DIVINE, YET VULNERABLE: GREGORY NAZIANZEN'S HUMAN *EIKON*

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Abstract

This thesis examines Gregory Nazianzen's approach to the human *eikon*, vis à vis the *imago Dei*. In the following pages I challenge the popular view amongst scholars that Gregory presents the human *eikon* solely as the soul or the spiritual intellect. Rather, I argue that Gregory's vision of the human *eikon* extends much further than this, embracing the full complexity and mystery of human existence. First, I argue that the *eikon* relates not only to the soul but also to the whole, dynamic human. I demonstrate this by considering Gregory's treatment of a) the human *eikon* as a literal, physical *eikon* of God, b) Christ the identical *Eikon*, and c) his theological anthropology where the 'divine' *eikon* transforms the dust. These three strands together reveal that Gregory's approach to the human *eikon* encompasses the whole human person, as a dynamic unity of body and soul. Gregory's presentation of the human *eikon* narrates the struggles of being human, which as a matter of priority attempts to describe human experience rather than focusing upon the question, "*what* is the human *eikon*?" Drawing on biblical narratives, Gregory posits the human *eikon* in a cosmological battle with the forces of evil, which is only won through participation in Christ and the protection offered by the Holy Spirit. A comprehensive analysis of Gregory's approach to the human *eikon* must incorporate her battle with the spiritual forces of evil.

Second, throughout the project, I argue that Gregory's approach is theological, since he interprets the human *eikon* primarily in light of the identical *Eikon*, Christ. Regarding his theological anthropology, Gregory is often read in light of philosophical sources such as Plato and the Stoics, with little reference to biblical and extra-biblical writings. Redressing the balance, I highlight how Gregory draws from biblical and extra-biblical traditions in order to weave together the threads which run through his overall vision of being human.

Finally, I analyse Gregory's intentions when he refers to the *eikon* as 'divine.' I argue that if we consider together a) Gregory's

theological anthropology in which God creates the human person specifically to be vulnerable (or porous) to the spiritual realm, b) Gregory's high pneumatology, c) his ideas about baptism and d) the interaction between the human *eikon* and the devil, then we must take seriously Gregory's ideas about a 'divine' *eikon*. Regarding how we may understand this 'divinity,' I contend that it encompasses the ontological, functional and relational aspects of the human *eikon* where she both participates in and functions like the identical *Eikon*, Christ.

In light of the argument which evolves throughout the thesis, I suggest that Gregory's presentation of the human *eikon* is summarised best as 'divine, yet vulnerable.' I intend this expression to reflect Gregory's multifaceted and open approach, which relates to human experience. It incorporates both the positive and negative vulnerability of the human *eikon,* since she is vulnerable to God, having been created with the purpose of becoming 'divine,' but at the same time vulnerable to 'the world, the flesh and the devil.'

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I am also extremely grateful to those at St Mary with St Alban Church (amongst whom I have the joy of serving my curacy) for their

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Words cannot express my thankfulness for my family, all of whom consistently affirmed that I would succeed in finishing this project. My sister purchased countless books and my father drove me to numerous conferences when I experienced problems with my back and could not lift my suitcase. My mother died suddenly halfway through the project, yet her unwavering voice remains, "with God's strength you can do this."

Finally, my husband Matthew allowed so generously Gregory to enter into our breakfasts, suppers, dates and telephone conversations. He has run alongside me, consistently cheering me on every step of the way, bearing with incredible grace and patience the peaks and troughs of research. I have completed the project thanks to his steadfast love and encouragement, so I dedicate joyfully this thesis to the 'divine' Matthew.

Abbreviations

Carm.	*Carmen* (Poem)
Ep.	*Epistula* (Letter)
Or.	*Oratio* (Oration)
LXX	Septuagint

Athanasius	*De Incarn.*	*De Incarnatione*
	Vit. Ant.	*Vita Antonii*
	Ep. Serap.	*Epistulae ad Serapionem*
Basil	*Hex. Hom.*	*Homilae in Hexaemeron*
Clement of Alexandria	*Paed.*	*Paedagogus*
	Strom.	*Stromata*
Didymus the Blind	*In Gen.*	*In Genesim*
Gregory Nyssen	*Op. Hom.*	*De opificio hominis*
Herodotus	*Hist.*	*Histories*
Homer	*Il.*	*Iliad*
Irenaeus	*Dem.*	*Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*
	Haer.	*Adversus haereses*
Josephus	*Ant.*	*Jewish Antiquities*
Justin Martyr	*1 Apol.*	*Apologia 1*
	Dial. Tryph.	*Dialogus cum Tryphone*
Origen	*Cels.*	*Contra Celsum*
	Comm. Jn.	*Commentarii in evangelium Joannis*
	Dial.	*Dialogus cum Heraclide*
	Hom. Gen.	*Homiliae in Genesim*
	Princ.	*De principiis*
Pausanias	*Descr.*	*Descriptio Graeciae*
Philo	*Opif.*	*De opificio mundi*
	Her.	*Quis rerum divinarum heres sit*

	Leg. 1, 2, 3	*Legum allegoriae I, II, III*
	Spec. 1, 2, 3, 4	*De specialibus legibus I, II, III, IV*
Plato	*Crat.*	*Cratylus*
	Gorg.	*Gorgias*
	Phaed.	*Phaedo*
	Resp.	*Respublica*
	Soph.	*Sophista*
	Symp.	*Symposium*
	Theaet.	*Theaetetus*
	Tim.	*Timaeus*
Plotinus	*Enn.*	*Enneades*
Plutarch	*Princ. Iner.*	*Ad principem ineruditum*
Socrates	*HE*	*Historia Ecclesiastica*
Suetonius	*Aug.*	*Divus Augustus*
Tertullian	*Marc*.	*Adversus Marcionem*

Secondary Literature

AB	*Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*
ABD	Anchor Bible Dictionary
AYB	The Anchor Yale Bible
ACCS	Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture
ACO	*Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*
AJP	*American Journal of Philology*
ALGHJ	Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums
ANRW	Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung
ATR	*Anglican Theological Review*
BA	*Biblical Archaeologist*
BLE	*Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique*

BM	*Benediktinische Monatsschrift zur Pflege religiösen und geistigen Lebens*
BSK	Beiträge zum Studium der Kirchenväter
BZAW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
BZNW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
CBAA	Catholic Biblical Association of America
CBOTS	Coniectanea Biblica Old Testament Series
CBQMS	Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series
CBR	*Currents in Biblical Research*
CCP	Cambridge Companions to Philosophy
CCSA	Corpus Christianorum Series Apocryphorum
CCWJCW	Cambridge Commentaries on Writings of the Jewish and Christian World, 200 BC to AD 200
CGLC	Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics
CH	*Church History*
CJ	*Classical Journal*
CMC	Cambridge Medieval Classics
CRAI	*Comptes rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-Lettres*
CSR	*Christian Scholars Review*
DOP	*Dumbarton Oaks Papers*
EHR	*The English Historical Review*
GELS	*A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint*
GOTR	*Greek Orthodox Theological Review*
GRBS	*Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*
HTR	*Harvard Theological Review*
ITQ	*Irish Theological Quarterly*
IPE	Initiations aux Pères de l'Église
IJOT	*International Journal of Orthodox Theology*
JAC	*Journal of Ancient Christianity*
JANER	*Journal of Ancient Near Eastern Religion*

JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
JEA	*Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*
JECS	*Journal of Early Christian Studies*
JETS	*Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society*
JHP	*Journal of the History of Philosophy*
JJS	*Journal of Jewish Studies*
JSJ	*Journal for the Study of Judaism*
JSNT	*Journal for the Study of the New Testament*
JSOT	*Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*
JSP	*Journal for the Study of Pseudepigrapha*
JSPSS	*Journal for the Study of Pseudepigrapha Supplement Series*
JTS	*Journal of Theological Studies*
LCL	Loeb Classical Libary
LSJ	Liddell, Scott and Jones' *A Greek-English Lexicon*
MH	*Museum Helveticum*
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MSR	Mélanges de science religieuse
NIGTC	The New International Greek Testament Commentary
NLH	*New Literary History*
NSBT	*New Studies in Biblical Theology*
NTL	New Testament Library
NTS	*New Testament Studies*
NPNF	Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
OCT	Oxford Classical Texts
OTL	Old Testament Library
OTM	Oxford Theological Monographs
OUP	Oxford University Press
PBR	*Patristic and Byzantine Review*
PG	Patrologia graeca [= Patrologiae cursus completus: Series graeca]. Edited by J.-P. Migne. 162 vols. Paris, 1857–1886
PGL	*Patristic Greek Lexicon*
PIOL	Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain
PPS	Popular Patristics Series

PUF	Presses Universitaires de France
RAC	*Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*
RB	Revue Biblique
RRT	*Reviews in Religion & Theology*
RSPT	*Revues des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques*
SC	Sources Chrétiennes
SGKA	Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums
SJT	*Scottish Journal of Theology*
SMRT	Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions
SOCM	Studia Orientalia Christiana Monographiae
SST	Society for the Study of Theology
SVC	*Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae*
SVT	*Supplements to Vetus Testamentum*
SVTP	Studia in Veteris Testamenti Pseudepigrapha
TB	*Tyndale Bulletin*
TFC	The Fathers of the Church
TLG	Thesaurus Linguae Graecae
TDNT	*Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*
TZ	*Theologische Zeitschrift*
USQR	*Union Seminary Quarterly Review*
VC	*Vigiliae Christianae*
VT	*Vetus Testamentum*
VTQ	*St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly*
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
WKGLS	Wissenschaftliche Kommentare zu griechischen und lateinischen Schriftstellern
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
ZAC	*Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum*
ZAW	*Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*

Declaration

This work has been submitted to the University of Nottingham in accordance with the regulations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It is my own work, and none of it has been previously submitted to the University of Nottingham or any other university for a degree.

Translations

Bible translations are from the NRSV, unless stated otherwise.
Translations of Gregory's work are my own, unless stated otherwise.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

> Who was I at first? And who am I now? And who shall I become? I don't know clearly.[1]

Gregory Nazianzen contemplates the complexity of human existence throughout his orations, letters and poetry. In identifying the nature and purpose of humankind, Gregory draws his inspiration from the first chapter of Genesis, where the author states that human persons are created according to the image of God.[2] This concept was a prominent aspect of theological anthropology in the early church, and continues at the heart of the Eastern Orthodox tradition.[3] However, imaging God raises far more questions than it answers.[4] For example, should we consider the *imago Dei*, as it has been coined from Latin, representing human persons collectively, individually, or both? Does it refer to the whole human person or a specific aspect within the human person? Consequently, theologians have speculated for centuries upon the meaning of the *imago Dei*.

Traditionally, systematic theologians have tended to approach the *imago Dei* from three predominant perspectives: structural, relational and functional, where 'structural' relates to the various capacities of the human person, for example, rationality or free will;[5]

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[1] Carm. 1.2.14, PG 37, 757, 17.

[2] Goran Sekulovski, "L'homme à l'image du Christ? Les fondements christologiques de l'anthropologie de Grégoire de Nazianze," *BLE* CXV, no. 2 (2014): 231-42, 240.

[3] Andrew Louth, *Genesis 1-11*, ACCS:OT (Chicago, Illinois: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001), 27; Vladimir Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness of God* (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974), 126.

[4] David Kelsey, "The Human Creature," in *The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology*, ed. John B. Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 122-39, 129.

[5] Alister E. McGrath, *Scientific Theology: Nature*, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,

'relational' considers the *imago Dei* as a relational being, both as God relates to her and as she relates to others;[6] and 'functional' conveys how a human person works out the task of being an image of God.[7] More recently, the Christological implications of the *imago Dei* have been re-examined, contributing substantially to the discussion.[8] However, none of these approaches are satisfactory in themselves, since independently they cannot encapsulate the fullness of human persons as they image God; thus, vociferous discussions continue in contemporary systematic theology, theological anthropology and biblical studies.[9]

From the latter half of the twentieth century onwards, a number of scholars have contributed to the discussion by producing full-length studies on the *imago Dei*, as envisaged by the early church fathers and later theologians.[10] This thesis extends their work by reading afresh

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2002), 198-200. For a critique of McGrath's position, see Alistair I. McFadyen, *The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of the Individual in Social Relationships* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 31. Following convention, I apply 'structural' and 'substantive' synonymously.

[6] McFadyen, *Call to Personhood*, 18; Christos Yannaras, *Person and Eros*, trans. Norman Russell (Brookline: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2007); John Zizioulas, *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church* (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), 15. For a critique of the relational approach, see Harriet A. Harris, "Should We Say that Personhood Is Relational?," *SJT* 51, no. 2 (1998): 214-34, 216-18.

[7] J. Richard Middleton, "'The Liberating Image? Interpreting the Imago Dei in Context'," *CSR* 24, no. 1 (1994): 8-25, 12. For a critique of the functional view, see G.C. Berkouwer, *Man: The Image of God, Studies in Dogmatics* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), 71.

[8] Kathryn Tanner, *Christ the Key* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Marc Cortez, *Embodied Souls, Ensouled Bodies* (London: T&T Clark, 2008).

[9] For a systematic response, see Ian A. McFarland, *The Divine Image: Envisioning the Invisible God* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2005). For responses by biblical scholars, see Stephen L. Herring, *Divine Substitution: Humanity as the Manifestation of Deity in the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East* (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013); Carly L. Crouch, "Genesis 1:26-7 as a Statement of Humanity's Divine Parentage," *JTS* 61, no. 1 (2010): 1-15; Crispin H.T. Fletcher-Louis, *Jesus Monotheism: Volume 1: Christological Origins: The Emerging Consensus and Beyond* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2015), 206-91.

[10] Henri Crouzel, *Théologie de l'image de Dieu chez Origène* (Paris: Aubier,

Gregory Nazianzen's views on the *imago Dei*. Gregory's work is an excellent resource to consider for a range of reasons. First, he understands that theologians should take care not to adopt "too narrow a perspective" when considering the *imago Dei*.[11] He does not reduce the *imago Dei* to one category or capacity of the human person alone. Secondly, Gregory's narrative of the *imago Dei's* existence is a dynamic mystery, which encompasses both her life on earth, and her telos. Thirdly, Gregory's approach to the *imago Dei* relates to being and becoming divine (εἰκὼν θεία).[12] For Gregory, being divine does not equate to invincibility or equality with God; rather, the human person is vulnerable because she lives in a world which is composed of both material and spiritual realms. Furthermore, Gregory narrates the vulnerability of humankind in light of the struggle with the devil and demons. It is through a battle with fallen angels from the spiritual realm that the divine, yet vulnerable existence of the *imago Dei* becomes apparent most, as I shall delineate throughout the project. Modern scholars have not previously observed this complex and apparently paradoxical existence, which may be due to the dearth of full-length studies dedicated to Gregory's theological anthropology. For example, two such studies which mention the *imago Dei* only briefly are those by Ellverson and Winslow.[13]

Moving on, I shall explain why I believe Gregory himself is worthy of a full-length study. After this, I expound my assumptions

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1954); Roger Leys, *L'image de Dieu chez Saint Grégoire de Nysse: Esquisse d'une doctrine* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1951); Walter J. Burghardt, *The Image of God in Man According to St. Cyril of Alexandria* (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1957); Matthew Drever, *Image, Identity, and the Forming of the Augustinian Soul* (Oxford: OUP, 2013).

[11] Stanley J. Grenz, *The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei* (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 200.

[12] Carm. 2.1.50, PG 37, 1389, 61-62.

[13] Anna S. Ellverson, *The Dual Nature of Man: A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Gregory of Nazianzus* (Stockholm: Uppsala, 1981); Donald F. Winslow, *The Dynamics of Salvation: A Study in Gregory of Nazianzus* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979).

regarding the key terms, genres and texts which I use throughout the thesis, before reviewing the contemporary literature regarding Gregory's approach to the *imago Dei.*

1.2 Gregory "The Theologian"

Further reasons for a full-length study on Gregory's concept of the *imago Dei* lie with Gregory himself: he is a hugely influential church father, particularly within the Eastern Orthodox Church. His surviving work has left us with Christian writing about God in virtually every Greek literary form.[14] Gregory describes the *imago Dei* alongside his own struggles in great depth; thus he provides a glimpse of the *imago Dei* in personal autobiographical material in addition to doctrinally oriented sermons.

Born circa A.D. 329 to Gregory the Elder, bishop of Nazianzus, Gregory's education was extensive, consisting of studies in Caesarea of Cappadocia, Caesarea of Palestine, Alexandria and Athens.[15] Fond of the monastic life, he spent time with Basil of Caesarea, deferring priestly office until he was ordained in Nazianzus at the command of his father. Gregory was discontented with Basil's decision later to deploy him to Sasima, betraying that he harboured a degree of public ambition contrary to his own suggestions. The height of his career consisted of the preaching and the production of the five theological orations in Constantinople circa A.D. 379 in which he aimed to delineate the doctrine of the Trinity. These orations became sources of standard Orthodox doctrine for later generations; consequently, Gregory is recognised as one of the theologians who contributed to the most accurate understanding of the nature of deity.[16] Only two years after

[14] Brian Daley, *Gregory of Nazianzus* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2006), 1.

[15] Bernhard Wyß, "Gregor von Nazianz," *RAC* 12 (1983): 793-863.

[16] Edward R. Hardy, "Gregory of Nazianzus," in *Christology of the Later Fathers*, ed. Edward R. Hardy and Cyril Richardson (London: SCM Press, 1954), 111-215.

writing the five theological orations, he returned to Nazianzus, later retiring to the family estate at Arianzum.

Numerous historians have assumed mistakenly that Gregory 'the man' is identical to Gregory 'the author.'[17] Opinions that Gregory is "self-pitying, demanding, dark in his views of humanity"[18] and that his life may be summed up as "the tragedy of a sensitive man who entered the arena of world affairs," exemplify this presumption.[19] Since, towards the end of his life, Gregory edited his own works with great precision, we can assume, as Abrams has commented, "the Gregory we meet in his writings is the man he wanted us to meet."[20] The man we meet is one who, when he writes about his family, presents them in such a way that he invariably shines out as a radiant son and brother.[21] Also, when speaking about God, Gregory assumes a position of authority and portrays himself as one who is qualified to theologise, as I shall demonstrate throughout this project.[22] Furthermore, Gregory was the first Greek Christian author to draw together a collection of his own correspondence. On the basis of this, we may observe that we read the work of a man who has great confidence in his own abilities.[23] This leads me to agree with Elm's more recent appraisal of him as

> one who evoked all the elite's notions of prized and shared stability as normative ideals, and fashioned himself a life that

[17] Neil McLynn, "The Other Olympias: Gregory Nazianzen and the Family of Vitalianus," in *Christian Politics and Religious Culture in Late Antiquity*, ed. Neil McLynn (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2009), 227-46, 227.

[18] Daley, *Gregory of Nazianzus*, 2.

[19] Georg Misch, *A History of Autobiography in Antiquity* (London: Routledge, 1950), 609.

[20] Suzanne Abrams Rebillard, "Speaking for Salvation: Gregory of Nazianzus as Poet and Priest in his Autobiographical Poems" (Ph.D. Diss., Brown University, 2003), 2.

[21] Carm. 2.1.12, PG 37, 1034-1035.

[22] For examples of this, see Ors. 27-31, SC 250.

[23] Wyß, "Gregor von Nazianz," 807.

embodied and presented authority, even power.[24]

Gregory became the most oft quoted author in Byzantine ecclesiastical literature, after the Bible, due to his passion for theologising in sermons, letters and poems.[25] He pioneered models for thinking about God and God's economy, coining terms such as "theosis," his neologism for deification. Theosis became the chief term used to describe deification in the Byzantine period and has continued through to contemporary theology.

Gregory composed numerous orations and poems on the doctrine of God, and went to great lengths to defend the deity of the Holy Spirit, but it was his writing about Christ that earned him the title "Theologos." He is one of only three theologians on whom the title has been conferred univocally in the Eastern Christian tradition, the others being St. John the Evangelist and St. Symeon the "New Theologian," who wrote much later in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Whilst it is not clear precisely how the title came about, it was in use by the time of the Council of Chalcedon in A.D. 451.[26] The council referred to Gregory as "Blessed Gregory, the Theologian."[27] They cite two short extracts from Gregory's work as a means of supporting their teaching on the two natures of Christ. The first is from Gregory's first *Theological Letter to Cledonius*, where he writes,

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[24] Susanna Elm, *Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church: Emperor Julian, Gregory of Nazianzus, and the Vision of Rome* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 9.

[25] Jacques Norét, "Grégoire de Nazianze, l'auteur le plus cité, après la Bible, dans la littérature ecclésiastique byzantine," in *Symposium Nazianzenum 2*, ed. Justin Mossay (Schöningh: Paderborn, 1983), 259-66, passim.

[26] Brian Daley, "Saint Gregory of Nazianzus as Pastor and Theologian," in *Loving God with Our Minds: The Pastor as Theologian*, ed. Michael Welker and Cynthia A. Jarvis (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 106-18, 107. For a full translation and commentary of the council, see Richard Price and Michael Gaddis, *The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005). Later, in the seventh century, Maximus the Confessor mentions Gregory's title in *Dialogue with Pyrrhus,* PG 91, 316C.

[27] ACO 2.1.3, 473.

> For there are two natures, God and human, as there are both soul and body, but there are not two Sons nor Gods.[28]

The second is from *On the Son*,

> And this is what makes the heretics go off the right path: the joining of names, names which overlap because of the blending. And a sign of this is that when the natures are separated in the mind the names also are distinguished.[29]

In spite of these early accolades, regrettably Gregory is the least studied of the Cappadocians in the West. This has led McGuckin to comment that the scant attention given to Gregory's work is one of the "great and enduring mistakes of contemporary patristic analysis."[30] McGuckin himself has dedicated a significant amount of his research to Gregory, producing a detailed biography of our theologian.[31] Often though, Gregory is either overlooked in favour of his companions, Gregory Nyssen and Basil of Caesarea, or given a small amount of attention in works devoted to all three theologians.[32] The reasons for this apparent lack of interest in his work are not immediately obvious.[33] Possibly,

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[28] Ep. 101.5 (101.19 SC), SC 208, 44. The SC series assumes different divisions for the *Theological Epistles to Cledonius* from those found in PG and the modern translations. To avoid confusion, I reference the PG chapter first, followed by SC in brackets throughout the thesis. Both this and the following translation are adapted from Andrew O.P. Hofer, *Christ in the Life and Teaching of Gregory of Nazianzus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 3.

[29] Or. 30.8, SC 250, 240-42.

[30] John A. McGuckin, "The Vision of God in St. Gregory Nazianzen," in *Studia Patristica 32*, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone (Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 145-52, 152.

[31] John A. McGuckin, *St. Gregory of Nazianzus: An Intellectual Biography* (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001).

[32] For example, one sentence alone is devoted to Nazianzen in a section on the Cappadocians in Richard Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 592. Also, see Philippe Molac, "L'homme réconcilié: le salut chez S. Grégoire de Nazianze," *Théophilyon* 1, no. 2 (1996): 373-87, 374.

[33] Possible reasons for the neglect of Gregory in Western Christian theology

scholars have turned to Basil's works, perceiving them to be more accessible, or else preferred the "apophatic mysticism" of Nyssen.[34] On occasion, either of these might be read in preference to Gregory's long poetic laments on his own life and the life of the Church! However, I contend that even amidst Gregory's darkest poetry lies a vision of humankind which warrants consideration. This thesis aims to lift Gregory's thoughts about human existence from obscurity; moreover, I believe that Gregory's unique and varied approach contributes to discussions concerning the *imago Dei* in a wider context.

1.3 Clarification of Key Terms

Since I use a number of terms in the thesis which require clarification, I shall next set out my assumptions regarding these. The first concerns the *imago Dei*.

1.3.1 *Eikon (εἰκών)*

Employing *imago Dei* requires that I use Latin words to describe εἰκὼν θεοῦ, which is the equivalent Greek phrase. I have adopted this approach thus far because *imago Dei* is the standard form used in Western theological anthropology to refer to the idea that the human person is created according to the image of God. However, for the sake of being concise and as a reminder that I am citing from Greek rather than Latin texts, I shall refer to the *imago Dei* as *eikon* for the majority of this thesis. I make this move assuming that *imago* and *eikon* are interchangeable when used in reference to the human person. When translating εἰκὼν θεοῦ or similar phrases, I remain as close to the texts as possible, in order to highlight nuances in Gregory's writing when

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can be found in Frederick W. Norris, "Gregory Contemplating the Beautiful: Knowing Human Misery and Divine Mystery through and being Persuaded by Images," in *Gregory of Nazianzus: Images and Reflections*, ed. Jostein Børtnes and Tomas Hägg (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 2006), 19-36.

[34] McGuckin, *Intellectual Biography*, xxii.

they occur. I have opted to transliterate rather than to translate εἰκών, because 'image,' the standard English translation, does not convey fully the broad sense which Gregory's use of εἰκών implies. When discussing the human person, Gregory applies εἰκών both literally as a physical *eikon* and metaphorically as the soul, as I shall discuss further throughout the thesis. Therefore, I retain *eikon* as a means of relaying Gregory's broad interpretation of the word as much as possible.

My final point regarding ἡ εἰκών is that it is a feminine noun. To reflect this, I use the feminine pronoun or possessive adjective throughout the thesis when referring to the human *eikon*. I also make this move on the grounds that we may assume a 'she' as much as a 'he' when describing an individual human person.

In addition to εἰκών, I am aware of three further terms which require explanation, namely, "soul" (ψυχή), "spiritual intellect" (νοῦς), and "ontological."

1.3.2 *Soul (ψυχή)*

Gregory's anthropology incorporates both di- and tri-chotomist ideas, where the human person is presented both as body (σῶμα) and soul (ψυχή), and as dust (χοῦς), spiritual intellect (νοῦς) and spirit (πνεῦμα).[35] Both ψυχή and νοῦς are difficult to render faithfully, being complex terms. ψυχή encompasses "the life force, the moral, the emotional, the intellectual quantity."[36] I translate ψυχή as "soul" in this study, assuming that it incorporates the aforementioned qualities. It is important to bear in mind that Gregory does not infer notions of Cartesian substance dualism in his anthropology since he lived in the

[35] Body and soul: Or. 2.17, SC 247, 112; 7.21, SC 405, 232; 18.3, PG 35, 988B-990A. Flesh and spirit: Or. 7.23, SC 405, 240; 40.2, SC 358, 200. For the human as dust, spiritual intellect and spirit, see Or. 32.9, SC 318, 104. On the dual nature of Gregory's anthropology, see Ellverson, *The Dual Nature of Man*, passim.

[36] Peter Bouteneff, "The Theological Value of Christ's Human Soul" (D.Phil., Oxford, 1996), 6.

pre-modern era; Gregory's idea of body and soul is that they form a unity, as I demonstrate in Chapter Four.

1.3.3 *Spiritual Intellect (νοῦς)*

In contemporary English translations, νοῦς is often translated as "mind," "intellect" or "rationality," all of which imply that reason is the primary connotation.[37] However διάνοια concurs much more closely with the notion of reason, since it denotes the formulation of arguments on the basis of reasoning. Rather, for Gregory, νοῦς is that aspect of the soul through which human persons experience and perceive God; it relates to the spiritual realm.[38] For this reason, "intellect" alone is insufficient for conveying Gregory's intent. I mean to move away from the notion that νοῦς resembles a kind of intellectual exercise and towards the idea that through νοῦς, human persons yearn for and apprehend God to varying degrees.[39] In order to reflect this, I have opted to use two words as a translation of νοῦς: "spiritual intellect," assuming that this encompasses personal feelings and emotions as well as intellectual endeavour.[40]

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[37] Geoffrey W.H. Lampe, *PGL* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 923; Francis E. Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon* (New York: New York University Press, 1967), 121-39; Alexander Sand, "νοῦς," in *Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament: Vol 2*, ed. Horst Balz and Gerhard Schneider (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 478-79, 478.

[38] Dragoș A. Giulea, "The Noetic Turn in Jewish Thought," *JSJ* 42, no. 1 (2011): 23-57, 47.

[39] Børtnes argues that Gregory presents νοῦς as the reason that human persons yearn for God, whereas Wesche and Barbel denote νοῦς as that which unites human persons with God. I argue that Gregory is broad in his view and consequently all three arguments are correct, but not exclusively; see Børtnes, "Rhetoric and Mental Images", 56; Wesche, ""Mind" and "Self"", 47; Barbel, *Die fünf theologischen Reden,* 284.

[40] Throughout his translations of Gregory's orations, Gallay employs "esprit", which carries the idea of spirit, intellect and mind, consequently conveying the sense better than a single English word; see Or. 28.17, SC 250, 134-35.

1.3.4 *Ontological*

Whilst it is not a term which Gregory employs, I use 'ontological' to describe the divinity of the *eikon*. I understand ontological to denote the first order of things from which the epistemological and moral stem, and I use it as a means of describing the reality of the divinity of the *eikon*. In later chapters, when I refer to the transformation of the *eikon* as ontological, I do not imply that she has crossed the gap (διάστημα) between herself and God. My argument is that the manner in which the *eikon* increases in divinity applies quantitatively and not qualitatively, since God alone is ontologically divine.

