



Ibn Taymiyya's Concept of Jihad and its Appropriation by Contemporary Jihadists.

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Abstract

Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (d.1328), is one of the most quoted medieval scholars by contemporary jihadists from the 1980s to the present time. Jihadists from ‘Abd Salām Faraj (d. 1981) to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) cite Ibn Taymiyya frequently in justifying their doctrines. These doctrines include excommunicating contemporary Muslim rulers and their allies and calling for jihad against them, classifying the Muslim countries as a domain of war and obligating emigration from them, suicide attacks in the name of jihad, and others.

This thesis studies the relationship between Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of jihad and how it is appropriated by the contemporary jihadists. The thesis is divided into two parts. Part one studies selected works of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad to outline his concept of jihad while part two studies selected works of the contemporary jihadists to outline how Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of jihad is appropriated by them.

The thesis argues that while some contemporary jihadi doctrines could be justified from Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of jihad, most of the doctrines cannot be justified from Ibn Taymiyya if his works on jihad are approached holistically. The thesis identifies the jihadi doctrines that can be justified from Ibn Taymiyya and those that cannot be. The thesis also identifies some sources that the jihadists use besides Ibn Taymiyya in justifying their doctrines.

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Background and Significance

Contemporary jihadists who call for jihad against their indigenous governments, other rival groups, or foreign governments from the late 20th century to the 21st century have a number of publications where they express their doctrines and attempt to justify them.¹ These doctrines include excommunicating contemporary Muslim rulers and their allies and calling for jihad against them, classifying the Muslim countries as a domain of war and obligating emigration from them, suicide attacks in the name of jihad, and others. In justifying these jihadi doctrines, contemporary jihadists employ quotations from the Qur'an, hadith, consensus, analogy and statements of some Muslims scholars. One example of this is an article titled "Our way to implementing Sharī'a" in issue no. 10 of *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* (The Echo of Epic Battles), a bimonthly magazine issued by the jihadist movement Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) from February 2008 to January 2011. The article argues for the obligation to fight the contemporary Arab rulers. The article uses Quran, Hadith, consensus, analogy and statements of some Muslim scholars as the justification.¹ Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (d.1328), the fourteenth century Damascene scholar, is one of the Muslim scholars that are frequently cited by the contemporary jihadists in justifying their jihadi doctrines. In the above-mentioned article of *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* Ibn Taymiyya is cited among other scholars to justify the argument. The frequent use of Ibn Taymiyya by the jihadists especially from the 1980s attracts the attention of scholars, academics, media, politicians and the public to investigating the relationship between Ibn Taymiyya and the contemporary jihadists. An article in the *Guardian* newspaper for instance attempts to understand one of these contemporary jihadi movements, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the only Muslim scholar quoted in the article is Ibn Taymiyya.² Another article from the same *Guardian* newspaper in 2016 attempts to explore the intellectual ideologies of the contemporary jihadists and states, "Theorists could turn for example to

¹ Abū al-Zubayr al-'Ibāb, "Ṭarīqunā 'ilā taḥkīm al-sharī'a," *Ṣadā al-Malāḥim* 10, (July, 2009): 12 – 14.

² "The secret world of Isis training camps – ruled by sacred texts and the sword" *The Guardian* (Jan, 2015) at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/25/inside-isis-training-camps> last accessed on 19/07/2017.

the 14th century theologian Ibn Taymiyya, who thought the threat posed by the invading Mongols was so great that warlike jihad had become a duty and the enemy could reasonably be anathematised as apostates.”³ Since the early 1980s some Muslim scholars and western academics have been undertaking research with the aim of finding the compatibility or otherwise between Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of jihad and the way it is appropriated by the contemporary jihadists. In doing so, some of these scholars and academics examine a document of the jihadists, study its arguments, and then compare it with the teachings of Islamic Sharī‘a and statements of some scholars including Ibn Taymiyya. Examples of these are Muftī Jād al-Haqq and Simon Wolfgang Fuchs. Jād al-Haqq examines the treatise *al-Farīda al-ghā’iba* (the Forgotten Obligation), one of the most known publications of the jihadists in 1980s and written by ‘Abd Salām Faraj (d. 1981).⁴ Jād al-Haqq analyses its arguments, discusses them within the Islamic *Sharī‘a* and repudiates the main arguments he thinks are not compatible with Islamic *Sharī‘a*. Fuchs also discusses and analyses the arguments of *al-‘Umda fī i’dād al-‘udda li-l-jihād fī sabīl Allāh*, one of the jihadists’ publications in the 1980s which became a manual for al-Qaida.⁵ Fuchs analyses how the author of *al-‘Umda* uses the Qur’anic verses, hadiths and statements of some Muslim scholars including Ibn Taymiyya in making the arguments. They have all provided useful analysis; however, their analyses are limited to one document each of the jihadists and they do not give emphasis on discussing the jihadists’ argument from Ibn Taymiyya’s works.

The works of Yahya Michot give emphasis to the use of Ibn Taymiyya by the jihadists. In his book *Muslims under non-Muslim Rule*, Michot addresses how the jihadists use the Mardin fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya in arguing for their jihadi doctrines.⁶ He discusses a number of writers, both jihadists and non-jihadists, who use the Mardin fatwa to justify violence. Michot then quotes three

³ Frech Patric “What do Islamist extremists believe? Salafi-Jihadism” by Shiraz Maher and “Crusade and Jihad” by Malcolm Lambert – review *The Guardian* (March, 2016) at <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/mar/24/salafi-jihadism-shiraz-maher-crusade-jihad-malcolm-lambert-review-patrick-french> last accessed on 19/07/2017.

⁴ Jād al-Haqq ‘Alī Jād al-Haqq, *Kutayb al-Farīda al-ghā’iba wa al-radd ‘alayh* (3 January 1982), in *Al-Fatāwā al-Islāmiyya min dār al-iftā’ al-Miṣriyya*, 2nd printing (Cairo: Wizārat al-awqāf, 1997), 3741 available at <https://ia800304.us.archive.org/18/items/waq61121/61121.pdf>

⁵ Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, “Do Excellent Surgeons Make Miserable Exegetes? Negotiating the Sunni Tradition in the ġihādī Camps” *Welt des Islams* 53 (2013): 192-237.

⁶ Yahya Michot, *Ibn Taymiyya: Muslims Under Non-Muslim Rule*, (Oxford: Interface Publications, 1427/2006).

passages from Ibn Taymiyya's works which serve to refute the writers who use the Mardin Fatwa for violent ends. In his other book *Ibn Taymiyya Against Extremism*, Michot quotes some passages from the works of Ibn Taymiyya which demonstrate how Ibn Taymiyya either distances himself from extremism or condemns the extremists.⁷ The works of Jād al-Haqq, Michot and others distance Ibn Taymiyya from influencing the jihadists and argue that the jihadists either misappropriate Ibn Taymiyya or quote him out of the context. However, some of these works either deal with only one document of the jihadists, or one fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya, while some of them deal with some fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya without referring to how they are used by the jihadists. The main problem is: to what extent can the use of Ibn Taymiyya by the jihadists be justified, and what are the jihadi doctrines that can be justified from Ibn Taymiyya's works from those that cannot be justified from him. What part of Ibn Taymiyya's work is used by the jihadists, how do they use it, and why? These questions need more elaborated answers by studying the works of Ibn Taymiyya and the jihadists.

This thesis attempts to answer these questions by studying some selected works of Ibn Taymiyya and some selected works of contemporary jihadists. The study outlines Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of jihad by taking a holistic approach to his selected works. It also outlines the works of Ibn Taymiyya that are frequently used by the jihadists, underline the arguments that the jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya to justify and verify which of these arguments can be justified from Ibn Taymiyya from the ones that cannot be justified from him.

⁷ Yahya Michot trans. *Ibn Taymiyya: Against Extremisms* (Beirut: Albouraq, 2012).

1.2 Methodology

The main question that the thesis addresses is: to what extent is the use of Ibn Taymiyya by the contemporary jihadists justified, what part of Ibn Taymiyya's work is used by the jihadists, and how do they use it? In answering these questions, the thesis studies selected works of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad with the aim of sketching Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of jihad and understanding how some scholars interpret these works. Eleven of Ibn Taymiyya's works on jihad are examined as a sample of his voluminous works on jihad. These include the three famous anti-Mongol fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya's letter against the Mongols, the Mardin fatwa,⁸ and the three anti-Nuṣayrī fatwas.⁹ Others are the treatises *Qā'ida mukhtasara fī qitāli al-kuffāri wa mudāhanatihim wa taḥrīmi qatlihim bi mujarradi kufrihim*,¹⁰ *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduww hal yajūz*¹¹ and *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya*.¹² These are not the only works of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad, but they are carefully chosen for study by this thesis for two reasons. The first of these reasons is that most of these works are the most frequently quoted by the contemporary jihadists and have been discussed and used by later scholars and activists. The three anti-Mongol fatwas, the Mardin fatwa and *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya* are the works of Ibn Taymiyya used most frequently by the jihadists in making their jihadi arguments, because of Ibn Taymiyya's harshness against the Mongols in the anti-Mongol fatwas, his emphasis on jihad in *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya*, and the general principles of jihad he sets out in both. The

⁸ Aḥmad 'Abd al Ḥalīm Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmū' fatāwā* ed. 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Qāsim and Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad (Riyadh: Maṭābi' al-Riyāḍ, 1961-67). (*Majmū' fatāwā* will be referred in the subsequent citations as MF) The three anti-Mongol fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya's letter against the Mongols and the Mardin fatwa are cited in volume twenty-eight. The first anti-Mongol fatwa is in 28:501-508, the second anti-Mongol fatwa is in 28:509 -543 and the third anti-Mongol fatwa is in 28:543 -553. The letter is in 28:424 - 467 and the Mardin fatwa is in 28:240- 241.

⁹ Aḥmad 'Abd al Ḥalīm Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwā al-kubrā* ed. Muhammad 'Abd al-Qādir 'Aṭā and Mustafā 'Abd al-Qādir 'Aṭā (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, 1978); the three fatwas are cited in volume three. The first fatwa is in 3:503-512, the second fatwa is in 3:513, and the third fatwa is in 3:513-14. The first and second fatwas are also in MF 35:145-160 and 35:161-162 respectively.

¹⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, Aḥmad 'Abd al Ḥalīm Shaykh al-Islām, *Qā'ida mukhtasara fī qitāl al-kuffār wa mudāhanatihim wa taḥrīm qatlihim bi mujarrad kufrihim*, ed. 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Ibrahim (Riyadh, KSA: Makatabati Malik Fahad al- waṭaniyya, 2004).

¹¹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduww hal yajūz*, ed. Abu-Muhammad Ashraf ibn 'Abd al-Maqsūd (Riyadh: Aḍwā'u al-Ṣalaf, 2002).

¹² Ibn Taymiyya, Aḥmad 'Abd al Ḥalīm Shaykh al-Islām, *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya*, ed. 'Alī ibn Muhammad al-'Umrān (n.p.p Dār 'Ālim al-fawā'id n.d.). also translated into English: Omar Farrukh, A., trans. *Ibn Taymiyya on Public and Private Law in Islam* (Beirut: Khayat, 1966).

following quotation from the first anti-Mongol fatwa for instance is quoted by almost all the jihadists analysed by this thesis:

Every group that resists adhering to any law from the widely reported and manifest laws of Islam among the people [i.e the Mongols] or others, then it is obligatory to fight them until they adhere to its laws, even if they pronounce the two testimonies and adhere to some of its laws, just as Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq and the Companions – may Allah be pleased with them–fought the people who resisted *zakāt*. The jurists after them [the Companions] agreed upon this after ‘Umar’s argument with Abū Bakr –may Allah be pleased with both. The Companions – May Allah be pleased with them– agreed on fighting for the privilege [*ḥaqq*] of Islam, in accordance with the book and the Sunna.¹³

The quotation is used by Faraj in *al-Farīda al-ghā’iba* (the treatise is studied by this thesis in Chapter Six) to argue for the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers.¹⁴ It is also used in the issue no. 10 of *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* to argue for the obligation of fighting the contemporary Arab rulers.¹⁵ The same portion is also used in *Dabiq* magazine issued by ISIS to argue for the apostasy of their opponents.¹⁶ Before the contemporary jihadists, the same portion was used by two Wahhābī scholars, namely, ‘Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1826) and Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1818) to argue for the apostasy of some groups of Muslims and tomb veneratorers respectively.¹⁷

¹³ Al-‘Ibāb, “Ṭarīqunā,” *Ṣadā al-Malāḥim*, 12, and Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:502.

¹⁴ ‘Abd al-Salām Faraj, *Al-Farīda al-ghā’iba*, available at http://unfulfilleduty.weebly.com/uploads/1/8/5/3/18537222/_.pdf p6. Last accessed on 16/09/2015.

¹⁵ Al-‘Ibāb, “Ṭarīqunā ’ilā taḥkīm al-sharī’a,” *Ṣadā al-Malāḥim*, 12.

¹⁶ “The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men,” *Dabiq* 10, (July, 2015): 56. Last accessed on 25/04/2017 <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/the-islamic-state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-1022.pdf>.

¹⁷ Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, *Taysīr al-‘Azīz al-Ḥamīd sharḥ al-Kitāb al-Tawhīd* (Riyadh: Dār al-ṣamī’ī li al-nashr wa al-tauzī’, 2008), 295. Accessed on 29/04/2017 <http://ia601407.us.archive.org/2/items/dnatdnat/tahskt.pdf>; and ‘Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb *al-Kalimāt al-nāfi’a fī al-mufakkirāt al-wāqi’a*. 4.

Another example is from *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* where the following quotation is repeated nine times in the jihadi treatise *al-‘Umda fī i‘dād al-‘udda li-l-jihād fī sabīl Allāh*: “It is obligatory to prepare for jihad by power and steeds of war even at the time when the Muslims are weak, for that without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled is itself an obligation.”¹⁸ This is explained in detail in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Also, the three anti-Nuṣayrī fatwas and Ibn Taymiyya’s letter against the Mongols are used by the jihadists due to Ibn Taymiyya’s harsh approach to the Nuṣayrīs, as explained in Chapters Three and Seven. The treatises of *Qā‘ida mukhtaṣara* and *Qā‘ida fī al-inghimās fī al-‘aduww* are neglected by the jihadists, but in the latter Ibn Taymiyya argues for a point that the jihadists argue for while in the former Ibn Taymiyya proves soft on jihad.

The second reason for choosing the selected works is that they encompass the range of Ibn Taymiyya’s understanding on jihad and illustrate the diversity of his thinking on the subject matter. Most of his other fatwas on jihad repeat the main arguments he makes in the selected works. One example of this is Ibn Taymiyya’s argument in the quotation above from the first anti-Mongol fatwa that “Every group that resists adhering to any law from the widely reported and manifest laws of Islam among the people [i.e the Mongols] or others, then it is obligatory to fight them until they adhere to its laws.”¹⁹ This argument is repeated in many of Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwas on jihad, either word by word or in meaning. It is repeated in another fatwa in volume twenty eight of the *Majmū‘ fatāwā* when Ibn Taymiyya was asked about the verdict on the Rāfiḍa.²⁰ It is also repeated in another fatwa in volume thirty five of the *Majmū‘ fatāwā* on the difference between the Khārijīs and *bughāt* (rebels),²¹ and in other places.²² In *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* the same statement is repeated with similar words, “Every group that resists adhering to any law from the widely reported and manifest laws of Islam, then it is obligatory to fight them until the whole

¹⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*, 27; and ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, *Al-‘Umda*, 5, 23.

¹⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:502.

²⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatwa on rāfiḍa and imāmiyya*, MF 28:468.

²¹ Ibn Taymiyya, *fatwa on bughāt and Khārijīs*, MF 35:57.

²² Ibn Taymiyya MF 35:90.

religion is for Allah, and this is by the agreement of all scholars.”²³ However, his argument in the first anti-Mongol fatwa is the fullest.

Another example is in the first anti-Nuṣayrī fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya argues that the Nuṣayrīs are more heretical than the Jews and the Christians and even more than several heterodox groups.²⁴ Ibn Taymiyya also makes the same claim in other fatwas in volume twenty-eight and thirty-five of the *Majmū‘ fatāwā*.²⁵ However, the issue is dealt with most fully in the anti-Nuṣayrī fatwa.

Some of these selected works have already been studied by some scholars, and this thesis presents the first analysis of others. The three anti-Mongol fatwas, the Mardin fatwa, and the three anti-Nuṣayrī fatwas have been studied by various scholars, while this thesis presents the first examination of Ibn Taymiyya’s letter on the Mongols. In Chapters Two and Three, the thesis enumerates and discusses the scholars who write on the fatwas. *Al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* was also studied by some scholars while *Qā‘ida mukhtasara*, and *Qā‘ida fī al-inghimās fī al-‘aduww* are studied for the first time by this thesis. Works of Ibn Taymiyya such as *al-Ṣārim al-maslūl*, *Kitāb al-nubuwwāt*, *al-Ṣafadiyya* and others are used to support the main arguments, but they are not studied independently because only minor segments of them here and there deal with jihad. The quotations and arguments in these books are used to compliment the major arguments made by Ibn Taymiyya in the main fatwas and treatises analysed. Studying these works of Ibn Taymiyya and using the secondary literature, the thesis outlines Ibn Taymiyya’s understanding of jihad both in the offensive and in the defensive modes. It outlines Ibn Taymiyya’s understanding of who should be fought and who should be subdued to giving *jizya* (poll-tax). It also examines Ibn Taymiyya’s understanding and application of the doctrine of excommunication and the etiquette of war.

The aim of the thesis is to find out to what extent Ibn Taymiyya’s understanding of jihad outlined from his works above is appropriated or misappropriated by the contemporary jihadists. In searching for the answer, besides studying Ibn Taymiyya’s works on jihad, the thesis also examines six

²³ Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* MF 28:208.

²⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:150.

²⁵ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:474; and 35:133.

publications of contemporary jihadists. These include two treatises of the jihadists that predated the formation of al-Qaida, namely *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba* and *al-'Umda fī i'dād al-'udda li-l-jihād fī sabīl Allāh*, and two magazines of AQAP, namely *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* and *Ṣadā al-jihād*. Others include *Dabiq* magazine issued by ISIS and *Hādhihi 'aqīdatunā wa manhaj da 'watinā* of Boko Haram. These are not the only publications of the contemporary jihadists, but are chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, the jihadi arguments in these publications represent and encapsulate the major arguments of the selected jihadi movements AQAP, ISIS and Boko Haram which use Ibn Taymiyya as justification. Secondly, there is an academic gap in studying some of these publications. Unlike *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba* and *al-'Umda*, the use of Ibn Taymiyya in the publications of AQAP, ISIS, and Boko Haram has not been studied. Some notable figures of al-Qaida have been studied by some scholars such as Joas Wagemakers in his book *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi*, in which he studies the ideology of al-Maqdisi.²⁶ Another example is Bruce Riedel's book *The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future*, where Riedel discusses the ideology of Abū Musab al-Zarqawi.²⁷ Both scholars discuss both al-Maqdisi and al-Zarqawi's use of Ibn Taymiyya briefly. However, there is not yet any academic work on the use of Ibn Taymiyya in the publications of AQAP, ISIS and Boko Haram. This thesis therefore presents the first study of their publications. The thesis outlines the number of times Ibn Taymiyya is mentioned in each publication and the arguments he is used to justify, and the part of his work quoted. The thesis traces the source of the quotation in Ibn Taymiyya's works and examines how the quotation is used in the jihadi publications. This is done sometimes using the secondary literature either on Ibn Taymiyya's works or on the jihadi publications and sometimes independently by the researcher where the secondary literature is lacking.

Examining the six publications of the jihadists, the thesis identifies the major arguments the jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya to justify and the most frequent quotations from Ibn Taymiyya in justifying the arguments. Identifying the

²⁶ Joas Wagemakers *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

²⁷ Bruce Riedel *The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).

arguments is a step in understanding whether the use of Ibn Taymiyya in justifying the arguments can be sustained. The thesis then uses secondary literature to examine the validity of the use of Ibn Taymiyya in justifying the identified jihadi arguments. The thesis discovers that some jihadi arguments can be justified from Ibn Taymiyya while others cannot. The thesis outlines the jihadi arguments that can be justified from Ibn Taymiyya from those that cannot. The thesis also examines the role of the Wahhābī movement in transmitting Ibn Taymiyya's thought on excommunication and jihad to the contemporary jihadists. Furthermore, the thesis scrutinizes other sources that are used by the jihadists in justifying their jihadi doctrines and the strength of their arguments if Ibn Taymiyya's quotations are removed. All these findings are summarised in the conclusion.

1.3 Ibn Taymiyya's Coherence

The thesis will look at the appropriation and misappropriation of Ibn Taymiyya's concept of jihad by the contemporary jihadists based on the assumption that a holistic reading of Ibn Taymiyya's concept of jihad is coherent. The coherence of Ibn Taymiyya on a number of issues is being debated by some scholars. These scholars in their various articles argued that the readers of Ibn Taymiyya often found themselves faced with the challenges in trying to piece together a cohesive understanding of his views. One example of this, is Jon Hoover, who cites the example of Ibn Taymiyya's inconsistency on the divine attributes by Ibn Taymiyya's rejection of analogical extension of human concept unto God, but portrays the meaning of some divine attributes in relation to human language.²⁸ This might be so, however, the followers of Ibn Taymiyya from among the contemporary Salafi scholars did not perceive this inconsistency. Rather, to them and Ibn Taymiyya the divine names and attributes are *tawqīfiyya* (there is no room for intellectual freethinking in them), therefore, should be affirmed to God in the literal meaning they appear in the divine texts, bearing in mind that the essence is different.²⁹ According to Sophia Vasalou the barrier of arrival to the unified understanding of Ibn Taymiyya on some issues is not merely

²⁸ Jon Hoover, *Ibn Taymiyya's Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism* (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing 2007) 118.

²⁹ Muhammad ibn Šāliḥ al-ʿUthaimīn, *al-Qawāʿid al-Muthlā fī al-Šifāt wa al-ʿAsmāʾ al-Ḥusnā*, (Riyadh: Dār al-Tadmuriyya, 2010) 70 -71.

a construction of his format, rather, it is due to the fact that many of his fatwas are issued independently of his other related works.³⁰

The said incoherence may likely also appear in two issues related to Ibn Taymiyya's concept of jihad. Firstly, in the content of *Qā'ida Mukhtaṣara*, where some scholars perceived inconsistency between Ibn Taymiyya's argument for the defensive jihad and his argument for the jihad in aggression in the rest his works. Secondly on Ibn Taymiyya's portrayal of Syria as a blessed city in the Mongol context as against his opinion that blessings may occur to people's actions but not places.

On the first issue, Chapter Four of this thesis will attempt establishing the textual evidence of the treatise and argue against the said inconsistency by proving that Ibn Taymiyya argued for jihad both in aggression and self-defense in the treatise *Qā'ida Mukhtaṣara* and other works of him on jihad. In *Qā'ida Mukhtaṣara* specifically, Ibn Taymiyya argued that if the non-believers refuse giving *jizya*, they should be fought with jihad. On the second issue, as argued by Zayde Antrium, Ibn Taymiyya repeatedly reminds his audience that merits may accrue to people, and specifically to people's actions, and not to places, as such, he is most known for his strong stance against visitation of a variety of sites thought to bring blessings to the visitor, such as mountain tops, caves, and tombs.³¹ However, in the Mongol context Ibn Taymiyya is perceived to treat Syria differently from his stance on other places. Part of the reasons he mentions of fighting the Mongols and superiority of the Mamluks over the Mongols is not only the merits of people's action but also the place they reside i.e. Syria. After citing the virtues of Syria Ibn Taymiyya states, "these [virtues] are among the things I depend on in my inciting the Muslims to fight the Mongols and commanding them to stay in Damascus and prohibiting them from fleeing to Egypt and calling upon the Egyptian army to come to Syria and to strengthen Syrians in this."³² The incoherence of Ibn Taymiyya on this issue may also be arguable in the sense that Ibn Taymiyya does not permit the visitation of Syria based on seeking blessings; rather, to him the city is blessed just like Makkah and Madinah. In the second anti-

³⁰ Sophia Vasalou, *Ibn Taymiyya's Theological Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 17-18.

³¹ Zayde Antrim, "The Politics of Place in the Works of Ibn Taymīyah and Ibn Faḍl Allāh al-'Umarī" *Mamluk study review* 18. (2014-2015) 93-96.

³² Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 27:505.

Mongol fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya gives emphasis on the merit of the people residing in Syria rather than the city itself.

But the sect in Syria and Egypt [Mamlūks] and their likes, are now fighting for the religion of Islam, they are the most deserving to be part of the victorious sect that the Prophet – Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him–mentioned by his statement in the authentic and circulated hadiths .“There will always be a group amongst my *umma* who is triumphant upon truth, abandoning them will not harm them, until the order of Allah is given and they will be like that [triumphant].”³³ In another narration in Muslim, “the people of Maghrib will continue to be.”³⁴

To Ibn Taymiyya, the merit and blessings belong to the people of Syria rather than the city itself. This, however, does not demerit Syria from being a blessed city, but like other blessed cities it should not attract visitation for the blessing sake.

Nevertheless, apart from these two issues discussed above, I have not found the said incoherence in Ibn Taymiyya’ concept of jihad especially in the major jihadi doctrines that the contemporary jihadists link to him. There are two examples I will cite here. The first example is Ibn Taymiyya’s views on fighting jihad under deviant Muslim leaders. Unlike the jihadists, Ibn Taymiyya has been consistent in all his fatwas that jihad should be fought under a Muslim ruler regardless of being him good or bad. For this reason, in the Mongol context Ibn Taymiyya argued for the necessity of fighting the Mongols under the leadership of the Mamluks whom in the first anti-Mongol fatwa Ibn Taymiyya admits are faulty. This concept is not only maintained by Ibn Taymiyya in the Mongol context but also in other fatwas in *Majmū‘ fatāwā* as will be elaborated in Chapter Two and conclusion of Part One of this thesis. The second example is Ibn Taymiyya’s view on the permissibility of suicide attack against the target if the cause of jihad is reasonable. Ibn Taymiyya maintains this view in all his works without any contradiction. Besides arguing for it in the second anti-Mongol fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya wrote an independent treatise arguing for it. This will be

³³ Muslim, 1037.

³⁴ Muslim, 4715. And Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:531.

elaborated in Chapter Four and the conclusion of Part One. This applies to other jihadi doctrines that the contemporary jihadists linked to Ibn Taymiyya, as will be elaborated where these doctrines are mentioned in the thesis.

1.4 Overview

Chapter One of the thesis is this Introduction, and the body is divided into two parts: Part One deals with Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of jihad and this consists of three chapters, while Part Two deals with how the contemporary jihadists appropriate Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of jihad, and this consists of three chapters. In Part One, Chapter Two examines the four anti-Mongol documents of Ibn Taymiyya. The documents comprise of the three anti-Mongol fatwas and Ibn Taymiyya's letter against the Mongols. The chapter outlines Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of who should be fought in jihad. It also examines why Ibn Taymiyya excommunicated the Mongols and called for jihad against them, how he collaborated with the Muslim rulers of his time in fighting the Mongols and what he sees in collaboration with the bad Muslim rulers in fighting a foreign invader. It also examines his understanding on the prisoners of war that are compelled to fight alongside the enemy. Are they going to be fought considering them among the enemy or not, considering them being compelled to fight? Chapter Three examines four of Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas: the Mardin fatwa and Ibn Taymiyya's three fatwas against the Nuṣayrīs of Syria and Lebanon. With respect to the Mardin fatwa, the chapter examines Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of the domain of peace and the domain of war and the obligation of migration from the domain of war to that of peace. With respect to the anti-Nuṣayrī fatwas, the chapter examines Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of some groups he considers deviant and fighting jihad against them. Chapter Four explores three miscellaneous treatises of Ibn Taymiyya, which are *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduww*, and *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya*. With respect to *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, the chapter outlines Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of defensive jihad and why the infidels should be fought: could it be due to their disbelief or when a danger is sensed from them, and from whom the *jizya* should be collected? With respect to *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās*, the chapter figures out Ibn Taymiyya's understanding on the permissibility of

suicide in the course of jihad. With regards to *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*, the chapter outlines what Ibn Taymiyya refers to as the meaning and purpose of jihad and how he argues for the offensive jihad. The overall aim of Part One is to figure out Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of jihad: how does he view jihad, who are fought in jihad, who are subdued to paying *jizya* and why?

In Part Two, Chapter five examines the relationship between Ibn Taymiyya and Wahhābism. Here the term “Wahhābism” and “Wahhābī scholars” are used to refer to the path, teachings and legacy of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792), the eighteenth century Islamic revivalist from Najd, currently in Saudi Arabia. This chapter argues that the Wahhābī scholars establish precedents in the interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya on excommunication and jihad before the emergence of the contemporary jihadists, especially in using the anti-Mongol fatwas outside the Mongol context. The contemporary jihadists then adopt the same method from the Wahhābīs. The chapter also discusses Ibn Taymiyya’s concept on Takfīr how it is adapted by the Wahhābīs and argues that the contemporary jihadists use the Wahhābī scholars in justifying the apostasy of contemporary Muslim rulers based on the non-enforcement of Sharī‘a and their collaboration with non-Muslims against the Muslims.

Chapter Six examines two jihadi treatises written before the emergence of al-Qaida and how Ibn Taymiyya is used in them. These treatises are *al-Farīda al-ghā‘iba* and *al-‘Umda fī i‘dād al-‘udda li-l-jihād fī sabīl Allāh*. In each of the treatises the chapter uses the secondary literature available to enumerate and discuss the jihadi arguments that use Ibn Taymiyya and how he is used. The chapter examines how some scholars discuss the validity of the use of Ibn Taymiyya’s thoughts in justifying such arguments.

Chapter Seven examines the two magazines of AQAP, namely, *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* and *Ṣadā al-jihād*, *Dabiq* magazine issued by ISIS, and a Boko Haram manual. The chapter examines how these movements use Ibn Taymiyya in validating their arguments. It identifies the arguments that Ibn Taymiyya’s texts are employed to justify and the validity of the use of Ibn Taymiyya to justify such arguments. It examines other issues not examined in Chapter Six such as the permissibility of killing diplomats and tourists and suicide as a form of jihad. The main aim of Part Two is to outline and discuss the main arguments which

the jihadists use from Ibn Taymiyya, how they use him and to what extent is the use of Ibn Taymiyya by the jihadists justified.

The thesis in general argues that some of the contemporary jihadi doctrines can be justified from Ibn Taymiyya while most of them cannot be justified from him. This research identifies the jihadi doctrines that can be associated with Ibn Taymiyya by stating where he argues for them in his works, and identify the ones that cannot be justified from him by stating where he argues against them in his works or secondary literature. All the findings are summarized in the Conclusion.

Part One: Ibn Taymiyya's Understanding of Jihad

Introduction to Part One

Part one of this thesis comprises three chapters. In these chapters, the thesis attempts to outline Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of jihad from his works. Although Ibn Taymiyya did not write any book or treatise titled "jihad", his collective works on the subject matter amount to about three volumes. The major and well-known collections of Ibn Taymiyya's works are two: the *Majmū' fatāwā* edited by 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Qāsim and Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad, and *Fatāwā al-kubrā* edited by Muhammad 'Abd al-Qādir 'Aṭā and Mustafā 'Abd al-Qādir 'Aṭā. While the former is thirty-seven volumes, the latter is six volumes. There are also some books and treatises of Ibn Taymiyya published independently outside both the *Majmū' fatāwā* and *Fatāwā al-kubrā*. Another compilation of Ibn Taymiyya's work which is less popular is *Āthār shaykh al-Islam wa mālahiqaha min-al-a' māl* the compilation of Muhammad 'Aziz Shams. Volume twenty-eight of the *Majmū' fatāwā* is wholly on jihad. The volume comprises many treatises and Islamic legal opinions (*fatwas*) of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad, *ḥisba*, *al-amr bi-al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar* (promoting what is right and forbidding what is wrong), and other related issues. The volume is not arranged in chronological order, but is a collection of various essays and questions answered by Ibn Taymiyya. Likewise, volume 3 and volume 35 have a considerable number of jihad topics alongside other treatises of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad that are published independently of the *Majmū' fatāwā* and *Fatāwā al-kubrā*.³⁵

In this part, eleven of Ibn Taymiyya's works relating to jihad are explored. This includes the five fatwas relating to the Mongols: the three famous anti Mongol fatwas, the letter of Ibn Taymiyya against the Mongols and the Mardin fatwa. Three anti-Nuṣayrī fatwas and three other treatises are also explored.

³⁵ Muhammad 'Abd al-Haqq Ansari, *Ibn Taymiyyah Expounds on Islam; Selected Writings of Shaykh al-Islam Taqī ad-Dīn Ibn Taymiyyah on Islamic Faith, Life, and Society* (n.p.p.2000).

In Chapter Two, an analysis of the four anti-Mongol documents are carried out: the three anti-Mongol fatwas and Ibn Taymiyya's letter against the Mongols. The four documents were issued by Ibn Taymiyya against the Mongols invaders of Syria between 1299 and 1313. The three fatwas which became one of the primary sources of the jihadists are cited in volume twenty-eight of the *Majmū' fatāwā* and amount to thirty-five pages with the second being the longest with about twenty pages. Parts of these fatwas are translated by Muhammad 'Abd al-Haqq Ansari in his book *Ibn Taymiyya Expounds on Islam*. Bonney Richard also translates and analyses some passages from the fatwas in his book *Jihad: From Qur'ān to bin Laden*.³⁶ Yahya Michot also translated part of the fatwas in his works here and there, but all these translations put together do not amount to one third of the fatwas. Ibn Taymiyya's letter against the Mongols is also cited in volume twenty-eight of the *Majmū' fatāwā*,³⁷ but I have not come across any translation or published work on the letter except a few paragraphs translated and quoted by ISIS in issue 14 of the *Dabiq* magazine.³⁸ Therefore the quotations from these documents will be primarily my own translation. I have translated all the three anti-Mongol fatwas and part of Ibn Taymiyya's letter.

Chapter Three also analyses four of Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas: the Mardin fatwa and the three Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas against the Nuṣayrīs/'Alawīs of Syria and Lebanon. Mardin is a city in modern-day Turkey, which was at the time of Ibn Taymiyya under the rule of the Mongols. Ibn Taymiyya was asked if the city would be considered a domain of peace considering its inhabitants or a domain of war considering the rulers. Ibn Taymiyya's answer does not only respond to the question, but became a source used by the jihadists in determining what makes a domain of peace and a domain of war and the obligation of migration from the latter to the former. With respect to the Mardin fatwa in this chapter, the thesis analyses the content of the fatwa and Ibn Taymiyya's concept of the binary division of the domains and the obligation for migration. This is done using other works of Ibn Taymiyya on the topics. The

³⁶ Richard Bonney, *Jihād: From Qur'ān to bin Laden* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

³⁷ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:424 – 467.

³⁸ "Lessons from the Fitnah of the Mongols," *Dabiq* 14, (April/May 2016): 47. Last accessed 25/04/2017 <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/the-islamic-state-22dacc84biq-magazine-1422.pdf>.

book of Yahya Michot: *Ibn Taymiyya, Muslims under non-Muslim Rule* is employed considerably in the analysis as it is the major secondary source on the fatwa.³⁹ Another segment in the chapter analyses Ibn Taymiyya's three fatwas against the Nuṣayrī sect in Syria. Like the anti-Mongol fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa against the Nuṣayrīs are also related to jihad. The three fatwas are cited in volume thirty-five of the *Majmū' fatāwā* and volume three of the *Fatāwā al-kubrā*.⁴⁰ All of the three fatwas are partially translated by Yaron Friedman in his book *The Nuṣayrī-ʿAlawīs: An Introduction to the Religion, History, and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria*.⁴¹ This chapter analyses the fatwas, quotes other scholars who issued similar fatwas and focuses on figuring out why Ibn Taymiyya was particularly harsh on the Nuṣayrīs just as he was to the Mongols.

Chapter Four explores three miscellaneous treatises of Ibn Taymiyya which are related to jihad, two of which are published outside these two famous collections. These treatises include *Qāʿida mukhtaṣara fī qitāl al-kuffār wa mudāhanatihim wa taḥrīm qatlihim bi mujarrad kufrīhim*, *Qāʿida fī al-inghimās fī al-ʿaduww hal yajūz?* and *al-Siyāsa al-sharʿiyya*. *Qāʿida mukhtaṣara* is a treatise attributed to Ibn Taymiyya by some scholars and denied by others. In this chapter, issues related to its textual evidence are discussed, then the analysis of its content follows. Ibn Taymiyya argues for two main points in the treatise. Firstly; the non-Muslims are not fought with jihad due to their disbelief, but rather because of the danger sensed in them. Therefore, if the danger is lifted, then the reason for fighting also ceases. Secondly, the *jizya* is to be collected from all non-Muslims, polytheists included. While analysing these two points, Ibn Taymiyya's statements are utilised and some of his other relevant works to substantiate and illustrate the points. This chapter explores *Qāʿida fī al-inghimās* another treatise of Ibn Taymiyya published outside *Majmū' fatāwā* but in another collection of his works. The treatise is edited by Abū Muhammad

³⁹ Yahya Michot, *Ibn Taymiyya: Muslims under Non-Muslim Rule* (Oxford, UK: Interface Publications, 2006).

⁴⁰ The first fatwa is in MF 35:145-160 and *Fatāwā al-kubrā* 3:503-512. Second fatwa is in MF 35:161-162 and *Fatāwā al-kubrā* 3:513. The fatwa is immediately after the anti- Mongol fatwas and *Fatāwā al-kubrā* from 514 to 515.

⁴¹ Friedman Yaron, *The Nuṣayrī-ʿAlawīs: An Introduction to the Religion, History, and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria* (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2010) the first fatwa is in the appendix 299 – 309. The second fatwa 192 – 193. The third fatwa 193 – 194.

Ashraf ibn ‘Abd al-Maqsūd and also published in volume nine of *Āthār shaykh al-Islam wa mā laḥiqa ha min-al-a‘ māl*. In the treatise, Ibn Taymiyya argues for the permissibility of suicide in the course of jihad and debates the opinion of scholars on the issue. This chapter examines the argument made by Ibn Taymiyya in the book, and discuss the opinion of other scholars, especially the contemporary Salafi scholars on the issue. The chapter also analyses some parts of *Al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*, a book written by Ibn Taymiyya on the public and private laws in which he delves into some of the issues related to jihad especially fighting offensive jihad. With all these and other works of Ibn Taymiyya such as *Al-Ṣārim al-maslūl*, *al-Ṣafadiyya*, *Minhāj al-sunna*, etc., the chapter tries to analyse Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of jihad and to establish his understanding of jihad based on a holistic approach in his works.

The overall aim of this part is to figure out Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of jihad: how he views jihad, who are fought in jihad, who are subdued to given *jizya* and why? As stated in the introduction of the thesis, the works studied here are not the only works of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad, but are chosen as samples due to two reasons: first, they encapsulate his understanding of jihad and capture his diverse thinking on the subject matter. Secondly, most of these works are the most frequently quoted by the contemporary jihadists and have been discussed and used by later scholars and activists. By the end of Part One it should be understood why Ibn Taymiyya is specifically harsh in some of his works on jihad and lenient in others. The whole thesis finds out to what extent the jihadists are right in using Ibn Taymiyya as justification for their arguments.

Chapter Two: Analyses of the anti-Mongol documents

2.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses four of Ibn Taymiyya's works on the Mongols: the famous three anti-Mongol fatwas and Ibn Taymiyya's letter on the Mongols.

The Anti-Mongol fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya are his most controversial treatises regarding jihad. The controversial nature of the fatwas exposed them to the exploitation by the jihadists.⁴² Almost all the contemporary jihadists from 'Abd al-Salām Faraj to ISIS use the fatwas as justification of the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers. Moreover, ISIS uses the fatwas and Ibn Taymiyya's letter about the Mongol to justify the apostasy of contemporary Muslim communities for refusing to join the Islamic State.⁴³ Prior to the emergence of the contemporary jihadists, the Wahhābi scholars used the fatwas to justify the apostasy of grave venerators and others. In some instances, the jihadists quote the fatwas through the Wahhābi scholars. The analysis of how the Wahhābi scholars and the contemporary jihadists use the fatwas is elucidated in chapters five, six and seven of this thesis.

The three fatwas and the letter were issued from 1299 to 1313, during the Mongol invasions of Syria. The Mongols made several attempts to invade Syria, the first was in 1260, two years before Ibn Taymiyya was born.⁴⁴ After the Mongols accepted Islam and advanced into Syria for another invasion in 1299, some of the Syrian people turned to Ibn Taymiyya for the religious legal opinion on fighting their invaders. Now the Mongols claim Islam, they are not fighting the Muslims for their religion but for other reasons. According to Denise Aigle, the Mongols even sought a fatwa from some Islamic scholars to fight the Mamlūks for invading the territory of Mardin, where the Mamlūks reportedly committed various acts of moral turpitude in the month of Ramadan.⁴⁵ The fact that the Mongols accepted Islam and claimed fighting for

⁴² Jon Hoover, "Ibn Taymiyya between Moderation and Radicalism," in *Reclaiming Islamic Tradition: Modern Interpretations of the Classical Heritage*, ed. Elisabeth Kendall and Ahmad Khan (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 3.

⁴³ "Lessons from the Fitnah of the Mongols," *Dabiq* 14, (April/May 2016): 47. Last accessed 25/04/2017 <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/the-islamic-state-22dacc84biq-magazine-1422.pdf>

⁴⁴ Denise Aigle, "The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām by Ghāzān Khān and Ibn Taymīyah's Three "Anti-Mongol" Fatwas," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 11.2 (2007): 89.

⁴⁵ Aigle, "The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām," 92.

it, just like the Mamlūks, created a doubt in the mind of Syrians that fighting the Mongols may be identical to the sedition that occurred among the Companions in the first century of Islam. From the wordings of the questions, some people considered the Mongols as *bughāt* (rebels), whose fighting is not recommended. Ibn Taymiyya issued the fatwas defining the status of the Mongols and arguing for the obligation of fighting them. The fatwas covered the status of five categories of people: The Mongols, the Mamlūk renegades, the Mamlūk prisoners compelled to fight alongside the Mongols, the Mamlūk sultans and the people who joined the Mongols out of fear. On the first category, the Mongols, Ibn Taymiyya declares them as Khārijīs, excommunicates them and calls for jihad against them. In the fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya attempts to clear the doubt of considering the Mongols as *bughāt*, instead, to Ibn Taymiyya, they are Khārijīs. He states many reasons from the Quran, Sunna of the Prophet and the history of the earlier Muslims for considering the Mongols as Khārijīs and apostates and why they should be fought.⁴⁶ The second category of people discussed in these fatwas is the Mamlūk renegades. Like the Mongols, in the second anti-Mongol fatwa Ibn Taymiyya also declares the Mamlūk renegades who joined the Mongols as apostates. The third category discussed in the fatwas is the Mamlūk prisoners who were compelled to fight alongside the Mongols. Ibn Taymiyya argues for fighting them with jihad, but unlike the Mongols and renegades if the Mamlūk prisoners compelled to fight alongside the Mongols were killed, Ibn Taymiyya argues, they are martyred. The fourth category is the Mamlūks. Throughout the fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya portrays the Mamlūks as the victorious group fighting for the religion of Islam, despite admitting a fault in them in the first fatwa. In the letter, Ibn Taymiyya deals with the fifth category of people with regards to the Mongol invasions. He termed the people who joined the Mongols out of fear as hypocrites analogous to those who abandoned the Prophet at the battles of Uhud and the Ditch.

The modern-day jihadists use these fatwas in the contemporary period to argue for the apostasy of the Muslim rulers. The Muslims rulers claim Islam like the Mongols, but still commit some acts that are tantamount to apostasy;

⁴⁶ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 101.

therefore, they are apostates like the Mongols and waging jihad against them is an obligation, just as it was with the Mongols.

In this chapter, the discussion is on the fatwas and the letter in details, using the Arabic text and secondary and tertiary sources available. It discusses the literature on the fatwas, set the historical inventions of Syria by the Mongols, attempts to find the chronological order of the fatwas and examines their contents. The examination of the content primarily uses two scholars in the field: Thomas Raff and Denise Aigle. It discusses the arguments of each fatwa independently according to the chronological order of the fatwas. This is then followed by an analysis of Ibn Taymiyya's letter on the Mongols.

One of the primary sources of these fatwas is *Majmū' fatāwā*, a thirty-seven volume collection of Ibn Taymiyya's works. The fatwas appeared in volume 28 of the 35-volume collection. The first fatwa is the shortest in seven pages, the second is the longest in thirty-four pages and the third is ten pages, while the letter is about forty-three pages.⁴⁷

2.2 Literature about the Anti-Mongol Fatwas

Notably, several articles are written on the Mongol invasion of Syria and Ibn Taymiyya's role in confronting them. The first to write on the fatwas is Henri Laoust's in his book *Essai sur les Doctrines Sociales et Politiques d'Ibn Tayrnbyra*, published in 1939. Yahya Michot has also written on the fatwas in 1995, both are in French, which I do not read. Subsequently, Denise Aigle reported these in her article, "A Religious Response to Ghāzān Khān's Invasions of Syria. The Three 'Anti-Mongol fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya.'"⁴⁸ Aigle's article studies the content of the fatwas and provides correct dating of the events, but does not relate their appropriations by the jihadists. Thomas Raff in 1973, elaborates on the Mongol invasions, their encounter with the Mamlūks and Ibn Taymiyya.⁴⁹ Using the Mongols' sources, he outlines their understanding of why they were fighting the world. According to him, the Mongols even before their conversion to Islam were fighting as soldiers of God. They thought it was

⁴⁷ The first fatwa is in MF 28:501 to 508, the second fatwa is in MF 28:509 to 543 and the third fatwa in MF 28:543 to 553. The letter is in MF 28:424 – 467.

⁴⁸ Aigle, "The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,"

⁴⁹ Thomas Raff, *Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwā by Ibn Taimīya*. Leiden: n.p., 1973.

their divine duty to enforce the universal peace. Hülagü designated the Mamlūks as sinners and demanded them to surrender to the soldiers of God.⁵⁰ Raff discusses the Mongols contact with Islam and argues that Ghāzān's conversion to Islam was primarily for political purposes, therefore it is open to question.⁵¹ He supports the claim with the statement of Uljaytu that, "Ghāzān is a Muslim from without and *kāfir* from within."⁵² Another reason according to Raff is the fact that Ghāzān did not make any effort to stop the use of the *yāsā* after his conversion.⁵³ Raff also reports Ibn Taymiyya's encounter with the Mongols after their invasion of 1299, how his effort to meet Ghāzān was aborted and how Ibn Taymiyya negotiated the release of the Jews, Christians and Muslims prisoners.⁵⁴ He set the chronological order of the fatwas, examines the content of the second fatwa which is employed in the section discussing the fatwas. However, according to Aigle, Raff got the dating of the second fatwa wrong.⁵⁵

Maryam Muhammad ibn Lādīn also in 1983 examines the Mongol invasion of Syria and Ibn Taymiyya's role, she contributes a detailed history on how the Mongols attempted to invade Syria, the motive behind their invasions and the role of Ibn Taymiyya in repelling it in both 699/1299-300 and 702/1302 invasions, but mentions little about the content of the fatwas. She reports how Ibn Taymiyya excommunicates the Mongols and participated in the jihad against them in the two invasions. However, she did not attempt dating the fatwas and therefore used them interchangeably.⁵⁶ Similarly, Reuven Amitai examines the Mongol occupation in 1300, and the roles of Ibn Taymiyya, Ṣayf al-Dīn Qitchab al-Mansūrī and Arjuwash, the commander of the Citadel,⁵⁷ but

⁵⁰ Raff, *Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwā*, 14.

⁵¹ Raff, *Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwā*, 17.

⁵² Raff, *Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwā*, 18.

⁵³ Raff, *Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwā*, 19. *yāsā* means order or decree. The Great *Yāsā* was a compilation of Genghis Khān Laws, rules, and words of wisdom. It was written on scrolls that were bound in volumes, and kept in secret archives to which only the supreme ruler and his closest associates had access. See Bonny, *Jihad from Quran*, 114. And Morgan, D.O. and C.E. Bosworth "Yāsā" in in P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs *Encyclopaedia of Islam* <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2>.

⁵⁴ Raff, *Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwā*, 25.

⁵⁵ Aigle, "The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām," 98.

⁵⁶ Maryam's work is a Masters dissertation found online at <http://www.al-eman.com/aleman/library/messages/03471.pdf> accessed on 16/09/2015.

⁵⁷ Reuven Amitai, "The Mongol Occupation of Damascus in 1300: A Study of Mamluk Loyalties," *The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syria Politics and Society*, ed. Michael Winter and Amalia Levanoni (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 21-41.

says nothing about the fatwas. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Haqq Ansari translates part of the fatwas without any analysis in *Ibn Taymiyya Expounds on Islam*.⁵⁸ Richard Bonney also translates and analyses some passages from the fatwas, but mistakes them in his analysis for the Mardin fatwa.⁵⁹ These works above are used in sketching the history of the Mongol invasion of Syria and the roles of both Ibn Taymiyya and Mamlūks in repelling the invasion.

2.3 Mongol invasions of Syria and Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwas

The Mongols made six attempts to invade Syria. The first attempt in 658/1260, two years before Ibn Taymiyya was born was successful at the outset, before the Egyptians Mamlūks defeated them at ‘Ayn Jālūt. After defeating the Mongols, the Mamlūks incorporated Syria in their dynasty.⁶⁰ The brutalities they recorded in their first invasion left such an execrable portrait of them in the memories of the Syrians, that their mention terrifies Syrians. Ibn Kathīr, the historian says the following about their invasion of 658/1260:

They besieged it [Aleppo] seven days; they entered the city after [they signed] a peace treaty, but they broke the treaty. Only Allah knows the number of people they killed, they looted the wealth and enslaved the women and children. Similar to what happened to the people of Baghdad happened to them [the people of Aleppo]. They entered the very innermost parts of houses, and rendered the honoured of its people humbled. And thus, do they do. Indeed, we belong to Allah, and indeed to Him we will return. They faced resistance from its citadel, then it was delivered to them in peace, they destroyed the walls of the city and also the walls of the citadel. Aleppo remains like a scabby donkey.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Ansari, *Ibn Taymiyyah Expounds on Islam*, 540.

⁵⁹ Bonney, *Jihād: From Qur’ān*, 113.

⁶⁰ Ismāīl Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya wa al-nihāya* ed. Dr. ‘Abd Allāhi Ibn ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Turkey (Dār al-hijra: Markaz al-buhūthi wa al-dirāsāti al-Islamiyya, n.d), 17:401. And Bonney, *Jihād: From Qur’ān to bin Laden*, 115.

⁶¹ Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya*, 17:396. (my translation)

Prior to the Mongol invasion of Syria in 658/1260, the Mongols invaded Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid dynasty in 656/1258, and reportedly committed atrocities according to historical reports. The last caliph and all his family were executed by the Mongols, and the dismemberment of the empire followed rapidly upon this event. Thus, Baghdad was reduced to a provincial capital.⁶² Some historians claim that the brutalities perpetrated by the Mongols in Baghdad had never happened in the history of wars; they killed more than a million people, including women and children.⁶³ Nevertheless, all this happened under the leadership of Hūlagū, before the Mongols became Muslims. In the year 694/1295, their leader Ghāzān Khān, at that time became Muslim and propagated the faith to many of his followers.⁶⁴ While some historians such as Dhahabī view the Islam of the Mongols as a victory to Islam and relief for the Muslims, Ibn Taymiyya, viewed this as an act of deception. According to him it was a plan from the Mongols to win the hearts of Muslims whose land they were invading.⁶⁵ Their subsequent invasions of the Muslim territories alongside their deviations from the mainstream Islam [as argued by Ibn Taymiyya and his disciples] were used as an evidence to justify this claim.

In the year 699/1299-1300, the Mongols advanced into Syria as Muslims and came with different claims; According to them, they advanced to emancipate the masses from the tyranny of the Mamlūks. According to Aigle, some Islamic scholars entrusted Ghāzān Khān with a fatwa to attack the Mamlūks for invading the territory of Mardīn, where the Mamlūks committed various acts of moral turpitude in Ramadan.⁶⁶ At the advance of the Mongols in 1299, the Syrians were terrified, yet divided over the position of the Mongols. When they advanced in the year 658/1260, they were non-Muslims, fighting them with jihad was almost a consensus, but now, fighting them could lead to sedition among the Muslims.⁶⁷ Both the Mamlūks and the Mongols were Muslims; the Prophetic traditions have forbidden the Muslims to take arms

⁶² Bonney, *Jihād: From Qur'ān*, 113.

⁶³ Maryam Muhammad 'Awad Ibn Lādīn, *Dawr Ibn Taymiyya fī al-jihād dīd al-Magūl* (1983), 86.

⁶⁴ Raff, *Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwā*, 1.

⁶⁵ Ibn Laden, *Dawr Ibn Taymiyya*, 80.

⁶⁶ Aigle, "The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām," 92.

⁶⁷ The fear was expressed in the question addressed to Ibn Taymiyya in the second *fatwā* Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:509

against one another. Fighting them might be identical to fighting in the sedition that occurred among the Companions in Şiffin in the first century of Islam. Some Damascenes, probably the notables or leaders turned to Ibn Taymiyya for the Islamic legal opinion. He issued the third anti-Mongol fatwa, which seem to be the first to be issued chronologically – defining the status of the Mongols, and the religious legal opinion on fighting them.⁶⁸ Ibn Taymiyya and Sanjar Arjuwash, the commander of the citadel, were the two most notable people that embodied resistance in this invasion, but the latter was acting on political motives. He announced: “Not a single item of army equipment is allowed to be put on sale; your Sultan is still in power.”⁶⁹ He was demonstrating loyalty to the Mamlūk sultanate, while Ibn Taymiyya’s resistance appeared to be based on a religious basis. He mediated between the Mongols and Damascenes to avoid skirmishes.

After the news of Mongol victory against the Mamlūks was spread in Damascus in January 1300, Ibn Taymiyya decided to meet the Mongols, alongside some notables of the city to ask for the release of the Mamlūks’ prisoners. This effort from Ibn Taymiyya was applauded and seen as bravery. It exhibits his bravery and commitment to resolve to peaceful treaty with minimum bloodshed. Although some prisoners consisting of Muslims, Christians and Jews were released, he was not granted an audience with Ghāzān Khān.⁷⁰ Later, when Ibn Taymiyya met Ghāzān, he proclaimed:

You claim that you are a Muslim and you have with you those who call the faithful to prayers [*mu’adhdhins*], judges, imams and Shaykhs, but you invaded us and reached our country for what? While your father and your grandfather Hūlagū, were non-believers, they did not attack the land of Islām; rather, they promised not to attack and they kept their promise. But you promised [us one thing] and broke your promise.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 117. The fatwa is in: Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:544-553.

⁶⁹ Amitai, “The Mongol Occupation,” 28.

⁷⁰ Amitai, “The Mongol Occupation,” 30-31.

⁷¹ Bonny, *Jihad from Quran*, 114.

Additionally, the Mongols gave assurance for the safety of lives and properties to the people of Damascus. The *amān* was read in the pulpit in Damascus; the content expressed the Islam of the Mongols and their intention of fighting the tyranny of the Mamlūks, and restoration of justice among the subjects. Quranic verses and prophetic traditions in support of the claims were cited in the *amān*.⁷² Despite the amnesty promise, the Mongols did not abide by their promises; they betrayed the populace yet again and perpetrated atrocities like those made in the year 658/1260.⁷³ But it appeared that the atrocities were perpetrated without the consent of Ghāzān. Ibn Taymiyya also at the request of Damascus soldiers went to Egypt persuading the Mamlūks to dispatch troops to fight alongside the Damascenes, which they did and the joint forces managed to defeat the Mongols.⁷⁴

Furthermore, by the year 702/1302, the Mongols advanced again for the same purpose, hitherto; already some notable scholars and leaders joined the Mongols, while some were ready to submit and abstain from resistance to avoid the re-occurrence of 699/1299-1300 catastrophe, where Damascus endured a three month siege. According to Aigle, this is where Ibn Taymiyya issued the first fatwa, for it has a reconciliatory tone.⁷⁵ Furthermore, he acknowledged that most of the Mongols have accepted Islam, although they did not adhere to its laws, therefore before fighting them, they should be introduced to proper Islamic teachings;⁷⁶ the exact obligation Ibn Taymiyya was fulfilling in the reconciliation, that is, correcting what he viewed as misconception of the religion by the Mongols and calling them to desist from attacking their fellow Muslims whom he believed were more close to Islam than the Mongols. Ibn Taymiyya's encounter with the Mongols and his utterances before the Ghāzān in 1300 made him more popular and the symbol of resistance. Despite not having enough audience with Ghāzān Khān for what his cabinet described as security reasons, meeting the Mongols was an opportunity for Ibn Taymiyya to explore their army, interview them and subsequently finds a basis upon which to criticize and denounce them in his second and longest fatwa to be issued

⁷² Shams al-dīn Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Dhahabī, *Tarīkh al-Islam* ed. Dr 'Umar 'Abdu al-salam Tadmurī (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Arabī, 2000), 52:75.

⁷³ Amitai, "The Mongol Occupation," 28- 29.

⁷⁴ Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya*, 18:27. And Bonny, *Jihad from Quran*, 113.

⁷⁵ Aigle, "The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām," 117.

⁷⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 28:506.

afterwards.⁷⁷ According to Ibn Kathīr, it was also at this battle of Marj al-Şuffar that Ibn Taymiyya issued the fatwa exempting the Mamlūks soldiers from fasting the Month of Ramadan, just as the Prophet relieved his companions from fasting at the conquest of Mecca.⁷⁸ Ghāzān Khān is said to have died in 703/1303 as a result of the defeat in the battle of Marj al-Şuffar.⁷⁹ Later in 709/1309, their new leader Uljaytū converted to Shi'ism, won the loyalty of many Shī'īs and swathed in his army, many Nuṣayrīs, Rāfiḍa and many self-declared Muslims; Ibn Taymiyya defined extreme innovators/apostates.⁸⁰ They also imposed Shi'ism on many Sunnis, and instructed the Friday sermons to take Shi'ism tone by omitting the names of Abū Bakr, 'Umar and 'Usman in the sermon and replace them with the *ahl al-bayt*.

