapter two, the post 1970s oil boom that expanded the Bahraini and other GCC countries' public sector and created a demand for immigrants labour resulted in reconstituting class and citizenship. Citizens had different working rights, access to a universal welfare system. Immigrants were guest workers, with no path to gaining citizenship. Most of the work in relation to low skilled jobs was occupied by immigrants, while citizens occupied public sectors jobs. According to Hannieh (2010):

*"citizenship was restricted to a tiny proportion of the population who were provided with varying levels of access to the benefits accruing from oil revenues. These ranged from cheap housing, education and other state benefits for the average citizen, to massive economic grants, contracts, and 'sustainers' for members of the ruling elite and wealthiest merchant families. The nature of the working class was transformed in this process. Rather than native workers, those who did most of the work in the Gulf states were brought from outside the country as temporary migrant labour" (*p.7)**.**

Upon the reform process, the labour market was segmented in accordance with citizenship rights and public versus private sectors. Since the 1970s, the immigrant workers' population in Bahrain grow from 50- 70 percent of labour force (Cited in Hannieh, 2010). The segmented labour market was divided between public sector with a high percentage of citizen workers versus private sector dominated by temporary workers. The public sector workforce was 90 percent Bahrainis in 2000; in contrast, two thirds of the private sector were non-Bahraini (ILO, 2002). Between 1990 and 2002, around 84,000 jobs were created by the private sector, 80 percent of these jobs paid less than BD200 (£407). Bahrainis were not attracted to these low paid jobs as two third of the newly created jobs went to immigrant labour (EDB, 2004). Some immigrants in low paid jobs live in impoverished living conditions. There was a relative poverty among Bahrainis as well especially in relation to religious sector, such as poverty among Bahraini Shia (Hanieh, 2011). Yet class-based division in Gulf

states is formed with the influx of cheap immigrant labour to these countries. According to Hanieh (2011), the class structure was "congealed spatially around temporary migrant labour flows and was demarcated through the institution of citizenship "(p.63).

The contextual inequality within the Bahraini environment affected the interest of the political societies and member of parliaments. The political societies in parliament do not represent the rights of those immigrant workers who do not have a vote in the political process. In addition, the social or economic interest that some MPs are presented in the continuous exploitation of immigrant labour rather than granting them the freedom to move from one employer to another. Such class structure explains the structural interest of MPs and how such interest affected their actions during the reform. The rights of citizens and what benefits them is different from those related to temporary workers. There was no bloc in the parliament that represented the rights of immigrants as they do not have the right to vote.

The effect of the class and citizenship structure will be illustrated in three examples: first in regard to how actors dealt with domestic workers right, second on the effect of considering immigrants worker as temporary labour, third, in regard to the relationship between AWNIS and the GFWTUB.

The perception regards Domestic Labour's right is an illustration to the interest of MPs as determined by the class structure within Bahraini society. There was a division between actors regards how to perceive domestic workers. The EDB, Ministry of Labour and some MPs deal with the economic impact of domestic workers while other MPs deals with domestic workers as a social unit that is important for the welfare of Bahraini Families. The MPs perceived the domestic worker issue as a matter of public interest. The MPs considered the "*domestic workers as a main element, and that they are the MPs representing the interest of people hence they didn't want to increase the cost of foreign labour, domestic labour, i.e. drivers, agricultural, servants, therefore MPs make the condition that the domestic labours should not be covered by the law and it*

should be covered by the private sector law which is under the responsibility of Ministry of Labour" (Personal Interview 18, 2016). Such concerns about what the domestic workers represent affected the decision-making process of actors involved in discussing the DLRM.

The DLRM that was submitted by the EDB and CPC includes the domestic workers. The EDB considers that domestic workers must be included in the draft of law because the domestic workers represent more than a third of the foreign workforce in the country (Parliamentary Minutes, 18 Oct 2005). The Minister of Labour Dr Majeed Alalawi support the inclusion of domestic Labour at least partially within the draft of law as the exclusion of domestic workers from the law means that the intended labour market reforms will be distorted (Parliamentary Minutes, 18 Oct 2005).

In contrast, The Joint Committee perspective was that the domestic workers are a social issue that must be dealt with cautions. Hence, the committee's suggestion was to include the domestic workers within the law but with recommending that the LMRA establishes a special designed system for them. The system that will be specially designed for them is related to how labour fees should be implemented on domestic labour but not to be excluded from all aspects of the draft of law (Parliamentary Minutes, 18 Oct 2005). The first secretary of the joint committee Abd Al Nabi Salman commented that the article related to domestic workers been discussed with EDB, CPC and the members of The Joint Committee and agreement had been achieved to keep including the domestic worker within the law. However, MPs insisted that the domestic workers article must be returned to the committee again for further discussions (Parliamentary Minutes of the Fourth regular parliamentary minutes,18 October 2005).

The domestic labour workers were the weakest circle within the policy package. Excluding them did not take extended arguments and debates as the other issues. The domestic labour workers were then excluded from the draft of law. The domestic workers' issue was traded for other disputed issues

(Personal Interview 18, 2016). This occurred during the process of convincing MPs to accept the clause regarding the movement of labour between different employers. Hence, part of the deal was to remove domestic workers from being covered by the DLRM. The CP and the Government pledge that domestic workers will be organised by a special system. This means they will not be treated like the other immigrant workers who came for work on jobs other than domestic work (Parliamentary Minutes, 18 Oct 2005).

After referring the domestic workers' issue to The Joint Committee, the MPs decided to include the domestic workers in one article within the law. The committee added a new clause to article no 42 in which the new LMRA can propose a special regulation on the determination of work permits fees for domestic workers. However, such a proposal can only be implemented three years from the date of the commencement of the law. In addition, the power to determine the implementation of domestic workers' fees system is within the hands of the Council of Ministers (FECSHC, 2006, p. 349).

The second illustration relates to considering immigrants as temporary non-citizens who do not have full rights. The perception of the citizenship statues affects both the Bahrainis who are part of the policy process and immigrants who organised themselves in civil societies to protect the interest of foreign labour in Bahrain. The beliefs that the immigrant workers are not an immigrant but rather a foreign, expat and temporary workers were a driving force that bounded the policy process and the type of policy recommendations. The law decree no (23) for 1976 for organising labour in the private sector in Bahrain refers to non-Bahraini workers as foreign workers in article 4 and 6, this continued with other legislative degrees amending the labour law in the following years (ILO, 1993).

Some actors that were interviewed expressed their dissatisfaction with addressing non-Bahraini labours as immigrants. The perception of the temporary existence of those immigrants considered as the basis of policy-making in Bahrain (Personal Interview 23, 2016). A former member of SHC in

Bahrain and the former chairman of National Institute for Human Rights said about this issue:

" we categorise the foreign labour in our categorisation during the policy-making as an expatriate not an immigrants because they are not seeking immigration as individuals but rather they came seeking for work, seeking jobs, they came only for work based on contracts… they did not come by themselves asking for immigration or for political asylum… he can't get a job unless he agrees with someone else, that happens when the job seeker is outside Bahrain, this happen through employment agencies…. So these are the basis of policy-making in Bahrain and the Gulf Countries, they are not immigrant because they haven't come seeking immigration due to some circumstances they are going through, they came seeking jobs and they come by themselves; their family don't come with them, that's why we consider them as job seekers not immigrants, job seekers looking for jobs in the region and we have jobs opportunities" (Personal Interview 23, 2016)

The perception of the status of immigrants as guests and not as citizens affects the activities of some actors such as the members of the Migrants Workers Protection Society. The perception of their status as temporary immigrants who are involved in voluntary activities to protect the rights of immigrants means that they have to be politically cautious of what they can say or do (Personal Interview 17, 2016). For instance, a board member of the MWPS, describes their relationship with the government: "*we have to keep that not all of us are Bahrainis so we have to keep in mind the balance between what a guest can say, you know we are not at home without impacting the society as a whole and then losing"* (Personal Interview 17, 2016).

Literature that discusses nationalisation policies in Bahrain confirms such a belief. Al Aali (2014) found that policy outcomes were related to how government officials perceived the status of immigrant labours. She says that "*As stated by government officials, there is a need to form a policy to limit expatriate stay on the understanding that the need for expatriate skills is temporary as they will be gradually filled by nationals."* (Alaali, 2014. p.319). Similarly, Gardner (2010) makes the same point that the temporary status of immigrant workers in Bahrain is reinforced by the government and citizens as

well (p.28). The data collected from the field work confirms the same findings of Al Aali and Gaerdner. For instance, a member of GFWTUB's general secretariat explains that the concepts being held by government about immigrant workers does not conform with reality, in real life immigrants are not temporary they stay in Bahrain for many years (Personal Interview 2, 2016). He adds that such concept is no limited to government actors, Bahrainis as well as trade unionist consider immigrant workers as temporary and that labour rights is limited to Bahrainis. He says that:

" governments and employers are still worried about the use of the word immigrants and insist on the word expatriate migrant workers, although this reflects concepts held regards immigrants, which is not just a word, and in fact they say temporary but we know that some workers have been in Bahrain for twenty or fifteen years Year, this obstacle must be eliminated and expat workers should be considered as worker with rights similar to local worker's rights" (Personal Interview 2, 2016).

The third illustration to how the economic interest of parliamentary blocs is affected by their economic and class interest is the relationship between AWNIS and the GFWTUB. The members of the general secretary of GFWTUB represents three different political societies: AWNIS, the democratic progressive tribune, and national democratic action society, and others who are independent. Around 53 percent of the general secretary members are associated with AWNIS (Alwasat, 2008). The GFWTUB relationship with those parties is described as based on harmony and mutual understanding (Personal Interview 8, 2016). However, AWNIS which dominates the GFWTUB's board of directors stands on different principles regards labour rights from the perspectives held by the GFWTUB. The GFWTUB adopts all ILO's principles when it comes to immigrants' labour rights. While AWNIS holds other interests to protect which is the Bahraini citizens' interest. In this respect, AWNIS tries to balance between labour and business interests. A former member of AWPB comments on the relationship with GFWTUB which shows how they try to support the business interest as well:

"we never tried to be in opposition of the trade unions, we perceived them as the entrusted body in taking decision in these issues (labour related issues), we always enjoyed listening to their opinion, they were always standing by the labour's rights. But we are different (AWNIS), we have to balance between labour and businessman, the GFWTUB's responsibility is to protect labours, but our responsibility is to protect labour and at the same time protect businessman" (Personal Interview 9, 2016).

The perspective of AWNIS regarding the causes of the unemployment problem resonates with the perception of its former MPs regarding the interest that AWNIS represents. AWNIS vision toward solving unemployment issues in Bahrain presents three causes to unemployment: the government, private sector, and the Bahraini citizens (Alwifaq, 2005, Alekri, 2005). Their vision is an attempt to balance between all three parties as responsible for the unemployment issues in Bahrain. From the perspective of AWNIS, the government is responsible because of the following:

- they are not serious about economic and educational reforms
- educational system does not match the demands of labour market
- the import of immigrant labour, the political unrest in Bahrain
- The government's failure to regulate the import of foreign labour
- illegal naturalization
- Non-compliance by the government with its constitution and charter regarding the citizen's right to decent work (Alwifaq, 2005., Alekri,2005).

In regard to citizens' responsibility, AWNIS believes that citizens are ignorant about the needs of the market, some students drop out of their schools before the completion of basic education. This provides the excuse for officials in the Kingdom and private employers to refuse employing Bahrainis due to lack the skills and minimum competencies to work. They also blame the behaviour of Bahraini workers such as lack of loyalty to work which is a similar rhetoric of businessmen. In terms of the private sector, they are blamed for the following:

preferring immigrant workers because they are cheaper to hire and easy to expel. Employers circumvent the laws by registering Bahraini workers by registering all parents, purchasing cards for those in need, and other twisted methods to attract more foreign labour, the focus of Private sectors on service led business rather than industrial activities, thus creating jobs for low skilled workers (Alwifaq, 2005., Alekri, 2005).

The stance of AWNIS is not equivalent to the position of the GFWTUB in the following topics: domestic workers right, fees imposed on foreign workers, the freedom to move from one employer to another, the minimum wage requirements, and Bahrainisation rate. The domestic workers' freedom to have a day off was regarded as not welcomed. The reason for that is due to the misbehaviour of men towards immigrant females (Personal Interview 8, 2016). AWNIS demanded a gradual application of fees on immigrant labour while the GFWTUB supported higher fees being imposed on businessmen (Personal Interview 9, 2016). Ironically, where the GFWTUB pushed for three months' notice before moving to another employer, AWNIS's representative in the Joint Committee between MPs and BBCI agreed on prioritising the work contract between the employer and employee when it comes to free movement of immigrant labour. Hence, indirectly disagreeing with the three months' notice that was implemented by the LMRA (Albilad Press, 8th January 2010). In addition, AWNIS bloc did not support the minimum wage suggestions because they perceived it as an obstacle for employment. Another point was about the Bahrainisation rate; AWNIS did not insist on such a policy because it could harm the competitiveness of Bahrain (Personal Interview 11, 2016).

Despite these differences, there were no disputes between the two organisations (Personal Interview 11, 2016). The political exchange between AWNIS and GFWTUB consists of communication and taking opinions rather than negotiations. The former MP of AWNIS describe the relationship with the GFWTUB as: "*there was no dispute between us and them, because of Salman (Salman is the general secretary of the GFWTUB), there was some differences in opinion regards some issues … yet there was a working relationship and give*

and take discussions". The GFWTUB did not insist for certain issues to be adopted by AWNIS parliamentary bloc. A former member of AWPB considers that AWNIS have legal resource hence its opinion matters a lot for the GFWTUB "the opinion of Alwifaq was important because they are part of the legislative process, though there were lots of communications (between Alwifaq and the GFWTUB)". (Personal Interview 11, 2016).

The outcomes of the connection between the GFWTUB and AWNIS for labour's right is that not all members of the leader of GFWTUB are committed to equalising the rights of immigrant and national workers. According former board member of GFWTUB, "*the political islamist parties supported unionist to be leaders in GFWTUB though those leaders are not convinced about trade union rights or equality among workers in all matters"* (Personal Interview 19, 2016).

The perspective of AWNIS of considering the perspective of businessmen as well as the labours reveals that they were not entirely agreeing with tall the policy details of labour market reforms. This explains the argument of Alhassan (2012) and LOUËR (2015). In regard to the position of AWNIS about the reforms ignores the fact the AWNIS political interest in supporting the CP does not mean that they ignored the business interest.

AWNIS were generally supportive to the reforms for two reasons: they considered the reforms in general as a good idea (Personal Interview 8,2016), and as per the argument of the literature they supported the shift of power to the new CP (LOUËR, 2015). They were not hostile in their discourses towards the reforms. However, they also considered some details of the policy tools as problematic. According to A former member of AWPB, the policy that was based on imposing the BD10 on all the business was not totally correct. The main problem with such policy is the equalising between the big businesses with thousands of workers and small businesses that may struggle to compete in the market. Such perspective is considering the economic interest of at least

the small business in the market and how they will be affected by imposing the labour market fees (Personal Interview 8, 2016).

As illustrated in chapter two, the literature regarding the reform categorised AWNIS as in alliance with CP for the sake of the labour market reforms and such alliance were needed for AWNIS movement (LOUËR, 2015a). LOUËR (2015a, 2015b) analysis to AWNIS position during labour market reforms concludes that the power rivalries between CP and PM, and the political interest of AWNIS during the reforms are the main context to understand the launching and implementation of the reforms. Similarly, Alhassan's (2012) illustration about the positions of different actors indicates the reforms as either with or against the reforms. Such analysis does not take in to account the perspective of AWNIS from specific policy tools suggested by the reforms and what does this position entail in term of the contextual effect on the reform process. It also does not consider the perceived interest that those actors support. Hence, the point that even if there was no division of power within the ruling family during the reforms, the class-based interest of different actors within the process would have been a challenge to those who wants to restructure the labour market.

7.5 Action of actors

This section discusses the actions of two main organisations: the Bahrain Champers of commerce and Industry, and the EDB. The EDB actions were communication and using legal experts for arguments. EDB increased its communication with different actors. Its action was to gain support to the disputed reforms. It was disputed as explained earlier on two different general ground: authority of LMRA, its perceived effects on businessmen and public interest.

On the other hand, the BCCI's main strategies were: research and studies, expressing opinion through media, interacting with interest groups and politicians, trying to participate in parliamentary elections. These actions are

understood as effect to how the EDB presented the reforms with different factual arguments and publicity. These actions are understood as driven by the same strategies used by the EDB to present the reform as a logical solution to the economic and labour market issue in Bahrain. The communication between the BCCI and other actors increased as well. Similarly, the EDB increased its communications and explanation of the reform's philosophy and polices. Therefore, BCCI's actions are understood as playing by the same strategies used by the EDB; hence, at this point of the discussion, they did not approach the PM to defend their position form the recommended polices.

7.5.1 The EDB and Crown Prince Court actions

EDB and CPC actions were based on two main strategies during discussions over the DLRM. Those strategies were: enhancing communications with interest groups and using legal expertise. The communication with actors was via formal and informal meetings. They communicated with MPs, BCCI, Political societies, Media and Clergymen to enhance EDBs and Crown gain more support to the reforms. Hence, it is an extension to its communicating efforts discussed in chapter six where they interacted with actors through consultation workshops. The second action was using legal expertise to work around the DLRM to make it sound more acceptable by interest groups.

Communications

During stage two of the process, the EDB and CPC accelerated their actions to an intensive communication with different MPs, interest groups and actors to gain support and increase EDBs and CP political legitimacy. Formal and informal meetings were held with actors to pursue them about the reforms (Interview 18, 2016). The CP chaired some of these meetings; even if some meetings were formal, the environment of the meetings was informal. A former member of parliaments described him as being very friendly and the meetings with him can be characterised as informal, he says:

"I remember that the meetings with the CP took a personal nature, even if we were two or three sitting in the table, we used to discuss issues that are not related to the meeting topic such as naturalization, or about lands reclamation, he wasn't displeased, everything was smooth, to the extent that the CP created a good relationship with us and to the extent that he was smoking during the meeting, so he doesn't give it an official nature" . (Personal Interview 1, 2016)

The meetings were held with small number of MPs as they were trying to personalise the meeting to a small number of people. In these meeting, the CP explained how important the support of those MPs was to the project and the CP is reliant on their support to pass the legislation. The discussions in the meetings were not in a form of consultations or negotiations. The political consultant explains that these meetings were workshops held in the CP Court. These workshops aimed to explain the project to MPs. There were around six workshops held specifically to MPs. The MPs who were against the project were also invited to CPC to meet up with experts to explain the project (Personal Interview 18, 2016).

The Informal meetings extended with actors outside the parliament such as political societies that boycotted the parliament and economic experts. According to a former member of AWPB, there were visitors and delegates meeting up on dinner or lunch (Personal Interview 11, 2016). The reason for such informal meetings were to "*market the project, and to gain people who supports the idea behind the project, so there was marketing from Ebrahim, but after Alwifaq joined the parliament the relationship become strongest, I remember with CP directly or people close to him, there was many gives and take*"". The contact between a former member of AWPB and the CP team was due to him being an academic and as a member of AWNIS as well (Personal Interview 11, 2016). He explains that the contact was:

"informal *and there was a focus on the economic situation and that this project will resolve so many issues. I think they felt that there is a receptive environment and there are people supporting the project especially when meeting with those people who are pro labour market".* (Personal Interview 11, 2016).

There were other meetings organised by the labour market reforms project's team with some member of parliaments. These meetings were also held in an informal way. Meetings were not only held at CP Court, there was other meetings which was outside the CPC and some of it informal (Personal Interview 18, 2016). There were several dinner or lunch meetings, and they established friendship with some members of parliaments. The team used to visit the Majlis of MPs as well. Majlis means the place of sitting which is an informal saloon; it is a cultural thing, as they open their house weekly to guests who come to chat and to drink tea (Khodr ,2014).

The LMRP team extends the communication to influential clergymen and Islamic political leaders who represent different sects and religious ideology within Islam. Among which was Shaikh Isa Qassim, the most influential Shia clergymen in Bahrain who is the soul leader of the biggest Shia opposition party in Bahrain. Other Clergymen and political leaders Shaikh Abdulla Algoraifi the Bahraini representative of an important Lebanese Shia scholar, Shaikh Mohammed Almahfood the General Secretary of the Islamic Action Society, and Shaikh Abd Alattif Almahmood, a prominent sunni politician (Personal Interview 18, 2016). There were no meetings with societies and political parties that are not legally approved by the state. These communications are understood as a way to gain support to the project that comes in contrast to business interest and less power to the government in relation to economic policies.

Using Legal expertise

The problem was not resolved by giving assurance to interest groups; the EDB dealt with it by taking advantages of the legal expertise that they employed. According to a member of LMRP's team, in order to pass Article no (25) regarding the free movement of workers in the labour market, the EDB had to amend it to reflect the concerns of the interest groups. In order to pass it in parliament, the MPs suggested an amendment to it. The amendment that was suggested by them is that the immigrant labour should not be transferred from

one employer to another if the action is against what is written in the work contract. For example, if the work contract states that the foreign worker must work for two years then the worker cannot be transferred to another employer within those two years. Hence, article no 25 from act no 19 for 2006 regarding the regulation of labour market was written as follows: "*and without infringement to the legal or contractual rights of the employer, a foreign worker may, without the consent of his employer, transfer to another employer." (Personal Interview 14, 2016)*

The MPs thought that they were protecting employers by adding the sentence "*without infringement to the legal or contractual rights*" (Personal Interview 14, 2016). However, they were mistaken with such perception regards such legal requirement. As long as the DLRM gives the immigrant worker the right to move to another employer then he/she can move regardless of violating the work contract. However, in this case, the employer has the right to file a case against the worker if the worker violated the contract. However, the employer does not have the right to force the employer to work for him. The article gives the right to the LMRA to transfer the visa of the worker to another employer without checking the work contract. According to Alabbsi, who worked with the EDB, "*our team knew the legal catch, and we let it go*" (Personal Interview 14, 2016).

The action of the EDB took advantage of a lack of legal knowledge by MPs. It was noted by former MP Ahmed Bahzad that the MPs passed this article in the first legislative term as it is. However, it was later discovered that the article is unfair to the employers; they discovered that the contract is not restricted to the worker (SHC minutes. 25th April 2011). This legal misunderstanding of article no 25 will affect how other actors defend their interest in future discussion of article no 25. Interest groups will use legal resources to defend their position regards the freedom given to immigrant workers to change employers and violating work contract. The Article will be discussed in parliament in 2008 and interest groups such as BCCI will issue a report based on consultation with three different legal consultants. Similarly, the service

committee in MPs will issue a comparative legal study about article no 25 (shura council, 2011a, pp 705 -723)

7.5.2 The role of BCCI: playing by the rules of the game

Four main strategies were used by the BCCI at the beginning of discussing the DLRM. First, the BCCI conducted their own research and studies to support their arguments and gain support from other actors. Second, they used media, third increase interactions with other interest groups and actors, fourth attempt to officially participate in parliament and build an economic bloc.

BCCI was not convinced with the conceptual framework used by MCK to solve the labour market problem. Hence, BCCI had to use their own research and studies to show that the suggested policy tools by MCK overlooked some financial and economic aspect related to the economy. The former CEO of the BCCI said about BCCI's research and studies *"we used it as a reference in our arguments, at least we had some analysis in regard to future inflation rates, the future cost of conducting business projects, we looked at the issue holistically" (Personal Interview 4, 2016).*

The BCCI used the same strategy that had been used by the EDB and the CPC which was about presenting numbers and statistics. The studies were conducted by the BCCI's Department of Economic studies and Ernest & Young company (Personal Interview 4, 2016). Hence the battle was about who own the correct information about the labour market, and therefore which policies must be made to solve labour market issues. During meetings between BCCI and McKinsey & Company, BCCI's Board of Directors members were rejecting MCK's analysis and statistics provided by the consultant company. The BCCI's Board of Directors shows doubts about the accuracy of MCK's statistics (Personal Interview 4, 2016). In addition, when lobbying among MPs through meetings or invitation to seminars, the bloc membership nor the political society affiliation was a factor, rather the economic perspectives of MPs was the main factor to consider (personal interview 4, 2016).

The second action by BCCI was to reach a large number of businessmen through media. The BCCI created a website to publish the following information: summary of McKinsey's study on labour market project, the Chamber's recommendations on structural reforms of the labour market in the Kingdom of Bahrain, and a questionnaire prepared by the Chamber to identify the views of employers and companies about the project. The BCCI aimed to achieve the following objectives by creating the website: First, to monitor and evaluate the results of the McKinsey study on the reality and future of the labour market, and its impact on the conditions and directions of employers, economic activity and investment. The second aim was to develop the views of the employers on the draft reform of the labour market. Third, to develop a vision of the private sector on the proposed actions contained in LMRP (Alwasat, 11th Nov 2004).

Third strategy is the increased Interactions between BCCI and other actors. In December 2004, the BCCI established a committee to develop its vision regards the labour markets reforms in Bahrain. The committee was chaired by Dr Issam Fakhro the second deputy of the BCCI. The members of the committee were businessmen, some members of the Board member of BCCI (FECSHC 2006, p.274). At the beginning, the interactions started within the business community such as business owners and some private sectors company's CEO's. The BCCI aimed to develop the views of employers about the LMRP. These interactions were aimed at creating a unified vision toward the proposed actions suggested by the project (Alwasat, 29 April 2004).