Continuing to establish the context for my argument, I shall turn next to discuss Gregory's use of varying genres and rhetoric, since he is unique amongst the Cappadocians by presenting his theology in both poetry and prose.[41]

1.4 Genre and Rhetoric

Gregory crafted his works during a period when Christian theological discourse was "rooted in the attempt to attract and convince persons of the Hellenistic world, be they already Christians, Jews or pagans."[42] Our theologian does this so well that Kennedy refers to him as "the most important figure in the synthesis of Greek rhetoric and Christianity."[43]

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[41] I do not analyse the rhetorical devices used by Gregory, but draw attention to the literary context in which he worked and wrote. For comments on Gregory's rhetoric, see Claudio Moreschini, "Struttura e funzioni delle Omelie di Gregorio Nazianzeno," in *Gregorio Nazianzeno teologo e scrittore*, ed. Tomáš Špidlík, Claudio Moreschini, and Giovanni Menestrina (Bologna: EDP, 1992), 151–70; Čelica Milovanović-Barham, "Sailing to Sophistopolis: Gregory of Nazianzus and Greek Declamation," *JECS* 13, no. 2 (2005): 187-232; Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Gregory of Nazianzus, Rhetor and Philosopher* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 55-128.

[42] Elizabeth S. Fiorenza, "Miracles, Mission, and Apologetics: An Introduction," in *Aspects of Religious Propaganda in Judaism and Early Christianity*, ed. Elizabeth S. Fiorenza (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 1-25, 2; Kenneth Burke, *The Rhetoric of Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), v.

[43] George A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: Princeton

Whilst Gregory presents his prose in the form of sermons, the fact that he edited his work at the end of his career means that we do not have the versions which he may have preached in churches whilst he was a priest and bishop. Whoever the original audiences were, the edited forms of the orations and poems were preserved for both schools and future theologians.[44]

Gregory studied rhetoric substantially, receiving advanced training under Prohaeresius and Himerius respectively.[45] He was mindful of the highly charged dispute between rhetoric and philosophy, which was fuelled by Plato's critique of the fifth-century sophists.[46] This tension is present in Gregory's own work when, in *On His Own Life*, he explains that he places no value on displays of eloquence.[47] Whilst he utilises the literary conventions of his time, Gregory intends his ideas sincerely.[48] Kustas affirms this in a detailed study of the effect of the 'Second Sophistic' movement on Christian writers.[49] He argues that

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University Press, 1994), 261. Further praise of Gregory's rhetoric can be found in Frances M. Young, "The Rhetorical Schools and Their Influence on Patristic Exegesis," in *The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick*, ed. Henry Chadwick and Rowan Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 182-99, 186; William S.J. Harmless, *Desert Christians: An Introduction to the Literature of Early Monasticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 317; Raymond Van Dam, *Kingdom of Snow: Roman Rule and Greek Culture in Cappadocia* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 141-42.

[44] For an argument that Gregory composed many of his speeches as showpieces for schools rather than for congregations, see Milovanović-Barham, "Sailing to Sophistopolis," 187-232. This is unlikely in relation to the *Theological Orations*; see Frederick W. Norris, *Faith Gives Fullness to Reasoning: The Five Theological Orations of Gregory Nazianzen* (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 80.

[45] Ruether, *Rhetor and Philosopher*, 19-20.

[46] *Resp.* 607b5–6; *Gorg.* 447a-466a.

[47] Carm. 2.1.11, PG 37, 1047, 254-58; Or. 2.104, SC 247, 224; 27.1, SC 250, 70-72; 34.10, SC 318, 214-16; 40.10, SC 358, 216-18.

[48] "Sophistic is basically an instrument of expression, and these techniques of style -questions, exclamations, imagery, oxymoron, methods of vivacity and verisimilitude- can just as easily be used to say important things;" Ruether, *Rhetor and Philosopher*, 56.

[49] George Kustas, *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric* (Thessalonike: Patriarchal Institute, 1973), 27-62.

rhetoric is the 'clothing' for Christian revelation. Orators like Gregory were concerned to convey the Christian gospel clearly, but also to clothe it in language that is expressive of the Christian mystery.

In *On His Own Verses*, Gregory offers four reasons why, later in life, he turned to verse.[50] First, he explains that verse imposes a certain discipline on a writer, which he himself finds beneficial.[51] Secondly, he writes for the young since they enjoy poetry and the harshness of his instruction is sweetened by verse.[52] Thirdly, Gregory states that he wants to prove himself as good as any pagan at verse. This desire to show that Christians are able to excel in the public realm is also evident in Gregory's invectives against Julian, where he challenges the emperor by asking, "Is poetry yours?"[53] Fourthly, Gregory finds comfort in writing poetry when he is ill.[54] Overall, his goal in writing poetry is much the same as in writing orations: to instruct his reader of what is true.[55]

1.5 Approaching the Texts

No complete critical edition of Gregory's texts currently exists. The extant works can be found in J.P. Migne's *Patrologia Graeca* 35-38, a reprint of the Benedictine texts edited by the Maurist monks in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[56] The texts amount to 45

[50] Carm. 2.1.39, PG 37, 1329-1336.

[51] Carm. 2.1.39, PG 37, 1331-32, 34-37.

[52] Carm. 2.1.39, PG 37, 1332, 37-42. Gregory's poetry displays the convention of didactic poetry; see Donald A. Sykes, "The Poema Arcana of Saint Gregory Nazianzen," *JTS* 21, no. 1 (1970): 32-42; Denis M. Meehan, *Three Poems* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1987), 20.

[53] Or. 4.108, SC 309, 260.

[54] Carm. 2.1.39, PG 37, 1333, 54-56.

[55] Carm. 2.1.39, PG 37, 1333, 63.

[56] For an overview of the textual traditions of Gregory's orations, see Véronique Somers, *Histoire des collections complètes des Discours de Grégoire de Nazianze* (Louvain: Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste, 1997). For modern editions until 1950, see Denis M. Meehan, "Editions of Saint Gregory of Nazianzus," *ITQ* 3 (1951): 203-19.

orations, 244 letters and 507 poems.[57] From Gregory's prose, Oration 35 remains disputed.[58] I have used the critically edited *Sources Chrétiennes* versions of the orations where possible and critical editions of the poems where they exist.[59] For the purpose of clarity, I have provided *Patrologia Graeca* references for the poems, following the divisions set out by the Maurist monks in the eighteenth century, owing to the fact that many people may have more access to *Patrologia Graeca*. The first book comprises theological poems which are divided into two sections: *Poemata Dogmatica* and *Poemata Moralia*; the second book comprises historical poems.[60] Whilst I have consulted the

[57] Also, a tragedy entitled *Christus Patiens* appears in *Sources Chrétiennes*. The majority of contemporary scholars think that it was composed in the eleventh or twelfth centuries because it includes long laments by the Virgin Mary. This was a theme that did not begin to surface in Byzantine literature until the late ninth century (with the exception in the sixth century of the *Kontakion* by Romanos the Melodist). Since it is not consistent with the rest of Gregory's work, I have omitted the tragedy from this study. Furthermore, the drama does not discuss the human *eikon* (for an example of *eikon* as non-human image, see *Christus Patiens*, SC 149, 200, line 923). André Tulier, SC 149, 11-18 is alone in offering a defence of Gregory's authorship of *Christus Patiens*.

[58] Claudio Moreschini, SC 318, 38. Since Gregory does not speak about the human *eikon* in Oration 35, I have omitted it from this study.

[59] Even in these excellent commentaries, little attention is given to the human *eikon*: Moreschini, Claudio and Sykes, Donald, A. *St Gregory of Nazianzus: Poemata Arcana*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Andreas Knecht, *Gregor von Nazianz: Gegen die Putzsucht der Frauen. Verbesserter griechischer Text mit Übersetzung, motivgeschichtlichem Überblick und Kommentar* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1972); Michael Oberhaus and Martin Sicherl, *Gregor von Nazianz: Gegen den Zorn (Carmen l,2,25) Einleitung und Kommentar* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1991); Kristjan Domiter, *Gregor von Nazianz: De humana natura (c. 1,2,14). Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar*, Patrologia. BSK, 6 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999); Christoph Jungck, *Gregor von Nazianz: De Vita Sua. Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1974); Beno Meier, *Gregor von Nazianz: Über die Bischöfe (Carmen 2,1,12). Einleitung, Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar*, SGKA. NF 2; Forschungen zu Gregor von Nazianz, Band 7 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1989).

[60] The PG ordering of the poems in the *Poema Arcana* differs from Moreschini and Sykes (1997); for clarity, I have followed the PG numbering. For an overview of the textual history of the poems, see Abrams Rebillard, "Speaking for Salvation," 7-11. For contested poems, see Henricus M. Werhahn, "Dubia and Spuria bei Gregor von Nazianz," in *Studia Patristica 7 (Texte und Untersuchungen, 92)*, ed. Frank L. Cross (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 337-47. For convincing defence of Gregory's authorship of these poems, see Christos Simelidis, *Selected Poems of Gregory of Nazianzus: I.2.17; II.1.10, 19,*

contemporary translations of Gregory's work specified in the bibliography, I have chosen to provide my own translations in order to highlight the nuances in the texts.

I aim to read the texts theologically because ultimately I am interested in how our theologian might contribute to contemporary Western theological anthropology. Whilst I attend to Gregory's historical, literary and philosophical background, my approach is largely empirical.[61] Shortly, in section 1.6.2, I illustrate how scholars have read Gregory primarily in light of his philosophical sources; whilst this research is invaluable, there has been little attention to Gregory's application of biblical and extra-biblical themes.[62] An example of this concerns the way in which Gregory sets the *eikon* in a world inhabited by angels and demons, beings found in biblical and extra-biblical narratives. Throughout the project, in order to reflect Gregory's consistent application of the Bible, I highlight heuristically the ways in which Gregory draws upon the biblical and extra-biblical narratives and themes to describe the existence of the human *eikon*.

I intend to listen to Gregory as much as is possible for a reader in

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32: A Critical Edition with Introduction and Commentary (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 40.

[61] I have chosen this in preference over a primarily historical-critical reading through which the texts are devoured "in a battle of critical readings;" see John Behr, "Reading the Fathers Today," in *A Celebration of Living Theology: A Festschrift in Honour of Andrew Louth*, ed. Justin A. Mihoc and Leonard Aldea (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 7-19, 19; Morwenna Ludlow and Scot Ray Douglass (eds.), *Reading the Church Fathers* (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2011), 1-20; Scot Ray Douglass, *Theology of the Gap: Cappadocian Language Theory and the Trinitarian Controversy* (New York: Peter Lang, 2005).

[62] Numerous scholars have challenged the use of terms such as 'extra-biblical,' 'apocryphal' and 'pseudepigraphal' because they are too "intimately linked" with heresy; Stephen Shoemaker, J., "Early Christian Apocryphal Literature," in *The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies*, ed. Susan A. Harvey and David G. Hunter (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 521-48, 523; Evelyne Patlagean, "Remarques sur la production et la diffusion des apocryphes dans le monde byzantin," *Apocrypha* 2 (1991): 155–64. It is beyond the scope of this project to identify new terminology; therefore, I apply 'extra-biblical' interchangeably with 'pseudepigraphal' throughout the thesis, whilst acknowledging that neither term is wholly adequate.

the twenty-first century.[63] However, I recognise that I cannot enter fully into Gregory's mind; therefore when I make such claims as "Gregory's approach is…" this is shorthand for "my interpretation of Gregory's approach is…"[64]

It is worth noting here that Gregory does not offer a succinct analysis of the human *eikon*. For example, observe below how Gregory adopts an interrogative practice when considering the *eikon*, like the psalmist before him:

> What are human beings that you are mindful of them, mortals that you care for them? (Psalm 8:4).
>
> What are human beings that you are mindful of them? What is this new mystery about me?[65]

Gregory's answer to these questions forms a series of paradoxical statements; these suggest that it is no mean feat to offer a response to "what is the human *eikon*?" Gregory tends to search for the *eikon*, engaging in questions of human existence rather than providing narrowly defined answers.[66] This concurs with the recommended approach of contemporary theologian Alistair McFadyen. Recently, he has argued that we should continue to search for the *imago Dei,* rather than offering reductionist definitions. By 'search,' McFadyen means that theologians should seek humanity in such a manner that we are caught

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[63] David Newheiser, "Time and the Responsibilities of Reading: Revisiting Derrida and Dionysius," in *Reading the Church Fathers*, ed. Morwenna Ludlow and Scot Ray Douglass (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2011), 23-43, 175.

[64] Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text," *NLH* 5, no. 1 (1973): 91-117, 105.

[65] Or. 7.23, SC 405, 238-40; 20.11, SC 270, 80; 28.5, SC 250, 108-10; 32.27, SC 318, 142.

[66] "Our conception of a person's identity is never final, since the person is constantly performing new actions;" see Clarence Walhout, "Narrative Hermeneutics," in *The Promise of Hermeneutics*, ed. Roger Lundin, Clarence Walhout, and Anthony C. Thiselton (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 65-131, 80.

up in a dynamic, exploratory and vulnerable interplay, which defies definition.[67] To a certain extent Gregory appears to adopt this very approach. At once he wonders at the *eikon* in relation to her Creator, whilst presenting her as mysterious, dynamic, divine and alive through her participation in the life of God. Therefore, when I offer explanations of Gregory's human *eikon*, these come with the caveat of acknowledging that for Gregory, human *eikones* reside under the banner of 'mystery.'

1.6 Gregory Nazianzen's Concept of the *Eikon* in Contemporary Research

Next, I summarise briefly my interpretation of Gregory's approach to the *eikon*. After this, I provide a critical overview of the discussions in contemporary research which are most pertinent to my overall argument. Relating to these discussions, first, I consider responses to whether Gregory perceives the *eikon* to be the whole human person or that which resides within the human person. Secondly, I consider the breadth of Gregory's inspiration. I demonstrate that whilst scholars have read Gregory most frequently in the light of Greek philosophers, Gregory's appeal to the biblical narrative has not received significant attention. This is essential, if we bear in mind that he was writing as a Christian bishop and that Scripture offers the language and imagery from which he wove his theological vision. Thirdly, I explore how we are to interpret Gregory's meaning when he speaks of the *eikon* as "divine."[68] Finally, I discuss 'the devil,' contending that whilst this character is virtually ignored by modern scholars, he is intrinsic to Gregory's understanding of the *eikon*'s existence.

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[67] Alistair I. McFadyen, "Imaging God: Not so much Defining as Seeking Humanity?," in *SST Postgraduate Conference* (Manchester 8/1/2015).

[68] Or. 1.4, SC 247, 76; 2.73, SC 247, 186; 7.23, SC 405, 240; 38.11, SC 358, 124-26; Carm. 1.1.4, PG 37, 423, 97-99; 1.2.2, PG 37, 622, 560-61.

1.6.1 *How Does Gregory Depict the Eikon?*

Gregory's vision of the human *eikon* is dynamic. By this, I mean that the *eikon* does not represent a static quality within the human person, but is a living and breathing *eikon*, created with the potential to become like God, or, in Gregory's words, "divine."

In describing this dynamic existence, Gregory situates the drama of human experience in the biblical narrative of creation, fall and restoration, presenting a worldview where the *eikon* inhabits a conceptual world which encompasses good and evil spirits. I shall discuss Gregory's perception of these in Chapter Five, where I argue that key to Gregory's narrative of human experience is the fallen angel Lucifer. After being cast out of heaven, the "evil one" is envious of the *eikon*'s divinity and aims to destroy her.[69] For this reason, the *eikon*'s path to becoming divine is arduous and even treacherous. Journeying towards God and becoming divine entails the free will of the *eikon*, which renders her vulnerable to the world, the flesh and the devil, with her divinity constantly at risk. In spite of being placed in paradise at creation, she succumbs quickly to the schemes of the evil one. The result of this is that the *eikon* is wounded; rather than glowing like a "new kind of angel" as she did at her creation, she is covered now in "thick, dull flesh."[70] Consequently, the *eikon* cannot fulfil her divine potential without Christ's incarnation and the deifying effects of the Holy Spirit at baptism.

I have spoken about the *eikon* in such a way as to imply that Gregory uses the term to speak about the whole human person. I have chosen to do this because on certain occasions Gregory himself explicitly denotes the *eikon* literally as a physical *eikon*. He achieves this drawing from the creation narratives in Genesis 1 and 2:

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[69] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 128.

[70] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 124-30.

> …a mortal human (βροτός) was made from earth (χοῦς) and breath (πνόη), an *eikon* of the immortal One (ἀθανάτοιο εἰκών).”[71]

However, Gregory does not always refer explicitly to the *eikon* as the whole human person; on other occasions he likens the *eikon* to the soul (ψυχή) or spiritual intellect (νοῦς):

> …even though the greatest feature in the nature of the human person is that she is [created] according to the *eikon* (εἰκών) and [possesses] the capacity of spiritual intellect (νοῦς).[72]

At first glance, in the citation above, the *eikon* equates to the spiritual intellect. In light of this, most scholars conclude that Gregory considers the *eikon* simply as the soul or the spiritual intellect, appearing to overlook the passages when Gregory describes the *eikon* differently, as in the example that I provided earlier.[73] Only a small number of

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[71] Carm. 1.1.8, PG 37, 452, 74-75; also, see Or. 3.7, SC 247, 250; 40.10, SC 358, 218; 40.14, SC 358, 226; Carm. 1.1.10, PG 37, 469, 58.

[72] Or. 22.13, SC 270, 248; also, see Or. 14.2, PG 35, 860B-861A; 28.17, SC 250, 134; 32.27, SC 318, 142-44.

[73] Manfred Kertsch, *Gregorio Nazianzeno: Sulla virtù, Carme giambico [I, 2, 10]* (Pisa: Edizioni Ets, 1995), 195; Oberhaus and Sicherl, *Carmen 1,2,25,* 75; Frederick W. Norris, "Gregory Nazianzen's Doctrine of Jesus Christ" (Ph.D. Diss., Yale, 1970), 69; Kenneth Paul Wesche, ""Mind" and "Self" in the Christology of Saint Gregory the Theologian: Saint Gregory's Contribution to Christology and Christian Anthropology," *GOTR* 39, no. 1-2 (1994): 33-61, 51; Bouteneff, "Christ's Human Soul," 89; Peter Gilbert, "Person and Nature in the Theological Poems of St. Gregory of Nazianzus" (Ph.D. Diss., Catholic University of America, 1994), 290; Jostein Børtnes, "Rhetoric and Mental Images in Gregory," in *Gregory of Nazianzus: Images and Reflections*, ed. Jostein Børtnes and Tomas Hägg (Chicago: Museum Tusculanum, 2006), 37-57, 56; Abrams Rebillard, "Speaking for Salvation," 90; Heinz Althaus, *Die Heilslehre des heiligen Gregor von Nazianz* (Münster: Verlag Aschendorff, 1972), 72-74; Ben Fulford, *Divine Eloquence and Human Transformation: Rethinking Scripture and History through Gregory of Nazianzus and Hans Frei* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2013), 80-81; Hannah Hunt, *Clothed in the Body: Asceticism, the Body and the Spiritual in the Late Antique Era* (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2012), 194; Anca Vasiliu, *Eikôn* (Paris: PUF, 2010), 49; Hilarion Alfeyev, *La chantre de la Luminère: Introduction à la spiritualité de saint Grégoire de Nazianze* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2006);

scholars observe the occasions when Gregory includes the body in the *eikon*.[74] Added to this, Vasiliu, Wesche and Norris observe the complexity of Gregory's description; Norris suggests that the *eikon* is depicted in such vague terms because Gregory himself is uncertain of how the various aspects of a person interrelate.[75]

My response to this is twofold. First, I observe that whilst modern commentators read the texts and ask, "What *is* the *eikon*?", Gregory, on the other hand, appears to be less concerned with this particular question. Rather, he pays more attention to describing the mystery of human experience and what it is like to *be* an *eikon*.[76] Secondly, I suggest that, rather than being confused, Gregory is interpreting the human *eikon* as described in Genesis 1:26 both metaphorically and literally. I believe that he does this intentionally in order to depict the complexity of human existence. I shall discuss Gregory's interpretation technique further in the following chapter. Added to this, in Chapter Four, I argue that if we consider the occasions on which Gregory speaks about the human person as a mixture (μίξις) of dust and *eikon*, we may observe that the *eikon* transforms the dust and renders it spiritual, following the mixture of Christ. Therefore, when Gregory speaks about the *eikon* as the soul or the spiritual intellect, it is possible that he implies the whole human person because the *eikon* transforms the dust and the two form a unity.

Kirsten Koonce, "Agalma and Eikon," *AJP* 109, no. 1 (1988): 108-10; Ellverson, *The Dual Nature of Man*, 25; Joseph Barbel, *Gregor von Nazianz. Die fünf theologischen Reden* (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1963), 284.

[74] Knecht, *Gegen die Putzsucht der Frauen*, 71; Anne Richard, *Cosmologie et théologie chez Grégoire de Nazianze* (Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes, 2003), 265; Jaroslav Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1993), 129.

[75] Norris, "Doctrine of Jesus Christ," 69; Gilbert, "Person and Nature," 86; Vasiliu, *Eikôn*, 328.

[76] Jostein Børtnes, "Eikôn Theou: Meanings of Likeness in Gregory of Nazianzus," in *Studia Patristica 41*, ed. Frances M. Young, Mark J. Edwards, and Paul Parvis (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 287-91. Brief consideration is given to works on Gregory's Christology and cosmology respectively; see Norris, "Doctrine of Jesus Christ," 68-69; Richard, *Cosmologie et théologie*, 264-71.

1.6.2 *Gregory's Sources of Inspiration*

The rational climate of the fourth century was "complex and syncretistic," rendering Gregory's use of philosophical language difficult to interpret.[77] In their endeavour to evaluate Gregory's work, scholars have pointed to where he draws ideas from Plato,[78] Aristotle,[79] Stoicism,[80] Plotinus,[81] Philo,[82] and Origen,[83] often praising him for his

[77] Bouteneff, "Christ's Human Soul," 8. "In more recent times scholars have laboured under the fallacy that a word can never mean anything other than what it was devised to mean;" Mark J. Edwards, *Image, Word, and God in the Early Christian Centuries* (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2013), 114.

[78] Henri Pinault, *Le Platonisme de Saint Grégoire de Nazianze: Essai sur le relations du Christianisme et de l'Hellénisme dans son oeuvre théologique* (La Roche-sur-Yon, France: G. Romain, 1925); Jan M. Szymusiak, *Éléments de théologie de l'homme selon saint Grégoire de Nazianze* (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1963), 29.

[79] Gilbert, "Person and Nature," 385; Hofer, *Christ in Gregory Nazianzen*, 124-51.

[80] Susanna Elm, "Inscriptions and Conversions: Gregory of Nazianzus on Baptism (Or. 38-40)," in *Conversion in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages*, ed. Kenneth Mills and Anthony Grafton (New York, USA: University of Rochester Press, 2003), 1-35; Althaus, *Die Heilslehre des heiligen*, 57-60.

[81] Dayna Kalleres, "Demons and Divine Illumination: A Consideration of Eight Prayers by Gregory of Nazianzus," *VC* 61, no. 2 (2007): 157-88. We do not actually know how widely defused knowledge of Plotinus was in late antiquity. When Gregory came to Athens, Plotinus would have been dead for about eighty years. It is very likely that an educated man like Gregory would have been familiar with the latter's works, especially *Enneads*. However, there is no explicit mention of him by either Gregory or the other Cappadocians; Anthony S.J. Meredith, "Gregory of Nyssa and Plotinus," in *Studia Patristica 17*, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone (Leuven: Peeters Press, 1982), 1120-26, 1120-21.

[82] Francesco Trisoglio, "Filone Alessandrino e l'esegesi cristiana: contributo alla conoscenza dell'influsso esercitato da Filone sul IV secolo, specificatamente in Gregorio de Nazianzo," *ANRW* II, 21, no. 1 (1984): 588-730.

[83] Joseph W. Trigg, "Knowing God in the Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus," in *God in Early Christian Thought: Essays in Memory of Lloyd G. Patterson*, ed. Lloyd G. Patterson, et al., *SVC* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 83-104, 104; Norris, "Doctrine of Jesus Christ," 72; Claudio Moreschini, "Nuove considerazione sull'origenismo di Gregorio Nazianzo," in *Origene e l'alessandrinismo cappadoce (III-IV secolo)*, ed. Mario Giradi and Marcello Marin (Bari: Edipuglia, 2002), 207-18. Differences and similarities between Gregory and Origen are noted throughout Richard, *Cosmologie et théologie*, passim. Not all commentators attribute Gregory's thought to Origen, for

integration of their philosophical ideas.[84] In the late nineteenth century, Adolf Harnack made a vociferous attack on the early church fathers, accusing them of infiltrating the gospel with Hellenism.[85] Harnack's Western post-Enlightenment worldview meant that he believed Scripture and philosophy to be incompatible. A number of Western scholars have responded by attempting to distance Gregory from almost every strand of Greek philosophy, a move which is both inaccurate and unhelpful. For example, writing in 1951, Plagnieux concluded that in Gregory, "we are far from Plato, Philo, Plotinus and Origen."[86] This polarised approach, which posits Gregory as writing either biblically or philosophically, has been critiqued by Ayres, who has offered a corrective view. Ayres argues that whilst

> the scriptural text [is] the primary resource for the Christian imagination, [it] may be explicated through the use of whatever lies to hand and that may be persuasively adapted.[87]

I assume this approach in my own reading of Gregory, who speaks for himself when he refers to the Platonists as "those who have thought

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example there is no mention of Origen in Jean Bernardi, *Saint Grégoire de Nazianze: le Théologien et son temps, 330-390*, IPE (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1995).

[84] With the exception of John Rist, "Plotinus and Christian Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 386-414, 398-99.

[85] Adolf Harnack, *History of Dogma*, trans. James Millar, vol. 3 (London: Williams & Norgate, 1897), 318. For a succinct overview of Harnack's criticisms, see David E. Wilson, *Deification and the Rule of Faith* (Bloomington, Indiana: Cross Books, 2010), xv-xvii; William Rowe, "Adolf Von Harnack and the Concept of Hellenization," in *Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response Within the Greco-Roman World*, ed. Wendy Helleman (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), 69-97.

[86] Jean Plagnieux, *Saint Grégoire de Nazianze théologien* (Paris: Éditions Franciscaines, 1951), 427.

[87] Lewis Ayres, *Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 392.

best about God and are nearest to us."[88]

As I have observed, Gregory's use of philosophical concepts has been much discussed. Other than noting the plethora of biblical allusions throughout his work, scholars have paid less attention to Gregory's use of biblical and pseudepigraphal themes and doctrines.[89] For example, in their articles on Gregory's approach to baptism, both Elm and Kalleres discuss primarily how Gregory has employed ideas from Stoicism and Plotinus.[90] Therefore, this thesis departs from previous approaches by focusing on the ways in which Gregory draws directly from Scripture and pseudepigraphal concepts to inform his view of the human *eikon*. As I argued above, I do not make this move because philosophical themes are unimportant, or because philosophy is separate from Scripture, but because scholars have considered Gregory's philosophical influences with the exclusion of biblical themes. Since Gregory was a Christian bishop, engaging with Scripture is essential if we are to understand his work more fully.

1.6.3 *The "Divine" Eikon*

Next I shall discuss the way in which scholars respond to Gregory's use of "divine" in relation to the *eikon.* Since the term lacks precise definition it causes a certain degree of consternation amongst scholars. On reading statements such as "I shall make the divine *eikon* present to Christ (εἰκόνα θείην παραστήσω Χριστῷ)," commentators question what exactly Gregory intends.[91] Their response to the divinity of the

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[88] Or. 31.5, SC 250, 282-84. For an appraisal of the aspects of Platonism which were excluded by the fathers, see Arthur H. Armstrong, *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 425-27.

[89] Szymusiak, *Éléments de théologie de l'homme*, 34; Beeley, *Trinity and the Knowledge of God*, 78.

[90] Elm, "Inscriptions and Conversions," 1-35; Kalleres, "Demons and Divine Illumination," 155-88.

[91] Carm. 2.1.50, PG 37, 1389, 61-62; 1.2.18, PG 37, 787, 14.

eikon ranges as widely as suggesting that it is metaphorical,[92] rhetorical,[93] literal,[94] real,[95] or ontological.[96] For example, Gilbert suggests hesitantly that Gregory seems to mean that human persons are "literally" divine.[97] Gilbert is reluctant to describe the manner in which Gregory speaks about the *eikon*'s divinity as literal because he does not want to present Gregory's thought as pantheistic, but he is, quite rightly, keen to show that Gregory observes a clear Creator and creature distinction. His remarks serve to highlight our difficulty in speaking about the divinity of the *eikon*. In order to preserve the Creator and creature distinction, scholars often apply terms such as "metaphor," as a means of summarising Gregory's intention when he describes the *eikon* as 'divine', yet they do not explain what they mean precisely. This results in a lack of clarity surrounding Gregory's use of "divine" in relation to the *eikon*. I argue that rather than representing opposing categories, the 'rhetorical', 'metaphorical,' 'real' and 'literal'

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[92] Vladimir Kharlamov, "Rhetorical Application of Theosis in Greek Patristic Thought," in *Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions*, ed. Michael J. Christensen and Jeffrey A. Wittung (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2007), 115–31, 126; Norman Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 213-25; Jules Gross, *The Divinization of the Christian According to the Greek Fathers*, trans. Paul Onica (Anaheim, California: A&C Press, 2002), 197; Norris, *Faith Gives Fullness*, 50; Paul M. Collins, "Between Creation and Salvation: Theosis and Theurgy," in *Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology Vol 2*, ed. Vladimir Kharlamov (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2012), 192-204, 67; Winslow, *Dynamics of Salvation*, 179-200.

