Political trust in Europe:

What it is and why it matters

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Abstract

Political trust is a vital resource in representative democracies. It helps citizens to forsake a degree of their personal autonomy to allow elected representatives to act on their behalf. Political trust therefore makes collective benefits possible and encourages citizens' acceptance of policies, laws and regulations. But while the theoretical value of political trust has been widely set out, there is little empirical evidence to support the argument that political trust plays an important role in representative democracies. This is partly due to the difficulty in operationalizing and observing political trust accurately in survey research when survey respondents are unable to disentangle their political trust from their support for incumbent officeholders. The highly endogenous relationships between political attitudes further complicate attempts to identify causal relationships between related political attitudes. The papers in this thesis address these issues to demonstrate that political trust clearly has a significant and substantial impact on political life.

This thesis elaborates this problematic in its first chapter, and then provides an overview of what is reported as theoretical arguments and empirical findings about political trust in the extant literature. It then presents three empirical papers that address questions about the causes as well as consequences of political trust. A concluding chapter reflects on the over-arching conclusions from these empirical papers.

The three empirical papers in this thesis demonstrate that political trust is a distinct attitude that is separate but closely related to citizens' support for the party in charge of their government and their views of democracy. As such, it is an aspect of diffuse support for the political system as a whole, rather than short-term assessments of government performance, actors or outputs, which influences other political attitudes. But survey research suggests that citizens appear unable to isolate political trust from other political attitudes, particularly their partisanship and support for incumbent officeholders. The first paper in this thesis demonstrates that, as well as offering a "winner's bonus" to supporters of governing parties, partisanship moderates the impact of exogenous measures of government performance on measured levels of political trust across Europe; close supporters of both the Prime Minister's party and other parties appear to be blinded to different aspects of government performance as they formulate their political trust. Partisanship therefore has both a direct and an indirect effect on political trust.

The second and third papers turn to the impact of political trust on other aspects of political life. Focussing on two European countries, they show that political trust influences the policy agenda and support for the democratic system of government as a whole. They also demonstrate how political trust does not have a homogenous impact across all citizens. It is particularly important in situations where sacrifice is required (it is a significant and substantial driver of support for government redistribution amongst citizens with high incomes) and at times of discontent (it ensures

that citizens' dissatisfaction with government performance does not necessarily overspill to a profound discontent with democracy).

This thesis therefore highlights how individual items in surveys purported to measure political trust generally fail to reflect that concept, because the responses to them are confounded by a variety of factors. Once a measure of political trust, as an aspect of diffuse support, is properly isolated, generally by using more advanced methodological tools, it can clearly be demonstrated that trust (as conceptualised) has a substantial impact on political life. The findings from this thesis therefore suggest that any changes in levels of political trust are likely to change the way governments operate and their relationship with their citizens.

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Introduction

"If the people cannot trust their government to do the job for which it exists - to protect them and to promote their common welfare - all else is lost."

Senator Barack Obama

'An Honest Government, A Hopeful Future'

University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya, August 28, 2006

When Barack Obama, then the junior US Senator for Illinois, spoke about corruption on a trip to Kenya in 2006 he was clear about how important he believed trust in government to be. Two years before being elected President of the United States of America, he spoke at the University of Nairobi to extol the importance of government fairness and probity, warning that without trust, citizens would suffer. Since making that speech, Senator Obama became President Obama and, after serving two terms in the most powerful office in the world, was replaced by a President for whom distrust seems itself to be a powerful resource.

In the intervening years, therefore, the saliency of political trust has only increased. A decade ago, declining political trust as observed in attitudinal surveys across representative democracies generated increased attention to the question of the role and consequences of trust in democratic politics. Now, the question of trust in politics seems to be only more important. In the intervening years, political (dis)trust has been

cited as one of multiple reasons explaining the rise of populist and anti-establishment parties and candidates in numerous western democracies, including the elections of Donald Trump and Emmanuel Macron to the Presidencies of the United States and France respectively. Political trust has also been offered as a contributory reason for the growing success of far-right parties, decreasing voter turnout and referendum results like that which saw the British people vote to leave the European Union. It now seems difficult to argue that political trust does not have a profound impact on the political lives of people in representative democracies.

That is not to say that political trust has not always been crucial in representative democracies. Political trust is a vital resource that acts as the "the glue that keeps the system together and…the oil that lubricates the policy machine" (van der Meer, 2010, p. 518). Therefore, without the trust of its citizens, government would be paralysed and unable to act to tackle the social and economic issues facing its citizens. For the future President Obama (2006), this meant that without political trust "all else is lost". And even if the declines in political trust that have recently been observed in representatives democracies do not appear to be matched by reduced support for a democratic system of government (Dalton, 1998), they still appear to have the capacity to influence other aspects of political life. Given that political trust appears to influence citizens' policy preferences (Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000; Hetherington, 2005; Rudolph, 2009), electoral participation (Citrin & Luks, 2001; Grönlund & Setälä, 2007; Hetherington, 1999; Hooghe, Marien, & Pauwels, 2011;

Ziller & Schübel, 2015) and respect for the laws and institutions of government (Ahnquist, Lindström, & Wamala, 2008; Dalton, Burklin, & Drummond, 2001; Lindström & Janzon, 2007; Marien & Hooghe, 2011), changes in political trust are likely to impact citizens' relationship with their government and the way democratic governments operate.

Trust is therefore key to a healthy representative democracy. In large and complicated political communities, citizens elect representatives to make the most important, and often highly contentious, decisions on their behalf. However, without the power, time or knowledge to constantly scrutinise these decisions, citizens must trust that their governments "will not deliberately or knowingly do [them] harm if they can avoid it, and will look after [their] interests, if this is possible" (Newton, 2007, p. 343). As such, trust is not simply an evaluation of the individuals who hold government office, nor of the outputs they generate. Instead, it is an assessment of the system of government, and whether it will act in a fair and equitable manner for its citizens.

Political trust, as a broader evaluation of the way the system of government works, is therefore one part of what David Easton (1975) called "diffuse support". As such, political trust is "the feeling that the system can be counted on to provide equitable outcomes" (Muller, Jukam, & Seligson, 1982, p. 241) rather than satisfaction with a government's chosen course of action, which Easton categorised as "specific support". Political trust is not, therefore, simply another way of

measuring satisfaction with the current officeholders in a political system. In fact, political trust has an important role to play as a "reservoir of support on which a system can fall back when *specific support* for a particular policy measure or prime minister is lacking" (Marien, 2011, p. 13). As such, it is not only separate from support for incumbent office holders, but it is an important political resource that is most valuable precisely at times of dissatisfaction with incumbents and their actions.

Nonetheless, this is an important distinction that is often not fully captured in survey research where political trust is often conflated with other, more short-term measures of political support, such as satisfaction with an incumbent government or the outputs it generates. This creates a methodological problem for investigating the causes and effects of political trust using survey data. Given the relatively coarse formulations of questions that lend themselves for use in mass surveys, it is difficult, if not impossible, for survey respondents to distinguish their assessment of the overall system of government from their views of the people and parties controlling it. This means that the theoretical concept under investigation is not necessarily captured in the responses to survey questions asking about political trust. This undermines the construct validity of trust items in survey research.

Such deficits in construct validity can lead to systematic measurement error in data collected in attitudinal surveys. If respondents, when asked about trust, allow their responses to reflect their partisan views or short-term assessments of government, their

responses will not capture cleanly the idea of political trust, as a manifestation of diffuse support, which is the theoretical concept under investigation here. In such a situation, the measurement error found in survey items asking about political trust would be highly correlated with partisanship and other political views. Such biased measurements subsequently affect analyses of the relationship between political trust and other related attitudes.

This systematic measurement error can also cause endogeneity issues. Respondents' inability to isolate, in their response to survey questions, political trust from other political attitudes makes it difficult to ensure that causal relationships between political trust and other political attitudes are fully isolated from the effects of other, related attitudes. Without knowing whether the most important potentially confounding factors are being controlled for, there is no easy way to be confident that any relationship between political trust and its potential causes or consequences is being estimated accurately. Furthermore, given the difficulty for respondents to distinguish specific political attitudes in survey research, it is often difficult to provide evidence of the direction of causality in research into political attitudes. The potential for reciprocal relationships and alternative causal pathways between political trust and related attitudes makes it difficult to establish the causes and effects of political trust, rather than simply the attitudes with which it is correlated. However, the existence of such relationships – and not their causal direction – only tells half of the story.

Therefore, the notion of political trust – and how it relates to other political attitudes – is complex. Though it has become a salient topic across many Western democracies, it is not a concept that requires further clarification before any investigation into its causes and consequences can be investigated. This thesis therefore starts with an in-depth review of what we already know about trust and the role it plays in the political sphere. This offers further evidence as to how trust is a relational concept – relying on the characteristics of both the trusting and trusted party. It also sets out, in more detail, how survey measurements attempting to capture trust are highly correlated with – and potentially contaminated by – citizens' support for incumbent officeholders. It is clear from the existing literature that political trust is highly endogenous with other, key political attitudes and this needs to be addressed before any investigations into the causes and consequences of political trust can begin.

The papers in this thesis therefore use a number of modelling and regression approaches specifically aimed to reduce the risk of construct validity, measurement error and endogeneity when investigating the causes and consequences of political trust. This includes the use of a variety of measurement models to capture political trust as a latent variable, rather than simply using individual survey items which are more susceptible to measurement error. In addition to this, panel data and a natural experiment are used to establish causal relationships between political trust and other political attitudes. Each paper in this thesis

examines a different aspect of the causal relationship between political trust and other political attitudes, first by offering further insights into the complex relationship between partisanship and political trust across Europe before turning to investigations of the political consequences of political trust in two European countries.

The first paper addresses the issue of how partisanship shapes individuals' political trust. This is not only an interesting topic in its own right but also has important implications for subsequent investigations into the effects of political trust, as a manifestation of diffuse support. Evidence from a range of attitude surveys and the extant literature demonstrates that, across a large number of representative democracies, citizens who support incumbent governments also report higher levels of political trust (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Citrin, 1974; Iyengar, 1980; Norris, 1999b). This finding, by itself, does not establish a causal relationship. Furthermore, it does not distinguish whether this relationship simply reflects that government partisans enjoy a "winner's bonus" to their political trust, or whether they are influenced differently by the workings and outputs of government due to their partisan attitudes towards government.

Using survey data from 26 European countries over ten years, the first paper in this thesis therefore investigates whether, and if so, how, partisanship moderates the effect of government performance on citizens' political trust. It uses exogenous measures of government performance (rather than highly endogenous measures of citizens'

perceptions and evaluations of government performance) in cross-classified, multi-level models to investigate the direct and indirect impact that partisanship exerts on political trust. By using procedural fairness and economic outputs to measure government performance, this paper investigates the impact of both the processes and the results of government action. The findings from this paper clearly show that the strength and the direction of citizens' partisanship moderate the effect of government performance on their political trust. While higher procedural fairness and economic outputs lead to higher political trust amongst all citizens who do not consider themselves close to a political party, those who are close to the Prime Minister's party appear unaffected by the government's economic performance while those who are close to another party appear unaffected by the government's procedural fairness. Partisan supporters of all parties therefore appear 'blind' to different measures of government performance as drivers of political trust; partisan supporters of the party in charge of government appear blind to its economic failures while partisan supporters of other parties appear blind to the government's procedural successes.

This study highlights how survey items asking respondents about their levels of trust in political actors and institutions are shaped by their partisan leanings, as well as by their assessment as to whether government is willing and able to act in the best interests of the citizens it represents. People who support the parties in charge of government still report a "winner's bonus" in their level of political trust, even when the

effect of government performance is allowed to vary by the direction and strength of an individual's partisanship. These analyses thus demonstrate that the common measure of political trust used in the surveys that were analysed is contaminated by a degree of "specific support" and that it does not exclusively reflect Easton's concept of "diffuse support".

Keeping this consideration in mind, the second and third papers in this thesis look at the consequences, rather than the causes, of political trust. This is an area of research that has received substantially less attention in the extant literature than research on the causes of political trust, or analyses of declines in such attitudes. But investigations into the consequences of political trust are not only interesting because they highlight specific effects of any changes in such attitudes but also because they reinforce the assertion that political trust is itself a powerful political attitude that has clear repercussions for other aspects of political life, above and beyond other measures of political support. These papers demonstrate that political trust is not merely a replication of support for the actors or institutions of government but rather a separate and important resource in political life.

The second paper in this thesis investigates the situations in which political trust is most important, namely when citizens are asked to make a sacrifice for government action. While political trust appears an important driver of the willingness to make such a sacrifice in the United States (Hetherington, 2005), little is known about such impacts of political trust in other countries. Given the different political cultures on either

side of the Atlantic, we cannot simply assume that findings from the US will hold up in European countries which show, by and large, less cynical and distrustful attitudes to government. This second paper therefore uses the United Kingdom as a case study to investigate the causal relationship between political trust and support for government redistribution.

This paper addresses methodological issues by using an instrumental variable approach. It uses the 2009 MPs' expenses scandal in the UK as a natural experiment to isolate a measure of political trust, uncontaminated by citizens' support for incumbents. This is possible because, as shown in the paper, the behaviour of a respondent's MP in the expenses scandal was as good as randomly assigned. This instrumented value of political trust is then used to estimate the impact of political trust on support for redistribution. This approach shows that higher levels of political trust encourage greater support for government redistribution. Furthermore, it also shows that when methodological steps are not taken to isolate political trust from other political attitudes, its effect is dramatically underestimated.

But given the importance of trust in situations of risk or personal sacrifice (Hetherington, 2005; Rudolph, 2009; Rudolph & Evans, 2005), we cannot assume that political trust will have a homogenous effect on support for government distribution amongst all citizens. Therefore, this paper also investigates the moderating impact of personal sacrifice on the effect of political trust. Individuals who receive an immediate, direct and personal benefit from government redistribution should not need trust to

support such policies. Conversely, those who must make personal sacrifices may need to trust government to support its efforts to redistribute resources. Therefore, a second set of models is estimated in which the effect of political trust on support for redistribution is allowed to vary between two groups of respondents; those whose household income is above and those whose household income is below the median value for the UK.

When the effect of political trust is allowed to vary by individuals' financial situation political trust remains a powerful factor driving support for redistribution, but only in situations where risk and sacrifice is involved. For respondents whose household income is below the national median value (i.e. those who are most likely to benefit from government redistribution) political trust is not a significant driver of support for government redistribution. However, for those respondents whose household income is above the national median, trust is a statistically and substantially significant factor. This highlights the importance of political trust in situations where an individual does not receive a direct and immediate benefit from government action. Therefore, trust is indispensable for governments who want to implement policies that confer unequal costs and benefits across their citizens. If a government wants to introduce a measure that make some of its citizens worse off, then these citizens need a reason not to withdraw their support from a government whose actions disadvantage them. Political trust – the belief

that the government will look after the interests of its political community – is one alternative reason to support such action.

This second study clearly shows that political trust has a significant and substantial effect on a particular aspect of political life: it helps citizens overcome any personal sacrifice required of them by government redistribution and it facilitates their support for policies that offer no immediate and direct financial benefit. However, this effect is limited to the role of political trust on a specific government policy. It does not address the impact of political trust on the broader system of government and how it interacts with other dimensions of political support, ranging from satisfaction with incumbents to support for democracy.

The third paper in this thesis therefore addresses the question of the impact of political trust on support for democracy. Using nine waves of panel data from the Netherlands, it investigates how citizens' support for government institutions, actors and outputs (their specific political support) influences their satisfaction with and confidence in democracy, and how this moderates the effect of political trust on citizens' support for democracy. By constructing latent variable measurement models of survey items from all nine waves of data, this paper investigates the relationship between the (latent) variables pertaining to specific support and political trust. By not focussing on individual survey items, this approach reduces the issue of measurement error outlined above. To address issues of endogeneity, a dynamic panel model is estimated using

a first differencing approach. This allows past values of the dependent variable to be included as instruments in the regression so as to isolate the changes between panel waves to establish causal relationships.

Using this approach, this paper shows that political trust has a direct, positive effect on citizens' satisfaction with democracy and on their confidence in democracy. The effect of political trust is greater on citizens' confidence in democracy than on their satisfaction with democracy. Given that satisfaction is a retrospective evaluation of performance and confidence involves looking to the future and anticipating future actions, this reinforces the interpretation that political trust is not simply a replication of citizens' support for the party in charge of government or assessment of its past performance. Instead, the prospective aspect of political trust appears to play an important role in reinforcing people's faith about how the democratic system will work in future.

But more importantly, given trust's power to act as a reservoir of political support, this paper also shows that the effect of political trust on both satisfaction with democracy and confidence in democracy is greater for people with low short-term, specific political support. Therefore, political trust appears to act as a buffer between short-term political dissatisfaction and a profound discontent with the way politics operates in representative democracies. Without such a buffer, low levels of support for an incumbent government could more easily become low levels of support for democracy as a whole. This means that poor

government performance is a bigger risk to the health and stability of democracy among distrustful citizens than it is among people with higher political trust.

Even when the effect of political trust is allowed to vary by specific support, it remains a significant driver of support for democracy for almost all citizens. High political trust is a key driver of citizens' confidence in democracy in particular. But looking at political trust in this way alone undersells its crucial importance in a representative democracy. Political trust also has an important role to play in ensuring that short-term discontent with an incumbent government – which is practically inevitable given the competing demands within political communities – does not overflow into disenchantment with the democratic system as a whole.

This final paper shows that the political impact of political trust is not only limited to citizens' opinions of a core aspect of government action, economic redistribution. Political trust also offers a crucial reservoir of political support at times of public dissatisfaction and amongst people who disagree with the actions and outputs of government. It therefore facilitates government action to tackle key social and economic issues and ensure that citizens who oppose government incumbents and their actions do not necessarily turn this discontent into opposition to the system of government as a whole.

The final section of this thesis reviews the overarching findings of these three papers, each of which highlights the importance of political

trust in different aspects of political life. It reiterates the crucial role that political trust plays in representative democracies and considers some of the wider implications of the findings of these papers, both for practitioners and for further academic research into the causes and consequences of political trust. This final section also reviews some of the methodological issues addressed in this thesis and highlights why robust work must be done to understand better the theoretical concepts that underpin survey questions, academic research and political debate in this area. It elaborates further on how the difficulty in clearly defining and working with the notion of political trust has wider ramifications for the study and discussion of political trust, as well as other political attitudes.

These investigations therefore highlight the methodological issues that abound in research into political attitudes, such as political trust. While attempts can be made to address issues such as construct validity, measurement error and endogeneity in research, the difficulty in clearly defining and working with the notion of political trust has wider ramifications for the study and discussion of political trust. It is clear from these investigations that researchers and practitioners interested in political trust need to be clear about the concept they investigate, and to use necessary and appropriate methodological procedures to ensure their findings relate to this key element of political life rather than to sundry of its correlates.

This is why robust work must be done to understand better the theoretical concepts that underpin survey questions, academic research

and political debate in this area. Not doing so has ramifications for both the academic study of political trust and for practical attempts by political actors and institutions who have shown a desire to increase political trust across representative democracies. A clearer understanding of the concept amongst researchers and practitioners will help to identify better the causes and consequences of political trust. It could also potentially offer a more realistic approach to address any observed declines in trust. Furthermore, the findings from this research suggest that political trust has a significant impact on political attitudes spanning from policy preferences to support for democracy. Therefore, a better understanding of the concept and a cleaner measurement of political trust will allow us to better understand the role it plays in political life. This thesis aims to contribute to this by addressing some of the most relevant methodological and substantive questions regarding political trust.

Contemporary views on the nature and significance of political trust

Representative democracies are built on trust. Citizens must trust their elected representatives to act on their behalf to allow them to take action in the interests of their political community. Without trust, governments would not have the freedom to act on behalf of their citizens and the foundations of the whole system of government would risk being undermined. But in recent years, observed levels of political trust have been in decline in many countries. This has led to greater attention being given to political trust, what it is and what it means for political life today. But this has also raised questions about what is actually being captured by indicators intended to reflect political trust. Responses to survey questions asking about political trust appear to capture at least a degree of support for the party in charge of government while the theoretical concept is often understood as a reflection of citizens' faith in the systems of government to act fairly and in the best interests of their citizens. Therefore, before we establish the causes and consequences of political trust, and any recent declines, it is important to be clear about the nature of political trust and the important role it plays in democratic politics.

Defining trust in the political sphere

Trust is a relational concept. It is "the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests,

if this is possible" (Newton, 2007, p. 343). It therefore only exists in situations that involve multiple actors. A trusting relationship is one in which one actor holds the opinion that another actor has the ability and desire to act in line with the trusting actor's interests (Hardin, 2006). As such, it is a "function of human interaction" (Solomon & Flores, 2001, p. 70) that relies on the characteristics of both the trusting and trusted parties (Bianco, 1994). It is therefore not identical to trustworthiness, which is simply an assessment of a single party's characteristic.

Because it is a relational concept, trust does not only depend on the characteristics of the parties involved but also on the context and dynamics of their relationship. It is therefore different in situations where an individual is asked to trust someone with whom they have strong personal ties, someone with whom they have weak personal ties or an institution (Khodyakov, 2007; Uslaner, 1999). Trust built on either strong or weak personal ties is based on reciprocal and symmetrical relationships. Such trust is therefore easier to generate than trust between individuals and institutions which relates to vertical relationships.

Trust in institutions is more difficult to generate than trust in individuals partly because citizens are unlikely to have personal contact with the individuals that make up many of the institutions they are asked to trust. Attempts to generate trust in political institutions is compounded further by the fact that conflict and competition characterise political life (Warren, 1999b). Furthermore, citizens demand their political institutions – and the individuals within them – act in their best interests, often without being fully

aware of what this best interest may be (Hardin, 2000). In representative democracies, it is therefore the role of elected representatives, with more time and information than the citizens they represent, to assess the important, and often complex, decisions that face their political community. This creates a disparity of knowledge, as well as of power, in the political arena which "inevitably establishes distance between the rulers and the ruled" (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1995, p. 2). This makes it more difficult for citizens to trust and thus to make themselves vulnerable to the actions of their political representatives. But the benefits available through collective action in representative democracies also make trust more desirable in political life.

However, Hardin (1999) argues that citizens do not have sufficient information about the operation of government to be able to trust it. He understands trust to be a rational decision whereby individuals will enter into a trusting relationship if and when they believe the trusted party will suffer if it does not act in a trustworthy manner (Hardin, 2006). As such, a trusting relationship is a co-operative relationship that benefits both parties. But he does not believe that this can be extended to the political sphere as he argues that politicians do not have such incentive to act in a trustworthy manner to maintain this relationship. He therefore speaks of confidence, rather than trust, in the political sphere. While these two concepts are closely connected, confidence does not contain the value judgement and normative element encompassed by the idea of trust (Siegrist, 2010). As such, the

forward-looking faith entailed in trust sets it apart from attitudes based on retrospective performance evaluations.

The competitive nature of politics – as well as the distance between the government and the governed – also makes trust difficult to generate in the political sphere. From competitive elections to opposition parties' scrutiny of government actions and policies, politics is defined by conflict. At the most basic level, electoral conflict means that governments take office having beaten opposition parties, often invoking the distrust of the latter's supporters along the way (Warren, 1999a). But the day-to-day business of government is also characterised by disagreements about what actions government should take to improve the lives of its citizens.

In politics, therefore, it may be difficult for citizens to determine whether they should trust political actors. However, Stoneman (2008) argues that people cannot but help make judgements as to the trustworthiness of political actors, even without complete information about their abilities and intentions. The relatively few "don't know" answers offered in response to survey questions about political trust appear to support this (Zmerli & Hooghe, 2011). Political trust may therefore be based on institutional norms (Grönlund & Setälä, 2007; Offe, 1999), common knowledge of institutional rules (Harré, 1999), endorsements from intermediaries (O. Patterson, 1999) or performance expectations based on past performance (Bowler & Karp, 2004; Carman, 2010; Catterberg & Moreno, 2006; John R. Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001). But political trust may also be an expression of a moral stance

(Mansbridge, 1999) or an assessment of the individuals who make up political institutions (Solomon & Flores, 2001).

Keele offers a definition of trust in political representatives that is analogous to the trust people utilise in everyday life: “A voter will trust his or her representative if he or she has evidence that the politician has the integrity and capacity to meet the voter’s expectations” (2007, p. 243). This highlights the two key aspects of the trust evaluation; the trusted party must be seen to be both willing and able to act in line with the trusting person’s interest (Damico, Conway, & Damico, 2000; Kavanagh, 1989). But the nature of political trust may vary depending on the type of relationship between citizens and a particular political agent or institution. Citizens may afford a type of strategic trust to political parties or politicians if they have a good track record in office, moral trust to politicians if they have been socialised to do so and deliberative trust to political institutions if they consider their structures to be fair and equitable (Fisher, Van Heerde, & Tucker, 2010). However, Hooghe contends that political trust has a single dimension, and as such can be understood as “a comprehensive assessment of the political culture” (2011, p. 275).

The idea of political trust, or trust in government, also depends on people’s interpretations of the idea of government. When people form their political trust, what institutions and relationships are they evaluating? Ideas of what government entails may themselves shape citizens’ evaluations of how much government should be trusted (A. King, 2000) but the criteria for citizens’ evaluations may also be different in different political cultures or

periods of time. Political trust is also likely affected by the scope of government (Listhaug & Wiberg, 1998) and policy areas that are salient when they are asked about trust (Hetherington & Husser, 2012). This suggests that measures of political trust are influenced by the context in which citizens interact with government. This risks undermining any comparison of political trust over time and between locations (Citrin, 1974).

It is clear, therefore, that there is not one single definition of political trust. But Easton (1975), in his attempt to distinguish between different types of political support, clearly set out that political trust – as an assessment of a political regime – should be considered part of a longer term assessment of the political system (labelled "diffuse support") rather than short-term evaluations of incumbent governments (which fall into the category of "specific support"). Diffuse support is an assessment of a political regime, its values and how it operates. This assessment should not rely on agreement with the short-term political aims of those in charge of the government. In fact, it should help to counter-balance any negative perceptions of government incumbents and outputs because diffuse support, including trust, helps a government to "weather periods of public dissatisfaction" (Dalton, 2005, p. 24) when citizens are not happy with policy agenda or outputs it administers.

Dalton (1998) considers both trust in political institutions and the party system to be instrumental evaluations of the performance of a political regime. However, he considers these judgements to fall into Eason's category of specific – and not diffuse – support. In contrast, Listhaug argues that

political trust is a measure of neither diffuse nor specific support, but an intermediary concept (1998, p. 261). However, while individuals' confidence in both the representative and administrative institutions of the state are inter-related, they appear to stand independent of their support for the nation state, democratic principles, incumbent office holders and state outputs (Norris, 2011). As such, each of these aspects of political support is likely to play different – if inter-related – roles in political life.

The importance of trust

Trust is a powerful tool as it facilitates action in situations of uncertainty, vulnerability and risk, when an individual does not have sufficient information to make a fully informed decision or when he or she does not have the power or capability to act (Stoneman, 2008). In choosing to trust someone, an individual must forsake a degree of control or influence over the decision making process (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006) as a trade off for the potential benefits that a trusting relationship may bring about. But whether they enter into it voluntarily or by necessity, trust renders a trusting party vulnerable to the risk that a trusted party may exploit the discretionary power a trusting relationship offers them (Pettit, 1995; Warren, 1999b).

Therefore trust, itself, is a risk. To fully understand this risk, individuals proffering trust to another party must be fully aware of how vulnerable they make themselves in this relationship (Solomon & Flores, 2001). Without sufficient information, though, people could take a leap of faith to blindly trust someone or revert to distrust as their "default strategy"

(Stoneman, 2008, p. 26) if they decide not to make themselves more vulnerable. Although the nature of politics – characterised by imbalances of knowledge and power plus the on-going conflict between political actors – does not make trust easy to generate, the set-up of representative democracy makes trust a particularly valuable resource; the benefits available from collective action across political communities are a powerful reward for trust.

In representative democracies, political elites act as the agents of the citizens who elect them. Usually, citizens do not have the time, knowledge or access to constantly scrutinise their agents' actions (Seyd, 2015) so citizens must give political elites the freedom to act on their behalf without continuous scrutiny. Trust can facilitate this. Therefore, without the trust of their citizens, governments' capacity to act is restricted (Braithwaite, 1998; Hetherington, 1998; Hetherington & Globetti, 2002; Levi, 1998; Rudolph & Evans, 2005) because trust acts as "the glue that keeps the system together and as the oil that lubricates the policy machine" (van der Meer, 2010, p. 518). Distrust therefore threatens the collective benefits available to society through government action (Solomon & Flores, 2001). This shows that, although political trust may be difficult to generate due to the competitive and hierarchical nature of representative democracies, it is a valuable asset in political life.

Nonetheless, constructive cynicism – as well as trust – is important in representative democracies. In fact, Almond and Verba (1989) argue that a balance of acquiescence (based on trust) and political involvement (based on

a critical assessment of retrospective performance) are the best conditions for democracy. Such cynicism is an important check on government power in liberal democracies which "emerged from the distrust of political and clerical authorities" (Warren, 1999b, p. 1). But while Hardin argues that "the beginning of political and economic liberalism is distrust" (2006, p. 135), trust and distrust are not mutually exclusive in politics. A need for critical distrust does not prevent trust having an important role to play in representative democracies. Trust can still facilitate co-operation (Solomon & Flores, 2001) and government action, so "too little [trust] may mean a government incapable of performing well the tasks that most people want government to do" (Nye, Zelikow, & King, 1997, p. 276). Therefore, distrust may in fact restrict government action so much that it cannot meet its citizens expectation which may create further distrust or broader disenchantment with government in general (Nevitte & Kanji, 2003).

Measuring political trust

Attempts to investigate political trust are further complicated by the difficulty in accurately and effectively capturing it in attitudinal surveys. This is partly due to the difficulty in operationalizing and measuring citizens' attitudes in general (de Leeuw & Dillman, 2008) but it is also because the practical limitations of survey research renders individuals unwilling or unable to isolate reported levels of political trust from other political attitudes. In particular, reported levels of political trust are highly correlated

with respondents' support for incumbent parties (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Citrin, 1974; Iyengar, 1980; Norris, 1999b).

Furthermore, many survey questions are not sufficiently specific to reflect the realistic nature of trusting relationships which tend not to be unlimited expressions of trust, but rather restricted to particular actions (Hardin, 1993). For example, the European Social Survey only asks respondents if they trust various public institutions, including parliament, executive offices and political parties with no mention of what each institution may be trusted to do. Although there do not appear to be systematic differences in responses to questions asking if respondents "trust" a range of professionals or if they "trust to them tell the truth" (Rose, 2014), the non-specific framing of survey questions risks letting questions capture attitudes about "all of the things that survey respondents think it is" (Hardin, 2006, p. 42). This could undermine any relationship that may be found between such measures of trust and other factors.

Equally, too specific survey questions may unnecessarily restrict trust assessments, especially if respondents are limited to a small number of responses that do not reflect the full spectrum of potential opinions. For example, questions that assume trust and distrust are simply polar opposites may overlook the nuanced nature of these attitudes. Furthermore, although political cynicism – extremely negative perceptions of political institutions and actors based on the belief that they are incompetent and selfish (van der Meer, 2016) – is often treated as the opposite of political trust, they are different attitudes with different consequences for political life (Fieschi &

Heywood, 2004). Therefore, items intended to measure cynicism cannot simply be inverted to create a measure of trust (Hardin, 2006). Similarly, questions asking how trustworthy an institution is do not necessarily fully capture political trust because they focus on the characteristics of the trusted party alone and ignore key characteristics of the individual being asked to trust. Given that trust is a relational concept, the characteristics of both the trusted and trusting party matter.

Therefore, many surveys use a battery of multiple questions to measure political trust (Stoneman, 2008), and consider the latent common root of the responses to these items as the phenomenon to be measured; this tradition does not rely on the observed (manifest) responses to individual items to measure trust, but relies instead on estimated latent variables (scales or factors) to reflect political trust. These questions do not always explicitly ask respondents about their political trust in various agents and institutions; many surveys ask about the behaviour and motivations of political actors as indicators of trust. These questions may ask about the conduct of political actors (such as the Eurobarometer[1] asking if respondents believe that "the giving and taking of bribes and the abuse of power for personal gain are widespread" in a range of professions) or government performance (such as the American National Election Study which has asked respondents "Do People in Government Waste Tax Money?" since 1958). Given respondents' inability to distinguish political trust from support for

[1] As in "Special Euorbatometer 374: Corruption", conducted in 2011

incumbents, such items offer the opportunity to measure a latent concept without explicitly asking respondents about trust.

Despite the complex issues involved in measuring political trust in survey research, questions relating to political trust have been asked in attitudinal surveys across the world for decades. However, even the longest attitudinal surveys asking questions about individual's levels of trust in government only go back so far as the middle of the 20th century, with most only recording a maximum of two or three decades worth of data. This not only makes it difficult to detect any long-term trends, but also makes it impossible to determine if the levels of trust at the start of these surveys was symptomatic of previous decades or a new phenomenon.

Nonetheless, from the data that is available, there is evidence to suggest that measured levels of political trust have seen recent declines in many Western democracies, including much of Europe and, most strikingly, in the United States (Dalton, 1999, 2004, 2004; Miller & Listhaug, 1990; Nye et al., 1997). Even countries that enjoyed democratic progress after World War Two have not been immune from this decline. These negative perceptions are not only limited to political office holders but extend to political institutions too. This has led Dalton to conclude that a "new civic culture of advanced industrial democracies is thus fundamentally different from the cultural model of the past." (2005, p. 150)

However, political trust has not declined in all countries at the same rate, nor from the same starting point. There are therefore clear differences in the changes to political trust in different periods and across Western

democracies (Holmberg, 1999; Listhaug, 1998; Listhaug & Wiberg, 1998; Newton & Norris, 2000; Putnam, Pharr, & Dalton, 2000). Political trust in the US appears to have dropped by over 30 percentage points between 1964 and 1994 (Hetherington, 2005, p. 35). In the UK, the percentage of people who reported they almost never trust government rose from 11.8% in 1986 to 34.3% twenty years later. But many other countries appear to have experienced trendless fluctuations in their aggregate levels of political trust (Norris, 2011, p. 82).

As well as establishing cross-national differences, survey responses suggest that citizens are able to distinguish between different institutions and actors within a political system (Gabriel & Walter-Rogg, 2008). Nonetheless, trust in one political institution is strongly correlated with trust in other political institutions (Christensen & Laegreid, 2003). There does, however, appear to be a clear hierarchy of trust in in most countries; trust in representative institutions is consistently lower than trust in administrative institutions across Europe (Gabriel & Walter-Rogg, 2008; Grönlund & Setälä, 2007; Marien, 2011). Coupled with citizens' on-going commitment to the principles of democratic government, this suggests that "There is a contemporary malaise in the political spirit involving the three key elements of representative democracy…: politicians, political parties, and parliament" (Dalton, 2004, p. 37).

Drivers of political trust

The recently measured declines in political trust in many Western democracies have led to increased attention being given to the causes of political trust. As political trust is a relational concept, it is shaped by the characteristics of both the trusting and trusted parties, as well as the communities in which they live. At the individual level, 'winners' in society, including those with higher levels of education, income, reported happiness, personal economic evaluations and social class have been found to have higher levels of political trust (Agger, Goldstein, & Peral, 1961; van der Meer & Dekker, 2011; Zmerli & Newton, 2013). Communities with higher levels of education and greater social heterogeneity are also likely to report higher political trust (Rahn & Rudolph, 2005). This is likely because people with more secure lives can afford to take a greater risk to trust but the relationship is not consistent across all countries. While better off individuals report higher political trust than their more disadvantaged counterparts in the UK (Pattie & Johnston, 2001), this does not appear to be the case in the US (Hetherington, 2005).

Although there are on-going debates about how individuals' socio-demographic characteristics shape their political trust, political factors rather than social characteristics appear to be the main drivers of citizens' political trust in representative democracies (Citrin & Luks, 2001; Hetherington, 2005; Holmberg, 1999; Levi & Stoker, 2000; Newton, 1999; Stoneman, 2008). In particular, people who voted for the party in charge of government tend to report higher levels of political trust (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson &

LoTempio, 2002; Keele, 2005; Norris, 1999b). They also appear to be more forgiving towards corruption within their own party or in a government run by their party, especially if they have little political awareness (Anduiza, Gallego, & Muñoz, 2013; Ecker, Glinitzer, & Meyer, 2016; van der Meer, 2010). This suggests that trust assessments are related to individuals' partisan assessments of government, and not simply a manifestation of diffuse support for the system at large. However, Hetherington (1998) argues that a causal relationship also runs from political trust to support for incumbent politicians, suggesting that political trust influences the approval ratings of both the US Congress and President.