The BCCI extends its communication to more open consultative interactions with other interest groups. A former member of BCCI's BOD held a: "A *consultative cultural movement, which you envision in the form of open consultative meetings with all parties, owners of all businesses, workers, and government agencies*" (Personal Interview 4, 2016). The BCCI established bilateral committees with different interest groups: the Ministry of labour, the GFWTUB, MPs (Personal Interview 4, 2016., FECSHC, 2005, p.282). Thus, the

BCCI was interested in forming a mutual stance with other actors as a way to push the parliament to adjust the draft of law in accordance to its interest.

The BCCI at this stage have not used all of its resources to affect the policy outcomes. They have not met with the PM yet or requested a meeting with him to dispute the policy outcomes that do not match the businessmen's interest. The former BCCI's Chief Executive Officer explains that though to some extent the project came in to contrast to businessmen interest, yet the national interest was also taking in to account (Personal Interview 4, 2016). National interest from the perspective of the former BCCI's Chief Executive Officer means decisions that serve the interest of Bahraini economy. National interest could be determined by regional or international factors (Personal Interview 4, 2016). For example, if the immigrant labour's wages increased in the region then Bahrain has to follow up such increase. The way to reconcile national interest with businessmen interest is to implement policies gradually, for example the BCCI's agreed on dismantling the Kafala system partially by not allowing the immigrant labour to move job before the first year of working contract (Personal Interview 4, 2016).

The fourth strategy was a failed attempt to establish a formal political bloc. The BCCI did not have an official representation in parliament. There was representation of businessmen through two MPS who are members of BCCI's board of directors, and five other MPs are businessmen which is around 18 percent of the total MPs (Al fardsn, 2005., Almaharri, 2004a). The BCCI internal law does not allow it to engage in official political activities, yet they can support other candidates or political societies (statement by former BCCI chairman Issam Fakhro, Almaharri, 2004b). In addition, member of BCCI who are MPs as well perceived the lack of representation of BCCI in parliament as an outcome to cultural antecedents of non-participation in political life. According to Jihad Buckamal:

" Unfortunately, the economic sector was away from the actual participation directly and indirectly during the first experience (meaning the parliamentary experience) experienced by Bahrain, and this is the result of the old culture that

prevailed during the past thirty years, which was adopted by the economic sector to be as far away as possible from the political issue, this was the prevailing culture at the time and, currently there is a content within this Sector that their direct and indirect presence in the Legislative Council is important and a strategic step they must take " (AlFardan, 2005).

The idea of supporting candidates and initiating a parliamentary bloc to support the interest of business man started in 2004, which is two years after the first parliamentary elections (Alfardsn, 2005). In 2004, the BCCI members approved the establishment of Committee for supporting the commercial sector in political affairs. However, the establishment of such committee has been suspended. This action is due to the law that prohibits any non-political institution, including BCCI, from supporting political candidates (Aljamri & Almahari, 2006). Despite such failed attempts, the BCCI increased its interactions with MPS. During 2005, before the submission of DLRM to the MJN, the BCCI started to hold meetings with MP such as Ahmed Behzad and with the Independent bloc in an attempt to establish a lobby that supports its perspectives toward LMRP (Alfardan , 2005). The increased interaction between the MJN members and BCCI was a direct outcome to the DLRM.

7.6 Policy outcomes after discussing the DLRM

With the approval of DLRM by the parliament, the legal basis to start implementing labour market reforms was set in place. The outcomes from this phase were as follows: Establishing LMRA. The authority has the following power: the power to determine the procedure regards issuing renewing, and cancelling work visas, proposing and collecting fees for employers for work permits and renewal fees, collecting data about labour market and providing statistics, Develop and implement a national labour market plan that includes strategy and policy on the employment of national and foreign workers, granting immigrant labour the right to change employers, excluding domestic workers from the DLRM which means they excluded from free movement in labour market and their employer will not pay monthly fees (Legal affairs, 2006).

There were informal pledges by the EDB in regards implementation of the fees. According to a statement by Shaikh Mohammed bin Isa Alkhalifa, the former chief executive of EDB. The labour markets reforms project is being heavily influenced by businessmen. The EDB took so much effort to convince them about the project. They object the determination of labour fee in the labour market proposed law (Draft law on the regulation of the labour market, attached to the Royal Decree No. (25) for the year 2005), they want to implement it gradually in accordance with the economic performance in Bahrain. The EDB accepted the demands of businessmen that two conditions must be met before imposing labour fees, these conditions are: gradual imposing of fee and training Bahrainis to meet the demands in labour market (Alwasat Newspaper, 26 September 2005).

The implementation of the policies will be gradual. The increase of in the foreign labour's fees will be after conducting studies regarding the effect of the fees. In addition, the Bahrainisation rate will decrease once the fees are applied. The assurance regards the gradual implementation came from different higher authority, the CP and the King as well. For instance, during the opening ceremony of the fourth session of the first legislative term of the SHC and House of Representatives said that the reform of the labour market will remain on the table for discussion, and it will be based on practical progress, according to the current economic data and their development (Alwasat, 28th Nov 2005).

The DLRM process was in parallel with other laws that established the basis for forming labour fund or Tamkeen. Tamkeen vision is to "Empowering Bahrainis to prosper and contribute to the national economy "(*Tamkeen, 2018a)*. They serve two main aims: Making Bahrainis the employee of choice and the second aim is to empower enterprises to economically flourish *(Tamkeen, 2018a). Tamkeen defines itself as "*public authority established in August 2006, tasked with supporting Bahrain's private sector and positioning it as the key driver of

economic growth and development. Tamkeen is one of the cornerstones of Bahrain's national reform initiatives and Bahrain's Economic Vision 2030." (Tamkeen, 2018b). The labour fund is funded from different resources: the amount of monthly assigned to immigrant labour, budget from the government, grants, fund's investments, and loans (ILO, 2006b). Tamkeen receives 80 percent of the monthly collected labour fees (legal affairs, 2006)

7.7 Conclusion

The characteristics of the LMRP during discussing the DLRM was a wider inclusion of actors during the process, yet the interest of businessmen was dominating the process. There were different context-based factors that widen the participation of actors, among which is the political reform process in Bahrain. Actors such as the GFWTUB and the MWPC perceived such change as positive; such a perception encourages them to establish themselves legally in the ministry of labour and social affairs. Yet the perception of the freedom to act within civil society was limited as well. The MWPC member were cautious regards their political involvement, hence they preferred to not engage in any political activities. In one hand, such perception limited the scope of what the activities they pursue to achieve their goals and affected the topics that MPs approached them for consultation. on the other hand, the established an effective and positive relationship with the government.

The new political environment that resulted in the inception of parliament in 2002, gave new actors a legal resource. MPs were part of the policy process as a result of the 2002 political reforms. Hence the political parties that participated and won the election will be included. The political societies that boycotted or lost the election will be excluded because they are not a member of the parliament which was an access point to other political societies. However, the effect of the parliament upon policy outcome cannot be understood in isolation from the rivalries between the PM and CP. The two contexts are connected through the political interest of MPs in parliament.

Hence, those who have political interest in supporting the PM did not approve giving the LMRA more power over the labour market policies.

The position of different actors from the policy tools suggested by the DLRM reveals that the position of actors from the reforms does not depend solely on political interest and the political division within the government. the way that the labour market is segmented, and the class formation meant that the existence of cheap labour that are controlled by citizens through the Kafala system is considered as a requirement to serve public interest through the services that cheap labour provides. Hence changing the cost of domestic labour was considered by some stakeholders as threat to public interest.

The actions of BCCI and EDB were a direct result to the interactions between them. The EDB started the reforms that was discussed in chapter six based on the philosophy and analysis of Mckinsey's concepts to adjust the limitation of Bahraini economy and labour market. The argument that was essential to the discussion and policy suggested is that labour market policies that manage the foreign labour must not be rigid. Hence the immigrant labour must have the freedom to move to other employers in similar to the Bahraini labours. The cost of employing immigrant labour must be increased to adjust the cost gap between them and Bahraini. Such argument was rejected by the BCCI and alternative analysis to the labour market limitation was provided by them. Hence, they relied on research and studies to support their position form the reforms. In addition, such argument was communicated to stakeholders to convince them about it, similarly the EDB were communicating extensively with stakeholders and public as well.

Chapter 8: The characteristics of labour market policy-making process during implementation phase

8.1 Introduction

The legal basis for implementing the labour market reforms was established after passing the DLRM and other law in relation to labour fund by the parliament and SHC by May 2006. In 2007, LMRA began implementing its programmes. Among these programmes are correcting illegal foreign workers, registering migrant workers' data, adopting electronic systems to enhance recruitment transactions and preparing for a large-scale inspection campaign to eliminate the irregular foreign labour, helping immigrants workers w hose visas were invalid to leave the country without facing problems (AlFardan and Almoughani, 2007). These missions were conducted with the least disagreement with the businessmen.

However, the other policies that were supposed to be implemented such as the free movement of labour and monthly fees was delayed and disputed with the interest groups and MPs. The negotiations will be regards the details of when to apply the fees, and free movement. The characteristics of the process after passing the DLRM were that relationships between actors were institutionalised with the establishment of LMRA. Despite such established institution for policy discussion, the interest groups such as the BCCI uses its relationship with the PM to influence policy outcomes. The MPs re enforced themselves as part of the process by suggesting the amendment of the DLRM that they have already approved in 2006.

The discussion over policy implementation is divided into two main sections. The first section covers the discussions over the application of monthly fees. The BCCI were powerful in affecting the implementation of the fees. In contrast

they had less effect over free movement of labour. The interaction with the LMRA failed to arrive in to an agreement between BCCI and LMRA. Hence the BCCI referred it dissatisfaction to the PM who decided the final amount of fees. The Kafala system discussion was affected by the GFWTUB support regards implementation criteria and was put forward for implementation due to support from higher authority in Bahrain.

The final part discusses the characteristics of post 14th 2011 February Bahraini uprising in changing the relationship between interest groups and the state. After the uprising, the interactions between different actors in relation to labour market policies were less frequent and not efficient. The exception was the BCCI interactions with the PM where they requested changes to labour market policy outcomes and succeeded. The BCCI perceived economic interest led them to request the changes to fees and free movement.

8.2 factors affecting the implementation of monthly fees

The plan was to start implementing the fees by January 2008. Meetings to achieve a consensus between the interest groups and the LMRA started before the proposal was submitted to the PM. The LMRA suggested a change in the fees from BD 150 every year to total BD440 (Bd 200 paid every two year and BD10 paid every month (AlFardan and Almoughan, 2007). The negotiation over the fees reduced the initial suggestion from BD 300 every two years to BD 200 every two years and BD 10 every month (AlFardan & Almoughani, 2007). The Minister of labour was pushing for BD 20 on each work permit (Alwasat newspaper, 27 November 2007). Though the MCK had suggested different amount in 2004 which was BD600 every two years and BD 75 every month. This amount was already eliminated earlier during the process when the BCCI had privilege access to the discussion after being consulted by the cabinet (The Finance Affairs and Economical Committee and Services Committee in the Parliament, 2005).

The LMRA's decision regarding the amount of the fees was based on survey report conducted in 2006 which covered the establishment's wage structure and distribution in Bahrain. They found that the Bahraini cost the employer around BD333 in comparison to BD187 for the non-Bahraini. The survey provided information about the following aspects of labour market: employment structure according to social and economic characteristics, wage structure, and "details of establishments according to economic activity, capital ownership structure and the commencement year of the economic activity, identify the employee's occupational composition and skill level" (LMRA, 14 May 2017). Hence, they identified the type and number of establishments operating in the private sector, the size of the workforce in each sector, details about the workforce (gender, nationality) wage distribution (non-Bahraini vs Bahraini in different sectors (LMRA, 14 May 2017).

The importance of implementing the fees increased after contracting training institutions by labour fund (Alfardan & Almoghani, 2007). The labour fund is designed to be financed by the monthly fees on hiring foreign labour. Before collecting the fees, the Labour Fund was working on the budget received from the EDB to cover the salaries of employees and some projects initiated by the Fund during the supervision of the EDB and before the commencement of its legal work. The EDB spent more than eight million dinars on the Labour Fund to support its programmes and activities. The estimated budget to support the reform of the labour market exceeds 200 million dinars annual (Alwasat, 24 March 2007). Hence, the fees are necessary to start affecting both the demand side by training job seekers and employees, and from supply side to support and enhance the performance of small and medium enterprises.

8.2.1 BCCI's actions to delay implementation: a reaction to LMRA's decisions

The BCCI actions during the implementation process are understood as triggered by its interactions with LMRA and the failure of such interactions to arrive in to agreement between the two parties. After the failure of the

negotiations between the two organisations during LMRA's meeting, the BCCI referred its complaints to the PM and succeeded in affecting the policy outcomes to some extent. Hence, the actions of BCCI to affect the policy outcome in relation to the amount of fees is explained by the BCCI's dissatisfaction from the outcomes of its interactions with LMRA which led them to contact the PM.

The BCCI refused two points in relation to the LMRA's decisions these are: the amount of monthly fees which they demanded to be BD 5. Second, they demanded to delay the implementation of the new fees until January 2009 (Alfardan & Almoghani, 2007). The delay in the implementation is due to enable the businesses establishments to adopt its structure for the new fees: Businesses should review their investments in capital, technology, tools and methods used, and skills should be standardized and developed, which may enhance existing low-skilled jobs (Alfardan & Almoghani, 2007).

The BCCIs requested from LMRA's board of directors to delay its proposal regards the fees. The BCCI intends to conduct a survey to study the potential impact of the fees on private sector companies, especially on small and medium enterprises. The study will also cover the effect of raising fees on various economic sectors, on the overall economic situation, especially with respect to inflation rates and consumer price indices (BCCI,2008).

The BCCI were not satisfied with the research and studies conducted by the LMRA to justify the amount of fees imposed on merchants. The BCCI criticized the LMRA's survey regarding the establishment's wage structure and distribution in Bahrain was criticised by the BCCI on different grounds. First, the survey did not take into account the size of the establishment, especially that the fees will have different effects on the establishment in accordance to its capital investment and the cost of production (BCCI,2008, p.4) . Second, the BCCI criticised the survey's data, they argue that:

"regards the labour cost of GNP in national accounts, these calculations do not show separately the share of the labour cost of gross domestic product (GDP).

The study appears to have taken the overall ratio of labour costs to gross output in 2005. It was supposed to calculate the share of labour cost as a percentage of each sector separately. For example, the ratio of labour costs to total output of the construction sector (the most important target sector) is about 67%, more than two thirds of the output. Thus, the effect of the cost of labour fees one and a half times higher than the estimates contained in the study." (BCCI,2008, p.4)

The LMRA and BCCI agreed to postpone the decisions over the fees until the completion of BCCI's study. However, this agreement was not fulfilled by the LMRA, as the fees proposal was sent to the cabinet before the completions and discussion over BCCI's study. The BCCI complained regarding the unfulfillment of the agreement, especially that they contracted with one of the advisory institutions to prepare this survey and it was near completion (BCCI, 2008).

With the disagreement between the two parties, the BCCI communicated its dissatisfaction to the cabinet. Hence, such communication is understood as a reaction to a failure of achieving agreement through the formal channel of discussions. The BCCI did defend its position through the formal channel namely during LMRA's meeting, yet they were not satisfied with the outcomes. Hence, they referred to the PM's office. The BCCI sent a letter to the PM disagreeing with LMRA's perspective regards the amount of the fees and the potential implementation in January 2008. The BCCI requested that the work permit fees to be 200 dinars every two years in addition to 5 dinars per month for each work permit and requested to postpone the implementation until January 2009 (Alwasat newspaper, 27 November 2007).

This conclusion is in contradiction to Marc's Valeri (2015) analysis to the actions of BCCI during implementation of the fees. He quotes an IT businessman who interprets that BCCI's actions regards the fees and the reforms were encouraged by the PM "He encouraged the Chamber of Commerce and the leading contractors to speak up to create cracks in the reforms" (P.33). There are two main issue in this statement, first it is not known if the IT businessman is a member or a leader in the BCCI. The second point is that BCCI's BOD expressed that they do not have any relationship to the actions of the

contractors who were protesting against the fees, and the contractors criticized BCCI's for ignoring their interest (LMRA, 22 March 2009).

The response to the dissatisfaction of BCCI was the establishment of labour market development committee by the cabinet. The PM issued an order to establish such committee which aims to reconcile the requirements of the labour market reforms with the interests of all parties of production. The members of this committee are the BCCI, the Minister of Labour Affairs, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, and chaired by the Minister of the PM's Office (Alfardan & Almoughani, 2007). Two weeks after the inception of the committee, the PM announced the solution to the dispute between LMRA and BCCI. The Biannual fee will be 200 dinars, and a monthly fee of 10 dinars for each work permit and to postpone the application until the middle of next year (July 2008) (Alwasat Newspaper, 02 December 2007). In addition, the Government approved the Chamber's other proposals regards compensating institutions and companies that may move from profitability to losses during the first year of application of new fees (Alwasat newspaper, 27 November 2007).

The BCCI in this case took advantage of such a relationship that is historically established by referring to the PM to protest against policies that does not serve their interest. When the PM met with businessmen, GFWTUB and other members of the government to discuss the fees imposed on immigrant labour, the PM was the one who decided the final amount. The BCCI representative during the meeting left the decision to the PM. The BCCI's representative BOD said to the PM:

"you are the judger for this issue, you have the perspective of this group, and the perspective of the other group, those are saying 20 Bahraini Dinars (£40) and we are saying BD5 (£10), so the decision is left for you your highness, so his highness decided BD10" (Personal Interview 5, 2016).

from the perspective of a former member of BCCI's BOD, the decision made by the PM was a balance between the different interests and the different

perspectives (Personal Interview 5, 2016). Yet the PM decision could be also analysed as favouring the businessmen side, especially that this meeting was requested by the BCCI and that the amount suggested by the PM was just a little bit higher than their suggestion (Personal Interview 7, 2016). In addition, the changes that occurred to this amount after 2011 prove that the businessmen interest is to be favoured.

8.2.3 The action of excluded interest after the application of fees

The action of excluded interest after the application of fees reveals that BCCI did not represent or defend all business sectors. Those excluded interests acted solely due to the effects of the fees on their economic welfare. Two interest groups were active after the application of fees in July 2008. These were the fisherman and construction contractors, represented by the fisherman's association and the construction contractors association. The fishermen who were excluded from the decision-making process of LMRP rejected the fees implemented on immigrant labours. Their action to protest against the imposition of labour fees was by striking for nine consecutive days (LMRA, 23 February 2009). The construction contractors' actions were by protesting outside the LMRA's headquarter. Their action led them to meet with the Minister of Labour, the chairman of the LMRA, and the speaker of parliament to discuss their demands (Alwasat newspaper, 18 July 2009). The construction contractor's demands are summarised in four point: the first point is the abolition of the labour market reform fee of 10 dinars per worker, the second point is the deportation of illegal foreign labour from the country, third point was regulating the movement of foreign worker from the sponsor to another sponsor, as well as control of the process of escape of workers from institutions. Finally, making more control on the process of leasing merchant licenses (Alwasat newspaper, 18 July 2009). The contractors are members of BCCI, yet they claim that BCCI did not defend their interest.

The PM responded to the fishermen's actions. The PM's action was towards supporting and responding to the criticism of the affected citizens from the

implementation of the labour market reforms. The fishermen cancelled their strike after a sudden visit by the PM Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa to the Fishermen's Association. He told the fishermen that they have all the support from the government and from him personally (LMRA, 23 February 2009). The immediate action by the government was the renewal of licenses of fishermen who fail to pay fees for 3 months (LMRA, 24 February 2009). The second action by the PM was directing the LMRA to stop legal proceedings against those who failed to pay the fishermen's monthly fees and postpone their collection for three months (LMRA, 9 May 2009). There was no response from the government in regard to the construction contractors. Around the same period that the contractors were protesting, the government issued a statement regards the importance of LMRA fees in supporting the role of the Labour Fund to carry out its responsibilities in making Bahrainis the best choice for employment in the market (LMRA, 13 April 2009). Yet, those who prove that they are affected by the implementation of the fees can review this with the LMRA (LMRA, 13 April 2009).

The parliamentary bloc who interacted mostly with the excluded interest were AAIS bloc, they have vested interest in supporting the fishermen. In general, the position of AAIS during reforms was representing the interest of businessmen. They supported the fisherman demands to stop the fees implemented on them. AAIS bloc in the MJN proposed an urgent desire to stop the LMRA's fees on the fishermen. The House of Representatives approved the proposal and submitted it to the government. AAIS claimed that they want to protect the fishing sector on which many Bahraini families rely on as a sole source of income (LMRA, 18 February 2009). AAIS extends its communication with fishermen to meetings for discussing the fishermen problems among which are the monthly fees (LMRA, 19 November 2008). The fishermen that AAIS met with were from Al Muharaqq city and Al Hidd Town. Al Hidd fisherman agreed with AAIS representative to form a committee to determine recommendations. These recommendations which will be adopted by MP

Albuainain and transferred to the House of Representatives after approval (LMRA, 10 March 2009).

8.2.4 The BCCI perception about the effect of fees on businessmen, and the Bahraini economy

The BCCI perceived the effect of the fees as negative on the following aspects: the competitive advantage of Bahrain over other neighbour countries, it is ineffective to implement the fees on some economic sectors such as construction sector. What the neighbouring gulf countries do to organise the economy and labour market was perceived as a factor that shape the available policy options in Bahrain. The BCCI used such rhetoric regarding the effect of regional labour market policies on their support to the recommended EDB's policies. The Ernest and Young study conducted by the BCCI upon the application of monthly fees on immigrant labour used the similar argument. The study concluded If the rest of the GCC does not implement similar reforms; it will make Bahraini enterprises in a difficult competitive position (BCCI, 2007). The BCCI (2004) commented on the link between Bahrain and gulf countries by stating that "The reform of the labour market in Bahrain requires that the labour market reforms in the GCC should be taken into consideration, given the similar conditions and the working environment in these markets" (P.12)

The former Chief Executive officer of BCCI considers that the policies that they support in relation to organising immigrant labour are connected to policies made in neighbouring Gulf countries (Personal Interview 4, 2016). For example, if the cost of employing immigrant labour increased in other GCC countries then BCCI would have considered to accept an increase in the cost of employing immigrant labour in Bahrain. yet the reason for such consideration is not just about competitiveness of Bahrain in comparison to other countries it can be related to other issues such as the public policies toward immigrant labour that push for more rights to them (Personal Interview 4, 2016). The former executive officer of the BCCI commented that the BCCI agrees with any national policies that progress at the same rate as other GCC countries. He said:

"It is impossible that the BCCI reject policies that go against the general policies applied in the region, for instance, if the cost of importing foreign labour increased in the region, then the BCCI reaction to such increase will not hold on refusing the increased wages and cost of foreign labour" (Personal Interview 4, 2016)

The second point is that they believe that the fees will not be effective on all sectors. For instance, most of the jobs created by the construction sector are not desirable by Bahrainis and are not acceptable to them. The trend towards expatriate workers is dictated by the conditions of lack of national labour willing to engage in this sector. The sector is employing non-Bahrainis, especially men, "according to a 12 per cent annual growth rate in the private sector." Most of the new created jobs are concentrated in the construction sector as well as in the services sector, such as hotels and restaurants. So, raising the cost will not solve the problem of employing non-Bahrainis in these sectors (BCCI,2008, p.3)

8.3 Factors affecting the implementation of free movement of immigrant labour

The dynamics that affected the implementation of immigrant labour were slightly different from the implementation of the fees. There was disagreement between BCCI, ministry of labour and GFWTUB regards the period in which the immigrant labour has to spend with his employer before moving to new one. Businessmen were pushing for a year while the GFWTUB were proposing three months. The BCCI as well were demanding the postponing of applying the free movement of labour. yet there was a support to such policy from the CP and the king as well. This potentially enforced the application of free movement of labour in the labour market. This section explains the interaction and actions of actors to affect the application of clause no 42 from law no 19 for the year 2006 regards the labour market in Bahrain.

8.3.1 Agreement between interest groups regards the negative effect of free movement on the interest of businessmen

As discussed in chapter seven, the position of stakeholders from policy content was affected by the segmented labour market and how class was formed in Bahrain after the 1970s. The position of different actors during the implementation of free movement of immigrant labour as understood under the same structural position that those actors occupy and the interest they present. Most of the actors were not welcoming the free movement of labour except the GFWTUB and the Ministry of Labour, and the SHC. The dispute around the free movement postponed the implementation until 2009.

There was a rejection to the implementation of the article without enforcing certain procedures that will govern the free movement. According to former Minister of Labour, most of the objections about this policy were from businessmen (Interview 22, 2016). The main point rejected by the BCCI was the minimum period that the immigrant labour workers have to work for the employer before moving to new one. The BCCI demanded that the period that the employee spends with his original employer must be based on the work contract signed by the worker. Therefore, article no 25 of Law number 19 for the year 2006 regulating the labour market was suspended for around three years (Personal Interview 5, 2016). The businessmen were concerned that free movement of labour will put them at risk of leaking the firm's secrets by immigrant's labour (Personal Interview no 5 & 22, 2016). Despite such claims regarding the expected role of the immigrant labour in leaking work secrets, the BCCI accepted the free movement but with imposing certain procedures to it. One of which is that immigrant labour workers have to stay for one year with the employer before moving to another firm (Personal Interview 4, 2016). Thus, the claim regarding work secrets was not the reason behind their objection to the free movement; rather it was their economic and cost related calculation. Such calculations regard immigrant labour as more discipline and efficiency at work, the discipline that is driven from a lack of legal rights and being controlled by one employer.

