Fighting Wars and Enforcing Laws:

Has the US-led 'war on drugs' transformed drug trafficking in Colombia and Mexico from a matter of public security to one of national security?

By Samuel Cousins



ID: 4317821

School of Politics and International Relations - OCTOBER 2018

Contents

Abstract 4

Acknowledgements 5

Abbreviations 6

Introduction 7

Research Aims 7

Significance 9

Methodology 11

Context 13

The United States, Drugs, and National Security 13

Colombia: Politics and Drugs 16

Drug Trafficking in Colombia: Law Enforcement and Security 18

Mexico: Politics and Drugs 20

Drug Trafficking in Mexico: Law Enforcement and Security 21

Summary 23

Chapter 1: Literature Review 24

The 'Collateral Damage' Thesis and Counternarcotic Aid 24

Militarisation of Law Enforcement Literature 24

Country Specific Literature 25

Summary 27

Chapter 2: Terminology of Security 29

National Security 30

An Alternative to 'National' Security 33

Militarisation and Securitization 34

Summary 36

Chapter 3: Colombia & the US 37

Medellin and Cali Cartel Period 38

Plan Colombia Period 45

Conclusion 53

Chapter 4: Mexico & the US: 54

Introduction 55

Before the Mérida Initiative 57

Post-2006 and the Mérida Initiative.....62
Drug Trafficking in Mexico: a National Security Threat?.....70
Conclusion.....74
Conclusion.....76
Colombia and Mexico: Congruent Cases?.....76
Research Findings.....82
Limitations and Recommendations.....83
Bibliography:.....85
Official Documents:.....85
Bibliography.....91

‘You have a bunch of bad hombres down there. You aren’t doing enough to stop them. I think your military is scared. Our military isn’t, so I might just send them down to take care of it’

-US President Donald Trump to
Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto

Abstract

The ‘war on drugs’ has been a staple issue of US-Latin American relations over the past five decades, as the US has sought to urge its Latin American neighbours to eradicate and interdict illicit drugs by all means possible. Meanwhile, drug traffickers and actors associated with the drug trade have contributed to an explosion of violence that has led Latin America to become the most violent region in the world. In response to this, Latin American governments have increasingly used their armed forces to combat the illegal drug trade, therefore taking counternarcotics out of the realm of public security and in to national security. This dissertation examines the logic and causes behind this process, and will focus on the cases of Colombia and Mexico in particular, which have been the two ‘frontlines’ in the war on drugs in Latin America. It will demonstrate that, while emphasis on militarisation of drug law enforcement has been an established goal of the US in Colombia and Mexico, in both cases this process was marked by domestic cooperation, particularly in the case of Mexico. The method, as well as being a binary comparative case study analysis, is primarily literature based, drawing upon politicians, academics, non-governmental organisations, and journalists. By doing so, this dissertation intends to account for the militarisation of drug law enforcement and its elevation to an issue of national security in these countries.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisors, Professors Sue Pryce and Wyn Rees, for their fortitude and kindness in persevering with the ups and downs of this work. It certainly cannot have been easy. I have been very fortunate to have had two exceptional academics supervising my work, who have ensured that I pushed myself to write the best piece of work that I could. It could not have been completed without both their support and confidence. It has been a privilege.

I would also like to thank my family, my girlfriend, my friends, and my cat for much needed emotional support. I will deeply miss the first year PhD students with whom I shared an office, as they helped prevent the total loss of my sanity.

It is also only fair to give credit to Nescafé (other coffee brands are available) for facilitating the many late nights (and early mornings) that contributed to this work.

Abbreviations

BBC – British Broadcasting Company

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency (United States)

CNP – Colombian National Police

CRS - Congressional Research Service (United States)

DEA – Drug Enforcement Administration (United States)

DOD – Department of Defense (United States)

DOJ – Department of Justice (United States)

DTO – Drug Trafficking Organisation

ELN – National Liberation Army (Colombia)

FARC – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

FY – Financial Year

GAO – Government Accountability Office (United States)

NSDD – National Security Directive

PAN – National Action Party (Mexico)

PFM – Ministerial Federal Police

PFP – Federal Preventative Police (Mexico)

PJF – Federal Judicial Police (Mexico)

PRI – Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico)

SEDENA - Secretariat of National Defence (Mexico)

SOUTHCOM – US Southern Command

TCO – Transnational Criminal Organisation

TOC – Transnational Organised Crime

UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

US – United States

WOLA – Washington Office on Latin America

Introduction

Research Aims

The declaration of the US-led 'war on drugs' in 1971 has led global prohibition of drugs to be one of the most important political issues in the North and South American continents. Between the 1970s and the turn of the millennium, the primary focus of US counterdrug attention has been on Colombia and Mexico, situated in South and North America respectively. The US 'war on drugs' involved an aggressive approach that described drug trafficking as a threat to US and other nations' national security (The White House 1986: 1-3; The White House 1989: 1-4; Cheney 1989; The White House 1991). Central to this national security approach was the use of the US military in counternarcotics and encouraging drug cultivation and transit countries to use their militaries to combat the drug trade. In both Colombia and Mexico, as well as many other countries, the task of counter-drug law enforcement activities was traditionally undertaken by civilian law enforcement agencies, as is the case in democracies across the world (Lee III 1998: 214; Treverton 1989: 142; Astorga 2000: 27; Boville 2004: 156-167; Neild 2005: 61; Francisco 2006: 99; Felbab-Brown 2009: 7; Lagos and Dammert 2012; Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017: 7). During the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, the role of the police in combatting the illicit drug trade in these countries diminished, while the role of the armed forces dramatically increased (Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 99; Keefer et al 2010: 12; Camp 2010: 292; Beittel 2013: 33; Grayson 2013: 3; LaSusa 2016b). This process is characterised as the militarisation of law enforcement. Specifically, militarisation in this context has been described as 'adoption and use of military models, methods, concepts, doctrines, procedures and personnel in police activities, thus giving a military character to public safety (and public space) questions' (Zavarucha 2000: 8; Sotomayor 2013: 43). The aspect of this that will be the focus of this dissertation is 'personnel', as the actual use of military personnel in police activities is not only the most practical method with which to determine militarisation, but also the clearest breach of democratic norms.

This dissertation will therefore use militarisation as a prism through which to analyse the role of the US in transforming counternarcotics in Colombia and Mexico from a matter of public security to one of national security. The link between elevation of a threat to national security and subsequent militarisation has been implicit in both the academic literature and actions by political actors. When President Reagan released his 1986 National Security Directive

(NSDD) declaring drug trafficking a national security threat to the US, the very same NSDD encouraged and enabled US military participation in the drug war abroad (The White House 1986: 1-3). In Mexico, the Federal Constitution (Article 53) limits the role of the army to national security threats, therefore the perception of drug trafficking as a threat to national security is intrinsically linked to their involvement in its enforcement (Olsen 1996: 3). To summarise, as Pion-Berlin and Carreras (2017: 11) state, 'crossing the threshold from a public security peril to one of national dimensions justifies the introduction of the armed forces, since no other agency of state could effectively grapple with such an existential crisis' (Bailey et al 2011). The precise relationship between public security, national security, and militarisation will be analysed in greater detail in Chapter 2: Terminology of Security.

Literature focussing specifically on the process of militarisation and its relationship with the 'war on drugs' is limited, and typically focusses on broader arguments on the preference for US security assistance over socio-economic assistance, rather than determining the extent to which the security assistance itself emphasised military over civilian law enforcement agencies. This dissertation will bridge this gap by analysing US initiatives in Colombia and Mexico with the lens of differentiating between police and armed forces funding.

The analysis of this dissertation will focus on US political rhetoric and counternarcotic aid, particularly the Andean Initiative, Plan Colombia, and the Mérida Initiative. These initiatives provided enormous amounts of counternarcotic aid from the US to Colombia and Mexico, and therefore analysing where these initiatives allocated funds and the circumstances of their creation is essential. Alongside this, the domestic political situations of Colombia and Mexico will be considered, such as their willingness to use their armed forces in counternarcotics, and the power of armed actors associated with the trade and their capability to challenge the integrity of the state. For example, in the case of Mexico there is an ongoing and controversial debate over whether the drug-related violence is political. Analysts such as Brands (2009), Grayson (2010), and Bunker (2013: 132) believe that Mexico is in the grips of a criminal insurgency, in which drug trafficking organisations are seeking to overthrow or control the state. This sort of perception feeds in to the public opinion, which in the case of Mexico suggested a favouring of using the army amongst a majority of the population (Sotomayor 2013: 48). These aspects will be expanded upon later and will make up the bulk of the analysis of this dissertation.

This dissertation will argue that while the role of the United States has been essential in the militarisation of drug law enforcement in Colombia and Mexico, this process has been marked by significant domestic cooperation by the case nations, a factor which has been often ignored by critics (Diamint 2004: 47; Youngers and Rosin 2005; Neild 2005: 89-92; Freeman and Sierra 2005: 285-286; Muggah, cited in Gagne 2015), and therefore militarisation cannot be solely attributed to US influence.

This chapter will next illustrate the significance of this dissertation, the methodology which will be used, and the necessary context. Chapter 1 is a literature review which will provide an overview of the bodies of literature relevant to this dissertation, such as the country-specific literature on drug trafficking in Colombia and Mexico, and the literature which compares them. Chapter 2 examines the terminology and concepts of security, and will both review the relevant security studies literature and provide clarification of key terms such as national security and public security.

Significance

Understanding why and how drug trafficking has been increasingly treated as an issue of national security and consequently militarised is significant for a number of reasons. Since the response to national security threats is usually undertaken by the armed forces, the threat of drug trafficking has been used to legitimise the use of soldiers' participation in law enforcement activities. There are a number of clear negative consequences from this.

The first is the violation of human rights. NGOs such as Amnesty International (2009; 2011; 2016), Washington Office on Latin America (1991; 1996; Youngers and Rosin 2005; Meyer 2010; Meyer 2014; Smith and Meyer 2016; Meyer and Suarez 2017), Human Rights Watch (1992; 2004; 2009; 2011; 2013; 2015a; 2015b) and InSight Crime (Gagne 2015; Gurney 2015; Kinosian et al 2015; Lohmuller 2015; LaSusa 2016) have highlighted the human rights abuses resulting from Latin American military forces' deployment in domestic law enforcement capacities. It is perceived by some supporters of 'iron fist' policies that there lies an inherent contradiction between security and human rights. This assumption is based on the idea that effective policing capable of providing security requires tough and even human rights-violating measures (Bonner 2011: 202). Furthermore, military training is centred on overwhelming use of lethal force against enemy combatants (Withers et al 2010: 2, 19; Gagne 2015). While police forces in these countries have similarly had poor human rights records, the nature of military discipline, such as its emphasis on following orders

unquestioningly and overwhelming use of force, is unsuitable for civilian enforcement and has catalysed conflict situations (Grayson 2010: 162; Kan 2012: 95; Daly et al 2012: 39; LaSusa 2016). Militaries tend to resist being compelled by principles of minimal use of force and due process, as they are thought to interfere with combat effectiveness (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017: 9). Consequently, human rights abuses at the hands of the Colombian army and Mexican army increased significantly as their involvement in the war on drugs rose (Jelsma 1997; Guzman 2003; Freeman and Sierra 2005: 266-286; Haugaard et al 2011: 2; Gautreau 2012: 61; Gagne 2014; Martin 2015: 1-5; Ahmed 2016).

In addition to human rights violations, use of the armed forces in combatting drug trafficking threatens fragile Latin American democracies. Many Latin American nations have a history of military dictatorships, and the increasing role of militaries in drug policy has led to a resurgence in politicisation of some militaries, representing a significant threat to fledgling and unconsolidated democracies (Hunter 1994: 633-636; Carrilho 2001: 5; Diamint 2004: 56-58). While Colombia and Mexico have not faced the problems of military dictatorship, as some of their neighbours such as Bolivia and Honduras, the re-politicisation of the armed forces is nevertheless problematic. In civil-military relations literature, for example, there is a significant emphasis on ensuring the de-politicisation of the armed forces as an essential factor in a functioning democracy (Huntington 1957; 1-14 Diamint 2004: 44; Solar 2017). In the United States the Posse Comitatus Act (1878) is a legislative barrier to domestic use of the armed forces, citing the potential risks of politicisation and military rule (Mabry 1988: 66; Carpenter 1990: 9; Withers et al 2010: 5-7) – and this is in a country with well-established democratic norms. Any enhancement of the power of the military vis-à-vis the power of the civilian sector is questionable and risky, particularly in the cases of fragile democracies in Latin America (Mabry 1988: 66; Carpenter 1990: 9; Olsen 1996: 3; Diamint 2004: 44; Withers et al 2010: 19).

A further negative consequence is the corrupting influence of the drug trade on military institutions. The huge profits of drug trafficking organisations compared with relatively low wages for government employees in Latin American countries lends itself to corruption (Jelsma 1997; Freeman 2006: 2; Keefer et al 2010: 22; Buxton 2011; Kan 2011: 42; Martin 2015: 11). By taking soldiers out of the barracks and deploying them to active law enforcement roles, military institutions, often seen as a guardian of national sovereignty and integrity, have become corrupted (Nagle 2010: 107). The Mexican armed forces, for example, once considered the least corrupt institution in the country, have been wracked by numerous

corruption scandals since its involvement in drug law enforcement (Mabry 1988: 62; Seper 2003; Montolivo 2009: 1-5; Ramsey 2011; Archibold 2012).

There are therefore clear dangers posed by the military assuming law enforcement roles, not only to the population and the democratic system, but also to the institution itself. Given that such dangers are present, and have been observed in the case countries, ascertaining and understanding how and why this militarisation occurred is important not only to aid reversal, but to avoid repetition in countries wishing to follow the Colombian and Mexican examples (Gagne 2015). The allure of quick gains through increased military presence seems to impel governments across the region to adopt this strategy, and Guatemala, Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador and Honduras have all taken recent steps to increase the role of the military in combatting crime (Withers et al 2010: 2; Gagne 2015; LaSusa 2016).

Methodology

The research method will be qualitative and primarily literature based. It will scrutinise primary sources, such as official documents, and examine secondary academic literature. It will ensure sources derive from a wide variety of authors. Academic literature will be accompanied by media accounts, congressional records, official government sources, and NGO literature. The purpose of utilising as wide a variety of source material as possible is to triangulate and mitigate author bias as much as possible. Official documents such as Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, Plan Colombia, and the Mérida Initiative, will be focused upon. Analysing the counternarcotic assistance data within these, particularly focussing on the allocation of military versus police funding within security aid, will provide a distinction often ignored by analysts who frequently group military and police funding together without distinguishing them (Veillette 2004: 14; Neild 2005; Isacson 2005a; Isacson 2005b: 138). It will also be possible, through examining the language used in some of these initiatives, and supporting documents, to observe the counternarcotic policy objectives the US sought to obtain in Colombia.

The project will be a binary comparative case study analysis. The two cases are Colombia and Mexico, which have been selected because both have received overwhelming counternarcotic aid as part of the US-led war on drugs, most clearly seen in the Plan Colombia and Mérida Initiative aid packages. They have been the two largest recipients (Goi 2017). The purpose of using both as case studies, rather than one, is to more accurately identify how counternarcotic aid has interacted with militarisation of domestic law

enforcement. The cases are in many ways different, being in different continents, at different times, playing different roles in the drug trade, and having different violent actors. Yet in the case of counternarcotic aid and drug law enforcement, there is no a-typical case. The important commonalities are a) both countries received enormous amounts of counternarcotic security aid, and b) both countries came to employ the military as the prime enforcement tool in the war on drugs. It is nevertheless important to recognise the limitations of two cases that are, in many ways, very different. Furthermore, they have not been chosen randomly and therefore will not be generalised easily to the broader category from which the cases are drawn (Hague and Harrop 2013: 366).

King et al (1994: 23) have stressed the importance of recording and reporting the process by which the data are generated. Obtaining primary official documentation, particularly from governmental sources, was identified as a key objective to enhance the validity of the research. This process proved to be in many ways challenging. The nature of the war on drugs, with its national security and military characteristics (as this research describes), has the unfortunate consequence that many documents of interest continue to be classified or are simply unavailable. For example, through analysing various official records it is possible to see budget allocations for a large amount of US counternarcotic funding. However, some of this information simply is not public information, such as spending which falls under the Pentagon's 'discretionary budget.' This would be impossible to analyse, and so publicly available figures must be relied upon. While this is a drawback, detailed statistics of the majority of US counternarcotic aid are available to view, and in some cases documents that were classified have since been declassified – particularly in the case of Colombia (CIA 1992; DEA 1994; CIA 1997).

In terms of locating the sources, a quantifiable or robustly randomised data generation process was not feasible due to the nature of the project (King et al 1994: 23-27). Though sources had to be located manually, through a process of searching key words on government archives or poring through bibliographies, as great variety of sources was used as possible, so as not to have a concentration in any one department of the US government. This dissertation makes use of resources from the State Department, Congressional Research Service, CIA, Government Accountability Office, the White House, US congressional documents (both houses) and the US Department of Justice, to name a few examples.

While a balance across government was sought, the most useful proved to be Government Accountability Office reports. This is largely because they provided statistical data on counternarcotic funding that could not be found elsewhere. Perhaps more importantly, they have been largely ignored by the literature and provide a crucial insight in to the thinking and decision-making of policymakers, as frequent references are made to quotes from officials from other departments. By virtue of being made publicly available from the beginning without redactions, these reports provide an excellent source of information for academics.

As well as government agencies, an important source of official primary literature was US executive documents and US congressional documents. The former are accessible online, and in particular the NSDD's provided a useful insight through reading the words of a US President. In the case of the latter, the website for the US Congress provides access to all bills, acts, etc for public viewing, though it does require finding the right documents within its labyrinth. Extensive searches were made, not only for specific known documents mentioned in the literature, but also word-based searches to find supplementary documentation on, say, *Plan Colombia* or the *Merida Initiative*. Additionally, the counter narcotic aid packages themselves – *Plan Colombia* and the *Merida Initiative* – are consistently drawn upon within this work. These documents, including their wording, provide an excellent primary source and offer a great deal in terms of analysis. Unfortunately, Bush Sr's *Andean Initiative* was not freely available, and so secondary literature was needed exclusively to analyse the data on this.

Context

The following section will contextualise the United States and its 'war on drugs', focussing in particular on its policies on Colombia and Mexico. It will then contextualise the country-specific cases of drug trafficking security challenges and militarisation of law enforcement. These are the necessary foundations for analysis of the extent to which the United States influenced Colombia and Mexico to militarise their 'war on drugs'. Most importantly, it will demonstrate that counternarcotics in both cases went from being the responsibility of civilian law enforcement to being primarily undertaken by the army.

The United States, Drugs, and National Security

The ‘war on drugs’ was first declared by US President Nixon in 1971, who advocated an aggressive approach to the international illegal drug trade (Carpenter 2003: 9; Whitford and Yates 2009: 86; Vulliamy 2011). While this was a significant moment in global prohibition of drugs, ushering in a new era of US foreign policy focus on illegal drugs, it was far from its beginning. The first international agreements advocating the prohibition of certain psychoactive substances were made in Shanghai in 1909 and at the Hague Convention in 1912 (Bevans 1963: 44-49; Waddell 1970: 310-313; Bewley-Taylor 1998: 21-24). These agreements centred around making illegal the production and distribution of such substances because of the adverse effect they had on individual health and public safety (Kan 2016: 3). By 1988, three UN Conventions (1961, 1971, 1988) comprised the regime of global prohibition, advocating an emphasis on supply-side policies such as interdiction and eradication (Buxton 2011: 3-5). This approach was predicated on the assumption that drugs and violence are causally related, and therefore reduction in supply would increase market prices, reducing consumption and reducing violence crime (Reuter and Kleinman 1986: 289).

While the driving force behind global prohibition was the United States, both Nixon (1969-1974) and his immediate successors, Ford (1974-1977) and Carter (1977-1981) did little to emphasise drug prohibition as a core foreign policy issue (Bertram et al 1996: 109; Carpenter 2003: 15). This changed under the Reagan administration (1981-1989), which took Nixon’s proclaimed ‘war on drugs’ as a major foreign policy initiative (Bagely 1988: 165; Chepesiuk 1999: xxviii). This involved the characterisation of drug trafficking, the production and distribution of illicit psychoactive substances, as an existential foreign national security threat to the United States. For Reagan, ‘illegal drugs were every bit as much a threat to the US as enemy planes and missiles’ (Reagan cited in Wilson 1989a). In 1986, Reagan signed a National Security Directive (NSDD) declaring that ‘the expanding scope of global narcotics trafficking… threatens the national security of the United States’ (The White House 1986: 1). This NSDD thrust the issue of drugs into the rubric of American foreign policy and national security, and signified to the US defence establishment that the drug war fell under its area of operations (Doyle 1993: 83; Astorga 2000: 26; Freeman and Sierra 2005: 277). The extension of drugs to the issue of national security is significant, as this perception influenced the US approach to drugs in other countries. For example, the 1986 NSDD also declared that ‘the national security threat posed by the drug trade is particularly serious outside US borders, and therefore US military activity would include training to assist foreign military forces in planning and conducting counter-narcotic operations’ (The White House 1986: 1-3). This

demonstrates clearly the link for Reagan between drugs as a national security threat and the use of military forces in counterdrug activities, a policy that was continued in subsequent administrations. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense in the Bush Sr administration (1989-1993), stated that 'detecting and countering the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high priority national security issue for the Pentagon' (cited in Wilson 1989b). Under Reagan the anti-drug budgets for the Pentagon, the headquarters of the US Department of Defense (DOD), had increased rapidly, from $5 million in their Financial Year (FY) 1982 budget to $400 million by FY1987. This continued under Bush Sr, and by FY1992, the Pentagon's anti-drug budget was at $1.22 billion (Zirnite et al 1997). Furthermore, in 1990 US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), a DOD command responsible for providing contingency planning, operations and security cooperation in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean, declared drugs its 'number one priority' (Olsen 1996: 1). This increasing involvement of US military departments, particularly the Pentagon and SOUTHCOM, in the drug war is significant as it demonstrates an increasingly militarisation of the US side of the drug war, influencing the methods with which they conducted their foreign policy.

As illicit drug production of opiates, marijuana, and cocaine were in foreign countries, particularly South America, US capability to deal with drug supply depended on both the interest and capability of foreign governments in drug control (The White House 1975: 50; The White House 1986: 1-3; Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 105-106). It therefore sought to ensure that the cocaine exporters in South America and the transhipment countries that lay between perceived drug trafficking as a national security threat (Dionne Jr., 1988, cited in Bagely 1988). The 'Americanisation' of global drug enforcement involved a massive expansion of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and robust efforts to modernise the drug enforcement capabilities of foreign police and governments (Nadelmann 1993: 194-195; Bartilow and Eom 2009: 94). The US aggressively internationalised its law and drug enforcement agenda and promoted its criminal justice norms and practices to other countries (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006: 105-106).

The precise details and mechanisms with which it conducted this are a core subject of this research, and will be covered in greater detail in later chapters, but the chief components of US foreign drug policy comprised of sanctions and aid. In 1986 the US Congress amended the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, introducing the certification process which ties US foreign aid to country performance in anti-drug efforts. If a country failed to meet these criteria, the US President could de-certify them, slashing aid and imposing sanctions (Perl 2006: 4). The

decertification mechanism has been used frequently by US presidents, with Reagan decertifying Bolivia in 1986 and 1987, and Clinton decertifying Colombia in 1996 and 1997 (Bagely 1998: 165). More recently, the Obama administration decertified Bolivia in 2009 (WOLA 2009), and the Trump administration has threatened to decertify Colombia (Alsema 2017). In addition to this coercive method is the more cooperative method of encouraging anti-drug efforts through increasing of economic assistance.

Economic assistance to both Colombia and Mexico favoured security aid, with an emphasis on the armed forces, providing training, arms, equipment and vehicles (Neild 2005: 61-64; Isacson 2005a: 15-20; Seelke 2017: 1). Counternarcotic aid to Colombia and Mexico was concentrated in three separate packages; the Andean Initiative, Plan Colombia, and the Mérida Initiative (See Chapters 3 and 4). It is also important to note that during this period, the department administering counternarcotic aid changed. Whereas it was previously almost entirely the responsibility of the State Department, a civilian institution, by the late 1980s and early 1990s the Department of Defense took an increasingly central role in the spending allocation (Neild 2005: 69).

This section has demonstrated that the US considered drug trafficking abroad among its most important foreign policy objectives, and it pursued a policy of militarisation in drug source and transit countries in an effort to reduce drug trafficking. The next sections will provide the context on drug war militarisation in Colombia and Mexico, detailing their role within the drug trade and their efforts to deal with it.

Colombia: Politics and Drugs

Colombia is one of Latin America's oldest democracies, and unlike many of its neighbours it has not faced recent problems of military rule, having a predominately civilian government (Francisco 2006: 95). Colombian politics has been dominated by an internal war for nearly sixty years, with Marxist guerrilla groups, particularly the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), attempting to overthrow the state through armed conflict. The roots for this conflict lie in a historical inability of the Colombian government to control its vast, often isolated, and culturally distinct territory, and enormous wealth inequality (Thoumi 2010: 206; Schirmer 2011: 5). As a result, the rural poor were abandoned to whichever forces de facto ruled an area, and the guerrillas often became the sole authority (Pearce, cited in Livingstone 2005: 10). The foundations for the

internal conflict were also laid by the extremely violent period Colombia experienced during the 1940s and 1950s, known as 'La Violencia', a civil war between two political parties which killed an estimated 200,000-300,000 people out of a population of 11-12 million (Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 102; Thoumi 2010: 209). Since 2016 there exists a fragile peace process between the guerrilla groups and the Colombian state, but nevertheless the internal conflict has been and continues to be a dominant political issue (Gill 2016; Yagoub 2016; Casey 2017; Brodzinsky 2017).

Colombia's role in the international drug trade is foremost as a drug production and source country, being for most of the past three decades the largest exporter of cocaine. Colombia's drug economy is a labour-intensive one, providing a living for thousands of farmers who grow and sell the coca leaf (Schirmer 2011: 47). For many who live in remote areas far from markets, coca leaf is the only crop that provides the possibility of sustaining a living. It was not until the rise in international demand for marijuana in the 1970s that the illegal drug trade became an important policy issue in Colombia. In this period, the domestic trade grew rapidly, and by the late 1970s the large Medellin and Cali drug trafficking organisations were powerful and embedded in Colombian society, funding political campaigns, building infrastructure, and giving money to poor communities (Thoumi 2010: 213). The Medellin cartel, which was dominant until 1993, was headed by the infamous Pablo Escobar, ranked in 1989 as the world's seventh richest man with an estimated wealth of $25 bn. dollars (Gibbs 2009).

When the Colombian state under the Barco Administration (1986-1990) began to crack down on the Medellin cartel with more vigour, Escobar waged a bloody war against the state which lasted until his death in December 2 1993 (Bowden 2001: 249; Rogan 2011: 28). The war against the Medellin cartel by the Colombian state was assisted not only by the DEA, but also the Cali cartel, whose death squad named 'Los Pepes' murdered a number of Medellin cartel members (Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 103). Escobar's death in 1993 left the Cali cartel to assume control of the Colombian drug trade. This was to be temporary, as during the Samper (1990-1994) administration it was revealed that Cali cartel money had been instrumental to Samper's electoral campaign. Under intense pressure from the US and domestic elements, the Samper administration eliminated the Cali cartel (Livingstone 2005: 125; Kirk 2013). This was not the end of the Colombian drug trade, as new, much smaller trafficking organisations replaced the Medellin and Cali cartels, often working with the FARC, ELN, and right-wing paramilitary groups such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) arose

(Livingstone 2005: 129; Mejia 2016: 3). Far from stemming the trade, this development resulted in a dramatic increase in drug production in Colombia. In 2003, it was estimated that Colombia supplied 90% of the cocaine and a significant proportion of the heroin consumed in the United States (Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 99). In addition, these new splinter groups, often called 'cartelitos', did not have the size or capability of their predecessors to traffic their cocaine or heroin internationally (Carpenter 2005; Livingstone 2005: 126; Freeman and Sierra 2005: 270). The resulting vacuum was filled by Mexican drug-trafficking organisations that did have the capability to tranship drugs from the production countries to the consumer countries (Withers et al 2010: 17; Rogan 2011: 26).

Drug Trafficking in Colombia: Law Enforcement and Security

Colombia has a national police closely integrated with the armed forces, with both operating under a single civilian controlled ministry (Bailey 2011: 1). Indeed, the national police are subordinate to the armed forces, demonstrated by the fact that the National Police was led by the top army general until 1991 (Lee III 1998: 224; Francisco 2006: 95). Resolution 743 of April 1981 assigned lead responsibility in drug trafficking enforcement to the National Police by creating an antinarcotics unit in its Operations Bureau (Francisco 2006: 99), and the police were tasked with tracking down cartel bosses. Historically, Latin American militaries, including Colombia's, had not sought a major role in the war on drugs, and tended to perceive the drug war as running counter to both its mission and its institutional interests (Lee III 1998: 214; Neild 2005: 61). Comments at the time indicate that it was not viewed as being important enough an issue to warrant their involvement.

However, as the power of the narco-traffickers rose, they were considered by many at the time, particularly in the US, to threaten the existence and survival of the Colombian state (Francisco 2006: 98). In response to this, in 1989 President Bush Sr introduced the 'Andean Initiative', a five year aid package (1989-1994) which was intended to strengthen Latin American police and militaries to conduct counterdrug operations (Youngers and Rosin 2005: 3). The military and police assistance provided to Colombia increased from US $18 million in FY1989 to US $93 million in FY1990. Notably, 90% of this US security assistance went to the police, and the dismantling of the Medellin and Cali drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) was enacted almost entirely without the Colombian military (Isacson 2005a: 45). It would be misleading, however, to view this as evidence of support for democratic policing, as this assistance had strikingly military characteristics. The Colombian National Police

received military training as well as military hardware (Neild 2005: 158). It became so militarised that in 1993 a process of institutional change was started within the Colombian National Police, intending to demilitarise and democratize the police, as its legitimacy had significantly declined (Llorente 2006: 111).