[93] Vladimir Kharlamov, "Basil of Caesarea and the Cappadocians on the Distinction between Essence and Energies in God and its Relevance to the Deification Theme," in *Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology Vol 2*, ed. Vladimir Kharlamov (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2012), 100-45, 120; Norris, *Faith Gives Fullness*, 51.

[94] Beeley, *Trinity and the Knowledge of God*, 119.

[95] Elm, *Sons of Hellenism*, 180.

[96] John A. McGuckin, "The Strategic Adaptation of Deification in the Cappadocians," in *Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions*, ed. Michael J. Christensen and Jeffery A. Wittung (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007), 95-114, 95.

[97] Gilbert, "Person and Nature," 62. Also, see Elm, *Sons of Hellenism*, 181, who states that the "link between soul and God is real and not a metaphor."

expressions of the *eikon*'s divinity co-exist in Gregory's thought.[98] Moreover, in Chapter Six, I argue that Gregory's intention regarding the divinity of the *eikon* is clear, if we take into account the following four factors: first, Gregory's particular doctrine of the Holy Spirit; secondly, the transformation of the *eikon* through the Holy Spirit at baptism; thirdly, the way in which Gregory's worldview meant that the *eikon* is "porous" to the spiritual realm; fourthly, the interaction between the *eikon* and the devil. In light of these features, I shall demonstrate that Gregory considers the *eikon's* transformation through the Holy Spirit at baptism to be a transformation of an ontological order through which the human *eikon* becomes divine.

1.6.4 *The Devil*

My final point pertaining to contemporary literature regards the devil, a character discussed rarely in theological scholarship, but who is central to Gregory's approach to the existence of the *eikon*.[99] The dearth of research directed towards the devil, not only with reference to Gregory's work, but also more widely in the field of theology, relates to the effect of the Enlightenment on Western culture.[100] Modernity ushered in scepticism towards transcendent beings such as angels and demons. Consequently, when contemporary early Christian and biblical studies scholars pay due attention to the devil, it is often to

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[98] Whilst the categories being used are unclear, when no categories are applied, comments about theosis become even more vague, such as, "an extraordinary kind of being in a state of blessedness;" Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, "Theosis According to Gregory," in *Gregory of Nazianzus: Images and Reflections*, ed. Jostein Børtnes and Tomas Hägg (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 2006), 257-70, 259.

[99] To name but one scholar, in her study on phenomenology and the patristic view of the *imago Dei*, Susan Windley-Daoust neglects to mention this key aspect of being a human *eikon*; see *The Redeemed Image of God: Embodied Relations to the Unknown Divine* (Maryland, U.S.A.: University Press of America, 2002).

[100] For a review of the Enlightenment reluctance to accept the reality of spirits, see Phillip Wiebe, *God and Other Spirits: Intimations of Transcendence in Christian Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1-6.

demythologise themes concerning evil powers.[101] However, we should not confuse the worldview of the premoderns with that which was largely adopted through modernity.[102] Following Gregory, I identify "the devil" with the biblical Satan, fallen angel Lucifer and the serpent, referring to them interchangeably.[103] In my translations, I aim to remain close to the text in order to demonstrate the various ways in which Gregory understands his 'enemy.' In linking the various titles, Gregory follows a common patristic reading of Isaiah 14:12 which understands Lucifer, the Morning Star, to be speaking of both Satan who appears in Job and the serpent in Genesis 3.[104] Ezekiel 28 also contributes to this tradition, having been read as linking a cosmic rebel and an earthly king.[105] In the New Testament, Revelation 12:9 draws together the serpent and the devil. This biblical basis is generally recognised to be the most likely source of the tradition, rather than the theory that the 'fall of Satan' myth originated from Zoroastrianism.[106]

Throughout his work, Gregory presents both the devil and the spiritual powers of darkness as enemies of the *eikon*. As Young's comment below indicates, Gregory's inspiration finds its origin in

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[101] Hans Boersma, *Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross: Reappropriating the Atonement Tradition* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2004), 194. Rudolf Bultmann was a key figure in this trend; Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," in *Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate*, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch (London: SPCK, 1964), 1-44. For recent comment, see Richard H. Bell, *Deliver Us from Evil* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007); Walter Wink, *Unmasking the Powers: The Invisible Forces that Determine Human Existence* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986).

[102] See Chapter Six for further discussion.

[103] For an overview of the tradition, see Henry Ansgar Kelly, *Satan: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 191-214.

[104] Justin Martyr was the Christian forerunner in equating Satan with the Serpent, *Dial. Tryph.* 45; also see Origen, *Princ*. 2.9.2.

[105] Neil Forsyth, *The Old Enemy: Satan and the Combat Myth* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 139-44; Hector M. Patmore, *Adam, Satan, and the King of Tyre: The Interpretation of Ezekiel 28:11-19 in Late Antiquity* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), passim.

[106] Greg J. Riley, "Devil," in *Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible*, ed. Karen Van Der Toorn, Bob Beckling, and Peter W. Van Der Horst (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 244-49, 246; Mary Boyce, *Textual Sources for the Study of Zoroastrianism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 46.

Jewish sources:

> A lively sense of the reality of Satan had been inherited from the Jewish Apocalyptic tradition, which clearly had a considerable influence on New Testament and second-century Christianity.[107]

Gregory refers to Satan with a variety of metaphors and titles, most of which can be found in Scripture. The vast number of names and descriptions demonstrate Satan's significance to Gregory. They also serve to demonstrate the multitude of ways in which Gregory understands Satan as a threat. Many of the names exist as a list in the poem *Aversion of the Evil One and Invocation of Christ*:[108]

> Thief, Serpent, Fire, Belial,[109] Vice, Death, Gulf, Dragon, Beast,[110] Night, Ambusher, Rage, Chaos, Slanderer, and Murderer.[111]

Elsewhere, Gregory uses "Satan,"[112] "Envy,"[113] the Evil One,[114] "the

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[107] Frances M. Young, *The Making of the Creeds* (London: SCM Press, 1991), 88; Everett Ferguson, *Demonology of the Early Christian World* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1984), 133. Contra, Anthony S.J. Meredith, *The Cappadocians* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1995), 42-43.

[108] Carm. 2.1.55, PG 37, 1399-1401.

[109] Also, see Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 556, 457; Or. 24.15, SC 284, 74. Belial is the name for Satan which is widely used in extra-biblical literature where the name is given to a figure who is important as a deceiver; see S. David Sperling, "Belial," in *Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible*, ed. Karel Van Der Toorn, Bob Beckling, and Pieter W. Van Der Horst (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 169-71, 170. It is also found in the form Beliar which occurs only once in the New Testament; 2 Cor 6:15.

[110] Rev 12:9; Rev 13:1.

[111] Carm. 2.1.55, PG 37, 1399, 4; cf. Matt 4.10; 12.26; 16.23; Mark 1.13; 3.23, 26; 4.15; Luke 13.16; 22.3.

[112] Or. 23.14, SC 270, 310.

[113] Or. 6.10, SC 405, 146; Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 444, 66; 1.1.10, PG 37, 466, 16; 1.2.1, PG 37, 531, 120; 2.1.63, PG 37, 1406, 4.

[114] ὁ πονηρός, Or. 2.88, SC 247, 202; 6.10, SC 405, 146; 28.15, SC 250, 132; 30.6, SC 250, 236-38; 37.10, SC 318, 292; 37.12, SC 318, 296; 38.14, SC 358, 134; 40.10, SC 358, 216, et al; cf. Matt 5:37; Eph 6:16; 2 Thess 3:3.

Devil," [115] "the Adversary," [116] "the Tempter," [117] "the Enemy," [118] "crooked,"[119] "ruler of the world,"[120] and "Destroyer of the *eikon*."[121] Since Gregory refers to Satan specifically as the "destroyer of the *eikon*," I conclude that Satan represents a particular threat to the *eikon* which she should not ignore.

In spite of the frequency with which the devil occurs in relation to the human *eikon* in Gregory's work, he makes infrequent appearances in contemporary scholarship. Kalleres has advanced this area of research by providing a translation and critique of eight poems relating to the devil.[122] Also, Morwenna Ludlow, whose article discusses the "reality" of the devil and demons in the work of all the Cappadocians.[123] Both scholars highlight the pervasiveness of the devil in the Cappadocians' work.[124] This project builds on their contributions both by challenging their conclusions and considering the effects of the devil upon the *eikon* in particular.

1.7 Conclusion

[115] ὸ διάβολος, Or. 2.62, SC 247, 174; 35.3, SC 318, 232; 38.12, SC 358, 128; cf. Matt 4.1; 13.39; Luke 4.2-3, 6, 13.

[116] Or. 26.3, SC 284, 230; 22.13, SC 270, 248; 40.16, SC 358, 230; see Francis X. Gokey, *The Terminology for the Devil and Evil Spirits in the Apostolic Fathers* (Washington: AMS Press, 1961), 68-69; Jeffrey B. Russell, *Satan: The Early Christian Tradition* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), 34.

[117] Or. 30.6, SC 250, 236; cf. Matt 4.3.

[118] Carm. 2.1.70, PG 37, 1418, 4; 2.1.88, PG 37, 1441, 168; cf. Luke 10.19.

[119] Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 442, 41.

[120] Or. 1.4, SC 247, 77; 8.12, SC 405, 272; 11.4, SC 405, 338; 14.21, PG 35, 884C; 19.6, PG 35, 1049C.

[121] ὸ φθορεὺς τῆς είκόνος, Carm. 2.1.65, PG 37, 1407, 6. Also, Or. 2.21, SC 247, 118; 24.18, SC 284, 80; 39.7, SC 358, 162; 40.10, SC 358, 218; Carm. 1.1.4, PG 37, 419, 46-50; 1.1.9, PG 37, 457, 9-12; 2.1.13, PG 37, 1230, 43-50.

[122] Kalleres, "Demons and Divine Illumination," 157-88.

[123] Morwenna Ludlow, "Demons, Evil and Liminality in Cappadocian Theology," *JECS* 20, no. 2 (2012): 179-211.

[124] Also, see Szymusiak, *Éléments de théologie de l'homme*, 38-42; Winslow, *Dynamics of Salvation*, 60-65.

Gregory's dynamic approach to the *eikon*, which emphasises both her divinity and vulnerability, unfolds throughout the following chapters. Having introduced Gregory's approach to the *eikon* and reviewed the contemporary literature in Chapter One, I move on to examine the historical, biblical and philosophical contexts of the *eikon* in Chapter Two. Here, I explore Judeo-Christian beliefs and Greek philosophical thought about pagan *eikones* (both portraits and statues), demonstrating how they all feed into Gregory's concept of the *eikon*; and in particular, the ways in which Gregory speaks about the divinity of the *eikon*. We shall see that on numerous occasions Gregory presents the human *eikon* quite literally as a living, physical *eikon* of God, who is divine because she bears God's spirit.

The following chapters aim to emphasise that Gregory's approach to the *eikon* is one which takes the form of a dynamic narrative which begins with Christ. Thus, Chapter Three establishes that Gregory considers anthropology within the theological framework of his doctrine of God. I highlight how Gregory draws from Scripture to describe both the Son and the human person as *eikones*. The implications of this move are manifold: first, Gregory uses *eikon* to denote Christ's ontological imaging of the Father. Secondly, Gregory describes Christ as a divine, living and dynamic *Eikon*, differentiating Christ from motionless *eikones*. This proffers the existence of the human *eikon* as divine and dynamic. Thirdly, Christ's kenosis entails his identification with the human *eikon,* since through the incarnation he becomes vulnerable. This paves the way for the theosis of the fallen human *eikon*. Finally, we see that Gregory's discussion concerning the devil is not restricted to the human *eikon*, since Christ battles with and defeats the devil, restoring the potential divinity of the human *eikon* and securing her victory over evil.

Having established Gregory's theological framework for the *eikon*, Chapter Four moves on to discuss her creation. Following Gregory's own sequence, I begin by considering the creation of the angelic realm. Since Gregory compares the *eikon* to a "new angel," a

discussion of angels serves to demonstrate Gregory's high regard for the *eikon.* From here, I consider the way in which God creates the human *eikon* from the spiritual and material realms. Due to his particular depiction of mixing and blending (μίξις and κρᾶσις), I argue that Gregory portrays the *eikon* and the body as a unity, thus a single, living being. After this, I explore the biblical themes relating to Gregory's description of the *eikon* at creation. I demonstrate how Gregory's approach is multifaceted, since it incorporates the ontology, function, relation and ethics of being an *eikon*.

Chapter Five continues to follow Gregory's narrative of the existence of the *eikon*, moving on to consider the portrayal of the fall and the extent of the implications for the *eikon*. Human *eikones* are banished from paradise and are clothed in garments of "thick, dull flesh." Whilst Christ conquers evil and offers healing, human *eikones* are still expected to resist the devil until Christ returns to annihilate the enemy completely. Here, I demonstrate how Gregory's ideas about the devil form a primary strand in his approach to the life of the human *eikon*, for the devil hovers in the background of conversations of sin, the flesh, the world and the passions.

Chapter Six explores how the *eikon* receives the restoration offered through Christ's incarnation. For Gregory, this begins primarily through baptism; here, Gregory's doctrine of the Holy Spirit is highly significant for the *eikon*. It is through the impact of the Holy Spirit at baptism that the 'divinity' of the *eikon* is sealed. This leads to a discussion of the theosis of the *eikon*. When Gregory's doctrine of the Holy Spirit is read together with a) his ideas of baptism, b) his notion of the *eikon* being vulnerable (or porous) to the heavenly realm and c) the interaction between the *eikon* and the devil, it becomes evident that Gregory considers the divinity of *eikon* in ontological, functional and relational terms. Whilst the theosis of the human *eikon* continues after baptism I do not move on to discuss how this occurs, largely due to constraints on space. How the human *eikon* continues her theosis after baptism remains for a further project.

Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by drawing together the previous chapters, considering avenues of further research and beginning to consider how Gregory's ideas might contribute to contemporary theological anthropology. Here, I observe the strength of Gregory's multifaceted interpretation of the human *eikon* found in Genesis. Gregory's approach creates space for mystery and inclusivity in his portrayal of the *eikon*. For this reason, I have coined the phrase 'divine, yet vulnerable' when speaking about Gregory's human *eikon*, intending that it remain an 'open' rather than 'closed' definition.

Chapter 2 The Human *Eikon* in Context

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the historical, biblical and philosophical contexts of Gregory's presentation of the human *eikon's* existence. Like church fathers before him, Gregory deploys *eikon* in a variety of ways, using the term to describe the human person and Christ primarily, but also to refer to metaphors, paintings and pagan statues.[125] Gregory's broad application reflects the fact that *eikon* plays a substantial role in patristic theology, occupying over five pages in Lampe's *Patristic Greek Lexicon*, compared with less than a page in Liddell, Scott and Jones' *A Greek-English Lexicon*.[126] Deriving from εἴκω, which translates as "to be like, to seem," εἰκών can mean "likeness" in the sense of that which is physical, such as a picture or a statue, or that which is immaterial, for example, a phantom or semblance.

Since Scripture forms the basis of Gregory's ideas concerning the human *eikon*, this chapter begins with a brief overview of Gregory's hermeneutics; here I argue that he approaches the Bible primarily in light of Jesus Christ as the "focal center of God's ordering of all of history."[127] After this, I move on to consider the *eikon*'s philosophical background, highlighting the variety of ideas which feed into Gregory's depiction. These include a melting pot of Judeo-Christian beliefs, ideas about pagan paintings and statues, and Greek philosophical thought. I argue that aspects of Gregory's interpretation of *eikon* in Genesis are understood more clearly in dialogue with contemporary attitudes

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[125] For Christ as *Eikon*, see Chapter Three; for *eikon* depicting paintings, see Or. 2.11, SC 247, 104; 4.65, SC 309, 172; 4.80, SC 309, 202; 11.2, SC 405, 332; 14.32, PG 35, 900D; 21.22, SC 270, 156; metaphor, Carm. 1.2.24, PG 37, 793, 37; pagan statues, Or. 11.5, SC 405, 338; Carm. 1.2.27, PG 37, 854, 8.

[126] *PGL*, 1961, 410-16; Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, and Henry Stuart Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th with supplement ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940; repr., 1973), 485.

[127] Fulford, *Divine Eloquence*, 1; Mario Baghos, "St Gregory the Theologian's Metanarrative of History," *Phronema* 26, no. 2 (2011): 63-79, 75.

towards pagan images, both statues and portraits. For, as I shall demonstrate, Gregory interprets the human *eikon* on certain occasions quite literally as a visible *eikon* of God. After this, I move on to consider further biblical themes from which Gregory draws to form his vision of the human *eikon*. These entail the ethical implications of being an *eikon*; the way in which the whole biblical narrative presents the *eikon* as dynamic; the view of Paul and later church fathers of Christ as the true *Eikon*; and finally, later pseudepigraphal interpretations of Genesis which set the *eikon* in a cosmological battle with the devil. Since the philosophical and biblical ideas are amalgamated in Philo and early church fathers, a discussion of these concludes this overview of the background to the *eikon*. Although Christian iconography was beginning to be discussed by Christians in the fourth century, I do not include this since Gregory himself mentions only pagan images.[128]

2.2 Gregory's Interpretation of Scripture

Beginning with the question of canon, Gregory makes explicit his view of the books which he considers to be "divinely inspired," in a poem entitled *On the Genuine Books of Divinely Inspired Scripture*.[129] Gregory states that all else is not genuine, although, as Demoen and Gallay highlight, this does not prevent him from citing and alluding to numerous extra-canonical books which are not included in this list.[130]

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[128] Also observed by Børtnes, "Eikôn Theou," 287-91. For the beginnings of Christian worship of images, see Ernst Kitzinger, "The Cult of Images in the Age before Iconoclasm," *DOP* 8 (1954): 83-150, 88-150.

[129] Carm. 1.1.12, PG 37, 472-474. This poem is translated by Brian Dunkle, *Poems on Scripture: Saint Gregory of Nazianzus* (New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2012), 37-39. The Bible is present in every work; Paul Gallay, "La Bible dans l'oeuvre de Grégoire de Nazianze le Théologien," in *Le monde grec ancien et la Bible*, ed. Claude Mondésert (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1984), 313-34, 318.

[130] Carm. 1.1.12, PG 37, 474, 39. For example, the Book of Judith is cited in Or. 45.15, PG 36, 644B; Baruch 3.36 is cited in Or. 30.13, SC 250, 252-54. Or. 1.6, SC 247, 78-80 is reminiscent of Tobit 10.4. For further examples, see "La Bible," 317-18; Kristoffel Demoen, *Pagan and Biblical Exempla in Gregory Nazianzen: A Study in Rhetoric and Hermeneutics* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996),

For example, Gregory mentions by name the books of Wisdom and of Revelation, although they are excluded from his poem.[131]

I believe that iconographers often depict Gregory holding a Bible because, for Gregory, Scripture could be said to be the "doorway to divinization."[132] When we consider the question of Gregory's biblical interpretation, we must remember that he approached the Bible as a priest and a pastor, concerned both with his own purity and that of the Church.[133] In a poem which Gregory wrote to be used as a prayer prior to reading Scripture, he writes that the Bible is a book of "holiness and purity" through which God may attend to the soul of God's servant.[134] He considers time spent dwelling in the written word to be the best use of time; this is indicated by the vast number of poems which comprise passages of the Bible put to verse, produced by Gregory for the purpose of easy memorisation.[135] Aside from poems, much of Gregory's biblical interpretation occurs in the context of festal orations, where language is sacramental, conveying "the eternal meaning of the biblical events that are being celebrated."[136]

Gregory writes that only the one whose heart has been made to burn as she reads the Bible is fit to stand and speak about God, since the

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[131] Or. 42.23, SC 384, 100-02 denotes Solomon as the author of Wisdom.

[132] Brian Daley, "Walking through the Word of God: Gregory of Nazianzus as a Biblical Interpreter," in *The Word Leaps the Gap: Essays on Scripture and Theology in Honor of Richard B. Hays*, ed. J. Ross Wagner, Christopher Kavin Rowe, and A. Katherine Grieb (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 514-31, 523.

[133] Regarding priestly concerns, Gregory's use of Paul can be found in Susanna Elm, "Paul as Conceived by Gregory of Nazianzus: Considerations Regarding his Antiochene Greek and Syriac *Nachleben*," in *San Paulo letto da Oriente*, ed. F. Bonaghi and E. Virginio, *SOCM 18* (Milan: Edizioni Terrae Sanctae, 2010), 109-18.

[134] Carm. 1.1.35, PG 37, 517, 10.

[135] Carm. 1.1.15, PG 37, 475-506. Gregory's study of Scripture appears tireless; see Gallay, "La Bible," 333.

[136] Frances M. Young, *Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 143-44; Paul M. Blowers, "Eastern Orthodox Biblical Interpretation," in *A History of Biblical Interpretation: The Medieval through the Reformation Periods*, ed. Alan J. Hauser and Duayne F. Watson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 172-200, 181.

text itself is a means of illumination.[137] Clearly Gregory counts himself among those who are illumined, since in *On the Holy Spirit*, Gregory bases his arguments for the deity of the Spirit solely on Scripture, thus demonstrating that he is able both to interpret the Bible and speak about God.[138] Whilst Gregory did not leave behind a plethora of exegetical commentaries, we should not conclude that the act of interpretation was of little consequence to him.[139] On the contrary, Gregory prizes not only the Bible itself, but also holds clear ideas about how it should be read and by whom it should be interpreted.[140] A number of commentators have drawn attention to the idea that for Gregory "the Bible *is* Christ, because its every word brings us into the presence of the one who spoke it."[141] This approach differs from the majority of contemporary Western scholarship. For, when approaching the biblical narrative of the human story, and in particular the human *eikon*, Western scholars often read it in light of the "creation, fall, redemption" narrative which runs from Genesis to Revelation.[142] Gregory's narrative adopts a different nuance and does not follow a strictly linear construction, where the incarnation is simply the next

[137] Or. 2.71, SC 247, 182-84; 2.96-97, SC 247, 214-16; for Scripture as illumination, see Or. 40.37, SC 358, 282-84; Frederick W. Norris, "Constructing and Constructed by Scripture," in *The Bible in Greek Christian Antiquity*, ed. Paul Blowers (Notre Dame, IND: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 149-62.

[138] I find it interesting that Gregory does not appeal to church tradition in his defence of the Spirit, but only the Bible. For further discussion of Gregory's use of Scripture in the defence of the Spirit, see Thomas A. Noble, "Gregory Nazianzen's Use of Scripture in Defence of the Deity of the Spirit," *TB* 39 (1988): 101-23.

[139] Or. 37, SC 318, 270-319 entails Gregory's only exegetical oration, focusing on Matt 19:12.

[140] Or. 31:21-24, SC 250, 314-22.

[141] Paul Evdokimov, *Orthodoxy*, trans. Jeremy Hummerstone (New York: New City Press, 2011), 194; Charles Kannengiesser, *Handbook of Patristic Exegesis: The Bible in Ancient Christianity, Vol 1* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 749.

[142] For example, Winslow, *Dynamics of Salvation*, passim.

chapter in the story of salvation.[143] This is evident when Gregory speaks about the creation of humanity in writings concerned primarily with Christ, or the Christian lifestyle, for example, *On the Theophany,*[144] *On the Lights*,[145] *On New Sunday*,[146] *On Sacred Pascha*,[147] poems which occur in his *Arcana*,[148] and *In Praise of Virginity*.[149] Thus, Christ is not conceived as though he were at the middle of a straight line, where there is a "before" and an "after."[150] Rather than two distinctive actions, creation and salvation should be understood as a continual process in light of Christ, "bringing the creature… to the stature of the Saviour, by whom and for whom all creation came into being."[151] This relates to the way in which Gregory views

> … the convergence of humanity and divinity in Christ's person at the incarnation, the significance of which (as both a remedy to evil and as opening up the potential for deification) places Christ metaphorically at the centre of the historical process.[152]

The principal implication of Gregory's view of the incarnation means

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[143] Contra Dragoş A. Giulea, "The Cappadocian Paschal Christology: Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa on the Paschal Divine Image of Christ," *JAC* 12 (2009): 475-501, 478.

[144] Or. 38, SC 358, 104-38.

[145] Or. 39, SC 358, 150-97.

[146] Or. 44, PG 36, 608A-622A.

[147] Or. 45, PG 36, 623A-664C. The creation of the human person in Oration 38 is repeated almost verbatim in Oration 45. Alternative titles for the orations can be found in Nonna Verna Harrison, *Gregory Nazianzen: Festal Orations*, PPS (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2008).

[148] For dating from A.D. 381-82, see Moreschini and Sykes, *Poemata Arcana*, 67.

[149] Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 521-578; Peter Bouteneff, *Beginnings: Ancient Christian Readings of the Biblical Creation Narratives* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2008), 168.

[150] Or. 2.88, SC 247, 202-04.

[151] John Behr, *The Mystery of Christ: Life in Death* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2006), 86.

[152] Baghos, "Metanarrative of History," 75.

that he reads Scripture as a unified whole, focusing on the narrative of salvation.[153] This approach determines Gregory's use of intertextuality, which I follow Hays as defining, "the embedding of fragments of an earlier text within a later one."[154] An example of this lies in Gregory's first Easter oration where he reads the Israelites' escape from Egypt both in light of Christ's passion and resurrection and the new life for those following Christ.[155]

Gregory's focus on interpreting Scripture as salvation history sets him apart, to a degree, from predecessors, such as Origen.[156] It is generally held that there are essentially two schools of biblical interpretation during Gregory's lifetime; namely, Antiochene, where the emphasis is on a literary and historical reading of the text, and Alexandrian, exemplified in Origen's threefold method of interpretation, where spiritual readings and allegory are prized.[157] Origen's three senses roughly correspond to the literal, moral and spiritual readings representing body, soul and spirit.[158] Whilst Gregory appeals to allegory on occasion, it is not his only method of making sense of the text.[159] In

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[153] For example, in *On Love for the Poor*, Gregory moves from the Old Testament through to the New Testament, highlighting all the varying ways God has demonstrated his mercy through the ages; Or. 14.27, PG 35, 892D-896A; Carm. 1.1.9, PG 37, 456-464.

[154] Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 14.

[155] Or. 1.1-5, SC 247, 72-94; Young describes the intertextuality as being one "of imaginative and creative play," *Biblical Exegesis,* 116.

[156] See Or. 45.12, PG 36, 637C-640B; Frances M. Young, "Interpretation of Scripture," in *The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies*, ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David G. Hunter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 845-63, 856.

[157] For Origen's system of exegesis, see Henri de Lubac, *History and Spirit: The Understanding of Scripture According to Origen*, trans. Anne Englund Nash (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007); Jean Daniélou, *Origen*, trans. Walter Mitchell (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955); Karlfried Froehlich, *Biblical Interpretation in the Early Church* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 48-78.

[158] Arguing for the similarities between the methods of Gregory and Origen, see Daley, "Gregory of Nazianzus as a Biblical Interpreter," 521; Fulford, *Divine Eloquence*, 109.

[159] Or. 20.4, SC 270, 62-64; 28.2, SC 250, 102-04; 38.11, SC 358, 124-26; Carm. 1.1.8, PG 37, 446-456; see Kannengiesser, *Patristic Exegesis*, 749.

his seminal work on Gregory's pagan and biblical exempla, Demoen concludes correctly that

> in the evaluations of Gregory's exegesis, the whole spectrum of typology and allegorism, Alexandrian and Antiochene can be found.[160]

Whilst these exegetical methods are evident in Gregory's work, his overriding approach is doubtless that which revolves around Christ and salvation history.[161] As I observed earlier, when Gregory speaks at length about the creation of the human *eikon*, he does so in orations focused upon Christ, setting the overall narrative of the human *eikon* in the context of the incarnation.[162]

2.3 The *Eikon* in Biblical and Pseudepigraphal Writing

2.3.1 *Eikon in Genesis*

Having discussed Gregory's approaches to Scripture, which he interprets primarily in light of Christ, I turn now to the themes and passages in the Bible itself, which are most relevant to Gregory's presentation of the human *eikon*. The notion of humankind as God's *eikon* occurs first in Genesis 1:26-27 where God's creation of humankind is the climax of the creation account.[163] Since Gregory read

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[160] Demoen, *Pagan and Biblical Exempla*, 249-50.

[161] Or. 38, SC 358, 104-48.

[162] See Chapter 3.