For instance, in a statement issued by BCCI in April 2009, they stated the negative side effects of free movement of immigrant in the labour market (LMRA, 26 April 2009). They stated two main reasons which will affect the interest of business establishments. For instance, the free movement, will create conditions in which the immigrant labour will be empowered to negotiate his salary and work conditions. In addition, it will effect on the production process of business establishment if immigrant labour can change employer easily, the BCCI Statement says that:

"this mechanism will have serious consequences for the functioning of most national establishments in all its categories and activities. What distinguishes expatriate workers now is their discipline to a large extent in the work of their facilities … and when It has had the opportunity to move to other jobs without conditions to control these transitions, it will adversely affect the work in the facilities and production processes, these facilities will witness serious repercussions of chaos and disruption of work" (LMRA, 26 April 2009)

The parliamentary blocs presented similar economic interest when it comes to granting immigrant workers more rights or charging extra fees on businessmen. There was an opposition to policies that will decrease the reliance on immigrant workers and to decrease the rate of exploitation. For instance, the discussion over the free movement of labour in parliament reveals the extent to which MPs represented similar interest to businessman's interest. In 27th May 2008 the House of Representatives referred to the Government a proposal to amend the provisions of Article (25) of Law No. (19) of 2006 regarding the regulation of the labour market and to put it in the form of a draft law (shura council service committee, 2009, p. 140,). The amendment to the article was proposed by AAIS bloc in 2007, they were the same members of parliament in 2006 who approved the article during the first legislative session (LMRA,28 May 2009a). The changes presented by AAIS were to amend the article to ensure that the foreign worker may not be transferred from another employer before one year of commencing work. One of the reasons that AAIS presented was in regard to the belief that free movement of labour will harm the interest of businessmen (LMRA, 28 May 2009a).

The economic interests presented by MPs were indifferent from the BCCI's stance. None of these blocs were politically or ideologically linked to BCCI yet supporting the interest of businessmen was a common stance between all of them. There was an ongoing communication between MPs and BCCI. They established a joint committee between the two organisations (LMRA, 28 May 2009 b). The committee held meetings once a month, there was a harmony between both sides. They arrived in to a common understanding in regard to the deregulating the labour market. According to a former member of AWPB, the committee was:

"the best model between us and any non-parliamentary body so that it a permanent committee and communication headed by the first deputy and other member of the House of Representatives and also headed by President and his deputies was Ibrahim Zainal and Abdullah Nass and Othman Sharif was deputy and Ahmed Najm The executive director and they had a consultant, it is an advanced experience in relations and discuss many issues, including Issues related to BCCI or the workers and understand their point of view and they also understand our point of view in the topics" (Interview 8, 2016)

The joint committee between the representative council and BCCI reached an agreement regarding article 25. They agreed that the immigrant labour cannot move from his employer if the work contract does not allow it. According to Khalil Almarzooq, the member of the Joint Committee, "It is unacceptable that the LMRA allows a foreign worker to move to another employer after a breach of what was agreed with the current employer, so that this is not a reason to encourage foreign workers to disregard labour contracts". (Alayam, 7th January 2010).

The stance of AWNIS from the free movement of labour or the fees on labour does not present the interest of its closer political ally, the GFWTUB. AWNIS were trying to protect the interest of businessmen as well as protecting the interest of labour. According to a former member of AWPB, *"We try to understand the points of view and balance between the different parties, we*

can't take sides to traders at the expense of workers and not to the workers at the expense of traders, in the end that you need to look forward to a system that protects everyone" (Personal Interview 8, 2016). AWNIS's position was between the demand of business community and giving the immigrants more rights in this matter and embracing the international standards (Personal Interview 11, 2016). This was not just the opinion of AWNIS bloc; other blocs referred to the same point.

8.3.2 The action of BCCI after the implementation: Establishing the temporary quarter committee

Unlike the effort of BCCI regarding the amount of fees where they were able to achieve some intended outcome, they failed to affect the policy outcome in relation to free movement of labour. There are two main differences between the two pillars of the reforms namely fees and free movement. The fees are needed to sponsor a new institution and without it there will be a huge gap in the implementation of the reforms. The second point is that the king and the CP showed a support and enthusiasm for the free movement as will be explained in section 8.3.3. In short, each policy discussed has its own structural influence and the nature of dependency differs as well; hence, it is worth discussing them separately.

On the 30TH April 2009, the Ministry of Labour announces the implementation of article no 25 (LMRA, 4 May 2009). However, BCCI has made a reservation on the decision (LMRA, 15 April 2009). A committee to discuss the procedures for immigrant labours free movement in the market was established as a result to BCCI disagreement. The members of the committee were representing four organisations, namely: LMRA, Ministry of Labour, GFWTUB, The BCCI (LMRA, 1st July 2009).

The committee was an outcome to a meeting held in 31st May 2009 between the BCCI's Board of directors and LMRA's Board of Directors. The meeting was held in BCCI's headquarters where the Ministry of Labour visited the Chamber of Commerce to hold a meeting with them. The Ministry of Labour agreed to

form such a committee upon the request of BCCI (LMRA, 27 May 2009). The meeting discussions was mainly about demanding the introduction of some additional controls on the conditions and criteria for implementing the decision. The meeting resulted in the formation of the quartet committee between the Ministry of Labour, the LMRA, the BCCI and the GFWTUB, which are responsible for making proposals on controls that may be adopted within the LMRA's acceptance criteria, provided they do not conflict with the principle and provisions of the law. The Joint Committee itself shall evaluate and follow up the consequences of implementing the law after it enters into force to monitor and address the negative aspects that may arise and harm employers or workers (LMRA, 24 May 2009).

Despite such communication between the BCCI, The Ministry of Labour and the LMRA's Board of directors, the BCCI was interacting with the PM and the CPC to communicate the lack of acceptance regarding how the free movement of immigrant labour will be regulated (LMRA, 26 April 2009). The BCCI had already a conflict with the LMRA previously regards the fees, hence their communication with higher authority might be a reflection to previous disagreement with the LMRA.

The BCCI sent its suggestion to the PM about the accepted procedures to regulate the free movement of immigrant labour. These procedures are as follows: The migrant worker shall be transferred after half the period prescribed in the contract of employment. The reason for such suggestion is to allow the employer to recover the expenses incurred in order to bring in and employ the expatriate worker. Such expenses may be determined in the contract of employment signed between the parties. The parties (the worker and the employer) sign a work contract that regulates the relationship between the parties and sets the controls and conditions for the transfer of the expatriate worker. The employment contract shall include a non-competition clause, i.e. prohibition of moving to a rival institution or employer in Bahrain for a period not less than one year (LMRA, 27 May 2009). None of these

suggestions were suggested by the cabinet. This reveals that the cabinet did not want to interfere in this matter at this stage.

During the quartet committee discussion, the other parties involved were all supportive to the free movement of labour except BCCI. It was the change for the GFWTUB to push for more workers right. They pushed for the clause to be implemented with three months as a minimum period that the workers should stay with the original employer. The GFWTUB used argument to defend their interest. Their argument was based on the extent to which the three months' notice that will condition the free movement will help in will affects the image of Bahrain internationally (Personal Interview 6, 2016). They argued that Bahrain is a member of the ILO and has signed several agreements regarding labour rights, hence such adjustment to immigrant labour's right will raise the Human rights profile of Bahrain. in a paper presented by GFWTUB under the title Migrant Workers in Bahrain- Facts and changes they regards that the free movement of immigrant labour was "one of the most achievement of GFWTUB" (GFWTUB, 2012, p.2). The changes that occurred in 2011 to this article were also regarded to be against the GFWTUB "during the political campaign against GFWTUB and in response to employers' pressure, this right was restricted by one-year service condition" (GFWTUB, 2012, p.2)

8.3.3 the support of the Crown Prince and the King to the application of free movement

There is a claim that the free movement of labour was affected by the perceived importance of enhancing Bahraini's international reputation. The perceived effect of international community over the implementation of free movement was one of the reasons that led AAIS bloc to reject the policy. AAIS MP Ebrahim Busandil expressed some doubts about the motives for economic reforms in Bahrain. He considers that economic and labour reforms in Bahrain are aimed at partial goals such as improving Bahrain's reputation in some international institutions in terms of human rights, disregarding the serious consequences that these decisions on the market and employers and then on

the Bahraini citizen (LMRA, 25 May 2009). They rejected the reforms for other reasons as well, AAIS bloc members belief that the labour market reforms are based on false statistics and political reasons. According to Hamed Almuhanidi (the chairman of AAIS parliamentary block), MCK provided false statistics about the unemployment issue in Bahrain. He said that MCK has claimed that unemployment will reach tens of thousands by 2010, but by the middle of 2009, the number of unemployed claiming unemployment insurance is no more than 2,000. He considers that there is no real unemployment, but it is artificially inflated for political reasons (LMRA, 28 May 2009a).

Indeed, the king and the CP were interested and supportive to the implementation of article no 25. According to the former Minister of labour, the king commented about the rejection of businessman "tell them (the businessmen) that they don't have secrets" (Personal Interview no 22, 2016). This was in reply to businessmen claim regarding how free movement of immigrant labour will risk leaking the business's secrets. With such support from higher authority, the Minister of labour knew that article no 25 will be implemented. He informed the businessman about the possible implementation of this article by saying "I warned them that this policy change is coming anyway, so you better get used to it and try to prepare yourself" (Personal Interview no 22, 2016). According to the former minister of labour, the king was proud about the changes to the immigrant labour rights in changing employers, he called the former minister of labour after reading articles in the financial times which was appraising the reform (Personal Interview 22, 2016). Similarly, the CP was excited regarding the application of clause no 25, he called the Minister of Labour a day before the implementation he said to him " Tomorrow is the second of August , I told him yes , today is the first of August so tomorrow is the second of August, he said anything rings a bell, the former Minister replies: "the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he said no (the CP), it is the application of free movement of immigrants" (Personal Interview no 22, 2016)

The support of the king to the application of free movement can answer why the SHC did not support the Parliament's proposal to change article no 25. Both councils have members who are businessman yet did not support the changes toward restricting the movement of immigrant labour. The SHC replied to Parliament by saying that the proposal is in contrast with the aims of the law. The government showed support to the essence of the labour market reform project. The SHC replied to Parliament that the article no 25 is supposed to be flexible to adapt to economic and social changes. Hence, suggesting a fixed period before the immigrant workers can change employer is against the essence of the law. In addition, any changes to the period or the law must be advised by economic studies and then the decision must go through consultation with different actors (shura council service committee, 2009, p.759).

The researcher does not have enough data to argue that enhancing Bahrain's international reputation was a reason for the king or the CP to support labour reforms, especially that the CP showed a belief in the concept related to restructuring the labour market through rights and cost gap. However, the statements of AAIS members during the reform time shows that the perception that Bahrain went through such reforms to enhance its international reputation was one of the reasons for them to reject the reforms suggested policy tools. Additionally, the enthusiasm and support of the king and the CP to such clause was influential in implementing it without the consent of the businessman.

8.4 The characteristics of actor's interactions post 14th of February 2011

A significant change within the Bahraini political context occurred in 2011. There was an uprising that was massive and had a consequence on the relationship between different actors and interest groups in Bahrain. Such an event would have its effect on the nature of policy processes in general and labour market policy process as well. This section provides a brief of the events

and then describes the changes that occurred to the relationship between different interest groups.

8.4.1 The 14th of February 2011 uprising

At the end of January 2011, calls for protesting in Bahrain were circulated through social media such as Facebook and other online discussions platforms. The intended protests were to demand social, political and economic reforms. The call for 'day of rage' were similar to the one occurred in Tunisia and Egypt in late 2010 and early 2011. The demonstrations were planned to be on the 14th of February 2011 to coincide with anniversary of the national referendum that was held a few years after the ascendance of Prince (now king) to throne in 1999. The organisers of the protest called themselves the youth of the February 14th Revolution (Bassioouni et al, 2011). They issued a statement calling for a:

"change and radical reforms in the system of government and the management of Bahrain, the absence of which [had] caused continuous unease in the relationship between the people and the regime." (Bassioouni et al, 2011)

The demonstration started in Bahrain on the date specified by the youth of February 14th. Two demonstrators were killed in less than 24 hours after the protestation started. The falling of two martyrs accelerated the anger of Bahrainis. The demonstrators marched towards the GCC roundabouts (known as pearl roundabout). In a televised speech that night, the king expressed his condolence to the family of the two martyrs and affirmed the right of people to protest accordance to the law. However, on the 17th of February, the police and personnel from the Bahrain defence forces raided the roundabouts at around 3am which resulted in seven martyrs. Despite such actions, people continued to demonstrate but the demonstration was outside the biggest medical centre in Bahrain. The clashes continued to the next day as protesters were trying to go back to the pearl roundabouts (*Bassioouni et al, 2011*).

On the same day, the CP held an interview at the national TV. He sent his condolences to martyrs' families, he said that it is the time that police, army and people to exercise self-restraint. The royal palace issued a statement by the king in which he grants the CP the power to start a dialogue with the oppositions. AWNIS put a condition to accepts the dialogue which will be in return for the withdrawal of forces from the roundabouts and the cabinet ministers must resign. The next day, the CP responded to AWNIS's demand to withdraw the police forces from the roundabout and that's demonstrators can go back (*Bassioouni et al, 2011)*.

The demonstrations continued at the pearl roundabouts with the participation of different labour unions. Different protests occurred around the country outside schools, the University of Bahrain, and other significant public and international organisations. Towards the middle of March, the confrontation between the security forces, demonstrators and gangs of individuals who were pro government escalated. On the 14th of March, gulf countries Jazeera shield forces arrived to Bahrain. The next day, the king issued Royal Decree No. 18 for the year 2011 announcing a state of national security for three months. With the enforcement of national security order, the national security agencies adopted a more brutal way to deal with protesters and personals who participated in the demonstrations. Many people were jailed and tortured the following few months / years as a consequence to the 14th of February 2011 uprising (*Bassioouni et al, 2011*).

8.4.2 The participation of GFWTUB in 14th Of February revolution and its effect on their relationship with the government and BCCI: re alliance of political interest

Some of the actors who were involved in labour market policy-making process between 2002 and 2010 had a role during the pearl roundabouts demonstrations. For instance, the relationship between the GFWTUB and the political opposition affected its position during the 14th of February 2011 revolution. The GFWTUB issued a statement in support the demands of the

protestors. The statement issued was requesting the officials to not terminate the contracts of workers who participated in the demonstrations. The GFWTUB called for a strike in February 2011 to demonstrate its lack of acceptance of the brutal attack by government police over the pearl roundabouts demonstrators. The GFWTUB were *"demanding the withdrawal of security forces in order to allow demonstrators to continue their peaceful demonstrations. The GFBTU also stated that they were striking because of what they perceived to be the GOB's (government of Bahrain) inhibition of medical personnel from carrying out their duties to attend to the injured." (Bassioouni et al, 2011, 2011, p.332).*

The action of GFWTUB and the perception of the government that GFWTUB is part of the 14th of Feb uprising resulted in four outcomes: less cooperative relationship between both parties, less available actions for defending labour's right, the inception of Bahrain free labour unions federation, and the deteriorated relationship with BCCI. There was no communication between the GFWTUB and the higher authority in regard to labour's issue after the uprising. The current communication (during the interviews conducted by the researcher) is with the with Deputy PM Sheikh Mohammed bin Mubarak and the Ministry of Labour (Personal Interview no3, 2016). According to a member of GFWTUB's general secretariat *" before the events of 2011, the trade union movement had more attendance, but you know the link of the trade union movement to the crisis in 2011, especially its connection to some of the details of the crisis, created a gap between us and the employers, and between us and the government*" (Interview no 2, 2016). He perceives that such changes in relationship between them and the government was behind the changes that occurred to article no 25 regards free movement of labour. He concludes that:

"there was a takeover by businessman after the crisis, they become more powerful, they were behind these changes (changes to article no 25), they were demanding these changes before, but they couldn't achieve their aims" (Personal Interview no 2, 2016).

The second outcome was the inability of the GFWTUB to organize the first of May march to celebrate the labour's day. A member of GFWTUB's general

secretariat perceive the march as a method for labour's right advocacy (Personal Interview 2, 2016). Hence with the decrease of communication between the GFWTUB and government, and the cancellation of May's march the GFWTUB has less channels to present their voice and demand for labour's right. The available channels are media and the Parliament. According to a member of the GFWTUB *"Any law sent by Nuwab which contradicts the principles of international work and the International labour Standard, we directly write our opinion send it to the House of Representatives"* (Personal Interview 2, 2016). The third point was a division of the labour movement of Bahrain after the inception of a second general federation for trade unions. The representation of the GFWTUB in the BOD of LMRA decreased by one seat due to the pro government new general federation.

The fourth outcome is decreased interaction with BCCI. The formal relationship between the BCCI and GFWTUB was established in April 2007. They established a joint committee which aimed at enhancing the role of both organisations in cooperating with the government and national assembly to suggest laws that serve both interests. The committee aimed to establish distinctive relationship through dialogue and coordination between the two parties to achieve economic prosperity. Other aims were related to cooperation in issues of work, economy, women right at work, supporting unemployment programmers, enhancing work environment, and Bahrainisation of jobs (GFWTUB & BCCI, 2007). The committee's meetings were periodic, they met around five to six times in 2007(Personal Interview no 3, 2016). The other formal channel for meeting was through the bilateral meetings were the BCCI and GFWTUB met with the ministry of labour. These bilateral meeting were effective as parties used to meet over labour issues. However, such interaction decreased after the uprising which is perceived by actors from the GFWTUB as an outcome to the participation of the unions in the events of February 2011.

8.4.3 the BCCI actions to change the procedures for applying the free movement and fees

The action of BCCI after the uprising is understood from different perspectives. The two perspectives are: changes in perception to the economic performance in Bahrain, second claim is perceived changes to power struggle within the royal family in which the interest of the PM was dominant. The BCCI approached the PM and requested a change to the procedures that conditions the free movement of immigrant labours in Bahrain. They revisited their older demand of a compulsory year spent by the immigrant labour with his employer before moving to another one. The BCCI requested a freeze to the monthly fees required upon businesses for each immigrant employee. Both of these demands were approved by the cabinet. The fees were later on re-introduced by the cabinet in 2013 with some changes to its implementation; they charged BD five on the first three immigrant workers. Once the number exceed three immigrant, they charged BD10 on the forth and the rest employees.

The BCCI claims that the deteriorated economic situation was the main reason for such requests. The reference to the deteriorated economic situation was referred to by the CEO of LMRA who a member of the LMRP steering committee and to the reformsa supporter was. He said that the planned project was detailed during a prosperous economic situation in Bahrain. He referred to the worldwide recession in 2008 as a factor that let them be loose with the amount of fees imposed on employer. He said “labour is part of the economy, and the law (DLRM) was issued in 2006, and in 2008 was the world recession. This affected all people, so we could not. people forget the historical relevance, historical relevance in 2008 is the worldwide collapse of the economy, you could not possibly put so much… it was the opposite the country was giving a stimulant package to activate (meaning activating the economy), we could not take away from it” (personal interview 14, 2016). A former member of labour market reform committee refers to the reluctance from the reformers side (EDB, and LMRA) to implement the fees as it was suggested by the MCK (BD75) as being affected by the 2008 recession. The deteriorated economic situation continued with the events of 2011 and then the decrease in oil prices (Personal

Interview 14, 2016). He continues to say that the fees were meant to be revised periodically:

"the monthly fees are the bare minimum, it wasn't planned to be like this, we wished for it to be implemented like the original amount…. Because of the economic situation, from one problem to another, we were done with the world recession, the 2011, done with 2011, the price of petroleum decreased significantly… when we planned it in 2004 the economic performance was peaking, everybody was doing well". (Personal Interview 14, 2016).

The discussion of policy outcomes in chapter seven explained that the EDB pledged that the application of fees will be associated with the economic performance of Bahrain (Alwasat Newspaper, 26 September 2005). In his speech during the ceremony of the fourth session of the first legislative term of the SHC and House of Representatives, the king also associated the application of fees will be gradual and according to the current economic data and their development (Almaskati & Aloliwat, 2005). Hence there is other possibilities to the changes in fees after the 2011 uprising. The statement by the former chairman of BCCI in 2011 is within the same aspects regarding the deteriorated economic situation in Bahrain. According to a former member of BCCI'S BOD the BCCI gave the Labour market reforms the chance and sufficient time to get to the expected outcome (Akhbar Alkhaleej, 2012). Yet the events of 2011 created different economic situation. Hence, the action of BCCI during the aftermath of 2011 was according to former member of BCCI's BOD "calling for reconsideration of some axes of the labour market reform project, especially with regard to the rates of Bahrainisation and reduce fees for institutions, especially small and medium and freeze them longer than the sectors most affected by the events» (Akhbar Alkhaleej, 2012).

The second perspective in relation to BCCI Actions is found in the literature and the perception of the as GFWTUB analyses such movement as influenced by the division of power within the ruling family. Marce Valeri (2013) comments that "thus, if the Bahraini private sector turned out to be one of the key beneficiaries of the marginalization of the CP since march 2011, there is no doubt that its lobbying for the reversal of EDB policies has only had a limited

impact on this evolution… the privileged interlocutor of the political elite requires adapting their strategies according to the balance of power among Al Khalifas, on whom they remain heavily dependent"(p.41). The BCCI were always pressing for changes to the labour market reforms. until 2010 before the uprising they were communicating their disagreement regards the BD10 fees to the PM's office (Torr, 2010). Hence, the 2011 events are considered as a chance for them to affect the policy outcomes (Personal Interview 2, 2016)

Tracing back the sequence of event during 2011 Bahraini uprising and the role of the CP may to some extent prove that such analysis is correct. According to Robert M. Gates, the United States' secretary of defence from 2006-2011 that the CP met with Shia opposition during the uprising because he "believed that the royal family had to be the voice of motivation" (2014, p.516). One of the opposition demands was the removal of the PM. The CP according to Robert M. Gates book is that Salman "was ready to become PM if asked and that the road map forward must include Shia representatives in the government." (2014, p. 516). Though such plan was praised by Gates, yet the plan was not fulfilled as gates analysed the reason due to the CP having less power in such matter.

However, the relationship between the ruling family and the nature of the power division is not clear. There are changes and dynamics that may not be understood without further investigation regarding the relationship between ruling family members. The dynamic within the family keeps changing and is not static. They have their own family council which maintain the cohesion within the ruling family (Peterson, 2007). According to Peterson, "such councils provide a forum for discussion of issues affecting the family. They strengthen ties between different branches. They function to settle disputes internally and quietly" (p.5).

Several changes occurred to the political power of the CP since 2013. After 2011, the CP was appointed as First Deputy PM in March 2013, a role that makes him more engaged with the executive authority. From that point

onwards, the CP was involved in different executive commitments in different policy areas (Alwasat, 03 August 2014, 23 April 2014, & 25 August 2016). Recently in 2018 he was appointed as the President of the Supreme Commission for The Royal Fund for Fallen Servicemen (Crown Prince official website, 2018a). In 2017, the initiates project to improve Bahrain airport offering (Crown Prince official website, 2018b). The activities of the EDB to attract FDI increase as well. They were able to attract Amazon Web Services (AWS) which will open its first infrastructure region-based office in Bahrain in early 2019 (Crown Prince official website, 2019). Thus, the powers of the CP have been increasing since at least 2013.

8.5 Conclusion

This Chapter divided the interactions based on two main policy outcomes: the fees, and the free movement of labour. The interactions over each of these policy outcomes is characterised by different criteria to some extent. The discussion over the fees was established during the LMRA's meetings in which actors interacted together as part of formal meeting. LMRA defended its position through research regarding the amount of fees. The BCCI criticised the basis that of LMRA's research, the BCCI suggested to establish its own research for further discussion on the final amount of fees. Th LMRA in meanwhile proposed the application of fees to the cabinet. The BCCI reaction to LMRA's actions was refusal to the step taken by the LMRA and communicating it's an acceptance to the PM's office. The BCCI's action resulted in a meeting with the PM and other stakeholders where the PM determined the final amount. Thus, the outcome is a result of interactions between different actors where the initial interactions failed to yield a satisfactory outcome from BCCI's perspectives. Hence, they referred their claims to the PM.

The discussion over the free movement of labour took different path from the discussion over the fees. The final decision was affected by the GFWTUB arguments over the usefulness of the three months period over one year compulsory period, and the support of the CP and the king to the application

of such policy. The communication between the former minister of labour and the different actors shows that such policy was about to be implemented despite the disagreement of BCCI.

The aftermath of the 2011 uprising on the interactions and communication between different stakeholders in regard to labour market issues was slowed down. The BCCI acted according to their understanding of changes within the political and economic context at that time. They requested changes to both fees and free movement of labour. Their requests were approved by the cabinet. Their capacity to affects outcomes as per literature was associated with the changes to power struggle in which the PM was in an advanced situation ahead of the CP. The data collected from the field work does not match such a story, and it doesn't defy it either. The literature does show that the CP was not the most powerful player during the uprising, yet the power balance within the ruling family is complicated and there is no enough literature or data to understand the dynamics of power within the ruling family and its precise effects on policy-making in Bahrain. A second possible perception of the event that led the BCCI to request such changes and succeed in it is the changes within the economic situation in Bahrain. The BCCI perceived the event as affecting the business activities in Bahrain and that fees must be reduced. Similarly, the Chairman of the LMRA explained the same effect of the economy over the changes in labour market policies after 2011.