The change in nature of the Colombian illegal drug trade following the destruction of the Medellin and Cali DTO's, and assumption of the trade by an amalgamation of 'cartelitos', guerrilla groups, and paramilitaries, the government and enforcement strategy also changed (GAO 1999: 4; Livingstone 2005: 129; Carpenter 2005: 1-10; Freeman and Sierra 2005: 270; Withers et al 2010: 17; Mejia 2016: 3; Heinle et al 2016). The lines between the 'drug war' and the internal conflict became increasingly blurred, as traffickers increasingly paid for guerrilla protection, and the guerrillas funded their armed activities through proceeds from drug trafficking (Kan 2009: 1). Separating drug enforcement from fighting the guerrillas became more complicated, while simultaneously drug-related violence spiralled to even higher levels than during the narco-terror campaigns of the Medellin cartel (Brauer and Gomez-Sorzano 2004: 29-50; Felbab-Brown 2009; Keefer et al 2010: 19; Bailey 2011: 4). The Clinton administration, in collaboration with the Colombian government, instituted another, more significant aid package than the Andean Initiative - 'Plan Colombia', introduced in 1999 with $5.4 bn. allocated for the region from FY2000-2005. By its end, Plan Colombia provided $6 bn. in aid to the Colombian state (Withers et al 2010: 19). Its stated aims were the reduction of violence, through reduction of drug trafficking, and to strengthen the Colombian state, particularly the military, to ensure law and order (Schirmer 2011: 51). Roughly half the Colombian expenditures and three-quarters of that of the US financed the military component, as the army became the undisputed chief crime-fighting agency (Isacson 2005: 46; Mejia 2010: 35).

Two distinct periods of Colombian drug-war militarisation can therefore be observed, both of which correspond to different armed actors in the drug trade and differing US policies. The first period is the struggle between the Colombian state and the Medellin and Cali DTO's, in which enforcement took the form of US-supported counterdrug units in the Colombian National Police, trained and equipped militarily. The second, the 'Plan Colombia' period, observed an increasing merging between the drug trade and the Marxist guerrillas, which, particularly when combined with the events of 9/11 and the fear of narco-terrorism and Colombian guerrilla links with Islamic terrorism, saw the army being utilised as the primary and almost exclusive tool in the fight against drug trafficking.

Mexico: Politics and Drugs

Mexico shares a nearly 2,000 mile land border with the United States. Until 2000 it has been a one-party state, governed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). The PRI has held a number of ideological positions over the course of its existence, usually fluctuating depending on the President of the Republic at the time. Since the 1980s it has been considered to be centre-right, favouring privatization of state-run industries and embracing free-market capitalism. The PRI's grip on political control of the country was lost in 2000 when President Fox of the National Action Party (PAN) won the election, transitioning the country to democracy. The PAN is not explicitly aligned to traditional ideologies, instead supposedly forming policy based on the challenges facing the nation at the time. President Fox was succeeded by President Calderón (2006-2012), also of PAN, who was then succeeded by current President Peña Nieto of the PRI.

The illegal drug trade only began to present itself as a domestic political issue to Mexican political leaders in the late 1990s. A dramatic increase in drug production and transhipment in and through Mexico, by 1996 aroused concern and this sudden rise captured the public's attention (Olsen 1996: 1, 6). While the drug trade was present in Mexico for some time prior to this, the PRI had permitted and managed the drug trade (Astorga 2000: 79; Bunker 2013: 129). However, with the shift in the international drug transhipment routes following the fall of the Medellin and Cali DTOs in the mid to late 1990s, and following a successful US-led interdiction efforts in the Caribbean during the 1980s, the main drug trafficking routes and control of those routes shifted to Mexico (Thoumi 2010: 213; Pryce 2012: 111).

Mexico's role within the international illegal drug trade is varied. Whereas Colombia is predominantly a producer country, Mexico both produces marijuana, opium and methamphetamines, and is a key transhipment route for cocaine passing from South America (US Department of State 2005: 18; Freeman and Sierra 2005: 263; Rios 2008: 3; US Department of State 2016). The drug market in Mexico is therefore mostly a labour non-intensive illicit economy (Felbab-Brown 2009: 14), because trafficking requires much less manpower than cultivation and production.

Mexican drug trafficking organisations rapidly expanded in sophistication and power from the mid-1980s, and were able to capitalise on the vacuum left in the international drug market by the fall of the Medellin and Cali cartels to expand their international reach (Freeman and

Sierra 2005: 270; Withers et al 2010: 17). In 2010 Mexican DTOs were thought by the US government to generate US$19-29 billion from the illicit drug trade (US Homeland Security 2010). The Mexican drug market is characterised by multiple competing DTOs. In 2006 there was estimated to be four major DTOs; Juarez, Sinaloa, Gulf and Tijuana (Paul et al 2014: 42). This number has increased to seven in 2014, with the ascendency of the Knights Templars, La Familia, Jalisco, and Los Zetas, and the fall of the Tijuana cartel (InSight Crime 2017). Drug-related homicides are at extreme levels and continue to rise (Kan 2011: 40; Smith and Meyer 2016: 1; Amnesty International 2017). While official data indicates some 47,500 deaths between December 2006 and January 2012 (Moloeznik 2013: 185), determining the exact number is difficult due to defining what constitutes 'drug-related' violence (Paul et al 2014: 24-25).

Drug Trafficking in Mexico: Law Enforcement and Security

Whereas Colombia has both the National Police and Army under a single Defence ministry, Mexico has much more clearly separated military and civilian roles, which are constitutionally protected (Mexican Federal Constitution, Article 53). There are nearly 2,000 police forces in Mexico, a combination of federal, state, and municipal police. The federal police forces have been repeatedly dissolved and replaced, and there have tended to be two federal police forces at a time. One, the Federal Preventative Police (PFP), was created by President Zedillo (1995-2000) in 1999. Though this was a civilian institution, it bore remarkably militaristic characteristics, with entire army units transitioned in to it, top positions being held by military officers, and a military organisational style (Freeman and Sierra 2005: 281; Bailey and Dammert 2006b: 258; Freeman 2011: 67). The PFP was replaced in 2008 with the Federal Police (PF), and retains many of these characteristics. The other federal police force, now the Ministerial Federal Police (PFM), replaced the Federal Investigations Agency (AFI), which itself replaced the Federal Judicial Police (PJF) in 2001. Whereas the PF are under the jurisdiction of the Secretariat of the Interior, and are typically heavily armed wearing combat fatigues, the PFM are under the authority of the Attorney General of Mexico (PGR). This separation and the successive reincarnations of federal police forces, in addition to the sheer number of different state and municipal police forces, illustrates the systemic problems that the Mexican police forces have faced when dealing with Mexico is drug trafficking organisations.

While the Mexican army has had a role in drug eradication since the 1940s, drug interdiction (limited as it was under the PRI's one-party state) was entirely conducted by the state and federal police (Astorga 2000: 27; Felbab-Brown 2009: 7). This shifted dramatically in line with the previously mentioned rise of drug trafficking as a public concern in the mid to late 1990s (Olsen 1996: 1). In 1995, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (1994-2000), unveiled a new five-year antinarcotics strategy called the 'National Drug Control Program, 1995-2000', in which he described drug trafficking as 'the most serious threat to (Mexico's) national security' (Olsen 1996: 2). This plan expanded the role of Mexico's armed forces in antinarcotics activities by involving them in drug interdiction for the first time. The National Public Security System, also created by Zedillo in 1995, for the first time gave Mexico's military a role in the decision making and policy setting in important domestic public security matters, previously an exclusively civilian responsibility (Olsen 1996: 3). In this year, a thousand Mexican soldiers received special training in counter-narcotics in the United States (Astorga 2000: 27), and on March 1st and 2nd the Mexican army, in a joint operation with the PGR, undertook a large operation to locate and arrest drug traffickers in Tijuana and Mexico City. Twenty houses were searched and areas were cordoned off by the army (Olsen 1996: 3). This coordination between the military and the police at the federal level also began to occur on the local level, as local military commanders met with police and judicial officers to map out a public security strategy (Olsen 1996: 3). The shift in responsibility between the police and the armed forces can be demonstrated by drug confiscation statistics. In 2003, the Secretary of Defence was responsible for 93% of the total amount of cocaine confiscated and 83% of the marijuana, a complete reversal of 1990 levels (Moloeznik 2006: 175).

During the presidency of Vincente Calderón (2006-2012) both use of the Mexican military in drug law enforcement and US counternarcotic aid intensified dramatically. President Calderón launched a 'war on drugs and organised crime' in 2006, expanding the PFP from 9,000 members in 2006 to 29,000 in 2009, and increasing domestic troop deployment from just over 19,000 to 45,000 (Keefer et al 2010: 12; Grayson 2013: 3; LaSusa 2016). In 2009 alone, 48,750 soldiers were assigned to combatting drug trafficking organisations, with only a quarter of those in joint operations with other agencies (Camp 2010: 292). Despite being a 'temporary measure', in 2011 more than 96,000 troops were engaged (Beittel 2013: 33). These measures were accompanied by the Mérida Initiative, which was agreed by Calderón and Bush Jr in October 2007, and provided $1.6 bn. in assistance, mostly police and military

equipment and training, to Mexico and other Central American nations (Withers et al 2010: 17). Roughly 41% of the year one spending was allocated to the Mexican army and navy (Selee 2008: 2). By FY2018, it is estimated by the Congressional Research Service (Seelke 2018: 15) that $2.74 bn. has been provided to Mexico by the US through Mérida.

Militarisation of Mexican public security has been clear and decisive. It has taken the form not only of a dramatic increase of the use of armed forces in counternarcotic and law enforcement roles – becoming essentially the primary law enforcement institution, but also of a militarisation of police forces (Olsen 1996: 3; Meyer 2014: 5-10). Alongside increasing levels of counternarcotic funding from the US to the Mexican military, the latter has become the principal counterdrug institution, assuming a number of law enforcement roles and in many cases replacing the police (Moloeznik 2013: 178-180).

Summary

This chapter has outlined the aims of this dissertation, which are primarily to ascertain the role of the US in influencing the way counternarcotics have been undertaken in Colombia and Mexico. Specifically, the militarisation of counternarcotics and therefore its transition from the realm of public security to that of national security. This interrelation between militarisation and public/national security will be examined in more detail in Chapter 2. This chapter has also demonstrated the significance of militarisation, in that it endangers both citizens and fragile democratic systems by placing soldiers in policing capacities and politicalising the armed forces.

In addition to providing background on the role of the illegal drug trade in Colombia and Mexico, this chapter has established that in both cases the armed forces came to be the primary tool of counternarcotic law enforcement, despite it having previously been a civilian police issue. Colombia and Mexico therefore made changes to their drug enforcement capabilities that were very much in line with US wishes, while also receiving substantial quantities of economic counterdrug assistance. The extent to which US actions influenced this change will be the subject of the main chapters of this dissertation.

The next chapter will provide a review of the relevant literature. It will examine the literature on US counternarcotic aid, primarily consisting of academics writing for human rights NGOs. It will also examine the literature on militarisation of law enforcement, particularly that of counternarcotics. This will be followed by country-specific literature, outlining the key

literature on drug trafficking in Colombia and Mexico, as well as literature which compares the two cases.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

The 'Collateral Damage' Thesis and Counternarcotic Aid

The 'collateral damage thesis', pioneered in Youngers' and Rosin's (2005: 1-10) work, asserts that US aid to Latin America has facilitated widespread abuse of human rights by its focus on security assistance without adequately supporting civilian institutions or addressing social and economic issues. They attributed the rise in violent crime and human rights violations in Latin America to the 'collateral damage' of the 'americanisation' of drug enforcement that encourages Latin American governments to militarise the drug war.

Furthermore, the focus for the collateral damage thesis has been specifically on US aid. While this is fundamental to an examination of militarisation of drug law enforcement in Latin America, Colombia and Mexico, particularly the latter, are large enough and have significant enough regional and strategic importance to be able to resist the US to some extent (Neild 2005: 91). For example, Mexico has continued to militarise its drug law enforcement in the face of declining US support (Gagne 2017). Expanding upon this more limited viewpoint will be one of the core research aims of this project.

The collateral damage thesis has received little scholarly attention in recent years, other than Bartilow's (2009, 2014) work. Mexico's drug war militarisation intensified in 2006 with Calderón's 'war on drugs', occurring after Youngers and Rosin's (2005) work, this dissertation will fill a gap in the literature by not only expanding upon the arguments and hypotheses of the collateral damage thesis, but also mitigating its tendency to ignore the agency of domestic actors. Think tanks and NGOs (Olson 1996; Neild 2005; Freeman and Sierra 2005; Isacson 2005a; Freeman 2011; Meyer 2014; Gagne 2015; LaSusa 2016; Suarez and Meyer 2017) have written extensively on the collateral damage aspect of the military and the war and drugs, but this literature is still limited and focusses almost exclusively on the effects of, rather than reasons for, militarisation of drug law enforcement.

Militarisation of Law Enforcement Literature

It was noted in the introduction that militarisation is a process which is intimately connected with national/public security dynamics. Militarisation of drug law enforcement refers to two separate but interrelated processes. One is the expansion of the anti-drug role of the military

as an institution into domestic law enforcement responsibilities, and the second is the appointment of military personnel to posts inside civilian law enforcement institutions, such as the police (Freeman and Sierra 2005: 277). However, there is little academic work focussed specifically on militarisation in the context of the drug war in Mexico and Colombia.

The most useful work on militarisation of domestic law enforcement that deals with security conceptions is Bailey and Dammert's 2006 edited collection, *Public Security and Police Reform in Latin America*. Yet while drug trafficking is mentioned, it is not a central theme. Furthermore, this work is over a decade old and, in the time since, drug-related violence and militarisation of drug law-enforcement in Central America has increased dramatically. Studies of the policing in developing democracies are few and far between (Bonner 2011: 201). Most studies focus on the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia. Diamint (2004) has provided an overview of the US's militaristic approach to drug trafficking in Latin America, but this was written before drug trafficking became a major issue in Mexico.

Think-tanks and NGOs have researched militarisation of drug law enforcement in Latin America extensively, for example Meyer (2010; 2014) from the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), and Pachico (2011) and Gagne (2014) from InSight Crime. However, in the case of the former the focus is purely on human rights abuses and it gives little attention to cause and process. In the case of the latter, analysis is short, confined to a page or two page articles. The absence of a significant body of literature dedicated to the process and cause of the militarisation of drug enforcement in these case countries has given rise to this dissertation. The militarisation literature has not engaged at all with the security studies literature with regards to conceptions and dynamics of security, with the exception of Bailey and Dammert's general work.

Country Specific Literature

Of the literature on Colombia and drug trafficking, much of the older literature explores Colombia as a part of the Andean region, or indeed as part of Latin America as a whole, rather than specifically on its own. Consequently Colombian drug trafficking is only a part in works such as Boville's (2004) *Cocaine War in Context: Drugs and Politics,* Menzel's (1997) *Cocaine Quagmire: Implementing the US Anti-Drug Policy in the North-Andes-Colombia* and Clawson and Lee III's (1996) *The Andean Cocaine Industry*. These all provide useful backgrounds to the early history and evolution of the Andean cocaine industry, but

offer little depth on issues such as law enforcement strategies. Of the works that do deal specifically with Colombia, Crandall's (2002) *Driven by Drugs: US policy toward Colombia*, Lee III's (1998) *The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power*, and Livingstone's (2005) *Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War* all provide exceptional detail. Of these, only Lee III's (1998) work deals specifically with early militarisation of counternarcotics. Consequently, there is somewhat of a reliance within the later literature on Lee III's work, particularly when it comes to statements made by US and Colombian officials. There are fewer sources on the Plan Colombia period, a key time period of analysis for this research. Furthermore, that which does exist rarely makes comparison with Mexico, which became the drug war's new frontline after 2006. While the literature does focus extensively on the role of the US policy toward Colombia and drug trafficking, the issue of militarisation is rarely if ever tackled – instead, US policy focussed upon security aid in general versus alternative development plans, or a focus on fumigation and eradication programmes.

The literature on Mexican drug trafficking differs considerably from that of Colombia. This is a result of two things: firstly is the time period. While the works on Colombia are largely monographs dating before the large-scale digitisation of academic literature, which sought to shed light on a new, distant and little known phenomena (drug production), the Mexican literature has largely been generated since the turn of the millennia, when the global drug trade has been much more extensively researched. Secondly, the Mexican literature is particularly atomised, written from the perspective of the discipline of organised crime studies, terrorism studies, gang studies, insurgency studies and future war studies (Bunker 2013: 130). This is a testament to the diverse and multi-disciplinary characteristics of the study of drug trafficking. The primary issues this literature is concerned with is the nature of the drug-related violence – for example, whether it is organised crime or a criminal insurgency, or the nature of narco-terrorism, and the ways in which the Mexican government (and US government) can stem the violence.

Using Metz's (1993: 15-16) definition of 'commercial insurgency', Sullivan and Bunker (2011: 745) make a case for the Mexican violence being an example of a criminal insurgency. They define this as the result of criminal enterprises competing with the state, where rather than seeking to attain political participation within state structure, criminal insurgents fight to free themselves from state control so they can maximise profits from illicit activities (Sullivan and Bunker 2011: 745-747). For Killbrew and Bernal (2010) the 'scale and capability to destabilise governments have made the cartels an insurgent threat as well as a

criminal one'. The logic behind the criminal insurgency theory is that criminal organisations, whether intentionally or accidentally, challenge the state by generating high intensity criminal violence that erodes the legitimacy and solvency of state institutions (Sullivan and Rosales 2011). This debate is relevant to this research project, as such evaluations of the threat posed by Mexican criminal organisations inform what can be considered to be the appropriate response, and therefore whether it falls under the remit of public or national security, police or army jurisdiction.

Given that there is a comparative component to this dissertation, it is necessary to review the literature comparing drug trafficking in Mexico and Colombia. One of the most cited examples is US Secretary Clinton's (2010) assertion that 'Mexico is increasingly looking like Colombia twenty years ago'. This was drawing a comparison between the contemporary Mexican DTOs and Escobar's Medellin 'cartel' as sharing their criminal narco-insurgent status (Rogan 2011: 2). There is a basis of literature that analyses comparatively the violence and drug problems of Mexico and Colombia (Galen Carpenter 2005; Felbab-Brown 2009; Beittel 2013), and there is also literature dedicated to criticising such comparisons. Paul et al's *Mexico is not Colombia* (2014) argues that the two are inherently different examples. Kan and Williams (2010) describe comparisons of Mexico with Colombia as 'pernicious' and 'facile'. These comparisons will be examined in greater detail later in this dissertation.

Security Sector Reform

An additional consideration is security sector reform (SSR) literature. SSR is analysis of the process to reform or rebuild a state's security sector towards good security sector governance (USAID 2009: 3). According to the UN, 'Security sector reform aims at improving safety through enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of security institutions controlled by civilians and operating according to human rights and the rule of law.' (UN 2008; UN, n. d.). The United States foreign assistance framework identifies SSR as an important area of focus (USAID 2009: 2).

In Mexico, SSR literature has focussed on getting the armed forces out of law enforcement. To this end, various proposals have been made by politicians and subsequent presidents. The formation of a gendarmerie to transition public security from the army to the police has been proposed by President Nieto (Corcoran 2014) and current president Lopez Obrador (Corcoran 2019), for example. Mexican police have been the topic of continuous and sustained reform (Moloeznik 2006; Moloeznik 2009; Meyer 2014) with several police agencies being

dissolved then re-created on several occasions. In Colombia, SSR reform has focussed on both reforming the Colombian National Police due to corruption (Llorente 2005; Bailey and Dammert 2006a; Francisco 2006), and reforming the Colombian army due to controversies such as the 'false positives' scandal, whereby the army was found to be killing civilians and claiming they were guerrillas (HRW 2011; HRW 2014). While SSR literature is important to be aware of in the periphery, it deals primarily with ongoing governance and process of improvement and democratisation, whereas this research is focussed on assessing how and why the armed forces were utilised in the first place.

Public Health Approach

In the literature, what is not addressed is the alternative to national security. If drug trafficking is not/should not be identified as a national security issue, then what is it? There is an increasing tendency to treat drugs as a problem of public health. This can be observed clearly in the case of Portugal, which in 2001 introduced Law 30/2000, decriminalising use, possession, and acquisition of illicit substances for personal use (Hughes and Stevens 2007: 1). Addicts are treated, rather than jailed in this public health approach (Domoslawski 2011; Ferreira 2017; NPR 2017). This approach, however, is confined to the demand side of the issue (Lancet 2001). So far, the production and supply of drugs remains firmly in the domain of public security, internal security, domestic security, law-and-order and crime.

Summary

This chapter has noted many of the key authors in the relevant literature, and the limits of their analysis. While there has been a great deal of analysis into US security aid to Colombia and Mexico, these have generally focussed on the effects without assessing the process itself. Furthermore the focus is on human rights abuses or effectiveness in reducing quantities of drugs produced or trafficked, rather than on the effect on law enforcement and public/national security dynamics. Additionally, the militarisation literature takes little account of conceptions of security and the impact and implications this has for militarisation and vice versa, instead focussing on the effects of militarisation on, again, human rights abuses or success in eradicating or indicting drugs. Literature on the drug trades in these countries offers little with regard to the processes of enforcement, focussing instead on details of the trade itself and the actors involved, and is also generally quite dated.

Underpinning this research is the interrelation between public and national security, and the way in which militarisation represents the movement from the former to the later in terms of

response. This connection has been alluded to by academics analysing state responses and enforcement of drug trafficking, and indeed by US policymakers, such as Reagan (cited in The White House 1986: 1-3; Richburg 1986; cited in Wilson 1989a). The next chapter will assess this connection, and demonstrate the linkage between the two.

Chapter 2: Terminology of Security

Drug trafficking has traditionally been classified as criminal activity, and viewed as a law enforcement issue (Cornell 2005: 623-624; Kan 2009: 91). Prior to 1970, in both Colombia and Mexico, drug trafficking was enforced by law enforcement institutions (Lee III 1998: 214; Boville 2004: 161; Neild 2005: 61; Francisco 2006: 99). With the advent of the US-led 'war on drugs', policymakers in Washington increasingly began describing drug trafficking abroad as a 'threat to national security' (The White House 1986: 1; The White House 1989: 59, 62; Cheney, cited in Wilson 1989b; The White House 1991: 3, 17; Doyle 1993: 83; Astorga 2000: 26; Freeman and Sierra 2005: 277). Defining drug trafficking as a national security threat is essential and intrinsically connected to militarisation, as the elevation of a security threat from the realm of public security to that of national dimensions justifies the use of the armed forces (Bailey and Dammert 2006; Bailey et al 2011; Pion-Berlin and Carreras: 2017: 11). This was reflected by advocates of drug trafficking as a threat to national security, who frequently argued the response to it should therefore be by the military (Mabry 1989: 8). For example, Reagan's 1986 NSDD declared that 'the national security threat posed by the drug trade is particularly serious outside US borders, and therefore US military activity would include training to assist foreign military forces in planning and conducting counter-narcotic operations' (The White House 1986: 1-3). Shortly after, the DOD, and particularly SOUTHCOM, considered drugs to be a priority (Olsen 1996: 1; Cheney, cited in Wilson 1989b). Mabry (1989: 8) has questioned: 'is the illegal narcotics trade a sufficient threat to national security to warrant using the US military as drug enforcement agents?' This chapter will demonstrate that military responses are a common response to threats to national security.

The first part of this chapter will examine how national security has been defined, and how this is relevant to militarisation of law enforcement. It will demonstrate significant shortcomings in tackling important security issues which have characterised the post-cold war world, not least of which being drug trafficking. This will lead in to the next section, which examines the terminology and definitions utilised to describe security threats that do

not qualify to be of national security status, and are more traditionally under the jurisdiction of civilian law enforcement. The final section in this chapter will discuss 'securitization theory', a conceptual framework for understanding how issues come to be perceived as a security threat. Securitization theory has its basis in linguistics and rhetoric, and though it will be useful to this dissertation in so far as it aids in understanding what constitutes a security threat, it is supplementary rather than crucial.

National Security

In its simplest form, security is defined as 'the absence of threats' (Booth 2005: 21). In the security studies literature, security is taken to mean 'national security'. National security is a historically ambiguous term (Baldwin 1997: 6), which has been subjected to a variety of attempts at redefinition since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, some scholars consider security such an essentially contested concept that no widely agreed upon definition can be found (Gallie 1956: 167-198; Buzan 1991: 18). Of the definitions and interpretations that do exist in the literature, the majority come from the Realist theory of international relations, where state-state relations are of almost singular importance. In these cases, therefore, security (and national security in particular) are only defined with states in relation to other states, with a near-total focus on military force (Wolfers 1962: 8; Booth 1991: 38; Baldwin 1997: 9; Williams 1994: 269). This has developed from a perception that national security threats are military threats that arise beyond the borders of one's own country. They are therefore external and existential in nature. It presupposes that threats arising from outside a state are more dangerous to its security than threats which arise within it, and this is deeply ingrained (Ullman 1983: 13; 15).

Yet viewing security as an analysis of state-state relationships is problematic and anachronistic in the modern world (Williams 1994: 269). As Booth (2005: 15) has pointed out, globalisation, among other factors, has changed the game when it comes to security. It is in many ways anachronistic not to consider the systematic violence of violent drug trafficking organisations, such as the cartels in Mexico, as not worthy of security studies. Such reasoning has led to the Copenhagen school of international relations theory, who argue that there are five types of security issues; military, environmental, economic, social, and political sectors and encourages analysis that embraces varying theories and practices at multiple levels of society (Buzan et al 1998: 21-23; Booth 2005: 15).

An expansion of the definition of security seems to be needed, particularly since Latin America has not experienced an interstate war in the last 30 years, yet citizen security is a significant problem in many countries. The previously described 'criminal insurgency' label for drug-related violence in Mexico (Killbrew and Bernal 2010; Sullivan and Bunker 2011: 745-74), argues that violence levels are similar to that of a civil war or late-stage political insurgency (Paul et al 2014: 30-32), 2006 onwards has become labelled 'la inseguridad' (the insecurity) (Suarez and Meyer 2017).

There have been many attempts to expand and redefine national security to include non-military threats, which have been assisted by its inherent ambiguity. In the 1960's Wolfers (1962: 6) argued that the term security covered a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies could be interpreted as policies of security. Wolfers also noted that national security threats and national security interests had become nearly indiscernible from one another. Nearly two decades later, national security analysts Jordan and Taylor Jr. (1981: 3) argued that national security now includes 'protection… of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which would threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the state.' Such a definition can, evidently, be used to cover a very wide range of different threats and policies. Providing a more specific definition, Ullman (1983: 13) argued that a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that threatens drastically, and over a relatively brief span of time, to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state. This could include, for example, the interruptions in the flow of critically needed resources. While Ullman (1983: 11), argued that, in practical terms, an understanding of national security as a narrow and military term has been the case for every US administration since the late 1940s, this is no longer strictly the case. Recently, for example, President Trump cited steel imports as a threat to national security (Gregg and Davenport 2018).

While Ullman recognised that non-military dimensions of security existed, he wrote that there was no consensus for the need for a single, authoritative determinations regarding this (Ullman 1983: 15; Buzan 1991: 19). Yet, particularly in the post-cold war era, the daily threat to lives and well-beings of most people and most nations is different from that suggested by the traditional military perspective (Booth 1991: 38; Buzan 1991: 19), and is posed not necessarily by foreign military forces but also by myriad other factors, not least transnational organised crime and the trade in illegal drugs.

Williams (1994: 267) asserts that drug trafficking is a national security threat, but that narrow military conceptions of security should be dropped for the broader understanding whereby drug trafficking is treated as a security issue, because it poses a serious challenge to the fabric of society in the US, Western Europe and many drug producing countries such as Colombia and Mexico. While more subtle and complex than traditional military challenges, they still deserve national security status. He argues that drug trafficking is intimately linked with transnational criminal organisations (TCOs), who produce and traffic the drugs. The trade has taken on new international dimensions and criminal organisations have developed to resemble legal transnational corporations which pose far greater threats to security (Williams 1994: 267). At the individual level, security is the provision of relative safety under which citizens do not fear violence or intimidation. In countries such as Mexico, where drug-related violence is extensive, clearly TCOs have a geosocial impact on this security (Williams 1994: 267). TCOs pose threats to security at three levels: individual, the state and international system of states. In some cases, the power of the TCOs rivals the state itself, and their willingness to use violence against the state and its law enforcement agencies challenges the state monopoly on organised violence and can be more destabilising that the activities of revolutionary or terrorist groups (Williams 1994: 268). This view argues that the drug trade in countries such as Colombia is destabilising, corrupting and causing violence, and therefore constitutes a national security threat (Mabry 1989: 3).

Kan (2016: 3-4) argues that realists have overlooked the way in which drug trafficking has been part of major power relations. For him, drug trafficking was initially perceived as a violation of sovereignty, and was 'securitized'. Military forces and intelligence forces began to be used to interdict supply and disrupt demand before the drugs reached consumer markets in developing countries. At times, figures like Escobar directly confronted the Colombian state with violence (narco-terrorism). The 'drug-security nexus' therefore became more important at the end of the Cold War and the aftermath of 9/11. The violence expanded beyond criminal groups and became infiltrated by insurgent and terrorist groups. Drug trafficking expanded violence and enabled more groups to stymie the power and authority of the state.