Strength, as well as direction, of partisanship is also highly correlated with political trust. People who consider themselves close to a political party report higher political trust (Hooghe & Kern, 2015). Citizens with no political alignment tend to have the lowest political trust (Citrin & Luks, 2001; Keele, 2005). This may be because they will never experience themselves as 'winners' in the political system (Zmerli & Newton, 2013) or because they assess the structures and workings of government differently than supporters of political parties whose party loyalties likely influence their political trust (Keele, 2005).

The changing nature of political competition may also have influenced political trust. Increasing policy ambiguity (Hardin, 2000) and focus on valence, rather than substantive policy, issues (Hay, 2013) may make it harder for citizens to trust their governments. But given that both party polarisation (D. C. King, 1997) and increasingly centrist policies (Miller, 1974)

have been blamed for declining political trust, there is no consistent evidence as to how party competition shapes political trust. Furthermore, dissatisfaction with policy programs and outputs should only extend to political distrust if the political system proves unresponsive to citizens' demands and cannot replace incumbents with other actors who would pursue a different policy agenda (Norris, 2011). This is perhaps why countries with longer histories of liberal democracies (and thus open party competition) report higher political trust (McAllister, 1999). If a political system does not facilitate an alternative to alleviate citizens' dissatisfaction, citizens may become disappointment in the system of government as a whole (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1995; Miller, 1974; Miller & Listhaug, 1990).

Post-material values also appear to shape individuals' political trust. Individuals with such values tend to report lower levels of trust in hierarchical institutions, including government, despite their relative security in life. Their readiness to challenge authority and more demanding expectations of government lead, almost inevitably, to disappointment in government performance and lower levels of trust (Dalton, 2005; Inglehart, 1999). Therefore, declining trust may not be a product of declining government performance alone if citizens are disappointed due to their higher – and potentially unrealistic – expectations of government (Warren, 1999a).

There is therefore clearly a link between citizens' political attitudes and their political trust. The relationship between social trust and political trust is less clear. While they appear related at the aggregate level (Newton & Norris, 2000), there is little evidence of a direct relationship between either

social trust or social capital and political trust at the individual level (Keele, 2007; Newton, 2001). Social and political trust therefore appear distinct dimensions of trust (Newton, 1999; Zmerli & Newton, 2013). Nonetheless trust that is developed in formal and informal social networks may be transferred to political actors, institutions and situations (Putnam, 2001; Uslaner, 1999), especially if social trust is based on shared values within a community and its political institutions are seen to share these common values (Braithwaite, 2003).

But as trust is a relational concept, it depends on the characteristics of both the trusted and the trusting party. More trustworthy governments may therefore expect to secure greater political trust and citizens do report higher political trust when their government is acting in a trustworthy manner (Bowler & Karp, 2004; Carman, 2010; Catterberg & Moreno, 2006; John R. Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001). Political trust tends to be higher in countries with fair and transparent governments (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006) and when scandal and corruption is lower (Bowler & Karp, 2004). While distrusting people are more likely to believe their government is corrupt (Wroe, Allen, & Birch, 2013), there is more compelling evidence for a stronger relationship running from government probity to political trust (Faulkner, Martin, & Peyton, 2015). But a lack of government corruption is not sufficient to guarantee political trust (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). The way government operates, including how fairly it treats its citizens (Carman, 2010; John R. Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001), its bureaucratic quality and the standard of law and order it maintains (Khan, 2016) – also impacts citizens'

trust. As does a government's ability to tackle citizens' concerns and social problems, including inequality (Kumlin, 2004; Schäfer, 2010; Torcal, 2014; Zmerli & Castillo, 2015).

Government outputs, as well as processes, also appear to influence political trust. Strong economic performance is correlated with high political trust (Alesina & Giuliano, 2009; Chanley et al., 2000; Kroknes, Jakobsen, & Grønning, 2015), especially amongst citizens with a high level of education (van der Meer, 2010). However, the high correlation between corruption and economic outputs (Aidt, Dutta, & Sena, 2008) suggests that there may not be a direct causal relationship from economic performance to political trust (van der Meer & Hakhverdian, 2016). Furthermore, economic measures, including a country's Gross National Product, appear to be poor predictors of aggregate levels of political trust (Holmberg, 1999; McAllister, 1999; Norris, 2011; Pharr, 2000).

Relative, rather than absolute, measures of economic performance may be stronger drivers of political trust, especially for less well educated citizens who are likely to be more at risk from economic downturns (van Erkel & van der Meer, 2016), but ultimately the strongest relationship exists between citizens' perceptions of economic performance and their political trust (Miller & Listhaug, 1990). This is likely due to the endogenous relationship between citizens' perceptions of government performance and other political attitudes; citizens who support the party in charge of government are more likely to report both higher political trust and better government performance. Therefore, such findings based on citizens'

perceptions alone do not establish a causal link between these attitudes (van der Brug, van der Eijk, & Franklin, 2007; van der Eijk, Franklin, Demant, & van der Brug, 2007).

The conduct, as well as the outputs, of political actors is also a relevant factor in generating political trust. Political scandals influence citizens' political trust (Bowler & Karp, 2004; Della Porta & Dalton, 2000), especially if citizens are only exposed to negative stories about politicians (T. E. Patterson, 2011). But political scandals are not the starting point for low political trust, and while they may reinforce the views of already distrusting citizens (Pattie & Johnston, 2012) they do not appear to be the original reason for low political trust (Bianco, 1994; Dalton, 2005; Stoker, 2011). Although checks may be put in place to attempt to increase the trustworthiness of actors and institutions in the wake or anticipation of such scandals, this does not necessarily increase trust. In fact, the acceptance of the need for such institutions threatens to increase a presumption of distrust (Pettit, 1995) which can have substantial repercussions for other aspects of political life.

Consequences of political trust

As a manifestation of citizens' diffuse political support, political trust captures an important aspect of citizens' relationship with their political system. Changes in political trust may therefore reflect a fundamental alteration in the relationship between citizens and their government, above and beyond their views of incumbent office holders or individual actors. At their most

severe, declining levels of political trust could threaten the stability of democracy and fuel anti-system movements that oppose the system of government, not just its current incumbents (Norris, 1999c). But even within the current system of government, citizens who do not trust their government may call for fundamental changes to the political system if they believe it is consistently unresponsive to their demands (Norris, 2011). Distrust may therefore lead to greater support for direct democracy (Norris, 1999c) devolution (Hetherington & Nugent, 2001), term limits for elected officials (Karp, 1995) or broader constitutional reform (Jowell & Curtice, 1997).

Individuals' political behaviour may also be impacted by their political trust. Citizens with lower levels of political trust are less likely to turn out to vote in democratic elections (Grönlund & Setälä, 2007) and are more likely spoil their ballot paper if they do turnout (Hooghe et al., 2011). Voters with low political trust are also less likely to vote for an incumbent (Citrin & Luks, 2001) and more likely to vote for anti-system, anti-establishment or populist parties or candidates (Hetherington, 1999; Ziller & Schübel, 2015), especially where voting is compulsory (Hooghe et al., 2011). Low levels of trust are also associated with broader anti-establishment sentiment, appearing to be a significant driver of support for Britain's withdrawal from the European Union (Hobolt, 2016) as well as the cultural shift in American politics that swept Donald Trump to the presidency (Inglehart & Norris, 2016).

But although people with low political trust are less likely to engage in traditional forms of political participation, including being active members of

political parties or trade unions (Norris, 1999c), low political trust does not necessarily cause people to withdraw from political life altogether. Political distrust may cause individuals to get more involved in politics to voice their discontent, rather than to disengage with traditional politics as a whole (Citrin & Luks, 2001). But while people with low political trust are more likely to engage in protest or other non-traditional manifestations of political discontent (Norris, 1999c), their discontent could turn into a deeper alienation if these actions prove ineffectual (Marien & Hooghe, 2011).

The effects of political trust are not limited to the electoral sphere. Political trust appears to impact citizens' acceptance of the decisions and actions of political authorities. Citizens with lower political trust tend to be more accepting of law-breaking behaviours (Marien & Hooghe, 2011) and less likely to comply with laws and regulations (Norris, 1999c) or to follow government advice, such as smoking cessation programs (Lindström & Janzon, 2007). Citizens with low trust are also more likely to consume illegal alcohol or drugs (Lindström, 2008) and to avoid paying taxes, especially those with a redistributive element (Hammar, Jagers, & Nordblom, 2009; Scholz & Lubell, 1998). This highlights the importance of trust in situations where citizens must make a material sacrifice for a broader or longer-term benefit.

Distrusting citizens are also more likely to support tax cuts and less likely to support government spending (Rudolph, 2009; Rudolph & Evans, 2005). In particular, they are less likely to favour redistributive policies, especially those that favour people perceived to be less vulnerable or deserving (Breznau, 2010; Hetherington, 2005; Hetherington & Globetti,

2002; Hetherington & Husser, 2012). In domestic politics, therefore, trust is particularly important in situations that impose unequal costs and benefits on citizens because trust makes it easier for individuals to make a material or an ideological sacrifice to support government action (Hetherington, 2005; Rudolph, 2009; Rudolph & Evans, 2005). Trust can therefore help to overcome citizens' opposition to policies with a broader social benefit because trust is required for collective, not individual, benefits (Seldon, 2011). Declining trust therefore threatens the most vulnerable in society if it reduces citizens' willingness to make individual sacrifices for a collective good.

Hetherington (2005) argues that the impact of declining political trust, which has restricted the scope of government action, has had a bigger impact on the US policy agenda than ideology in recent years. As governments must be responsive to citizens' desires in representative democracies, declines in trust impact the workings and outputs of governments if political actors alter their behaviour because they sense a change in public sentiment (Stimson, Louis, & Erikson, 1995). Therefore, declining trust limits government's ability to tackle social problems which require government intervention as "People need to trust government to support more government" (Hetherington & Husser, 2012). Even in Europe where political distrust is less pervasive than it is in the US, the role of government has been scaled back as levels of distrust have increased (Stoneman, 2008). However, this threatens to create a spiral of distrust whereby political distrust, although coupled with a desire for

political change, actually limits the actions of government so that it renders it unable to invoke such change (Miller, 1974).

There is therefore much theoretical and empirical evidence to support the importance of the role played by political trust in political life. The declining levels of political trust that have been measured over recent years have made the issue more prominent in academic research and practical politics. But both methodological and substantive questions about political trust remain. And before further efforts to investigate the causes and consequences of trust in political life can shed further light on its importance in representative democracies, the methodological issues that arise from survey research in this area must be addressed. But given the theoretical arguments that suggest political trust plays a crucial role in representative democracy, empirical evidence as to its causes and consequences merit further attention. This is particularly true for European representative democracies where little empirical evidence is available as to the impact of political trust on political life but where survey research suggests political trust is in decline.

Blind trust: How political support reduces the effect of government performance on citizens' political trust[2]

Abstract: For government performance to be an important driver of political trust, citizens must be aware of government performance and willing and able to use this to inform their political trust. While there is evidence to suggest government performance does impact citizens' political trust, little is known as to whether its effect is homogenous across all citizens. Furthermore, while political trust is highly correlated with political support for an incumbent government, it is not clear if this is because government partisans simply report a "winners' bounce" in their political trust or if they are blinded to their government's failures. The highly endogenous relationship between political trust and other political attitudes makes it difficult to disentangle the causal relationship between these factors. This paper therefore uses exogenous government performance measures in cross-classified models for 26 European countries over ten years to investigate whether partisanship mediates the effect of government performance on political trust. It finds that partisan supporters of the party in charge of government and of another party are both blinded to measures of government performance as drivers of political trust.

Recent declines in political trust that have been measured across a number of western democracies (Dalton, 2004) have led to an increased interest in the drivers of political trust amongst citizens. Such declines in political trust are a concern for the future of representative democracies and how they operate; citizens' distrust risks paralysing political institutions and a government's ability to act (Braithwaite, 1998; Hetherington, 1998; Hetherington & Globetti, 2002; Levi, 1998; Rudolph & Evans, 2005), undermining the collective benefits available to society (Solomon & Flores, 2001) and threatening the legitimacy and stability of the institutions of government (Denemark & Niemi, 2012). This has led to an increased focus on the characteristics of individuals and institutions that drive political trust in attempt to address such declines.

[2] As revised and resubmitted to the European Journal of Political Research

Political trust does appear to be largely driven by government performance as citizens have higher political trust when their government is behaving in a more trustworthy manner (Bowler & Karp, 2004; Carman, 2010; Catterberg & Moreno, 2006; John R. Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001). Furthermore, there is strong theoretical evidence that government performance – in terms of the way in which government operates and the outputs it produces – influences political trust (Bouckaert, Geert; Van de Walle, 2001; Norris, 2011; van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). This supports a causal relationship running from government performance to political trust and suggests that governments that act fairly and produce positive outcomes for their citizens should be more likely to secure the trust of their citizens. However, high quality government performance is not sufficient for it to enjoy the trust of its citizens; within country differences alone show different citizens react in different ways to the way their government operates. Trust depends on the characteristics of the trusting, as well as the trusted, party so we cannot simply assume that government performance – as a measure of the trustworthiness of government – has a homogenous effect on all citizens.

Trust is a relational concept driven by the characteristics of both the trusting and the trusted party (Levi & Stoker, 2000). In particular, individuals who could be considered 'winners' in society – those with higher income, education and social status – are more likely to report higher political trust (van der Meer & Dekker, 2011; Zmerli & Newton, 2013). But political factors appear to be the biggest drivers of individuals' political trust. In particular, supporters of the governing party consistently report higher political trust

than other citizens (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Citrin, 1974; Iyengar, 1980; Norris, 1999b). It is not clear if this is because support for the incumbent government affords a "winner's bonus" to citizens' political trust or because these citizens are blind to the performance of government as they develop political trust.

To address this issue, this paper investigates how partisanship moderates the effect of government performance on political trust across Europe. Given the interrelated nature of political trust, incumbent support and related political attitudes, exogenous measures of government's procedural quality and economic performance are used to disentangle the causal relationship between government performance and political trust. This paper therefore matches exogenous measures of government performance with data from five waves of the European Social Survey. This covers 26 European countries over ten years to investigate the effect of partisanship and government performance on political trust. Using a cross-classified model to take into account the country-by-year structure of the data, these exogenous government performance indicators are used to determine the effect of government performance on citizens' political trust and how this is mediated by their partisanship.

This research therefore makes both methodological and substantive contributions to the literature. First, it reduces the risk of endogeneity that is present in studies studying public attitudes to government performance and political trust alone. While the use of exogenous measures of government performance cannot rule out that government performance and citizens'

political trust are both driven by a third factor, not included in this research, it does establish that the relationship between government performance and political trust is not simply a product of citizens' views of government performance which – like political trust – is highly correlated with their support for an incumbent administration. Second, latent concepts underlying these exogenous indicators – relating to procedural quality and economic performance – are used to overcome high correlations between many of these items and to investigate the relationship between broader concepts of government performance rather than individual items, such as unemployment rate. This allows us to determine how these broader concepts impact citizens' political trust while overcoming issues of high collinearity between individual items that could otherwise impact the detected effect of these variables. Furthermore, the use of a latent concept to measure political trust – rather than an individual item measuring trust in a single government institution – reduces measurement error from survey responses. Finally, by using these methods with data collected over 10 years across 26 European countries, the paper expands investigations into the relationship between broader concepts of government performance, partisanship and political trust into more countries than ever before.

This research finds that there is a significant relationship between government performance – in particular government fairness – and citizens' political trust. However, this by no means tells the full story. Citizens' political alignment is also a significant driver of political trust, not just directly but also by influencing the way in which government performance impacts citizens'

political trust. In fact, though government performance appears to be a significant driver of political trust across Europe, its effect is attenuated amongst citizens with strong partisanship. Strong, partisan opponents of the prime minister's party are unwilling to reward governments with high procedural quality with higher political trust, while strong, partisan supporters of the prime minister's party do not penalise poor economic performance with lower political trust. Strong partisan opponents of the prime minister's party therefore appear blind to the procedural qualities of government while strong partisan supporters of the party in charge of government appear blind to its economic troubles.

These findings are important not only because they highlight the power of partisanship to overshadow normative evaluations of government but also because they demonstrate the limited impact of government performance on citizens' political trust. Therefore, any attempts to increase citizens' political trust cannot assume that all citizens will react in the same way to improved government performance. Strong partisans are likely to remain unmoved by such improvements so long as they remain blinded by their partisanship as they form their attitude of trust.

Political trust and government performance

Political trust – citizens' belief that the political institutions of their government are willing and able to act in their best interest (Hardin, 2006) without their constant scrutiny (Seyd, 2015) – is widely considered a benefit in representative democracies. In such systems, where citizens delegate

personal autonomy to their elected representatives to act on their behalf, political trust is "the glue that keeps the system together and as the oil that lubricates the policy machine" (van der Meer & Dekker, 2011, p. 95). Without political trust, citizens may not be willing to delegate sufficient autonomy to profit from the benefits of collective action (Solomon & Flores, 2001), rendering government "incapable of performing well the tasks that most people want government to do" (Nye et al., 1997, p. 276). Distrust also risks situations in which citizens believe they have little reason to abide by laws (Marien & Hooghe, 2011), to contribute financial resources through the tax system (Rudolph, 2009; Rudolph & Evans, 2005) or to take part in traditional forms of political participation (Hooghe & Marien, 2013).

It is therefore unsurprising that recently measured declines in trust in western democracies are a concern for those who study political systems and those who work within them. Although individual-level characteristics – including individuals' income, education and social class (van der Meer & Dekker, 2011; Zmerli & Newton, 2013) – are highly correlated with political trust, the main focus of attempts to restore levels of political trust have concentrated on the performance of government institutions and actors, which appears to be the main driver of political trust (Keele, 2007). Political trust therefore appears to be a product of individuals' political experiences more than their personal characteristics (Levi & Stoker, 2000). In particular, citizens report higher trust in fair and transparent governments (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006) and lower trust in governments mired by political corruption and scandals (Bowler & Karp, 2004). Although individuals with lower political

trust are more likely to believe their government is corrupt (Wroe et al., 2013), the causal relationship appears to run from government probity to political trust. (Faulkner et al., 2015).

Nonetheless, low levels of corruption are merely a necessary, not sufficient, condition for a good quality of government (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). Other aspects of procedural quality – including bureaucratic quality and standard of law and order (Khan, 2016) – also impacts citizens' views of their government. Political trust is also high when inequality is – or is perceived to be – low (Schäfer, 2010; Zmerli & Castillo, 2015), or when citizens believe their government treats them fairly (Carman, 2010; John R. Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001) and is capable of addressing social problems (Kumlin, 2004). Therefore, citizens appear willing and able to reward fair and effective governments by affording them greater political trust than that which is won by more poorly performing governments.

Government outputs are also correlated with political trust. In particular, strong economic performance is associated with high political trust (Alesina & Giuliano, 2009; Chanley et al., 2000; Kroknes et al., 2015), particularly amongst citizens with a high level of education (van der Meer, 2010). Although there is evidence that this relationship is no longer significant once models control for corruption (van der Meer & Hakhverdian, 2016), this may be because corruption has a negative effect on economic growth in countries with high quality political institutions (Aidt et al., 2008). Furthermore, relative, rather than absolute, measures of economic performance may be more important determinants of political trust,

especially for less well educated citizens who are likely to be more at risk from economic downturns (van Erkel & van der Meer, 2016). Although citizens' perceptions of government outputs appear to contribute more to individuals' political trust than actual outputs (Miller & Listhaug, 1999), this is conceivably due to the endogeneity of citizens' perceptions and evaluations of government.

Even though institutions' failure to address citizens' concerns appears a bigger driver of citizens' distrust than national economic performance in times of economic crisis (Torcal, 2014), strong economic performance does appear to impact political trust in the same way it impacts a range of political attitudes and behaviours: by rewarding incumbent governments. When the economy performs well, the incumbent government tends to be rewarded at the ballot box (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000, 2007). Citizens therefore appear to believe that their government is responsible for the country's economic performance, able to accurately assess the economic situation for them to attribute credit or blame and willing to use this to influence their political attitudes and behaviours. This is especially the case when lines of economic accountability are clear (Anderson, 2000; Bengtsson, 2004; van der Brug et al., 2007). Although the magnitude of the effect of economic voting varies over countries and time (Duch & Stevenson, 2006; Lewis-Beck & Nadeau, 2012; Nadeau, Niemi, & Yoshinaka, 2002) and individual effects may be small, they have the capacity to influence electoral outcomes (van der Brug et al., 2007). However, economic voting is lower when there are fewer voters with strong partisanship (Kayser & Wlezien, 2011), suggesting

partisans may be less willing to use a government's economic performance to shape their political attitudes and to guide their vote.

Individuals' political attitudes also appear to shape their assessments of government performance and outputs, including government's economic performance (Ladner & Wlezien, 2007). Even when economic conditions are so bad that government loyalists cannot overlook the poor state of the economy, they are still able to absolve the government of blame by holding them less responsible than other citizens (Bisgaard, 2015). The endogenous relationship between individuals' partisanship and assessment of government performance is unsurprising given individuals' capacity for motivated reasoning whereby they process information in a way that fits their prior beliefs (Taber, Lodge, & Glathar, 2001). This means that any study that aims to establish a causal relationship between government performance, measured using citizens' perceptions, and other political attitudes is undermined by endogeneity issues when all are highly correlated with support for the party in charge of government (Bartels, 2002; Dickerson, 2015; Gerber & Huber, 2010).

It is clear that partisanship also shapes political trust. Although party alignment is in decline in western democracies (Dalton, 2002; Mair, 2013), substantial numbers of citizens do still consider themselves to have a strong, enduring link to a political party. These citizens are more likely than others to report high levels of political trust. In particular, closeness to a political party is associated with political trust (Hooghe & Kern, 2015) and individuals with


no partisan alignment tend to be the least trustful of government institutions (Citrin & Luks, 2001; Zmerli & Newton, 2013).

Citizens who voted for the party in charge of government report higher political trust and satisfaction with democracy than those who did not (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Citrin, 1974; Iyengar, 1980; Norris, 1999b). This suggests that citizens' are unable to disentangle their partisan evaluation of government from their assessments of the framework of government itself. Comparing political trust in France during a period in which there was a change in the party in charge of government clearly demonstrates this link between incumbent support and political trust. As the first plot in Figure 1.1 displays, political trust amongst French citizens who had voted for the Prime Minister's party in the previous general election are consistently higher than those who did not. In this plot the two groups refer to two different sets of people over time: before 2012, this group is made up of supporters of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) who won the 2002 and 2007 legislative elections. From 2012 it is made up of supporters of the Parti Socialiste (PS) who won the 2012 elections. Across this whole period, supporters of the governing party report higher political trust than supporters of an opposition party but the pattern of decline in trust is similar across both groups.

The second plot shows how political trust actually changes markedly when a new government is elected; before 2012, citizens who voted for the UMP who ran the government had significantly higher trust than those who had voted for the PS. After 2012, when the PS defeated the UMP, this was

reversed. Similar patterns are evident in other member states. This suggests there is a clear partisan component to political trust.

Figure 1.1: Mean political trust in France by respondent's reported vote in previous General Election



Data: European Social Survey, waves 2-7

From this figure it is not clear, however, if the higher political trust amongst supporters of an incumbent government are because partisans view government performance and responsibility differently from citizens who do not feel close to the party in charge of government (Tilley & Hobolt, 2011) or because such measures of political trust reflect incumbent support as well as support for the system of government as a whole. Research restricted to specific institutions of government has found that partisans are more forgiving towards corruption within their own party, especially when they have little political awareness (Anduiza et al., 2013; Ecker et al., 2016) and that the effect of corruption on trust in civil servants is weaker amongst citizens who support the party in charge of government than those who do not (van der Meer, 2010). However, these findings offer only limited

evidence as to the moderating effect of partisanship on government performance as they focus one specific area of government performance and how this impacts trust in individual government institutions. Little is known about the moderating effect of partisanship on other aspects of government performance or political trust as a broader concept.

Given the abundance of evidence to suggest that political attitudes are shaped not only by individuals' political experiences but also by the partisan frame through which they view the world, it is hardly surprising that people with different political affiliations view the structures of government differently. What is not clear is what is driving these differences. Is political trust higher amongst citizens with a close, enduring link to the party in charge of their government than others simply because they enjoy a "winners' bonus" or do they turn a blind eye to the operations of government because they support the party elected to run it?

Hypothesis

As outlined above, the extant research on political trust offers evidence, at least in part, that there is a relationship between the performance of the political institutions of government and citizens' political trust. While there is stronger evidence that procedural quality, and particularly corruption, influences citizens' political trust, the findings as to the impact of economic outputs is more mixed. Furthermore, associations that have been detected between individuals' perceptions of government performance and political trust have not offered conclusive proof as to any causal relationship. Given

the endogeneity of political attitudes, particularly those related to incumbent support, this paper uses exogenous measures of procedural quality and economic outputs to test the first hypothesis:

H_1: Citizens' political trust is higher when their government is performing well compared to when it is performing poorly.

There is clear evidence that political support, and particularly the close, enduring binds of partisanship, frames the way in which individuals form a wide range of political attitudes and behaviours. While it has long been established that partisans of any party and supporters of the party in charge of government report higher political trust than other citizens, it is not clear if this is simply because of their position within the political system or because they are blinded by their partisanship in their assessment of government performance. The heterogeneous affect of government performance on political trust is tested in a second set of hypotheses:

H_{2a}: The effect of government performance on citizens' political trust varies depending on the direction of their partisanship.

H_{2b}: The effect of government performance on citizens' political trust varies depending on the strength of their partisanship.

Data and measures

The individual data used in this analysis comes from waves three to seven of the European Social Survey (ESS). Although not all countries are included in all waves, responses were collected for at least one of these waves in 32 different countries. However, due to limitations in the aggregate level data

matched with individual responses, 119,708 responses from only 26 countries over ten years are included in this model[3]. This ten-year period (from 2006 to 2015) includes years in which the economic situation in many participant countries was badly hit by the European Sovereign Debt crisis and thus major changes in economic performance in these countries. These responses are merged with country-level government performance measures from the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al., 2016), the World Bank and the European Union.

Dependent variable

As detailed above, the concept of political trust has proven difficult to operationalize clearly and measure accurately in survey research. To address the issue of measurement error, a battery of survey items are used to construct an additive scale of the latent concept of political trust (Rose, 2014). From wave two of the ESS onwards, respondents were asked to report their trust in a range of government actors and institutions. This includes the political institutions of representative democracies as well as the administrative institutions of the state. Given this paper focuses on the moderating impact of partisanship on political trust, only the items relating

[3] Full details of the sample by year and country are in Appendix A. Responses are used from any country in waves 3 to 7 of the ESS for which there are all relevant country-level, government performance variables apart from Switzerland. Switzerland is omitted from this analysis as their Federal Council acts as a collective head of government, meaning there is no clear party in charge of government.

to political institutions are used in this analysis.[4] Responses to three of these questions, asking about respondents' trust in their national parliament, politicians and political parties, can be demonstrated to reflect a single latent variable using Mokken scale analysis (van Schuur, 2011). Mokken scaling shows that these three items create a very strong scale (H=0.740)[5]. They can therefore be combined into a single, combined score to reflect respondents' political trust.

Independent variables

Government performance

Given the homogeneity in political attitudes that sees political trust highly correlated with support for an incumbent government, only external measures of government performance are used in these models. This ensures that any significant relationship detected is driven by government performance itself, rather than by citizens' perceptions of it. Although government performance has several components, only two are used in this analysis to capture measures of the way in which government operates and the results it produces. These are reflected in exogenous measures relating to the procedural quality and economic outputs of government, both of which are expected to be positively correlated with citizens' political trust.

[4] As shown in the robustness checks section, using items asking respondents' trust in political and administrative institutions of government does not change the findings of this paper.

[5] Full details of the Mokken Scale analysis can be found in Appendix B

These two aspects are considered to be distinct as the first relates to the way in which the system of government operates within a country and the second relates to the outcomes of decisions made by a government (Norris, 2011)

Three measure of procedural quality are used in this analysis, all of which are derived from the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al., 2016). Control of administrative and political corruption is measured through Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. This is reverse coded so that higher values reflect cleaner countries[6]. Political rights are measured through Freedom House's index of political rights, capturing items related to individuals' access to take part in the political process. This is reverse coded so higher values reflect greater political rights. Government efficiency is measured through the World Economic Forum's score of the wastefulness of government spending in a country from its Executive Opinion Survey. Higher values of this variable reflect more efficient provision of goods and services.

Three further variables are used to measure the outputs of government. All relate to the economic situation within a country. Economic inequality within a country is measured through the GINI index, as published by Eurostat. This measure is reverse coded so higher values reflect a more equal society. Economic performance is measured through annual

[6] Annual scores from the CPI reflect a three-year moving average which may mask the full extent of year-to-year change but this, and the year-to-year differences in methodologies, questions asked and experts involved, will only underestimate its effect. Therefore, any significant effect detected is likely to be a conservative estimate.

percentage changes[7] in national employment rates and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, as published by the World Bank as these are amongst the most obvious metrics for citizens to judge the economy (van der Brug et al., 2007, p. 70). Higher values for both of these items reflect stronger economic performance.

Table 1.1 shows that some of these measures of government performance are highly correlated. Such high correlation between independent variables in a model would risk increasing the variance and standard error of estimates, making them less precise and increasing the probability of a type II error (by failing to identify significant effects). Therefore, before including these measures in any model, a principal component analysis (PCA) is conducted to determine if a smaller number of orthogonal components captures the common variance between these items. This PCA, in which parallel analysis is used to determine the number of components to retain (Franklin, Gibson, Robertson, Pohlmann, & Fralish, 1995), results in two components to be used in later analysis.

[7] Year-on-year changes are used as absolute values are likely to reflect long-term and structural factors within a country.

Table 1.1: Correlation between government performance indicators

	Change in Employment Rate	Change in GDP	GINI Coefficient	Political Rights	Wasteful Spending	Corruption
Change in Employment Rate	1	-	-	-	-	-
Change in GDP	0.642	1	-	-	-	-
Income inequality	-0.087	0.069	1	-	-	-
Political rights	0.049	-0.026	-0.593	1	-	-
Government efficiency	0.074	0.056	-0.430	0.327	1	-
Control of corruption	0.034	-0.071	-0.530	0.477	0.845	1

Table 1.2 shows the results of this PCA. The first component relates mainly to items pertaining to procedural quality. It loads most heavily on items measuring control of corruption, government efficiency, political rights and income inequality. Higher values of this component represent higher procedural quality. The second component relates to items measuring economic outputs, loading heavily on items measuring annual changes in employment rate and GDP. Higher values of this represent stronger economic performance.

Table 1.2: Loadings from principal components analysis


	Component 1	Component 2
Change in Employment Rate	-0.12	0.90
Change in GDP	-0.01	0.91
Income equality	0.78	-0.05
Political rights	0.72	0.04
Government efficiency	0.82	-0.04
Control of Corruption	0.90	0.07

Countries' component scores reflecting procedural quality and economic outputs are merged with individual data to measure the political context in which responses to the ESS were collected.[8]

Given that the countries included in this analysis are directly elected, parliamentary or presidential democracies across Europe whose economies are closely tied together by the Economic and Monetary Union, similar levels of procedural quality and economic performance may be expected across these countries. This would be a problem as when there is little variation in key independent variables it is unlikely that these factors will contribute much to explain the variance in the dependent variable of a model. However, as Figure 1.2 shows, the average change in each component for each country varies widely between countries. Annual changes in each component for each country are shown in Appendix C. This range in values for the government performance components suggests that there is sufficient variation in the key independent variables in this model to investigate their effect on individuals' political trust.

[8] Responses that were collected in the first half of the calendar year are matched to measures of government performance from the previous year as these are likely to reflect better the political situation of the times. Responses collected in the second half of the year are matched to measures of government performance from that year. Matching responses all responses in a calendar year to government performance measures for that calendar year instead does not substantially change the findings.

Figure 1.2: Average annual change in economic performance and procedural quality by country



Partisanship

Given the importance of both the direction and degree of partisanship in shaping political attitudes, measures of both aspects of partisanship are included in these models. To measure individuals' direction of partisanship, a binary variable is included to denote if they reported voting for the prime minister's party or if they voted for a different party in the previous general election[9]. A binary variable is used as this paper focuses only on the difference between supporting a party in charge of government and supporting a different party. Although there are clearly ideological and other

[9] Data on the composition of government from ParlGov's database (Döring & Manow, 2012) is used to identify the prime minister's party after each general election.

differences between the range of parties that do not control government in a country, these are not directly relevant to this research question. To measure respondents' degree of partisanship, their self-reported closeness to a political party from the ESS is used. A binary variable is created from this which identifies those respondents who said they were "very close" to a political party.

Control variables

To isolate the effect of government performance as well as possible, relevant demographic, economic and political control variables are included in all models. Full details of these are included in Appendix D. Individual level controls measuring a respondent's age, gender, religion, degree of religiosity, level of education, relative household income within their country and employment status are included. Binary variables are also included to identify respondents who were not born in or are not citizens of their country of residence and who consider themselves a member of a disadvantaged group. Respondents' self-reported political interest and social trust are also included in the model. At the national level, controls for the previous regime type in the country, the national electoral system and the time since the last general election in the country are included. The coefficients for these are presented in Appendices D and E.

Research design and methods

The structure of the data outlined above – with individual respondents to the ESS grouped into clusters based on both the country and year of the survey – requires multi-level analysis to be used in this research as variation in individuals' political trust could come from the individual, country or time level. Although all individuals in the data are nested in both countries and years, they are not all within a single hierarchy of levels. Instead the two higher levels (year and country) create a cross-classified hierarchy within which two separate hierarchies intersect. As individual respondents are nested within this structure, a cross-classified model, using maximum-likelihood estimation, is used to construct mixed-effects models to investigate the drivers of political trust across Europe.

This cross-classified three-level model takes into account potential sources of variation in political trust at the individual, country and year levels. However, this structure would assume that any variation over time would not vary by country and any variation between countries would not vary over time. This is unlikely to be a reasonable assumption so a fourth level is added to this model, a country-by-year level, which allows between country differences to vary over time.[10]

Multi-level models are estimated in stages to test each hypothesis individually; the first, to test the effect of government performance on individuals' political trust, and subsequently to investigate if these effects

[10] This is also supported by looking at the structure of this data. A Chi-square test to compare intercept-only models with three and four levels finds the latter to be a significantly better fit of the data ($P<0.001$).

vary depending on individuals' partisanship. Each model includes all individual and country level controls outlined above. Variables measuring government performance within countries and years are included in the model in two ways. First as a mean value across all years for that country and second as the difference between this mean value and the value for the year in which the survey was taken. This approach allows us to distinguish between the cross-sectional and longitudinal effects of these variables (Fairbrother, 2012).

The inclusion of these government performance variables in a model to predict political trust, compared to a model containing only the control variables, improves the fit of the model to this data significantly. Including government performance variables reduces the country level Intra-Class Correlation (ICC) from 10% to 4% and the country-by-year ICC from 3% to 2% showing it captures much more of the between country-variance in political trust. Although a Chi-square test finds that the model allowing the effect of the government performance components to vary by direction of partisanship is not a better fit to the data than the non-interacted model ($p=0.544$), the model allowing the effect of the government performance components to vary by direction and strength of partisanship is a significantly better fit ($p<0.001$).

Results

To test the first hypothesis that individuals' political trust is driven by exogenous measures of government performance a multi-level model

including country by year component scores and all control variables listed above is estimated. Results from this model, reported in Table 1.3, show that the mean value of procedural quality, but not of economic performance, is a significant driver of political trust amongst respondents. This suggests that there are cross-sectional effects between countries. There are also clear longitudinal effects above and beyond the cross-section differences between countries; the difference between the annual and the mean value of procedural quality and the difference between the annual and mean value of economic performance are both significant drivers of political trust. This suggests that year-on-year changes in procedural quality and economic performance both influence citizens' political trust.