[163] Gerhard von Rad, *Genesis*, trans. John H. Marks, rev. ed., OTL (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972), 57. Scholars are generally agreed that the redaction of Genesis 1 belongs to a Priestly source; Gordan J. Wenham, *Genesis 1-15*, WBC (Waco: Word, 1987), xxxvii-xlii. For broad coverage of the history of the exegesis of Gen 1:26–28, see Claus Westermann, *Genesis 1-11: A Continental Commentary*, trans. John Scullion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 147–55; David J.A. Clines, "The Image of God in Man," *TB* 19 (1968): 53-103; Gunnlaugur A. Jónsson, *The Image of God: Genesis 1:26-28 in a Century of Old Testament Research*, CBOTS (Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1988).

the Septuagint, I cite this below:[164]

> And God said, "Let us make the human being according to our *eikon* and likeness (καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽ὁμοίωσιν), and let them rule over the fish of the sea, and over the flying creatures of heaven, and over the cattle and all the earth, and over all the reptiles that creep on the earth." And God made humankind, according to the *eikon* of God he made him. Male and female he made them (καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, κατ᾽εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτόν, ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποίησεν αὐτούς).[165]

My primary concern is Gregory's interpretation of the human *eikon*, therefore I shall discuss the interpretations which are relevant to Gregory's ideas, rather than attempting to resolve the disparities about which contemporary Hebrew Bible scholars debate.[166] In order to inform further the interpretation of the *eikon* in Genesis 1:26-27,

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[164] Gregory informs us himself that he did not know Hebrew in Carm. 2.1.39, PG 37, 1335, 82-83. Gregory usually read the LXX, occasionally referring to Theodotion's translation, see Demoen, *Pagan and Biblical Exempla*, 235. The LXX itself is generally dated to the third century B.C.; see Robert J.V. Hiebert "Septuagint: Origins and Significance," in *The Book of Genesis: Composition, Reception, and Interpretation*, ed. Craig A. Evans, Joel N. Lohr, and David L. Petersen, *SVT* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 405-26. For an overview of development of the LXX, see Sarah A. Brayford, *Genesis* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 1-31; John W. Wevers, *Text History of the Greek Genesis* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), passim. For details on construction of the LXX, see Emanuel Tov, "The Septuagint," in *Mikra: Text, Translation, Reading and Interpretation of the Hebrew Bible in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity*, ed. Martin J. Mulder and Harry Sysling (Assen, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 161-88, 165-68.

[165] Translation amended from Sophie Cartwright, *The Theological Anthropology of Eustathius of Antioch* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 142. Greek text from *Septuaginta*, Alfred Rahlfs (ed.) and emended by Robert Hanhart. Rev.edn. (Stuggart, 2006), 2. צלם is translated consistently as εἰκών throughout the LXX; see Martin Rösel, *Übersetzung als Vollendung der Auslegung*, BZAW (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994), 48.

[166] For views regarding ontology, see Andreas Schüle, "Made in the 'Image of God': The Concepts of Divine Images in Gen 1-3," *ZAW* 117, no. 1 (2005): 1-20, 5. For comments on structure, see Wenham, *Genesis 1-15*, 29-30. For the function of the *imago Dei*, see Middleton, "Imago Dei in Context," 12.

biblical scholars have attended to the way in which צלמ/εἰκών is employed throughout the Old Testament. On a number of occasions צלמ /εἰκών describes a physical object, such as a statue or an idol (Wis 2.23, Num 33:52, Ezek 7:20, 2Kgs 11:18, Dan 3:1). This, alongside recent archaeological discoveries, has led certain scholars to re-examine ideas of the *eikon* in light of cultures contemporary with those of the Old Testament.[167] Research has demonstrated that the Ancient Near Eastern notion of an image (צלמ) involved a ritual process of transformation.[168] Once the ritual was completed, the image of the god was believed to embody the god so fully that the image became the god itself. Egyptian texts make clear that the craftsmen were not concerned primarily with representing what a god looked like; instead, the image was the place where the god manifested itself, "thus the presence of the god and the blessing that accompanied that presence were effected through the image."[169] The images were considered to be living images embodying the divine presence, rather than being merely lifeless wood or bronze statues. In effect, through ritual the images became the gods themselves and were considered to be 'divine.'

This background evolved in a vastly different time and culture from Gregory's, therefore I shall outline corresponding concepts of statues and portraits of gods and emperors in Graeco-Roman culture, since this was the worldview in which Gregory formed his ideas. Traditionally, scholars are sceptical regarding the belief that the Graeco-Roman gods were present in their statues. This is due to the lack of evidence for any ritual of animation in Ancient Greece, unlike in ancient Mesopotamia.[170] Furthermore, following a negative reading of

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[167] Edward M. Curtis, "Image of God," in *ABD, H-J*, ed. David N. Freeman (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 389-91.

[168] Ibid., 390; Zainab Bahrani, *The Graven Image: Representation in Babylonia and Assyria* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 121-48.

[169] Curtis, "Image of God," 389. Also, see Ellen J. Van Wolde, "The Text as an Eloquent Guide: Rhetorical, Linguistic and Literary Features in Genesis 1," in *The Book of Genesis: Composition, Reception, and Interpretation*, ed. Craig A. Evans, Joel N. Lohr, and David L. Petersen (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 134-52.

[170] Walter Burkert, *Greek Religion*, trans. John Raffan (Cambridge, Mass.:

Platonic mimesis, scholars have argued that the educated elite understood the *eikon* as merely a copy.[171] More recently however, studies on images have successfully challenged this argument by building on the "popular" Graeco-Roman view, which accepted the presence of deities in *eikones*.[172] For an example of this, Fox appeals to Augustus, who banished Poseidon's statue because of bad weather; through this action it was believed that Augustus insulted Poseidon himself.[173] Also, an ambiguity in the Greek language means that "'Artemis' can imply either the goddess herself or an image of her."[174] This explains why so much care had to be taken when handling statues; the "ambiguity afforded an edge of danger, since incorrect treatment of a statue could be construed as an assault on the deity embodied in it."[175] This notion of representation extends to ancient dream theory, where it makes no difference whether the dreamer sees the statue of a god or the god itself.[176]

Images of Roman emperors are also pertinent to this

Harvard University Press, 1985), 91.

[171] Verity J. Platt, *Facing the Gods: Epiphany and Representation in Greco-Roman Art, Literature and Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 204; Danielle S. Allen, *Why Plato Wrote* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 174-76; Kenneth Lapatin, "New Statues for Old Gods," in *The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and Transformations*, ed. Jan N. Bremmer and Andrew Erskine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 126-54, 133.

[172] Christopher A. Faraone, *Talismans and Trojan Horses: Guardians and Statues in Ancient Greek Myth and Ritual* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), passim; Moshe Barasch, *Icon: Studies in the History of an Idea* (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 24; Hans Belting, *Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image Before the Era of Art*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 37; Jaś Elsner, "Iconoclasm as Discourse: From Antiquity to Byzantium," *Art Bulletin* XCIV, no. 3 (2012): 368-84, 370.

[173] Suetonius, *Aug.* 16.

[174] Pausanias, *Descr.* 3.16.9; Matthew Dillon and Lynda Garland, *Ancient Greece: Social and Historical Documents from Archaic Times to the Death of Alexander* (London: Routledge, 2010), 240. Also, Jaś Elsner, *Roman Eyes: Visuality & Subjectivity in Art & Text* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 11; Robin Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians* (Harmondsworth: Viking, 1986), 133.

[175] Elsner, *Roman Eyes*, 11. See Pseudo-Lucian's *Amores,* 15–16.

[176] Barasch, *Icon*, 32-33.

discussion.[177] For instance, Theodosius made Maximus an emperor by erecting the latter's image, which he commanded the people to worship in place of their Alexandrian gods.[178] Furthermore, in Gregory's own lifetime, the images of the emperor Theodosius were smashed to pieces in the tax rebellion in A.D. 387, and he was angry precisely because his imperial image "embodied his own actual presence within the city."[179] Thus, a statue of a god embodied the divine presence of the god; likewise *eikones* of emperors were perceived to embody the emperor's presence, functioning as a substitute for the emperor.[180]

On the subject of emperors and their *eikones,* in his first invective *Against Julian*, Gregory argues that it is acceptable to venerate an *eikon* of the emperor, but not if pagan gods also feature in the same picture. This is because by the fourth century Christians accepted the emperor cult; but for Gregory, bowing down before portraits or statues of pagan gods was a step too far. He offers no such detail on the relationship between emperors and their *eikones* as Basil who, in *On the Holy Spirit*, writes "we speak of the emperor and the emperor's image – but not two emperors… the honor given the image passes to the prototype."[181]

Thus far, I have argued that pagan *eikones* are likenesses which have the potential to carry some presence or power of the figure represented, whether it is an emperor or a god. Pagan and Christian ideas about the power of certain portraits are also pertinent to this

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[177] Plutarch wrote that the Roman emperor was considered to be an "image of God, who orders all things;" *Princ. Iner.* 780E.

[178] Sabine MacCormack, *Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 67.

[179] Frederick G. McLeod, *The Image of God in the Antiochene Tradition* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1999), 236; Elm, *Sons of Hellenism*, 325.

[180] Or. 4.80-81, SC 309, 202-06.

[181] 18.45, SC 17, 194. Translation; David Anderson, *St Basil the Great: On the Holy Spirit*, PPS (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1980), 72. Børtnes has identified that John Damascene quoted extensively from all the Cappadocians in the florilegia to his *Treatises against the Iconoclasts*; see "Rhetoric and Mental Images," 37.

discussion. In his second poem *On Virtue*, Gregory recounts the experience of a whore, who comes across an *eikon* of Polemon in the home of a dissolute youth.[182] Gregory describes the immense power of Polemon's gaze staring out from the portrait. He depicts the portrait of Polemon as possessing such power that the woman was put to shame "as if he were alive (ζῶν)."[183] Gregory's description suggests that particular *eikones* bear a presence, or a power, which means that the person encountering them meets, in some way, the figure that the portrait is depicting.[184]

This belief, evident both in Ancient Near Eastern and popular Graeco-Roman cultures, informs the interpretation of Genesis 1:26-27, in which human persons are *eikones* of God. In the same way that pagan *eikones* bear the presence of the god or emperor which they embody, likewise the human *eikon* bears God's presence, in such a way that she could be said to be 'divine.' Ideas such as these appear to have contributed to the interpretation of Genesis 1:26-27 in the work of certain early theologians, for example, Clement of Alexandria, as Nasrallah has argued successfully.[185] Nasrallah goes as far as to argue that Clement's writing on the human person is understood only in light of contemporary views on pagan statues and idols. She advises,

> We must also take these statues seriously as *theological* statements. That is, even as Christians debate incarnation and *theosis*, so also these statues say something about human

[182] For the identity of Polemon, see Wayne Meeks, *The Origins of Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 22.

[183] Carm. 1.2.10, PG 37, 738, 807; Børtnes discusses the role of Polemon in this poem at length; refer to Børtnes, "Rhetoric and Mental Images," 37-40.

[184] Elsner describes this concept as "the thrust of an implicit theological perspective;" see "Iconoclasm as Discourse," 369.

[185] *Prot*. I.5.4, I.6.4; Laura Nasrallah, "The Earthen Human, the Breathing Statue: The Sculptor God, Greco-Roman Statuary, and Clement of Alexandria," in *Beyond Eden: The Biblical Story of Paradise [Genesis 2-3] and its Reception History*, ed. Konrad Schmid and Christopher Riedweg (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 110-40.

possibilities of becoming divine, and about the divine in human form.[186]

Clement is not the only theologian to consider the human *eikon* as a physical *eikon*; Irenaeus also emphasises the inclusion of the body when discussing the human *eikon*, resulting in the whole human person being, quite literally, an *eikon* of God.[187] Thus, the human person could be said to be divine because she is an *eikon* of God, embodying the spirit of God.[188]

Consider that for a human *eikon* to function like a pagan *eikon*, *eikon* must relate to the whole human person and not just the spiritual intellect or the soul. This challenges the general view concerning Gregory's approach to the human *eikon*. As I demonstrated in Chapter One, most scholars equate Gregory's understanding of the *eikon* with the soul or the spiritual intellect. This discussion is influenced by the approach of early theologians such as Philo, who argued that the spiritual intellect (νοῦς) is the aspect of the human person which images God.[189] He came to this conclusion through his interpretation of the differing creation accounts in Genesis 1 and 2. Scholars are almost unanimous in believing that Philo regards the accounts as speaking of two different people, one earthly and one heavenly.[190] For Philo, it is the

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[186] Nasrallah, "The Earthen Human," 122.

[187] *Dem.* 22; see John Behr, *St. Irenaeus of Lyons: The Apostolic Preaching* (Crestwood, New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1997); Matthew C. Steenberg, *Of God and Man: Theology as Anthropology from Irenaeus to Athanasius* (New York: T&T Clark, 2009), 17.

[188] For a discussion of the different emphases of the Eastern fathers, see Nicolae Răzvan Stan, "Human Person as a Being Created in the Image of God and as the Image of the Son: The Orthodox Christian Perspective," *IJOT* 2, no. 3 (2011): 120-43. For Western approaches, see David Cairns, *The Image of God in Man* (London: Collins, 1973).

[189] *Spec.* 1.171; Philo, *The Works of Philo: Complete and Unabridged*, trans. Charles Duke Yonge, New updated ed. (Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Pub., 1993), 550. In making this move, Philo protects God from being understood as anthropomorphic, which is crucial to his theology; see *Leg.* 2.1.

[190] *Leg.* 1.31, 2.4. For an informative overview of the history of scholarly interpretation of this problem, see Thomas H. Tobin, *The Creation of Man:*

heavenly person alone who is made according to the *eikon* of God; this notion aligns itself with Philo's idea that the *eikon* is not corporeal, but relates only to the spiritual intellect.[191] A few centuries later, Origen presents the same view: "The soul, not only for the first man, but of all men arose according to the image."[192] However, I argue that whilst Gregory undoubtedly interprets the human *eikon* metaphorically as the soul and the spiritual intellect on numerous occasions, he also interprets the *eikon* quite literally as a physical *eikon*.

Next, I shall demonstrate that this idea, i.e. that pagan statues and portraits are likenesses which have the potential to bear some presence or power of the figure represented, informs Gregory's literal interpretation of Genesis 1:26-27, in which humankind is created according to the *eikon* of God. For our first example of how Gregory employs these ideas of contemporary statuary, we need look no further than *A Funeral Oration on the Great Basil*. Here we observe Basil functioning in a manner similar to a pagan *eikon*, when Gregory likens him to a statue at the Epiphany Eucharist:

> With body and eyes and mind (διάνοιαν) unswerving, as though nothing new had occurred, but rather being fixed like a statue (ἀλλ᾽ ἑστηλωμένον) so to speak, for God and the altar, while those around him stood in fear and reverence (τοὺς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν ἑστηκότας ἐν φόβῳ τινὶ καὶ σεβάσματι).[193]

Philo and the History of Interpretation, CBQMS (Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1983), 102-34. For support of the "two man" theory, see George H. Van Kooten, *Paul's Anthropology in Context: The Image of God, Assimilation to God and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 60; Ronald Williamson, *Jews in the Hellenistic World: Philo*, CCWJCW (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 127; David T. Runia, "God and Man in Philo of Alexandria," *JTS* 39, no. 1 (1988): 48-74; Stefan Nordgaard, "Paul's Appropriation of Philo's Theory of 'Two Men' in 1 Corinthians 15.45-49," *NTS* 57, no. 3 (2011): 348-65, 355.

[191] *Opif.* 134-35.

[192] Origen, *Homilies on Jeremiah; Homily on 1 Kings 28*, trans. John Clark Smith, TFC (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1998), 23.

[193] Or. 43.52, SC 384, 234.

Like a stone or wooden *eikon,* Basil is perfectly still. In the same way that we would expect pagans to respond to a pagan *eikon* with fear and reverence, those around Basil respond likewise with "fear and reverence." In effect, Gregory treats Basil here as though he were a 'divine' *eikon*. If we bear in mind that *eikones* were often seen as being "direct links back to their prototypes," it is logical that those around Basil would revere him, for in revering Basil as God's *eikon*, they revere God.[194]

Elsewhere, ideas about the pagan *eikon* as a bearer of divine presence shed light on the occasions when Gregory contrasts directly the human *eikon* with the pagan *eikon* or idol (*eidola*). Gregory seeks to undermine the power of the pagan *eikon*, by demonstrating the unique status of the human *eikon*. For the human person is the *eikon* who truly bears divine presence because she alone is made alive through God's breath.[195] Gregory makes this point in his second poem on *Ignoble Ways of Nobility*:

> For indeed the painted *eikon* (εἰκών) is not greater than
> the *eikon* of the breathing man, even though it shines (τῆς τοῦ πνέοντος ἀνδρὸς, εἰ καὶ λάμπεται).[196]

The notion of the breathing human *eikon* as superior to all other *eikones* relates back to the way in which the human person was created. Drawing from the creation accounts in both Genesis 1 and 2, Gregory

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[194] Jaś Elsner, *Art and the Roman Viewer: The Transformation of Art from the Pagan World to Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 170; Peter Stewart, "The Image of the Roman Emperor," in *Presence: The Inherence of the Prototype within Images and other Objects*, ed. Rupert Shepherd and Robert Maniura (Hants., U.K.: Ashgate, 2006), 245-58, 243-44; MacCormack, *Art and Ceremony*, 67; Suzanne Saïd, "Deux noms de l'image en grec ancien: idole et icône," *CRAI* 131, no. 2 (1987): 309–30, 323.

[195] Patricia Cox Miller, *The Corporeal Imagination: Signifying the Holy in Late Ancient Christianity* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press Incorporated, 2012), 133-42.

[196] Carm. 1.2.27, PG 37, 854, 8-9.

depicts the human *eikon* as being animated through God's breath in his poem *On the Soul*:

> As [God] spoke, taking a portion of freshly made earth,
> with immortal hands he established my form and he gave to it a share of his own life.
> For into it [God] infused spirit (πνεῦμα), a fragment of the hidden Godhead.
> From clay and breath a mortal *eikon* of the immortal One (βροτός ἀθανάτοιο εἰκών) was established…[197]

The example above is typical of how Gregory describes the creation of the human *eikon*. She is unique amongst all *eikones* because she is created by God and infused with God's breath. Consequently, the human *eikon* is set apart from all other images, as the *eikon* who bears divine presence truly. This becomes evident further through Gregory's use of language in his poem on the ten commandments, as they appear in Exodus 20:1-17 and Deuteronomy 5:6-22. [198] The second commandment in Exodus is relevant to this discussion:

> You shall not make for yourself an idol (εἴδωλον), whether in the form of anything that is in heaven above, or that is on the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth (Ex 20:4).

Gregory interprets this commandment as,

> You shall not set up an empty likeness and a breathless *eikon* (οὐ στήσεις ἴνδαλμα κενὸν καὶ ἄπνοον εἰκώ).[199]

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[197] Carm. 1.1.8, PG 37, 452, 70-75.

[198] Carm. 1.1.12, PG 37, 471-474.

[199] Carm. 1.1.15, PG 37, 476. Dunkle provides the following translation, "You shall not erect an empty façade, a lifeless image;" *Poems on Scripture*, 41.

Whilst εἴδωλον occurs in both Exodus and Deuteronomy, Gregory exchanges it for εἰκών in his interpretation of the commandment. Since Gregory is famed for his rhetoric and chooses his words carefully, we should not assume that the alteration was either an oversight or merely to fit with the metre of the poem. Rather, Gregory appears to recall that there is only one true *eikon* of God; namely, the human person.[200] Relating to Gregory's application of the ten commandments is a thesis put forward by Frances Young. She has explored early church fathers' concepts of *eikon* in relation to Exodus 20:4 and idolatry; Colossians 1:15 and Christology; Genesis 1:27 and anthropology, arguing that these three passages are implicitly related in Athanasius, the Cappadocians, and Cyril of Jerusalem.[201] Young attempts to draw the three key texts together, arguing,

> As the image of the Image of God human beings replace idols, all the more so as the corruption of sin is washed away and they are renewed after the Image in Christ so as to become more and more God-like.[202]

In light of my discussion thus far, I am inclined to agree with Young's evaluation. I extend her thesis by observing that Gregory's poetic reworking of the second commandment, which I cited above, is an explicit, not implicit, example of the human *eikon* replacing a pagan idol.[203] Furthermore, a significant factor in how the human *eikon* functions on earth relates to where human *eikones* direct their worship.

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[200] "Man is to make himself no image or likeness of God… because he himself and only he is intended to represent the image and likeness of God upon the earth," Jürgen Moltmann, *Man: Christian Anthropology in the Conflicts of the Present*, trans. John Sturdy (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), 109.

[201] Frances M. Young, "God's Image: The 'Elephant in the Room' in the Fourth Century?," in *Studia Patristica 50*, ed. Allen Brent and Markus Vinzent (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2011), 57-72.

[202] Ibid., 67.

[203] For a similar discussion in relation to Clement, see Nasrallah, "The Earthen Human," 110-40.

Gregory argues that it is not fitting for mortals to commit idolatry, precisely because they are *eikones* of God:

> It is not right, it is not proper for a mortal to be born from God (οὐδ' ἐπέοικε θεοῦ βροτὸν ἐκγεγαῶτα)
> A beautiful and imperishable *eikon* (ἄφθιτος εἰκών) of the Heavenly Word…
> To give way unlawfully to empty idols (εἴδωλα κενά)
> Of things which live in the sea, the earth and that which flies in the air…[204]

Above, Gregory argues that as an imperishable *eikon* the human person must not worship idols. The human person is the breathing *eikon* because she is filled with the breath of God, compared with idols which are empty; therefore she must not commit idolatry.

I shall continue to explore this theme in Chapter Three in which we shall see that Gregory also presents Christ as a physical *Eikon*; and Chapter Four, in which I shall discuss how Gregory treats women literally as physical *eikones.* Together these examples build a picture of how Gregory views the *eikon* literally as physical *eikon.* I am not suggesting that what Gregory writes about *eikones* and idols is either highly theorised or conclusive. However, throughout his work, Gregory refers to physical *eikones* (whether two or three-dimensional) frequently enough to warrant considering how these concepts inform his overall idea of the human *eikon*.

Through presenting this significant strand of Gregory's approach to the human *eikon*, I challenge the general agreement amongst contemporary scholars; namely that Gregory's view of the human *eikon* is solely metaphorical. Thus, I contend that Gregory's approach is complex and multifaceted. Next I move on to discuss further biblical themes on which Gregory draws to inform his view of the human *eikon*.

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[204] Carm. 2.2.7, PG 37, 1555, 51-56.

2.3.2 *Ethical Eikon*

Being created as an *eikon* of God entails that all human life is precious and must be treated with care and respect. This is the interpretation offered in Genesis 9:6,

> Whoever sheds the blood of a human, by a human shall that person's blood be shed; for in his own image God made humankind.

This ethical interpretation of Genesis 1 continues to be prevalent throughout pseudepigraphal literature, Philo and the early church fathers.[205] Gregory follows the author of Genesis 9:6 and later interpreters in placing a high value upon the life of the human *eikon* precisely because she images God. Taken from an oration on theological discourse, the lines below exemplify this:

> It is not the same thing to cut down a plant or a flower which blooms temporarily, and a human person (ἄνθρωπος). You are an *eikon* of God and you converse with an *eikon* of God.[206]

Above, Gregory demonstrates two ways in which he approaches the ethics of being an *eikon* of God, namely function and ontology.[207] First, he argues that, in order to image God, the human *eikon* must imitate God's philanthropy towards other human *eikones*; this relates to the function of the *eikon*. Secondly, Gregory observes that human life is

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[205] 2 Enoch 44; *Spec.* 3.83; *Comm. Jn.* 13.28.165. For further comments on ethics and the *eikon*, see Jacob Jervell, *Imago Dei: Gen 1,26f. im Spätjudentum, in der Gnosis und in den paulinischen Briefen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1960), 26-37; Carlos Lévy, "Philo's Ethics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Philo*, ed. Adam Kamesar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 146-71.

[206] Or. 32.30, SC 318, 148.

[207] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 124-26.

precious because human persons image God; this relates to her ontology. Later betraying ethical concerns, Gregory states that the ruler must rule fairly because he (i.e. the ruler) is an *eikon* of God. In making this move he demonstrates that the divine function of the human *eikon* is to rule as God rules. Also, Gregory observes that the ruler should rule fairly because those over whom he rules are *eikones* of God.[208] Thus, the human *eikon* warrants fair treatment precisely because she is an *eikon* of God.

Observe this two-pronged approach regarding function and ontology in Gregory's treatment of philanthropy towards the poor.[209] Gregory argues that those who are poor and sick should be treated benevolently because they too are God's *eikones*.[210] Likewise those who practise good works toward the poor and sick are most like God,[211] where practising philanthropy increases the divinity of the *eikon*.[212] Gregory's views on the relationship between poverty, wealth and the *eikon* are consistent. They are scattered throughout his orations, poems and letters,[213] occurring in abundance in *On Love for the Poor*.[214]

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[208] Or. 17.9, PG 35, 976B-D.

[209] On how the poor themselves are more divine, see Verna E. F. Harrison, "Poverty, Social Involvement, and Life in Christ according to Saint Gregory the Theologian," *GOTR* 39, no. 1-2 (1994): 151-64, 156. Gregory also recalls the creation of humankind as reason for providing relief for the needy in Or. 14.26, PG 35, 892B-D.

[210] Anthony S.J. Meredith, "The Three Cappadocians on Beneficence: A Key to their Audiences," in *Preacher and Audience: Studies in Early Christian and Byzantine Homiletics*, ed. Mary B. Cunningham and Pauline Allen (Leiden: Brill 1998), 89–104, 102. For a thorough critique of all of the literature pertaining to poverty relief by the Cappadocians, see Susan Holman, *The Hungry are Dying: Beggars and Bishops in Roman Cappadocia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1-29.

[211] Or. 14.22-23, PG 35, 885B-888A; 14.27, PG 35, 892D-893A.

[212] Or. 14.27, PG 35, 892D-893A; 17.9, PG 35, 976B-D.

[213] Or. 8.9, SC 405, 262-64; the whole of Or. 14, PG 35, 858A-909C; 26.6, SC 284, 138-40; 38.5, SC 358, 110-12; 43.63, SC 384, 262-64. There are similar themes in *Against Wealth*; see Ulrich Beuckmann, *Gregor von Nazianz: Gegen die Habsucht (Carmen 1,2,28) Einleitung und Kommentar*. SGKA. NF 2 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1988), 12. For classical reminiscences, see Francesco Trisoglio, "Reminiscenze e consonanze classiche nella XIV orazione di San Gregorio Nazianzeno" (paper presented at the Atti della Accademia

Holman has observed that Gregory exhorts his audience

> to imitate the ἰσότης of God, which translators render equality, evenhandedness, or "the justice of God." He also uses ἰσονομία, a Greek political term meaning "equality of rights."[215]

Thus, the purpose of the human *eikon* is to function like God in all ethical concerns. The more she functions like God, the more the *eikon* becomes like God, vis à vis 'divine.'

Gregory continues to develop the ethical implications of being an *eikon* of God as a major theme regarding humankind throughout his writing. Numerous scholars have observed that Gregory's high view of the human *eikon* informs directly his ethics.[216] Exemplifying the

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delle Scienze di Torino II: Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche, 1964), 199-204.

[214] Or. 14, PG 35, 858A-909C. For a discussion concerning the two titles of this oration as, *On Love for the Poor* and *On Feeding the Poor*, see Donald F. Winslow, "Gregory of Nazianzus and Love for the Poor," *ATR* 47, no. 4 (1965): 348-59, 349. Scholars who argue that Oration 14 was written after Basils' campaign for the poor include Brian Daley, "Building a New City: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Rhetoric of Philanthropy," *JECS* 7, no. 3 (1999): 431-61, 448-49; Winslow, "Gregory of Nazianzus and Love for the Poor," 348-59. Those who argue that it was written before the campaign consist of Bernard Coulie, *Les richesses dans l'oeuvre de saint Grégoire de Nazianze*, Étude littéraire et historique, PIOL 32 (Louvain: Université Catholique de Louvain, 1985), 171; McGuckin, *Intellectual Biography*, 145. Following Coulie and McGuckin, I believe that it was written before Basil's campaign, circa A.D. 366-67, since there is no mention of Basil in the oration; furthermore, there are indications of beggars on the streets who would have been housed through the campaign.

[215] Susan R. Holman, "Out of the Fitting Room: Rethinking Patristic Social Texts on "The Common Good"," in *Reading Patristic Texts on Social Ethics: Issues and Challenges for Twenty-First Century Christian Social Thought*, ed. Johan Leemans, Brian J. Matz, and Johan Verstraeten (Washington D.C., USA: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 103-23, 115.

[216] Or. 7.9, SC 405, 202; 14.20, PG 35, 881D-884B; 14.27, PG 35, 892D-896A; 26.10, SC 284, 248; Carm. 1.2.25, PG 37, 824, 148-53; 2.2.6, PG 37, 1549, 89. See Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 123-24; Stanley S. Harakas, "Presuppositions for Ethical Method in St. Gregory the Theologian's Five Theological Orations," *GOTR* 55, no. 1-4 (2010): 89-126, 120; Verna E. F. Harrison, "Male and Female in Cappadocian Theology," *JTS* 41, no. 2 (1990): 441-71, 456; McGuckin, *Intellectual Biography*, 148-50; Stanley S. Harakas, "Ethical Teaching in Saint Gregory the Theologian's Writings," *GOTR* 39, no. 1-

scholarly opinion, Mumford argues, "the concept of the *eikon* functions for Gregory as it does originally in *Genesis*, as a source of 'normativity'."[217]

Having considered how Gregory draws upon the connection between ethics and the human *eikon* in Genesis, I shall demonstrate how Gregory develops further biblical themes which relate to the *eikon*, moving on to the Pauline view that Christ is the true *Eikon*. I shall begin by exploring the origins of this idea.