There has been a movement in the academic literature to include non-military issues in the national security rubric, but this has done little to mitigate the political opinion that military responses are required. While threats such as TOC and the drug trade may constitute threats to national security, the persistence of national security threats to be understood in military

terms make this dangerous, as this dissertation will demonstrate. There is therefore something of a tension in the literature. Many analysts advocate a broader understanding of national security beyond military issues (Ullman 1983, Buzan 1991, Williams 1994), but are opposed to military solutions. Yet as the perception persists that a national security threat warrants a military solution, classifying threats as national security will securitise them in a military sense, as has happened with the drug trade in the US, Colombia, and Mexico. Waever (cited in Lipschutz 1995a: 10) warned that redefining security to encompass new forms of threats would risk applying traditional logic of military behaviour to non-military problems.

While this conceptual discourse is important to understand, it offers little in the way of a workable definition for national security. According to Bailey and Dammert (2006a: 11), national security focuses on protecting the state or state institutions from both external and internal threats. The external threats are posed by both the conventional military forces of hostile states and transnational actors. Threats to national security may also be posed by internal subversion. National security threats target state institutions and state attributes, such as sovereignty and territoriality, and the responses are typically led by military forces. Using this definition, militarisation of drug law enforcement is therefore a national security response, which in turn implies that drug trafficking can be and is perceived as a national security threat.

An Alternative to 'National' Security

In the national security literature, what is not addressed is the alternative to national security. If drug trafficking is not/should not be identified a national security issue, then what is it? The terms used to describe alternatives range from, public security, internal security, domestic security, law-and-order issue and crime issue. The ambiguity surrounding the definition of national security threats, as mentioned previously in this chapter, combined with the ambiguity of how we perceive and understand the alternative, makes it clear how the difference has become obscured and how the two have been blurred. This subsection will examine these terms to reach a workable term to be used as an alternative to national security threats/responses.

Public security is the term that has received the clearest attempt at definition. Bailey and Dammert (2006a: 11), whose national security definition was used earlier, also provided a definition for public security threats and responses. They argue public security can be defined as 'the physical and psychological safety of persons from threats such as natural disasters or

actual physical aggression by others'. The threats are principally crime, violence, terrorism, corruption and impunity. Responses to public security threats typically involve both government and civil society and involve, for example, hiring of additional police officers and strengthening the judicial system (Bailey and Dammert 2006a: 11). Public security in this context provides a useful intellectual alternative to national security, clearly differentiating not only the threat but also the response.

Law-and-order and crime issues are another term which analysts have presented as an alternative to national security. For example, Williams (1994: 265) asserts that organised crime has traditionally been seen as a domestic law-and-order problem, with the implication being that this is in opposition to a national security issue. These terms, similar to public security, suggest a civilian law enforcement responsibility. Domestic security and internal security are more problematic. Since security threats transcend borders, a threat being internal or domestic does not separate it from national security. For example, Marxist revolutionary guerrillas waging an all-out war against the state can be considered domestic and internal security, while also being traditionally military in nature and therefore a national security issue simultaneously (Bailey and Dammert 2006a: 11). Shining Path in Peru and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia would be considered by few to be a public security or crime issue. These two terms therefore most succinctly demonstrate the necessity to separate these terms. For something to be domestic does not inherently make it non-military, but to be a crime issue or a public security issue it is – otherwise it would be elevated to national security. Therefore, the advantage of the public security term is that it is mutually exclusive to national security, whereas domestic and internal security are not.

Militarisation and Securitization

In discussing security and, in particular, the Copenhagen School of International relations, it is necessary also to include what Waever termed 'securitization theory' (1995: 57) Securitization is the process of when an actor moves a topic away from ordinary politics and into an area of security concerns, thereby legitimising extraordinary means against the socially constructed threat (Waever 1995; Buzan et al 1998: 4-5; Taureck 2006: 54). The main argument of securitization theory is that security is an illocutionary speech act, in that by labelling something a security issue, it becomes one (Waever 2004: 13; Taureck 2006: 54). The implication of this is that security, rather than being an objective condition, is a social and intersubjective construction (Lipschutz 1995b: 213). The essential difference is

that security the objective condition suggests that something is a security issue due to the threat it poses to the self, usually the state, whereas security the intersubjective phenomenon perceives security as a speech act made by political actors.

While securitization theory perceives security solely as an illocutionary speech act (Waever 1995: 57; Taureck 2006) and is grounded in linguistics and discourse analysis, it is important not to view the securitisation 'speech act' in isolation but also the objective security conditions. Unlike issues such as migration, which have been the subject of much securitization literature (Huysmans 1998: 226-230), drug trafficking has a clear systemic violent impact that has claimed the lives of tens of thousands in Colombia and Mexico over the past thirty years (Goldstein 1985: 143-147; Freeman 2006: 15; Rios 2008: 138; Freeman 2011: 67). To ignore the objective threat itself would automatically ignore the arguments by academics and politicians that the drug trade is so violent and destabilizing in fragile democracies that it warrants being a national security threat, requiring the intervention of the armed forces. This dissertation intends to examine such claims, as the argument of necessity has been a regular justification for military intervention in crime fighting in these countries (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017: 11). Furthermore, Waever considers securitisation primarily within the unit (state) itself (Waever 1995:50-57; Lipschutz 1995b). In the case of the 'war on drugs', however, securitisation is occurring between units – in this case, the United States has potentially securitised drug trafficking in external countries. This will be analysed in detail in later chapters.

Furthermore, as securitisation theory is the process of a non-security issue being 'securitized' and therefore treated as a security issue, its usefulness to this dissertation is limited. Rather, this dissertation evaluates the process of a public security issue becoming, being, or being treated as, a national security one. Instead of transitioning from the realm of non-security to that of security, this is the transitioning of an issue from one sort of security to another, higher one. In this sense, it is securitized in that it is moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal democratic rules of policy-making (Taureck 2006). Nevertheless, the reluctance of the security studies literature to accept concepts of security outside of the national security paradigm renders it of limited use to this dissertation.

Summary

This chapter has acknowledged securitization theory, and has demonstrated why it is of limited utility for this dissertation. Additionally, this research project will use the definition given by Bailey and Dammert (2006a: 9-12) of national versus public security threats and responses. In the former, national security threats target state institutions and state attributes, such as sovereignty and territoriality, and the responses are typically led by military forces (Bailey et al 2011). For public security, on the other hand, the threats are principally crime, violence, terrorism and corruption and impunity. Responses to public security threats typically involve both government and civil society and involve, for example, hiring of additional police officers and strengthening the judicial system (Bailey and Dammert 2006a: 11). The use of this definition of public security has implications for the wider field of security studies, since there is a failure to appreciate the alternatives to national security threats and responses.

This chapter has demonstrated the connection between a national/public security threat, a national/public security response, and the militarisation of law enforcement. Particularly, that the upgrading of a public security threat to a national security threat justifies the introduction of the armed forces, since it is the only institution capable of combatting existential threats (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017: 11). If, therefore, a public security threat is responded to by the government and civil society, usually by strengthening civilian law enforcement agencies and/or the judicial system (Bailey and Dammert 2006a: 11), and a national security threat is responded to militarily (Bailey at al 2011; Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017: 7), drug trafficking in Colombia and Mexico have both clearly been treated as a national security threat. This is despite drug trafficking traditionally, and in the case of Mexico constitutionally, being under the jurisdiction of civilian law enforcement agencies. By sending the majority of their counternarcotic aid to the armed forces in Colombia and Mexico, it appears the US shifted drug trafficking away from public security and in to the national security rubric. Similarly, by using their armed forces in counterdrug roles, the governments of Colombia and Mexico are themselves shifting the security response from one of public security to one of national security. Examining this shift and evaluating the factors which drove it, particularly the role of the US, is the primary focus of this dissertation. Militarisation is the prism through which to observe the change. Having examined the terminology of security which underpins the analysis of this dissertation, the next chapter will be the first case study: Colombia.

Chapter 3: Colombia & the US

This chapter will examine the case of militarisation of drug law enforcement in Colombia from 1985-2006, a period in which Colombia was the focal point of US antidrug attention and in which the Colombian state contended with armed actors involved with the drug trade (Treverton 1989: 141; Crandall 2001: 95; Isacson 2005b: 140; Peceny and Durnan 2006: 101; Veillette et al 2007: 6; Crandall 2008: 1). This chapter will make a distinction between the cartel era of the power of the Medellin and Cali cartels (1987-1995) and the Plan Colombian era of 1995-2006. The two periods had different actors involved with the drug trade, a different role for the country in the drugs trade, and different responses by the state. They also had different US initiatives, with the Andean Initiative (1989-1994) in the Medellin and Cali cartel period, and Plan Colombia (2000-2006) in the Plan Colombian period. These will be examined in chronological order and comparison will be made between them.

Since these policies were not pursued in a vacuum, this chapter will also assess other factors influencing the militarisation of counternarcotics in Colombia: the domestic transition of drug trafficking from a public security threat to one of national security. Additionally, the security situation itself, such as the nature of armed actors involved with the drug trade, and the influence of domestic political actors and institutions will be considered.

The chapter will conclude that, though the Medellin and Cali period of Colombian drug trafficking was met with a counternarcotic response within the sphere of public security and conducted almost entirely by the Colombian National Police, this was not because the US was pursuing a policy of civilian enforcement of counternarcotic activities. Resistance, particularly from the Colombian army, prevented the US from militarising Colombian counternarcotics. The late 1990s and early 2000s, however, saw the Colombian military become the undisputed lead in counternarcotic activities. This occurred for a combination of reasons. While, with an exception for about three years from 1995-1998 when the Clinton administration reduced military aid, the US policy and preference for militarisation of counternarcotics enforcement in Colombia remained consistent through the 1990s and first half of the 2000s, the scale changed dramatically.

Plan Colombia, implemented in 2000, allocated enormous amounts of counternarcotic aid to the Colombian military if they were prepared to take on the mission, making Colombia the third largest US security aid recipient in the world at the time (Withers et al 2010: 16). The

intervening period, from the fall of the Medellin and Cali cartels, had also paved the way for the Colombian guerrillas to become a key actor in the drug trade. By 2000 their extensive involvement in the trade, with the FARC became referred to as 'third cartel' due to its deep involvement in the drug trade (Kan 2016: 48), provided the Colombian military with justification for combining their 'main mission' of fighting the guerrillas with the counternarcotic mission the US desired. While the US, particularly the US Congress, resisted such conflation – instituting aid provisions prohibiting the use of counternarcotic aid for counterinsurgency – for the first fourteen months of Plan Colombia, the 9/11 terrorist attacks removed any such resistance. The counternarcotic war and counterinsurgent war became essentially indistinguishable (Youngers and Rosin 2005: 1-10; Buxton 2011: 5; Kan and Williams 2010: 226). Therefore, while the US did step up in scale its efforts to militarise counternarcotic activities in Colombia at the turn of the millennia, this was aided significantly by the change in opinion of the Colombian military, a result of the shifting drug trade, and in September 2001 with a change in opinion of the US Congress, a result of the of the September 9/11 attacks.

Medellin and Cali Cartel Period

This period of 1987-1995 was marked by the majority of counternarcotic activity being undertaken by the Colombian National Police rather than military forces (Los Angeles Times 1989a; Farah 1990; Farah 1993b; Boville 2004: 161; Isacson 2005a: 45) in a 'US backed all-out war against drug lord Pablo Escobar' (Bowden 2001: 249; Rogan 2011: 28; Bagley 2012: 7). Though the army did strike blows against the Medellin cartel, such as raiding some laboratories, these were the exception rather than the rule (Lee III 1998: 215). This is significant since, despite the violent 'narcoterror' campaign by the Medellin cartel which included bombing of government and civilian targets killing hundreds of people (Los Angeles Times 1989b; Davison 1993) and myriad assassinations of officials, including three Colombian presidential candidates, and law enforcement personnel (UPI 1992; Mendez 1992: 86; Peceny and Durnan 2006: 101-102), the security status remained at the public security level and under the jurisdiction of the Colombian National Police. Ramirez Lemus et al (2005: 101) have gone as far as to state that the Colombian police was the 'primary US ally' in this period. Yet, analysing the evidence suggests that this use of civilian law enforcement agencies to dismantle the cartels was against the policy wishes of the Bush Sr administration

(The White House 1989: 62; The White House 1991; GAO 1991: 28; GAO 1998a; GAO 1998b).

The US was the largest market for cocaine at the time (Treaster 1991b; UNODC 2010: 70, 77, 83), and as the Colombian Medellin and Cali cartels controlled the majority of the international drug market, it became a high priority of the US administrations to tackle the cartels in order to reduce drug cultivation and production (Bagely 1988: 165; The White House 1989: 62; Chepesiuk 1999: xxviii). The Introduction to this dissertation demonstrated that, beginning with the Reagan administration (1981-1989), there was an increased emphasis on treating drug trafficking as a national security, and therefore military, issue (The White House 1986: 1-3; Richburg 1986; Reagan cited in Wilson 1989a; The White House 1986: 1-3; Doyle 1993: 83; Astorga 2000: 26; Freeman 2005: 277). Reagan's 1986 NSDD declared that 'the national security threat posed by the drug trade is particularly serious outside US borders, and therefore US military activity would include training to assist foreign military forces in planning and conducting counter-narcotic operations' (The White House 1986: 1-3). This is one of the earliest indications that the 'war on drugs' would take on a new and military phase. While the US had been involved in counternarcotics activities in Colombia since the 1940s, the 1980s saw this increase to unprecedented levels. Between FY1980 and FY1987 US spending on narcotics efforts internationally more than tripled (Carpenter 2003: 21).

The Bush Sr administration (1989-1993) replicated this approach, overseeing the US-side of the conflict with the Medellin cartel. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, stated that 'detecting and countering the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high priority national security issue for the Pentagon' (cited in Wilson 1989b). The Bush administration's 1989 National Drug Control Strategy (p. 59) and 1991 National Security Strategy (pp. 3, 17) reflected the administration's opinion that the Colombian military would be essential for combating drug trafficking. In 1989 the Bush administration introduced the Andean Initiative, a five year aid package greatly increasing counterdrug aid to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia (Youngers and Rosin 2005: 3), which it stated was in response to bloody events in Colombia at the time (Carpenter 1990: 3). The Andean Initiative had an explicitly military focus (Bedard 1989), and increased military and police assistance from $18 million in FY1989 to $93 million in FY1990 (Isacson 2005a: 45).

While such statistics demonstrate the preference for security aid over economic development aid, something for which human rights NGOs such as the Washington Office on Latin America have criticised the US government for, they rarely consider separating the different types of security aid – military versus police funding (Veillette 2004: 14; Neild 2005; Isacson 2005a; Isacson 2005b: 138, 139; Youngers and Rosin 2005; Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 103, 105; Gautreau 2012: 65; Meyer 2014). This makes using funding statistics provided in the secondary literature, and many of the official documents, difficult for the purpose of understanding military/police dynamics.

However, some US official documents do reveal an insight into the intentions for Andean Initiative funding. A 1991 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on Colombian Narcotics aid offers some insights into the nature and intentions of such aid. While not written by the policymakers of the aid package itself, it is a US government source with access to classified information. It is important to note that the GAO has an oversight role on US government spending, but while it is scrutinising in nature, it is still a part of the US government. It therefore has the advantage of having access to classified information and primary sources, but is biased in favour of the US government. According to this report, in order to achieve the joint US-Colombian goal of disrupting the drug trade, the priorities were: to increase the effectiveness of Colombian military and law enforcement operations against traffickers, and to dismantle drug organisations and arrest key personnel (GAO 1991: 1). Immediately after, the report states that 'the military will receive most of the assistance so that it can become more involved in the drug war than it has been in the past by increasing its capacity to conduct counternarcotic operations and provide support to police operations' (GAO 1991: 28). This statement appears to be contradictory. While the language suggests an intention for the military to be supplementary in that it is intended to support police operations, that the military would receive the majority of the assistance suggests otherwise. Indeed, four pages later the report notes that US officials also stated that the counternarcotic aid to the police could be used to fight insurgents and support the military (GAO 1991: 32). The figures in the report reinforce this preference for the military. Of the $87 million of additional grant aid in 1990, on top of the $65 million emergency assistance, the GAO report specifies that 82% of this would go to the military versus a mere 18% to law enforcement agencies (GAO 1991: 28).

Drug control policy overseas was still in many ways in its infancy in 1991, as far as the 'war on drugs' is concerned, and this document makes clear the method with which the US

government sought to most clearly disrupt the trade abroad. Yet while it indicates an emphasis on both law enforcement and the military, the language and funding demonstrates that this intended for the military to be primary and law enforcement to be secondary, or for both military and law enforcement to be combined. The report also offers a unique insight into US justification for such a disparity. The report states that the reason the army was to receive over four times the aid of law enforcement is that, while 'the police have traditionally been the principal agency for conducting antidrug operations, US officials argued that the police could not effectively use much more aid than they will receive' (GAO 1991: 28).

Additional evidence supporting the view that the desire of the Bush administration was to militarise Colombian law enforcement's battle against the Medellin cartel, can be seen in the United States protest at the dismissal in September 1991 of Colombian Police General Armando Maza Marquez, who had been director of the Administrative Department of Security (DAS). DAS was a law-enforcement and intelligence gathering body which was given a large role in combating drug trafficking. General Maza had led a bloody campaign against drug traffickers, and was replaced by President Gaviria with a civilian, marking the first time that the Colombian National Police had not been led by a General (Human Rights Watch 1992). This demonstrates the pursuit of narco-traffickers at any cost, regardless of Colombian efforts to bring their armed forces under civilian control. Interestingly, General Maza was sentenced in 2016 for the murder of Colombian Presidential candidate Luis Galan in 1989 (BBC 2016).

While analysts have noted that the Colombian police were the primary US ally during the period (Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 101), it is clear that US government policy during the Bush administration was fundamentally committed to enhancing the role of the Colombian army in counternarcotic activities in Colombia. Yet, as demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter, during the conflict with the Medellin cartel the Colombian National Police was the almost entirely dominant state entity (Los Angeles Times 1989a; Farah 1990; Farah 1993b; Boville 2004: 161; Isacson 2005: 45). This suggests that the Bush administration was unsuccessful in enacting the preferred policy of militarising Colombian counternarcotics. The next section will demonstrate that this was due to a resistance not only from the Colombian governments of Barco (1986-1990) and Gaviria (1990-1994), but also the Colombian army itself, demonstrating the limits of US influence during this period and providing evidence against the claim that the US was able to pressure Colombia to enact counternarcotic policies US policymakers desired (Neild 2005: 61; Carpenter 2003: 9).

The Colombian army appears to have been unwilling to take on the counternarcotics mission unless it involved fighting the insurgency (Boville 2004: 161; Neild 2005: 61; Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 107; Withers et al 2010: 16). In 1992 the Colombian military flatly rejected a US offer of $2.8 million to set up army counterdrug units (Kirk 2003: 188), demonstrating an outright rejection of US efforts to involve the army in counternarcotic activities. Later that year, according to the National Security Archive, the US and Colombia agreed to reduce the Colombian military's level of involvement in the drug war, and redirected approximately $75 million in assistance to the Colombian National Police (Withers et al 2010: 16). This attitude is reflected in quotes from the time. US army general Paul Gorman stated that most military officers in Colombia 'disbelieve that the narco-traffickers threaten Colombia's national security' and probably resent being distracted from their main mission (Lee III 1998: 215). Colombia's Defense Minister Molina observed at the time that 'the Army would have better results in the anti-guerrilla struggle if it were not tied down in antinarcotic activities' (cited in Lee III 1998: 215). Indeed, in some cases members of the armed forces, apparently concerned about the effect of arousing guerrilla support in rural regions which were sustained by the production of coca, actively resisted combatting the trade. The Chief of Staff of the Colombian Army's Seventh Brigade, when asked why his special forces did not impound cocaine laboratories found during an operation against guerrillas, responded that 'it is not the mission' of the army to control the cocaine problem but rather to combat guerrillas (Lee III 1998: 217). This view echoed that stated by an army officer in neighbouring Peru, a country that was also battling a leftist insurgency and had high levels of coca production. He stated 'we have to have popular support to fight terrorism. We have to be a friend to the population. You can't do that by eradicating coca' (cited in Lee III 1998: 88-89). Evidently, much of the inability of the US to militarise counternarcotics in Colombia during this period was a result of a fundamental disagreement by the army of the importance and effects of counternarcotics and the role of the military.

The Colombian military's refusal to become involved in counternarcotics lest it damage their 'main mission' of fighting the guerrilla insurgency was cemented by an unwillingness in the US to conflate the issue of drug trafficking and the insurgency campaign against the FARC and ELN. At this time, the US embassy in Bogota complained publicly that the military had been using US counterdrug aid to fight guerrillas (Treaster 1992; Evans 2002). An amendment in 1986 to the Foreign Assistance Act prohibited counternarcotic funds being used for counterinsurgency. It seemed that 'Colombia's military brass had resisted the

conflation of the drug war and counterinsurgency' as they wanted no part of chasing down traffickers or busting labs, a dirty job better suited to the police (Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 107; Withers et al 2010: 17). This unwillingness to conflate the two threats, on both sides, prevented the Colombian military from taking a core counternarcotic role.

The Colombian army may also have resisted the CNP receiving counternarcotic aid. Whereas in Peru and Bolivia the military objected to the police having helicopters and planes, the Colombian military had no such objection. It did, however, draw the line at firepower. In the foreign Assistance Act of 1986, Congress authorised $1 million to 'arm, for defensive purposes, aircraft used in narcotics control eradication or interdiction efforts' (Lee III 1998: 224). There was a US plan in early 1986 to use some of this money to arm the Colombian police helicopters with light machine guns; however, under pressure from the armed forces, the project was disapproved by the Colombian Defense ministry. So the police still had to rely on military gunships to escort them on antinarcotics missions in insecure areas (Lee III 1998: 224). This stems from a military-police rivalry and as a result caused the military to put qualitative and quantitative limits on counternarcotic security assistance. For Lee III (1998: 224) these limits were so forceful that he described the US-sponsored narcotics control efforts in South America to be to some extent a 'hostage of the military'. Indeed, he argues that the inherent 'police' function aspect of drug control makes it a sensitive issue for military establishments (Lee III 1998: 224). This presents another way in which the Colombian armed forces were able to resist the US.

The army was not the only domestic actor that resisted the militarisation of counternarcotics in Colombia. The Colombian government pointedly declined US offers of US military assistance (Lee III 1998: 233), and appears to have held different priorities to those of the US with regard to the most efficient way to deal with the cartels and over the appropriate role of the army. The Colombian government had tended to aim to end the violence of narco-trafficking through reinforcing the judicial system and providing socio-economic assistance. During the Barco administration (1986-1990) this focussed on ending bribery associated with the Medellin cartel, and in the Gaviria administration (1990-1994) the focus was on reforming and strengthening the judicial system by rejecting extradition to the US (Boudreaux 1991; Brooke 1991; Boville 2004: 160). This policy of leniency, nonextradition and reduction of penalties to traffickers who surrendered and offered evidence against others, particularly after the Constituent Assembly of Colombia made extradition of Colombian nationals illegal, was actively and vocally opposed by the Bush Sr administration (Treaster

1991a; Human Rights Watch 1992; GAO 1999: 13). Resistance to militarisation of counternarcotics in Colombia was therefore found not only within the military hierarchy but also amongst civilian politicians.

The threat of decertification[1] was not utilised until 1995, despite the presented evidence of Colombian resistance against US efforts to militarise, and even then a National Security Waiver was applied by President Clinton to prevent decertification (Boville 2004: 284). Although the Bush administration sought, through the Andean Initiative, to militarise counternarcotic enforcement in Colombia, ultimately its goal was to aid in the destruction of the drug traffickers, particularly the Medellin cartel, regardless of the method. Therefore, while the Bush administration had disagreements with the Colombian armed forces and the Colombian government over how to conduct the war against the cartels, it was not prepared to go as far as decertification, as long as Colombia was sufficiently committed to counternarcotics. The Bush administration was, after all, content to fund the CNP in the aftermath of the army's rejection, and the DEA worked closely with the CNP to find and arrest or kill Medellin kingpins (LA Times 1989a; Farah 1990; Farah 1993b; Bowden 2001: 249; Boville 2004: 161; Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 101; Isacson 2005: 45; Rogan 2011: 28; Bagley 2012: 7).

During this period of conflict with the Medellin and Cali cartels (1987-1995), effectively spanning the Barco and Gaviria administrations in Colombia as well as the beginning of the Samper administration, and the Bush Sr administration in the US, drug trafficking was not elevated to national security in the sense that it became an army issue, and instead stayed primarily as a 'police function'. The Medellin and Cali cartels were dismantled by the CNP in conjunction with the DEA and with little logistical support from the Colombian army. This was not due to a consensus between Colombia and the United States, however, as although the US attempted to increase the role of the army in counternarcotic activities, they were prevented from doing so in the face of resistance not only from Colombia's government but also by the Colombian army. Yet despite this divergence in policy, the US did not de-certify Colombia in this period, demonstrating that while the US wanted militarisation of Colombian counternarcotics efforts, they were prepared to support the CNP instead if it meant that the cartels would be tackled.

[1] Introduced in 1986 – See Introduction.

Plan Colombia Period

The death of Escobar in December 1993, the destruction of the Medellin cartel and Cali cartels not long after (Peceny and Durnan 2006: 101-103), and the conclusion of the Andean Initiative in 1994, brought a temporary reduction in US aid to Colombia. This changed dramatically with the aid package, Plan Colombia, signed in July 2000. The following section will analyse the role of the US in militarising counternarcotic activities in Colombia from 1995 to 2006, a period in which the Colombian state contended with guerrillas, paramilitary groups, and drug trafficking organisations all involved in the drug trade (Veillette 2004: 1-4). The period following the destruction of the Medellin and Cali cartels resulted in a shift in the domestic and international drug market and production chain. The drug trade had been controlled by the Medellin and Cali cartels, their fall led to the spread of 'cartelitos', small trafficking organisations which lacked the same international reach as their predecessors (GAO 1999: 4; Livingstone 2005: 129; Carpenter 2005: 25; Freeman and Sierra 2005: 270; Withers et al 2010: 17; Mejia 2016: 3; Heinle et al 2016). These cartelitos, along with various guerrilla groups such as the FARC and ELN, and paramilitary organisations such as the AUC, fought over and splintered the drug supply chain.

This period saw the Colombian army's resistance to counternarcotic activities dissipate, as the US provided unprecedented levels of counternarcotic assistance (Withers et al 2010: 16-19). The fusion of the drug war with the insurgency provided the army with the incentive to embrace counternarcotics enthusiastically, and the prospect of enormous quantities of military assistance from the US cemented this change. This, coupled with the potential for Colombia becoming a failed state, as the insurgent groups, funded by huge amounts of drug money, captured large swathes of Colombian territory (Manwaring 2008: 77-78). The elevation of drug trafficking to national security was secured. This change was confirmed with the September 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in New York and Washington D.C respectively. The term 'narco-terrorist', long used to describe actors in the drug trade such as Pablo Escobar, provided a new way to depict the actors in the drug trade in Colombia as threats to national security (Rodriguez 1991; Treadwell 1992; Farah 1993a; Davison 1993; Beers and Taylor 2002).

In the intervening period between the Andean Initiative (1989-1994) and Plan Colombia (2000-2008), the US had continued to provide security aid. From FY1990 to FY1997, the US programmed approximately $731 million in assistance and equipment support for Colombian

police and military units involved in counternarcotic activities (GAO 1998a: 2). The statistics for this funding again only show military and police aid as a joint statistic, not specifying how much went to either institution separately. The 1998 GAO report did, however, break down the aid division between police and military from the Section 506a (2) funding. Of this, $10.2 million went to the police and $29.7 million went to the military, demonstrating a clear disparity in favour of the latter. The Clinton Administration dramatically reduced military aid in 1996 and 1997, virtually halting it (Jehl 1993; National Security Archive 2002; CRS 2003), but this changed with the proposal of Plan Colombia, the largest increase in the Defence budget since the Reagan years (Boville 2004: 163).

Plan Colombia was first announced in September 1999 by the Colombian government (Arnson 2000: 6-7; GAO 2008: 2). It represented an enormous increase in assistance to the region, far surpassing the levels provided under the Andean Initiative, and had even more of a military focus than previous assistance. From FY2000-2005, Plan Colombia provided $5.4 bn. to the region in State Department and Department of Defense funds (Veilette 2004: i). Only 26% of Plan Colombia's original budget (approximately $1.3bn.) was for alternative development and socio-economic programmes – the remaining figure was primarily invested in the military, police, and aerial spraying campaigns (Gautreau 2012: 65). It went on to provide roughly $6 bn. in military and police aid, in which an increasing share went to counterinsurgency activities. This aid provided helicopters, equipment, and training, primarily from army special forces, and the centrepiece of the US contribution was training and equipping of a counternarcotic brigade dedicated entirely to supporting eradication of coca (Rabas and Chalk 2001: 63; Neild 2005: 61-64; Isacson 2005a: 15-20; Marks 2007: 51; Seelke 2017: 1).

Plan Colombia's funding, as has been the case with the Andean Initiative, is difficult to break down in terms of separating what was given to police and military due to a lack of comprehensive lists, but there is evidence of an emphasis on the military. Ramirez Lemus et al claim that the military received the lion's share of the funding (2005: 101). Through Plan Colombia, the DOD and SOUTHCOM trained and equipped Counter Narcotics Brigades and riverine (a Navy-Army hybrid) units, training pilots and crews of helicopters, assisted with infrastructure upgrades, providing counterdrug intelligence support, and military training (Omar 2004 :53). A particular example was the creation of a 2,300-person counternarcotics brigade in Colombia's army (Isacson 2005b: 140). Indeed, critics of the policy, such as Stokes (2007: 59-62) have referred to Plan Colombia as a 'US military aid package to the

Colombian military'. While this is extreme in that it ignores the large sums of aid that did go to the CNP and alternative development strategies, it demonstrates the widely held criticism of the militarised nature of the package.