Procedural fairness, in particular, appears to have a substantial effect on political trust. An increase of one standard deviation in the difference in procedural quality causes an estimated increase in political trust of 0.341 points, on a scale of 0 to 10. This is greater than the effect of having voted for the winning party, rather than any other party, in the previous general election. However, the effect of the difference in economic outputs is much smaller. This is in line with findings in the economic voting literature that exogenous economic measures find smaller effects of political attitudes than endogenous measures of citizens' economic perceptions which are correlated with citizens' approval of government (van der Brug et al., 2007). Nonetheless, exogenous measures of economic change are still a significant driver of political trust despite their relatively small effect.

Table 1.3: Multilevel linear models predicting political trust

	Dependent variable:	
	Political trust	
	Non-interacted Model 1	Vote choice interacted Model 2
Change in procedural quality		
Difference from mean	0.341*** (0.085)	0.330*** (0.086)
Mean value	0.507*** (0.087)	0.507*** (0.087)
Change in economic performance		
Difference from mean	0.070* (0.029)	0.075* (0.030)
Mean value	0.340 (0.324)	0.340 (0.324)
Direction of partisanship		
Voted for opposition/coalition/minor party (Ref.)		
Voted for prime minister's party	0.329*** (0.012)	0.327*** (0.012)
Strength of partisanship		
Not very close to party (Ref.)		
Very close to party	0.547*** (0.024)	0.547*** (0.024)
Voted for prime minister's party*Close to party	0.448*** (0.043)	0.446*** (0.043)
Change in procedural quality: difference from mean * Voted for prime minister		0.029 (0.040)
Change in economic performance: difference from mean * Voted for prime minister		-0.012 (0.012)
Individual level controls	*Included*	*Included*
Country level controls	*Included*	*Included*
Constant	1.438*** (0.191)	1.440*** (0.191)
Observations	119,708	119,708
Countries	26	26
Years	10	10
Countries x Years	150	150
Random effects		
Country	0.118	0.118
Year	0.000	0.000
Country x Year	0.069	0.069
Residual	2.942	2.942

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

This first model assumes that the effect of government performance is homogenous across all citizens. As discussed above, this is unlikely to be the case. To determine if being on the winning side in the previous general election moderates the effect of government performance on individuals' political trust, interactions between the dummy variable identifying individuals who voted for the prime minister's party and the two measures of government performance are added to a second model. Neither interactive effect (between the annual difference in procedural quality and having voted for the prime minister's party nor between the annual difference in economic performance and having voted for the prime minister's party) is statistically significant. This suggests that individuals' vote choice alone does not moderate the effects of procedural fairness or economic performance on citizens' political trust. The year-on-year differences in procedural quality and economic performance remain significant in this interacted model.

Model 2 only address whether the direction or partisanship, and not the intensity of partisanship, mediates the effect that government performance has on individuals' political trust. This only tells half the story as individuals who consider themselves very close to the party in charge of government are likely to view politics different than those who voted for that party but do not consider themselves to be close to it. The same is true for individuals who voted for an opposition, coalition or minor party who do or do not feel close to that party. Therefore, a third model includes a set of three-way interactions which allow the effect of procedural quality and economic performance to vary by direction and degree of partisanship. Full


details of this model are in Appendix F but the effect of the interactions in this model are shown graphically through predicted levels of trust by partisanship and government performance in Figure 1.3.

As the plots in Figure 1.3 show, individuals who do not consider themselves very close to a political party report similar levels of political trust, no matter which party they voted for in the previous general election. While political trust increases notably for all these individuals who are not very close to a political party as procedural quality increases, it increases to a much smaller (yet still significant) degree as economic performance improves.

Much clearer differences exist between respondents who consider themselves very close to a political party. Not only does their political trust tend to be higher than the political trust of people who do not consider themselves close to a party, but they also react differently to government performance. As with people who do not consider themselves close to a party, people who are close to the party in charge of government report significant higher levels of political trust as levels of procedural fairness increase. However, close supporters of a party not in charge of government do not appear to respond to higher procedural fairness with higher political trust. This suggests that while close supporters of the prime minister's party are willing to reward high levels of procedural quality with high levels of political trust, close supporters of other parties are unlikely to see increased procedural quality as a reason to offer increased political trust.

There is also a moderating effect of partisanship on economic performance but the magnitude of the effect remains much smaller than it is for government fairness. While change in economic performance has a significant, albeit relatively small, effect on political trust for three out of the four groups analysed here, it does not have a significant effect on the political trust of people who voted for and are close to the party in charge of government. Therefore, close supporters of the party in charge of government appear blind to its economic successes or failures when determining their political trust. However, given the small magnitude of the effect of economic performance on all other groups, especially in comparison to the size of the effect of procedural fairness, economic performance does not appear to have a substantial effect on individuals' political trust. This suggests that good economic performance is not, alone, sufficient to command high levels of political trust from any group of citizens. While strong economic performance may be correlated with high levels of political trust at the aggregate level (Alesina & Giuliano, 2009; Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000; Kroknes, Jakobsen, & Grønning, 2015), a country's stronger economic success does not appear to provoke high levels of political trust amongst its citizens when controlling for procedural fairness. Given the high correlation between procedural quality and economic growth (Rothstein, 2003), this may be because high levels of political trust in countries with strong economic performance are driven by the high procedural quality that often goes hand in hand with this.

Figure 1.3: Predicted political trust by vote in previous General Election (opposition or Prime Minister's party), closeness to party and government performance



However, even when the effects of procedural quality and economic performance are allowed to vary by the direction and strength of individuals' partisanship, the difference in political trust between individuals depending on the direction and strength of their partisanship persists. This suggests that while proximity to, and support for, a party influences how they react to government performance, this does not capture the entirety of the

difference. Therefore, it appears that a "winner's bonus" in political trust continues, particularly for close supporters of the party in charge of government. This suggests that increased levels of political trust amongst this group are not simply explained by government performance, or the way they react to it. Nonetheless, the findings from this research do show that the direction and strength of partisanship have the capacity to moderate the influence of government performance on citizens' political trust.

Robustness tests

A number of robustness tests were run for this analysis to ensure that these findings were not a product of the methods used. The full results of the models used for these robustness checks are in Appendix F, alongside the final model. The first robustness check focuses on the measures of government performance used. The models in the analysis above use changes in national unemployment rates and GDP to measure economic performance because absolute values of both measures are likely to reflect long-term institutional factors within a country. Replicating the PCA procedure using absolute measures of national unemployment and GDP suggests that these form a single component along with the national measures of procedural quality, rather than a second component specifically relating to economic performance. This component – labelled simply government performance – has a similar effect as procedural quality in the previous model; it has a significant effect for all groups and this effect is


significantly larger for close supporters of the prime minister's party and significantly smaller for close supporters of other parties.

Expanding this analysis to include non-voters as well as those who reported voting in the previous general election makes little difference to the results. While this group reports consistently lower political trust, government performance appears to have no different effect on the political trust of this group than it does on people who had voted for, and are not close to, a party other than the prime minister's. The significant differences between all other groups and close supporters of the prime minister's party remain the same.

When the effects of government performance are allowed to vary between respondents who voted for the Prime Minister's party, another party in a coalition government or an opposition party, the key findings from this analysis persist. As Figure 1.4 shows, the effect of procedural quality and economic performance for people who voted for an opposition party are similar to those reported in the final model for supporters of any party other than the Prime Minister's; procedural quality remains a significant driver of political trust for people who voted for, but are not close to, an opposition party while economic performance remains a significant (but much smaller) driver of political trust amongst people who voted for an opposition party, whether they consider themselves close to it or not. The effects of procedural quality and economic performance are not significantly different for people who voted for a coalition party compared to those who voted for an opposition party, no matter if they consider themselves close to this party

or not. This supports the binary distinction between supporters of the Prime Minister's party and all other parties in the final model used in the analysis above.

Figure 1.4: Predicted political trust by vote in previous General Election (opposition, cabinet or Prime Minister's party), closeness to party and government performance



The final robustness check uses a scaled measure of trust in five institutions of government – both representative and administrative – as the dependent variable in this model. These five items adds trust in the legal system and the police to items measuring trust in parliament, politicians and political parties. This reduces the strength of the scale, but it remains strong (H=0.515). While this reduces the size of the effects of procedural quality across these groups, they remain significant and the moderating effect of partisanship – even when non-partisan institutions are included in a trust in government scale – remains. However, the effect of economic performance is no longer significant. This may be because procedural fairness is directly relevant to all institutions of government while administrative institutions have a lesser ability to influence economic performance.

Conclusions and discussion

The findings from this paper clearly suggest that government performance is a significant driver of political trust. This implies that political trust is an evaluative assessment of how government functions. However, while changes in procedural quality and economic performances both appear to influence citizens' political trust, the effects of each measure are moderated by the direction and strength of individuals' partisanship. This shows that strong partisans – of both the party in charge of government and of other parties – are blinded to some aspects of government performance as they come to determine their own political trust.

Partisan supporters of a party other than that in charge of government appear blind to changes in the procedural quality of government. Even though they may potentially stand to lose more if their government acts unfairly or restricts political rights, partisan supporters of parties other than the party in charge of government do not reward conditions of high procedural quality with higher political trust. In contrast, partisan supporters of the party in charge of government appear blind to changes in economic performance. Whether this is because they fail to face up to negative economic changes when their party is in power or because they attribute blame to non-political actors remains to be seen. Nonetheless, it is not simply that close supporters of the party in charge of government report high levels of political trust in any situation as procedural quality is a significant driver of political trust amongst this group.

Nonetheless, even when the effects of government performance are allowed to vary by direction and strength of partisanship, an intercept effect persists; strong partisans and supporters of the party in charge of government still enjoy a "winners bonus" in their reported political trust. While the size of the effect of supporting the prime minister's party on political trust is cancelled out by a one-point improvement in the procedural quality of government, a more than 3.5 point improvement in economic performance is needed to cancel this out. The magnitude of the effects of being close to a political party, particularly the party in charge of government, are even larger. Political factors therefore continue to be key drivers of individuals' political trust.

This does not mean, though, that we can generalise to say that all policy outcomes (such as economic performance) have only a small impact on citizens' political trust. As a valence issue, strong economic performance is a clear goal for all citizens and politicians and as such may affect political attitudes differently to a policy-driven issue, such as the delivery of public services where both the type and the success of government action is judged by citizens. In such cases, one could imagine that individuals' political attitudes, as well as their partisanship, would likely impact the way the government of the day, and potentially the framework in which it operates, is viewed.

Although there is clear evidence from this research that government performance impacts citizens' political trust and this impact is moderated by individuals' partisanship, good government performance does not appear to be a sufficient condition to ensure high political trust. The measures of government performance used here (particularly for economic performance) have a relatively small effect on citizens' political trust. This may be due to the lack of information or knowledge many citizens have about the way their democracy works. Therefore, the main concern for the health of democracy may not simply be how it performs but also how its performance can be better acknowledged by citizens. Furthermore, attempts to improve political trust that rely on improving government performance alone are unlikely to suffice.

Therefore all citizens appear somewhat blind to the performance of government as they determine how much they trust its political institutions.

But strong partisans appear to suffer from a greater blindness than people not close to any political party. As people who are close to political parties tend to report higher political trust than those who are not, this suggests these higher levels of trust are not based on an evaluative assessment of the way government works. Instead, higher political trust amongst citizens who consider themselves close to a political party appears to be a product of blind trust afforded to governments by those most closely connected to political parties who are key actors to link citizens and government in the political system.

The power of trust: Corruption, trust and support for the welfare state[11]

Abstract: Although political trust is crucial in representative democracies, little is known about its impact on other aspects of political opinion, especially outside the US. This is partly due to the difficulty in accurately measuring and isolating political trust. This paper mitigates these issues by using an instrumental variable technique, made possible through a natural experiment occurring around the 2009 MPs' expenses scandal, to estimate an uncontaminated measure of political trust and investigate the effect this has on citizens' support for government redistribution in the UK. The findings highlight that higher levels of political trust lead to higher levels of support for government distribution, and that this effect is underestimated in OLS regressions that do not address issues of measurement error and endogeneity. However, this effect is only significant amongst individuals who are least likely to benefit from redistributive programs: those with an above median household income. This shows that political trust can be the key to motivating citizens to support policies which do not offer them a direct benefit.

The relationship between citizens and a democratic government is based on trust; citizens must believe that political actors and institutions are willing and able to act in their interests to maintain a system of representative democracy. Without trust, citizens have little reason to forsake their own personal autonomy and give power to government to take decisions on behalf of society as a whole. But while measured levels of political trust have declined across western democracies in recent years (Dalton, 2004) little is known about any tangible impact that this has on other aspects of political life. If there is no impact, then these declines may merely reflect a different articulation of citizens' relationship with their government. But if they reflect a real decline, which causes an increasing number of

[11] As revised for resubmission to Electoral Studies

distrusting citizens to be sympathetic to calls for smaller government, then government's ability to act to tackle social problems will be put at risk.

Although recently measured declines in political trust have led to increased focus on the factors that contribute to such declines, less attention has been given to the effects of this on the public policy agenda. There is evidence that individuals with lower levels of trust are less supportive of welfares state reforms (Gabriel & Trudinger, 2011), more likely to avoid paying taxes (Hammar et al., 2009) and be less moved by government's public health initiatives (Lindström & Janzon, 2007). However, If politics is ultimately about "who gets what, when, and how" (Lasswell, 1958) then the question of government redistribution is central to how political life operates and the question of trust becomes a question as to whether or not governments have sufficient political resources to address the social problems that afflict their citizens.

As citizens' support for a government policy which offers them a direct and immediate benefit is less likely to depend on their level of trust, not all policy areas would be impacted equally by declining trust. Universal government programmes are likely to maintain mass support, but means-tested policies that require individual sacrifice from some citizens are at greater risk; what incentive do citizens have to support policies which impose costs upon them if they do not trust the political actors and institutions responsible for them? This is the case for economic redistribution. Citizens who benefit from redistributive policies do not need to trust government to support them. In contrast, citizens who, in financial terms, contribute more

than they receive from government redistribution need to trust government to believe that their sacrifice is worthwhile and to approve of such action.

While there is evidence of an association between political trust and support for a range of government actions in European countries, this is based on attitudinal data which is troubled by measurement error and endogeneity issues. More work has been completed in the US using panel data to establish the causal link between political trust and support for government redistribution. However, this relies on the relevance of the time differences between panel waves and could also be undermined by any time-variant measurement error. Furthermore, lower political trust and less support for interventionist governments in the US compared to in Europe means we cannot merely assume that findings from the US will hold in European countries which have less sceptical citizens who are more open to government action. This paper therefore expands investigations into the causal relationship between political trust and support for government redistribution by taking advantage of a natural experiment to investigate the effect of political trust on support for government redistribution in the UK.

The contribution of this paper is therefore twofold. First, it addresses methodological issues of measurement error and endogeneity by using an instrumental variable (IV) approach made possible by the MPs' expenses scandal in 2009 to establish an uncontaminated measure of political trust. Second, it uses this method to show that political trust has a statistically and substantively significant effect on support for government redistribution for those individuals who must make a sacrifice for such policies. As such, it

offers empirical evidence that political trust is a valuable resource that can be used to persuade individuals to support policies that require a personal sacrifice from them for a broader societal or long-term benefit.

Theoretical background

Trust is "the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible" (Newton, 2007, p. 343). It requires one actor (the truster) to believe that another (the trustee) has the ability and desire to act in line with the truster's interest (Hardin, 2006). In politics, it can be especially difficult for citizens to decide whether to trust political elites because of the great imbalance of knowledge and power that is inevitable in representative democracies (Bianco, 1994). Representative politics is therefore susceptible to principal-agent problems. If citizens do not have the time, knowledge or access to consistently scrutinise the actions of political elites, then how do they know that their representatives are using their power for the good of the people rather than for their own gain?

Trust can overcome this obstacle by giving citizens a reason to give decision-making powers to political elites to act on behalf of society as a whole. It can therefore be considered "the oil that lubricates the policy machine" (van der Meer, 2010, p. 518), particularly when the implementation of policies requires sacrifices from a group of citizens. Citizens do not need to trust government to support initiatives which offer them a direct and immediate benefit, but political trust is particularly

important in generating support for policies that do not directly benefit all citizens, such as redistributive policies which confer unequal costs and benefits on different members of society (Hetherington, 2005). Even citizens who believe there are social problems which need to be addressed may not necessarily believe the state is best placed to address them if they do not trust its institutions or actors.

There is evidence of a relationship between individuals' assessments of government quality and fairness and their support for welfare spending, (Svallfors, 2012), policy reforms (Gabriel & Trudinger, 2011), tax compliance (Edlund, 1999) and public health initiatives (Lindström & Janzon, 2007) in various European countries. However these studies use attitudinal data and do not address issues of measurement error and endogeneity so only theorise as to its causal direction. In the US, more attention has been given to establishing a causal relationship between political trust and other political attitudes; panel studies have shown that higher levels of political trust lead to greater support for government action in general (Chanley et al., 2000) and policies that require sacrifice such as economic redistribution, healthcare reform and programs favouring disadvantaged groups (Hetherington, 2005; Hetherington & Globetti, 2002; Rudolph & Evans, 2005). These findings led Hetherington (2005) to conclude that declining political trust – rather than any ideological shift – has motivated Americans' increased support for a smaller state over recent decades. Yet little is known about any causal relationship between political trust and support for government redistribution outside of the US, including for example in Western European

states where reported levels of political trust tend to be higher and welfare provisions stronger.

One of the main reasons for this lack of compelling evidence is the difficulty in disentangling political trust from other, highly correlated political attitudes. Political trust should capture normative evaluations of the institutions of government (Miller, 1974). It is a manifestation of citizens' "diffuse support" for a system of government rather than of their "specific support" for incumbent office-holders and their policies (Easton, 1975, p. 447). But survey measures of political trust are influenced by the supposedly distinct ideas of incumbent support and partisanship (Citrin, 1974; Iyengar, 1980; Norris, 1999). A measure of political trust must be isolated from these attitudes before we can investigate the impact it has on other political attitudes which are likely to bias findings if a normative concept of political trust cannot be measured accurately. This is a particular risk if, as has been suggested, political trust is a consequence of citizens' experiences of welfare states (Kumlin, 2004) or that social trust or economic inequality are a common cause of both trust in government and support for redistribution (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2013; Uslaner, 2002).

Once an uncontaminated measure of political trust has been isolated, we can investigate a first hypothesis:

H_1: Lower levels of political trust have a negative effect on support for government redistribution.

As redistributive policies confer unequal costs and benefits on different groups of citizens, political trust is more likely to impact support for

these policies amongst those citizens who do not benefit directly from them. Political trust should be less important for individuals who are on the receiving end of government redistribution. The effect of this uncontaminated measure of political trust is therefore allowed to vary between citizens in different economic situations to investigate a second hypothesis:

H_2: Lower levels of political trust have a stronger, negative effect on support for government redistribution among citizens who must make economic sacrifices for such programs.

Overcoming construct validity and endogeneity issues: an instrumental variable approach

As a broad and undefined vernacular term, "trust" in survey questions risks becoming "all of the things that survey respondents think it is" (Hardin, 2006, p. 42). This ambiguity in its operationalization means we cannot be sure that the theoretical concept under investigation is clearly and accurately manifested in the survey items used. This risks undermining the construct validity of the theoretical concept which requires that the survey measurement captures accurately the theoretical understanding of political trust under investigation (Cook, Campbell, & Shadish, 2002). Although organisations such as the Hansard Society attempt to overcome this issue by asking about other, related concepts including confidence, reliability and efficacy (House of Commons Committee on Standards, 2015, p. 12) such an

approach risks overlooking the distinct nature of political trust (Siegrist, 2010).

This threat to the construct validity is compounded by endogeneity issues when studying political attitudes; it is very difficult for respondents to isolate political trust from other political orientations – including ideological and partisan attitudes (Citrin, 1974; Iyengar, 1980; Norris, 1999b) – which are also highly correlated with a wide range of political attitudes. If we cannot be sure that survey measures of political trust are actually measuring the theoretical construct under investigation or fully control for all confounding factors, we cannot accurately estimate the size of any relationship between political trust and other attitudes.

Therefore, to investigate the impact of political trust on other political attitudes techniques that can isolate an uncontaminated measure of political trust from survey research must be used. Models using panel data would reduce measurement error that is consistent over time and where there is only time invariant measurement error, such an approach could be used to attempt to isolate political trust and model its effects. However, such an approach requires there to be no time-varying measuring error that cannot be explicitly controlled for within the model. However, political trust is likely to be influenced by short-term political factors and attitudes, many of which cannot be controlled for. These are highly endogenous and would create omitted variable bias even using panel data. Therefore an instrumental variable approach is preferred here. This overcomes issues of measurement error and endogeneity by using an external factor (or 'instrument') that acts

as a 'treatment' in a natural experiment to estimate the variation in the regressor that is uncorrelated with the error term. This problem-free part of the regressor can then be used in a second stage to estimate its causal effect on the outcome variable.

The 2009 MPs' expenses scandal as a natural experiment

The British political establishment was rocked when, in May 2009, the Daily Telegraph started publishing un-redacted details of expense claims made by individual MPs. This culminated in the publication of a special supplement by the newspaper called "The Complete Expenses File", listing details of all MPs' expenses claims on 20 June 2009. Although there had been previous scandals focused on specific misdemeanours of individual or very small groups of politicians, stories about the size and nature of all MPs claims had never previously received the exposure the 2009 MPs' expenses scandal brought upon them. Even though trust in politicians has never been high in the UK, the high-profile publication of MPs' expenses "helped erode trust yet further" (Park & Curtice, 2010, p. 145).

As soon as the Daily Telegraph starting publishing un-redacted details of MPs' expenses claims, an unprecedented amount of media and political attention focussed on the amount, and content, of MPs' expenses claims. Stories of MPs' profligacy dominated media coverage for months, with no final view on the legitimacy of potentially valid claims until the Legg Inquiry completed its review and any subsequent appeals in February 2010, nine months after the stories first broke in the media (House of Commons

Members Estimate Committee, 2010). Press coverage of the story peaked in May and June 2009, when the initial information about expense claims was published. In May 2009, almost 2,000 newspaper stories referenced parliamentary expenses, compared to only 353 the previous month (and before the scandal broke). However, the number of stories soon decreased with fewer than 500 stories published in July 2009, only 2 months after the initial revelations. Even in October 2009, when the Legg Inquiry's initial recommendations for repayment were published, fewer than 600 stories were published (Allen & Birch, 2014, pp. 135–136). There were therefore more than three times as many press stories about parliamentary expenses when the initial claims were released compared to when the Legg Inquiry reported its findings as to the validity of these claims.

Before the Daily Telegraph started publishing uncensored expenses claims of Members of Parliament "few outside of the Westminster Village could claim to know much about MPs' pay and expenses claims" (Van Heerde & Ward, 2014, p. 3). Even though limited details of MPs' expenses claims had previously been made public, "the scale of rule- breaking or rule-stretching that emerged in May 2009 took most people by surprise" (Allen, 2011, p. 231). Stories of MPs' profligacy dominated media coverage for months leading to 'an unprecedented onslaught of public fury' (van Heerde-Hudson, 2011, p. 246) against British politicians. The reporting of the MPs expenses scandal portrayed MPs as indulging in personal perks, particularly through the Additional Cost Allowance (ACA), designed to help MPs maintain homes

close to both Westminster and their constituency. At a time of financial crisis, MPs were seen as having luxurious lifestyles funded by these allowances.

Despite the public and media outrage surrounding the scandal, relatively few MPs were judged guilty of wrongdoing by the Legg Inquiry when it announced its verdict on the legitimacy of claims made in the two previous sessions of parliament. 51% of sitting MPs were recommended to repay expense claims, all of which had previously been signed off through the official procedure managed by the House of Commons Fees Office. Although only six MPs were prosecuted for offences relating to their expense claims "many [MPs] were implicated in the scandal and charged in the court of public opinion as having abused the system" (van Heerde-Hudson & Ward, 2014, p. 2).

MPs' expense claims, as made public by the Daily Telegraph, can be used as a treatment given to constituents across the UK in a natural experiment. This – which reflects the extent to which each MP was tainted by the scandal – can be used to estimate an instrumented level of political trust, uncontaminated by measurement error from survey response. While the MPs' expenses scandal does not offer us a 'perfect' instrument, it does still operate as an instrument that can be used to generate and investigate an uncontaminated measure of political trust. Although it only captures attitudes related to probity and not to policy-related performance evaluations, it is easier for citizens to judge the performance of politicians on these grounds (Dimock & Jacobson, 1995). That it does not explain the majority of the variance in individuals' level of political trust does not

invalidate it as an instrument and even a weak – yet valid – instrument offers greater insights into the relationship between political trust and support for redistributive spending in the UK than a naïve regression.

Data and methods

For this analysis, constituency level data on the size of local MPs' expenses claims were merged with individual-level survey responses from the first, pre-campaign wave of the internet panel of the 2010 British Election Study (BES) and constituency level economic data from the 2011 UK census to measure the socio-economic context.[12] The figures used for MPs' expense claims measure how much each MP claimed under either the ACA or the London supplement during the 2008-09 parliamentary session (the most recent data available before the time of the survey).

The pre-campaign wave of the BES survey took place between 29 March and 7 April 2010, roughly one month ahead of the 2010 General Election and less than a year after the Daily Telegraph had started publishing details of MPs' expenses claims. In total, 16,816 respondents in all 632 constituencies across England, Wales and Scotland completed this. However, the greater tax-raising powers transferred to the Scottish Parliament compared to other devolved assemblies, along with the more distinctive

[12] The changes to constituency boundaries that were put in place ahead of the 2010 General Election complicated this matching process. A number of 'old' (pre-2010) constituencies were divided between multiple 'new' (2010) constituencies. Only new constituencies where over 50% of the electorate could be traced back to a single constituency and therefore a single sitting MP were included in this analysis. This reduced the number of constituencies used in this analysis to 555, from a total of 573 in England and Wales.

political culture in Scotland compared to other parts of the UK (Scully, 2013), means that, when investigating the relationship between citizens and the Westminster parliament, Scottish respondents are not directly comparable with those in England and Wales. Therefore, this analysis only uses data from respondents living in England and Wales. The pre-treatment control variables included in the model control for any further non-homogeneity that would undermine this statistical analysis.

Outcome variable: Support for government redistribution

The BES measures respondents' attitudes to government redistribution through the question: "Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where would you place yourself on this scale?" Although respondents are offered a categorical scale when identifying their response, the large number of categories (eleven) and the relatively normal distribution of the data (shown in Appendix G) suggests this can be treated as an interval scale for this analysis (Blunch, 2008).

Asking respondents if they prefer more or less government tax and spending requires them to assess perceived levels of tax and spending at a particular moment in time. Although this would be an issue for a longitudinal or cross-national analysis where the actual level of welfare spending may vary, it should not be problematic here. This question may help to assess

respondent's perceptions of welfare spending because asking respondents to react to a baseline set by current government policy may "facilitate unusually straightforward assessments of whether current spending in any given area is too high, too low, or about right" (Bartels, 2008, p. 2).

Treatment: Political trust

The BES also asked respondents about their trust in a range of public institutions. Responses were measured on an 11-point scale from 0 ("no trust") to 10 ("a great deal of trust"). Three of these items (pertaining to parliament, politicians, and political parties) reflect the same latent variable as evidenced by ordinal item-response analyses.[13] This allows the responses to these questions to be combined in an additive score, which serves as a measure of political trust. For ease of interpretation, the cumulative score was divided by three to create a 0 to 10 point scale of respondents' political trust. Unsurprisingly given recent research into levels of political trust, the vast majority of the sample displayed low values on this scale, with the lowest possible score being the modal category.

[13] Mokken scale analysis was used to test if these items clustered together on a scale pertaining to a single, underlying concept. They were all found to do so ($p < 0.01$). All H-coefficients (for each item and the overall scale) were greater than 0.8, suggesting a very strong scale made up of individual manifestations of a broader, latent trait referred to as 'political trust' here. Adding items pertaining to non-political institutions (the police and the courts) weakened the scale as the overall H-coefficient fell to 0.588. The results of these Mokken analyses are reported in Appendix H.


Instrument: Constituency MP's expenses claim

The 2009 MPs' expenses scandal was a natural experiment in which citizens were assigned different levels of a 'treatment' depending on the behaviour of their constituency MP. This offers the potential of a number of different instruments that could be used in this analysis. Given that both the amount claimed and the amount recommended to repay were published for each MP, both offer exogenous measures of involvement in the scandal. Implication in media report is an alternative potential instrument. However media attention on individual MPs was not merely a function of their wrongdoing. Women and ethnic minorities were subject to "longer, more prominent and more negative coverage" (van Heerde-Hudson & Ward, 2014, p. 22). Furthermore, individual level media consumption is not exogenous to political preferences (Newton & Brynin, 2001, p. 266). Therefore, without knowing to which outlets respondents were exposed, why they chose these and the tone of their coverage, such a measure would be a less reliable instrument than one relating to the actions of a respondent's MP (which respondents cannot control).

As Figure 2.1 shows, the BES's Continuous Monitoring Survey recorded drops in political trust both when the initial stories broke in the Daily Telegraph in May 2009 and when the Legg Inquiry first reported its recommendations five months later. This offers support to the suggestion that both impacted citizens' views of the trustworthiness of MPs, at least in the short-term. The lowest levels of trust over this period were recorded

when the scandal was first reported in May 2009, when - as outlined above – the number of press articles about the scandal was highest.

Figure 2.1: Mean level of trust in politicians from BES Continuous Monitoring Survey, 2009-2010



The amount an MP claimed is negatively correlated with the average political trust amongst respondents in their constituency ($r=-0.18$, $p<0.001$) but the correlation between the amount an MP was recommend to repay by the Legg Inquiry and the average level of trust in their constituency is not significant ($r=-0.03$, $p=0.42$).[14] Therefore an MP's expense claims explains more of the variation in the political trust in their constituency than their recommended repayment, even though the latter measure could be

[14] This finding holds when Kendall's tau is calculated, given the non-normal distribution of expense claims and recommended repayments.

considered a measure of wrongdoing in the eyes of the parliamentary authorities. This may be because the final rulings of the legitimacy of individual claims were not announced for some 10 months after the initial story broke. However, it may also be because constituents were unable or unwilling to disentangle their MP's legitimate claims from any abuse of the expenses system, with the former also portrayed as wrongdoing in the media and by parties challenging incumbent MPs in the forthcoming election.

During the initial months of the scandal, the validity of a claim was left to commentators, the media and individuals to judge. Much of that coverage suggested that higher claims were made by more profligate MPs committing the biggest misdemeanors while MPs who made no claim for the second homes allowance were portrayed as "saints" by the media ('MPs' expenses: The saints (part 1)', 2009). But such suggestions were not confined to the national media. Parties challenging sitting MPs in the 2010 General Election often cited expense claims as part of their General Election campaign. Details of MPs' claims appeared in local leaflets attacking incumbents even when the sitting MP was recommended to make no repayment. Such literature, like that aimed at the Bishop Auckland MP Helen Goodman who made the maximum ACA claim, all of which the Legg Inquiry judged to be legitimate, suggested that the size of the claim made it reproachable despite the official verdict as to its legitimacy:

> "Our Labour MP has made huge claims on her expenses, including g £24,000 just for one year's mortgage and £400 a month for food….All at your expense" (Bishop Auckland Liberal Democrats, 2010)

It was not merely MPs' rule-breaking (never mind law-breaking) that angered the British public. Relatively little of the behaviour exposed by the Daily Telegraph's investigations proved to be illegal, or even against the rules set out for MPs' expenses. Nonetheless, they were seen to be against the spirit of the expenses system which ended up facilitating "the systematic use of the expenses system to maximize personal gain" (Hine & Peele, 2016, p. 68). Even though only about half of the sitting MPs were recommended to make repayments, and only six faced criminal prosecutions, the pre-campaign wave of the 2010 British Election Study found that the majority of respondents (54%) believed the expenses scandal proved that most MPs were corrupt.

Therefore, citizens' views of corruption were not necessarily driven by MPs' breaking the law. At the heart of any idea of corruption is the notion that public servants have placed their own self-interest over the common good, or acted in a way that causes this to happen (Philp, 2011). If a political system sets the rules for its own elites, the legality of actions may not be sufficient to determine if they are corrupt or otherwise (Gardiner, 2011). In a self-regulating set-up such as the pre-2009 MPs expenses system, it is perhaps unsurprising therefore that while many MPs defended their claims (and were supported by the findings of the Legg Inquiry) by reminding the public they fell within the rules of the system, the public felt they were "utterly unacceptable" (Hine & Peele, 2016, p. 68) and constituted evidence of corruption.

Many investigations into the impact of the MPs' expenses scandal have focussed on the amount MPs' were recommended to repay. However, repayment amounts cannot be assumed to be a simple measure of individual MPs' abuse of the existing expenses system of the time (van Heerde-Hudson, 2011), given that many claims that were approved by the Fees Office were later deemed unsuitable. In fact, in individual letters to MPs stating his recommended repayment for each, Sir Christopher Legg wrote that his "findings carry no implication or innuendo about the conduct or motive of MPs" (Watt, Wintour, Sparrow, & agencies, 2009). As well as assuming that wrongdoing is only measured through this amount, and thus that any notion of corruption is restricted to behaviour that goes against rules or regulations and not against a common interest or public opinion, this also overlooks that some repayment amounts were reduced on appeal if an individual MP chose to challenge the recommendation. Other MPs made repayments above and beyond the amount recommended by the Legg Inquiry. Therefore, MPs who had made similar claims could have repaid very different amounts depending on their willingness to challenge the official recommendations, or even to go further than they suggested.

For these reasons, MPs' claims are used as an instrument given the prominence given to these figures when the scandal first broke and in the run-up to the 2010 General Election. This amount is also used because perceptions of corruption extend to the spirit, as well as the legality, or claims. Furthermore, the stronger correlation between MPs' expenses claims and average levels of political trust within a constituency suggest that

wrongdoing in the eyes of the Legg Inquiry was not necessarily the same as wrongdoing in the eyes of an MP's constituents.

The behaviour of a respondent's constituency MP was considered particularly suitable as British citizens have consistently rated their own MP as more trustworthy than MPs in general (Grasso, Rose, & The Research Advisory Board of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2011). Therefore, any wrongdoing by their constituency MP is likely to be more damaging than misdemeanours by other MPs or parliamentarians in general. Although the boundary changes ahead of the 2010 General Election allocated some citizens to new or different constituencies – potentially reducing their local connection to their constituency MP – the majority of constituencies (419 out of 673, or 62%) experienced less than 10% change (Rallings, Johnston, & Thrasher, 2008, p. 81). Even if these boundary changes did impact these findings, they would only bias the estimated causal effects downwards so any detected effect would be under- rather than over-estimated.

The validity of this instrumental variable hinges on five assumptions. When fulfilled, the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of the instrument (an MP's expenses claim) on the treatment (a respondent's political trust) can be estimated.[15] As outlined below, each one of these assumptions is met sufficiently to allow the MPs' expenses scandal to be used as an instrument to predict the uncontaminated effect of political trust on support for government redistribution.

[15] Assuming treatment effects are consistent across the whole sample

Assumption 1: Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)

This requires that respondent's treatment status (here, the amount claimed by the constituency MP) is unrelated to the treatment status of others. This holds at the constituency level as the amount claimed by any MP was not affected by the amount claimed by any other MP. The SUTVA assumption could be undermined if there were spill-over effects from one constituency to another. However, the MPs' expenses scandal had a particularly strong effect at the local level where the focus on constituency MPs' claims – in both local campaigns and media ahead of the 2010 General Election – meant that 'British voters were substantially more likely to think that their MP over claimed on expenses when that MP was publicly implicated in the expenses scandal' (Vivyan, Wagner, & Tarlov, 2012, p. 751). Therefore, the immediate impact of having a local MP caught up in the scandal is likely to overshadow any potential spill-over effects from wider social or media networks. However, even if such spillover did exist, it would lead to an underestimation rather than an overestimation of effects. This would only be a problem if no effect were detected, due to an extreme underestimation of an effect that actually did exist. As shown below, this is not the case.