In 712/1312, the Mongols advanced with this composition of army, which consisted of many sects, the Shī'īs, non-Muslims and others to siege Syria from the Sunni Muslims. The composition of their army angered Ibn Taymiyya, for in their previous invasion, *da'wa* could be given to them considering them as new converts lacking proper understanding of the religion, but now, they were accompanied by the worse of creations, the innovators, hypocrites, apostates whose harm to Islam is more grave than the harm of non-believers, Ibn Taymiyya states.⁸¹ According to Aigle, Ibn Taymiyya issued the second fatwa at this invasion, detailing the status of the Mongols, encouraging the people to fight them, clearing some doubts about the position of the religion in fighting them, and supporting his claim for excommunicating them.⁸²

Chronological order and analyses of the content of the fatwas

Here we shall analyse the fatwas according to the order in which they were issued rather than in the order they appear in *Majmū' fatāwā*.

2.4 The third fatwa

⁷⁷ Thahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islam*, 52:82.

⁷⁸ Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya*, 18:28.

⁷⁹ Abū al-Fidā', *Mukhtasar fī tārīkh al-Bashar*, 4:78.

⁸⁰ Hoover, "Ibn Taymiyya between Moderation and Radicalism," 8.

⁸¹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 28:525 and 530.

⁸² Aigle, "The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām," 117. The fatwa is in: Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:508-543.

According to Aigle, the third fatwa seems to be the first to be issued by Ibn Taymiyya. It may have been issued at the time of the battle of Wādī al-Khaznadār. According to her the fatwa is dedicated to considering the status of the Mamlūks who fought under duress or willingly in the Mongol armies at the invasion of 699/1299-1300.⁸³ The nine-page fatwa like the two others is addressing questions posed to Ibn Taymiyya. In this fatwa, he is asked two questions: firstly, about the Mamlūk soldiers who refuse fighting the Mongols and said some among the army of the Mongols were compelled to fight. And secondly, if any of the Mongol army runs away should he be pursued or not?⁸⁴ In answering the question, Ibn Taymiyya addresses five issues: firstly, the obligation of fighting the Mongols in general, secondly, the obligation of fighting the Mamlūk prisoners who were forced out to fight with the Mongols and thirdly the permissibility of perusing the Mongol army if they flee the battle field. The fourth and fifth issues respectively are the difference between the Khārijīs and the *bughāt* and the status of the people who fought alongside with the Mongols willingly. In the paragraphs below we shall elucidate how Ibn Taymiyya addresses the five issues one after the other citing quotations from the fatwa and other secondary sources.

The first issue Ibn Taymiyya begins with in the fatwa is the obligation of fighting the Mongols in general. Although this is not directly addressed in the question, Ibn Taymiyya uses two Quran verses to argue for the obligation of fighting the Mongols based on their rebellion against some of the widely circulated laws of Islam.

Fighting the Mongols that advanced into Syria is obligatory [in accordance] to the Book and Sunna. Allah says: “Fight them until there is no turmoil and the whole religion is for Allah.” (Q 8:39). And the religion is indeed obedience, when part of the religion is for Allah and part of it is for other than Allah, [then] the fighting is obligatory until the whole religion is for Allah; therefore, Allah says, “You who believe, beware of Allah: give up any outstanding dues from

⁸³ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 117. The fatwa is in: Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:501-508.

⁸⁴ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:544.

usury, if you are true believers. If you do not, then, be warned of war from Allah and His Messenger.” (Q 2:278).⁸⁵

Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya establishes a principle: it is obligatory to fight any resisting group if it refrains from some of the Islamic obligations that are manifest and widely accepted, even if the resisting group claims Islam and practices some of its obligations. Ibn Taymiyya states:

The Muslim scholars have come to agreement that it is obligatory to fight a resisting group if it refrains from some of the Islamic obligations that are manifest and widely accepted, if they pronounce the two testimonies and abstain from prayer and *zakāt* or fasting the month Ramadan or pilgrimage to the ancient house or [if they abstain] from the judgement according to the book [of Allah] and the tradition [of the Prophet] or if they refuse forbidding obscenity, alcohol, incest, taking the life and property of a Muslim, usury, gambling or [if they refuse] partaking in the fight against non-believers or if they refuse enforcing *jizya* against the people of the Book and similar things from the laws of Islam, [then] they will be fought until the whole religion is for Allah.⁸⁶

However, in this fatwa Ibn Taymiyya did not state how the Mongols rebelled from the Islamic law nor did he mention what qualifies them to be Khārijīs. Although he classified them as deviants, throughout the fatwa no evil action of the Mongols was mentioned as an example of their deviation.

Another reason for fighting such groups according to Ibn Taymiyya is the action of the Companions. The Companions in the first generation of Islam fought two groups who claimed Islam, but both groups refrained from some Islamic obligations. Those who withheld *zakāt* were fought by Caliph Abū Bakr and the Khārijīs were fought by ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib.⁸⁷ The Mongols according to Ibn Taymiyya are more heretical than these two groups fought by the

⁸⁵ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:544.

⁸⁶ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:545.

⁸⁷ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:545.

Companions. Whoever doubts about fighting them is the most ignorant of the Islamic religion.⁸⁸

After establishing the obligation of fighting the Mongols in general, Ibn Taymiyya preceded to the second issue which was the first addressed from the questions: the obligation of fighting the soldiers that were forced out by the Mongols to fight the Mamlūk army. Ibn Taymiyya considers the Mongols as Khārijīs and cites the agreement of the scholars that the soldiers forced out to fight alongside the Khārijīs should be fought.

The Muslims have agreed that they [the Khārijīs] should be fought when fighting them is obligatory even if some of them were forced out. Just as al-‘Abbas said when he was taken a prisoner of war on the day of Badr: “O messenger of Allah! I was compelled [to fight]. Then the Prophet –the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him- said: ‘We deal with your outward, Allah deals with your inward’”⁸⁹

As Aigle points out, Ibn Taymiyya has recourse to the outstanding events of the first centuries of Islam. He uses the scenario of the battle of Badr, to justify jihad against the Mamlūk prisoners among the Mongol soldiers. During the battle of Badr, some Companions had been taken prisoners. Ibn Taymiyya considers that, as at Badr, if the Mamlūk prisoners fighting in the Mongol army are killed in the battle they will be considered martyrs for God’s cause.⁹⁰

Ibn Taymiyya further states another reason for fighting the soldiers that were forced out by the Mongols. He reports the agreement of the scholars that if a non-Muslim army used the Muslim captives as human shields and Muslim might be harmed if they did not fight, then they would fight even if that leads to killing the Muslims captives that were used as shields. However, if the Muslims used as shields were killed they become martyrs. Killing them is for the benefit of Islam and whoever is killed for the benefit of Islam and he is not

⁸⁸ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:546.

⁸⁹ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:546.

⁹⁰ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 103.

deserving to be killed inwardly is a martyr.⁹¹ Another reason why fighting them is legal is analogy to the punishment that God sent to a group of sinners. It is established in the hadith that: “An army will raid this house [*ka’ba*] and when it reaches a desert land, all of them will be swallowed up by the earth. Then it is said; ‘O Messenger of Allah! Some of them are forced out’ He answered, they will be raised for judgement according to their intentions.” Ibn Taymiyya comments on the hadith:

If the punishment that God sends against the army fighting the Muslims will be descended against the compelled and the voluntary, then what of the punishment by which God punishes them at the hands of the believers? As Allah said, “Say: Do you wait for us [anything] except one of the two best things [martyrdom or victory]; while we wait for you either that Allah will afflict you with a punishment from Himself or at our hands.” (Q 9:52). And we do not know who is forced, we cannot differentiate. If we kill them with Allah’s command we would be rewarded and excused, and they will be [resurrected] on their intention. Whoever is compelled [to fight] that cannot resist will be resurrected on the day of judgement based on his intention.⁹²

The third issue addressed by Ibn Taymiyya is the second question in the fatwa: if any of the Mongol armies run away, should he be pursued or not? Before answering the question, Ibn Taymiyya reports two opposing opinions of the scholars on pursuing one of the *bughāt* who fought ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib on the day of Camel. After parading the opinions, Ibn Taymiyya then argues that the Mongols are not analogous to the *bughāt* who fought ‘Alī based on permissible interpretation. Therefore, the two opinions on the *bughāt* should not apply to them. Instead, the Mongols are analogous to the Khārijīs, those who withheld *zakāt* and the people of Ṭā’if. These categories are not fought due to their

⁹¹ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:547.

⁹² Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:547.

rebellion against the political leader (*imām*), rather due to their rebellion against the *sharīʿa*.⁹³ He states:

The correct [opinion] is that those [the Mongols] are not part of those with [permissible] interpretation. Those [Mongols] have no any [permissible] interpretation at all. They are type of the rebel Khārijīs, those who resist *zakāt*, the people of Ṭāʾif, the Kharmiyya and their likes who were fought [based] on their rebellion against the laws of Islam.⁹⁴

Ibn Taymiyya then advances to the fourth issue which is not included in the question: the difference between *bughāt* and Khārijīs. Citing some hadiths about the two groups, Ibn Taymiyya outlines some differences between the two groups and argues that the topic confuses many jurists who made the two identical and issued similar verdict on them.⁹⁵

This topic confuses many people from the jurists; those that have written on “Fighting the Rebels” made the fight against those who resist *zakāt*, the fight against the Khārijīs, ‘Alī’s fight against the people of Basra and his fighting against Muʿāwiya and his followers, as part of fighting the rebels which was commanded. And they made it a branch of those who have the same view, they erred; the correct is the opinion of the imams of hadith and Sunna and the people of Medina of the Prophet; such as al-ʿAwzāʿī, al-Thawrī, Mālik, Aḥmad and others that there should be difference between this and that, ‘Alī fighting of Khārijīs is established by clear text from the Prophet—Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him—, all Muslims agreed on this. But the Companions did not agree on the fighting on the day of Ṣiffīn and its likes, rather the greatest of the Companions such as Saʿd ibn Abī Waqqās, Muhammad ibn Maslama, Usāma ibn Zayd, ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar and other turned

⁹³ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:548.

⁹⁴ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:548.

⁹⁵ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:549.

away from it. Beside ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib no one in the [both] armies was greater than Sa‘d ibn Abī-Waqqās.⁹⁶

According to Richard Bonney, Ibn Taymiyya’s independent reasoning on this issue is invalid because of the existence of a clear Qur’anic text to fight the group, that is, a transgressor, along with the hadith of the Prophet warning that ‘Ammār bin Yāsir would be killed by the faction of transgressors. Contrary to Ibn Taymiyya’s interpretation, “the faction of transgressors” was that of Mu‘āwiya, while fighting on ‘Alī’s side as a duty and Sunna.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyya states some of his predecessor on the issue: “The correct is the opinion of the imams of hadith and Sunna and the people of Medina of the Prophet; such as al-‘Awzā‘ī, al-Thawrī, Mālik, Aḥmad and others that there should be difference between this and that.”⁹⁸

Ibn Taymiyya concludes the fatwa by criticizing those who fight alongside the Mongols voluntarily. He labelled them innovators, but he did not accuse them of apostasy because hitherto the Mamlūk renegades did not join the Mongols. He also accused the Mongols of being ignorant and changing the religion of Islam.

And no one will fight alongside [the Mongols] voluntarily except the deviant, innovator, or irreligious [*zindīq*], such as the *malāḥida al-qarāmita al-bāṭiniyya*, and *Rāfiḍa al-sabāba* and *jaḥmiyya al-mu‘aṭṭila* from the *al-nufāt al-ḥulūliyya*. And with them [the Mongols] from their blind followers that claim knowledge and religion who are worse than them. The Mongols are ignorant; they blind follow who they think is right. Because of their stray they follow in their stray what is lie against Allah and His Messenger, they change the religion of Allah, they do not forbid what Allah and His Messenger forbid, they do not practice the true religion. If I were to narrate what I know about their affairs the speech would be long.

⁹⁶ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:549.

⁹⁷ Bonny, *Jihad from Quran*, 112.

⁹⁸ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:549.

In the fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya did not explicitly label the Mongols apostates, but he made some statements indicating their extreme deviation from the religion of Islam. Such statements include classifying them as more rebellious against Islamic law than the Khārijīs and those who refused *zakāt*: “The Mongols and their likes are more rebellious against Islamic law than the ones who resisted *zakāt* and the Khārijīs of Ṭā’if that refused abstaining from usury.”⁹⁹ Towards the end of the fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya also argues that the path of the Mongols and the religion of Islam cannot be combined.¹⁰⁰

Some of the issues discussed in this fatwa are detailed in the second fatwa and will be elucidated more in the section discussing the second fatwa.

2.5 The first fatwa

According to Aigle, the first anti-Mongol fatwa printed in *Majmū‘ fatāwā* is the second issued chronologically. The wording of the fatwa indicates that it is after the first invasion of 699/1299-300. It is dated 702/1302 when Ibn Taymiyya was mediating between the Mongols and local population sorting ways to end the crisis diplomatically, but to no avail, the Mongols insisted on the invasion. Like the third fatwa, the first fatwa seeks to define the status of the combatants in the armies of the two sides.¹⁰¹ In the seven-page fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya was asked only one question; whether fighting the Mongols is obligatory or permissible?¹⁰² From the tone of the question, the populace had no doubt about the status of the Mongols or permissibility of fighting back due to what they perpetrated in 699/1299-1300; the only question was whether it is obligatory to fight or just permissible. In this fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya addressed three issues: the status of the Mongols and obligation of fighting them, differentiating between Khārijīs and people of the Camel and Ṣiffīn [*bughāt*], and the status of the Mamlūk Sultans fighting the Mongols. In the following paragraphs, we shall state how Ibn Taymiyya addresses the three issues, citing quotations from the fatwa and the secondary sources.

⁹⁹ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:546.

¹⁰⁰ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:553.

¹⁰¹ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 117.

¹⁰² Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:502.

After praising Allah, Ibn Taymiyya makes an opening statement establishing a general principle that legalizes fighting any group that resists adhering to the Islamic law. The statements, however, became the most frequent quotation from the anti-Mongol fatwas by all those who use the anti-Mongol fatwas outside the Mongol context.

Every group that resists adhering to any law from the widely reported and manifest laws of Islam among the people [i.e. the Mongols] or others, then it is obligatory to fight them until they adhere to its laws, even if they pronounce the two testimonies and adhere to some of its laws, just as Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq and the Companions – may Allah be pleased with them- fought the people who resisted *zakāt*. The jurists after them [the Companions] agreed upon this after ‘Umar’s argument with Abū Bakr –may Allah be pleased with both. The Companions – May Allah be pleased with them – agreed on fighting for the obligations [*ḥaqq*] of Islam, in accordance with the Book [of Allah] and the tradition [of the Prophet].¹⁰³

On the status of the Mongols and the obligation of fighting the Mongols, Ibn Taymiyya maintains the same views as in the third fatwa: the Mongols are Khārijīs and should be fought. The Mongols should not be treated as *bughāt*, rather, they are Khārijīs:

These [Mongols] according to the most judicious scholars – are not on the same level as the rebels (*bughāt*) resisting a leader or resisting obedience to him, like the people of Syria with the Commander of the Faithful ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib— May God be pleased with him. But the aforementioned [Mongols] exit from Islam just like those who resisted *zakāt*, and in the position of the Khārijīs that ‘Ali Ibn Abī Ṭālib – may Allah be pleased with him—.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:502.

¹⁰⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:504.

Therefore, fighting them is obligatory by the consensus of the Muslims. Whoever knows the religion of Islam and the reality of the situation of the Mongols will not doubt the obligation of fighting them, Ibn Taymiyya argues.¹⁰⁵ Unlike in the third fatwa where Ibn Taymiyya did not cite any example of the deviation of the Mongols, in this fatwa Ibn Taymiyya mentions a number of reasons obligating to fight them not mentioned in the first fatwa. These reasons include: their army consist of people from different religion. They pledged allegiance to their dynasty and fought for that instead of Islam, they violated the sacredness of wealth and blood of Muslims, and the majority of them do not adhere to obligations. They do not adhere to verdict according to the judgement of Allah, rather they judge by their laws.

Firstly, they saw Islam as an obligation, but they do not fight whomever abandon it, rather they ennoble whoever fights with the Mongol empire even if he was a non-believer, an enemy of God and His Messenger. And they permit fighting whomever rebels against the Mongol Empire even if he was the best of the Muslims. They do not fight non-Muslims; they do not enforce *jizya* and humility upon the people of the Book. They do not prohibit anyone in their army to worship what he wants, either sun, moon or anything, rather what is manifest from their pattern is that; they consider as a Muslim as a just or pious of the Muslims and as non-Muslim as immoral of the Muslims or one who abandons the supererogatory acts. And also, the majority of them does not prohibit the blood and wealth of the Muslims except if the sultan prohibits them from it. [That is] they do not abide by its prohibition. If he [the sultan] forbade them from it or other things they obey him because he is the sultan not because of the religion. And most of them do not adhere to obligations; neither the prayers nor *zakāt* nor the pilgrimage nor anything else. And they do not adhere to judgement according to the judgement of Allah, rather they judge

¹⁰⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:506.

according to their laws which sometimes agree with Islam and sometimes oppose it.¹⁰⁶

In this fatwa unlike the two others, Ibn Taymiyya argues that *da'wa* should be given to the Mongols before fighting them: “Yes, a legal way should be followed in fighting them, by calling them to adhere to the Islamic laws, if the *da'wa* did not reach them, just as the non-believing fighters are called first to the two testimonies if the *da'wa* did not reach him.”¹⁰⁷

The second issue in this fatwa is the difference between the Khārijīs and *bughāt*. As in the third fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya argues that the Khārijīs and *bughāt* are two different entities and should not be treated equally. He mentions similar reasons to those in the third fatwa with a slight difference in presenting the reasons. In both fatwas Ibn Taymiyya stated that the hadiths about fighting Khārijīs differed from those of fighting the rebels. The Prophet commanded fighting the Khārijīs and preferred a treaty with the *bughāt*. In addition, in the third fatwa, he states that the Companions differed in fighting the *bughāt* and united in fighting the Khārijīs, therefore, fighting the Khārijīs is by the consensus of the Companions. While in this fatwa, he states that Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib took a different pattern in his fight against the Khārijīs from the pattern of fighting the *bughāt*:

Because of this, ‘Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib [took a different pattern] in fighting the people of Basra and the Syria from the pattern of fighting the people of Nahrawān: his relation to the people of Basra and Syria was that of a brother to his brother, but with the Khārijīs it was different. There are established traditions from the Prophet—Peace and blessings of Allah be upon him – [supporting] the consensus of the Companions for [Abū Bakr] al-Ṣiddīq fighting [those who resisted *zakāt*] and fighting the Khārijīs, unlike the *fitna* that occurred with the people of Syria and Basra; the traditions

¹⁰⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:505.

¹⁰⁷ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:506.

in it showed what it showed, the Companions and the followers differ [in opinion] on it.¹⁰⁸

The third issue in the fatwa is defining the status of the Mamlūk sultans. After arguing the obligation of fighting the Mongols, Ibn Taymiyya then argues that, if the one fighting the Mongols fulfils the utmost conditions of pleasing Allah, strengthening His words, establishing His religion and obeying His messenger then it is better. However, if they were overcome by libertinism and false intention- fighting for leadership or transgressing the law in some issues, yet the evil of abandoning the fight would be greater than the evil of fighting those with the corrupt habits, then it is obligatory to fight them to repel the greater of two evils by committing the lesser one. This is part of the fundamentals of the religion that must be observed.¹⁰⁹ Here Ibn Taymiyya is attempting to admit that the Mamlūks are also corrupt and guilty of violating Sharīʿa; nevertheless, the crimes of the Mongols outweigh theirs, and therefore joining the Mamlūks in fighting the Mongols is taking to the lesser evil. According to Aigle, Ghāzān Khān considers the Mamlūks as *bughāt* and sought a fatwa from some Islamic scholars to fight them. He accused them of having invaded the territory of Mardin, where they committed various acts of moral turpitude. Amongst the misdeeds ascribed to them were orgies with the daughters of Muslims and drinking alcohol in the mosques, all during the month of Ramadan.¹¹⁰ But Ibn Taymiyya had a different view of them. He admitted a fault in the Mamlūks, yet presents them as the true champions of Islam. According to him, they are the victorious group whom the Prophet referred to when saying: “A group of my community will never cease to show their support for the victory of right, and neither those who oppose them nor those who betray them shall cause them any harm, until the hour passes.”¹¹¹

Although Ibn Taymiyya did not mention the above atrocities of the Mamlūks reported by Aigle, yet considering the Mamlūks as lesser evils indicates that Ibn Taymiyya admits fault in them, but he considers the Mongols’ fault to be greater. Consequently, to Ibn Taymiyya, fighting the Mongols

¹⁰⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:504.

¹⁰⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:506.

¹¹⁰ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 92.

¹¹¹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:531. And Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 111.

alongside the Mamlūks is for the good of the religion. It is established in the religion that committing the lesser of two evils is obligatory. Ibn Taymiyya stated that:

It is part of fundamentals of *ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamā'a* to fight alongside the good and bad [Muslims] for Allah will make his religion victorious via a bad person and with people that have no share [in the hereafter], just as the Prophet – the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him – said. This is because if the fighting cannot be achieved except with the bad leaders or with army whom the majority are immoral, then there must happen one of the two: either to abandon the battle with them, then the most harmful in the here and the hereafter will overcome [the Muslims], or to engage in the battle alongside the bad ruler to repel the lesser of the two evils and to establish most of the Islamic rulings if establishing all is not achievable. And this is obligatory in this form and its likes. Rather, most of the battles that took place after the *Rāshidūn* [rightly guided Caliphs] are of this type.”¹¹²

2.6 The second fatwa

The second fatwa is the longest and according to Aigle, the last to be issued by Ibn Taymiyya on the Mongols. Raff argues it was also issued before the battle of Marj al-Ṣuffar, because there was no mention of it in the fatwa, but Aigle follows Yahya Michot and emphasised it was issued at the invasion of 712/1312-13 after Uljaytū's conversion to Shi'ism. According to Michot, due to the Mongols conversion to Shi'ism Ibn Taymiyya repudiated Shi'ism and emphasised that it was a threat to Sunni Islam.¹¹³ The fatwa is thirty five pages and repeats the arguments of the two previous fatwas. According to Aigle, the composition of the Mongol army at this invasion inspired Ibn Taymiyya's anger; thus he issued a tough fatwa against them. Their army was composed of the adherents of various religions; among them were Muslims, Christian, pagans

¹¹² Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:506-7.

¹¹³ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām, 117 – 18.

and polytheists.¹¹⁴ Moreover, according to her, when Ibn Taymiyya with the delegation of Damascene notables went to meeting with Ghāzān Khān in December 1299 before their invasion, Ibn Taymiyya sees the Mamlūk renegades including the former governor of Damascus Qitchab al-Mansūrī in the Mongol army. This scenario pushed Ibn Taymiyya to employ more reasons why the Mongols and the renegades should be fought.¹¹⁵

In the previous two fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya did not explicitly excommunicate the Mongols despite arguing for the obligation for fighting them. Perhaps that is why the wording of the question in this last fatwa admits the Islam of the Mongols: “They pronounced the two testimonies of faith and claim Islam. They are no more the non-believers they were in the first place.”¹¹⁶ Moreover, despite the previous two fatwas by Ibn Taymiyya obligating to fight the Mongols and classifying them as Khārijīs, yet some people still have a doubt on fighting the Mongols and instead of considering them as Khārijīs based on Ibn Taymiyya’s argument, they consider them as *bughāt*. The enquirer needs more convincing clarification from Ibn Taymiyya for the arguments in the previous two fatwas. Here are the enquirer’s questions:

Is it obligatory to fight them? What is the evidence for fighting them? What are the opinions of scholars in that [fighting them]? And what is the position of those renegades that joined them from the Muslim army; the emirs and others? What is the position of those that were compelled [to fight with them]? What is the position of those in their army who inclined to knowledge, jurisprudence, poverty, Sufism and others? What is said to the one who alleges that they and the ones fighting them are Muslims and both of them are tyrants, so none of them should be sided with, and the statement of whoever alleges they should be fought like the rebels with permissible interpretations? What is obligatory upon the scholars, the skilful fighters and wealthy people towards them [the Mongols]? Elaborate your answer for us

¹¹⁴ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām” 99.

¹¹⁵ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām” 100.

¹¹⁶ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:509.

concerning this, for their status has confused many or most of the Muslims.¹¹⁷

From the above question, the enquirer requested Ibn Taymiyya to address five issues; firstly, more clarification and reasons for the obligation of fighting the Mongols, secondly, the position of those renegades that joined the Mongols from the Muslim army; the emirs and others. Hitherto Ibn Taymiyya did not address the issue of renegades in the previous two fatwas. Thirdly, the position of the Mamlūk prisoners compelled to fight with the Mongols, which Ibn Taymiyya already addressed in the previous two fatwas and fourthly, those who inclined to knowledge, jurisprudence, poverty, and Sufism from among the Mongol army. These categories were mentioned briefly by Ibn Taymiyya in the third fatwa. Lastly, the enquirer urged Ibn Taymiyya to elaborate on why the Mongols are not considered as *bughāt* with permissible interpretation, since both the Mongols and Mamlūks are tyrants.

According to Raff, the question of the second fatwa exhibits the doubt about fighting the Mongols based on their conversion to Islam. Therefore, Ibn Taymiyya attempts to clear the misconception and distance fighting the Mongols from being analogous to the sedition that took place in the first generations of Muslim.¹¹⁸ Ibn Taymiyya's answer is not categorized based on the questions. In the following paragraphs, we shall follow Ibn Taymiyya on how he answers these questions; however, I will discuss his responds categorially according to how they appear in the question not in the fatwa.

The first issue, on the obligation of fighting the Mongols, Ibn Taymiyya maintains the same position as in the previous two fatwas: fighting the Mongols is an obligation. Not only Mongols, rather, each group that resists adhering to Islamic law should be fought.

Each group that rebels against any law from the widely reported and manifest laws of Islam, then it is obligatory to fight them with the agreement of the imams of Islam; even if they pronounce the two testimonies of faith. If they

¹¹⁷ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:509.

¹¹⁸ Raff, *Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwā*, 40.

confess the two testimonies of faith and resist from the five prayers they should be fought until they pray. If they refuse *zakāt*, they should be fought until they give *zakāt*. Also, if they refuse fasting the month of Ramadan or [performing] the pilgrimage to the ancient house [*ka'ba*]. And also, if they refuse forbidding obscenity, fornication, gambling, alcohol or other than that from the prohibitions of Sharī'a, and also if they resist the judgement of the Book [of Allah] and the Sunna [of the Prophet] with regard to wealth, honour (*a'rāḍ*), chastity (*abḍā'*) and their likes...¹¹⁹

Ibn Taymiyya cites many qualities of the Mongols that qualified them to be fought with jihad. First is their atrocities of 699/1299:

It is known that those people came to Syria the first time in the year [six hundred and] ninety-nine and gave the people amnesty. They read [the amnesty] on the pulpit in Damascus. Despite this, they took almost one hundred thousand Muslim families or more [as captives]. Only Allah knows who they killed and took [as captives] from Jerusalem [Bayt al-Maqdis,] Jabal al-ṣālihiyya, Nablus, Aleppo, and Dārīyā [cities]. It is even said that they took almost one hundred thousand. They fornicated with the best Muslim women in the mosques and other places, such as the mosque of al-Aqsā, al-Umawī and others. They demolished the mosque at al-Aqabiyya.¹²⁰

Second is the composition of the Mongol army. Their army consists of many people who, according to Ibn Taymiyya deserves to be fought. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the majority of them do not even pray or fast. Their allegiance was for their dynasty not for Islam:

The only people in their dynasty are the worst of creations, either freethinker (*zindīq*) hypocrite who does not admit the

¹¹⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:510.

¹²⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:520.

religion of Allah, or the worst of the innovators such as *al-Rāfiḍa*, *al-Jahmiyya*, *al-Ittiḥadiyya* and their likes, or the most deviant of people. Despite their ability in their city, they do not perform Hajj to the ancient house. Although some of them fast and pray, the majority of them does not establish prayers or give *zakāt*. They fight for king Genghis Khān. They made whoever submits to them as a saint even if he were a nonbeliever.¹²¹

Aigle explains that the Mongols do not give any religion's superiority over the other and granted tax immunity for the churchmen if they accepted Mongolian authority. This pragmatism displayed in dealing with the various religious communities of their empire was another basis for Ibn Taymiyya's polemics against them.¹²²

The third reason is that the Mongols raised their king Genghis Khān to the same level as the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), to the point of claiming that he is the Son of God, just as the Christians believed in Jesus Christ.

Of their elders that advanced to Syria said while addressing the ambassadors of Muslims and expressing their [Mongols] Islam. He said: "These are two great signs from Allah; Muhammad and [Genghis] Khān." This is the best their elders can express to the Muslims, to equate the messenger of Allah, the best of his creations, the leader of the children of Adam and seal of messengers with the nonbelieving and polytheist king, one of the worst polytheists, tyrants and transgressors, typical to Bukht-naṣr [Nebuchadnezzar II] and the likes. That is because the Mongols have great belief for Genghis Khān; they believe he is the son of god just as the Christians believe the messiah is the son of god. They said that the sun impregnated his mother; the sun descended to his mother in a tent and impregnated her. It is known to every religious [person] that this is a lie. This shows that he

¹²¹ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:521.

¹²² Aigle, "The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām," 115.

is bastard; his mother fornicated, concealed her fornication and claimed that to defend herself from the shame of fornication. With all this they [Mongols] made him a great messenger of Allah by revering whatever he legislates for them from his desires; they even consider their wealth as provision from Genghis Khān. They made him a partner [to Allah] in their food and drink.¹²³

According to Raff, Ibn Taymiyya got their claim of making Genghis Khān the son of God wrong. He confounds Alan Guu-a, the mother of Budancer who is Genghis Khān's mythical ancestor with the mother of Genghis Khān. The confusion, according to Raff, is due to the fact that Genghis Khān like Christ was declared the son of God and Budancar like Christ was declared to be born of a virgin. Thus, Ibn Taymiyya like Near Eastern people such as Armenian historian Kirasko made the error of understanding that Alan Guu-a is the mother of Genghis Khān.¹²⁴ Aigle has made the picture clearer. She pointed out that the Mongols refer to Genghis Khān as the son of God based on their legend of their origin. According to them, Alan-Q'oa, their mythical ancestor, gave birth to three sons after the death of her husband. A being with "pale yellow" skin had crept into her tent three times and its light had penetrated her stomach. Since the tenggeri¹²⁵ was seen by Christians and Muslims as a personalized God, there was only one step needed to consider Genghis Khān the son of God.¹²⁶

The fourth reason is that the Mongols ennoble the non-Muslims and instead of judging according to the book of Allah, they judge according to the *jahiliyya* (non- Islamic judgement):

They [Mongols] claimed the religion of Islam, but they ennoble the religion of those non-believers over the religion of Islam. They submit to them and befriend them much more than they obey Allah and His Messenger and befriend the

¹²³ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:522.

¹²⁴ Raff, *Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwā*, 47.

¹²⁵ According to Mongol legend, Tenggeri entrusted Genghis with the mission of uniting the world under Mongol control.

¹²⁶ She is here repeating the same argument with Raff about the misconception of Ibn Taymiyya on Mongols claim on Genghis Khān.

believers. They resolve the disputes among their elders with the judgement of Jāhiliyya not the Judgement of Allah and His messenger. Also, the elders from their ministers and others consider the religion of Islam just like Judaism and Christianity; [they claim that] all these religions is way to Allah, just like the four schools of jurisprudence for Muslims.¹²⁷

Ibn Taymiyya then argues for the disbelief of whoever judges with other sources not Sharī'a, using the agreement of all Muslims as an evidence.

It is necessarily known in the Islamic religion and by the agreement of all Muslims that, whoever legalizes following other than Islamic religion or following a path [*sharī'a*] other than the Sharī'a of Muhammad is a non-believer, just like the disbelief of those who believe in part of the book and disbelieve in part of the book. As Allah the most high said, "Verily, those who disbelieve in Allah and His Messengers and wish to make distinction between Allah and His Messengers [by believing in Allah and disbelieving in His Messengers] saying, "We believe in some but reject others, and wish to adopt a way in between. They are in truth disbelievers. And we have prepared for the disbelievers a humiliating torment." (Quran 4:150– 151).¹²⁸

The above quotation is one of the most frequent quotations from Ibn Taymiyya by the jihadists as will be explained in Chapters Five and Six of this thesis.

In all the three fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya criticizes the Mongols based on the same issue of not judging according to Sharī'a, but in this fatwa the use of *yāsā* in particular is stressed by Ibn Taymiyya as one of the reasons obligating to fight the Mongols and the Shī'is who adopted the *yāsā*.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:523.

¹²⁸ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:524.

¹²⁹ Throughout the three anti-Mongol fatwas Ibn Taymiyya did not use the term Shī'a, he uses Rāfiqa instead. However, Aige, Michot and the jihadists use Shī'a in reporting Ibn Taymiyya's

The Muslims have come to consensus that fighting the Khārijīs, Rāfiḍa and their likes is obligatory, if they exit from the communion of Muslims, just as ‘Alī –may Allah be pleased with him– fought them, what of if they add to that the rules of the polytheists such as the *yāsā* of Genghis Khān, king of the polytheists what is most gravely contrary to the religion of Islam.¹³⁰

According to Aigle, The Mongols advocated religious freedom and claimed to follow the *yāsā*, the law established by Genghis Khān, at the cost of strict obedience to the Sharī‘a. In other words, although they had converted to Islam, the Mongols did not comply with the principles of Islamic law.¹³¹ As Bonney puts it, the word *yāsā* means order or decree. The Great *Yāsā* was a compilation of Genghis Khān Laws, rules, and words of wisdom. It was written on scrolls that were bound in volumes, and kept in secret archives to which only the supreme ruler and his closest associates had access.¹³² The contemporary jihadists analogised the sources of law used in the contemporary Muslim nations to the *yāsā* codes of the Mongols. This will be elaborated in the second part of this thesis.

The second issue from the question is the position of the Mamlūk renegades. On the Mamlūks renegades who joined the Mongols, Ibn Taymiyya is tougher on them as he regards them as apostates, and considers their disbelief as way higher than that of the Mongols. He cites a number of cases in Islamic jurisprudence, where the non-believers are given the soft treatment over the

use of Rāfiḍa. While the two terms are used intergengbly, the term Rāfiḍa is more specific as it refers to the proto-Imāmiyya (and, subsequently, the Twelver Shī‘a). For alternative reading on the two terms refer to S.H.M. Jafri, *Origins and early development of Shi‘a Islam*, (Beirut: np 1979) and Kohlberg, E. “al-Rāfiḍa” in P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs *Encyclopaedia of Islam*

<http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2>.

¹³⁰ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:530. In MF it appears “*aḥkām al-mushrikīn—kanā’isan—* wa-jankhishkhān malik” which renders no meaning, but according to Aigle, Michot established the correct reading. She states: Jean Michot demonstrates that the word kanā’isan is in fact a corruption of ka-yāsā, the manuscript form of which is very similar. This renders the phrase comprehensible: “that which, of the rules of the associationists (*aḥkām al-mushrikīn*)—such as the *yāsā* (*ka-yāsā*) of Chinggis Khan, king of the polytheists—is most gravely contrary to the religion of Islam.” Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 95.

¹³¹ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 116.

¹³² Bonny, *Jihad from Quran*, 114.

apostates; for the apostates are to be killed in all circumstances, unlike the non-believers who are only fought in some circumstances, Ibn Taymiyya argues.¹³³

Whoever defects from them [Mamlūk] to the Mongols deserves to be fought more than many of the Mongols. Among the Mongols are the coerced and volunteers. The tradition has been established from many considerations that the punishment of the apostates is more severe than the punishment of the disbeliever. Part of it is that the apostate is killed in all situations, *jizya* should not be collected from him, and he should not be covered by covenant unlike disbeliever. From it, the apostate is killed even if he is unable to fight unlike the disbeliever, that is, not combatant, he would not be killed by the opinion of the majority scholars such as Abū Hanīfa, Mālik, Shafi‘ī and Aḥmad. From it is that the apostate will not inherit [his Muslim relative] he would not be married and his slaughtered [animal] would not be eaten, unlike the disbeliever, and other rulings.¹³⁴

According to Aigle, Ibn Taymiyya argues that the renegades are apostates and deserve to be fought more than the Mongols. He relies on the Companions who at the beginning of Abū Bakr’s caliphate termed those who refused to pay the *zakāt* apostates, even though they fasted, prayed, and did not fight against the Muslim community. Ibn Taymiyya argues that according to the Sunna of the Prophet, the penalty set out for the apostate is harsher than that which applies to those who are unbelievers. The apostate must be put to death, even if he is incapable of fighting, whereas many jurists do not decree the execution of the unbeliever.¹³⁵

The third issue from the question is the status of the Mamlūk prisoners compelled to fight alongside the Mongols. Ibn Taymiyya addressed the issue in the third fatwa. In these fatwas, however, he maintains the same position as in

¹³³ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:534.

¹³⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:534.

¹³⁵ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 102-3.

the previous fatwa and repeats the same argument: they should be fought. However, if they are killed, they become martyrs. He quotes four hadiths as evidence. One of the hadiths goes: “An army will raid this house [the Ka‘ba] and when it reaches a desert land, all of them will be swallowed up by the earth. Then It is said; O Messenger of Allah! Some of them are forced out. He answered, they will be raised for Judgement according to their intentions.”¹³⁶ Ibn Taymiyya then comments:

Allah the most high destroyed the army that wanted to violate his sacredness— the coerced and non-coerced— despite his ability to distinguish between them, and He will resurrect them based on their intention, how would it be obligatory upon the believers fighting [jihad] to distinguish between the coerced and others, while they do not know that. If someone claims that he was forced out his claim will not work [for him], as it was reported that al-‘Abbās ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib said to the Prophet —the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him— when the Muslims captured him on the day of Badr: O Messenger of Allah! I was forced out. And he [the Prophet] said: “We will deal with your outward Allah deals with your inward.” Rather even if there were pious people from the best of mankind among them and they [Mongols] couldn’t be fought unless they [the pious people] were killed they would be killed also. The imams have agreed that if the nonbelievers were to take shield with the Muslims and [the general] Muslims may be harmed if they didn’t fight, then it is permissible to throw them [Muslims shield] while intending the non-believers. It is permissible to attack those Muslims Even if the [general] Muslims are feared for, according to one of the two statements of the scholars. Whoever is killed because of the jihad that Allah and His messenger commanded- and inwardly he is wronged [not deserving to be killed] – is a

¹³⁶ Bukhārī

martyr, and will be resurrected on his intention. Killing him is not a worse corruption than killing whoever is killed from the believers' fighters.¹³⁷

According to Ibn Taymiyya, those who were forced to fight alongside the Mongols should abstain from the fighting. They should isolate themselves and destroy their weapons, even if that will lead the Mongols to kill them. If they were killed by the Mongols for not fighting the Mamlūks, the Mongols will bear the sin of killing them, but the jihad against the Mongols cannot stop due to fear of killing the compelled:

If jihad is obligatory even if Muslims as many as Allah wills are killed, then killing who is killed among the Muslims from their [Mongols] side is not greater than that. Rather, the Prophet –the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him– commanded who is compelled [to fight] in sedition to break his sword. He should not fight even if he were killed. As in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim from Abū Bakra who said: The Prophet –the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him– said, “There would soon be turmoil. Behold! There would be turmoil in which the one who would be seated would be better than one who would stand and the one who would stand would be better than one who would run. Behold! When the turmoil comes or it appears, the one who has a camel should stick to his camel and he who has a sheep or goat should stick to his sheep and goat and he who has land should stick to the land. A person said: 'Allah's Messenger, what is your opinion about one who has neither camel nor sheep nor land? Thereupon, he said: He should take hold of his sword and beat its edge with the help of stone and then try to find a way of escape. O Allah, I have conveyed [Thy Message]; O Allah, I have conveyed [Thy Message]; O Allah, I have conveyed [The Message]. A person said: Allah's Messenger, what is your opinion if I am drawn to a rank in spite of

¹³⁷ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:537- 38.

myself, or in one of the groups and made to march and a man strikes with his sword or there comes an arrow and kills me? Thereupon he said: He will bear the punishment of his sin and that of yours and he would be one amongst the denizens of Hell.” [It could be deduced] in this Hadith that he [the Prophet] forbids fighting in sedition, rather he commands the avoidance of fighting by isolation or destroying the weapons that are fought with, this includes the one compelled to fight and other than him. He then elucidated that if the compelled to fight was killed wrongly, the killer will bear his sins and the sins of the [person] killed. As Allah says about the one who was killed wrongly in the story of two sons of Adam “Indeed, I want you to bear [thereby] my sin and your sin so you will be among the companions of the Fire. And that is the recompense of wrongdoers.” (Quran 5:29).¹³⁸

Ibn Taymiyya further argues that it is an act of jihad for the one compelled to fight the Muslims to abstain and to be killed for the benefit of jihad. If he can spare his life for the benefit of the religion, then his act is equally jihad that he will be rewarded for:

He should not wrong the other by killing him to spare himself, if he does that the retaliation should be on the coercer and coerced together by [the opinion] of majority scholars such as Aḥmad, Mālik and Shāfi‘ī in one of his statements and in other the retaliation is obligatory upon the coercer only similar to [the statements of] Abū Hanīfā and Muhammad, it is said the retaliation is on coerced as it is reported from Zufar. And Abū Yūsuf is obligating compensation with the blood money instead of retaliation, he did not obligate it. Muslim reported in his Ṣaḥīḥ from the Prophet –the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him– the story of Aṣḥāb al-Ukhdūd and in it: “A child commanded

¹³⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:538 – 39.

killing himself for the benefit of manifesting the religion.” And due to this the four imams permit a Muslim to immerse in the non-Muslims row [during the fight] even if he thinks they will kill him if there is a benefit of the Muslims in doing that. We have details of this issue in another place.

If a man will do what he believes he would be killed for, for the benefit of jihad, despite that killing himself is worse than him killing others; what leads to killing others for the benefit of the religion that will not be achieved without that and repelling the harm of enemy; the one who will corrupt here and hereafter that will not be repelled without that is even better. If the tradition and consensus have agreed that if the robbery of a Muslim arm robber could not be repelled without killing him, he would be killed, even if the money he robs is carat of Dinar as the Prophet – the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him – said in authentic hadith: “Whoever is killed defending his wealth is a martyr; whoever is killed defending his blood is a martyr whoever is killed defending his honour is a martyr.” What about fighting those that rebelled from the Islamic laws. The fighters of Allah and his messenger, whose robbery and rebellion is the least in them. Fighting the transgressors robbers is established by tradition and consensus.¹³⁹

The above analysis of Ibn Taymiyya on forcing oneself to be killed for the sake of jihad is used by the contemporary jihadist as justification for the suicide in the course of jihad. This will be elaborated in Chapter Seven of the thesis.

The fourth issue in the question is defining the status of those who inclined to knowledge, jurisprudence, poverty, Sufism and others in the Mongol army. Ibn Taymiyya did not address the question directly, but he issues his

¹³⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:540 – 41.

understanding generally on the Mongols. He argues that there are no good people in their camp:

The only people in their dynasty are the worst of creations, either freethinker [*zindīq*] hypocrite who does not admit the religion of Allah, or the worst of the innovators such as *al-Rāfiḍa*, *al-Jahmiyya*, *al-Ittiḥadiyya* and their likes, or the most deviant of people. Despite their ability in their city, they do not perform Hajj to the ancient house. Although some of them fast and pray, the majority of them does not establish prayers or give *zakāt*.¹⁴⁰

The fifth and last issue in the question is why the Mongols are not considered as *bughāt* with permissible interpretation, since both the Mongols and Mamlūks are sinners. In addressing the question, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that the Mongols are analogical to Khārijīs not *bughāt*. He attempts to outline some differences between the Khārijīs and the *bughāt*.

In six pages, he expatiates on the differences between the Khārijīs and *bughāt*.¹⁴¹ He employs the same logic as in the previous two fatwas and adds more. In this fatwa, he states three differences between the Khārijīs and *bughāt*. The first difference is that there are hadiths commanding to fight the Khārijīs.

The hadiths [commanding] to fight the Khārijīs have circulated from the Prophet –the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him- it is widely reported/accepted by the people of Hadith. Imam Ahmad said: the hadith about Khārijīs is authentic from ten narrations. Muslim recorded it and Bukhari recorded three of it: the hadith of ‘Alī, Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudurī and Sahl ibn Ḥanīf. And there are many narrations in *sunan* and *masānīd*. The Prophet –the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him–said, “One of you will trivialize his prayer compared to theirs, and his fasting compared to theirs, and his reading of the Quran compared

¹⁴⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:520.

¹⁴¹ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:512-18.

to their: they recite the Quran, but it will hardly pass down their throat, they will move out of Islam just as the arrow passes out the pray it kills. Where ever you meet them kill them for Allah will reward whoever kills them on the day of judgement, if I were to meet them I would kill them killing of ‘Ad.’¹⁴²

These hadith commands fighting the Khārijīs, unlike *bughāt* whom there were no hadith commanding to fight them.

The second difference between the Khārijīs and *bughāt* is that the pious predecessors agreed on fighting the Khārijīs. They did not dispute on fighting the Khārijīs as they disputed on fighting the *bughāt* on the day of camel and Šifḥīn. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the Companions divided into three groups with regard to fighting the *bughāt*: the first group fought alongside ‘Alī, the second group fought against him, and the third group abstained from fighting either of the two groups. In contrast to Khārijīs whom none of the Companions sided with. And none of the companions forbade fighting them.¹⁴³

The third difference between the Khārijīs and *bughāt* is that ‘Alī’s approach differs with regards to the two groups:

The text and the consensus differentiate between this [Khārijīs] and that [*bughāt*]. ‘Alī took a different path between this and that. He fought the Khārijīs applying the text of the Prophet, and was happy with that. None of his [‘Alī’s] companions argued with him over that. But he showed dislike and criticism for the fighting on the day of Šifḥīn. And he said concerning the people of Camel and others: our brothers rebelled against us the sword has purified them and he prayed [a funeral prayer] over the dead of both parties.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Bukhārī 3610 and Muslim 1064 and Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:512.

¹⁴³ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:513.

¹⁴⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:516.

On the other hand, the Mamlūks despite being sinners are the victorious sect. In the first fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya admits that the Mamlūks are sinners; however, their sins should not deter people from joining them to fight jihad against the Mongols. Aigle pointed out that Ghāzān Khān considered the Mamlūks as *bughāt* and sought a fatwa from some Islamic scholars to fight them. He accused them of having invaded the territory of Mardin, where they committed various acts of moral turpitude. Amongst the misdeeds ascribed to them were orgies with the daughters of Muslims and drinking alcohol in the mosques, all during the month of Ramadan.¹⁴⁵ However, Ibn Taymiyya had a different view of them: they are the champions of Islam.

But the sect in Syria and Egypt [Mamlūks] and their likes, are now fighting for the religion of Islam, they are the most deserving to be part of the victorious sect that the Prophet – Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him—mentioned by his statement in the authentic and circulated hadiths .“There will always be a group amongst my *umma* who is triumphant upon truth, abandoning them will not harm them, until the order of Allah is given and they will be like that [triumphant].”¹⁴⁶ In another narration in Muslim, “the people of Maghrib will continue to be.”¹⁴⁷

Ibn Taymiyya further argues that the Muslim world was weakened by disunity, sectarian religious movements and poor participation in jihad. The authorities in Yemen submitted to the Mongols; Shi’ism was taking over the *hijāz*; Ghāzān Khān’s claim over the holy places is a grave danger to Sunni Islam. The Mamlūks sultans are the only ones fighting jihad against the Mongols; therefore, they deserved to be the victorious sect.

Whoever considers the situation of the world at this time will know that this sect is the most correct of the sects within the religion of Islam in terms of knowledge and practicing jihad in the east and west. They are the one fighting the strong

¹⁴⁵ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 92.

¹⁴⁶ Muslim, 1037.

¹⁴⁷ Muslim, 4715. And Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:531.

people from the polytheists and the People of the Book. Their battles are known with Christians, Turkish polytheists, free-thinkers hypocrites from the Rāfiḍa and others, such as Ismāʿīliyya and their likes from the Qarāmiṭa. It is known previously and presently. The greatness of the Muslims in the East and West is by their greatness. That is why when they were defeated in the year six hundred and ninety-nine only Allah knows the humiliation and catastrophe that befalled the Muslims in the East and West. This is because the inhabitants of Yemen in this period are weak, non-able to do jihad, or non-serious about it, they are subservient to whoever rules this city. They even mentioned that they send an allegiance to those people [Mongols], and when the king of polytheists comes to Aleppo a heavy fighting took place. Most or many of the inhabitants of Hijāz are deviants from the Islamic law, only Allah knows the amount of innovations, misguidance and deviation in them. The people of faith and religion in them are weakened and unable. The power and mightiness in these cities are with non-Muslims. Now, if this sect [in Syria] were humiliated – may Allah forbid- the believers in Hijāz would be the most humiliated, especially Rafḍ [Shi'ism] has overcome them, and the king of those Mongols fighting Allah and His Messenger is now rejected [Marfuḍ or is in Shi'ism]. If they [Mongols] become victorious, they will destroy Hijāz in total. As for Africa, its villagers have overcome it, they are part of the worst creation, they even deserve to be fought and battled. As for the far west with the dominance of the Franks in most of the cities, they do not fight the Christians there, rather, there are many Christians carrying crosses in their army. If the Mongols were to dominate these cities the people of the west would have been the most humiliated by them. Especially if the Christians join the Mongols and they become party against the people of the West. This and other

things elucidate that this group that is in Syria and Egypt are the Islamic Battalion, their mightiness is the mightiness of Islam and their humiliation is the humiliation of Islam, if the Mongols were to defeat them there would be no mightiness left for Islam, nor superiority and no superior party that the people of earth fear that will fight for it.¹⁴⁸

As Aigle pointed out that the Mongols looked down on the Mamlūks for the lack of noble lineage and to Ibn Taymiyya, despite that Ghāzān Khān's ancestors were the sons of kings, but they were all sons of infidel kings. There was nothing to be proud of about being the son of an infidel king; a Muslim Mamlūk is better than an infidel king.¹⁴⁹ Ibn Taymiyya states:

Some of them addressed me and said: our king is a king, son of king, son of king to the seventh of his great grandfathers and your king is a son of emancipated slave. I said to him: the fathers of that king are all non-believers there is no proud of being a non-believer; rather a Muslim slave is better than a nonbeliever king, Allah the most high says, “And verily, a believing slave is better than a [free] *mushrik* (idolater), even though he pleases you.” (Q 2: 221). This and its likes are their evidences. And it is known that it is obligatory for a Muslim to be loyal to a Muslim [ruler] even if he is a slave and he should not be loyal to a non-believer. It is established in the two Ṣaḥīḥ [Bukhārī & Muslim] from the Prophet –the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him– that he said: “Hear and obey [your leaders], even if an Ethiopian slave whose head is like a raisin, is made your chief provided that he rules according to the book of Allah and religion of Islam” a man becomes superior with his believe and piousness not with his [fore] fathers even if they were from Banū Hāshim; the household of the Prophet- the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him,– for Allah has created the

¹⁴⁸ Muslim, 4715. And Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:532 – 34.

¹⁴⁹ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 112.

paradise for who obeys him even if he is a black slave, and created hellfire for who disobeys him even if he is from noble Quraysh, Allah the most high says: “O mankind! We have created you from a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, the most honourable of you with Allah is that who is the most pious.” (Q 49: 13). And in *Sunan* from him –the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him–that he said, “Indeed there is no excellence for an Arab over a non-Arab, nor for a non-Arab over an Arab, nor for a white person over a black one, nor for a black person over a white one, except through *taqwa* (piety), human beings are from Adam and Adam is from clay.”¹⁵⁰

In the second fatwa in general, beside repeating the arguments of the previous two fatwas and addressing the questions of the fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya also adds two things not in the previous fatwas. He explicitly declares the Mongols apostates and criticizes the Shī‘īs and argues for fighting them.

On declaring the Mongols apostates, Ibn Taymiyya argues that the Mamlūk renegades and Mongols are both apostates just as the people who refused *zakāt* were termed apostates despite carrying out other religious obligations:

Whoever decamps to them from the commanders of the camps or non-commanders will have the same status with them, their apostasy is similar to his [Khān]. If the predecessors called those who resist *zakāt* apostates– despite that they were fasting, praying and they were not fighting the Muslim community– how would it be for those who sided with the enemies of Allah and His messenger fighting the Muslims?! Adding to that may Allah forbid if those fighting Allah and His messenger, opposing Allah and His Messenger, the enemies of Allah and His Messenger

¹⁵⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:532 – 43.

were to take the leadership of Egypt and Syria at this time it would lead to vanishing the religion of Islam and the demise of its laws.¹⁵¹

On the Shī'īs, Ibn Taymiyya describes them as worse than the Khārijīs. He enumerates a number of things that made them the worst.

The sect of Rāfiḍa is worse than the Khārijīs. The worst Khārijīs can do is to excommunicate 'Uthman and 'Alī and their supporters. They [Rāfiḍa] resist the traditions of the Prophet –the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him– more than the Khārijīs. They are more liars, fabricators, transgressors and deviants than the Khārijīs. They sided with nonbelievers against the Muslims more than the Khārijīs [did].¹⁵²

However, Ibn Taymiyya's argument against the Shī'īs seems to be based on their collaboration with the Mongols. As Raff points out, while Ibn Taymiyya accused the Mongols with disbelief, he accuses the Shī'ī renegades of apostasy. The Shī'ī, according to Ibn Taymiyya cherish the Mongols and their state, they have been siding with the polytheists, Jews and Christians against the Muslims. They are among the people who helped the Mongols in fighting their and seizure of the country of Islam, in their murder of Muslims and the captivity of their women. The affair of Ibn al-Qamī and the likes of him in Baghdad and their affair in Aleppo with the prince of Aleppo are famous.¹⁵³ Ibn Taymiyya expressed their disbelief amidst-discussing their collaboration with the Mongols:

The Rāfiḍa like the Mongols and their empire because they feel exalted under their empire more than the Muslims' empire. The Rāfiḍa side with the polytheists, Jews and Christians to fight the Muslims. They are one of the greatest causes for the Mongols invasion of Kharasān [a city], Iraq and Syria, before they [Mongols] become Muslims. They

¹⁵¹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:531

¹⁵² Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:527.

¹⁵³ Raff, *Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwā*, 50.

are part of the greatest help to them [Mongols] in invading the Muslim lands, killing the Muslims and enslaving their women. The issue/case of Ibn al-Qāmī and he likes with the Caliph, and their issues in Aleppo with the head of Aleppo is famous and known to the general public. And also, the battles between Muslims and Christians in the coast of Syria (sawāhil- Shām), it is known by the people of experience that the Rāfiḍa side with the Christians against the Muslims, and when the Mongols came they [Rāfiḍa] helped them to take the city. The conquest of Akka and other coast [by the Muslims] became painful for them [Rāfiḍa]. The Rāfiḍa will become heartbroken if the Muslims overcome the Christians and polytheists, and if the polytheists and Christians overcome the Muslims, the Rāfiḍa will take that as feast and joyful.

The freethinkers and the deviators from Nuṣayrīyya, Ismā‘īliyya and their likes from the deviants of al-Qarāmīta and others at Khurasān, Iraq and Shām enrolled in to Rāfiḍa. The Rāfiḍa are Jahamiyya Qadariyya; lie, innovations, and fabrication against the Prophet is more in them than in the Khārijīs; that were fought by ‘Alī and other companions by the command of the Messenger of Allah—Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him. They are more apostates from the religious law than those who refused *zakāt*, who Abū Bakr al-Siddīq and the Companions fought.¹⁵⁴

In general, as Raff points out, Ibn Taymiyya follows two tactics in this fatwa. Firstly, he attempted to win the heart of those who decide to abstain from fighting the Mongols considering them rebels with permissible interpretation; thus, Ibn Taymiyya projected the Mongols as Khārijīs and draw the line between Khārijīs and *bughāt*. He attempts to prove that unlike the *bughāt*, the Mongols have no permissible interpretation. Secondly, Ibn Taymiyya attempts to put the

¹⁵⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:527-28.

ideology of Genghis Khān in the service of Islam. Genghis Khān described the Mongols as “spreaders of universal well-being and repairs” and their opponents as “tyrants and libertines”. In this fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya turns the tables against them. He projects the Mongols as “spreaders of universal damage and harm”. Ibn Taymiyya is retaliating against them with their own ideology. He did so by narrating their evils and particularly their outrage against the Damascenes in their invasion of 1300. Despite their promises in the *amān*, nevertheless, they killed the Muslims and committed many atrocities that are known only to God.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya projected the Mongols as being thickly sullied by paganism: despite their ability to perform the pilgrimage from their home nation the Mongols do not. Among them are people who do not even pray or fast. They do not enforce *jizya*, despite their ability to do that, and they even equate Genghis Khān with the Prophet Muhammad.¹⁵⁶

2.7 Ibn Taymiyya’s letter about the Mongols

The letter is published in volume 28 of the *Majmū‘ Fatāwā*.¹⁵⁷ It is written in March 1301 after the second invasion. For that reason, Ibn Taymiyya mentions the two invasions and refers to the invasion of 1299/1300 as the invasion of last year.¹⁵⁸ It is lengthier than the second anti-Mongol fatwa, but unlike the second anti-Mongol fatwa, this fatwa focusses more on discussing the battles of the Prophet and the status of the hypocrites during the lifetime of the Prophet. Ibn Taymiyya analogises the Mongol invasions with the battles of the Prophet and uses the Quranic arguments against the hypocrites of Medina during the lifetime of the Prophet and applies them in the Mongol context. In the fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya devotes many pages discussing the battles of the Prophet and establishing the status of the hypocrites. However, my analysis will be limited to how he analogises the Prophet’s period to the Mongol period. Like the three anti-Mongol fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya criticises the Mongols and argues for fighting them with jihad, but did not mention anything about the renegades. Like the three anti-Mongol fatwas, the arguments of the letter are used by the contemporary jihadists in justification of their fighting the contemporary

¹⁵⁵ Raff, *Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwā*, 44.

¹⁵⁶ Raff, *Remarks on an Anti-Mongol Fatwā*, 45.

¹⁵⁷ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:424 – 467.

¹⁵⁸ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:431. At the end of the letter Ibn Taymiyya says it was written in Rajab after his return from Egypt. Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:467.