The emphasis on military aid was also codified in the language of Plan Colombia document itself. The wording in Plan Colombia is particularly interesting given that it was so heavily influenced by Americans that its early draft was written in English rather than Spanish (Livingstone 2005: 147; Fukumi 2008: 178). While this is contested (Marcella 2001: 7), and the US government described Plan Colombia as: '… a plan developed by the Colombian Government to address Colombian issues in Colombia (Hunter and Brownfield 2001), early incarnations of the Plan drafted by Colombian President Pastrana (1998-2002) had different focuses than those of the final version. Isacson (2005b: 138) notes that the Colombian government indicated that it expected 75% of Plan Colombia to go to non-military purposes, the US contribution was the reverse – 75% of the July 2000 appropriations went to Colombia's military and police (Meija 2010: 135). Fukumi (2008: 180-182) has shown, a US source revealed there were frequent meetings between Colombia and the US to discuss details, at times almost on a daily basis. The focus of the Plan had changed from being focused on investment for social development, reduction of violence and the construction of peace when unveiled in 1998, to reflecting US priorities and downplaying of development in favour of military aid (Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 106; Fukumi 2008: 181).

The Plan Colombia document (Presidency of the Republic 1999) espoused the militarisation emphasis of the next phase in the Colombian drug war. It stressed the transnational and complex threat posed by drug trafficking, that drug trafficking was destabilising a country in which the armed forces and the police were unable to guarantee order and security (Presidency of the Republic 1999: 2). While 'negotiations with insurgents is the core of the strategy', it repeatedly emphasised the threat of drug trafficking – as a 'destabilising force, distorting the economy, corrupting society, multiplying violence, depressing the investment climate and most seriously, providing increased resources to fund all armed groups' (Presidency of the Republic: 3). By reframing Colombia's internal conflict as being integrally connected to the issue of drug control, particularly after US counterinsurgency disasters in Vietnam and Central America, US policymakers were able to garner Congressional support for Plan Colombia (Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 106). Notably, US intelligence reports and other now declassified documents, present an inconsistent and often contradictory account of

the actual relationship between guerrilla groups and drug trafficking organisations in Colombia (National Security Archive 2002).

Interestingly, CIA (1992; 1997) and DEA (1994) reports from the time maintained that the link between guerrillas and traffickers was not nearly as strong as officials had indicated, for example Thomas Constantine (Administrator of the DEA) stated that the 'DEA believes that the insurgents never will be major players in Colombia's drug trade' (1994: 5) and that 'the independent involvement of insurgents in Colombia's domestic drug production, transportation, and distribution is limited' (1994: 9). These contradictions indicate the complex, confusing, and multi-tiered relationship between the groups in Colombia. Evans, writing in the National Security Archive (2002), has suggested that the efforts to link guerrillas and drug traffickers were mainly attempts by Colombian security forces to get permission to use US security assistance against the guerrillas, with little or no benefit against traffickers. The 1992 CIA document seems to support this, stating that 'Andean government assertions that increased attacks against the insurgents would affect the drug trade are primarily an attempt to convince the US to allow the use of counternarcotics aid for counterinsurgency operations; in fact, many traffickers would support government counterinsurgency operations'. However, the GAO reports analysed (1991, 1998a, 1998b, 1999), Plan Colombia itself, and rhetoric of the Bush Jr administration make it clear of US belief and policy that the two were linked. For example, as early as 1991 the GAO concluded that the nature of the Colombian drug trade legitimised the use of aid by Colombia against both drug traffickers and insurgents involved in the drug trade (1991: 2).

The role of the military is clearly emphasised in stating that Colombian military forces are 'required to uphold the law and return a sense of security to all Colombians everywhere in Colombia' (Presidency of the Republic: 3). This constitutes the fourth bullet point on the ten bullet point list at the end of the plan, consisting of 'a national defense strategy to restructure and modernize the armed forces and the police, so that they will be able to restore the rule of law and provide security throughout the country, to combat organised crime and armed groups and to protect and promote human rights and international humanitarian law' (Presidency of the Republic: 6). Plan Colombia justified this by stating: 'even though the fight against narcotrafficking is a primary activity for the State's police, the close link with the illegal, armed groups has forced the military forces to focus on making a decided and committed contribution, in an integrated and cohesive form in the fight against this threat'

(Presidency of the Republic: 15). This indicates clearly an intrusion of the armed forces into the realm of public security, not only in the arena of counternarcotic activities, but in providing security and upholding the rule of law more generally.

Plan Colombia and the period directly leading up to it saw the Colombian military become far more receptive to the idea of an expansion of their role beyond traditional national defence tasks. The change of attitude in the Colombian army is exemplified by an agreement in December 1998 between US Defense Secretary Cohen and Colombian Defense Minister Lloreda which established a counternarcotics battalion in the Colombian army (Withers et al 2010: 16). Financed entirely by the US Defense budget, it was joined in 1999 by the US aided counter drug riverine brigade in the Colombian navy. This signified a clear turnaround from the episode in 1992 where the Colombian army turned down aid to create a counternarcotic battalion (Withers et al 2010: 16). This turnaround can be explained by the fact that the Colombian armed forces hoped they could use the counternarcotics funds to combat insurgents given the increased linkage with drug trafficking. Plan Colombia's wording, after all, emphasised increasing the capacity of the Colombian military to combat the 'armed protectors of drug traffickers' (Presidency of the Republic: 15). Plan Colombia resulted in the Colombian military surpassing the police as the primary beneficiary of US assistance (Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 105).

However, a barrier remained in that the US Congress was unwilling to allow counternarcotic funds to be used for counterinsurgency. Examples of such restrictions imposed by the US can be seen in guidance issued in June 1998, restricting the sharing of any information on insurgent capabilities and activities unless it directly related to an approved counternarcotic operation (GAO 1999: 21). This is despite US embassy officials stating that drug traffickers and guerrillas had become 'virtually indistinguishable' from one another. These issues can be seen in, for example, an attack in August 1998 on a joint military and CNP base that was used by US contractor personnel for coca eradication. The US embassy did not know if it could share information about the insurgents with the CNP or military because information was not directly linked to counternarcotics (GAO 1998b: 21). The US Congress had specifically banned the US government from granting counterinsurgency aid to Colombia and stipulated that military aid could only be used for counternarcotic purposes (Livingstone 2005: 28).

The Colombian army had begun to receive large amounts of counternarcotic aid, far more than the CNP – indicating a vital US role in militarisation of Colombian counternarcotics

during this period. Yet, as the Medellin period demonstrated, for this to work would require the cooperation of the armed forces as willing participants. It was noted above that the armed forces had happily accepted this new role, despite a flat rejection eight years before, because counternarcotics and counterinsurgency appeared, due to the changing nature of the Colombian drug trade, to be becoming less distinguishable. These issues, for the US Congress and for the Colombian military, were essentially eliminated with the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001. Previously, the US Congress contended that counternarcotic funding would and should not be used for counterinsurgency (Ramirez Lemus et al 2005; Berrios 2017: 533), and this view had also been reflected by members of the Clinton administration. US ambassador to Colombia, Myles Frechette (1997) stated that assistance for fighting the guerrillas raises too many human rights concerns and has been a 'searing experience for us in Central America'. In late 2000, General Barry McCaffrey, Clinton's drug czar, declared that the US would not support counterinsurgency efforts in Colombia (2000: 1).

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC on September 2001 and the subsequent global war on terror, as well as fear of the links between guerrillas and Islamic terrorism, led to the abolition of this caveat (Isacson 2005a: 47). While the expansion of US objectives in Colombia beyond drugs to include aggressive counterinsurgency efforts was not just a post-9/11 mind-set for US policymakers, as demonstrated in Plan Colombia's linking of guerrillas and drug traffickers, 9/11 vanquished any remaining resistance (Crandall 2002: 159; Crandall 2008: 2-3; Thoumi 2010: 216; Buxton 2011: 5). Officials in the Bush Jr administration (2000-2008) immediately began drawing parallels between Colombia's armed groups and Al Qaeda. For example, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated in October 2001 'that FARC belongs in the same category as Al-Qaeda' (cited in Wright 2001). President Bush (cited in Campbell 2002) declared 'If you quit drugs, you join the fight against terror in America', and stated that 'When we fight drugs, we fight the war on terror' (cited in State Department 2002). Counternarcotic and counterinsurgency became doctrinally linked with the pursuit of the US's global war on terror (Youngers and Rosin 2005: 1-10; Kan and Williams 2010: 226; Buxton 2011: 5). Reflecting this, a 2002 change in foreign aid law permitted the Colombian army to fight guerrillas with counternarcotic aid (Veillette 2004: I; Livingstone 2005: 28; Friesendorf 2007: 137; Withers et al 2010). Resulting from this, US funded units raided laboratories, helped eradicate coca, searched people, vehicles, and boats

at checkpoints, carried out counterdrug intelligence missions, and patrolled neighbourhoods where drug funded gangs held sway (Withers et al 2010).

National Security Directive 18, introduced in November 2002, allowed greater authority for the US military to provide intelligence and training support to the Colombian military (Rogan 2011: 38). Additionally, US Special Forces could now assist their Colombian special operations forces counterparts in training for operations against 'narco-terrorists'. This provided the Colombian military with the conflation that they had been hoping for, and fully combined their 'main mission' with counternarcotics from the perspective of US aid (Withers et al 2010: 16-19). Representing a significant shift from the Medellin period, where neither the Colombian military nor the majority of the US government were prepared to conflate counterinsurgency and counternarcotics, the contingent events of a shift in the nature of the Colombian drug trade and then the events of 9/11 dissolved this resistance, and the military seized the opportunity to combine counternarcotics with their 'main mission'.

Militarisation was being supported by both the US and the Colombian military in this period, but it was also reflected in Colombia's civilian politics, and was strengthened domestically with the election of Uribe (2002-2010) as president in 2002. Uribe granted immediate emergency powers to the military by declaring a state of 'internal disturbance' (Veilette 2004: 11; Diamint 2004: 50; Bailey 2011: 4). Uribe additionally ensured that Colombia's conflict was consistent with the US 'war on terror', describing guerrillas not as combatants but terrorists (Human Rights Watch 2004; Livingstone 2005: 26) and using terms such as 'Talibanes' and 'Bin Ladenes' to describe the FARC (Engeland and Rudolph 2008: 144). Colombia dramatically increased its own military spending in this period, with expenditures rising at an average rate of over 5% (7.2% between 1995 and 1999). Friesendorf (2007: 137) has argued, one of the strongest supporters for US counterinsurgency aid was the Colombian government itself, which wanted to free itself from previous constraints on the use of US aid. Uribe and Bush represented a convergence in ideological outlooks. Before 9/11, upon taking office, Bush was an enthusiastic proponent of an aggressive strategy to support the Colombian government and military (Crandall 2008: 3). The election of Uribe represented a shift from the anti-militaristic strategies of the Gaviria government in the early 1990s.

This can perhaps be explained by examining the change in violence from the Medellin era and the increase of security risks. Drug-related violence spiralled to even high levels than during the Medellin cartels' war on the state (Brauer and Gomez-Sorzano 2004: 29-50;

Keefer et al 2010: 19; Bailey 2011: 4). As violence had swept across the country in the late 1980s, Latin American political leaders came under increasing pressure from public demands to prevent crime and violence, and looked for quick answers in militarisation (Bailey and Dammert 2006a: 4). Such concerns crystallised in Colombia with the election of Alvaro Uribe in 2002. According to a 1999 GAO report, the guerrilla insurgents could at that time exercise some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia's territory (GAO 1999: 6; Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 106). As the conflict showed little sign of slowing, a military response appeared to be the only available political instrument. Uribe's election demonstrates clearly that the public, concerned with security and the ongoing war with the FARC and ELN, favoured a response centred on military strategy (Ospina and Marks 2014: 354, 359).

It is important to note that the threat was different, and perhaps more severe, than in the Medellin period. While the Medellin cartel did attack the state, sponsoring assassinations of hundreds of judges, police, journalists, and politicians including three presidential candidates (Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 103), the late 1990s and early 2000s represented an even greater threat, even to the very existence of the state. The term 'narco-state' has been used to describe the 'drug-fuelled insurgency' in Colombia (Kan 2016: 48), and the FARC, ELN and other guerrilla groups were able to gain de facto control over large swathes of the country, funded in a large part by the drug trade (GAO 1999: 4; Pardo 2000: 71; Veillette 2004: I; Kan 2016: 101). The FARC and ELN used drug income to help finance their military capability (Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 106). Rotberg (2002: 86) argues that a key indicator in the extent to which a state is considered 'failed' is the amount of the state's geographical expanse a government genuinely controls. He notes the official defence and political establishment have effectively ceded authority in those zones to the insurgencies and traffickers demonstrates clearly the power and threat that the guerrillas posed (Rotberg 2002: 92). This threat, by its very nature as a mix of guerrilla conflict tips the scales toward a continued close coordination of national police and military (Bailey and Dammert 2006a: 15). Withers et al (2010) argue the nature of this threat generated the indiscrimination of armed forces and police roles and has caused the Colombian armed forces to be more oriented towards domestic public order control functions, which has left a functional ambiguity between army and police (Withers et al 2010: 13). Furthermore, key military defeats in 1997 and 1998 by the state forces against the guerrillas had convinced many Colombians of the need to strengthen the military (Marcella 2001: 96; Ospina and Marks 2014: 354).

The political goals of the guerrillas, combined with their aim to destroy and replace the Colombian state made them a national security threat to the territoriality and integrity of the state. This, coupled with the fact that 90% of coca growing areas were within FARC strongholds (Pardo 2000: 17), adds credibility to the GAO's (1999: 8-10, 13, 15) assessment that the military's involvement in counternarcotics was necessary for eradication, reflecting the view of the US executive branch. The RAND Corporation produced an influential report in June 2001 arguing that Bogota needed to control the national territory to reduce drug supplies, and therefore it was inappropriate to distinguish between drug control and counterinsurgency (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). This view was met with widespread agreement from policymakers both in Washington and in Bogota (Isacson 2002: 36; Carpenter 2003: 62-63; Friesendorf 2007: 137).

Conclusion

There is a clear transition from the police-led counternarcotic strategy against the Medellin and Cali cartels in 1987-1995, and the army-led counternarcotic strategy against the FARC, ELN, and other Marxist guerrillas. While Andean Initiative funding indicated a preference for the CNP in counternarcotics, it is evident from the statements of US officials that they wished for greater involvement of the Colombian armed forces in counter narcotics. The Andean Initiative's focus on supporting the CNP should therefore not be seen as US support for continuing counternarcotics within the realm of public security and under the jurisdiction of the police. It was instead the armed forces refusal of counternarcotics aid, due to concerns of damaging the counterinsurgency war, which accounts for the preference for law enforcement in the Andean Initiative - not US policy. Therefore, though the Medellin and Cali period of Colombian drug trafficking was met with a counternarcotic response within the sphere of public security and conducted almost entirely by the Colombian National Police, this was not because the US was pursuing a policy of civilian enforcement of counternarcotic activities.

The Plan Colombia period saw a more complicated security situation, in which multi-faceted violence between armed groups involved with the drug trade and against the state combined the decade's long Colombian civil war with the policy to eradicate and interdict coca and cocaine. While there was not a change in US policy during the Plan Colombia period, there was a significant increasing in monetary support for the military to conduct counternarcotics, and the Colombian armed forces became far more central to counternarcotics activities than the CNP. The US trained and equipped counternarcotics brigades within both the Colombian

army and Navy, and the Plan Colombia document, heavily influenced by the US, emphasised a law enforcement role for the Colombia to 'restore the rule of law and provide security throughout the country' (Presidency of the Republic: 6).

The US therefore has had a clear role in the militarisation of Colombian counternarcotics efforts, and therefore the transformation of a public security response to a national security response. Throughout the 'war on drugs', it has consistently sought to ensure that the Colombian armed forces have a primary role in combating the illegal drug trade, in pursuit of reducing drugs trafficked in to the US. GAO reports demonstrate that as early as 1991 the US sought a far greater role for the Colombian army in counternarcotics. Changes within the Colombian drug trade following the demise of the Medellin and Cali cartels, which saw the guerrillas gain an increasing presence in the trade, contributed to the Colombian army being able to combine their 'main mission' of counterinsurgency with counternarcotics. The increasing power of the guerrillas, financed by the illegal drug trade, caused a shift within Colombia which saw the election of Uribe, whose policies reflected an ideological convergence with the Bush Jr administration. Domestic actors in Colombia who had prevented militarisation of counternarcotics during the Medellin and Cali cartel period had therefore reversed in their willingness for the Colombian armed forces to perform a counternarcotic role. These changes, combined with 9/11 and its effect on the US Congress, reducing reluctance to support counterinsurgency aid, enabled the long held policy objectives of US administrations – to militarise Colombian counternarcotics – to be implemented successfully. Therefore, the US has had an instrumental role in the militarisation of Colombian counternarcotics, representing a clear transformation from public security response to that of national security.

This chapter has demonstrated the role of US and Colombian policy on militarisation in Colombia during the Andean Initiative and Plan Colombia aid packages, the next chapter will consider a case centred on another major US counternarcotics aid package – the Mérida Initiative. Representing a geographical shift in focus for US policymakers, from the mid-2000s onward Mexico became the primary focus of US counternarcotic aid. The next chapter will examine the case for US-led militarisation of drug law enforcement in Mexico, and draw comparisons to Colombia where appropriate.

Chapter 4: Mexico & the US:

Introduction

This chapter will consider the case of US-led militarisation of counternarcotics in Mexico. It was demonstrated in the introduction, militarisation of Mexican law enforcement is most notable after 2006, with the Calderón administration's 'war on drugs and organised crime' in which the armed forces were deployed to police many Mexican cities and states and became the country's primary law enforcement agency (US House of Representatives 2009: 4; Seelke 2009: 21; Moloeznik 2009: 8-9; Keefer et al 2010: 12; Moloeznik 2013: 185; Beittel 2013: 33; Grayson 2013: 3; LaSusa 2016). Calderón's 'war on drugs and organised crime' was supported by the US-Mexican Mérida Initiative, announced in 2007 and contributing funds from FY2008 (US House of Representatives 2010: 2). This places it chronologically near to the end of the main phase of Plan Colombia, and reflects the ballooning of the drug trade from Colombia to Mexico (Olsen 1996: 1, 6; Thoumi 2010: 213; Pryce 2012: 111). Although the Mérida Initiative and Mexico's 'war on drugs and organised crime' will be the primary focus of this chapter, it is essential to also consider the period leading up to 2006, as critics have observed significant US pressure to militarise in this period (Doyle 1993: 82-85; Olsen 1996: 5).

This chapter will first provide an overview of the highly militarised counternarcotic situation present in Mexico. It will then examine the period leading up to 2006, and the role of the US in militarisation of Mexican public security. Following this, it will assess the period from 2006 onward, placing emphasis on the Mérida Initiative and the effects this had. The final section will consider the argument that drug trafficking in Mexico is inherently a national security threat and therefore naturally falls under the jurisdiction of the army, regardless of politics.

The present situation in Mexico is one of a highly militarised public security paradigm. Many academics have remarked on the blurred lines between police and military in Mexico (Freeman and Sierra 2005; Withers et al 2010; Moloeznik 2013; Sotomayor 2013; Meyer 2014; Smith and Meyer 2016; Pansters et al 2017), with the army regularly performing public security and law enforcement activities and being the primary crime-fighting organisation of the Mexican state (Moloeznik 2009: 8-9; Moloeznik 2013: 185). Soldiers arrest drug traffickers, have established checkpoints throughout the country, burn marijuana and opium, and interdict drug shipments (Seelke 2009: 21). They enforce curfews and stop and search

vehicles at checkpoints, and many areas are patrolled solely by the military (Moloeznik 2009: 8-9; Moloeznik 2013: 185; Pansters et al 2017). The military has frequently excluded or taken over from municipal authorities and the police in areas in which they operate (Kan 2012: 95; Moloeznik 2013: 185). The military asserts dominance over law enforcement, taking over command and in some cases arresting entire police forces, in large areas of many Mexican states (Withers et al 2010: 17). For example, by 2013, in 14 of 32 Mexican federal states a member of the armed forces ran the agency for public security, and an active duty military officer served as head of the local police in six states (Gonzalez 2011; Sotomayor 2013: 43). The prevailing situation in Mexico is therefore one of a replacement of both local authorities and civilian law enforcement by military apparatus (Moloeznik 2009: 8-9; Moloeznik 2013: 185).

This situation is so pronounced that even Mexico's Secretary of Defence, General Salvador, has spoken out against it. In March 2016, he stated that 'we shunted them (the police) aside and we ended up with a problem that wasn't ours… we're soldiers, trained for war, and we're taken out to confront delinquents that aren't exactly combatants' (cited in Pansters et al 2017). He also stated that '[n]ot one of the people with responsibility for this institution is prepared to carry out the functions of the police… We don't do that, we don't ask for it. We have no taste for it and we are not comfortable in this role' (cited in Ditta 2016; cited in Guevara 2016). Mexican officials had maintained that army deployment would be a temporary measure. For example, Alexandro Romero, former technical secretary of the National Security Council and later Interior Secretary, denied any such trend toward militarisation. Stating that, 'neither the army nor the Navy… is supplanting police agencies. At present the elements deployed, together with the Federal Police, are temporarily… assisting civilian authorities' (Romero, cited in Grayson 2013: 2; Sotomayor 2013: 46). Yet deployment continues (*Mexico News Daily* 2018), with recent Mexican legislation opening the door to permanent deployment (Smith and Meyer 2016; Suarez and Meyer 2017).

Calderón's strategy to combat the DTOs therefore emphasised 'the supremacy of national security over public security, as it bases its rationale on the notion of a 'war' against drug trafficking' (Moloeznik 2013: 180). It involves a direct clash with the threat of drug trafficking under the justification that the main manifestation of organised crime in Mexico seriously challenges the integrity and stability of the state. Thereby endorsing a process of militarisation of the national power by directly engaging the armed forces in this fight, and chooses to apply *ultima ratio* – the maximum intensity of use of force, in an abandonment of

citizen-centric security (Moloeznik 2013: 186). The 'national security policy', and therefore how to defeat the DTOs, rests currently in the control of the Department of National Defence – the military. Mexican public security, and counternarcotics, is therefore highly militarised.

Many critics argue that the Mérida Initiative and broader US counternarcotic aid to Mexico has represented a core driver in this militarisation of public security (Olsen 1996: 5; Youngers and Rosin 2005; Freeman and Sierra 2005; Carpenter 2005: 23, 27; Freeman 2011; Meyer 2014; Muggah, cited in Gagne 2015; Pansters et al 2017). Analysts such as Sotomayor (2013: 46) have gone as far as to state that Calderón's strategy 'relied' on the US assistance. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, while the US has had a key part to play in the use of the armed forces to combat drugs, this is far less striking than in Colombia. Furthermore, analysts have tended to overemphasise the significance of US policy in militarisation and ignored not just cooperation of significant domestic actors, but advocacy.

Before the Mérida Initiative

Analysing militarisation of Mexican counternarcotics pre-2006, and the US role in this, is important to the aims of this dissertation. It enables the establishment of the counternarcotic norms in Mexico, and provides essential context in how and when the process of militarisation of Mexican counternarcotics efforts began and transitioned. While analysts have claimed that US counternarcotic aid was small and only for eradication prior to the Mérida Initiative (Felbab-Brown 2009: 24; Seelke 2013: 1; Paul et al 2014: 42; Seelke 2017: 9), the reality is not as clear cut. The Washington Office on Latin America (1996: 5), for example, observed significant drivers of militarisation a decade before Mérida.

The introduction and chapter on Colombia demonstrated that the US has traditionally seen the challenge of drug trafficking through a national security lens (White House 1986: 1-3; National Drug Control Strategy 1989: 62; National Security Strategy 1991: 3, 17; Doyle 1993: 83; Astorga 2000: 26; Freeman 2005: 277; Carpenter 2005: 23; Sotomayor 2013: 45). The Reagan administration (1981-1989) and the Bush Sr administration (1989-1993) indicated, through National Security Directives and other official statements, their desire for foreign militaries to be integral to counternarcotic enforcement (White House 1986: 1-3; National Drug Control Strategy 1989: 62; National Security Strategy 1991: 3, 17). Reagan's 1986 NSDD declared, the 'the national security threat posed by the drug trade is particularly serious outside US borders, and therefore US military activity would include training to assist

foreign military forces in planning and conducting counter-narcotic operations' (White House 1986: 1-3). The previous chapter demonstrated that it was the policy of these administrations to fund the Colombian military to bring them into the drug war. In the case of Mexico, analysts such as Boville (2004: 157, 166) have noted that, from Reagan onward, the US put increasing pressure on Mexico to use military apparatus in the war on drugs. Relations between Mexico, and its neighbour and largest trading partner, the United States, became exclusively dominated by the drug question (Boville 2004: 166) during the 1980s and 1990s. This in many ways mirrored the attitude towards Colombia exhibited by the US at the same time.

Unlike in Colombia, the Mexican military had a role in counternarcotics prior to the Reagan administrations 'war on drugs'. The Mexican military's involvement in Mexican counterdrug efforts has been a 'permanent campaign' that stretches back to the 1930s (Astorga 2000: 27; Human Rights Watch 2009b; Daly et al 2012: 4). In 1970, Mexico made drug eradication a major army mission (Treverton 1989: 142), involving about a third of the nation's defence budget. More than half the Attorney General's budget of $36 million went on such operations, with the US contributing $15 million. Pre-dating Reagan, this establishes precedent in Mexico for militarising their counternarcotic efforts with US assistance. However, this was confined to rural eradication, and Mexico simultaneously created a special police force, the Federal Judicial Police, to prosecute the war on drugs (Treverton 1989: 142). This demonstrates an intention to ensure that drug interdiction remained a police issue (Astorga 2000: 27; Felbab-Brown 2009: 7). To an extent the PRI permitted the trades existence as they benefited from it (Shirk 2013: 3), so political will to dismantle the Mexican drug trade was limited in this period.

The change from rural eradication to urban interdiction and wide-scale police roles has its roots in the 1990s. The Washington Office on Latin America (1996: 1) has emphasised the role of the US in militarising Mexican counternarcotics as early as the 1990s. They argue the significant militarisation occurred in Mexico since Reagan's war on drugs, and attribute blame to the US for encouraging it, that 'the US is clearly supportive of the Mexican military's involvement in antinarcotics efforts, and has offered both training and equipment to make it possible' (Olsen 1996: 5).

It is evident that Mexico rapidly militarised its counternarcotics from the administration of Mexican President Salinas (1988-1994) onward. Salinas granted the military an elevated role

in national security matters when SEDENA[2] and the Navy were included in the formation of a national security cabinet, which considered drugs amongst its concerns and included a new army staff section for special operations that concentrated on developing anti-narcotics activities (Reuter and Ronfeldt 1992: 22-24; Doyle 1993: 84; Daly et al 2012: 5). In 1995, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (1994-2000), unveiled a new five-year antinarcotics strategy called the 'National Drug Control Program, 1995-2000', in which he described drug trafficking as 'the most serious threat to (Mexico's) national security' (Olsen 1996: 2). This plan expanded the role of Mexico's armed forces in antinarcotics activities by involving them in drug interdiction for the first time. The National Public Security System, also created by Zedillo in 1995, for the first time gave Mexico's military a role in the decision making and policy setting in important domestic public security matters, previously an exclusively civilian responsibility (Olsen 1996: 3; Moloeznik 2009b: 79; Daly et al 2012: 5).

In 1995, a thousand Mexican soldiers received special training in counternarcotics in the US (Astorga 2000: 27), and on March 1st and 2nd the Mexican army, in a joint operation with the PGR, undertook a large operation to locate and arrest drug traffickers in Tijuana and Mexico City. Twenty houses were searched and areas were cordoned off by the army (Olsen 1996: 3). This coordination between the military and the police at the federal level also began to occur on the local level, as local military commanders met with police and judicial officers to map out a public security strategy (Olsen 1996: 3). This represented a significant intrusion of the armed forces into the realm of public security, and intimately linked with drug trafficking. The US, through its training of Mexican soldiers, evidently supported this. In addition to the thousand Mexican soldiers which received counter-narcotics training in the US in 1995 (Astorga 2000: 27), a cable revealed in 1991 that the US intended the Mexican military to become instrumental in establishing a semi-autonomous intelligence capability to support counternarcotics that would not rely on the police (Doyle 1993: 87). After all, it was US policy of the Reagan and Bush Sr administrations to utilise foreign militaries in counternarcotics (White House 1986: 1-3; National Drug Control Strategy 1989: 62; National Security Strategy 1991: 3, 17).

However, prior to 1996 there was limited scope to directly influence Mexican policymakers, due to significant sovereignty sensitivities (Treverton 1989: 142). Mexico was very resistant to the drug war in the early years (Carpenter 2005: 13). Gordon Liddy, a US official during

[2] The Secretariat of National Defence (SEDENA) is responsible for managing Mexico's Army and Air Forces. http://www.sedena.gob.mx/en/index.php/get-to-know-sedena/powers

the Nixon administration, said Mexican officials told them to ‘go piss up a rope’ over a disagreement on drug trafficking (cited in Doyle 2003; cited in Carpenter 2005: 13; cited in Buxton 2006: 177; cited in Grillo 2012b: 44). Furthermore, Mexico had flatly rejected any relationship with SOUTHCOM before the Reagan administration (Doyle 1993: 87). In January 1993 the government of Mexico initiated a new drug policy under which it declined US counternarcotic assistance (GAO 1993; GAO 1998a: 3; GAO 2007: 6). This policy remained in effect until 1995 when, according to the State Department, economic conditions and the growing drug trade threat prompted the Mexican government to begin accepting US counter-narcotics assistance for law enforcement agencies (GAO 1998a: 3).