Assumption 2: Ignorability

This requires that a respondent's treatment assignment through the instrument (an MPs' expenses claim) is not related to the outcome of interest (their support for redistribution). Although a respondent's place of residence

is not random – many socio-economic and political factors may affect this – there is no reason to think that individuals changed constituency due to their MP's behaviour. Nonetheless, this assumption would also be undermined if people whose MP claimed a large amount were fundamentally different from those whose MP claimed less in respect of any characteristic which would influence their support for government redistribution. Although the instrumental variable used here cannot be considered independent of the treatment assignments, conditional ignorability can be achieved by controlling for key factors correlated with treatment assignment.

As Appendix I shows, there are a series of characteristics of both individuals and the areas in which they live which are correlated with the size of their MP's expenses claim. Comparing MPs' claim amounts shows significant differences in the median amount depending on respondents' party identification, age, ethnicity, marital status, educational qualifications, the region in which they live, their occupational grade, housing tenure, their sector of work and both the main source and level of their household income. Individuals' attention to politics is also significantly correlated with the amount their MP claimed.

At the constituency level, the amount an MP claimed is significantly correlated with the constituency's population density, the percentage of households in the constituency with no adult in work and the percentage of people in the constituency who are economically active, white, in poor health, have no educational qualifications, who are limited by a disability, own their own home, fall into 1 or into 4 indices of deprivation or claim any

state benefit. All of these controls are therefore included in the model. Therefore, although the instrumental variable used here cannot be considered independent of the treatment assignments, conditional ignorability can be achieved by controlling for these pre-treatment factors. After controlling for these, we are confident that these findings are not driven by any key systematic differences that are correlated with constituency MPs' expense claims.

There is not, however, any significant relationship between an MP's expenses claim and their margin of victory in the 2005 General Election in constituencies in England and Wales. There is therefore no reason to believe that MPs facing more competitive elections claimed less. Nor is there any reason to believe that MPs felt free to claim more in the most partisan battles because ideology was prioritised over probity. In these contests – between the Conservative and Labour parties (Eggers, 2014) – MPs tended to claim less than those where a candidate from a minor party (such as the Liberal Democrats) won the highest or second highest number of votes (£18,586 compared to £19,308). This mitigates concerns that the amount claimed by an MP may be impacted by electoral pressure.

Assumption 3: Non-Zero Average Causal Effect of Z on D

This assumption requires that the instrument (MPs' expense claims) is correlated with the treatment (political trust). Table 2.1 shows that in a bivariate regression clustered at the constituency level, the amount claimed by a respondent's constituency MP is a statistically significant predictor of the

respondent's political trust (at the 99% confidence level). This holds when a dummy variable is included to show if an MP claimed the London Supplement (rather than the ACA) along with an interaction between this dummy and the amount claimed. The R-squared value for model 2 (which includes the dummy and interacted variables) also increases. Although the London Supplement dummy is also a stand-alone significant predictor of political trust in a bivariate model, the goodness-of-fit for a bivariate model containing this as the only dependent variable (Model 3) is also worse than that for the interacted model shown here. This suggests that simply having an inner-London MP does not underlie the difference in political trust. The variables remain jointly significant when pre-treatment individual and constituency level controls are added to the interacted model, as shown in Model 4. Although the R-squared values for these models are low[16], this increases substantially when the control variables are added. However, we will see that post-estimation tests of the instrumental variable models suggest that this is not an issue in this estimation. MPs' expense claims can therefore be used as a valid instrument.

[16] Models using MPs' recommended repayments have lower R-squared values and thus explain less of the variation in political trust

Table 2.1: Regression models using instrument (MP's expense claim) to estimate treatment (political trust)

	Model 1: Claim amount Only	Model 2: Interacted claim amount	Model 3: London Supplement Only	Model 4: Interacted instrument & Controls
MP's Expense Claim (£000s)	-0.012***	-0.008**		-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.004)		(0.003)
London Supplement Dummy		-0.916*	0.323***	-1.183***
		(0.169)	(0.087)	(0.180)
London Supplement Dummy *		0.380***		0.312***
MP's Expense Claim (£000s)		(0.025)		(0.033)
Constant	3.326***	3.218***	3.084***	
	(0.057)	(0.070)	(0.023)	
Observations	13,303	13,303	13,303	13,227
Clusters	567	567	567	567
R^2	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.156

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Assumption 4: Monotonicity

This requires that no-one does the opposite of their treatment assignment because of this assignment alone. Therefore, it requires that no-one has higher levels of trust in government precisely because their MP claimed a higher amount of expenses. It is likely that there are some people who are always distrustful of government and some - albeit fewer - people who are never distrustful of government across all constituencies, no matter their MP's behaviour. However, there is no reason to believe that respondents react in a way contrary to their treatment status due to the treatment alone. This reinforces the utility of a constituency MP's expenses claim as an instrument for political trust.

Assumption 5: Exclusion

This assumption requires that a change in the instrument (a respondent's MP's expense claim) causes a change in the outcome variable (support for government redistribution) only through the treatment variable itself (political trust). It can have no independent effect. This could be undermined if Labour MPs, whose party is traditionally in favour of greater redistribution than its opponents, were more likely to make higher claims. If so, Labour MPs could be penalised more than those from opposing parties and the expenses scandal could lead to a decline in approval of the Labour Party which could then, in turn, lead to lower levels of support for government redistribution.

This is clearly not the case. Almost all MPs claimed some amount of expenses: over 95% of MPs from each of the three main parties claimed the ACA or the London Supplement in 2008-09. Furthermore, the median amount claimed by Labour MPs in England and Wales (£17.364) was over £3,000 less than the median amount claimed by their Conservative colleagues (£20.440). Only 43% of Labour MPs claimed above the median amount, compared to 58% of Conservative MPs. There is therefore no evidence to suggest that Labour MPs would be penalised more than Conservative MPs due to larger claims. This addresses any concerns for potential knock-on effects that would cause citizens to be more critical of those politicians who – coincidentally - are more supportive of redistribution.

Overall these analyses show that the amount a respondent's MP claimed in the 2009 MPs' expenses scandal can act as valid instrument to use to investigate the causal relationship between citizens' political trust and support for government redistribution. While there are some limitations to

this instrument, these tend to risk under-estimating the effect of trust on support for redistributive policy. This means that any significant relationship that is detected is beyond reasonable doubt, although it is likely to be biased downwards.


Covariates

Although the use of an instrumental variable aims to isolate the effect of political trust through the use of a natural experiment, there may be important differences between those citizens who did and did not get the treatment which may influence the outcome. Therefore, to ensure conditional ignorability, pre-treatment factors that are correlated with MPs' expense claims are controlled for the model. To reduce the potential of post-treatment bias, controls that could be affected by the instrument are not included in the model. It is clear that a respondent's MP's claim did not have the capacity to affect respondents' demographic characteristics or the socio-economic environment in which they live. However, it could potentially impact their partisanship if they turned their back on a party to whom they had previously felt close due to the events of the MPs' expenses scandal.

As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, political attitudes regarding support, trust and performance evaluations are closely entwined. Controlling for political factors that are themselves consequences of political trust or that are correlated with the error term in survey measures of political trust will undermine the use of an instrumental variable approach that attempts to isolate the relationship from political trust to support for government

redistribution. But as party identification is a more long-term and profound commitment to a party than support in an election and individuals' instrument political trust is correlated with their partisanship if this is excluded from the model, individuals' party identification is also included as a pre-treatment control. Although its inclusion in the model risks attenuating the impact of using only fully exogenous variables in this model, excluding it from the model is likely to lead to omitted variable bias. This is because the relationship between party identification and even instrumented political trust (predicted without controlling for party identification) is highly significant.

Figure 2.2: Endogeneity issues with relevant political attitudes



A number of individual-level pre-treatment controls are included to overcome potential threats to the ignorability assumption to isolate the first stage relationship between a respondent's constituency MP's expenses claim

and their political trust.[17] Those variables required to establish conditional ignorability, as detailed above, are included in this model to ensure that instrumented values of political trust are not driven by pre-existing differences between respondents in different constituencies, but by their treatment through the MP expenses scandal.

Results

Table 2.2 shows, in an ordinary least-squares regression which includes the control variables listed above[18], there is a statistically significant relationship between the survey measure of political trust and support for increased government tax and spending; a one point increase in political trust is associated with a 0.176 point increase in support for increased government tax and spending (both measured on eleven-point scales). However, we

[17] The formats of these variables are listed in Appendices I and J.

[18] Using OLS imposes the assumption that the categories of the dependent variable are evenly spaced and that zero responses in the dependent variable scale are not a special case. To test the first of these assumptions, an ordered probit model was estimated. As shown in Appendix K, the majority of differences between truncation points (demarcating the different response categories) are similar in magnitude; only two are less than 0.30 and one greater than 0.45, while the 95% confidence intervals for all but one of the differences between truncation points (between truncation points 5 & 6) overlap. Though the magnitudes of the coefficients in these two models are not directly comparable, the R^2 of the OLS model is larger and the direction and significance of the coefficients are consistent across both models. Due to the large number of zero scores on the political trust scale, a zero-inflated negative binomial model was also estimated, as reported in Appendix L. Fitted values from this model are almost identical to those produced by OLS, with a mean value of 3.141 for both sets of fitted values. These are also highly correlated (Pearson's R=0.995), as shown in Appendix M. There is therefore no compelling evidence that using an ordered probit or zero-inflated negative binomial model rather than OLS would offer a substantial advantage. OLS is therefore retained in the first stage regression of the instrumental variable approach.

cannot assume in the OLS model that the error term is not correlated with the regressors due to issues of construct validity and the difficulty in controlling for all confounding factors. This undermines these findings.

An instrumental variable approach allows us to reduce construct validity concerns and also endogeneity issues to better understand the causal relationship between these attitudes. Here, the first stage regression uses MPs' expenses claims to predict respondents' political trust (as an additive score of their trust in parliament, government and political parties). As explained above, the exogenous variables included in this first stage are the amount claimed by each respondent's MP in the 2008-09 session, a dummy variable to show if the MP claimed the London Supplement and an interaction between this dummy and the amount the MP claimed. All relevant pre-treatment control variables, as outlined above and in Appendices I and J, are also included in the model to reduce the potential for omitted variable bias.

This first stage shows that an MP's expenses claim is a statistically significant predictor of their constituents' level of political trust. Post-estimation tests reject the null hypothesis that the instrumental variable is underidentified ($p=0.045$). However, this does not rule out the problem of weak identification. Results from a cluster-robust Anderson–Rubin Wald test, show we can reject the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressor are not relevant ($p=0.024$) and using Stock and Yogo's (2005) test for weak instruments, we find that the bias in these estimates is less than 5% of that in the OLS estimates. We therefore continue to use this model to investigate

the effect of political trust on support for increased government tax and spending.

The second stage demonstrates that (instrumented) political trust has a significant and substantial effect on support for increased government tax and spending. Table 2.2 shows that the coefficient of the instrumented measure of political trust is not only statistically significant (p=0.021) but also substantial in magnitude; a one point change in a respondent's political trust leads to a 0.704 point increase in a respondents' support for tax and spending. This is over twice the size of the effect of a respondent's main source of income coming from state benefits (0.335).

Table 2.2: Effect of political trust on support for increased government tax and spending


	OLS	IV (2nd stage)
Measured political trust	0.176***	
	(0.011)	
Instrumented political trust		0.703**
		(0.304)
Individual level controls	Included	Included
Constituency level controls	Included	Included
Observations	12,784	12,433
Clusters	571	556
R^2	0.155	
F-Test of Instrument		27.55
P value - Test of Underidentification		0.046

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The size of the coefficient on political trust in the IV regression is almost four times larger than it is in the OLS regression. This shows that OLS is not only unable to establish the direction of the causal relationship between political trust and support for government redistribution but it also

grossly underestimates the true magnitude of this effect. Figure 2.3 displays this graphically; holding all else equal, the effect of political trust as modelled in an instrumental variable regression has a much more dramatic effect on respondents' support for increased government tax and spending than those predictions generated from an OLS regression, particularly in the region of the trust scale where most respondents are located.

Figure 2.3: Predicted levels of support for government tax and spending by levels of political trust



The difference in the size of these coefficients highlights how OLS models cannot disentangle political trust from other political attitudes and accurately quantify the size of its effect. One of the main drivers of this is likely to be individuals' assessment of an incumbent institution. As this survey was conducted at the time of a Labour government, Conservative supporters

(not only those who identify with the Conservative party) are likely to report lower levels of trust in government at this time but they are also likely to be ideologically less supportive of government tax and spending. This coincidental association is not a causal relationship. However, it may help to explain why the measured relationship between political trust and support for government tax and spending is attenuated in the OLS regression.

The role of sacrifice

Hetherington (1999) demonstrated that political trust drives support for policy areas where individual sacrifice is required. In this model, political trust should therefore have a greater effect on support for government tax and spending among individuals who receive no material incentive benefit from government redistribution. To test this hypothesis, a second model is estimated which includes an interacted term between the instrumental variable and a dummy variable to show if a respondent's household income is above the median amount for UK households in 2010 which was £21,212 (Office for National Statistics, 2010).[19] As redistribution aims to transfer wealth from the most to the least affluent members of society, these respondents are more likely to have to make a sacrifice rather than receive an immediate and direct personal benefit from government redistribution.

For the instrumental variable approach, we must interact this dummy variable with all the exogenous instruments included in the first stage

[19] As we only have categorical level data on respondents' household income, this dummy is equal to 1 for those respondents who reported their household income as being above £20,000.

estimation. All the original control variables are retained. As with the non-interacted model, a cluster-robust Anderson–Rubin Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the endogenous regressors are not relevant ($p<0.001$). Using Stock and Yogo's (2005) test for weak instruments, we also find that the bias in these estimates is less than 5% of that in the OLS estimates. Nonetheless we also checked these models using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood estimators, which are more reliable when instruments are weak, and there were minimal changes to the results. Full details can be found in Appendix P.

Table 2.3 shows the effects of political trust in the interacted model. Here, it is not a significant driver of support for redistribution amongst people with a household income below the median level. However, it is a significant driver of political trust for individuals whose household income is above the median level ($p<0.001$). Political trust therefore only has a significant effect on support for government redistribution for those respondents who must make a financial sacrifice for such transfer of wealth.


Table 2.3: Effect of political trust and interactions on support for increased government tax and spending

	Source of income model: 2nd stage
Instrument political trust	0.374
	(0.423)
Instrumented political trust *	0.464
Above median income	(0.413)
Observations	12,433
Clusters	556
F-Test of non-interacted instrument	22.11
F-Test of interacted instrument	95.31
P value - Test of joint significance	0.026

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The wide confidence interval in the first plot of Figure 2.4 highlights the absence of any significant effect of political trust on support for government tax and spending among respondents with below median household income. In comparison, the levels of support for government tax and spending increase dramatically as political trust increases across respondents with above median household income and who have to make greater sacrifices for redistributive policies. This demonstrates how political trust encourages individuals to support policies that go against their personal material interest. This makes trust a powerful mechanism in encouraging individuals to support policies aimed to address inequalities or to deliver collective goods.

Figure 2.4: Predicted levels of support for government tax and spending for respondents with under and over median household income



Robustness tests

The limitations of natural experiments mean that there is little chance that we will find a 'perfect' instrumental variable. Therefore, the use of an instrumental variable that meets the above-mentioned assumptions offers us the best available opportunity to investigate the causal relationship between political trust and support for government redistribution. Nonetheless, we can offer further support for the use of this instrument through a series of robustness tests.

MP Retirement

The use of MPs' expenses claims as an instrumental variable would be undermined if political trust rebounded in constituencies where the incumbent MP retired ahead of the 2010 General Election. To ensure this is

not the case we add MP's retirement status to the first stage model. There is no change in the R-squared value of either of the first stage models. Using Stock and Yogo's (2005) test for weak instruments, we find that the bias in these estimates remains less than 10% of that in the OLS estimates. Political trust remains a statistically significant driver of support for government redistribution amongst respondents with an above median household income, although the magnitude of this effect is reduced when MPs' retirement status is included. However, it remains a substantive effect so there is no evidence to suggest these findings undermine the original results. Full details of this model can be found in Appendix Q.

Geographical location

The use of this instrumental variable method would also be undermined if MPs' expense claims only affected constituents' levels of political trust because they simply reflected the distance between the constituency and Westminster, as individuals who live further away from the centre of political power are likely to have lower levels of trust. This would be a greater concern if the instrument used here also captured travel expenses, for which MPs who have a longer commute between Westminster and their constituency should have greater costs. Nonetheless, to ensure the findings are not driven by constituency distance from Westminster, we add a variable measuring the distance of the central point of an MP's constituency from Westminster (measured in kilometres) as a control in this model.

As shown in Appendix R, when distance from Westminster is included in the model, the estimates from the model remain very similar to those in the final model. Political trust remains insignificant for people with under median household income and significant (p=0.047), and of similar magnitude, for those with above median household income. The strength of the instrument is also maintained as the bias in these estimates remains less than 5% of that in the OLS estimates. There is therefore no evidence that these findings undermine the relationship detected in the original model.

Economic evaluations

As Figure 2.2 above showed, economic evaluations are likely to be a mediating factor in the relationship between political trust and support for government redistribution; individuals with higher levels of political trust are likely to be more optimistic about future economic performance than those with lower levels of trust. As such, this should be considered a post-treatment control which, if introduced, may dilute any detected effect of political trust on support for government redistribution.

Appendix S shows that when prospective personal and national economic assessments are added to both stages of the model, the strength of the instruments falls and post-estimation tests show that we cannot reject that the model is under-identified (p=0.265). Furthermore, the effect of political trust is no longer significant, even for those respondents who have a higher than median household income (p=0.091). Given that political trust is significantly associated (p<0.001) with both personal and national economic

outlooks, this is likely due to economic evaluations mediating the effect of political trust. This is consistent with the idea that prospective economic evaluations are impacted by individuals' political trust, and therefore cannot be considered exogenous pre-treatment controls. As such, while these findings shed light on the moderating impact of economic evaluations, prospective economic evaluations should not be included in this instrumental variable model due to the endogeneity issues outlined above.

Political support

Individuals' political affiliations are particularly difficult to distinguish from political trust in survey research; respondents consistently struggle to isolate their level of trust in political institutions from their level of support from incumbent office holders. Political support is therefore highly correlated with the measurement error often found in survey measures of political trust. This is true for individuals' vote choice in particular elections as well their long-term partisanship. However, vote choice cannot be assumed to be a wholly pre-treatment control as the MPs' expenses scandal may have impacted individuals' vote choice.

To investigate this further we add a variable to the model to control for each individual's voting intention ahead of the 2010 General Election; no party, the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats or another party. This shows that Labour supporters tended to have the highest level of political trust when their party was in government, followed by Conservative supporters (the main opposition), Liberal Democrats, non-

voters and finally supporters of the other minor parties. This highlights the complicated relationship between political trust and partisanship.

Adding these variables to the model makes little difference to the significance and magnitude of the effect of political trust. It remains a significant driver of support for government tax and spending for respondents with above median household income, with a similar sized effect. The bias in the estimates from this model increases to less than 15% of that in the OLS estimates, suggesting that the excluded instruments are now more weakly correlated with political trust. This is likely due to the endogeneity between political trust and vote choice. As (short-term) political support is likely to be the main source of measurement error in surveys responses asking about political trust, this is not included in the final model. Full details can be found in Appendix T.

Conclusions and discussion

Despite recent attention given to measured declines in citizens' political trust across western democracies, little has been proven as to the consequences of any such declines. This paper, using an instrumental variable approach to overcome the difficulty in gaining an accurate and uncontaminated measure of political trust, shows that there is a clear, causal relationship from an individual's level of political trust to their support for increased government tax and spending. However, this only tells half the story. This research also finds that when the effect of trust is allowed to vary between sub-groups of the population, it only remains a significant and positive effect for the most

economically secure citizens who must make the largest sacrifice for redistributive policies. This suggests that it is sacrifice that makes political trust a relevant, significant and substantial driver of support for government redistribution.

There is compelling evidence from this research that, without addressing issues of construct validity and endogeneity, researchers will underestimate the effects of political trust. Even with an instrument whose limitations are likely to under- rather than over-estimate any effect of political trust, we find the effect of political trust to be over three times larger than the measured relationship in an OLS regression. It is likely that incumbent support is one key factor that contaminates survey measures of political trust. This is a particular concern in any longitudinal analysis that attempts to measure and model political trust over a period of time in which there is a change of government, or indeed where satisfaction with the party rather than structures of government fluctuates and cannot be disentangled from a normative measure of political trust.

Although this study is confined to a single country during a period of time when MPs' probity was a particularly salient issue, we believe that these findings are relevant not only for the future of the welfare state in the UK but also for systems of government where elected representatives require individual members of society to make sacrifices for a wider public good. The MPs' expenses scandal that occurred in the UK in 2009 offered us the opportunity to test this theory through a natural experiment occurring in a representative democracy that has seen a not unusual decline in levels of

political trust over recent decades. That is not to say that these findings are automatically assumed to hold in other countries that have experienced similar declines in political trust over recent years, but this is clearly an avenue that merits further investigation. In particular, there may be different relationships between political trust and support for redistribution in countries which offer more widespread welfare benefits than the UK and with different welfare regimes.

The important effect detected here suggests that measures of declining political trust do not merely reflect a superficial disenchantment with politics; political scandals that diminish citizens' political trust have consequences not only for the reputation of the business of politics but also for policy aims and outputs. They have clear repercussions for the policy agenda. This has important – and timely – consequences for scholars and practitioners alike who wish to preserve the legitimacy of modern welfare states that are coming under increasing pressures from immigration, aging populations and austerity measures in western democracies. It also has possible ramifications for other policy areas. Foreign aid spending, for example, requires all citizens to make a material sacrifice to help citizens of another country. This is another policy area that may be particularly badly impacted by declines in political trust.

These findings show that the political environment, including levels of political trust, has a tangible impact on the policy-making process. They display how issues above and beyond the traditional left-right ideological views can impact policy preferences and outputs, as governments that wish

to introduce more progressive policies will struggle to do so if they are not trusted by those citizens who must make sacrifices for such programs. This means that low levels of political trust could redefine citizens' expectations as to the appropriate role of the state in tackling social inequality and beyond. Political trust is therefore a key resource for any government that wishes to legislate on behalf of its most disadvantaged citizens.

Trust shall overcome: How specific support moderates the effect of political trust on citizens' support for democracy

Abstract: Without the support of its citizens, the legitimacy of a democratic system is put at risk. But in diverse political communities, political conflict and competing interests are inevitable. Therefore, political support cannot be guaranteed by citizens' support for the actions and outputs of an incumbent government alone. To overcome citizens' dissatisfaction with government performance, political trust is a valuable resource. As one aspect of diffuse support, political trust should offer a reservoir of support to stop short-term discontent escalating into profound dissatisfaction with the entire system of government. But there is little empirical evidence of the way in which political trust provides such a reservoir of support in modern democracies. This paper uses data from the nine-wave LISS Panel conducted in the Netherlands to investigate the relationships between political trust and short-term political support on citizens' satisfaction with and confidence in democracy. It finds that both political trust and short-term political support have significant effects on citizens' support for democracy, but more interestingly it also finds that the effect of political trust is greater when short-term political support is low. It therefore offers empirical evidence that political trust does indeed offer a reservoir of support by having a larger effect on citizens' support for democracy when satisfaction with government performance is low.

Political support is crucial in representative democracies. Citizens must support the principles and workings of their system of government – even if they do not agree with the political aims of it officeholders – for it to remain legitimate. Without such legitimacy, citizens may feel they have no reason to abide by their government's laws (Marien & Hooghe, 2011), contribute finances to its tax system (Rudolph, 2009) or engage in traditional forms of political participation. Furthermore low levels of political support may undermine the democratic system of government as a whole if they cause citizens to believe democratic politics does not work for them and their community (Stoker, 2006).

Political trust is a key aspect of political support. It reflect citizens' belief that their government can be "counted on to provide equitable

outcomes" (Muller et al., 1982, p. 241). As such, it contributes to citizens' support for the political system as a whole. But as well as this direct effect, political trust may also impact citizens' assessments of their political system indirectly. This is because political trust contributes to a "reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will" (Easton, 1965, p. 273) towards a political system when citizens are not happy with the short-term performance or outputs of their political authorities and institutions. This helps to prevent the almost inevitable political disappointment experienced by at least some citizens in diverse political communities from necessarily becoming discontent with the democratic system of government as a whole. Without political trust, therefore, citizens' support for democracy is at greater risk from short-term disappointment with and fluctuations in support for the actions and outputs of political officeholders.

It is therefore a potentially troubling sign that increased levels of political dissatisfaction, distrust and disengagement have been observed over the past two decades around the world, particularly in advanced industrialised democracies (Dalton, 2004; Norris, 1999a; Stoker, 2006). However, citizens' discontent with the way politics functions in their countries is often not matched by a profound disenchantment with democracy. Therefore, citizens appear able to disentangle their evaluations of the performance of government institutions and authorities from their evaluations of the values that underpin the system of government in their country.

This reinforces that political support is not a one-dimensional concept. It suggests that the broad notion of political support is made up of a range of different attitudes, depending on the type and object of citizens' support (Easton, 1965, 1975; Norris, 1999a). So while they may be related, support for political office-holders is not the same as support for the institutions of a political system. Nor can either of these be considered analogous with support for the principles that underpin the democratic system in which they operate. This is not merely a theoretical distinction. The implications of low levels of political support vary depending on the type and object of such support in question. Low levels of support for incumbent officeholders are likely to lead to incumbents being replaced in the next election, if a more popular option is available to the electorate. If this system of political replacement works efficiently, it is unlikely there will be more profound implications for the democratic system as a whole. However, the implications of low levels of support for the principles of democracy are likely more serious and may undermine the democratic system of government itself.

This means that the mechanisms that stop short-term disapproval with officeholders becoming a more profound dissatisfaction with the democratic system as a whole are crucial to ensure democratic stability. Political trust – one dimension of political support – is key to this. Political trust allows citizens to overcome short-term discontent by ensuring that they have sufficient faith and confidence in the institutions of government to maintain support for the system of government, even if they themselves do

not enjoy direct or short-term benefits from its actions or policies (Hetherington, 2005). In political communities, where individuals have diverse and often competing interests, it is inevitable that some citizens will be disappointed by or disagree with government actions and polices. These citizens require a reason to endorse the system of government as a whole that is not simply based on the performance and outputs of an incumbent government. Political trust can act as this reason. It is therefore crucial for maintaining support for a political system amongst citizens who do not agree with or benefit from the policies and actions of an incumbent government. However, there is little empirical evidence as if, or how, political trust offers such a resource modern representative democracies.

This paper uses public attitude data from the Netherlands to investigate the relationship between different dimensions of political support and address the role played by political trust in representative democracies. Using panel data to investigate the causal relationship between potentially endogenous political attitudes, it investigates the extent to which political trust influences citizens' support for democracy. Furthermore, it also investigates how the effect of political trust is moderated by short-term measures of political support. This paper therefore contributes to the research on political support in democratic systems by examining the causal relationship between different dimensions of political support. In particular, it investigates the way in which political trust can ensure that citizens' unhappiness with the actions and outputs of office-holders does not inevitably lead to unhappiness with the system of government as a whole. It

finds that political trust is a key mechanism for ensuring that citizens who are unhappy with the policies and performance of officeholders do not necessarily lose support for the system of democracy as a whole which is, itself, crucial to maintain the legitimacy and credibility of the political system.

Conceptual Framework

Political support is vital in representative democracies where governments must be able to govern without force or coercion. Citizens must support the framework and principles of their system of government, even if they do not approve of the political agenda of those in charge of its political institutions, for it to remain legitimate. But political support is a wide-ranging concept that encompasses a multitude of objects and evaluations. In representative democracies, the political system is made up of multiple actors and institutions working within a framework of government which has been established under particular democratic ideals. Therefore, political support could refer to a range of different actors, institutions or outputs, as well as the principles and values of the system in which they operate.

This is not only clear at a theoretical level, but also from empirical evidence, especially in advanced industrial democracies where citizens appear to differentiate between different types of political support. In particular, many citizens appear to be committed to the principles of democratic government but increasing critical of the way it operates in their country (Dalton, 1999; Norris, 1999a). While there have been some concerns as to the impact of citizens' dissatisfaction with government actors,

institutions and performance on the health of representative democracy (Stoker, 2006), there has been little evidence to suggest that such discontent has spread to negative evaluations of the system of representative government as a whole (Dalton, 1999). That political discontent does not always – or indeed often – lead to a profound threat to the core values of a political system offers further evidence that political support cannot be considered a single, homogenous attitude.

Diffuse and specific support

As Easton (1965, 1975) set out, distinct – but inter-related – dimensions of political support can be differentiated within political life. His framework organised these dimensions along a spectrum running from specific to diffuse support. Easton was clear that, though there may be some overlap between diffuse and specific support, they should be considered distinct concepts. While specific support is mainly manifested in citizens' approval of political officeholders, their actions and outputs, diffuse support relates to a broader assessment of the institutions and frameworks that underpin political life.

Specific support is an assessment of the performance of political institutions and the officeholders who control them. It refers to "the satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities" (Easton, 1975, p. 437). As such, it relates to the relationship between citizens and the authorities that run their governments, rather than the political regime in which their government operates. At the other end of the spectrum, diffuse support is

not dependent on citizens agreeing with the actions and outputs of government. It is instead a more profound and longer-term evaluation of the way a system of government operates.

But the concepts of diffuse and specific support are not limited to one type of institution or one evaluation of government. Diffuse support can be broken down into at least two components. One component is political trust. This reflects citizens' feeling that "their own interest would be attended to even if the authorities were exposed to little supervision or scrutiny" (Easton, 1975, p. 447). Trust is crucial in representative democracies where citizens forsake a degree of personal autonomy to give their elected representatives the power to act on their behalf. A second component of diffuse support is legitimacy. This relates to citizens' acceptance of the principles that confer a position (along with its duties and privileges) onto an actor. These evaluations can be directed at different levels of political life. Easton distinguished between the political community, political regime, and political authorities but support for the political regime can, again, be broken down further into support for its principles, performance and institutions (Dalton, 1999).

In democratic countries, support for regime principles reflects citizens' commitment to democratic values while support for regime performance relates to how the system actually operates and the outcome it produces. It is clearly possible for citizens to support the values behind a democratic political system but not be satisfied with the way it functions in practice. It is also possible for citizens to have high levels of support for

regime principles but not for regime institutions. Support for regime institutions is, in turn, distinct from support for political office holders, which is captured in specific support for political actors and authorities. Therefore, political support is not only made up of different types of evaluations (short-term or long-term, specific or diffuse) but it is also made up of evaluations of different types of actors, institutions and systems.

These dimensions are not simply interesting at a theoretical level but also have clearly different consequences for political life. Dissatisfaction with the political authorities may lead to a change in office-holders, but dissatisfaction with any aspect of the political regime is likely to have more profound consequences for the political system itself. In fact, some aspects of political dissatisfaction may be valuable in representative democracies. In particular, critical assessment of government performance acts as a basis for citizens' political involvement. When balanced with a degree of acquiescence, this can facilitate a healthy representative democracy (Almond & Verba, 1989). Therefore, low levels of some dimensions of political support do not necessarily suggest that the political system as a whole is failing, and can be combined with more positive views as the workings of or values underpinning the overall system of government. Attitudinal surveys suggest that this is indeed the case; democratic values remain very popular, particularly in established democracies (Dalton, 1999) but there appears to be large numbers of "critical citizens" (Norris, 1999a) who are committed to democratic values but not satisfied with the way their governments operate in practice. However, support for the democratic values does not necessarily

go hand-in-hand with approval of the way democracy works in reality (Huang, Chang, & Chu, 2008).

Therefore even without trust in their government or support for its legitimacy, individuals could have high specific support if they agreed with or benefited from its actions and outcomes. Similarly, even without supporting its policy aims or outputs, citizens could have high diffuse support if they had sufficient faith in the structures and workings of the system of government. In fact, diffuse support is particularly important precisely when citizens disagree with the aims or outputs of a current governing administration. In such situations, diffuse support should act as a buffer to citizens who disagree with government actions by providing a "reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposes or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants" (Easton, 1965, p. 273). It has the potential therefore to ensure that short-term discontent with the outputs and actions of officeholders (which is expected in representative democracies where not all citizens support the actions or agenda of the political party in charge of government) do not inevitably lead to dissatisfaction with the system of government as a whole.

But where political trust is located amidst other forms and aspects of political support has been keenly contested. If political trust is a manifestation of specific support then declining levels of political trust should have few long-term consequences for the institutions of government (Citrin, 1974). In this case, it should be linked to citizens' approval of government performance and therefore should rebound when performance improves or

when a new set of office-holders is elected. But, if political trust is a facet of diffuse support, then the consequences of declining trust may be more profound for a political regime (Miller, 1974). If political trust, as a type of diffuse political support, offers citizens a reservoir of support that can be kept in reserve to help governments "weather periods of public dissatisfaction" (Dalton, 1999, p. 59), what happens when levels of political trust are depleted and the reservoir runs dry? In such situations, what will stop short-term discontent becoming a broader dissatisfaction with the system of government as a whole? If political trust or other aspects of diffuse support cannot act as such a buffer to protect the current system of government, then short-term discontent with the workings and outputs of government may destabilise and threaten the health of democratic systems of government.

While recent declines in specific political support and political trust have not appeared to coincide with equally dramatic declines in support for the principles of democracy (Dalton, 1999), there does appear to be a growing disenchantment with the way democracy, and particularly representative democracy, works in many countries (Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014). This is likely to cause increasing demands for changes to how political systems operate. Citizens with more negative views of the working of democracy are more likely to support measures which restrict the actions or influence of political elites, such as political term limits (Karp, 1995). While some studies suggest that distrusting citizens are more likely to favour deliberative or direct democracy (Dalton et al., 2001; Ercan & Dryzek,

2015; Norris, 1999c; Scarrow, 2003) citizens' reluctance to be more involved in politics may cause political distrust to lead to greater support for experts, rather than citizens, being involved in the policy-making process (J. R. Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002).

Drivers of support for democracy

Low levels of support for political actors and institutions are not necessarily signs of poor democratic health, but if this spreads to democratic politics as a whole it becomes more concerning. Measures of support for democracy reflect whether citizens' discontent has spread to the whole political system and satisfaction with democracy reflects "generalized support for the political system…which is decisive when it comes to maintaining the democratic system" (Fuchs, Guidorossi, & Svensson, 1995, p. 330). Any declines in support for democracy may, therefore, lead to fundamental changes to the political system and the way representative politics is organised and executed. This would result in more profound consequences for a political system than declines in specific support for a political actors or institutions.

It is therefore reassuring for the health of representative democracies that support for democracy has not fallen as dramatically as specific support for political actors and institution or as political trust (Dalton, 1999). This also suggests that, even though different aspects of political support are related, they clearly measure different concepts as citizens in representative democracies still appear largely supportive of the idea – if not always the functioning – of democracy in their country. Amid declining incumbent

support and political trust in the 1990s, this led Fuchs et al. to – optimistically – conclude that "there is currently no legitimation crisis in West European polities…[and]…there is a high probability that there will be no legitimation crisis in the foreseeable future." (1995, p. 352)

Given that citizens' support for democracy has held up better than other dimensions of political support in advanced industrialised democracies, it is important to understand the mechanism that facilitates this. Part of the explanation may lay in the fact that political support is influenced by individuals' expectations of governments (Dalton, 2005; Miller & Listhaug, 1999), as well as how they perform. This argument suggests that increasingly critical citizens are committed to the principles of democracy, even if they are not happy with the way it currently operates. Indeed, satisfaction with democracy appears to actually be increasing amongst some of the most demanding citizens, including those with high levels of education and post-materialist values (Fuchs et al., 1995; Inglehart, 1999).

But increasing citizen demands do also threaten to undermine support for democracy if the structures and workings of government are so rigid that they cannot address the changing demands of their citizens (Fuchs et al., 1995). If the traditional structures of representative democracy cannot adapt to new challenges, or if unpopular incumbents cannot be replaced by a more popular alternative, then this may undermine support for the political system as a whole (Pharr & Putnam, 2000). This would risk creating generalised "performance deficits" (Fuchs et al., 1995, p. 326) of entire

political systems in Western democracies as the democratic system would not be able to meet the demands of its citizens.