2.3.3 *The Dynamic Narrative of Christ as Eikon*

Gregory's interpretation of Christ as *Eikon* originates in the Greek translation from the Masoretic text of Genesis 1:26-27; אדם בצלמנו כדמותנו ויאמר אלהים נעשה.[218] The differences are minor: the Septuagint omits the second pronominal suffix "our" and repeats the prefix "according to" (καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ᾽εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ᾽ὁμοίωσιν). Nevertheless, Philo explains that they are important. I refer to Philo since the early Christians preserved his work for generations; furthermore, he serves as the first main overlap between Greek philosophical thought and Judaism.[219] Although Gregory himself makes no direct reference to Philo in his surviving works, Trisoglio has

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2 (1994): 141-50; Tasos Sarris Michopoulos, "Mimisometha Nomon Theou: Gregory the Theologian's Ontology of Compassion," *GOTR* 39, no. 1-2 (1994): 109-21.

[217] James Mumford, *Ethics at the Beginning of Life: A Phenomenological Critique* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 188. Also, see Pascal D. Bazzell, "Toward a Creational Perspective on Poverty: Genesis 1:26-28, Image of God, and Its Missional Implications," in *Genesis and Christian Theology*, ed. Nathan MacDonald, Mark W. Elliott, and Grant Macaskill (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 228- 41, 229. It is surprising that there is no mention of Gen 1:26 in Brian J. Matz, "Deciphering a Recipe for Biblical Preaching in *Oration* 14," in *Re-Reading Gregory of Nazianzus*, ed. Christopher A. Beeley (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 49-66.

[218] *Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia,* 2.

[219] Henry Chadwick, "Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought," in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Arthur H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 137-92, 137.

demonstrated that Gregory is familiar with Philo's thought.[220] Regarding Genesis 1:26-27, Philo explains that moving from the Hebrew "in" to the Greek "according to" points towards the human person as an *eikon* of an *Eikon*.[221] From this position, he lays out a system of thought regarding the *eikon*, where the *eikon* is the Logos, through whom the world was made.[222] Origen builds on this by explaining that the Logos is "in" the image of God, whereas humanity is "according to" the image of God:

> In addition a principle [beginning] is that in accordance with which something is, that is, in accordance with its form. So, if indeed the first-born of all creation is "the image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:15), the Father is his principle. But similarly Christ is the form of those who have come to be in accordance with the image of God. Therefore, if men are created "according to the image", the image itself is "according to the Father."[223]

Whilst Gregory does not offer a systemic explanation like Origen, he follows Philo, Paul, Origen and later fathers by interpreting Christ as the *Eikon* according to whom human *eikones* are created, the implications of which I discuss in detail in the following chapter.

Two further traditions feeding into the concept of Christ as the *Eikon* of God run through the New Testament. First, Paul's Adam Christology where Christ is the second Adam, the true bearer of the divine *Eikon* in contrast to Adam;[224] secondly, the portrayal of Wisdom

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[220] Trisoglio, "Filone Alessandrino," 588-730; David T. Runia, *Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 241.

[221] *Her.* 230-31.

[222] *Spec.* 3.81; *Spec.* 3.83; *Leg.* 3.96. John 1:1, 14 refers to Jesus Christ as the Logos.

[223] *Comm. Jn* 1.104; translation, Joseph W. Trigg, *Origen* (London: Routledge, 1998), 122. Also, see *Haer*. 4.20.1; Sophie Cartwright, "The Image of God in Irenaeus, Marcellus and Euthasthius," in *Irenaeus: Life, Scripture, Legacy*, ed. Sara Parvis and Paul Foster (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012), 173-82, 176.

[224] 1 Cor 11:7, 15:49; 2 Cor 3:18, 4:4. George H. Van Kooten, "Image, Form and

as the *eikon* of God's goodness in Wisdom 7:26 and in Philo.[225] Paul's Adam Christology is the tradition that is most relevant to this study, since its soteriological emphasis is evident in Gregory's thought about the human *eikon*'s restoration, as I discuss shortly. Paul argues that the believer is no longer affiliated to the "first Adam" but rather the goal is to become the *eikon* of the "heavenly man" (1 Cor 15:49). Dragoş Giulea has coined this process *"Eikonic* soteriology" because it represents the "transformation from being the *eikon* of Adam into the *eikon* of the glorious Jesus…the *eikon* of the Heavenly Anthropos and the second Adam."[226] Beginning at baptism (Rom 6:3-5), salvation is viewed through an eschatological lens, whereby humanity's transformation into Christ's *eikon* is understood to be a dynamic process, rather than a "one-off" event. The follower of Christ is transformed by encountering the glory of the Lord through which believers "are being transformed into the same *eikon* from one degree of glory (δόξα) to another" (2 Cor 3:18). Throughout the thesis we shall see that Gregory remains close to this tradition.

2.3.4 *The Devil*

Our final consideration of Gregory's human *eikon* in her biblical context concerns the interplay between the *eikon* and the devil, which is a strong tradition in apocryphal and pseudepigraphal writings.[227] The

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Transformation. A Semantic Taxonomy of Paul's "Morphic" Language," in *Jesus, Paul, and Early Christianity: Studies in Honour of Henk Jan De Jonge*, ed. Rieuwerd Buitenwerf, Harm W. Hollander, and Johannes Tromp (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 213-42, 216.

[225] *Leg.* 1.43; see James D.G. Dunn, *The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon*, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 89; Friedrich-Wilhelm Eltester, *Eikon im Neuen Testament*, BZNW (Berlin: Topelmann, 1958), 76; Seyoon Kim, *Paul and the New Perspective: Second Thoughts on the Origin of Paul's Gospel* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 137.

[226] Dragoş A. Giulea, *Pre-Nicene Christology in Paschal Contexts: The Case of the Divine Noetic Anthropos* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 155.

[227] John R. Levison, *Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism: from Sirach to 2 Baruch*, JSPSS (Sheffield: JSOT, 1988), 178.

tradition appears first in Wisdom 2:23-24, as an interpretation of the first three chapters of Genesis:

> …for God created us for incorruption,
> and made us in the *eikon* of his own eternity,
> but through the devil's envy death entered the world (φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον),
> and those who belong to his company experience it.

Many scholars have observed that this theme of hostile angelic powers is also prevalent in the New Testament, particularly in Paul's letters.[228] The devil and his army of demons are seen as a threat to all that God has created, especially human persons.[229] Paul refers directly to the notion of evil powers with reference to Christ as the *Eikon* in two ways. First, Christ as God's *Eikon* has authority over the powers (Col 1:15, 2:10). The particular list of powers in Colossians 1:16 can also be found in apocalyptic writings, which are concerned with the eschatological defeat of evil.[230] Secondly, Paul writes in reference to the notion that the

> god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers, to keep them from seeing the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the *Eikon* of God (2 Cor 4:4).

The "god of this world" refers to a darkness which is "cosmic, universal and demonic."[231] Most scholars are agreed that this refers to the devil

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[228] Clint E. Arnold, *The Colossian Syncretism: The Interface Between Christianity and Folk Belief at Colossae* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 158; Peter T. O'Brien, *Colossians, Philemon*, WBC (Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1982), 46.

[229] Dunn argues that Paul understood these powers to be real; Dunn, *Colossians and Philemon*, 93. For an argument against Dunn, see Wesley Carr, *Angels and Principalities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 48-52.

[230] 2 Enoch 20:1; 1 Enoch 41:9.

[231] Paul W. Barnett, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (Grand Rapids:

since he is also named as a ruler in Ephesians 2:2, John 12:31, 14:30 and 16:11.[232] Whilst Paul does not give his readers a detailed description of what he thinks the evil powers are, it is clear that the notion of evil and the devil blur into one another as "an existentially real power cohered in single focus."[233]

The prevalence of the struggle between the forces of evil and the human *eikon* is a theme which continues in the writing of the early church fathers. Origen, advancing a sophisticated demonology, identifies that demons are fallen angels. Unlike the view of pagan Greeks, who thought that some demons were good and others were bad, Origen states that all demons are evil.[234] They stand as powers behind the opposing political authorities, and their primary desire is to tempt human persons to sin.[235] Later, Athanasius writes most about spiritual warfare, particularly in *Life of Anthony*, where the progressive holiness and divinity of the *eikon* encourage more attention from the envious enemy. Athanasius stresses that it is the saints, having trained and placed themselves at the head of the battle, who struggle the most with the devil and his demons; however, they are far from helpless. Athanasius observes that in the Bible demons hold no sway even over the swine, since they must ask Christ's permission before they enter the swine. On the basis of this episode, he argues that demons hold even less sway over the person made as God's *eikon*, since she possesses greater authority over the powers of darkness than swine.[236]

Eerdmans, 1997), 220.

[232] Murray J. Harris, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 328. For Paul's writing about "powers," see Rom 8:38-39; 1 Cor 15:24; Col 1:16; Eph 1:20-21; Eph 6:12.

[233] Dunn, *Colossians and Philemon*, 109.

[234] *Cels*. 5.5.

[235] *Princ*. 3.3.2; see Heinrich Schlier, *Principalities and Powers in the New Testament* (West Germany: Herder and Herder, 1961); George Caird, *Principalities and Powers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956).

[236] *Vit. Ant. 29*, (cf. Matt 8:31); see Athanasius, *The Life of Antony*, trans. Tim Vivian, Apostolos N. Athanassakis, and Rowan A. Greer (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 2003), 126-27; David Brakke, "Athanasius," in *Early Christian World*, ed. Philip F. Esler (London: Taylor & Francis, 2002), 1102-27,

As I discussed in the introductory chapter, Gregory develops this tradition, by drawing even more prolifically on the biblical and pseudepigraphal theme of the devil and fallen angels, in order to describe the struggle of the *eikon*'s existence as she endeavours to draw closer to God.[237] Below is an example of Gregory's presentation of the devil's hatred of the *eikon*. It occurs in an extract from *On His Own Life*, and is consistent with Gregory's approach throughout his writing. In it, Gregory mourns the devil's constant attack on the *eikon*. Note that here; "the corrupter" (ὸ φθορεύς) is one of the many epithets given to the devil:

> Excessively numerous are the paths which lead away from
> both the straight and settled road,
> they all lead to the pit of destruction.
> Into this the corrupter has torn down the *eikon*,
> in order that he might gain a way of slipping in,
> dividing doctrines, rather than tongues like God in ages past.[238]

The *eikon*'s encounter with demons continues to be a key theme in the work of theologians upon whom Gregory has exerted an influence, in particular Evagrius Ponticus. He was a protégé of Gregory who served Gregory as a deacon in Constantinople, going on to produce a comprehensive demonology and method of combat in over five hundred types of demonic battles.[239] Brakke suggests that it is probable Evagrius "learned from Gregory about the danger of demonic thoughts [λογισμοί], and the possibility of refuting them verbally with powerful

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[237] The devil forms a prevalent theme in the Bible; see Gallay, "La Bible," 333.

[238] Carm. 2.1.11, PG 37, 1107-8, 1146-51. In his critical edition of the text, Jungck has corrected the aorist subjunctive passive λάβῃ to aorist optative active λάβοι, line 1150. For an alternative translation, see White, 1996, 95.

[239] David Brakke, *Demons and the Making of the Monk: Spiritual Combat in Early Christianity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), 49.

words." [240] His "intense conflict with demons" was one which preoccupied his approach to piety and consequently he is said to have "crafted the most sophisticated demonology."[241]

In this chapter thus far I have attempted to explore biblical and pseudepigraphal ideas of the *eikon* through Gregory's eyes. In order to situate Gregory's approach in its historical context, I have set out the biblical viewpoints in dialogue with beliefs about pagan images, before moving on to discuss further significant biblical themes. Whilst Scripture was the predominant influence upon Gregory's thoughts about the *eikon*, aspects of Greek philosophical thought would have inevitably influenced him; whether received from Plato's writings, from commentators, or from earlier Jewish or Christian writers who absorbed and amalgamated Greek philosophical ideas with Scripture. Therefore, I move on to discuss the predominant Greek philosophical approaches to the *eikon* which were adopted and adapted by the early church fathers in the first four centuries, recognising that each father's reading has unique qualities which I cannot render fully here.

2.4 Greek Philosophical Approaches to the *Eikon*

Like the biblical authors, Plato's application of *eikon* is multifarious, encompassing linguistic *eikones*, shadows, statues and paintings.[242] *Eikones* such as the sun, the cave and soul provide us with "models that give access to concepts derived from and participating in imperceptible truths."[243] Whilst Plato does not depict the human as an *eikon*, he

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[240] David Brakke, *Talking Back: A Monastic Handbook for Combating Demons* (Minnesota: Cistercian Publications, 2009), 19. Also, see Robert E. Sinkewicz, *Evagrius of Pontus: The Greek Ascetic Corpus* (New York: OUP, 2003), xviii.

[241] Brakke, *Talking Back*, 2.

[242] *Symp.* 215a; *Crat.* 432c; *Resp.* 515a. For a discussion of the impact of names on images, see Deborah Steiner, *Images in Mind: Statues in Archaic and Classical Greek Literature and Thought* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 71-73.

[243] Allen, *Why Plato Wrote*, 153. For further discussion of participation see ibid., 148-53.

describes the cosmos as a sensible god made in the *eikon* of the intelligible.[244] This idea is associated with Plato's theory of Forms, where sensible objects are images of eternal models, in which images denote kinship rather than mere resemblance.[245] This occurs because the *eikon* proceeds from the model, "radiating from the Form" according to Plato.[246] For this reason, on occasion Plato speaks about an *eikon* as possessing great power; for example, Alcibiades declares that the *eikon* of Socrates is capable of making him feel ashamed.[247]

Moving forward to Plotinus, founder of Neoplatonism, the concept of the *eikon* participating in its model continues.[248] Plotinus understands the created world as an *eikon*; where the One who fills all things and makes all things has ontological priority to all that is created.[249] In spite of the fact that the concept of *eikon* is key to Plotinus' metaphysics, he does not offer a clear explanation of exactly how he envisages the *eikon* to be connected to its prototype. He describes an *eikon* reflected in a mirror or pool of water where it is not possible for what has come to be to exist when it is cut off from its source.[250] Scholars have acknowledged the ambiguity of Plotinus' discussion of the *eikon*: on the one hand it has the closest possible relation to its prototype, on the other hand it is inferior.[251] Whilst the exact relationship between the *eikon* and prototype is unclear, unarguably the relationship is one of close affiliation.

The Greek philosophical approach, found in Plato and later in

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[244] εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεὸς αισθητός; *Tim.* 92c.

[245] κοινωνία; *Phaed.* 100d-e.

[246] Alain Besançon, *The Forbidden Image: An Intellectual History of Iconoclasm* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 28. On likeness and difference of images, see *Crat.* 432c; *Soph.* 236a.

[247] *Symp.* 216b.

[248] *Enn*. 6.9.11; *Enn.* 5.8.12; Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms*, 51.

[249] *Enn.* 3.9.4; see John Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 27.

[250] *Enn*. 6.4.10.

[251] Margaret Miles, "Image," in *Critical Terms for Religious Studies*, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 160-72, 162.

Plotinus, entails a relationship between *eikon* and prototype which goes beyond mere imitation. Like beliefs about pagan *eikones* bearing the presence of the god they depict, the Greek philosophical view outlined above demonstrates that the worldview inhabited by Gregory was one where the *eikon* was ontologically affiliated to its prototype. It is through this ontological affiliation that the *eikon* is able to become divine.

2.5 Becoming Divine

The designation of the double "according to" (κατ᾽είκόνα and καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν) in the Septuagint translation of Genesis 1:26-27 led fathers, such as Clement, Irenaeus, and Origen, to place a distinction between the *eikon* and the 'likeness.'[252] Interpreted thus, God gives the *eikon* to humanity at creation, whereas the 'likeness' is regarded as a process of transformation which reaches its completion at the eschaton. See Origen's explanation of this below:

> The highest good towards which every rational creature is hurrying, also called the end and goal of all things,... is to become like God as much as possible... this is indeed what Moses is pointing out above all when he describes the original creation of humankind... thus when he said: "In the image of God he created him" and said nothing more about the likeness, he is actually indicating that the human being did indeed receive the dignity of God's image in the first creation, and the dignity of his likeness is reserved for the consummation.[253]

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[252] *Strom.* 2.131.6; *Haer.* 5.6.1; *Princ*. 3.6.1. For further reflections, see Th. Camelot, "La Théologie de l'Image de Dieu," *RSPT* 40 (1956): 443-71.

[253] *Princ.* 3.6.1, trans. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Origen, Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings*, trans. Robert J. Daly (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 56. Also, see *Cels.* 4.30; Crouzel, *Théologie de l'image de Dieu chez Origène*, 217-45; Maximos Aghiorgoussis, "Applications of the Theme "Eikon Theou" (Image of God) according to Saint Basil the Great," *GOTR* 21, no. 3 (1976): 265-88, 276.

Often scholars attribute this distinction between *eikon* and likeness to the adaptation of Platonic thought regarding progressive divinity.[254] Knowing God and becoming like God as far as possible (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν), is the *telos* of Plato's philosophical system.[255] According to Van Kooten, this is "the natural extension of the semantic-conceptual field of the image of God."[256] Also, Andrew Louth writes,

> The verse from Genesis, to a Greek philosophical ear, suggested that the human was made in the image of God and that human destiny was assimilation to God, what the Greek Fathers, especially, came to call deification.[257]

Whilst Gregory speaks consistently about the *eikon* becoming divine, unlike Clement and Origen, he offers no detailed explanation regarding the distinction between *eikon* and likeness. The closest notion of this distinction occurs in Gorgonia's funeral oration. First Gregory, following Paul, describes Gorgonia's real citizenship as being in heaven.[258] Then he observes that her nobility consisted in "the preservation of the *eikon* and becoming like the archetype (εὐγένεια δὲ ἡ τῆς εἰκόνος τήρησις καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἐξομοίωσις)."[259] Even here, Gregory does not echo

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[254] Julia Annas, *Platonic Ethics, Old and New* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 52; David Sedley, "The Ideal of Godlikeness," in *Plato Volume 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion and the Soul*, ed. Gail Fine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 309-28, 309; Daniel C. Russell, "Virtue as 'Likeness to God' in Plato and Seneca," *JHP* 42, no. 3 (2004): 241-60.

[255] *Symp.* 207c-209e; *Theat.* 176e-177a; Sedley, "Ethics, Politics, Religion and the Soul," 309.

[256] Van Kooten, *Paul's Anthropology in Context*, 125.

[257] Andrew Louth, "The Fathers on Genesis," in *The Book of Genesis: Composition, Reception, and Interpretation*, ed. Craig A. Evans, Joel N. Lohr, and David L. Petersen (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 561-78, 573.

[258] Eph 2:19-20.

[259] Or. 8.6, SC 405, 256; ἐξομοίωσις in Or. 24.15, SC 284, 74; 32.15, SC 318, 116; ὁμοιώσεως in Or. 6.14, SC 318, 156; Carm. 2.1.12, PG 37, 1182, 221. Calvet-Sebasti, SC 405, 287 correctly argues that the archetype represents the Father.

Plato precisely in his approach to human *eikones* becoming divine. Whilst Gregory identifies Gorgonia's purpose as becoming like God, he does it within the context of Paul's words about followers of Christ being citizens in heaven. Thus, we cannot appreciate fully Gregory's ideas without also turning to the biblical narrative. Elsewhere, Gregory is consistent in drawing his ideas of theosis from biblical and pseudepigraphal narratives, which I demonstrate in Chapter Six.[260]

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has situated Gregory's approach to the *eikon* in its historical, biblical and philosophical contexts. Beginning with a brief overview of Gregory's hermeneutics, I argued that Gregory approaches the Bible in light of the salvation history narrative which revolves around Jesus Christ. Thus, Gregory also approaches the human *eikon* from this perspective. From here, I moved on to explore the various themes concerning the *eikon* in the Bible, beginning with the creation of humankind in Genesis 1:26-27. I concluded that Gregory's presentation of the *eikon*, as she appears in Genesis, is interpreted more clearly in light of ideas about physical pagan *eikones.* These images embody the god or figure they represent, being considered 'divine.' Therefore, it should not surprise us when Gregory refers to the human *eikon* as 'divine', since she bears God's presence far more powerfully than is possible for any pagan *eikon*. This unique status then entails ethical implications for the *eikon*.

From here, I considered how the particular translation of the Septuagint informs the way in which Philo, Paul and later church fathers view Christ as the true *Eikon*, which places the human *eikon* in a dynamic soteriological narrative. This narrative entwines with later pseudepigraphal interpretations of Genesis, which set the *eikon* in a

[260] For arguments of theosis in the Pauline works, see Ben C. Blackwell, *Christosis: Pauline Soteriology in Light of Deification in Irenaeus and Cyril of Alexandria* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), passim.

cosmological battle with the devil, a theme which is prevalent in Gregory's work.

Finally, I discussed the Greek philosophical context of the *eikon*, in which the *eikon* affiliates to the divine. Whilst Gregory develops his particular presentation of the *eikon*'s divinity from biblical themes, the progressive nature of this process and ontological affiliation between the *eikon* and prototype overlaps Greek philosophical and biblical views. I turn now to the following chapter, where I embark on tracing the dynamic narrative of the *eikon*, echoing Gregory's interpretation of Scripture by beginning with Christ.

Chapter 3 Jesus Christ, the Identical *Eikon*

3.1 Introduction

Chapter Three establishes Gregory's anthropology within the theological framework of his doctrine of God. The modern discussion concerning whether theology should start above or below is not a problem for our theologian.[261] For him, any notion of what the human *eikon* is, or could become, begins inarguably with God.[262] Gregory provides this theological framework for the existence of the human *eikon* throughout his orations and poems; for example, observe that Gregory's *Arcana* begins with God and gradually progresses towards the creation of the human person.[263] In order to reflect Gregory's sequence as closely as possible, this chapter and those that follow keep the same pattern.

I begin by situating Gregory's doctrine of God within its historical context. As with all thought about God, ancient and current, Gregory's doctrine does not develop in a vacuum; his context is one of bitter discussions over the doctrine of the Trinity, during which he develops his theology in direct response to several other competing cosmologies.[264] With an outline of Gregory's concept of God in place, I move on to discuss Gregory's approach to the Son, in particular. Following Paul, Gregory refers to the Son as the "identical *Eikon* (ἡ ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκών)."[265] The Son is the *Eikon* upon whom the human person is modelled, which renders him more than merely the remedy to

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[261] Craig S. Evans, *The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith: The Incarnational Narrative as History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 8-11.

[262] Or. 38.7, SC 358, 114; 44.3, PG 36, 609B; 45.4, PG 36, 628B-C.

[263] Moreschini and Sykes, *Poemata Arcana*, 55-56.

[264] Robert C. Gregg, "Gregory Nazianzen's Opponents in Oration 31," in *Arianism: Historical and Theological Reassessments*, ed. Robert C. Gregg (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2007), 321-26.

[265] Col 1:15.

the fall of the human person.[266] Rather, Gregory's approach to the human *eikon* is placed within the theological framework of the Son. This relates to my argument in the previous chapter regarding Gregory's interpretation of the Bible. In the same way that Gregory approaches the Bible in light of Christ, likewise, he approaches the human *eikon* in light of the "identical *Eikon*."

Whilst scholars have paid considerable attention to Gregory's Christology, few attend to the significance of Gregory referring to Christ as the "identical *Eikon*," nor do they move on to discuss how it relates to the same title bestowed upon the human person.[267] This is possibly due to the predominant focus in scholarship on the metaphysics of Gregory's Christology.[268] At the heart of Gregory's understanding of theological anthropology is that Christ and humans are both *eikones.* Considering the title '*Eikon'* in relation to the Son reveals several important aspects concerning how the human person images God.

First, Gregory employs *eikon* to denote Christ's ontological likeness to the Father. Gregory explains that the Son is the kind of *eikon* which is identical to the Father in essence, rather than different. This means that Christ is unique amongst *eikones* since he alone is "identical" to God. Nevertheless, the fact that the human person shares this title with Christ points to how Gregory understands the likeness between the *eikon* and the prototype. Being "κατ᾽εἰκόνα," denotes the human person's affiliation to, rather than distance from, God.

Secondly, both Christ and the human *eikon* are living and dynamic *eikones* (ζῶντες), differentiating them both from motionless

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[266] Panayiotis Nellas, *Deification in Christ: Orthodox Perspectives on the Nature of the Human Person* (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1987), 95.

[267] For examples, see Moreschini and Sykes, *Poemata Arcana*, 96-97; Norris, *Faith Gives Fullness*, 180. Both consider Christ as *Eikon*, but neither consider the implications of this on the human *eikon*.

[268] For specific bibliographies on Gregory's Christology, see Moreschini and Sykes, *Poemata Arcana*, 93; Johannes Quasten, *Patrology: The Golden Age of Greek Patristic Literature from the Council of Nicaea to the Council of Chalcedon*, vol. 3 (Utrecht: Spectrum Publishers, 1963), 252-53.

eikones. This conjures up the notion of *Eikon* as a verb, rather than a noun; it is dynamic, not static. The human *eikon* is set apart from other *eikones* through being brought alive by God's breath, which is different from the way in which Christ is set apart since he is identical to the Father; nevertheless, the shared title denotes how the human *eikon* follows Christ in being dynamic.

The third feature regarding Christ as *Eikon* relates to Gregory's efforts to present Christ as a unified person. Contrary to assertions made by Fulford, Gregory applies the title '*Eikon*' to both the transcendent Logos and the incarnate Christ and does not consider *Eikon* as a title reserved for the Son before he is incarnate.[269] From the description of the Logos as Creator in *On the Theophany*, Fulford concludes that only the divine *Logos* is the archetypal *Eikon* of the human person.[270] However, Fulford overlooks the overall context of the oration, which is the birth of Christ. He also overlooks the many other occasions where Gregory refers specifically to Christ as *Eikon,* which I discuss in this chapter. This is key to my argument in the following chapter, where I demonstrate the similarity between Gregory's writing about the unity of Christ and the composition of the human person. In Chapter One, I observed that scholars sometimes assume the *eikon* to equate only to the spiritual intellect or the soul, or else they are not sure what Gregory thinks regarding the *eikon*.[271] In response to this, I argued that the *eikon* transforms the dust to form a whole human person; consequently *eikon* may refer both to the soul and the whole human person. This argument is strengthened in light of the unity of Christ. The way in which Gregory depicts Christ's unity mirrors his description of the human person, formed from a mixture of *eikon* and

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[269] Or. 38.13, SC 358, 130-34; 29.17, SC 250, 112-14.

[270] Or. 38.13, SC 358, 130-34; Ben Fulford, "Douleur et transfiguration. Une lecture du cheminement spirituel de saint Grégoire de Nazianze [Pain and Transfiguration. A Reading of Saint Gregory of Nazianzus' Spiritual Way]– By Philippe Molac," *RRT* 16, no. 2 (2009): 307-10, 29.

[271] Norris, "Doctrine of Jesus Christ," 69; Gilbert, "Person and Nature," 86; Vasiliu, *Eikôn*, 328; Wesche, ""Mind" and "Self"," 45.

dust. Therefore, as *Eikon* refers to the transcendent Logos and the incarnate Christ, likewise *eikon* denotes the whole human person, body and soul.

The fourth point about Gregory's use of *Eikon* concerns the way in which Gregory describes Christ's kenosis. This depicts the way in which Christ is both divine yet becomes vulnerable, so vulnerable that Gregory states that Christ is "God crucified."[272] Here I observe how the dynamic pattern of Christ's kenosis paves the way for the human *eikon's* theosis. These descriptions of Christ proffer the existence of the vulnerable human *eikon* as divine. When applying "vulnerable" to Christ, I mean the "loving freedom" God exhibits by becoming human.[273]

The final point of correlation between Christ and the human *eikon* relates to the human *eikones*' struggle with evil. Developing the biblical narrative, Gregory portrays Christ as battling with and constantly defeating the devil, during his life on earth and through his passion.[274] Christ achieved what Adam and Eve did not: he conquered the devil.[275] Through his healing of the human *eikon,* she is set back on her path towards becoming divine. Furthermore, Christ's victory demands a response from the human *eikon*: she is called to live a life which imitates him, thus revealing how she should respond to the devil's temptations.

3.2 Gregory's Theology

Before I discuss further these features of *Eikon*, I turn to Gregory's doctrine of God, within its historical context. Since a plethora of

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[272] Or. 45.28-9, PG 36, 661B-663A.

[273] For further reflection upon this, see William A. Placher, *Narratives of a Vulnerable God: Christ, Theology and Scripture* (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994), 3-21.

[274] Contra, Winslow, *Dynamics of Salvation*, 107. Stating, "… he pays less attention to the defeat of Satan at the hands of the crucified Christ," Winslow fails to observe that Christ's whole life and resurrection are a defeat of Satan, paving the way for the victory of believers.