This expansion of the role of the Mexican armed forces into law enforcement was a controversial one, as Article 129 of the Mexican Federal Constitution states that ‘no military authority may, in time of peace, perform any functions other that those that are directly connected with military affairs’ (Mexican Federal Constitution Article 53), providing a clear constitutional limit on the role of the armed forces to matters of national security (Olsen 1996: 3). Nevertheless, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled that participation of the armed forces is public security matters is constitutional because it is at the request of civilian authorities.

Therefore, there were steps toward the present situation in Mexico prior to 1996, representing a significant move toward militarised counternarcotics and public security through the inclusion of the military in the National Security Cabinet and the National Drug Control Program by Salinas and Zedillo respectively. Though these were supported by the US, evident through its aid and training, there were obstacles to US influence over Mexican counternarcotics policies. A flat ban on aid from 1993-1995, as well as other sovereignty sensitivities made cooperation difficult. Furthermore, Mexican army involvement in counternarcotics had a precedent, and the Mexican Supreme Court permitted Salinas and Zedillo’s involvement of the army in public security. However, the removal of the Mexican ban on US counternarcotic aid was accompanied by significant increases in US counternarcotic aid.

Between FY1996 and 1998, the DOD provided the Mexican military with $76 million, compared with $11 million to civilian law enforcement (GAO 1998a: 2), a significant jump from previous levels of aid. As early as March 29 1996 the US gave 12 weeks of training to 15 Mexican military officers in ‘how to use their weapons in support of police, as opposed to

using them in standard military ways' (Brian Sheridan, cited in Olsen 1996: 4). The Pentagon official in charge of the counterdrug operations at the time stated that 'they will learn not only how to conduct a proper search, but also how to protect a crime scene… We hope they will emerge from this with enhanced skills so they can help the police enforce the law in Mexico (cited in Farah and Priest 1998). The US therefore began, from 1996 onward, to take a more active role in the direct intrusion of the Mexican army into public security and civilian law enforcement tasks. A 1998 GAO report concluded that US-provided assistance has enhanced the counternarcotics capabilities of Mexico's military (GAO 1998a: 8).

This set the new norm, and increasing levels of US counternarcotic aid to the Mexican military continued throughout the early 2000s (Freeman and Sierra 2005: 273; GAO 2007: 25). By the early-2000s, the Mexican army maintained domestic roles, combating drug trafficking and social unrest and negotiating directly with American agencies without the intervention of the Mexican civilian administration (Diamint 2004: 51). Mexican President Fox (2000-2006), had proposed demilitarising law enforcement, but was warned by the US drug czar 'not to move too quickly in eliminating the role of the Mexican military in the drug war' (cited in Copley News Service 2000). According to the State Department, during the Fox administration the Mexican military has 'aggressively sought out training and assistance to improve its counterdrug capabilities… The Mexican military services have requested additional types of training' (State Department 2002). Indeed, this training itself demonstrates that the US sought a police role for the Mexican army, given that it involved protecting crime scenes and other law enforcement tasks. By 2003, the Secretary of Defence was responsible for 93% of the total amount of cocaine confiscated and 83% of the marijuana, a complete reversal of 1990 levels (Moloeznik 2006: 175), demonstrating the shift in responsibility between the police and the armed forces. The military made arrests, carried out investigations, and interrogated drug suspects (Freeman and Sierra 2005: 276).

Analysts who have emphasised the influence of the United States in the militarisation of Mexican counternarcotics efforts (Doyle 1993; Olsen 1996; Freeman and Sierra 2005) have raised valid points about the role of the United States in encouraging militarisation through this period. The training provided, coupled with the rhetoric from the White House, clearly shows the US intentions. The US was an eager participant in militarisation of Mexico's counterdrug policy (Freeman and Sierra 2005: 277). However, the US ability prior to 1996 to influence US counternarcotics was somewhat limited. Sovereignty sensitivities, particularly in the Mexican army, exemplifying itself most clearly on the ban on counternarcotic aid,

obstructed the US from directing the Mexican response to drug trafficking. Indeed, significant steps toward militarisation, such as the formation of the National Security Cabinet, and the National Drug Control Strategy, which interlinked the military and counternarcotic efforts, were taken at a time when Mexico prohibited US counternarcotic aid.

Post-2006 and the Mérida Initiative

In 2006, counternarcotics in Mexico entered a new phase as Vicente Calderón declared a 'war on drugs and organised crime'. This involved increased domestic troop deployment from just over 19,000 to 45,000 (Keefer et al 2010: 12; Grayson 2013: 3; LaSusa 2016). In 2011, more than 96,000 troops were engaged (Beittel 2013: 33). Soldiers were tasked with public security and law enforcement activities – such as arresting drug traffickers, interdicting drug shipments, enforcing curfews, and stopping and searching vehicles at checkpoints (Moloeznik 2009: 8-9; Seelke 2009: 21; Moloeznik 2013: 185). The military has frequently excluded or taken over from municipal authorities in areas in which they operate (Withers et al 2010: 17; Gonzalez 2011; Kan 2012: 95; Sotomayor 2013: 43; Moloeznik 2013: 185), representing a replacement of both local authorities and civilian law enforcement by military apparatus. A year after Calderón launched his 'war on drugs and organised crime', the US and Mexico agreed the Mérida Initiative. Mérida appropriated $2.8 billion between FY2008 and 2017, of which $1.6bn. was delivered by the end of FY2017 (Withers et al 2010; Seelke 2017: 1).

Analysts have noted the security focus of the Mérida aid (Withers et al 2010: 19). Mérida certainly appears to have prioritised security aid, particularly military assistance (Gautreau 2012: 67) over others sorts of counternarcotic assistance. As a 2008 Congressional Research Report on Mérida's funding demonstrates, (Cook, Rush and Seelke 2008: 1-4), a significant portion of aid went to the Mexican military. Roughly 41% of the year one spending was allocated to the Mexican army and navy (Selee 2008: 2), for example. For analysts such as Withers (et al 2010: 19) Mérida encouraged the Mexican military to orient itself toward domestic security threats and to leave the barracks and operate among the citizenry. For Sotomayor (2013: 43) US funding and Colombia's military approach to drug trafficking influenced and shaped Mexican strategy preferences, and the Mexican strategy relied on US funding.

Another example of the US policy to utilize the armed forces as primary counternarcotic agencies can be seen in a 2009 New York Times investigation, which found that the US embassy initially told the Mexican army where a major cartel leader was hiding out. When the army failed to respond, the embassy notified the navy, which deployed an American-trained unit that killed the cartel leader after he refused to surrender (Malkin 2010). Another cable showed the US ambassador Pascual praising the country's military-led strategy, but called the Mexican army 'risk averse' (Ellingwood: 2011). Furthermore, the DOD created a Mexican Special Command and began training the Mexican military in Iraq-style tactics (Dozier 2013; Pansters et al 2017: 1). A 17 January 2013 report by the Associated Press revealed that the Pentagon created a new US-based special operations headquarters to teach Mexican security forces how to hunt drug cartels the same way special operations teams hunt al-Qaeda (cited in Pansters et al 2017).

This funding breakdown suggests that the Bush administration certainly supported a counterdrug role for the Mexican army, and to an extent so did the 110th US Congress. The Mérida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce Organised Crime Authorization Act of 2008 (Mérida Initiative Act 2008) stated 'the Mérida Initiative reflects the belief that Mexican military involvement is required in the short-term to stabilize the security situation, but that most aspects of this problem fall into the realm of law enforcement' (US House of Representatives 2008*:* 3).

Seelke (2017: 1-10) notes in a CRS report, the Mérida Initiative did not include an active US military presence. She attributes this primarily to Mexican concerns about national sovereignty. Therefore, the DOD did not play a primary role in designing the Mérida Initiative, and the DOD does not provide assistance through the Mérida accounts (Seelke 2017: 29). This is significant, since administering of aid by the State Department rather than the DOD means civilian oversight rather than military. Despite this, military cooperation between the US and Mexico is increased alongside, but separate to, Mérida. The DOD provided training and equipment to Mexican military, totalling some $64.2 million in FY2016 (Seelke 2017: 29-30).

The US Congress, with power of the purse, has played a major role in determining the level and composition of Mérida funding for Mexico (Seelke 2013: 2). Concerned with the possible human rights implications of Mérida's emphasis on the Mexican military, the 110th US Congress imposed limits on Mérida, and limited funds available to provide equipment to

the Mexican military, and earmarked funds for institution-building, rule of law, and anti-corruption activities (Seelke 2009: 14). Congress questioned the apparent emphasis in the FY2008 supplemental on providing extensive equipment to the Mexican military with its poor human rights record (Seelke 2009: 14). The Mérida Initiative Act (US House of Representatives 2008: 6) placed limits on the executive as to how much may be provided for the armed forces in Mexico - $205 mil. For FY2008, reducing to $120 mil. In FY2009, and $9 mil. In FY2010. In FY2009, Mérida already moved away from military and placed more emphasis on assistance to non-military agencies (Cook et al 2008: 4). It was not that the Bush administration did not want to have a greater emphasis on security funding, but Congress prevented it.

The US clearly supported militarisation in the initial supplementation of Mérida, analysts noting this have tended to ignore advocacy for the policy but significant domestic actors. The most notable of these was Calderón himself. Mérida has provided an estimated $1.6 bn. in majority security assistance between FY2008 and FY2017 (Seelke 2017: 1), but Calderón's government invested far more in domestic security. Calderón increased Mexico's security budget from $2 bn. in 2006 to $4 bn. in 2008, to $9.3 bn. in 2009 (Fainaru and Booth 2009; Seelke 2009: 21; US State Department 2009: 1-5; US House of Representatives 2009: 4; Keefer et al 2010: 12). The 2017 budget stood at roughly $8.8 billion (Seelke 2017: 1). Mexico has invested some $100 billion of its own resources in security and public safety since the start of the Mérida Initiative, dwarfing the $1.6 bn. contributed by the US (US State Department 2015; US State Department 2016b). Claims that Mexican militarisation 'relied' on the Mérida Initiative (Sotomayor 2013: 45) seem to ignore this.

Mérida appears to have been a US response to a Mexican request (Withers et al 2010: 17). According to the Congressional Research Service In March 2007, Calderón specifically requested US assistance in combatting drugs and crime, and Mérida was in response to a request from the Mexican government (Seelke 2009: 2; 2017: 9) and was a partnership proposed jointly in October 2007 (State Department 2009: 2). As Bill S.3172 in the US House of Representative's (2010: 5) states, 'the Government of Mexico sought a greater role for the Mexican military in stabilizing the security situation in the short-term'. It went on to state 'the long term solution will require – less military involvement in enforcing the law' (p. 5). Indicating that the US Congress supported the use of the Mexican military, but as a temporary measure. This has been disputed by Pansters et al (2017: 1), who claim that Calderón's request for Mérida is a misconception, and in fact Plan Mexico (as they claim it

was first called) is the practical embodiment of extending the perimeter of the US homeland security area to the Mexico-Guatemala border (Carlsen 2009). However, they offer no evidence for their claim. This assertion seems dubious given that Calderón massively increased domestic security spending and had made combatting organised crime his top domestic priority during his presidential campaign (US Senate 2007: 43; 2017: 9; US House of Representatives 2009: 4; Seelke 2009: 1). Human Rights Watch (2011: 4) criticised Calderón for launching a war instead of reforming Mexico's law enforcement agencies, and for making the military the centrepiece of his strategy. Daly et al (2012: 6) argue militarisation grew rapidly under Calderón, as he felt an urgent need to address rising violence among DTOs in states along Mexico's pacific coast northern border regions. Seelke (2013: 1), in her testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, described Mérida as supporting the aggressive security strategy of Calderón. She emphasised that the Mérida Initiative was developed 'in response to the Calderón government's unprecedented request for increased US support and involvement in helping Mexico combat drug trafficking and organized crime' (Seelke 2013: 2).

Additionally, in the aforementioned 110th US Congress's questioning of the apparent emphasis in the FY2008 budget allocations on providing extensive equipment to the Mexican military, Bush Jr administration officials contended, that the Calderón government had specifically requested security assistance because Mexican law enforcement and military forces were being outgunned by the drug cartels (US Senate 2007: 45-47; Seelke 2009: 14). It is evident that the Calderón administration was keen to emphasise the military, citing being outgunned.

Therefore, Mérida and its large extensive security, particularly military, assistance is not indicative of the US imposing its objectives on an unwilling victim. Instead, a clear convergence of opinion between Calderón and Bush on how to tackle to the DTOs can be observed. Felbab-Brown (2009: 20) has argued, US funding for the first two years had therefore been consistent with the approach of the Mexican government.

Indeed, Moloeznik (2013: 177, 179) has laid blame for militarisation almost exclusively at the hands of President Calderón and his predecessors. Calderón appeared to appreciate the importance of civilian-led law enforcement, stating that 'the support given by the armed forces and federal police to the state and municipal authorities is temporary and subsidiary'. In a meeting with President Obama on August 2009, Calderón underlined the importance of

developing effective civilian law enforcement authority to provide security, curtail violence, and protect public safety in the long term (State Department 2009: 2). Yet the actions of his government clearly emphasised a response exclusively in the national security sector and made little effort to reduce the army's involvement over time (Moloeznik 2013: 177). He opted to follow a strategy that endorsed the use of the military to try and recover public spaces and create the minimum conditions of security (Moloeznik 2013: 179). Mexican officials explicitly embraced a national-security approach to drugs, claiming cartels amassed extensive capabilities and posed a serious threat to the state, which in turn justified the use of armed forces (Sotomayor 2013: 44). In the face of calls for a new anti-drug approach, Mexican officials staunchly defend the military strategy, indicating positive results (Fainaru and Booth 2009; Seelke 2009: 21).

Considerable agency must therefore be attributed to Calderón himself. It appears that the Calderón administration intended to use a national security, militarised strategy from the beginning of his presidency, and sought US help in doing this. The militarised nature of the Mérida Initiative was in many ways a response to the Mexican government's strategy. However, there also appears to have been widespread advocacy for militarisation of counternarcotics in Mexico beyond the highest echelons of government. In August 21 2008, Calderón, the mayor of Mexico City, and other municipal leaders, state governors, Mexican congressmen, religious leaders, representatives of business groups, cabinet secretaries, and the president of the Supreme Court unanimously adopted a 75-point package of security measures to be adopted which included significantly increasing the 'domestic security budget' (State Department 2009: 2).

Calderón certainly found himself under pressure amid the rising drug-trafficking related violence (Seelke 2017: 9). Citizens overwhelmingly supported the increased role of the military in law enforcement activities. In a 2007 survey by *Milenio*, more than 80% of those surveyed believed the armed forces should be used for public security, while less than 9% were against such measures (Sotomayor 2013: 48). In March and April 2011, Pew found that 83% of Mexicans still favoured the use of military to fight the cartels. 74% supported US military training for Mexican troops, 64% welcomed US assistance programs for the Mexican police and armed forces (Sotomayor 2013: 48). Pion-Berlin and Carreras (2017: 3) have analysed the level of public support for military interventions in crime-fighting in Latin America, and have found that tough *mano dura* measures are often wanted by the public

more than elites. In the case of Mexico specifically, public support of militarisation has continued despite lacklustre results.

In 2012 when pollstars asked Mexicans who they thought had won the war (Calderón's 2006 'war on drugs and organized crime'), 54% said criminals and only 18% said the government. Pansters et al (2017: 9) have used this as evidence that public support for militarisation is waning. Yet by October 2012, 69% of those polled still maintained it was correct to use the army to combat organised crime (CESOP 2013: 39; Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017: 9). A 2016 public opinion survey found that 82% of Mexicans wanted the Army and the Marines to continue patrolling city streets in pursuit of criminals (CESOP 2016). Citizens may simply conclude that there are no better alternatives (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017: 21). Society in general tolerated it, legitimised it, and therefore facilitated and enabled militarisation (Sotomayor 2013: 47, 55).

Other sectors have also facilitated this. The Mexican Supreme Court enabled militarisation of public security by establishing that the armed forces 'can participate in civilian actions in favour of public security and in assistance to civilian authorities' (Supreme Court of the Nation 1996 and 2000, cited in Moloeznik 2013: 185) in response to the legal challenge that the Federal Constitution prohibits it. Local politicians, such as governors, confronted with public security challenges, have opted to call in the military since this makes it a federal, rather than state, expense (LaSusa 2016). According to Mexican Senator Gil (cited in Malkin 2017) Mexican governors have used military intervention as a crutch rather than set up their own police forces.

Simultaneously, significant members of the opposition in Mexico have argued against militarisation. PRI party spokesperson Alfonso Navarrete Prida argued that using the military is an inadequate strategy that has generated anxiety throughout Mexico (Daly et al 2012: 7). The centre-left party, Democratic Revolution, has long argued against military intervention in the drug war, dating back to 1995 when it claimed 'public security is not a military mission' (Camp 2005: 370). A view supported by the Mexican Federal Constitution (Article 53). Even members within Calderón's party, PAN, criticised militarisation - Senator Ricardo Monreal stated the role of the army in counterdrugs is damaging the military's reputation and credibility (cited El Universal 2011; Daly et al 2012: 7).

Despite this opposition to militarisation, the administration of Peña Nieto (2012-2018) has remained attached to the status quo. At the outset of his presidency, Nieto stated Mexico's

cooperation with the US on security matters would be reined back and, importantly, managed exclusively by Mexico's civilian interior ministry (Shirk 2013: 3). It appears that pressure from other federal and state-level agencies led to a softening of this policy (Shirk 2013: 3), and many aspects of cooperation have essentially remained the same.

Far from changing Mexico's militarised counternarcotics and public security, recent legislation has cemented the role of the army. In December 2017 the Mexican Congress passed a law that strengthened and cemented the military's role in fighting organised crime. It set up a legal framework permitting the deployment of soldiers in regions controlled by drugs gangs (Suarez and Meyer 2017; Malkin 2017; Agren 2017). Peña Nieto also proposed creating a large national gendarmerie (police) to replace soldiers engaged in public security (Fox 2012; Rama 2014; Paul et al 2014: 42; Partlow 2014). This, due to internal pressure, was watered down - the proposed force became a part of the federal police. Another goal, to create a centralized intelligence agency, was abandoned (Seelke 2013: 7; Seelke 2017: 4). Therefore, despite appearing to seek the contrary (O'Neil 2013: 3), Nieto's operational approach to security has remained essentially the same as Calderón's, with its continued reliance on the Mexican military's active involvement in internal security (Meyer 2014: 20; Seelke 2017: 1, 4). President Peña Nieto has maintained a reactive approach of deploying federal forces, including the military, to areas in which crime surges rather than focussing on police reform and deterring violence and human rights abuses by strengthening the criminal justice sector (Seelke 2017: 4).

What is most significant about the continued cementing and strengthening of the Mexican armed forces role in Mexican counternarcotic and public security efforts since Calderón's presidency is the change to US policy over the same period. Soon after Mérida's start, the US already began reducing support for the military. In the Mérida Initiative Act itself, limits were placed on the executive regarding how much may be provided for the Mexican armed forces - $205 mil. For FY2008, reducing to $120 mil. In FY2009, and $9 mil. In FY2010 (US House of Representatives 2008: 6). In FY2009, Mérida had already moved away from military and placed more emphasis on assistance to non-military agencies (Cook et al 2008: 4). As Bill S.3172 in the House of Representative's (2010: 5) states, 'the Government of Mexico sought a greater role for the Mexican military in stabilizing the security situation in the short-term'. It went on to state 'the long-term solution will require – less military involvement in enforcing the law' (p. 5). As early as 2010, Bill S.3172 (p. 8, 11) advocated decreasing the reliance on the use of militaries for law enforcement purposes and countering the underlying

causes of the drug trade, through citizen safety and crime prevention programs. In March 2010 the Obama administration and Mexican government agreed to a new strategic framework for security cooperation under Mérida, and US assistance which had initially been focused on training and equipping Mexican security forces for counternarcotics shifted toward addressing weak government institutions and underlying societal problems (State Department 2010; Seelke 2013: 2). It broadened the scope of bilateral efforts to include economic development and community-based social programs, areas where 'Mexico had not previously sought significant US support (Seelke 2013: 2). In Shannon K. O'Neil's prepared statement before the subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Global Narcotics Affairs (2013), she stated that the Obama administration significantly revised Mérida, 'moving from a heavy emphasis on military equipment to a more comprehensive bilateral strategy' (p. 2). This opinion is not only reflected by US politicians and congressional researchers. Isacson, a vocal critic of US policy in Latin America, told Insight Crime that there had been a 'real shift' on the part of the US toward limiting support for the military in citizen security roles (Gagne 2015). The academic consensus is that Mérida did in fact shift focus in its second phase (Felbab-Brown 2009; Bailey 2011: 2; Isacson, cited in Gagne 2015; Seelke 2017).

This shift in US priorities, amid the continued use of the Mexican armed forces in counternarcotics and its legislative strengthening in recent years, demonstrates a fundamental separation between US and Mexican policies over the course of the Mérida Initiative. If critics attribute Mérida to the use of the armed forces in Mexican counternarcotics, then a US shift in strategy would be reflected by a shift of strategy in Mexico. Yet the shift in US strategy has been accompanied by no such shift in real-terms in Mexico. Peña Nieto, it seems, has tried, but domestic pressures and constraints prevented him from doing so – he has in fact deployed the military to new areas (Felbab-Brown 2013; Ahrens 2014; *Reuters* 2018).

This section has demonstrated that the influence of the Mérida Initiative on militarisation of Mexican counternarcotic efforts is not as clear cut as many analysts claim. While it did have an evident emphasis on military assistance, this was small compared with the contribution of Mexico, it was requested, and it was reduced shortly after. Compared with Plan Colombia, the Mérida Initiative places greater emphasis on non-security aid. Furthermore, Mexican President Calderón was an advocate of militarisation, under pressure from segments of society, not least the public, to combat drug violence. This presence of domestic support is further demonstrated by the inability of the Nieto administration to fundamentally change the approach, despite a significant reduction in US monetary support and rhetoric in support of

such a strategy. Therefore, the US undoubtedly contributed to the militarisation of Mexican counternarcotics during this period, but it was not operating unilaterally nor pressuring Mexico into obeying its will. Furthermore, the role of the Mérida Initiative in militarising counternarcotics is lessened by the fact that Mexican counternarcotics was already highly militarised by 2003. Mérida helped to cement this change, but did not initiate nor orchestrate it.

Drug Trafficking in Mexico: a National Security Threat?

Both Mexican and US policymakers and academics have presented an additional explanation for the use of the army in counternarcotics: the violent and destabilizing nature of drug trafficking has required a military response. They argue that due to the wealth of the DTOs, the police are outgunned, unreliable (corrupt), and therefore inadequate (US Senate 2007: 45-47; Seelke 2009: 14; Fainaru and Booth 2009; Sotomayor 2013: 44). Some further argue that the cartels challenge the territorial integrity of the state, therefore are a national security threat that should be met with a national security response. Calderón's national security response with the military reflects this view, as does the rhetoric and actions of his predecessors.

The introduction to this dissertation demonstrated that US actors have been keen to emphasise the national security threat of Mexican drug traffickers (Seelke 2017: 3). A 2009 State Department report (2009: 1) stated: Mexico today faces an unprecedented threat to the security of its people and the authority of the state from narco-criminal organizations'. Mexican presidents have also emphasised the national security dimensions of the threat posed. In the late 1970s, President de la Madrid described drug trafficking as a national security problem (Toro 1995: 18-27; Daly et al 2012: 5). President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) in his first state of the union address, in 2001, argued that transnational organised crime represented the gravest threat to the security of nations (Moloeznik 2006: 174). Interestingly, Mexican leaders had previously refrained from using national security rhetoric, perceiving it to be linked with US imperialism (Doyle 1993: 84-85).

Violence in Mexico since 2006 is certainly at unprecedented levels. Official data indicates drug trafficking in Mexico has generated more than 47,500 deaths between December 2006 and January 2012 (Moloeznik 2013: 178). Homicides increased 260% from 2007 to 2011 (Human Rights Watch 2011: 3). Violence escalated even further thus far in 2017 (4,370 such

killings recorded in the first quarter as compared to 2,538 for that period in 2016). Fragmentation and infighting among criminal groups has intensified since the rise of the Jalisco New Generation or CJNG cartel, a group that shot down a military helicopter in 2015 and a police helicopter in September 2016 (Seelke 2017: 3). 2017 became the deadliest year in Mexico for homicides linked to organised crime at 18,898 (Dittmar 2018; Guardian 2018). Paul et al 2014 (31) levels of violence comparable with civil war or insurgency (Paul et al 2014: 31).

Describing Mexican drug traffickers as terrorists, or narco-terrorists, has been a method by which to emphasise the national security threat they pose, and the US has been a proponent of this. Bill H.R. 4303 in March 2012 introduced by the 112th Congress stated that 'things that are being done by those organizations (drug cartels) are consistent with what we would call terrorism or insurgency in other countries' (US House of Representatives 2010: 2). It asserts that 'DTOs use car bombs, displays of murdered individuals, body mutilations, beheadings, and other indiscriminate attacks on civilians… to intimidate the public (p. 4). It went on to state that 'the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organizations threatens… the national security of the United States' (p. 5). It designated seven of the largest Mexican DTOs as foreign terrorist organisations (p. 5). Secretary Clinton in a 2011 Congressional hearing stated that Mexican drug trafficking 'has characteristics of an insurgency' (cited in US House of Representatives 2012: 2).

The Mexican DTOs have certainly partaken in acts of narco-terrorism (Bunker 2011), orchestrating criminal cleansings (Paul et al 2014: 33) including the killing of bystanders including children (Roig-Franzia 2008a; Roig-Franzia 2008b; Scherlen 2009: 1). Political assassinations, car bombs, extreme violence: some have argued this demonstrates that the violence in Mexico goes beyond criminal activity (Beittel 2013: 44). The dominant debate regarding cartel violence is the threat they may pose to sovereign states, a debate also taking place within the halls of the US Congress (Bunker 2013: 13).

Sullivan and Bunker (2011: 742) argue that these criminal actors are challenging the state through high-order violence to potentially usher in a new political dynamic. Presenting a modern form of insurgency, which they have called 'criminal insurgency', the convergence of unconventional threats in the 21st century (Castillo 2010). They find evidence in Mexico in that new power configurations which witness a decline in the authority and control of the state over portions of the country. They also indicate that the vast wealth of criminal

insurgents enables them to match the technological sophistication of government's counterinsurgent forces (Sullivan and Bunker 2011: 744). In 1995 Metz warned of commercial insurgency leading to what he called a 'grey area phenomena', in which powerful criminal organizations with political veneer possessed the capability to threaten national security rather than just law and order (Metz 1995: 31-41). While they may not seek outright capture of political power as traditional revolutionary insurgents do, they can pose significant security threats (Sullivan and Bunker 2011: 744). Commercial or criminal insurgents will seek a compliant regime that will allow them to pursue criminal activity unimpeded, and if that is impossible, they will use persistent violence to weaken and distract the state (Metz 1995).

Sullivan and Elkus (2009: 1-4) note that criminal organisations in these evolving criminal insurgencies are acting in a neo-feudal manner challenging the legitimacy of the state and creating autonomous zones outside of state control, para-states or lawless contested zones within and across borders (Sullivan and Weston 2006: 616-617; Sullivan and Bunker: 2011: 745). Killebrew and Bernal (2010: 5) argue that the scale and capability to destabilise governments have therefore made the Mexican cartels an insurgent threat as well as a criminal one (Killbrew and Bernal 2010: 6). Sullivan and Bunker (2011: 745) describe them as 'criminal soldiers', forging their own operational space and challenging the traditional state monopoly on violence and political control (Sullivan and Weston 2006: 617-619). Indeed, Brands (2009:4-5) went as far as to call the Mexican situation one of a 'multi-sided narco insurgency'. Bunker expands on this to argue that the Mexican state is unable to govern entire sectors within its territory, which have been lost to the narco insurgency (Bunker 2010: 10). Others have referred to the Mexican DTOS as the 'guerrillas next door' (Krause 1999: 34-35).

The prevailing situation in Mexico is marked by the violent deaths of civilians, members of law enforcement agencies, and also members of the armed forces (Moloeznik 2013: 178). Some analysts have warned of the potential for the virtual collapse of the state (Manwaring 2009; Brands 2009; Sotomayor 2013: 54). US Joint force command recommended Mexico be monitored alongside Pakistan as a 'weak and failing state' (Debusmann 2009; Grayson 2010: 267). Mexican DTOs, however, have not established de facto control over geographic areas (Kan 2011: 39-42). Rather than seeking to overthrow the state and replace it, they require a state structure in which to operate. Their narco-terror tactics are intended as a deterrent, not to overthrow the state (Kan 2016: 128). Traffickers aim to corrupt at every level but to pursue

illicit profits, not to capture the state. Criminality rather than a problem of insurgents or terrorists (Beittel 2013: 44). Their sophisticated arsenals result from the scale of the trade, number of competitors, and resistance of interdiction efforts, not the desire to institute specific social or political agenda (Kan 2011: 38).