Muslim rulers. In the letter, Ibn Taymiyya begins by comparing between the Mongol invasions of Syria and the battles of the Prophet. Ibn Taymiyya argues that the turmoil in Mongols invasions is similar to those of the battles fought by the Prophet and his Companions:

Indeed, there has occurred in this *fitna* [of the Mongols] which Allah has afflicted the Muslims with this invading enemy who is outside the fold of the *Shari'a* of Islam – similar to what had occurred with the Muslims and their enemy in the time of Allah's Messenger – may the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him–. [In the *fitna* that occurred with the Prophet] Allah revealed [some verses of] His book and tested His Prophet and believers so as it will serve as a lesson for anyone whose hope is in Allah and the final day, and who engages much in the remembrance of Allah till the day of resurrection ... Allah's covenants in His book and in the Sunna of His Messenger encompass the last part of this *Umma* just as they encompass its first part. Allah related the stories of the nations before us in order to serve as a lesson for us, so that we would compare our situation to their situation and measure the last nations according to the first nations.¹⁵⁹

Ibn Taymiyya then narrates the stories of the previous nations, how they were afflicted and the wisdom for the afflictions. According to him, the stories of the previous nations were narrated in the Quran, so as this nation may take lessons from them. He uses the following verses to support the argument; in the story of Joseph, “Indeed in their stories, there is a lesson for men of understanding. It is not a forged statement” (Q 12:111), in the story of Pharaoh “So Allah seized him in exemplary punishment for the last and the first [transgression]. Indeed, in that is a warning for whoever would fear [Allah].” (Q 79: 25-26) and the story of the Muslims in the battle of Badr, “Already there has been for you a sign in the two armies which met - one fighting in the cause of Allah and another of disbelievers. They saw them [to be] twice their [own]

¹⁵⁹ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:424. Translation partly from “Lessons from the Fitnah,” *Dabiq* 44-45

number by [their] eyesight. But Allah supports with His victory whom He wills. Indeed, in that is a lesson for those of vision” (Quran 3:13). In all the stories narrated, taking the signs and lessons is emphasized.¹⁶⁰

Ibn Taymiyya goes on analysing the battles of the Prophet between victory and defeat in order to make comparison with the Mongol invasion of Syria. In the battle of Uḥud Muslims were defeated due to their sins so as in the first Mongol invasion of 699/ 1300. He discussed how the Muslims began defeating the Quraysh in the battle and how the Muslims were eventually defeated due to their sins and turning away from the command of the Prophet.¹⁶¹ He then said comparing the two battles:

And this [the battle of Uḥud] is similar to what happened when Muslims were defeated last year. The Muslims were defeated last year due to their sins which consist of corrupt intention, arrogance, operation, wrong doings, turning away from the judgements of the Book and Sunna, turning away from the obligations...¹⁶²

However, Ibn Taymiyya argues that the defeat in the first invasion was God’s mercy for the believers so as to serve as expiation for their sins:

So, it was out of Allah’s wisdom and His mercy upon the believers that He afflicted them with the trials He had afflicted them with, so that Allah may purify the believers and they may return to their Lord in repentance ... Just as Allah’s support for the Muslims on the day of Badr was a mercy and a blessing and their defeat on the day of ‘Uhud was a blessing and a mercy upon the believers, for indeed the Prophet- the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him- said “Allah does not decree anything for the believer except that it is good. And this is not for anyone except the believer. If he receives good and is thankful to Allah, it is good for

¹⁶⁰ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:426.

¹⁶¹ Ibn Tymiyya, MF 28:430- 31.

¹⁶² Ibn Tymiyya, MF 28:431.

him, and if he is afflicted with hardship and is patient, it is good for him.”¹⁶³

Furthermore, according to Ibn Taymiyya, barely two years after the battle of Uhud, the Muslims gained victory in the battle of congregation/trench so as the Syrian troops against the Mongols in 1301-2. The battle of trench was similar to the second Mongol invasion. In the battle of trench the enemies from variety of origins such as the polytheists of Mecca, the Jewish of Medina congregated against the Muslims just as the Mongol army in their invasion of 1302 consists of the Mongols, Turks, Arab, Christians and others. Both the battle of trench and Mongol invasion of 1302 lasted for more than 20 days.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, in the battle of trench, the congregation was defeated by wind and armies from angels likewise the Mongols were drove back and defeated by snow and rain.¹⁶⁵ In the course of this anylisis, Ibn Taymiyya divided the people in relation to the battles of Uhud and trench in to three; the believers who supported the Prophet and stood firm against the non-believers in the both battles. The second category are the hypocrites, who abandoned the jihad sought for a hide-out in Medina, and the third category are the non-believers; the polytheists of Mecca, the Jews of Medina and their congregation.¹⁶⁶

Since Allah sent Muhammad –May the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him- and supported him with the migrants and supporters, people became divided into three: the believers who believed in him inwardly and outwardly, the unbelievers who exhibit their disbelief and the hypocrites who believed outwardly not inwardly.¹⁶⁷

He expatiates on the hypocrites and the division of hypocrisy into major and minor. Ibn Taymiyya contextualises the categorisation in his period. The believers are Ibn Taymiyya and those fighting the Mongols; the unbelievers are the Mongols and those in their camp and the third category are those who

¹⁶³ Ibn Tymiyya, MF 28:432. Translation from “Lessons from the Fitnah,” 45-46.

¹⁶⁴ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:444.

¹⁶⁵ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:445.

¹⁶⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:433-35.

¹⁶⁷ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:433

abandoned jihad. The third category echoed the same fear of the enemy by the hypocrites of Medina in the battle of the Ditch.¹⁶⁸

And many of the hypocrites of these times leaned towards the Mongol dynasty because they do not obligate upon them the Sharīʿa of Islam. Rather, they leave them and that which they are upon. Some of them flee from the Mongols not for the sake of the religion, but only due to the Mongols' track record of corruption, confiscation of wealth, and their unrestrained bloodshed and enslavement.¹⁶⁹

As can be seen in this letter, Ibn Taymiyya classifies the people who joined the Mongols out of fear as hypocrites. This classification does not appear in the three anti-Mongol fatwa. In the three fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya deals with four categories of people: the Mongols, Mamlūks, Mamlūk prisoners compelled to fight alongside the Mongols and renegades. However, in this fatwa a fifth category appears. The hypocrites are the ones who abstained from jihad against the Mongols and sought a way-out of the crisis:

When this enemy advanced some of the hypocrites said: the Islamic state desists, we should join the Mongol state and some of them said there is no abode in Syria we should migrate to either Ḥijāz, Yemen or Egypt. And some of them said: rather, the best solution is to surrender to the Mongols and their judgement, just as the people of Iraq did.¹⁷⁰

However, the difference between the renegades and the hypocrites in Ibn Taymiyya's categorisation is that unlike renegades, the hypocrites joined the Mongols out of fear not because they believed the Mongols are righteous. When Ibn Taymiyya discussed how the hypocrites expressed their fear at the battle of the Ditch, he said the following on the people who expressed the fear of the Mongols:

¹⁶⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 28:452.

¹⁶⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 28:435.

¹⁷⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 28:450-51.

Likewise, the same happened to many people in this battle, they flee from the borders to the fortress and citadels and faraway places such as Egypt, saying that: our intention is to protect our family, we cannot trust anyone on our family. They were lying, they could have kept them [their family] in the citadel of Damascus when the enemy advanced just as the Muslims did in the lifetime of the Prophet- the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him-. They could also have sent them [their family] and stay for jihad.¹⁷¹

Because of this difference between the renegades and the hypocrites, Ibn Taymiyya was more lenient towards the hypocrites than the renegades. Toward the end of the letter Ibn Taymiyya hopes for their repentance and argues that they are subject to the Mercy or Punishment of Allah. He states:

Allah has afflicted the people with this *fitna* so as to reward the truthful for their truth, they are the ones who stayed firm and steadfast in support of Allah and His messenger and to punish the hypocrites or forgive them if he wishes. We hope from Allah to forgive many of those hypocrites. Some of them have lamented. May Allah the most high accepts the repentance of his servants and overlook the wrongs.¹⁷²

In general, this letter disclosures Ibn Taymiyya's concept on another category of people in the Mongol context not discussed in the three anti-Mongol fatwas: the hypocrites who unlike the renegades joined the Mongols out of fear. It also shows how Ibn Taymiyya analogises the Mongol invasions with the battles of the Prophet and how he copied the Quranic arguments on the hypocrites and applies them to the people in this period seven hundred years later.

2.8 Conclusion

In the three fatwas and the letter about the Mongols, Ibn Taymiyya defines the status of five categories of people: the Mongols, the renegades, the

¹⁷¹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 28:452.

¹⁷² Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:462.

Mamlūk prisoners who were compelled to fight alongside the Mongols, the Mamlūks and those who joined the Mongols out of fear.

Throughout the fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya argues for the obligation of waging jihad against the Mongols. In the third and first fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya declares them as Khārijīs, while in the second fatwa which was the last to be issued, he declares them apostates. He specifically states the reasons for his arguments from the Quran, the Sunna and the history of the early Muslims. He excommunicates and denounces the Mongols not only based on non-enforcement of Sharī‘a as often portrayed by the contemporary jihadists, but also on other reasons. The other reasons Ibn Taymiyya used against the Mongols, according to Aigle, are that, the Mongols do not fight on behalf of Islam, but rather in order to gain the submission of peoples, whoever they might be: “Whoever enters into their obedience and into their infidel way is their friend, even if he is an infidel, a Jew, or a Christian. Whoever refuses to submit is their enemy, even if he were to be among the prophets of God.”¹⁷³ Secondly, on their faith; they may have pronounced the declaration of faith, but they have deviated from the laws of Islam by keeping their ancient beliefs from the Age of Ignorance. He states “It is that, the Mongols believe grave things about Genghis Khān. They believe that he is the son of God, similar to what the Christians believe about Christ. The sun, they say, impregnated his mother . . . , he was a bastard despite which they hold him to be the greatest messenger of God.”¹⁷⁴ Thirdly, the composition of their army, the pragmatism displayed in dealing with the various religious communities of their empire, was another basis for polemics against them. The Mongols do not give any religion's superiority over the other and granted tax immunity for the churchmen if they accepted Mongolian authority.¹⁷⁵

The renegades were only addressed in the second fatwa, which was the last issued by Ibn Taymiyya against the Mongols. Ibn Taymiyya declares them apostates and argues that their apostasy is worse than that of the Mongols. He relies on the Companions who at the beginning of Abū Bakr’s caliphate termed

¹⁷³ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 112.

¹⁷⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:521-22. And Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām 113.

¹⁷⁵ Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām,” 115.

those who refused to pay the *zakāt* apostates, even though they fasted, prayed, and did not fight against the Muslim community.

Ibn Taymiyya also maintains that the Mamlūk prisoners who were compelled to fight alongside the Mongols should be fought. He addresses their issue in the third and second fatwas. He uses some hadiths and the scenario of the battle of Badr, to justify jihad against them. During the battle of Badr, some Companions were taken prisoners. Ibn Taymiyya considers that, as at Badr, if the Mamlūk prisoners fighting in the Mongol army are killed in the battle they will be considered martyrs.¹⁷⁶ Nevertheless, the jihad prescribed upon believers cannot be abandoned because of the Muslims feared to be killed on the side of the Mongols.

On the Mamlūks, Ibn Taymiyya argues that they were the victorious sect at their time. He admits a fault in the Mamlūks, yet presents them as the true champions of Islam. According to him, the Mamlūks were fighting on behalf of the religion; therefore, all other groups should join them. Joining them was taking the lesser of two evils.

In the letter, Ibn Taymiyya deals with the fifth category, the hypocrites who either abandoned the jihad or joined the Mongols out of fear. This category is subject to the mercy of God and many of them later repented according to Ibn Taymiyya.

In general, the circumstances surrounding the period and harsh approach of Ibn Taymiyya in the anti-Mongol fatwas exposed them to exploitations by extremists. Some of his statements in the fatwas, such as excommunicating the Mongols after they claimed Islam, motivating people to attack them despite their pronouncement of the two testimonies of faith and performing some religious obligation, analogising them with Khārijīs and those who withheld *zakāt* might have given room for the extremists to take over the fatwas to their end. Ibn Taymiyya was harsher to the Mongols than his contemporary scholars and historians were on them. Ibn Taymiyya did not mention any good of the Mongols, either on their conversion to Islam or otherwise. In contrast, Dhahabī is more moderate in mentioning both sides of the Mongols. He applauds them

¹⁷⁶ Aigle, "The Mongol Invasions of Bilād Al-Shām," 103.

for accepting Islam. Muhammad Ibn al-Jazarī (d. 1429) went further in elucidating some good qualities of Ghāzān Khān. Part of what he mentioned is, his forgiveness, patience and perseverance. Despite Ibn Kathīr followed the footsteps of Ibn Taymiyya in condemning the Mongols, yet the former was more balanced in mentioning some of their brighter sides. In the events of the 665/1268, Ibn Kathīr applauded Hūlagū's nephew for being a good Muslim, loving scholars and sincerity. Similarly, in the events of 720/1330, he applauded one of their kings Bū-Sa'īd for fighting indecency, establishing justice and being compassionate to his subjects. This balance is lacked in Ibn Taymiyya's approach to the Mongols. However, the position of Ibn Taymiyya on the Mongols might be because of the negative effect they had on him from his childhood; at the age of ten, the Mongols made his family to flee from Harran in Mesopotamia to Damascus. This ordeal might have developed a negative effect on Ibn Taymiyya's approach to the Mongols. If this is established, then the fatwas need to be interpreted circumstantially. However, after scrutinising the fatwas, the additional reason that appears more likely to have pushed Ibn Taymiyya against the Mongols is their atrocities of 699/1299-300, his interactions with their army, and their conversion to Shi'ism.

Another fundamental issue Ibn Taymiyya deals with in the fatwas which is exploited by ISIS is the position of what Ibn Taymiyya termed as "the extreme innovators" such as the extreme Shī'īs; Nuṣayrīs and 'Alawīs. Ibn Taymiyya labelled them as non-believers (*kuffār*), hypocrites, and freethinkers (*zanādiqa*). This, however, is not only for their deviant believes of excommunicating the Companions, but also for being renegades. He cites some examples where they connived with the non-Muslims to fight the Muslims, a crime he said even Khārijīs did not perpetrate. In the segment on ISIS in Chapter Seven, the thesis will outline how ISIS uses Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa on the Rāfiḍa. The thesis will also quote another fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya on Rāfiḍa to argue that ISIS' quotations of Ibn Taymiyya lack balance.

Chapter Three: The Mardin fatwa and Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas against the Nuṣayrīs-ʿAlawīs of Syria/Lebanon

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the thesis discusses four of Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas used by the contemporary jihadists, the Mardin fatwa issued in the Mongol context, and three fatwas issued against Nuṣayrīs-ʿAlawīs of Syria/Lebanon.

Like the anti-Mongol fatwas, the Mardin fatwa is also associated with the Mongols, but the latter is only one page long, more precise and Ibn Taymiyya's approach in it is less harsh than in the former. In the fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya was not asked about the Mongols, rather, about the Muslim inhabitants in Mardin under the Mongol rule. The fatwa has been used by the contemporary jihadists as justification for two arguments: labelling the Muslim nations as domain of war and subsequently obligating the migration from the domain of war to the domain of peace. Yahya Michot translates and comments on the fatwa and quotes a number of articles by some writers who used it as justification of these two arguments. He also cites a number of western academics who either confuse the Mardin fatwa with the anti-Mongol fatwas or misinterpret it to justify the jihadists' argument.¹⁷⁷ Michot interprets the fatwa in a way that reflects the overall understanding of Ibn Taymiyya on the topic, by quoting other texts of Ibn Taymiyya regarding the subject. He translates some passages from Ibn Taymiyya's works and towards the end translated six passages from the contemporary writers who quote the Mardin fatwa in a way that denotes violence.¹⁷⁸ Though not all the six writers are jihadists, they all

¹⁷⁷ Yahya Michot, *Ibn Taymiyya: Muslims Under Non-Muslim Rule*, (Oxford: Interface Publications, 1427/2006), 123-132. He cited examples of Natana Delong-Bas, Menahem Milson and others.

¹⁷⁸ Michot, *Muslims under*, 101-122. He translated some passages from Muhammad ʿAbd al-salam Faraj, ʿAbd Allah ʿAzzam, Muhammad al-Masʿary, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al- Jarbū, Zuhair Sālim and Saʿd al-dīn al-kibbī.

misinterpret Ibn Taymiyya according to Michot. After discussing the fatwa in this chapter, in Chapter Six of this thesis, the thesis discusses how one of the jihadists ‘Abd al-Salām Faraj uses the fatwa in making his arguments. The first part of this chapter will analyse the content of the fatwa using other statements of Ibn Taymiyya and the secondary literature available. The chapter analyses the binary division of the domains and the obligation of migrating from the domain of war to that of peace as deduced from this fatwa by the jihadists.

Likewise, Ibn Taymiyya issued three fatwas against the Nuṣayrīs-‘Alawīs of Syria/Lebanon. These fatwas, like the anti-Mongol and Mardin fatwas, are also employed in the jihadi literature, but in contrast to the anti-Mongol fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas against the Nuṣayrīs are not widely quoted. The fatwas are used by the jihadists specifically on the contemporary Nuṣayrīs-‘Alawīs of Syria and Lebanon. ISIS is the only jihadists group I came across who employed the fatwas against the contemporary Nuṣayrīs-‘Alawīs. The account of how ISIS uses the fatwa is elaborated in Chapter Seven of this thesis. Friedman Yaron translates substantial amount of the fatwas and analyses them in his book on The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs, Yvette Talhamy also analyses them in her article on the Fatwas against the Nuṣayrī/‘Alawīs.

In the section on the Nuṣayrīs in this chapter, the relationship between the Sunni scholars and Nuṣayrīs-‘Alawīs sect is briefly discussed, especially their relationship with the Mamlūks and Ibn Taymiyya. The content of the three fatwas is also analysed using the Arabic text and analysis of Yaron Friedman and Yvette Talhamy.

3.2 Analysis of the Mardin Fatwa

Mardin is a city in Turkey that was invaded by the Mongols after being under the protectorate of the Mamlūks. It was invaded in 658/1260 after a series of campaigns by the Mongols against the Muslim cities in the aftermath of their conquest of the Abbasid Empire.¹⁷⁹ According to Dhahabī, it took the Mongols more than two months of bloody confrontations with the people of Mardin before the city was eventually captured. This happened shortly before the battle of ‘Ayn Jālūt.¹⁸⁰ After the Mongols were defeated in ‘Ayn Jālūt, Mardin and other cities captured were restored and skirmishes continued

¹⁷⁹ Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islam*, 48:57.

¹⁸⁰ Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islam*, 48:57.

frequently between the Mongols and Muslims in the region mostly under the Mamlūks.¹⁸¹ In the year 659/1261 the Mongols betrayed Malik Muzaffar bin Sa'īd the mayor of Mardin and killed him alongside seventy thousand of his people.¹⁸²

Unlike the anti-Mongol fatwas, the exact date of the Mardin fatwa is not known, but it is compiled in volume twenty-eight of the *Majmū' fatāwā*.¹⁸³ It is also reported by Ibn Taymiyya's student and contemporary 'Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Muflih al-Maqdisī (d. 1361) in his book *Ādāb al-sharī'a*,¹⁸⁴ and later in *al-Durar al-Saniyya*, the collection works of Najdi scholars.¹⁸⁵ It was translated by Michot, and my translation below is adapted from his.

Ibn Taymiyya was asked about the land of Mardin. Is it a land of war or peace? Are the Muslims who live there obligated to immigrate to other Muslim countries? If they are obliged to emigrate and they fail to do so, and if they assist the enemies of Islam with their lives and property, are they sinful for doing so? Are those who accuse them of hypocrisy and malign them sinful for doing so?

Ibn Taymiyya answered:

Praise be to Allah. The lives and property of the Muslims are inviolable, whether they are living in Mardin or elsewhere. Assisting those who are acting in opposition to Islam is unlawful, whether those who give the assistance are the people of Mardin or others. The people living there, if they are unable to practice their religion, then they are obliged to emigrate. Otherwise, it is preferable but not an obligation that they do so. It is unlawful for them to aid the enemies of the Muslims with their lives and property. They

¹⁸¹ Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya*, 17:599-421.

¹⁸² Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islam*, 48:77.

¹⁸³ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28:240-41

¹⁸⁴ 'Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Muflih al-Maqdisī, *Ādābu al-sharī'a*, ed. Shu'aib al-Arnā'ūt and 'Umar al-Qayyām (Beirut: Muassatu al-risala 1419/ 1999), 1:212. accessed on 21/10/2015 <https://ia802701.us.archive.org/5/items/FP47297/adabsh1.pdf>

¹⁸⁵ *Durar al-Saniyya lil ajwibati al-najdiyyah* ed. 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Qāsim al-Āṣimī al-najdī n. accessed on 21/10/2015 http://ia801601.us.archive.org/16/items/WAQ41814/12_41825.pdf

must refuse to do so by whatever means they can, like absenting themselves, being evasive, or showing flattery. If the only way open to them is to emigrate, then that is what they must do. It is not lawful to malign them categorically or to accuse them of hypocrisy. Disparaging and accusations of hypocrisy must be according to the designations set forth in the Qur'an and Sunna and are equally applicable to some of the people of Mardin as they are applicable to some people elsewhere.

As for whether it is a land of war or peace, it is a composite situation. It is not an abode of peace where the legal rulings of Islam are applied and its armed forces are Muslim. Neither is it the same as an abode of war whose inhabitants are unbelievers. It is a third category. The Muslims living therein should be treated according to their rights as Muslims, while the non-Muslims living there outside of the authority of Islamic Law should be treated according to their rights.¹⁸⁶

Michot translates the fatwa as it appears in the *Majmū‘ fatāwā*. However, in 2010 a conference consisting of the religious and academic scholars chaired by Shaykh ‘Abd Allah bin Bayyah discovered a misprint in the *Majmū‘ fatāwā* edition and established the correct wording. The discrepancy, according to the conference was in the last sentence of the fatwa which reads “the non-Muslim should be fought [*yuqātalu*] as he merits” instead of “the non-Muslims should be treated [*yu‘āmalu*] as he merits.”¹⁸⁷ The above translation is from the conference version.

According to Michot, what seems most interesting about Ibn Taymiyya’s answer vis-à-vis jihad is two concepts. Firstly, the concept of *hijra* (emigration) and secondly, the abode of peace abode of war dichotomy.¹⁸⁸ After translating the Mardin fatwa, Michot quotes and translates three Taymiyyan texts from where Ibn Taymiyya discusses the concept of *hijra* and the two

¹⁸⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:240-41.

¹⁸⁷ Abd al-Wahhab al-Turayri, *The Mardin Conference – Understanding Ibn Taymiyyah’s Fatwa*, accessed 13/10/2015.

<http://muslimmatters.org/2010/06/29/the-mardin-conference-%E2%80%93-a-detailed-account/>

¹⁸⁸ Michot, *Muslims under*, 32.

domains.¹⁸⁹ The purpose of Michot in quoting these texts is for the reader to understand how Ibn Taymiyya projects the two concepts in his works outside the Mardin fatwa. Michot then follows by quoting six writers who use the Mardin fatwa to argue for *hijra* or binary division of the domains in a way that contradicts how Ibn Taymiyya projects these concepts in the quotations. However, Michot did not discuss the Taymiyyan text he quoted. In the paragraphs below, I will discuss the two concepts using the quotations from Ibn Taymiyya via Michot.

Hijra or emigration from the domain of disbelief to the domain of Islam is connected to jihad and is elucidated under jihad in the works of scholars who wrote about jihad including Ibn Taymiyya. According to Ibn Taymiyya, *hijra* is of two types, the first type is emigration from sins as the Prophet- the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him- is reported to have said that the emigrant is the one who flees that which God has prohibited.¹⁹⁰ The second *hijra* is the emigration from the domain of disbelief to the domain of Islam.¹⁹¹ As for Ibn Taymiyya this type of *hijra* of departing the abode of disbelief is also of two types as the Prophet elucidates in two hadiths. In the first hadith the prophet said, “No more *hijra* after the conquest but jihad and good intention when you are called to jihad go to it,”¹⁹² and the second in his statement: “The *hijra* shall by no means be suspended as long as the enemy remains to be fought.”¹⁹³ In the first hadith the Prophet is referring to the emigration from Mecca to Medina which was obligatory at a point in time when the Muslims were weak at Mecca and could not perform the religious obligation but after the conquest of Mecca it became the abode of belief just like Medina, so the reason for emigration desist.¹⁹⁴ Whereas the second hadith refers to emigration from the land of disbelief and sin to the land where the servant will be able to worship his Lord. This type of emigration is synonymous to repentance, and it is therefore valid till the end of time.¹⁹⁵

¹⁸⁹ The three texts are quoted from *Majmū‘ fatāwā*. The first text is in Ibn taymiyya, MF 18:279-84. The second quotation from Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:216-17. The third quotation

¹⁹⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 18:280. And Michot, *Muslims under*, 67. And Bukhārī, 2481.

¹⁹¹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 18:281.

¹⁹² Bukhārī, 2912.

¹⁹³ Al-Nasā’ī 4102.

¹⁹⁴ Ibn Taymiyya MF 18:282. Translation adapted from Michot, *Muslims*, 72.

¹⁹⁵ Michot, *Muslims under*, 85. And Ibn Taymiyya, MF 18:284.

From the above elucidation by Ibn Taymiyya, we can conclude that the purpose of emigration is to flee to a land where the servants can worship peacefully. That is why, according to Ibn Taymiyya, by no means a particular land is identified where all believers will have to migrate to. In the Mardin Fatwa Ibn Taymiyya also maintains the same trend by relating the condition of the emigration to be based on the ability of the inhabitants of Mardin to practice their religion. In the Mardin fatwa Ibn Taymiyya did not give a straightforward answer to whether the inhabitants of Mardin should emigrate or not, but he says, “If the one resident in Mardin is disabled from putting his religion into effect, it is obligatory for him to emigrate. If that is not the case, it remains preferable, but not obligatory.”¹⁹⁶ Despite Mardin being under the Mongols whom Ibn Taymiyya views as apostates, he obligates the emigration only if the Muslims were not able to put their religious obligation into practice. For this, Ibn Taymiyya did not obligate emigrating from Mardin provided that its inhabitants can practice their religion. Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya clarifies this elsewhere in his work by stating:

That is why the best land for what is of merit for any man, is a land where he is more obedient to God and His messenger. This varies as situations vary, and by no means is the land identified where it would be better for one to settle. The best, for what is of merit for any man, is correlative only to fear of God and to obedience, to humility, to submission [to God’s will] and to attentiveness. Abū al-Dardā wrote to Salmān: come to the Holy Land! Salman wrote to him: a land does not make anyone holy. It is his actions that make a servant holy.¹⁹⁷

Ibn Taymiyya also said regarding turning away from a sinner which he synonymised with *hijra* considering both as deserting or parting a person/ place due of the sin therein:

When by the fact of thus turning away from someone, the outcome is that one obtains good desirable [*ma ‘rūf*] and pushes away something that is reprehensible [*munkar*]

¹⁹⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28: translation adapted from Michot, *Muslims Under*

¹⁹⁷ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 18:283. Translation adapted from Michot, *Muslims*, 80.

doing so is prescribed by the law [*mashrū*]. When [on the contrary] the outcome thereof is a corruption still greater than that from the fault, doing so is not prescribed by the law.¹⁹⁸

Also, when answering a question about turning away from a sinner, after classifying *hijra* into two Ibn Taymiyya emphasizes that emigration from the abode of disbelief or prevent is done for those that cannot establish the commands of God while living amid the disbelievers and hypocrites.¹⁹⁹

The second important issue Michot noticed in the fatwa is identifying the domain of peace from that of war, but he did not elaborate much on how Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of the composite domain differs from that of the jihadists. The focus of his book is more on the emigration.

The Muslim jurists discussed the domain of peace domain of war dichotomy centuries before Ibn Taymiyya. The division cannot be established from the Quran or Hadith but has its root from post *tābi'ūn* [followers, i.e. second generation] era when the scholars at that time deemed it necessary making the division.²⁰⁰ The scholars have differed in opinion on what characterizes the domain of peace from the domain of war. According to Ibn al-Qayyim the majority of the scholars opined that the domain of peace is where the inhabitants are Muslims and Islamic rulings are established.²⁰¹ These two conditions are emphasized in the statements of many scholars including, Abū Yūsuf, Ibn Hazam and al-Shawkānī.²⁰² Ibn Taymiyya used the two conditions to define the status of Mardin. In Mardin, the inhabitants are Muslims, but the rulings are not Islamic, so, it is composite. Thus, it is egalitarian society the Muslim should be treated as he merits and the one who is outside of the authority of Islamic Law should be treated according to their rights. The quotation from Ibn Taymiyya below outlines his position on what distinguishes a domain of belief from the domain of unbelief:

¹⁹⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:217. Translation adapted from Michot, *Muslims*, 91.

¹⁹⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:204

²⁰⁰ 'Abbās Ahmad Muhammad al-Baz, *Al- Māl al-harām wa dawābiḥ al-intifāu wa al-taṣarruf bihi fī al-fiqh al-islāmī* (Jordan: dar al-nafāis, 1998), 196.

²⁰¹ Ibn Qayyim, *Ahkām alh al-dhimma* 1/366 via Abbas Ahmad 193

²⁰² Ahmad Muhammad al-Baz, *Al- Māl al-harām*, 194.

Whether a land is a domain of unbelief or a domain of faith or of perverts is not an attribute that is necessary concomitant (*lāzim*). It is, rather, an accidental attribute, correlative to its inhabitants. Every land whose inhabitants are the believers, who fear [God], is at that moment, is a domain of the friends of God. Every land whose inhabitants are the unbelievers is, at that moment, a domain of unbelief. Every land whose inhabitants are perverts, is, at that moment, a domain of perversity. If others than those we have mentioned [come to] dwell in a [land], and it is transformed by those others, it is their domain.²⁰³

From the above quotation we can conclude that, to Ibn Taymiyya what is considered in the status of a domain is its inhabitants. Therefore, “Every land whose inhabitants are the believers, who fear [God], is at that moment, is a domain of the friends of God.” By this, the contemporary Muslim countries whose inhabitants are Muslims will be considered by Ibn Taymiyya as a domain of belief. Countries such as Egypt that is considered as domain of war by Faraj or Sahwa coalition territories in Iraq and Syria that are considered domains of war by ISIS would be considered a domain of peace if the above analysis were applied. However, this analysis will only be valid in refuting al-Qaida and other jihadists who consider the inhabitants of these countries as Muslims and argue for the apostasy of their rulers. As for ISIS who considers apostates not only the rulers, but also the subjects who do not join the Islamic State, will still consider their domains as domains of unbelief. ISIS considers the Islamic State established in 2014 as the only domain of belief and says the following about the mass migration of the Syrian and Libyan refugees in 2015:

Sadly, some Syrians and Libyans are willing to risk the lives and souls of those whom they are responsible to raise upon the Sharī‘a – their children – sacrificing many of them during the dangerous trip to the lands of the war waging crusaders ruled by laws of atheism and indecency. Although most of these families leave from *dār al-kufr* – Sahwah,

²⁰³ Ibn Taymiyya MF 18:282, translation adapted from Michot, *Muslims Under*, 32.

PKK, or regime territory – to the crusaders’ lands, the possibility of families leaving the Khilāfa for America or Europe in pursuit of the Dunyā is a matter that should bring focus to the ruling of abandoning *dār al-Islām* for *dār al-kufr*. Therefore, it should be known that voluntarily leaving *dār al-Islām* for *dār al-kufr* is a dangerous major sin, as it is a passage towards *kufr* and a gate towards one’s children and grandchildren abandoning Islam for Christianity, atheism, or liberalism.²⁰⁴

According to them, the domain of disbelief is not only America and Europe, rather, the territories under the Sahwa coalition are equally domain of disbelief. Nevertheless, for the 15 issues of *Dabiq* so far, I have not come across any article where ISIS uses Ibn Taymiyya to argue for making the Muslim countries as domain of unbelief. Their argument regarding the issue is devoid of the use of Ibn Taymiyya, therefore will not be discussed in the second part of this thesis. The second part of the thesis will be exclusively for the arguments which the jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya as justification. The use of the Mardin fatwa by the jihadists however, will be discussed in Chapter Six under the segment on *al-Farīda al-Ghāiba* of Faraj.

In the following section, I will discuss Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwas against the Nuṣayrīs and Druze of Syria.

3.3 The Nuṣayrīs-‘Alawīs and their relationship with the Sunni scholars

According to the sources, the Nusayrīs are a Muslim Shī‘ī sect that split off from the major stream of the Shī‘a at the end of the ninth century.²⁰⁵ The sect’s name was derived from its founder Muhammad Ibn Nuṣayr al-Baṣrī, (d.868) a slave of Banī Numayr, originally from Persia, from Khuzestan.²⁰⁶ Ibn Nuṣayr is a disciple of one of the Shī‘īs Imams, Imam al-Hasan al-Askarī (d.873) and said to have been disowned and excommunicated by the Shī‘a scholars due to some extreme concepts he developed which deviate from the main teaching of Shī‘ism.²⁰⁷ The Nuṣayrī sect believes in the doctrine of

²⁰⁴ “The Danger of Abandoning Dārul-Islām” *Dabiq*, 11, (August/Sept 2016), 22.

²⁰⁵ Yaron Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs: An Introduction to the Religion, History, and Identity of the Leading Minority in Syria* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 5.

²⁰⁶ Talhamy, Yvette. “The Fatwas and the Nusayri/‘Alawis of Syria.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 46.2 (2010): 176.

²⁰⁷ Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs: An Introduction to the Religion*, 8.

incarnation and manifestation. They believe that divinity had incarnated itself in the person of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. Moreover, the Nuṣayrī doctrine holds that God had been manifested in mankind since the dawn of time. Among their beliefs is that reincarnation takes the place of the Resurrection, the Day of Judgment, and for being held to account in the Hereafter. Furthermore, they believe that, reward and punishment will not take place in Heaven or Hell in the Hereafter, but it will occur in the worldly life according to the bodily forms, physical manifestations, and transformations that the soul will undergo.²⁰⁸ It is reported in one of their sources that Imam Al Sādiq said “Verily the disbeliever completes in disbelief and is incarnated into an animal or lowly thing and is punished and is raised degree by degree until his disbelief is complete and he finishes in it. And if he finishes (in disbelief) he is incarnated and tortured in an animal or lowly thing.”²⁰⁹ Their beliefs retain traces of paganism and veneration of high places.²¹⁰ The Nuṣayrīs are also referred to as ‘Alawīs, the name given to them by French during the time of their colonial occupation of Syria in 1920. They are the only ruling religious minority in the world.²¹¹ They are currently in Syria and estimated to be about 11 % of the population.²¹²

At the time of Ibn Taymiyya, the Nusayrīs were not in good relationship with the Mamlūks because most of the Sunni scholars anathematized the Nusayrīs. Baybars made numerous attempts to convert the Nuṣayrīs to Sunnism; he forbade initiations into the sect and ordered the construction of mosques throughout the country.²¹³ At a point in time orders arrived from the Mamlūk Sultan in Egypt to eliminate the Nusayrīs, and significant numbers of them were executed based on the order. Subsequently, knowing that they were not considered Muslim by the Sunnī authorities, the Nusayrī leaders requested from the Mamlūks that at least they should be considered among the People of the Book (*ahl al-kitāb*) and pay a *jizya* instead

²⁰⁸ Yvette. “The Fatwas and the Nusayri/‘Alawis,” 176.

²⁰⁹ Al Mufaddal ibn Umar al-Gaafi, *Al Haft Al Shareef Min mawlana Ja’far al-Sadiq* Translated by Abdullah Hashem and published online at: <https://ahmedalhasan313.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/al-haft-al-shareef-by-mufaddal-english.pdf> pp. 33 accessed on 21/March/2016.

²¹⁰ “Nuṣayriyya” in Encyclopedia of Islam 2 accessed 05/06/2017, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nusayriyya-COM_0876?s.num=53&s.start=40

²¹¹ Yvette. “The Fatwas and the Nusayri/‘Alawis,” 175.

²¹² “Nuṣayriyya” in Encyclopedia of Islam 2.

²¹³ “Nuṣayriyya” in Encyclopedia of Islam 2.

of their execution.²¹⁴ There are allegations however, that the Mamlūks' antagonism against the Nusayrīs was not solely religious, but the Nusayrī refused submitting themselves to the Mamlūks and their subordination by the Mamlūks was political.²¹⁵ This relation with the Mamlūks might be part of the reasons why questions against them were posed to Ibn Taymiyya. Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas against them were based on the questions posed to him, his understanding of their doctrine and the danger they posed against the Sunni Islam as Ibn Taymiyya understood. Like the anti-Mongol fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya issues three fatwas against the Nusayrīs all of which are compiled in *Majmū' fatāwā*. The first and second fatwas are cited in volume thirty-five: the first fatwa is from page 145 to 160 and the second fatwa is cited from 161 to 162 while the third fatwa against the Nuṣayrīs is published in volume twenty-eight of the *Majmū' fatāwā* immediately after the third anti-Mongol fatwa.²¹⁶ The three fatwas are also cited in *Fatāwā al-kubrā*. The first fatwa is cited in volume three from 503 to 512 and the second fatwa from 513 to 514, while the third fatwas is from 514 to 515.²¹⁷

3.4 Analysis of Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas against the Nuṣayrīs- 'Alawīs and the Druze.

Yaron Friedman translates the whole of the third fatwa and crucial parts of the first and second fatwas. Most of the translation of the fatwas in this chapter is adapted from his translation with some amendments.

On the chronological order on which the fatwas were issued, Friedman argues that the first fatwa to be issued chronologically by Ibn Taymiyya against the Nuṣayrīs is the first in the compilation of *Majmū' fatāwā*, because its content is repeated in the two later fatwas.²¹⁸ It could have been issued in 705/1305 when Ibn Taymiyya issued a fatwa against the Nuṣayrīs, and participated in a raid against them to secure the roads of al-Ẓanīnayn as a part of the Mamlūk raid against the Shī'īs of Qisrawān.²¹⁹ Ibn Kathīr, also mentions

²¹⁴ Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī- 'Alawīs*: 62.

²¹⁵ Nasīb Mus'īd *Lebanon fī al tārīkh- hikāyat sha'b*, published online at http://lebanoninhistory.com/?page_id=93 accessed on 11/March/ 2016.

²¹⁶ First fatwa is in MF 35:145-160 and *Fatāwā al-kubrā* 3:503-512. Second fatwa is in MF 35:161-162 and *Fatāwā al-kubrā* 3:513.

²¹⁷ Ibn Taymiyya, Aḥmad 'Abd al Ḥalīm Shaykh al-Islām, *Fatāwā al-kubrā* ed. Muhammad 'Abd al-Qādir 'Aṭā and Mustafā 'Abd al-Qādir 'Aṭā Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, 1978.

²¹⁸ Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī- 'Alawīs*: 195.

²¹⁹ Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī- 'Alawīs*: 195.

Ibn Taymiyya's participation in the raid of 705/1305 against the Shī'īs of Qisrawān. While the third *fatwā* clearly refers to the Nusayrīs' messianic uprising (717/1317), the second fatwa dealing with the Druze and Nusayrī sects, cannot be associated with any precise period.²²⁰

On the motive of the fatwas, according to Friedman, the fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya were issued because of the need of the Mamlūks for the religious legitimacy to exterminate the sect. This explains why Ibn Taymiyya, in his first fatwa against the Nusayrīs shows much fear in accepting their assistance, which might lead to the opposite result—their acceptance as part of the Muslim community. In order to express his fear, Ibn Taymiyya compares them with the *munāfiqūn* (hypocrites).²²¹

On the version of the fatwas, Friedman, outlines the differences between the versions of the fatwa in in three compilations of Ibn Taymiyya's works: *Majmū' fatāwā*, *al-Fatāwā al-kubrā*, and *Mukhtaṣar al-fatāwā al-Miṣriyya* and the version edited by M. St. Guyard. He argues the version in the three compilations suffers serious discrepancies. It appears that these versions were altered from their original form to agree with the version of a disciple of Ibn Taymiyya, Badr al-Dīn Muhammad ibn 'Alī al-Ba'ī (d. 778/1376) who according to Friedman, permitted himself to add one line to ibn Taymiyya's fatwa. Friedman based his analysis on the St. Guyard's version of that fatwa believing that it is Ibn Taymiyya's original text, while the other three versions, and have been altered.²²²

In the first fatwa, a very long question was posed to Ibn Taymiyya along other things asking whether the Nusayrīs should be considered as Muslims or not. From the wording of the question, the enquirer seems to have the details of the Nusayrī creed but wants to know Ibn Taymiyya's opinion and ruling concerning them. In about three pages the enquirer fills Ibn Taymiyya in on the details of Nusaysī creed on various religious concepts, and how they interpret these concepts differently from the mainstream Muslim. Part of the question reads:

What is the view of the noble scholars, the religious leaders, concerning the Nusayrīs, may Allah forgive them, how could they help

²²⁰ Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāya*, 18:49.

²²¹ Friedman, *The Nusayrī-ʿAlawīs*: 195.

²²² Friedman, *The Nusayrī-ʿAlawīs*: 190.

to unveil the clear truth and oppress the owners of lie, concerning the Nusayrīs, who believe in the permissibility of wine, in the transmigration of souls, in the eternity of the world and the denial of the resurrection of the dead and [the existence of] heaven and hell. [They believe] that the five prayers represent five names which are ‘Alī, Ḥasan, Ḥusayn, Muḥsin and Fāṭima, that the mentioning of these five releases them from the cleaning from impurity and from the rest of the obligations of prayer.

[They believe] that the fast represents for them the names of thirty men and thirty women counted in their books, which this paper is too short to include. [They believe] that the one who created the heaven and earth is ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, may Allah be pleased with him, who is for them the divinity in heaven and the Imam on earth. They maintain that the logic of the appearance of the divinity in this human form is that he makes himself present among his creatures and his worshippers in order to teach them how to worship him.²²³

The enquirer went on to fill Ibn Taymiyya in on the details about the beliefs of the Nusayrīs on the messengers and prophets and the way they interpret the hierarchy of the prophets based on the historical events. The enquirer further said:

A part of the truth of the *khiṭāb* and their religion is the grasping that ‘Alī is the Lord [*al-Rabb*], Muhammad is the veil (*al-hijāb*) and Salmān is the door (*al-bāb*) and this is based on an eternal order, and a well-known poem by a damned member of their dignitaries says: ‘I testify that there is no other God but ‘Alī the transcendent the esoteric, and there is no veil but Muhammad the righteous the faithful, and there is no path to him but Salmān the powerful.’²²⁴

The enquirer narrated other creeds of the Nusayrīs, which include degradation of Abū Bakr, ‘Umar and other companions, dividing some religious concepts into plain meaning and concealed meaning and attributing the divine

²²³ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:145. Translation amended slightly from Friedman, *The Nusayrī-‘Alawīs*, 299.

²²⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:147. And Friedman, *The Nusayrī-‘Alawīs*, 301.

attributes to some individuals.²²⁵ After narrating what he believes to be the creed of the Nuṣayrīs, he puts his question as follows:

Is it permitted to kill the above-mentioned Nuṣayrīs and to confiscate their property, or not? If the commander, may the exalted God support him, were to fight jihad to oppress their heresy and remove them from the fortresses of the Muslims and the Muslim people were to refrain from marrying them and eating their slaughtered meat and were he to order them to fast [in Ramadan] and to pray [the orthodox prayers] and were he to prevent them from maintaining openly their heretic religion in order to make them understand their heresy – is this better and more rewarding than preparing the war against the armies of the Mongols in their territory [that of the Nuṣayrīs] and the attack of the Chinese territory, and that of Zanj (Africans), or is this [oppressing the Nuṣayrīs] better? Can a Nuṣayrī jihad fighter be considered a *murābiṭ* [pl. *murābiṭūn*, a frontier defender] and should he be rewarded as a *murābiṭ* in the border towns by the sea preventing the invasion of the Franks [Crusaders], or is this [oppressing them] more rewarding? Is it obligatory for someone who knows the doctrine of the mentioned [Nuṣayrīs] to publish their matter and to help eliminating their heresy and spread Islam among them? Then maybe God may turn their descendants and their sons into Muslims, or is it permitted to him to overlook and ignore [their heretic doctrine]? What is the reward of someone who strives for it [revealing the Nuṣayrī doctrine and oppressing them]? And that of the fighter and the *murābiṭ* who persist in it? Please answer as simply [as possible] and we will be grateful and thankful.²²⁶

²²⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:147.

²²⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:149. Translation slightly amended from Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-ʿAlawīs*: 302.

From the above passage, it could be sensed that the enquirer had already developed his understanding of the Nuṣayrī sect, he believed that they are deviant, but wants the confirmation from Ibn Taymiyya. Regarding the questions, the major issues in the questions are mainly two. Firstly, are the Nuṣayrīs considered as Muslims that a Muslim can interact with regarding marriage, eating from their slaughtered animals, praying behind them and collaborating with them on the issue of jihad or not? Secondly, is waging jihad against them and compelling them to practice the mainstream Islam obligatory upon the Muslim ruler and how would jihad against them be compared to the jihad against the Mongols and crusaders?

Ibn Taymiyya answers the two questions in about twelve pages. He mostly repeats the allegations in the question and elaborates more on them. On the first question, Ibn Taymiyya's answer is straight forward, the Nuṣayrīs are not only heretics, but the danger they posed against the Muslims is more heretical than that of the Jews and the Christians and even more than several heterodox groups. Ibn Taymiyya states:

All praises are due to Allah, the Lord of the universe. These people called Nuṣayrīs, they and the other kinds of Qarmaṭians, the Bāṭinīs, are more heretical than the Jews and the Christians and even more than several heterodox groups. Their damage to the [Muslim] community of [the Prophet] Muhammad, may the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him, is greater than the damage of the infidels who fight [against the Muslims], such as the heretical Mongols, the Crusaders and others, since they [Nuṣayrīs and other Bāṭinīs] are pretending before the uneducated Muslims that they are Shī'īs and loyal to the *ahl al-bayt* (people of the house of the Prophet), but in reality they do not believe in God, in His messenger, in His book, in obligation or prohibition. [They do not believe] in reward and punishment, in paradise and hell, or in any of the messengers prior to Muhammad, – The Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him, – or in one of the previous religions [prior to Islam]. They rather use the words of God and His messenger

that are known to the Muslim scholars, and would give them interpretation based on matters they invent and call them the esoterica sciences.²²⁷

Ibn Taymiyya affirms against the Nuṣayrīs all the allegations the enquirer narrated. In addition to that Ibn Taymiyya also alleges that the Nuṣayrīs made some false interpretation of Quranic verses in order to make the verses concur with their desires. Furthermore, when they have an opportunity they shed the blood of the Muslims, he gave the example of their murder of the pilgrims and throwing their bodies into the *Zamzam* well, and the stealing of the black stone of the *ka'ba*. Ibn Taymiyya also said the Nuṣayrīs killed Muslim Scholars and *shaykhs*, a number that only the exalted God knows.²²⁸

They do not have any limit to their heretical claims concerning the names of the exalted God and his [Qur'ānic] verses, as well as to the falsification of the words of God and His Messenger from their original signification. This is a result of their goal of denying the belief and the laws of Islam in any possible way, pretending that their claims are based on truths [only] they know. They have well-known struggles as well as [polemical] books against Islam and the Muslims. When they have an opportunity, they shed the blood of the Muslims, such as their murder of the pilgrims and throwing their bodies into the *Zamzam* well on one occasion, and the stealing of the black stone of the *Ka'ba* and keeping it for some time on another occasion. They killed Muslim scholars and *shaykhs*, a number that only the exalted God can count.²²⁹

He further elucidates that he is not the first Muslims scholar to issue a fatwa against them or to accuse them of the heresy, rather “The Muslim scholars wrote books unveiling their secrets and exposing their mysteries and explained in them their situation of heresy and their heterodoxy, which is more severe than that of the Jews and the Christians and [even] of the Brahmans of

²²⁷ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:150. Translation slightly amended from Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs*: 303.

²²⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:150.

²²⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:150. Translation from Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs*: 303.

India who worship idols.”²³⁰ In establishing their heresy, Ibn Taymiyya accuses them of conniving with the non-Muslims on several occasions to fight against the Muslims. He said, “It is well known about them that the Syrian coasts were conquered by the Christians from their [lands] direction since they are always hostile to the Muslims, with the Christians against the Muslims. And the most severe calamity for them is the victory of Islam against the Mongols and the Muslims’ conquest of the coastland and the submission of the Christians.”²³¹ Ibn Taymiyya mentions some other names that the Nuṣayrīs are referred to and argues that they do not believe in any of the revealed books, messengers or here after.

They have names that are well known to the Muslims: sometimes they are called Malāḥida, sometimes Ismā‘īliyya, sometimes Qarāmita, sometimes Bāṭiniyya, sometimes Khurramiyya and sometimes Muḥammara. Some of these names concern them all and some only a group of them, such as the name Islam and beliefs concerning all the Muslims, and some Muslim groups have a specific name according to their lineage, their territory or other component. Interpreting their goals would be a long task, as the scholars said concerning them: the open aspect of their religion is *rafd*, and its concealed aspect is absolute heresy and the truth concerning their matter is that they do not believe in any of the prophets and the messengers, not in Noah, not in Abraham, not in Moses, not in Jesus or Muḥammad. They do not believe in any of the revealed holy books, not in the Bible, not in the Evangelical Gospels or the Qur’ān. They do not believe that this world has a creator that created it, or that there is a religion that he ordered be followed, or that he has a world where he rewards and punishes people for their acts other than this world.²³²

²³⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:150. Translation from Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs*,: 303.

²³¹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:151. Translation from Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs*,: 304.

²³² Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:152. Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs*: 304-5.

He also alleges that besides their Shi'ism in some cases they base their belief on the doctrines of the naturalist and theist philosophers, and in other cases on the philosophers with inclination to the Persian heretics and objectors who worship light.²³³ After establishing their heresy, he reports the agreements of all the Muslim scholars concerning the Nuṣayrīs, that it is forbidden to either marry them, or give the hand in marriage to one of them who is under his control or a free woman and the meat that they slaughter is prohibited.²³⁴ Their utensils have the same verdict as to that of the non-believers and if anyone of them were to die it is prohibited to bury them in Muslim graveyards or to pray for one of them who died because God forbade prayer for hypocrites.

All the Muslim scholars agreed concerning such people that it is forbidden to marry them, nor can a Muslim marry one of them who is under his control or a free woman. The meat that they slaughter is prohibited. As to their cheeses, their rennet is a matter of controversy between two famous points of view, that it is like the rennet of carrion and that it is like the meat of the Persians and the rennet of the Crusaders of whom it is said that they do not purify their meat... As to their tools and their clothes they are like those of the Persians, which the great reliable scholars say cannot be used before being washed, since their meat is impure and that probably touched their tools to make them impure as well. The exceptions are tools which logically would not touch impure things and do not need to be washed. [Even] 'Umar [the caliph] purified himself from his Christian slave woman, so there is no doubt about his impurity [since he touched her].

It is prohibited to bury them in Muslim graveyards or to pray for one of them who died because God forbade prayer for *munāfiqīna* [hypocrites] such as 'Abdallāh ibn Ubayy and his kind, who openly prayed, gave alms, fasted and fought *jihād* with the Muslims and did not reveal doctrines which

²³³ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:153. Translation from Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī- 'Alawīs*., 305.

²³⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:154.

contradict the religion of Islam, but concealed them. In this context Allāh said: “You must not pray for any one of them who died or visit his grave” [Qur’ān, 9:84], let alone those who are part of the heresy, hypocrisy and are openly infidels.²³⁵

Regarding the second question, whether fighting/killing the Nuṣayrīs by the Muslim leader and preventing them from maintaining openly their heretic religion is permitted or not? Ibn Taymiyya answers in the affirmative. Fighting them is not only permissible, but one of the greatest obligations of Islam. He states:

There is no doubt that fighting these people and attacking them from the borders is one of the greatest obligations and the rightful, it is more obligatory than attacking the heretics and the people of the Book. [Abū Bakr]²³⁶ Al-Ṣiddīq and the rest of the Companions began a jihad against the apostates before the war against the heretics from the People of the Book, because fighting them [means] defending Muslim land... and no one is authorized to keep secret what he knows about them. On the contrary, he should expose it and unveil them until the Muslims know the truth concerning them. No one is authorized to help them to remain in the army and in other kinds of work. No one has the right to prohibit the execution of an order of God and His messenger concerning them, since this is one of the most important issues [literally: doors] connected with commanding what is good and preventing what is evil and the holy war for God’s sake. God told his Prophet: “O Prophet! Fight the holy war against the apostates and the infidels!”²³⁷

Having answered the fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya concludes by mentioning some merits of jihad and its relationship with enjoining what is good and forbidding what is wrong (*amr bi-al-ma’rūf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar*). He cites some texts from the Book and Sunna regarding the merits of jihad which

²³⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:155. Translation from Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs*: 306-7.

²³⁶ Freidman wrote [Umar] in bracket, while Ibn Taymiyya used al-Ṣiddīq meaning Abū Bakr.

²³⁷ Ibn Taymiyya MF 35:159. Translation from Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs*: 308.

includes a hadith recorded by Bukhārī where the Prophet said, “In Janna there are a hundred grades which Allah has prepared for those who fight in His Cause; and the distance between any two of those grades is like the distance between the heaven and the earth.” And another recorded by Bukhārī and Muslim that “A war camp during day and night for God’s sake is better than pilgrimage in the holy months and in the rest of the periods.” he then cites Quran 9:19–21. The verses are referring to the merits of the martyrs.

However, according to Friedman, Ibn Taymiyya has a misconception about the Nuṣayrīs and confuses them with other Ismā‘īlīs. He argues that Ibn Taymiyya’s knowledge of the Nuṣayrīs was not driven from their sources, rather from the information he received from enquirer and he subsequently built his fatwas upon that wrong and misleading information.²³⁸ According to him, although some of the theological accusations against the sect could also be relevant to the Nuṣayrīs, such as the allegorical interpretation of Islamic law and the influence of Greek philosophy, Ibn Taymiyya directed the accusations to Ismā‘īlī doctrines instead of the Bāṭinīs. Friedman cites some examples where Ibn Taymiyya’s accusations against the Nuṣayrīs are not found in the Nuṣayrī sources. According to him, Ibn Taymiyya mentions the various names of the sect under discussion: *Mulāḥida*, *Ismā‘īliyya*, *Qarāmita*, *Bāṭiniyya*, *Khurramiyya* and *Muḥammara*, but the name “Nuṣayriyya” is missing. All these names according to Friedman, excluding the pejorative name *Mulāḥida*, are included in the list of names given by al-Ghazālī’s *Faḍā’ih al-bāṭiniyya*, which deals exclusively with the Ismā‘īlīs: *Bāṭinis*, *Qarāmita*, *Qarmatiyya*, *Khurramiyya*, *Khurramdīniyya*, *Ismā‘īliyya*, *Sab‘iyya*, *Bābakiyya*, *Muḥammara* and *Ta‘līmiyya*.²³⁹ He further rejects the claim by Ibn Taymiyya against the Nuṣayrīs of the killing of pilgrims in Mecca stealing of the Black Stone of the Ka‘ba, collaborating with enemies of Islam mainly the Crusaders and the Mongols and helping the Mongols to murder the Caliph of Baghdad.²⁴⁰ According to Friedman Ibn Taymiyya’s confusion was as the result of his assumption that the Nuṣayrīs are branch of Ismā‘īlīs that split from it. While both groups only share the same geographical territory in addition to several similarities between the two groups concerning certain theological issues, such

²³⁸ Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs*: 194.

²³⁹ Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs*., 189.

²⁴⁰ Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs*: 191.

as cyclical history and emanative creation.²⁴¹ According to Friedman Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa not only reflects confusion between the Nuṣayrīs and Ismā'īlīs, but also demonstrates the gap between the vast knowledge available about the Ismā'īlīs, and the poor information about the Nuṣayrīs. He argues that the difference in the information available to Sunnis about the two groups can be explained by the fact that the Ismā'īlī doctrine had been disseminated throughout Egypt and Syria by the Fātimid Empire's *da'wa* (propaganda) during the tenth century and by its Nizārī branch in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.²⁴²

Talhamy also makes an argument similar to that of Friedman. According to her, Ibn Taymiyya's answer shows some ignorance regarding the Nuṣayrīs. To her despite that Ibn Taymiyya lived in Syria, his knowledge of the Nuṣayrīs is very poor. Like Friedman, Talhamy also mentions the killing of pilgrims on their way to Mecca and stealing the Black Stone of Ka'ba, and argues that these deeds that were perpetrated by the Qaramita not the Nuṣayrīs. She concludes that Ibn Taymiyya was wrong in declaring the Nuṣayrīs to be heretics who should be hunted and killed for their disbeliefs. She disqualifies Ibn Taymiyya from being a Mufti and argues that Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa against the Nuṣayrīs is more of a sermon of incitement against them and inciting is not a function of the fatwa.²⁴³

However, these claims by Friedman and Talhamy could be so if we consider the Nuṣayrīs as an independent sect in isolation from other bāṭinī groups, but Ibn Taymiyya considers the Nuṣayrīs as a sub sect of other bāṭinī groups and therefore issues the same verdict against them.

They have names that are well known to the Muslims: sometimes they are called Malāḥida, sometimes Ismā'īliyya, sometimes Qarāmita, sometimes Bāṭiniyya, sometimes Khurramiyya and sometimes Muḥammara. Some of these names concern them all and some only a group of them, such as the name Islam and beliefs concerning all the Muslims,

²⁴¹ Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-ʿAlawīs*: 191.

²⁴² Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-ʿAlawīs*: 191.