[275] Or. 38.13-14, SC 358, 134-38; 37.1, SC 318, 270-72.

scholarship already exists concerning the various doctrinal controversies in which Gregory was involved, I shall not discuss in depth the particular groups to which Gregory was responding. Nor do I intend to resolve disparities between contemporary commentators on these groups or those leaders around whom they formed.[276] Arianism had been long in dispute when Gregory became a priest, evolving and shifting throughout the fourth century.[277] From what is written in his orations, the form of Arianism that Gregory disputed the most had to do with the deity of the *Logos*.[278] In addition to arguing for Christ's divinity and equality with God, Gregory also worked to defend Christ's humanity against Apollinarianism, which denied that Christ possessed a human soul and was finally condemned in the second council of Constantinople in A.D. 381.[279]

Groups supporting Sabellianism caused further problems for Gregory, since they were guilty of compressing "the three" into "one," thus denying the persons within the Godhead.[280] Eunomius and Aetius, advancing upon Arianism, also created dissension for Gregory and his fellow Cappadocians, since they refused to acknowledge the likeness of

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[276] For example, on Arius being a "literal minded conservative," see Frances M. Young, *From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and Its Background* (London: SCM Press, 1983), 64. This contrasts with the view that the Arian debate involved sophisticated arguments about metaphysics; see Rowan Williams, *Arius: Heresy and Tradition* (London: SCM Press, 2001), passim.

[277] McGuckin, *Intellectual Biography*, 290-310; Georges Florovsky, *The Eastern Fathers of the Fourth Century* (Belmont, MA: Notable & Academic Books, 1987), 66-67; John Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes* (U.S.A.: Fordham University Press, 1983), 180; Ayres, *Nicaea and Its Legacy*, 1-126.

[278] Or. 2.37, SC 247, 138; 20.5, SC 270, 68; 31.30, SC 250, 338; 33.16, SC 318, 194; 37.22, SC 318, 316; Carm. 2.1.2, PG 37, 887-907.

[279] Or. 30.5, SC 250, 234; Ep. 101.1-101.3 (101.1-101.11 SC), SC 208, 36-40; Ep. 102.2 (102.3 SC), SC 208, 70-72; see John N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (New York: Continuum, 1977), 289-95; Christopher A. Beeley, "The Early Christological Controversy: Apollinarius, Diodore, and Gregory Nazianzen," *VC* 65, no. 4 (2011): 376-407, 405. In this article Beeley argues that Gregory is far more opposed to Diodore than Apollinarius and that it is Nyssen who is the most aggressive opponent of Apollinarius.

[280] Or. 20.5, SC 270, 66; 31.30, SC 250, 338; 33.16, SC 318, 194; 37.22, SC 318, 316.

the *Logos* to the Father and denounced the Spirit's deity.[281] In arguing for the Spirit's deity, Gregory opposed not only Eunomius, but also groups referred to as the "Pneumatomachians" and the "Macedonians."[282] Gregory understood himself to be willing to take the arguments for the deity of the Spirit further than his friend Basil who, according to Gregory, compromised on the language concerning the Spirit.[283] Throughout his orations, Gregory employs his best rhetorical skills in order to show the flaws in the arguments of his various opponents.[284] In spite of this, during his enthronement as bishop Gregory lost his battle in declaring that the Holy Spirit is consubstantial to God.[285] Gregory informs his readers of this in the poem, *On His Own Life*, in which he makes bitter complaints about the ambiguity of the faith of the bishops.[286]

Gregory attends to the doctrine of the Trinity in many orations,

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[281] Norris, *Faith Gives Fullness*, 163-64; Robert Letham, *The Holy Trinity: In Scripture, History, Theology, and Worship* (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2004), 146. Gregory followed Athanasius (*Ep. Serap*. 1.27) in referring to the Spirit "as consubstantial with the Father;" George C. Berthold, "The Procession of the Spirit in Athanasius," in *Studia Patristica 41*, ed. Frances M. Young, Mark J. Edwards, and Paul Parvis (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 125-31. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Michael A. Haykin, *The Spirit of God: The Exegesis of 1 and 2 Corinthians in the Pneumatomachian Controversy of the Fourth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 170-85.

[282] The term "Macedonians" is a "misnomer" since there is little historical evidence to associate Macedonius with those who renounced the deity of the Spirit; Richard P.C. Hanson, *The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy 318-381* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 760.

[283] Ep. 58.7, Gallay *Lettres 1*, 75; Boris Bobrinskoy, *The Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic Tradition* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1999), 246.

[284] Basil Studer, *Trinity and Incarnation: The Faith of the Early Church* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 141.

[285] The creed of Constantinople was put forward as a statement of faith which would be acceptable to all parties; see Adolf-Martin Ritter, *Das Konzil von Konstantinopel und sein Symbol* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), 182-208. Also, the council is "circumspect in what it affirms of the Spirit;" see John Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, vol. 2 (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2004), 374. Contra Kelly, who mistakenly writes that Gregory won the debate about the consubstantiality of the Spirit and that it was formally endorsed; see *Early Christian Doctrines*, 263.

[286] Carm. 2.1.2, PG 37, 1506-1519.

poems and letters, although the majority of his writing specifically on the Trinity occurred during A.D. 379-381 when he was in Constantinople. Whilst he did not achieve the success he longed for during his lifetime, Gregory's five *Theological Orations* received the "conciliar endorsement" many years later at the council of Chalcedon.[287]

Aiming to delineate Trinitarian doctrine, Gregory informs us that God is not knowable in any clear sense, since he is boundless like the sea.[288] However, one can know that "God" is "Father, Son and Holy Spirit,"[289] "one divinity and power."[290] This summarises Gregory's approach to Christian faith, according to which God is both "One" and "Trinity." Beeley has demonstrated that in speaking about the unity of God,[291] Gregory's language varies between One (μόνας, ἕν),[292] God (θεός),[293] Divinity (θεότης),[294] being (οὐσία),[295] and nature (φύσις).[296] When he speaks about the threeness of God, Gregory usually refers to hypostases (ὑποστάσεις),[297] persons (πρόσωπα),[298] or three (τρία).[299] Considerable discussion has taken place amongst scholars concerning

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[287] John A. McGuckin, "The Trinity in the Greek Fathers," in *The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity*, ed. Peter C. Phan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 49-69, 65.

[288] Or. 38.7, SC 358, 114 .

[289] Or. 38.8, SC 358, 118.

[290] Or. 1.7, SC 247, 80.

[291] Beeley, *Trinity and the Knowledge of God*, 221-22; Robert W. Jenson, *The Triune Identity: God According to the Gospel* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 105-14.

[292] Or. 6.22, SC 405, 176; Carm. 1.1.3, PG 37, 413, 60-71.

[293] Or. 20.7, SC 270, 70.

[294] Or. 21.13, SC 270, 136; 31.14, SC 250, 302; Carm 1.1.3, PG 37, 409, 10.

[295] Or. 6.13, SC 405, 154; 31.28, SC 250, 330; 34.13, SC 318, 220.

[296] Or. 33.16, SC 318, 194; 34.15, SC 318, 224; 42.15, SC 384, 82.

[297] Or. 20.7, SC 270, 70; 34.15, SC 318, 226.

[298] Or. 31.30, SC 250, 338; 37.22, SC 318, 316.

[299] Or. 6.22, SC 405, 176.

Gregory's Trinitarian doctrine.[300] Much of the debate centres on Gregory's depiction of the monarchy and causality of the Father.[301] In response to this, Beeley has argued astutely that if one reads all Gregory's orations, it is evident that whilst Gregory does present the Father as the cause of the Godhead, he does not understand the Son and the Spirit to be subordinate to the Father.[302] Assuming this position, I shall move on directly to Gregory's writing about the Son, "the identical *Eikon*."

3.3 The Identical *Eikon*

> And this was the very Word of God, the eternal, the invisible, the incomprehensible, the incorporeal, the beginning from the beginning, the light from the light,[303] the source of life and immortality,[304] the impression of the beautiful Archetype (τὸ ἐκμαγεῖον τοῦ ἀρχετύπου κάλλους),[305] the immovable seal,[306] the identical *Eikon* (ἡ ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκών), the definition and explanation of the Father. He proceeds to his own *eikon* and bears flesh on behalf of flesh and mingles with a spiritual soul

[300] For a comprehensive bibliography concerning Gregory's Trinitarian doctrine, see John A. McGuckin, ""Perceiving Light from Light in Light" (Oration 31.3): The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Gregory the Theologian," *GOTR* 39, no. 1-2 (1994): 7-32, 7-8. For a critique of Gregory's Trinitarian doctrine, see Vladimir Lossky, *The Vision of God*, 2nd ed. (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1983), 69; Rowan Williams, *The Wound of Knowledge: Christian Spirituality from the New Testament to St. John of the Cross*, 2nd ed. (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1991), 74.

[301] Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, 39-41; Thomas F. Torrance, *Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Faith* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 238; Najeeb G. Awad, "Between Subordination and Koinonia: Toward a New Reading of the Cappadocian Theology," *Modern Theology* 23, no. 2 (2007): 181-204.

[302] Christopher A. Beeley, "Divine Causality and the Monarchy of God the Father in Gregory of Nazianzus," *HTR* 100, no. 2 (2007): 199-214, 213.

[303] John 8:12.

[304] John 1:14.

[305] Heb 1:3.

[306] John 6:27.

> for the sake of my soul, purifying like with like (ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδίαν εἰκόνα χωρεῖ καὶ σάρκα φορεῖ διὰ τὴν σάρκα καὶ ψυχῇ νοερᾷ διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχὴν μίγνυται, ὁμοίῳ τό ὅμοιον ἀνακαθαίρων).[307]

Gregory follows Paul in presenting Christ as the truest, purest *Eikon* on no less than twenty occasions.[308] I state this plainly to challenge assertions made by scholars, such as Richard, who argues that Gregory portrays the human *eikon* as being made in the *eikon* of the Trinity. She suggests incorrectly that there is a distance between Gregory and the Alexandrian tradition of reserving the function of the *Eikon* for the Son.[309] In making her case, Richard neglects to observe the number of occasions on which Gregory refers to Christ as God's *Eikon*. She also overlooks that the designation of Christ as *Eikon* begins in the New Testament, and that Gregory follows the biblical ideas intentionally and closely. It may be that Richard is influenced by contemporary trends which often posit the human *eikon* as imaging the Trinity.[310] Whilst the Trinitarian approach to the *imago Dei* is appealing due to its relationality and inclusivity, it does not reflect the New Testament which understands Christ to be the true *Eikon* of God. The result is that the focus is taken off Christ "except insofar as he is one of the persons in communion in heaven."[311] There is no doubt that Gregory focuses first on Christ as *Eikon*, since in addition to naming Christ "identical *Eikon,*" he refers to the human person explicitly as the "*eikon* of Christ (Χριστοῦ

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[307] Or. 38.13, SC 358, 132.

[308] Col 1:15; ἡ ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκών, Or. 38.13, SC 358, 132; 1.4, SC 247, 76; 2.98, SC 247, 216; 4.78, SC 309, 200; 14.2, PG 35, 860C; 14.7, PG 35, 865C; 29.17, SC 250, 212; 30.3, SC 250, 230; 30.20, SC 250, 268; 45.9, PG 36, 633C; Carm. 1.1.2, PG 37, 402, 8-10; 1.2.1, PG 37, 533, 145; 1.2.14, PG 37, 762, 92; 2.1.1, PG 37, 1016, 628; 2.1.38, PG 37, 1326, 7; 2.1.45, PG 37, 1356, 32; Ep. 101.4 (101.32 SC), SC 208, 50; Ep. 102.8 (102.11 SC), SC 208, 76.

[309] Richard, *Cosmologie et théologie*, 464.

[310] Dominic Robinson, *Understanding the 'Imago Dei': The Thought of Barth, von Balthasar and Moltmann* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), passim; Grenz, *The Social God*, passim.

[311] Behr, *Mystery of Christ*, 176.

εἰκών)," but never as the *eikon* of the Trinity.[312]

Following the biblical depiction of Christ as *Eikon* raises challenges for Gregory, in light of defending the Nicene Creed against Arianism. In order to establish that Christ is God, Gregory emphasises that Christ is a unique form of *eikon* because he is not only reflecting or mirroring the Father's glory but is also of the same substance as his prototype. This explains why, when Gregory applies *eikon* to the Son, he is consistent in using it to denote the Son's similarity to the Father, rather than his difference.[313] Gregory emphasises this in his use of adjectives; Christ is not "made according to the *eikon* (κατ᾽ εἰκών)," but is the identical *eikon* (ἡ ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκών).[314] Furthermore in *On the Son,* Gregory's use of "equal nature" alongside *eikon* demonstrates that when discussing the Son, our theologian understands *eikon* to be denoting an equal nature to the Father:

> The Word of the great God sprang from the Father, eternal Son,
> *Eikon* of the original, nature equal to the one who begot him
> (εἰκὼν ἀρχετύποιο, φύσις γεννήτορι ἴση).[315]

In the previous chapter, I argued that the human *eikon* in Genesis is interpreted most successfully in light of contemporary approaches to pagan images, both portraits and statues. For these bear the presence of the figure they image, in a manner which ontologically affiliates them with their prototype. Thus, they are considered 'divine' and could be

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[312] Carm. 1.2.29, PG 37, 893, 126.

[313] Or. 29.17, SC 250, 212; 38.13, SC 358, 176; 45.9, PG 36, 633C; Carm. 2.1.38, PG 37, 1326, 7.

[314] Or. 38.13, SC 358, 132.

[315] Carm. 1.1.2, PG 37, 402, 7-8 (cf. 2.1.1, PG 37, 1016). The poem is a defence against Eunomius; for full background, see Moreschini and Sykes, *Poemata Arcana*, 96. The term Archetype does not occur in the Bible, however it is used by Philo. For comment on *Eikon* being used to distinguish the Son from the Father, see Philippe Molac, ""A-t-il commis une faute en étant pour toi miséricordieux? Pour moi, c'est très admirable!" la Christologie dans le deuxième poème dogmatique de Grégoire de Nazianze," *BLE* 109, no. 4 (2008): 307-38, 316.

described as being of the same nature as their prototype. With this idea of *eikones* in mind, it is possible to see how Gregory holds the apparently paradoxical belief that Christ is both *Eikon* and the same nature as his Father, especially if we bear in mind that pagan *eikones* were regarded as genuine substitutes for their prototypes. For Gregory, Christ is far closer to the Father than any other *eikon*; thus Gregory marries Pauline and Nicene theology.

Further to this, in his oration *On the Son*, Gregory takes care to explain that the Son's titles have always existed as the Son has always existed. For Gregory, Christ being an *Eikon* of God means that Christ is eternally begotten:

> Clearly, these are speaking about the Son, and others which are of the same meaning, not being newly acquired, nor became attached later to the Son, or to the Spirit, any more than to the Father himself. For perfection does not stem from that which is added.[316]

If we are in any doubt that Gregory's use of *Eikon* in relation to Christ implies anything less than full participation in the Godhead, Gregory makes this explicit in his second oration *On the Son*. Gregory works his way through some of the titles given to the Son in the New Testament, offering a brief explanation of why each particular label was allotted. Beginning with "Son" (Υἱός),[317] Gregory elaborates upon, "Only-begotten" (Μονογενής),[318] "Word" (Λόγος),[319] "Wisdom" (Σοφία),[320] and "Power" (Δύναμις).[321] After these, he moves onto "Truth" (Ἀλήθεια), the elucidation of which appears in full below:

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[316] Or. 29.17, SC 250, 214; 2.98, SC 247, 216.

[317] Or. 30.20, SC 250, 266.

[318] John 1:18.

[319] John 1:1.

[320] Or. 30.20, SC 250, 268; 1 Cor 1:30.

[321] Eph 5:9.

> And he is called "Truth", because He is one (ἕν), not many by His nature (τῇ φύσει), for truth itself is one, while falsehood is fragmented in multiple ways; and because He is the pure seal of the Father (ὡς καθαρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς σφραγίς), and the most faithful impress (χαρακτὴρ ἀψευδέστατος).[322]

In order to explain why Christ should be called "Truth", Gregory employs χαρακτήρ, which has an extensive semantic field including impress, stamp and *eikon*.[323] The wide range of meanings is reflected in Gregory's work, in spite of the fact that the term only occurs on fifteen occasions throughout his corpus.[324] He uses it both positively and negatively to depict *eikones* which accurately represent their archetypes and those which do not.[325] Above, when applying it to Christ, he supplies the adjective "most faithful (ἀψευδέστατος)" as a means of qualifying that Christ is different from other impressions.[326] With the need to re-interpret and clarify what kind of "faithful impress" is Christ, we might ask why Gregory uses this description. As with Gregory's use of *eikon*, the answer lies in Scripture. On this occasion

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[322] Or. 30.20, SC 250, 268; Heb 1:3.

[323] Paul Ellingworth, *The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 99; Luke Timothy Johnson, *Hebrews: A Commentary* (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), 69; Ulrich Wilckens, "χαρακτήρ," in *Φ-Ω TDNT, Vol 9*, ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Freidrich (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 418-23, 421-23; *PGL*, 1513. Scholars agree on the semantic field of χαρακτήρ being the same as εἰκών, see David J. MacLeod, "The Finality of Christ: An Exposition of Hebrews 1:1-4," *Bibliotheca Sacra* 162, no. 646 (2005): 210-30, 229; Harold W. Attridge, *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989), 43-44. Scholars agree that Hebrews was not written by Paul; see Clare K. Rothschild, *Hebrews as Pseudepigraphon: The History and Significance of the Pauline Attribution of Hebrews* (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), passim.

[324] Or. 2.15, SC 247, 108; 2.43, SC 247, 146; 6.11, SC 405, 150; 20.1, SC 270, 56; 23.7, SC 270, 296; 32.27, SC 318, 144; 40.27, SC 358, 258; 42.18, SC 384, 88, et al.

[325] Or. 40.27, SC 358, 258; 11.4, SC 405, 338.

[326] Or. 40.26, SC 358, 258.

Gregory is drawing from Hebrews, which conveys that the Son is the same substance as the Father:[327]

> He is the reflection of God's glory and the exact imprint of God's very being (ὃς ὢν ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ), and he sustains all things by his powerful word.[328]

Like Colossians 1:15-20 which uses εἰκών to describe Christ, Hebrews 1 denotes Christ as one through whom the world was created (Heb 1:1), who sustains all things (Heb 1:3), and to whom all powers are subject (Heb 1:13). In the collection of letters attributed to Basil, the author of *Epistula 38* connects Hebrews 1:3 to John 14:9, Colossians 1:15 and Wisdom 7:26, with the purpose of explaining that in relation to Christ, both χαρακτήρ and εἰκών express Christ's likeness to the Father.[329]

After explaining why the Son is called "Truth" Gregory continues his list of Christ's titles with εἰκών, appearing to use it synonymously with χαρακτήρ. Here Gregory provides his reader with a rare description and explanation of what he intends by εἰκών when it is applied to Christ:

> And He is called "*Eikon*" (Εἰκών)[330] because he is consubstantial (ὁμοούσιον), since he comes from the Father, but the Father does not come from Him. For the nature of an *eikon* is to be a

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[327] It is the only time χαρακτήρ appears in the New Testament, although Philo applies it on fifty-one occasions; MacLeod, "Exposition of Hebrews 1:1-4," 221; William L. Lane, *Hebrews 1-8*, WBC (Dallas, Texas: Word Books, 1991), 12-13.

[328] Heb 1:3.

[329] On the authorship of the letter and other texts where Basil and Nyssen have connected Christ to χαρακτήρ and εἰκών, see Alessandro Capone, "Apollonaris, Basil and Gregory of Nyssa," *ZAC* 17, no. 2 (2013): 315-31. For further discussions of the close relationship between χαρακτήρ, εἰκών and δόξα, see Karl Prüum, "Reflexiones theologicae et historicae ad usum Paulinum termini "eikon"," *Verbum Domini* XL (1962): 232-57, 236-37.

[330] Col 1:15.

> representation (μίμημα) of the archetype, and to be given its name. But there is more to be said than this: for an *eikon* is motionless (ἀκίνητος), representing a being set in motion; however here is one living (ζῶν), also imaging a living being and possessing a more precise similarity than that of Seth to Adam and all those born from parents. For this is the nature of those who are simple (ἡ τῶν ἁπλῶν φύσις), there is neither likeness nor unlikeness, but they are the whole impression of the whole, and the same rather than similar (ἀλλ᾽ ὅλον ὅλου τύπον εἶναι, καὶ ταύτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀφομοίωμα).[331]

In the passage above, Gregory leaves his reader in no doubt about what he means when he describes the Son as *Eikon*.[332] Gregory's use of terms such as ἁπλοῦς purports a clear message: the Son images in a way that means he is identical in substance to the Father. Here Gregory presents a description of εἰκών which is radically different from the one offered by Eunomius, who, in *Apology* 24 argues that likeness does not refer to likeness in substance but only in operation (ού πρὸς τὴν ούσίαν φέροι ἄν ἡ εἰκὼν τὴν ὁμοιότητα, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν).[333] Thus, Gregory is both specific and clear in his notion of *eikon*, using it in a way that is different from his opponents to denote the ontological likeness of the Son to the Father. Whilst Gregory is explicit that the human *eikon* is not consubstantial with God's substance, his consistent appraisal of *eikon* as a concept which closes the gap should be taken seriously when considering the human *eikon*, since she is the *eikon* of the Son and follows his pattern.[334]

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[331] Or. 30.20, SC 250, 268.

[332] For a study arguing that Paul and a number of early church fathers used *eikon* to denote similarity, see Sebastián Bartina, ""Cristo imagen del Dios invisible" según los papiros," *Studia Papyrologica* 2 (1963): 13-34, 22ff.

[333] Norris, *Faith Gives Fullness*, 180. From Eunomius' argument it is clear that εἰκών is both varied in meaning and controversial, which is why it requires such careful attention.

[334] Or. 42.17, SC 384, 86.

A further title, which Christ and the human *eikon* share in the passage cited above, idenitfies them each as a living *eikon* (ζῶν), rather than as one who is motionless (ἀκίνητος).[335] Gregory's inspiration for this comes from John 14:6 where Christ is depicted as saying "I am the way and the truth and the life" (ἐγὼ εἰμί ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ ἡ ζωή).[336] This shared notion of Christ and human persons as living *eikones* has significant implications on how humans image God.[337] Gregory offers his reader a vision of a human *eikon* which denotes a 'lived' existence. If she were not God's *eikon,* the human would be like a breathless statue, unable to resemble her prototype in any real sense. This is why it is unhelpful to consider the *eikon* only in terms of static metaphysical categories, concerned singularly with the questions about which internal part of the human person is denoted by the *eikon*. Approaching the *eikon* as the capacity or category of the human person means that we miss Gregory's crucial point about being the *eikon* of God: the *eikon* exists principally as a living being imaging a living being.

3.4 *Eikon* of God: Logos or Incarnate Christ?

So far in this chapter I have spoken about Christ as the identical *Eikon*, since it is theologically incorrect to distinguish between 'the transcendent Logos' and 'the incarnate Christ.' Nevertheless, during the first five centuries, views about Christ's unity were still evolving, with differences occurring over whether the *Eikon* of God was the

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[335] Or. 30.20, SC 250, 268. In the LLX ζωή is applied in opposition to death; see Deut 30.15; likewise, everlasting life, Dan 12:12; life itself, Gen 2:7; Takamitsu Muraoka, *GELS* (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 315. In the New Testament it is the only term for life which is applied to God; Frederick W. Danker and Walter Bauer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 430-31. Many early church fathers such as Clement used it as a synonym for God; *PGL*, 594-96.

[336] Or. 29.17, SC 250, 212.

[337] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 126.

transcendent Logos or the incarnate Christ.[338] It is worth noting here that significant discussions of Christology had not yet occurred, but would take place in the run-up to the councils of Ephesus (A.D. 431) and Chalcedon (A.D. 451). Preceding Gregory, Origen for example, designates the transcendent Logos as the true *Eikon* because he intends to prevent anthropomorphic views of God: "as the Father is invisible by nature, he has begotten an *eikon* that is also invisible."[339] It is universally recognised that Origen's thought influenced Gregory, although on the following point let us observe that Gregory employed a different approach from Origen with respect to Christ as *Eikon*.[340]

Gregory is explicit that he sees Christ and the Logos as a unity, thus rendering Christ as *Eikon*.[341] At first, it may appear as though Gregory follows Origen's thesis, regarding the *Eikon* being invisible, when he writes in a poem entitled *Oaths of Gregory*,

> I swore on the Logos himself, who to me is greatest God,
> source from source, from the eternal Father,
> *Eikon* of the archetype, a nature (φύσις) equal to his begetter,
> who came from heaven even into a mortal life.[342]

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[338] The two concepts of Christ would not be fully eliminated until the time of Cyril of Alexandria and then the council of Chalcedon.

[339] *Princ*. 1.2.6, Origen, *On First Principles*, trans. George W. Butterworth (London: SPCK, 1936), 19. Also, see *Hom. Gen.* 1.13; *Cels.* 6.63. For more on Origen's belief that *Eikon* describes transcendent Logos but not the incarnate Christ, see Frances M. Young, *God's Presence: A Contemporary Recapitulation of Early Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 162.

[340] Trigg, "Knowing God in the Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus," 83; McGuckin, *Intellectual Biography*, 10; Hanson, *Christian Doctrine of God*, 782; Claudio Moreschini, *Filosofia e letteratura in Gregorio di Nazianzo* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1997), 309. For differences between the cosmology and anthropology of Origen and Gregory, see Richard, *Cosmologie et théologie*, passim.

[341] For a discussion on Logos language in Gregory, see Petrus J. Maritz, "Logos Articulation in Gregory of Nazianzus," in *Acta Patristica et Byzantina*, ed. Hendrick F. Stander (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, Department of Ancient Languages, 1995), 99-108.

[342] Carm. 2.1.2, PG 37, 1017, 1-4. For an alternative translation, see Suzanne Abrams Rebillard, "The Speech Act of Swearing: Gregory of Nazianzus's Oath in Poema 2.1.2 in Context," *JECS* 21, no. 2 (2013): 177-207, 180.

However, Gregory identifies Christ with the Logos from several different angles, which I shall discuss further below. First, Gregory's use of "Logos" when speaking about Christ indicates that he considers the Logos and Christ as "One." Secondly, Gregory is explicit in describing Christ as "One" Son and not "two," since his approach to soteriology necessitates that the Logos assumes the human soul within the concept of a single self, thus transforming humanity. Finally, I shall demonstrate that Gregory refers specifically to Christ's flesh as *Eikon* denoting that Christ images God in the fullness of his being.

Gregory states that Christ is the "Power of God" and the "Wisdom of God," observing that these are titles attributed to the Son.[343] In his poem entitled *Hymn to Christ after the Silence at Pascha*, Gregory begins by addressing "Lord Christ" and moves on to praising him in the following manner:

> Light of the Father, Logos of the Great Spiritual Intellect, mightier than myth,
> High Light of the Highest Light, Only Child,
> *Eikon* of the Immortal Father, and seal of eternity
> (εἰκὼν ἀθανάτοιο πατρὸς, καὶ σφραγὶς ανάρχοι).[344]

Gregory continues his poem by praising Christ as the "giver of Life" and as the "Demiurge of being and being to come."[345] His understanding of the incarnate Christ as the pre-existent Logos means that it is possible for Gregory to conceive of Christ as creator, the role which Paul assigns to the *Eikon* of God in Colossians 1.[346] I am not suggesting that Gregory

[343] Or. 29.17, SC 250, 212.

[344] Carm. 1.2.38, PG 37, 1325, 12–1326, 2.

[345] Carm. 1.2.38, PG 37, 1326, 6-7.

[346] Also, see Or. 40.2, SC 358, 200. A key discussion amongst New Testament scholars concerns whether the *eikon* language implies the pre-existence of Christ in Paul's thought. Considering Col 1, "there can be little doubt that a role in the original creation of the cosmos is attributed to God's Son the Christ;"

conceives of the incarnate Christ as existing in human form before creation; however, his language does reveal the identification of Christ "as the eternal son of God" which reflects the New Testament custom of not regarding the two as separate identities.[347] Below is explicit support for this:

> Not that he became two (δύο), but that he was upheld to be one (ἕν) from two… two natures meeting in one, not two sons.[348]

I concur with most scholars who have written extensively on the unity of Christ, in particular Beeley, who writes, "the central principle and ultimate focus of Gregory's Christology is the union of God and human existence in the person of Jesus."[349]

Gregory's particular approach to soteriology advances fourth-century views on Christ's unity. It is universally agreed that Gregory's famed phrase, "For that which is unassumed is unhealed (τὸ γὰρ ἀπρόσληπτον, ἀθεράπευτον)" encapsulates his soteriology and thus, his Christology.[350] According to Gregory, for the Son to assume all that is human, it is crucial that the Son assumes the human soul, because of

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James D.G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 269.

[347] Beeley, *Trinity and the Knowledge of God*, 137; "Gregory of Nazianzus on the Unity of Christ," in *In the Shadow of the Incarnation: Essays on Jesus Christ in the Early Church in Honor of Brian E. Daley, S.J*, ed. Peter William Martens (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 97-120, 98.

[348] Or. 37.2, SC 318, 274.

[349] Christopher A. Beeley, *The Unity of Christ: Continuity and Conflict in Patristic Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 184; Wesche, ""Mind" and "Self"; "The Union of God and Man in Jesus Christ in the Thought of Gregory of Nazianzus," *VTQ* 28, no. 2 (1984): 83-98; Bouteneff, "Christ's Human Soul," 105-37; "St Gregory Nazianzen and Two-Nature Christology," *VTQ* 38, no. 3 (1994): 255-70; Norris, "Doctrine of Jesus Christ," passim; Hofer, *Christ in Gregory Nazianzen*, passim.