Chapter 9: application of the policy network analysis, network formation and transformation

9.1 Introduction

This chapter applies the PNA to the process of labour immigration policy-making in light of the labour market reforms process. The chapters focus on the changes in the policy network through the lifetime of the process until the field work. Thus, the characteristics of the network and changes in it based on the discussion of the process in chapter six, seven and eight. The importance of discussing the policy network in this chapter is to establish the background for the discussion in chapter ten, where the relationship between network, agency, context and policy outcomes are established.

The chapter starts with discussion regarding why the labour market network is considered as network. The chapter then proceeds to discuss the different phases in which the network characteristics changed. The phases are depended on the changes to network characteristics based on Marsh's and Rhodes (1992) dimensions: Size of the network and interest representation, Integration, Consensus between members, Exchange of resources, and Power. The different phases discussed are the network formation and its characteristics between 2002 and 2004. There will then be a focus on network expansion during the DLRM and its characteristics between 2005 and 2006. There will also be a focus on the characteristics of the network after establishing the LMRA between 2006 and 2010. The final phase is after the 2011 Bahraini uprising until the field work where actors described their interactions with different stakeholders during this thesis field work. The final part of this chapter discusses the type of network as per Marsh and Rhodes (1992) discussion of policy community and issue network.

9.2 labour immigration Policy network during LMRP

As delineated in section 3.2.2, there were several concepts about what networks are about and Rhodes' (2006) definition is adopted as explained in that section. Rhodes (2006) defines policy network as "formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policy-making and implementation. These actors are interdependent, and policy emerges from the interactions between them" (Rhodes, 2006, p.426). This section uses the definition proposed by Rhodes; the analysis of the chain of actors during labour market reform as forming a network is based on the following characteristics:

- Formal and informal linkage between actors
- Exchange of resources
- Shared or negotiated interest
- Shared or negotiated beliefs

There was formal and informal linkage between actors. Actors engaged with the LMRP described different type of interactions between them and actors such as EDB, CP, advisors of the CP, Ministry of labour, MPs (Personal Interview no 11 and 22). There were formal and informal interactions, a former MP of AWNIS, describes the relationship with former Minister of Labour: "Dr Majeed Alalawi, as a minister, his relationship was strong with AWNIS, we always meet in the ministry or social occasions, in different occasions, a celebrations, social events, diplomatic events, a lunch, opening ceremony, there was a significant interactions in relations to labours issues and unemployment" (personal Interview no 11, 2016).

The actors involved in the policy-making were perceived as cluster or chain. For instance, a former board member of BCCI and LMRA describe the relationship between actors as forming a chain , he says:*" all of actors played a role in the process, they are like the chain connected to each other, the traders or employer, and the union of workers , the government, all have a role and an*

important role ,I can't underestimate any of them," (Interview 7, 2016). Conflation between the role of EDB and the CPC was inevitable as both were involved in holding meetings and negotiations with interest groups (Personal Interview 18, 2016). The EDB holds a formal authority to establish economic related policies, while the Diwan of the CP does not hold such authority. The other informal linkage is the involvement of BCCI in discussing the draft of laws before submitting it to the parliament (The Finance Affairs and Economical Committee and Services Committee in the representative council, 2005, p.274)

There are two main explanations for why actors came together during the reforms. These are the exchange of resources, and the shared interest. The actors of the LMRP form a network as they were needed for the reforms. There was a need for different actors for their expertise; the need for implementation such as BCCI, the need to influence public opinion through media and clergyman, the MPs were needed because of legal authority to influence the project. However, the resources dependency thesis does not explain why there were different actors other than MPs or businessmen during the consultation workshops. The consultation workshops included actors who do not have major resources such as politicians who some of them are not MPs, economist, and legalist. Those actors were considered by the EDB and the members of the core network at formation stage as al Jihat al ma'nia which means the stakeholders (Alabsi, 2016). Hence, perceived shared interest can be a reason to interact with stakeholders during policy-making especially in this case were major reforms is about to occur. Similarly, when the MJN interacted with the Migrant workers society, they were a stakeholder that must be consulted (shura council service committee, 1st April 2009, p87).

The last point is the shared belief which was a reason to form the network because the actors considered high unemployment as a problem. The CP asked a question in a meeting within the EDB regarding how to solve the unemployment issue when Bahrain is dependent on a large number of immigrant labour workers (Personal Interview 14, 2016, and Alabsi, 2016).

Actors who joined the process later on shared the same concern regarding unemployment issue in Bahrain (Personal Interview no 17, 2016)

However, there is no evidence that those actors came together because they had similar beliefs on the best policies to solve the unemployment problem. Even the decision to hire MCK and not another firm is related to technical and financial competitive advantage that the company hold (Alabsi, 2016). Hence, the shared beliefs might have been established after the formation of the LMRP. There is no evidence yet that the shared beliefs were factors to the establishment of the network. The only related matter was that the Labour market reforms started with informal discussions with the CP at the EDB regarding how to solve the unemployment issue in Bahrain whilst Bahrain is simultaneously importing a high number of immigrant labour workers. (Personal Interview 14, 2016, Alabsi, 2016). Hence, referring to a fundamental problem in Bahrain was as well a reason for establishing the reforms and by that the reform network as well. The characteristics of network at formation stage are explained in the next section.

9.2.1 network formation and transformation between 2002-2016

The discussion in chapter five in regard to the formation of network and transformation indicates that the networks are dynamics and keep changing. Hay and Richards (2000) suggested different phases for network as they argued that networks are dynamics. Similarly, Marsh and Smith's Dialectical model suggest changes within the network as an outcome to the different dialectical relationship through the policy process. The Labour market reforms network went through different phases as well. The indication of these phases is the changes in Network characteristics, interactions and how these changes affected the policy outcomes. There are different characteristics of the network at formation stage between 2002 and 2004. The Network then expanded between 2004 and 2006. The network between 2006 and 2010 was institutionalised and aimed for implementation. From 2011 until the field work in 2016, the network hallowed out and fewer interactions were noticed

between actors. The characteristics of the network during each stage are illustrated in this section.

The section uses characteristics of the network which was suggested by Marsh and Rhodes (1992) as mentioned in chapter five. These dimensions are: size of the network and interest represented within the network, Integration and frequency of interactions, consensus vs conflict, exchange of resources, and power. In the original work of Marsh and Rhodes these dimensions were divided in to: Membership which contains the number of participants, type of interest, and continuity in membership (these two are combined together for presentational purposes). Continuity in general meant continuity in membership, values, and outcomes (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992).

9.2.2 The characteristics of the network at formation phase

There are two main contextual dimensions in Bahrain that answer why the network was formed. First a long term objective of resolving unemployment issue, in addition to a comprehensive change to the economy in Bahrain. The second point is the changes in government. The PM was not the chairperson of the EDB. He was replaced by the new CP Shaikh Salman Bin Hamad Alkhalifa and the board of directors was reorganised with the same combination of actors and expertise, namely nine Ministers and other expertise but appointed by the CP (Official Gazette, 2002). These two main points that explain the enabling environment at the formation of the network was explained by Hay and Richards in their discussion regarding network formation. According to Hay (1995) networks form for “either a long-term common strategic agenda...or a short-term, goal-oriented strategic initiative" (1995, pp: 24-25). Hay and Richards (2000) recognise that network formation or modification stage can be traced back to change in government, yet not always be associated with “electoral cycles” (p.7). At this stage, new interest groups may find themselves as part of the network; others will be outside the process. In Bahrain, the network formation came as well after political changes in the government not the elections.

Size of the network and interest representation

The membership of the network varied during the first few years of the project. There were fixed members of the network. The EDB established a steering committee consisting of the following ministries and organisations: the EDB, the CPC, the Minister of Labour, ministry of interior, ministry of finance and national economy, central organisation for information statistics (Personal Interview 14, 2016. Alabsi, 2016). The other members not part of the steering committee was the MCK and experts in some issues related to economy, labour market and politics. Other members of the network e were temporary at this stage as they were needed to collect information from or to be consulted about the policy package.

The access to this newly formed network was exclusive to people with special knowledge about the following issues: the political process in Bahrain, the economic expertise, labour expertise, consultation Company and individuals from business and public sectors who were interviewed. This resulted in employing a consultant to political issues in the CPC. He was a former diplomat and one of the main contact persons with the civil actors (Personal Interview 18, 2016). Other actors were former employees in the Ministry of Labour who possess knowledge about labour market due to former position in the Ministry of Labour (Personal Interview 14, 2006). For instance, Mr Ausamah Alabbsi the director of recruitment department at the Ministry of Labour and social affairs was a member of the committee (Alwasat Newspaper, 28 August 2004). A member of the steering committee said regards the role of the committee as "both steered the study but also supported them when they needed info, or they needed whatever else" (Personal Interview 14, 2016). The members of the committee met with different interest groups to explore the views of the various stakeholders and social partners concerned with the structure of the labour market. The meeting was held with the relevant ministers and employers in the private sector representing the various companies and job seekers and the GFWTUB to take advantage of these views in guiding the ongoing study (Alwasat Newspaper, 28 August 2004).

Other interest groups were excluded from most of the policy process during this stage; they had a very limited access to the process. During stage one of policy process, the actors involved were forming the labour market project. They were collecting the information about the labour market and the economy to draw the final recommendation. Hence, the actors who were interviewed - businessman - were needed for collecting information. The limited interaction between the reform project initiator and BCCI was perceived by BCCI as limited. For instance, in 19 April 2004, an internal announcement letter sent by the BCCI's board member to BCCI's member explaining the importance of engaging the BCCI in labour market policy-making. The BCCI' BOD perspective is that they should be part of the process to ensure the balance of interest between all parties and to ensure that labour market policies achieve their intended goals. The announcement shows that the BCCI was not involved in the policy process to set the labour market reforms. Their engagement was only during the consultation workshop held by the CP in September 2004 (BCCI, 2004b, p.2).

Other interest groups who were not part of collecting information process had access to the policy process through one consultation meeting which was held in September 2004. They will be more involved in the following stages where negotiations start about the policy recommendations and where the laws necessary to reform the Bahraini labour market must be passed by the parliament. The other actors mostly individuals that the project initiator interacted with were businessmen, editors in chief and government actors to collect information from. The interaction with these individuals was more extensive than the interactions with interest groups.

Integration

The interactions between members of the network were frequent. The steering committee used to meet with MCK twice a week. The CP as well conducted meeting with steering committee and MCK (Alabsi, 2016). The tasks of actors during this stage was collecting information, conducting analysis and studies of

the market, then discussing the outcomes of these studies with the steering committee. The consultant company team used the collected information for analysis and suggesting the policy package. According to the EDB (2004), "*the labour market reform policy recommendations have been developed with extensive coordination with stakeholders in Bahrain*" (p.1). Starting from September 2003, the EDB has met with more than 600 individuals from different sectors in order to "*understand their perspectives on the challenges Bahrain is facing, to hear their recommendations for reform, and to solicit their feedback on proposed policy recommendations*" (EDB, 2004, p.1).

Consensus between members

The cohesion and consensus were really high between members of the core committee. It was mainly a support and agreement to what EDB, CP, MCK diagnoses and solutions about the Bahraini Labour Market. There was some disagreement with MCK recommendations. The Steering committee adjusted the recommendation of McKinsey & Company's recommendation. For instance, there was some suggestions regarding the restructuring of the Bahraini welfare system, but the committee did not approve it (Personal Interview 18, 2016). MCK at that time suggested that public sector must minimize the subsidies of product and services in Bahrain. such suggestion was refused by the network members because that suggestion does not fit with the culture in Bahrain which is based on the support of the state to its citizens (Personal Interview 18,2016). Despite such disagreement the shared views of actors within the core network at this stage is an evident characteristic of the network structure. The idea that cost shall be the policy instrument to manage the foreign labour in Bahrain will dominate the discussions in the future. No alternative ideas were presented, it's like policy-making become constrained with this suggested tool. In the future phases of the policy-making process these policy tools became the main themes for contestation between actors involved in the process.

The members of the peripheral network such as BCCI and other interest groups lack understanding regarding the labour market reform project. They have not comprehended the full concept of it. The BCCI were not pleased with the information they had about the reform. It was still an ambiguous issue to them. According to a letter sent to BCCI's members from BCCI's BOD that: "the information about labour market reforms are not sufficient, and that the BCCI has not yet received the full draft of Mckinsey study and the conclusion they arrived to" (an internal announcement letter sent by the BCCI's board member to BCCI's member, 2004, p.2). This position had the BCCI to request more information from the EDB to form a vivid perspective that presents the businessman stance about the project. Hence the BCCI requested the study from the EDB. This was similar with some members of the SHC; for instance, khalid Almaskati a businessman and member of SHC was asking questions to the former minister of labour regards labour market reforms. Almaskati showed that the project is vague, and they do not understand it. He requested to have a look at MCK full report. This shows that the businessman were unaware of the details of the project and not included in the early discussions of the project except the big workshop that was held in September 2004 (Shura council minutes, 2004)

Exchange of resources

There was an exchange of resources during phase one of the policy process. The main resources that were exchanged were between the following actors: EDB (Authority to propose economic related policies) , the CPC (employed expertise for public relations issues), the Ministry of Labour (the formal institution that draws foreign labour policies and implements it), the MCK a management consultation company was needed to collect information about labour market and writes policy recommendation, the expertise who were employed from different organisations such as the director of labour at the Ministry of Labour. Regarding this matter, a member of LMRP steering committee, comments on why he was part of the process: "As the director of labour, so they came to me because it was my job" (Personal Interview 14,

2016). Finally, the stakeholders the company interviewed to collect information about labour market. However, the exchange of resources was not always two sided, the stakeholders who were interviewed participated in giving information only not policy recommendations (EDB & CPC, 2004b,2004c).

power

The process reveals unequal powers during the initial phase of the process. The core policy members such as EDB, MCK, and steering committee had more power to affect the policy recommendations. In contrast, Interest groups who were part of the peripheral network had rare access to policy process and less effects on policy outcomes. The unequal power relationship is an outcome of contextual factors and how the network distributed power at this stage. The contextual factors grant the CP and EDB the power to initiate policies. The role of different actors such as member of steering committee or MCK was given through their membership in the network. The CP was also involved in affecting the final recommendations. Therefore, the sources of power for affecting the outcomes at this stage was either determined by context such as the authority of the Crown Prince, or because of how network distributed power and resources through determining the role to actors such as membership in the steering committee or Research and studies.

9.2.3 The characteristics of the network during the legislative phase: drafting and discussing the DLRM between 2005-2006

The legislative phase exhibits changes in the characteristics of the network and increase in interactions between actors. The size of the network expanded as MPs and BCCI members become core member of the network. There was more exchange of resources and trade-off between actors. The meetings between actors were more frequent with the aim to arrive in to agreement in regards some aspects of the DLRM. The DLRM phase is considered as a stage due to the different network characteristics in comparison to 2002-2004 when the EDB was planning the reform and conducting studies then revealing its conclusion to interest groups.

Size of the network and interest representation

This phase is characterised by a greater participation of interest groups and MPs. There were more interactions that were not just based on consultation. The reason for this expanded interaction was to get the DLRM to be approved by the Parliament and SHC as soon as possible (Parliamentary minutes, 18th October 2005). During this stage, actors who were in the peripheral network became core network member. MPs who were just attending the consultation workshop in September 2004 became core and important players. The increased need for them is due to the importance of the legal resource they possess, which is voting to pass the law. The BCCIs are needed to finance for implementing the project, as they will finance the labour fund institution (Tamkeen). In addition, the BCCI member's position will be enhanced as they increase interactions with businessman, more communications with MPs, Crown Prince, PM and other interest groups and the need for them to implement the project.

Integration

The intense communication between actors started after referring the law to Parliament. Passing the draft law on the regulation of the labour market annexed to the Royal Decree No. (25). For the year 2005, the legislator was essential for starting to implement the new labour market policies in Bahrain. Hence, the founder of the project went into intense interaction with other actors to pass it through legislator as soon as possible. The former Minister of Labour commented on the importance of passing the law as soon as possible during the fourth parliamentary sessions and said:

"*Regarding the postponement of the debate on these two laws, I believe that the national need to implement these two laws been delayed, and we need the support of the legislature to proceed with the discussion and approval of these two laws" (2005, p.15). Similarly, the* Legal Affairs Advisor at the EDB said *"We* really aspire to be issued as soon as possible to enable the process of reforming the labour market and the consequent procedures" (parliamentary minutes. 3rd Dec 2005, p.30)

The interactions between actors were through the parliament and outside it as well. The parliament had a thorough discussion over the DLRM. The DLRM was discussed in twelve parliamentary sessions (Alabsi, 2016). In addition, the service committee in the Parliament and then later on in the SHC held meetings with MPs, the EDB, the BCCI, the GFWTU, and the Ministry of Labour. The MPs spent more time in discussing the project in comparison to the SHC which spent only two months to study the DLRM and then they approved it (FECSHC, 2006).

Outside the parliament, the EDB and BCCI were very active in organising meetings. The EDB and the CPC had several formal and informal meetings with MPs. These meetings were held every week then every two to three weeks (Personal Interview18, 2016). For the purpose of discussing and pushing for the DLRM to be approved by MPs, the Crown Prince formed a special team work. The team's main responsibilities were to communicate with the MPs and negotiate over the DLRM. The members of the team were from the CPC and the EDB, they were the Chief Executive Officer of the EDB and legal advisor to the Crown Prince's Diwan, Political Affairs Advisor at the Diwan of the CP. The working team organised several workshops and seminars for the MJN for the purpose of explaining the idea behind the reform project (Alabsi, 2016). Other interactions outside the parliament were between the CPC and other groups such as BCCI, Clergymen, and the Media (Personal Interview 18, 2016).

The action of BCCI during this stage resulted in an increase of the number of actors that participate in the discussions and the frequency of meetings outside the parliament. The meetings and seminars were held at the headquarters of the BCCI. According to the former chief executive officer of BCCI, the meetings were "every day, the BCCI was similar to beehive, in terms of sounds and numbers, a real Beehive, or workshop, the BCCI was actually a workshop, meetings everywhere, in the rooms, consultative meetings in the main big hall, during the afternoon, BCCI was open to everyone, among which are people supportive to the reforms.. MPs used to come, especially the MPs with economic background" (Personal Interview 4, 2016).

Consensus between members

A measure of agreement exists, yet disagreement was more prominent than the early phase of the project. The number of interests involved in the process increased, and each has a different perspective toward the proposed labour market reforms. Hence inevitably consensus will no longer be a feature of the network. As discussed in chapter seven The sources of disagreement were, in relation to harming the interests of businessmen, or lack of understanding about the project (Interview 4, 2016), other topics of disagreement were: in regards to the power of LMRA, the application of DLRM on the domestic workers, the rights of the MJN to monitor the work of the LMRA and the rights of foreign workers to move to new employer without the consent of the current employer. Hence, part of the intensity in interactions between different actors is inferred from the clashes of perceived interest that different actors represented and potentially to misunderstanding to the project as well. The resources that were held by those actors is the other reason that describe such interactions at will be explained in the next paragraph.

Exchanging resources

The most intense interactions between the EDB and other actors was with MPs and BCCI. They were the most needed actors during this stage. MPs were needed for their legal resources, it was important for the EDB to put effort in convincing MPs about the LMRP. Similarly, BCCI were needed for financial resources. Others who were needed as well were for the purpose of public support such as Media, clergymen, Economic experts, and other interest groups.

The intense interactions between EDB and MPs were to convince them about the importance of passing the draft of law regards regulating the labour market. Without such a law, there would not be a LMRA that set the labour market policies and regulate the flow and right of immigrant workers in Bahrain. Therefore, the parliamentary approval of such a law was important.

Members of representative and consultative councils possess a legal resource that is required to pass the draft of law. The intense communication between MPs, EDB and CPC reveals the extent to which the support of MPs was needed. As observed by one of the MPs from the democratic bloc that the increased interactions with the CP is due to them having a voice, meaning their ability to discuss and vote in the parliament. In return MPs from the Democratic bloc supported the LMRP because it will provide more jobs for Bahrainis, Makes Bahrain more attractive for foreign investment, and makes Bahrainis the preferred option for employment (Personal Interview 15, 2016).

In addition, Parliament and SHC were the field that each government party were using to advance the interest they represent. By government party, the researcher means the fragmented perspective regards the labour market project in which the government actors did not act as unified actor. Hence each group/individual lobbied within the Parliament and SHC to advance the interest they represent. The former Minister of Labour was supportive to the initiatives of the EDB and CP reforms. He was convinced about the project and decided to support it (Personal Interview 22, 2016). The former Minister of Labour worked by himself to gain the support of MPs. He used to invite MPs for working lunch or breakfast and discusses the Labour Market Reforms with them. However, his perspective to the reform does not represent the whole government body. Other members of government were working with Parliament and SHC members to defy the project (Personal Interview 22, 2016). Yet not much information is available to understand how the government's anti-labour reform groups worked against the project.

The Parliamentary blocs that acted against the DLRM were Alasalah bloc, Almenber bloc (Muslim brotherhood) and finally an independent bloc was hesitant about the project. Throughout the discussions, those blocs especially Alasalah rejected several articles related to immigrant labour and domestic workers. AAIS Members demonstrated their lack of acceptance to the project through media and by organising seminars (LMRA, 25 May 2009). They used their membership within the parliament to communicate the disagreement

when their leader Ghanism Alboinein requested the establishment of temporary committee (Parliamentary minutes, 3rd December 2005). The data available shows that these blocs were protecting economic and political based interest. These blocs were hesitant about the project mostly on the basis of its effect on business sector. In terms of the political interest of AAIS and Almenber Society, they are involved in exchange relationship with the government/ royal family of Bahrain. Both societies are pro government political parties; they have no history of opposition nor conflict with the government. The political history of Bahrain shows a long term of conflict between the government and opposition which were mostly communist, nationalist and Islamism Shia.

Outside the parliament, there was a need for BCCI's approval upon the project. Businessmen are the most affected interest group by the project. They are the sources of fees imposed on immigrant labour. Fees are one of the pillars to implement the LMRP. Without it the LMRP will be missing an important policy tool that is highly needed to restructure the labour market in Bahrain. Therefore, the EDB assured the businessmen that they will get something in return. The BD 10 will be used to fund educational projects that will train Bahrainis who will eventually work for the private sector. In addition, part of the money will be used to fund the business sector in Bahrain through helping entrepreneurship, small and medium businesses. Hence the fees on immigrants will eventually be spent on expanding and enhancing the work of the private sector (Elamin & Alabsi, 2016, personal Interview 4, 2016). The BCCI explain that for Tamkeen to be financed partially by the private sector is "something of reciprocal trade-off. It takes it from the private sector to give it back to the private sector" (Services Committee in Parliament, 2012, p.111). This important position of BCCI explains the interactions with higher authority. On 18th June 2005, the CP visited the BCCI and met with its members to discuss labour market reform project. The visit was the first visit by the CP to the BCCI's headquarter (Alwasat, 18th June 2005). The visit was requested by BCCI to assure the businessmen that the project will not harm their interest. The CP

informed businessman that if the project does not succeed then it will be cancelled (Personal Interview 4, 2016). Hence, the acceptance of the BCCI to the Labour reforms came after the assurance that reforms will be accompanied by other necessary reform such as the education and training systems to improve their outputs in line with the goal of making Bahrain the preferred choice for employment (Alwasat, 06 July 2007)

The other groups that were involved in the process such as Media and Clergymen were important to mobilise the public opinion to support the labour market reforms in Bahrain. Public support was the source of legitimising the policies presented by EDB and CP Court. Regarding the need for media and public support, the former editor of one of Bahraini's newspaper expressed that the project founders were seeking "the support of society, political societies and business sector" (Personal Interview 20, 2016).

The least effective actor during this phase was the General Federation of Workers Trade Union in Bahrain. Its role was mainly consulted by the Service Committee in Parliament and SHC. The committee has to consult interests groups as part of a formal process when setting any laws. The GFWTUB did not have any interactions with other actors outside the parliamentary circle during this phase. This indicates that the GFWTUB had a symbolic participation in the process due to its limited resources especially that the negotiation of the draft law was not through tripartite consultation process. The GFWTUB had a significant role in the policy-making process where the negotiations took place in a tripartite consultation process. AWNIS was not part of the parliament during this stage of the process, they will be more involved between 2006-2010 when they participate in parliament.

Power

There were unequal sources of power during negotiation of the DLRM. Two mains different interests dominated during the discussion of DLRM: pro-business interest, and groups that support the role of government in

determining the fees. Pro-business interest was represented by BCCI, and MPs from different blocs. The BCCI had different sources of power: first their historical relationship with the cabinet gave them early access to the process yet limited effect on the explanatory memorandum of the DLRM. In contrast, other groups such as the GFWTUB or sector based association such as the fisherman association or construction contractors, political societies did not have similar historical relationship with cabinet. The second source of power is the need of businessman to implement the project. They affected the outcome because they were needed for implementation, hence they were able to strike a deal with the EDB in regard to implementation of reforms in accordance with decrease of Bahrainisation rate, and the use of monthly fees to support the private sector.