While Los Zetas have used military tactics and are a core of former-soldiers (Grillo 2012a), the military threat posed by the Mexican traffickers is considerably less than that of the FARC and ELN in Colombia (Felbab-Brown 2009: 12). The Colombian guerrillas had significant military victories over the Colombian army. By comparison, Mexican DTOs have far fewer members and are not nearly as strong militarily as the FARC (Felbab-Brown 2009: 12), and the Mexican army has never been unable to enter geographic locations. Shirk (2013: 2) argues, as bad as violent crime has become in Mexico, the average citizen is still more likely to die from car accidents or preventable illnesses, such as diabetes, than a bullet from a drug trafficker. He claims that from a human security perspective, most Mexicans should be more afraid of a cheeseburger than El Chapo. Nevertheless, violent crime has become a major security threat for young men aged 18-40 over the last decade. Best estimates available suggest that organised crime accounts for between 45%-60 of all homicides in Mexico (Shirk 2013: 4).

Nevertheless, a core justification for militarisation given was that the military was brought in to patrol the streets in order to bring some element of law and order in the absence of a reliable or effective police force (Lopez-Montiel 2000: 82; Freeman and Sierra 2005: 277; Paul et al 2014: 42; Kan 2016: 103). The US and Mexican governments used these same justifications in their support of the Mexican army, arguing that the military represented a clean alternative to a corrupt and compromised police force, and that the Mexican federal police did not have the equipment or capacity to carry out sophisticated air and marine interdiction operations necessary to combat the drug cartels on an equal footing (Olsen 1996: 5; GAO 1998a). In the 110th US Congress's questioning of the apparent emphasis in the FY2008 supplemental on providing extensive equipment to the Mexican military, Bush Jr administration officials contended that the Calderón government had specifically requested security assistance because Mexican law enforcement and military forces were being outgunned by the drug cartels (US Senate 2007: 45-47; Seelke 2009: 14). While Sotomayor (2013: 43) has argued that militarisation was a political choice not a reflection of the threat posed by drug trafficking, it nevertheless evidently played a part. Pion-Berlin and Carreras (2017: 3) attribute the calls for military intervention to have risen in tandem with the rise of

larger, more lethal, and more sophisticated national and transnational criminal organisations. As many Latin American states are plagued by drug-related violence and crime, and the financial might this provides (worsening corruption), they are unable to rely on their police forces for protection (Desmond Arias 2006; Bruneau 2011; Dammert 2012; Withers et al 2010: 11), which has led to a significant erosion of trust of the police (Lagos and Dammert 2012). They are also outgunned, inept, and without sufficient resources (Jenkins 2009: 27; Longmire and Longmire 2008: 37; Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017: 7). When violence escalates, voters pressurize their political leaders to deploy soldiers onto streets (Bailey and Dammert 2006; Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017: 8).

Additionally, there is the argument that the police were unreliable due to corruption. In 1997, DEA administrator Thomas Constantine stated that there 'is not one single law enforcement institution in Mexico with whom the DEA has an entirely trusting relationship' (cited in United States Senate 1997; cited in Robbins 1997). Corruption was and is rampant within Mexican law enforcement institutions (Leahy 2008), leading to a culture of mistrust for police forces in Mexico (Sotomayor 2013: 45). Nagle (2010: 97) has stated, corruption is not a characteristic of the system in Mexico – it is the system. According to INEGI's study, just over half the population trust Mexico's state and municipal police, with federal police faring slightly better at 65% (Smith and Meyer 2016). 33% of citizens consider reporting a crime a waste of time, or do not trust the authorities. This police corruption has made the campaign against drug cartels much harder (Seelke 2009: 22), and for analysts such as Felbab-Brown (2009: 23) and Pryce (2012: 111) made reliance on the army necessary.

Conclusion

The policy of the United States toward militarisation of counternarcotics in Mexico, until the Obama administration, remained consistent with that observed toward Colombia over the same period. The Mérida Initiative introduced in 2007, dubbed 'Plan Mexico', did emphasise and prioritise the army's role in counternarcotics, and facilitated the operational capacity to deploy enormous numbers of Mexican soldiers permanently to the streets. However, analysts who emphasise this have often failed to consider the support for these policies of domestic actors. While Mérida provided lots of security aid, this was dwarfed by the Mexican government's own contribution. Furthermore, President Calderón specifically requested security aid and it was his policy, amid rising violence, to use a national security sector response to combat drug trafficking. This was supported by a large percentage of the

population and local politicians, the latter of whom had favoured it since the military is a federal expense and enables them to avoid the vital task of law enforcement reform and taking responsibility for its failure. This domestic support is further demonstrated by the recent strengthening of militarisation of public security in Mexico, despite a change in US priorities from security to socio-economic assistance. While Nieto appears to have tried to alter it, his administration has given way to domestic pressure and the government's operational approach has remained the essentially same. Therefore, though the Mérida Initiative did provide funds for the army to increase its role in public security, it was far from the driving factor. Domestic forces, both bottom-up and top-down not only permitted it, they advocated for it. Furthermore, the army was already the primary counternarcotic agency at least four years before the Mérida Initiative, suggesting that critics of US policy who focus exclusively on the Mérida Initiative are ignoring the period prior to 2006 which, as this chapter has shown, observed important steps toward militarisation. The present situation has its roots in decisions taken in the Salinas and Zedillo administrations, at a time when US aid and influence was extremely limited due to Mexican sovereignty concerns. The incursion of the army into public security, and therefore the use of a national security tool to deal with a public security problem, has without a doubt occurred in Mexico. But not solely at the behest of the United States. In fact, direct US involvement in this policy was limited, far more so than in Colombia.

However, while their direct role may have been more limited than many think, the US did have a role in elevating the threat perception of drug trafficking in Mexico, not just through the rhetoric of US presidents such as Reagan and Bush Sr, but legislation such as the designation of Mexican DTOs as terrorist organisations. While there is an argument that DTOs in Mexico, with their huge wealth and sophisticated equipment, are inherently a national security threat, as they challenge the integrity of the state, DTO's in Mexico do not seek control of geographic territory, as guerrillas did in Colombia. They do not seek the overthrow of the state, nor do they seek to impose a social or political agenda, and they do not pose a traditional military threat as the Colombian guerrillas did – having far fewer personnel and ever engaging the state militarily. They are far more akin to Pablo Escobar's Medellin cartel, which was successfully dealt with by civilian law enforcement. However, it is undeniable that the profits of drug money reduced Mexican police force effectiveness, and many believed army to be the only reasonable alternative. This process has occurred

independently of the US, and has contributed to the morphing of a public security threat in to being perceived as a national security one.

This chapter has examined the case of US-led militarisation of counternarcotics in Mexico, and has found evidence that suggests considerable domestic cooperation and advocacy for militarisation of counternarcotics. The next chapter will compare commonalities and differences between the two cases, during which it will summarise all the key arguments made during this dissertation. It will finish with reflections on the limitations of the research this dissertation undertook, with recommendations for expanding it.

Conclusion

This piece of research set out to examine the role of the US in converting the issue of drug trafficking in Colombia and Mexico from an issue of public security to one of national security. It has examined this through the prism of drug war militarisation, specifically the increasing use of armed forces in law enforcement roles. Before providing a final summary on the research findings of this dissertation, this chapter will evaluate the aspects in which the Colombia and Mexican cases converge or divert.

Colombia and Mexico: Congruent Cases?

Analysts drawing comparisons between the cases of counternarcotics enforcement in Colombia and Mexico have generally focussed on two specific areas of perceived similarity. The first is that the Mérida Initiative was a Mexican equivalent of Plan Colombia, following the same objectives and priorities, earning it the nickname ‘Plan Mexico’ by critics (Fazio 2007; Carlsen 2007; Carlsen 2008; Lendman 2008; Carlsen 2009; Reyes 2010: 1; Haugaard et al 2011: 3). The second is the argument, more commonly presented by US and Mexican politicians, that Mexico’s security situation was similar to that of Colombia. Statements made by high level US government officials, such as then Secretary of State Clinton when she claimed ‘Mexico is increasingly looking like Colombia twenty years ago’, sought to emphasise the criminal narco-insurgent status of Mexican DTOS (Rogan 2011: 2). In a similar vein, analysts had described the increase in drug-related violence in Mexico as being a ‘Colombianisation’ of the situation (Carpenter 2005: 1-10). Some are more hesitant to compare the two, with Kan and Williams (2010: 220) describing such comparisons as

'facile'. Nevertheless, the research and conclusions drawn in this dissertation lend themselves to comparison, and there are both similarities and differences that can be observed.

One of the most immediate differences in the process of militarisation in Colombia and Mexico is the role their respective armed forces had in counternarcotics prior to Reagan's 'war on drugs'. Colombia had no history of military involvement in counternarcotics. In fact, the state was reluctant to take any action on 'the drug problem' at all, partially due to the economic benefits provided by it (Livingstone 2005), the reliance of poor farmers on the income it provided (Schirmer 2011: 47), and the perception that it was an 'American' problem (Thoumi 2010: 211-214). The military rejected getting involved, believing that clamping down on drugs would increase rural support for the Marxist guerrillas (Lee III 1998: 214; Neild 2005: 61). In Mexico, by contrast, there was greater precedent for military involvement in counternarcotics dating backs to the 1930s and 1940s, prior to large-scale US intervention (Astorga 2000: 27). Therefore, the US role in the transition in Colombia of the military to be deployed in counternarcotics is more pronounced than in the case of Mexico, where there was (to some extent) a precedent. In the latter case, however, it must be noted that the military's role was strictly confined to rural crop eradication, a factor that changed dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s.

One core similarity between the two cases is the consistency of the US attitude toward militaries and drug trafficking. All three initiatives (Andean Initiative, Plan Colombia, Mérida Initiative) had a focus on security assistance (Isacson 2005a: 45; Youngers and Rosin 2005; Neild 2005: 158; Seele 2008: 2; US House of Representatives 2010; Meija 2010: 135; Gautreau 2012: 65; Seelke 2017: 1). Throughout both, US presidents emphasised that perception that drug trafficking is a 'national security threat' that warrants using the army can be seen clearly in US administrations during all three aid packages (The White House 1986: 1-3; The White House 1989: 59, 62; The White House 1991; GAO 1991: 1, 28; GAO 1998a; Bush, cited in State Department 2002).

Despite consistency in the US attitude and emphasis on security assistance, the cases differ in the extent to which the military was prioritised. The Andean Initiative, launched in 1989 by Bush Sr, is anomalous compared with Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative, given its security assistance went primarily to CNP rather than the armed forces (Isacson 2005: 45). This dissertation has demonstrated that this was not of design and preference for non-military solutions, but necessity due to the Colombian armed forces unwillingness to engage in

counternarcotics (Lee III 1998: 214). US policy regarding Latin American militaries and the 'drug war' remained consistent.

Unlike the Andean Initiative, Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative had significant counterdrug funding allocated specifically to the Colombian and Mexican militaries. This aspect, or more broadly their emphasis on security assistance, has been frequently criticised by analysts (Youngers and Rosin 2005; Neild 2005: 89-92; Freeman and Sierra 2005: 285-286; Muggah, cited in Gagne 2015). Yet, there was significant difference between the two in both the circumstances of their creation and the extent to which they prioritised military funding over police funding. Indeed, Plan Colombia's funding for the armed forces was proportionally significantly higher – 75% (Isacson 2005b: 138) in the first year, compared with 41% for Mérida's first year (Seele 2008: 2). In addition to this, the total amounts provided by Plan Colombia were far higher than those provided by Mérida - $6.4 million more (Seelke 2017: 1; Goi 2017). Though both encouraged a crucial role for the armed forces, both percentages and total funds allocated were far higher for Plan Colombia than the Mérida Initiative. Furthermore, Mérida very quickly reduced the amount of military aid going to the Mexican armed forces, as the Mérida Initiative Act (US House of Representatives 2008: 6) laid out. Though the Mérida Initiative may have shared characteristics with Plan Colombia regarding emphasis on the military, there is a difference in degree. Mérida allocated less in percentage, less in total amounts, and quickly changed its emphasis compare with Plan Colombia. While Mérida is still indicative of US facilitation of militarisation in the Mexican drug war, it was not a 'Plan Mexico' in the sense of being identical to Plan Colombia.

In both cases, the successful deployment of armed forces to the drug war required a measure of domestic support. In the case of Mexico, this support was more forthcoming than in the case of Colombia. For example, Congressional Research Service reports reveal that Plan Colombia was also more militaristic in its creation than the Mérida Initiative. In contrast to the Mérida Initiative, Plan Colombia's creation had heavy DOD involvement (Seelke 2017: 29) and included an active US military presence on Colombian soil. The DOD's direct involvement in the creation of Plan Colombia perhaps goes some part in explaining the disproportionate emphasis on the military in the final part of the Plan. It was demonstrated earlier that Plan Colombia itself was far more a product of US influence than the Mérida Initiative. The early drafts of Plan Colombia were written in English, with extensive US involvement (Fukumi 2008: 178), and the final funding allocations did not reflect those

advocated by the Colombian government at the inception of Plan Colombia (Isacson 2005b: 138; Meija 2010: 135). The militarisation within the Mérida Initiative, however, reflected the prioritisation of the Mexican government (United States Senate 2007: 45-47; Seelke 2009: 14; Felbab-Brown 2009: 20; United States House of Representatives 2010: 1-4), and reflected the Calderón administration's priorities and polices prior to Mérida (Moloeznik 2013: 177).

The necessity of domestic support for militarisation of counternarcotics in Colombia is most clearly demonstrated in the divergence between the Andean Initiative and Plan Colombia. The Andean Initiative supported the CNP, and Plan Colombia supported the Colombian armed forces. This dissertation has shown that this was not due to different views in US administrations. Bush Sr, whose administration launched and oversaw the Andean Initiative, evidently supported the use of the military (The White House 1989: 59, 62; The White House 1991; GAO 1991: 1; Doyle 1993; GAO 1999). The Colombian army were not willing to partake, as they feared it would impede their efforts in the civil war. The Colombian government were also resistant, favouring treating the problem of drug trafficking and the Medellin and Cali cartels with a public security response emphasising civilian law enforcement, judicial reform, and socio-economic causes. Plan Colombia was able to provide the extensive counternarcotic aid that it did to the Colombian army, some six years after the Andean Initiative ended, can be explained by changes in these Colombian institutions which saw domestic support for militarisation, and therefore a willingness to treat treating drug trafficking as a national security issue. Conflation of the guerrillas and drug trafficking, particularly in the context of 9/11 and the global war on terror, enabled the Colombian armed forces to combine their war against the Marxist guerrillas with the US-led 'war on drugs'. The election of Uribe on the platform of 'war' with the guerrillas, demonstrated that this change was also reflected in the Colombian presidency. Therefore, within Colombia the emphasis on militarisation of Plan Colombia compared to the Andean Initiative can be explained by domestic factors rather than a change in US policy. While Colombia had previously resisted militarisation of its counternarcotics efforts, and the emphasis had been on public security responses, the shift enabled the US to pursue its foreign policy objective of ensuring foreign militaries were brought in to the drug war, with the hope that they would be able to interdict drugs more effectively.

Domestic support for militarisation appears to have been far more forthcoming in the case of Mexico than in Colombia. The Mérida Initiative came a year after Calderón's 'war on drugs and organised crime', which massively increased domestic troop deployments and was an

aggressive military strategy launched against the cartels (Keefer et al 2010: 12; Grayson 2013: 3; Beittel 2013: 33; LaSusa 2016). The US, through Mérida, supported this strategy (Withers et al 2010: 17; Seelke 2017: 1-6), but Congress ensured that US financial support to the Mexican military would be time limited (Mérida Act 2008: 6). Attributing Mexico's militarisation to Mérida would be to ignore the fact that militarisation was a strategy Calderón not only supported, but actively endorsed, as did much of the population (Seelke 2009: 1; US House of Representatives 2009: 4; 2017: 9; Sotomayor 2013: 48; Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017: 9). In this way Mérida was very different to Plan Colombia. In essence, Plan Colombia's emphasis on militarisation was directly a result of the US, with support of some domestic political actors, particularly after 9/11. The Mérida Initiative's emphasis on militarisation, though less pronounced than in Plan Colombia, was a result of a convergence of opinion between US and Mexican administrations, and limited by the US Congress.

In terms of the Mérida Initiative being 'Plan Mexico', from the perspective of militarisation this is not the case. Plan Colombia's funding was far more geared toward the Colombian armed forces than the Mérida Initiative was toward the Mexican armed forces. Furthermore, Plan Colombia caused a shift of policy within Colombia, getting the Colombian army involved with counternarcotics by offering the potential to combine it with counterinsurgency, particularly after 9/11 (and its impact on the will of the US Congress. The Mérida Initiative caused no such shift, instead reflecting continuity in Mexican policy already implemented.

All three major US-aid packages were, to an extent, a response to rising drug-related violence (Bailey 2011: 1-4). In all three cases, armed actors associated with the illegal drug trade were causing this drug related violence, which was extremely high in both countries (Brauer and Gomez-Sorzano 2004: 29-50; Shirk and Rios 2011; Heinle et al 2016). [3] Though high in all cases, the nature of the drug-related violence varied across the periods analysed. The Andean Initiative, to support Colombia's battle against Escobar's Medellin cartel, supported a police

[3] At the height of the war against the Colombian DTOs, Medellin had a homicide rate of 320 per 100,000, and Cali had 124 per 100,000 (Meija 2016: 1). Colombia's homicide rate reached a new peak in 1999 with a national average of more than 70 homicides per 100,000 of the population (Brauer and Gomez-Sorzano 2004: 29-50). On average, 27,000 people were murdered every year in Colombia in the 1990s (Keefer et al 2010: 19). In Mexico, there have been an estimated 65,000-80,000 organised crime style homicides since 2006 (Kan 2012: vii; Heinle 2016: 0).). Mexico's homicide rate had furthermore been declining through the mid-2000s, reaching a record low in 2007 of 8.1 per 100,000. In 2012, it had risen to 21.5 deaths per 100,000 of the population (Heinle et al 2016).

response to a drug cartel which was conducting its violence in pursuit of profits. The Medellin cartel did fund social goods, such as housing projects, and its leader, Escobar, had some political aspirations, but it did not directly challenge the territorial integrity of the Colombian State (Felbab-Brown 2009: 12). Rather than seeking to institute political or social agenda, the Medellin cartel sought to use narco-terrorist tactics to discourage the Colombian state from enforcing the law (Rogan 2011: 26-28). They did not pose a national security threat to the Colombian state in the sense that Bailey and Dammert (2006a: 11) describe, being hyper-violent profit-oriented crime, and therefore a public security issue. This viewpoint adheres to the DEA's (1994: 9) own assessment of Colombian drug traffickers as being 'aggressive capitalists who wish to exploit, not to destroy, Colombia's political system and free market economy'.

The actors involved in the drug trade at the time of Plan Colombia were not solely economically motivated as the Colombian cartels had been. The drug trade was controlled by a mixture of drug traffickers, guerrillas, and paramilitaries (Thoumi 2010: 213-215), but Plan Colombia was primarily a façade masking counterinsurgency purposes. The guerrillas were not conducting violence in order to make profits, they were using drug profits to fund their war against the Colombian state (Kan 2009: 1). The guerrillas sought to overthrow the Colombian state and introduce their own social and political agenda (DEA 1994: 9; Arnson and Kirk 1993: 13; Scherlen 2009: 11; Schirmer 2011: 51; Martin 2015: 12). The guerrillas' political aims are demonstrated by their control over approximately a third of Colombian territory (GAO 1999: 6; Ramirez Lemus et al 2005: 106; GAO 2008: 27-29; Beittel 2013: 44). Many analysts believed the Colombian state was close to collapse at the time of Plan Colombia: (DeShazo et al 2007: 5; Meija 2016: 3), violent drug-related crime rose to higher levels than during the Andean Initiative (Brauer and Gomez-Sorzano 2004: 29-50; Keefer et al 2010: 19; Bailey 2011: 4). The FARC and ELN commanded thousands of guerrillas who inflicted military defeats on the Colombian army (Marcella 2001: 96; Ospina and Marks 2014: 354). In this sense, they challenged the Colombian state in a way more typical of that of a national security threat (Bailey and Dammert 2006: 11). The militarisation of counternarcotics under Plan Colombia to some extent reflected changes within the drug trade itself, particularly the fact that much of the drug trade had come under control of traditional insurgent forces seeking destruction of the state. Coca areas largely coincided with areas protected by the guerrillas (Pardo 2000: 17), and civilian law enforcement was unsuitable for the task.

The case of Mexico at the time of the Mérida Initiative is different to Colombia at the time of Plan Colombia in this respect: Mexican DTOs have not made territorial gains. While some argue Mexico is also potentially becoming a failed 'narco-state' (Manwaring 2009: 2; Brands 2009: 4-5; Grayson 2010: 162; Bunker 2010: 10), Mexico retains at least nominal control over the entire territory, and is so far more in comparison to the Colombian state in the periods examined (Jenkins 2009: 30; Kan and Williams 2010: 218-219). The Mexican DTOs furthermore do not have a social or political agenda, as the guerrillas at the time of Plan Colombia did. Mexican DTOs furthermore did not have the same military might of the guerrillas. Well-equipped and comprising in some cases of former soldiers they may be, but Mexican DTOs do not have the personnel that the FARC and ELN had in the early 2000s. In this respect, although they are hyper violent, Mexican DTOs do not rise above the public security realm. Indeed, the hyper violence that characterises the Mexican situation has, as many analysts have argued, been a reaction to the use of the military in counternarcotics, as cartels have engaged in an 'arms race' to defend their profits (Freeman 2006: 16; Felbab-Brown 2009: 19; Buxton 2011: 5; Martin 2015: 12-13). In this sense, the Mexican security situation at the time of the Mérida Initiative had more in common with the Colombia situation at the time of the Medellin cartel – orchestrating a narcoterrorism campaign to reduce public support for drug interdiction efforts, in a ruthless pursuit of profits. A security situation in which the response was called for by law enforcement agencies, not the army.

The two cases therefore present two similar but diverse examples of the role of the US in militarising counternarcotics. In both cases, the militarisation of counternarcotics represented a shift from public security to national security, and the US strongly supported this change, but the domestic willingness varied considerably and over time, and therefore there is a variation in the extent to which the US caused militarisation compared with a convergence in militarisation.

Research Findings

Both of the case studies have had findings summarised in their respective conclusions, and many of the findings have been discussed further in the comparison section above. To provide an overall answer to the central question of this dissertation, it can be concluded that the US-led 'war on drugs' has had a central role in transforming drug trafficking in Colombia and Mexico from a matter of public security to one of national security. It has done this through advocating and financially supporting militarisation within both these countries over

a protracted period of time. In Colombia, this was most evident in Plan Colombia, which supported a weak Colombian military with enormous amounts of counternarcotic aid to engage in drug interdiction and eradication. The US intended the army to become involved in counternarcotics much earlier, but this had been resisted by the Colombian government and more importantly, the Colombian army. The increasing involvement of the Colombian guerrillas in the drug trade can account for this change, and the Colombian army enthusiastically engaged in counternarcotics if it could be combined with its 'main mission' of counterinsurgency. The US was fundamental to the process, but so was support from the Colombian government and particularly the armed forces themselves.

In Mexico, the Mérida Initiative is often indicated as the US enforcement of counternarcotic militarisation. This dissertation has demonstrated that the Mérida Initiative did support militarisation of Mexican counternarcotics, but this was a convergence of opinion with the government of Calderón. Therefore the US supported, rather than caused, the massive deployment of soldiers to combat drug trafficking in Mexico. That said, Mexico's militarisation predated the Calderón government, and the US did support militarisation in Mexico as early as 1986 (The White House 1986: 1-3), but Mexican sovereignty sensitives limited the extent of this.

In both cases, drug trafficking was transformed from a matter of public security to one of national security through intervention of the military in crime-fighting. In both cases, the US was not able act unilaterally in enforcing counternarcotics militarisation, but relied on support from significant domestic political actors. In the case of Mexico, this support was more forthcoming and often deployed the military independently of US influence. The role of the US in Colombia is therefore more pronounced than in the case of Mexico.

Limitations and Recommendations

This dissertation has analysed primary sources, particularly numerous GAO reports (1991, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2007) which have not been taken in to account by the existing literature. These have provided a valuable insight in to the breakdown of funding, as well providing insight in to the methods and motivations of US officials involved in implementing these counternarcotic policies. Despite this, the research has been limited by classified information. It is not possible to know the full extent of funding to the Colombian and Mexican militaries, particularly that which flows through the DOD's discretionary budget

(Neild 2005). It is highly likely that the information which remains classified could provide the clearest insight as to the extent of the US support for, and facilitation of, militarisation. Nevertheless this dissertation, using the means which are available to civilians, has been able to demonstrate the US support for militarisation in both countries.

Colombia and Mexico have both experienced significant militarisation of public security though the 'war on drugs' and their efforts to tackle the drug trade. Latin American neighbours, such as El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Brazil, and Argentina are either taking steps to militarise or are considering militarising their efforts to combat rampant organised crime and drug-related violence (Gagne 2015). By demonstrating the role of the US in militarising counternarcotics in Colombia and Mexico, this dissertation can contribute to efforts to ensure policymakers, particularly in Washington, do not repeat the same mistakes.

Bibliography:

Official Documents:

Bailey, John (2011) 'Prepared statement for the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Management: Hearing on "The US. Homeland Security Role in the Mexican War against Drug Cartels,"' [31/03/2011] *Homeland Security Committee* [online] Available at: https://homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Bailey.pdf [Accessed 14/01/2018]

Beers, Rand and Taylor, Francis X. (2002) 'Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection between Drugs and Terror [13/03/2002] *United States State Department* [online] Available at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/8743.htm [Accessed 14/03/2018]

Beittel, June S. (2013) 'Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence', *Congressional Research Service* [online] Available at: https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc93853/m1/1/high_res_d/R41576_2011Sep07.pdf [Accessed 25/12/2017]

Bush, George W. (2002) 'President Bush Announces Drug Control Strategy' [12/02/2002] *United States Department of State* [online] Available at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/8451.htm [Accessed 05/05/2018]

Central Intelligence Agency (1992) *Narco-Insurgent Links in the Andes* (CN M 92-20010 – DECL: OADR – DRV FR: MULT) [online] Available at: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col24.pdf [Accessed 12/12/2017]

Central Intelligence Agency (1997) *Colombia-Venezuela: Continuing Friction Along the Border* (APLAIR 97-41030) [online] Available at: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col40.pdf [Accessed 25/07/2018]

Cheney, Richard B (1989) 'D.O.D and its role in the war against drugs', *Defense*, pp. 2-7

Clinton, Hillary Rodham (2010) 'A Conversation with Hillary Clinton' [08/09/2010] *Council on Foreign Relations* [online] Available at: http://www.cfr.org/world/conversation-us-secretary-state-hillary-rodham-clinton/p34808 [Accessed 26/03/2017]

Colombia: Presidency of the Republic (1999) *Plan Colombia: Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State* Bogota, Colombia [online] Available at: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/plan_colombia_101999.pdf [Accessed 02/06/2018]

Congressional Research Service (2003) 'Colombia: Summary and Tables on US assistance, FY1989-FY2004' [19/05/2003] *Congressional Research Service* [online] Available at: https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20030519_RS21213_4e90fa43ae3a51a120aeaee654e0a23b40c16c49.pdf [Accessed 21/03/2018]

Cook, Colleen W., Rebecca G. Rush, and Clare Ribano Seelke (2008) 'CRS Report for Congress - Mérida Initiative: Background and Funding' [18/03/2008] *Congressional Research Service* [online] Available at: https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/past/CRS%20report.pdf [Accessed 17/05/2018]

Doyle, Kate (2003) 'Operation Intercept: the perils of unilateralism' [13/04/2003] *The National Security Archive* [online] Available at: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86/ [Accessed 18/11/2017]

Evans, Michael (2002) 'War in Colombia: Guerrillas, Drugs and Human Rights in U.S.-Colombia Policy, 1988-2002' [03/05/2002] *The National Security Archive* [online] Available at: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/part2.html [Accessed 11/12/2017]

Federal Constitution of Mexico [online] Available at: https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/en/mex/en_mex-int-text-const.pdf [Accessed 21/10/2017]

Frechette, Miles (1997) 'Ambassador 's January 12 Meeting with New MOD [Minister of Defense] Designate' [13/01/1997] Bogota [online] Available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col51.pdf. [Accessed 10/04/2018]

Government Accountability Office (1991) *Drug War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia* (GAO/NSIAD-91-296) [online] Available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/220/215039.pdf [Accessed 21/11/2017]

Government Accountability Office (1993) *Drug Control: Revised Drug Interdiction Approach Is Needed in Mexico* (GAO/NSIAD-93-152) [online] Available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/153382.pdf [Accessed 21/11/2017]

Government Accountability Office (1998a) *Drug Control: Status of Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico* (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-129) [online] Available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/110/107301.pdf [Accessed 16/06/2018]

Government Accountability Office (1998b) *Drug Control: U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face Difficult Challenges* (GAO/NSIAD-98-154) [online] Available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/225908.pdf [Accessed 09/09/2018]

Government Accountability Office (1999) *Drug Control: Narcotics Threat Colombia Continues to Grow* (GAO/NSIAD-99-136) [online] Available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/227439.pdf [Accessed 12/01/2018]

Government Accountability Office (2007) *Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow into the United States* (GAO-07-1018) [online] Available at: https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071018.pdf [Accessed 03/11/2017]

Government Accountability Office (2008) *Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance* (GAO-09-71) [online] Available at: https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0971.pdf [Accessed 05/10/2017]

Hunter and Brownfield (2001) 'Remarks at Special Briefing - US assistance to Colombia' [12/03/2001] *United States Department of State* [online] Available at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/jan_apr/1198.htm [accessed 25/08/2018]

McCaffrey, Barry R., (2000) 'Remarks to the Atlantic Council of the United States' [28/11/2000] Washington D.C. [online] Available at: http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/112801.htm. [Accessed 12/10/2017]