Nonetheless, government performance does still appear to impact citizens' support for democracy, including both objective and subjective measures of economic performance across Europe (Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014; Cordero & Simón, 2016; Quaranta & Martini, 2016). The effect of economic performance is especially strong in countries where government power is concentrated in the hands of a single party (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2015). As well as influencing citizens' satisfaction with democracy, economic performance appears to influence citizens support for liberal democracy (Kotzian, 2011) as does the generosity of unemployment benefits in a country (Kumlin, 2014).

However, political factors appear to be stronger drivers of support for democracy than its performance and outputs (McAllister, 1999). In particular, support for the party in charge of government and its policies (particularly policies relating to social spending) are correlated with higher support for the democratic system (Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Ferland, 2016; Fuchs et al., 1995). However, the effect of being on the winning or losing side in election is not homogenous across all electoral systems. In more consensual systems, electoral 'losers' tend to report higher satisfaction with democracy than those in majoritarian systems (Anderson & Guillory, 1997). The effect of losing in elections also appears to be cumulative; consistently being on the losing side in elections has a larger, negative effect on satisfaction with democracy than one-off losses (Delgado, 2016)

However, a country's political history and culture also impacts its citizens' attitudes towards democracy. Support for democracy tends to be higher in countries with longer histories of democratic political institutions (McAllister, 1999), and consensual rather than majoritarian political systems (Anderson & Guillory, 1997). Political context also appears to have a moderating effect on the effects of political factors on citizens' support for democracy; the effects of institutional performance and of citizens' ideological proximity to the party in charge of government are both larger in majoritarian political systems than in proportional democracies (Criado & Herreros, 2007).

While internal political events, histories and cultures make each country unique, the Netherlands is one of many advanced industrialised democracies that has recently experienced declines in levels of political trust, in approval of government and in engagement with the traditional institutions of political systems (Bovens & Wille, 2008; Taylor & The Research Advisory Board of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2013; van der Brug & van Praag, 2007). However, there appears to be no lesser commitment to the principles of democracy amongst Dutch citizens. Therefore, the Netherlands is a good test case to examine the relationship between support for different aspects of the political system amongst citizens in more depth.

This paper therefore uses data collected by the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences (LISS) Panel (described in more detail below) to investigate the causal relationship between different dimensions of

political support. The first hypothesis tested investigates the relationship between support for the workings and outputs of governments and support for democracy in the Netherlands:

H_1: Higher levels of political trust and specific political support lead to higher levels of support for democracy

Given the crucial role political trust is believed to play in representative democracies, the second hypothesis tests whether there is empirical evidence to support the idea that trust acts as a reservoir of political support to help overcome citizens' short-term discontent with government actors and outputs:

H_2: Specific support moderates the impact of political trust on support for democracy.

Data from all 9 waves of the LISS Panel are therefore used in this paper to investigate the relationship between political trust and support for democracy, and the extent to which this is moderated by specific, political support.

Data and methods

This analysis uses data collected in all nine waves of the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences (LISS) Panel. This panel study, which has been running since 2007, is an online survey of around 7,000 citizens in 4,500 households across the Netherlands. The LISS Panel is drawn from a true probability sample of households, based on the population register in the Netherlands to gain a representative sample of households across the

country. To ensure that all selected households were able to take part (and thus retain as representative a sample as possible), those without a computer or internet connection were provided with any equipment required to allow them to complete the survey. All items in this analysis come from the LISS Panel's core study which asks respondents about their political views and attitudes, economic situation and questions on a range of other topics on an annual basis. As the LISS Panel asked respondents identical questions on these issues in nine separate waves over the course of a decade, this panel data can be used to estimate dynamic panel models to investigate the causal relationship between political attitudes.

As Table 3.1 shows, the LISS panel asks respondents to evaluate a wide range of government institutions, actors and outputs on a continuous scale from 0 (the most negative rating) to 10 (the most positive rating). These include items relating to citizens' support for democracy (through separate question for, respectively, confidence in and satisfaction with democracy), regime institutions (such as the national government and parliament), political actors (including questions about politicians in general as well as specific party leaders) and economic performance. These cover many different aspects of political support and can therefore be used to investigate the relationship between these attitudes.

Each of these items was asked in each of the nine waves of the LISS Panel. Therefore, for respondents who have taken part in multiple survey waves, this dataset records their responses to each question at multiple time points. This means that the temporal aspect of this data can be used to

investigate how these attitudes have changed over time. This reduces any potential issues of time-invariant measurement error in responses and omitted variable bias in estimated models. It also offers a stronger basis for establishing causal relationships between variables that are believed to be strongly inter-related and potentially endogenous, such as political trust and other aspects of political support, than would be available from cross-sectional data.

All but two of the items used in this analysis are the responses to individual questions in each wave of the survey. Only respondents' evaluations of their favourite political party and of their favourite party leader are items that have been directly derived from responses to items to this survey[20]. These variables reflect respondents' evaluation of the best party available and the best party leader available to a respondent, whoever that party and leader may be. As such, they are included in this analysis to capture respondents' assessment of how well the political system presents them with attractive electoral options.

[20] Respondents' evaluations of their favourite political party and their favourite party leader have been calculated by taking the highest value from their responses to items asking about each party individually and each leader individually in each wave.

Table 3.1: Survey items from LISS Panel core study

Survey item	Response categories
Confidence in the Dutch government	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)
Confidence in the Dutch parliament	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)
Confidence in politicians	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)
Confidence in political parties	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)
Confidence in the legal system	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)
Confidence in the police	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)
Confidence in democracy	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)
Satisfaction with the Dutch government	0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)
Satisfaction with the Dutch parliament	0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)
Satisfaction with politicians	0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)
Satisfaction with political parties	0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)
Satisfaction with the legal system	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)
Satisfaction with the police	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)
Satisfaction with democracy	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)
Satisfaction with the economy	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)
What do you think of your favourite political party?	0 (very unsympathetic) to 10 (very sympathetic)
What do you think of your favourite party leader?	0 (very unsympathetic) to 10 (very sympathetic)
How satisfied are you with your financial situation?	0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (entirely satisfied)
How satisfied are you with the current economic situation in the Netherlands?	0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (entirely satisfied)

Measuring political support

Many of the LISS Panel's questions asking about respondents' attitudes towards various political institutions, actors and outcomes are clearly related and responses are likely to be driven by underlying, latent factors. To determine the number of latent factors that underpin these items, a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is undertaken to determine the relationship between these items. CFA tests if the items under investigation fit a hypothesized measurement model. The full list of items included in this analysis is shown in Table 3.1.

These items ask respondents to evaluate a range of national political actors within the Netherlands on a number of criteria. They ask for both retrospective evaluations (in terms of satisfaction) and prospective evaluations (in terms of confidence or trust[21]) of the national government, parliament, political parties, politicians and democracy. Respondents are also asked how satisfied they are with their personal finances, the current economic situation in the Netherlands and the economy and these are used to measure citizens' evaluations of the economic outputs of government. Respondents' highest evaluation of any political party leader and any party are also included as measures of how well represented they are in the party system.

[21] Although the English translation of questions asking about these prospective evaluations translate the Dutch word "vertrouwen" to confidence, this can also be translated to the English word "trust" as it refers to a prospective evaluation of actors and institutions. It is therefore not only based on knowledge of how someone has acted in the past but also on faith in how they will act in the future.

The construction of a measurement model looks at the patterns of correlations between individual items to determine if they are manifestations of a (smaller) number of latent factors which are deemed to be of more fundamental importance than the specific items themselves. However, such correlations may also be a product of a strong causal relationship between these factors. Therefore, theoretical arguments – as well as the factor analysis procedure itself – influence the construction of these latent variables. This is particularly evident when we look at different aspects of political support as, for example, individuals' satisfaction with democracy may be highly correlated with their satisfaction with the economy but, given the theoretical and conceptual discussion earlier, it is more likely that satisfaction with the economy influences citizens' satisfaction for democracy than these items reflecting a single, latent trait. Therefore, items pertaining to support for democracy are dealt with separately in this analysis.

Measurement models are constructed for data pooled across all waves of this survey. The goodness of fit statistics from identical models estimated for each wave individually can be found in Appendix V. These show that while the CFA does not fit equally well across all waves of data, the differences (qua fit) between the measurement models reported below are consistent across all waves. The differences between the CFA for each wave may be driven, at least in part, by changes in the political environment across the lifetime of the survey. However, these results do not offer any compelling evidence to suggest that the measurement


models estimated for individual waves are a significantly better fit than that estimated for the pooled data. Therefore, the pooled data is used for estimation of these models and further analysis.

The first measurement model tests if a single latent variable – here called "political support" underpins all the items used in this analysis. Correlations are also included between items relating to the same institutions (such as confidence in and satisfaction with parliament), between types of institutions (such as the legal institutions of the legal system and the police) and related objects (such as personal and national finances). The goodness of fit statistics shown in Table 3.2 for this model suggest that this model does not fit the data acceptably[22]. Values below 0.95 for the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and a Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) value of 0.096 (considerably higher than the threshold 0.05 used to determine good fit) suggest that a single factor model does not reflect well the latent concept underlying these items[23].

[22] A combination of absolute and comparative fit indices is used to assess the goodness of fit of these models. Although thresholds used to determine the good fit of models have been contested – as they can vary depending on the characteristics of the model and data used – the RMSEA, SRMR, CFI and TLI statistics used here have been found to perform sufficiently well in simulated tests of goodness-of fit statistics (Hu & Bentler, 1999). RMSEA and SRMR are both absolute fit indices and a value below 0.05 of each suggests a good fitting model (Browne & Cudeck, 1992; Sun, 2005). Values for CFI and TLI statistics (both comparative fit indices) above 0.95 reflect good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).

[23] This is the case even though Model 1 contains co-variances between the error terms of a number of the manifest items, as explained above and displayed in Figure 3.1. Without these co-variances, the goodness of fit of this model is even poorer.


Figure 3.1: Model 1 - Single factor model



Given the poor fit statistics and the strong theoretical arguments, as outlined above, that a single factor model overlooks differences between distinct – but inter-related – aspects of political support, there is no reason to accept this model. A second measurement model is therefore estimated with items loading onto two separate factors: specific political support and political trust. This model, shown in Figure 3.2, distinguishes between, on the one hand, evaluations of the past performance of political institutions, actors and outputs, and, on the other hand, items relating to prospective evaluations labelled as "vertrouwen" in the Dutch survey items and translated into English as confidence or trust. While "confidence" and "trust" may not refer to identical concepts, they are clearly related. Giddens defines trust as

"confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcome or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles" (2013, p. 30). Confidence in the institutions of government is clearly, therefore, a key part of political trust. The prospective element of both confidence and trust clearly distinguish them from retrospective evaluations which are measured by specific support which is "related to the actions and performance of the government or political elites" (Dalton, 1999, p. 58).

Figure 3.2: Model 2 - Two factor specific support and trust model




As Table 3.2 shows, this model has a lower RMSEA and higher CFI and TLI values than the first model. This, along with the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayseian Information Criterion

(BIC) which are both lower for this second model, suggest it is a better fit to the data than the first model tested. But the RMSEA value is still considerably higher than the 0.05 threshold that is generally accepted as a criterion for acceptable fit. It therefore appears that improvements can be made to this model.

Although the items used in this analysis may ultimately be driven by two concepts of specific support and political trust, the diversity of items included in this analysis suggest that there may also be lower level factors which – though highly correlated – reflect distinct aspects of support or trust. These lower level factors would be driven by higher order factors of specific support and trust. Therefore, a third model is estimated with lower order factors focussing on different aspects of specific political support and trust, depending on the object of the survey question, as shown in Figure 3.3.

The inclusion of these lower order factors allows us to determine if there are different dimensions of political support and trust depending on the types of political institutions and outputs evaluated. The lower order factors in this model group together evaluations relating to different types of regime institutions (political institutions, political actors or legal institutions), political authorities (political leaders and parties) and government outputs (in terms of economic performance). This distinguishes between different but inter-related aspects of the two higher order factors.

Figure 3.3: Model 3 - Higher order factor model



As Table 3.2 shows, model 3 has a significantly better fit to the data. With an RMSEA value of 0.040, it appears to fit the data quite well. It also has lower SRMR (Standardized Root Mean Square Residual), AIC and BIC values as well as higher CFI and TLI values than both previous model. On all criteria, Model 3 is the best fitting model. It also best reflects the conceptual discussion presented earlier in this chapter. As Appendix V shows, these results hold not only for the pooled data set but also for each of the waves separately. Factor scores estimated from Model 3 for each wave of data (the full details of which can be found in Appendix W) are therefore used in the next stage of this analysis.

Table 3.2: Model Goodness of Fit Statistics for pooled data models

	Model 1: Single factor	Model 2: Co-varying factors	Model 3: Higher order factor
Log likelhiood	35633.293	30221.744	6082.914
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
RMSEA	0.096	0.089	0.040
AIC	1877000	1871000	1847000
BIC	1877000	1872000	1848000
CFI	0.949	0.957	0.991
TLI	0.934	0.943	0.988
SRMR	0.044	0.045	0.020

Measuring support for democracy

As set out above, there are clear theoretical reasons as to why attitudes towards democracy are not included in the above confirmatory factor analysis. Assessments of the way democracy works in a country are evaluations of the norms and procedures of a political regime. They are therefore citizens' evaluations of how a political regime as a whole performs, rather than of how one aspect of it (such as its institutions or actors) operates. As such, it is a "mid-level" evaluation of a political system (Norris, 2011).

The two items from the LISS Panel relating to attitudes to democracy ask respondents how confident they are in democracy and how satisfied they are with the way it operates in the Netherlands. As outlined above, the prospective evaluation involved in assessments of confidence or trust (in Dutch, "vertrouwen") distinguishes this attitude from satisfaction, a retrospective evaluation of previous performance. Two sets of models are therefore estimated here, one with confidence in

democracy as the dependent variable, and the second with satisfaction with democracy as the dependent variable.

Investigating drivers of support for democracy

With nine waves of data from the LISS Panel core study, the temporal aspect of this dataset can be used to investigate the causal relationships between citizens' support for democracy, specific political support and political trust. By collecting responses to identical questions from the same individuals at different points in time, panel data facilitates the modelling of changes over time and allows lagged variables to be included in models. This provides a stronger basis for causal inference, particularly between variables believed to be strongly inter-related.

However, if "A week is a long time in politics", then the 12 month intervals between the waves of the LISS Panel[24] will inevitably span periods of much political change in the Netherlands. It is therefore important to consider if these time difference are of an appropriate length to detect any relationship between these variables. Given that individuals' political attitudes evolve continuously over on-going periods of time, rather than in discrete steps as demarcated by the arbitrarily timed panel waves, using values from previous waves may not prove useful in determining causality. In fact, using lagged data to investigate contemporaneous effects can lead to coefficients with the opposite sign

[24] The time period between waves 7 and 8 is actually twice as long; wave 7 was conducted in December 2013/January 2014 and wave 8 was conducted in December 2015/January 2016.

of the true effect, causing Vaisey and Miles to conclude that "Capturing short-term processes with widely-spaced data is best approximated by a cross-sectional approach" (2014, pp. 62–63). Given the risk in including outdated lagged variables, only contemporaneous values of the independent variables are included in these models as explanatory for the dependent variable.

However, there is a clear risk for endogeneity issues when investigating the effect of specific support and political trust on support for democracy as there is the potential for reverse or reciprocal causality between these attitudes. Therefore, we cannot rule out, in this model, that support for democracy does not influence people's specific political support or their political trust. To address this, dynamic panel models are estimated using the xtdpdml estimator in Stata (Allison, Williams, & Moral-Benito, 2017). This uses maximum likelihood estimation for structural equation modelling. It estimates models that include lagged values of the dependent variable while allowing values of the independent variables (whether they be lagged or contemporaneous) to be predetermined by (or sequentially exogenous with) earlier values of the dependent variable.

Two sets of models are estimated using this approach; one in which *satisfaction* with democracy is the dependent variable and one in which *confidence* in democracy is the dependent variable. The independent variables included in the model are the factor scores estimate from our third CFA model outlined above: a higher order factor

of political support and a co-varying factor of political trust. Higher values of all three variables reflect more positive attitudes.

As the results in Table 3.3 show, the lagged value of support for democracy and respondent's factor score for political trust and specific support are all significant drivers of satisfaction with and confidence in democracy in the current period. Therefore, respondents' support for democracy at t=t-1 and both their political trust and specific support at t=t are significant drivers of support for democracy at t=t. However, the magnitude of the coefficients in these two models suggest that specific support has a greater impact on citizens' satisfaction with democracy while political trust has a greater impact on the prospective evaluation of confidence in democracy. The magnitude of the coefficients in these models suggest that the effect of specific support on satisfaction with democracy is one and half times greater than its effect on confidence in democracy while the effect of political trust on confidence in democracy is over twice as large as its effect on satisfaction with democracy.

Table 3.3: Non-interacted model results

	Satisfaction with democracy	Confidence in democracy
Satisfaction with democracy L1.	0.099 (0.010)***	
Confidence in democracy L1.		0.100 (0.010)***
Political trust	0.114 (0.030)**	0.230 (0.030)***
Specific support	0.550 (0.036)***	0.373 (0.037)***
Log likelhiood	255.65	228.25
Prob > chi2	<0.001	<0.001
RMSEA	0.029	0.025
CFI	0.989	0.991
TLI	0.978	0.983
Number of units	1,638	1,741
Number of time periods	9	9

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

This shows that both specific support and political trust influence citizens' views of democracy, though the effect of specific support is greater than the effect of citizens' political trust on both satisfaction with and confidence in democracy. It therefore confirms the first hypothesis tested in this paper. But it does not address the second hypothesis, whether specific support moderates the impact of political trust on satisfaction with and confidence in democracy. To do so, a second set of dynamic panel models are estimated including an interactive term between political trust and specific support. When the effect of political trust is allowed to vary by specific support in these models, it is clear that citizens' specific support has a clear moderating effect.

As Table 3.4 shows, both specific political support and political trust continue to have a significant effect on both satisfaction with and confidence in democracy in these interacted models. Furthermore, the

direct effect of specific support continues to be greater in magnitude than the direct effect of political trust. However, when the interaction is added the direct effects of both political trust and specific support are reduced by similar amounts in absolute terms in both models (approximately 0.02 points). But given the smaller magnitude of the coefficient on political trust, the relative impact on its effect on both satisfaction with and confidence in democracy is greater.

These interactive effects demonstrate that political trust has a significant and positive effect on satisfaction with and confidence in democracy when specific support is low, but as specific support increases, the size of the effect of political trust gets closer to zero. At the highest values of specific support, there is no significant relationship between political trust and satisfaction with democracy. The relationship between political trust and confidence in democracy is moderated in a similar fashion; as specific support increase, the effect of an individual's political trust on their confidence in democracy decreases but this remains significant (though much smaller in magnitude) even amongst those people with the highest levels of specific support.

Table 3.4: Interacted model results

	Satisfaction with democracy	Confidence in democracy
Satisfaction with democracy L1.	0.098 (0.010)***	
Confidence in democracy L1.		0.099 (0.009)***
Political trust	0.091 (0.030)**	0.206 (0.030)***
Specific support	0.532 (0.037)***	0.353 (0.037)***
Political trust * Specific support	-0.032 (0.006)***	-0.034 (0.006)***
Chi-squared	276.11	238.61
P-value	<0.001	<0.001
RMSEA	0.029	0.025
CFI	0.989	0.991
TLI	0.978	0.983
Number of observations	1,638	1,741
Number of groups	9	9


Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

As Figure 3.4 shows, the moderating effect of specific support is so large that the effect of political trust on confidence in democracy is more than five times larger for people with the lowest political trust than it is for people with the highest political trust. The effect of political trust on satisfaction with democracy is not even significant for people with the highest level of specific support, but highly significant for those with low specific support[25]. This clearly demonstrates that political trust is an important of driver of support for democracy amongst those with the most negative view of political authorities, institutions and outputs while

[25] For people with the lowest specific support, a one point increase in political trust leads to a 0.364 point increase in their confidence in democracy compared to a 0.071 point increase in confidence in democracy for those with the highest political trust. The effects of a one point change in individuals' political trust on their satisfaction with democracy is 0.240 points for people with the lowest specific support but not statistically significant for those with the highest levels of specific support.

it is far less important for people who have more positive, short-term political assessments.

Figure 3.4: Effects of political trust on satisfaction with and confidence in democracy



These findings clearly demonstrate, therefore, that the relationship between political trust and support for democracy is moderated by individuals' specific political support. This offers empirical evidence to support the notion that political trust acts as a reservoir of

support for the political system as a whole which can help ensure the dissatisfaction with the workings and outputs does not overspill into dissatisfaction with the democratic system as a whole. This also means that when political trust is lower, poor government performance is a bigger risk to citizens' satisfaction with and confidence in democracy than when political trust is higher. This suggests that declines in political trust make poor government performance an increasingly severe threat to support for the democratic system of government as a whole.

Conclusions and discussion

The findings from this paper show that both political support and political trust are clear drivers of satisfaction with and confidence in democracy. Specific support, however, has a larger impact on citizens' satisfaction with democracy than their confidence in democracy while the opposite is true for political trust. Even when controlling for specific support, political trust also has a significant – though much smaller – effect on satisfaction with and confidence in democracy. This offers further evidence that citizens do differentiate between different aspects of political support and, in particular, that they distinguish between retrospective evaluations (satisfaction) and prospective expectations (trust or confidence) of their government.

This paper also highlights how the effect of political trust is not homogenous across all citizens but that it is more important when specific support is low. It therefore offers clear empirical evidence that

political trust acts as a reservoir of diffuse support that helps to ensure that short-term discontent with the workings and outcomes of government does not spill over into dissatisfaction or a lack of confidence in democracy as a whole. For people who are not satisfied with the performance of their government and its outputs, political trust has a larger effect on both their satisfaction with and confidence in democracy than they do for those with higher specific support. This is likely because people who are already content with their government's performance do not need political trust to be satisfied with and have confidence in the system of government that facilitated such performance. For other citizens, political trust becomes a crucial resource that protects democracy from their short-term discontent.

The decline in political trust that has been measured across Western democracies is therefore potentially doubly worrying; not only do decreasing levels of political trust suggest that citizens are becoming increasing critical of the way politics works in their country but low political trust may also fail to stop citizens' short-term discontentment from becoming disenchantment with the democratic system of government as a whole. Given that political communities in modern democracies are made up of diverse individuals with competing interests, it is inevitable that there will always be a sizeable number of citizens who are not satisfied with political authorities, institutions and outputs. When such dissatisfaction is limited to incumbent officeholders, this can be addressed at the ballot box so long as individuals have the option to

replace a government they do not like. However, that would not be a sufficient remedy if low levels of political trust no longer prevent short-term dissatisfaction becoming discontent with the way government works as a whole.

This paper has therefore offered empirical evidence to support the argument that political trust is an important political resource, particularly amongst citizens who are not happy with government performance. However, it has assumed that the relationship between specific support, political trust and support for democracy is stable over time. By estimating coefficients that are constrained to be equal across all survey waves, the approach used in this paper does not allow for political events that happened during the lifetime of the LISS Panel (including the change in government) to impact the way these attitudes intersect. This is an area that merits further attention; is the relationship between political trust, specific support and support for democracy impacted by the context in which the relationship exists and has this relationship evolved over time?

Furthermore, the findings of this paper are limited to a single country. Although there is no reason to believe that the relationship between these attitudes would be fundamentally different in the Netherlands than in other representative democracies, further work is required to establish the extent to which these findings are replicable in other countries. It has already been established that the effect of supporting the winning party in an election on citizens' support for

democracy is greater in majoritarian than in proportional electoral systems (Anderson & Guillory, 1997). Therefore, it would be interesting to see if these findings hold in countries with less proportional electoral systems, fewer coalition governments and less consensus politics.

Nonetheless, this paper does offer empirical evidence that demonstrates the importance of political trust to the health and stability of democratic political systems. It shows that political trust offers protection to the democratic system of government to ensure that it is not under threat from the inevitable short-term fluctuations in citizens' satisfaction with political authorities, institutions and outputs. This means that political trust does not only contribute to the legitimacy of a political system but it also helps to maintain its stability by ensuring that, when support for incumbent officeholders is low, there is an additional mechanism to offer support for democracy as a whole. This means that political trust also affords political elites the freedom to make potentially necessary but unpopular decisions without risking the health of democracy as a whole (even if it may jeopardise their own electoral success).

The importance of trust in representative democracies cannot, therefore, be overlooked. Not only does it have a direct effect on individuals' satisfaction with and confidence in democracy, but it also offers a powerful back-up mechanism for ensuring citizens' support for democracy when specific support is low. As such, it can help to ensure that declines in support for incumbent office holders, the institutions they

run or the outcomes they deliver do not inevitably undermine democracy. As such, it preserves both on-going support for and the stability of democratic systems of government by ensuring that citizens who disagree with the actions and outputs of government limit their discontent to incumbent officeholders rather than democracy as a whole. Without political trust, therefore, citizens' short-term political dissatisfaction could easily become a profound disenchantment with the way democracy works as a whole.

Conclusions and discussion

The important role played by political trust in representative democracies has long been acknowledged in the academic literature. Even before widespread attempts to measure political trust amongst citizens were undertaken in survey research, political trust was recognised as a key resource in democratic political systems where citizens delegate autonomy to their elected representatives to act on their behalf. Findings from attitudinal surveys that have observed a changing relationship between citizens in representative democracies and their governments over recent decades have only increased interest in political trust amongst academics and practitioners alike. However, disputes have continued as to the definition, measurement and role of trust in political life. This thesis sets out to offer further insights on these issues by investigating the important role that political trust continues to play in political life. It offers empirical evidence to support the long-standing theoretical argument as to the value of political trust in representative democracies.

In particular, this thesis has addressed two over-arching questions that are central to research into political trust: i) to what extent is political trust an attitude distinct from people's partisan beliefs and their opinion of incumbent governments?; and ii) what impact does political trust have on other aspects of political life? Investigations into these research questions in this thesis provide practical evidence of the importance of political trust in representative democracies. They show that political

trust is a concept that is distinct but closely related to other political attitudes and that it is a vital resource in political life. In particular, political trust (isolated from other political attitudes) helps to preserve support for democracy and to ensure that governments have the ability to act to tackle the social issues that face its citizens. It does so by helping citizens to overcome the political dissatisfaction or personal sacrifice that many inevitably face in large and diverse political communities.

The papers in this thesis set out the importance of trust in various aspects of political life. They also make clear why great care must be taken in the way political trust is operationalized, observed and discussed in academia and in public life. They highlight how political trust is closely related to, but demonstrably different from, a number of other political attitudes and orientations that also influence citizens' relationships with their government. The findings from these papers show that political trust, as a distinct concept, has a clear and considerable impact on other political attitudes and so shapes many different aspects of political life. Findings from the three empirical papers in this thesis make it clear that the impact of political trust goes above and beyond the effects of partisan orientations and short-term satisfaction with or support for office holders and specific policies. In doing so, these papers offer new insights into the impact of political trust in Europe and the ways in which political trust influences public opinion, citizens' relationship with their government and the policy agenda.

From investigations into the partisan drivers of political trust to empirical investigations of when and why political trust affects actual political life, the papers in this thesis therefore examine the key role political trust plays in representative democracies. They highlight the issue of responses to survey measures being contaminated by other political attitudes but also shed light on why this might be. Furthermore, they show the importance of isolating a clear measure of political trust and investigating its consequences. The findings clearly indicate that political trust affects public attitudes towards government policies and towards the system of government as a whole. They allow us to understand better the nature of trust in representative democracies and the repercussions that declining trust is likely to have in political life. They make it clear that declining political trust (not, necessarily, merely declining figures in responses to individual survey items) is likely to have a serious and significant effect on the policy agenda and the stability of government in representative democracies.

This concluding chapter focuses on two overarching insights that derive from this thesis, before turning to review the methodological implications of this research. It first addresses the partisan nature of measures of political trust observed in survey research, and reflects on why and how this could be addressed in future research. It then turns to the important consequences of political trust that have been identified in this thesis. In particular, it focuses on the role played by trust in helping citizens to overcome personal sacrifice or short-term discontent which

helps to preserve the functioning of government and the stability of democratic systems. It also considers some of the implications these findings have for future research in this area.

The importance of taking the party political out of political trust

Despite the important role trust can play as one aspect of diffuse political support for the political system, it is not an easy phenomenon to capture in survey research. Respondents' answers to questions about political trust suggest that measures of political trust and support for incumbent administrations are often conflated in survey research. Therefore, while political trust may be understood in many academic studies as a manifestation of citizens' belief that their government "will not deliberately or knowingly do [them] harm if they can avoid it, and will look after [their] interests, if this is possible" (Newton, 2007, p. 343), this is not so clear in responses given to attitudinal surveys. Survey responses to question asking about "political trust" appear to reflect respondents' assessments of incumbent officeholders, their actions and outputs. As such, they do not mirror the concept of political trust as an aspect of diffuse support for the political system as a whole. However, if survey respondents understand "political trust" to be a fundamentally different concept than that under investigation by political scientists, then this undermines research in this area.

The first paper in this thesis therefore investigates the extent to which survey measures of political trust are driven by respondents'

political partisanship. Given the abundance of evidence that government supporters report higher political trust (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001; Citrin, 1974; Iyengar, 1980; Norris, 1999b), this paper does not merely ask if partisan supporters of the party in charge of government have higher political trust, but offers empirical evidence as to why this might be. There is clear evidence from this paper that while both government performance and partisanship have direct effects on political trust across Europe, partisanship also moderates the effect of government performance on political trust. People who consider themselves close to a political party appear to perceive or process government performance differently than those with no strong partisanship as the effect of government performance on political trust differs by the direction and the strength of citizens' partisanship. This offers new evidence that helps to explain why political trust (as captured in survey research) varies between supporters who do and do not feel close to the Prime Minister's or another party.

Nonetheless, even given this finding, the direct effect of both supporting the party in charge of government and of how close a respondent feels to a political party persists. Therefore, even when the effect of government performance is allowed to vary by citizens' partisanship, there still appears to be a "winner's bonus" of political trust that is enjoyed by strong partisan supporters of the party in charge of government. This suggests that survey measures of political trust continue to capture a degree of specific political support, driven by

citizens' strength and direction of support for a political party. However, this research focussed on only two areas of government performance (procedural quality and economic outputs) and further investigations could shed light on whether this winner's bonus persists if the effect of other areas of government performance on political trust is allowed to vary by partisanship.

Given that both procedural fairness and economic outputs are generally agreed-upon aims for governments, it is possible that the relationship between more ideologically contentious government outputs, partisanship and political trust may differ from those detected in this paper. When citizens' policy preferences diverge from those of an incumbent government, it is perhaps less likely that the successful implementation of government policies influences the political trust of their opponents in the same way as it does their supporters. This further highlights the problem in assuming that the trustworthiness of a government alone will generate trust; if citizens do not agree about the aims of government action then they are unlikely to reward a fair and effective government that delivers outcomes with which they disagree. Therefore, although the first paper in this thesis offers new insight into the way in which partisanship shapes the relationship between government performance and political trust, the moderating effect of partisanship on political trust may be even greater than that detected in this paper for more highly contested policy areas.

These findings emphasise how trust is a relational concept that depends on the characteristics of both the trusting and the trusted party. Governments who protect their citizens and who can be "counted on to provide equitable outcomes" (Muller et al., 1982, p. 241) could be considered to have trustworthy characteristics, but this is not necessarily sufficient to secure high political trust – especially if not all citizens agree about what equitable outcomes may be. Therefore, citizens may not trust their government, even if it has displayed trustworthy characteristics, because of their own values and beliefs. This is clearly shown in the first paper of this thesis which demonstrates the power of citizens' partisanship to shape their political trust.

This means that any attempts to increase political trust by improving government performance will not inevitably have the desired effect. While they may improve the trustworthiness of government, we cannot assume that this will be recognised to the same extent by all citizens. Attempts to improve trust by improving government performance are likely to make little difference to the political trust of those citizens whose partisanship blinds them to government performance. Therefore, increases in trustworthiness will not necessarily be matched by increases in trust. This has clear implications for practitioners who are likely to find any attempt to increase reported levels of political trust by improving the conduct and outputs of political actors and institutions to be insufficient. This is not because attempts to increase political trust are a lost cause, but because those who believe

trust can be increased simply by improving the trustworthiness of the trusted party fail to recognise the importance of the relational aspect of trust. Whether efforts to improve probity, or the "ethical environment" (Doig, 1996, p. 36), of government will face the same challenges as efforts to improve government performance in increasing political trust remains to be seen. But questions about political probity, related to the accepted ethical processes of a political system rather than simply measures of its performance, are closely related to questions of political trust (Rose, 2014) and the moderating impact of partisanship on the effect of probity on political trust would be an interesting avenue for further research.

This paper implies that partisanship impacts the way that citizens process information as they form their decision to trust. However, it is not in fact clear from these findings to what extent the moderating effect of partisanship on the effect of government performance on trust is a product of citizens' cognitive dissonance, motivated reasoning or different information sources. While there is existing evidence to support the argument that the partisan frame through which citizens view the world has the power to moderate their political attitudes and behaviour (Bisgaard, 2015; Ladner & Wlezien, 2007), it may in fact be the information that citizens receive about government performance that influences their perceptions of government performance and thus of political trust. This would particularly be the case if partisan news sources prevailed and caused close partisan supporters of the governing party to receive different information about government performance than that

received by partisan supports of other parties or non-partisans. The question of what drives the moderating effect of partisanship on the effect of government performance on political trust is therefore an interesting avenue for future research. Is it because partisans receive different information from different sources than other citizens or because they process this information differently, no matter how they receive it?

Nevertheless, while the exact mechanisms explaining the indirect effect of partisanship on trust may merit further exploration, it is abundantly clear that partisanship and party political preferences have both direct and indirect effects on reported levels of political trust. This risks undermining the construct validity of items purported to reflect political trust, conceptualised as an aspect of diffuse political support (and as such limited to evaluations of the workings of a political system, rather than the political actors who control it). Therefore, any attempts to investigate the causes and effects of political trust, if it is conceptualised to be a part of diffuse support, need to address the potential for poor construct validity and systematic measurement error.

The second empirical paper in this thesis demonstrates why any empirical investigations into the consequences of political trust must address the issues caused by survey measures of political trust being contaminated by citizens' partisanship and party political preferences. It makes clear how using citizens' reported political trust without addressing issues of measurement error and endogeneity risks mis-

estimating the true effect of political trust and the impact it has on political life. By comparing results from an instrumental variables (IV) approach, which generates a measure of political trust uncontaminated by citizens' related political attitudes, to those from an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression, which simply uses respondents' reported levels of political trust, it is shown that the OLS regression dramatically underestimates the effect of political trust. This shows that the impact of political trust can be attenuated if it is not isolated from other political attitudes, such as incumbent support. This has clear repercussions for further investigations into the causes and consequences of political trust as the true effect of political trust is mis-estimated when it is not isolated from other political attitudes. Efforts to shed further light on the role played by trust in the political sphere are therefore undermined if they do not attempt use measures of political trust from which contaminating effects of other attitudes and orientations have been eliminated.

There are therefore considerable methodological problems for research into political trust which, if unaddressed, risk undermining the validity of findings about the causal relationship between this and other political attitudes. That is why this thesis has used methodological approaches specifically selected to ensure that an accurate and uncontaminated measure of political trust is obtained. Without attention to the need to de-contaminate measures of political trust (as a component of diffuse and not specific support), we cannot have confidence in the conclusions about its causes and consequences. Given

that declines in political trust reported for the past few decades in many democratic systems have caused concern for the health and operation of representative democracies, such more demanding methodological work must be done to estimate validly the impact of political trust, and any declines in trust, in political life.

Trust can be a bridge and trust can be a reservoir

The findings from this thesis clearly demonstrate that, once isolated from other political attitudes, political trust has a clear and substantial influence on political life in representative democracies. It is an important driver of support for interventionist governments and for the stability of a democratic system of government as a whole. This may not be surprising – after all, who would want to give greater power or strength to any agent they did not trust? – but the breadth and scale of its impact is more remarkable. As shown in the second and third empirical papers of this thesis, political trust influences a range of political attitudes, from citizens' policy preferences to their support for democracy, and it is more valuable in situations of risk, sacrifice or discontent.