²⁴³ Yvette. "The Fatwas and the Nusayri/'Alawis," 180.

and some Muslim groups have a specific name according to their lineage, their territory or other component.²⁴⁴

The argument that Ibn Taymiyya has misinformation about the sect, or that he appears to have used the information concerning the Nuṣayrī sect included in the question he received from the enquire could be true. However, Ibn Taymiyya demonstrates the available knowledge he has about the sect which was not included in the question. In the second fatwa, he mentions their origin, which was not included in the question: “Regarding the Nuṣayrīs, they are a sect of Abū Shu‘ayb Muḥammad ibn Nuṣayr, who was one of the extremist Shī‘īs who believed that ‘Alī is God.”²⁴⁵ This differentiation between the origin of the Nuṣayrīs and Druze by Ibn Taymiyya in the second fatwa shows Ibn Taymiyya’s knowledge about the sect. In addition to that, there a number of other scholars who consider the Nuṣayrīs and other branches of Bāṭinī. Ibn al-Qayyim in *Ighāthat al-luhfān* is reported to have classified the Nuṣayrīs and other branches of Bāṭinī among the Magians, who he argues do not believe in the creator, resurrection or prophet hood. Ibn al-Qayyim like Ibn Taymiyya and other scholars also maintains the heresy of all the Bāṭinī sects, Nuṣayrīs included.²⁴⁶ Ibn Kathīr also said: “The Nuṣayrīs are the extremes who believed in the divinity of ‘Alī, they are more heretic than the Jews and the Christians.”²⁴⁷ One could also say that although Ibn Taymiyya was misinformed about the sect, his accusations in the fatwas were not specifically limited to Nuṣayrīs, but generally to all Bāṭinī groups. This could be sensed in the wording of the fatwas, as Ibn Taymiyya mentioned in his reputation of the other branches of Bāṭinīs, such as Ismā‘īlīs and Qarāmiṭa. If the Nuṣayrīs are considered as a branch of the Bāṭinīs, then there are some scholars prior to Ibn Taymiyya who made the same accusation against the Bāṭinīs. Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī’s book *Faḍā’ih al-Bāṭiniyya* is wholly dedicated in rebuking the Bāṭinī creed.²⁴⁸ It includes all the accusations Ibn Taymiyya made in his fatwas and more. Perhaps when Ibn Taymiyya said books were written against them, he was referring to al-Ghazālī’s book among others. Other Sunni scholars who declared the Bāṭinī

²⁴⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:152. Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs*: 304.

²⁴⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:161.

²⁴⁶ Ali ibn Abd al-Qadir saqqaf, *Hukm Al-islam*

²⁴⁷ Ismāil Ibn Kathīr, *Talkhīṣ kitāb al-ithtiḡātha* (maktabat al-ghurabā’ n.d), 583.

²⁴⁸ Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī, *Faḍā’ih al-Bāṭiniyya* (Kuwait: Muassasat dār al-kutub al-thaqāfiyya n.d.)

sects as heretics, prior to Ibn Taymiyya include Ibn Ḥazm al-Zahrī, and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī in his book *al-Milal- wa al-Nihal*.²⁴⁹ There are also a number of them after Ibn Taymiyya, but most probably they are influenced by him. These scholars include Jalāl al-dīn al-Ṣadīqī (d. 1521) in his book *Al-Ḥujaj al-Bāhira*.²⁵⁰ What is intended here is to establish that the excommunication of the Nuṣayrīs by Ibn Taymiyya due to their belief is not an isolated case. There are other scholars before and after Ibn Taymiyya, who maintain the same view as Ibn Taymiyya on the sect.

The second fatwa is shorter, about a page and half. In the fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya was asked: “what is [Islam’s] judgment for the Druze and the Nuṣayrīs?” And he answered:

These Druze and Nuṣayrīs are heretics according to [the judgment of] all Muslims; their [methods of] slaughter is not permitted for eating nor [can a Muslim] marry their women. The *jizya* will not be accepted from them, and they are considered *murtaddūn*. They are neither Muslims, nor Jews, nor Christians. They do not accept the obligations of the five prayers, the fast of Ramaḍān or the pilgrimage. They do not forbid what Allah has forbidden [such] as [eating] carrion and [drinking] wine. Even if they apparently declare their belief [in Islam] and accept its doctrines, they should still be considered heretics by all Muslims. Regarding the Nuṣayrīs, they are a sect of Abū Shu‘ayb Muhammad ibn Nuṣayr, who was one of the extremist Shī‘īs who believed that ‘Alī is God. They [the Nuṣayrīs] recite the [confessional] phrases: I testify that there is no other God but Ḥaydara [lion, one of ‘Alī’s nicknames] the transcendent the esoteric/ and that there is no veil but Muhammad the righteous the faithful / and that there is no path to him but Salmān the powerful.....²⁵¹

²⁴⁹ Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal- wa al-Nihal* (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1992,) 192-193.

²⁵⁰ Jalāl al-dīn al-Ṣadīqī, *Al-Ḥujaj al-Bāhira* (Madinah: Maktabat Imām al-Bukharī, 2000), 197.

²⁵¹ Ibn Taymiyya MF,35:161. Translation from Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī- ‘Alawīs*: 193.

Ibn Taymiyya maintains the same view of excommunicating both the Nuṣayrīs and Druze as in the first fatwa. Friedman argues that the specific date of issuing the second fatwa is not known.²⁵²

The only differences in the contents of the two fatwas are two. Firstly, in the second fatwa Ibn Taymiyya declares the Nuṣayrīs as apostates. He did not use the term in the first fatwa, despite its length. This term will help a long way in understanding why Ibn Taymiyya is harsh on the Nuṣayrīs. As explained in the anti-Mongol fatwas and will be established in the analyses of *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, according to Ibn Taymiyya apostasy is worse than the heresy. For that reason, *jizya* will be collected from the heretics and their lives would be spared in return, unlike the apostates that according to Ibn Taymiyya should be killed unconditionally. Secondly, in the second fatwa Ibn Taymiyya mentions the origin of the Nuṣayrīs “Regarding the Nuṣayrīs, they are a sect of Abū Shu‘ayb Muhammad ibn Nuṣayr, who was one of the extremist Shī‘īs who believed that ‘Alī is God.”²⁵³ This exhibits Ibn Taymiyya’s knowledge about the sect and that mentioning other sub sects of the Bāṭinīs was not deviation, rather, he intended a thorough explanation and repudiation of all the Bāṭinī sects.

Friedman argues that this fatwa was altered to add the Druze who were initially not in Ibn Taymiyya’s answer. He accused al-Ba‘lī, with the alteration and based his reason on the fact that in some versions of the *al-Fatāwā al-kubrā* this specific *fatwā* does not appear at all. Friedman said the same effort is revealed in his *Mukhtaṣar* version of the first fatwa in which the opening phrase of Ibn Taymiyya is as follows: “This people called the Nuṣayrīs; al-Ba‘lī adds a comment ‘settled in the Druze Mountains of Syria.’” This geographical detail does not exist in any other version of the first fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya against the Nuṣayrīs. To Friedman, this inclusion of the Druze is the need of al-Ba‘lī to attack this sect, which was widespread in his own region.²⁵⁴

The third fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya against the Nuṣayrīs is published in the third volume of the *Fatāwā al-kubrā*. The fatwa is about a page and half. As in the first fatwa the enquirer gave some details of his knowledge about the sect. his question goes:

²⁵² Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs*, 195.

²⁵³ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 35:161.

²⁵⁴ Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-‘Alawīs*, 193.

About a group of herdsmen who believed in the Nusayrī doctrine; all believed in a man about whom they had variety of opinions. Some claimed he was God, some said he was a prophet sent [by God], others said he was Muhammad ibn Ḥasan, meaning the Mahdī. They ordered that anyone who should meet him [the Mahdī] should prostrate themselves before him. In doing so they revealed their heresy [as they did in] cursing the Prophet Muhammad's Companions. They revealed their refusal to obey and their determination to fight. Are we obliged to fight them and kill their warriors? Are we permitted [to hold as captives] their children and [to confiscate] their property?²⁵⁵

Ibn Taymiyya's response has a little difference from the two fatwas above. Notwithstanding, he maintains the apostasy of the Nuṣayrīs and the obligation of fighting them. He answers:

Praise be to God. These [Nuṣayrīs] should be fought as long as they resist, until they accept the law of Islam. The Nuṣayrīs [springs] from the worst heretical people guided by the devil, they are from the worst *murtaddūn* [apostates]; their fighters should be killed and their property should be confiscated.

In the third fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya insists that even if the Nuṣayrīs do not reveal their extremism still they have to be fought, "Even if they do not reveal their extremism, and do not declare that this liar is the expected Mahdī, they should be fought."²⁵⁶ As Friedman argues, it seems Ibn Taymiyya wants by his fatwa the extermination of sect by all means. In the third fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya made a distinction between the extreme Nuṣayrīs, who ascribe divinity to 'Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib and the non-extremists who only practice Shī'ism. While according to Ibn Taymiyya both sects are fought, the distinction is that, the women and children of the extremists will be considered as booty. However, if the Nuṣayrīs do not reveal their extremism of ascribing divine attributes to 'Alī

²⁵⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwā al-kubrā*, 3:513-14. And Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī- 'Alawīs*, 193.

²⁵⁶ Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī- 'Alawīs*: 194.

Ibn Abī Ṭālib, then they should have the same status as the Khārijīs and those who refused *zakāt* fought by ‘Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib and Abū Bakr respectively, by which their women and children will not be considered as booty. About the leaders who lead them astray, Ibn Taymiyya said that if killing them is the only way to deter their evil they should be killed even if they repent.²⁵⁷

Friedman believes that Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwas against the Nusayrīs and considering them apostates had no influence in the long term. Even the motivation to convert them by force did not last long, and mosques built in their villages by the Mamlūks were never used for prayers. The sect has survived to this day in the same territory while preserving its original religious beliefs. On the other hand, Talhamy believes that the fatwas had a great impact on the Nusayrīs at the time they were issued. He argues that the fatwas influenced the military expedition against the Kisrawan region where different religious creeds lived including the Nusayrīs. Because of the expedition many Nusayrīs were killed and those who survived fled from Kisrawan to the north, mainly to the mountain known as the ‘Nusayriyya Mountain’.

Nevertheless, Friedman admits the influence of the fatwas on Sunni thought in the short and long terms. According to Friedman, the first fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya is cited by almost every Sunni who wishes to attack the Nusayrīs as heretics, from his time to the present. He also argues that, the fact that no other fatwa against the Nusayrīs can be found in any Muslim source indicates that Ibn Taymiyya is the only eminent scholar to have explicitly declared their heresy and that his *takfīr* was not echoed by other important scholars.²⁵⁸ However, Talhamy mentions other Sunni Scholars who issued a fatwa against the Nusayrīs during the period of Ottoman rule and beyond. These scholars include Shaykh Nuh al-Hanaf. And during the twentieth century three other fatwas were issued regarding them. The first fatwa was issued by Hajj Amīn al-Husaynī, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in 1936; the second was given by Ayatollah Hasan Mahdi al-Shirazi in 1972, and the third was given by al-Sayyid Musa al-Sadr in 1973.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁷ Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwā al-kubrā*, 3: 515. And Friedman, *The Nusayrī-‘Alawīs*., 194.

²⁵⁸ Friedman, *The Nusayrī-‘Alawīs*: 197.

²⁵⁹ Talhamy, “The Fatwas and the Nusayri/Alawis,” 175.

3.5 Conclusion

The analysis in Chapter Two shows how Ibn Taymiyya called for jihad against the Mongols and analogises them with the Khārijīs and those who refused *zakāt*. He argues for jihad against them in the first and third anti-Mongol fatwas before he declares them apostates in the second fatwa. This might have paved way for the jihadists in their use of the fatwas as will be explained in Part Two of this thesis. In contrast to the anti-Mongol fatwas, the Mardin fatwa does not give such room. The language of the fatwa does not connote violence; rather Ibn Taymiyya took a moderate or even soft way in inventing the concept of the third domain which was not in existence before his time to insinuate that the Muslims do not necessarily have to be in the domain of war if they were not in the domain of peace. The creation of third domain could be interpreted as Ibn Taymiyya's effort to lessen hostilities and reduce to nothing the notion that you either live in the domain of Islam or you are at war. What Ibn Taymiyya defines as the composite is defined as a domain of war by the majority of scholars before and after him.

In the three anti-Nuṣayrī fatwas also, Ibn Taymiyya reveals his understanding of the Nuṣayrīs and other Bāṭinī sects. Ibn Taymiyya maintains the apostasy of the sect and argues for waging jihad against them based on ascribing divinity to 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib and other creations. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya argues that the sect has changed many of the religious concepts from what is traditionally known, accepted and practiced by the majority Muslims. The Bāṭinī group developed a concept which distinguishes between an inner, esoteric (*bāṭinī*) level of meaning in the divine text from the outer, exoteric (*ẓāhirī*).

As in the anti-Nuṣayrīs fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya maintains the same view against the Bāṭinī group in all of his works. Answering a question about them in another fatwa compiled in the *Majmū' fatāwā*, Ibn Taymiyya said: "Their claim of the knowledge of the Bāṭinīs made them non-believers by the agreement of the Muslims, Jews, Christians and most of the polytheists. It [the concept] entails that the divine books have a concealed meaning opposing the plain meaning of commands, prohibitions, and narrations known by the believers."²⁶⁰

²⁶⁰ Ibn Taymiyya MF. 35:132.

What could also be understood from the analyses of the anti-Mongol fatwas alongside the anti-Nuṣayrī fatwas is that Ibn Taymiyya is harsher on the people he accuses of apostasy than on the heretics. In both the anti-Mongol and the anti-Nuṣayrīs fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya is not the only scholar who excommunicates both groups, but always his fatwas have a harsher tone than fatwas of the other scholars. Perhaps this is what attracts the jihadists to Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas.

Ibn Taymiyya's opinion of attacking the Nuṣayrīs as a form of jihad just like he did with the Mongols further unveils his understanding of jihad. To Ibn Taymiyya, as will be explained in the next chapter, waging offensive jihad against the apostates in contrast to the heretics is obligatory.

In all these eight fatwas examined in these two chapters, Ibn Taymiyya argues for jihad against groups and sects that claim Islam, but Ibn Taymiyya argues they have apostatized. Nevertheless, not in any of these fatwas did Ibn Taymiyya argue for the apostasy or waging jihad against the constituted authorities. Therefore, using the fatwas against the authorities would be taking them out of the context.

Chapter Four: Miscellaneous Treatise of Ibn Taymiyya on Jihad

4.1 Introduction

Beside the famous fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya against the Mongols and Nuṣayrīs, there are other works of his on jihad. These works are often neglected in the jihad discourse, especially by the contemporary jihadists. To formulate Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of jihad, we need to examine these works and compare them with his fatwas against the Mongols and Nuṣayrīs.

In this chapter, the thesis analyses three treatises of Ibn Taymiyya that are purposely written on jihad. The treatises are *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara fī qitāl al-kuffār wa mudāhanatihim wa taḥrīm qatlihim bi mujarradi kufrihim*, *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduww hal yajūz?* and *Al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya*. In each of the treatises the content is analysed in its relation to other works of Ibn Taymiyya. In *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, Ibn Taymiyya presents jihad in a rather very soft way. He argues for two points regarding jihad. Firstly, that the infidels are not fought due to their disbelief, rather; if no danger is sensed from them they should only be subdued to paying *jizya*. Secondly, the *jizya* should not be restricted to the people of the Book; it should be collected from all the infidels. However, the textual evidence of the treatise is being disputed by some scholars. Before analysing these two arguments, the textual evidence of the treatise will be discussed. In the course of analysing these two points, the statements of Ibn Taymiyya on the issues in other works of his are employed.

The second treatise is *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduww*, the treatise is very short and Ibn Taymiyya argues for only one point, the permissibility of suicide in the course of jihad. Ibn Taymiyya deals with this issue briefly in the second anti-Mongol fatwa and from there most of the jihadists quote his view on the issue. In this treatise, Ibn Taymiyya discusses the issue in a more detailed way.

The third treatise is *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya* whose content is not on jihad, rather, on public and private laws in Islam, but Ibn Taymiyya delves into jihad in some segments of the book.

4.2 *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*: the question of its authenticity and analysis

Qā'ida mukhtaṣara fī qitāli al-kuffāri wa mudāhanatihim wa taḥrīmi qatlihim bi mujarradi kufrihim: this is one of the treatises of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad. The treatise is a summary of a book written by Ibn Taymiyya on the subject matter, it was summarized from the main book by Sheikh Sulaiman Ṣanī' (d. 1969), and edited by a Riyadh scholar Dr. 'Abdu al-'Azīz Bn 'Abd Allah Bn Ibraīm al-Zurair Al-Humayd. In not more than twenty pages, the editor strives to establish the authenticity of the treatise. The strategy followed by the editor in establishing the authenticity of the treatise is quoting two manuscripts from the summarized version and comparing the contents with other works of Ibn Taymiyya. The editor further uses some statements of Ibn Taymiyya which indicates the existence of the treatise. These include his statement in *Al-Nubuwwāt*: "The non-believers are fought only on condition if they attack; this is the consensus of the scholars and indication of the book and the Sunna as elaborated elsewhere."²⁶¹ And in *al-Jawāb al-Ṣaḥīḥ*: "But they [scholars] dispute about the *jizya*, is it collected from the people of the Book? This is elaborated elsewhere."²⁶² The editor argues that Ibn Taymiyya's statement "as elaborated elsewhere" is referring to the treatise.²⁶³ He also cites one of Ibn Taymiyya's disciples Ibn 'Abd al-Ḥādī stating that Ibn Taymiyya has a book about fighting the Christians and repelling the invasion, which the editor believes to be this treatise.²⁶⁴

However, some scholars have doubted the authenticity of the treatise. Among those who doubt its authenticity are 'Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn Muḥammad ibn Qāsim, the editor of *Majmū' fatāwā* and Ibn Bāz the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia.²⁶⁵ For that reason the former did not include the treatise in his

²⁶¹ Ibn Taymiyya, Aḥmad 'Abd al Ḥalīm Shaykh al-Islām, *Kitāb al-Nubuwwat*. Ed. 'Abd al-'Azīz bin Ṣāliḥ al Ṭawayān (Medina: Aḍwāu al-salaf), 140.

²⁶² Ibn Taymiyya, Aḥmad 'Abd al Ḥalīm Shaykh al-Islām, *Al-jawāb al-Ṣaḥīḥ li-man baddala dīn al-masīḥ* ed. 'Alī Ibn Hasan Ibn Nāṣir (Riyadh: Dār al-'āṣima, 1999), 3: 120

²⁶³ Ibn Taymiyya, Aḥmad 'Abd al Ḥalīm Shaykh al-Islām *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara fī qitāl al-kuffār wa mudāhanatihim wa taḥrīm qatlihim bi mujarrad kufrihim* ed. 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Ibrahim (Riyadh, KSA: Makatabati Malik Fahad al- waṭaniyya, 2004), 47.

²⁶⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, 47.

²⁶⁵ Sulaimān Ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Khurashī, *Aqwāl al-'ulmā'a fī al-risālat al-mansūba ilā sheikh al-islam ibn Taymiyya fī al-jihād*. Found online at <http://www.saaaid.net/Warathah/Alkharashy/32.htm> accessed on 19/Feb. 2016.

edition of Ibn Taymiyya's works *Majmū' fatāwā*.²⁶⁶ However, in the process of establishing the authenticity of the treatise Yusuf al-Qardawī repudiated the claim of the said scholars and said:

Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya has a treatise on fighting the nonbelievers, that he supported this argument [that non-belief is not the sole reason for fighting]..... but some Saudi scholars denied the authenticity of the treatise and refuse including it in the collection of *Majmū' fatāwā* which is about thirty five volumes- without any valid reason except that the content does not concur with the principle they established of fighting the whole world; who sought a truce with us and who fought us.²⁶⁷

A-Qardawī further mentioned some scholars who affirm the authenticity of the treatise to Ibn Taymiyya which include Shaykh Muhammad Abū Zahra in his book on Ibn Taymiyya, Shaykh 'Abd Allah ibn Zayd al-Mahmūd the chief judge of Qatar in his book *Al-Jihād al-mashrū' fī al-Islām*, and another Saudi scholar, Dr. 'Abd Allah Qādarī in his book *Al-Jihād fī al-Islām*.²⁶⁸

Analysing the arguments, it could be understood that the main reason for doubting the treatise is that in the treatise Ibn Taymiyya argues only for defensive jihad while in his other works he argues for both offensive and defensive jihad. However, the jihad doctrines mentioned in the treatise only repeats what Ibn Taymiyya argues elsewhere in his works. Even if the authenticity of the treatise is not established, the same content and arguments are found elsewhere in Ibn Taymiyya's works as I will establish in the arguments. Furthermore, in the treatise Ibn Taymiyya did not neglect offensive jihad, rather he opines that the nonbelievers must be subdued to paying the *jizya*, which if they accepted should be left untouched. Should in case they refused to pay out their *jizya*, they should be fought in jihad as an aggression. Ibn

²⁶⁶ Ibn Šālih, *Aqwāl al-'ulmā'a fī al-risālat al-mansūba ilā sheikh al-islam*

²⁶⁷ Yusuf al-Qardāwī, *Fiqh al-jihad: dirāsa muqarana li-aḥkāmihi wa falsafatihi fī daw'i al-Quran wa al-sunna* (Cairo: Maktabat al-wahba, 2009), 1:396.

²⁶⁸ Al-qardāwī, *Fiqh al-jihad*, 1:396.

Taymiyya only argues against those who opine that the non-belief in the main reason why the nonbelievers are fought in jihad, for that will neglect the freedom of religion articulated in many verses in the Quran and practiced by the Prophet the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him.

Despite the differences of opinion of scholars on the matter, the point Ibn Taymiyya argues for being what Yusuf al-Qardawī also reports from Ibn Qudāma to be the preponderant and the opinion of the majority of scholars.²⁶⁹

In the treatise, Ibn Taymiyya argues two main points. Firstly; the non-believers are not fought in jihad due to their disbelief, but rather, because of the danger sensed in them. Therefore, if the danger is lifted, then the reason for fighting also ceases. Secondly, *jizya* is to be collected from all non-believers, polytheists included. With this established, there is no reason for fighting the non-believers of whatever kind if they agree to give the *jizya*. After discussing the arguments, I will analyse Ibn Taymiyya's statements from other works of his to support the arguments.

On the first point, Ibn Taymiyya argues extensively that jihad is not purposely meant to kill non-believers due to their disbelief. If any danger is not sensed from them, then they should be subdued to paying *jizya*. To support the argument, Ibn Taymiyya states some reasons. Firstly, Quran 2:90: "And fight in the Way of Allah those who fight you, but transgress not the limits". The phrase "those who fight you" indicates that the fighting is meant to be for self-defence and if they do not initiate the attack, they should not be attacked. The phrase "but transgress not the limits." emphasizes that attacking those who do not initiate an attack is transgressing the limit, Ibn Taymiyya argues.²⁷⁰

He [God] then said: fight them until there is no *fitna* (turmoil). And the *fitna* is to afflict a Muslim for his religion just as the polytheists of Mecca were afflicting who accepts Islam. For this, Allah says "and *fitna* is worse than killing." And this is only when they overpowered and transgress limits against the Muslims then it is obligatory to fight them

²⁶⁹ Al-Qardāwī, *Fiqh al-jihad*, 1:396.

²⁷⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara fī qitāli al-kuffāri wa mudāhanatihim* 91-92.

until they stop afflicting the Muslims... He [God] did not say fight them until they accept Islam.²⁷¹

He further said that: “This shows that when we fight the people of the Book [with jihad] we fight them until the *fitna* seizes and the whole religion is for God and this is achieved when they give the *jizya* while they are humbled.”²⁷²

Ibn Taymiyya then responds to the hadith which says “I have been commanded to fight the people until they say there is no God but Allah. So when they say there is no God but Allah then they will be granted protection from me for their lives and properties, except by right of justice, and their reckoning is with Allah.”²⁷³ Ibn Taymiyya argues it does not signify fighting individuals till they believe; rather it indicates that, the fighting is only for the purpose of believing, and that the Prophet always succumbed to the treaty when he was offered.²⁷⁴ He said, “It is established from the text and consensus that it is prohibited to fight the people of the Book and Magians if they offered *jizya* while they are humbled”²⁷⁵ Ibn Taymiyya then discusses the opinion of scholars on the interpretation of the verse “And fight in the Way of Allah those who fight you, but transgress not the limits” (Q 2:90). He said the first group of scholars argue that Quran 2:90 is abrogated by Quran 2:291 “And kill them wherever you overtake them.” The second group of scholars argue that the verse is not abrogated. Ibn Taymiyya sides with the second group and says:

The second group opines that the verse is not abrogated and the meaning of “And fight in the Way of Allah those who fight you” is [fighting] the combatants. As for the non-combatants such as the monks, elderly, sick, blinds and insane are not fought and this ruling is not abrogated. This is the opinion of the majority scholars such as Mālik, Aḥmad and others. The first opinion is weak and the claim of

²⁷¹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, 92-94.

²⁷² Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, 94-95.

²⁷³ Bukharī, 392. Muslim 20, 21.

²⁷⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, 95.

²⁷⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, 98.

abrogation needs evidence. There is nothing in the Quran that contradicts this view.²⁷⁶

Secondly, Ibn Taymiyya cites some hadiths where the Prophet forbade the killing of some non-Muslims despite their disbelief. It is reported in Bukhārī that the Prophet passed by a woman killed in one of his battles and said: “this was not combatant.” Ibn Taymiyya said this indicates that the Prophet only approves the killing of the combatants.²⁷⁷ In another hadith in Sunan Abī-Dawūd, the Prophet when sending a raid would say: Go in Allah's name, trusting in Allah, and adhering to the religion of Allah's Apostle. Do not kill a decrepit old man, or a young infant, or a child, or a woman; do not be dishonest about booty, but collect your spoils, do right and act well, for Allah loves those who do well.²⁷⁸

Thirdly, Ibn Taymiyya uses “No compulsion in the religion” (Q 2:256) and argues that if people were only left with the option of belief or death that would have been the greatest compulsion. He discusses the opinion of the scholars on whether the verse is abrogated or not and concludes that the verse is not abrogated.

The majority of the predecessors (*salaf*) and successors (*khalaf*) opine that the verse is not specified (*makhṣūṣ*) or abrogated. Rather, they said we do not oblige anyone to [accept] the religion. We only fight who fights us, if they accept Islam their wealth and blood are protected. If they are not combatant we do not fight them or oblige them to [accept] the religion.²⁷⁹

In addition to that Ibn Taymiyya also uses historical events in the life of the Prophet to justify his stand. He argues that the prophet signed many treaties with the Jewish community in Medina and when he had victory in the conquest

²⁷⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, 101.

²⁷⁷ Ibn Taymiyya quoted the Hadith “.... this was not combatant” but the correct wording of hadith in Bukhari is “a woman was found killed in one of these battles; so the Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) forbade the killing of women and children” Bukharī 4320.

²⁷⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, 119-20.

²⁷⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, 123 – 24.

of Mecca despite obvious disbelief of the people of Mecca and atrocities they committed against him and his followers, the Prophet did not order their extermination, and rather he issued a general pardon. If unconditional killing of non-believers is commanded the Prophet would have executed both the Jewish community in Medina and the people of Mecca without any treaty.²⁸⁰ For this reason, Ibn Taymiyya argues that the Prophet did not initiate any attack against the Christian community throughout his mission, rather he sent missionaries to them preaching and introducing the religion of Islam. The battle of Mu'ta between the Muslims and Christians was fought by the Prophet in self-defence after the Christians in Levant attacked the missionaries sent to them by the Prophet.²⁸¹ Throughout the missionary life of the Prophet he never engaged in a war against anyone who sought a truce with him. Ibn Taymiyya narrates some historical moments where the Prophet set free some of the captives of war justifying that if the non-believers were meant to be killed, the Prophet wouldn't have set them free. This first argument of Ibn Taymiyya in this treatise is echoed in other works of his as follows.

He made a similar argument in *al-Ṣarim al-maslūl* stressing that women, the elderly and priests are exempted from attacks for the same purpose.²⁸² In a fatwa in *Majmū' fatāwā*, Ibn Taymiyya also supports the argument by reporting the opinion of the majority of scholars that, it is permissible to spare the life of a captive of war by means of pardoning or taking ransom.²⁸³ He also argues for it in many of his works, such as *Kitāb al-nubuwwāt*, where he states that, the majority of the jurists opined that only combatants of the non-believers are to be killed as indicated in the book and the tradition.²⁸⁴ The same is repeated with a slight addition in *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya*, where Ibn Taymiyya states that the non-combatants such as the women, minors, priests, elderly and blinds are not to be fought by the opinion

²⁸⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, 131, 200.

²⁸¹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, 136.

²⁸² Ibn Taymiyya, Aḥmad 'Abd al Ḥalīm Shaykh al-Islām. *Al-ṣarim al-maslūl 'alā Shāṭimi al-rasūl* ed. Muhammad 'Abd Allah ibn 'Imran alhuwainī (Dammām, KSA: zamādi publishers, 1997), 2:515.

²⁸³ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 27/414.

²⁸⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, *Kitāb al-Nubuwwat*, 140.

of the majority scholars. He said some scholars opposed to this opinion and exempt only women and minors to be taken as booty, but he made preponderant the opinion of the majority scholars.²⁸⁵

Ibn al-Qayyim, the famous disciple of Ibn Taymiyya also maintains the same view as he supports the argument in his book *Aḥkām ahl-al-dhimma* when he said, “Rather, we only fight who attacks us for this has been the tradition of the Prophet in the earth; he fights his attackers until they accept the religion, sign a treaty with him or being subdued to paying *jizya*. And this was his command to all his raids and militaries.”²⁸⁶ He also elaborates further in *Hidāyat al-ḥayara*, when he said:

Whoever studies the tradition of the Prophet - Peace and blessings of Allah be upon him - would ascertain that he [the Prophet] did not compel anyone to the religion. He only fights back in self-defence. He did not fight those who sought a truce with him if they abide by the truce, rather God the exalted is He commanded him to maintain the truce. “So as long as they are upright toward you, be upright toward them.” When he advanced to Medina, he signed a treaty with the Jewish community and confirmed them on their religion. When they fought him, broke the treaty and initiated the attack, he fought back; conferred favour on some exiled and killed others. Additionally, also when he made a truce with the Quraysh for twenty years, he did not attack them throughout the period until they initiated the attack and broke the truce. Subsequently, he attacked them in their homes. Prior to that, they attacked him in Badr, Uḥud and trench (*khandaq*). Had they turned away from him, he would have not attacked them. What is the intent is that, he never forced anyone to his religion; the people willingly joined the religion on their own.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Shaykh al-Islām. *Alsiyāsāt al-shar‘īyya fī iṣlāḥi al-rā‘i wa al-ra‘īyya*. Ed. ‘Alī ibn Muhammad al-‘Umrān (Dar ‘Alam al kitāb), 158.

²⁸⁶ Ibn alqayyim, *Aḥkam ahl al-zimma* 1/79 via *Qā‘ida mukhtaṣara* 124.

²⁸⁷ Ibn al Qayyim, *Hidayat al-hayara* 1/12 via *Qā‘ida mukhtaṣara* 85.

However, this matter has been discussed and debated by many scholars prior to Ibn Taymiyya and after his time. The basis of debating the issue has been the Quran “Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress” (Q 2:190) is it abrogated by the verse after it Quran “And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you, and *fitna* is worse than killing” (Q 2:191)? Some scholars of exegesis opposed to Ibn Taymiyya’s opinion and answer in affirmative. Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ [d. 980], the famous Ḥanafī scholar opines that Quran 2:191 abrogates Quran 2:190 and indicates the unconditional killing of the non-believers. He states: “This verse indicates that the only option for the Arab polytheists is to accept Islam or face the sword.”²⁸⁸ Ibn al-‘Arabī, [d. 1152] the Mālikī scholar in his exegeses of the Quran maintains the same view as that of al-Jaṣṣāṣ. He states:

The second issue: this verse [Q 2:193] indicates that the reason for killing [the non-believers] is the disbelief, for that reason, The exalted is He said “And fight them until there is no more *fitna*”, the text signifies that the purpose of fighting is to end the disbelief, and explains that the reason of killing that legalises the fighting is disbelief. The companions of Abū Hanīfa went astray on this by claiming that the reason of fighting is self-defence and use “Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you” as an evidence, but this verse is abrogated by the verse after it. In the first verse, [Allah] shows that the fighting is in self-defence, then [He] elucidated that the purpose of fighting him [non-believer] and killing him is his disbelief that motivates him to fight,

²⁸⁸ Abu-Bakr Ahmad Ibn ‘Alī al-rāzī al-jaṣṣāṣ, *Ahkām al-Quran* ed. Muhammad Ṣādiq al-qamhāwī (Beirut: Dār iḥyā’i turāth al-‘arabī, 1992), 325. Found online at: https://archive.org/stream/WAQAhqrgsAhqrgs/01_ahqrgs#page/n1/mode/2up accessed on 17th Feb. 2016.

He then commands unconditional killing [of non-believers] without specifying those who initiate the attack.²⁸⁹

The above statement of Ibn al-‘Arabī reveals that Ḥanafī scholars maintain the opinion of Ibn Taymiyya on the matter, but this just signifies how fragmented the matter is, as al-Jaṣṣāṣ is among the famous Ḥanafī scholars but opposes to the opinion of Ibn Taymiyya as cited above. An earlier Mālikī scholar who argues against the opinion of Ibn Taymiyya on the same matter is Abū ‘Abd Allah al-Qurṭubī (d. 1272) in his exegeses on the Quran. Al-Qurṭubī like the two others mentioned above argue against the opinion of Ibn Taymiyya and made preponderant the opinion that the nonbelievers are fought because of their disbelief. He states:

And his statement ‘and kill them’ is a command to fight all the polytheists at every spot, for those [scholars] who view it as the ruling [*al-nāsikh*], and those with the different viewpoint said: fight those that Allah said [on their regards]: ‘if they fight you...’ But the first opinion is the strongest, which is unconditional fighting of the nonbelievers for that reason Allah said: “until there is no *fitna*” and the Prophet- the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him- said: ‘I was commanded to fight the people until they say there is no deity worthy of worship except Allah.’ and *fitna* is disbelief, [Allah] made the end to be negation of disbelief.²⁹⁰

On the second argument in *Qā’ida mukhtaṣara*, Ibn Taymiyya argues that *jizya* is to be collected from all categories of non-Muslims, the polytheists included. If this argument of Ibn Taymiyya is established it reduces his

²⁸⁹ Abū Bakr Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd Allah Ibn al-‘Arabī, *Ahkām al-Quran* ed. ‘Alī Muhammad al-jabāwī. 1: 109. Found online at: https://archive.org/stream/Ahkam_Quran/ahquiap#page/n0/mode/2up accessed on 17th Feb. 2016.

²⁹⁰ Abū Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Abī-Bakr al-Qurṭubī, *Al-jāmi‘u li-ahkām al-Quran* ed. Abd Allah ibn Abd al-Mushim al turkī (Beirut: Muassat al-risāla, 2006), 246. Found online at https://archive.org/stream/waq73651/03_73653#page/n245/mode/2up accessed on 18/ Feb. 2016.

understanding of jihad from killing, execution and extermination to subduing the non-Muslims under the Islamic rule. Subsequently, Ibn Taymiyya employed a variety of ways to substantiate his point. He begins by parading the opinions of the scholars from the predecessors, as in the previous point Ibn Taymiyya also claims the point he is arguing for to be the opinion of the majority of scholars.²⁹¹ Those who argue against it and opine that the *jizya* is only collected from the people of the book and Zoroastrians said Qur'an 9:29 "Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the last day and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture – [fight] until they give the *jizya* willingly while they are humbled" is referring to the People of Book excluding the polytheists. Furthermore, it is known that Islamic jurisprudence distinguishes between the People of the Book and the polytheists in a number of rulings including marriage and eating from the slaughtered animal. As for the Zoroastrians, the Prophet is reported to have said regarding them "treat them as you treat the People of the Book" indicating that the People of Book and Zoroastrians are parallel. Notwithstanding, Ibn Taymiyya argues against this opinion and establishes from a variety of ways that the *jizya* is to be collected from all categories of non-Muslims. Despite that Q 9:29 was revealed purposely on the Christians, but it also encompasses Jews, Zoroastrians and polytheists by a fortiori, Ibn Taymiyya argues.²⁹² To make his argument firm, Ibn Taymiyya quotes a long hadith narrating how the Prophet advised a raid when dispatched:

Fight in the name of Allah and in the way of Allah. Fight against those who disbelieve in Allah. Make a jihad, do not embezzle the spoils; do not break your pledge; and do not mutilate [the dead] bodies; do not kill the children. When you meet your enemies who are polytheists, invite them to three courses of action. If they respond to any one of these, you also accept it and withhold yourself from doing them any harm. Invite them to Islam; if they respond to you, accept it from them and desist from fighting against them.

²⁹¹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, 149.

²⁹² Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, 150.

Then invite them to migrate from their lands to the land of the migrants (Muhājirīn) and inform them that, if they do so, they shall have all the privileges and obligations of the migrants. If they refuse to migrate, tell them that they will have the status of Bedouin Muslims and will be subjected to the Commands of Allah like other Muslims, but they will not get any share from the spoils of war or (Fai‘) except when they actually fight with the Muslims [against the disbelievers]. If they refuse to accept Islam, demand from them *jizya*. If they agree to pay, accept it from them and hold off your hands. If they refuse to pay the *jizya*, seek Allah's help and fight them.²⁹³

From the hadith above, Ibn Taymiyya deduces that the Prophet commanded the raid in one of the three options to take a *jizya* from polytheists and if the polytheists agree to pay, it should be accepted from them and they should not be fought.²⁹⁴ Additionally, when the Prophet sent Mu‘āz to Yemen to collect the *jizya* he did not distinguish the polytheists from the people of the book. Furthermore, the Zoroastrians and the polytheists are two faces of the same coin, Ibn Taymiyya argues. They both have no messenger sent to them and no book descended upon them and both claim the plurality of God. Besides, the Prophet and his four Caliphs were not known to have differentiated between the people of book and others in collecting the *jizya*.²⁹⁵

Ibn Taymiyya also argues for this point in his other works. In a fatwa in *Majmū‘ fatāwā* after surveying the differences of opinion of scholars regarding the issue, he made preponderant the opinion of the majority that the *jizya* would be collected from all non-Muslims alike, stating that he knows none of the predecessors [*Salaf*] who argue against it.²⁹⁶ In *al-Şafadiyya*, after repeating the same argument as in *Majmū‘ fatāwā*, Ibn Taymiyya argues for the

²⁹³ Muslim, 1731. Translation with the help of sunna.com at <http://sunnah.com/muslim/32> accessed last on 10/12/2016.

²⁹⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā‘ida mukhtaşara*, 153.

²⁹⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā‘ida mukhtaşara*, 158.

²⁹⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 35:219 -232.

reason why the Prophet did not collect *jizya* from the Arab polytheists in Mecca; “The Prophet did not take it [*jizya*] from the Arab because battles with them seized before the legislation of *jizya*.”²⁹⁷ He further mentioned that the majority scholars opined that the *jizya* will be collected from the polytheists of India, turkey and non-Arabs.²⁹⁸ He made similar arguments in *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* and *Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya*.²⁹⁹

His disciple Ibn al-Qayyim also supports the argument in *Zād al-ma‘ād*. After discussing the matter and compiling the opinions of scholars, he made preponderant the opinion of Ibn Taymiyya that *jizya* is to be collected from all categories of non-believers. Responding to the counterclaim that the Prophet did not collect the *jizya* from the polytheists of Mecca, Ibn al-Qayyim said that was because it was legislated after the conquest of Mecca, leaving no polytheist in Mecca. To make it clearer, he further argues that, the Prophet and his Caliphs did not distinguish between the Arabs and non-Arabs in taking the *jizya*. Despite that, the Arabs were not originally Jews or Christians, they reverted to both religions, but the Prophet did not consider the origin of their religion, rather he took the *jizya* from them and Zoroastrians alike. As in the previous topic, the scholars have a difference of opinion on whom to collect the *jizya* from. It is reported in *al-Mawsū‘at al-Fiqhiyya*; a recent encyclopaedia of Islamic jurisprudence, that the majority of scholars argue against Ibn Taymiyya’s opinion that *jizya* is collected from all categories of non-Muslims, including the polytheists. “The majority of the jurists from the Shāfi‘īs, the manifest statement of Aḥmad and a narration from Mālik that *jizya* should not be collected from the polytheists, the Arabs and non-Arabs alike, they either accept Islam or face death.”³⁰⁰ This statement seems not only opposing Ibn Taymiyya’s view on the *jizya*, but on the purpose of fighting as a whole. If the *jizya* is not collected from the polytheists and they are only left to the options of Islam or death, then the purpose of fighting jihad against the polytheists is the disbelief. Unlike the previous point, Ibn Taymiyya is the only scholar who claims the majority of the

²⁹⁷ Ibn Taymiyya *Kitāb, al-Ṣafadiyya*, ed. Muhammad Rishād sālim , 2:322 .

²⁹⁸ Ibn Taymiyya *al-Ṣafadiyya*, 2:322.

²⁹⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Minhaj al-sunna al-nabawiyya* 8:516. And *Alsiyāsāt al-shar‘iyya*, 160.

³⁰⁰ Wizārat al auqāf wa al shu‘ūn al-Islāmiyya, *Al- Mawsū‘at al-fiqhiyya*, (Kuwait: wizārat al auqāf wa al shu‘ūn al-Islāmiyya,) 15:170.

scholars support his view on *jizya*. Ibn al-Qayyim dedicates many pages arguing for the matter in *Aḥkām ahl al-dhimma* but only attributes the opinion to Abū Ḥanīfa and Aḥmad in one of the narrations from him.³⁰¹ Al-Qarḍāwī also follows Ibn Taymiyya in the argument. He mentions the differences of opinion of scholars but did not parade it as the opinion of the majority scholars.³⁰²

However, for Ibn Taymiyya the apostates have completely a different status from the non-believers. In the second anti-Mongol Fatwa and elsewhere Ibn Taymiyya maintains that the apostates are to be killed unconditionally.³⁰³ They are not covered either by the *jizya* or fear of any danger from them. This is what he argues for and promotes in many of his works. He also claims it to be a consensus of all scholars, “There is consensus that the apostate is killed even if he was not able to fight such as blind, weak and priest.”³⁰⁴

These two main points that Ibn Taymiyya argues for in this treatise [*Qāʿida mukhtaṣara*], parade his opinion on jihad in a way far less radical than it is claim by the contemporary jihadists. The jihadists who paraded Ibn Taymiyya as extremist and engaged in killing and bombardment of those who claim Islam let alone the People of the Book and polytheists using Ibn Taymiyya as justification would be shocked when they come across some of his statements in this treatise. For that reason, the jihadists in their various publications did not quote or acknowledge the treatise or any of his works similar to it. This treatise when compared to the anti-Mongol and Nuṣayrī fatwas would reiterate the necessity of making a holistic approach to all the works of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad before branding or sidelining him with particular doctrine on jihad. The treatise has furthermore made clear why Ibn Taymiyya was particularly harsh in the anti-Mongol fatwa. As argued in the anti-Mongol fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya was faced with a danger of the Mongols whose atrocities they committed in history were enormous.

³⁰¹ Ibn al-Qayyim, *Aḥkām ahl al-dhimma* (Dammam: Ramādī li-annashr, 1998), 2:87.

³⁰² Al-qarḍāwī, *Fiqh al-jihad*, 2:835-38.

³⁰³ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:534.

³⁰⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 20:100.

4.3 *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduww, hal yajūz?*

This is another treatise by Ibn Taymiyya on jihad. The treatise is very short. It is edited independently by Abū Muhammad Ashraf ibn 'Abd al-Maqsūd.³⁰⁵ It is also published in volume nine of *Āthār shaykh al-Islām wa mā lahīqaha min-al-'a māl*.³⁰⁶ The title could be translated as “Principle in plunging in to the enemy, is it permissible?” In the treatise, Ibn Taymiyya argues for suicide in the course of jihad. Prior to his discussion on suicide in jihad, he elaborates on the importance of jihad citing many verses of the Quran on the issue. He cites the verse, “The believers are only the ones who have believed in Allah and His Messenger and then doubt not but strive with their properties and their lives in the cause of Allah” (Quran 49:15) on the importance of jihad and elucidates that jihad is against both the non-believers and the hypocrites. He said Allah calls on the believers to fight jihad against the hypocrites alongside the non-believers in two places in the Quran, in Quran 9:72 and Quran 66:10: “O Prophet, strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh upon them.” He further argues that jihad is carried out with wealth and self as Quran 9:41 “And strive with your wealth and your lives in the cause of Allah.” In another treatise in *Majmū' fatāwā* Ibn Taymiyya elaborates that self and wealth are a necessity in carrying out jihad. He states “The invasion [*al-ghazw*] needs engaging in jihad with both self and wealth. If someone sacrifices his self and the other his wealth and both with good intention then each of the two is *mujāhid*.³⁰⁷ Further in *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduww*, Ibn Taymiyya says even those that cannot physically partake in jihad can do so by intention.³⁰⁸ He cites a hadith that when the Prophet was on the way to some battles he said “There are some men in al-Medina who are with you wherever you march and whichever valley you cross. They remained behind for a valid excuse.”³⁰⁹ In

³⁰⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Shaykh al-Islām, *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduww hal yajūz* ed. Abu-Muhammad Ashraf ibn 'Abd al-Maqsūd (Riyadh: Aḍwā'u al-Ṣalaf, 2002).

³⁰⁶ Muhammad 'Aziz shams, *Āthār shaykh al-Islām wa mā lahīqaha min-al-'a māl*, (Jedda: majma' al-fiqh al Islāmī, 1422/2002).

³⁰⁷ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 10: 722.

³⁰⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida fī al inghimās*, 19.

³⁰⁹ Bukhari 4423, Muslim 1911.

another hadith the Prophet said, “Fight the polytheists with your hands, tongues and wealth.”³¹⁰

Turning to the permissibility of suicide in the course of jihad, Ibn Taymiyya argues extensively for the issue. He said there are a number of Quranic verses, Prophetic traditions and the consensus of the predecessors on the matter.³¹¹ He previously reported the permissibility of suicide in jihad to be the opinion of four schools of jurisprudence.³¹²

As for the followed imams such as Shāfi‘ī, Aḥmad and others, all uttered the permissibility of that. It is also the school of Abū Ḥanīfa, Mālik and others. Their reason is the Book, the Sunna and the Consensus. Allah the Most high says: “And of mankind is he who would sell himself, seeking the Pleasure of Allah. And Allah is full of Kindness to (His) slaves.” (Q 2:207)³¹³

For the reason of the revelation of the verse, Ibn Taymiyya quotes a narration that Suhayb, one of the migrants who was confronted by the people of Mecca on his way to migration and he alone vowed to fight them, “Men of Quraysh! You know, by God, that I am one of the best archers and my aim is unerring. By God, if you come near me, with each arrow I have, I shall kill one of you. Then I shall strike with my sword.” After he escaped and narrated his story, the Prophet applauded him for bravery.³¹⁴

He also quotes another interpretation of the verse from caliph ‘Umar:

Aḥmad reports with a chain of narrators (*isnād*) that a man plunged into the enemy alone and the people [around] said he throws himself into destruction ‘Umar then said: Nay, rather, this is part of those whom Allah says about them: “And of mankind is he who would sell himself, seeking the

³¹⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā’ida fī al inḡimās*, 19.

³¹¹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā’ida fī al inḡimās*, 27.

³¹² Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā’ida fī al inḡimās*, 25.

³¹³ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā’ida fī al inḡimās*, 31.

³¹⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā’ida fī al inḡimās*, 31.

Pleasure of Allah. And Allah is full of Kindness to (His) slaves.” [Quran 2:207]³¹⁵

Ibn Taymiyya deduces from these narrations that a single person can confront a group of people even if he knew he could not escape, and by so doing he was selling himself seeking the pleasure of Allah.³¹⁶ After quoting a number of texts on the virtues of a martyr and martyrdom, Ibn Taymiyya said the Prophet in many of the battles took same risk of confronting the enemy that manifold his army. He gave an example of the battle of Badr where the people of Mecca were thrice the number of the Muslims, the battle of Uhud where the people of Mecca were four times the number of the Muslims, and the battle of the Trench where Muslims were many folded by the congregation of Arabs and Jews. With all these dangers, the Prophet and the believers with him took the risk of fighting.³¹⁷ Ibn Taymiyya then quotes a very long hadith reported by Bukhārī where the Prophet sent ten men to fight more than two hundred men from the tribe of Huzail.³¹⁸ And another Hadith from *Sunan Abī-Dāwūd* where the Prophet said:

Our Lord Most High is pleased with a man who fights in the path of Allah, the Exalted; then his companions fled away (i.e. retreated). But he knew that it was a sin (to flee away from the battlefield), so he returned, and his blood was shed. Thereupon Allah, the Exalted, says to His angels: Look at My servant; he returned seeking what I have for him (i.e. the reward), and fearing (the punishment) I have, until his blood was shed.³¹⁹

He later deduced from the hadith a justification for suicide in jihad. He said the returning of the man alone after fleeing to confront the enemy acquired him the love of God, and subsequently indicates that the action is pleased.³²⁰

³¹⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida fī al-inḡimās fī al-'aduw hal yajuz*, 32.

³¹⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida fī al-inḡimās fī al-'aduw hal yajuz*, 33.

³¹⁷ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida fī al-inḡimās fī al-'aduw hal yajuz*, 35 – 37.

³¹⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida fī al-inḡimās fī al-'aduw hal yajuz*, 47.

³¹⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida fī al-inḡimās fī al-'aduw*, 54. Abū Dāwūd 2536.

³²⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida fī al-inḡimās fī al-'aduw hal yajuz*, 55.

All these indicate that such type of actions is beloved to Allah and pleases Him. It is not enough to argue for mere permissibility... rather, the hadith shows that the action is loved and pleased by Allah. And it is known that the person is more likely to be killed in such actions despite that he strived in fighting.³²¹

Towards the end of the treatise Ibn Taymiyya argues that the legislation of the suicide [in jihad] for this nation might be a substitute for what was legislated in the previous nations of self-destruction in repentance. He quotes a verse where the previous nations were commanded to engage in self-killing as a form of repentance “And [recall] when Moses said to his people,

O my people, indeed you have wronged yourselves by your taking of the calf [for worship]. So repent to your Creator and kill yourselves. That is best for [all of] you in the sight of your Creator.” Then He accepted your repentance; indeed, He is the Accepting of repentance, the Merciful” (Q 2: 54) and linked it to the permissibility of suicide in jihad for this nation³²²

Ibn Taymiyya said the above was legislated for the nation before us, but Allah substituted it with what is more beneficial for this nation. Instead of killing one another the Muslims are killed by the enemy to gain the reward of martyrdom.³²³ Ibn Taymiyya also narrates the stories of some Companions who throw-self to the enemy during the battle and their actions were approved by the fellow Companions. He also argues that Prophet Ibrāhīm was commanded to slaughter his only son Ismā‘īl as a sacrifice to the Lord. According to Ibn Taymiyya, this legislation is equivalent to committing suicide. This indicates that Allah the exalted is He can test the believers with variety of hardships to assess their perseverance.³²⁴

³²¹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduw*, 55

³²² Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduw*, 56 .

³²³ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduw*, 37.

³²⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduw*, 36.

After making the argument, Ibn Taymiyya also acknowledges and responds to the viewpoints of others. He cites the verse:

Now, Allah has lightened [the hardship] for you, and He knows that among you is weakness. So, if there are from you one hundred [who are] steadfast, they will overcome two hundred. And if there is among you a thousand, they will overcome two thousand by permission of Allah. And Allah is with the steadfast. [Quran 8: 66]

According to Ibn Taymiyya, the verse only indicates the obligation of fighting two non-Muslims by one Muslim but does not forbid supererogatory acts if one wishes to. Ibn Taymiyya also argues this point in other works of his. In a fatwa in *Majmūʿ fatāwā* after stating the story of Ashāb al-Ukhdūd where a young boy sacrificed himself for the prevalence of the truth, Ibn Taymiyya said “For this reason the four imams of the schools of jurisprudence permit a Muslim to plunge into the rows of infidels even if he was certain that he would be killed if there is any benefit for the Muslims in doing so.”³²⁵

The editor of the treatise also reports statements of some classical scholars such as Shāfiʿī, Ahmad and Mālik in support of the argument. He reports that Imam Shāfiʿī argues for suicide in jihad in his book *al-Umm*. Shāfiʿī said there is no harm for a person to plunge in the group [of enemy] even if he knew he was going to be killed because similar action was done before the Prophet- the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him- on the day of Badr. The same opinion was also reported from Imam Ahmad by his sonʿ Abd Allah and Abū Dāwūd in their various narrations from him.³²⁶

As Ibn Taymiyya claims the support of majority scholars on this point, some scholars also argue for it and claim it to be the opinion of the majority scholars. Ibn Hajar, [d. 1448] states: “As for the matter of one person to plunge into many enemies, the majority scholars permit that if he is certain of terrifying the enemy, preventing them against the Muslims or any other good

³²⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, MF27:540 .

³²⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qāʿida fī al-inghimās fī al-ʿaduw*, 25.

purpose, but if it leads to more harming consequences, it is then forbidden.”³²⁷ Abū Hāmid al-Ghazali’s tune was closer to Ibn Taymiyya, as he reports no differences of opinion of scholars on the issue. He said: “We said there is no dispute that a Muslim can plunge into the row of infidels to fight; even if he knew he was going to be killed. Some might assume this to oppose the verse [Quran 2: 195], which it does not.”³²⁸ Most of the medieval scholars who discuss the issue of suicide in jihad support the opinion of Ibn Taymiyya and report it as either consensus or the opinion of the majority scholars. This opinion is also reported from Muhammad ibn Hassan al-Shaybānī [d. 805], Ibn Hazam al-Zāhirī [d. 1064], Abū ‘Abd Allah al-Qurtubī Ibn al-‘Ābidīn [d. 1836] and others.³²⁹ The core reasons that most of the scholars relied upon are Quran 2:207, “And of mankind is he who would sell himself, seeking the pleasure of Allah, and Allah is full of Kindness to slaves,” and the story of Ashāb al Ukhdūd reported by Bukharī and Muslim, where a young boy sacrificed himself for truth to prevail. Subsequently, another reason is the story of Barā’ Ibn ‘Āzib when the Muslims fought Musaylama. When the army of Musaylama sought a refuge in a garden, Barā’ ascended a high hill and cried, “O Muslims, carry me and throw me over to them in the garden.” When they refused to throw him in, he climbed the wall by himself, threw himself in the garden and opened the gate alone. This act is considered as an attempt to commit a suicide by most of the people with this opinion.³³⁰

However, in contrast to Ibn Taymiyya, the famous contemporary Salafi scholars object to this opinion and argue against suicide in the course of jihad. A popular Salafi website, Sahab Salafi Network, published a number of fatwas from the leading contemporary Salafi scholars objecting to suicide in the

³²⁷ Ahmad Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, *Fathu al-bārī* (Beirut: maktabat al-salafiyya) 8:185-86.

³²⁸ Muhammad Ibn Muhammad al-Husainī, *Ithaf al-sadāt al-muttaqīna bi sharhi ihyā’ I’ulūm al-dīn* (Beirut: Muassat al-tārīkh al-Gharbī, 1994), 7:26.

³²⁹ Abd al-Ḥakīm Hassan, *Hukm ‘amaliyyat al-istishhādiyya* published online at http://www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_13090.html accessed on 25/Feb/2016.

³³⁰ Ahmad Ibn Abd al-Karīm Najīb, *Al-dalā’il al-jaliyya ‘alā mashrū’iyyat al-‘amaliyyat al-istishhādiyya*, published online at <https://saaid.net/Doat/Najeeb/2.htm> accessed on 26/Feb./2016.

course of jihad.³³¹ Most of these fatwas were taken from their various treatises or audio recordings. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Abd Allah ibn Bāz was reported responding to a question about the permissibility of suicide against the Jews. Ibn Bāz said: “My opinion that I voice out severally is that it is not good [*lā ya-ṣiḥḥ*], because it is self-killing and Allah says, “Do not kill yourself” and the Prophet- the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him-said: “Whoever kills himself with something, then he will be punished with that thing on the day of Judgement.” One should participate in jihad when the jihad is legal, if he is killed he should be thankful to Allah, but it is a mistake and not permissible to commit suicide in order to kill more number... what the Palestinians are doing is wrong and not permissible...”³³² Muhammad Ibn Ṣāliḥ al-‘Uthaymīn insists that the story of Ashāb al Ukhdūd does not justify the permissibility of suicide in jihad. In the course of explaining the hadith in his commentary on *Riyāḍ al Ṣāliḥīn*, Ibn ‘Uthaimīn states:

But the suicide some people commit today by making some explosives and explode it among the infidels is self-killing, May Allah forbid. Whoever kills himself will abide forever in the hellfire, as it is narrated from the Prophet- the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him. The person committing suicide kills himself with no benefit to Islam. If a hundred or two hundred people were to die with him, Islam benefits nothing from it as no one will accept Islam for that, unlike the story of the boy [Ashāb al Ukhdūd] where many people accepted Islam instantly....this actions might attract reprisals with most damaging consequences, as the case is between the Jews and Palestinians..., for this, we view these suicides as self-killing which obligates hellfire, and the one committing the suicide is not a martyr...”³³³

³³¹ Sahab Salafi Network, *Fatāwā ‘ulmā’ kibār fī ‘amaliyyat al-intihāriyya*, <http://www.sahab.net/forums/index.php?showtopic=114416> acceded on 26/ Feb. 2016.

³³² Sahab Salafi Network, *Fatāwā ‘ulmā’ kibār*, acceded on 26/ Feb. 2016.

³³³ Muhammad Ibn Ṣāliḥ al-‘Uthaimīm, *Sharḥ Riyāḍ al Ṣāliḥīn* (Riyadh: Madār al-waṭan li-alnashr, 2006), 1:222. Pdf Found online at

In some of his recordings, he described suicide in the name of jihad as an act of terrorism.³³⁴ Muhammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī did not only argue against suicide in jihad, but against the existence of any legal jihad in the contemporary period. In the course of rejecting the suicide in jihad, he states: “Today there is no jihad whatsoever in Islam lands, but there is fighting, because jihad ought to be under the Muslims’ caliph who is not in existence today. If the Muslim Caliph is not in existence, so the Islamic jihad, subsequently the suicide in the name of jihad is illegal.”³³⁵ He continued to argue that the suicide in jihad might be permissible when the jihad is legal under Islamic leader which he gave example of the Prophet the- Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him. He said, if the caliph authorizes the action, then it is legal, but even under the Islamic caliph an individual cannot make such a decision.³³⁶

Based on the points above, the contemporary Salafi scholars object to suicide in the course of jihad due its misapplication by the contemporary jihadists. Almost all of the scholars, who object to it, cite an example of its misapplication by the jihadists. For that reason, Muhammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī argues for its permissibility if it was authorized by the caliph. However, there are ongoing debates among other contemporary Sunni scholars on the permissibility of suicide in jihad or not. There are a number of articles written in support of the argument. Some of these articles found online include *Hukm ‘amaliyyāt al-istishhādiyya* by Abd al-Ḥakīm Ḥassan, *Al-dalā’il al-jaliyya ‘alā mashrū’iyyat al-‘amaliyyat al-istishhādiyya* by Ahmad ibn Abd al-Karīm Najīb and *‘Amaliyyat al-istishhādiyya dirāsāt fiqhiyya* by ‘Irḍ Hamdī Sa’d.³³⁷ As analysed earlier by the thesis the permissibility of suicide in jihad is the opinion of the majority medieval scholars as quoted above.

http://ia700402.us.archive.org/15/items/waq70259/01_70259.pdf. Accessed on 26/ Feb.? 2016.