Perl, Raphael F. (2006) 'CRS Report for Congress: International Drug Trade and US Foreign Policy' [06/11/2006] *Congressional Research Service* [online] Available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33582.pdf [Accessed 10/02/2018]

Seelke, Clare Ribando (2009) 'Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues' [21/08/2009] *Congressional Research Service* [online] Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40135.pdf [Accessed 04/04/2018]

Seelke, Clare Ribando (2013) 'Testimony of Clare Seelke 'U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: An Overview of the Mérida Initiative 2008-Present' [23/05/2013] Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere [online] Available at: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130523/100907/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-SeelkeC-20130523.pdf [Accessed 12/12/2017]

Seelke, Clare Ribando (2017) 'US.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond' [18/01/17] *Congressional Research Service* [online] Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf [Accessed 12/03/2018]

Seelke, Clare Ribando (2018) 'Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations' [29/01/2018] *Congressional Research Service* [online] Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42917.pdf [Accessed 01/08/2018]

The White House (1975) *Domestic Council Drug Abuse Report* Washington D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office (20402) [online] Available at: https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0067/1562951.pdf [Accessed 09/08/2018]

The White House (1986) *National Security Directive: Narcotics and National Security* [08/04/86] Available at: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-221.pdf [Accessed 12/05/2018]

The White House (1989) *National Drug Control Strategy* [15/09/1989] Available at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/119466.pdf [Accessed 03/06/2018]

The White House (1991) *National Security Strategy of the United States* [01/08/1991] *The White House* [online] Available at: http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1991.pdf [Accessed 13/03/2018]

United Nations General Assembly Security Council (2008) *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform – Report of the Secretary-General* [23/01/2008] *United Nations* [online] Available at: https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/39 [Accessed 11/03/19]

United Nations (n. d.) *United Nations and the Rule of Law: Security Sector Reform (SSR)* [online] Available at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/access-to-justice-and-rule-of-law-institutions/ssr/ [Accessed 23/02/19]

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010) *World Drug Report 2010* [online] Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/1.3_The_globa_cocaine_market.pdf [07/07/2018]

United States Agency for International Development (2009) *Security Sector Reform* [online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf [Accessed 21/02/19]

United States Department of Homeland Security (2010) *United States of America-Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study* [online] Available at: https://www.ice.gov/doclib/cornerstone/pdf/cps-study.pdf [Accessed 16/06/2018]

United States Department of Justice - Drug Enforcement Administration (1994) *Insurgent Involvement in the Colombian Drug Trade: Drug Intelligence Report* (DEA-94045) [online] Available at: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB69/col33.pdf [Accessed 05/02/2018]

United States Department of Justice - Drug Enforcement Administration (2016) *2016 National Drug Threat Assessment: Summary* (DEA-DCT-DIR-001-17) [online] Available at https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/DIR-001-17_2016_NDTA_Summary.pdf [Accessed 16/04/2018]

United States Department of State (2002) *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report – Canda, Mexico, and Central America* Available at: https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/html/17941.htm [Accessed 18/01/2018]

United States Department of State (2005) *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I Drug and Chemical Control* [online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239560.pdf [Accessed 29/09/2018]

United States Department of State (2009) *Mexico – Mérida Initiative Report* [online] Available at: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=33501 [Accessed 12/10/2017]

United States Department of State (2010) *Joint Statement of the Mérida Initiative High-Level Consultative Group on Bilateral Cooperation Against Transnational Organized Crime* [online] Available at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/03/139196.htm [Accessed 16/12/2017]

United States Department of State (2015) *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I Drug and Chemical Control* [online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239560.pdf [Accessed 06/01/2018]

United States Department of State (2016) *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I Drug and Chemical Control* [online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253655.pdf [Accessed 13/02/2018]

United States House of Representatives (2008) *Mérida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics and Reduce Organized Crime Authorization Act of 2008* [online] Available at:

https://www.congress.gov/110/crpt/hrpt673/CRPT-110hrpt673-pt1.pdf [Accessed 07/11/2017]

United States House of Representatives (2009) *Resolution: Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding drug trafficking in Mexico* [18/03/2009] [online] Available at: [Accessed 06/03/2018] https://www.congress.gov/111/bills/hres258/BILLS-111hres258ih.pdf

United States House of Representatives (2012) *H. R. 4303 - to direct the Secretary of State to designate as foreign terrorist organizations certain Mexican drug cartels and submit a report on the activities the Department of State is taking to assist Mexico with drug cartel violence, and for other purposes* [online] Available at: https://www.congress.gov/112/bills/hr4303/BILLS-112hr4303ih.pdf [Accessed 14/08/2018]

United States Senate (1997) *DEA Congressional Testimony: Statement by Thomas A. Constantine – Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration* [online] Available at: https://fas.org/irp/congress/1997_hr/s970312c.htm [Accessed 11/12/2017]

United States Senate (2007) *The Antidrug Package for Mexico and Central America: An Evaluation – Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate* [15/11/2007][online] Available at: https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/111507_Transcript_The%20Antidrug%20Package%20for%20Mexico%20and%20Central.pdf [Accessed 04/07/2018]

United States Senate (2010) *S.3172 – To support counternarcotics and related efforts in the Inter-American region* [online] Available at: https://www.congress.gov/111/bills/s3172/BILLS-111s3172is.pdf [Accessed 08/08/2018]

United States Senate (2013) *Refocusing U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Prepared statement by Shannon K. O'Neil before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Global Narcotics Affairs* [online] Available at: https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2013/06/Congressional%20Testimony%20-%20ONeil%20June%202013.pdf [Accessed 10/12/2018]

United States Senate (2017) *Senate Resolution 102: Reaffirming the strategic partnership between the United States and Mexico, and recognizing the bilateral cooperation that advances the national security and national interests of both countries* (S.Res.102) [online] Available at: https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/sres102/BILLS-115sres102is.pdf [Accessed 08/12/2018]

Veillette, Connie (2004) ‘CRS Report for Congress - Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2005 Assistance’ [10/05/2005] *Congressional Research Service* [online] Available at: https://securityassistance.org/sites/default/files/050510crs.pdf [Accessed 20/01/2018]

Veillette, Connie, Mark P. Sullivan, Clare Ribando Seelke, and Colleen W. Cook (2007) ‘CRS Report for Congress - US foreign assistance to Latin America and the Carribean: FY2006-FY2008’ [28/12/2007] *Congressional Research Service* [online] Available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl34299.pdf [Accessed 28/01/2018]

Bibliography

Agren, David (2017) ‘Mexican senate votes to keep troops in police role despite outcry from rights groups’ [15/12/2017] *The Guardian* [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/15/mexican-military-police-drugs-crackdown-human-rights [Accessed 02/02/2018]

Ahmed, Azam (2016) ‘Mexican Military Runs Up Body Count in Drug War’ [26/05/2016] *The New York Times* [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/world/americas/mexican-militarys-high-kill-rate-raises-human-rights-fears.html [Accessed 12/04/2018]

Ahrens, J. M. (2014) ‘Peña Nieto sends troops to Tamaulipas’ [14/05/2014] *El Pais* [online] Available at: https://elpais.com/elpais/2014/05/14/inenglish/1400085656_979639.html [Accessed 22/12/2017]

Alsema, Adriaan (2017) ‘Trump threatens to decertify Colombia as partner in war on drugs’ [14/09/2017] *Colombia Reports* [online] Available at: https://colombiareports.com/trump-threatens-decertify-colombia-partner-war-drugs/ [Accessed 04/05/2018]

Amnesty International (2009) ‘Mexico: New Reports of Human Rights Violations by the Military’ [online] Available at: https://www1.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/mexiconewreport.pdf [Accessed 04/12/2018]

Amnesty International (2011) 'Mexican Military Abuse Cases Must Be Tried In Civilian Courts' [04/11/2011] *Amnesty International* [online] Available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2011/11/mexican-military-abuse-cases-must-be-tried-civilian-courts/ [Accessed 11/11/2017]

Amnesty International (2017) 'Annual Report Mexico 2016/2017' [online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/mexico/report-mexico/ [Accessed 14/02/2018]

Andreas, Peter and Nadelmann, Ethan A. (2006) *Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Archibold, Randal, C (2012) 'Adding to Unease of a Drug War Alliance' [29/05/2012] *The New York Times* [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/world/americas/mexican-army-case-adds-to-us-unease-in-drug-war.html [Accessed 13/03/2018]

Arnson, Cynthia J. (2000) 'The Peace Process in Colombia and U.S. Policy', *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,* May: 6-18 [online] Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACF362.pdf [Accessed 20/04/2018]

Arnson, Cynthia, and Kirk, Robin (1993) *State of War: Political Violence and Counterinsurgency in Colombia* London: Human Rights Watch

Astorga, Luis (2000) 'Drug Trafficking in Mexico: A First General Assessment', *UNESCO,* [online] Available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001176/117644Eo.pdf [Accessed 01/02/2018]

Bagely, Bruce (1988) 'US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Analysis of a Policy Failure', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,* 30/2: 189-212

Bagley, Bruce (2012) 'Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the Twenty First Century' [online] Available at: http://www.as.miami.edu/media/college-of-arts-and-sciences/content-assets/international-studies/documents/publications/Bagley%20Drugs,%20Crime%20and%20Democracy%20in%20Latin%20America%20and%20the%20Caribbean%20Dec%202011.pdf [Accessed 25/08/2018]

Bailey, John and Dammert, Lucia (2006a) 'Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas', in J. Bailey and L. Dammert (eds.) *Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 1-23

Bailey, John and Dammert, Lucia (2006b) 'Assessing Responses to Public Insecurity in the Americas', in J. Bailey and L. Dammert (eds.) *Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 245-262.

Bailey, John, P. Paras, and D. Vargas (2011) 'Army as Police? Correlates of Public Confidence in the Police, Justice System, and the Military: Mexico in Comparative Context'; paper presented at *Seminario Desafios de la Politicia Mexicana: Visiones desde el Baromentre de las Americas,* Mexico City (18 January)

Baldwin, David A. (1997) 'The Concept of Security', *Review of International Studies,* 23: 5-26

Bartilow, Horace A., and Eom, Kihong (2009) 'Busting Drugs While Paying With Crime: The Collateral Damage of US. Drug Enforcement in Foreign Countries', *Foreign Policy Analysis,* 5: 93-116

BBC (2016) 'Colombia general jailed for 30 years over Galan death' [25/11/2016] *British Broadcasting Company* [online] Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-38101907 [Accessed 12/06/2018]

Bedard, Paul (1989) 'Bush to Widen Military Role in Drug War' [16/08/1989] *Washington Times*

Berrios, Carlos G. (2017) 'Critical Ingredient: US aid to counterinsurgency in Colombia', *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* 28/3: 546-575

Bertram, Eva, Morris Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe, and Peter Andreas (1996) *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial* Oakland: University of California Press

Bevans, C. I. (1963) 'International Conventions in the Field of Narcotic Drugs' *Temple Law Quarterly* 37: 41-58

Bewely-Taylor, David R. (1998) *United States and International Drug control, 1909-1997* London : Continuum:

Bjornehed, Emma (2004) 'Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror', *Global Crime*, 6:3-4: 305-324

Bonner, Michelle (2011) 'Book Reviews: Niels Uildriks, ed., Policing Insecurity: Police Reform, Security, and Human Rights in Latin America Mercedes S. Hinton and Tim

Newburn, eds., Policing Developing Democracies', *Latin American Politics and Society*, 53/4: 201-204

Booth, Ken (1991) 'Security and empancipation', *Review of International Studies*, 17/4: 313-326

Booth, Ken (2005) 'Introduction to Part 1' in K. Booth (ed.) *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 21-26

Boudreaux, Richard (1991) 'Colombia Drug Lord Surrenders: Cocaine: Pablo Escobar, object of a seven-year manhunt, turns himself in after a promise of leniency and a guarantee against extradition to the United States' [20/06/1991] *The Los Angeles Times* [online] Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-20/news/mn-1456_1_united-states [Accessed 20/01/2018]

Boville, Belen (2004) *The Cocaine War in Context: Drugs and Politics* New York: Algora Publishing:

Bowden, Mark (2001) *Killing Pablo* New York: Penguin books

Brands, Hal (2009) 'Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S counter-drug policy', *Strategic Studies Institute*, May: 1-61 [online] Available at: http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub918.pdf [Accessed: 30/01/2018]

Brauer, Jurgen and Gomez-Sorzano, Alejandro Gustavo (2004) 'Homicide Cycles in Colombia', *International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies*, 1/1: 29-50

Brodzinsky, Sibylla (2017) "Welcome to peace': Colombia's Farc rebels seal historic disarmament' [27/06/2017] *The Guardian* [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/27/colombia-farc-weapons-war-government [Accessed 10/04/2018]

Brooke, James (1991) 'Gaviria's Gamble' [13/10/1991] *The New York Times* [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/13/magazine/gaviria-s-gamble.html [Accessed 23/11/2017]

Bruneau, T. (2011) 'Introduction', in T. Bruneau, L. Dammert, and E. Skinner (eds.) *Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America* Austin: University of Texas Press, pp. 1-19

Bunker, Robert J (2013) 'Introduction: the Mexican Cartels – organized crime vs. criminal insurgency', *Trends in Organized Crime*, 16: 129-137

Bunker, Robert J. (2010) 'Strategic Threat: Narcos and Narcotics Overview', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 21/1: 8-29

Buxton, Julia (2006) *The Political Economy of Narcotics* New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Buxton, Julia (2011) 'Introduction', in J. Buxton (ed.) *The Politics of Narcotic Drugs* London: Routledge, pp. 3-7

Buzan, Barry (1991) *People, states and fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era* Colchester: Harvester Wheatsheaf

Buzan, Barry (1995) 'Security, the State, the "New World Order," and Beyond', in R. D. Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security* new York: Columbia University Press, pp. 187-211

Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Camp, Roderic A. (2005) 'Mexico's Armed Forces: Marching to a Democratic Tune?' in K. J. Middlebrook (ed.) *Dilemmas of political change in Mexico* London: Institute of Latin American Studies, pp. 353-372

Camp, Roderic A. (2010) 'Armed Forces and Drugs: Public Perceptions and Institutional Challenges', *Wilson Center*: 291-325 [online] Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Chapter%2010-Armed%20Forces%20and%20Drugs%2C%20Public%20Perceptions%20and%20Institutional%20Challeges.pdf [Accessed 12/04/2018]

Campbell, Duncan (2002) 'Bush tars drug takers with aiding terrorists: Mandatory jail makes a drugs gulag' [08/08/2002] *The Guardian* [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/aug/08/usa.duncancampbell1 [Accessed 05/12/2017]

Carlsen, Laura (2007) 'Plan Mexico', *Foreign policy in Focus*, [online] Available at: https://fpif.org/plan_mexico/ [Accessed 03/09/2018]

Carlsen, Laura (2008) 'A Primer on Plan Mexico', *Americas Program of the Center for International Policy*, [online] Available at:

https://www.counterpunch.org/2008/05/08/a-primer-on-plan-mexico/ [Accessed 01/09/2018]

Carlsen, Laura (2009) 'Perils of Plan Mexico: Going Beyond Security to Strengthen US-Mexico Relations' [24/08/2011] *Counterpunch* [online] Available at: https://www.counterpunch.org/2009/11/24/the-perils-of-plan-mexico/ [Accessed 12/09/2018]

Carpenter, Ted (2005) 'Mexico is Becoming the Next Colombia', *CATO Institute* November: 1-8 [online] Available at: https://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/mexico-is-becoming-next-colombia [Accessed 01/04/2018]

Carpenter, Ted G. (1990) 'Perilous Panacea: The Military in the Drug War' [15/02/1990] *Cato Institute* [online] Available at: https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/perilous-panacea-military-drug-war [Accessed: 12/12/2017]

Carpenter, Ted Galen (2003) *Bad Neighbour Policy: Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin America* Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan

Carrilho, Maria (2001) 'Transition and Consolidation of Democract: The Role of the Armed Forces and Security Forces'; paper presented at *Conference Democratic Transition and Consolidation* Madrid (19-20 October)

Casey, Nicholas (2017) 'Colombia and FARC Sign New Peace Deal, This Time Skipping Voters' [24/11/2016] *The New York Times* [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/world/americas/colombia-juan-manuel-santos-peace-deal-farc.html [Accessed 18/03/2018]

Castillo, Juan Camilo (2010) '"Criminal" Insurgencies: A Nexus of Unconventional Threats in the New Century' [11/05/2010] *Defence Viewpoints* [Online] Available at: https://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/criminal-insurgencies-a-nexus-of-unconventional-threats-in-the-new-century [Accessed 26/03/2018]

Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinion Publica (2013) *Fuerzas armadas e institutions de seguridad en la opinion publica* Mexico: Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinion Publica

Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinion Publica (2016) *Fuerzas armadas e institutions de seguridad en la opinion publica* Mexico: Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinion Publica

Chepesiuk, Ron (1999) *The War on Drugs: An International Encyclopedia* Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO

Claweson, Patrick L., and Lee III, Rensselaer W. (1996) *The Andean Cocaine Industry* London: Macmillan Press Ltd

Copley News Service (2000) 'US drug Czar warns new Mexican president on anti-drug strategy' [12/10/2000]

Corcoran, Patrick (2014) 'Mexico's New Gendarmerie: Security Game Changer or Window Dressing?' [29/07/2014] InSight Crime [online] Available at: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/mexicos-new-gendarmerie-security-game-changer-or-window-dressing/ [Accessed 11/03/19]

Corcoran, Patrick (2019) 'Is Mexico's New National Guard Just Another Uniform' [20/03/19] InSight Crime [online] Available at: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/new-mexico-national-guard/ [Accessed 23/03/19]

Cornell, Svante E. (2005) 'Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzebekistan', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 17/4: 619-639

Crandall, Russel (2001) 'Explicit Narcotization: U.S Policy toward Colombia during the Samper Administration', *Latin American Politics and Society*, 43/3: 95-120

Crandall, Russel (2002) 'Clinton, Bush and Plan Colombia', *Global Politics and Strategy*, 44:1: 159-172

Crandall, Russel (2008) *Driven by Drugs: US Policy Toward Colombia* Boulder: Lynne Rienner

Daly, Catherine, Kimberly Heinle and David A. Shirk (2012) *Armed with Impunity: Curbing Military Human Rights Abuses in Mexic*o San Diego: Trans-Border Institute

Dammert, Lucia (2012) *Fear and Crime in Latin America: Redefining State-society Relations* New York: Routledge

Davison, Phil (1993) 'Escobar's hand seen in Bogota bomb atrocity' [01/02/1993] *The Independent* [online] Available at:

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/escobars-hand-seen-in-bogota-bomb-atrocity-1470238.html [Accessed 12/11/2017]

Debusmann, Bernd (2009) 'Among top U.S. fears: A failed Mexican state' [09/01/2009] *The New York Times* [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/world/americas/09iht-letter.1.19217792.html [Accessed 03/12/2017]

DeShazo, Peter, Tanya Primiani, and Phillip McLean (2007) *Evaluating Progress in Colombia, 1999-2007* Washington D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Desmond Arias, Enrique (2006) 'The Dynamics of Criminal Governance: Networks and Social Order in Rio de Janiero', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 38/2: 292-325

Diamint, Rut (2004) 'Security Challenges in Latin America', *Journal for the Society for Latin American Studies,* 23/1: 43-62

Ditta, Elise (2016) 'Use of Armed Forces in Drug War a 'Mistake' Says Mexico Military Chief' [16/03/2016] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/a-mistake-for-mexico-s-military-to-fight-drug-traffickers-secretary-of-defense/ [Accessed 03/09/2018]

Dittmar, Victoria (2018) 'Study: 2017 Was Deadliest Year in Mexico for Homicides Linked to Organised Crime' [26/01/2018] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/2017-deadliest-year-organized-crime-related-homicides-mexico/ [Accessed 11/06/2018]

Domoslawski, Artur (2011) 'Drug Policy in Portugal: The Benefits of Decriminalizing Drug Use' [31/08/2011] *Transnational Institute* [online] Available at: https://www.tni.org/en/issues/decriminalization/item/2725-drug-policy-in-portugal [Accessed 10/02/19]

Doyle, Kate (1993) 'The Militarization of the Drug War in Mexico', *Current History*, 92/571: 83-88

El Universal (2011) 'Caso Hank daña imagen del Ejército: PRI y PT' [15/06/2011] *El Universal* [online] Available at: http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/772897.html [Accessed 12/05/2018]

Ellingwood, Ken (2011) 'US ambassador to Mexico resigns' [19/03/2011] *Los Angeles Times* [online] Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/19/nation/la-na-us-mexico-ambassador-20110320 [Accessed 11/11/2017]

Engeland, Anisseh Van and Rudolph, Rachael M. (2008) *From Terrorism to Politics (Ethics and Global Politics)* London: Routledge

Fainaru, Steve and Booth, William (2009b) 'New Strategy Urged in Mexico' [28/07/2009] *The Washington Post* [online] Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/27/AR2009072703074.html [Accessed 06/09/2018]

Fainaru, Steve, and Booth, William (2009a) 'As Mexico Battles Cartels, The Army Becomes the Law' [02/04/2009] *The Washington Post* [online] Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/01/AR2009040104335.html [Accessed 11/11/2017]

Farah, Douglas (1990) 'Colombian Police Claim a Major Blow to Cartel' [13/08/1990] *The Washington Post* [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/08/13/colombian-police-claim-a-major-blow-to-cartel/146d8940-222e-46dc-be71-c50f78c9d48e/?utm_term=.caf58ce96182 [Accessed 05/03/2018]

Farah, Douglas (1993a) 'Bombs Rip Bogota' [16/02/1993] *The Washington Post* [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/02/16/bombs-rip-bogota/cf99d050-970d-4aaf-9b04-766f716acab3/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.d1bd22b2adca [Accessed 01/12/2017]

Farah, Douglas (1993b) 'Escobar Killed In Medellin' [03/12/1993] *The Washington Post* [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/12/03/escobar-killed-in-medellin/36339ba2-8021-4942-8c7a-00604b95070a/?utm_term=.538bc75b546c [Accessed 12/09/2018]

Farah, Douglas and Priest, Dana (1998) 'Mexican Drug Force is U.S.-Bred' [26/02/1998] *The Washington Post* [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/02/26/mexican-drug-force-is-us-bred/233966c1-4374-4af2-bf1d-ca6c07f1e46f/?utm_term=.ecd8a3d63626 [Accessed 07/12/2017]

Fazio, Carlos (2007) 'El Plan México' [19/11/2007] *La Jornada* [online] Available at: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/11/19/index.php?section =opinion&article=031a1pol) [Accessed 19/07/2018]

Felbab-Brown, Vanda (2009) 'The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia' *Brookings Insitute* March: 1-29 [online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-violent-drug-market-in-mexico-and-lessons-from-colombia/ [Accessed 01/02/2018]

Felbab-Brown, Vanda (2013) 'Peña Nieto's Pinata: The Promise and Pitfalls of Mexico's New Security Policy against Organized Crime' *Brookings Institute*: March: 1-27 [online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/pena-nietos-pinata-the-promise-and-pitfalls-of-mexicos-new-security-policy-against-organized-crime/ [Accessed 28/05/2018]

Ferreira, Susan (2017) 'Portugal's radical drugs policy is working. Why hasn't the world copied it?' [05/12/2017] *The Guardian* [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/dec/05/portugals-radical-drugs-policy-is-working-why-hasnt-the-world-copied-it [Accessed 20/02/19]

Fox, Edward (2012) 'Peña Nieto Rolls Out Security Strategy' [18/12/2012] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/pena-nieto-rolls-out-security-strategy/ [Accessed 04/10/2017]

Francisco Z, Gonzalo (2006) 'Armed Conflict and Public Security in Colombia', in J. Bailey and L. Dammert (eds.) *Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 94-110

Freeman, Laurie (2006) 'State of Siege: Drug-Related Violence and Corruption in Mexico: Unintended Consequences of the War on Drugs' *Washington Office of Latin America* June: 1-28 [online] Available at: https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/past/state_of_siege_06.06.pdf [Accessed 02/11/2017]

Freeman, Laurie (2011) 'A tale of two countries: Drugs, guns, violence and the US-Mexico border', in J. Buxton (ed.) *The Politics of Narcotic Drugs* London: Routledge, pp. 64-82

Freeman, Laurie, & Sierra, Jorge Luis (2005) 'Mexico: The Militarization Trap', in C. A. Youngers & E. Rosin (eds.) *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US. Policy* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 263-302

Friesendorf, Cornelius (2007) US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the Cocaine and Heroin Industry London: Routledge

Fukumi, Sayaka (2008) Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America: EU and US Policy Responses Hampshire: Ashgate

Gagne, David (2014) 'Mexican Govt Commission Confirms Army Massacre' [22/10/2014] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexican-govt-confirms-massacre-army-tlatlaya [Accessed 23/04/2018]

Gagne, David (2015) 'The Siren Call of Militarization in Latin America' [19/08/2015] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/explaining-appeal-militarization-latin-america/ [Accessed 10/05/2018]

Gagne, David (2017) 'More Money, More Problems? Mexico Security Spending Jumps Amid Rising Violence' [10/05/2017] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/more-money-more-problems-mexico-security-spending-jumps-amid-rising-violence [Accessed 12/05/2018]

Gallie, W. B. (1956) 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 56: 167-198

Gautreau, Ginette Léa (2012) 'To Rid the World of the Drugs Scourge: A Human Security Perspective on the War on Drugs in Colombia and Mexico', *Paterson Review of International Reviews*, 12: 61-83

Gibbs, Stephen (2009) 'Mexican Drug Lord on Rich List' [12/03/2009] *BBC News*, [online] Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7938904.stm [Accessed 01/02/2018]

Gill, Stephen (2016) 'Colombian government and FARC rebels sign revised peace deal' [24/11/2016] *Colombia Reports* [online] Available at: https://colombiareports.com/colombia-government-farc-rebels-sign-2nd-peace-deal/ [Accessed 22/03/2018]

Goi, Leonardo (2017) 'New Database Aims to Increase Transparency of US Security Aid to LatAm' [01/05/2017] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/database-increase-transparency-us-security-aid-latam [Accessed 02/05/2018]

Goldstein, Paul J (1985) 'The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework', *Journal of Drug Issues,* 39: 143-174

Gomis, Benoit (2015) ‘Demystifying ‘Narcoterrorism’’ [05/2015] *Swansea University* [online] Available at: https://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/Demistifying%20narcoterrorism%20FINAL.pdf [Accessed 06/03/2018]

Gonzalez, Luz (2011) ‘Usan mas militares como policias: CIDE’ [17/09/2011] *El Universal* [online] Available at: http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/primera/37737.html [Accessed 13/12/2017]

Graham, Bradley (1989) ‘Extradition Feared By Traffickers, Resented By Colombians’ [23/08/1989] *The Washington Post* [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/23/extradition-feared-by-traffickers-resented-by-colombians/2d2b6a83-c665-478f-8cad-2916719c7c03/?utm_term=.fe98ede26f1f [Accessed 03/10/2018]

Grayson, George W. (2010) *Mexico: Narco-violence and a Failed State?* London: Transaction Publishers

Grayson, Grayson W. (2013) ‘The Impact of President Felipe Calderón’s War on Drugs on the Armed Forces: The Prospects for Mexico’s “Militarization” and Bilateral Relations’, *Strategic Studies Institute* January: 1-84 [online] Available at: https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1137.pdf [Accessed 02/03/2018]

Gregg, Aaron and Davenport, Christian (2018) ‘Trump Says Steel Imports are a Threat National Security’ [05/03/2018] *The Washington Post* [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/03/05/trump-says-steel-imports-are-a-threat-to-national-security-the-defense-industry-disagrees/?utm_term=.a15f5af15184 [Accessed 10/03/2018]

Grillo, Ioan (2012a) ‘Special Report: Mexico’s Zetas rewrite drug war in blood’ [23/05/2012] *Reuters* [online] Available at: www.uk.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-drugs-zetas-idUSBRE84M0LT20120523 [Accessed 09/12/2017]

Grillo. Ioan (2012b) *El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency* New York: Bloomsbury Press

Guardian (2018) ‘Drug violence blamed for Mexico’s record 29,168 murders in 2017’ [21/01/2018] *The Guardian* [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/21/drug-violence-blamed-mexico-record-murders-2017 [Accessed 22/01/2018]

Guevara, Oliver 'Lucha Vs. el narco "no nos tocaba": General Cienfuegoes' [16/03/2016] *Pulso* [online] Available at: http://pulsoslp.com.mx/2016/03/16/lucha-vs-el-narco-no-nos-tocaba-general-cienfuegos/ [Accessed 14/06/2018]

Gurney, Kyra (2015) 'Testimonies Suggest Mexico Military Cover-up in Killing of 22' [04/02/2015] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/testimonies-suggest-mexico-military-cover-up-in-killing-of-22 [Accessed 20/03/2018]

Guzman, Jorge Luis Sierra (2003) 'Mexico's Military in the War on Drugs' [04/03] The *Washington Office on Latin America* April: 1-20 [online] Available at: https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/past/ddhr_mexico_brief.pdf [Accessed 12/07/18]

Hague, Rod and Harrop, Martin (2013) *Comparative government and politics: an introduction* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Haugaard, Lisa, Adam Isacson and Jennifer Johnson (2011) 'A Cautionary Tale: Plan Colombia's Lessons for U.S. Policy Toward Mexico and Beyond' [11/2011] *The Washington Office on Latin America* November: 1-28 [online] Available at: http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/Mexico/lawgef%20cautionary%20tale%20f.pdf [Accessed 06/12/2017]

Heinle, Kimberly, Octavio Rodriguez Ferreira, David A. Shirk (2016) 'Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2016' *Justice in Mexico* [online] Available at: https://justiceinmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017_DrugViolenceinMexico.pdf [Accessed 31/02/2018]