The second paper in this thesis investigates the impact of political trust on citizens' preferences for government redistribution. Using an instrumental variable approach, made possible by the MPs' expenses scandal which occurred in the UK in 2009 and which acts as a natural experiment, this paper isolates a de-contaminated measure of political trust from related attitudes, such as incumbent support. The effect of this

uncontaminated measure is then investigated. This shows that political trust is a significant driver of support for government redistribution. Furthermore, as outlined above, the size of this effect is drastically underestimated when steps are not taken to ensure that the measure of political trust used in this analysis is not contaminated by other political attitudes. Studies that do not take these considerations into account therefore risk mis-estimating the true effect of political trust.

However, although political trust is a demonstrably significant driver of support for government redistribution, it does not have a homogenous effect across all citizens. The findings from this paper clearly show the importance of political trust in helping citizens overcome a direct, financial sacrifice to support a government policy that does not confer a direct and immediate benefit on them. This clearly demonstrates the importance of political trust when sacrifice is required. People who benefit from government redistribution do not need political trust to support such policies. However, for those who must make a sacrifice for government redistribution, political trust is a significant and substantial driver of support for these policies. Therefore, political trust can act as bridge to overcome the gap between citizens' self-interest and their willingness to support government action taken for a collective good.

There is therefore clear evidence from this paper that political trust has a significant and substantial effect on policy preferences. These findings also suggest that expressions of political trust do not simply offer survey respondents an alternative way to express their satisfaction with

an incumbent government, because political trust has an effect above and beyond other political attitudes, and specifically so in situations where risks and sacrifice are required. Given that personal sacrifices are inevitably required from at least some citizens for political communities to enjoy the shared benefits offered by collective action, political trust is a crucial resource for political life.

Given its importance in driving support for policies that redistribute wealth, political trust is an important political resource for governments who want to address inequality or poverty by transferring resources from the most to the least well off. This means that the consequences of any decline in political trust are unlikely to be felt equally by all political actors across the ideological spectrum. The effect of political trust on government redistribution therefore has clear policy implications that are particularly relevant for the viability of the aspirations of left wing and interventionist parties who believe that a government has an important role to intervene in social and economic processes in order to improve the life of its citizens. However, there are clearly political actors whose political preferences – such as support for small government and anti-interventionist stances - might actually benefit from a decline in trust. Those who ideologically oppose government redistribution (or state intervention more generally) would see their cause furthered by declines in political trust because citizens need to trust government to support any policy that does not deliver them a direct and immediate benefit. Political trust, therefore, is not a neutral or

apolitical matter. While the attitude itself should not be influenced by citizens' partisanship, it is clear from this paper that declining trust has a disproportionate impact on those who support governments redistributing wealth within their political community.

While the second paper in the thesis focuses on one area of government policy, economic redistribution, political trust is likely to be also a relevant factor for other areas of government action. Redistributive policies are the most high profile way of rearranging resources within a state, but governments also impose costs and sacrifices on their citizens in a range of other areas. In particular, the effects of political trust are likely to extend to international as well as domestic policy. Political trust is likely to be influential in determining citizens' support for foreign aid and other such government action that requires all citizens to make a material sacrifice for no immediate and direct benefit within their own country.

But while the direct relationship found here shows that political trust has a significant effect on citizens' policy preferences, it is also likely to have wider ramifications for the policy agenda because changes in the public mood that are brought about by lower political trust have the capacity to influence government policies and outputs. Representative governments try to ensure they are responsive to public opinion, and if not they may be replaced by an opponent who is. If lower levels of political trust cause citizens to demand that governments do not introduce policies that require them to make a personal sacrifice, then

the capacity for governments to act is very much reduced. And this, in turn, can lead to greater dissatisfaction with government if it is unable – under these restrictions – to tackle important social problems facing its citizens. Given that we know that a government's inability to tackle social problems reduces political trust (Kumlin, 2004; Schäfer, 2010; Torcal, 2014; Zmerli & Castillo, 2015), this risks creating a vicious circle. If declines in political trust create a situation in which governments do not have sufficient public support to introduce policies or programs that address inequality, then they will be unable to tackle some of the biggest social problems facing their political community. Such a failure would likely decrease political trust amongst – at least some – citizens who may see no reason to trust a government that proves to be unable to help the citizens who need it the most.

However, declines in political trust would not only impact the policy-making process. They would also have broader implications for other aspects of political life. As the third paper in this thesis shows, low political trust also risk citizens' support for democracy, especially if governments are not consistently able to deliver the short-term outcomes citizens demand of them. This is not simply because lower levels of political trust lead to lower levels of satisfaction with and confidence in democracy but because the impact of political trust is particularly important when short-term political support is low. Political trust is therefore a crucial resource to ensure that dissatisfaction with incumbent governments and their actions does not immediately transfer

to discontent with the system of representative democracies as a whole. The findings from this third paper therefore suggest that declines in political trust have practical implications for the way democracy operates and for the relationship between citizens and their governments because political trust contributes to the stability, as well as to the long-term health, of democratic systems.

This third empirical paper offers evidence to support Easton's differentiation between political trust – as one aspect of diffuse support – and measures relating to the performance evaluations of a political system, its actors and its outputs. Furthermore, by demonstrating that the effect of political trust is largest for respondents with low specific political support, this paper also provides empirical support for Easton's idea of political trust as a reservoir. When citizens are unhappy with the way an incumbent government is operating or the outputs it produces, political trust acts as a resource that can be called upon to maintain support for a democratic system of government. This demonstrates that political trust can act as a reservoir of support to ensure that poorly performing or poorly perceived incumbents do not put the whole system of democracy at risk. This is particularly pertinent given how citizens appear increasingly discontent (or at least increasingly willing to express their discontent) with political incumbents.

In fact, the nature of politics makes political trust crucially important in this regard. Governments have to make political decisions that affect the lives of large and diverse communities who have diverging

and often competing interests. It is for governments, therefore, to balance the conflicting goals and interests of their citizens to find a way to achieve their political aims. This, inevitably, means that some citizens will disagree with their government and the actions it chooses to take. Political trust allows governments to act without fearing that any discontent their decisions provoke will automatically threaten the health of democracy as a whole.

Both the second and third empirical papers in this thesis investigate the consequences of political trust in just a single country. The selection of these countries (the UK and the Netherlands respectively) was driven by the methodological opportunities and data available there. However, the investigations themselves test hypotheses that are equally relevant for other representative democracies. While other countries – especially those with different political cultures – record different degrees of support for government redistribution and political trust than the UK, or different levels of specific and diffuse support than observed in the Netherlands, there is no clear reason to believe that the relationship between these attitudes as identified in this thesis will be profoundly different in other representative democracies. This is especially true given that this thesis offers clear empirical evidence to support (largely untested) theoretical arguments in the academic literature which set out, without limitation to particular systems, the importance of trust in situations where sacrifice is required or where short-term dissatisfaction

risks undermining long-term support for a system of democratic government.

There is therefore clear evidence from these papers that political trust has serious consequences for the day-to-day business of politics and the health of democracy. In fact, the second empirical paper in this thesis demonstrates how the effect of political trust – when isolated from related, political attitudes – is in fact substantially larger than that estimated in a more simple linear regression model. Given these findings, it is likely that political trust also impacts a far wider range of political attitudes and orientations than included in this thesis. But despite recent interest in levels of political trust across representative democracies, relatively little academic attention has been given to the consequences of political trust. Therefore, little is known about the implications of any decline in political trust, particularly with regards to other political attitudes across Europe. The findings from this thesis clearly suggest that any declines in political trust (as an aspect of diffuse political support) have real and substantial consequences for the political agenda, for the policy making process and for the system of representative democracy as a whole. This means that declines in political trust are likely to impact a government's ability to address the issues facing its citizens as well as risking the on-going support of its citizens for the democratic system as a whole.

The findings from this thesis therefore have clear implications for political actors, as well as academics concerned with the health of

representative democracies. They demonstrate, using empirical evidence from across Europe, how and when political trust is crucial to facilitate the policy making process and to ensure the health and stability of representative democracy. These findings make it clear why modern representative democracies are the precise situations in which trust is important; with diverse political communities and competing demands, political trust is required to preserve the legitimacy of the political institutions and to ensure that government has the resources required to act on behalf of the citizens it represents. Political trust therefore has a crucial role to play – above and beyond the partisanship and incumbent support that often drives the responses to items purported to measure political trust – to protect the operation and institutions of representative government as well as the wellbeing of its citizens.

Methodological implications

As well as the substantive findings from this thesis, the papers in this thesis have also shed further light on the difficulty in capturing empirically the phenomenon of political trust. This difficulty is partly due to the inevitable limitations of survey research; questions in mass surveys do not allow great nuance or detailed qualification. Therefore, important conceptual distinctions between closely related attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and evaluations are reflected only imperfectly, if at all, in the formulation of the stimuli to which respondents are asked to respond. In addition, the conceptual distinctions made by political scientists do not

necessarily reflect the cognitive schemata of respondents or the associations and connotations that are invoked by the phrasing of survey items. All of this implies that it is impossible for citizens to report their level of political trust, uncontaminated by other political attitudes. There is no assurance, therefore, that survey respondents understand the concept of political trust in the same way as political scientists. This, in turn, creates methodological issues for any in-depth investigation into the relationships between political trust and other attitudes and beliefs.

This is partly an inevitable consequence of mass survey research; respondents are often asked broad-brush questions which cannot fully capture the nuances of many of the concepts under investigation. This is compounded by the difficulty in clearly articulating specific political concepts in everyday language for survey questions. Therefore, when survey respondents are asked how much they trust their national government, it appears that they are not assessing whether they believe that the key actors and institutions of political life will act in the best interests of their political community but whether they believe incumbent office holders will implement a policy agenda with which they agree. In-depth analyses of survey responses pertaining to political trust (including latent variable modelling and multivariate explanatory modelling) suggest that answers to questions intended to measure political trust are contaminated by people's opinions of political parties, particularly those in charge of government.

This is why the empirical papers in this thesis use a range of methodological approaches to isolate and investigate political trust to demonstrate the importance of trust in political life. But the methodological issues addressed in this thesis (including measurement error, construct validity and endogeneity) are not only limited to the concept of political trust. They also plague investigations into a wide range of political attitudes, particularly those that are conceptualised more precisely (and hence differently) by political scientists than they are in ordinary language. Therefore, the methodological insights from these papers are relevant for a broad field of social survey research and offer insights into how questions about the relationships between other, inter-related attitudes could be investigated. Without addressing these methodological issues in detail, the relationship between inter-related political attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and evaluations are likely to be mis-estimated, and causal inferences are likely to be biased.

Had these fundamental methodological issues not been addressed in this thesis, the analyses would not have obtained as compelling evidence as it did about the causal relationship between political trust and related political attitudes. Without properly accounting for such methodological issues, we are even in doubt whether the often reported decline in political trust over the past decades really exists (when conceptualising trust as an aspect of diffuse support). Failing to take these issues into account undermines any attempts to understand fully citizens' political trust and the impact it has on political life. Any practical

attempts to react to changes in observed levels of political trust in representative democracies that are based on a methodologically unsound understanding of political trust, its causes and consequences will thus also be fundamentally flawed.

After addressing these methodological issues, this thesis has clearly shown that political trust has profound consequences for political life in representative democracies. In particular, the empirical papers in this thesis offer new empirical evidence to demonstrate that political trust is important in situations where the short-term rewards of government action are not sufficient to satisfy all of its citizens all of the time; this is a common situation across all representative democracies. Political trust also helps citizens to overcome short-term dissatisfaction with their incumbent government or the policies it introduces. As such, it facilitates government action (particularly in policy areas that require citizens' sacrifice) and insulates the democratic system of government from short-term fluctuations in specific support.

Political trust, therefore, ensures that democratically elected governments can survive, even when they take unpopular action, and that they have the room to legislate, even when such action requires sacrifice by some of their citizens. Without political trust, democratic governments would be paralysed to inaction and see the values and principles that underpin representative democracies be – potentially fatally – undermined. For governments who want to use the structures of

representative democracy to act to improve the lives of their citizens it would seem that, without trust, all else is indeed lost.

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uropean Social Study sample size by country by year

	Interview Year									
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	-	1,201	-	-	-	-	-	-	167	1,056
	950	514	3,189	2,350	1,135	1,170	2,636	-	2,478	115
	231	-	-	-	155	2,801	-	-	-	-
	50	-	-	-	-	-	4,008	128	-	-
ublic	-	-	-	708	-	-	-	-	436	964
	940	251	2,463	49	1,600	749	-	-	2,034	33
	-	-	532	1,261	-	-	2,652	84	-	-
	2,729	-	2,847	365	2,718	-	5,341	823	5,225	405
	2,569	1,192	3,338	145	2,362	430	-	-	3,142	638
	1,764	193	1,692	468	1,546	731	2,245	164	2,717	664
	-	-	-	1,289	-	58	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	1,085	-	1,193	68	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	467	117	-	-
	369	682	-	1,938	608	1,564	767	1,103	1,296	436
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	845	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	382	-	672	-	-
ds	2,060	659	1,744	975	1,684	870	1,391	290	1,509	64
	1,363	-	1,413	23	1,257	157	1,356	163	1,322	-


	Interview Year									
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	2,747	2	1,092	113	1,208	21	2,179	15	-	-
	344	569	425	436	-	-	185	753	-	-
	494	433	-	-	1,324	497	880	256	-	-
	1,020	-	1,396	6	1,151	158	1,321	-	850	28
	747	253	1,433	2	-	110	-	-	-	-
	1,425	192	1,503	144	900	400	940	653	1,516	10
ıgdom	1,361	10	3,088	40	1,644	107	1,467	165	-	-
	21,163	6,151	26,155	10,312	20,377	10,205	29,028	6,299	22,692	4,413


Appendix B: Mokken scale analysis of items relating to institutional and political trust from the European Social Survey

Mokken scaling of respondents' trust in public institutions shows that attitudes towards political institutions (parliament, politicians and political parties) form a strong scale (H>0.70).

	Mean score	Political trust scale
Trust in parliament	4.579	0.685
Trust in politicians	3.841	0.761
Trust in political parties	3.846	0.776
Overall scale coefficient (H)	-	0.740
n	-	161,429

Appendix C: Changes in components of government performance by country by year





ıdividual level control variables included in cross-classified models predicting political trust

Variable	Mean value	Categories	% of respondents
Age	51.76		
Gender		Male	48%
		Female	52%
Religion		Catholic	29%
		Protestant	19%
		Orthodox	8%
		Other	3%
		None	42%
Religiosity	5.66		
Discriminated group		No	94%
		Yes	6%
Number in household	2.55		
Born in country		No	4%
		Yes	96%
Citizen of country		No	0.4%
		Yes	99.6%
Household income		Decile 1 or 2	16%
		Decile 3 or 4	20%
		Decile 5 or 6	22%
		Decile 7 or 8	22%
		Decile 9 or 10	20%

Employment status		Housework	7%
		In education	3%
		In work	53%
		Retired	28%
		Unemployed or sick	7%
		Other	1%
Education level		Lower secondary education or lower	25%
		Higher secondary education	40%
		Post-secondary education	35%
Social trust	6.35		
Political interest		Not at all	10%
		Hardly	33%
		Quite	43%
		Very	14%
Vote in previous elections		Prime minister's party	73%
		Other party	27%

redicting political trust – non-interacted and vote choice interaction models

	Political trust		
	Non-performance model	Non-interacted model	Vote choice interaction model
nge in procedural quality			
Difference from mean		0.341***	0.330***
		(0.085)	(0.086)
Mean value		0.507***	0.507***
		(0.087)	(0.087)
nge in economic performance			
Difference from mean		0.070*	0.075*
		(0.029)	(0.030)
Mean value		0.340	0.340
		(0.324)	(0.324)
ction of partisanship			
Voted for opposition/coalition/minor party (Ref.)			
Voted for prime minister's party	0.330***	0.329***	0.327***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
ngth of partisanship			
Not very close to party (Ref.)			
Very close to party	0.546***	0.547***	0.547***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)

ed for prime minister's party*Close to party	0.449***	0.448***	0.446***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
nge in procedural quality difference from mean*Voted for prime minister's party			0.029
			(0.040)
nge in economic output difference from mean*Voted for prime minister's party			-0.012
			(0.012)
rest in politics			
lot at all interested (Ref.)			
lardly interested	0.673***	0.673***	0.673***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Quite interested	1.073***	1.073***	1.073***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
'ery interested	1.192***	1.192***	1.192***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
der: Female (Ref.=Male)	-0.063***	-0.063***	-0.063***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
in years	-0.036***	-0.036***	-0.036***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
squared	0.0003***	0.0003***	0.0003***
	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)
gion			
lo religion (Ref.)			

rotestant	0.147***	0.147***	0.147***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
atholic	0.097***	0.097***	0.097***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
)rthodox	-0.316***	-0.292***	-0.293***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
)ther	0.038	0.042	0.042
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
ree of religiosity	0.057***	0.057***	0.057***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
nber of disadvantaged group	0.533***	0.534***	0.534***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
nber in household	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
en of country	0.055	0.055	0.054
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)
n in country	-0.220***	-0.218***	-0.218***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
sehold income			
st or 2nd decile (Ref.)			
rd of 4th decile	0.002	0.003	0.003
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)

th or 6th decile	0.033	0.033	0.033
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
th or 8th decile	0.127***	0.126***	0.126***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
th or 10th decile	0.214***	0.214***	0.213***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
loyment status			
ı work (Ref.)			
lousework	0.027	0.027	0.027
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
ı education	0.188***	0.187***	0.187***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
etired	-0.072***	-0.072***	-0.072***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Unemployed or sick	-0.127***	-0.127***	-0.127***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
)ther	-0.075	-0.075	-0.076
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
el of education			
ower secondary education or lower (Ref.)			
ligher secondary education	0.042**	0.042**	0.042**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)

ost-secondary education	0.201***	0.201***	0.201***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
st in people	0.230***	0.230***	0.230***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
ime type in 1970			
emocracy (Ref.)			
uthoritarian	-0.680	0.538	0.537
	(0.391)	(0.330)	(0.329)
ommunist	-0.836**	-0.083	-0.084
	(0.279)	(0.262)	(0.261)
toral system family			
roportional representation (Ref.)			
Mixed	-0.025	0.032	0.031
	(0.389)	(0.245)	(0.245)
lurality/Majority	-0.399	0.025	0.025
	(0.453)	(0.287)	(0.287)
s since last election	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00004)
stant	2.014***	1.438***	1.440***
	(0.200)	(0.191)	(0.191)
ervations	119,708	119,708	119,708
ntries	26	26	26
rs	10	10	10

ntries x Years	150	150	150
dom effects			
ntry	0.339	0.118	0.118
r	0.006	0.000	0.000
ntry x Year	0.086	0.069	0.069
idual	2.942	2.942	2.942

$^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$

redicting political trust – fully interacted model and robustness checks

	Dependent variable:				
	Political trust				Ins
	Full model	Single component model	Non-voter model	Coalition model	
procedural quality					
ıce from mean	0.365***		0.405***	0.407***	(
	(0.086)		(0.082)	(0.088)	
alue	0.506***		0.510***	0.503***	(
	(0.088)		(0.085)	(0.087)	
economic performance					
ıce from mean	0.075*		0.072*	0.070*	
	(0.030)		(0.029)	(0.030)	
alue	0.340		0.386	0.313	
	(0.325)		(0.315)	(0.323)	
nt performance					
ıce from mean		0.477***			
		(0.064)			
alue		0.461***			
		(0.077)			

of partisanship					
or opposition/coalition/minor party (Ref.)					
or prime minister's party	0.328***	0.328***	0.324***	0.380***	(
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	
or other coalition party				0.195***	
				(0.014)	
vote			-0.259***		
			(0.015)		
f partisanship					
y close to party (Ref.)					
se to party	0.551***	0.547***	0.563***	0.487***	(
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.029)	
prime minister's party*Close to party	0.411***	0.452***	0.420***	0.475***	(
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.048)	
other coalition party*Close to party				0.255***	
				(0.053)	
te*Close to party			-0.239*		
			(0.098)		
procedural quality interactive effects					
nce from mean*Voted for prime minister's party	-0.007		0.005	-0.054	
	(0.041)		(0.041)	(0.042)	
nce from mean*Voted for other coalition party				-0.121	
				(0.062)	

ıce from mean*Did not vote		0.037		
		(0.047)		
ıce from mean*Close to party	-0.468***	-0.472***	-0.510***	-
	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.098)	
ıce from mean*Voted for prime minister's party*Close to party	0.546***	0.560***	0.587***	
	(0.153)	(0.154)	(0.159)	
ıce from mean*Voted for other coalition party*Close to party			0.323	
			(0.228)	
ıce from mean* Did not vote *Close to party		-0.270		
		(0.319)		
economic performance interactive effects				
ıce from mean*Voted for prime minister's party	-0.005	-0.006	0.002	
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
ıce from mean*Voted for other coalition party			-0.022	
			(0.020)	
ıce from mean*Did not vote		-0.016		
		(0.016)		
ıce from mean*Close to party	0.021	0.018	0.008	
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.029)	
ıce from mean*Voted for prime minister's party*Close to party	-0.115**	-0.109*	-0.097*	-
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.046)	

ıce from mean*Voted for other coalition party*Close to party				-0.061	
				(0.072)	
ıce from mean* Did not vote *Close to party			-0.188		
			(0.123)		
nt performance interactive effects					
ıce from mean*Voted for prime minister's party		-0.010			
		(0.030)			
ıce from mean*Close to party		0.422***			
		(0.067)			
ıce from mean*Voted for prime minister's party*Close to party		-0.279*			
		(0.116)			
politics					
ıll interested (Ref.)					
nterested	0.673***	0.673***	0.670***	0.671***	(
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.020)	
ıterested	1.073***	1.073***	1.055***	1.074***	(
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)	
erested	1.192***	1.192***	1.153***	1.191***	(
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.023)	
emale (Ref.=Male)	-0.063***	-0.063***	-0.045***	-0.065***	-
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	
rs	-0.036***	-0.036***	-0.041***	-0.036***	-
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	

ed	0.0003***	0.0003***	0.0004***	0.0003***	0
	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(
ion (Ref.)					
ant	0.147***	0.147***	0.152***	0.146***	(
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	
:	0.097***	0.096***	0.097***	0.092***	(
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.017)	
ox	-0.294***	-0.299***	-0.255***	-0.290***	-
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.048)	
	0.042	0.040	0.033	0.040	
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.035)	
religiosity	0.057***	0.057***	0.059***	0.056***	(
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
f disadvantaged group	0.532***	0.533***	0.542***	0.528***	(
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)	
household	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001	-0.003	
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	
country	0.051	0.054	-0.277***	0.053	-
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.044)	(0.084)	
untry	-0.218***	-0.219***	-0.279***	-0.218***	-
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.025)	

l income					
d decile (Ref.)					
h decile	0.004	0.003	-0.001	0.001	
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.018)	
h decile	0.033	0.032	0.037*	0.029	
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	
h decile	0.126***	0.126***	0.128***	0.122***	(
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.020)	
)th decile	0.214***	0.214***	0.212***	0.208***	(
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)	
nt status					
(Ref.)					
ork	0.028	0.027	0.021	0.028	
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)	
ation	0.188***	0.188***	0.243***	0.184***	(
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.031)	
	-0.072***	-0.073***	-0.057***	-0.071***	-
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	
loyed or sick	-0.128***	-0.128***	-0.121***	-0.128***	-
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)	
	-0.075	-0.075	-0.091	-0.076	-
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.055)	

lucation					
econdary education or lower (Ref.)					
secondary education	0.042**	0.042**	0.012	0.040**	(
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	
condary education	0.201***	0.201***	0.168***	0.195***	(
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)	
ople	0.230***	0.230***	0.228***	0.229***	(
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	
pe in 1970					
acy (Ref.)					
tarian	0.540	0.540	0.515	0.546	
	(0.330)	(0.341)	(0.321)	(0.329)	
nist	-0.084	0.180	-0.125	-0.058	
	(0.262)	(0.251)	(0.254)	(0.261)	
ystem family					
ional representation (Ref.)					
	0.029	0.168	0.042	0.032	
	(0.246)	(0.231)	(0.238)	(0.244)	
//Majority	0.023	0.067	0.064	0.047	
	(0.288)	(0.276)	(0.280)	(0.286)	
last election	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	
	(0.00004)	(0.00004)	(0.00003)	(0.00004)	(


	1.444***	1.345***	1.974***	1.394***	2
	(0.191)	(0.188)	(0.172)	(0.190)	
ons	119,708	119,708	140,642	119,708	1
	26	26	26	26	
	10	10	10	10	
x Years	150	150	150	150	
ffects					
	0.119	0.108	0.112	0.116	
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
Year	0.069	0.058	0.066	0.070	
	2.941	2.941	3.006	2.934	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Appendix G: Distribution of responses on tax-spend scale from the 2010 British Election Study

The BES collected respondents' support for government tax and spending through a question that asked "Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where would you place yourself on this scale?" Although this collects responses on a categorical scale, the large number of response categories and the relatively normal distribution of these, as shown below, suggests it can be treated as an interval scale in this model.

n=12,860



Source: British Election Study 2010: Pre-Campaign Internet Panel Survey

Appendix H: Mokken scale analysis of items relating to institutional and political trust from the 2010 British Election Study

Mokken scaling of respondents' level of trust in the representative institutions of government shows that attitudes towards political institutions (parliament, politicians and political parties) form a very strong scale (H>0.80) while adding trust in the courts and the police weakens the overall strength of the scale considerably.

	Mean score	Institutional trust scale	Political trust scale
Trust in parliament	3.325	0.650	0.810
Trust in politicians	2.971	0.650	0.837
Trust in political parties	3.094	0.632	0.813
Trust in courts	5.244	0.534	-
Trust in police	5.615	0.480	-
Overall scale coefficient (H)	-	0.588	0.820
n	-	16,149	16,275

Appendix I: Differences between sub-groups of sample for instrumental variable model

The findings from the instrumental variable model could be undermined if respondents' whose MP made large expense claims were fundamentally different from those whose MP did not and if these differences were likely to drive respondents' support for government redistribution. To ensure this was not the case, respondents' MP's expenses claims are compared to see if they differ along key demographic, socio-economic and political grounds. As shown below, there are statistically significant differences in respondents' MP's expenses claims when split by region, age, ethnicity, marital status and if the respondent cares for children, a disabled person or the elderly. There are also significant differences between respondents with different levels of education, income, occupational grade, sector of work, property tenure and party identification.

As these can be considered pre-treatment effects, these variables are included in the model to control for these differences, along with respondents' attention to politics which is significantly correlated with their MP's expense claim ($r=-0.0317$, $p<0.001$).

Variable	Categories	Median claim	P-value
Region	East Anglia	£20,513.22	<0.001
	East Midlands	£20,855.48	
	Greater London	£2,916.00	
	North	£19,813.38	
	North West	£20,148.47	
	Scotland	£17,352.16	
	South East	£18,282.59	
	South West	£20,416.16	
	Wales	£20,371.13	
	West Midlands	£19,181.87	
	Yorkshire and The Humber	£20,618.31	
Property tenure	Own	£18,967.88	<0.001
	Rent	£17,883.41	
	Neither	£17,998.47	
Gender	Male	£18,582.34	0.342
	Female	£18,826.91	
Ethnicity	White	£18,908.09	<0.001
	Non-white	£11,370.60	
Religious	No	£18,582.34	0.565
	Yes	£18,826.91	
Occupational grade	D/E	£19,236.96	<0.001
	C2	£19,181.87	
	C1	£18,364.11	

	A/B	£18,428.34	
Sector of work	Never worked	£19,370.98	<0.001
	Private	£18,763.47	
	Public	£18,882.36	
	Voluntary	£17,216.07	
Highest qualification	None	£18,780.91	<0.001
	GCSEs	£19,069.88	
	A Levels	£18,917.36	
	HE Diploma	£19,763.53	
	Degree	£18,168.99	
Annual household income	Unknown	£18,967.88	<0.001
	Under 20	£19,069.88	
	20-40	£18,908.09	
	40-60	£18,763.47	
	Over 60	£17,267.87	
Carer	No	£18,582.34	0.026
	Yes	£18,967.88	
Trade Union Member	No	£18,826.91	0.656
	Yes	£18,430.34	
Age	18-29	£17,648.00	<0.001
	30-44	£18,429.34	
	45-59	£18,998.62	
	60+	£19,620.36	
Has children	No	£18,763.47	0.879
	Yes	£18,780.91	
Party identification	None/Don't know	£18,826.91	<0.001
	Labour	£18,144.18	
	Conservatives	£19,181.87	
	Liberal Democrats	£18,763.47	
	Nationalists	£17,831.95	
	Other	£18,998.62	
Marital status	Single, divorced, widowed or separated	£17,946.15	<0.001
	Married or living as married	£19,017.45	
Main source of income	Earnings	£18,428.34	<0.001
	Private pension	£19,773.22	
	State pension	£18,826.91	
	Benefits	£18,998.62	
	Other	£18,912.72	

Appendix J: Constituency level differences for instrumental variable model

The findings from the instrumental variable model could also be undermined if constituencies where an MP made large expense claims were fundamentally different from those where an MP did not and if these differences were likely to drive respondents' support for government redistribution. As shown below, an MP's expenses claims is significantly correlated with the percentage of people in their constituency who are economically active, who are white, in poor health, have no educational qualifications, are limited by disability or who own their own home. They are also significantly correlated with the percentage of respondents who fall under at least one measure of deprivation or under at least four measures of deprivation, the percentage of households with no adults in work and the constituency's population density. These constituency-level variables are therefore controlled for in the model.

	Pearson correlation		Kendall correlation	
Variable	**R**	**P-value**	**Tau**	**P-value**
% households with no adult in work	-0.33	<0.01	-0.19	0.01
% economically active	-0.17	0.02	-0.08	1
% white	0.39	<0.01	0.22	<0.01
% in poor health	0.11	1.00	0.05	1
% with no qualifications	0.21	<0.01	0.11	1
% limited by disability	0.29	<0.01	0.15	0.1
% own home	0.35	<0.01	0.17	0.02
Population density	-0.45	<0.01	-0.23	<0.01
% in 1 index of deprivation	-0.16	0.03	-0.09	1
% in 2 index of deprivation	0.01	1.00	-0.01	1
% in 3 index of deprivation	-0.12	0.75	-0.09	1
% in 4 index of deprivation	-0.28	<0.01	-0.15	0.12
Job density	-0.09	1.00	0.01	1
% claiming any benefit	-0.15	0.12	-0.09	1

Appendix K: Comparison of OLS and Ordered Probit Models predicting support for government redistribution

Although the OLS and ordered probit models are not directly comparable, the R^2 of the OLS model is larger and the direction and significance of the coefficients are consistent across both models. Furthermore, the majority of differences between the truncation points are between 0.31 and 0.47, so similar in magnitude. Therefore, there is no compelling evidence that an ordered probit model is required to estimate respondents' support for government redistribution.

Variable	OLS	Ordered Probit
Measured political trust	0.176***	0.090***
	(0.011)	(0.006)
Age (Reference category=18-29 years old)		
30-44 years old	0.136**	0.081**
	(0.067)	(0.034)
45-59 years old	0.340***	0.188***
	(0.069)	(0.035)
60 years old+	0.280***	0.162***
	(0.096)	(0.049)
Married	-0.032	-0.017
	(0.049)	(0.025)
Non-white	-0.483***	-0.249***
	(0.121)	(0.062)
Carer	0.095**	0.044*
	(0.044)	(0.023)
Annual household income (Reference category = Don't know)		
Under £20,000	0.045	0.024
	(0.077)	(0.039)
£20,000-£39.999	-0.053	-0.030
	(0.070)	(0.036)
£40,000-£59.999	-0.150*	-0.079*
	(0.078)	(0.040)
£60,000 or over	-0.323***	-0.161***
	(0.092)	(0.047)
Main source of income (Reference category=Don't know)		
Earnings	-0.046	-0.008
	(0.171)	(0.086)
Private pension	-0.078	-0.031
	(0.182)	(0.092)
State pension	0.392**	0.218**
	(0.194)	(0.098)
State benefits	0.424**	0.242**
	(0.193)	(0.098)
Other	0.043	0.043
	(0.203)	(0.104)
Housing tenure (Reference category=Own)		
Rent	0.169***	0.082***
	(0.058)	(0.030)
Neither	-0.136	-0.073
	(0.162)	(0.080)

Occupational grade (Reference category=D/E/never worked)		
C2	-0.014	-0.001
	(0.065)	(0.034)
C1	-0.018	-0.009
	(0.064)	(0.034)
A/B	-0.137**	-0.069**
	(0.061)	(0.032)
Sector of work (Reference category=Never worked)		
Private	-0.343***	-0.180***
	(0.127)	(0.065)
Public	0.090	0.043
	(0.131)	(0.067)
Voluntary	0.093	0.048
	(0.154)	(0.080)
Highest education qualification (Reference category=None)		
GCSEs	-0.080	-0.047
	(0.066)	(0.034)
A Levels	-0.055	-0.033
	(0.070)	(0.036)
HE diploma	0.185*	0.091*
	(0.098)	(0.050)
University degree	0.016	0.012
	(0.072)	(0.037)
Party identification (Reference category=None)		
Labour	0.651***	0.353***
	(0.063)	(0.033)
Conservative	-0.811***	-0.417***
	(0.062)	(0.032)
Liberal Democrats	0.458***	0.249***
	(0.073)	(0.038)
Nationalist party	-0.118	-0.030
	(0.346)	(0.174)
Other party	-0.250***	-0.113**
	(0.092)	(0.047)
Attention to politics	-0.002	0.003
	(0.011)	(0.005)
Region (Reference category=East Anglia)		
East Midlands	-0.236**	-0.132**
	(0.104)	(0.055)
Greater London	-0.094	-0.041
	(0.117)	(0.061)
North	-0.255**	-0.130**
	(0.122)	(0.065)
North West	-0.133	-0.064
	(0.107)	(0.056)
South East	-0.061	-0.025
	(0.089)	(0.047)
South West	-0.042	-0.027
	(0.096)	(0.050)
Wales	0.078	0.043
	(0.144)	(0.074)
West Midlands	-0.113	-0.064
	(0.118)	(0.062)
Yorkshire & Humber	-0.133	-0.068
	(0.105)	(0.056)
Constituency level variables		
% economically active	0.005	0.002

	(0.010)	(0.005)
% receiving state benefits	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
% with no qualifications	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.011)	(0.005)
% limited by disability	0.012	0.005
	(0.017)	(0.009)
% own home	-0.004	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.002)
% white	-0.001	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.002)
% in 1 index of deprivation	-0.029*	-0.014*
	(0.016)	(0.008)
% in 4 indices of deprivation	-0.157	-0.094
	(0.170)	(0.092)
% households not in work	-0.010	-0.005
	(0.012)	(0.006)
Population density	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Constant	5.399***	
	(1.097)	
Truncation points		
1		-1.894***
		(0.564)
2		-1.725***
		(0.564)
3		-1.409**
		(0.563)
4		-1.048*
		(0.563)
5		-0.699
		(0.562)
6		0.298
		(0.562)
7		0.751
		(0.563)
8		1.218**
		(0.564)
9		1.666***
		(0.565)
10		1.858***
		(0.566)
Observations	12,784	12,784
Clusters	571	571
R^2	0.155	
Pseudo R^2		0.0425

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

ero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model predicting support for government redistribution

ge number of zero scores on the political trust scale, a zero-inflated negative binomial model was also used to estim
evel of political trust. Predicted probabilities from this model are almost identical to those produced from an OLS n
evidence that this would offer a substantial improvement to the first stage of the instrumental variable approach.