The MPs were effective in affecting the outcomes in relation to domestic labours and the power of the proposed LMRA. The legal resources were used to affect such outcomes. The negotiating team working with the EDB were able through their legal expertise and skills to keep the clause related to immigrant labour free mobility in the labour market without being affected. Hence, the legal advisers for EDB used non-structural power to affect the outcomes; they used their skills in negotiation.

9.2.4 The characteristics of the network during implementation phase 2006-2010

The characteristics of the network changed after the approval of the DLRM. The interaction between actors was still frequent, yet the main themes of discussion were around when to start the implementation. Some actors such as MPs re introduced themselves occasionally through suggesting an amendment to the DLRM. In addition, the relationship between actors become institutionalised by the creation of the LMRA which its Board members are representing different interest. Some actors from the steering committee became part of establishing the LMRA. Hence, the main features of this phase are the disagreement in regard to implementation and the institutionalisation of interactions.

Size of the network and interest representation

The LMRA was established after the approval of the DLRM by the SHC and then the Royal decree to issue it. Passing the DLRM through the parliament and SHC was perceived by some members of the reform process as the end of their prescribed job. Some of the experts who were needed for such a purpose are no longer employed by the CPC such as a political consultant. In addition, the interaction with the media decreased (Personal Interview 18, 20, 2016). Other members of the network such as Ausamah Alabbsi continued his involvement with the reforms. The EDB gave him the responsibility to manage the establishment of the LMRA (Alabsi, 2016).

The EDB continued its direct involvement with the project. This was achieved through the direct involvement in establishing the LMRA and continues interactions with interest groups such as AWNIS (Personal Interview 11, 2016). The EDB role during this phase was through the appointment of the LMRA's and labour fund's executive authority (AlFardan, 2005). Some appointed members in the Executive authority within the LMRA were working with the reform process or the EDB. For instance, the Director of Policy Development Department in the EDB was appointed in the LMRA's department of policy development and labour's market information (Alfardan,2005). In addition to the appointment of Ausamah Alabsi as Deputy CEO for LMRA, he previously was member of Labour market reforms steering committee (Personal Interview 14, 2016. Alfardan, 2005). The EDB and CP continued to approach political parties such as AWNIS, especially that AWNIS joined the parliament in 2006. In relation to such a relationship, a former member of AWPB comments:

after AWNIS joined the parliament the relationship become strongest, I remember with CP directly or people close to him, there was many gives and take, the CP team approached me personally as an academic and as a member of AWNIS as well. it was informal and there was a focus on the economic situation and that this project will resolve so many issues. I think they felt that there is a receptive environment and there are people supporting the project

especially when meeting with those people who are pro labour market" (Personal Interview 11, 2016)

The Board of directors of the LMRA consist of the following organisations: Minister of Labour who is the Chairman of the LMRA, the Board Members were: the Undersecretary of Ministry of Labour, CEO of Central information Organisation, CEO of Reef Finance (a real estate development company) , one member from EDB, two BCCI representatives, and two representatives of GFWTUB (Official Gazette, 2006.,Alwasat, 31st July 2008)

Integration

The interaction between actors was less frequent than in 2005. The interactions were held during the meetings of the LMRA's BOD. These meetings are not frequent as they officially meet four times a year (Personal Interview 2, 2016). There were continues meeting in regard to certain topic related to policy proposed for labour market reforms. These topics were the free movement of labour after the approval and the fees. Some of these meetings were not part of LMRA's BOD meetings. There were several committees that were established to discuss several topics in relation to the reforms. The committees that were established for the purpose of discussing the free movement of labour (Alwasat Newspaper, 31 July 2009). There was at least one formal meeting with the PM. Other meetings were the results of the action carried by excluded interest such as the fisherman and contractors. Their actions created an interaction between them, LMRA and cabinet.

consensus

Consensus was not a feature for this phase. There was tension during meetings especially when discussing the free movement of labour (Personal Interview 2, 2016). The disagreement over the implementation resulted in delays to implementation of the free movement of labour for almost three years (Alwasat Newspaper, 31 July 2009). After the implementation the major disagreements came from outside the network members mainly from excluded

interest. This disagreement led to some interactions with LMRA and the cabinet to solve the issues faced by fisherman.

exchange of resources

The members of LMRA BOD were part of the process because the DLRM created the legal basis for such inclusion. The BCCI were still needed for implementation as without the monthly fees the labour fund cannot function. The EDB played the major role in implementing the reforms as they set up the LMRA and financed the activities of labour fund (Alwasat Newspaper, 24 March 2007).

power

The sources of power to affect the outcomes were several. The EDB has financial resources and authority to start setting up the LMRA. The BCCI used other sources of power that is not generated from the network. They communicated their disagreement on implementing the monthly fees to the PM. Hence, they used their historical established relationship with the cabinet to affect the outcomes. Other non-structural sources of power to affect the policy outcomes were used by the GFWTUB. They convinced the ministry of labour that applying the free movement with specifying a three month notice before the worker move to another employer as an outcome that will affect the Bahraini international reputation in relation to labour's right.

9.3 The characteristic of the network after the Bahraini uprising in 2011

In chapter five, we discussed Hay and Richards' stages of networking. They suggested that the networks terminate after the network served its purpose through passing the necessary legislation and then implementation. This did not occur with labour market case study. As the network was institutionalised with the creation of the DLRM, then there was no official termination to the network. However, the network interaction and effect over the policy outcomes decreased significantly. The changes in the political context mainly the Bahraini uprising in 2011 affected how actors interact within the realm of

labour market. As discussed in chapter eight, the perceived political and economic interest of the BCCI changed after the uprising which affected the actions of the BCCI. In addition, the relationship between different actors within the Bahraini political environment changed as a direct outcome to the political stance of interest groups during the uprising. Hence all these contextual changes had a greater effect on the interaction of actors within the labour market policy-making. Thus, resulting in almost stagnate policy network as the interaction and negotiation between actors were diverted to other issues such as the need to return dismissed employer to their jobs. Hence, in this case study, the network effect slowed down as an outcome to changes in context and how it was perceived by actors rather than a break in resources dependencies as suggested by Benson (2000).

The general characteristics of the network until the field work was conducted in 2016 are described as following. In terms of integrations, LMRA's meetings were less than the first few years after establishment it (Personal Interview 2, 2016). In general, interactions between actors were significantly less than before the Bahraini uprising. The BCCI continued its actions to affect the policy outcomes and to stop implementation and they succeeded. The other members of the network such as the GFWTUB were focusing their work on how to resolve the problems of labours and trade unionist who were fired from work as an outcome to their participation in Bahraini uprising. The size did not change; it was the frequency of the meeting that mainly changed.

9.3.1 How to explain the post 2011 actor's interactions

The effect of the uprising on actor's interactions can be understood with reference to three factors. First, the capacity of the rentier state to repress its citizens. Second, the perception of the extreme faction within the royal family in regard to how to deal with Shia and the uprising in Bahrain. Third, the ability of BCCI members to bypass the network and to communicate directly with the prime minster is more effective once other actors are excluded from the process.

The kingdom's security and military forces were able to crackdown the protest and repress the participants. Their ability is internal they did not need any intervention. The intervention made by the neighbouring countries were not needed to control and limits the protest as Bahraini's security forces is well established for such mission. The nature of the military intervention from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in Bahrain is disputed by literature. On one hand, the GCC military intervention did not participate in violence against demonstrators (Brownlee et al, 2015). On the other hand, the argument made by protesters is that the GCC forces participated in accelerating the human rights violation in Bahrain (Bassiouni, 2011). In general, the Bahraini security forces are able to control the uprising without such interventions. This ability is understood as an outcome to the petrodollar, as the state employ foreign workers to supress its own citizens (Brownlee et al, 2015).

The second factor which explains the deteriorated political situation in Bahrain is that the royal family have different competing factions within it. The 'Khawalid' are the most extreme in their perspective to how to deal with security issues in Bahrain. According to Gengler (2013) "*the dominant strategy was increasingly dictated by a newly empowered coalition of royals — the Khawālid — who conceive of the country's 'Shīʿa problem' in security rather than political terms and have continued to pursue a corresponding security solution to what is a political conflict."* (p.53).

The strategy used by Alkhawalid to repress the uprising meant that participant in the uprising were strictly dealt with by security forces. Among those were workers and trade unionist who were punished for their participation in the uprising. The security state was then using all its potential to revenge from the pro revolution civil actors among which were the GFWTUB. The BCCI were then part of a greater revenge process as will be explained in part 10.3.2. Thus, resulting in affecting the relationship between the GFWTUB and the BCCI. The inclusion of several parts of the society in the state's retaliation process against the participants in Bahraini's uprising reveals the significant power of the extreme branch in Alkhalifa. The Alkhawalid were applying their beliefs on how

to deal with the uprising by security forces rather than by political means which is preferred by the Crown Prince of Bahrain (Gengler,2013).

The third point is that the outcome to stagnate network is enhancing the ability of BCCI to directly communicate with cabinet. The path to change the labour market policy outcomes was minimised. As there was no need for extended discussions and meetings. Thus, the BCCI communicated directly with the cabinet to change the policy outcomes. The data explained in chapter eight shows that the BCCI were arguing to stop the collection of fees and to change the free movement system due to the deteriorated economic situation in Bahrain. Their claim was not disputed and was taken in to account by the cabinet, as they referred directly to the PM.

How can we understand the actions of BCCI in comparison to pre 2011 interactions and communication with different actors? In chapter seven and eight the BCCI's activities and collective action was explained. These actions can be categorised and explained based on the timeline within this thesis as activities before 2011 and post 2011. This broad division aim to show how these activities are arranged and affected based on wide network interactions and reactions. In 2011 the BCCI's activities has not gone through the network of actors that was established prior to 2011. They did not engage with the LMRA or GFWTUB to change the fees. They have directly referred to the higher authority presented by the PM.

During a more stable political circumstances the interactions between actors was through the network of actors that was established at the early stages of the reforms. Thus, the activities and actions of BCCI cannot be understood without reference to the network interactions or the need for BCCI for implementation. The characteristics of the interactions that the BCCI were part of are summarised with the following two points. First, a lengthy period of negotiations took place to achieve the intended outcomes. Actors were actively interacting and negotiating the labour market reforms and the procedures to implement such reforms. This has led the BCCI to act collectively by organising

meeting and lobbying among MPS. Second, The BCCI did not refer to the Prime Minister until they have negotiated the changes with the LMRA and other actors. These negotiations were lengthy and the BCCI presented its researches and studies to support its position. The reference to higher authority that they have an established historical relationship with was that last strategy. Hence, during the politically stable period in Bahrain the BCCI were collectively active in defending their interest in relation to labour market policies. Their interactions and reactions were affected by the network structure, and the reference to higher authority is an outcome for a failure to reach an understanding between different negotiating parties.

However, with the uprising and the stagnated network the process of change to policy outcomes took different path. This time the BCCI referred directly to its long term ally the PM. There were no lengthy negotiations, nor activities or lobbying other than the PM. The literature and data gathered explains the relationship between merchants and cabinet as based on two explanations. First, a good and established relationship between merchants and different influential members of the royal family but no precise explanation for the benefits received by the two parties or what sustain such relationship (Valeri, 2015).

Second, the business man has connections with the government through different channels. The first channel is the BCCI. The BCCI is a de facto member of the government, and that the BCCI are usually a part of the government process are being consulted (Lawson, 1989, Interview no 5, 2016). Second, the businessman are members of the cabinet. For instance, the former Minister of labour explains that one of the ways that business man exert influence is through their membership in the cabinet (Interview no 22, 2016). Membership of businessman as part of the cabinet as one of the indicators to the potential existence of crony capitalism. The membership in the cabinet is assumed to be an influential channel for benefiting the businessmen.

The literature explains that oil rents were used to establish a patron-client relationship between the businessman and the PM. The patron-client relationship explains the changes that occurred to BCCI's tune in reaction to the Bahraini uprising. This shows that the royal family needed the political support of merchants in a very critical situation. According to Anthony Hall (1976) the patron depends politically on clients in some political situation that is deemed as critical. In addition, the businessman in general hold on their political loyalty to the government even in a time during decreased oil rents. According to Kamrava et al (2016) "existing patterns of close ties, clientelism and the business sector's dependence on the state are unlikely to undergo significant changes, even if the state has fewer resources to distribute" (p.11). The prime minister is connected with merchants through patronage network were the prime minister enjoys the political support by the merchants who in return receive material benefits (Gangler,2013). Thus, the Prime minister was not reluctant to react to businessman demands during unsettled political context in Bahrain.

Figure three in page 268 shows the changes in network interactions between 2002-2016. It shows the changes in the frequency of interactions and actors who were part of the process. It explains shortly the function and role of the network which has changed throughout the process. Figure three attempt to show the difference between the Bahraini case and policy network literature. As explained through the two figures in chapter four page 101 and 119 were both agreed that a break in the structure of resources entail a break in the structure of the network. The 2011 events showed that the political instability and the political interest of actors can have an effect on their relationship within the network and their inclusion in the process. The effect of the political context is more significant on actors who already lack resources for inclusion such as GFWTUB. In contrast, the BCCI have multiple resources that can benefit its position within the policy process. In addition, the choices of strategies by actors differ when network interactions are highly influential. For instance, the BCCI acted and interacted in accordance to network structure, while during the

political unrest they pass by the network and act solo by using their historical alliance with the government.

In addition, figure three shows that the programmatic beliefs were not relevant during the post 2011 interactions. The ideational approach to policy network analysis that was explained by Figure no2 page119 emphasised the importance of ideational context and programmatic beliefs. The ideational context is assumed to be significant factor during all the phases of the interactions. In comparison, the original Marsh and Smith's dialectical process which eliminated the effects of ideational context. The case of Bahrain is slightly different, in 2011 the economic and political interest of actors were more prominent than the effect of the ideational context. Thus, ideas and programmatic beliefs of actors are not influential during all the stages of the policy process. The discussions over the ethos of the reforms were prominent during the early stages of discussing MCK drafts until the legislation phase. Such discussions decreased with time and by 2011 the policy actors were suggesting that the economic performance in Bahrain was not adequate to continue with the fees imposed on labour or the free movement of labour.

Figure 3: The features of the policy process between 2002-2016

2002-2004 **context**: political reforms, new division of power, beliefs in deregulating the labour market, high unemployment, economic restructure
Actors: EDB CP, MCK, steering committee, Governmental actors and experts. Businessman and other actors had less frequent encounter with the core members of the network.
frequency of Interactions: very frequent, twice a week between the steering committee and MCK, one general workshop in 2004
Type of interactions: meetings, interviews
Relationships: two ways relationship except with interest groups
Role of the network: sat the main parameters of the reforms, determined responsibilities of actors, collection and analysis of information, discussion of policy proposals

↓

2005-2006 **context:** parliament membership structure, Power division within ruling family, beliefs in deregulating the labour market

Actors: EDB, Political consultant, MPs, Shura members, BCCI, Financial and economic committees in Shura and parliament, political societies, Media, GFWTUB, Ministry of Labour

Frequency of Interactions: very frequent and between all participants

Type of Interactions: formal and informal meetings, lunch & Dinner meetings, consultations, exchanging letters, seminars, workshops

Relationships between actors: two-way interactions between actors.

Role of the network: negotiations and bargaining, making deals, lobbying



2006-2010 **context:** changes in governance of labour market, increased tension between PM & CP

Actors: LMRA, BCCI, PM, GFWTUB, EDB, Ministry of Labour. MPs (on and off)

Frequency of Interactions: moderate number of meetings depending on the topic of discussions

Type of Interactions: formal meetings, letters to higher authority, protesting, media interactions

Relationships: there was interactions between different interest groups

Role of the network: negotiation, bargaining, and disputing the suggested reforms



2011-2016 **context:** political unrest in Bahrain, declined economic performance in Bahrain

Actors: LMRA, GFWTUB, PM, MPs, BCCI

Frequency of Interactions: exceptional interactions were between MPs and BCCI , PM and BCCI, LMRA and BCCI

Type of Interactions: requests of meetings by BCCI, consultation by MPs, and **informal** meetings between BCCI and LMRA

Relationships: The dominant interest was by business sector**,** rare and nonexistence relationship between BCCI, Government and GFWTUB

Role of Network: interactions bypass the labour market network in some cases and other historically established relationship between pm and businessman was the way to defend interest.

9.4 Types of policy network

As we mentioned in chapter five that Marsh & Rhodes's (1992) suggested a continuum to describe the type of policy networks. There are two ideal policy

networks at each end of the continuum: namely: policy community and issue network. The policy community network is characterised by stable membership, strong dependencies, limited number of participants, frequent interactions, members share the same values, they all have resources, and there is a balance of power. Issue network on the other hand consist of large number of actors with different types of interest, contacts fluctuate, conflict presents, limited resources for some participants and unequal distribution of power. The labour market reforms policy network throughout the different phases and time were neither a policy community nor an issue network. The network characteristics lay somewhere in between. At the beginning, the network characteristics exhibit more policy community network characteristics; it then departed from this end to acquire features that was similar to issue network.

The first stage is to some extent a mixture of both, though it looks more like a community network rather than an issue network. The features of the network that resembles policy community are as following: closed network, central authority, the membership of policy experts, the network is divided between core and periphery members, and high degree of cohesion between core members. The network members showed a high degree of cohesion when expressing their beliefs about the policies to tackle unemployment in Bahrain and how to restructure the Bahraini Economy. Those members of the network will act in a later stage as a promoter to the policy package that resulted from stage one policy process. The policy networks at stage one look more closed than open to public or other interest groups. Despite that, the EDB met with numerous actors to collect information; however, it was for the purpose of building the policy package and not for policy negotiations.

There was one leading government agency which is the EDB. The EDB acted as a central authority that initiated policies. The other government organisations such as the Ministry of Labour were not the leading organisation; it was a member of the network. The LMRP network did involve expertise to research the labour market and suggest policy recommendations, similarly literature

discussed the role of experts in policy communities rather than issue network (Campbell et al, 1989)

According to Laumann and Knoke (1987) the policy community networks may consist of core and peripheral members or primary and secondary members. The primary actors determine rules of the game, membership of the network and the policy direction. Secondary members do not have enough resources to exercise influence over the policy outcomes. They are important for some issues and hence have occasional access to the policy network (Smith, 2013). To some extent this was the case with the BCCI, they had rare access to the network during the time between 2003 and 2004. In November 2004, the CP met with the BCCI's chairperson Khaled Kanoo and other businessmen. However, there was not a direct contact between the EDB, and the BCCI regards the LMRP before that meeting. As the CP expressed to Mr Kanoo and the other individuals in the meeting that the EDB "*follows up all the published opinions on labour market reforms, stressing that the multiplicity of views on this study is a healthy phenomenon reflected the interaction of society and its institutions with what was put forward"* (Alwasat, 6th November 2004).

Moving from the stage where policy proposal was set in a cohesive network, the need to pass a law to start implementing the reforms resulted in expanding the network of actors involved in the process. The characteristics of the network at this stage departed from being more policy community to exhibits some characteristics of issue network. The characteristics of the network that is shared with Marsh and Rhodes issue network were: Large number of participants, over 100 members, different affected interest, a measure of agreement exists but disagreement was a feature. The only characteristic shared with policy community was the frequent interactions. The dimensions of the network that is in between the policy community and issue network were: access fluctuate because it depends on when interest groups will be consulted by MPs, and the more effort made by the BCCI to enhance its position by organising seminars and meetings with different actors. The last

point is that some participants had more resources than others which means there was an unequal power.

With the establishment of the LMRA in 2006, the network became institutionalised. All the members of the network are a formal member of LMRA's BOD with a formal consultative role. The network is not a community network because members of the LMRA's BOD represent different interests, yet not all the interests are included. The BCCI still the representative of all business interest, the other business association are not included. For this reason, the network is not a perfect issue network as well. It was still somewhere between those two types of networks. After 2011, the network was less effective with less interaction and limited access to it, it was almost nonexistence as meetings were very distant and inefficient (Personal Interview 2, 2016).

9.5 Conclusion

This chapter provided the descriptive part of the analysis. The chapter serves three aims: to analyse the process as being part of a network by using Rhodes' (2006) definition. The interaction process between different actors forms a network because: there was an exchange of resources, shared interest to solve the unemployment issue and restructure the economy, formal and informal interactions. There was a shared perspective regards the unemployment problem must be resolved.

The network characteristics and the changes to it was described to cover around more than a decade of interactions between actors (2002-the beginning of 2016). The first few years of interactions between actors was led by the EDB which initiated the reforms. The member of the network showed shared understanding of the problem and supported the same policy philosophy. Their interactions aimed at designing the policy recommendations and collecting information from participants to understand the problems faced by the labour market in Bahrain. Once the project was written and suggested

to stakeholders through workshops, the EDB drafted the DLRM without consulting with stakeholders. However, the DLRM must go through formal and informal channels for discussion. Thus, the network expanded significantly and the interactions with different actors was intense. Such interactions yielded outcomes as discussed in chapter seven in regard to policy outcomes and the role of different actors. The intense interactions continued after the passing of the DLRM, yet in regard to issues related to implementation, policy network at that time (after 2006) was institutionalised with the creation of LMRA. Until 2009 all the policy outcomes took place within the institutionalised sphere unless the BCCI refers its dissatisfaction to the PM. After 2011, the network became stagnate and less efficient in policy discussion. The marginalisation of less powerful groups such as the GFWTUB becomes more evident.

Chapter 10: The dialectical relationships

10.1 Introduction

The previous chapters discussed the characteristics of LMRP and how it affected the policy outcomes in relation to labour market and the immigrant labours. In addition, there was a discussion regards the interactions between different actors which was considered as forming a network or chain of actors. This chapter uses the previous discussions regards the process to map out the relationship between the context, network, actions of actors and policy outcomes. The chapter is divided into three sections to discuss the three dialectical relationship as proposed by Marsh and Smith (2000). The first dialectical relationship is between context and network which understood through the effect of context over network through resources and interest, The direct effect of context over network, and the reverse effect of network over context. The second relationship between actions and network is analysed. To analyse the actions of actors during the process, the chapter reviews the actions of actors as an outcome to the perceived changes within the context. Finally, the chapter discusses the extent to which policy network characteristics explain policy outcomes through presenting: Policy principles and Policy instruments

10.2. The dialectical relationships

This section analyses the relationship between the different component within Marsh and Smith dialectical approach to PNA. The components are context, network, actors' actions and policy outcomes. The first relationship that is analysed is between context and network. This will be followed by an analysis to the relationship between actors, context and network. The final section discusses the relationship between policy outcomes, network and actor's actions.

10.2.1 The relationship between context and network

As discussed in the theory chapter, the characteristics of the policy network and the changes in it can be partially affected by the broader context. There

are three sets of relationship to examine in relation to context these are: the indirect effect of context over network through actor's resources and interest, the direct two way relationship between context and network structure, the indirect two way relationship between context and actor's actions which is mediated by the actor's resources and their interpretation of context. The first two set of relationship will be examined in this section; the last one is examined in section 10.3.2.

This section starts with summarising the variables of the context that affected the features of the network. These are as follows:

- The effect of context over network through resources and interest
    - Changes in actor's resources after political reforms
    - the division of power and the intense network interaction
- The direct effect of context over network
    - the societal inequality which affects inclusion and exclusion of actors
    - the role of ideas and the EDB's economic model
- The effect of network over context
    - New structures for labour market and training institutions
    - Intense relationship between the EDB and the government

10.2.2 Network affected by context through actors resources and interest

Changes in an actor's resources after political reforms

Several laws were introduced that changed the resources of actors and authorised the activities and formations of interest groups. These had a direct effect on initiating the network and expanding it. This started with the

appointment of the CP as the chairman of the EDB (EDB) through royal decree. The expansion of the network came as a de facto to the contextual factors that preceded the reforms. The Introduction of new constitution in 2002, the Decree law no. (33) for the year 2002 regarding trade unions, and Law No. 26 of 2005 concerning political associations meant that new actors are to be included along the way. Hence, the new actors who are part of policy-making after the political reforms were as following: CP, GFWTUB, MP, political societies, and migrant workers protection society. Before the political reforms policy-making were limited to government actors and BCCI, occasional request for assistance from ILO, and occasional participation from the trade unions committee (ILO, 2002, Lawson,1989.)

As explained in chapter seven, the positive perception of changes with the political environment in Bahrain led interest groups such as the unionist and advocates of immigrant labour rights to pursue legalising their existence. Some of these efforts were before the LMRP such as the efforts of trade unionist, and during the reforms such as the effort of migrant workers protection society. Their actions were separate from labour reform process, yet effective in increasing the number of memberships within the network. The perception and action of these organisations during a positive context of the political reforms shows how such a context affected the increase of membership within the LMRP network.

The context effect on network and actor's membership provides a partial explanation to actors' involvement in the process. For instance, consideration will be given to why the MWPS is occasionally involved especially in regard to domestic labour's right and less in relation to other immigrant's related issues. Such an aspect of the process may be related to how the MWPS engaged more with the most vulnerable immigrant labour issues. Hence, the involvement of MWPS is also explained by how the society presents itself and how they are perceived by other groups such as the MPs. The reports produced by the MJN committees does not specify why each organisation/interest group was requested to write an opinion in regard to certain law proposals; however, they

address these organisations as “aljihat al'ahlia almukhtasa” or competent authorities (Shura council service committee, 2009, p87). Hence, the inclusion and exclusion of organisations during MJN’s discussion dependents on the perception of the role played by such organisations. Therefore, inclusion in or exclusion from the network is not solely explained by exogenous factors.