³³⁴ Sahab Salafi Network, *Fatāwā ‘ulmā’ kibār*.

³³⁵ Sahab Salafi Network, *Fatāwā ‘ulmā’ kibār*.

³³⁶ Sahab Salafi Network, *Fatāwā ‘ulmā’ kibār*.

³³⁷ ‘Irḍ Hamdī Sa’d, *‘Amaliyyat al-istishhādiyya dirāsāt fiqhiyya* Published online at <http://articles.islamweb.net/media/index.php?page=article&lang=A&id=17213> accessed on 04/March/2016.

The point Ibn Taymiyya argues for in this treatise might complement the jihadists; however, he argues for suicide in jihad only if the course of fighting is justified. In the beginning of the treatise Ibn Taymiyya states that suicide is permitted if it benefits the Muslims.³³⁸ It could be argued that, as to what the contemporary jihadists are doing, it does not attract any benefit to the Muslims; rather it deteriorates their situation and attracts reprisals with more damaging consequences. On this difference, his argument for suicide in jihad cannot be used as a justification for the atrocities of the extremists.

4.4 *Al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*.

The book of *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* is published in volume twenty-eight of *Majmū‘ fatāwā*. It is also printed independently and translated into English by Umar Farrukh.³³⁹ It is one of the most popular works of Ibn Taymiyya. The book was not written on jihad; it was basically for public and private laws in Islam, but Ibn Taymiyya deals with some issues of jihad in two places. In the first place, Ibn Taymiyya discusses the meaning of jihad and its obligation upon the Muslims. On the meaning and purpose of jihad Ibn Taymiyya states: “The punishment for abandoning the obligations and committing the forbidden is what is meant by the jihad”³⁴⁰ Ibn Taymiyya mentions this amid discussing the punishment of abandoning the obligatory prayers to indicate that his understanding of jihad encompasses punishing anyone who deserves the punishment regardless of religious affiliation. Earlier, before stating the meaning and purpose of jihad, Ibn Taymiyya argues that the consensus of the Muslims is that each group that resists adhering to the some of the Islamic law such as fasting and *zakāt* should be fought. He gives examples similar to what he states in the anti-Mongol fatwas. Furthermore, he discusses the obligation of jihad and its merits which he cites many verses and hadiths for. One of the hadiths he quotes on the merits of jihad is:

A man came to Allah's Messenger and said, “Instruct me as to such a deed as equals jihad (in reward).” He replied, ‘I do

³³⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā‘ida fī al-inghimās fī al-‘aduww*, 23.

³³⁹ Farrukh, Omar A., trans. *Ibn Taymiyya on Public and Private Law in Islam* (Beirut: Khayat, 1966).

³⁴⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*, 97.

not find such a deed.” Then he added, “Can you, while the Muslim fighter is in the battlefield, enter your mosque to perform prayers without cease and fast and never break your fast?” The man said, “But who can do that?” He said: that is what is equal to jihad.³⁴¹

And another hadith which states: “In Paradise there are one hundred degrees, which Allah has prepared for those who strive in jihad for the sake of Allah. The distance between each two degrees is like the distance between the heavens and the earth.”³⁴² And another hadith: “The root of this matter (foundation) is Islam, its pillar is the prayer and its highest point is jihad.”³⁴³ This was followed by some verses of the Qur’an which include: “The believers are only the ones who have believed in Allah and His Messenger and then doubt not but strive with their properties and their lives in the cause of Allah. It is those who are the truthful.” (Q 49: 15), and more.

In the second place, Ibn Taymiyya states that whoever receives the message of Islam from the Messenger- may the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him- but refuses to adhere to it should be fought until there is no turmoil and the whole religion is for Allah. Ibn Taymiyya then mentions the steps of obligating jihad. He argues that jihad is was not prescribed in Mecca when the believers were weak. However, when they migrated to Medina the believers were permitted to fight defensively after the following verses were revealed:

Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged. And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory. [They are] those who have been evicted from their homes without right - only because they say, “Our Lord is Allah.” And were it not that Allah checks the people, some by means of others, there would have been demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name of Allah is much mentioned.

³⁴¹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*, 98; and Bukhārī 2633 the ending in the Bukhārī’s version is :Abū Huraira added, “The Mujāhid (i.e. Muslim fighter) is rewarded even for the footsteps of his horse while it wanders about (for grazing) tied in a long rope.”

³⁴² Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*, 98; and Bukhārī 2637.

³⁴³ Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*, 98; and Bukhārī.

And Allah will surely support those who support Him. Indeed, Allah is Powerful and Exalted in Might. [And they are] those who, if We give them authority in the land, establish prayer and give *zakāt* and enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong. And to Allah belongs the outcome of [all] matters. (Q 22:39 – 41).

And later in Medina fighting jihad (in the offensive) was made obligatory after the following verse was revealed: “Fighting has been enjoined upon you while it is hateful to you. But perhaps you hate a thing and it is good for you; and perhaps you love a thing and it is bad for you. And Allah Knows, while you know not.” (Q 2:216). The obligation of jihad is then strengthened by the following verse:

Say, [O Muhammad], If your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your wives, your relatives, wealth which you have obtained, commerce wherein you fear a decline, and dwellings with which you are pleased are more beloved to you than Allah and His Messenger and jihad in His cause, then wait until Allah executes His command. And Allah does not guide the defiantly disobedient people. (Q 9:24)

Ibn Taymiyya mentions more than twenty verses emphasizing the importance and merits of fighting jihad and mentions that there are more verses than that. Ibn Taymiyya did not explain whether subduing particular people to giving *jizya* will exempt them from falling victims of jihad as he explains in *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, *al-Ṣafadiyya* and other places. This will necessitate making a holistic approach to the works of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad before we outline what his views on jihad are.

Ibn Taymiyya also examines the target of jihad, which he said is to make the word of Allah prevail, and whoever becomes a stumbling block should be cleared.³⁴⁴ He later exempts women, minors and those in their category, and states that only the combatants are to be fought. He reiterates his opinion of withholding from the non-combatants as he argues for it in *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*,

³⁴⁴Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Siyāsah al-shar'īyya*, 158.

“The [infidel] who does not prevent the Muslims from establishing the religion of Allah, is the one who suffers the disadvantages of his infidelity.”³⁴⁵

It could be understood that in *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, Ibn Taymiyya argues for jihad in self-defence, while in *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya* he argues for it also in aggression when he said: “Anyone who was summoned by the messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, to propagate the religion of Allah, and he did not respond, he should be fought until there be no more persecution and the whole religion is for Allah.”³⁴⁶ He argues for it more clearly when he said: “The obligatory jihad -against the infidels and those who refuse adhering to the Islamic law such as those who withheld *zakāt* and Khārijīs- is in aggression and in self-defence...”³⁴⁷ The two opinions however, could be reconciled by stating that Ibn Taymiyya considers jihad both in aggression and in self-defence. In aggression, the infidels should be fought until there is no persecution and the whole religion is for Allah, this could be achieved if they agreed to give the *jizya* which indicates their submission to the rule of Islam, but in no way should they be fought to accept Islam. Jihad in aggression however should only be when Islam becomes a power as the case was in Medina. To establish this, Ibn Taymiyya states the jihad was not made obligatory in Mecca; it was after the migration to Medina that the Muslims were commanded to fight in self-defence and then later when the verse of sword was revealed jihad in aggression was legislated.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Siyāsat al-shar'iyya*, 159. Translation from Umar Farrukh

³⁴⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Siyāsat al-shar'iyya*, 153.

³⁴⁷ Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Siyāsat al-shar'iyya*, 163.

³⁴⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Siyāsat al-shar'iyya*, 153-155. Ibn Taymiyya, *al-ṣafadiyya*, 2:317-18.

4.5 Conclusion

These treatises of Ibn Taymiyya further unveil his understanding of jihad. His arguments in *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara* reveal his soft side on jihad, which is often neglected by the jihadists. It shows how Ibn Taymiyya argues and defends jihad in self-defence, although in some other works of his such as *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya* he argues for it in aggression as well, to make a balance. His argument in *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduww* may give the impression of his support to the jihadists, but Ibn Taymiyya argues for suicide in jihad only if the course of fighting is justified. Supporting the suicide in jihad also is not an opinion developed only by Ibn Taymiyya; rather it is reported as the opinion of the majority scholars by Ibn Ḥajar. The concurring of his opinion and the jihadists might be a coincidence. More analyses about reconciling all his thoughts on jihad are done in the conclusion of this part.

Conclusion of Part One

The fatwas and treatises analysed in this section are not the only works of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad, but they encapsulate his general understanding of the subject matter. The anti-Mongol, the Mardin and anti-Nuṣayrī fatwas were singled out from his other fatwas on jihad due to their significance. Besides being the anti-Mongol and anti-Nuṣayrī fatwas being his harshest fatwas on jihad, these alongside the Mardin fatwa are the most quoted by the jihadists of all his works on jihad. The three other treatises analysed, namely, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduww* and *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya* were given preference in analysis because of their importance. The first two treatises are specifically referring to jihad, and they touch very sensitive areas with regard to contemporary jihadism. Other books and treatises such as *al-Ṣārim al-maslūl*, *Kitāb al-nubuwwāt* and others were not analysed separately, because only minor segments of them here and there deal with jihad. The arguments in these books were used to compliment the major arguments Ibn Taymiyya makes in the main fatwas and treatises analysed in this section. The opinions of other scholars beyond Ibn Taymiyya were also engaged to compliment his arguments and add more strength to them. Special preference was given to Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, due to his being one of the best-known disciples of Ibn Taymiyya and one of the prominent scholars respected by the jihadists and the contemporary Salafism.

From the above fatwas and treatises of Ibn Taymiyya, we can deduce that Ibn Taymiyya understands jihad as “The punishment for abandoning the obligations and committing the forbidden.”³⁴⁹ Therefore, it could be fought against the Muslims as much as it is fought against the non-Muslims. It is fought against non-Muslims as a ‘just war’ waged by Muslims whenever their security is threatened by infidels.³⁵⁰ It is an obligation that is divided into individual and communal obligations. As for the jihad in self-defence Ibn Taymiyya views it as an individual obligation in the religion.³⁵¹ This could be sensed in almost all the treatises as he argues for it in all. For that reason, he motivated the

³⁴⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya*, 97.

³⁵⁰ Bonney, *Jihad from Quran*, 120.

³⁵¹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-siyāsāt al-shar'iyya*, 97.

Damascenes to repel the invasions of the Mongols. Ibn Taymiyya is not isolated in this case, as he argues that it is the consensus of the scholars: “There is nothing after believing in God that is more obligatory than repelling an invader who spoils the religion and the world (*al-dīn wa al-dunyā*), fighting such is unconditional. Everyone has to employ all he can of power, tongue and expertise.”³⁵² Most of Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments on jihad are on defensive jihad. He also argues that offensive jihad is not an individual, but a communal obligation. It could also be extracted from his understanding of jihad that both the jihad in aggression and in self-defence is only obligatory upon the Muslims when they have the power to carry it out. For that reason, jihad was not made obligatory in Mecca when the Muslims were a minority and asylum seekers. The following passage from *al-Ṣārim al-maslūl* encapsulates this:

Whoever among the believers finds himself in a land or era that he is weakened should exercise the verses of patience and turning away [from the fight] ...but when the believers are powerful, then they should exercise the verses of fighting (*āyāt al-qitāl*) and subduing the People of the Book to paying *jizya*.³⁵³

He also argues for this point in *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*. According to Ibn Taymiyya, defensive jihad is an individual obligation whenever Muslims are attacked and can repel the invasion; it was first legislated in Medina when the Muslims were permitted to fight in self-defence against the Quraysh in Badr. Almost all the battles fought by the Prophet, including Badr, Uhud, Ahzab (congregation), and Mu’ta were in self-defence.³⁵⁴ As for offensive jihad, Ibn Taymiyya argues for it if the Muslims have the power as was the case in Medina, but when fighting offensive jihad, the non-Muslims were not fought to embrace Islam but rather to submit to Islamic rule by paying the *jizya*. He argues extensively against fighting for the course of accepting the religion using Quran 2:251 “No compulsion in the religion” and other relevant verses that express jihad in self-defence to substantiate the argument. He also uses some Prophetic traditions and accounts of the battles of the Prophet in backing the argument.

³⁵² Ibn Taymiyya, *fatāwa al-kubrā*, 4:608.

³⁵³ Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Ṣārim al-maslūl*, 2:413.

³⁵⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā’ida mukhtaṣara*, 136.

The Prophet fought many battles in Medina after the legislation of jihad, but never attacked any people to enforce the religion upon them. On the contrary, he lived with the Jewish community in Medina and signed a treaty which gave the non-Muslims in Medina the freedom to practice their religion, and they were never compelled to accept Islam. At the conquest of Mecca, the Prophet neither forced Islam on the people of Mecca, nor exterminated them due to their disbelief.³⁵⁵ Ibn Taymiyya also opines that in collecting the *juice*, there should be no difference between the people of the Book and the polytheists. By establishing this, he negates any reason that a non-Muslim should be attacked based on his faith. If the polytheists were to be exempted from paying *jizya* as some scholars argue, then they would be subjected to either accept Islam or face death, the point Ibn Taymiyya argues against in *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*. Although Ibn Taymiyya claims the opinion of the majority scholars on the issue of *jizya*, some scholars also claim that the majority opinion is against Ibn Taymiyya's claim. In *al-Mawsū'a al-fiqhiyya* it is stated, "The majority of the jurists from the Shāfi'īs, the manifest statement of Aḥmad and a narration from Mālik that *jizya* should not be collected from the polytheists, the Arabs and non-Arabs alike, they either accept Islam or face death."³⁵⁶ With this established, one can argue that Ibn Taymiyya's opinion is softer than that of the majority scholars, and could be presented as the only opinion that concurs with the contemporary situation. The idea of submitting to Islam or face death would not be applicable after the Muslim nations signed treaties on equality and religious freedom.

In Ibn Taymiyya's understanding, jihad is not only fought against the non-Muslims or apostates. Some Muslims are also fought. According to Ibn Taymiyya, each group that resists adhering to any law from the widely reported and manifest laws of Islam should be fought with jihad until they adhere to its laws, even if they pronounce the two testimonies and adhere to some of its laws.³⁵⁷ Both Khārijīs and *bughāt* are Muslims according to Ibn Taymiyya, yet fighting the Khārijīs is an obligation, while fighting the *bughāt* is also permissible though not preferred. In his understanding of jihad also, if a group

³⁵⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, 131.

³⁵⁶ Wizārat al auqāf wa al shu'ūn al-Islāmiyya, *Al- Mawsū'at al-fiqhiyya*, (Kuwait: wizārat al auqāf wa al shu'ūn al-Islāmiyya,) 15:170.

³⁵⁷ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:501.

of people are taken as human shields by the target of the jihad, the target should be fought alongside the human shield even if the human shield are the most pious people. The jihad that Allah has made obligatory cannot be abandoned due the fear of whom will be killed. For that reason, in the second and third anti-Mongol fatwas Ibn Taymiyya argues for fighting the Mamlūk prisoners who were compelled to fight alongside the Mongols, but he argues that if they were killed, they would be martyrs.

Ibn Taymiyya also opines that jihad should be under the Muslim leader, whether good or corrupt, and he supported his Mamlūk rulers despite their widespread corruption against the Mongols who were foreign invaders.

It is part of fundamentals of *ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamā'a* to fight alongside the good and bad [Muslims]. For Allah will make his religion victorious via a bad person and with people that have no share [in the hereafter], just as the Prophet – the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him – said. This is because if the fighting cannot be achieved except with bad leaders or with an army the majority whom are immoral, then there must happen one of the two [options]: either to abandon the battle with them, -then the most harmful in the here and the hereafter will overcome [the Muslims] - or to engage in the battle alongside the bad ruler to repel the lesser of the two evils and to establish most of the Islamic rulings if establishing all is not achieved. And this is obligatory in this form and its likes. Rather, most of the battles that took place after the *Rāshidūn* [rightly guided Caliphs] are of this type.”³⁵⁸

He argues for fighting jihad under a Muslim ruler in some fatwas in the *Majmū' fatāwā*. He states, “It is the tradition of the Prophet, his guided Caliphs and those who followed them from the Abbasid and Umayyad that both the prayer and jihad should be under the same imam.”³⁵⁹ Ibn Taymiyya also argues for suicide in jihad, and claims that to be the consensus of the predecessors,

³⁵⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28: 506-7.

³⁵⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF*, 35:38.

based on the Quran 2:207 and some hadiths he cited. This idea might suit the jihadists; however, Ibn Taymiyya only accepts suicide in jihad if the course of jihad is justified.

Part One also explores Ibn Taymiyya's position towards some laws of war. Ibn Taymiyya considers the motive in jihad and envisions only the jihad fought for the sake of God and targeting the right people as the right jihad. He argues extensively against killing innocent souls in jihad. Only the combatants and those who pose a threat to the mission of Islam should be fought. Everyone has the right to practice the religion of his choice if he gives room for the Islamic mission to prevail. "It is not permissible to kill an innocent soul, it is not permissible to kill children and the insane for women, children, and the insane do not fight."³⁶⁰ Respect for humanitarian laws in the battle ground also reflects in his works. He mentioned category of people that are to be exempted in the war.

In the anti-Mongol fatwas, his harsh approach to the Mongols due to the practical danger he and the Damascenes faced subjected his fatwas to be hijacked by the jihadists. On the other side, his softness in *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara* and other treatises where he argues for *jizya* collections from all types of polytheists puts him against most of the scholars, including the contemporary Salafis who consider Ibn Taymiyya a model. This reiterates the necessity of taking a holistic approach in studying Ibn Taymiyya's work on jihad before sidelining him with a particular doctrine of jihad. A point worth noting is that Ibn Taymiyya's anti-Mongol fatwas which are the fatwas that have been made almost a manual for the jihadism, constitute less than five percent of his collective works on jihad.

Part of what I found studying these fatwas and treatises is that it will be difficult or impossible for anyone to analogise the Mongols with any other group. This is because, while it is possible to find some of the attributes Ibn Taymiyya enlisted in the Mongols which led him to excommunicate them, such as pledging allegiance to their dynasty and fighting for that instead of Islam, violating the sacredness of wealth and blood of Muslims, not judging according to the judgement of Allah, and others, it is impossible to find other attributes in

³⁶⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 16:80.

any group.³⁶¹ Some of the attributes that are not found in the contemporary Muslim rulers are equating their leader Genghis Khan with Prophet Muhammad [PBUH] and claiming him to be the son of God after the fashion of Christians on Jesus Christ.³⁶² Excommunicating the Mongols was solely for applying the *yāsā* codes or abstaining from some obligations. Rather, Ibn Taymiyya enumerates a number of other things that led him to the conclusion on the Mongols. Unless all the attributes he enumerates are found in the contemporary Muslim rulers the analogy remains weak.

Another point worth considering on Ibn Taymiyya about jihad is that he is harsher on the people who he deems as apostates than he is to the people who were never Muslims. This is manifest in how he treats the Mongols and Nuṣayrīs. Ibn Taymiyya's attack against the Mongols and the Mamlūk renegades was, among other reasons, because he declared them apostates. Like in many other places, in his second anti-Mongol fatwas, while discussing the status of the renegades, Ibn Taymiyya argues for the death penalty for the apostates:

Whoever crosses from them [the people of Syria] to the Mongols deserves to be fought more than many of the Mongols. Among the Mongols are the coerced and volunteers. The tradition has been established from many considerations that the punishment of the apostates is more severe than the punishment of the disbeliever. Part of it is that the apostate is killed in all situations; *jizya* should not be collected from him: and he should not be covered by covenant unlike disbeliever. From it is that the apostate is killed even if he is unable to fight, unlike the disbeliever that is not a combatant, he would not be killed by the opinion of the majority of scholars such as Abū Hanīfa, Mālik, Shafi'ī and Aḥmad. From it, is that the apostate will not inherit from [his Muslim relation], he would not be married, and his slaughtered [animal] would not be eaten, unlike the disbeliever, and other rulings.³⁶³

³⁶¹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:505.

³⁶² Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:521.

³⁶³ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 28:534.

In the third anti-Nuṣayrī fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya says about the apostasy of the Nuṣayrīs: “The Nuṣayrīs are from among the worst heretical people guided by the devil. They are from among the worst *murtaddūn* (apostates); their fighters should be killed and their property should be confiscated.”³⁶⁴ The vast majority of the classical and medieval scholars maintain the same opinion of executing the apostate.

Another point discovered studying these fatwas and treatises is that Ibn Taymiyya easily claims the consensus of the scholars or Muslims on some issues, but after thorough investigations differences of opinion of scholars will be detected. In the second anti-Mongol fatwa for instance Ibn Taymiyya claims, “The Muslims have come to consensus that fighting the Khārijīs, Rāfiḍa and their likes is obligatory, if they exit from the communion of Muslims, just as ‘Alī –may Allah be pleased with him– fought them.”³⁶⁵ However, in the real sense there is no consensus of the Muslims to fight the said sects. How would there be a consensus of the Muslims to fight them while they are considered as Muslims? They just could not be counted among the consensus! On the contrary, throughout Islamic History, these sects have been living among the Muslim community from the time of the Companions till the present. Sometimes they will be engaged in debates; sometimes they will be living with peacefully. In some instances, they will be part of the ruling body as in the case was in Abbasid and Fatimid dynasties. Of course, in some cases, skirmishes are recorded between these groups and the Sunnis, but in no way does that qualify as the consensus of Muslims to fight them.

In *Qā’ida fī al inghimās fī al-‘aduww*, Ibn Taymiyya also claims the consensus of scholars on the permissibility of suicide in jihad.³⁶⁶ However, Ibn Ḥajar reports the permissibility as the opinion of the majority of scholars while some later scholars dispute the permissibility.³⁶⁷ Ibn Taymiyya considers as consensus whatever was practiced by some Companions without any objection from the rest of the Companions. This is referred to in *usūl al-Fiqh* as a consensus by silence or “Silence gives consent.” To Ibn Taymiyya, if the pious

³⁶⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 28:553.

³⁶⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:530.

³⁶⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā’ida fī al inghimās fī al-‘aduww hal yajuz*, 19.

³⁶⁷ Ibn Ḥajar al-‘asqalānī, *Fathu al-Bārī* 8:185-86. & Sahab Salafi Network, *Fatāwā ‘ulamā’ kibār*.

predecessors have a consensus about an issue, whatever of differences arises thereafter will not be considered. In *al-‘Aqīda al-wāsiṭiyya* Ibn Taymiyya states: “The only consensus that counts is the consensus of the [pious] predecessors of the *umma*. Disputes and spreading of the *umma* started after them.”³⁶⁸

³⁶⁸ Muhammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-‘Uthaymīn, *Sharḥ al-‘Aqīda al-wāsiṭiyya* (Jedda: Dār ibn al-Jawzī, 1421/2001), 2:328.

Part Two: The use of Ibn Taymiyya by the jihadists

Introduction to Part Two

In the Part One of this thesis, some of Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas and treatises are examined with the aim of outlining his concept of jihad. Part One of the thesis outlines Ibn Taymiyya's concept of jihad in the offensive and defensive. It also identifies who should be targeted in jihad, the purpose of fighting, and the etiquette of jihad in Ibn Taymiyya's understanding.

This second part of the thesis examines how the contemporary jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya in justifying their jihadi arguments. This part comprises three chapters. Chapter five examines the relationship between Ibn Taymiyya and Wahhābism. This chapter argues that the Wahhābī scholars establish precedents in the interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya on excommunication and jihad before the emergence of the contemporary jihadists, especially in using the anti-Mongol fatwas outside the Mongol context, and the contemporary jihadists adopt the same method from the Wahhābīs. The chapter also argues that beside Ibn Taymiyya the contemporary jihadists also use the Wahhābī scholars in justifying the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers based on the non-enforcement of Sharī'a and collaboration with the non-Muslims against the Muslims.

Chapter Six examines two jihadi treatises written before the emergence of al-Qaida. These treatises are *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba*, and *al-'Umda fī i'dād al-'udda li-l-jihād fī sabīl Allāh*. The treatise *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba*, is the best known radical interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya in the contemporary period. The treatise is studied using the secondary literature available. I look at how scholars such as Mufti Jād al-Ḥaqq, Johannes J.G. Jansen, Michot, and others read *al-Farīda*'s arguments and contextualise them with both the Taymiyyan and contemporary period. The second treatise: *Al-'Umda fī i'dād al-'udda li-l-jihād fī sabīl Allāh* is also examined primarily using the work of Simon Wolfgang Fuchs on the treatise. In *al-'Umda* I will try to outline the main jihadi arguments that use Ibn Taymiyya as justification, how Ibn Taymiyya was used and the shift from *al-Farīda*'s method if there is any.

Chapter Seven examines three magazines of the two jihadi movements, al-Qaida, and ISIS and a Boko Haram manual. The chapter examines how these movements use Ibn Taymiyya in validating their arguments. Two of the magazines, namely *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* and *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* were issued by AQAP from December 2003 to January 2011. The two magazines use Ibn Taymiyya frequently in justifying jihadi and non-jihadi arguments. Chapter Seven outlines the number of times Ibn Taymiyya is mentioned in the magazines and examines the jihadi arguments in which Ibn Taymiyya is used as a justification. The chapter also examines *Dabiq* magazine, the official magazine of ISIS, by which they relate their jihadi arguments to the public. Like the two previous magazines *Dabiq* also quotes Ibn Taymiyya in justification of jihadi arguments though less frequently. This chapter examines how Ibn Taymiyya is used in *Dabiq* from issue one of June 2014 to issue 15 of July 2016. Although a Boko Haram manual is examined independently, Boko Haram is still considered as part of the ISIS.

These are not the only documents where the jihadists make jihadi arguments or use Ibn Taymiyya as justification. There are other treatises and documents that carry the same message, but the above documents are chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, the jihadi arguments in these documents represent and encapsulate the major arguments of the jihadists who use Ibn Taymiyya as a justification. Secondly, the above documents have some unique features that distinguish them from other jihadi documents. *Al-Farīda al-ghā'iba* for instance is the first and most known radical interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad in the last century and is the only document that relies solely on Ibn Taymiyya in making jihadi arguments. For these reasons, the treatise attracts the study of scholars and academics. *Al-'Umda fi i'dād al-'udda* also demonstrates the first shift from relying solely on Ibn Taymiyya to using Ibn Taymiyya as one among other scholars in making the jihadi arguments. *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* and *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* are also unique compared to two other magazines: *Madad* and *Inspire* both issued by AQAP. *Madad* is mainly for news propaganda and does not contain rich articles on jihadi theological arguments while *Inspire* magazine has very few quotations from Ibn Taymiyya and most of the quotations in *Inspire* are contained in either *Ṣadā al-malāḥim*, *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* or both. *Dabiq* is the top and most popular avenue for ISIS in propagating their ideology. In addition to that, the use of Ibn Taymiyya in the magazines of *Ṣadā al-malāḥim*, *Ṣāḍā al-*

jihād, *Dabiq* and the Boko Haram manual have not been studied before. This is the first time the use of Ibn Taymiyya in these publications will be examined.

The main argument in this part is to outline and discuss the main arguments in which the jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya, how they use him and to what extent is the use of Ibn Taymiyya by the jihadists justified. This is done using the books and articles of other scholars who either discuss the relationship between Ibn Taymiyya and the jihadists such as Michot or analyse the jihadi documents such as Mufti Jād al-Ḥaqq, Johannes J.G. Jansen, Simon Wolfgang Fuchs and others.

Chapter Five: Ibn Taymiyya, Wahhabism and the Jihadists.

5.1 Introduction

Wahhabism refers to the path, teachings and legacy of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792), an eighteenth century Islamic revivalist from Najd, currently in Saudi Arabia. The word “Wahhābī” is derived from the name of his father ‘Abd al-Wahhāb by the detractors of the movement. Wahhabism and Wahhābī Islam are frequently invoked terms in contemporary discourse on jihad and terrorism.³⁶⁹ It is noteworthy that unlike Sunnism and Shi‘ism and despite the widespread use of the term Wahhabism and Wahhābī Islam, there are no individuals or group of people who willingly answer to the name of Wahhābī. The people referred to as Wahhābīs always refute the term, consider it as derogatory and coined by opponents and instead identify themselves as *Ahl al sunna wa al-jamā‘a* or Salafis. Some Salafi scholars refer to the movement as Najdī da‘wa.³⁷⁰ The Wahhābīs accused their opponents of fabricating the term to link the movement of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb with the eighth century Khārijī movement named as Wahhābī which was denounced by the Sunni Muslims.³⁷¹

The Wahhābī movement is also associated with Ibn Taymiyya. This is, among other things, due to the frequent citing of Ibn Taymiyya by the Wahhābī scholars and their inclination to Ibn Taymiyya’s methodology in creed and jurisprudence.

Through the secondary sources, this chapter establishes the relationship between Ibn Taymiyya and the Wahhābī scholars in methodology, creed and jurisprudence. The chapter proves that the Wahhābī movement is very much shaped by the Wahhābī scholars' understanding of Ibn Taymiyya. The chapter then argues two points. Firstly, before the emergence of contemporary jihadism, the Wahhābī scholars established precedents in the interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya on excommunication and jihad, especially in using his anti-Mongol fatwas outside the Mongol context. The contemporary jihadists then adopt the same method from the Wahhābīs.

³⁶⁹ Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (Oxford University Press, 2004), 4.

³⁷⁰ Yasir. Qadhi, "On Salafi Islam". *Muslim Matters*. <http://muslimmatters.org/2014/04/22/on-salafi-islam-dr-yasir-qadhi/> accessed on 11/08/2016.

³⁷¹ Muhammad ibn Sa‘īd al-shuwai‘īr, *Taṣḥīḥ al-khaṭa‘i ḥawla tārikh al-Wahhābiyya* (Madinah: Islamic University, 1419/1998 ah), 16.

Secondly, the chapter also argues that the contemporary jihadists use the Wahhābī scholars in justifying the apostasy of contemporary Muslim rulers based on the non-enforcement of Sharī‘a and collaboration with non-Muslims against the Muslims.

Five scholars from the descendants of ‘Abd al-Wahhāb are mentioned in this chapter. All of these scholars use Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb as their last name. To distinguish them from one another, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb will refer to Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, while ‘Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb will be referred to as Ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb. Two descendants are named Sulaymān. Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb will be referred by his full name, while Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb will be referred to as Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd Allah. The fifth descendant ‘Abd al-Latīf ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Hasan ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdul-Wahhāb is only mentioned once in the chapter.

5.2 Relationship between Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb.

There are a number of similarities between Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb. Besides both being Sunnis from the Ḥanbalī school of jurisprudence, the latter revived the former and regarded him highly to the extent that he copied many of his writings with his own hand.³⁷²

Some scholars and writers, who analyse the relationship between the two figures, concluded that Ibn Taymiyya had great influence on Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb in many ways. Shaykh Ṣāliḥ al Munajjad (b.1960) the Saudi scholar and famous blogger enumerates six ways in which Ibn Taymiyya influenced Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb:

- 1) In their strong belief of making the Quran and Sunna as primary sources.
- 2) Clinging to the teachings of the pious predecessors from the Companions, the followers and leaders of four schools of jurisprudence.
- 3) Calling to the unity of God and opposing *shirk* [polytheism, associating partners with God, etc.].
- 4) Attributing the names and qualities of God as the God and His Messenger attributed them to God.

³⁷²Shaykh Ṣāliḥ al-Munajjad, *Āthār shaykh al islam ibn Taymiyya fī da‘awati shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb*. Published on 28/02/2007 by Islam Question and answer. <https://islamqa.info/ar/89671> accessed on 12/08/2016.

- 5) Rejecting blind following of the imams and scholars of Islam, and following the truth base on seasons.
- 6) Calling to the Sunna and fighting innovations.³⁷³

‘Abd Allāh al-Ṣāliḥ ‘Uthaymīn’s analysis of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb also reveals that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb was influenced among other things by Ibn Taymiyya. According to ‘Uthaymīn, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb first come in contact with Ibn Taymiyya’s work through his teacher in Medina Muhammad ibn Ḥayya al-Sindī (d. 1751/2). Al-Sindī was an admirer of Ibn Taymiyya and with no doubt he drew the attention of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb to the celebrated Ibn Taymiyya and assisted him to study his works.³⁷⁴ According to al-‘Uthaymīn, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb often quotes Ibn Taymiyya in supporting his arguments especially in his book on the divine unity *al-Kitāb al-tawhīd* and *Muḥīd al-mustafīd fī kufr tārik al-tawhīd*.³⁷⁵ In *Kitāb al-tawhīd* Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb touches on many aspects of *tawhīd* supporting his arguments with the Quranic verses, Hadith, or both in most cases, and occasionally with the statements of the Companions, followers, Ibn Taymiyya and his disciple Ibn al-Qayyim.³⁷⁶ Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb also, according to al-‘Uthaymīn, adopts Ibn Taymiyya’s attitude against innovation. Ibn Taymiyya is strongly against innovation as a whole, and as such argues that the religion of Islam is based on two principles: worship is to be devoted to Allah alone and it should be carried out only in accordance with His commandments and the teachings of the Prophet. Adopting this method from Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb condemns all forms of innovation and rejects the views of those who maintain that some innovations could be praiseworthy.³⁷⁷ Another issue which Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and the Wahhābī scholars took from Ibn Taymiyya is the rejection of *taqlīd* (blind following of the scholar) and the exercise of *ijtihād* (independent legal judgement). Following Ibn Taymiyya, the Wahhābīs believe that Allah commands the believers to obey Him and follow the teachings of the Prophet and did not make it obligatory upon them to obey anyone else. Although the

³⁷³ Al-Munajjad, *Āthār shaykh al islam ibn Taymiyya*

³⁷⁴ ‘Abd Allāh al-Ṣāliḥ ‘Uthaymīn, *Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb: the man and his works* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 33-34.

³⁷⁵ ‘Uthaymīn, *Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb*., 86-87.

³⁷⁶ ‘Uthaymīn, *Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb*., 77.

³⁷⁷ ‘Uthaymīn, *Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb*: 136 – 37.

Wahhābīs adhere to the Ḥanbalī School of jurisprudence, like Ibn Taymiyya they will not hesitate to reject any ruling which they deem not according to the Book and Sunna.³⁷⁸

From the above analysis by al-‘Uthaymīn, we can infer that the Wahhābīs emulate Ibn Taymiyya in three concepts: the concept of tawhīd and what constitutes *shirk*, the concept of rejecting innovations, and the concept of *usūl al-fiqh* (principles of jurisprudence). Moreover, David Commins adds a forth concept: the political theory.

Like ‘Uthaymīn, Commins also analyses the origin of Wahhabism and argues that the movement’s doctrine was informed by the views of Ibn Taymiyya.³⁷⁹ Commins argues that Wahhābī doctrine bases its political theory on the views of Ibn Taymiyya. However, in contrast to the jihadists who learnt rebellion against the Muslim rulers from Ibn Taymiyya, Commins argues that the Wahhābīs learnt tolerance and steadfastness towards the Muslim rulers from Ibn Taymiyya, who requires Muslims to obey the ruler, even if he is a sinner.³⁸⁰ According to Commins, in Ibn Taymiyya’s views the only ground for disobedience to a ruler is if he commands a believer to violate something prohibited by the Sharī‘a. To Ibn Taymiyya, the believers owe the ruler obedience. The ruler is free to organize government as he sees fit as long as he does not cross the line of commanding the believers to violate the Sharī‘a. According to Commins, Ibn Taymiyya grants unlimited powers to the ruler; provided that the ruler does not cross the limit of commanding the individuals to violate Sharī‘a. Commins also argues that the Ottoman Arab reformers came in contact with the works of Ibn Taymiyya through the Wahhābīs. The Ottomans Arab reformers in their quest for the reforms became attracted to Ibn Taymiyya’s views on the right of qualified scholars to perform *ijtihād* on legal issues. This interest in Ibn Taymiyya by the Ottoman Arab reformers led them to a search for rare manuscript copies of the writings of Ibn Taymiyya which made them take an interest in the Wahhābīs, who themselves were assiduous in seeking to justify their beliefs by citing Ibn Taymiyya.³⁸¹ However, the Ottoman Arab reformers and the Wahhābīs’ common interest in Ibn Taymiyya does not

³⁷⁸ ‘Uthaymīn, *Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb*: 139- 140.

³⁷⁹ David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 132.

³⁸⁰ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission*, 115.

³⁸¹ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission*, 132.

mean that they concurred on doctrinal matters. According to Commins, not only Ottoman Arab reformers, but other scholars in Baghdad, Damascus, Najd, Mecca and India who showed enthusiasm for the works of Ibn Taymiyya had to go through the Wahhābīs to access the works of Ibn Taymiyya. He cites examples of some scholars such as Nu‘mān Khayr al-Dīn al-Alūsī (d. 1899) who published a work that presented arguments to refute Ibn Taymiyya’s medieval detractors, in particular for their rejection of Ibn Taymiyya’s view that religious scholars could undertake *ijtihād*. Alūsī’s interest in Ibn Taymiyya led him to contact with Wahhābī Scholars, from whom he sought manuscripts missing from Baghdad’s collections. Also, in Damascus, another religious scholar named Ṭāhir al-Jazā’irī compiled a list of twenty-two essays of Ibn Taymiyya and proclaimed that the essays had been copied in 1802 at the request of Ibn Abd al-Wahhāb’s son ‘Ali. Commins goes on to citing the names of other scholars who had to go through the Wahhābī scholars in order to have access to the works of Ibn Taymiyya.³⁸²

Most of the works of the Wahhābī scholars demonstrate these four concepts analyzed by ‘Uthaymīn and Commins. Thus, from these analyses, we can deduce that the Wahhābī movement is very much informed by what the earlier Wahhābī scholars understood to be the right teachings of Islam from the works of Ibn Taymiyya. In Commins’ analysis, we also can gather that, apart from the fact that the Wahhābī movement is being informed by the views of Ibn Taymiyya, other movements and scholars also use the Wahhābīs as a source to access the works of Ibn Taymiyya. This further demonstrates how the relationship between the Wahhābīs and Ibn Taymiyya is viewed by these scholars and movements. In the next section, I will demonstrate how the contemporary jihadists also use the Wahhābī scholars as a secondary source of information and understanding of Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of *takfīr* and jihad.

5.3 *Takfīr* in Ibn Taymiyya’s works and how it is adapted by the Wahhābīs.

Excommunication or *takfīr* is one of the important topics vis-à-vis jihad. Some of the people that are fought in jihad are either because they are considered non-believers from the origin or because they are deemed apostates. As stated in many of Ibn Taymiyya’s writings apostates are to be fought

³⁸² Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission*, 133.

unconditionally. The Wahhabis and jihadists who wage jihad against some communities only do so after excommunicating them and declaring them apostates. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and his decedents fought the people of Najd and their surroundings claiming their deviation from the true Islam. Faraj also declared the war against the Egyptian society after excommunicating the leaders and the masses for supporting the leaders in what he deems as heresy.³⁸³

As controversial as in other issues, some writers accuse Ibn Taymiyya of excommunicating the Muslims. Natalie Goldstein argues that Ibn Taymiyya’s teachings drew on the Khārijī’s in sharply dividing the Islamic world into Muslims and non-Muslims, but Goldstein based her argument on Ibn Taymiyya’s confrontation with the Mongols which was analysed in Chapter One of this thesis.³⁸⁴ This allegation of Goldstein may not be sustained considering how Ibn Taymiyya severally castigates the Khārijīs in many of his writings. In the second anti-Mongol fatwas, Ibn Taymiyya says the following about the Khārijīs:

The *umma* has agreed to criticize the Khārijīs and consider them astray. They only have dispute over excommunicating them; two famous statements in the school of Mālik and Aḥmad, there is dispute in the school of Shafī‘ī also over excommunicating them. That is why there are two positions on them [Khārijīs] in the school of Aḥmad and others: the first is that they are rebels. The second is that they are non-believers like apostates, it is permitted to kill them initially, killing their captive, following the one who runs away among them, and whoever is captured among them should be asked to repent just like apostate if he repents [he would be let free] if not, he would be killed: just as his [Aḥmad] school has two opinions over the one who refuses *zakāt* if he fought the Imam over it: would that be tantamount to disbelieve or not? Two statements of scholars.³⁸⁵

³⁸³ Faraj, *al-Farīda*, 8-10.

³⁸⁴ Natalie Goldstein, *Religion and State* (New York: Impobase publishing 2010), 54.

³⁸⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 28:18.

The Khārijīs are known to be excommunicating the Muslims for committing sins as Ibn Taymiyya and other scholars describe them. Ibn Taymiyya says about the Khārijīs: “This is the attribute of the rebels such as the Rāfiḍa and others; they make legal the bloods of Muslims and level them as apostates more than they make legal the blood of the heretics that are not apostates, because the apostate is worse than the others [heretics].”³⁸⁶ The excommunication in Ibn Taymiyya’s writings in contrast to the Khārijīs is more towards the doctrines of sects or groups than individuals. Ibn Taymiyya issued a general excommunication against the Mongols, Nuṣayrīs and other Shīʿīs but was very cautious in excommunicating the individuals.

Some writers also associate Ibn Taymiyya with excommunication and argue that the contemporary jihadists draw their inspiration of excommunication from him. Delong-Bas for instance exonerates Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb from any linkage with the contemporary jihadists and claim instead that the excommunication can only trace its path from Ibn Taymiyya. She states:

Contemporary fundamentalists have also taken a new approach to defining who qualifies as a “true Muslim.” In classical scholarship, the label of apostate could only be applied when a person either expressly abjured Islam or denied axiomatic articles of faith in either word or deed. Lack of adherence to Islamic law did not constitute sufficient grounds for accusations of apostasy for classical scholars other than Ibn Taymiyya.³⁸⁷

It is true that Ibn Taymiyya declared the Mongols and Nuṣayrīs as apostates and motivated people to wage jihad against them, but in other statements of his, Ibn Taymiyya was very cautious about declaring individuals or groups as apostates. In a fatwa cited in volume three of the *Majmūʿ fatāwā* Ibn Taymiyya made a lengthy statement about the danger of excommunicating individuals or groups of Muslims. Ibn Taymiyya after narrating the deviancies of the Khārijīs and citing Hadiths against them argues that despite all what is

³⁸⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 28:497.

³⁸⁷ Natana J. Delong-bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (OXFORD: Oxford University Press, 2004), 242.

said against them; the Khārijīs are not excommunicated by scholars. He further argues:

So, if these people [the Khārijīs], whose misguidance has been established through clear textual evidence and consensus, were not excommunicated nor declared to be unbelievers, even though they were fought at the command of the Prophet so how then can the various differing groups in the Muslim community be anathematized for committing errors which those wiser than them have committed? Indeed, it is absolutely impermissible for any of these groups to anathematize or excommunicate the other, nor to make permissible the shedding of their blood or the transgression upon their wealth/property, even if such groups exhibit clear misguidance. Verily, could it not also be that the accusers themselves could also be misguided in some ways? Indeed, the latter's misguidance may actually be worse and it is usually the case that they are all ignorant of the fact that they do not differ on the basic truths.³⁸⁸

Ibn Taymiyya further argues against violating the lives and wealth of Muslims due to the differences of opinion:

It is a supreme principle that the lives of the Muslims and their wealth and their honour are prohibited from being transgressed upon by other Muslims. The Prophet- The Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him- said during the Farewell Pilgrimage: "Verily, your lives, your wealth, and your honour are sacred and prohibited to be transgressed upon [by each other], in the same manner as this day, this city, and this month is sacred to you" The Prophet also said: "Every Muslim is forbidden to any other Muslim [from

³⁸⁸ Ibn Taymiyya MF 3:283 Translation with the help of an article posted online at <https://ballandalus.wordpress.com/2015/06/23/ibn-taymiyya-d-1328-and-the-question-of-takfir-excommunication/> accessed on 16/05/2016.

being harmed or attacked], with regard to his life, his wealth, and his honour.³⁸⁹

As stated earlier, Ibn Taymiyya's thoughts can always be subject to interpretation by the opposing sides. It is true that Ibn Taymiyya excommunicates some groups such as the Mongols and Nuṣayrīs but in contrast to the jihadists Ibn Taymiyya is against excommunicating individuals and did not issue a general excommunication against the people of his society. Towards the end of his life Ibn Taymiyya retreated from excommunicating any Muslims for the sins they have committed. Ibn Taymiyya's disciple al-Dhahabī states: "Towards the end of his life, Ibn Taymiyya would state: 'I do not deem anyone from among the Muslims to be an unbeliever. He also used to say: The Prophet—the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him— said: "None keeps the ablution except the true believer."³⁹⁰

In the methodology of excommunicating individuals, Abū al-‘Alā’ ibn Rāshid a contemporary writer from Saudi Arabia, argues that both Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and Ibn Taymiyya share common methods in the principles that determine what and how someone is excommunicated. He argues that the two shaykhs both agree that a Muslim could only be excommunicated after he is shown a clear proof that his actions are tantamount to disbelief and yet he refuses to correct the said actions.³⁹¹ Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, however, differs from Ibn Taymiyya in how the proof is established. To Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, establishing the proof does not mean that the person accused of *shirk* should understand the verses and hadiths recited for him; mere reciting the proof is enough evidence to excommunicate who does not succumb to it.³⁹² Ibn Rashid examines the commonality in methods of the two shaykhs which includes, besides establishing clear proof, that the person being excommunicated must know and intend the implication of his statements and actions. He argues that both shaykhs give excuses to the individuals when they commit actions that are considered as disbelief. In addition, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb like Ibn Taymiyya

³⁸⁹ Ibn Taymiyya MF 3: 283

³⁹⁰ Shams al-dīn Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Dhahabī, *Siyar A' lām al-Nubalā'* (Beirut: Muassasat al-Risāla, 1983), 15:88.

³⁹¹ Ibn Rashid, *Qawābiṭ takfīr al-mu'ayyan*, 10.

³⁹² 'Uthaymīn, *Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb*, 134.

made some statements elaborating the danger of excommunicating Muslims without sound proofs and following due process.³⁹³ Ibn Rāshid cites Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb stating: “In general, it is obligatory upon a sincere Muslim not to indulge in this matter [of excommunication] except with knowledge and clear proof from God. He should be cautioned from excommunicating any Muslim or admitting [anyone] into Islam. This is among the greatest matters of the religion.”³⁹⁴ The author believes that like in other matters Ibn Taymiyya influenced Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb on the topic of excommunication.

The Wahhābī scholars use the statements of Ibn Taymiyya in justifying their claim of the apostasy of a particular group of people. In the paragraphs below, I will demonstrate how the Wahhābī scholars use Ibn Taymiyya to justify the apostasy of some groups of people before the emergence of the contemporary jihaditsts.

‘Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb wrote a treatise arguing that not all Muslims who proclaim the two testimonies of faith are Muslims. Rather, there are some people who claim Islam who declare the two testimonies, but commit some acts that will nullify their faith. To support his argument, Ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb quoted the statements of scholars across the four schools of jurisprudence. In the Ḥanbalī School, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim are quoted. And Ibn Taymiyya is quoted more than ten times. Here are two of the quotations:

If there were people who claimed Islam in the lifetime of the Prophet -May the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him- and the era of the caliphs, but apostatize, then it should be known that those who claim Islam and Sunna in this period may also apostatize for some reasons. One of these reasons is transgressing the limit (*al-ghuluw*) that Allah condemned in His Book “Do not exceed the limits in your religion.” ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib may Allah be pleased with him burnt those who transgressed the limit among the *Rāfiḍa*... the Companions agreed upon killing them, but Ibn ‘Abbās opined beheading them instead of burning, and this is the

³⁹³ Ibn Rashid, *Ḍawābiḥ takfīr al-mu‘ayyan*, 149- 150.

³⁹⁴ Ibn Rashid, *Ḍawābiḥ takfīr al-mu‘ayyan*, 10.

opinion of the majority scholars. Also, transgressing the limit with regards to some scholars even transgressing the limit with regards to ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, rather, even transgressing the limit with regards to Christ and the like [is shirk]. Whoever transgresses the limit with regards to a Prophet or pious person and ascribes him part of the divine attribute such as saying: oh, my master, commit me to success or rescue me, and the likes of these statements are *shirk* and misguidance. The doer will be asked to repent; if he does not, then he should be killed...³⁹⁵

Another quotation from Ibn Taymiyya is from the first anti-Mongol fatwas:

Every group that resists adhering to any law from the widely reported and manifest laws of Islam among the people [i.e the Mongols] or others, then it is obligatory to fight them until they adhere to its laws, even if they pronounce the two testimonies and adhere to some of its laws, just as Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq and the Companions – may Allah be pleased with them- fought the people who resisted *zakāt*. The jurists after them [the Companions] agreed upon this after ‘Umar’s argument with Abū Bakr –may Allah be pleased with both. The Companions – May Allah be pleased with them– agreed on fighting for the privilege [*haqq*] of Islam, in accordance with the book [of Allah] and the tradition [of the Prophet]...³⁹⁶

According to Ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, these and other quotations from Ibn Taymiyya are part of the reasons indicating that some Muslims apostatize and consequently deserved to be fought with jihad even if they claim Islam and declared the two testimonies of faith. The point worth consideration here is that the Wahhābī scholars engaged in battles against the people who claim Islam in Najd and surroundings. Therefore, like the jihadists, the Wahhābī scholars need to establish the apostasy of these people in order to

³⁹⁵ ‘Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb *al-Kalimāt al-nāfi‘a fī al-mufakkirāt al-wāqi‘a*, 3. Accessed on 30/04/2017. And Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-risāla al-sunniyya ilā al-ṭā’ifa al-‘adawiyya*, MF, 3:383.

³⁹⁶ Ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb *al-Kalimāt al-nāfi‘a*, 4; and Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:502.

justify their campaigns against them. In the justification of declaring their opponents as apostates, the Wahhābī scholars use Ibn Taymiyya and other scholars. This commonality of declaring the target as apostates between the Wahhābī scholars and the jihadists led the jihadists to use the Wahhābīs as a secondary source of appropriating Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas of apostasy. Both the Wahhābīs and jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas, especially the anti-Mongol fatwa, outside the context they were issued and the jihadists quote the fatwas through the Wahhābīs. The part of the first anti-Mongol fatwa above was quoted by the ISIS through Ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb and his son Sulaymān to argue for the apostasy of the Sahwa coalition. This will be elaborated in the paragraphs below after citing another example of the use of Ibn Taymiyya by the Wahhābī scholars.

The second example is in the commentary on *al-Kitāb al-tawhīd* by Sulaymān ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb. Sulaymān ibn 'Abd Allah argues for the apostasy and obligation of fighting those he terms "grave worshipers" (*'ubbād al-qubūr*) and quotes segments of Ibn Taymiyya's first anti-Mongol fatwas below as justification:

Every group that resists adhering to any law from the widely reported and manifest laws of Islam among the people [i.e the Mongols] or others, then it is obligatory to fight them until they adhere to its laws, even if they pronounce the two testimonies and adhere to some of its laws, just as Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq and the Companions -may Allah be pleased with them- fought the people who resisted *zakāt*. The jurists after them [the Companions] agreed upon this.³⁹⁷

Sulaymān ibn 'Abd Allah then said: he [Ibn Taymiyya] then said:

So, any group that refrains from the obligatory prayers, fasting, Hajj or resists abiding by the prohibitions against spilling blood, looting wealth, alcohol, adultery, gambling, incest or resists adhering to jihad against the non-believers or collecting *jizya* upon the People of the Book or abiding by anything else from the obligations and prohibitions of the

³⁹⁷ Sulaymān ibn 'Abd Allah *Taysīr al-'Azīz al-Ḥamīd*, 295; and Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:501.

religion—those rulings that no one has an excuse to deny or abandon— and which a denier [commits] disbelief by denying. Then the resisting group is fought on account of it even if it acknowledges it. This is part of what I know [regarding which there are] no differences of opinion among the scholars.³⁹⁸

Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd Allah then said: He [Ibn Taymiyya] then said: These [Mongols] according to the most judicious scholars – are not on the same level as the rebels (*bughāt*), rather, they rebelled from Islam (sic).³⁹⁹

The above quotations from Ibn Taymiyya, are used by Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd Allah to justify the apostasy and obligation of fighting the tomb venerators even if they claim Islam. In issue 10 of *Dabiq* magazine of ISIS an article titled “The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men” quotes the same segments of the first anti-Mongol fatwa through *Taysīr al-‘Azīz al-Ḥamīd* and *al-Kalimāt al-nāfi‘a* to argue for the apostasy of the Sahwa coalition.⁴⁰⁰ The Sahwa coalition is a coalition of group of rebels fighting the Syrian government. Most of these groups are Muslims united by secular values. The analysis on how ISIS uses Ibn Taymiyya will follow in Chapter Seven of this thesis. However, there are two points worth of consideration from the above quotations. Firstly, Ibn Taymiyya issued the fatwa excommunicating the Mongols and calling for jihad against them, and the same portion of the fatwa is quoted by Ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb to argue for the possibility of the apostasy of some Muslims without specification. His son, Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd Allah, also quotes the same portion to argue for the apostasy of tomb venerators and from the two of them, and ISIS quotes the same portion of the fatwa to argue for the apostasy of the Sahwa coalition. When Ibn Taymiyya issued the fatwa in 1299, he was not aware that in the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries his fatwa will be

³⁹⁸ Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd Allah, *Taysīr al-‘Azīz al-Ḥamīd*, 295 and Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 28:503.

³⁹⁹ Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd Allah, *Taysīr al-‘Azīz al-Ḥamīd*, 295 and Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 28:503. That is how Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb quoted it, but the correct wording in MF is “These [Mongols] according to the most judicious scholars – are not on the same level as the rebels (*bughāt*) resisting a leader or resisting obedience to him, like the people of Syria with the Commander of the Faithful ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib—May God be pleased with him. But the aforementioned [Mongols] rebelled from Islam.”

⁴⁰⁰ “The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men,” *Dabiq* 10, (July, 2015): 52. Last accessed on 25/04/2017 <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/the-islamic-state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-1022.pdf>

quoted to argue for the apostasy of tomb venerators and the Sahwa coalition. Ibn Taymiyya does not approve tomb veneration; however, were he to be asked about the tomb venerators or the Sahwa Coalition his fatwa might differ. Therefore, using his statements to justify these actions does not make him justify the actions. Secondly, these quotations are evidence for what this chapter argues, namely, that the Wahhābī scholars preceded the contemporary jihadists in using Ibn Taymiyya as justification for apostasy and jihad. Some of the contemporary jihadists even copy these arguments from the Wahhābī scholars. Like the Ottoman Arab reformers, the jihadists also use the Wahhābīs as a source for accessing Taymiyyan works. The jihadists in contrast to the Ottomans also used the Wahhābīs as the secondary sources of interpreting and appropriating Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas.

Like the jihadists, the Wahhābīs were challenged by some scholars, but I have not come across anyone who challenged them with regards to the use of Ibn Taymiyya specifically, except Sulaymān ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (d.1793), a blood brother to Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb. Sulaymān ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb's challenge was not specifically with regards to the use of Ibn Taymiyya. However, in some aspects of what constitutes *shirk*, Sulaymān ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb argues that his brother deviates from the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and the Sunni tradition.⁴⁰¹ Sulaymān ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb's interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya on the apostasy of grave veneration, slaughtering and making vows to other than Allah differs considerably with that of his brother. To him, Ibn Taymiyya considered these acts as forbidden (*muḥarram*) or minor *shirk*, but not major *shirk* as interpreted by his brother. He argues that, according to Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, when an individual commits any act of apostasy out of ignorance or mistake, that individual should not be excommunicated; rather, awareness should be made.⁴⁰² According to Tarrik K. Firro, Sulaymān Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb follows his brother's methodology of classifying *shirk* into major and minor. However, Sulaymān Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab accuses his brother of intolerance in accepting minor *shirk* and instead considering it as grave as major *shirk*. Sulaymān insists that minor *shirk* should be dealt with using more tolerance as long as it does not

⁴⁰¹ Sulaymān ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, *Al-Ṣawā'iq al-ilāhiyya fī al-radd 'ala al-Wahhābiyya* (Beirut: Dār- Zul Qaffār, 1997), 37.

⁴⁰² Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, *Al-Ṣawā'iq al-ilāhiyya*, 53.

harm the essence of belief (*imān*). According to Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, for Ibn Taymiyya, the veneration of holy places is not an act of major *shirk*, but a minor one tolerable for those who fulfil their main Islamic duties.⁴⁰³

5.4 The jihadists’ use of the Wahhābī scholars

Chapters Six and Seven of this thesis will elucidate that one of the central arguments of the jihadists is that the contemporary Muslim rulers are apostates, based on two things: their non-enforcement of Sharī‘a and their collaboration with the non-Muslim countries in fighting the Muslims [jihadists]. The jihadists mostly use Ibn Taymiyya’s anti-Mongol fatwas to substantiate the argument. However, in some cases, the jihadists also refer to the works of the Wahhābī scholars. In this section, I will elaborate how the contemporary jihadists use the statements of the Wahhābī scholars to justify the apostasy of the Muslims based on a) non-enforcement of Sharī‘a and b) collaboration with the non-Muslims.

Firstly, the apostasy of the Muslims based on the non-enforcement of Sharī‘a

Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb is known to have written an independent treatise titled *Nawāqid al-Islam* (nullifiers of Islam). The treatise consists of ten nullifiers and in some of these nullifiers Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb will state his reason from either the Book, Sunna or both, and also states some examples. The treatise is endorsed by al-Qaida and cited among the most important treatises that should be studied. The following passage is from their *Ṣadā al-jihād* magazine stressing the importance of the treatise.

It is [incumbent] upon preachers and scholars to strive in unveiling the religious knowledge and propagating the religion of Allah The Most High. People should be exposed to the authentic creed [both in] theory and in practice, and they should be cautioned against apostasy in all its ramifications. [The awareness should be made] through knowledge circles, sermons, publications, cassettes and the likes. Tawhīd should be given emphasis, also emphasis should be given to the knowing apostasy in the

⁴⁰³ Tarrik K. Firro, “The Political Context of Early Wahhabi Discourse of Takfir” *Middle Eastern Studies* 49, no. 5 (2013): 772.

contemporary period by teaching the treatise *Nawāqid al-Islām* of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, may Allah have mercy upon him. Despite the treatise being concise, it elucidates the most important, most encompassing and most frequent nullifiers.⁴⁰⁴

AQAP’s statement above shows how they embrace Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s treatise on *takfīr* and make it one of the sources to be used in outlining what constitutes apostasy in the contemporary period.