Variables	Full Model	Logit Model	Constant only Model
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s)	-0.002*	-0.014***	
	(0.001)	(0.005)	
MP claimed London Supplement	-0.228***	7.553	
	(0.052)	(5.437)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) *	0.058***	-2.504	
London Supplement	(0.010)	(1.897)	
Age (Reference category=18-29 years old)			
30-44 years old	-0.080***	0.327***	
	(0.018)	(0.109)	
45-59 years old	-0.101***	0.366***	
	(0.018)	(0.107)	
60 years old+	-0.095***	0.334**	
	(0.024)	(0.148)	
Married	-0.005	0.044	
	(0.015)	(0.079)	
Non-white	0.058**	-0.222	
	(0.028)	(0.160)	
Carer	0.010	-0.021	
	(0.014)	(0.075)	

Annual household income (Reference category = Don't know)		
Under £20,000	0.030	0.037
	(0.021)	(0.101)
£20,000-£39.999	0.053***	-0.210**
	(0.019)	(0.102)
£40,000-£59.999	0.040*	-0.283**
	(0.021)	(0.123)
£60,000 or over	0.066***	-0.819***
	(0.024)	(0.167)
Main source of income (Reference category=Don't know)		
Earnings	-0.042	-0.488*
	(0.040)	(0.252)
Private pension	-0.049	-0.655***
	(0.044)	(0.253)
State pension	0.000	-0.643**
	(0.046)	(0.268)
State benefits	-0.037	-0.506*
	(0.050)	(0.264)
Other	-0.005	-1.168***
	(0.046)	(0.298)
Housing tenure (Reference category=Own)		
Rent	-0.013	0.155*
	(0.016)	(0.086)
Neither	-0.040	0.284
	(0.045)	(0.224)
Occupational grade (Reference category=D/E/never worked)		
C2	-0.002	-0.033
	(0.020)	(0.091)
C1	0.011	-0.215**
	(0.018)	(0.107)

A/B	-0.039**	-0.015
	(0.017)	(0.099)
Sector of work (Reference category=Never worked)		
Private	-0.050	-0.074
	(0.031)	(0.155)
Public	-0.030	-0.084
	(0.033)	(0.163)
Voluntary	0.012	-0.298
	(0.041)	(0.208)
Highest education qualification (Reference category=None)		
GCSEs	0.001	-0.066
	(0.019)	(0.096)
A Levels	-0.021	-0.198*
	(0.019)	(0.106)
HE diploma	0.004	-0.476***
	(0.025)	(0.152)
University degree	0.022	-0.542***
	(0.020)	(0.118)
Party identification (Reference category=None)		
Labour	0.331***	-1.413***
	(0.018)	(0.094)
Conservative	0.195***	-1.160***
	(0.018)	(0.096)
Liberal Democrats	0.163***	-1.379***
	(0.022)	(0.137)
Nationalist party	0.067	-0.877**
	(0.075)	(0.417)
Other party	-0.117***	0.106
	(0.032)	(0.098)
Attention to politics	0.039***	-0.095***
	(0.003)	(0.015)

Region (Reference category=East Anglia)		
East Midlands	-0.001	0.022
	(0.026)	(0.165)
Greater London	0.046	-0.310
	(0.035)	(0.224)
North	-0.042	0.415**
	(0.036)	(0.176)
North West	0.022	0.247
	(0.029)	(0.170)
South East	-0.001	-0.085
	(0.024)	(0.139)
South West	-0.029	-0.008
	(0.030)	(0.155)
Wales	0.009	0.104
	(0.037)	(0.216)
West Midlands	-0.029	-0.105
	(0.027)	(0.167)
Yorkshire & Humber	-0.013	-0.079
	(0.026)	(0.157)
Constituency level variables		
% economically active	-0.002	-0.008
	(0.002)	(0.015)
% receiving state benefits	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
% with no qualifications	0.001	0.025*
	(0.003)	(0.015)
% limited by disability	-0.008*	-0.023
	(0.005)	(0.030)
% own home	-0.000	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.008)


% white	0.002*	-0.002	
	(0.001)	(0.005)	
% in 1 index of deprivation	-0.004	0.034	
	(0.005)	(0.023)	
% in 4 indices of deprivation	-0.005	-0.202	
	(0.045)	(0.248)	
% households not in work	0.002	-0.007	
	(0.003)	(0.018)	
Population density	0.000	-0.000	
	(0.000)	(0.003)	
Constant	2.333***	-0.200	-1.583***
	(0.287)	(1.608)	(0.026)
Observations	13,227	13,227	13,227
Clusters	556.000	556.000	556.000

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix M: Fitted values from OLS and ZINB models predicting support for government redistribution

To compare the results of OLS and zero-inflated negative binomial models to predict levels of political trust, predicted probabilities from the two models are compared. As shown below, these values are almost identical; the mean value of both sets is 3.122 and they are highly correlated R=0.996.



ffect of political trust on support for increased government tax and spending

ults from an OLS model and an instrumental variable approach shows that the OLS model underestimates the effe
ially; the coefficient on the instrumented measure of political trust in the 2nd stage regression is almost four times l
s model.

Variables	OLS	1st stage Political trust	2nd stage Support for redistribution
Measured political trust	0.176***		
	(0.011)		
Instrumented political trust			0.703**
			(0.304)
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s)		-0.002	
		(0.003)	
MP claimed London Supplement		-1.274***	
		(0.184)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) *		0.318***	
London Supplement		(0.035)	
Age (Reference category=18-29 years old)			
30-44 years old	0.136**	-0.342***	0.325***
	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.122)
45-59 years old	0.340***	-0.433***	0.571***
	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.146)
60 years old+	0.280***	-0.416***	0.487***
	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.160)
Married	-0.032	-0.051	-0.006
	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.060)
Non-white	-0.483***	0.282***	-0.654***
	(0.121)	(0.107)	(0.159)

Carer	0.095**	0.017	0.075
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.052)
Annual household income (Reference category = Don't know)			
Under £20,000	0.045	0.094	-0.003
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.090)
£20,000-£39.999	-0.053	0.227***	-0.174*
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.101)
£40,000-£59.999	-0.150*	0.231***	-0.271**
	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.106)
£60,000 or over	-0.323***	0.450***	-0.569***
	(0.091)	(0.093)	(0.166)
Main source of income (Reference category=Don't know)			
Earnings	-0.046	0.196	-0.156
	(0.170)	(0.200)	(0.207)
Private pension	-0.078	0.253	-0.206
	(0.181)	(0.202)	(0.221)
State pension	0.392**	0.418*	0.204
	(0.194)	(0.214)	(0.259)
State benefits	0.424**	0.173	0.335
	(0.192)	(0.218)	(0.226)
Other	0.043	0.480**	-0.224
	(0.202)	(0.221)	(0.279)
Housing tenure (Reference category=Own)			
Rent	0.169***	-0.096	0.210***
	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.072)
Neither	-0.136	-0.183	-0.077
	(0.162)	(0.166)	(0.191)
Occupational grade (Reference category=D/E/never worked)			
C2	-0.014	-0.011	-0.025
	(0.065)	(0.071)	(0.076)

C1	-0.018	0.087	-0.069
	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.083)
A/B	-0.137**	-0.148**	-0.064
	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.083)
Sector of work (Reference category=Never worked)			
Private	-0.343***	-0.133	-0.292*
	(0.126)	(0.121)	(0.156)
Public	0.090	-0.057	0.101
	(0.130)	(0.125)	(0.155)
Voluntary	0.093	0.155	-0.019
	(0.153)	(0.158)	(0.183)
Highest education qualification (Reference category=None)			
GCSEs	-0.080	0.041	-0.093
	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.078)
A Levels	-0.055	0.028	-0.066
	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.083)
HE diploma	0.185*	0.189**	0.081
	(0.097)	(0.089)	(0.128)
University degree	0.016	0.229***	-0.104
	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.111)
Party identification (Reference category=None)			
Labour	0.651***	1.526***	-0.154
	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.470)
Conservative	-0.811***	0.932***	-1.306***
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.293)
Liberal Democrats	0.458***	0.922***	-0.027
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.293)
Nationalist party	-0.118	0.566**	-0.404
	(0.345)	(0.260)	(0.400)
Other party	-0.250***	-0.335***	-0.082
	(0.092)	(0.082)	(0.151)

Attention to politics	-0.002	0.138***	-0.074*
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.045)
Region (Reference category=East Anglia)			
East Midlands	-0.236**	-0.030	-0.223*
	(0.104)	(0.097)	(0.124)
Greater London	-0.094	0.230*	-0.180
	(0.116)	(0.126)	(0.141)
North	-0.255**	-0.278**	-0.129
	(0.122)	(0.134)	(0.172)
North West	-0.133	-0.061	-0.124
	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.120)
South East	-0.061	-0.007	-0.078
	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.102)
South West	-0.042	-0.144	0.030
	(0.096)	(0.102)	(0.120)
Wales	0.078	-0.024	0.086
	(0.144)	(0.138)	(0.164)
West Midlands	-0.113	-0.110	-0.077
	(0.118)	(0.098)	(0.131)
Yorkshire & Humber	-0.133	-0.025	-0.132
	(0.104)	(0.096)	(0.120)
Constituency level variables			
% economically active	0.005	-0.002	0.011
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)
% receiving state benefits	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
% with no qualifications	-0.007	-0.009	-0.003
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)
% limited by disability	0.012	-0.019	0.026
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.022)

% own home	-0.004	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
% white	-0.001	0.007**	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
% in 1 index of deprivation	-0.029*	-0.022	-0.018
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)
% in 4 indices of deprivation	-0.157	0.092	-0.238
	(0.170)	(0.165)	(0.199)
% households not in work	-0.010	0.009	-0.015
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Population density	0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	5.399***	2.256**	4.064***
	(1.093)	(1.080)	(1.485)
Observations	12,784	12,433	12,433
R-squared	0.155		
Clusters	571		556
F-Test of instrument			27.55
P value - Test of Underidentification			0.046

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

ffect of political trust on support for increased government tax and spending by household income

rumented measure of political trust is interacted with a dummy variable denoting those respondents whose housel
ne UK median value for 2010-11, political trust is only a significant driver of trust for individuals with an above medi
nagnitude of the effect of trust for this group is also larger than that estimated using a non-interacted instrumental
;her levels of political trust cause higher levels of support for government redistribution only for those respondents
eive a direct benefit from such policies.

ariables	1st stage Political trust	1st stage Political trust * high income	2nd stage Support for redistributio
IP's Expenses Claim (£000s)	-0.001	0.004**	
	(0.006)	(0.002)	
IP claimed London Supplement	-0.816***	-0.262**	
	(0.305)	(0.131)	
IP's Expenses Claim (£000s) *	0.172***	-0.007	
London Supplement	(0.049)	(0.028)	
IP's Expenses Claim (£000s) * high income	-0.002	-0.008*	
	(0.007)	(0.005)	
IP claimed London Supplement * high income	-0.644**	-1.128***	
	(0.307)	(0.195)	
IP's Expenses Claim (£000s) *	0.204***	0.426***	
London Supplement * high income	(0.048)	(0.033)	
olitical trust			0.374
			(0.423)
olitical trust * high income			0.464
			(0.413)

ge (Reference category=18-29 years old)			
30-44 years old	-0.341***	-0.136***	0.277**
	(0.065)	(0.052)	(0.127)
45-59 years old	-0.433***	-0.199***	0.522***
	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.150)
60 years old+	-0.415***	-0.175**	0.431***
	(0.091)	(0.069)	(0.166)
larried	-0.051	-0.018	-0.014
	(0.055)	(0.039)	(0.059)
on-white	0.282***	0.106	-0.610***
	(0.108)	(0.087)	(0.165)
arer	0.018	-0.015	0.089*
	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.054)
nnual household income (Reference category = Don't know)			
Under £20,000	0.094	0.019	0.016
	(0.077)	(0.024)	(0.085)
£20,000-£39.999	0.259*	3.290***	-1.568
	(0.147)	(0.093)	(1.245)
£40,000-£59.999	0.263*	3.337***	-1.687
	(0.154)	(0.102)	(1.265)
£60,000 or over	0.481***	3.579***	-2.029
	(0.162)	(0.112)	(1.314)
lain source of income (Reference category=Don't know)			
Earnings	0.197	0.105	-0.146
	(0.200)	(0.114)	(0.201)
Private pension	0.254	0.142	-0.194
	(0.202)	(0.116)	(0.218)
State pension	0.420*	0.081	0.298
	(0.214)	(0.113)	(0.265)
State benefits	0.174	0.188	0.299
	(0.219)	(0.116)	(0.222)

Other	0.482**	0.125	-0.130
	(0.221)	(0.125)	(0.288)
ousing tenure (Reference category=Own)			
Rent	-0.096	-0.079*	0.215***
	(0.060)	(0.044)	(0.072)
Neither	-0.184	-0.119	-0.085
	(0.166)	(0.128)	(0.196)
ccupational grade (Reference category=D/E/never worked)			
C2	-0.012	0.008	-0.032
	(0.071)	(0.050)	(0.075)
C1	0.087	0.039	-0.059
	(0.071)	(0.049)	(0.081)
A/B	-0.149**	-0.066	-0.082
	(0.065)	(0.049)	(0.082)
ector of work (Reference category=Never worked)			
Private	-0.133	-0.039	-0.315**
	(0.121)	(0.076)	(0.151)
Public	-0.058	0.004	0.081
	(0.125)	(0.077)	(0.150)
Voluntary	0.155	0.114	-0.019
	(0.158)	(0.105)	(0.177)
ighest education qualification (Reference category=None)			
GCSEs	0.041	0.070	-0.113
	(0.069)	(0.051)	(0.078)
A Levels	0.028	0.017	-0.064
	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.082)
HE diploma	0.189**	0.074	0.109
	(0.089)	(0.073)	(0.128)
University degree	0.230***	0.157***	-0.101
	(0.075)	(0.060)	(0.109)

arty identification (Reference category=None)			
Labour	1.526***	0.863***	-0.052
	(0.061)	(0.046)	(0.466)
Conservative	0.933***	0.464***	-1.213***
	(0.060)	(0.047)	(0.298)
Liberal Democrats	0.923***	0.520***	0.035
	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.291)
Nationalist party	0.567**	0.302	-0.357
	(0.260)	(0.198)	(0.407)
Other party	-0.335***	-0.102	-0.144
	(0.082)	(0.065)	(0.156)
ttention to politics	0.137***	0.076***	-0.064
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.044)
egion (Reference category=East Anglia)			
East Midlands	-0.030	0.017	-0.242**
	(0.097)	(0.069)	(0.123)
Greater London	0.229*	0.169*	-0.191
	(0.126)	(0.094)	(0.139)
North	-0.279**	-0.079	-0.185
	(0.134)	(0.112)	(0.182)
North West	-0.062	0.061	-0.170
	(0.108)	(0.082)	(0.128)
South East	-0.007	0.079	-0.116
	(0.085)	(0.066)	(0.108)
South West	-0.144	-0.044	0.004
	(0.102)	(0.072)	(0.123)
Wales	-0.025	0.075	0.044
	(0.138)	(0.107)	(0.170)
West Midlands	-0.111	-0.067	-0.082
	(0.098)	(0.073)	(0.133)

Yorkshire & Humber	-0.026	-0.045	-0.119
	(0.096)	(0.074)	(0.121)
onstituency level variables			
% economically active	-0.002	-0.001	0.010
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.011)
% receiving state benefits	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
% with no qualifications	-0.009	0.010	-0.010
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.014)
% limited by disability	-0.019	-0.026*	0.031
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.022)
% own home	-0.002	-0.006	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
% white	0.007**	0.004	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)
% in 1 index of deprivation	-0.022	-0.012	-0.019
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.020)
% in 4 indices of deprivation	0.091	0.031	-0.225
	(0.165)	(0.135)	(0.196)
% households not in work	0.009	-0.005	-0.009
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Population density	0.001	0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
onstant	2.242**	-0.116	4.858***
	(1.083)	(0.819)	(1.663)
bservations	12,433	12,433	12,433
usters			556
value - Test of underidentification			0.028
Test of non-interacted instrument			22.11

Test of interacted instrument	95.31
value - Test of joint significance	0.026

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

stimating effect of political trust on support for increased government tax and spending by household income using
laximum Likelihood estimators

: the estimated effect of political trust is not biased by weak instruments, we also use limited information maximun
rs which offer a more robust estimation method in the presence of weak instruments. The results of these models
e using two stage least squares (2sls), and there is no change in the significance of the instrumented trust variables
their magnitude. The size of the effect of political trust estimated using this method is in fact greater than that 2sl

ariables	1st stage Political trust	1st stage Political trust * high income	2nd stage Support for redistributio
1P's Expenses Claim (£000s)	-0.001	0.004**	
	(0.006)	(0.002)	
1P claimed London Supplement	-0.816***	-0.262**	
	(0.305)	(0.131)	
1P's Expenses Claim (£000s) * London Supplement	0.172***	-0.007	
	(0.049)	(0.028)	
1P's Expenses Claim (£000s) * high income	-0.002	-0.008*	
	(0.007)	(0.005)	
1P claimed London Supplement * high income	-0.644**	-1.128***	
	(0.307)	(0.195)	
1P's Expenses Claim (£000s) * London Supplement * high income	0.204***	0.426***	
	(0.048)	(0.033)	
olitical trust			0.452
			(0.524)
olitical trust * high income			0.472
			(0.474)

ge (Reference category=18-29 years old)			
30-44 years old	-0.341***	-0.136***	0.305**
	(0.065)	(0.052)	(0.153)
45-59 years old	-0.433***	-0.199***	0.557***
	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.184)
60 years old+	-0.415***	-0.175**	0.465**
	(0.091)	(0.069)	(0.197)
larried	-0.051	-0.018	-0.010
	(0.055)	(0.039)	(0.063)
on-white	0.282***	0.106	-0.634***
	(0.108)	(0.087)	(0.183)
arer	0.018	-0.015	0.087
	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.057)
nnual household income (Reference category = Don't know)			
Under £20,000	0.094	0.019	0.008
	(0.077)	(0.024)	(0.090)
£20,000-£39.999	0.259*	3.290***	-1.612
	(0.147)	(0.093)	(1.421)
£40,000-£59.999	0.263*	3.337***	-1.732
	(0.154)	(0.102)	(1.445)
£60,000 or over	0.481***	3.579***	-2.094
	(0.162)	(0.112)	(1.496)
lain source of income (Reference category=Don't know)			
Earnings	0.197	0.105	-0.164
	(0.200)	(0.114)	(0.213)
Private pension	0.254	0.142	-0.216
	(0.202)	(0.116)	(0.231)
State pension	0.420*	0.081	0.264
	(0.214)	(0.113)	(0.294)
State benefits	0.174	0.188	0.283
	(0.219)	(0.116)	(0.231)

Other	0.482**	0.125	-0.170
	(0.221)	(0.125)	(0.322)
ousing tenure (Reference category=Own)			
Rent	-0.096	-0.079*	0.223***
	(0.060)	(0.044)	(0.077)
Neither	-0.184	-0.119	-0.071
	(0.166)	(0.128)	(0.207)
ccupational grade (Reference category=D/E/never worked)			
C2	-0.012	0.008	-0.032
	(0.071)	(0.050)	(0.078)
C1	0.087	0.039	-0.066
	(0.071)	(0.049)	(0.086)
A/B	-0.149**	-0.066	-0.070
	(0.065)	(0.049)	(0.091)
ector of work (Reference category=Never worked)			
Private	-0.133	-0.039	-0.304*
	(0.121)	(0.076)	(0.159)
Public	-0.058	0.004	0.086
	(0.125)	(0.077)	(0.155)
Voluntary	0.155	0.114	-0.033
	(0.158)	(0.105)	(0.185)
ighest education qualification (Reference category=None)			
GCSEs	0.041	0.070	-0.117
	(0.069)	(0.051)	(0.081)
A Levels	0.028	0.017	-0.066
	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.085)
HE diploma	0.189**	0.074	0.094
	(0.089)	(0.073)	(0.141)
University degree	0.230***	0.157***	-0.120
	(0.075)	(0.060)	(0.124)

arty identification (Reference category=None)			
Labour	1.526***	0.863***	-0.179
	(0.061)	(0.046)	(0.590)
Conservative	0.933***	0.464***	-1.290***
	(0.060)	(0.047)	(0.374)
Liberal Democrats	0.923***	0.520***	-0.041
	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.365)
Nationalist party	0.567**	0.302	-0.404
	(0.260)	(0.198)	(0.435)
Other party	-0.335***	-0.102	-0.117
	(0.082)	(0.065)	(0.182)
ttention to politics	0.137***	0.076***	-0.076
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.055)
egion (Reference category=East Anglia)			
East Midlands	-0.030	0.017	-0.240*
	(0.097)	(0.069)	(0.128)
Greater London	0.229*	0.169*	-0.203
	(0.126)	(0.094)	(0.146)
North	-0.279**	-0.079	-0.164
	(0.134)	(0.112)	(0.201)
North West	-0.062	0.061	-0.167
	(0.108)	(0.082)	(0.135)
South East	-0.007	0.079	-0.117
	(0.085)	(0.066)	(0.112)
South West	-0.144	-0.044	0.015
	(0.102)	(0.072)	(0.132)
Wales	-0.025	0.075	0.044
	(0.138)	(0.107)	(0.177)
West Midlands	-0.111	-0.067	-0.075
	(0.098)	(0.073)	(0.137)

Yorkshire & Humber	-0.026	-0.045	-0.117
	(0.096)	(0.074)	(0.124)
onstituency level variables			
% economically active	-0.026	-0.045	-0.117
	(0.096)	(0.074)	(0.124)
% receiving state benefits	-0.002	-0.001	0.010
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.012)
% with no qualifications	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
% limited by disability	-0.009	0.010	-0.009
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.015)
% own home	-0.019	-0.026*	0.033
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.023)
% white	-0.002	-0.006	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
% in 1 index of deprivation	0.007**	0.004	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)
% in 4 indices of deprivation	-0.022	-0.012	-0.018
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.021)
% households not in work	0.091	0.031	-0.234
	(0.165)	(0.135)	(0.204)
Population density	0.009	-0.005	-0.010
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.016)
onstant	0.001	0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
bservations	12,433	12,433	12,433
lusters	556	556	556
value - Test of underidentification			0.028
-Test of non-interacted instrument			22.11
-Test of interacted instrument			95.31

value - Test of joint significance	0.049

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

/ model robustness check 1 – Including MP's retirement status as control variable

: the instrument was not undermined in cases where MPs retired ahead of the 2010 General Election, potentially ca
ese constituencies, we add a dummy variable to the first stage regressions to denote those MPs who did step down
ne R-Squared values of the first stage regression and reduces the strength of the instrument. The effect of trust rem
d substantively significant for respondents whose household income was above the median amount.

Variables	1st stage Political trust	1st stage Political trust * Above median income	2nd stage Support for redistribution
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s)	-0.001	0.004**	
	(0.006)	(0.002)	
MP claimed London Supplement	-0.820***	-0.260**	
	(0.308)	(0.130)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) *	0.171***	-0.007	
London Supplement	(0.049)	(0.027)	
MP retired before General	0.108*	0.111*	
Election	(0.064)	(0.065)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) *	-0.001	-0.008*	
Above median income	(0.007)	(0.005)	
MP claimed London Supplement *	-0.620**	-1.111***	
Above median income	(0.310)	(0.197)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) * London	0.208***	0.429***	
Supplement * Above median income	(0.048)	(0.033)	
MP retired before General Election	-0.193*	-0.115	
* Above median income	(0.106)	(0.071)	
Instrumented political trust			0.026
			(0.366)

Instrumented political trust *			0.561
Above median income			(0.384)
Age (Reference category=18-29 years old)			
30-44 years old	-0.342***	-0.135***	0.173
	(0.065)	(0.052)	(0.106)
45-59 years old	-0.435***	-0.201***	0.392***
	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.124)
60 years old+	-0.412***	-0.171**	0.297**
	(0.091)	(0.069)	(0.142)
Married	-0.052	-0.021	-0.028
	(0.056)	(0.039)	(0.054)
Non-white	0.282***	0.105	-0.517***
	(0.107)	(0.087)	(0.152)
Carer	0.020	-0.013	0.090*
	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.050)
Annual household income (Reference category = Don't know)			
Under £20,000	0.091	0.019	0.045
	(0.077)	(0.024)	(0.082)
£20,000-£39.999	0.207	3.255***	-1.796
	(0.151)	(0.095)	(1.155)
£40,000-£59.999	0.208	3.300***	-1.912
	(0.158)	(0.103)	(1.173)
£60,000 or over	0.428***	3.542***	-2.208*
	(0.164)	(0.111)	(1.215)
Main source of income (Reference category="Don't know")			
Earnings	0.199	0.107	-0.087
	(0.201)	(0.115)	(0.192)
Private pension	0.253	0.141	-0.114
	(0.203)	(0.118)	(0.208)
State pension	0.411*	0.078	0.434*
	(0.215)	(0.115)	(0.241)

State benefits	0.176	0.187	0.343
	(0.219)	(0.117)	(0.217)
Other	0.481**	0.126	0.026
	(0.222)	(0.127)	(0.259)
Housing tenure (Reference category=Own)			
Rent	-0.095	-0.078*	0.191***
	(0.060)	(0.044)	(0.066)
Neither	-0.189	-0.129	-0.124
	(0.167)	(0.129)	(0.180)
Occupational grade (Reference category=D/E/never worked)			
C2	-0.012	0.008	-0.037
	(0.071)	(0.050)	(0.070)
C1	0.091	0.044	-0.035
	(0.071)	(0.049)	(0.072)
A/B	-0.144**	-0.060	-0.125*
	(0.065)	(0.049)	(0.072)
Sector of work (Reference category=Never worked)			
Private	-0.137	-0.040	-0.357***
	(0.122)	(0.076)	(0.138)
Public	-0.060	0.004	0.061
	(0.125)	(0.077)	(0.140)
Voluntary	0.152	0.113	0.025
	(0.158)	(0.105)	(0.167)
Highest education qualification (Reference category=None)			
GCSEs	0.040	0.068	-0.108
	(0.070)	(0.051)	(0.072)
A Levels	0.025	0.014	-0.056
	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.076)
HE diploma	0.188**	0.072	0.163
	(0.090)	(0.074)	(0.117)

University degree	0.228***	0.154**	-0.037
	(0.075)	(0.060)	(0.093)
Party identification (Reference category=None)			
Labour	1.530***	0.865***	0.393
	(0.061)	(0.047)	(0.371)
Conservative	0.933***	0.463***	-0.934***
	(0.060)	(0.047)	(0.241)
Liberal Democrats	0.926***	0.521***	0.302
	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.233)
Nationalist party	0.546**	0.303	-0.206
	(0.261)	(0.199)	(0.388)
Other party	-0.333***	-0.103	-0.249*
	(0.082)	(0.066)	(0.136)
Attention to politics	0.138***	0.076***	-0.024
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.034)
Region (Reference category=East Anglia)			
East Midlands	-0.044	-0.004	-0.255**
	(0.099)	(0.070)	(0.117)
Greater London	0.223*	0.160*	-0.164
	(0.126)	(0.094)	(0.128)
North	-0.288**	-0.097	-0.279*
	(0.135)	(0.114)	(0.159)
North West	-0.074	0.041	-0.200*
	(0.108)	(0.082)	(0.122)
South East	-0.009	0.074	-0.134
	(0.086)	(0.067)	(0.101)
South West	-0.147	-0.047	-0.047
	(0.103)	(0.073)	(0.115)
	-0.033	0.066	0.025
Wales	(0.138)	(0.107)	(0.160)

West Midlands	-0.119	-0.082	-0.118
	(0.099)	(0.074)	(0.128)
Yorkshire & Humber	-0.038	-0.064	-0.131
	(0.097)	(0.075)	(0.115)
Constituency level variables			
% economically active	-0.003	-0.002	0.008
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.010)
% receiving state benefits	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
% with no qualifications	-0.009	0.010	-0.013
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.013)
% limited by disability	-0.019	-0.026*	0.024
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.019)
% own home	-0.002	-0.005	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
% white	0.007**	0.004	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
% in 1 index of deprivation	-0.022	-0.013	-0.025
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.018)
% in 4 indices of deprivation	0.088	0.019	-0.190
	(0.164)	(0.135)	(0.180)
% households not in work	0.009	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Population density	0.001	0.002	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	2.341**	-0.025	5.695***
	(1.082)	(0.825)	(1.465)
Observations	12,373	12,373	12,373
Clusters			554
P value - Test of underidentification			0.024

F-Test of non-interacted instrument	17.45
F-Test of interacted instrument	73.48
P value - Test of joint significance	0.047

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

' model robustness check 2 – Including constituency distance from Westminster in 1st stage regression

: the findings were not caused by respondents living further from Westminster having both lower political trust and
s, we added a measure of constituency distance from Westminster to the first stage regressions. This increases the
irst stage regression by only 0.001 each and reduces the strength of the instrument. The effect of trust remains sta
significant for respondents whose household income was above the median amount.

Variables	1st stage Political trust	1st stage Political trust * Above median income	2nd stage Support for redistribution
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s)	-0.001	0.004**	
	(0.006)	(0.002)	
MP claimed London Supplement	-0.834***	-0.251*	
	(0.304)	(0.131)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) * London Supplement	0.177***	-0.006	
	(0.049)	(0.028)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) * Above median income	-0.001	-0.007	
	(0.007)	(0.005)	
MP claimed London Supplement * Above median income	-0.624**	-1.127***	
	(0.306)	(0.195)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) * London Supplement * Above median income	0.201***	0.426***	
	(0.048)	(0.033)	
Instrumented political trust			0.350
			(0.413)
Instrumented political trust * Above median income			0.453
			(0.414)

Age (Reference category=18-29 years old)			
30-44 years old	-0.340***	-0.132**	0.257**
	(0.065)	(0.052)	(0.123)
45-59 years old	-0.428***	-0.199***	0.512***
	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.144)
60 years old+	-0.401***	-0.169**	0.413***
	(0.092)	(0.069)	(0.160)
Married	-0.055	-0.021	-0.012
	(0.056)	(0.039)	(0.059)
Non-white	0.279***	0.102	-0.592***
	(0.108)	(0.087)	(0.163)
Carer	0.017	-0.012	0.093*
	(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.054)
Annual household income (Reference category = Don't know)			
Under £20,000	0.095	0.019	0.021
	(0.078)	(0.024)	(0.084)
£20,000-£39.999	0.251*	3.282***	-1.529
	(0.148)	(0.093)	(1.248)
£40,000-£59.999	0.258*	3.331***	-1.647
	(0.155)	(0.102)	(1.268)
£60,000 or over	0.469***	3.568***	-1.986
	(0.163)	(0.113)	(1.319)
Main source of income (Reference category="Don't know")			
Earnings	0.175	0.105	-0.116
	(0.203)	(0.115)	(0.198)
Private pension	0.221	0.136	-0.160
	(0.205)	(0.118)	(0.213)
State pension	0.393*	0.081	0.330
	(0.217)	(0.115)	(0.256)
State benefits	0.163	0.201*	0.317
	(0.221)	(0.117)	(0.223)

Other	0.471**	0.134	-0.088
	(0.223)	(0.127)	(0.281)
Housing tenure (Reference category=Own)			
Rent	-0.097	-0.084*	0.214***
	(0.060)	(0.045)	(0.071)
Neither	-0.189	-0.124	-0.087
	(0.166)	(0.128)	(0.192)
Occupational grade (Reference category=D/E/never worked)			
C2	-0.011	0.008	-0.034
	(0.071)	(0.050)	(0.075)
C1	0.091	0.043	-0.063
	(0.072)	(0.050)	(0.080)
A/B	-0.151**	-0.070	-0.086
	(0.065)	(0.049)	(0.081)
Sector of work (Reference category=Never worked)			
Private	-0.126	-0.034	-0.318**
	(0.122)	(0.076)	(0.149)
Public	-0.040	0.017	0.075
	(0.126)	(0.077)	(0.148)
Voluntary	0.150	0.110	-0.006
	(0.159)	(0.106)	(0.176)
Highest education qualification (Reference category=None)			
GCSEs	0.038	0.074	-0.116
	(0.070)	(0.051)	(0.078)
A Levels	0.028	0.021	-0.064
	(0.073)	(0.054)	(0.082)
HE diploma	0.204**	0.087	0.100
	(0.090)	(0.074)	(0.129)
University degree	0.235***	0.165***	-0.105
	(0.076)	(0.060)	(0.108)

Party identification (Reference category=None)			
Labour	1.534***	0.868***	-0.012
	(0.061)	(0.047)	(0.453)
Conservative	0.937***	0.464***	-1.187***
	(0.060)	(0.047)	(0.290)
Liberal Democrats	0.931***	0.526***	0.054
	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.284)
Nationalist party	0.555**	0.302	-0.282
	(0.267)	(0.204)	(0.407)
Other party	-0.326***	-0.104	-0.166
	(0.083)	(0.066)	(0.150)
Attention to politics	0.139***	0.077***	-0.062
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.043)
Region (Reference category=East Anglia)			
East Midlands	-0.010	0.011	-0.288**
	(0.100)	(0.071)	(0.120)
Greater London	0.221*	0.176*	-0.150
	(0.127)	(0.094)	(0.142)
North	-0.165	-0.081	-0.418**
	(0.164)	(0.131)	(0.192)
North West	0.022	0.046	-0.351**
	(0.136)	(0.104)	(0.147)
South East	-0.008	0.089	-0.095
	(0.084)	(0.065)	(0.109)
South West	-0.071	-0.043	-0.154
	(0.126)	(0.090)	(0.130)
Wales	0.070	0.070	-0.122
	(0.157)	(0.124)	(0.175)
West Midlands	-0.064	-0.076	-0.183
	(0.110)	(0.081)	(0.141)

Yorkshire & Humber	0.032	-0.062	-0.247*
	(0.118)	(0.090)	(0.137)
Constituency level variables			
% economically active	-0.006	-0.003	0.015
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.011)
% receiving state benefits	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
% with no qualifications	-0.011	0.010	-0.007
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.015)
% limited by disability	-0.016	-0.029*	0.020
	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.023)
% own home	-0.003	-0.006	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
% white	0.008**	0.004	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)
% in 1 index of deprivation	-0.026	-0.017	-0.016
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.020)
% in 4 indices of deprivation	0.104	0.034	-0.242
	(0.166)	(0.135)	(0.198)
% households not in work	0.009	-0.006	-0.009
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Population density	0.001	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Distance from Westminster	-0.000	0.000	0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Constant	2.341**	-0.025	5.695***
	(1.082)	(0.825)	(1.465)
Observations	12,373	12,373	12,373
Clusters	549	549	549

P value - Test of underidentification	0.031
F-Test of non-interacted instrument	22.03
F-Test of interacted instrument	92.46
P value - Test of joint significance	0.030

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

model robustness check 3 – Including economic evaluations as 'exogenous' controls

omic evaluations are likely to be a post-treatment control (because higher levels of political trust are likely to drive
mic evaluations), we add respondents' personal and national prospective economic evaluations to ensure that our
sed by including these in our mode. Adding these variables increases the R-Squared values of our first stage regress
rength of the instrument. The effect of trust remains statistically and substantively significant for respondents who
ove the median amount but the magnitude of this effect is reduced, most likely because economic evaluations in t
f this effect.