The division of power and the intense network interaction

The political reforms as a context was one of the factors for the inclusiveness within the process through inception of legislative council and legalising the activities of civil and political societies. Yet these changes solely do not explain the intense communication that occurred during the reform or why the EDB approached social actors such as clergyman. The government structure and division of power explained in 7.3.1 can be the second factor to contribute to a more holistic explanation for such intense interaction as it affects the political/ business interests of some actors. In terms of political interest, the reforms attached the power to introduce changes to fees to the LMRA, in addition the business interest were affected by reducing cost/rights gap between Bahrainis and immigrant workers. These two affected interests which are related as well, as the BCCI, AAIS, Almenber Alwatani Alislami disagreed with the power granted to the LMRA. The BCCI considers that economic related policy is a speciality of the cabinet. Hence, such intense communication and actions by different actors are related to how the reforms affects the interest of those actors, and its exceptional for the policies that directly related to labour market reforms.

The evidence for such a claim is that such intense interactions did not occur in other parallel decision making process that occurred between 2004 and 2012. The DLRM decision making process was discussed in chapter seven which revealed the extent to which the EDB were negotiating the draft with MPs, BCCI and other actors by conducting consultation workshops and marketing the reforms through the media. However, other processes in regard to making Law

No. 36 of 2012 regarding the promulgation of labour law in the private sector did not take the same path as the DLRM.

The process of discussing the draft of law regards the promulgation of labour law in the private sector started with an inclusive process. The discussion over the draft of law was through a tripartite committee that included the BCCI, the GFWTUB and the Ministry of Labour. After concluding the first draft, the Ministry of Labour sent the draft to the EDB (Majeed Alawi comments during the Shura council's 11th minutes, fourth session, second legislative session, 21st Dec 2009). The EDB changed the content of the law without consulting with actors then it was referred to parliament. There was not direct interaction between EDB and other actors in the following stages and no other actions were made to influence the content of the law no 36 of 2012 regards the promulgation of labour law in the private sector (Personal Interview no 3, 5. 2016). The tripartite committee was supposed to continue its work by formulating the explanatory notes and some of the articles that was disagreed upon between members of production tripartite committee. The memos and the ministerial decisions developed by the government and the law was adjusted by the EDB (Personal Interview no 3, 2016).

10.2.3 The direct effect of context over network

Societal inequality affects inclusion and exclusion of actors

As delineated in chapter five, the inequality within the society can be reflected within the network structure. According to Marsh and Smith (2000) "broader patterns of structured inequality 'based on class, gender or ethnicity can be observed in a policy network, for instance, in the way structural positions are occupied by the actors (Marsh, 1998., Marsh & Smith, 2000). There are three points in relation to exclusion and inclusion of actors in the process as an outcome of social and economic inequality: the domination of certain business groups over other business groups such as the fisherman, farmers, and contractors, the interest represented in parliament; finally, the position of merchants within the society.

The economic wealth can determine the interest represented during policy-making processes. An illustration to this point is found in the experience of fisherman and contractors whose interest was not represented during the process. Through the process, business groups that represent smaller or medium sectoral based enterprises were excluded from the policy-making process (LMRA, 22 March 2009, Alwasat Newspaper, 18th July 2009). These interests are organised in civil societies which are separated legally from the BCCI such as the contractors' society or fisherman society. To the extent, they consider presenting their interest in the BCCI by participating in the BCCI's elections (Alwasat Newspaper, 18th July 2009). The interest of small or medium enterprises may differ from the one presented by BCCI or not taken as priority by the BCCI. For instance, some businessmen who were in the contractor's strike perceived that the small businessman will be affected more than large capital enterprises. It is perceived that small business in contracting industry will lose their competitive advantages in comparison to high capital businesses (LMRA, 22 March 2009). In addition, contractors perceived that the deal between the government and businessmen in regards of how to spend the fees will not benefit the contractors. The contractors do not need a highly skilled labour nor a university graduate because they are not attracted to such sector. The secretary of the contractor's society Ali Marhoon criticized how that labour fund have not helped the sector except for few cases in relation to drilling contractors (LMRA, 22 March 2009).

The BCCI action during the contractors' strike reveals that the interest of contractor's society is not a matter that they will act over. The BCCI denied its relationship to activities conducted by the contractors' society in relation to contractors' objection over labour's monthly fees. After the announcement of contractors' strike to protest against the free movement of immigrant labour and the fees imposed on contractors, the BCCI affirmed that they are not connected to these events. The Chairman of the Contractors Sector Committee at BCCI Samir Nass affirmed to the press that the position of the Chamber is

not to interfere in the matter as these societies are independent (LMRA, 22 March 2009).

The second point is regarding how inequality within the society can affect the characteristics of the network is the membership in parliament. As explained in chapter seven, the membership in parliament is important for inclusion and exclusion of actors in the decision-making process. However, which interest is dominant within the parliament is related to the drawing of constituency lines. The constituency lines do not reflect the population distribution in Bahrain. In practice, smaller less dense constituencies had proportionately more MPs than more populated ones. For instance, the southern governorate is much less populated (they had six seats allocated) than the northern governorate -had nine seats (The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2002). The drawing of constituency meant that if opposition parties were popular in the election, they will not form a majority. This led the opposition parties such as AWNIS, the National Democratic action society and four other political societies to demand the delineation of electoral districts (The National Democratic action society's website, updated 2017). The opposition argued that the electoral districts do not reflect the equitable representation of individuals and groups; according to the former General Secretary of the National Democratic action society Ebrahim Sharif:

"The re-delineation of the electoral districts is of great importance in Bahrain because of the serious violations of the principle of justice due to the huge disparity in the number of voters among the constituencies" (The National Democratic action society's website, updated 2017).

The final point is the structural position of businessmen within the society. As discussed in chapter seven, the merchants had early privilege inclusion in the decision-making process. They also held privileged positions within the government. The early inclusion by cabinet to BCCI is traced back to their historical relationship with the government as discussed in chapter two. Historically, the members of prominent merchant families held different

governmental positions as they were among the first generations of educated individuals in Bahrain (Paterson, 2007). They continue to constitute half of the cabinet where they exert influence through it (Personal Interview 22, 2016).

The role of ideas and the EDB's economic model

As explained in chapter six, the economic model and beliefs of EDB, CP, MCK affected the ideas presented by the reform project. These ideas were effective in influencing the characteristics of interactions between actors. The beliefs in the same model were a source of cohesion at the beginning of reform process. However, with the expansion of discussion, these ideas were the reason for dispute between different actors. Thus, part of the intense interactions was the disapproval regarding McKinsey's policy suggestions. The ideas presented by Mckinsey were considered as new. It was new to the extent that a significant effort was spent by the EDB to explain the project, and a good level of lack of understanding was a cause to disagreement by some actors (Personal Interview 18 and 4, 2016). A former BCCI's board of directors explains that one of the reasons to object the project was: *"the lack of understanding, as man are the enemies of what they are ignorant about, we were unaware of project's content, as it was a new project". (personal Interview 4, 2016).*

These ideas and beliefs in regard to the best economy shaped and defined the alternative policies suggested by MCK. In a similar vein to what Majone (1989) argued for in regards the "existing stock of ideas shapes response to events by defining the conceptual alternatives from among which they choose" (p.161). Therefore, the EDB did not come up by itself with the concepts of knowledge-based economy, it was already existed and worked upon some were else. Basing policy suggestions on a certain economic model reveals that the EDB did not choose policy output that will serve the economic interest of elites or certain groups. It was actually the opposite. They choose policy outcomes that will take more money from elites. Hence, most of the policy recommendation especially in regard to policy instruments to restructure the labour market was not a representative of a certain interest. It was more an outcome of beliefs in

an economic model. The only part of the policy outcome that can be understood in relation to political interest is the authority that they intend to grant to the LMRA.

10.2.4 Context affected by network

The contextual factors that were directly affected by the reforms were limited. There were two main contextual factors that were reshaped by the reforms. The labour market regulatory framework changed as an outcome to the LMRP, and the creation of labour fund which is financed by the fees imposed on foreign labour. The LMRP might partially explain other changes within the context such as: the intense relationship between the EDB and government during the reforms which resulted in *Exchanging letters between CP and the King, and the participation of Alwifaq in parliamentary election in 2006.* The limited change to the context indicates that Raab's (2001) criticism that was discussed in section 4.3 regarding Marsh and Smith's model was correct. According to Raab, not all of the relationships presented by the dialectical model are equally important. The existence of the relationship in both directions between the components of the dialectical model depends on the nature of the case study under research. while Marsh and Smith's model where they consider all components (context, network structure, actor's action and policy outcomes) as equally important throughout the full policy-making process (Raab, 2001).

New structures for labour market and training institutions

The reform did restructure the regulatory institutions related to the labour market. Before the labour market reforms, the regulatory framework with respect to the management of immigrant labours was within the authority of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Article no 7 of the private sector labour law (1976) under royal decree no 23 states that the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs "shall take orders regulating the granting of work permits, work cards to foreign workers and determining the fees on immigrant labour" (Legal affairs, 2018, p.1). In 1993 Article no 4 of the private sector labour law

(1976) amended to grants the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs the authority to determine the conditions of employing immigrant workers (ILO, 2002., ILO, 1993). This structure changed in 2006 as a direct consequence of labour market policy process. In May 2006, the LMRA was established. The LMRA is Responsible for: *"regulating and controlling work permits for expatriate employees and self-employed, in addition to issuing licences for manpower and recruitment agencies…. introducing Labour Market reforms and tackling all issues related to this sector by drafting a strategy and policy of employment of nationals and expatriate employees. Additionally, the Authority is responsible for the collection and analysis of data, information and statistics on the economic situation in the Kingdom"* (LMRA, 2018).

The changes that occurred to the labour market regulatory framework is highly correlated to the network structure. At the beginning of labour market reforms, the EDB's proposal was to change labour market governance and how policies are made (EDB & CPC, 2004b). The proposal was to be achieved by creating a new governmental institution to regulate the labour market to develop policy and a one stop institution for paper works related to hiring foreign labour. The EDB proposed an authority with seven board members, four of which are appointed by the council of ministries. The other three members are representative of the following organisations: EDB, BCCI, and GFWTUB. The LMRA was suggested to hold several authorities in terms of drawing policies among which are specifying and implementing labour market fees on:

- employers that hire foreign labour,
- on license of agencies that supply foreign workers,
- and fees imposed on license granted to non-Bahraini foreign workers.

However, with the changes of network to an expanded network with larger number of actors interacting, these outcomes changed. The BCCI and MPs suggested that the LMRA should have more members from BCCI and GFWTUB.

Hence, these two organisations have two representatives in the LMRA's BOD. The LMRA's BOD authority for any fees extends to suggesting not specifying those fees. The final fees must be approved by the Council of Ministries (Finance and Economic Affairs' committee in the shura council, 2005).

The second organisation that was found as an outcome to labour market reform was the labour Fund or Tamkeen. Tamkeen is an institution that aims to improve overall prosperity in Bahrain by investing in supporting small and medium business and equipping of Bahrainis for employment, job creation and social support. The Institution is financed by the fees collected from the employers who employ foreign labour, as 80 percent of labour fees are directed to Tamkeen and 20 percent to the government. Tamkeen was also affected by other forms of communication between actor's who were not all part of discussing the DLRM. The finance and the services that Tamkeen will provide is highly linked to the discussions that occurred during the discussion of DLRM and fees imposed on foreign labour. The action of the BCCI during the reform in 2005 resulted in a deal that the fees they will pay must benefit the private sector (Personal Interview 4, 2016).

The network effect on power struggles between the PM and the CP is not apparent as much as the effect of network over labour market governance. The relationship between these variables seems to sometimes be dependent on the type of the structures in the case study. For instance, Toke and Marsh (2003) note "Some ways in which network affects context are more apparent than others" (p.247). The societal structured inequality as a context in this case study affected the characteristics of the network, yet not apparent how the reverse relationship worked. While there were other apparent relationships such as between the network and the public opinion about food safety and genetically modified crops (Toke & Marsh, 2003). Hence, there are structures that are more complicated and correlated with other factors. The network impact overt it might be hard to assess. Other factors that can be an issue for my case study is the lack of insider's data. The relationship between the royal family and why and how such division of power occurred needs more details.

Exchanging letters between Crown Prince and the King

The rivalries between the CP and the PM affected the implementations of Labour market reforms and other economic reforms in relation to Gulf Air, the national airplane company. In a letter sent from the CP to King Hamad, he complains about the cooperation between the government and the EDB: *"our work in the Economic Development Council based on the views of your reformist project has not been echoed by some government officials, which has led to great difficulties in implementing the economic reform project, which is an essential part of your Majesty's project." ." (Alwasat Newspaper,* 14th January 2008*).* He continues his complaint by referring to a lack of harmony between the work of government and the political reforms values "the efforts of your son's at the EDB and the efforts of everyone who participated in the national dialogues which was supported by Your Majesty, god save you, has made a lot of achievements that we are proud of and could have expanded these achievements and increased it if the harmony was achieved between your Majesty's values and national ideals with the policies implemented by some of our government agencies" (2008). The king replied with full support to his son. He pointed out in his letter to his son that government officials must not postpone the implementation of EDB's policies. He said that "The relevant government agencies should go beyond delay and slow implementation and comply with your directives" and "*those who are short of performance in the council will negatively affect his position in the ministerial formation. " (Alwasat Newspaper,* 14th January 2008*).*

10.3 How can we understand Actor's actions

As per the theoretical framework in chapter four an actor's actions are understood in accordance to its properties: they have resources as a member of the network or from outside the network, discursive understanding of the constrains and opportunities provided by context, strategic interaction and actions, interest can be defined by membership in the network or by contextual factors, skills and learning. These properties can be linked to the network

structure or might be independent from it but affect the network interaction. Hence in the following paragraphs we will try to unpack the link between actor's action and network structure, an actor's actions and broader context. The later relations are indirect it occurs through the effect of the broader context on an actor's resources (Marsh & Smith) and will add to it actor's interest (Sacli, 2011) and, additionally, any potential relationship between an actor's actions and policy outcomes, learning and skills. Furthermore, an actor's perception of the broader context is significant as well.

10.3.1 Actors and network's structure

The argument of Marsh and Smith (2000) is that the network as a structure constrains or facilitates the action of actors. The structure of the network is expected to "define the roles the actors play; shape the issues which are discussed, and how they are dealt with; have a distinct set of rules; and contain organizational imperatives" (Sacli, 2011. P.92, Marsh and Smith, 2000, p.5). The researcher found a correlation between the network, the role of some actors within it, the issues that were discussed and the choices of strategic action.

Network defines an actor's role

The LMRP network defined the role of some actors but not all actors. Authority and financial resources were deployed by EDB and CPC to hire Mckinsey to conduct a labour market assessment. Experts in different field were employed by EDB and CPC to work for the project (Personal Interview 14, 17). The actions by those actors were facilitated by the membership in the network. Mckinsey was able to collect information by conducting interviews and surveys. Political expert involved in meetings with influential politicians and clergyman as part of their role within the network. Once such a role was not needed by the network, those actors were no longer part of the process (interview 18, 2016).

Actors whose work was based on their specified role contributed to slight changes to the structure of the network; for instance, the political consultant

who was employed for the LMRP played a role on the inclusion of AWNIS during the consultation process in 2004. The political consultant suggested to the CP that AWNIS must be included in the consultation process in 2004 even if they boycotted the parliament (Personal Interview 18, 2016). He considered that AWNIS position from 2002 elections is mainly a political stance, while the reforms are working on economic matters which the reform's initiator believes in separating the economic and political matters. The political consultant believes that such a positive approach towards Alwifaq led them to reconsider their political stance and reverse their 2002 decision of boycotting the elections (personal interview 18, 2016). Hence, the political consultant used resources allocated to him by his membership with labour market reform network, his perception regards the distinction between political and economic believes led him to suggest the invitation of AWNIS. The invitation of AWNIS meant an increase to the number of peripheral networks, but no other effects on network characteristics other than the number. Literature discussion in chapter two regarding AWNIS participation in 2006 elections was considered as alliance with CP to empower him. LOUËR (2015b) considers that AWNIS participated in 2006 election to support the CP to gain more power over the PM. Thus, the political consultant action might be just a partial explanation to how his action affected the reconsideration of AWNIS to participate in the election process.

Network shapes issues of discussions

The network shapes the issues which are discussed, and how they are dealt with. The LMRP limited ideas and solutions toward the labour market. The definition of the problem connects the unemployment to a large number of immigrant workers who are easy to access and easy to expel (EDB and CPC ,2004a, 2004b,2004c). The second diagnosis was related to the poor education outcome that does not match the demands of labour market. Within this narrow definition of the problem the issues related to sectarianism within the labour market was not considered by policymakers (Personal Interview 8,

2016). Such a narrow definition continued to structure the policy discussions in which other factors that causes unemployment are eliminated.

The LMRP founders focused on nationalising job market through bridging cost, right and skills gap between immigrant and nationals. Yet, diagnosis to unemployment problem in Bahrain from other interest groups especially the opposition suggest that discrimination based on religious background is present in the labour market. A former member of AWPB explains that the government of Bahrain is basing its policy on excluding some part of the society from gaining jobs (Personal Interview 8, 2016). He says" the problem is that the government of Bahrain is basing its policy on excluding some part of the society from gaining jobs. For example, for jobs in the education sector the government of Bahrain market these jobs in Egyptian and Jordanian newspaper" (Personal Interview 8, 2016). Opposition accuse the government of excluding Shia from some sectors such as military sector which mostly employ Bahraini sunni and non-Bahraini (Personal Interview 8, 2016). The discrimination based on sect issue within the labour market was not discussed during LMRP and solving it was not considered as one of the ways of solving the unemployment issue among Bahrainis.

In addition, having a set of ideas to solve the problems faced by the labour market and Bahraini economy limits the variation of suggestion provided by other members of the network. The solutions provided later on during the process were an enhancement to the original ideas proposed by EDB and MCK. For instance, AWNIS former MP said that the vision of AWNIS regards implementing some policies was slightly different from the one presented by the EDB. AWNIS perspective was not to implement the fees on all the business sectors (Personal Interview 8, 2016). For instance, AWNIS proposed in their discussion with the Ministry of Labour to exempt the small businesses from the monthly fees. They proposed an incentive for merchants who employ Bahrainis to exempt them from paying some of the fees or to apply a discount (Personal Interview 8, 2016). These suggestions were proposed within the same theme of raising the cost on employer to deter them from employing immigrant

labour. Thus, the ideas and beliefs of EDB and MCK framed the discussion over amending the labour market policies.

past decision made within the LMRP network restrict actors actions in the future

The informal deal between the EDB and the businessman about the way that the fees will be used restricted the changes that the government suggested in 2011. The concept of reciprocal trade off of what will be paid for labour fees must be invested toward the private sector become a binding concept that affect how BCCI, MPs and SHC will react to future change. The government proposed a draft of law to direct 50 percent of those fees to the government. The BCCI and the parliament and SHC refused that adjustment. This refusal was the first rejection to a proposed law by the government in history of Bahraini Parliament. What happened during the discussion of the DLRM and labour reforms in 2004 and 2005 was considered as binding from the perspective of the BCCI. According to BCCI, the idea that one of the labour fund's resources come from the private sector is a part of an exchange relationship, as whatever is taken from the private sector is to be given back to the private sector (Mubasher, 2011). The BCCI defends its stance by commenting that:

*"Employers' fees for work permits are a right for them - aka the private sector - and what was a right for the private sector must be directed at benefiting the private sector itself" (*The Finance Affairs and Economical Committee and Services Committee in the Parliament*,* 2005*, p.111)*

In the same vein, the service committee of the MJN council rejected the Decree-Law No. 32 of 2011 amending Article (e) of Article (42) of Law No. (19) of 2006 on the regulation of the labour market. The committee argued that the refusal is "As the ratio deducted for the benefit of the public account of the state is a kind of fee that is deducted from the employers, and are not related to services provided to them or directly benefit them because they do not finance the training programs ... This violates the basic objectives of the draft

Labour Fund, and is not consistent with the aims of business fee targets that must be obtained from employers for the purpose of providing training services to the business, marketing support, and support for small and medium enterprises" (service committee in parliament, 2012, p.114)

choices of strategic action

Some of the actor's actions are understood as following the rules of the game as set by the early stage of labour market policy-making process. The following strategic actions by the BCCI are understood as a reaction to how the actions of EDB and LMRA. These actions are: Research and studies, lobbying attempts and communication with different groups to gain support and attempts to establish political blocs in parliament, and finally communicating with the PM after failing to achieve an agreement with the LMRA.

Providing statistics and data-based arguments to convince actors about the logic behind the reform were highly used. Affected interest groups such as BCCI used the same strategic action and provided counter arguments. The factual game continued throughout the process until 2007/ 2008; the LMRA were providing their factual basis for applying fess and BCCI replying by their own research and studies. According to a former executive officer of BCCI, "studies were used during arguments as a reference" (personal interview 4, 2016). In regards communication and discussion with different actors the aim of it was to minimise the disagreement between different actors such as government, GFWTUB and BCCI. According a former executive officer of BCCI: "the consultation meetings which presents different opinions, were ongoing until the establishment to a certain doctrine that we can all agreed upon" (Personal Interview 4, 2016). The final action that can be understood as affected by network is when the BCCI and LMRA did not achieve an agreement over the application of fees. The BCCI in this case communicated its dissatisfaction over this policy to the PM.

10.3.2 Actors and the broader context: economic and political interest

Actions of actors were not solely determined by the network structure; the broader context affected the behaviour of actors. As discussed in chapters six and seven, the EDB's intense communication with actors was to gain public support to the project. The context of the new division of power between the EDB and Government was a reason for increased interactions to the first project that was set by the EDB. Other contextual factors that had a significant impact on an actor's actions were the perceived economic and political interest of actors in accordance with a changing context.

EDB increasing its resources: Public support

Public support and attention to the labour market reforms was perceived as important from the reform's team perspective. Actors involved in the labour market policy reforms explained that there was a need to create public awareness regarding labour markets issues. According to the vice president for the political affairs in the CPC "we wanted to create a public debate, so the society starts to be more interested in these issues that are more important (he means the economic and labour market issues) rather than the other issues (political issues), as political issues have no benefits in them. We tried to change the topics that the nation talks about, instead of talking about politics they talk about economic issues" (Personal Interview 18, 2016). They succeeded in doing so as explained by different interviewers that labour market reform project was a hot topic in Bahrain (Personal Interview 14, 2016).

BCCI resources

Interest groups that have mostly mobilised its resources during the process were the BCCI. In short, the BCCI possess the following resources as an established organisation: financial abilities, established institutional structures, relationship with cabinet. As mentioned in chapters seven and eight, BCCI's researches and studies were a strategic action to be used in arguing against some facts provided by MCK studies and later on LMRA's studies. However, the

ability of BCCI to conduct such a study is related to its organisational structure and financial abilities. Hence, choosing such actions is defined by the network interactions but the ability to conduct it is defined by BCCI's organisational and financial structure. BCCI deployed its financial and human resources to present its own factual information and argue against the analysis of Mckinsey report (Personal Interview 4, 2016). They have a department for economic research, economic experts, experts in labour's issues who usually participated in ILO's meetings and conferences. In addition to financial ability to hire an external consultation firm (Personal Interview 4, 2016). These resources are external to the network; BCCI used it to advance its position in the arguments regards the labour market reforms.

The BCC communicates with the cabinet to express its dissatisfaction about policies and laws. They did that several times during the DLRM and implementation. Such communication was successful in terms of engaging the cabinet and the PM in reconsidering the policy details and adjusting it in accordance with the BCCI requests. Such actions and reactions increase the interactions within the policy networks as more meetings and discussions are established as an outcome to BCCI actions.

Perceived Economic and social Interest

The perceived economic interest and its effect on an actor's actions is illustrated by different examples. First the perception regards domestic workers, the action of BCCI in 2011, the position of some parliamentary blocs against the free movement of labour, the perception of Bahrain's competitive advantages that was discussed in section 8.2.4.

As discussed in chapter seven regarding how the formation of class in Bahrain was associated with the influx of labour, the immigrant labour were organised based on different criteria in comparison to Bahrainis in which the labour market is segmented based on nationality. The domestic labour rights and policies related to it are partially explained by the perceived economic interest

of actor. When members of parliament agreed with EDB and the Ministry of Labour to postpone dealing with domestic labour in the DLRM; it was due to them being perceived as a social unite that matters for public interest (Parliamentary minutes, 18th October 2005, and Interview with the cpc political consultant, 2016). Similarly, AWNIS former MP commented in regard to the importance of domestic workers to the Bahraini society and hence there was an agreement to delay the inclusion of domestic workers in laws (Personal Interview 9, 2016). He said:

"domestic workers are of great benefit to the Bahraini society. Therefore, we can put them on hold for those objective reasons. More Bahraini women can seek work Because of the services provided by Domestic workers. So, we agreed to put it on the side, take the other things and we can always come back to it, and it wasn't critical. There was no lobbying to issues related to domestic worker" (Personal Interview 9, 2016).