Another example of how the jihadists use the Wahhābīs as a source of excommunication is a chapter in Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s *Kitāb al-tawhīd*. A chapter in the book titled “Whoever obeys the Scholars and the Rulers, forbidding what Allah has made permissible and permitting what He has made forbidden, has certainly taken them as Lords [besides Allah].” The wording of the title is cited by Boko Haram as one of their reasons for excommunicating whoever does not judge with the Quran and Sunna.⁴⁰⁵ In this case, Boko Haram now turns to Wahhābī sources instead of Ibn Taymiyya to evidence the apostasy of the people who refuse enforcing *shar‘a*.

Secondly, using the statements of Wahhābī scholars to argue the apostasy of the Muslims based on the collaboration with the non-Muslims

Another nullifier of Islam mentioned by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb in *Nawāqid al-Islām* is “Supporting and assisting the polytheists against the Muslims.” He states the verse of the Quran “And whoever amongst you takes them [the disbelievers] as allies and protectors then he is indeed from among them. Verily, Allah does not guide a wrong-doing people.” (Q 5:51), as the proof for the claim. ISIS quoted this nullifier to argue for the apostasy of the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia who happens to be the descendant of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, and main embodiment of the mainstream Wahhābism in the contemporary period. The article claims that the Mufti hides behind claims of being Sunnī, Hanbalī, Salafī and descendant and student of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb; he and his like are truly nothing more than slaves of *tāghūt* (false deity) waging war against the jihadists in order to

⁴⁰⁴ ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Āl ‘Abd al-Laṭīf, “Amwāj al-ridda wa Ṣakhrat al-īmān,” *Ṣadā al-jihād* 34, (March, April 2009) 22.

⁴⁰⁵ Yusuf, *Hadhih aqīdat nā*, 59.

maintain the status quo. To prove his apostasy, the above nullifier from Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb is quoted:

It was Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb may Allah have mercy on him who mentioned among the ten greatest nullifiers of Islam: “Eighth: Backing the *mushrikīn* and aiding them against the Muslims. The evidence is His saying, ‘And whoever allies with them of you, then indeed he is of them. Verily Allah does not guide the tyrannical people.’” (Q 5:51).⁴⁰⁶

Al-Qaida also quotes the same portion in *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* to argue for the apostasy of the Saudi regime for their collaboration with the Western nations in fighting Yemen.⁴⁰⁷

Another Wahhābī scholar ‘Abd al-Latīf ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Hasan ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdul-Wahhāb also made similar arguments against seeking assistance from the non-Muslims. From him ISIS copied the argument and used it against the Sahwa coalition. I will quote his fatwa from *Dabiq* to demonstrate how ISIS is using the Wahhābī scholars in making their arguments.

Shaykh ‘Abdul-Latīf Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān Ibn Hasan Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdul-Wahhāb, in refutation of those who permit supporting the apostates against the Muslims under the claim that they are only seeking their help, said, “As for your permitting to seek their support, the argument is not on this issue, but rather on the issue of allying with them and bringing them here, and giving them control over an Islamic land wherein they demolished the rites of Islam, the principles of the religion, its fundamentals and its branches. And with their leaders is a set of manmade laws and a *tāghūt* whom they set up in order to judge between people concerning their blood, their wealth, and other matters, with laws that oppose and go against the shar’ī texts. If any issue

⁴⁰⁶ “Kill the imams of kufr,” *Dabiq* 13 (Dec. 2015), 7, last accessed last 01/05/2017. <http://clarionproject.org/factsheets-files/Issue-13-the-rafidah.pdf>

⁴⁰⁷ “Ḥukm mushārakat al-amrīkān fī qitāl-almuslimīn fī al-yaman,” *Ṣadā al-Malāḥim* 12 (Jan. 2010), 13.

arises, they look into it and judge by the manmade laws, and throw the book of Allah behind their backs.⁴⁰⁸

ISIS also in an article titled: “Kill the Imāms of Kufr in the West,” quotes Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdul-Wahhāb among other scholars, including Ibn Taymiyya to argue for the apostasy of some notable Islamic scholars in the West. The apostasy of these scholars according to the article is for uniting with the cross-bearing allies in the global war against the Islamic State. Verses of the Quran, Hadiths and statements of other scholars are quoted as evidence. One of the scholars quoted is Ibn ‘Abdul-Wahhāb:

Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdil-Wahhāb said, know that the evidences for making *takfir* of the seemingly upright Muslim who commits *shirk* or sides with the *mushrikīn* [polytheists] against the *muwahhidīn*, [monotheists] even if he does not commit *shirk*, are too numerous to mention, as found in the speech of Allah, the speech of His Messenger, and the speech of all people of knowledge.⁴⁰⁹

The above quotations from the Wahhābī scholars by the jihadists to justify their arguments reveals that the jihadists equally use the Wahhābī scholars in making their arguments perhaps less frequent than the way they used Ibn Taymiyya. Chapter Seven of this thesis will in more elaborated analysis demonstrate how the jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya in making their arguments.

Based on these and other reasons, some writers argue that the jihadists have been influenced by the works of the Wahhābī scholars. Firro argues that a number of the contemporary jihadists are influenced by the teachings of the Wahhābī scholars. He cites the example of Yusuf al-‘Uyayri, one of the Sahwi (awakening) ideologues who legitimizes the killing of infidels, including women, elders and children, taking his cue from Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb. Firro also mentions Muhammad ibn Sa‘īd al-Qaṭānī, another jihadi scholar who articulates the principles of excommunication and links it with Ibn ‘Abd al-

⁴⁰⁸ “The Law of Allah” 58. And ‘Abd al-Latīf ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Hasan ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdul-Wahhāb ‘Uyūn al-rasā’il wa al-ajwiba ‘alā al-masā’il (Riyadh: Maktabat al-rushd, 200), 1:281-82.

⁴⁰⁹ “Kill the Imāms of Kufr in the West,” *Dabiq* 14, (April/May 2016): 16. Last accessed 01/05/2017 <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/the-islamic-state-22dacc84biq-magazine-1422.pdf> ; and *al-Durara al-saniyya fi al-ajwiba al najdiyya*, 8:49.

Wahhāb. Al-Qaḥṭānī dedicates a special book to deal with *al-walā' wa al-barā'* as an important principle for excommunication through which he legalizes the killing of those he considers infidels.⁴¹⁰

However, Natana J. Delong-Bas has a different reading of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb. In her work on him, she analyses the teachings of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb on jihad, then compares them to the writings of other jurists and activists on this topic, both past and present, placing him within a long tradition of jurisprudence on the topic of jihad and demonstrating what she believes to be a contrast between his teachings and those of contemporary jihadists.⁴¹¹

Delong-Bas argues that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb did not go the extra mile in excommunication as perceived by some, but has a different way of interpreting the Quranic verses on jihad from the way of the classical scholars. Delong-Bas exonerates Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb from any linkage with the contemporary jihadists and argues that the jihadists' interpretation of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb is a distortion of his creed. Instead, Delong-Bas places the blame on Ibn Taymiyya. She states: "It is very important to note that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb did not support the approach of the medieval Ḥanbalī scholar Ibn Taymiyya of simply declaring anyone who did not adhere to his teachings to be an unbeliever who had to be fought."⁴¹² The first part of this thesis established Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of jihad which apart from his ant-Mongol fatwas is far from the accusation of Delong-Bas. Before this thesis, Michot was the first to declare Delong-Bas wrong in her assessment of how the jihadists copy Ibn Taymiyya.⁴¹³ The link between Ibn Taymiyya and the jihadists will be elaborated in the next two chapters.

However, Firro responds to Delong-Bas analysis. Firro argues that the assessment of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb will give a different picture of him from that portrayed by Delong-Bas: "This picture takes on another colour when one follows Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb's writings beyond his theological and legal treatises dealt with by DeLong-Bas."⁴¹⁴ He further argues that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb made charges of excommunication without presenting his legal arguments. When citing an example of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb's excesses in

⁴¹⁰ Firro, "The Political Context," 785-6.

⁴¹¹ Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, 194.

⁴¹² Natana, *Wahhabi Islam*, 200.

⁴¹³ Michot, *Ibn Taymiyya against Extremism*, 35.

⁴¹⁴ Firro, "The Political Context," 774.

excommunication, Firro said Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb describes Muhammad ibn Fayruz (1729–1801), one of his ardent opponents, as a heretic who was guilty of committing major *shirk*, while Ibn Fayruz was a prominent Ḥanbalī scholar from Hasa whose legal exegesis followed the prominent Ḥanbalī scholars, especially Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim. According to Firro this excommunication was not as the result of committing a nullifier but rather due to the great animosity manifested by Ibn Fayruz toward the Wahhābī creed and the Saudi political and military power.⁴¹⁵

Firro thinks that Delong-Bas’ approach mainly treats theological treatises of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb rather than writings that dealt with specific attacks against adversaries. She also relies mainly on the writings of the founder of the doctrine, overlooking those of his descendants and other Wahhābī scholars who kept the tradition alive and reshaped it in the course of time.

As illustrated in the above discussion, the aim of this chapter is to argue that the Wahhābī scholars used Ibn Taymiyya to argue for excommunication and jihad against the opponent prior to the contemporary jihadists, and also to demonstrate how the jihadists use other sources other than Ibn Taymiyya in making their arguments.

5.5 Conclusion

Before the emergence of contemporary jihadism, the Wahhābī scholars are associated with Ibn Taymiyya. Unlike the jihadists who are mostly linked to Ibn Taymiyya with the concept of jihad, the Wahhābī movement is associated with Ibn Taymiyya in methodology, creed, jurisprudence and jihad. This chapter establishes that, the Wahhābī movement preceded the contemporary jihadists in quoting Ibn Taymiyya and appropriating his fatwas to substantiate their arguments. The anti-Mongol fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya for instance, were quoted interpreted and appropriated by the Wahhābī scholars long before the contemporary jihadists. Some scholars and movements before the contemporary jihadists also identified Wahhabism as a source of finding Ibn Taymiyya’s works. The jihadists only go far from making the Wahhābīs as a source of finding Ibn Taymiyya’s works to making them secondary sources of appropriating the Taymiyyan texts on *takfīr* and jihad. This chapter establishes

⁴¹⁵ Firro, “The Political Context,” 775.

that the contemporary jihadists also justify their arguments of excommunicating the contemporary Muslim rulers from the works of the Wahhābī scholars. Thus, the contemporary jihadists diversify their ways of sourcing evidences to validate their arguments which will make it difficult to identify a single source of theological inspiration for the jihadists. Having established this, the next two chapters will focus on identifying how the jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya in making their arguments, how the jihadists shift in using Ibn Taymiyya over time and how the scholars view the justification of the jihadists' arguments using Ibn Taymiyya. The next chapter, through secondary sources available analyses how Ibn Taymiyya is used in making jihadi arguments in two pre-al-Qaida treatises. Chapter Seven focuses on analysing how Ibn Taymiyya is used by two jihadi movements, namely, al-Qaida and ISIS.

Chapter Six: The use of Ibn Taymiyya in pre-al-Qaida Jihadi literature.

6.1 Introduction

Ibn Taymiyya's role in fighting the Mongols and his fatwas against them subjects him to use by contemporary jihadists.⁴¹⁶ His role in fighting the Mongols and his fatwas have been used by jihadists from the early 1980s onward to advance their own purposes. This chapter analyses two pre-al-Qaida jihadist treatises that use Ibn Taymiyya to their end, namely, *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba*, and *al-'Umda fī i'dād al-'udda li-l-jihād fī sabīl Allāh*. One can argue that Ibn Taymiyya is the most respected scholar by the contemporary jihadists, with their diverse and sometimes opposing views. Irrespective of these diverse views, Ibn Taymiyya is the most cited scholar in their literatures, and they all use him for one core argument directly or indirectly: the apostasy and necessity of waging jihad against the rulers who deny the application of Sharia.⁴¹⁷

The jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya and other ideologues to argue for this and reject the interpretations of traditional and mainstream scholars. Scholars and academics have differed on whether the jihadists' interpretations of Ibn Taymiyya can be justified or not. Some writers such as Natana J. Delong-Bas, K. Eylem Ozkaya and Berk Akgul approve the jihadists' interpretation as echoing the radical views of Ibn Taymiyya in the contemporary period.⁴¹⁸ These group of writers are backed by the 9/11 commission, which affirms that the jihadists are influenced by the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya.⁴¹⁹ On the other hand, the contemporary Salafi scholars exemplified by the Saudi scholars and some academics such as Michot see the jihadists' use of Ibn Taymiyya to their end as taking him out of the context and an injustice to the life and works of the Damascene Shaykh.

This chapter explores these two jihadi treatises namely *al-Farīda* and *al-'Umda* to examine the extent to which Ibn Taymiyya's views are employed

⁴¹⁶ Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, 66.

⁴¹⁷ K. Eylem Ozkaya Lassalle and Berk Akgul, "Light Years Ahead: Differences and Similarities between Al-Qaeda and Islamic State's Approach to the Global Jihad" in *Review of International Law & Politics* 12, no: 2: (2016), 41-74 (53-55).

⁴¹⁸ Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), and Eylem Ozkaya, "Light Years Ahead."

⁴¹⁹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*: 362 at <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf> accessed on 09/03/2017.

by the contemporary jihadists in validating their arguments. The treatise *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba*, the best known radical interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya in the contemporary period will be studied using the secondary literature available.⁴²⁰ I will look at how the scholars such as Mufti Jād al-Ḥaqq, Johannes J.G. Jansen, Michot, and others who read *al-Farīda's* arguments and contextualise them with both the Taymiyyan and contemporary period. The second treatise; *al-'Umda fī i'dād al-'udda li-l-jihād fī sabīl Allāh* will also be examined primarily using the work of Simon Wolfgang Fuchs on the treatise. In *Al-'Umda*, I will try to outline the main jihadi arguments that use Ibn Taymiyya as justification, how Ibn Taymiyya was used and the shift from *al-Farīda* if there is any. *'Umda* is the first shift in the 1980s from relying solely on Ibn Taymiyya to using him as one of the scholars in justifying the jihadi arguments.

The overall aim of this chapter is to identify the main arguments that Ibn Taymiyya's thoughts were used to justify and how the scholars discuss the validity of the use of Ibn Taymiyya's thoughts in justifying such arguments. Toward the end of the chapter and in the conclusion, I will argue that the two treatises do not use Ibn Taymiyya appropriately.

6.2 *Al-Farīda al-ghā'iba*,

Al-Farīda al-ghā'iba, (The Forgotten Obligation) was written by 'Abd al-Salām Faraj in Egypt, shortly before the assassination of Sadat in 1981. It is believed that the 32-page treatise influenced the assassination.⁴²¹ The treatise is the best known radical interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya, and it is the first known treatise to solely rely on Ibn Taymiyya and use him frequently in justifying jihadi doctrines. The use of Ibn Taymiyya by the contemporary jihadists from the 1980s, is more frequent than the use of him by the jihadists before the 1980s. Before the 1980s Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1957) and Sayyid Abū al-A'ālā al-Maudūdī (d. 1979) are among the most associated people with the jihadists. Quṭb for instance, in his over 400-page book *Milestones* refers to Ibn Taymiyya only 4

⁴²⁰ Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, "Do Excellent Surgeons Make Miserable Exegetes? Negotiating the Sunni Tradition in the ḡihādī Camps" *Welt des Islams* 53 (2013): 192-237 (198).

⁴²¹ Jon Hoover, "Ibn Taymiyya between Moderation and Radicalism," in *Reclaiming Islamic Tradition: Modern Interpretations of the Classical Heritage*, ed. Elisabeth Kendall and Ahmad Khan (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), 180; and Johannes J.G. Jansen, *The Neglected Duty the Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), 49.

times, while Faraj in 1980s refers to Ibn Taymiyya, 21 times in a 32 page book *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba*.⁴²² Both Quṭb and Faraj share the same view of excommunicating the contemporary Muslim rulers for the non-enforcement of Sharī'a. However, while Faraj solely relies on Ibn Taymiyya to argue for that, Quṭb does not even use Ibn Taymiyya to argue for that. Although al-Maudūdī quotes Ibn Taymiyya in his works, his treatise on jihad does not even refer to Ibn Taymiyya.⁴²³

According to Rudolph Peters, Faraj divides the treatise *al-Farīda* into three parts; in the Part One, he argues that jihad against the government is incumbent, In Part Two, Faraj refutes a number of contrary positions, which actually represent the points of view of the whole spectrum of Islamic organizations and groups, and Part Three addresses the *Jamā'a Islāmiyya* (Islamic group) without referring to their name.⁴²⁴ Our concern in this chapter is parts one and two, where Faraj uses Ibn Taymiyya to validate his arguments. According to Fuchs, the treatise is the most known radical interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad.⁴²⁵

Johannes J.G. Jansen discusses the treatise *al-Farīda* and reports a number of treatises and scholars who repudiate it. The analysis of Jansen is very comprehensive. He discusses the content and arguments of the treatise in Chapter One of the book and follows with the reaction of Azhar scholars and Sufis in chapters two and three respectively. Jansen also discusses and analyses the role understanding and contributions of some notable Egyptian scholars such as Shaykh 'Abd al-Hamīd Kishk and Shaykh al-Sha'rāwī in Chapters Four and Five respectively. My concern in this chapter however, is to outline Jansen's understanding on how Faraj uses Ibn Taymiyya in making his arguments in *al-Farīda*. Jansen mentions four subheadings where Faraj quotes Ibn Taymiyya in justifying his arguments. Firstly Jansen reports Dr. 'Ammāra's analysis that Faraj outlines the similarity between the modern leaders and the Mongols and

⁴²² Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'ālim fī al-ṭarīq* ed. A.B. al-Mehri (Birmingham: Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers, 2006), 223, 319, 326, 389.

⁴²³ Sayyid Abū al-a'lā al-Maudūdī, *Al-jihād fī sabīl Allah* (Beirut: The Holy Koran Publishing House, 1980)

⁴²⁴ Rudolph Peters, "The Political Relevance of the Doctrine of Jihad In Sadat's Egypt" in E. Ingram (Ed.), *National and international politics in the Middle East: essays in honour of Elie Kedourie*. London: Frank Cass: 264.

⁴²⁵ Fuchs, "Do Excellent Surgeons," 198.

more specifically equates Sadat with Genghis Khan and his successor, and the Egyptian government and its bureaucracy with the Mongols using Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas as justification.⁴²⁶ Secondly, Faraj spells out the apostasy of the contemporary rulers even if they perform prayers, fast and claim Islam due to their collaboration with crusaders, communists and Zionists and their implementation of the non-Islamic laws. These acts equate them with the Mongols who Ibn Taymiyya excommunicates for using the *yāsa* codes. The contemporary Muslim rulers are even worse than the Mongols, since the contemporary rulers enact laws that are further away from Islam than the Mongol *yāsa* codes.⁴²⁷ Thirdly, according to Jansen, Faraj uses Ibn Taymiyya to argue for the permissibility of killing the Muslim soldiers if the army of the non-Muslims consists of them. Faraj is following Ibn Taymiyya's second anti-Mongol fatwa for the permissibility of killing the soldiers forced out to fight with Gazan Khan in the events of year 1300.⁴²⁸ Fourthly, a Muslim can serve in the army of non-Muslims if that even if this can lead to his death, if there is benefit for the Muslims in doing so.⁴²⁹

The central response that Jansen reports from the scholars and writers in all these arguments is that Ibn Taymiyya is quoted out of context. *Al-Farīda*'s style is weak, and Faraj cannot claim Ibn Taymiyya's authority in support of his own extreme ideas.⁴³⁰ Jansen gives more focus on discussing the overall arguments of the book and the reactions of the scholars and writers more than focussing on analysing the validity of the quotations from Ibn Taymiyya. This is in contrast to Michot who specifically emphasises on analysing how Faraj uses Ibn Taymiyya and contextualizing the quotations and interpreting them with other Taymiyyan texts. Michot's analysis of *al-Farīda* will follow shortly.

Rachel Scott discusses *al-Farīda* and its refutation by Mufti Jād al-Ḥaqq [the refutation of Mufti Jād al-Ḥaqq will follow later]. He compares the two treatises to show how they agree or disagree on the fundamental issues associated with what makes a Muslim a Muslim and whether it is justified to

⁴²⁶ Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 4.

⁴²⁷ Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 8.

⁴²⁸ Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 25.

⁴²⁹ Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 27.

⁴³⁰ Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 4.

revolt against a Muslim ruler.⁴³¹ Like Jansen, Scott argues that Faraj uses the works of Ibn Taymiyya to claim that the contemporary Egyptian rulers are apostates. Using Ibn Taymiyya, Faraj defines the specific conditions under which rebellion could be justified in the framework of Sunni political theory.⁴³² Using the anti-Mongol fatwas, Faraj argues that Sadat should be fought for rebelling against laws that are necessarily known from Islamic sharia.⁴³³ Scott argues that the notion of *takfir* or excommunication was alien to classical Muslim scholars. It was introduced into Islamic thought by the Khārijīs during the civil war of the seventh century and revived and used by Ibn Taymiyya against the Mongols for their failure to enforce sharia.⁴³⁴ However, Scott faults Faraj's analogy of Sadat and by extension the contemporary Muslim rulers with the Mongols due to what Scott called "extreme irregularities" of the Mongols that could not be found in Sadat. According to Scott, Ibn Taymiyya was probably ruling only on a special case, and that his fatwas on the Mongols were not intended to have a universal application.⁴³⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, according to her never challenged the legitimacy of any sultan.⁴³⁶

Both Jansen and Scott outline one of the two central arguments in *al-Farīda* in respect to Ibn Taymiyya: the contemporary Muslim rulers are apostates for the non-enforcement of Sharī'a; thus, it is obligatory to wage jihad against them. This is simply because Ibn Taymiyya declared the Mongols apostates and called for jihad against them.

In my analysis of *al-Farīda* I found that Faraj quotes Ibn Taymiyya more than 21 times in justification of the two major jihadi doctrines. Both doctrines are discussed by Jansen and Michot. Firstly, as discussed by Jansen and Scott, is declaring the Egyptian government and by extension the Arab rulers as apostates and obligation of waging jihad against them. To use Ibn Taymiyya as the justification of this argument, Faraj finds parallels between the Middle East under Mongol rule and the contemporary Egyptian/Muslim society. As Jon Hoover puts it, Faraj argues that "Both modern Muslim rulers and the Mongols

⁴³¹ Scott, Rachel. "An 'official' Islamic Response to the Egyptian Al-Jihād Movement." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 8, no. 1 (2013): 39.

⁴³² Scott, "An 'official' Islamic Response," 48.

⁴³³ Scott, "An 'official' Islamic Response," 49.

⁴³⁴ Scott, "An 'official' Islamic Response," 44.

⁴³⁵ Scott, "An 'official' Islamic Response," 48.

⁴³⁶ Scott, "An 'official' Islamic Response," 44.

confess Islam, but they are nonetheless both apostates because they rule according to non-Islamic laws.”⁴³⁷ The Egyptian/Muslim rulers apply the laws made by unbelievers instead of the Sharī‘a; they take unbelievers as their allies; and therefore, they are apostates, they must be fought like the Mongols.⁴³⁸ Faraj uses the following passage from second anti-Mongol fatwa as justification. The passage is one of the most repeated quotations from Ibn Taymiyya by the jihadists.

It is necessarily known in the Islamic religion and by the agreement of all Muslims that, whoever legalizes following other than Islamic religion or following a path (Sharī‘a) other than the Sharī‘a of Muhammad is a non-believer, just like the disbelief of those who believe in the part of the Book and disbelieve in part of the Book. As Allah The Most High said, “Verily, those who disbelieve in Allah and His Messengers and wish to make a distinction between Allah and His Messengers [by believing in Allah and disbelieving in His Messengers] saying, “We believe in some but reject others,” (Q 4: 150– 151) and wish to adopt a way in between. They are in truth disbelievers. And we have prepared for the disbelievers a humiliating torment.”⁴³⁹

To Faraj, the above quotation from Ibn Taymiyya applies to the contemporary Muslim rulers for their application of the man-made laws. Faraj did not argue for the apostasy of the populist Egyptian society; however, he argues that aiding, supporting the apostate’s authorities of the Arab rulers by whatever means or working under them is tantamount to disbelief. To justify that, he uses the quotation below from the Mardin fatwa “Assisting those who are acting in opposition to Islam is unlawful, whether those who give the assistance are the people of Mardin or others.”⁴⁴⁰ So, from the analysis of Faraj, apostasy is limited to those who aid the apostate’s government. This position of Faraj is less radical than the position of ISIS who argued for the apostasy of the

⁴³⁷ Hoover, *Ibn Taymiyya between Moderation and Radicalism*, 180.

⁴³⁸ Peters, “The Political Relevance of the Doctrine of Jihad,” 264.

⁴³⁹ Faraj, *Al-Farīda*, 6.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:241 and Faraj, *Al-Farīda*, 9.

whole community that refuses to pay allegiance to the Islamic State. The position of ISIS will be analysed in the next chapter.

However, this Mongolization of the contemporary Muslim rulers, based on Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas is rejected by many scholars. Abd al-Salam's *Farīda* was refuted by an Egyptian scholar Mufti Jād al-Ḥaqq 'Alī Jād al-Ḥaqq who disqualified the analogy of Egyptian society to that of the Mongols as Faraj claimed. "Prayer is established, *zakāt* is given, pilgrimage is performed and Islamic rulings are established, except in some cases which do not prevent either the society or the rulers from being Islamic," the Mufti argued.⁴⁴¹ As to whether the rulers are apostates for not judging according to the Sharī'a in some cases, his answer was in the negative. Likewise, as Ibn Taymiyya argues for the Mamlūks, the Mufti Jād al-Ḥaqq argues for the contemporary Muslim rulers that they might not be the ideal ones, but the Prophet taught us the ideal way to relate to them-

The best of your rulers are those whom you love and who love you, who invoke God's blessings upon you and you invoke His blessings upon them. And the worst of your rulers are those whom you hate and who hate you and whom you curse and who curse you. It was asked shouldn't we overthrow them with the help of the sword? He said: No, as long as they establish prayer among you.⁴⁴²

The Hadith he said indicates that rebellion against a Muslim ruler is not allowed, provided that he prays, but instead he should be offered sincere advice (*naṣīḥa*).⁴⁴³

According to Scott, Haqq shows that Faraj's analogy between the Mongols and the ruling classes of Egypt is weak; the Mongols were so irreligious that they could not be compared to Sadat's government. They did not carry out any religious obligations and, therefore, it is clear that they were unbelievers and not Muslims. However, Scott questioned the argument of Haqq,

⁴⁴¹ Jād al-Ḥaqq 'Alī Jād al-Ḥaqq, *Kutayb al-Farīda al-ghā'iba wa al-radd 'alayh* (3 January 1982), in *Al-Fatāwā al-Islāmiyya min dār al-iftā' al-Miṣriyya*, 2nd printing (Cairo: Wizārat al-awqāf, 1997), 3741 available at <https://ia800304.us.archive.org/18/items/waq61121/61121.pdf>

⁴⁴² Sahih Muslim, Hadith no. 1856.

⁴⁴³ Jād al-Ḥaqq, "*Kutayb al-Farīda al-ghā'iba*," 3743.

as Haqq earlier claimed that “A Muslim does not become an unbeliever on account of any sin apart from not believing in God. When a Muslim commits a crime that is contrary to a text in the Qur’an or the Sunna, he is only rebellious and sinful.”⁴⁴⁴ In what seems a contradiction to this, Haqq declares the Mongols unbelievers despite their claim of believing in God. This implies that there are certain acts beyond believing in God by which a Muslim renders himself an unbeliever.⁴⁴⁵ Apart from disqualifying the analogy of the Egyptian rulers with the Mongols, Haqq avoids addressing the quotations from Ibn Taymiyya and discussing them. Rather, he focusses on addressing the overall argument of Faraj and refuting them giving more emphasis on reinterpreting the Quranic verses and hadiths quoted by Faraj.

Yahya Michot also discusses the arguments of Faraj and outlines the arguments above. In his response to the arguments, Michot disqualifies the analogy of the Mongols to the contemporary Muslim rulers; instead, they are analogical to the Mamlūks that Ibn Taymiyya viewed as lesser evil. In contrast with Faraj and jihadists, Ibn Taymiyya tried to repel a foreign invader, and in doing so, he had to connive with the Mamlūks that were not better in status than the contemporary Muslim rulers. In his book, *Muslims Under non-Muslim Rule*, Michot dedicates some pages to rebut ‘Abd al-Salām’s *al-Farīda*, and other similar writings for quoting the Mardin and anti-Mongol fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya to suit their claims. “The Anti-Mongol fatwas was in fact, a text for mobilising against a foreign invader” he states.⁴⁴⁶ According to Michot, despite that, the Mamlūk sultans in Cairo exercised power in a way that from the point of view of the religion, could be subject to serious criticism, Ibn Taymiyya commended patience above all.”⁴⁴⁷ Hoover’s reading of Michot is that Michot interprets the Taymiyyan texts in a way that express tolerance and passiveness.⁴⁴⁸ Thus, the anti-Mongol fatwas and other Taymiyyan texts could not justify the atrocities of the jihadists at least in Michot’s interpretation. Michot’s interpretation of the Taymiyyan texts if employed against *al-Farīda* can weaken Faraj’s argument as Faraj, unlike the later jihadists, solely relies on

⁴⁴⁴ Scott, “An ‘official’ Islamic Response,” 51.

⁴⁴⁵ Scott, “An ‘official’ Islamic Response,” 52.

⁴⁴⁶ Yahya Michot, *Ibn Taymiyya: Muslims Under Non-Muslim Rule* (Oxford: Interface Publications, 1427/2006), 50.

⁴⁴⁷ Michot, *Ibn Taymiyya Muslims*, 53.

⁴⁴⁸ Hoover, “Ibn Taymiyya between Moderation and Radicalism,” 182-183.

Ibn Taymiyya in substantiating his arguments. Moreover, like ‘Alī Jād al-Ḥaqq and Michot, al-Qaraḍāwī, also rejects Faraj’s use of the anti-Mongol fatwa to validate his arguments, but according to Hoover, al-Qaraḍāwī’s lengthy discussion of the topic employs juristic principle of forbidding the removal of evil if that will lead to the greater evil. In other words, in al-Qaraḍāwī’s analysis; even if we establish the apostasy and corruption in the contemporary Muslim rulers as argued by Faraj, the anarchy that will result the attempt to overthrowing them will be the greater evil. Consequently, this will lead to the obligation of taking to the lesser of the two evils which is passive rather than active resistance.⁴⁴⁹ These arguments of Haqq, Michot, and al-Qaraḍāwī are stronger than that of Joas Wagemakers who argues that Ibn Taymiyya establishes a precedent and model to the jihadists for excommunicating the Muslim rulers. According to Wagemakers, Ibn Taymiyya’s excommunication of the Mongols and calling for jihad against them after they accept Islam based on the use of the *yāsā* is excommunicating the Muslim rulers for the non-enforcement of Sharī‘a.⁴⁵⁰ However, as argued by Michot the Mongols cannot symbolize the contemporary Muslim rulers but foreign invaders, because unlike the contemporary Muslim rulers who are indigenous, the Mongols come from foreign country.

The second argument in *al-Farīda* which is the second jihadi doctrine, uses the Mardin fatwa. Faraj argues that the contemporary Egyptian society and by extension the Muslim societies are an abode of war. The citizens are Muslims, but the rulings as he argued in the first point are un-Islamic. Faraj tries to reconcile between the Mardin fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya and the definition of the abode of war by Abū Ḥanīfa, Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal and Abū Yūsuf. Using the Mardin fatwa, the author concludes by affirming that the Egyptian society is an abode of war but the inhabitants are not necessarily infidels.⁴⁵¹

Both Peters and Scott’s analysis of *al-Farīda* omit the Mardin fatwa, but Jansen and Michot mention it. According to Jansen, Faraj was able with no difficulty to term the contemporary society as an abode of war using quotations

⁴⁴⁹ Hoover, “Ibn Taymiyya between Moderation and Radicalism,” 181-182.

⁴⁵⁰ Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 60 – 61.

⁴⁵¹ Faraj, *al-Farīda*, 5.

from Ibn Taymiyya and Abū Ḥanīfa.⁴⁵² Michot discusses the abode of war abode of peace dichotomy in his book on the Mardin fatwa. According to Hoover, Michot rejects Faraj's conceptualization of Ibn Taymiyya as saying that Mardin is a domain of war despite being inhabited by Muslims. For Ibn Taymiyya according to Michot, a domain of war is in fact defined by the absence of Muslims.⁴⁵³ Michot's analyses of the Mardin fatwa is not limited to refuting Faraj; rather he argues that the Mardin fatwa has been subjected to misinterpretation not only by the jihadists like Faraj but also some writers who either confused it with the anti-Mongol fatwas or misinterpret it in the jihadists' fashion.⁴⁵⁴ To rectify the misinterpretation, Michot approaches the fatwa in a way that it will reflect the overall understanding of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad, by quoting some Taymiyyan texts and interpreting the Mardin fatwa in the context of the Taymiyyan texts. Michot's understanding of Ibn Taymiyya regarding the status of any domain is the ability of its inhabitants to practice their religion. A domain such as Egypt and the rest of the Muslim nations today where the majority of the inhabitants are Muslims is qualified as a domain of peace. The point of contention between Faraj and Michot on what constitutes the domain of peace in Mardin fatwa is the interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya's statement in the Mardin fatwa: "As for whether it is a land of war or peace, it is a composite situation. It is not an abode of peace where *ahkām al-Islam* (the legal rulings of Islam) are applied and its armed forces are Muslim. Neither is it the same as an abode of war whose inhabitants are unbelievers."⁴⁵⁵ According to Faraj and the jihadists *Ahkām al-Islam* in the statement refers to the establishment of the Islamic state and government where Sharī'a is source of law, whereas to Michot *ahkām al-Islam* refers to personal matters relating to rituals, marriage, burial, inheritance, protection of property, and other actions that are up to individual Muslims to implement.⁴⁵⁶

Michot was not alone in reinterpreting the Mardin fatwa against the misappropriation of Faraj and jihadists; a number of Islamic scholars and academics, including Shaykh 'Abd Allah ibn Bayyah also raised against the

⁴⁵² Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 7-8.

⁴⁵³ Hoover, "Ibn Taymiyya between Moderation and Radicalism," 186.

⁴⁵⁴ Michot, *Ibn Taymiyya Muslims*, 27 – 45.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28: 241.

⁴⁵⁶ Hoover, "Ibn Taymiyya between Moderation and Radicalism," 188.

misinterpretation of Faraj. In 2010 a conference were held in the Mardin city of Turkey with the aim of conceptualizing the fatwa, determining its correct wording, finding the correct understanding of the fatwa and its relevance to the contemporary period.⁴⁵⁷ The scholars of the conference repudiate Faraj's and the jihadists' interpretation, establish correct wording and like Michot interpret in the context of other Taymiyyan texts.⁴⁵⁸ Although Michot did not concur with the conference scholars on the process and procedure of their repudiation, yet both the outcome of Michot's book and the conference yielded the same result of refuting Faraj's interpretation.

However, Faraj was not the only jihadi to make these arguments, the only thing unique about Faraj is solely relying on Ibn Taymiyya in substantiating his arguments. The subsequent jihadists and jihadi movements adopt the method of using other scholars alongside Ibn Taymiyya in validating their arguments. In the following section, I will analyse how the latter jihadi Dr. Fadl uses Ibn Taymiyya in justifying his claims and to what extent could the use of Ibn Taymiyya justify those claims.

6.3 *Al- 'Umda fī i 'dād al- 'udda li-l-jihād fī sabīl Allāh*

Al- 'Umda fī i 'dād al- 'udda li-l-jihād fī sabīl Allāh (The Essential Guide of Preparation for *Jihad* on the Path of God) was written in 1988 by another Egyptian 'Abd al-Qādir b. 'Abd al- 'Azīz, also known as Dr Fadl (b. 1950).⁴⁵⁹ The 459 pages have become one of the sources used by the jihadists especially al-Qaida in validating their arguments.⁴⁶⁰ Unlike Faraj, Dr. Fadl uses the works of other scholars such as al-Nawawī, Ibn Hajar al- 'Asqalānī, al-Shawkānī and al-Mawardī alongside Ibn Taymiyya to argue for the jihadists doctrines, but his use of Ibn Taymiyya on the jihadi arguments is by far more than any of these scholars per se. According to Simon Wolfgang Fuchs, Dr. Fadl referred to Ibn Taymiyya 102 times in the book; 21 of these quotations according to Fuchs are from the three anti-Mongol Fatwas, 23 from *al-Siyāsa al-Shar' iyya* mainly

⁴⁵⁷ Abd al-Wahhab al-Turayri, *The Mardin Conference – Understanding Ibn Taymiyyah's Fatwa*, accessed 13/10/2015.

⁴⁵⁸ <http://muslimmatters.org/2010/06/29/the-mardin-conference-%E2%80%93-a-detailed-account/>

⁴⁵⁹ Al-Turayri, *The Mardin Conference*

⁴⁵⁹ Fuchs, "Do Excellent Surgeons," 197.

⁴⁶⁰ Jon Hoover, "Ibn Taymiyya between Moderation and Radicalism," 8.

dealing with the necessity of political authority.⁴⁶¹ According to Fuchs, roughly one third of these quotations are related to jihad, while the second third incorporates essentially political issues, like establishing the imperative of coercive authority and the other third define jihad as commanding right and forbidding wrong, or identify repelling the enemy who threatens religion as the believers' most important task.⁴⁶² Fuchs studied the book in depth and argues that *al-Umda* is the most dangerous jihadi document in circulation.⁴⁶³ He analyses the method of Dr. Fadl and his use of the Quranic verses, Hadiths, and statements of Hanbalī scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qudāma, Ibn al-Qayyim, and Shāfi'i scholars such as Ibn Ḥajar, al-Nawawī, and others such as Shawkānī in making his arguments. Fuchs argues that Dr. Fadl intends to present himself as a thinker who takes the entire breadth of the Sunni tradition into view. For that reason, unlike Faraj, Dr. Fadl does not rely solely on Ibn Taymiyya, in making his argument. Instead, he remains far more faithful to many Sunni scholars prior to and after Ibn Taymiyya. Fuchs' analysis on *al-Umda* is not solely on Ibn Taymiyya. In this segment, however, I am going to focus the analyses on the use of Ibn Taymiyya without analysing how Dr. Fadl uses other scholars, as the purpose of the chapter is not analysing the book, rather, the use of Ibn Taymiyya by the jihadists. I will discuss Fuchs analysis on Ibn Taymiyya and follow up with my analyses of Dr. Fadl's use of Ibn Taymiyya.

According to Fuchs, Dr. Fadl portrayed an entirely negative account of the situation of Muslims today and argues jihad as the only remedy for the Muslims, uses Ibn Taymiyya in supporting many of his arguments. He uses Ibn Taymiyya to argue for the virtues of jihad and its superiority over other obligations. He quotes a section of Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa to support the

⁴⁶¹ Fuchs, "Do Excellent Surgeons," 217. However, after I read the book I found out that Ibn Taymiyya appeared in the main text 114 times and was referred to as *Shaykh al-Islam* 19 times, out of which he was quoted more than 100 times as an evidence or support for the jurisprudential issues on jihad and the jihadi doctrines. The pages are as follows: *Al-Umda* pages 5, 12, 14x2, 23, 29, 35, 39, 44, 51, 55, 56, 57, 69x2, 70, 77, 79x2, 82, 83x2, 85, 87, 88x2, 91, 99, 102, 109, 115, 121, 123, 134, 135, 136, 140, 145, 147x2, 168, 169, 170x2, 177x3, 178x3, 179, 180, 185x2, 186, 187x4, 188, 189, 214, 225, 234, 248, 253, 252, 263, 268, 271, 274, 275, 277, 280, 285, 296, 298, 303, 305, 313, 316, 318, 320, 321, 322, 325, 326, 328, 329, 331, 335x2, 337, 338, 350, 354, 355, 362, 370x2, 377, 378, 379, 380, 383x3, 400, 407, 410, 420, 424, 446 and 447. And as *Shaykh al-Islam* without Ibn Taymiyya, pp 44, 83, 148x2, 148, 170, 117x4, 178x7, and 179x2.

⁴⁶² Fuchs, "Do Excellent Surgeons," 218.

⁴⁶³ Fuchs, "Do Excellent Surgeons," 202.

argument.⁴⁶⁴ The most frequent quotation from Ibn Taymiyya in the book is one line statement in *al-Siyāsa al-Sharʿiyya*: “It is obligatory to prepare for jihad by power and steeds of war even at the time when the Muslims are weak, for that without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled is itself an obligation.”⁴⁶⁵ The quotation is not tied to any context according to Fuchs but shows the importance of jihad and obligation or preparing for it. The quotation was repeated nine times. According to Fuchs, Dr. Fadl also did not use Ibn Taymiyya to demonstrate the permissiveness of waging jihad against unbelieving rulers, the only exception to this was when Dr. Fadl dismisses the objection that the anti-Mongol fatwas could not apply to the apostate Muslim rulers because the Mongols, unlike them, were a foreign enemy.⁴⁶⁶ Another argument by Dr. Fadl, according to Fuchs, is that jihad does not need the permission of a Muslim ruler. Dr. Fadl infers from the works of Abū Yaʿlā and Ahmad ibn Hanbal that the people may choose judges for themselves if there is no Islamic ruler available and that apostates may not be employed in sensitive positions of the state.⁴⁶⁷ In this argument, Dr. Fadl uses Ibn Taymiyya’s statements as a support for other scholars.

From Fuchs’ analysis, we can deduce that Dr. Fadl uses Ibn Taymiyya to argue for three main jihadi doctrines. Firstly, the virtues of jihad and its superiority over other obligations. Secondly, the permissibility of waging jihad against the apostates rulers. This was done indirectly by dismissing the objection that the anti-Mongol fatwas could not apply to the apostate Muslim rulers because the Mongols, unlike them, were a foreign enemy. Thirdly, that waging jihad does not require the permission of an imam.

On the first argument, as Fuchs argues that, Dr. Fadl was following Ibn Taymiyya in this argument, the argument is not unique to Ibn Taymiyya as Dr. Fadl also cites similar statement from Aḥmad ibn Hanbal, Sarakhsī and Ibn al-Qayyim.⁴⁶⁸ On the second argument, my reading of *al-ʿUmda* on the matter is close to that of Fuchs. Dr. Fadl did not use Ibn Taymiyya’s second anti-Mongol fatwa to justify the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers as many jihadists do. Rather, he uses other statements of Ibn Taymiyya, such as “Both

⁴⁶⁴ ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz, *Al-ʿUmda*, 14.

⁴⁶⁵ ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz, *Al-ʿUmda*, 5, 23.

⁴⁶⁶ Fuchs, “Do Excellent Surgeons,” 219.

⁴⁶⁷ Fuchs, “Do Excellent Surgeons,” 223.

⁴⁶⁸ Fuchs, “Do Excellent Surgeons,” 209 and ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz, *Al-ʿUmda*, 13.

Abū Bakr and ‘Umar who fought the apostates did not allow them the leadership of the Muslims”⁴⁶⁹ to validate his argument. Although, he did not rely solely on the Taymiyyan texts to substantiate the argument, he quotes the above statement of Ibn Taymiyya and what Fuchs refers to as “the most repeated quotation” from *al-Siyāsa al-Shar‘iyya* stated above alongside his refutation of the objection of the use of the anti-Mongol fatwas against the apostates’ Muslim rulers, thus making Ibn Taymiyya the most quoted scholar in the argument.

On the third argument according to Fuchs, Dr. Fadl argues against what is established from the Sunni tradition that the jihad should be conducted under the leadership and permission of an imam.⁴⁷⁰ Using Ibn Taymiyya to support the argument, Dr. Fadl says the Mongols fought by Ibn Taymiyya and Qutuz was after the abolishment of the Abbasid Caliphate.⁴⁷¹ He reports Ibn Taymiyya’s willingness to appoint a jihad leader against the Mongols if the rulers in *Shām* (Syria) fail to do so as an evidence of partaking in jihad without the consent of the rulers.⁴⁷² Dr. Fadl argues the irrelevance of the contemporary Muslim rulers and uses Ibn Taymiyya’s leadership against the Mongols to support the leadership of the contemporary jihadists groups. As can be seen Dr. Fadl disregards the Mamlūks continuity of the Muslims leadership after the fall of the Abbasid caliphate.

In addition to what Fuchs has found in *al-‘Umda*, I discovered that, Dr. Fadl in *al-‘Umda* uses Ibn Taymiyya to argue for the permissibility of indiscriminate attack against the target. To validate this argument, Dr. Fadl took to the path of Faraj, solely relies on Ibn Taymiyya and makes three lengthy quotations from the second anti-Mongol fatwa.⁴⁷³ The last quotation goes:

Rather, even if there were pious people from the best of mankind among them and they [Mongols] couldn’t be fought unless they [the pious people] were killed they would be killed also. The imams have agreed that if the nonbelievers were to take shield with the Muslims and [the general] Muslims may be harmed if they didn’t fight, then it

⁴⁶⁹ ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, *Al-‘Umda*, 316.

⁴⁷⁰ ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, *Al-‘Umda*, 55.

⁴⁷¹ ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, *Al-‘Umda*, 76.

⁴⁷² ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, *Al-‘Umda*, 79.

⁴⁷³ ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, *Al-‘Umda*, 325-26.

is permissible to attack them [the Muslims shield] while intending the non-believers. It is permissible to attack those Muslims Even if the [general] Muslims are feared for, according to one of the two statements of the scholars. Whoever is killed because of the jihad that Allah and His messenger commanded- and inwardly he is wronged [not deserving to be killed] – is a martyr, and will be resurrected on his intention. Killing him is not a worst corruption than killing who is killed from the believers' fighters. If jihad is obligatory even if Muslims as many as Allah wills are killed. Then killing who is killed among the Muslims from their [Mongols] side is not greater than that. Rather, the Prophet –the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him– commanded who is compelled [to fight] in sedition to break his sword. He should not fight even if he were killed.⁴⁷⁴

This is the only argument that Dr. Fadl solely relies on Ibn Taymiyya. As can be seen, unlike Faraj, Dr. Fadl does not use Ibn Taymiyya to argue for the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers, nor did he expatiate on the matter; rather, Dr. Fadl discusses it briefly and refers to his treatise *Risālat da'wat al-tawhīd* where he argues for the matter. In general, there is shift from Faraj's method of using Ibn Taymiyya as a sole reason to validate the jihadi doctrines. This shift from Dr. Fadl demonstrates that most of the arguments can be established even outside the Taymiyyan texts. However, Ibn Taymiyya still remains the most quoted scholar per se in the book. And the latter jihadists' movement also took from Dr. Fadl and use Ibn Taymiyya alongside other scholars to validate their doctrines.

6.4 Conclusion.

Ibn Taymiyya's confrontation with the Mongols, Nuṣayris, Druze and Shī'īs and his fatwas against them, alongside his charisma among the Salafists, the mainstream and the jihadists, subject his views on jihad to diverse interpretations. The Salafi jihadists employ his views to substantiate their jihadi

⁴⁷⁴Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28: 537-38; and 'Abd al-'Azīz, *Al-'Umda*, 326.

arguments just as the mainstream Salafists employ his views to substantiate other issues in creed and jurisprudence. From Faraj to ISIS, the jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya to argue for one central point; the apostasy of the Muslim rulers and the obligation to wage jihad against them. The most referred to work of Ibn Taymiyya in substantiating this argument is his anti-Mongol fatwas, where Ibn Taymiyya issued a similar verdict against the Mongols. The jihadists' use of Ibn Taymiyya is not limited to validating the obligation of waging jihad against the Muslim rulers, rather they use the anti-Mongol fatwas and other works of Ibn Taymiyya to validate other controversial issues, such as the apostasy of the whole community, jihad against the opponents, suicide in jihad and other marginal issues. As *al-Farīda* is the first most known radical interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya by the jihadists, the treatise adopts a unique method of solely relying on Ibn Taymiyya in making such arguments. However, after the refutation of *al-Farīda* by some scholars and academics, the later jihadists shift to validating their arguments through the views of other Sunni scholars alongside Ibn Taymiyya. The shift is clearly demonstrated in *al-'Umda* where Dr. Fadl avoids the use of Ibn Taymiyya in declaring the contemporary Muslim rulers as apostates and uses other scholars alongside Ibn Taymiyya in making other jihadi arguments. Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyya remains the most cited scholar in backing most of the arguments in *al-'Umda*.

The frequent use of Ibn Taymiyya by the jihadists combined with his harsh approach against the Mongols and Nuṣayris and his controversial stands on some issues on jihad convinced some non-jihadi writers such as Natana Delong-Bas, K. Eylem Ozkaya and Berk Akgul to assimilate Ibn Taymiyya's views on jihad with that of the jihadists. This claim, however, is hard to sustain if Ibn Taymiyya's views of jihad are holistically studied and contextualised within his time as Part One of this thesis attempted. In this chapter and the next, I am able to trace how the jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya in justifying these ideas and how the scholars analyse the validity of the said justification and contextualise Ibn Taymiyya's view of jihad within the frame of his time.

In general, Faraj's use of Ibn Taymiyya to argue for labelling contemporary Muslim societies as domain of war, justify the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers and subsequently wage jihad against them was refuted by a number of scholars including al-Haqq and Michot. Looking at the

circumstances surrounding the period and considering other works and fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya will disqualify Faraj's claims. Firstly, as Michot argues, the Mongols could not be analogized to the contemporary Muslims leaders; they were foreign invaders, whereas the contemporary jihadists mostly made their case against their indigenous leaders. The Mamlūks Ibn Taymiyya supported against the Mongols would have been in better status to be analogized with the contemporary rulers, but despite that, Ibn Taymiyya conceded a fault in them; he considered them as lesser evil and urged the populace to team up with them in fighting the Mongols. Secondly, the faults Ibn Taymiyya listed in the Mongols, such as equating their leader with Prophet Muhammad, killing innocent Muslims, enslaving their women and children, destroying mosques and many other negatives, could not be found in the contemporary Muslim leaders. Yes, they might be sinners as well and do not apply the Sharī'a as *rāshidūn* and other Muslim leaders do in the classical era of Islam, nonetheless the Prophet guides his followers on how to relate with them. Thirdly, Ibn Taymiyya's basic point of attacking the Mongols is analogizing them with Khārijīs fought by 'Alī bin Abī Ṭālib, and those who withheld *zakāt* that caliph Abū Bakr fought. This analogy could not be established between the contemporary Muslim leaders and either the Khārijīs or those who withheld *zakāt*. On the contrary, most of the contemporary Muslim scholars do consider the jihadists as Khārijīs. Fourthly, Caliph Abū Bakr, 'Alī ibn Abī-Ṭālib and the Mamlūks that Ibn Taymiyya supported in fighting the Mongols were all leaders with a degree of acceptance from their followers, whereas the contemporary jihadists lack such recognition from the populace.

Chapter Seven: The use of Ibn Taymiyya in the literature of al-Qaida and ISIS

7.1 Introduction

The last chapter discussed two jihadist treatises, namely, *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba*, and *al-'Umda fī i'dād al-'udda li-l-jihād fī sabīl Allāh* and how both treatises use Ibn Taymiyya in justifying their jihadi ideologies. This chapter analyses four publications of the contemporary jihadi movements. These are the two magazines issued by AQAP namely *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* and *Ṣāḍā al-jihād*, the *Dabiq* magazine issued by ISIS and a Boko Haram manual.

Al-Qaida uses a variety of ways in communicating their ideas and making their arguments to the public. This includes their two magazines in the Arabian Peninsula: *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* and *Ṣāḍā al-jihād*, the subsequent *Madad* and the English magazine *Inspire*. I choose to analyse the first two because they are the main documents where al-Qaida makes lengthy arguments and quotes Ibn Taymiyya for justification. *Madad* is mainly for news propaganda and does not contain rich articles on jihadi theological arguments. *Inspire* magazine also has very few quotations from Ibn Taymiyya. I have not come across any scholarly article discussing the arguments of the two magazines: *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* and *Ṣāḍā al-jihād*, let alone the use of Ibn Taymiyya in them. I will outline where Ibn Taymiyya is mentioned in the magazines and analyse where he was quoted as justification for the jihadi arguments. I will translate the specific questions into English, trace where they are quoted from Ibn Taymiyya's works and discuss the arguments they were used for.

ISIS relates its ideas through the *Dabiq* magazine. In the fifteen issues till the winter of 2016, only three articles used Ibn Taymiyya to argue for jihadi doctrines. I will outline where Ibn Taymiyya is mentioned in the magazine and analyse the three articles that use Ibn Taymiyya to argue for jihadi doctrines. Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015. I will therefore consider it as part of the larger group and cite some examples from their manual on how they use Ibn Taymiyya to argue for the jihadi doctrine. I will only use quotations from the Boko Haram manual to express their inclination towards Ibn Taymiyya even before amalgamating with ISIS. These publications of the jihadists are chosen to be studied as a sample because the use of Ibn Taymiyya in them to

justify the major jihadi doctrines is frequent. Moreover, I have not come across any scholarly article that discuss the use of Ibn Taymiyya in these publications. This chapter will be the first examination of the use of Ibn Taymiyya in these jihadi publications.

In the publications, the thesis examines how the arguments rely on the quotations from Ibn Taymiyya and how other scholars and sources were employed alongside Ibn Taymiyya.

In the conclusion, the thesis discusses the validity of copying Ibn Taymiyya's arguments against the Mongols and applying them in the contemporary period.

7.2 Ibn Taymiyya in al-Qaida's literature

Al-Qaida which can be translated as "base of operation" or "foundation" is a jihadi movement that traces its origin to 1987 when 'Abd Allah Azzam formed *al-Qa'ida al-sulba* (a vanguard for the strong) as an independent movement that would galvanize the jihadists against the Soviet Union invasion in Afghanistan.⁴⁷⁵ After the victory of the jihadists against the Soviet Union in the early 1990's, Usama bin Laden unified the movement again and named it *Qā'idat al-jihad* (the base or foundation of jihad).⁴⁷⁶ Al-Qaida has become the biggest jihadi organisation known before the emergence of ISIS and like other jihadists, al-Qaida gives preference to Ibn Taymiyya and uses him in justification for many of their actions. Following the 9/11 attacks, the 9/11 commission links al-Qaida with Ibn Taymiyya and claimed that Usama bin Laden and other terrorists draw their inspiration of extremism from the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya.⁴⁷⁷ This claim might not be disconnected with the frequent use of Ibn Taymiyya by the jihadists and the mention of Ibn Taymiyya by Usama bin Laden in his 1996 and 1998 declarations of jihad against America. However, the claim was not left without refutation, as Michot describes it as "extreme intolerance" indirectly led against Ibn Taymiyya which does not correspond to the truth.⁴⁷⁸ Delong-Bas also associates al-Qaida with Ibn

⁴⁷⁵ Jason Burke, "Al Qaeda" in *Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC* no. 142 (May - Jun., 2004), 18; and K. Eylem Ozkaya, "Light Years Ahead" 6.

⁴⁷⁶ Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, 131.

⁴⁷⁷ National Commission, *The 9/11*, 362.

⁴⁷⁸ Michot, *Ibn Taymiyya against Extremism*, 36.

Taymiyya. In her analyses of Ibn Taymiyya's concept of jihad, she concluded that al-Qaida and other jihadists have drawn significant inspiration from some of Ibn Taymiyya's teachings such as the permissibility of overthrowing an apostate ruler and dividing the world into a domain of peace and domain of war.⁴⁷⁹ Delong-Bas' account of Ibn Taymiyya on jihad and its linkage to al-Qaida cannot be well-justified. According to Michot, Ibn Taymiyya's struggle to create a third domain in the Mardin fatwa and his refusal to limit himself to the binary division of domain of peace-domain of war is sufficient to refute Delong-Bas.⁴⁸⁰ In addition to that, Ibn Taymiyya's working hand in hand with the Mamlūks against the Mongols further distanced him from the likes of al-Qaida who projects the Muslims rulers as apostates. K. Eylem Ozkaya and Berk Akgul argue that not only al-Qaida, rather, all the contemporary jihadists have drawn their inspirations solely from the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and his disciples.⁴⁸¹ According to them, Azzām whom they described as the father of the modern jihadists was influenced by Ibn Taymiyya's ideologies of jihad especially the notion that jihad is an obligation that has to continue until the jihadists have reconquered all Muslim lands and reinstalled Islam.⁴⁸² However, in the analyses of the jihadists' literature one can infer that with the exception of Faraj, none of the jihadists solely relies on Ibn Taymiyya in making such arguments. The said arguments can be established from the works of other scholars before and after Ibn Taymiyya. Moreover, I will establish in the analyses of *Ṣadā al-malāḥim*, *Ṣadā al-jihād* and *Dabiq* that if Ibn Taymiyya were to be excluded the jihadists' arguments still stand.

In 1996 Usama bin Laden's declaration of Jihad against America, Bin Laden quotes Ibn Taymiyya to stress the importance of jihad. According to Hoover, Bin Laden quotes Ibn Taymiyya to justify the same point with Dr. Fadl that "Even if the intentions of the fighters are impure, it is obligatory to fight to protect religion if the danger to religion from not fighting is greater than that from fighting."⁴⁸³ The paradox is that the jihadists emphasize the necessity of collaborating with corrupt jihadi leaders while rejecting the corrupt Muslim

⁴⁷⁹ Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, 250-56.

⁴⁸⁰ Michot, *Ibn Taymiyya against Extremism*, 35.

⁴⁸¹ Ozkaya and Akgul, "Light Years Ahead" 6.

⁴⁸² Eylem Ozkaya, "Light Years Ahead" 12.