Hope, Alejandro (2012) 'What Zeta's Confessions Say About Mexico's Internal Drug Market' [23/05/2012] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/what-a-zetas-confessions-say-about-mexicos-internal-drug-market/ [Accessed 23/12/2017]

Hughes, Caitlin Elizabeth and Stevens, Alex (2007) 'The Effects of Decriminalization of Drug Use in Portugal' [12/2007] *The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme* [online] Available at: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/13325/1/BFDPP_BP_14_EffectsOfDecriminalisation_EN.pdf.pdf [Accessed 01/03/19]

Human Rights Watch (1992) 'Colombia' [online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/AMW-04.htm [Accessed 26/10/2017]

Human Rights Watch (2004) ‘Colombia and the “War” on Terror: Rhetoric and Reality’ [03/03/2007] *Human Rights Watch* [online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/03/03/colombia-and-war-terror-rhetoric-and-reality [Accessed 13/02/2018]

Human Rights Watch (2009) ‘Uniform Impunity: Mexico’s Misuse of Military Justice to Prosecute Abuses in Counternarcotics and Public Security Operations’ [online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/04/29/uniform-impunity/mexicos-misuse-military-justice-prosecute-abuses-counternarcotics [Accessed 08/04/2018]

Human Rights Watch (2011) ‘Neither Rights Nor Security: Killings, Torture, and Disappearances in Mexicos “War on Drugs”’ *Human Rights Watch* October: 1-218 [online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf [Accessed 12/04/2018]

Human Rights Watch (2013) ‘Mexico: Crisis of Enforced Disappearances: Peña Nieto Needs Strategy to Investigate, End ‘Disappearances’’ [20/02/13] *Human Rights Watch* [online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/20/mexico-crisis-enforced-disappearances [Accessed 15/01/2018]

Human Rights Watch (2015a) ‘Mexico: Events of 2015’ *Human Rights Watch* [online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/mexico#043288 [Accessed 23/04/2018]

Human Rights Watch (2015b) ‘Colombia: Top Brass Linked to Extrajudicial Executions’ [24/06/15] *Human Rights Watch* [online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/24/colombia-top-brass-linked-extrajudicial-executions [Accessed 15/01/2018]

Hunter, Wendy (1994) ‘Contradictions of civilian control: Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the 1990s’, *Third World Quarterly*, 15/4: 633-653

Huntington, Samuel (1957) *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* London: Harvard University Press

Huysmans, Jef (1998) ‘Security! What do you mean? From concept to thick signifier’, *European Journal of International Relations,* 4/2: 226-255

InSight Crime (2017) ‘Mexico Profile’[17/11/2017] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/mexico/#crim [Accessed 13/02/2018]

Isacson, Adam (2002) 'Colombia's human security crisis' [online] Available at: https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/UNIDIR_pdf-art1446.pdf [Accessed 05/11/2017]

Isacson, Adam (2005a) 'The US. Military in the War on Drugs', in C. A. Youngers & E. Rosin (eds.) *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US. Policy* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 15-60

Isacson, Adam (2005b) 'Failing Grades: Evaluating the Results of Plan Colombia', *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, 138-154

Jehl, Douglas (1993) 'U.S. Is Cutting Aid to Latin Drug War' [25/03/1993] *The New York Times* [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/25/world/us-is-cutting-aid-to-latin-drug-war.html [Accessed 15/04/2018]

Jelsma, Martin (1997) 'Introduction: Damaging Side Effects – The War on Drugs' [01/04/1997] *Trans National Institute* [online] Available at: https://www.tni.org/en/article/introduction-damaging-side-effects-war-drugs [Accessed on: 18/02/2018]

Jenkins, Brian (2009) 'Could Mexico Fail?' *RAND* February: 1-6 [online] Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1391.html [Accessed 12/04/2018]

Jordan, Amos A. and Taylor Jr, William J (1981) *American National Security: Policy and Process* Baltimore: Hopkins University Press

Kan, Paul Rexton (2009) *Drugs and Contemporary Warfare* Dulles: Potomac Books

Kan, Paul Rexton (2011) 'What we're getting wrong about Mexico', *Parameters*, 41/2: 37-48

Kan, Paul Rexton (2012) *Cartels at War: Mexico's Drug-Fuelled Violence and the Threat to U.S. National Security* Washington, D.C: Potomac Books

Kan, Paul Rexton (2016) *Drug Trafficking and International Security* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield

Kan, Paul Rexton and Williams, Phil (2010) 'Afterword: criminal violence in Mexico – a dissenting analysis', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 21/1: 218-231

Keefer, Philip, Norman Loayza & Rorigo R. Soares (2010) 'Drug Prohibition and Developing Countries: Uncertain Benefits, Certain Costs', in P. Keefer & N. Loayza (eds.) *Innocent Bystanders: Developing Countries and the War on Drugs* Washington D.C: The World Bank, pp. 9-60

Kellner, Tomas and Pipitone, Francesco (2010) 'Inside Mexico's Drug War', *World Policy Journal*, 27/1: 29-37

Killebrew, Bob and Bernal, Jennifer (2010) 'Crime Wars: Gangs, Cartels, and U.S. National Security' *Center for a New American Security* September: 1-77 [online] Available at: http://www.cwagweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CNAS_CrimeWars_KillebrewBernal_2.pdf [Accessed: 24/03/2018]

Kilpatrick, James J. 'It is a matter of national security: Use every weapon' [18/05/1988] *Baltimore Sun*

King, Gary, Verba, Sidney and Robert O. Keohane (1994) *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* Chichester: Princeton University Press

Kinosian, Sarah, John Lindsay-Poland and Lisa Haugaard (2015) 'The US Shouldn't Export Colombia's Drug War 'Success'' [09/07/15] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-us-shouldnt-export-colombia-drug-war-success [Accessed 11/06/2018]

Kirk, Robin (2004) *More Terrible Than Death: Drugs, Violence and America's War in Colombia* New York: Public Affairs

Krause, Lincoln B. (1999) 'The Guerrillas Next Door' *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement,* 8/1: 34-56

Kyra, Gurney (2015) 'Testimonies Suggest Mexico Military Cover-up in Killing of 22' [04/02/2015] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/testimonies-suggest-mexico-military-cover-up-in-killing-of-22/ [Accessed 12/07/2018]

Lagos, M., and Dammert, L. (2012) *La Seguridad Ciudadana: El problema principal de America Latina* Santiago: Corporaction Latinobrometro

Lai, Brian (2003) 'Examining the Goals of US. Foreign Assistance in the Post-Cold War Period, 1991-1996', *Journal of Peace Research*, 40/1: 103-128

Lancet (2001) ‘Rethinking America’s “War on Drugs” as a public-health issue’ [31/03/2001] *The Lancet* [online] Available at: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(00)04242-2/fulltext [Accessed 26/01/19]

LaSusa, Mike (2016a) ‘Argentina Militarizing Fight Against Crime with Help from US, Israel’ [09/08/2016] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/argentina-militarizing-fight-against-crime-with-help-from-us-israel [Accessed 20/09/2018]

LaSusa, Mike (2016b) ‘Mexico’s War on Crime: A Decade of (Militarized) Failure’ [06/12/2016] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/news/120616.Mexico-InSightCrime.pdf [Accessed 02/11/2017]

Lee III, Rensselaer W. (1998) *The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power* London: Transaction Publishers

Lendman, Stephen (2008) *Plan Mexico: Plan Colombia Heads for Mexico* Canada: Global Research Center

Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (1995a) ‘On Security’, in R. D. Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security* Columbia University Press: New York, pp. 1-23

Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (1995b) ‘Negotiating the Boundaries of Difference and Security at Millennium’s End’, in R. D. Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security* Columbia University Press: New York, pp. 212-228

Livingstone, Grace (2005) *Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War* London: Latin American Bureau

Llorente, Maria Victoria (2006) ‘Demilitarization in a War Zone’, in J. Bailey and L. Dammert (eds.) *Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 111-131

Lohmuller, Michael (2015) ‘Using Military as Police in Honduras Led to Abuse’ [10/07/2015] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/using-military-as-police-honduras-abuse [Accessed 28/04/2018]

Longmire, Sylvia, and Longmire, John P. (2008) 'Redefining Terrorism: Why Mexican Drug Trafficking is more than just Organised Crime', *Journal of Strategic Study,* 1/1: 35-52

Lopez-Montiel, Angel Gustavo (2000) 'The Military, Political Power, and Police Relations in Mexico City', *Latin American Perspectives,* 27/2: 79-94

Los Angeles Times (1989a) 'Drug Cartel Figure Slain by Police: Colombia: Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha was on the list of a dozen Colombian drug traffickers most wanted by the U.S. Justice Department. His son and five bodyguards were also killed in the shoot out' [17/12/1989] *Los Angeles Times* [online] Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1989-12-17/news/mn-1442_1_colombian-drug-traffickers [Accessed 12/10/2017]

Los Angeles Times (1989b) 'Bogota Blast Kills 45' Drug Kingpins Blamed: Colombia Bus bomb rips through the headquarters of the police intelligence agency. 400 are injured. [07/12/1989] *Los Angeles Times* [online] Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1989-12-07/news/mn-253_1_intelligence-agency [Accessed 14/09/2017]

Mabry, Donald (1988) 'The US Military and the War on Drugs in Latin America', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs,* 30/2/3: 53-76

Mabry, Donald (1989) 'Narcotics and National Security' in Donald Mabry (ed.) *The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security* London: Greenwood Press

Malkin, Elizabeth (2010) 'U.S. Aided Mexican Drug War, With Frustration' [02/12/2010] *The New York Times* [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/world/americas/04wikileaks-mexico.html [Accessed 06/08/2018]

Malkin, Elizabeth (2017) 'Mexico Strengthens Military's Role in Drug War, Outraging Critics'[15/12/2017] *The New York Times* [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/15/world/americas/mexico-strengthens-militarys-role-in-drug-war-outraging-critics.html [Accessed 01/04/2018]

Manwaring, Max (2002) 'Non-State Actors in Colombia: Threats to the State and to the Hemisphere', *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* 13/2: 68-80

Manwaring, Max G. (2007) 'A Contemporary Challenge to State Soverignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica and Brazil' *Strategic Studies Insititute* December: 1-59 [online]

Available at: http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub837.pdf [Accessed 10/03/2018]

Marcella, Gabriel (2001) 'Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Imperatives' *Strategic Studies Institute* April: 1-29 [online] Available at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/104653/Plan_Colombia_Strategic.pdf [Accessed 09/12/2017]

Marks, Thomas A. (2007) 'A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe's Colombia (2002-2006) vs FARC' *Military Review* March-April: 41-56 [online] Available at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/marks2.pdf [Accessed 09/09/2018]

Martin, Catherine (2015) 'Casualties of War: How the War on Drugs is Harming the World's Poorest' *Heath Poverty Action* February: 1-26 [online] Available at: https://www.healthpovertyaction.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2015/02/Casualties-of-war-report-web.pdf [Accessed 16/02/2018]

Mcfadden, Robert D. (1994) 'Drug Trafficker Convicted of Blowing up Jetliner [20/12/1994] *The New York Times* [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/20/nyregion/drug-trafficker-convicted-of-blowing-up-jetliner.html [Accessed 13/04/2018]

Meija, Daniel (2010) 'Evaluating Plan Colombia', in P. Keefer & N. Loayza (eds.) *Innocent Bystanders: Developing Countries and the War on Drugs* Washington D.C: The World Bank, pp. 135-164

Meija, Daniel (2016) 'Plan Colombia: An Analysis of Effectiveness and Costs', *Foreign Policy at Brookings* [online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Mejia-Colombia-final-2.pdf [Accessed 12/04/2017]

Mendez, Juan E. (1992) *Political Murder and Reform in Colombia: the Violence Continues* London: Human Rights Watch

Menzel, Sewall H. (1997) *Cocaine Quagmire: Implementing the U.S. Anti-Drug Policy in the North Andes-Colombia* Oxford: University Press of America

Metz, Steven (1993) 'The Future of Insurgency', *Strategic Studies Institute: US Army War College* December [online] Available at: www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/metz.pdf [Accessed 13/12/2017]

Metz, Steven (1995) ‘A Flame Kept Burning: Counterinsurgency Support After the Cold War’, *Parameters,* 31-41

Mexico News Daily (2018) ‘There were more soldiers on the streets than ever last year: The government sent out 52,000 soldiers to fight drug cartels in what appears to be a losing battle’ [16/07/2018] *Mexico News Daily* [online] Available at: https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/more-soldiers-on-the-streets/ [Accessed 08/09/2018]

Meyer, Maureen (2010) ‘Abused and Afraid in Ciudad Juarez: An Analysis of Human Rights Violations by the Military in Mexico’, *Washington Office on Latin America* September: 1-16 [online] Available at: https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/2010/WOLA_RPT_Juarez_FNL2-color.pdf [Accessed 06/05/2018]

Meyer, Maureen (2014) ‘Mexico’s Police: Many Reforms, Little Progress’ [May 2014] *Washington Office on Latin America* May: 1-35 [online] Available at: https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Mexicos%20Police.pdf [Accessed: 20/10/2017]

Meyer, Maureen, and Suarez-Enriquez, Ximena (2017) ‘By Strengthening Military’s Role in Fighting Crime, Mexico’s Proposed Security Law Will Worsen Human Rights Abuses and Harm Transparency’ [13/12/2017] *The Washington Office on Latin America* [online] Available at: https://www.wola.org/analysis/strengthening-militarys-role-fighting-crime-mexicos-proposed-security-law-will-worsen-human-rights-abuses-harm-transparency/ [Accessed 13/12/2017]

Moloeznik, Marcos Pablo (2006) ‘Public Security and Police Reform in Mexico’, in J. Bailey and L. Dammert (eds.) *Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 169-186

Moloeznik, Marcos Pablo (2009) ‘The militarization of public security and the role of the military in Mexico’ in R. Donnelly and D. A. Shirk (eds.) *Police and Public Security in Mexico* San Diego: Trans-border institute, pp. 61-86

Moloeznik, Marcos Pablo (2013) ‘Organized crime, the militarization of public security,and the debate on the “new” police model in Mexico’, *Trends in Organized Crime*, 16: 177-194

Montolivo, Daniel (2009) ‘Do you trust your Armed Forces?’ *AmericasBarometer Insights* 15: 1-5 [online] Available at: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0827en.pdf [Accessed 13/01/2018]

Nadelmann, Ethan A. (1993) *Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of US Criminal Law Enforcement* University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press

Nagle, Luz E. (2010) 'Corruption of politicians, law enforcement, and the judiciary in Mexico and complicity across the border', *Small Wars & Insurgencies,* 21/1: 95-122

Neild, Rachel (2005) 'US. Police Assistance and Drug Control Policies', in C. A. Youngers & E. Rosin (eds.) *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US. Policy* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 61-90

NPR (2017) 'In Portugal, Drug Use Is Treated As A Medical Issue, Not A Crime' [18/04/17] *National Public Radio* [online] Available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/04/18/524380027/in-portugal-drug-use-is-treated-as-a-medical-issue-not-a-crime?t=1555015627233 [Accessed 15/02/19]

Olsen, Eric L. (1996) 'The Evolving Role of Mexico's Military in Public Security' [06/96] *The Washington Office on Latin* America [online] Available at: https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/past/mexico_evolving_role_military.pdf [Accessed 11/11/2017]

Omar, Pina (2004) 'Plan Colombia: how U.S. Military assistance affects regional balances of power', *Calhoun* [online] Available at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/1531/04Jun_Pina.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [Accessed 10/11/2017]

Ospina, Carlos and Marks, Thomas (2014) 'Colombia: Changing strategy amidst the struggle', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 25/2: 354-371

Owen, Taylor (2004) 'Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquial Remarks and a Proposal for Threshold-Based Definition', *Security Dialogue,* 35/3: 373-387

Pachico, Elyssa (2011) 'Where Troops Surged in Mexico, So Did Homicides' [19/01/2011] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/where-troops-surged-in-mexico-so-did-homicides [Accessed 10/02/2018]

Pansters, Wil G., Benjamin T. Smith, and Peter Watt (2017) *Beyond the Drug War in Mexico: Human rights, the public sphere and justice* Routledge: London

Pardo, Rafael (2000) 'Colombia's Two-Front War', *Foreign Affairs,* 79/4: 64-73

Partlow, Joshua (2014) 'Mexico launches new police force to guard commerce' [22/08/2014] *The Washington Post* [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/mexico-launches-new-police-force-to-guard-commerce/2014/08/22/902d0b04-d5fb-4bfe-bb2e-713198114f4b_story.html?utm_term=.9f373ba776b6 [Accessed 24/01/2018]

Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, and Chad C. Serena (2014) *Mexico is not Colombia: alternative historical analogies for responding to the challenge of violent drug-trafficking organizations* Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Peceny, Mark and Durnan, Michael (2006) 'The FARC's Best Friend: US Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s', *Latin American Politics and Society,* 48/2: 95-116

Pion-Berlin, David, and Carreras, Miguel (2017) 'Armed Forces, Police and Crime-Fighting in Latin America', *Journal of Politics in Latin America,* 9/3: 3-26

Poe, Steven C. (1991) 'Human Rights and the Allocation of US Military Assistance', *Journal of Peace Research* 28/2: 205-216

Pryce, Sue (2012) *Fixing Drugs: The Politics of Drug Prohibition* London: Palgrave Macmillan

Rabasa, Angel and Chalk, Peter (2001) 'Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability', *The RAND Corporation* [online] Available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1339.html [Accessed 06/11/2017]

Rama, Anahi (2014) 'Mexico launches special police force to guard economic activity' [22/08/2014] *Reuters* [online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/mexico-security-idUSL2N0QS12U20140822 [Accessed 09/11/2017]

Ramirez Lemus, Maria Clemencia, Kimberly Stanton & John Walsh (2005) 'Colombia: A Viscious Circle of Drugs and War', in C. A. Youngers & E. Rosin (eds.) *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US. Policy* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 99-142

Ramsey, Geoffrey (2011) 'Cable Suggests Mexican Army May Have Worked with Juarez Paramilitary Group [28/03/2011] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/cable-suggests-mexican-army-worked-with-juarez-paramilitary-group [Accessed 13/03/2018]

Reuter, Peter and Kleinmann, Mark A. R. (1986) 'Risks and Prices: An Economic Analysis of Drug Enforcement', *Crime and Justice*, 7: 289-340

Reuter, Peter, and Ronfedt, David (1992) 'Quest for Integrity: the Mexican-US Drug Issue in the 1980s', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 34/3: 89-154

Reyes, Alfonso (2010) 'Plan Mexico? Towards an Integrated Approach in the War on Drugs' *Small Wars Journal* September: 1-46 [online] Available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/542-reynes.pdf [Accessed 12/12/2017]

Richburg, Keith. B. (1986) 'Reagan Order Defines Drug Trade as Security Threat' [08/06/1986] *The Washington Post* [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/06/08/reagan-order-defines-drug-trade-as-security-threat-widens-military-role/309fdc6f-e5b8-4a64-8249-7b51182b3db1/?utm_term=.3be59af4d55e [Accessed 01/03/2018]

Rios, Viridiana (2008) 'Evaluating the economic impact of drug traffic in Mexico' [online] Available at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/59f0/3d0474ea01a2aba9d8b3e8ee08cce335a6da.pdf?_ga=2.15048054.1192580852.1538591499-1186195022.1538591499 [Accessed: 20/03/2018]

Robbins, Carla Anne (1997) 'US DEA Chief Blasts Mexicans on Drug Efforts' [26/02/1997] *The Wall Street Journal*

Robinson, Eugene (1989) 'Colombian Candidate Murdered' [20/08/1989] *The Washington Post* [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/08/20/colombian-candidate-murdered/5a3b063e-d2a9-4e14-8862-ec7b1c8fc890/?utm_term=.e0d80895c323 [Accessed 23/03/2018]

Rodriguez, Cecilia (1991) 'Jailing a Feared Narco-Terrorist Won't End Narco-Trafficking: Colombia: The government may have had no choice, but in moving to end extradition, it is also letting Pablo Escobar win his war against his own people' [09/06/1991] *Los Angeles Times* [online] Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-06-09/opinion/op-717_1_pablo-escobar [Accessed 12/06/2018]

Rogan, Michael G. (2011) 'Is the Narco-Violence in Mexico an Insurgency?' *School of Advanced Military Studies* [online] Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a545818.pdf [Accessed 20/02/2018]

Roig-Franzia, Manuel (2008a) 'In Mexico, War on Drug Cartels Takes Wider Toll' [14/04/2008] *The Washington Post* [online] Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/13/AR2008041302154.html [Accessed 20/03/2018]

Roig-Franzia, Manuel (2008b) 'Mexico's Drug Cartels Take Barbarous Turn: Targeting Bystanders' [30/07/2008] *The Washington Post* [online] Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/29/AR2008072902106.html [Accessed 05/03/2018]

Rotberg, Robert, L. (2002) 'The New Nature of Nation-State Failure', *The Washington Quarterly*, 25/3: 85-96

Schaefer, Agnes Gereben, Benjamin Bahney, and Jack K. Riley (2009) *Security in Mexico: Implications for US. Policy Options* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation

Scherlen, Renee G. (2009) 'The Colombianization of Mexico? The Evolving Mexican Drug War'; paper presented at the *Southern Political Science Association Conference*, New Orleans, Los Angeles (7-10 January) [online] Available at: https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/f/Scherlen_Renee_2009_the_colombianization.pdf [Accessed 01/01/2018]

Schirmer, Jennifer (2011) 'The white economy: Drugs, poverty and violent conflict in Colombia', in J. Buxton (ed.) *The Politics of Narcotic Drugs* London: Routledge, pp. 47-63

Selee, Andrew (2008) 'Overview of the Mérida Initiative' *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars* May: 1-7 [online] Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/overview_merida_initiative.pdf [Accessed 12/09/2018]

Seper, Jerry (1999) 'Mexico Doubted as Drug Fighter' [09/03/1999] *Washington Times* [online] Available at: https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-59674111.html [Accessed 25/10/2017]

Seper, Jerry (2003) 'Mexican Army Officers Found Guilty of Taking Drug Bribes' [04/04/03] *Washington Times* [online] Available at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/apr/4/20030404-090545-7495r/ [Accessed 25/04/2018]

Sheldon, Oliver (2014) 'US military aid to Colombia had a 'significant impact' on increased extrajudicial killings by Armed Forces' [20/06/2014] *Colombia Reports* [online]

Available at: http://colombiareports.com/us-military-aid-colombia-significant-impact-increase-extrajudicial-killings-armed-forces/ [Accessed 21/02/2017]

Shirk, David A. (2013) 'The State of Security in Mexico', *Wilson Center* December: 1-6 [online] Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/security_2013_mexico_shirk.pdf [Accessed 05/11/2017]

Shirk, David A., and Rios, Viridiana (2011) *Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2010* San Diego: Trans-Border Institute

Smith, Hannah and Meyer, Maureen (2016) 'Review: addressing Mexico's human rights security situation', *Washington Office of Latin America* December: 1-6 [online] Available at: https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/WOLA-2016-Review-Addressing-Mexico%E2%80%99s-Human-Rights-and-Security-Situation-2.pdf [Accessed: 12/12/2017]

Solar, Carlos (2017) 'Civil-military relations and human security in a post-dictatorship', *Journal of Strategic Studies* August: 1-25 [online] Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2017.1358168?needAccess=true [Accessed 01/09/2018]

Sotomayor, Arturo C. (2013) 'Militarization in Mexico and Its Implications' in B. Brow and A. Santa Cruz (ed.) *The State and Security in Mexico: Transformation and Crisis in Regional Perspective* London: Routledge, pp. 42-60

Stokes, Doug (2001) 'Better lead than bread? A critical analysis of the US's Plan Colombia', *Civil Wars,* 4/2: 59-78

Sullivan, John P. and Bunker, Robert J. (2011) 'Rethinking insurgency: criminality, spirituality, and societal warfare in the Americas', *Small Wars and Insurgencies,* 22/5: 742-763

Sullivan, John P. and Elkus, Adam (2009) 'Red Teaming Criminal Insurgency', *Red Team Journal* [19/08/2008] Available at: http://redteamjournal.com/2009/01/red-teaming-criminalinsurgency-1/ [Accessed 09/12/2017]

Sullivan, John P. and Rosales, Carlos (2011) 'Ciudad Juarez and Mexico's ''Narco-Culture'' Threat' [28/02/2011] *Mexidata*

Sullivan, John P., and Weston, Keith (2006) 'Afterward: Law Enforcement Responses for Criminal-states and Criminal-soldiers', *Global Crime,* 7/3: 615-628

Taureck, Rita (2006) 'Securitization theory and securitization studies', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 9/1: 53-61

Thoumi, Francisco E. (2010) 'Competative Advantages in the Production and Trafficking of Coca-Cocaine and Opium-Heroin in Afghanistan and the Andean Countries', in P. Keefer & N. Loayza (eds.) *Innocent Bystanders: Developing Countries and the War on Drugs* Washington D.C: The World Bank, pp. 135-164

Toro, Maria Celia (1995) *Mexico's 'War on Drugs: Causes and Consequences* London: Lynee Rienner publishers

Treadwell, David (1992) 'Fugitive Drug Lord, Reputed Assassin Indicted in U.S.: Charges: Escobar and his associate are accused in the 1989 bombing of a Colombian jetliner. Two Americans were among the 110' [14/08/1992] *Los Angeles Times* [online] Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1992-08-14/news/mn-5352_1_pablo-escobar [Accessed 01/12/2017]

Treaster, Joseph B. (1991a) 'Drug Baron Gives Up in Colombia As End to Extradition Is Approved' [20/06/1991] *The New York Times* [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/20/world/drug-baron-gives-up-in-colombia-as-end-to-extradition-is-approved.html [Accessed 13/03/2018]

Treaster, Joseph B. (1991b) 'The World; Cocaine Manufacturing Is No Longer Just A Colombian Monopoly' [30/06/1991] *The New York Times* [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/30/weekinreview/the-world-cocaine-manufacturing-is-no-longer-just-a-colombian-monopoly.html [Accessed 07/07/2018]

Treaster, Joseph B. (1992) 'U.S. and Colombia Reduce Army's Role in Drug Battle' [27/02/1992] *The New York Times* [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/27/world/us-and-colombia-reduce-army-s-role-in-drug-battle.html [Accessed 12/05/2018]

Treverton, Gregory F. (1989) 'Antinarcotics Strategies and U.S.-Latin American Relations' in D. Mabry (ed.) *The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security* London: Greenwood Press, pp. 139-150

Ullman, Richard (1983) 'Redefining Security', in C. W. Hughes & L. Y. Meng (eds.) *Security Studes: A Reader* London: Routledge, pp. 11-18

United Press International (1992) 'Drug gunmen kill 29th policeman in Medellin' [12/11/1992] *United Press International* [online] Available at:

https://www.upi.com/Archives/1992/11/12/Drug-gunmen-kill-29th-policeman-in-Medellin/9066721544400/ [Accessed 12/03/2018]

Vulliamy, Ed (2011) 'Nixon's 'war on drugs' began 40 years ago, and the battle is still raging' [24/07/2011] *The Guardian* [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2011/jul/24/war-on-drugs-40-years [Accessed 15/12/2017]

Waddell, Ian G. (1970) 'International Narcotics Control', *American Journal of International Law,* 64/2: 310-323

Waever, Ole (1995) 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in R. D. Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security* New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 46-86

Whitford, Andrew B. and Yates, Jeff (2009) *Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda: Constructing the War on Drugs* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press

Williams, Phil (1994) in C. W. Hughes & L. Y. Meng (eds.) *Security Studes: A Reader* London: Routledge, pp. 265-270

Wilson, George C. (1989a) 'Military Urged to Lead in Fight Against Drugs; Deeper Involvement Demanded at Hill Hearing' [23/02/1989] *The Washington Post*

Wilson, George C. (1989b) 'Cheney pledges Wider War on Drugs' [19/09/89] *The Washington Post*

Withers, George, Lucila Santos, and Adam Isacson (2010) 'Practice What You Preach: The Seperation of Military and Police Roles in the Americas' *The Washington Office on Latin America* November: 1-31 [online] Available at: https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Regional%20Security/2010/preachwhatyoupractice.pdf [Accessed 14/12/2017]

WOLA (1991) *Clear and Present Danger: The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes* Washington D.C.: The Washington Office on Latin America

WOLA (2009) 'U.S. Decertification of Bolivia: A Blast from the Past' [17/09/2009] *The Washington Office on Latin America* [online] Available at: https://www.wola.org/2009/09/us-decertification-of-bolivia-a-blast-from-the-past/ [Accessed 08/08/2017]

Wolfers, Arnold (1962) 'National Security as an Ambigious Symbol', in C. W. Hughes & L. Y. Meng (eds.) *Security Studes: A Reader* London: Routledge, pp. 5-10

Wright, J (2001) 'Powell Sees 'Gray Areas' in Defining Terrorism' [25/10/2001] *Reuters*

Yagoub, Mimi (2016) 'Peace Deal Signed in Colombia as Threat of FARC Fragmentation Looms Large' [24/11/2016] *InSight Crime* [online] Available at: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/peace-deal-signed-in-colombia-as-threat-of-farc-fragmentation-looms-large/ [Accessed 12/12/2017]

Youngers, Coletta A., & Rosin, Eileen (2005) 'The US. "War on Drugs": Its Impact in Latin America and the Carribean', in C. A. Youngers & E. Rosin (eds.) *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of US. Policy* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 1-14

Zavarucha, Jorge (2000) 'Fragile democracy and the militarization of public safety in Brazil', *Latin American Perspectives,* 27/3: 8-31

Zirnite, Peter, Martin Jelsma, and Coletta Youngers (1997) *Reluctant recruits: the US military and the war on drugs* Washington: The Washington Office on Latin America