[350] Ep. 101.5 (101.32 SC), SC 208, 50; Brian Daley, ""Heavenly Man" and "Eternal Christ": Apollinarius and Gregory of Nyssa on the Personal Identity of the Savior," *JECS* 10, no. 4 (2002): 469-88, 479; Donald L. Gelpi, *The Firstborn of Many: Synoptic Narrative Christology*, vol. 1 (Marquette: Marquette University Press, 2001), 117. In applying this dictum, Gregory was building on Irenaeus, *Haer*., preface to book 5, and Origen, *Dial.,*136.

the soul's role as mediator between divine and human:

> For this reason, God was united with the flesh through the mediating soul, and the separate realities were combined well (ἀνεκράθη) by the affinity towards both of that which was mediating.[351]

Gregory posits the co-existence of the human soul and the Logos within the concept of a single "self," which accommodates both divine and human natures.[352] Below, when Gregory discusses the mixture of the divine and human he does this in a manner which expresses predominance of the stronger over the weaker, thus unifying the whole:

> He bears all of me, with all that is mine, in himself (ἐν ἑαυτῷ) so that he may consume in himself that which is inferior, in the same way that fire consumes wax or as the sun consumes mist on the ground, so that I may partake of that which is his through the blending (διὰ σύγκρασιν).[353]

For us to appreciate fully Gregory's statement above, I turn to his pronouncement of the incarnation as "O, new mixture! O, paradoxical blending!"[354] How does Gregory understand this "new mixture"'? Do

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[351] Or. 2.23, SC 247, 120.

[352] Or. 30.6, SC 250, 236; 33.15, SC 318, 194. For the importance of self to Gregory's Christology, see Wesche, "Union of God and Man," 95. Scholars debate whether Gregory emphasises Christ's divinity over his humanity; Alois Grillmeier, *Christ in Christian Tradition: From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451)*, Vol. 1; trans. John S. Bowden, 2nd revised ed., (London: Mowbray, 1965), 369. Grillmeier criticises Gregory for being Antiochene in his Christology, whereas others argue that Gregory is more akin to the Alexandrian tradition; Boris Bobrinskoy, "The Indwelling of the Spirit in Christ: "Pneumatic Christology" in the Cappadocian Fathers," *VTQ* 28, no. 1 (1984): 49-65, 64. I suggest that Gregory does not fall neatly into either category and is best read on his own terms.

[353] Or. 30.6, SC 250, 236.

[354] Or. 38.13, SC 358, 134; cf. 2.23, SC 247, 120; 14.15, PG 37, 876B; 30.6 SC 250, 236.

divine and human co-exist, but remain separate, like beans and grains of wheat, or are they fully blended to the extent where there could be no easy identification of each component, or does Gregory take some other approach?[355] The response depends somewhat on the question of Gregory's philosophical influences with regard to the concept of mixture. Generally, scholars suggest that Gregory is most influenced by Stoic thought on this issue.[356] For example, Sykes states confidently that the Stoic influence upon Gregory leads him to

> stress the reality of the union of the elements without losing the individuality of the constituent elements and their retention of their specific characteristics.[357]

This is the view expressed by philosophers such as Chryssipus, for whom κρᾶσις occurs when two elements co-exist but remain separate.[358] Recently, Hofer has challenged this by surveying carefully different philosophical approaches. He reviews Stoic and Neoplatonic philosophers thoroughly with respect to the discussion of mixing.[359]

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[355] Compare the description of Chryssipus' theories of blending by Alexander in Robert B. Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics: A Study of the De Mexitione with Preliminary Essays, Text, Translation and Commentary* (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 116-17.

[356] Moreschini, SC 358, 56; Franz Xaver Portmann, *Die göttliche Paidagogia bei Gregor von Nazianz: eine dogmengeschichtliche Studie* (St. Ottilien: EOS Verlag der Erzabtei St. Ottilien, 1954), 64; Norris, "Doctrine of Jesus Christ," 85; Susanna Elm, ""O Paradoxical Fusion!" Gregory of Nazianzus on Baptism and Cosmology (Orations 38-40)," in *Heavenly Realms and Earthly Realities in Late Antique Religions*, ed. Annette Yoshiko Reed and Ra'anan S. Boustan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 296-316, 300, n11; Althaus, *Die Heilslehre des heiligen*, 57-60; Bouteneff, *Beginnings*, 148; Sigurd Bergmann, *Creation Set Free: The Spirit as Liberator of Nature* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 87. For these and other references, see Hofer, *Christ in Gregory Nazianzen*, 96. For an overview of mixture in Stoic philosophical thought, see Anthony A. Long and David N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1, Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 290-93.

[357] Moreschini and Sykes, *Poemata Arcana*, 242.

[358] Todd, *Stoic Physics*, 116-17.

[359] Hofer, *Christ in Gregory Nazianzen*, 96-106.

Building on work by Wolfson in the mid-twentieth century, Hofer discusses an Aristotelian notion of μίξις and κρᾶσις, where one component transforms the other.[360] In relation to this, Aristotle writes, "mixture is the union of things mixable, which have been altered."[361] Hofer describes this approach to mixture as "predominance." This leaves a significant difference in approach between Aristotle and the Stoics:

> For Aristotle, there is a sort of transformation so that the stronger overpowers the weaker, while for the Stoics, that which is little is preserved intact when it comes into contact with that which is greater.[362]

Hofer, preceded by Gilbert, argues convincingly that Gregory leans more towards the Aristotelian model of mixture. Hofer achieves this by pointing to Gregory's choice of images to describe the mixing that has taken place in Christ. The result of this mixing is that the Word transforms the meaner element in the same way that fire transforms wax.[363] Since mixture is key to how Gregory speaks of the human person, I shall consider this further when I discuss the creation of the human *eikon* in the following chapter.[364]

Finally, I turn to *Against Apollinarius* where Gregory depicts

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[360] Hofer departs from Wolfson, since the latter argues that predominance is evident in the Fathers' explanation of the "unity of person in Jesus", but not the union of soul and body; see Harry A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers; Faith, Trinity and Incarnation*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956), 386. Richard Sorabji goes too far when he argues that Gregory's idea of mixture at the incarnation is "obliteration;" see *Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel* (London: Duckworth, 1988), 120-21.

[361] Hofer, *Christ in Gregory Nazianzen*, 99; *On Generation and Corruption* 1.10, 328b.

[362] Hofer, *Christ in Gregory Nazianzen*, 101.

[363] Or. 30.6, SC 250, 236.

[364] For discussions of perichoresis as the basis for Christology, see Nonna Verna Harrison, "*Perichoresis* in the Greek Fathers," *VTQ* 35, no. 1 (1991): 53-65, 55; Peter Stemmer, "Perichorese. Zur Geschichte eines Begriffs," *AB* 27 (1983): 9-55.

Christ's flesh as God's *Eikon*:

> But since God is unmingled (ἄμικτος) with flesh (σαρκίῳ),
> and the soul (ψυχή) and spiritual intellect (νοῦς) [are] such a thing as is in the middle,
> as though a shared dwelling-place of flesh,
> and as though the *Eikon* of God
> (σαρκὸς μέν, ὡς σύνοικος, ὡς δ᾽εἰκὼν θεοῦ).
> God's nature (φύσις) mingles (μιγεῖσα) with its kin,
> and from there it has communion with the dull, thick flesh (πάχους).[365]

At the heart of Gregory's defence against Apollinarius is the notion that Christ possesses a human soul.[366] Through the soul, God is able to be in communion with the flesh, which means that in this poem, the flesh is considered as God's *Eikon* through its identification with the soul. This sheds further light on how we interpret Gregory's approach to the human *eikon*. In view of what Gregory writes about Christ as a complete, unified and living *Eikon*, which includes his flesh, it is reasonable that the human person follows the same pattern since she is the *eikon* of Christ.

Thus far, I have argued that we may understand Gregory's intention regarding the human *eikon* if we turn first to Christ as *Eikon*. This continues to be true, as we turn to Gregory's writing on soteriology, particularly where he draws on Philippians 2:7 to discuss the implications of Christ's kenosis.

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[365] Carm. 1.1.10, PG 37, 469, 56-60.

[366] "In Apollinarius there is a complete absence of the traditional phrases of the Logos-theology which treat Christ as the Image of God and men as made after that image," Charles E. Raven, *Apollinarianism: An Essay on the Christology of the Early Church* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1923), 187.

3.5 Divine, yet Vulnerable *Eikon*

I shall demonstrate that through his soteriology, Gregory presents Christ as one who is 'divine, yet vulnerable,' setting the pattern for human persons. Christ's divinity and vulnerability stem from the premise stated in Gregory's soteriological dictum which I mentioned in brief earlier:

> That which is unassumed is unhealed, but that which has been united to God (ἥνωται τῷ θεῷ) is also being saved.[367]

In other words, Christ must become human for the human *eikon* to be restored, uniting the Logos to humanity through the soul.[368] As a means of describing the particular way through which Christ becomes incarnate, Gregory draws from Philippians 2:7, where Paul writes of Christ emptying himself and taking on the form of a slave (ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβών).[369] Paul's proclamation appears in a hymn about Christ, which has attracted much attention from New Testament scholars, due to its complex theology.[370] Whilst the hymn itself does not mention *eikon*, a number of Pauline scholars have argued that form (μορφή) and *eikon* (εἰκών) fall in the same semantic field, thus contrasting Christ with Adam as God's *eikon*.[371] In a passage from

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[367] Ep. 101.5 (101.32 SC), SC 208, 50.

[368] Or. 38.13, SC 358, 130-34.

[369] Or. 4.78, SC 309, 200; 30.3, SC 250, 230; 38.13, SC 358, 134; 45.9, PG 36, 633B-636A; Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 533, 144-48; 2.1.14, PG 37, 762, 90-92; 2.1.45, PG 37, 1355, 28-30. Gregory cites Phil 2:7 forty-four times, either as a direct quote or as an allusion; Brian J. Matz, "Philippians 2:7 as Pastoral Example in Gregory Nazianzen's Oration 12," *GOTR* 49, no. 3-4 (2004): 270-90, 282.

[370] For a historical review of how the verses in Philippians have been read, see David Brown, *Divine Humanity: Kenosis Explored and Defended* (London: SCM Press, 2010), 1-33; Charles B. Cousar, *Philippians and Philemon: A Commentary*, NTL (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 47-63; Gerald F. Hawthorne and Ralph P. Martin, *Philippians*, Revised ed., WBC (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2004), 99.

[371] Van Kooten, "Image, Form and Transformation," 213-42. For arguments against synonymy, see Larry W. Hurtado, *Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in*

his oration *On the Son,* in which he argues that Christ is God, Gregory himself contrasts the form (μορφή) of a slave and the divinity of the *eikon* (εἰκών) explicitly*:*

> And what about "the bending of every knee?"[372] "The emptying" for our sakes, and the divine "*Eikon*" blending with the "form of a slave?"[373]

Gregory draws together 'form (μορφή)' and '*eikon* (εἰκών)' by arguing that the divine *Eikon* and form of a slave are blended, which points to how he interprets the act of Christ's kenosis. Christ, as the divine *Eikon*, blends with the form of a slave, but does not stop being God; on the contrary, Christ's taking the form of a servant actually "manifests his true divinity" rather than diminishes it.[374] Observe below how this idea is also evident in Gregory's poetry:

> Christ, on seeing as great a heavenly share as he placed in the mortal body
> being devoured by heart-gnawing (θυμοβόροιο δαπτόμενον) evil
> and the crooked dragon (σκολιὸν δράκοντα) ruling over mortals,
> in order that he might raise his portion
> he did not send towards the disease other forms of help,
> (for a little cure is of no use to great sufferings). But having emptied (κενώσας) his glory,
> the heavenly and the eternal *Eikon* of heaven,
> assumed flesh in the holy womb of an unwed woman

Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 121-23; David Steenberg, "The Case Against the Synonymity of Morphe and Eikon," *JSNT* 34 (1988): 77-86; Markus Bockmuehl, "'The Form of God' (Phil. 2: 6). Variations on a Theme of Jewish Mysticism," *JTS* 48, no. 1 (1997): 1–23.

[372] Phil 2:10.

[373] Or. 30.20, SC 250, 230.

[374] Behr, *Mystery of Christ*, 35; Molac, "Christologie," 312.

> with laws that are human and not mortal (ἀνδρομέοις τε καὶ ού βροτέοισι νόμοισι)…[375]

Above, Gregory describes the *Eikon* as eternal; therefore, Christ's kenosis does not mean that he, as the *Eikon* ceases to be God, but rather that he ceases to live in the glory of heaven for a time. Christ's kenosis and assumption of humanity points towards the nature of his existence as being at once divine and vulnerable. In spite of the fact that Tsirpanlis and Matz have discussed Christ's kenosis in Gregory's work, they have not observed this key point.[376] Tsirpanlis argues that Christ's kenosis is the basis of the Christian life; whilst this is correct, it denotes only part of Gregory's intention. Matz discusses broader concerns, arguing correctly that kenosis itself performs more than one function in Gregory's writing; namely, it denotes both the full deity and humanity of Christ, and that it is used as a language for salvation and as an example for believers to "follow Christ's example of humility."[377] In light of the passages cited above, I argue that Gregory views Christ's kenosis as far more than simply an ethical example of how humans are supposed to live; rather, through kenosis, Gregory points both to an ontological uniting of divinity to humanity, or, said another way, to a Christ who is divine, yet vulnerable.

Christ, as the *Eikon* who is at once divine, yet vulnerable, demonstrates how in turn we may understand the human *eikon* as 'divine, yet vulnerable.' For through Christ's kenosis, divinity blends with humanity, which renders possible the vulnerable human *eikon*'s

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[375] Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 533, 139-47. For alternative translations, see Peter Gilbert, *On God and Man: The Theological Poetry of St. Gregory of Nazianzus* (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001), 93-94; Claudio Moreschini et al., *Gregorio Nazianzeno: Poesie*, vol. 1 (Roma: Città Nuova Editrice, 1994), 76.

[376] Constantine N. Tsirpanlis, "The Doctrine of Katharsis: Contemplation and Kenosis in St Gregory of Nazianzus," *PBR* 3 (1984): 5-17; Matz, "Philippians 2:7," 270-90.

[377] Ibid., 284. Norris exaggerates when he writes, "It could almost be said that in Gregory's view, all of theology could be included under the kenosis-theosis pattern;" *Doctrine of Jesus Christ*, 62.

theosis. In other words, Christ's kenosis transforms the human *eikon* ontologically into one who is divine.

Christ's divine, yet vulnerable existence is encapsulated in Gregory's declaration, "God crucified."[378] Thus, the passion of Christ is the passion of God:

> … lest you leave off the argument, on hearing about the blood of God, his passion and his death, (μήπου τὸν λογισμὸν ὀκλάσῃς, αἷμα θεοῦ, καὶ πάθος ἀκούων, καὶ θάνατον) …[379]

Since elsewhere Gregory is equally clear that God is impassible and incapable of suffering in God's own being, I conclude that Gregory views the passion itself as a paradox.[380] Gregory does not merely refer to Christ's passion in such extreme terms for the sake of paradox, but rather as a means of highlighting the complexity of salvation.

A significant consequence of Christ's vulnerability in becoming incarnate involves his encounters with the devil and demonic powers. Gregory is explicit that only the identical *Eikon* is able to resist and conquer the devil. Through his resistance, Christ provides a way for the human *eikon* to achieve the victory over the devil, which she was unable to accomplish for herself.[381]

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[378] Or. 45.29, PG 36, 661D. For God as passible, see Or. 30.1, SC 250, 226. Gregory Nyssen charged Apollinarius with violating divine impassibility on the basis of his claim that God had died. Beeley suggests that Gregory Nazianzen was guilty of the same; see *Unity of Christ*, 221. In light of the occasions where Nazianzen also states that God is impassible, I cannot agree with Beeley's conclusion.

[379] Or. 45.19, PG 36, 649C; 26.12, SC 284, 254; 43.64, SC 384, 266-68; 45.28-29, PG 36, 661B-663A.

[380] Or. 30.5, SC 250, 234. For a convincing defence of paradox as a necessary means of discussing God, see John Milbank, "The Double Glory, or Paradox versus Dialectics: On Not Quite Agreeing with Slavoj Žižek," in *The Monstrosity of Christ*, ed. Creston Davis (Massachusetts: MIT, 2009), 110-233. Milbank highlights that the "both/and" of paradox is "in no way static, because the likeness to the other shown through the different identity of the first thing acts to ensure that the first thing reaches further out toward that alterity, yet only by further realizing its own distinctiveness," 171.

[381] Or. 39.13, SC 358, 178.

3.6 Conquering Evil

In spite of the focused attention paid to Gregory's Christology and soteriology, scholars often pass over Christ's interactions with the devil as though they are of little consequence, or worse, pass over Christ's defeat of evil altogether.[382] As I suggested in Chapter One, this is possibly due to the effect of the Enlightenment, which renders discussions of the devil unpopular, except in cases where scholars seek to demythologise the concept of spiritual beings. Nevertheless, Christ's defeat of evil is a prevailing theme in Gregory's writing. Since Christ's victory has significant implications for the human *eikon*, it would be remiss to ignore it here.

Gregory writes that when Christ became incarnate, Satan was ruling over human persons, which meant that evil was devouring their hearts; the situation was so dire that only the identical *Eikon* could rescue the human *eikon*.[383] Unlike the human *eikon,* Christ does not succumb to the devil's schemes; rather he takes authority over the devil. As a means of revealing Christ's authority over the devil, Gregory draws on the gospel accounts where Christ drives out demons.[384] Gregory also presents Christ's life as one of wisdom and self-control, in which he discerns the temptations of the devil and resists him.[385] However, Christ's ultimate victory over the devil occurs on the cross, as seen below in the passage taken from an oration in praise of Saint Cyprian:

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[382] Winslow argues that Christ's defeat over evil is not significant to Gregory; *Dynamics of Salvation*, 108. Nor is the devil paid attention by the following: Bouteneff, "Two-Nature Christology," 255-70; Norris, "Doctrine of Jesus Christ," passim; Beeley, *Trinity and the Knowledge of God*, passim. The only exception is Althaus, who observes that Gregory connects the cross with the defeat of the devil, see *Die Heilslehre des heiligen Gregor von Nazianz*, 126-27.

[383] Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 533, 139-47; 1.1.10, PG 37, 465, 5-9; Or. 1.4, SC 247, 76; 7.23, SC 405, 240; 29.17, SC 250, 212-14; 30.21, SC 250, 274; 44.4, PG 36, 612B.

[384] Or. 29.20, SC 250, 220; 38.16, SC 358, 142.

[385] Or. 14.3, PG 35, 861B; 40.10, SC 358, 216-18.

> Thus, in this way there are many means available to us for the purpose of guiding us towards that which is greater, and many means of educating us in virtue; reason, law, prophets, apostles, the very sufferings of Christ (αὐτῶν τῶν Χριστοῦ παθημάτων), the first martyr who went up on the cross, also gathering me in, so that he might put a nail through my sin (ἵνα προσηλώσῃ τὴν ἐμὴν ἁμαρτίαν) and triumph over the serpent and sanctify the tree and conquer pleasure and heal Adam and restore the fallen *eikon* (τὴν εἰκόνα πεσοῦσαν ἀνακαλέσηται).[386]

Above, Gregory draws together Christ's victory over the serpent and the restoration of the fallen *eikon.*[387] Gregory does not provide us with details of exactly how crucifixion effects victory over the devil other than the comments that he makes in *On the Baptism of Christ*. In this oration, Gregory explains that humankind is separated from God through the envy of the devil and the taste of sin.[388] The separated and wounded human *eikon* is able to receive healing only through the incarnation. After succeeding in his temptation of the first humans, the devil attempts to trick Christ. Thinking himself to be invincible, the devil is tricked into believing that he is attacking Adam, when in fact he is attacking God.[389] Gregory appears to give little thought to God's morality in tricking the devil, as he makes no further comment other than that death was put to death by flesh.[390]

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[386] Or. 24.4, SC 284, 46; Carm. 1.1.9, PG 37, 459, 34-40; 1.2.1, PG 37, 535, 162-69; 1.2.45, PG 37, 1355-56. On this theme, also see Judith L. Kovacs, ""Now Shall the Ruler of This World Be Driven Out": Jesus' Death as Cosmic Battle in John 12:20-36," *JBL* 114, no. 2 (1995): 227-47.

[387] As I stated in Chapter One, Gregory equates the serpent with the devil.

[388] Or. 39.13, SC 358, 176-78; 30.1, SC 250, 226; 33.9, SC 318, 174-76; 33.14, SC 318, 186-88; 43.64, SC 384, 266-68; 45.22, PG 36, 653A-C.

[389] Or. 39.13, SC 358, 178.

[390] Or. 39.13, SC 358, 178. For a discussion which links the deceit to Gregory's concept of ransom, see John P. Egan, "The Deceit of the Devil According to Gregory Nazianzen," in *Studia Patristica 22*, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone

In presenting Christ as the conqueror of evil powers, Gregory interweaves a theme prevalent in Irenaeus, who views atonement as conquest, or who sees conquest in the atonement.[391] In the twentieth century, Gustaf Aulén coined this theme "Christus Victor." Commenting on Irenaeus, Aulén writes, "The work of Christ is first and foremost a victory over the powers which hold mankind in bondage: sin, death, and the devil." [392] Recently, theologian Ben Myers criticised Aulén's theory, arguing that it is not present in patristic literature.[393] Whilst there is room for much improvement in Aulén's suggestions, I cannot agree with Myers that Christ's defeat of the devil is a minor strand in Gregory's work.[394]

It is important to note that for Gregory, like Irenaeus and Origen before him, the victory is won on the cross through non-violent means, since it is won through Christ's sacrifice.[395] Encompassed in Christ's sacrifice is the theme of ransom, which Gregory addresses rather unsatisfactorily, concluding that it could not have been paid to the devil, nor to the Father because he "neither requested nor required it"; instead, Gregory suggests that it is part of the plan (οἰκονομία) where the human person needs to be sanctified by God, who "prevailed over the tyrant by might (τοῦ τυράννου βίᾳ κρατήσας)."[396]

(Leuven: Peeters Press, 1989), 8-13. This loosely follows Althaus, *Die Heilslehre des heiligen*, 133-34.

[391] *Haer.* 3.18.7; see Giulea, *Pre-Nicene Christology in Paschal Contexts*, 159; Hendrickus Berkhof, *Christ and the Powers* (Scottdale: Herald, 1962), 31.

[392] Gustaf Aulén, *Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement*, trans. A.G. Herbert (London: SPCK, 1965), 20. For the background behind the theme in extra-biblical literature, see Giulea, *Pre-Nicene Christology in Paschal Contexts*, passim.

[393] Ben Myers, "Atonement and the Image of God," in *Los Angeles Theology Conference* (Los Angeles 15-16 January 2015).

[394] For a contemporary summary and critique of "Christus Victor"; see Boersma, *Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross*, 181-201. Christus Victor theory of atonement can only function to a certain extent within cosmic dualism, although this does not need to be ultimate or eternal.

[395] Or. 4.78, SC 309, 200.

[396] Or. 45.22, PG 36, 653B. Norris concludes that ransom is used to show Christ's divinity and humanity; "Doctrine of Jesus Christ," 150-55.

In depicting Christ's victory over the devil, Gregory draws on biblical and pseudepigraphal themes, as I shall discuss further in the following chapters. Whilst Gregory places the *eikon* in a cosmological battle with the devil, the overall picture is not pessimistic, since Christ has won the victory for the human *eikon*.

3.7 Conclusion

I began this chapter by arguing that, for Gregory, the human *eikon* is primarily a theological term, where the human person is understood first in light of her relationship to God. For this reason, I surveyed briefly Gregory's doctrine of God in its historical context, observing that Gregory's work emerged amidst varying, competing cosmologies. I highlighted that Gregory's belief that God is both 'one' and 'three' is key to his doctrine of God in which 'three' entails the identities of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.

From there, I moved on to demonstrate that Gregory follows the New Testament in referring to the Son as the *Eikon* of God, differentiating the Son from humans as *eikones*, by bestowing the title "identical *Eikon*" upon the Son. Gregory's attempt to marry Pauline and Nicene theology is successful in light of the particular manner in which he applies *eikon*, since he consistently uses it to denote Christ's likeness to the Father rather than Christ's difference. For example, Gregory states that the nature of the "identical *Eikon*" is equal to the nature of the Father and that he is eternally begotten.[397] I built on this argument through considering the way in which Gregory used terms such as χαρακτήρ and εἰκών. I demonstrated that when applied to Christ, these terms infer intimacy and similarity, rather than distance and dissimilarity. For this reason, I suggest that we should take seriously the application of the title *eikon* to the human person. As I shall demonstrate in following chapters, Gregory applies *eikon* as a term

[397] Carm. 1.1.2, PG 37, 402, 8; Or. 29.17, SC 250, 214.

denoting human likeness to God, following his treatment of Christ. Whilst the human *eikon* does not exist eternally, in all other ways *eikon* situates her ontology, function and relationship to God as categories that express radical likeness to her Creator. This radical likeness is realised through both Christ and the human *eikon* being described as "living beings," which leads me to suggest that *eikon* is more clearly expressed as that which is dynamic rather than static.

Moving on from there, I discussed Christ's unity, arguing that the title '*Eikon'* refers to the transcendent Logos and the incarnate Christ, rather than being reserved for the former. I highlighted that Gregory is explicit in describing Christ as "One" Son and not "two," due to his approach to soteriology. This entails that the Logos assumes the human soul within the concept of a single self. Lastly, in relation to Christ's unity, I demonstrated that Gregory refers specifically to Christ's flesh as *Eikon*, denoting that Christ images God in the fullness of his being. The implications upon the human *eikon* are immense since, yet again, we are prevented from adopting the view that the *eikon* equates to the spiritual intellect or the soul alone; rather to speak of the *eikon* is to speak of the whole human person, including the flesh.

Next, I considered Gregory's approach to soteriology, specifically where it is developed through Christ's kenosis. Through his kenosis Christ remains divine, whilst at the same time becoming vulnerable through the incarnation. Christ's kenosis effects the theosis of the human *eikon*. The result of this is that through the incarnation the *eikon* is restored to her divine potential. Gregory states this with great rhetorical flourish in the extract below:

> Yesterday I was crucified with Christ, today I am glorified with him. Yesterday I was put to death with Christ, today I am made alive with him. Yesterday I was buried with Christ, today I am raised with him. But let us bear fruit for the one who died and rose on our behalf. Perhaps you think I speak about gold, or silver, or robes or stones of brilliance and value; earthly matter

> (ὕλη) which ebbs and flows, remaining below, of which the evil ones and slaves of things below and of the world-ruler (τοῦ κοσμοκράτορος) have more. Let us bear fruit ourselves, the most honourable possession belonging to God and the nearest to him. Let us give back to the *Eikon* that which is according to the *eikon* (ἀποδῶμεν τῇ εἰκόνι τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα), let us recognise our worth, let us honour the archetype, and let us know the power of the mystery and on whose behalf Christ died.[398]

Above, Gregory identifies closely with Christ's death and even more significantly, with Christ's resurrection. He states explicitly that Christ's actions demand a response: that human persons offer themselves to Christ, precisely because they are his *eikones*, the closest of creation to God on earth.

With an overview of Gregory's presentation of Christ as *Eikon* in place, upon whom the human *eikon* is modelled, I shall move now to discuss the creation of the human *eikon* herself.

[398] Or. 1.4, SC 247, 76-78.

Chapter 4 Creation of the Human *Eikon*

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I demonstrated that Gregory approaches *eikon* as a theological term, which he achieves by situating the human *eikon* within Christ, the identical *Eikon*.[399] Further to this, I argued that we should take seriously Gregory's approach to *Eikon* as a term which suggests a close, ontological relationship with the prototype rather than a mere reflection of it; or said another way, which emphasises likeness rather than difference. This chapter builds on the theological context of the human *eikon* by exploring Gregory's narration of her creation. As I highlighted in Chapter One, Gregory often approaches his theological anthropology with rhetorical questions, set in a theological context. We saw that Gregory follows the psalmist, who wonders upon humanity's relationship to God.[400] After making this move, Gregory turns his questions towards the mixed nature of the human person:

> … so am I curious about the mixture (τὸ κρᾶμα) of your body and soul. How is it that you are dust (χοῦς) and an *eikon* of God?[401]

As a response to this, Gregory suggests that in order to begin to make sense of our existence, human *eikones* should consider their creation in paradise.[402] Following Gregory, I move to creation next. From attending to Gregory's creation narratives, I argue that the phrase 'divine, yet vulnerable' encapsulates best Gregory's presentation of the human *eikon,* since this description lends itself to an open interpretation and

[399] Carm. 1.1.8, PG 37, 452, 55-56; Or. 20.9, SC 270, 74-76; 25.17, SC 284, 198; 34.8, SC 318, 212; 41.14, SC 358, 344-46.

[400] Psalm 8.

[401] Or. 20.11, SC 270, 80.