⁴⁸³ Hoover, "Ibn Taymiyya between Moderation and Radicalism," 12.

rulers and declaring them apostates. Dr. Fadl makes a lengthy deliberation on the same point drawing on the writings of Ḥanbalī scholar Abū Ya‘lā (d. 1066).⁴⁸⁴ Furthermore, in 1998 Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Rifai Ahmad Ṭāha, Mir Hamza and Fazl al-Rahman issued a communique obligating upon all Muslims to kill Americans and their allies whether civilians or military for their occupation of the Arabian Peninsula and their support of Israel against the Palestine in occupation of Masjid al-Aqsā. The fatwa mentions some Ḥanbalī and Shāfi‘ī scholars such as Ibn Qudāma, al-Kasāni, al-Qurtubī, Ibn Kathīr and Ibn Taymiyya. However, none of the statements of these scholars were quoted except the statement of Ibn Taymiyya: “As for defensive fighting, the most important of the types [of fighting] is to repel an invader from the sanctity and the religion is an obligation according to consensus. There is nothing more obligatory- other than believing [in Islam] - than repelling an attacking invader who corrupts the religion and this world.”⁴⁸⁵ This is also the first and most frequent quotation from Ibn Taymiyya in *Ṣadā al-Malāhim*.⁴⁸⁶

All these quotations and references are indications of how al-Qaida revive Ibn Taymiyya and how they accord themselves the right of interpreting the Taymiyyan texts to their end. As Michot rejects this utilitarian use of Ibn Taymiyya by al-Qaida, other scholars also repudiate al-Qaida’s use of the Taymiyyan text. Bonney made a similar argument to Michot that Ibn Taymiyya was acting to repel foreign invasion, a claim that al-Qaida cannot make against their indigenous rulers or non-Muslim nations that do not attack them.⁴⁸⁷

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula communicate their ideologies to the public via electronic and printed media and the internet. *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* and *Ṣadā al-Jihad* are official magazines used by al-Qaida for jihadi propaganda. In this segment, I will analyse how al-Qaida uses Ibn Taymiyya in these magazines to justify their jihadi ideologies.

⁴⁸⁴ Fuchs, “Do Excellent Surgeons,” 223.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-Fatāwal-kubrā* 4:608; Ibn Taymiyya, *Ikhtiyārat al-Fiqhiyya*, 4:520; and Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, 174.

⁴⁸⁶ “Lā tukallaf illa nafsak,” *Ṣadā al-Malāhim* 1 (Jan. 2008): 13. Accessed 25/04/2017 <https://archive.org/stream/MagalahSadaAlMalahemAdd1To13/1#page/n0/mode/2up> All the subsequent *Ṣadā al-Malāhim* magazines 1-13 are found at the same link.

⁴⁸⁷ Richard, *Jihād From Qur’ān*, 123.

The two magazines

Ṣadā al-malāḥim and *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* magazines are the main magazines of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* (The Echo of Epic Battles) was issued bimonthly from February 2008 to January 2011, while *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* (The Echo of jihad) was issued monthly from Dec 2003 to October 2009. The magazines primarily focused on spreading the jihadi ideologies, but also contain other religious topics such as *‘aqīda*, manners and other rulings. According to Elisabeth Kendall, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula via *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* uses cultural material to win local communities for the jihadists’ project. As a mixed content magazine, it could appeal to a range of consumers, including the illiterate to whom it could be read aloud, or, in the case of poems or advice, simply passed on by word of mouth.⁴⁸⁸ The magazines like other jihadists documents use Ibn Taymiyya and other scholars in justifying many of their ideologies, but the use of Ibn Taymiyya is by far more than the use of any medieval scholar per se. Ibn Taymiyya appeared 44 times in the 16 issues of *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* across a variety of topics and 61 times in the 36 issues of *Ṣāḍā al-jihād*.⁴⁸⁹ As Fuchs analyses on *al-‘Umda* that only thirty percent or so of the quotations from Ibn Taymiyya directly deals with jihad, this also applies to these two magazines. Most of the quotations from Ibn Taymiyya do not relate directly to the radical jihadi ideologies, they are often peripheral, citing the importance of jihad, fighting in self-defence, patience on the battlefield and other side issues. I have not found any scholarly article about the magazines, but I analyse how both magazines use Ibn Taymiyya to validate their claims. Like Dr. Fadl, the arguments in these magazines do not solely rely on Ibn Taymiyya. The following are the major arguments of the articles and their use of Ibn Taymiyya.

⁴⁸⁸Elisabeth Kendall, “Al-Qaeda And Islamic State In Yemen A Battle For Local Audiences,” in *Jihadism Transformed Al-Qaeda and Islamic State's Global Battle of Ideas*, ed. Simon Staffell Akil N. Awan (London: C. Hurst & co Publishers, 2006) 93.

⁴⁸⁹*Ṣadā al-Malāḥim* issue 1 p 13, issue 4 p 3, 18, 32 and 35. Issue 6 p 5, 9, 3x2. Issue 7 p 8, 9 and 15. Issue 8 p 12, 14x2, 15x2, 16, 43 and 47. Issue 9 p 4x2, 11x2, 15 and 48. Issue 10 p 11, 12x2, 31, 37 and 57. Issue 11 p 10. Issue 12 p 14 and 32. Issue 14 pp 7, 19 and 30. Issue 15 p 11, 13, 16, 17 and 24. Issue 16 p 6.

Ṣāḍā al-jihād: issue 1 pp 41. Issue 2 p 28x2. Issue 3 p 5. Issue 12 p 8x2, 33 and 35. Issue 13 p 6, 16, 25, 43 and 56. Issue 14 p 20. Issue 16 p 30, 32 and 34. Issue 17 p 17. Issue 18 p 10, 25, 26, 27, 31, 39, 52, and 53. Issue 19 p 29, 41, 42 x 2, 43, 44, 46 and 47. Issue 20 pp 50 x 2. Issue 21 p 10. Issue 22 p 35. Issue 23 p 1, 2, and 34. Issue 24 p 16, 17 and 19. Issue 25 p 14. Issue 26 p 21, 22x2 and 48. Issue 27 p 19, 20x2 and 27. Issue 28 p 5, 18, 35 x 2 and 63.

Şadā al-malāḥim

Apostasy of the Muslim rulers and obligation of fighting them

Nine quotations featured from the anti-Mongol fatwas repeating the same arguments made by Faraj and Dr. Fadl. The central issue in both magazines with regards to Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas is to establish the similarities between the period of the Mongol invasion of Syria and the contemporary period. For that, people are divided into three groups. The first group are the Mongols and the renegades, the people who Ibn Taymiyya considered apostates. The second group is the victorious group, Ibn Taymiyya and those fighting the Mongols. And the third group is the people who forsake jihad. According to these magazines the same categorization applies in the contemporary period. The contemporary Muslim rulers and their aids are the Mongols and renegades respectively, the jihadists are the victorious group and the rest of the people forsake jihad. In issue 9 of *Şadā al-malāḥim* an article quotes a segment of Ibn Taymiyya's letter about the Mongols to argue that the jihadists are the victorious sect.

In this *fitna* the people are divided into three parties: the victorious sect and they are the people fighting the Mongols, the people opposing [the victorious sect] and they are the Mongols and the renegades and [the third category] people who forsake jihad even if their Islam is sound. Each person should carefully consider his position from these groups.⁴⁹⁰

The one and one-half page article does not expatiate more on the three categories analysed by Ibn Taymiyya in the text. The main argument in the article is to establish that the jihadists are the victorious sect. Before citing the quotation above, a hadith defining the victorious sect and their qualities was cited. The Prophet, may the Peace and Blessings of Allah be upon him said, "There will always be a group amongst my *umma* who is triumphant upon truth, abandoning them will not harm them, until the order of Allah is given and they will be like that."⁴⁹¹ This was followed by another hadith which signifies that

⁴⁹⁰ "Al-Mutasāqitūn," *Şadā al-Malāḥim* 9, (May, 2009): 4. and Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:416-417.

⁴⁹¹ "Al-Mutasāqitūn," 4 and *Şaḥīḥ Muslim* 1920.

this victorious group are the group that will be fighting for the truth. The hadith states: “There will always be a group, triumphant in fighting for the truth until the Day of Resurrection.”⁴⁹² Ibn Taymiyya was cited among the scholars who authenticate the hadith. The article then argues that this victorious group is the jihadists. According to the article, the victorious group are the ones re-establishing what is omitted from the religious acts. It is the one that will stand firm in carrying out the fundamentals of the religion, such as enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong and fighting jihad. According to the article, the jihadists are the ones who stand in the face of the United States, Israel and other powerful nations in their aggression and transgression against the Muslims, thus, this qualified them as the victorious group. Ibn Taymiyya’s statement above was quoted to outline the categorization of the people in the Mongol context into three groups. As Ibn Taymiyya contextualized the hadith of the victorious group in the Mongol period, the jihadists also contextualise it in the contemporary period. The article does not deal with the two groups in Ibn Taymiyya’s letter. This categorisation by Ibn Taymiyya is more radically interpreted by the ISIS in *Dabiq* issue 14, where, unlike al-Qaida, ISIS considers the third category as apostates just like the first category. ISIS radical interpretation on this categorisation will be elucidated on the section on *Dabiq*.

In issue no. 8, a quotation from the second anti-Mongol fatwa was used to argue for fighting the apostate rulers.⁴⁹³ The article titled “Ḥukm al-Murtadd” [the verdict on apostate] uses quotations from Hadiths to establish that the apostates should be killed. After establishing the verdict from the hadiths, the article divides the apostates into two categories: individuals and groups. The individual apostates should be executed by the imam. As for the groups, they should be fought with jihad. To validate that the group should be fought with jihad, the article employs the statements of some scholars, starting with two quotations from Ibn Taymiyya. The first quotation goes:

But the Khārijīs, those who resist *zakāt* and the people of Ṭā’if that refused forbidding usury are fought until they accept the established rulings from the Prophet –the Peace

⁴⁹² “Al-Mutasāqitūn,” 4.

⁴⁹³ Abū al-Zubayr, “Ḥukm al-murtadd,” *Ṣadā al-Malāḥim* 8, (March, 2009): 14, 15.

and Blessings of Allah be upon him. And those [Mongols] if they have a resisting party, then there is no doubt that it is legal to kill their captives, to follow the one who runs away and to finish off their wounded.⁴⁹⁴

In the above quotation, Ibn Taymiyya analogises the Mongols with the people of Ṭā'if, the people who refuse *zakāt* and the Khārijīs and argues that the Mongols should be fought just as those were fought. The article in question uses the quotation from Ibn Taymiyya to analogise the Mongols with the contemporary Muslim rulers and by extension the people of Ṭā'if, Khārijīs and those who refuse *zakāt*. Like the people of Ṭā'if who were fought for refusing the forbiddance of usury despite adhering to some Islamic laws, those who refused *zakāt* and Khārijīs were fought for refusing to adhere to some Islamic laws, the Mongols and consequently the apostate's rulers also should be fought. The second quotation from Ibn Taymiyya which is in his letter about the Mongols elucidates that.

As for killing one of the Khārijīs, such as the *harūrīs*, *rāfiḍīs* and the likes, there are two statements of the jurists, they are the two reports from Ahmad. The most authentic view is that it is permissible to kill one of them, like the one calling to his way (*madhhabihī*)⁴⁹⁵

From the above quotation, Ibn Taymiyya approves the killing of some Khārijīs and *rāfiḍīs* especially the ones inviting people to their sect. Despite that, the article is arguing for fighting the apostate rulers, not individual innovators, and Ibn Taymiyya's statement was quoted as part of the evidence. Here one can argue that Ibn Taymiyya is quoted out of context because he was not referring to killing or fighting the apostate rulers. Nevertheless, the article does not limit the evidences of fighting the apostate group to the quotations from Ibn Taymiyya. Other scholars with similar views on the matter, such as Shāfi'ī and Ibn Qudāma were also quoted. Shāfi'ī argues for the obligation of fighting the apostate group just as in the first quotation from Ibn Taymiyya while Ibn Qudama argues for killing individual apostate concurring with the second

⁴⁹⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:551 and Abū al-Zubayr, "Ḥukm al-Murtadd," 14.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:499 and Abū al-Zubayr, "Ḥukm al-Murtadd," 14.

quotation from Ibn Taymiyya.⁴⁹⁶ Even if the statements of Ibn Taymiyya were taken out of the article, the statements of these two scholars could serve the jihadi argument.

In issue no. 10 of *Ṣadā al-malāḥim*, an article titled “Our way to implementing Sharī‘a” argues for the obligation of fighting contemporary Arab rulers and uses two of Ibn Taymiyya’s statements as justifications.⁴⁹⁷ According to the article the obligation of fighting them is based on their refusal to implement Sharī‘a. The article, like the previous ones, relies on the Mongol context. It attempts to interpret the meaning of *al-ṭā’ifa al-mumtani’a* (the resisting group) in the first anti-Mongol fatwa. The article defines *al-ṭā’ifat al-mumtani’a* as any person or group of people who uses force to deter himself or others from the implementation of any law necessarily known from the Sharī‘a.⁴⁹⁸ The article argues that the Arab states are the living example of *al-ṭā’ifa al-mumtani’a* in the contemporary period, for their refusal to implement Sharī‘a. The article then argues for the obligation of fighting the *al-ṭā’ifa al-mumtani’a* and uses as justification Quran 8: 39 and 9: 29⁴⁹⁹ followed by the popular hadith of Ibn ‘Umar “I have been ordered to fight against people until they testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah and until they perform the prayers and pay the *zakāt*, and if they do so they will have gained protection from me for their lives and property, unless in accordance with Islam, and their reckoning will be with Allah the Almighty.”⁵⁰⁰ The hadith was followed by a statement of ‘Umar; “If people were to refuse Hajj we would fight them the way we would fight those who refuse prayer and *zakāt*.”⁵⁰¹ All these were to establish the obligation of fighting whoever resists abiding by one of the obligations of Sharī‘a. This was followed by the first quotation from Ibn Taymiyya which is quoted from the first anti-Mongol fatwa.

⁴⁹⁶ Abū al-Zubayr, “Ḥukm al-Murtadd,” 15.

⁴⁹⁷ Abū al-Zubayr al-‘Ibāb, “Ṭarīqunā ‘ilā taḥkīm al-sharī‘a,” *Ṣadā al-Malāḥim* 10, (July, 2009): 12.

⁴⁹⁸ Al-‘Ibāb, “Ṭarīqunā,” 12.

⁴⁹⁹ Quran 8:39 is “And fight them until there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah. And if they cease - then indeed, Allah is seeing of what they do.” And 9: 29 is “Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture - [fight] until they give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled.”

⁵⁰⁰ Al-‘Ibāb, “Ṭarīqunā,” 12. And Sahih Muslim 1:33.

⁵⁰¹ Al-‘Ibāb, “Ṭarīqunā,” 12.

Every group that resists adhering to any law from the widely reported and manifest laws of Islam among the people [i.e. the Mongols] or others, then it is obligatory to fight them until they adhere to its laws, even if they pronounce the two testimonies and adhere to some of its laws, just as Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq and the Companions -may Allah be pleased with them- fought the people who resisted *zakāt*. The jurists after them [the Companions] agreed upon this after ‘Umar’s argument with Abū Bakr –may Allah be pleased with both. The Companions – May Allah be pleased with them– agreed on fighting for the privilege [*ḥaqq*] of Islam, in accordance with the book and the Sunna.⁵⁰²

Immediately after this quotation, the article states that contemporary Arab governments refuse to adhere to *Sharī‘a*.⁵⁰³ Hence, they are like the Mongols who should be fought. The second quotation from Ibn Taymiyya is not in the Mongol context, but it is aimed at strengthening the fact that the main reason for considering the rulers as apostates is their non-implementation of *Sharī‘a* which in the Mongol context analogises them with the Mongols. The quotation is from *Minhāj al-sunna* of Ibn Taymiyya:

There is no doubt that whoever does not believe the obligation of judging by what Allah has revealed to His messenger is a heretic and whoever permits judging by what he views as justice without following what Allah has revealed is [also] a heretic. There is no nation (*umma*) except that it commands justice. The justice might be in what they inherit from their forefathers as many Muslims judge with the tradition that Allah does not reveal... and view this as what should be used as judgement instead of the Book and Sunna, this is heresy.⁵⁰⁴

⁵⁰² Al-‘Ibāb, “Ṭarīqunā,” 12 and Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:502.

⁵⁰³ Al-‘Ibāb, “Ṭarīqunā,” 12.

⁵⁰⁴ Al-‘Ibāb, “Ṭarīqunā,” 12 and Ibn Taymiyya, al-Minhaj al-Sunna 5:83.

Using these two quotations from Ibn Taymiyya, the article argues that the Arab rulers are apostates and fighting them with jihad is an obligation. Like the jihadists before them, al-Qaida is using Ibn Taymiyya's statement to make the same argument about waging war against those they classified as apostate rulers for the non-implementation of Sharī'a. This article, however, is based on elucidation of what is meant by *al-ṭā'ifat al-mumtani'a*, the concept known in Ibn Taymiyya's anti-Mongol fatwas. Towards the end of this chapter, I will analyse the validity of these quotations and to what extent the quotations can serve the purpose they are quoted for.

Another article in issue 12 made a similar argument for the apostasy of the Arab rulers and the obligation of fighting them and uses Ibn Taymiyya's statement as justification. The article states a different reason for the apostasy. At this phase, it is not the refusal of implementing Sharī'a, rather, their collaboration with the United States in fighting the Muslims in Yemen. This, according to the article, made the rulers have the same status with the Mamlūk renegades who in the second anti-Mongol fatwa Ibn Taymiyya considers apostates for their collaboration with the Mongols.⁵⁰⁵ The article does not limit the evidences to Ibn Taymiyya's statement, but it employs some verses of the Quran, hadiths and statements of some scholars. It uses Quran 5:51 as the basis, "O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you - then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people." According to their interpretation, "And whoever is an ally to them among you - then indeed, he is [one] of them" signifies heresy for the allies of Christians and Jews; therefore, collaborating with the United States is alliance.⁵⁰⁶ The analyses on the verse was followed by other verses, hadiths and quotations from some scholars such as Ṭabarī, Ibn Hazm and Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb. Ibn Taymiyya appeared at the end of the article; the anti-Mongol fatwa was paraphrased and quoted from *al-Bidāya* of Ibn Kathīr:

Shayk al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya was asked about the Muslim army who joined the Mongols. [The Mongols] articulate the

⁵⁰⁵ Al-'Ibāb, "Ṭarīqunā," 14.

⁵⁰⁶ Al-'Ibāb, "Ṭarīqunā," 13.

two testimonies of faith, claim Islam but do not abide by the manifest laws of Islam. Despite the wide differences between America and the Mongols' claim of Islam, Ibn Taymiyya issued a fatwa for fighting the Muslim army that joined the Mongols, even if the people of knowledge participated with them. He even said, if you see me in their midst fight me, he motivated people to fight them.⁵⁰⁷

The reason for fighting the renegades is their collaboration with the Mongols, so as the reason for fighting the Arab rulers is their collaboration with America in fighting the Muslims in Yemen. This is a clear that the jihadists are drawing an analogy from the Mongol context to the contemporary context.

Killing diplomats and tourists

In issue no. 6 of *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* an article argues for the permissibility of killing diplomats. According to the article, the diplomats are lacking the condition of *mu'āhad*.⁵⁰⁸ *Mu'āhad* refers to the people of the Book who have been promised protection by the Muslim State either for diplomatic, business or other purposes. A *mu'āhad* according to the article must be given a covenant from a recognised imam and the covenant has to be for a specific period of time. In contrast to these conditions, the diplomats are given indefinite covenant by the apostate rulers, extending their stay in the Muslim countries depends on their governments of origin not hosting government, besides, they are aiding their governments in fighting and killing the Muslims. For these reasons, they should not be considered as *mu'āhad*, but an enemy that should be fought.⁵⁰⁹ After discussing the topic using Quran and statements of scholars, Ibn Taymiyya was cited in *al-Siyāsa al-Shar'iyya*.⁵¹⁰ In the short quotation, Ibn Taymiyya was quoted out of the context. He was not arguing for the permissibility of killing diplomats, rather the conditions of *mu'āhad* according to the jurists. In issue no 9 another article uses a segment of *al-Siyāsa al-Shar'iyya*, to justify the permissibility of killing non-Muslim tourists.⁵¹¹ Using the same logic of

⁵⁰⁷ Al-'Ibāb, "Ṭarīqunā," 14 and Ibn Kathīr al-Bidāya 14:24.

⁵⁰⁸ "Ḥukm al-'āmilīn fī al-Safārat," *Ṣadā al-Malāḥim* 6, (Nov., 2008): 8.

⁵⁰⁹ "Ḥukm al-'āmilīn fī al-Safārat," 9.

⁵¹⁰ "Ḥukm al-'āmilīn fī al-Safārat," 9.

⁵¹¹ Abū 'Umar al-Farūq, "Ḥukm istihdāf al-Sayyāḥ," *Ṣadā al-Malāḥim* 9, (May, 2009):11.

mu'āhad, the article quotes from another segment of *al-Siyāsa al-Shar'iyya* to validate the argument. Before quoting Ibn Taymiyya, the article has already established the permissibility of killing tourists who do not fulfil the condition of *mu'āhad* from the following verses: “And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them” (Q 9:5) “And fight against the disbelievers collectively as they fight against you collectively” (Q 9:36) and “O you who have believed, fight those adjacent to you of the disbelievers and let them find in you harshness.” The article deduces from these verses that any non-Muslim who does not fulfil the condition of *mu'āhad* should be fought. The verses were followed by two hadiths and statements of Ibn Qudāma and Ibn Ḥajar. Ibn Qudāma was quoted stating: “If a polytheist is devoid from *'ahd* or *amān* he should be killed.”⁵¹² Then Ibn Taymiyya was quoted:

For this, the Sharī'a obligates fighting the heretics but it did not obligate killing the captured among them. Rather, if one of them is held as a captive of war, or otherwise like when a vessel throws him to us or he misses the way... then most of the jurists opine that the imam will do what he deems appropriate of either killing him, enslaving him, freeing him or exchanging him with a ransom of money or other captives as the Book and tradition indicate. Some of the jurists opine that freeing him or exchanging him with ransom is abrogated.⁵¹³

This quotation alongside the three Quran verses, two hadiths and the quotations from Ibn Qudāma and Ibn Ḥajar validate the killing of the tourists. The articles ignore other statements of Ibn Taymiyya. Even if the diplomats and tourists do not fulfill the condition of *mu'āhad*, to Ibn Taymiyya as established in *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara* non-believers are only fought if a danger is sensed from them.

The majority of the predecessors (*salaf*) and successors (*khalaf*) opine that the verse is not specified (*makhṣūṣ*) or

⁵¹² Al-Farūq, “Ḥukm istiḥdāf al-Sayyāḥ,” 11; and Ibn Qudāma, *al-Mughnī* 20:554.

⁵¹³ Al-Farūq, “Ḥukm istiḥdāf al-Sayyāḥ,” 11; and Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:355.

abrogated. Rather, they said we do not oblige anyone to [accept] the religion. We only fight whoever fights us, if they accept Islam their wealth and blood are protected. If they are not combatant we do not fight them or oblige them to [accept] the religion.⁵¹⁴

Ibn Taymiyya maintains this position in other works of his as established in Chapter Four of this thesis. He made a similar argument in *al-Šārim al-maslūl* stressing that women, the elderly and priests are exempted from attacks for the same purpose.⁵¹⁵ In a fatwa in *Majmū‘ fatāwā*, Ibn Taymiyya even supports the argument that it is permissible to spare the life of a captive of war by means of pardoning or taking ransom.⁵¹⁶ Therefore killing the diplomats and tourists cannot be justified from Ibn Taymiyya even if they do not fulfill the condition of *mu‘āhad* provided that no danger is sensed from them.

As can be seen here, if Ibn Taymiyya’s statement was omitted, the argument can still be substantiated using Quranic verses and interpreting other scholars.

Suicide

In issue 14, *Šadā al-malāḥim* an article argues for the permissibility of suicide against the target and uses a quotation from the second ant-Mongol fatwa as part of the justification. The article cites a verse of the Quran, “And of the people is he who sells himself, seeking means to the approval of Allah. And Allah is kind to [His] servants” (Q 2:207). The verse was followed by some hadiths illustrating the reason of revelation following the same method followed by Ibn Taymiyya in *Qā‘ida fī al-inghimās* as elucidated in Chapter Four of this thesis.

Ibn Taymiyya’s statement from the second ant-Mongol fatwa was quoted towards the end of the article to strengthen the argument, “The four imams permit a Muslim to immerse in the non-Muslims group [during the fight]

⁵¹⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā‘ida mukhtaṣara*, 123 – 24.

⁵¹⁵ Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Šārim al-maslūl* 2:515.

⁵¹⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 27:414.

even if he thinks they will kill him if there is benefit for the Muslims in doing that.”⁵¹⁷ Ibn Taymiyya argues for the permissibility of suicide in the course of jihad in *Qāʿida fī al-inghimās* and labelled it as the opinion of the four schools of jurisprudence. *Qāʿida fī al-inghimās* was discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis.

Ṣāḍā al-jihād

Three articles in *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* also argue for the apostasy of the Arab rulers and use the quotation below from the second anti Mongol fatwa as justification.⁵¹⁸ As indicated in the last chapter, the quotation is one of the most frequent quotations from the anti-Mongol fatwas by all the jihadists.

It is necessarily known in the Islamic religion and by the agreement of all Muslims that, whoever legalizes following other than the Islamic religion or following a path [Sharīʿa] other than the *sharīʿa* of Muhammad is a non-believer, just like the disbelief of those who believe in the part of the book and disbelieve in part of the book. As Allah the most high said, “Verily, those who disbelieve in Allah and His Messengers and wish to make distinction between Allah and His Messengers [by believing in Allah and disbelieving in His Messengers] saying, “We believe in some but reject others” (Q 4: 150– 151).⁵¹⁹

In issue 29 of *Ṣāḍā al-jihād*, an article titled “Imāṭat al-litham ‘an ḥukūmat al-kufri wa al-ijrām” (Uncovering the government of heresy and crime), argues for the apostasy of Muhammad al-Bashir, the Sudanese president and uses the above quotation from the second anti-Mongol fatwa as justification.⁵²⁰ The same portion was quoted in issue 16 to argue for the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers for the non-implementation of

⁵¹⁷ “Ishrāqat āyah,” *Ṣadā al-Malāḥim* 14, (June/July, 2010): 7. And Ibn Taymiyya MF 28: 540.

⁵¹⁸ *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* issue 16. Pp 32. *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* issue 29 pp32 and issue 36. Pp 18.

⁵¹⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28: 524. The statement was quoted in *Ṣāḍā al-jihad* issue 16. Pp 32. Issue 29 pp32 and issue 36 Pp 18.

⁵²⁰ Abū Nāṣir al-Sunnī, “Imāṭat al-litham ‘an ḥukūmat al-kufri wa al-ijrām,” *Ṣāḍā al-jihad* 29, (Sept, 2008): 32 accessed 25/04/2017 <https://archive.org/stream/Sada-aljihad-magazine/Sada-aljihad29#page/n1/mode/2up>

All the subsequent *Ṣāḍā al-jihad* magazines are found at the same link.

Sharī'a and the permissibility of rebellion against them.⁵²¹ And in issue 36 the same quotation also features to prove the apostasy of Turkish president Tayyip Erdoğan and Palestinian group Hamas.⁵²² In the paragraphs below, I will elaborate how the same quotation was used in the three articles. I will start with the article in issue 29 because of the similarities between the articles in issues 16 and 36.

The first article in issue 29 is on the apostasy of al-Bashir, the Sudanese president. According to the article, the Sudanese president al-Bashir is the most heretic of all the Arab rulers, despite his deception of praying in public, reciting the Quran and calling for jihad against America. He and his government are apostates for five reasons. Firstly, the country is named Democratic Republic of Sudan, instead of Islamic republic. Accepting democracy is tantamount to heresy. Instead of submitting to the laws of Allah, in democracy people make their own laws, and making laws is rejecting the statement of Allah, "Legislation is not but for Allah. He has commanded that you worship not except Him" (Q 12: 40). It is also taking the lawmakers as lords besides Allah as against His saying, "And not take one another as lords instead of Allah" (Q 3: 64). This according to the article is enough in proving the apostasy of al-Bashir and his government.⁵²³

Secondly, in Sudan, the constitution states that *Sharī'a* is one of the sources of law. This signifies that there are other sources of law. *Sharī'a* only applies to issues of personal status and is neglected in other issues such as *hudūd* punishments. Using other sources other than *Sharī'a* is enough for declaring apostasy. To prove this, three verses of the Quran were quoted: "And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the disbelievers." (Q 5:44), "Then We put you, [O Muhammad], on an ordained way concerning the matter [of religion]; so, follow it and do not follow the inclinations of those who do not know" (Q 45:18), and "Then is it the judgement of [the time of] ignorance they desire? But who is better than Allah in judgement for a people who are certain [in faith]? (Q 5:50). A quotation for a contemporary

⁵²¹Abū Usāma al-Makkī, "Hum al-Khawārij ḥaqq," *Ṣāḍā al-jihad* 16, (May/June, 2007): 29-34.

⁵²²Abū Usāma al-Makkī, "al-Tadarruj fī taṭbīq aḥkām al-dīn," *Ṣāḍā al-jihad* 36, (Oct. 2009): 18.

⁵²³Al-Sunnī, "Imāṭat al-litham," 31.

Egyptian scholar Ahmad Shākir (d. 1958) followed the verses. According to Shākir, using such laws that are derived from other sources is clear disbelief.⁵²⁴ After all this analysis, the above quotation from the second anti-Mongol fatwa appears as the climax and final evidence. The quotation from the second anti-Mongol fatwa was not followed by any analyses, but it is clear that, according to the article, like the Mongols the Sudanese government legalizes following other than the Sharī'a of Islam, and, therefore, they are apostates.⁵²⁵

Thirdly, the Sudanese government is a member of the United Nations, which necessitate accepting the UN Charter. The Charter obligates the members to accept the judgements of the International Court of Justice, a court which does not comply with the Sharī'a. The mere acceptance of the court is tantamount to disbelief. The article in question quotes article 94 of the Charter which states: "Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party."⁵²⁶ This membership and inclination to the UN Charter according to the article is against the Quran, "Have you not seen those who claim to have believed in what was revealed to you, [O Muhammad], and what was revealed before you? They wish to refer legislation to Ṭāgūt, while they were commanded to reject it; and Satan wishes to lead them far astray" (Q 4:60).⁵²⁷ Moreover, the Sudanese government is a member of the Arab League, whose charter is clear-cut disbelief. The disbelief of the Arab League can be manifested in article 8, which negates the obligation of jihad: "Each member-state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member-states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government."⁵²⁸

Fourthly, the Sudanese Government hands over the jihadists to America. They imprison some, confiscate their wealth and punish them. This is a clear disbelief according the article, to substantiate that, the article quotes two verses

⁵²⁴ Al-Sunnī, "Imāṭat al-litham." 31.

⁵²⁵ Al-Sunnī, "Imāṭat al-litham." 32.

⁵²⁶ Al-Sunnī, "Imāṭat al-litham." 32. And UN Charter, Chapter XIV — The International Court of Justice

Article 94 found online at <http://legal.un.org/repertory/art94.shtml> accessed on 04/04/2017.

⁵²⁷ Al-Sunnī, "Imāṭat al-litham." 32.

⁵²⁸ Al-Sunnī, "Imāṭat al-litham." 32 and Arab Charter of Arab League, article 8 found online at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ab18.html> accessed on 04/04/2017.

of the Quran: “O you who have believed, do not make allies of a people with whom Allah has become angry. They have despaired of [reward in] the Hereafter just as the disbelievers have despaired of [meeting] the inhabitants of the graves” (Q 60:13) and “So you see those in whose hearts is disease hastening into [association with] them, saying, we are afraid a misfortune may strike us. But perhaps Allah will bring conquest or a decision from Him, and they will become, over what they have been concealing within themselves, regretful” (Q 5:52) the verses were followed by the commentary of Ṭabari, Aḥmad ibn ‘Atīq and Ibn Ḥazam. In their various commentaries, all of the scholars affirmed that collaborating with the non-Muslims against the Muslims is tantamount to apostasy.⁵²⁹ After the verses and quotations from these scholars, a quotation from Ibn Taymiyya features.

He was asked about who kills a Muslim for his religion? Ibn Taymiyya replied: “If the Muslim was killed for his religion, like the Christians fighting the Muslims because of their religion, this [the killer] is a heretic equal in status to those who fought the Prophet. They [the killers] will abide in hell fire forever.”⁵³⁰

This quotation from Ibn Taymiyya was followed with no comment.

Fifthly, the non-Muslims were put in charge of the affairs of the Muslims. The vice president is a non-Muslim from the South [now Southern Sudan]. This will necessitate the Muslims to obey him, whereas it is forbidden for a Muslim to obey a non-Muslim. In addition, the Sudanese vice president occupied the position after a treaty which compelled the Sudanese government to follow some instructions from the non-Muslim party [Southern Sudan]. The article states that Obedience to non-Muslims is heresy, since the Quran states, “Indeed, those who reverted back [to disbelief] after guidance had become clear to them - Satan enticed them and prolonged hope for them. That is because they said to those who disliked what Allah sent down, we will obey you in part of the matter. And Allah knows what they conceal” (Q 47:25-26).

⁵²⁹ Al-Sunnī, “Imāṭat al-litham.” 33.

⁵³⁰ Al-Sunnī, “Imāṭat al-litham.” 35.

In all of the five reasons for the apostasy of the Sudanese president only two are justified with a quotation from Ibn Taymiyya. Even the two quotations from Ibn Taymiyya were not the sole reason for the apostasy. In the both cases, the apostasy was established from the Quranic verses and statements of other scholars. Quotations from Ibn Taymiyya are used as additional confirmation. In the second reason for the apostasy where the quotation from the anti-Mongol fatwa is used, the article like other articles analogises the Sudanese government with the Mongols. The main reason for their apostasy was using other sources of law just like the Mongols who were excommunicated by Ibn Taymiyya for using the *yāsa* code.

The second article in issue 16 uses the same quotation from the second anti-Mongol fatwa for the justification of the apostasy of the Muslim rulers without specifying any ruler per se. The article is titled “Hum al-Khawārij Haqq” (They are the true Khārijīs.) The aim of the article is to exonerate the jihadists from any link with the Khārijī sect and instead, to prove some similarities between Khārijī sect and the contemporary Muslim rulers. The article argues for the differences between the Khārijī sect and the jihadists. Unlike the Khārijīs who fight the legitimate imam, connive with the non-Muslims against the Muslims, excommunicate the Muslim sinners, deny the intercession of the Prophet among other things, the jihadists only legalise rebellion against the apostate rulers, the article argues.⁵³¹ The article elaborates on the Khārijī sect, its development and the Prophetic statements against the sect. In the course of elaborating the qualities of Khārijīs, Ibn Taymiyya was quoted:

If the origin of the innovations is known, then the origin of the belief of the Khārijīs is that they excommunicate the sinners and consider a sin what is not a sin. They follow the book, but not the Sunna even if it is concurrent (*mutawātir*) if it contradicts the plain meaning of the book. They excommunicate their [Muslim] opponent, and they make permissible from him [the Muslim opponent] for considering him apostate what they don’t make permissible

⁵³¹ Al-Makkī, “Hum al-Khawārij haqq,” 28-31.

from the non-believer, just like the Prophet said about them, “They kill the people of Islam and spare the people of idols.” For this reason, they excommunicate ‘Uthmān, ‘Alī and their supporters. They excommunicate the two parties of the people of Şifḥīn...⁵³²

Using the quotation above, the article deduced seven qualities of the Khārijīs. The Khārijīs fight against the imam that fulfils the condition of leadership. They excommunicate the Muslims for committing the major sins; they consider Sin that which is not sin, they follow the Book but not the Sunna that contradicts the plain meaning of the book; they excommunicate their opponents and make permissible their blood and wealth; and they kill the Muslims and spare the non-Muslims and they deny the intercession for the people who commit major sins.⁵³³

As can be seen, the article relies on Ibn Taymiyya’s definition of the Khārijīs instead of using the reliable sources that discuss the Muslim sects and groups prior to Ibn Taymiyya, such as *al-Milal wa al-niḥal* of both Shahrastānī and Ibn Ḥazm. This proves the attachment of the jihadists to Ibn Taymiyya and quoting him even in issues that Ibn Taymiyya is not considered a source.

To justify the similarities between the contemporary Muslim rulers and the Khārijī sect, the article argues for the apostasy of the Muslim rulers on two grounds: the non-implementation of Sharī‘a and collaborating with the non-Muslims against the Muslims. The article then argues for the obligation of rebelling against the apostate rulers. To prove their apostasy based on the non-implementation of Sharī‘a, the article turns to some Qur’anic verses and statements of other scholars including Ibn Taymiyya. The Qur’an verses used for the argument are 4: 65, 24: 63 33: 36. The analysis of the verses was intermittent among the quotations from some scholars such as Ibn Kathīr, Ibn Ḥazm, Ibn Taymiyya and the latter scholar Muhammad al-Amīn al-Shanqīṭī (d. 1973). All of these quotations revolve around proving the apostasy of anyone who uses other than the Sharī‘a of Islam in making judgment among the people. In Ibn Kathīr’s analyses he refers to the Mongols and their laws that consists of

⁵³² Al-Makkī, “Hum al-Khawārij ḥaqq,” 30; and Ibn Taymiyya MF 3:355.

⁵³³ Al-Makkī, “Hum al-Khawārij ḥaqq,” 31.

laws taken from different religions. Ibn Kathīr is echoing the same analyses of the Mongols by Ibn Taymiyya in the second anti-Mongol fatwa. Ibn Taymiyya is quoted three times: the above quotation from the second anti-Mongol fatwa, and two other quotations as follows: “Whenever a person makes permissible that which is forbidden by the consensus or makes forbidden that which is permissible by the consensus or changes a ruling that is agreed upon then he is heretic by the agreement of the scholars.”⁵³⁴ And the third quotation:

It is not [permissible] for anyone to judge among people, neither Muslims, nor heretics (*kuffār*), nor youth, nor hunters, nor soldiers, nor poor, nor other than that except with the judgement of Allah and His messenger. Whoever seeks other than that is engulfed in the verse “And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the disbelievers.” And His saying “But no, by your Lord, they will not [truly] believe until they make you, [O Muhammad], judge concerning that over which they dispute among themselves and then find within themselves no discomfort from what you have judged and submit in [full, willing] submission” (4:65). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Muslims to use Allah and His Messenger’s judgement on any dispute among them.⁵³⁵

The three quotations from Ibn Taymiyya alongside other evidences were to prove the apostasy of the rulers for using other laws than the Sharī‘a. The second reason for their apostasy according to the article is their collaboration with the United States in their war in Afghanistan and Iraq, just as argued in issue 12 of *Ṣadā al-malāḥim*, but the article in this issue does not make any quotation to support the second ground. The article then argues for the obligation of rebellion against these apostate rulers. To justify the obligation of the rebellion, the following hadith was quoted:

The Messenger of Allah called upon us and we gave him the pledge of allegiance (*bay‘a*). Of the matters that we pledged

⁵³⁴ Ibn Taymiyya 3: 267; and al-Makkī, “al-Tadarruj fī taṭbīq aḥkām al-dīn,” 18.

⁵³⁵ Ibn Taymiyya 35:403; and al-Makkī, “al-Tadarruj fī taṭbīq aḥkām al-dīn,” 19.

ourselves to is that we gave the pledge of allegiance to listen and obey during our zeal and laziness, our hardship and our ease, and giving preference over ourselves, besides we must not dispute the authority with its people. He said: Unless you see a clear disbelief (*kufran bawāḥan*) you have upon it a proof from Allah.⁵³⁶

The article argues that the above hadith is a clear-cut evidence for rebellion against the apostate rulers. The hadith states “Unless you see a clear disbelief” and the clear disbelief is already established by proving their non-application of Sharī‘a and their collaboration with the non-Muslims against the Muslims.⁵³⁷ So, as can be seen here, Ibn Taymiyya’s statements are used just to prove the apostasy of the rulers, but the obligation of rebellion is established from other sources. The article then concludes by accusing the rulers of possessing the same qualities of Khārijīs, part of which is conniving with the non-Muslims against the Muslims and argues that the Khārijīs are even better than the contemporary Muslim rulers. As for the Khārijīs, they transgress limits in interpreting the Quran while the contemporary rulers completely turn away from the Quran.⁵³⁸

The third article in issue 36 of *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* argues for the apostasy of Turkish president Tayyip Erdoğan and the Palestinian group Hamas.⁵³⁹ According to the article both Erdoğan and Hamas claim following Islam, but argue that the Sharī‘a should be implemented step by step, thus, compromising many fundamentals of Islamic Sharī‘a. According to the article, Sharī‘a should be implemented in full force; compromising any tenet of it is tantamount to disbelief.⁵⁴⁰ Hamas claims to work for Islam, but accepts democracy as a platform that will lead them to power, whereas in democracy many Islamic fundamentals have to be compromised.⁵⁴¹ To substantiate the argument, the article repeats the same Quran verses as in the issue 16 and adds a few more verses (Q, 4:65, 97, 5:44, 45, and 47; 6: 15, 24:63, 33:36). The Qur’an verses

⁵³⁶ Al-Makkī, “Hum al-Khawārij ḥaqq,” 33 and Muslim no.1709.

⁵³⁷ Al-Makkī, “Hum al-Khawārij ḥaqq,” 33.

⁵³⁸ Al-Makkī, “Hum al-Khawārij ḥaqq,” 33.

⁵³⁹ Al-Makkī, “al-Tadarruj fī taṭbīq aḥkām al-dīn,” 18.

⁵⁴⁰ Al-Makkī, “al-Tadarruj fī taṭbīq aḥkām al-dīn,” 20.

⁵⁴¹ Al-Makkī, “al-Tadarruj fī taṭbīq aḥkām al-dīn,” 20.

were followed immediately by the same three quotations from Ibn Taymiyya above. Unlike in issue 16 where the verses and quotations from Ibn Taymiyya and other scholars were used to argue for the apostasy of the rulers who do not implement Sharī‘a, in issue 36 the apostasy is specifically for Erdoğan and Hamas, but the reasons for the arguments are similar.

From the above arguments, we can deduce that the jihadists always find a justification in Ibn Taymiyya’s statements for declaring the contemporary rulers apostates, mostly but not necessarily the anti-Mongol fatwas. Nevertheless, apostasy can also be established from other sources and scholars. In the above arguments, five things facilitate the apostasy of the Sudanese president. However, only two are justified from the statements of Ibn Taymiyya. In the two points, Ibn Taymiyya was not the only scholar quoted, the apostasy was first established from the Quran, Hadith and other scholars prior to Ibn Taymiyya, but Ibn Taymiyya’s statements are used as supportive. On the apostasy of Erdoğan and Hamas, Ibn Taymiyya is the first to be quoted then followed by other scholars. Were the quotations from Ibn Taymiyya taken from the arguments in the two articles, the arguments would still remain. Like Faraj the articles find a parallel between the contemporary Muslims rulers and the Mongols. Both quotations featured in *al-Farīda* backing the same argument, Ibn Taymiyya argues for the apostasy and the obligation of fighting “each group that resists adhering to any law from the widely reported and manifest laws of Islam.”⁵⁴²

Jihad does not need the permission of a leader (in Ṣāḍā al-jihād)

Ṣāḍā al-jihād echoes another argument made by Dr. Fadl that against the perception of mainstreams Muslims, jihad does not require the permission of an Imam before waging it.⁵⁴³ According to Fuchs, Dr. Faḍl deduces the argument from the works of Abū Ya‘lā and Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal and uses Ibn Taymiyya’s statements as supportive. In *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* however, they took a different direction. They argue that the Muslims today are fighting in self-defence and as such they don’t need the permission of an imam to strike back

⁵⁴² Faraj, *al-Farīda* 6. and Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:502.

⁵⁴³ Abū Usāma al-Makkī, “Yaḳūlūna lā jihād illa bi imām,” *Ṣāḍā al-jihad* 21, (Jan. 2008): 40-49.

when they are hunted.⁵⁴⁴ Like Dr. Fadl, they also argue that the Muslim rulers are apostates, thus their leadership is nullified.⁵⁴⁵ They employ many scholars from across the schools of jurisprudence such as al-Mawardi, Ibn Hazm, Ibn Qudāma and use two quotations from Ibn Taymiyya towards the end of the article as additional justification.⁵⁴⁶

There are three points I want to elucidate here. Firstly, Ibn Taymiyya's statements are mostly employed in these two magazines to establish the apostasy of Arab rulers and the obligation of waging jihad against them. This is done by analogizing the contemporary period with the period of the Mongol occupation of Syria. The apostasy of the Arab rulers is established on two grounds: a) by analogizing them with the Mongols for the non-implementation of Sharī'a and b) by analogizing them with the Mamlūk renegades for supporting the non-Muslim governments such as the United States of America. In both cases, they should be fought as Ibn Taymiyya fought the Mongols and Mamlūk renegades.

Secondly, as Fuchs argues, sometimes the views of Ibn Taymiyya are not used by Dr. Fadl to justify a certain opinion, but play only a subordinate role to confirm the position held by another scholar. The same also applies to al-Qaida in these magazines.⁵⁴⁷ In their arguments on the apostasy of the Arab rulers, the apostasy was established through the verses, hadiths and interpretations of other scholars such as Ṭabarī, Ibn Hazm, Ibn Qudama, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb and others. Ibn Taymiyya's statements are quoted as supportive, in all the arguments, even if his statements were taken out of the arguments, the arguments would still stand.

Thirdly, after making the argument and citing evidences in support of the argument, Ibn Taymiyya's statement is quoted either at the beginning or as closing remarks. Although, this method seems to lack consistency, it demonstrates the importance the jihadists attached to Ibn Taymiyya's statement

⁵⁴⁴ Al-Makkī, "Yaqūlūna lā jihād," 45-46.

⁵⁴⁵ Al-Makkī, "Yaqūlūna lā jihād," 46.

⁵⁴⁶ al-Makkī, "Yaqūlūna lā jihād,"

⁵⁴⁷ Fuchs, "Do Excellent Surgeons," 217.

and the need for finding the relationship between the jihadists and Ibn Taymiyya.

Although, these two magazines echoed the same jihadi ideologies of Faraj, Dr. Fadl and other jihadists, in general, there is a big shift from Faraj's method of relying solely on Ibn Taymiyya in making arguments. While Dr. Fadl only relies exclusively on Ibn Taymiyya in arguing for indiscriminate attack against the target, the two magazines do not rely solely on Ibn Taymiyya for validating any argument.

7.3 Ibn Taymiyya in ISIS's literature

Formed in June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria superseded al-Qaida as the most powerful and effective jihadi group in the world.⁵⁴⁸ According to Patrick Cockburn both al-Qaida and ISIS draw their ideology from one source: Wahhabism.⁵⁴⁹ However, Delong-Bas argues that the jihadists are influenced by Ibn Taymiyya while the contemporary Wahhabi scholars will deny that and associate ISIS and other jihadists with the Khārijīs.⁵⁵⁰ However, Delong-Bas' work was before the formation of ISIS. ISIS and al-Qaida can be simply described as different branches of the same philosophy. They both have the same ultimate goal of re-establishment of the caliphate and waging jihad against whomever they deem apostates, but their strategies are distinctly different.⁵⁵¹ One of the main differences between ISIS and al-Qaida is in declaring a community as apostates. While al-Qaida limits apostasy and jihad against the Muslim rulers and their aids, ISIS according to Ozkaya and Akgul does not limit the apostasy on the Muslim rulers and their aids. Rather, they consider the whole community who does not pay allegiance to them as apostates, and, like Faraj, they argue for fighting the near enemy before the

⁵⁴⁸ Patrick Cockburn, *The rise of Islamic State ISIS and new Sunni Revolution* (London: verso, 2015), 2.

⁵⁴⁹ Cockburn, *The rise of Islamic State*, 6.

⁵⁵⁰ Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, 250 -56: and "Muftī al-su'ūdiyya: dā'ish 'aduwwul islam" published on 14/08/2016 at <http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/saudi-today/2014/08/19/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%88%D9%82%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-.html> accessed on 07/10/2016.

⁵⁵¹ Ozkaya and Akgul, "Light Years Ahead," 13.

far.⁵⁵² Apostasy according to ISIS engulfs many Sunni scholars who refuse to adhere to jihadi ideology. ISIS declares some prominent Western scholars Bilal Philips, Yasir Qadhi, Hamza Yusuf, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and its members as apostates. Their apostasy is for arguing against ISIS and participating in democracy.⁵⁵³ Additionally, despite both al-Qaida and ISIS considering Shī'īs as apostates, the former is more lenient in dealing with the apostasy of the Shī'īs. According to ISIS, the apostasy of Shī'īs is on the sect itself, unlike other apostates such as the Muslim rulers and their aids who were Muslims before committing apostasy. The Shī'īs have never been Muslims at a point in time, and their heresy is similar to that of Christians and Jews who had never been Muslims.⁵⁵⁴ This, however, might not be disconnected with the fact that ISIS was developed in the context of the Iraqi insurrection at the beginning of the twenty-first century at the moment when the political struggle between the Sunnis and Shī'īs intensified. Irrespective of these minor differences, ISIS considers its jihad as a continuation of the jihad of al-Qaida and regard Usama bin Laden as an epitome of contemporary jihad.⁵⁵⁵

ISIS comes into existence due to the negligence of the Western and Arab rulers to curtail the 2011 uprising in Syria. The funding and logistic support injected to the Syrian rebels to serve as a counter-force to the Assad regime ended up at the disposal of the jihadists and were used in forming ISIS.⁵⁵⁶ In the paragraphs below I will analyse how ISIS uses Ibn Taymiyya in validating their arguments through the articles they publish in their monthly magazine *Dabiq*.

Dabiq

Dabiq is a monthly magazine issued by ISIS in English through which they express their views and ideologies and communicate them to the public. The magazine is named after the city of *Dabiq* located in the northwest of Syria, in which, according to hadith an apocalyptic battle will take place between

⁵⁵² Ozkaya and Akgul, "Light Years Ahead" 15 and 18.

⁵⁵³ "The Ruling on Riddah," *Dabiq* 14, (April/May, 2016): 12-16. Accessed 25/04/2017 <https://clarionproject.org/docs/Dabiq-Issue-14.pdf>, and *Dabiq* issue 10, pp 33 -43.

⁵⁵⁴ "The Rāfidah from Ibn Saba' to Dajjāl," *Dabiq* 13, (Jan. 2016): 42-43, accessed on 25/05/2017 <http://clarionproject.org/factsheets-files/Issue-13-the-rafidah.pdf>

⁵⁵⁵ "Responding to the Doubts," *Dabiq* 7, (Feb., 2015): 25. Accessed on 25/04/2017 <https://clarionproject.org/docs/islamic-state-Dabiq-magazine-issue-7-from-hypocrisy-to-apostasy.pdf>.

⁵⁵⁶ Cockburn, *The rise of Islamic State*, 8.

Muslims and their enemies before the ultimate victory of the Muslims against the Romans in Constantinople.⁵⁵⁷ An online article analyses the propaganda of the ISIS through the *Dabiq* magazine and argues that ISIS copied some of the strategies of al-Qaida in propagating their ideologies. However, in contrast to al-Qaida, ISIS gives more emphasis on directing their propaganda to the western world than in the Middle East.⁵⁵⁸ According to the article, through *Dabiq* ISIS succeeded in drawing the attention of the world, especially the west and engaging with them making ISIS popular and formidable. Such propaganda through *Dabiq* helps ISIS in their recruiting strategy. Additionally, in contrast with al-Qaida, ISIS is uncompromising in doctrinal matters, prioritizing the promotion of an unforgiving strain of Salafi thought.

Like other jihadists, ISIS uses works from several political thinkers, but primarily from Ibn Taymiyya. According to Mohamed W. Saleh the writings of Ibn Taymiyya are manipulated by ISIS because they use quotes for their own interests but do not explain precisely what the writings represent.⁵⁵⁹ Saleh in a very short article analyses the use of Ibn Taymiyya in the *Dabiq* magazine. He uses the recorded speech of some Salafi scholars on the topic and analyses the use of Ibn Taymiyya in one issue of the magazine. He argues that the articles in the *Dabiq* quote Ibn Taymiyya out of the context and use him for the arguments he did not make.⁵⁶⁰ Saleh, however, did not state any specific examples of how and where the magazine misappropriates the use of Ibn Taymiyya. Abū Iyaad also refutes of al-Qaida and ISIS for using Ibn Taymiyya to their end.⁵⁶¹ Abū Iyaad considers ISIS as part of Khārijīs and quotes a number of Taymiyyan texts that repudiate their ideologies referring to al-Qaida and ISIS as the living examples.⁵⁶² However, his article like that of Saleh did not make any analyses

⁵⁵⁷ “Dabiq Magazine” *Dabiq* 1, (July, 2014) 4. Last accessed 20/05/2017 at <http://www.ieproject.org/projects/dabiq1.pdf>

⁵⁵⁸ “Overview of Daesh’s Online Recruitment Propaganda Magazine, Dabiq” *The Carter Centre*, (December 2015) 3. Online at https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/countering-isis/Dabiq-report-12-17-15.pdf last accessed on 17/01/2017.

⁵⁵⁹ Muhemed W. Saleh, *Ibn Taymiyyah and the reception of his Political Thought by ISIS and its influence on their action*. at https://www.academia.edu/31544557/Ibn_Taymiyyah_and_ISIS accessed on 13/03/2017.

⁵⁶⁰ Saleh, *Ibn Taymiyyah and the reception of his Political Thought*, 4-5.

⁵⁶¹ Abū ‘Iyād, *Refutations of the Shaykhs of Islām Ibn Taymiyyah & Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb against the Takfīrī Jihādīst khārijites who follow the Ideology of Mawdūdī and Quṭb and make Jihād in obeying Satan*, (Birmingham: Salafi publications, 20015).

⁵⁶² Abū ‘Iyād, *Refutations of the Shaykhs of Islām Ibn Taymiyyah & Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb*, 1,11,17,19.

on how Ibn Taymiyya is used by these organisations. Both articles are neither rich nor academic.

In my analyses of the use of Ibn Taymiyya in *Dabiq*, I found out that Ibn Taymiyya was referred to 75 times across the 15 issues.⁵⁶³ However, not all of these references and quotations are directly connected with jihad. Only three articles in the 15 issues are directly connected to jihad and apostasy. Two articles are on apostasy: one article about the apostasy of the Sahwa coalition in issue 10, and the other analysing the *fitna* of the Mongols in issue 14. The third article is on the apostasy of the Rāfiḍa. I will analyse the three articles and show how Ibn Taymiyya is used to support their ideas.

Apostasy

ISIS is the most extreme of the jihadi groups on excommunication and jihad. Like other jihadists, ISIS also uses Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas to justify the apostasy not only of the Muslim rulers, but of their opponents for non-enforcement of Sharī'a.⁵⁶⁴ In issue 10 an article titled "The law of Allah or the laws of men" argues for the apostasy of the Sahwa coalition. Sahwa coalition is the coalition of the rebel groups against the Syrian regime. The article bases the apostasy of the Sahwa coalition on three grounds: non-enforcement of Sharī'a, fighting ISIS and collaborating with the apostate Muslim rulers such as the Saudi, Qatar, and Turkish governments. Discussing the non-implementation of Sharī'a the article encapsulates the reason for apostasy in the paragraph below:

There is also no doubt the lands ruled by the Sahwa Coalition now are not ruled by what Allah revealed and the "best" of these lands is where there are committees that they've dubbed *sharī'a* committees" to give an illusion of *sharī'a* while they are in reality committees afflicted with *fitna* and which do not rule by the *sharī'a* except for a few laws codified by their laws, like the "Unified Arabic Law," which is called to by some of the factions, or laws which do

⁵⁶³ *Dabiq* issue 1 p 21, 23x2. Issue 2 pp 21, 23x2. Issue 3 p 10, 11, 32x2. Issue 4 pp 1, 36x3, 37. Issue 6 p 19x2, 31, 40. Issue 7 p 21, 22x2, 59, and 63. Issue 8 pp 45, 46, 50x2, 52. Issue 9 p 13x2. Issue 10 p 8, 9x2, 16, 56x2, 57x3, and 63. Issue 11 pp 13. Issue 13 pp 33x2, 36x3, 38x2, 43, 44x2. Issue 14 pp 12, 15x3, 17, 44x2, 45, 46x3, 47x2, 48x2, 49x3, and 50. Issue 15 p 57x2.

⁵⁶⁴ *Dabiq* issue 10 p 53-54.

not irritate the coalition partners nor the “common people,” as is the case with the committees that do not establish the *hadd* upon the individual apostates such as those who mock Allah or His Messenger or those who abandon prayer. They do not establish the *hadd* upon the transgressing sinner like the thief or the fornicator and they substitute the *sharʿī ḥadd* with *taʿzīr* (a censure for sins that do not have a specified *hadd*). Their authority is almost limited to affairs of reconciliation between the people and even in this domain the strong have the upper hand over the weak.⁵⁶⁵

According to the article, based on the non-enforcement of Sharīʿa, the Sahwa coalition deserved to be fought with jihad. To validate the argument, two verses of the Quran Are quoted: “Fight them until there is no *fitna* and until worship is for Allah. But if they cease, then there is to be no aggression except against the oppressors” (Q 2:193). “And fight them until there is no *fitna* and until the religion, all of it, is for Allah. And if they cease – then indeed, Allah is seeing of what they do” (Q 8:39). The verses signify fighting until the *fitna* ceases and the *fitna* according to the article is the non-enforcement of Sharīʿa by the coalition. The verses were followed by a quotation from Ibn Taymiyya’s first anti-Mongol fatwa. The fatwa was quoted via Wahhābī scholar Sulaymān Āl Shaykh in his book *Taysīr ʿAzīz al-Ḥamīd*:

Ibn Taymiyya said when he was asked about the issue of fighting the Mongols while they claimed to adhere to the *shahādatayn* (testimony of Islam) and claimed to follow the basics of Islam, ‘Every party that resists the obvious and definite laws of Islam from these people or others, then it is obligatory to fight them until they comply with its laws even if they pronounce the *shahādatayn* and follow some of its laws, just as Abū Bakr and the Companions fought those who resisted the *zakāt*. The *fuqahāʾ* (jurists) after them agreed upon this.’ He then said, ‘So any resistant party that resists some of the obligatory prayers, fasting, hajj, or resists

⁵⁶⁵ “The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men,” *Dabiq* 10, (July, 2015): 52. Last accessed on 25/04/2017 <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/the-islamic-state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-1022.pdf>

abiding by the prohibition of spilling blood, looting wealth, alcohol, gambling, incest, or resists adherence to jihad against the disbelievers or the enforcement of *jizya* upon the people of the Book.⁵⁶⁶

The Sahwa coalition became analogical to the Mongols. Like the Mongols, the Sahwa coalition claims to adhere to the *shahādatayn* and claims to follow the basics of Islam, but resists some laws of Islam, such as establishing *hadd* punishment for fornication, stealing and the like. Therefore, they should be fought just like the Mongols. Here ISIS follows the footsteps of the jihadists before them in analogising the contemporary period with the period of the Mongols. The anti-Mongol fatwas used in the article are quoted directly from Ibn Taymiyya's *Majmū' fatāwā* and via secondary sources (i.e. Wahhābī scholars). Quoting them from the Wahhābī scholars will establish that understanding the anti-Mongol fatwas in the context they are used by ISIS is not limited to ISIS. Some scholars also interpret the fatwas in their own context. Sulaymān Āl al-Shaykh and his father Shaykh 'Abd Allāh ibn Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb both interpret the fatwas in their own context. In their commentaries, they both demonstrate that the anti-Mongol fatwas are not only valid for the period of the Mongol invasion of Syria. Neither are the accusations lavelled against the Mongols the sole reason reasons for fighting. The Mongol period can be analogised with other periods. So, refusing other obligations not refused by the Mongols can also be a reason for waging jihad. The very portion of the fatwa quoted above is the most frequently quoted portion by all the jihadists. It was quoted by Faraj to argue for the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers.⁵⁶⁷ In his commentary on the fatwas, 'Abd Allāh ibn Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb listed a number of other things not in the anti-Mongol fatwas that people will be fought for resisting.