The second point is the action of BCCI in 2011. In 2011, the BCCI demanded stopping implementing some policies related to labour market reform. This action is understood in regard to BCCI's perception of the economic stagnation in Bahrain after 2011. The BCCI's perspective about the events is that it has created a new economic reality represented by a large recession in most sectors of the economy. Thus, the economic interest of the businessman are threatened and policies to counter the effect of recession on merchants are by decreasing the fees imposed on them. Data collected from field work shows that the perceived economic situation after 2011 was a reason for such change (Akhbar Alkhaleej, 2012, interview 14, 2016).

Another example of how context affected the economic interest of actors within the network is the case of parliamentary blocs within the parliament. For instance, AWNIS, AAIS and democratic bloc members also defended businessmen rights in some occasion against the freedom of labour to move. The position of AWNIS which is in political alliance with the GFWTUB yet economically they try to balance between business interest and labour interest as well. Such economic interest from political blocs that should represent low and middle class citizens is traced back to how the Bahraini labour market is

segmented according to citizenship and sectors. Hence, those MPs represent the interest of fellow citizens rather than the interest of immigrants.

The perception of businessmen in regard to how to protect the competitive advantage of Bahrain was affected by the regional labour market policies. During the implementation of labour market reforms such constrains provided by the context were brought up by BCCI's research and studies (BCCI, 2007). The effect of these perceptions is continuous actions by BCCI to lower down the amount of fees imposed on enterprises. Thus, the BCCI would go as far as requesting the PM to interfere in such matters.

Perceived Political interest

The post 14th of Feb relationships between actors witnessed an enhanced political alliance between the government and the BCCI. The BCCI became part of governmental retaliation against the participants in the 14th February uprising. The action of BCCI in support of the government position were translated in expelling of workers and trade unionist from their work jobs in the private sector, expelling two members of BCCI's board of director for their participation in the events of Feb 14, 2011. Around 2,464 private sector employees were fired from their work as an outcome to demonstration in pearl roundabout. According to the GFWTUB, 57 union leaders were dismissed from their jobs (Bassiouni et al, 2011).

In addition, the BCCI issued several political statements that used similar rhetoric to the one used by the government to describe the protesters. The chairman of BCCI Dr Essam Fakhro condemned terrorism acts in Bahrain, in reference to the Bahraini continuing protesting in 2011. He said "the trader sector had had enough of these acts" he also said about protesters "your sectarian –mongering tactics have laid bare your claims of peaceful protests and belied your allegations" (p.1, 2011). The statements made by Dr Essam Fakhro in November 2011 came in contrast to their quiet tone in the joint statement with GFWTUB March 2011 (Akhbar Al Khaleej, 13th March 2012).

Just a few months before Issam's fakhro anti protester statement, the BCCI and GFWTUB issued a joint statement ten days after the announcement of Royal Decree No. 18 of 2011 announcing the state of national safety (Alwasat, 15th March 2011). The statement used a unified national discourse asking for a national dialogue to be held to solve the political unrest in Bahrain. The statement held three main points: first requesting from government to protect the " safety of citizens and residents and their families, and ensure the smooth flow of labour and transport them to and from their workplaces smoothly, safely and without any obstacles, and called on the parties to work to reduce the points of security barriers in the roads as much as possible." The second point was suggesting a solution to the problem through national dialogue and "supporting reunification efforts, preserving the social fabric and national unity, fighting the calls for division, sectarianism and strife between the people of the same nation through national programs and initiatives in which everyone participates." (Alayam newspaper, 25 March 2011). The third point was that the BCCI appraised the GFWTUB for calling off a general strike that went on for few days against the government political escalation language of the statement was different from the one used by national media were the discourse of considering the demonstrators as traitors to their country. Those demonstrators were mostly Shia; they were accused of following Iranian agendas in Bahrain.

The differences in the rhetoric between the two statement show that there was a change in the perspective of BCCI toward the uprising in Bahrain from calling for a dialogue to unify Bahrainis and reduce the sectarian division to saying statements that describe protesters as terrorist. According to ILO Interim Report - Report No 364, the BCCI "underwent a political change due to a shift in the internal balance of powers, which tilted the organisation in favour of the Government" (2012, p.5).

The events of 2011 paved the way to formally institutionalise the relationship between the government and the BCCI. The BCCI became less independent with the changes that followed the 2011 uprising. Since its inception in 1939,

there was no law to govern the work of the BCCI, it was regulated through internal rules set by the BCCI members. According to the Ministry of Industry and commerce, the draft of law to in regard to the regulation of BCCI was suggested by the BCCI members. The BCCI draw the details of the law and referred it to the Ministry of commerce and Industry which referred it later on to the council of ministries (FECSHC, 2012). The BCCI considers the law to be a protection from political conflicts in Bahrain and conflicts between merchants. According to the Ministry of commerce and industry the law will help in "unification of traders and businessmen and not differentiate them by politicization" (FECSHC, 2012, p.356).

The suggested draft held the BCCI to be under the supervision of the minister of industry and commerce (article 3). Article no 32 of the law explain how the Ministry supervise the work of the BCCI: "The President shall notify the Minister of the Council's decisions and recommendations for information within five days from the date of the decision or recommendation. In the event that the Minister deems that any of these resolutions or recommendations are outside the jurisdiction of the Chamber or contain a violation of the law or a deviation from the general policy of the State; he has the right to object thereto within 15 days from the date of notification of the decision or recommendation and return it to the Chamber If the chamber insists on its decision or recommending it or guaranteeing it a new violation, the matter shall be presented to the Council of Ministers for taking what it deems appropriate" (FECSHC , 2012, p.417).

In addition, the new law changes the election system by giving each merchant a number of votes in accordance with the capital invested by the firm. Historically merchants were allowed to give a proxy to another businessman for voting purpose. This led to the exploitation of such right by selling the proxy to candidates. The old vote mechanism states that each institution has one or more votes and the authorized person has the right to make a vote (FECSHC, 2012). Thus, why were such changes to the voting mechanism proposed in 2012, more than 70 years after BCCI's inception? The law was presented to the

parliament as urgent, to pass it before the general election of BCCI. According to BCCI "That the urgency in issuing was necessary to avoid political disputes ... The clashes that took place during the recent elections of the Council and the existence of many abuses and misuse of the agencies in the electoral process requires the speedy end of the subject of agencies to avoid abuse of exploitation" (FECSHC, 2012, p.358-359).

The effect of the uprising was to tighten the relationship between the government and BCCI. This reinforcement of political interest by changes in the broader context affected the relationship between BCCI and GFWTUB. The meetings between the GFWTUB and BCCI stopped after the Bahraini uprising in 2011 (Personal Interview 2, 2016). A member of GFWTUB's general secretariat comments on the changes of relationship between the GFWTUB, BCCI and Ministry of Labour: "After the events of February 14, the chamber created a complete break-up and the ministry as well, the speed of its meetings were far apart and also ineffective"(Interview 6, 2016). The members of GFWTUB perceive the changes that occurred to their relationship with the BCCI after 2011 as caused by the lack of independency of BCCI from the decisions of government. A member of GFWTUB's general secretariat believes that "Anything the government wants is implemented by the Chamber, whatever the government wants in passing (through national assembly) the chamber will support it "(Personal Interview no 6, 2016).

The changes in relationship between the BCCI and GFWTUB were perceived as an obstacle toward the enhancement of labours rights. According to a member of GFWTUB's general secretariat of the GFWTUB " if we continued with the same ground that we started in 2007 until today (Interview 3, 2016), we would have maintained a good relationship that would serve us in finding the minimum protection for labour and businessman in the production process… unfortunately the BCCI stopped all interactions with the GFWTUB after the 14th of February events" (Personal Interview 6, 2016). For instance, the BCCI worked on freezing the labour market fees on foreign workers and reducing

Bahrainisation rate directly after the February 14 events » (Akhbar Alkhaleej, 2012).

10.4 The extent to which policy network characteristics explains policy outcomes

The analytical framework discussed in chapter four suggests that policy outcomes are explained by the structure of the policy network and the network interactions. The analytical framework as well divided the component of the policy outcomes to: policy objectives, policy principles and policy instruments. This section attempts to analyse the extent to which these components can be understood in the light of the policy network characteristics and type or other factors such as actors actions, interactions and context. The focus will be on the policy principles and policy instruments because they were the essence of tension. In contrast the policy objectives were not disputed; hence, it does not change through the process. All the actors showed an enthusiasm to reduce the unemployment level in Bahrain, to reduce the reliance on immigrant workers, and to enhance the overall performance of the economy (personal interviews no:2,3,4,8,14,17). These are all general statements that everyone agreed upon, but what mattered to the discussion was the policy principles and the policy instruments. In addition to these components, the policy instruments are divided in to three categories: economic, regulatory and the choice of implementing organisation.

10.4.1 Policy principles

As suggested by Daugbjerg (1998) in chapter four, the network members at formation stage sat the policy principles and those principles changed when the network expanded. The policy principles are like a framework that shape and define the policy content (Daugbjerg, 1998, p.129). The policy principles that was sat during network formation were: greater role to market mechanism in determining demand and supply of labour, less bureaucracy and more efficiency in regard to managing labour market, less government intervention in labour market (EDB and CPC, 2004a,2004b,2004c.). The policy

principles in relation to greater role by the private sector to create jobs in the market were generally acceptable by actors, especially BCCI (BCCI, 2004a).

However, as shown in chapter seven, the main policy principle that was challenged is the role of government in determining fees. These principles which defined the content of the DLRM in regard to the role and authority of LMRA were highly disputed. The newly formed policy network during 2002-2004 was not controlled by the government, despite the membership of some government representative in it. Most of the actors in this newly formed network agreed upon its outcomes and defend it (Personal Interview 18, 14, Alabbsi, 2016). However, with the expansion of the network during the DLRM when the MPs and BCCI were highly active in defending their interests, the content that was defined by this principle was changed. The fragmentation in government is acceptable as long as the cabinet will have enough power in the policy outcomes.

10.4.2 Policy instruments

The policy instruments that were developed through interactions between actors from 2002 to 2012 are divided in to three categories. First, the negative economic instruments to affect the Labour market access for foreign workers, second, the Labour market governance through creating new implementing organisation. Finally, legal instruments to amend the relationship between employer and employee.

Labour market access for foreign workers: negative economic instruments

How fees become part of the policy tools to restructure the labour market goes back to the formation of labour market policy network starting from 2002. The network affected the policy outcome during formation stage in two ways: the characteristics of the network, the activities conducted by actors as prescribed by the membership within the network. The policy network at the formation stage was essential for introducing such policy instrument. According to discussion in chapters six and eight, the cohesion and believes in certain

economic model were influential characteristics of the network. The member of the network and the belief in eliminating the cost gap between Bahrainis and immigrants was very important factor to come up with the first draft of policy proposal. The details of the suggested policy were to impose BB 600 every two years and BD75 every month to adjust the cost difference between Bahraini's labour and immigrant labour. The precise amount to lower the cost gap was an outcome of network interactions as data regards the labour market were collected via interviewing, surveys, information obtained from ministry of labour and social affairs, and data from the ministry of finance (EDB and CPC, 2004b,2004c, 15 September 2004). The amount suggested at the formations stage was agreed upon between the core members and then presented to the stakeholders during the consultation workshop.

Throughout the years, the amount kept fluctuating. The reason behind this fluctuation is that the amount and the details attached to it was affected by: interest of actors, resources needed for the reforms, structural position used by actor (i.e. relationship with cabinet). As mentioned in the previous paragraph, at the beginning of the process the fees for hiring immigrant labour were determined to be BD 600 every two years and BD 75 every month. This amount was specified in the explanatory note attached to the DLRM. This was changed after the cabinet sent the draft of law to BCCI. They disagreed with specifying any amount in the explanatory notes attached to the DLRM. The suggestion was made by the BCCI to lower the work permits fees to BD 300 every two years (The Finance Affairs and Economical Committee and Services Committee in the parliament, 2005, p.277). The adjusted explanatory notes which removed a specified amount meant that the amount will be open for more discussions in the future. This outcome reflects the privilege position of BCCI within the society. They are the representative of businessman who possess a historical relationship with the government and consultant occasionally.

The position of the BCCI continued to be very important to specifying the details attached to the policy instrument related to hiring foreign labour. The

structure of resources dependencies with the network of actors and the need for the BCCI to implement the reforms explains why the policy outcomes resulted in agreement to: lower Bahrainisation gradually in accordance with the increase in the fees, and to use the money collected from private sector to be used to benefits the businessman.

As discussed in chapter eight, in 2009 the BCCI reacted to the decisions made within the network which was now more formalised with the inception of LMRA. The LMRA possess legal resources to suggest monthly fees and to conduct studies to support their arguments. After they proposed the fees, the BCCI refused it. Despite such refusal from the BCCI, the LMRA sent the suggested fees to the cabinet. As a reaction to this action the BCCI contacted the cabinet to protest against the LMRA's suggestions. The outcome was a meeting between interest groups and PM which resulted in a decision by the PM. He decided a monthly amount of BD10 which was slightly more from the BCCI's recommended amount, and a monthly amount of Bd200. This amount was implemented in July 2008 which is 7 months delay from the date suggested by LMRA and six months earlier from the one suggested by BCCI (Alwasat Newspaper, 27 November 2007, and 02 December 2007).

In 2011, the network interactions were highly affected by the context of February 14th uprising. The interactions between actors slowed down. There was no meeting between interest groups such as the GFWTUB, the Ministry of Labour, the BCCI. Therefore, the effect of the network over policy outcomes was hollowed out by the context and how it was perceived by BCCI and finally the BCCI actions. The BCCI perception of the economic situation was used as a factor to request the freezing of the monthly fees. The PM agreed on such suggestion. Hence, the changes that occurred to the amount of fees after 2011 were the product of BCCI's actions. The BCCI's perception to the economic situation changed. The perceived challenges to the economic situation after the political unrest in Bahrain was interpreted as the reason for the BCCI actions. They requested the freeze of fees.

The summary of this policy tool and the initial attempt to decrease the access of foreign labour to Bahraini market was not achieved. The network characteristics explain the suggested policy tools in 2004 were cohesion, beliefs in a certain economic model and the activities of collecting information resulted in the specific details of the fees amount. Beyond this year, the details of this policy instruments had different sources of change among which is the political and economic context was used by BCCI to argue for a frees and a decrease in the amount of fees. Hence, policy outcomes do change as a direct effect of network, or through action of actors determined by the network or by action of actors affected by the changes of context.

Labour market governance: creating new implementing organisation

The variables that affected the inception of LMRA and the details of its roles in managing labour market were affected by the following: the structure of the network especially in terms of cohesion and believes in new form of governance to labour market, the political interest presented within the core network in 2002-2003 and how it was expanded after the submission if DLRM to house of representative. The first effect of network was a belief in the importance of more efficient way to manage the labour market. The EDB and CPC (2004b) papers in regards reforming labour market in Bahrain criticised the lengthy days that the old system in Bahrain took to finish the paper work before issuing a visa for foreign labour. The effect of the network extends to affecting the administrative structure of the LMRA as the setup of this organisation was later on assisted by the EDB.

The second point in relation to political interest presented in the network is understood within the new political changes in Bahrain. Granting more power to CP especially economic authority away from the PM was a change that started in 2002. The power of LMRA was understood as an extension to such changes. The MJN council were divided based on such political interests were some parliamentary blocks disagreed of taking some of the government

authority and granting it to LMRA. Hence, this policy outcome is highly correlated to the features of the network and how it changed in 2005.

Relationship between employer and employee: legal instruments

Sponsorship system

The legal skills which the EDB's member possess was powerful in affecting the negotiation over the clause no 25 in the DLRM regarding the criteria that governs the movement of immigrant labour from one employer to another. The other criteria governing this policy were determined by the negotiation that occurred between different interest groups after passing the DLRM by the parliament. Two main themes determined the implementation and the criteria of free movement in 2009. First membership of GFWTUB in the LMRA and the committees that discussed the criteria for implementing the free movement of immigrant labour were important resources that enabled the GFWTUB to affect the criteria of implementation. The discussion during meeting was to either specify three months' notice before the immigrant move or one year period before the movement. Th GFWTUB argued for three months as they knew that this argument will benefit the human rights reputation of Bahrain. The second factor is contextual in which the support of the CP and the king for the implementation of the free movement meant the clause will be implemented even if businessman wants to delay it (Personal Interview 22, 2016). Hence network affected the criteria of implementation, and context affected the timing of implementation.

Hiring quotas: Bahrainisation

The network is highly correlated with how Bahrainisation changed through the time. There are four points to illustrate in this matter. The first is the beliefs of EDB and MCK in market mechanism against rigid regulations such as the Bahrainisation quotas on business sector. Second, the pledge made to Businessman that the increase in the cost of hiring foreign labour will be associated with a gradual decrease in Bahrainisation rates. Third, the role of

the newly established LMRA and its department which was the outcome of the LMRP. Fourth, the exclusion of GFWTUB from contributing to policy outcomes despite its legal membership within the LMRA's BOD, hence network membership does not ensure inclusion in discussion.

Making Bahrainisation less rigid policy was an acceptable policy outcome by BCCI and the EDB. The explanatory memorandum sent to describe the effect of Bahrainisation quotas as effective in employing Bahrainis, yet "the government micromanage the decisions by businesses, hampering their ability to grow and create more jobs." (2004a, p.25). In addition, the report established a correlation between the low productivity of Bahrainis and the fact that jobs were reserved for them. The BCCI as well recommended that the application of fees must be associated with decreasing Bahrainisation rates (BCCI, 2004a). Hence, both the most powerful players within the process agreed on changing the Bahrainisation system, while the GFWTUB who supported it had less contribution to influence the outcome (Personal Interview 6 &13, 2016).

After the establishment of the LMRA, the Bahrainisation rate was discussed through the consultation process established by the new authority (Personal Interview no 14 & 22, 2016). The new established policy development department within the LMRA played a role in such a matter. They created the current system of Bahrainisation by correlating the number of visas to the following: the number of Bahraini workers, the number of foreign workers, the size of the business, the type of the business. This system was proposed by the policy development department in the LMRA. The department sent the proposal to the LMRA's board of directors. The proposed system then was sent to the ministries in charge, to BCCI and the GFWTUB (Personal Interview 13, 2016).

The Bahrainisation rates were also discussed in meetings outside the LMRA's BOD. The CEO of the LMRA met with different business sectors that are represented by sector based committees in the BCCI (Alabsi, 2016). The GFWTUB had less of a role on this matter as they were excluded from

discussions outside the LMRA's BOD "The decision for this policy was actually made in the meetings between the LMRA and BCCI. The results of these meetings were only presented to us, but it wasn't for discussion purpose. They told us is for you to know about it. so, we were totally excluded from determining Bahrainisation rates" (Personal Interview no 6, 2016)

10.5 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the interactions between different elements within the process: the context, the network structure, the actions of actors, and policy outcomes. The analysis for these elements indicates that PNA is useful to assist researcher to understand the labour immigration policy-making process in Bahrain between 2002-until the field work. although the labour immigration policy-making is not distinguished from the labour market policy network during the reform process and after the process. The labour immigration policies are highly linked to the overall labour market polices in Bahrain and the economic reforms as well.

The chapter reviewed the changes in contextual factors and linked it to the establishment of the policy network. The changes in resources through political reforms in Bahrain were a sourced for establishing and expanding the policy network. Several characteristics of the network were affected by contextual factors. The intense interactions were affected by the new division of power within the royal family. The Societal inequality affects inclusion and exclusion of actors. The role of ideas and the EDB's economic model affect the cohesion and disputes during discussions. However, the effect of the network interactions over context was limited to establishing New structures for labour market and training institutions and might have some effects over deteriorating the relationship between EDB and Government in 2008. In terms of an actor's actions, the network defined the role of some actors, shapes issues of discussions, restrict actors' actions in the future, and determine choices of strategic action. However, actions of actors are sometimes a

reflection to perceived contextual factors such as perceived changes to economic and political circumstances.

Finally, is linking policy outcome with network structure is that policy principles as sat by EDB and Mckinsey resulted in disputes between actors after the expansion of the network members. The fees were highly correlated with network structure as it kept fluctuating with the interactions within the network. As the inclusion of BCCI and the needs for their contribution in implementation resulted in affecting the criteria of applying the fees. The free movement was affected by the network structure less than the fees. This was because the implementation was coming anyway due to support of higher authority. However, after the 2011 uprising, both of these policies changed while the network was almost stagnating. The effect of the network over policy outcomes was more evident during political stability than political unrest.

Chapter 11: Conclusion and recommendations

11.1 Introduction

The main aim of this thesis as described in chapter one was to explain the labour immigration policy-making process in the Kingdom of Bahrain, to understand the role of different actors and the relationship between them, and the constrains of context over policy-making process. The PNA was successful in explaining the labour market policy-making process in Bahrain and the implementation of such reforms. The main contribution of this study is driven

from providing a new narrative regarding how labour market processes were made in Bahrain. The data collected from different contributors to the process and the vast document analysis that were not previously carried out. Except for few papers that analysed the LMRP, but the data were driven from limited number of documents and interviews in comparison to this thesis.

This chapter provides the main findings in relation to the objectives and research questions of this study. In addition, the chapter assesses the extent to which the PNA assisted in understanding the labour immigration policy-making in Bahrain and the limitation of applying such theoretical framework to explain the policy process in Bahrain. The chapter concludes with referring to recent development in this policy field and policy recommendation.

11.2. summary of the research findings

- *The role of different actors in the policy process*

The findings regarding the role of different stakeholder during the labour market policy-making 2002-2016 is that reforms were initially set by elites within the government, yet stakeholders had a role in affecting the final policy outcomes. The interactions between those actors were intense especially between 2005 and 2009. The role of different actors is understood as a reflection to the network interactions, their own resources and skills at some points, and perceived changes within the context. These findings reveal that the literature analysis in understanding the role of actors such as businessman in relation to internal power conflict within the ruling family in Bahrain is not a sufficient explanation to the actions of those actors and their abilities to affect some policy outcomes (Valeri, 2013, & Alhassan, 2012).

The reforms were driven by elites with newly acquired power to establish economic policies in Bahrain, namely the CP of Bahrain Shaikh Salman bin Hamad Alkhalifa and the EDB. The reforms were not a result of internal pressure from civil societies or from external pressure from international community. In this case, the elites were keen to solve the unemployment issue

in Bahrain along with economic and education restructuring. Hence, it was an internal problem that initially initiated the reforms. The EDB, CP and other actors during the early reform process believed in a more liberalised economic model. Such beliefs were a driving factor to the reforms.

Elites driven reforms expanded to interact with different actors. The first cohort of actors was the McKinney & company, experts from different governmental organisations. The first set of interactions was in part related to the need for a consultation company for research and study purposes; in addition, other governmental actors and experts were either stakeholders or experts in matter of labour issues and politics. This early need to study the labour markets and decide the details of limitations within it and the solutions for it resulted in establishing the Mckinsey's reports about labour market in Bahrain. Mckinsey's ideas and beliefs regarding this issue were important factors that determined the policy outcomes, especially that actors in the first stage of policy-making shows support to the policy principles provided by Mckinsey& Company.

The second type of actors required were interest groups and influencer personals within the society. The need for interactions with interest groups and influencer personal in the society is reduced to three main factors: the division of power within the ruling family, the need for Businessman to finance part of the project, the legal requirement to engage with member of the national assembly. The division of power within the ruling family and the need to interact with MPs are two are related to each other, yet the researcher is not able to argue which structure matter the most. The MPs were mostly supporting the power of the cabinet to determine labour market fees; hence, such position is arguably affected by the new division of economic power in Bahrain. In terms of the capacity of BCCI to establish a deal in relation to how the fees will be used is understood as a factor powerful by itself without referring to the division of power within the ruling family. This conclusion is

driven by the ability of BCCI and MPs to refuse the adjustment of how the fees will be used in 2013 though it was suggested by the cabinet that they support.

- *The relationship between the interest group and the government*

The position of different actors from the details of labour market reforms is based on the perceived economic, social interest, political interest, and the ideas presented by the reforms. Understanding the position of actors from each content specifically the disputed ones is more analytically useful than the perceived position from the whole reform. The reason for such suggestion is that the perceived political interest of some stakeholders might be in contrast to each other, while the perceived economic or social interest can be the same for actors who are politically opposite to each other. AWNIS, for instance, were politically supporting the CP power (LOUËR , 2015), yet economically their perspective regarding the details of the reform were not in contrast to the perspectives of business sector. AWNIS themselves, perceive their interest position as representing both the interest of labour and businessman. Therefore, Alhassan (2012) division of pro and against the reforms were not accurate. Alhassan categorised stakeholders based on the general position from the labour reforms. Such a position was based on the agreement and disagreement regarding the new division of power between the ruling family. Hence, Al Hassan regarded AWNIS as a supporter to the reform.

Hence, the analysis of how the class structure was developed in Bahrain is an important contextual factor that explains the actors' stance from the reforms. The position of interest groups, regardless of their political affiliation, was against granting domestic labour and other immigrant labour the freedom of mobility within the labour market. Such position explains that their social or economic interests that they present is not determined by the political context during the reforms.

The position of actors from the reforms was affected by the ideological beliefs and interest of actors. The perceived best solution to solve the unemployment

issue was a determinant factor that increased the interactions between actors. The perceived political, business and social interest by themselves do not explain the position of actors from the reforms. AWNIS, for instance, supported the reforms as well because they would support any good project (Personal Interview 8, 2016). The BCCI's members refused the project not just due to its effect on their business interest, the lack of understanding was a source of disagreement as well (Personal Interview 4, 2016).