Variables	1st stage Political trust	1st stage Political trust * Above median income	2nd stage Support for redistribution
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s)	-0.002	0.005***	
	(0.005)	(0.002)	
MP claimed London Supplement	-0.589**	-0.127	
	(0.279)	(0.141)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) * London Supplement	0.122**	-0.032	
	(0.048)	(0.030)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) * Above median income	-0.000	-0.008*	
	(0.007)	(0.005)	
MP claimed London Supplement * Above median income	-0.529*	-1.052***	
	(0.292)	(0.209)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) * London Supplement * Above median income	0.159***	0.398***	
	(0.047)	(0.036)	
Instrumented political trust			0.281
			(0.479)
Instrumented political trust * Above median income			0.542
			(0.410)

Age (Reference category=18-29 years old)			
30-44 years old	-0.136**	-0.016	0.219**
	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.094)
45-59 years old	-0.111*	-0.031	0.479***
	(0.067)	(0.057)	(0.091)
60 years old+	-0.094	-0.002	0.406***
	(0.092)	(0.072)	(0.117)
Married	-0.013	-0.004	0.009
	(0.054)	(0.040)	(0.060)
Non-white	0.284***	0.095	-0.586***
	(0.102)	(0.089)	(0.186)
Carer	0.071	0.003	0.078
	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.062)
Annual household income (Reference category = Don't know)			
Under £20,000	0.116	0.014	0.013
	(0.075)	(0.028)	(0.096)
£20,000-£39.999	0.184	3.254***	-1.791
	(0.143)	(0.098)	(1.236)
£40,000-£59.999	0.148	3.275***	-1.913
	(0.150)	(0.105)	(1.257)
£60,000 or over	0.336**	3.513***	-2.273*
	(0.160)	(0.117)	(1.315)
Main source of income (Reference category=Don't know)			
Earnings	0.078	0.147	-0.128
	(0.196)	(0.129)	(0.212)
Private pension	0.117	0.171	-0.186
	(0.201)	(0.132)	(0.225)
State pension	0.295	0.112	0.350
	(0.214)	(0.130)	(0.261)
State benefits	0.080	0.220*	0.340
	(0.213)	(0.133)	(0.246)

Other	0.171	0.099	-0.063
	(0.217)	(0.140)	(0.250)
Housing tenure (Reference category=Own)			
Rent	-0.117**	-0.086*	0.212**
	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.083)
Neither	-0.039	-0.048	-0.131
	(0.167)	(0.137)	(0.193)
Occupational grade (Reference category=D/E/never worked)			
C2	-0.027	-0.000	-0.036
	(0.070)	(0.052)	(0.077)
C1	0.072	0.038	-0.060
	(0.070)	(0.051)	(0.081)
A/B	-0.141**	-0.064	-0.096
	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.090)
Sector of work (Reference category=Never worked)			
Private	-0.071	-0.000	-0.370**
	(0.122)	(0.077)	(0.155)
Public	0.012	0.053	0.030
	(0.126)	(0.079)	(0.154)
Voluntary	0.212	0.173	-0.068
	(0.157)	(0.109)	(0.194)
Highest education qualification (Reference category=None)			
GCSEs	0.015	0.060	-0.097
	(0.069)	(0.053)	(0.080)
A Levels	-0.037	-0.017	-0.060
	(0.073)	(0.056)	(0.086)
HE diploma	0.152*	0.061	0.090
	(0.091)	(0.076)	(0.128)
University degree	0.147*	0.121*	-0.099
	(0.076)	(0.062)	(0.103)

Party identification (Reference category=None)			
Labour	1.148***	0.682***	-0.012
	(0.064)	(0.048)	(0.445)
Conservative	0.911***	0.462***	-1.183***
	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.361)
Liberal Democrats	0.749***	0.441***	0.045
	(0.071)	(0.055)	(0.301)
Nationalist party	0.581**	0.269	-0.172
	(0.238)	(0.198)	(0.420)
Other party	-0.298***	-0.086	-0.184
	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.168)
Attention to politics	0.144***	0.081***	-0.063
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.057)
National prospective economic evaluation	0.470***	0.254***	-0.019
	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.182)
Personal prospective economic evaluation	0.233***	0.106***	0.023
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.098)
Region (Reference category=East Anglia)			
East Midlands	-0.024	0.009	-0.210*
	(0.090)	(0.066)	(0.126)
Greater London	0.148	0.105	-0.110
	(0.124)	(0.098)	(0.142)
North	-0.270**	-0.075	-0.197
	(0.132)	(0.112)	(0.196)
North West	-0.044	0.062	-0.118
	(0.101)	(0.080)	(0.128)
South East	0.011	0.099	-0.096
	(0.080)	(0.065)	(0.111)
South West	-0.126	-0.036	0.004
	(0.097)	(0.072)	(0.131)

Wales	-0.009	0.081	0.091
	(0.133)	(0.111)	(0.177)
West Midlands	-0.090	-0.054	-0.054
	(0.089)	(0.071)	(0.136)
Yorkshire & Humber	-0.007	-0.035	-0.088
	(0.091)	(0.074)	(0.125)
Constituency level variables			
% economically active	-0.002	-0.003	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.011)
% receiving state benefits	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
% with no qualifications	-0.005	0.011	-0.009
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.014)
% limited by disability	-0.014	-0.021	0.027
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.022)
% own home	-0.003	-0.006	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
% white	0.005	0.002	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
% in 1 index of deprivation	-0.022	-0.011	-0.024
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.021)
% in 4 indices of deprivation	0.139	0.068	-0.192
	(0.159)	(0.138)	(0.198)
% households not in work	0.009	-0.004	-0.017
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Population density	0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.389	-1.097	5.172***
	(1.034)	(0.817)	(1.474)

Observations	11,610	11,610	11,610
Clusters	556	556	556
P value - Test of underidentification			0.243
F-Test of non-interacted instrument			10.88
F-Test of interacted instrument			72.04
P value - Test of joint significance			0.086

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

' model robustness check 4 – Including political support as an 'exogenous' control

sanship is unlikely to be an exogenous variable in this model as it is likely to be highly correlated with the error terr
e for political trust, we investigate the effect of adding this to our model through a categorical variable that shows
n in the 2010 General Election. The first stage regressions show that supporters of the then government party, the
ly higher levels of political trust followed by supporters of the then main opposition, the Conservative Party. This is
s of the incumbent government and MPs as much as attitudes of trust in institutions. Unsurprisingly, this reduces t
t but the effect of political trust in the second stage regression remains significant for respondent whose household
dian level.

Variables	1st stage Political trust	1st stage Political trust * Above median income	2nd stage Support for redistribution
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s)	-0.002	0.005***	
	(0.005)	(0.002)	
MP claimed London Supplement	-0.589**	-0.127	
	(0.279)	(0.141)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) * London Supplement	0.122**	-0.032	
	(0.048)	(0.030)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) * Above median income	-0.000	-0.008*	
	(0.007)	(0.005)	
MP claimed London Supplement * Above median income	-0.529*	-1.052***	
	(0.292)	(0.209)	
MP's Expenses Claim (£000s) * London Supplement * Above median income	0.159***	0.398***	
	(0.047)	(0.036)	
Instrumented political trust			0.281
			(0.479)

Instrumented political trust * Above median income			0.542
			(0.410)
Age (Reference category=18-29 years old)			
30-44 years old	-0.136**	-0.016	0.219**
	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.094)
45-59 years old	-0.111*	-0.031	0.479***
	(0.067)	(0.057)	(0.091)
60 years old+	-0.094	-0.002	0.406***
	(0.092)	(0.072)	(0.117)
Married	-0.013	-0.004	0.009
	(0.054)	(0.040)	(0.060)
Non-white	0.284***	0.095	-0.586***
	(0.102)	(0.089)	(0.186)
Carer	0.071	0.003	0.078
	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.062)
Annual household income (Reference category = Don't know)			
Under £20,000	0.116	0.014	0.013
	(0.075)	(0.028)	(0.096)
£20,000-£39.999	0.184	3.254***	-1.791
	(0.143)	(0.098)	(1.236)
£40,000-£59.999	0.148	3.275***	-1.913
	(0.150)	(0.105)	(1.257)
£60,000 or over	0.336**	3.513***	-2.273*
	(0.160)	(0.117)	(1.315)
Main source of income (Reference category=Don't know)			
Earnings	0.078	0.147	-0.128
	(0.196)	(0.129)	(0.212)
Private pension	0.117	0.171	-0.186
	(0.201)	(0.132)	(0.225)
State pension	0.295	0.112	0.350
	(0.214)	(0.130)	(0.261)

State benefits	0.080	0.220*	0.340
	(0.213)	(0.133)	(0.246)
Other	0.171	0.099	-0.063
	(0.217)	(0.140)	(0.250)
Housing tenure (Reference category=Own)			
Rent	-0.117**	-0.086*	0.212**
	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.083)
Neither	-0.039	-0.048	-0.131
	(0.167)	(0.137)	(0.193)
Occupational grade (Reference category=D/E/never worked)			
C2	-0.027	-0.000	-0.036
	(0.070)	(0.052)	(0.077)
C1	0.072	0.038	-0.060
	(0.070)	(0.051)	(0.081)
A/B	-0.141**	-0.064	-0.096
	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.090)
Sector of work (Reference category=Never worked)			
Private	-0.071	-0.000	-0.370**
	(0.122)	(0.077)	(0.155)
Public	0.012	0.053	0.030
	(0.126)	(0.079)	(0.154)
Voluntary	0.212	0.173	-0.068
	(0.157)	(0.109)	(0.194)
Highest education qualification (Reference category=None)			
GCSEs	0.015	0.060	-0.097
	(0.069)	(0.053)	(0.080)
A Levels	-0.037	-0.017	-0.060
	(0.073)	(0.056)	(0.086)
HE diploma	0.152*	0.061	0.090
	(0.091)	(0.076)	(0.128)

University degree	0.147*	0.121*	-0.099
	(0.076)	(0.062)	(0.103)
Party identification (Reference category=None)			
Labour	1.148***	0.682***	-0.012
	(0.064)	(0.048)	(0.445)
Conservative	0.911***	0.462***	-1.183***
	(0.060)	(0.048)	(0.361)
Liberal Democrats	0.749***	0.441***	0.045
	(0.071)	(0.055)	(0.301)
Nationalist party	0.581**	0.269	-0.172
	(0.238)	(0.198)	(0.420)
Other party	-0.298***	-0.086	-0.184
	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.168)
Attention to politics	0.144***	0.081***	-0.063
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.057)
National prospective economic evaluation	0.470***	0.254***	-0.019
	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.182)
Personal prospective economic evaluation	0.233***	0.106***	0.023
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.098)
Region (Reference category=East Anglia)			
East Midlands	-0.024	0.009	-0.210*
	(0.090)	(0.066)	(0.126)
Greater London	0.148	0.105	-0.110
	(0.124)	(0.098)	(0.142)
North	-0.270**	-0.075	-0.197
	(0.132)	(0.112)	(0.196)
North West	-0.044	0.062	-0.118
	(0.101)	(0.080)	(0.128)
South East	0.011	0.099	-0.096
	(0.080)	(0.065)	(0.111)

South West	-0.126	-0.036	0.004
	(0.097)	(0.072)	(0.131)
Wales	-0.009	0.081	0.091
	(0.133)	(0.111)	(0.177)
West Midlands	-0.090	-0.054	-0.054
	(0.089)	(0.071)	(0.136)
Yorkshire & Humber	-0.007	-0.035	-0.088
	(0.091)	(0.074)	(0.125)
Constituency level variables			
% economically active	-0.002	-0.003	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.011)
% receiving state benefits	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
% with no qualifications	-0.005	0.011	-0.009
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.014)
% limited by disability	-0.014	-0.021	0.027
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.022)
% own home	-0.003	-0.006	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)
% white	0.005	0.002	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
% in 1 index of deprivation	-0.022	-0.011	-0.024
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.021)
% in 4 indices of deprivation	0.139	0.068	-0.192
	(0.159)	(0.138)	(0.198)
% households not in work	0.009	-0.004	-0.017
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Population density	0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.389	-1.097	5.172***
	(1.034)	(0.817)	(1.474)

Observations	12,433	12,433	12,433
Clusters	556	556	556
P value - Test of underidentification			0.049
F-Test of non-interacted instrument			20.21
F-Test of interacted instrument			97.25
P value - Test of joint significance			0.047

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

J: LISS Panel survey items and question wording

anel asks respondents questions about a range of different political attitudes. These questions include retrospective
s, asking respondents how satisfied (in Dutch “tevredenheid”) they are and prospective evaluations, asking how mu
e or trust (in Dutch “vertrouwen”) they have in political institutions, actors and outputs.

m	Response categories	Dutch survey wording
:e in the Dutch government	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)	Kunt u op een schaal van 0 tot 10 aangeven ho vertrouwen u persoonlijk hebt in elk van de v instellingen? Nederlandse regering
:e in the Dutch parliament	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)	Kunt u op een schaal van 0 tot 10 aangeven ho vertrouwen u persoonlijk hebt in elk van de v instellingen? Nederlands parlement
:e in politicians	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)	Kunt u op een schaal van 0 tot 10 aangeven ho vertrouwen u persoonlijk hebt in elk van de v instellingen? Politici
:e in political parties	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)	Kunt u op een schaal van 0 tot 10 aangeven ho vertrouwen u persoonlijk hebt in elk van de v instellingen? Politieke partijen
:e in democracy	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)	Kunt u op een schaal van 0 tot 10 aangeven ho vertrouwen u persoonlijk hebt in elk van de v instellingen? Democratie
ɔn with the Dutch government	0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)	Hoe tevreden bent u met de manier waarop de volgende instellingen werken in Nederland? Nederlandse regering
ɔn with the Dutch parliament	0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)	Hoe tevreden bent u met de manier waarop de volgende instellingen werken in Nederland? Nederlands parlement

ɔn with politicians	0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)	Hoe tevreden bent u met de manier waarop de volgende instellingen werken in Nederland? F
ɔn with political parties	0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)	Hoe tevreden bent u met de manier waarop de volgende instellingen werken in Nederland? F partijen
ɔn with democracy	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)	Hoe tevreden bent u met de manier waarop de volgende instellingen werken in Nederland? Democratie
ɔn with the economy	0 (no confidence at all) to 10 (full confidence)	Hoe tevreden bent u met de manier waarop de volgende instellingen werken in Nederland? E
ɣou think of the current party in charge ·nment?	0 (very unsympathetic) to 10 (very sympathetic)	Wat vindt u van de CDA (Christen Democratisch Appèl)/VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Dem
ɣou think of the current Prime ·?	0 (very unsympathetic) to 10 (very sympathetic)	Wat vindt u van Jan Peter Balkenende/Mark Ru
ɣou think of your favourite political	0 (very unsympathetic) to 10 (very sympathetic)	Hoe sympathiek vindt u politieke partijen?
ɣou think of your favourite party	0 (very unsympathetic) to 10 (very sympathetic)	Hoe sympathiek vindt u partijleiders?
fied are you with your financial ɲ?	0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (entirely satisfied)	Hoe tevreden bent u over uw financiële situatie
fied are you with the current economic ɲ in the Netherlands?	0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (entirely satisfied)	Hoe tevreden bent u over de huidige toestand economie in Nederland?

Appendix V: Goodness of fit statistics for CFA models for political support using pooled data from the LISS Panel and by survey wave

The goodness of fit statistics for CFA models constructed using data from individual panel waves are very similar to those for the CFA model using the pooled dataset from all waves. In particular, model 3 is a significantly better fitting model in each survey wave as well as for the pooled data used in this analysis.

	Pooled data		
	Model 1: Single factor	Model 2: Co-varying factors	Model 3: Higher order factor
Log likelhiood	1743.975	1581.005	1342.954
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
RMSEA	0.071	0.068	0.063
AIC	187370.243	187209.272	186977.221
BIC	187732.607	187577.993	187365.014
CFI	0.974	0.977	0.98
TLI	0.965	0.968	0.972
SRMR	0.034	0.034	0.027

	Wave 1		
	Model 1: Single factor	Model 2: Co-varying factors	Model 3: Higher order factor
Log likelhiood	1743.975	1581.005	1342.954
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
RMSEA	0.071	0.068	0.063
AIC	187370.243	187209.272	186977.221
BIC	187732.607	187577.993	187365.014
CFI	0.974	0.977	0.98
TLI	0.965	0.968	0.972
SRMR	0.034	0.034	0.027

	Wave 2		
	Model 1: Single factor	Model 2: Co-varying factors	Model 3: Higher order factor
Log likelhiood	1613.339	1361.105	1213.634
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
RMSEA	0.070	0.064	0.062
AIC	177429.076	177178.843	177037.371
BIC	177788.686	177544.761	177422.217
CFI	0.975	0.979	0.982
TLI	0.967	0.972	0.974
SRMR	0.026	0.026	0.020

	Wave 3		
	Model 1: Single factor	Model 2: Co-varying factors	Model 3: Higher order factor
Log likelhiood	1612.831	1365.663	1221.773
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
RMSEA	0.069	0.064	0.062
AIC	179262.648	179017.48	178879.59
BIC	179622.761	179383.91	179264.974
CFI	0.977	0.981	0.983
TLI	0.969	0.973	0.975
SRMR	0.025	0.026	0.020

	Wave 4		
	Model 1: Single factor	Model 2: Co-varying factors	Model 3: Higher order factor
Log likelhiood	2483.695	2408.674	2203.95
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
RMSEA	0.092	0.091	0.089
AIC	169086.556	169013.535	168814.811
BIC	169440.331	169373.516	169193.412
CFI	0.953	0.955	0.959
TLI	0.937	0.938	0.941
SRMR	0.050	0.051	0.046

	Wave 5		
	Model 1: Single factor	Model 2: Co-varying factors	Model 3: Higher order factor
Log likelhiood	2547.077	2292.94	2075.024
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
RMSEA	0.089	0.084	0.082
AIC	183391.089	183138.952	182927.036
BIC	183750.304	183504.469	183311.459
CFI	0.962	0.966	0.969
TLI	0.948	0.953	0.956
SRMR	0.039	0.040	0.035

	Wave 6		
	Model 1: Single factor	Model 2: Co-varying factors	Model 3: Higher order factor
Log likelhiood	1485.764	1312.275	1109.37
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
RMSEA	0.069	0.065	0.061
AIC	175519.63	175348.141	175151.235
BIC	175875.272	175710.022	175531.835
CFI	0.978	0.981	0.984
TLI	0.971	0.974	0.978
SRMR	0.024	0.024	0.019

	Wave 7		
	Model 1: Single factor	Model 2: Co-varying factors	Model 3: Higher order factor
Log likelhiood	1792.247	1636.515	1379.824
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
RMSEA	0.077	0.074	0.069
AIC	174728.292	174574.56	174323.868
BIC	175083.329	174935.825	174703.82
CFI	0.973	0.976	0.98
TLI	0.964	0.967	0.971
SRMR	0.027	0.028	0.024

	Wave 8		
	Model 1: Single factor	Model 2: Co-varying factors	Model 3: Higher order factor
Log likelhiood	2232.193	2060.209	1716.531
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
RMSEA	0.080	0.077	0.072
AIC	199258.034	199088.049	198750.371
BIC	199621.3	199457.688	199139.13
CFI	0.971	0.973	0.978
TLI	0.961	0.964	0.969
SRMR	0.028	0.028	0.022

	Wave 9		
	Model 1: Single factor	Model 2: Co-varying factors	Model 3: Higher order factor
Log likelhiood	2197.973	2105.479	41806.517
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000
RMSEA	0.083	0.082	0.077
AIC	181270.25	181179.753	180886.794
BIC	181627.772	181543.548	181269.405
CFI	0.968	0.969	0.973
TLI	0.956	0.958	0.962
SRMR	0.031	0.031	0.029

Results of higher order CFA model for political support using pooled data from LISS Panel and by survey wave

	Pooled data	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6	Wave 7	W
ical actors <-									
	0.990***	1.027***	1.021***	1.038***	1.070***	1.035***	0.954***	0.973***	0.9
	(222.69)	(72.43)	(73.94)	(79.72)	(50.62)	(68.21)	(81.24)	(79.18)	(8
ical institutions <-									
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
institutions <-									
	0.816***	0.933***	0.949***	0.887***	0.927***	0.857***	0.736***	0.758***	0.7
	(161.24)	(56.99)	(61.18)	(58.53)	(40.65)	(50.85)	(53.59)	(51.80)	(6
olitical actors <-									
	1.150***	1.034***	1.027***	1.098***	1.131***	1.174***	1.214***	1.206***	1.1
	(179.22)	(63.19)	(66.64)	(65.48)	(51.96)	(61.08)	(56.58)	(55.61)	(6
olitical institutions <-									
	1.248***	1.123***	1.097***	1.165***	1.131***	1.228***	1.354***	1.310***	1.2
	(183.19)	(67.13)	(70.87)	(67.22)	(47.93)	(58.45)	(58.84)	(57.51)	(6
gal institutions <-									
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
nomic outputs <-									
	0.329***	0.344***	0.301***	0.326***	0.379***	0.356***	0.309***	0.384***	0.3
	(55.15)	(19.58)	(16.38)	(18.53)	(18.47)	(19.53)	(17.02)	(20.46)	(2

tical authorities <-									
	0.278***	0.233***	0.259***	0.255***	0.247***	0.289***	0.242***	0.322***	0.2
	(56.36)	(16.64)	(18.15)	(17.61)	(16.33)	(19.78)	(16.32)	(20.54)	(1
icians <-									
olitical actors	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
	4.824***	4.872***	5.150***	4.997***	5.258***	4.840***	4.513***	4.475***	4.6
	(462.65)	(176.25)	(183.69)	(169.12)	(172.90)	(160.29)	(131.18)	(129.77)	(14
ical parties <-									
olitical actors	0.961***	0.957***	0.964***	0.929***	0.960***	0.968***	0.972***	0.958***	0.9
	(363.93)	(107.72)	(112.61)	(118.37)	(95.22)	(123.82)	(130.98)	(128.96)	(13
	4.776***	4.863***	5.090***	4.964***	5.165***	4.774***	4.468***	4.436***	4.6
	(467.70)	(179.97)	(184.87)	(175.04)	(171.76)	(160.76)	(132.41)	(131.42)	(14
rnment <-									
olitical institutions	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
	5.395***	5.448***	5.847***	5.507***	5.801***	5.316***	4.975***	4.958***	5.2
	(509.76)	(201.62)	(216.49)	(191.34)	(176.77)	(167.34)	(139.35)	(142.77)	(16
ament <-									
olitical institutions	0.994***	0.997***	1.002***	0.983***	1.050***	1.029***	0.976***	0.991***	0.9
	(333.02)	(114.65)	(122.22)	(111.91)	(69.92)	(96.08)	(123.02)	(115.80)	(13
	5.458***	5.448***	5.755***	5.514***	5.918***	5.402***	5.160***	5.103***	5.3
	(538.14)	(208.26)	(216.38)	(198.40)	(200.28)	(181.40)	(149.03)	(150.46)	(17

egal system <-									
gal institutions	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
	6.021***	5.854***	5.962***	5.878***	6.060***	5.952***	5.983***	6.049***	6.1
	(555.72)	(193.87)	(197.42)	(189.59)	(181.50)	(187.28)	(174.09)	(171.49)	(19
olice <-									
gal institutions	0.768***	0.807***	0.820***	0.820***	0.849***	0.795***	0.727***	0.743***	0.7
	(159.68)	(54.94)	(60.67)	(57.76)	(51.73)	(56.84)	(48.56)	(50.35)	(5
	6.224***	6.031***	6.084***	6.031***	6.195***	6.093***	6.290***	6.365***	6.4
	(637.42)	(217.03)	(220.97)	(211.19)	(200.80)	(211.36)	(204.90)	(204.68)	(22
oliticians <-									
l political actors	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
	4.821***	4.916***	5.120***	4.958***	5.200***	4.810***	4.511***	4.489***	4.6
	(473.27)	(184.11)	(189.67)	(174.71)	(174.47)	(161.59)	(133.48)	(132.06)	(14
olitical parties <-									
l political actors	1.004***	1.016***	1.010***	0.981***	0.998***	1.005***	1.005***	1.007***	1.0
	(439.80)	(130.12)	(130.87)	(138.76)	(123.90)	(150.44)	(153.17)	(159.83)	(16
	4.779***	4.887***	5.074***	4.941***	5.115***	4.755***	4.467***	4.462***	4.6
	(473.47)	(185.04)	(189.60)	(178.62)	(173.81)	(159.77)	(133.47)	(132.04)	(14
gal system <-									
l legal institutions	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
	5.761***	5.636***	5.735***	5.648***	5.795***	5.701***	5.678***	5.770***	5.9
	(545.59)	(196.13)	(198.27)	(190.31)	(180.25)	(184.61)	(163.60)	(164.91)	(18

e national government <-									
political institutions	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
	5.233***	5.257***	5.650***	5.325***	5.623***	5.152***	4.850***	4.849***	5.0
	(486.21)	(191.11)	(203.98)	(180.86)	(173.79)	(159.25)	(133.44)	(136.80)	(15
e national parliament <-									
political institutions	0.992***	0.982***	0.996***	0.989***	1.040***	1.013***	0.978***	0.992***	0.9
	(391.04)	(135.20)	(141.87)	(132.30)	(85.35)	(115.41)	(150.27)	(132.90)	(15
	5.279***	5.293***	5.559***	5.337***	5.679***	5.230***	4.980***	4.950***	5.1
	(511.39)	(200.15)	(206.01)	(187.92)	(188.57)	(171.25)	(141.22)	(143.32)	(16
e police <-									
legal institutions	0.761***	0.789***	0.811***	0.806***	0.858***	0.790***	0.714***	0.745***	0.7
	(168.78)	(59.41)	(65.01)	(61.79)	(54.87)	(59.78)	(50.91)	(53.15)	(5
	5.962***	5.811***	5.859***	5.809***	5.882***	5.848***	5.978***	6.073***	6.1
	(618.11)	(216.69)	(217.21)	(208.91)	(191.31)	(205.31)	(196.38)	(193.79)	(21
financial situation <-									
conomic outputs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
	7.763***	7.744***	7.828***	7.762***	7.837***	7.801***	7.718***	7.669***	7.7
	(843.17)	(288.68)	(282.57)	(291.29)	(275.00)	(290.22)	(268.35)	(259.62)	(29
national economy <-									
conomic outputs	1.515***	1.492***	1.271***	1.196***	1.239***	1.402***	1.679***	1.451***	1.4
	(63.95)	(22.51)	(17.55)	(20.48)	(21.26)	(21.67)	(18.99)	(23.57)	(2
	6.279***	6.752***	5.992***	6.327***	6.493***	5.746***	5.558***	6.215***	6.6
	(726.22)	(271.89)	(229.45)	(275.53)	(258.19)	(218.56)	(198.35)	(238.43)	(28

ıe national economy <-									
conomic outputs	2.412***	1.716***	2.317***	2.015***	2.188***	2.496***	2.814***	2.271***	2.2
	(56.50)	(19.35)	(16.37)	(18.41)	(18.87)	(19.98)	(17.48)	(21.13)	(2
	5.614***	6.236***	5.488***	5.709***	5.896***	5.085***	5.014***	5.248***	5.7
	(608.00)	(282.27)	(212.87)	(237.80)	(215.66)	(177.72)	(163.77)	(172.06)	(21
ɔlitical party <-									
olitical authorities	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	
	7.415***	7.439***	7.346***	7.524***	7.639***	7.420***	7.361***	7.229***	7.2
	(1025.13)	(370.76)	(353.21)	(355.52)	(373.99)	(354.16)	(327.15)	(302.93)	(34
ɔlitical party leader <-									
olitical authorities	1.089***	1.050***	1.183***	1.164***	0.879***	1.018***	1.277***	0.928***	1.2
	(77.31)	(22.23)	(25.54)	(25.80)	(19.96)	(26.36)	(24.20)	(25.76)	(2
	7.375***	7.460***	7.418***	7.514***	7.828***	7.574***	7.298***	6.952***	7.2
	(965.49)	(367.29)	(347.43)	(348.24)	(374.93)	(347.30)	(306.29)	(273.89)	(31
ɔvernment)									
	0.620***	0.446***	0.351***	0.478***	1.295***	0.938***	0.502***	0.570***	0.5
	(86.71)	(27.51)	(25.21)	(27.65)	(33.07)	(34.08)	(24.05)	(26.31)	(2
ɜrliament)									
	0.328***	0.266***	0.246***	0.344***	0.255***	0.247***	0.418***	0.428***	0.3
	(55.13)	(18.65)	(19.10)	(22.52)	(9.07)	(12.35)	(21.71)	(21.74)	(2
ı legal system)									
	0.560***	0.595***	0.521***	0.576***	0.733***	0.539***	0.625***	0.623***	0.5
	(36.59)	(16.31)	(16.61)	(16.10)	(16.34)	(12.94)	(10.72)	(10.71)	(1

ı the police)									
	1.370***	1.260***	1.075***	1.210***	1.229***	1.225***	1.522***	1.519***	1.4
	(104.16)	(36.72)	(35.35)	(35.44)	(29.52)	(33.41)	(33.92)	(32.75)	(3
ıe legal system)									
	0.745***	0.901***	0.753***	0.830***	0.906***	0.702***	0.691***	0.799***	0.7
	(42.08)	(19.92)	(19.44)	(18.92)	(17.06)	(14.53)	(11.15)	(12.44)	(1
ıe police)									
	1.394***	1.360***	1.101***	1.260***	1.206***	1.236***	1.587***	1.523***	1.4
	(99.15)	(35.10)	(32.94)	(33.24)	(27.22)	(31.68)	(33.49)	(31.95)	(3
ı the national government)									
	0.522***	0.358***	0.317***	0.416***	0.984***	0.753***	0.386***	0.497***	0.4
	(88.21)	(27.37)	(26.90)	(28.63)	(32.91)	(33.93)	(23.59)	(26.41)	(2
ı the national parliament)									
	0.238***	0.215***	0.179***	0.238***	0.224***	0.193***	0.291***	0.323***	0.2
	(50.04)	(19.15)	(17.50)	(19.56)	(10.48)	(12.34)	(19.63)	(19.56)	(1
ıwn financial situation)									
	2.746***	2.745***	2.864***	2.634***	2.664***	2.606***	2.860***	2.912***	2.6
	(130.54)	(44.14)	(43.86)	(43.91)	(41.74)	(43.91)	(42.72)	(42.48)	(4
ıwn national economy)									
	1.909***	1.838***	2.327***	1.733***	1.798***	2.127***	2.122***	1.650***	1.4
	(120.58)	(39.43)	(42.38)	(41.94)	(39.93)	(41.98)	(39.90)	(38.59)	(4
ı the national economy)									
	1.020***	1.011***	1.126***	1.088***	1.042***	1.103***	1.092***	1.201***	0.9
	(52.39)	(25.65)	(17.16)	(21.53)	(18.32)	(17.62)	(16.68)	(21.26)	(2

ı politicians)									
	0.344***	0.386***	0.345***	0.318***	0.354***	0.288***	0.362***	0.337***	0.3
	(85.74)	(31.82)	(30.66)	(28.49)	(27.19)	(26.46)	(28.22)	(26.90)	(3
ı political parties)									
	0.245***	0.232***	0.240***	0.263***	0.279***	0.254***	0.235***	0.224***	0.2
	(67.75)	(22.31)	(23.99)	(25.81)	(23.33)	(24.10)	(20.80)	(19.81)	(2
ɔliticians)									
	0.313***	0.350***	0.299***	0.268***	0.333***	0.296***	0.338***	0.291***	0.3
	(52.54)	(20.28)	(18.30)	(16.54)	(15.21)	(18.04)	(18.75)	(15.46)	(1
ɔlitical parties)									
	0.431***	0.451***	0.394***	0.443***	0.499***	0.391***	0.394***	0.453***	0.4
	(75.26)	(27.43)	(25.46)	(28.28)	(23.41)	(24.83)	(23.33)	(24.79)	(2
f political party)									
	0.555***	0.539***	0.654***	0.639***	0.242***	0.454***	0.741***	0.347***	0.6
	(32.24)	(10.08)	(14.77)	(13.51)	(3.81)	(9.17)	(14.79)	(5.07)	(1
f political party leader)									
	0.525***	0.458***	0.298***	0.277***	0.611***	0.556***	0.219**	0.894***	0.3
	(25.96)	(7.84)	(5.06)	(4.50)	(11.99)	(10.75)	(2.85)	(14.41)	(5
ɔlitical institutions)									
	0.321***	0.337***	0.300***	0.267***	0.530***	0.418***	0.359***	0.248***	0.2
	(36.18)	(15.76)	(14.98)	(12.61)	(16.64)	(16.06)	(11.70)	(8.49)	(9
ı legal institutions)									
	1.288***	0.849***	0.746***	0.891***	1.156***	1.236***	1.600***	1.704***	1.3
	(70.63)	(20.87)	(21.11)	(21.98)	(22.28)	(24.57)	(23.08)	(24.12)	(2

gal institutions)									
	1.452***	0.981***	0.883***	1.049***	1.367***	1.398***	1.663***	1.804***	1.4
	(70.42)	(20.64)	(21.04)	(22.03)	(22.47)	(24.50)	(22.82)	(23.73)	(2
ı political institutions)									
	0.240***	0.228***	0.219***	0.207***	0.406***	0.314***	0.289***	0.225***	0.1
	(31.14)	(12.29)	(12.74)	(11.14)	(15.39)	(13.86)	(10.91)	(8.64)	(8
conomic outputs)									
	0.120***	0.122***	0.103***	0.0887***	0.0817***	0.0908***	0.0871***	0.111***	0.1
	(27.01)	(7.85)	(7.39)	(6.82)	(6.64)	(8.15)	(7.96)	(8.60)	(9
ı political actors)									
	0.502***	0.419***	0.357***	0.383***	0.448***	0.395***	0.485***	0.630***	0.5
	(64.13)	(21.52)	(19.46)	(19.64)	(17.88)	(18.59)	(19.32)	(22.94)	(2
olitical authorities)									
	1.189***	1.089***	0.984***	1.083***	1.193***	1.171***	1.062***	1.606***	1.1
	(63.20)	(19.12)	(21.02)	(21.35)	(17.28)	(21.38)	(20.17)	(20.82)	(2
olitical actors)									
	0.567***	0.452***	0.484***	0.452***	0.608***	0.460***	0.537***	0.672***	0.6
	(60.29)	(19.24)	(20.54)	(18.52)	(18.46)	(18.02)	(18.33)	(21.03)	(2
	2.238***	2.136***	2.183***	2.201***	1.965***	2.144***	2.399***	2.411***	2.4
	(83.35)	(30.19)	(30.87)	(29.83)	(25.12)	(27.82)	(26.01)	(25.87)	(2
	3.166***	2.382***	2.357***	2.704***	2.190***	2.790***	4.031***	3.849***	3.8
	(103.26)	(34.73)	(35.17)	(35.51)	(25.26)	(31.37)	(35.57)	(35.56)	(3

ɔvernment, e.Satisfaction with the national government)								
	0.411***	0.277***	0.224***	0.343***	0.890***	0.657***	0.286***	0.370***	0.3
	(75.92)	(23.46)	(21.48)	(25.61)	(30.18)	(30.81)	(19.04)	(22.23)	(2
arliament, e.Satisfaction with the national parliament)								
	0.126***	0.111***	0.0877***	0.141***	0.0702***	0.0784***	0.204***	0.194***	0.1
	(29.73)	(11.28)	(9.73)	(12.82)	(3.60)	(5.48)	(15.06)	(13.46)	(1
ɹ legal system, e.Confidence in the legal system)								
	0.359***	0.433***	0.383***	0.406***	0.528***	0.366***	0.328***	0.399***	0.3
	(25.16)	(12.45)	(12.76)	(11.92)	(12.51)	(9.41)	(6.32)	(7.50)	(8
ɹ the police, e.Confidence in the police)								
	1.060***	1.012***	0.806***	0.968***	0.896***	0.942***	1.182***	1.169***	1.1
	(87.82)	(31.33)	(28.76)	(30.20)	(23.86)	(28.14)	(28.89)	(27.99)	(3
›wn financial situation, e.Assessment of own national economy)								
	0.781***	0.926***	0.818***	0.823***	0.878***	0.779***	0.732***	0.752***	0.8
	(56.52)	(22.03)	(18.25)	(21.54)	(21.28)	(18.90)	(16.49)	(18.39)	(2
ɹ politicians, e.Confidence in politicians)								
	0.0370***	0.0825***	0.0641***	0.0219	-0.00865	0.0455**	0.0670***	0.0190	0.0
	(6.91)	(5.28)	(4.51)	(1.49)	(-0.46)	(3.21)	(4.15)	(1.09)	(0
ɹ political parties, e.Confidence in politicians)								
	-0.165***	-0.147***	-0.161***	-0.177***	-0.213***	-0.145***	-0.148***	-0.188***	-0.1
	(-35.41)	(-11.08)	(-13.50)	(-14.10)	(-12.77)	(-11.40)	(-10.63)	(-12.30)	(-1
ɒlitical institutions, e.Satisfaction with political institutions)								
	0.115***	0.104***	0.129***	0.112***	0.270***	0.209***	0.120***	0.0555*	0.0
	(16.39)	(6.30)	(8.28)	(6.61)	(11.00)	(10.06)	(4.99)	(2.37)	(3

ı legal institutions, e.Confidence in legal institutions)									
	1.227***	0.809***	0.729***	0.858***	1.119***	1.166***	1.460***	1.565***	1.2
	(70.92)	(20.83)	(21.32)	(21.97)	(22.35)	(24.40)	(23.11)	(23.90)	(2
ı political actors, e.Confidence in political actors)									
	0.496***	0.419***	0.398***	0.413***	0.514***	0.355***	0.445***	0.600***	0.5
	(61.69)	(20.94)	(20.58)	(19.72)	(18.86)	(16.66)	(17.94)	(21.49)	(2
Political trust)									
	2.530***	2.134***	2.136***	2.322***	1.948***	2.324***	2.977***	2.907***	2.9
	(105.34)	(36.66)	(36.60)	(36.51)	(30.18)	(34.19)	(34.18)	(34.11)	(3
	36,653	4,335	4,123	4,165	3,729	4,109	3,839	3,871	4

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001