May Allah have mercy upon you [the reader], reflect upon the Imām's [Ibn Taymiyya's] clarification in this fatwa that the one who forcefully resists a law from the laws of Islam, like the five prayers, fasting, *zakāt*, or hajj, or forcefully resists abandoning the forbidden matters like fornication,

⁵⁶⁶“The Law of Allah,” 56 and Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:502.

⁵⁶⁷ Faraj, *al-Farīda*, 6.

murder, theft and plunder, alcohol, or intoxicants, and so forth, then it is obligatory to fight the party resisting such until the religion is only for Allah alone and until they abide by all laws of Islam, even if they pronounce the *shahāda* and hold on to some of the laws of Islam, and that this is something that all the scholars have agreed upon, since the Companions and those after them, and that this is in accordance with the Qur’ān and the Sunna. Thus, it becomes clear to you that the mere adherence to Islam coupled with the resistance to some of its laws does not save them from war and that they are to be fought because of their *kufṛ* and apostasy from Islam as he made clear in the end of his fatwa⁵⁶⁸

Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb lived in the nineteenth century, but quotes the anti-Mongol fatwas and uses them in his context.

The second reason for the apostasy of the Sahwa coalition is fighting ISIS. The article in *Dabiq* does not expatiate in substantiating the reason. The only evidence stated is analogy. If those who refused imposing *jizya* against the People of the Book are apostates, then those who fight the people who impose *jizya* are also a fortiori apostates. The third reason for the apostasy of the Sahwa coalition is their collaboration with the apostate regimes of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey. Unlike other articles of the jihadists who use Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa against the Mamlūk renegades in excommunicating the people who collaborate with the apostate regimes, the article in question takes a different dimension. The article makes lengthy quotations from Najdi scholars ‘Abd al-Latīf Ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn Hasan Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and Sa’ūd Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ibn Muhammad Ibn Sa’ūd in their various treatises. Both scholars argue for the apostasy of whoever collaborates with non-Muslims in fighting the Muslims. Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa against the renegades is omitted, but a segment of the second anti-Mongol fatwa where Ibn Taymiyya argues for fighting those who refuse adopting the teachings of the Book and Sunna was paraphrased and a fortiori argument was used against the Sahwa coalition:

⁵⁶⁸ “The Law of Allah,” 56-57 and Ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb *al-Kalimāt al-nāfi‘a*, 4.

Shaykhul-Islām Ibn Taymiyya mentioned the obligation of fighting the heretical parties that forcefully resist adopting the ‘*aqīdah* [creed] of Ahl al-Sunna concerning the *tawhīd* [oneness] of Allah’s names and attributes, *qadā’* and *qadar*, the Companions and the Jamā’a.⁵⁶⁹

The article argues that the Sahwa coalition is even more deviant than the ones described by Ibn Taymiyya [Mongols]; therefore, they are more deserving to be fought. The Sahwa coalition, according to the article do not only deny the names and attributes of Allah, but dignify the other deities, such as the kings of Saudi, Qatar, president Erdogan and the Syrian National Coalition and declare them along with their governments to be brothers and friends.⁵⁷⁰

Like Dr. Fadl and al-Qaida, ISIS did not solely rely on Ibn Taymiyya in substantiating the argument. In issue 14, an article titled “Lessons from the fitnah of the Mongols” discusses Ibn Taymiyya’s letter about the Mongols.⁵⁷¹ The letter is published in volume 28 of the *Majmū‘ fatāwā* as analysed in Chapter Two of this thesis.

As can be seen in the analyses of the letter in Chapter Two, Ibn Taymiyya divided the people of Syria at the time into three: a party striving in support of the religion, another outside the Sharī’a of Islam, and another forsaking it.⁵⁷² The first party is Ibn Taymiyya and those fighting the Mongols with him, the victorious sect; the second is the Mongols; while the third is the hypocrites who abandoned jihad for the fear of enemy and lack of sound *imam*. According to ISIS the contemporary period exemplified the same categorisation:

And likewise today, the people are divided into three groups with respect to the establishment of the Islamic State and the return of *khilāfa* upon the prophetic methodology: A group that supports the revival of the *khilāfa* and the implementation of the Sharī’a, a group that wages war

⁵⁶⁹ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:511.

⁵⁷⁰ “The Law of Allah,” 63.

⁵⁷¹ I use the term letter not fatwa because Ibn Taymiyya named it *kitāb*

⁵⁷² “Lessons from the Fitnah of the Mongols,” *Dabiq* 14, (April/May 2016): 45, last accessed 25/04/2017 <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/the-islamic-state-22dacc84biq-magazine-1422.pdf>

against the *khilāfa* and the Sharī'a, and a third group that claims to be in support of establishing the *khilāfa* and implementing the Sharī'a but seems to think that this can only come about by abandoning jihad, fear-mongering, and criticizing the *mujāhidīn* (jihadists) over any perceived shortcomings.⁵⁷³

According to the article, the first group are ISIS, the second are those fighting the ISIS, while the third group are those who abandoned ISIS, they are the hypocrites, the apostates. The article gives more emphasis on discussing the third category. They are the people who are treading the path of knowledge and jihad, they want to implement the Sharī'a but through standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the secularists in their parliaments and nationalist factions. In the Mongol context, these are the people who abandoned Ibn Taymiyya and the Muslims fighting the Mongols and at the time of the Prophet they are the hypocrites, who believed in him outwardly, not inwardly.⁵⁷⁴ In the contemporary period, they are the Muslims who abandon jihad when the lands of the Muslims are being attacked from all directions by the enemies of Allah and are dominated by the laws and constitutions imposed and enforced by the crusaders and their puppets.⁵⁷⁵ By these categorisation, all the Muslims who abandoned the Islamic State are hypocrites and apostates. In contrast to the jihadists who limit the apostasy to the Muslims rulers and their aids, ISIS extend the apostasy to everyone who does not pay allegiance to them. Going by Ibn Taymiyya's letter, one can argue that the ISIS interpretation of the arguments of Ibn Taymiyya in the letter and implementing them in the contemporary period is wrong. Ibn Taymiyya declared the third group as the hypocrites who abandoned jihad in both the period of the Prophet at the battles of Uḥud and the Ditch and the period of the Mongols. In contrast to ISIS, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that they are hypocrites and never argues for their apostasy. Hypocrites and apostates are two different groups to Ibn Taymiyya. While the apostates are fought with jihad, the hypocrites should not be fought as the Prophet did not fight any of them in Medina. Toward the end of the letter Ibn

⁵⁷³ "Lessons from the Fitnah," 47.

⁵⁷⁴ "Lessons from the Fitnah," *Dabiq* 46.

⁵⁷⁵ "Lessons from the Fitnah," *Dabiq* 47.

Taymiyya is more lenient with them, hoped for their repentance and argued that they are entitled to the Mercy and punishment of Allah. He states:

Allah has afflicted the people with this *fitna* so as to reward the truthful for their truth, they are the ones who stayed firm and steadfast in support of Allah and His messenger and to punish the hypocrites or forgive them if he wishes. We hope from Allah to forgive many of those hypocrites. Some of them have lamented. Allah the most high accepts the repentance of His servants and overlooks the wrongs.⁵⁷⁶

ISIS does not follow the path of Ibn Taymiyya in treating the third category as hypocrites. Instead ISIS declare them apostates, which were not given room for repentance or hope for mercy.

Rāfiḍa and Nuṣayrīs

ISIS also employs Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa against the Rāfiḍa also known as Shī'īs. Both al-Qaida and ISIS consider the Shī'īs apostates, but according to Ozkaya and Akgul al-Qaida sees killing sprees against them as too extreme and thus detrimental to the broader jihadist project.⁵⁷⁷ On the other hand ISIS sees jihad against the Shī'īs as the necessity of starting with the nearest enemy. To establish the obligation of waging jihad against the Shī'īs, ISIS made a very lengthy argument, stating the scholars who opine the general excommunication of the Shī'īs. In the argument, Ibn Taymiyya was first to appear. He was cited criticizing the Shī'īs for fabricating hadiths on shrine visitation:⁵⁷⁸ "The first to fabricate these hadiths about travelling to visit shrines built upon grave were the people of deviant heresies such as the *rāfiḍa* and their likes"⁵⁷⁹

However, on the Shī'īs, contrary to their argument of making general excommunication and waging jihad against them, Ibn Taymiyya despite his refutation of Shī'ism does not hold the view of excommunicating the Shī'īs as a whole. According to Ibn Taymiyya, some Shī'īs are Muslim:

⁵⁷⁶ Ibn Taymiyya's letter against the Mongols, MF 28:462.

⁵⁷⁷ Ozkaya and Akgul, "Light Years Ahead" 14.

⁵⁷⁸ "The Rāfiḍah from Ibn Saba'," *Dabiq* 36.

⁵⁷⁹ "The Rāfiḍah from Ibn Saba'," *Dabiq* 36.

The Twelver Shī'īs are much better than Ismā'īlīs because in spite of the ignorance and misguidance of the Twelver Shī'īs, there are some who are Muslims in their heart and outwardly and they are not hypocrites and freethinkers (*zanādiqa*) as they are ignorant who become misguided and followed their whims. As for their leaders and scholars, who know the reality of their hidden agenda of their *madhhab* are hypocrites and *zanādiqa*. As for the Twelver Shī'ī layperson whose inner belief is not obvious or confirmed to be right, then they might be Muslims.⁵⁸⁰

To Ibn Taymiyya, some of the Shī'īs are Muslims, especially the lay persons, which constitute the majority of Shī'īs fought by ISIS today. ISIS's view of declaring all Shī'īs apostates made them run into a battle of words with other jihadists such as Ayman al Zāwāhirī, the Taliban and others who hold less radical views. ISIS considers them as ignorant jihadi claimants whose understanding of the religion lacks depth.⁵⁸¹

ISIS also makes similar arguments against the Nuṣayrīs and the Druze of Syria, citing Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa against them.⁵⁸²

Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya was asked about the ruling upon the Nusayriyya and the Druze and answered, "The Druze and the Nusayriyya are *kuffār* according to the agreement of the Muslims. It is not permissible to eat what they slaughter nor marry their women. Rather, they cannot be acknowledged with *jizya*, for they are apostates from the religion of Islam, not Muslims, nor Jews, nor Christians. They do not recognize the obligation of the five daily prayers, nor the obligation of the Ramadān fast, nor the obligation of hajj, nor the prohibition of what Allah and His Messenger have prohibited of dead animals, alcohol, and so on. And if they manifest the two testimonies of faith [there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His messenger]

⁵⁸⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, *Minhāj al-Sunna*, 2:279.

⁵⁸¹ "The Rāfidah from Ibn Saba'," *Dabiq* 38.

⁵⁸² "The Allies of al-Qaida in Shām part 3," *Dabiq* 10 (July, 2015): 8.

alongside these tenets of creed, then they are *kuffār* according to the agreement of the Muslims.⁵⁸³

Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa against Nusayrīs has already been analysed in Chapter Three of this thesis. One of the reasons that Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas against the Nuṣayrīs cannot be employed by the jihadists against the contemporary Nuṣayrīs is that according to Friedman the fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya was issued because of the need of the Mamlūks for the religious legitimacy to exterminate the sect. This explains why Ibn Taymiyya, in his first fatwa against the Nuṣayrīs, shows much fear in accepting their assistance, which might lead to the opposite result—their acceptance as part of the Muslim community. In order to express his fear, Ibn Taymiyya compares them with the *munāfiqūn* (hypocrites).⁵⁸⁴ While Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa against the Nuṣayrīs was motivated by the authorities, the contemporary Nuṣayrīs in Syria are accepted by the regime as a part of the citizens.

In general, ISIS is more radical in excommunicating its opponents than other jihadi groups. This might be due to the political reasons and other factors that facilitate the creation of the group. Like other jihadists ISIS also uses Ibn Taymiyya's statements in making their arguments, but, unlike Faraj, ISIS employs other scholars alongside Ibn Taymiyya in validating their arguments.

7.4 Ibn Taymiyya in Boko Haram's literature

Boko Haram is a jihadi group in Northern Nigeria known as *Jamā'at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da'wa wa al-Jihād* (Group of people of Sunna for Proselytization and Jihad), before the group formally paid allegiance to ISIS and changed to *al-Wilāyat al-Islāmiyya Gharb Afriqiyya*. In March 2015, the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau formally pledged allegiance to ISIS.⁵⁸⁵ Some writers such as Otoabasi Akpan and Mike Smith link the emergence of Boko Haram to socio-political and economic problems in Nigeria. Since independence from the colonial masters, Nigeria has not benefited from an uninterrupted democratic and federal system of government. The army has seized the reins of power from time to time, which resulted in economic,

⁵⁸³ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 35:161; and The Allies of al-Qaida in Shām," *Dabiq* 8.

⁵⁸⁴ Friedman, *The Nuṣayrī-ʿAlawīs: An Introduction to the Religion*, 196.

⁵⁸⁵ "The Bay'ah from West Africa," *Dabiq* 8 (April, 2015): 14.

security and social degradation. According to Akpan, Boko Haram is one the factors that resulted from the imperial politics of the first republic, imperial governance of the army general, and imperial democratic credentials of the second and the third republic.⁵⁸⁶ Smith also attributes the emergence of the group to socioeconomic problems. He believes that after the crackdown on the Boko Haram group by the Nigerian government in 2009, poverty, corruption, unemployment and lack of proper education may have been part of the reasons that led the youth to join the group.⁵⁸⁷ Boko Haram is known for its brutality and indiscriminate attacks against the people of Northern Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad. According to Alexander Thurston, Boko Haram started as a non-violent mainstream Salafi group influenced by the Graduates of the Medina University in Nigeria. However, from 2009 the movement shifted from the path of main-stream Salafism to preaching offensive jihad, imitating other global jihadi actors, and in 2014 the group declared an Islamic State in part of Northern Nigeria.⁵⁸⁸ According to Thurston, although there may be tendencies that Boko Haram members received training and inspiration from al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) and al-Shabāb in Somalia, there are real limits to any influence al-Qaida may have had over the early Boko Haram.⁵⁸⁹ Their allegiance to ISIS is not a coincidence as Boko Haram also follows the same pattern of excommunicating the whole community and fighting them with jihad. In a popular online video, the leader of the group appeared excommunicating all the Nigerian Muslim groups: “*Izala* [Salafis] are apostates, *tijāni ṭarīqa* are apostates *qādiri ṭarīqa* are apostates... we will kill and enslave the apostates.”⁵⁹⁰ The main headquarters and Mosque of Boko Haram are named after Ibn Taymiyya to demonstrate how much the group feels attached to Ibn Taymiyya.

Hādhihi ‘aqīdatunā wa manhaj da ‘watunā

The manual of the group is entitled: *Hādhihi ‘aqīdatunā wa manhaj da ‘watunā* (This is Our Creed and Method of Preaching) written by their

⁵⁸⁶ Otoabasi Akpan, *War and Conquest without weapons, Tactics and Strategies of Scorching the Phenomenon of Boko Haram in Nigeria* (London: Adonis & Abbey, 2013), 60.

⁵⁸⁷ Mike Smith, *Boko Haram inside Nigeria’s Unholy War* (London: I.B Tauris, 2015), 34 - 39.

⁵⁸⁸ Alexander Thurston *Salafism in Nigeria Islam Preaching and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 194.

⁵⁸⁹ Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria*, 197 – 98.

⁵⁹⁰ Online video by Abubakar Shekau at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iD-R93n3o_Y last accessed on 22/04/2017.

founder and first leader Muhammad Yusuf. According to Thurston, Yusuf cites numerous authorities from among the Salafi scholars. According to him, the 166-page book invokes Ibn Taymiyya more than a dozen times to denounce any system of government not anchored in the Quran and Sunna. Besides Ibn Taymiyya, Yusuf also refers to classical scholars such as Ibn Ḥanbal and other scholars such as Ibn al-Qayyim and Wahhābī scholars. He also refers to non-Wahhābī scholars that are associated with Salafism such as Shawkānī and Rāshīd Ridā.⁵⁹¹ Thurston also observes that Yusuf limits the role of Albānī to mere authentication of hadith, while Shākir's was treated as a scholar of hadith and jurist. According to him, this might be due to the Albānī's antipathy to jihad against the Muslim rulers, while Shākir's statement are partly employed by the contemporary jihadists, especially his work *Ḥukm al-jāhiliyya* (The rule of Pre-Islamic Ignorance) and *Al-ʿIlmāniyya* (secularism).⁵⁹² In the segment on *Ṣadā al-jihad* in this chapter, I mention how AQAP uses Shākir alongside other scholars to argue for the apostasy of al-Bashir of Sudan.

In the quotations below, Yusuf quotes segments of Ibn Tamiyya's statement on *al-qaḍā'* (the judgement) cited in volume thirty-five of the *Majmūʿ fatāwā* to justify the claim that the Nigerian leaders are apostates for applying man-made laws in the country.

If the ruler is religious, but rules in ignorance, he will be in hell fire, if he is knowledgeable, but rules against the truth he will be in hell fire. If his rule is devoid of knowledge and justice, then he will be more deserving of hell fire. All these if he [the ruler] judges for an individual on a particular issue, but when the ruling is about general issues then.....⁵⁹³

And

It is not [permissible] for anyone to judge among people, neither Muslims, nor unbelievers (*kuffār*), nor youth, nor hunters, nor soldiers, nor poor, nor other than that except

⁵⁹¹ Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria*, 208.

⁵⁹² Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria*, 209.

⁵⁹³ Ibn Taymiyya MF 35:388; and Muhammad Yusuf, *Hādhihi ʿaqīdatunā wa manhajī daʿawatinā* (Maiduguri: 1430AH/2008), 56.

with the judgement of Allah and His messenger. Whoever seeks other than that is engulfed in the verse “And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the disbelievers.” And His saying “But no, by your Lord, they will not [truly] believe until they make you, [O Muhammad], judge concerning that over which they dispute among themselves and then find within themselves no discomfort from what you have judged and submit in [full, willing] submission” (4:65). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the Muslims to use Allah and His messenger’s judgement on any dispute among them.⁵⁹⁴

The second quotation is featured in *Ṣāda al-jihad* for the same argument. These quotations alongside quotations from other scholars are used by Boko Haram as evidence for the apostasy of the Nigerian government and by extension any government that refuses the implementation of Sharī‘a. The Boko Haram manual was written before the group turned violent, and therefore does not express their brutality. The above segment is quoted just to demonstrate how the group follows the footsteps of other jihadists in using Ibn Taymiyya to justify their arguments.

7.5 Conclusion

Like other jihadists discussed in the previous chapter, both al-Qaida and ISIS use Ibn Taymiyya in making their arguments. Quotations from Ibn Taymiyya in the three magazines *Sāda al-malāḥim*, and *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* issued by AQAP and *Dabiq* issued by ISIS, as well as the Boko Haram manual are not only used to substantiate issues of jihad. Rather, his thoughts are employed for arguments across various topics of creed and jurisprudence. In this chapter, however, I have analysed only how al-Qaida, ISIS and Boko Haram use Ibn Taymiyya’s thoughts on the issues of jihad. After analysing the three magazines, I found that the core arguments Ibn Taymiyya was employed for are declaring the contemporary Muslim rulers and their aids as apostates and the obligation of waging jihad against them. In substantiating the argument, Ibn

⁵⁹⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 35:403-4 and Yusuf, *Hādhihi ‘aqīdatunā*.

Taymiyya's anti-Mongol fatwas are used most often. The jihadists analogize the contemporary period with the period of the Mongol invasion of Syria and thus divide people into three groups following Ibn Taymiyya's division of people into three groups in respect of the Mongol invasion of Syria. The first group is the victorious group: the jihadists are analogical to Ibn Taymiyya and those who fought the Mongols. The second group is the contemporary Muslim rulers and their aids who are analogous to the Mongols and Mamlūk renegades. The third group is the people who claim to support Islam, but abandon jihad due to the fear of the enemy; these are analogous to the people that Ibn Taymiyya termed hypocrites for abandoning jihad out of the fear of the Mongols. Both al-Qaida and ISIS stick to this division; however, ISIS are more radical in declaring both the second and third groups as apostates as against Ibn Taymiyya and al-Qaida who considers the third group as hypocrites. The question here is: are the jihadists right in applying Ibn Taymiyya's categorization of people in the Mongol period to the contemporary period or are Ibn Taymiyya's thoughts on the Mongols contextual? Some scholars such as Jansen and Michot will argue that Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas against the Mongols are contextual; thus, they should not be analogized at least in the way they are analogised by the contemporary jihadists. The fatwas were issued against foreign invaders. Others, such as Delong-Bas will argue that the jihadists are faithful to Ibn Taymiyya in their interpretation and consequently blame Ibn Taymiyya for influencing the jihadists. In my analyses of the use of Ibn Taymiyya by the jihadists, however, I found that, the main differences between Ibn Taymiyya's anti-Mongol fatwas and their application by the jihadists in the contemporary period are two. Firstly, Ibn Taymiyya was addressing the Mongols who were foreign invaders. They travelled all the way from their territories to invade Syria. Ibn Taymiyya and the Syrians were acting in self-defence, a claim that al-Qaida and ISIS cannot make against the Muslim rulers today. Ibn Taymiyya collaborated with the Mamlūks who were in no better position than the contemporary Muslim rulers to fight the foreign invaders. This point is stated by some scholars who defend Ibn Taymiyya's thought against the jihadists. Such scholars include Haqq, Michot, 'Abd Allah ibn Bayya and others. Secondly, in all Ibn Taymiyya's fatwas against the Mongols, Ibn Taymiyya states many reasons that qualified the Mongols as apostates. While the non-

implementation of Sharī‘a often cited by the jihadists is part of these reasons, there are many other reasons the jihadists omit. These reasons include blasphemy of claiming Ghenis Khan to be the son of God and equating him with the Prophet Muhammed alongside attacking the Muslim nations. Unless all the accusations of Ibn Taymiyya against the Mongols are found in the contemporary Muslim rulers, the analogy remains weak. However, one can argue that it is difficult to exonerate Ibn Taymiyya’s thoughts from influencing the jihadists. His thoughts on jihad are partly transferred to the contemporary jihadists via the Wahhābi scholars, who contextualized the anti-Mongol fatwas in their encounters with their opponents. And from there some of the jihadist such as ISIS quote the fatwas and also contextualize them to the contemporary period. This could be countered by the fact that the majority of the Salafis and those who champion Ibn Taymiyya’s thoughts do not apply the interpretation of the jihadists on the Taymiyyan texts. Thus, the jihadists’ interpretation might be resulting from lack of proper understanding of the Taymiyyan text as stated in the first point. Both Ibn Taymiyya and the jihadists are treading the path of Salaf as against the accusation that latter are Khārijīs.

Another issue with regards to the use of Ibn Taymiyya in these magazines is that, despite Ibn Taymiyya being the most cited scholar in justifying the apostasy of the Muslim rulers and the obligation of fighting them, other scholars are also cited. The arguments are normally substantiated from the Quranic verses and hadiths before quoting Ibn Taymiyya and other scholars. In *Sāda al-malāḥim* three articles in issue 8, 10 and 12 argue for the apostasy of the Arab rulers and obligation for fighting them. The article in issue 8 was substantiated with hadiths and statements of Shafī‘ī and Ibn Qudāma alongside Ibn Taymiyya. In issue 10 the argument was proven with the Quran 8:39, 9:29, and hadith before Ibn Taymiyya was quoted. The article in issue 12 used Quran 5:51, followed by quotations from Ṭabarī, Ibn Hazm and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb before Ibn Taymiyya was cited. In *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* also three articles make similar arguments. The article in issue 29 argues for the apostasy of Muhammad al-Bashir, the Sudanese president.⁵⁹⁵ The article in issue 16 argues for the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers for the non-implementation of Sharī‘a and

⁵⁹⁵ Al-Sunnī, “Imāṭat al-litham.” *Ṣāḍā al-jihād*, 32.

the permissibility of rebellion against them⁵⁹⁶ and in issue 36 to prove the apostasy of Turkish president Tayyip Erdoğan and Hamas.⁵⁹⁷ In the article arguing for the apostasy of Al-Bashir, five points were stated, out of which only two were partly substantiated with a quotation from Ibn Taymiyya. The article in issue 16 uses Quran 4:65, 24:63, 33:36 and the analyses of the verses is intermingled by quotations from some scholars such as Ibn Kathīr, Ibn Ḥazm, and the latter scholar Muhammad al-Amīn al-Shanqīṭī. Issue 36 repeats similar evidences stated in issue 16. If in the six articles in both magazines the quotations from Ibn Taymiyya were omitted the arguments would still stand with strength.

In *Dabiq* only one article in issue 14 on the “Lessons from the fitnah of the Mongols” relies solely on Ibn Taymiyya. The article relies on Ibn Taymiyya because it discusses the Mongol period and through analysing Ibn Taymiyya’s letter about the Mongols. The article establishes the jihadists’ argument of analogising the contemporary period with the period of the Mongol invasions of Syria. Were this article removed from the magazine, the jihadists’ augment of declaring the Arab rulers as apostates and the obligation of waging jihad against them would still stand. This further indicates a big shift from solely relying on Ibn Taymiyya by Faraj in making such arguments. With or without quotations from Ibn Taymiyya, the jihadists can make their arguments and substantiate them through other sources.

Another point for refuting ISIS in using Ibn Taymiyya’s thought to argue for the creation of an independent Islamic state is that ISIS and the jihadists justify their violence in establishing an Islamic state which they visualized as coercing the majority to accept some standard rules enforced by the authority,⁵⁹⁸ whereas Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of the Islamic state was more of what is existing in the contemporary Muslim nations than what is pictured by the jihadists. As Qamaruddīn Khan puts it:

The state of Ibn Taymiyya is then neither a divine commission nor a power-state based on sheer military

⁵⁹⁶ Al-Makkī, “Hum al-Khawārij ḥaqq,” *Ṣāḍā al-jihād*, 29-34.

⁵⁹⁷ Al-Makkī, “al-Tadarruj fī taṭbīq,” *Ṣāḍā al-jihād*, 18.

⁵⁹⁸ Bonney, *Jihad from Qur’ān*, 124.

might; it is a cooperation between all members of the community to realize certain common ideals – the recognition of *tawhīd*, one God, the Creator, the Provident, the Law-giver, and of the Prophet, the intermediary between God and man, and the submission to a common law, the *sharī‘a*. ... Whatever function is assigned to an individual its proper and honest execution is an act of virtue and contribution to the collective life of the state.⁵⁹⁹

⁵⁹⁹ Qamaruddin Khan, *The Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyah* (Delhi, India: Adam Publishers and Distributors, 2009), 185-86. Part of this was quoted by Richard Bonney but he referenced it to different source.

Conclusion of Part Two

Part Two of the thesis studies Wahhābī and contemporary jihadi documents with the aim of conceptualising how Ibn Taymiyya's concept of jihad is appropriated by both. The part consists of three chapters. Chapter Five uses the secondary literature available to study the relationship between Ibn Taymiyya and the Wahhābī movement in jihad and excommunication. The chapter examines how the contemporary jihadists use the Wahhābī scholars as a source of quoting and appropriating Taymiyyan texts in jihad and excommunication. The main finding of the chapter is that the Wahhābī movement preceded the contemporary jihadists in quoting Ibn Taymiyya and appropriating his fatwas, especially the anti-Mongol fatwas, to substantiate jihadi arguments. The jihadists use the Wahhābīs in two forms. Firstly, they make them secondary sources for understanding and appropriating the Taymiyyan texts on excommunication and jihad. Secondly, they use the statements of the Wahhābī scholars in excommunicating the contemporary Muslim rulers for the non-enforcement of Sharī'a and collaborating with the non-Muslims in fighting the Muslims. An article in *Dabiq* issue 10 for instance quotes the first anti-Mongol fatwa via a Wahhābī scholar Sulaymān Āl Shaykh in his book *Taysīr 'Azīz al-Ḥamīd* to argue for the apostasy of the Sahwa coalition. Sulaymān quotes the fatwa arguing for the apostasy of whoever does not enforce Sharī'a in general and from him ISIS quotes the same portion to argue for the apostasy of the Sahwa coalition.

Chapter Six studies two treatises of the jihadists that were written before the emergence of al-Qaida. These treatises are *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba*, and *al-'Umda fī i'dād al-'udda*. Using the secondary literature, the chapter finds that in *al-Farīda*, Faraj uses Ibn Taymiyya to argue for two jihadi arguments. Firstly, the contemporary Muslim rulers and their aids are apostates and fighting them with jihad is an obligation just as Ibn Taymiyya declared the Mongols and Mamlūk renegades apostates, and argues for waging jihad against them. Secondly, using Ibn Taymiyya's Mardin fatwa, Faraj concludes that contemporary Muslim countries are a domain of war; therefore, migrating from them is an obligation. These two arguments by Faraj are repeated by almost all the jihadists using Ibn Taymiyya's anti-Mongol and Mardin fatwa as justification. In *al-'Umda fī i'dād al-'udda* Dr. Fadl repeats the same arguments,

but differs from Faraj by justifying the arguments of other scholars instead of solely relying on Ibn Taymiyya as Faraj did. Dr. Fadl also uses Ibn Taymiyya in making some jihadi arguments that were not made by Faraj. These include arguing for the permissibility of jihad without the permission of the Muslim ruler. He argues for it using Ibn Taymiyya's role in fighting the Mongols after the abolishment of the Abbasid caliphate. Another point Dr. Fadl uses Ibn Taymiyya to argue for is the permissibility of indiscriminate attack against the target in jihad.

Chapter Seven studies three magazines of two jihadi movements: *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* and *Ṣadā al-jihād*, issued by AQAP and *Dabiq* Magazine issued by ISIS, and Boko Haram Manual. There was no secondary literature found in respect to how the magazines use Ibn Taymiyya; therefore, all the analyses in the chapter are solely mine. The magazines in various articles repeat the same argument of Faraj that the contemporary Muslim rulers and their aids apostatize just like the Mongols and the Mamlūk renegades, and jihad against them is obligatory as it was with the Mongols and the Mamlūk renegades. The magazines also analogise the contemporary period in the Muslim countries with the Mongol period and apply Ibn Taymiyya's categorization of people in the Mongol period to the contemporary period. According to them, the contemporary Muslim rulers and their aids are analogous to the Mongols and the Mamlūk renegades that joined the Mongols respectively. The contemporary jihadists are analogical to Ibn Taymiyya and the people fighting the Mongols; they are the victorious sect. The masses in the contemporary Muslim countries who claim was supported Islam, but abandoned jihad due to the fear of their governments or claim enforcing Sharī'a through democracy are analogous to the people that Ibn Taymiyya termed hypocrites for abandoning jihad out of fear of the Mongols. Both al-Qaida and ISIS stick to this division. However, in contrast to Ibn Taymiyya, who declares the people who joined the Mongols out of fear as hypocrites, ISIS declares the people who do not rebel against the contemporary Muslim rulers as apostates.

The three magazines also use Ibn Taymiyya in making some jihadi arguments outside the Mongol context. These include the permissibility of targeting diplomats and tourists as a form of jihad. This was done by disqualifying the diplomats and the tourist from having the status of *mu'āhad*

who should be protected by the host government. They also use Ibn Taymiyya to argue for the permissibility of suicide in the course of jihad. The jihadists mostly use the following statement of Ibn Taymiyya in the second anti-Mongol fatwa to argue for suicide in jihad: “The four imams permit a Muslim to immerse in the non-Muslims row [during the fight] even if he thinks they will kill him if there is benefit for the Muslims in doing that.”⁶⁰⁰ In Part One of this thesis, Ibn Taymiyya’s treatise on suicide was analysed, but the jihadists resolve to using his statement in the second anti-Mongol fatwa to argue for the suicide instead of referring to the treatise. Both al-Qaida and ISIS consider Shī‘īs as apostates, but in contrast to al-Qaida, ISIS argues for the obligation of fighting and killing Shī‘īs as a form of jihad. The three magazines also, like Dr. Fadl, mostly use other scholars alongside Ibn Taymiyya in substantiating these arguments, making Faraj as the only jihadist who relies solely on Ibn Taymiyya in justifying jihadist doctrines. Using the secondary literature, this part of the thesis discusses the validity or otherwise of the use of Ibn Taymiyya in justifying the above jihadi doctrines. It distinguishes the arguments in which the jihadists use of Ibn Taymiyya can be justified and the arguments in which the use of Ibn Taymiyya cannot be justified.

⁶⁰⁰ “Ishrāqat āyah,” *Ṣadā al-Malāḥim*, 7. And Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:540.

Conclusion

Ibn Taymiyya is the main medieval Muslim authority cited by contemporary jihadists.⁶⁰¹ He is cited by the contemporary jihadists to argue for some jihadi doctrines which include the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers for the non-enforcement of Sharī'a and the obligation to fight them with jihad. Other jihadi doctrines that the jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya for include excommunicating the Shi'īs and arguing for fighting them with jihad, arguing that jihad does not require the permission of the political leader (*imām*) and the permissibility of killing diplomats and tourists. Others include the permissibility of indiscriminate attack and the permissibility of suicide in jihad. This thesis argues that while some of these doctrines could be justified from Ibn Taymiyya, it is difficult or rather, an injustice to Ibn Taymiyya to link most of these doctrines to him, and this can only be done if his other works on jihad are ignored.

From the early 1980s the contemporary jihadists have been using Ibn Taymiyya frequently to justify many of the above doctrines. Before the 1980s, some writers and scholars that are associated with the jihadists ideology used Ibn Taymiyya to justify some thoughts and actions, but their use of him is not as frequent as the use of him by the jihadists from the 1980s. Sayyid Quṭb for instance is one of those scholars associated with the jihadists; however, in his over 400 page book *Milestones* he refers to Ibn Taymiyya only four times, while Faraj in the 1980s refers to Ibn Taymiyya 21 times in his 32 page book *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba*. The fact that the jihadists started using Ibn Taymiyya frequently from the 1980s attracts the attention of Muslim scholars, western academics, politicians and media. Books, articles, write ups and public lectures have been put forward with the aim of understanding the link between Ibn Taymiyya and the contemporary jihadists and whether the use of Ibn Taymiyya by the contemporary jihadists can be justified or not.

The findings of these scholars and writers are diverse, and the materials they assessed and the method they follow in their analysis also differ. Some of these scholars and writers analyse the documents of the jihadists and discuss

⁶⁰¹ Hoover, *Ibn Taymiyya between Moderation and Radicalism*, 180.

them within the framework of Islamic law in general making Ibn Taymiyya as one of the Islamic scholars. The scholars with this method include Muftī Jād al-Ḥaqq of Egypt in his refutation of *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba*. Haqq's criticism of *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba* is not limited to Faraj's use of Ibn Taymiyya; rather, Haqq addresses the jihadi doctrines that Faraj argues for. He refutes Faraj's claim that Egyptian rulers are analogical to the Mongols and that Egyptian society is a domain of disbelief. Johannes J.G. Jansen also discusses the treatise *al-Farīda* and reports a number of treatises and scholars who refute it. He discusses the content and arguments of the treatise in chapter one of his book and follows with the reaction of Azhar scholars and Sufis in chapters two and three respectively. Jansen also discusses and analyses the overall understandings and contributions of some notable Egyptian scholars such as Shaykh 'Abd al-Hamīd Kishk and Shaykh al-Sha'rāwī in chapters four and five respectively. Rachel Scott's analysis is also limited to *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba*. Simon Wolfgang Fuchs also limits his analysis to one treatise of jihadists: *al-'Umda fī i'dād al-'udda li-l-jihād fī sabīl Allāh*. His analysis, like the analysis of those who examine *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba*, does not limit itself to examining Ibn Taymiyya. Elisabeth Kendall analyses *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* of AQAP, but her analysis is on how AQAP uses cultural material to win local communities, rather than discussing theological issues. All these and their likes limit their analyses to one document of the jihadists and without giving preference or even sometimes mentioning Ibn Taymiyya in some of the analysis. Michot's works on Ibn Taymiyya and the jihadists are more comprehensive. Michot in his book on the Mardin fatwa addresses how the jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya in arguing for their jihadi doctrines. He discusses a number of writers: the jihadists and non-jihadists who use the Mardin fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya in a way that connotes violence. Michot then quotes three passages from Ibn Taymiyya's works which serve as refutations of the writers who use the Mardin Fatwa for violent ends. In his other book, *Ibn Taymiyya Against Extremism*, Michot quotes some passages from the works of Ibn Taymiyya which demonstrate how Ibn Taymiyya either distances himself from extremism or condemns the extremists. However, in this book Michot does not either analyse the works of the contemporary jihadists or identify specifically which works of Ibn Taymiyya are quoted by the jihadists in making their arguments.

Using the works of the above scholars and others as secondary literature, this thesis attempts to outline Ibn Taymiyya's concept of jihad and identify which parts of his works are frequently quoted by the jihadists in making their arguments and why these parts are quoted frequently. Part One of the thesis studies eleven documents by Ibn Taymiyya on jihad. These documents include eight of his fatwas which include the three famous anti-Mongol fatwas, his letter against the Mongols, the Mardin fatwa and the three fatwas against the Nuṣayrīs of Syria and Lebanon. This was followed by analysis of the three short treatises *Qā'ida mukhtaṣara*, *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduww* and *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya*. Some of these fatwas and treatises are independently studied by various scholars and some are not. Part one of the thesis brings together the analysis of the scholars on the analysed fatwas and treatises and examines other fatwas and treatises not studied before. The three anti-Mongol fatwas, Mardin fatwa and the three anti-Nuṣayrī fatwas have been studied by various scholars, while this thesis examines Ibn Taymiyya's letter for the first time. *Al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya* was also studied by some scholars while *Qā'ida Mukhtaṣara*, and *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduww* are studied for the first time by this thesis. Part Two of the thesis studies six publications of the jihadists. Some of these publications are studied by some scholars before, while some of them are studied for the first time by this thesis, especially how Ibn Taymiyya is used in them. Two of these documents, namely, *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba* and *al-'Umda fī i'dād al-'udda li-l-jihād fī sabīl Allāh*, predated the formation of al-Qaida, while *Ṣadā al-malāḥim*, *Ṣadā al-jihād* are issued by AQAP, and *Dabiq* is issued by ISIS. The sixth is *Hādhihi 'aqīdatunā* which belongs to Boko Haram. Studying these documents, the thesis outlines Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of jihad. It also examines how Ibn Taymiyya is used by the jihadists in their publications and outlines the arguments that the jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya to justify. It also figures out to what extent the use of Ibn Taymiyya by the contemporary jihadists can be justified.

The thesis finds out that the three anti-Mongol fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya are the most used fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya by the contemporary jihadists studied. Almost all the contemporary jihadists from Faraj to ISIS use the fatwas to either justify their central argument that the contemporary Muslim rulers apostatise or to make other specific argument. The other fatwas and treatises of Ibn Taymiyya

on jihad are not used by the jihadists as frequently as the anti-Mongol fatwas. The jihadists use the anti-Mongol fatwas to argue for two central points: firstly, that the contemporary Muslim rulers and their aids are apostates, and secondly, the obligation of fighting the apostate Muslim rulers.

Two quotations from the anti-Mongol fatwas are the most frequently repeated by the jihadists in justifying their doctrines. The first of these quotations is from the second anti-Mongol fatwa:

It is necessarily known in the Islamic religion and by the agreement of all Muslims that whoever legalizes following other than the Islamic religion or following a path [Sharī'a] other than the *sharī'a* of Muhammad is non-believer, just like the disbelief of those who believe in the part of the Book and disbelieve in part of the Book. As Allah the most high said, "Verily, those who disbelieve in Allah and His Messengers and wish to make A distinction between Allah and His Messengers [by believing in Allah and disbelieving in His Messengers] saying, "We believe in some but reject others." (Quran 4:150– 151).⁶⁰²

The above quotation is used by Faraj in *al-Farīda al-ghā'iba* to argue for the apostasy of whoever does not enforce Sharī'a.⁶⁰³ Three articles in *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* use the above quotation to justify the apostasy of Muslim rulers. In issue 29 of *Ṣāḍā al-jihād* an article argues for the apostasy of Muhammad al-Bashir, the Sudanese president, and uses the above quotation from the second anti-Mongol fatwa as justification.⁶⁰⁴ The same portion is quoted in issue 16 to argue for the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers for the non-implementation of Sharī'a and the permissibility of rebellion against them.⁶⁰⁵ And in issue 36 the same quotation also features to prove the apostasy of the Paletinian group Hamas and Turkish president Tayyip Erdoğan.⁶⁰⁶

⁶⁰² Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:524.

⁶⁰³ Faraj, *al-Farīda*, 6.

⁶⁰⁴ Abū Nāṣir al-Sunnī, "Imāṭat al-litham 'an ḥukūmat al-kufri wa al-ijrām," 32.

⁶⁰⁵ Abū Usāma al-Makkī, "Hum al-Khawārij ḥaqq," *Ṣāḍā al-jihad* 16 (May/June, 2007): 29-34.

⁶⁰⁶ Abū Usāma al-Makkī, "al-Tadarruj fī taṭbīq aḥkām al-dīn," *Ṣāḍā al-jihad* 36, (Oct. 2009): 18.

The other most frequently repeated quotation is from the first anti-Mongol fatwa:

Every group that resists adhering to any law from the widely reported and manifest laws of Islam among the people [i.e the Mongols] or others, then it is obligatory to fight them until they adhere to its laws, even if they pronounce the two testimonies and adhere to some of its laws, just as Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq and the Companions – may Allah be pleased with them- fought the people who resisted *zakāt*. The jurists after them [the Companions] agreed upon this after ‘Umar’s argument with Abū Bakr –may Allah be pleased with both. The Companions – May Allah be pleased with them– agreed on fighting for the privilege [*ḥaqq*] of Islam, in accordance with the book and the Sunna.⁶⁰⁷

The above quotation is used by Faraj in *al-Farīda al-ghā’iba* to argue for the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers.⁶⁰⁸ It is also used in issue no. 10 of *Ṣadā al-malāḥim*, to argue for the obligation of fighting the contemporary Arab rulers.⁶⁰⁹ The same portion is also used in *Dabiq* to argue for the apostasy of the Sahwa coalition.⁶¹⁰ Dr. Fadl argues for the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers without quoting the anti-Mongol fatwas, but according to Fuchs Dr. Fadl still refers to the Mongol context by arguing for the apostasy of the Mongols based on Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa.⁶¹¹ The jihadists sometimes argue for the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers from other statements of Ibn Taymiyya, not the anti-Mongol fatwas. An article in *Ṣadā al-malāḥim* argues for the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers for the non-enforcement of Sharī‘a and uses the quotation above and another quotation below from *Minhāj al-sunna* of Ibn Taymiyya.

There is no doubt that whoever does not believe the obligation of judging by what Allah has revealed to His

⁶⁰⁷ Al-‘Ibāb, “Ṭarīqunā,” 12, and Ibn Taymiyya, MF 28:502.

⁶⁰⁸ Faraj, *al-Farīda*, 6.

⁶⁰⁹ Abū al-Zubayr al-‘Ibāb, “Ṭarīqunā ’ilā taḥkīm al-sharī‘a,” 12.

⁶¹⁰ “The Law of Allah,” 56.

⁶¹¹ Fuchs, “Do Excellent Surgeons,” 219

messenger is heretic and whoever permits judging by what he views as justice without following what Allah has revealed is [also] a heretic. There is no nation (*umma*) except it commands justice. The justice might be in what they inherit from their forefathers as many Muslims judge with the tradition that Allah does not reveal... and view this as what should be used as judgement instead of the Book and Sunna. This is heresy.⁶¹²

Besides excommunicating the contemporary Muslim rulers and arguing for jihad against them, the jihadists also use Ibn Taymiyya to argue for other jihadi doctrines. These include excommunicating the Shī'īs and arguing for fighting them with jihad, arguing that jihad does not require the permission of the imam and the permissibility of killing diplomats and tourists. Others include the permissibility of indiscriminate attack and the permissibility of suicide in jihad. In the following paragraphs, I will summarise how the thesis demonstrates which of these doctrines can be justified from Ibn Taymiyya and which cannot be.

Firstly, on using the anti-Mongol fatwas to argue for the apostasy of the contemporary Muslim rulers and the obligation of fighting them with jihad, the thesis concurred with some scholars such as Jād al-Ḥaqq, Michot and Bonney who argue that the fatwas cannot justify what the jihadists used them for. Haqq argues that the analogy between the Mongols and the ruling classes of Egypt is weak; the Mongols were so irreligious that they could not be compared to Sadat's government. They did not carry out any religious obligations and, therefore, it is clear that they were unbelievers and not Muslims.⁶¹³ Michot also disqualifies the analogy of the Mongols to the contemporary Muslim rulers; instead, they are analogical to the Mamlūks that Ibn Taymiyya viewed as a lesser evil. In contrast with Faraj and the jihadists, Ibn Taymiyya tried to repel a foreign invader, and in doing so, he had to connive with the Mamlūks that were not better in status than the today's Muslim rulers.⁶¹⁴ Bonney also made a similar argument to Michot that Ibn Taymiyya was acting to repel foreign

⁶¹² Al-ʿIbāb, "Ṭarīqunā," 12 and Ibn Taymiyya, al-Minhaj al-Sunna 5:83.

⁶¹³ Scott, "An 'official' Islamic Response," 51.

⁶¹⁴ Michot, *Ibn Taymiyya Muslims*, 50.

invasion, a claim that the contemporary jihadists cannot make against their indigenous rulers or non-Muslim nations that do not attack them.⁶¹⁵ Moreover, in the second anti-Mongol fatwa Ibn Taymiyya states some reasons that qualified the Mongols for apostasy. While the non-implementation of Sharī'a often cited by the jihadists is part of these reasons, there are many other reasons the jihadists omit. These reasons include the blasphemy of claiming Ghenis Khan to be the son of God and equating him with the Prophet Muhammed alongside attacking the Muslim nations. Unless all the reasons mentioned by Ibn Taymiyya are found in today's Muslim rulers are found in the Mongols, the analogy remains weak.

Secondly, on excommunicating the Shī'īs, the thesis argues that although Ibn Taymiyya is harsh with Shī'īs, there was no evidence from his works that he declares them apostates. Rather, some of his statements indicate that he distinguishes between the lay person and the scholars of Shī'īs. Whereas the jihadists issue a general excommunication against the Shī'īs, Ibn Taymiyya does not. The following statement from Ibn Taymiyya indicates his position on both the layperson and the scholars of the Shī'īs; he did not excommunicate any of them.

The Twelver Shī'īs are much better than the Ismā'īlīs because in spite of the ignorance and misguidance of the Twelver Shī'īs, there are some who are Muslims in their hearts and outwardly and they are not hypocrites and freethinkers (*zanādiqa*) as they [Ismā'īlis] are ignorant who become misguided and followed their whims. As for their leaders and scholars, who know the reality of their hidden agenda of their madhhab [they] are hypocrites and *zanādiqa*. As for the Twelver Shī'ī layperson whose inner belief is not obvious or confirmed to be right, then they might be Muslims.⁶¹⁶

Thirdly, it is also difficult to sustain the argument for the permissibility of jihad without the leadership of the imam from Ibn Taymiyya's works. This

⁶¹⁵ Bonney, *Jihād From Qur'ān*, 123.

⁶¹⁶ Ibn Taymiyya, *Minhāj al-Sunna* 2:279.

is because the jihad against the Mongols was not fought under the leadership of Ibn Taymiyya or any other individual, but rather under the Mamlūk sultans. Ibn Taymiyya at a point in time after the invasion of 1299/1300 ran to Egypt to plead with the Mamlūks to send troops to fight the Mongols. In the first anti-Mongol fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya even stresses the necessity of cooperating with the Muslim leader, whether good or bad in fighting jihad. He says:

It is part of the fundamentals of *ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamā'a* to fight alongside the good and bad [Muslims], for Allah will make his religion victorious via a bad person and with people that have no share [in the hereafter], just as the Prophet – the peace and blessings of Allah be upon him – said. This is because if the fighting cannot be achieved except with the bad leaders or with an army the majority of whom are immoral, then there must happen one of the two: either to abandon the battle with them, then the most harmful in the here and the hereafter will overcome [the Muslims] or to engage in the battle alongside the bad ruler to repel the lesser of the two evils and to establish most of the Islamic rulings if establishing all is not achieved. And this is obligatory in this form and its likes. Rather, most of the battles that took place after the *Rāshidūn* [rightly guided Caliphs] are of this type.”⁶¹⁷

Some statements of Ibn Taymiyya indicate that if the Muslims are fighting in self-defence they will fight without any condition. “There is nothing after believing in God that is more obligatory than repelling an invader who spoils the religion and the world (*al-dīn wa al-dunyā*), fighting such is unconditional. Everyone has to employ all he can of power, tongue and expertise.”⁶¹⁸ However, his loyalty to the Mamlūks in fighting the Mongols despite it being in the defensive indicates that to Ibn Taymiyya the permission of an imam is required when possible. The contemporary jihadists claim fighting in self-defence, but their case cannot be analogous to Ibn Taymiyya’s

⁶¹⁷ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 28: 506-7.

⁶¹⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, *Al-fatāwa al-kubrā*, 4:608.

case, because the jihadists are fighting their indigenous rulers whereas Ibn Taymiyya fought foreign invaders.

Fourthly, on the permissibility of killing diplomats and tourists, the jihadists or AQAP in particular do not quote any unambiguous statement of Ibn Taymiyya regarding the issue. They rely on his statement regarding the *mu'āhad* which was explained in Chapter Seven of the thesis. However, if we explore other works of Ibn Taymiyya we will find out that to Ibn Taymiyya, even if the diplomats and tourists do not fulfil the conditions of *mu'āhad* as claimed by the jihadists, they are non-Muslims who do not carry any danger. To Ibn Taymiyya the non-Muslims are only fought if a danger is sensed from them. This is made clear in his *Qa'ida mukhtaṣara*, where he states: “We only fight who fights us; if they accept Islam, their wealth and blood are protected. If they are not combatants we do not fight them or oblige them to [accept] the religion.”⁶¹⁹ This position of Ibn Taymiyya is stated in other works of his. He made a similar argument in *al-Ṣārim al-maslūl* stressing that women, the elderly and priests are exempted from attacks for the same purpose.⁶²⁰ In a fatwa in *Majmū' fatāwā*, Ibn Taymiyya even supports the argument that it is permissible to spare the life of a captive of war by means of pardoning or taking ransom.⁶²¹ Therefore, killing diplomats or tourists has no base in Ibn Taymiyya's works.

Fifthly, on the permissibility of indiscriminate attack against a target: this argument is made by Dr. Fadl, who relies solely on Ibn Taymiyya for justifying it. Dr. Fadl quotes a segment of the second anti-Mongol fatwa where Ibn Taymiyya argues for fighting the Mamlūk prisoners who were compelled to fight alongside the Mongols.

Rather, even if there were pious people from the best of mankind among them and they [Mongols] couldn't be fought unless they [the pious people] were killed, they would be killed also. The imams have agreed that if the nonbelievers were to make a shield with the Muslims and [the generality of] Muslims may be harmed if they didn't

⁶¹⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qa'ida mukhtaṣara*, 123 – 24.

⁶²⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Ṣārim al-maslūl* 2:515.

⁶²¹ Ibn Taymiyya, MF, 27/414.

fight, then it is permissible to shoot at them [the Muslim shield] while intending the non-believers.⁶²²

Ibn Taymiyya's statement above can be understood to apply to when the target cannot be identified, but if the non-combatants can be identified, then to Ibn Taymiyya distinguishing them is necessary as he argues in *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya*:

Since jihad is lawful warfare and Religion acknowledges Allah, and the word of Allah prevails over all so he who refuses jihad should be fought, as is agreed upon by all Muslims. But those who do not constitute a defensive or offensive power, like the women, the children, the monks, old people, the blind and the permanently disabled should not be fought, as is agreed upon by the majority of Muslims, unless they carry on a kind of fighting with words [spreading propaganda] or with certain actions [spying, transport of ammunition, etc.] Some jurists maintain that all should be fought and put to death because they are infidels, except the women and the children as they constitute a part of the booty. The former view, however, is the true one, since we should only fight those who fight us, if we really want the Religion of Allah to be victorious and spread.⁶²³

In addition to that, Ibn Taymiyya approves indiscriminate attacks when the target is not identified, but only if the course of jihad is justified. The jihad fought by Ibn Taymiyya against the Mongols was under the leadership of the Mamlūks, and therefore is considered as the use of force by an authority. This is regardless of whether the reason for that is justified or not, whereas on the other hand the jihad Dr. Fadl and other jihadists argue for is use of force by individuals and cannot be analogised to Ibn Taymiyya's jihad.

Sixthly, AQAP uses Ibn Taymiyya to argue for suicide in the course of jihad in issue 14 of *Ṣadā al-malāḥim*. The following statement of Ibn Taymiyya

⁶²² Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:537; and 'Abd al-'Azīz, *Al-Umda*, 326.

⁶²³ Omar A., *trans. Ibn Taymiyya on Public and Private Law*, 140.

from the second anti-Mongol fatwa is used as one of the evidences for that: “The four imams permit a Muslim to plunge into the non-Muslims row [during the fight], even if he thinks they will kill him, if there is benefit for the Muslims in doing that.”⁶²⁴

I have not come across any statement of Ibn Taymiyya repudiating the permissibility of suicide. On the contrary, I have come across a treatise where Ibn Taymiyya argues for it. The treatise *Qā'ida fī al-inghimās fī al-'aduww* is analysed in Part One of this thesis, and from the treatise the thesis argues that the permissibility of suicide in the course of jihad is the opinion of Ibn Taymiyya. One could say that the jihadists are right in their use of Ibn Taymiyya on the issue; however, they are to be faulted for two things. Firstly, Ibn Taymiyya approves suicide in the course of jihad only when the jihad is justified, and secondly, instead of referring to the anti-Mongol fatwas, it would have been more astute to refer to the particular treatise where Ibn Taymiyya deals with the issue. This shows the shallow knowledge of the jihadists about the works of Ibn Taymiyya.

Another issue discovered by the thesis is that the Wahhābī scholars preceded the contemporary jihadists in the use of Ibn Taymiyya on excommunication and jihad. The scholars who discuss the issue of the use of Ibn Taymiyya on excommunication and jihad, such as Michot, Bonney, Fuchs, Lassalle and Akgul and others only discuss the use of Ibn Taymiyya on excommunication and jihad by the contemporary jihadists. However, going back to the works of the Wahhābī scholars and using other secondary sources that are not mainly for excommunication and jihad, such as the works of 'Uthaimīn, Commins, Firro and others, the thesis finds out that Wahhābī scholars establish a precedent in the use of Ibn Taymiyya on excommunication and jihad. These scholars establish the relationship between Ibn Taymiyya and the Wahhābī scholars, while the thesis goes further to outline some segment of Ibn Taymiyya's works on excommunication and jihad that are used by the Wahhābīs before the emergence of the contemporary jihadists. The thesis finds out that the anti-Mongol fatwas and other works of Ibn Taymiyya are used by the Wahhābīs to excommunicate their opponents and call for jihad against them.

⁶²⁴ “Ishrāqat āyah:” *Ṣadā al-jihād*, 7 and Ibn Taymiyya MF 28:540.

The following passage from the first anti-Mongol fatwa is used by two Wahhābī scholars, namely, Ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd Allah to argue for the apostasy of some group of Muslims and tomb venerated respectively.

Every group that resists adhering to any law from the widely reported and manifest laws of Islam among the people [i.e the Mongols] or others, then it is obligatory to fight them until they adhere to its laws, even if they pronounce the two testimonies and adhere to some of its laws, just as Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq and the Companions -may Allah be pleased with them- fought the people who resisted *zakāt*. The jurists after them [the Companions] agreed upon this.⁶²⁵

The thesis also finds out that the contemporary jihadists use the Wahhābī scholars as a source from which they quote Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwas on excommunication and jihad and use them in the contemporary period. The above segment from the first anti-Mongol fatwa is quoted by ISIS in *Dabiq* from both Ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd Allah to argue for the apostasy of Sahwa coalition.⁶²⁶

Lastly, all the arguments that the jihadists use Ibn Taymiyya to justify are justified by the jihadists from the Quran and the Hadith and other scholars prior to and after Ibn Taymiyya. Faraj is the only jihadist in this study who relies solely on Ibn Taymiyya to substantiate his jihadi doctrines. The other jihadists after Faraj diversify their way of justifying their doctrines. Although all the jihadi documents I have examined quote Ibn Taymiyya more than any other scholar per se, still if the quotations from Ibn Taymiyya were taken out of the texts the arguments would still stand. An example of that is in issue 29 of *Ṣadā al-jihād* where an article argues for the apostasy of Al-Bashir, the Sudanese president, and states five points that makes al-Bashir apostate.⁶²⁷ In all of the five points for the apostasy of the Sudanese president only two are justified with a quotation from Ibn Taymiyya. Even the two quotations from Ibn Taymiyya

⁶²⁵ Ibn Taymiyya MF, 28:501: and Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd Allah *Taysīr al-‘Azīz al-Ḥamīd*, 295. And Ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb *al-Kalimāt al-nāfi‘a*, 4.

⁶²⁶ “The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men,” 52.

⁶²⁷ Al-Sunnī, “Imāṭat al-litham,” 31.

are not the sole reason for the apostasy. In the both cases, the apostasy is established from Quranic verses and statements of other scholars, Quotations from Ibn Taymiyya are used as additional confirmation. This does not mean that the jihadists' interpretation of the Quran or their appropriation of the statements of other scholars is correct; rather, it is the matter of interpretation. The correctness of their interpretation or otherwise would have to be evaluated through further research. The scope of this thesis has been to figure out the extent to which the jihadists' use of Ibn Taymiyya can be justified.

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