- *Finding three: Sources of actor's influence*

The sources of power were mostly structural in this case study. It was either related to a context that provides certain political authority such as the CP who is the chairman of the EDB or through the network which gave MCK the role to conduct a study and draw recommendation, or power to steering committee to discuss the Mckinsey's recommendations. Other forms of resources were when actors used their negotiation skills to discuss policies; they were effective sometimes, but these cases were limited. Other form of non-structural power where actors applied their resources to affect outcomes. for instance, the BCCI used their historical relationship with the PM to affect policy outcomes.

There were disparities in interest groups power to affect the policy outcomes. The BCCI had different sources of power that makes them active influencer during the policy-making process. For instance, they have their connections with the cabinet, their own organisational resources to do research and organise activities to mobilise businessman to support the BCCI decisions. In addition, they were needed to implement the project. In contrast, the GFWTUB has a history of contestation with the government as mentioned in the introduction chapter. Their chance to influence policy outcomes was through their negotiation skills in perusing the government to implement the free movement with only three months' notice to employer. Other than that, they are one of the most affected interest groups during political unrest as it is associated with opposition parties.

During the early phase of the process when the EDB and MCK were drawing the details of the project, the power sources were structural power. The network then changed to be more like an issue network where there was more application of resources and skills. The most notable use of non-structural resources was during the negotiation over an article about free movement where the EDB legal advisers used their skills to change the words. Another example was when GFWTUB convinced the ministry of labour in regard to free movement in 3 months not one year. Thus, Daugbjerg (1997) argues that the sources of power used during policy community may differ from issue network where structural power is mostly used in policy community and non-structural power increases in the issue network.

policy networks distribute power among political actors unequally. Those who are members of networks are more privileged than those who are excluded. In policy communities, some groups do not have access to the policy process and policy-making is mainly characterised by the exercise of structural power. An actor's choices are constrained because certain options are excluded whereas others are favoured. Therefore, policy communities create power relations which privilege some groups over others. in contrast the exercise of non-structural power characterizes policy-making in issue networks (Smith, 1993, p.73)." (128)

11.3 To what extent does the PNA explains the Labour immigration policy process in Bahrain

This section explains the strengths and limitations of applying policy network analysis to explain the policy process within the Bahraini political context. The strength of using PNA to analyse the policy process in Bahrain is summarised in the following points, first PNA explains the interactions between state apparatus and wider society based on need for support to new authority. Second, the PNA shed a light on the importance of policy process, actors interactions, and external context in determining the policy outcomes, thus the discussion of political feasibility of change is required. Third, reciprocal relationship between state and interest group is not absent. Fourth, actor's

preferences can be achieved through bargaining process and negotiations. Finally, holding a powerful position within the state can facilitate the advancement of new concepts and beliefs about the best policy options.

In addition, the section explains the limitations of applying PNA to the Bahraini context. First, the PNA has less explanatory power to the actor's interactions after 2011 uprising in Bahrain. Second, the PNA does not differentiate between different actors within the government, the ruling family and the blurring boundaries between businessman and state actors. Finally, Less explanatory power during political unrest in Bahrain

11.3.1 The strength of using policy network analysis to the Bahraini context

1- Policy network analysis explains the Interactions between state apparatus and wider society based on need for support to new authority

In chapter three we explained why policy network become an important paradigm for discussing policy-making in west Europe. The move from centric state to differentiated polity due to new public management, privatisation and functional differentiation between state apparatus were important factors for actors to come together to exchange resources.

In Gulf states fragmentation of power is possible as well. As explained in chapter three that Hertog (2010) discussed the fragmentation of state apparatus in Saudi Arabia due to relationship between bureaucrats and members of royal family. Those webs of actors are maintained through oil rents in which the bureaucrats benefit from such relationship. Each state organisation has its own web of actors.

In Bahrain the fragmentation of power and state apparatus is recent and the mechanism that sustain it is different from the one presented by Hertog. Bahrain was a centric state Prior to 1999 with most of the power vested to government which is run by shaikh khalifa Bin Salman since 1971. The Amir who is the brother of shaikh khalifa was mostly holding diplomatic role (Wright, 2008). Thus, the starting point for the changes in the structure of power within the house of Alkhalifa was after the death of shaikh Isa in 1999. His son

ascended to the throne and appointed and empowered a faction of Alkhalifa who are labelled as 'Alkhawalid' (Gray, 2011). AlKhawalid are holding an important role in state security policies. The new king then appointed his son the crown prince as the chairman of the EDB and gave him the EDB the power to draw economic policies. These power originally were vested to the prime minister. Starting from these changes a fragmented state apparatus was set in place.

This fragmentation in power created a need for the EDB to interact with public and some interest groups. The increased interactions between actors is partially attributed to such need. Therefore, the policy network analysis was able to explain policy interactions in Bahrain prior to 2011. It has shed a new light on how needs for actors and inclusiveness a reason for extended interactions and a way can be to empower actors to affect policy decisions. During such period the RST literature would not have much explanatory power. According to rentier state literature the ability of the state to be politically independent from other interest is greater during increased rent from natural resources. A rentier political bargain is assumed to be an outcome of increased revenues from hikes in oil prices (Schwarz, 2008). According to Schwarz (2008) interest groups are "usually organized around the state's allocation system. Political reform and democratization can be expected in rentier states only in time of declining resources or in times of fiscal crisis". (p.610).

However, the case in Bahrain is almost the opposite in every sense, actors pushed for their inclusiveness in the political process during a period were oil revenues were increasing. The state interactions with interest groups were intense as well and the meeting between actors were frequent between 2002 and 2009. There was an oil boom during the 2002 until mid-2008 which has generated an increased oil revenue to Bahrain and the other Arab Gulf States (Saif, 2009). While the interactions have dropped after the uprising in 2011 until the field work in 2016.

In addition, the BCCI which has settled on a bargain of exchange between money paid to Tamkeen and receiving services for the private sector means that the bargain is not necessarily related to macro politics and the demand for democracy. The BCCI bargain was to receive services for the money they will pay then what they demanded was a larger representation in Tamkeen's BOD. For this to happen, the BCCI acted collectively to defend business interest. This means that collective actions were not vanished due to political bargain at the time of increased oil revenues and at least in relation to labour market issues such relationship does not exist or need to be modified based on sectors. The BCCI's had invested efforts and money to push for changing the policy decisions that was undertaken by the EDB. The activities conducted by the BCCI at that time was intense and very organised and they have used their organisational resources to defend their interest.

2- Political feasibility and policy analysis

The application of policy network analysis shed a light on an important aspect of policy-making in GCC countries which is the political feasibility of change. The question is can the perfectly suggested reforms be implemented and what are the constraints to such implementation. The thesis discussed different aspects that led to the initial recommendations by McKinsey & Company to change throughout the years. One of the important aspects is businessman interest and their ability for collective actions. Second the potential influence of parliament though it can be disputed as the structure of parliament changes throughout the years and the activism of parliament changed as well. Yet, the parliament can act as a negative influencer over positive change for cultural and social reasons. For instance, the case of domestic labour and their inclusion in the DLRM was rejected, hence they are treated as different labour segment from another immigrant labour.

Political feasibility analysis involves examining "the actors and events involved in each stage of a political policy-making process and anticipate the likely resolution of a policy problems as it works its way through the policy process"

(Webber, 2005, p.546). The parameters of political feasibility analysis provided by Webber (2005) is in democratic countries were political support is important for policy drafts. In non- democratic countries the dynamic would be different. Yet state-society interactions are not absent and as shown in this thesis businessman can exert influence over policy decisions. Their power to influence policy outcomes is driven from different sources one of which is the need for resources provided by them.

This suggestion regards the importance of political feasibility in policy analysis in oil rich countries was missing from early literature about resources rich countries. As discussed in chapter three regards rentier states analysis is that the early assumption was that the state-society interactions are absent. Thus, RST and resource curse literature were too deterministic in analysing that natural resources endowment as the main reason behind policy failure and authoritarianism (Rooser, 2006). Thus Rooser (2006) considers that change in polices, institutional and social in a resources rich countries must take in to account the political feasibility of change "recommendations for overcoming the resource curse have not generally taken into account the issue of political feasibility" (p.268) .

A growing literature related in general to Gulf countries and their attempts for economic reforms refers to different aspects other than natural resources effects on policy outcomes. This literature discuses that these countries are cursed by institutions rather than by natural resources (Mohaddes et al, 2019, Elbadawi and Selim, 2016). Mohaddes et al (2019) argues that political, fiscal and monetary institutions provide more explanation in relation to macroeconomic policies and its outcomes rather than the effects of rent from natural resources.

Thus, the routs to reform is not without considering political feasibility or other institutional constraints. This call for a consideration of policy alternatives during policy discussions. According to Webber (2005) that a policy alternative must be available for discussion. In the cases of democratic system, a vast

political support is needed. In Bahrain as discussed in this thesis the BCCI were the most effective actor before and after the uprising, thus negotiating alternatives with them would have been useful for achieving the needed policy impact.

The thesis through its use of policy network analysis and the iterative relationship between network, agency and structure have shed a light on new variables to account for before suggesting new reforms. These variables are the following: the need for resources such as financial or political support, the ability of some groups to advance their interest through collective actions, social and economic interest of actors, and the effect of political division in Bahrain. The inconsideration of the effect of these variables was a limitation to consultancy company hired to write a theoretically perfect model to restructure the Bahraini labour market. Their policy recommendations were not inclusive of political feasibility analysis.

However, the problem with the political feasibility assessment in Bahrain in some aspect that the political analyst has to acquire some understanding of the political division within the ruling family, such understanding may not always be easy to uncover even when we see its manifestation on different policy areas. It is as well apparent that the policy initiator considered the importance of political aspects to some extent. They have employed a political consultant for the period of formulating and pushing the legislative part of the reforms.

3- **The reciprocal relationship between business sector and the government**

The PNA as used in this thesis was able to provide a new narrative to the relationship between state and businessman in relation to labour market policy-making. In addition, to a more comprehensive understanding of the actions of the BCCI during the reform and implementation process. The narrative about such a relationship within the literature focuses only on the ability of businessmen to affect the outcome of policies through their historical established relationship with the cabinet. Yet, their role is still minimal in comparison to the government which set the policy designs and implement

policies (Valeri, 2015). This thesis showed that policy outcomes are not the mere outcomes of such historical structural relations and that policy-making went through negotiations and interactions between actors. The businessmen played an important role in some topics because they were needed for implementation; other outcomes were reached because the businessmen made efforts and reacted by using similar strategies used by the EDB. The BCCI lobbied, used media and arguments based on research and studies. Why would they do such an effort if they can simply communicate their dissatisfaction to the PM? The BCCI had certain beliefs regarding the labour market deficiencies, and they went in to defending their position through research and studies, in a similar strategy that was used by the EDB.

4- **The perceived public interest and its effects on actor's preferences**

The social or public interest as perceived by different actors such as the MJN was also a factor in determining the outcomes. Such a factor is neglected within the literature that overly focuses on the impact of power division within the royal family. It therefore neglects to understand the perceived social interest and how the class structure in Bahrain where Bahrainis/foreign labour are two different segments. For instance, the joint committee in the MJN council came in agreement with the EDB regarding some disputed aspects of the DLRM. However, the rest of the MJN especially form AAIS disagreed with the joint committee outcomes. The leader of AAIS bloc requested the establishment of new committee to further discuss the disputed issues. Such action intensified the interactions and resulted in removing the domestic labour clauses from the DLRM. These MPs were to some extent defending what they perceived as public interest. On the other hand, the negotiating team from the EDB perceived such topic as potentially possible for a trade off if the effect of Alasalah can be reduced to them being part of the network because of their membership in parliament.

5- **Explaining the increased interaction as an outcome to the introduction of new economic paradigm which represents a belief in a more liberal economic and labour market policies.**

The policy network analysis showed why actors went through prolonged interactions. one of which is that the reforms introduced new concepts for restructuring the labour market. These were based on beliefs and economic model promoted by MCK in which the power of the CP facilitated its introduction. This show that the interactions between actors and the suggested new policies are not necessary explained by rentier state theory and oil effects on interactions between actors. As explained by Niblock and Malik (2007) " holding key positions in the state and determined to create a basis for post-oil economic survival, they may form an alliance within the state structure which redirects economic policies" (p.19). The state actors with different vision can ally to introduce changes within certain policy areas. The obstacles they may encounters within such process can be explained by adopting the policy network analysis. The PNA captures a patterned prolonged interaction between different actors and analyse the role of agency and structure and how such process can affect the policy decisions.

11.3.2 Limitation of policy network analysis when applied to the Bahraini context

1- Less explanatory power during political unrest in Bahrain

The PNA ability to account for the changes in the relationship between different actors is less prominent during the time of political crisis. The political stability in the country can be a source for actors' inclusiveness. Political stability further the ability of poorly resourced actors to affect policy decisions during the policy process. The powerful state security and the contentious politics in Bahrain and how actors react to the changing political context can shed a light on the intensity and effectiveness of actor's interactions in policy fields such as labour market.

The political crisis effect on the inclusiveness of actors during the policy process was more intense on under resourced actors. Those actors do not have financial resources or even lack the established relationship with government. In contrast actors with financial resources and historically established relationship with cabinet such as the BCCI continued their effects on some of labour market policy outcomes. For example, Bahrainisation rates, cost of

employing foreign workers and how to allocate the funds gathered from business sectors.

This finding is not entirely explained by policy network analysis and needs to be included in the policy analysis of Gulf states. The decline of the activity of actors such as GFWTUB is located back to their political stance and their link with opposition parties in Bahrain. Why those parties are considered as an enemy to the government and to what extent there will be a security crackdown on them differed in accordance to regional balance and local politics and the balance of power within ruling family. Hence, security measures in Bahrain are an important factor that could impact the relationship between interest groups.

The analysis to this situation is partially explained by reference to the RST literature as explained in chapter 9. The links between the RST and the policy process is mostly in relation to the links between state's security and oil rents and the historical established relationship between some royal family member and businessman. The decision and the ability of the state's security apparatus to react to the uprising. In addition to the strategies used by the security forces to retaliate against the groups that supported the protesters such as the GDWTUB and the involvement of BCCI in such process has affected how they interact in relation to policy matters.

The changes in the relationship between actors has as well affected formal institutions such as the LMRA. The LMRA did not play a role in the changes that occurred in 2011 as it was decided by the cabinet (LMRA, 11 April 2011). The LMRA leader at that time was under criticism by media that positioned itself against the 2011 uprising. He was criticised as failing to take administrative actions against the employees that were absent from work during the uprising and that he discriminates based on religious sector (Alwatan Newspaper, 22 March 2011). The LMRA disapproved of such claims, saying that they registered the absent employees and informed the Civil Service Bureau to take the necessary actions (LMRA, 22 March 2011).

As a result, to this changes the discussion over labour market and economy become less important in comparison to security problems. The perception of such an effect is stated by one of the participants who was interviewed by the researcher: *"there was relationships between political forces and the decision circles, after 2011 these relationship between the influential actors within the community and the political forces (government) almost become the opposite of what happened and thus the issue now becomes the priority of the security side and the political side on the economic side"* (interview no 19, 2016).

2- Who governs in Bahrain?

The definition of actors and the segmentation of private, civil society and state within the policy network analysis is not similar to the Bahraini case study. The gulf states can be fragmented within the state itself, yet the fragmentation mechanism may differ according to each state. As presented in chapter three that Hertog (2010) study about Saudi Arabi identifies that a chain of officials and bureaucrats are connected with different elites within different state's organisation. This resulted in decreased communication and efficiency. Hertog referred to the rent of oil as sustaining such mechanism. The political fragmentation in Bahrain as we stated in chapter seven and two is traced back to 1999 with the death of former Amir Isa bin Salman. The appointment of CP as the chairman of EDB and increasing the EDB authority was an upward down fragmentation of power that reflects a division of power within the ruling family itself. Thus, the government itself is not unified, you have two or even three governments, they do not possess the same perspective regards economic issues or even the security measures undertaken in Bahrain in 2011.

This unique fragmentation is not reflected by the policy network analysis which consider state as one unified actor. The policy network analysis does talk about different organisations and agencies within the state and that they are fragmented based on function, new public management or privatisation. The case of Bahrain is different, the government is not unified as there is a rivalry between different powerful personals within the ruling family and they as well have different perspectives about what works best for the country.

In addition, the business sector boundaries with the government can be blurred. Although the thesis showed that BCCI have collectively acted to defend the interest of the business sector, and that they occasionally communicated their disagreement to higher authority through letters and meetings. The discussion between the BCCI and other members of for instance the shura council were formal as far as the data show, those members of shura council are as well businessman and member of BCCI. For example, according to Jamal Fakhro a member of Shura Council and member of BCCI remembering his role to convince the BCCI's members about the new fees, he says "I remember that we sat for long sessions with the brothers in Bahrain Chamber of Commerce and Industry to convince them to agree to the additional fees, so that all the proceeds of these fees go the private sector to help it improve production and improve small and medium enterprises, this is what has already happened in the past years"(2013, p.22). Thus, businessman are found in different positions within the network as either members of shura council, government, parliament and have their institution to acts collectively on behalf of the business sector.

In addition, who is the business sector and what is the exact boundaries between state actor and businessman is an important question in relation to Bahrain and other Arab Gulf states. According to Valeri (2015) the ruling family in Bahrain have been involved significantly in business. The Royal Family members have benefited from the oil revenues and have distributed lands and even small island on the Al khalifa members (Fuller, 1999).

3-PNA does not explain why the need to public support was limited to the period of the consultation with interest groups and the legislation process

Part of the reason that led the author of this thesis to choose policy network analysis is the increased interactions between actors. In addition, to the need for support of wider public during the early stages of LMRP and especially during the drafting of the DLRM. However, such need was exclusive to the early stages of LMRP. Although the policy network analysis explains that actor's

inclusion or exclusion from the process is dependent on needs for resources and any changes to the structure of need will change the inclusiveness of actors. Yet, it does not explain why the EDB terminated the job of the political consultant they hired in 2003 until 2006 after the parliament approval of the DLRM. Furthermore, the publicity of the project in the media decreased after 2006 as the communication between the crown prince office and some supporting media has declined. The risk of parliament effect and businessman influence over the labour market reforms were not vanished after 2006.

This potentially can be attributed to actor's choices of which strategy to apply. For instance, the appointment of a deputy chairman of the crown's prince court for political affairs was with specific role related to interacting with the civil society. His role ended as he considers that with passing the law to regulate the labour market was his mission. He explains that the mission to continue and push the effort for reforms is passed now to those regulators of the labour market. In a sense. Such regulators were an extension to the same network that started the reform and have engaged with business sectors mostly when they were protesting against the reforms.

11.5 Recent changes in labour market policies in Bahrain

The most recent changes in labour immigration policies remain within the same policy principles set in 2004. For instance, in 2017, the LMRA implemented the flexible work system (LMRA, 17 July 2017). the system issues a work permits without a sponsor (Employer) for qualified person to work in the Kingdom of Bahrain) for two years. The worker can work in any non-specialized job with any number of employers full or part-time (LMRA. 22 April 2018). the system was established as a solution to a specific type of illegal immigrant workers in Bahrain. the informal workers who are qualified to apply for the flexible work permits are those whose sponsors cancelled their permits while in Bahrain or has not renewed their work permits leaving them to be illegal in the country. According to Ausamah Alabsi (Alayam Newspaper, 2 September 2018,) the CEO of LMRA "The largest segment of informal employment in Bahrain, which

accounts for 94.5% of the total informal employment in the Kingdom, is the workers whose residency permits were revoked during the validity period, while the total number of workers leaving the "fugitive" work is only 5.4% Irregular". This system corrected the problems which mostly occurred because of employers who issue visas to later on use it as a commodity and trade it. They collect money from those immigrant workers who then work in the market as informal workers with a revoked work permits (Alayam Newspaper, 2 September 2018).

In regards the philosophy behind such a system, it appears to be both a solution to a problem and a belief that the Kafala system is no longer appropriate to serve the Bahraini economy. For instance, Alabsi (2017) comments in relation to the concept behind such system "Expatriate labour management systems in the Gulf were developed more than 50 years ago and were specifically established in Bahrain in 1962. They were suitable for the needs of the economy at the time and were in line with the official and societal aspirations. The system that was established was based on the rule of the sponsored and the sponsor. The employer cannot employ a person who is not under his guarantee, and the worker cannot come out from under the cloak of this eternal bond. Given the simple structure of the economy and the composition of conservative society at the time, the system was appropriate" (LMRA, 31 July 2017). Thus, it appears that such a system is a continues to the believes that started in 2002 in the need to reform the labour market in accordance with the economic need in Bahrain.

11.6 Recommendation for further research

The PNA that was used in this research provided a framework to analyse labour immigration policy process in Bahrain. It has identified the role of different actors in the policy making process, how and why they gained access to the process and their actions to influence the policy outcomes. However, there are still questions to be answered in regards the labour market policy making process in general and the relationship or interactions between different

actors. Therefore, there are three recommendations for future research in relation to labour markets and other public policy processes as well. The first recommendation is the need for research that focuses on subsystems such as policy network. Network analysis could assist the researcher to understand the policy-making process in terms of the relationship between different actors, context and policy outcomes. Second, an in-depth analysis to business- state relationship by exploring the policy making processes in recent years. The researcher recommends an exploration of both formal and informal interactions between government agencies and business owners and how such interactions affects policy outcomes. Finally, the researcher recommends that more attention to be given to studying the BCCI as an organisation, to understand how it works and if such internal dynamic within the BCCI affects its role during the policy making process

Appendix 1: Breakdown of the interviews: participant position, interview date, and duration

Interview code	Organisation	Date	Duration
Interview 1	Former MP (2002-2006),	26/1/2016	58.33 minutes
Interview 2	GFWTUB	2/2/2016	43.15 m
Interview 3	GFWTUB	3/2/2016	1 hour and 3m
Interview 4	BCCI	4/2/2016	1 hour
Interview 5	BCCI	8/2/2016	43.59 m
Interview 6	GFWTUBGFWTUB	11/2/2016	1.2.46 hour
Interview 7	BCCI	18/2/2016	28.15 m

Interview 8	Alwifaq Society	23-2-2016	52: 47
Interview 9	Alwifaq society	2016-2-25	32:26
Interview 10	Former member of SHC	1-3-2016	1 hour
Interview 11	Alwifaq society	6-3-2016	54:42
Interview 12	member of SHC	6- 3-2012	32 m
Interview 13	LMRA	7-3-2016	58:52
Interview 14	LMRA	14-3-2016	45 minutes
Interview 15	former MP	15-3-2016	55.1
Interview 16	MWPS	19-3-2016	One hour and five minutes
Interview 17	MWPS	19-3-2016	1 Hour

Interview 18	worked for the CPC	20-3-2016	55:43
Interview 19	GFWTUB	21-3-2016	53:40
Interview 20	Editor in chief of a newspaper	27-3-2016	35:26
Interview 21	government	3-4-2016	25 minutes
Interview 22	Former minister	6-4-2016	47 m
Interview 23	Former Mp and former member of SHC	7-4-2016	1 hour and 19, minutes

Appendix 2 the general form for Interviews questions

Part 1

- Can you briefly explain who you are and what organisation you present?
- Your role in the organisation?
- From your perspectives what are the best policies to regulate the foreign labour in Bahrain?
- Has your perception changed with time about what works and what doesn't work for policies related to the rights and regulation of foreign labour?
- What principles underlay the development of such policies?
- From your perspectives what were the constraints for developing such policies over the time period between 2001 and 2012?
- From your perspective what was the role of the national Bahraini environment on developing the foreign labour policies between 2001 and 2012?

Part 2

What was your role / contribution in the making of the following policies and laws?

- Law number 19 for the year 2006 regulating the Labour Market
- Free labour mobility for migrant workers
- Work visas
- Bahrainisation rate
- Fees Imposed on non-Bahraini workers
- The new private sector labour law 2012
- Covering the domestic workers in the new private sector labour law
- Minimum wage

Other policies

- Putting a cap for the number of immigrant workers in Bahrain
- Putting a ceiling for the maximum years of immigrants work in Bahrain

- Free visa
- Social protection

Strategies and tactics

- What strategies does your organisation use to get its message across? Do you use the media for example or you campaign or provide information's and reports or lobbying?
- Did you change your strategies to defend your arguments with time? and why
- Have the strategy/tactics pursued by your organisation changed as a result of their prior experience?
- Did the changes in the context factors affects your interest or the type of strategy you use?

Links and interactions

- What type of contacts does your organisation have with other actors in the process?
- How frequent were these meetings?
- How much contact did you have with the members and non-members of the committee/ meeting?
- What are the basis of the contact, (do you share information or suggestions, loyalty, friendship, kinship)?

Other actors

- How can you describe your experience with other actors?
- How do you compare the relationships between domestic actors involved in discussing immigrant labour issues over times? Has it changed over time and why?
- How can you describe your experience with the international actors (ex. ILO, Human Rights Organisations, Colombo process, Abu Dhabi dialogue … etc) in relations to the labour immigration issues? Where they influential during the policy process? Did this experience changed over time?
- Did the national context had any influence on your relationship with the other actors over the time?
- Who were the most influential actors?
- Has the changes in the national context given any other actors in the process more privileges over others with time?
- How were they influential?

- Was authority used to enforce certain policy perspective?
- Were there any tensions between those actors during discussions?

Other issues

- How did other policies affect your participation in foreign labour policy-making?
- Vision 2030
- Documents
- Suggested names and contact details

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