[402] Or. 45.24, PG 36, 656C.

captures the most significant aspects of Gregory's human *eikon*, rather than representing a reductionist view. Furthermore, as I shall demonstrate throughout this chapter, Gregory describes the creation of the human *eikon* in such a way that she is vulnerable to the spiritual realm and, more significantly, vulnerable to God; consequently she is created with the capacity for divinity. This aspect of Gregory's theological anthropology is crucial to my discussion of Gregory's concept of theosis in Chapter Six.

In order to clarify further my interpretation of Gregory's use of "divine" in relation to the human *eikon*, I begin by discussing Gregory's doctrine of creation, where the Logos creates *ex nihilo*. *Creatio ex nihilo* is intrinsic to Gregory's doctrine of God and to his theological anthropology. For Gregory, the implications of c*reatio ex nihilo* are that only God exists eternally; consequently, the human *eikon* is a creature. Therefore, when Gregory speaks of the human *eikon* as "divine," her divinity is conferred, since divinity belongs to God alone in the proper sense.

After establishing Gregory's doctrine of creation, I move on to discuss his creation narratives. Gregory depicts God creating the world as two realms, invisible and visible respectively, which form a single whole. Following Gregory's sequence, I discuss the invisible realm first, which is the home of the angels. Since in his writings Gregory describes the human *eikon* as "another kind of angel (ἄγγελος ἄλλος)," a discussion of these "invisible spirits" is vital to build a clearer picture of the human *eikon.*[403] It is noteworthy that, following Genesis 1, Gregory does not name angels as *eikones* of God, as we shall see below; rather human persons alone image God. This is significant because it points towards the uniqueness of the human as God's *eikon*. Key to Gregory's description of humans is that they are a mixture of the material and spiritual realms; their materiality means that they are visible, unlike angels whom Gregory describes as invisible and simple. Thus, their

[403] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 126; 45.7, PG 36, 635C; Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 529, 90; 1.2.15, PG 37, 777, 155.

materiality means that humans are able to function literally as physical, breathing *eikones* of God, which I proposed in Chapter Two.

In order to explore further how this human *eikon* is unique, I shall examine Gregory's description of how God creates her. At creation, Gregory describes the human *eikon* as God's breath, which is the spiritual, intellectual soul. As I stated in Chapter One, this description of the *eikon* has led many scholars to conclude that Gregory applies *eikon* to the soul or the spiritual intellect alone. We shall see that the *eikon* transforms the dust to form a dynamic human person; thus the *eikon* assumes the whole human person in addition to being described solely as the spiritual intellect. The transformation of the dust by the *eikon* is possible because God creates the material realm to be vulnerable to the spiritual realm. This vulnerability is wholly good, since it enables the human person to reach her proper end; thus Gregory regards the human person's vulnerability as positive at creation. His negative approach to vulnerability develops later, when the glorious divinity of the *eikon* incites envy from Satan. It is after her first encounter with the devil that Gregory depicts the human *eikon'*s vulnerability as negative, which I discuss in the following chapter.

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that Gregory goes to great lengths to present Christ, the Identical *Eikon*, as a unified, living human person, who is different from pagan *eikones*; in this manner as in many others, the human *eikon* follows Christ. Like Christ, and unlike pagan *eikones*, Gregory's creation narratives show that the human *eikon* is a dynamic, living being. In other words, being alive is an aspect of divinity. In the same way that Gregory applies *eikon* to Christ in order to denote Christ's likeness to God, rather than his difference, so he applies *eikon* to the human. This is evident not only through her dynamic nature, but also through the terms which Gregory applies to the human at her creation. For example, when Gregory refers to the human *eikon* as "another angel" and a king who "rules over that which is on earth,"

he points to ways in which she is like God.[404]

Gregory's application of the concept of the human *eikon* as a king and ruler has led to criticism from feminist theologians who object to these metaphors on the basis that they are exclusively masculine. I respond to these critiques by examining Gregory's use of *eikon* in relation to women, where I demonstrate that Gregory includes both male and female in his notion of the *eikon*. I argue that a consideration of the female *eikon* reveals more than simply Gregory's argument for women's equality with men. In observing Gregory's writing about women as *eikones*, a key aspect of his thought about the human *eikon* becomes clearer still. Thus far, I have argued that Gregory does not only envisage the human *eikon* as an aspect of the human person which resides as an internal, i.e. spiritual, aspect of the human person. Rather, I have suggested that Gregory's ideas are broader than this, encompassing the whole human person, who functions literally as a physical breathing *eikon* of God. I built on this in Chapter Three by demonstrating that Gregory presents Christ's flesh as the *Eikon*, rather than merely Christ's soul. This vision of the *eikon* is evident further through Gregory's approach to women as *eikones*, for Gregory presents women imaging God dynamically, in both body and soul. Moreover, he discusses women as *eikones* in relation to cosmetics, the use of which, in Gregory's eyes, reduces the *eikon* to an idol. Yet again, Gregory's vision of the *eikon* encompasses the notion of humans as living, breathing *eikones* of God, which differentiates them from breathless pagan *eikones*.

Before I turn to discuss Gregory's portrayal of the human *eikon* further, I shall outline his doctrine of creation, demonstrating that for Gregory, *creatio ex nihilo* is intrinsic both to his understanding of God and to his discussion of the human *eikon* as divine.

[404] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 124-26.

4.2 *Creatio Ex Nihilo*

Gregory's explanation of the distinction between theology and economy proceeds as follows: theology concerns how human persons speak about God, whereas economy entails God's activity in the world.[405] Nevertheless, Gregory's thought often expresses an overlap between theology and economy. Observe this overlap in Gregory's second theological oration, *On the Doctrine of God,* in which Gregory ruminates at some length on the wonders of cosmology and creation. During his wondering, Gregory observes that God alone is the creator and sustainer of the world:

> For how could also this universe have been caused to subsist (ὑπέστη), or set together (συνέστη) if God had not given being (οὐσιώσαντος) and sustained all things?[406]

Gregory's belief that God is both the cause (αἴτιος) and source (ἀρχή) of all being relates to his understanding of the doctrine *creatio ex nihilo.*[407] By the fourth century when Gregory was writing, *creatio ex nihilo* was a normative Christian doctrine, which he accepted.[408] For Gregory,

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[405] Or. 38.8, SC 358, 118. οἰκονομία is understood as management of a household and is used by the early church to speak of God's involvement in the world, often referring to matters of salvation.

[406] Or. 28.6, SC 250, 110. The philosophy attributed to Gregory's doctrine of creation is dealt with thoroughly in Moreschini and Sykes, *Poemata Arcana*, 143-51; Portmann, *Die göttliche Paidagogia bei Gregor von Nazianz*, 53-62.

[407] Or. 28.6, SC 250, 110; 20.7, SC 270, 72.

[408] By the early third century, theologians such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen did not question *creatio ex nihilo*. Considered by numerous scholars to derive from Genesis, the earliest alleged example of *creatio ex nihilo* occurs in 2 Maccabees 7:28. According to May, the doctrine appeared in its fullest sense in the Christian climate, stemming from Christian thinkers such as Theophilus of Antioch; May, Gerhard, *Creatio Ex Nihilo (*New York: T&T Clark, 2004). Scholars have critiqued May's thesis, arguing that there is evidence of *creatio ex nihilo* in the Septuagint; see Russell R. Reno, *Genesis* (London: SCM Press, 2010). Also, see Paul Copan, "Is Creatio Ex Nihilo a Post-Biblical Invention? An Examination of Gerhard May's Proposal," *Trinity Journal* 17, no. 1 (1996): 77-93. Copan's thesis discusses the whole biblical narrative and is widely

creatio ex nihilo is both significant and important, since it is key to his concept of monotheism, where God is One.[409] Further to this, Gregory employs *creatio ex nihilo* as a means of confirming the sovereignty of God and denying the eternity of matter (ἡ ὕλη). In making this move Gregory follows Wisdom and Job in their depiction of matter as formless:[410]

> Come now and let us celebrate the creation of great God,
> contesting against false opinions.
> God is One (εἷς θεός); but matter and forms, things thought by the wisest of the Greeks to be eternal, are a feeble story.
> …. but if these things were mixed,
> how is it that they were mixed? Who mixed them other than God? If it is God who mixed them,
> then accept him as the Creator of everything as well (τοῦτον καὶ κτίστορα δέχνυσο πάντων).[411]

As seen above, Gregory reasons that only God is without beginning and, since God created everything, all things are contingent on him. Whilst Elm has argued that Gregory integrated the creation account in Genesis into a variety of Platonic and Neo-Platonic cosmological traditions, his stipulation of the Christian doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* suggests that Gregory approached his doctrine the other way around. [412]

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supported; see Frank F. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), 281; Richard J. Clifford, *Creation Accounts in the Ancient Near East and in the Bible* (Washington, D.C.: CBAA, 1994), 199.

[409] Or. 7.19, SC 405, 226; 24.7, SC 284, 52; 32.7, SC 318, 98; Carm. 1.1.4, PG 37, 415-417.

[410] Wis 11:17; Job 19:29; see Muraoka, *GELS*, 694.

[411] Carm. 1.1.4, PG 37, 415-16, 1-15; 1.1.6, PG 37, 430, 1-11; Or. 24.7, SC 284, 52; 25.8, SC 284, 174-76; 28.8, SC 250, 114-16; 32.10, SC 318, 104-06. For Athanasius and Irenaeus, *creatio ex nihilo* entails that creatures are ontologically different from God, which also applies to Gregory; see Paul Gavrilyuk, "Creation in Early Christian Polemical Literature: Irenaeus against the Gnostics and Athanasius against the Arians," *Modern Theology* 29, no. 2 (2013): 22-32, 30.

[412] Elm, "O Paradoxical Fusion!," 297.

Furthermore, in *On Pentecost*, Gregory follows the sequence laid out in Genesis without alteration:

> But, there is no doubt that in six days God gave substance to matter (ἡ ὕλη), he both shaped and arrayed it with varied and complex forms and created this world which we see now.[413]

Gregory's following of the Christian doctrine *creatio ex nihilo* is significant to his account of the human *eikon*, since it informs Gregory's perception of the divinity of the *eikon.* For Gregory, a clear distinction exists between God and God's *eikon,* relating to the fact that the human *eikon* receives her existence as a gift from God. Therefore, when he speaks of the human *eikon* as divine, Gregory not does imply that she is God's ontological equal. This follows for every being God creates, including the angels. As I commented earlier, angels are relevant to the human *eikon,* since Gregory depicts her as "another angel" on a number of occasions. Before I consider the implications of this, I shall outline Gregory's thoughts about angels, demonstrating that Gregory draws on Scripture in order to form his picture of the invisible spirits.

4.3 Invisible Realm of Angels

Angels hold a substantial place in Gregory's worldview, occurring in every poem in the *Arcana*, and in many other poems and orations.[414] From his discussions of angels, it is clear that Gregory, in line with his patristic Christian tradition, "accepted the reality of the spiritual world."[415] However, in spite of the fact that Gregory refers to the angelic realm frequently, his name appears rarely in the secondary scholarship

[413] Or. 41.2, SC 358, 314-16; 43.67, SC 384, 272-74.

[414] See *On Spiritual Beings*, Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 438-446, which Gregory dedicates to the subject of angels.

[415] Ferguson, *Demonology*, 133.

on angels in Byzantium.[416] This might be because Gregory is often associated with his work on Christology and the Trinity. These subjects themselves receive more attention than angelology in contemporary scholarship; consequently scholars often overlook the centrality of angels to Gregory's thinking. To date, Rousse has paid the most detailed attention to Gregory's angelology.[417] Concerning Gregory's sources, Rousse suggests a combination of Scripture, Plato, Origen and possibly Clement, who suggested that a treatise should be written about angels, although if he did write one it is nowhere to be found.[418] Added to this, note that Gregory lived following an age where the importance of angels had increased significantly through the influence of mystical Judaism and extra-biblical traditions.[419]

When Gregory writes about angels he clarifies that such matters are really too great for him to fully comprehend.[420] This follows the patristic tradition, since the early church fathers generally perceived angels as being beyond human understanding. Should we incline towards questioning Gregory's authority on the glory of angels, he informs us that the Spirit has given the information to him.[421] In claiming that he has heard directly from the Spirit, Gregory is drawing attention to his own authority, and stands alongside a Christian

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[416] Gregory is mentioned once in Glenn Peers, *Subtle Bodies: Representing Angels in Byzantium* (California: University of California Press, 2001). Only brief consideration is given to Gregory's "innovative ideas" in Ellen Muehlberger, *Angels in the Religious Imagination of Late Antiquity* (Indiana: Indiana University, 2008). In a recent systematic review of angels, Gregory is overlooked in favour of Origen, see Oliver Dürr, *Der Engel Mächte: Systematisch-theologische Untersuchung: Angelologie* (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 2009), 50. For the exception to this pattern, see Jean Daniélou, *The Angels and their Mission: According to the Fathers of the Church*, trans. David Heimann (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, Inc., 1982), 34, 40, 51, 58, 59, 66, 86, 87.

[417] Jacques Rousse, "Les anges et leur ministère selon Saint Grégoire de Nazianze," *MSR* 22 (1965): 133-52.

[418] Ibid., 152. See *Strom*. 6.3.

[419] David Flusser, *Judaism of the Second Temple Period: The Jewish Sages and their Literature*, trans. Azzan Yadin (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 40.

[420] Or. 38.10, SC 384, 122-24; 28.31, SC 250, 172.

[421] Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 446, 96.

tradition "of a Jewish esotericism that existed at the time of the Apostles" where particular Christians were given visions and insights into the mysteries of heaven.[422] In spite of his "hesitation" in speaking about such matters, Gregory is sure of certain aspects of the angelic realm: angels are closest to God, their realm being created first:

> First, while [God] conceived the angelic and heavenly powers, this thought was an action, attained by the *Logos* and perfected by the Spirit. And in this way the secondary splendours (λαμπρότητες δεύτεραι) came about, servants (λειτουργοὶ) of the first Splendour; one must consider them as intellectual spirits (νοερὰ πνεύματα) or fire as such immaterial and incorporeal, or as another nature, which is closest to that of which has been spoken.[423]

Gregory's depiction of angels as spirits and fire follows Psalm 104:4 LXX and Hebrews 1:7. [424] This idea is also common in Jewish Apocalyptic texts, such as 2 Enoch 29:13 and 2 Baruch 21:6.[425] Gregory refers to angels as "second lights," observing that they receive blessings from God.[426] They are an order separate from human persons, who, as we shall see are the "third lights." In presenting the creation of angels and humans as distinct from one another, Gregory departs from Origen's notion that angels were the pre-existent souls, who had

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[422] Jean Daniélou, "Les traditions secrètes des Apôtres," *Eranos Jahrbuch* 31 (1962): 199–215, 214.

[423] Or. 38.9, SC 358, 120; 6.12, SC 405, 152; 28.3, SC 250, 106; 28.31, SC 250, 172; 38.10, SC 384, 122; 40.5, SC 358, 204; 41.11, SC 358, 258; 44.3, PG 36, 609B; 45.5, PG 36, 629A; Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 439-40, 6-15; 1.2.1, PG 37, 524, 30-34.

[424] Or. 28.31, SC 250, 170.

[425] Harold Barnes Kuhn, "The Angelology of the Non-Canonical Jewish Apocalypses," *JBL* 67, no. 3 (1948): 217-32, 119. The notion that angels were somehow composed of intellectual fire and spirit was usual from the second century, appearing to stem from Theodotus; see Peers, *Subtle Bodies*, 2-3.

[426] Or. 22.14, SC 270, 252.

retained their heavenly glory and status.[427]

Angels have multiple functions, each in a particular rank according to their brilliance.[428] They serve the Trinity by praising God and executing God's commands in heaven, continuing on earth as Christ's entourage.[429] Furthermore, angels are characterised as co-workers alongside human persons, active in life of the Church and present at baptism.[430] Gregory's concept of priestly ministry incorporates angels, since he stands with them at the Eucharist.[431] Daniélou notes, "the mysteries of Christ are celebrated by the heavenly powers at the same time as they are celebrated by the Church on earth."[432] This is important to remember when considering the heavenly and the earthly realms since, for Gregory, they function simultaneously in the life of the Church.[433]

Humans require protection from the devil's schemes, as I shall discuss in the following chapter, consequently angels assume the role of guardians, both of churches and of people.[434] Indeed, Gregory speaks about his own angel when he is ill, and asks the angel to come to his aid.[435] Gregory's personal experience with angels extends to a vision of "one like an angel" where he situates himself alongside the great Habakkuk.[436] Bocur and Mueller explore this vision in relation to later

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[427] Or. 2.5, SC 247, 94; 20.7, SC 270, 72; 28.7, SC 250, 112-14; 29.4, SC 250, 182-84; 34.8, SC 318, 212; 38.8, SC 358, 118; 42.17, SC 384, 86; Carm. 1.1.4, PG 37, 422, 77-83.

[428] Or. 28.31, SC 250, 170-74; Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 440, 22-26; 1.2.10, PG 37, 688, 103.

[429] Or. 38.14, SC 358, 136; 45.25, PG 36, 657B.

[430] Or. 40.36, SC 358, 280.

[431] Or. 40.4, SC 358, 204; 2.73, SC 247, 186.

[432] Daniélou, *Angels and Their Mission*, 66.

[433] Gregory expresses a vision of heaven with angels endlessly singing praise to God that would later be developed even more fully in Dionysius the Areopagite's *Celestial Hierarchy*.

[434] Or. 42.9, SC 384, 70.

[435] Carm. 2.1.89, PG 37, 1443, 8.

[436] Or. 45.1, PG 36, 624A.

iconography which depicts this scene.[437] They conclude that "the angel offers an image of what the human herald of the Good News should be."[438]

Having established the prevalence of angels in Gregory's worldview, I conclude our brief tour of the heavenly realm with an extract from *On Spiritual Beings*, which serves as a summary of Gregory's high regard for the fiery spirits:

> Radiant angels, without visible form,
> going about the great throne, since they are nimble spiritual intellects,
> fire and divine spirits (πνεύματα θεῖα) flying swiftly through the air,
> hurrying, they obey God's great commands
> being both simple and spiritual intellects (ἁπλοῖ τε, νοεροί τε)…[439]

Gregory's high regard for angels, both in the passage above and elsewhere, presents us with some problems. It may have been that Gregory was aware of this himself, hence he provides the disclaimer that these intellectual spirits are really too great for him to comprehend. I shall discuss the issue where angels become demons in the following chapter; where I highlight that Gregory admits he cannot understand how Lucifer chose to move away from God. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that some angels do fall from heaven, observe that Gregory presents angels as superior to human persons since he describes angels as closest to God. Furthermore, Gregory exhorts

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[437] For a print and description of the icon, see Leslie Brubaker, *Vision and Meaning in Ninth-Century Byzantium: Image as Exegesis in the Homilies of Gregory of Nazianzus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 284-85.

[438] Bogdan G. Bucur and Elijah N. Mueller, "Gregory Nazianzen's Reading of Habbakuk 3:2 and Its Reception: A Lesson from Byzantine Scripture Exegesis," *Pro Ecclesia* 20, no. 1 (2011): 86-103, 102.

[439] Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 439-40, 13-17.

human persons to imitate the angelic way of life in service of God, by practising virginity and in growing in likeness to God.[440]

The problem I wish to raise here concerns the titles which Gregory bestows upon angels and human persons. Above, Gregory describes angels as "divine", a title which they share with human *eikones*. Gregory does not state how angels are divine, other than to imply it is by virtue of their proximity to God. However, in spite of their shared divinity, Gregory does not bestow upon angels the gift of being God's *eikon*, but rather follows Genesis which reserves God's *eikon* as a privilege for human persons alone. If angels are closer to God and more like God than human *eikones*, then it is surprising that Gregory does not consider them to image God. In response to this, I suggest that Gregory is doing something more profound than simply echoing biblical titles and descriptions for being human. Rather, it is possible that Gregory is making sense of his own materiality. By preserving *eikon* as a means of describing the human person, Gregory points towards the fact that an aspect of imaging God concerns visibility, as I have commented already. Humans are visible, whereas angels are invisible, which means that they cannot visibly image God.[441] Moreover, Christ is the identical *Eikon*, through which Gregory affirms the significance of the incarnation, by preserving the title *eikon* for the human.

Before I discuss this further, I shall outline Gregory's description of the creation of the cosmos, in which the invisible and visible realms form a "praiseworthy", single world. The harmony of creation is echoed in the human person, as we shall see shortly.

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[440] Or. 37.10-11, SC 318, 292-96; Carm. 1.2.3, PG 37, 633, 2-6. See Karl S. Frank, *Angelikos bios. Begriffsanalytische und begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zum "engelgleichen Leben" im frühen Mönchtum* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1964), passim.

[441] Angels may appear in human form, for example as Gabriel does in the annunciation to the Virgin Mary, however they do not generally share the same bodily form as humans.

4.4 Visible Realm

> And since the first things seemed good to him, [God] had in his mind a second material (ὑλικός) and visible realm, and this is the structure and compound of heaven and earth and of the things in between; praiseworthy according to each good natural part, but even more laudable because of the suitability and harmony of everything, one bearing up well with another, and all parts (drawing) towards the whole, into completion of a single world (εἰς ἑνὸς κόσμου συμπλήρωσιν), in order that he might show not only his own nature to himself, but also that he was able to give substance to that which is completely strange (to himself).[442]

Together the two realms make a "single world," which is harmonious, beautiful and ordered.[443] Observe that Gregory presents the material, visible realm as wholly good. Following Genesis, where ordering of creation is a key feature, Gregory's ideas concerning the created order connect together in various orations. For example, he explains that there is order in the body of Christ, the Church, because God purposed creation itself in an ordered fashion.[444] Furthermore, Gregory frequently cites Psalm 8 to suggest that our only exact knowledge concerning creation is that it is ordered.[445] Next, we shall see that the order and harmony continue to be fundamental to God's creation of the human *eikon*.

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[442] Or. 38.10, SC 358, 122-24. Gregory's doctrine of creation is peculiar to him and cannot be found in its entirety in any of his predecessors; Winslow, *Dynamics of Salvation*, 46-47.

[443] Or. 6.14, SC 405, 156; 28.27-29, SC 250, 158-168; Carm. 1.2.34, PG 37, 954, 115-19.

[444] Or. 32.10, SC 318, 104.

[445] Or. 20.11, SC 270, 80; 28.5, SC 250, 108-10; 32.27, SC 318, 142.

4.5 The Mixed Human *Eikon*

> And there was not yet a mixture (τὸ κρᾶμα) from both,[446] nor yet a particular mingling (ἡ μίξις) of opposites…[447] the Creator-Logos, wanting to exhibit this [makes] a single living being from both (ζῷον ἓν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων), by which I mean from the invisible and visible nature, fashioned the human person (δημιουγεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον). While taking the body from the existing matter (ἡ ὕλη), he blew in the breath of himself, which Scripture knew to be the spiritual, intellectual soul (νοερὰ ψυχή) and an *eikon* of God.[448]

Above, Gregory combines the creation narratives found in Genesis 1 and 2, depicting the human *eikon* as the breath of God mixing with matter.[449] Throughout his work, Gregory varies between describing God as mixing the *eikon* with matter (ἡ ὕλη), clay (ἡ πηλός, ἡ ὗλις) and dust/earth (ὁ χοῦς) respectively.[450] As I demonstrated earlier, Gregory argues that God creates matter; key to Gregory's concept of creation is that neither matter nor forms are eternal. The other materials used in the creation of the human person, namely, clay and dust, both appear in the Septuagint, which depicts God as a potter.[451] The most frequent

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[446] Or. 20.11, SC 270, 80; 14.7, PG 35, 865. See Song of Songs 7:2 where it is used to describe a mixture of wine and water, and in *Paed*. 2.2 where Clement discusses the union of soul and body. Also, see *PGL*, 774.

[447] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 124; 2.23, SC 247, 120; 2.54, SC 247, 162; 4.49, SC 309, 152; 6.2, SC 405, 124; 21.23, SC 270, 156; 45.9, PG 36, 633B-636A; Carm. 1.1.4, PG 37, 423, 92; 1.1.8, PG 37, 453, 79-86 et al.

[448] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 124.

[449] Or. 14.2, PG 35, 860B-D; 20.11, SC 270, 80; 32.27, SC 318, 142; Carm. 1.1.8, PG 37, 452, 70-74; 1.2.1, PG 37, 552, 395-397. Gregory draws our attention to the human person as a mixture of spiritual and material frequently; see McGuckin, "The Vision of God in St. Gregory Nazianzen," 150.

[450] For examples of the *eikon* mixed with the following, see matter (ἡ ὕλη), Or. 38.11, SC 358, 124; clay (ἡ πηλός), Or. 14.6, PG 35, 865A; dust/earth (ὁ χοῦς), Or. 14.2, PG 35, 860B-D; Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 529, 97; 2.1.45, PG 37, 1362, 119.

[451] For examples of the potter using clay, see Is 29:16; Jer 18:6; Muraoka, *GELS*, 556. For the human person as a mixture of God's breath and dust, see Gen 2:7.

terminology that Gregory applies for the mixing of the *eikon* with dust or matter is μίξις, which he uses in conjunction with κρᾶσις, appearing to apply them indiscriminately and in a variety of ways.[452]

If we were to read Gregory's description of the *eikon* found above, without taking into account his view of how the invisible and visible realms are mixed, we might conclude that Gregory considers the *eikon* only to be the breath of God, vis à vis the spiritual, intellectual soul. Rather, Gregory understands the complexity and mystery of human existence, which is reflected in his different approaches to being a human *eikon*. Thus, whilst Gregory applies *eikon* to the soul or the spiritual intellect on some occasions, he does this in such a way that the *eikon* transforms the dust and renders it spiritual. This results in the human *eikon* becoming a unified, dynamic being, which is a broader concept than that proposed by a categorical approach, a point which I have raised throughout the thesis thus far.

For insight into the transformation of dust by the *eikon*, I turn back to Gregory's writing about Christ, the identical *Eikon*. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that Gregory incorporated Christ's flesh into his views about Christ, the identical *Eikon*.[453] This allows humanity and divinity to come together in a unique way in Christ, so that he remains a unified hypostasis or person.[454] If we consider Gregory's writing about the human person, we may see that a similar process ensues. Gregory approaches God's mixing of *eikon* and matter as a unification, where the *eikon* bestows upon the dust its proper end, which is to be made spiritual. This is evident in Gregory's short poem below entitled *Concerning Human Life*, in which the dust is made spiritual by the *eikon*:

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[452] Gregory also speaks of mixing in relation to the elements of the universe; see Or. 2.29, SC 247, 128; 2.54, SC 247, 162; 6.2, SC 405, 124; 6.15, SC 405, 160; 38.13, SC 358, 134. Also, drawing on Paul, Gregory applies the terms rhetorically when he states that ideally one should approach the congregation with a mixture of strictness and gentleness; see Or. 2.54, SC 247, 162. Lastly, Gregory speaks of his tears mingled with joy; see Or. 4.49, SC 309, 152.

[453] Carm. 1.1.10, PG 37, 469, 56-60.

[454] Hofer, *Christ in Gregory Nazianzen*, 92-120.

> And now peeping out, just like from some depth,
> the dust, made spiritual by the divine *eikon* (ὸ χοῦς ὸ θείᾳ πνευματωθεὶς εἰκόνι) cries out the earthly tragedies…[455]

It is this transformation of the dust that allows Gregory to refer to the whole human person as God's *eikon*:

> I am a human person, a model (πλάσμα) and an *eikon* of God.[456]

Therefore, when Gregory speaks about the *eikon* as the soul or the spiritual intellect, it is possible that he also implies the whole human person because the *eikon* transforms the dust and the two together form a unity. The creation of the human person as a unified, mixed *eikon* is essential to her theosis, which I examine further in Chapter Six.

Before I move on to discuss Gregory's description of the human *eikon* at creation, I must make a final point about the transformation of dust. In order that the transformation of dust or matter should occur, and in order that a dynamic human person should be formed, the material realm must be vulnerable to the divine, spiritual realm. Thus, material vulnerability to God is a necessary aspect of being a human *eikon*. Certainly, as Gregory depicts the creation of the human person, the vulnerability of matter is wholly positive. This is important to bear in mind as I turn to Gregory's description of the human *eikon* after her creation.

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[455] Carm. 1.2.18, PG 37, 787, 13-14; 1.1.8, PG 37, 452, 74-75; 1.1.10, PG 37, 469, 58; Or. 3.7, SC 247, 250; 40.10, SC 358, 218; 40.14, SC 358, 226. Gregory is not very far from Methodius who envisaged that "the soul infuses the body with the image… the soul makes the body more truly the body, more truly the image of God;" Cartwright, *Theological Anthropology of Eustathius*, 161.

[456] Carm. 1.2.34, PG 37, 947, 20.

4.6 Imaging God

> God placed upon the earth a kind of second world, great in miniature, another angel, a mixed worshipper, overseer of visible creation, an initiate of the spiritual (creation), king of that which is on earth, being governed from above, earthly and heavenly, transient and immortal, visible and spiritual, mid-way between magnitude and lowliness. (οἷόν τινα κόσμον δεύτερον, ἐν μικρῷ μέγαν, ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἵστησιν, ἄγγελον ἄλλον, προσκυνητὴν μικτόν, ἐπόπτην τῆς ὁρατῆς κτίσεως, μύστην τῆς νοουμένης, βασιλέα τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς, βασιλευόμενον ἄνωθεν, ἐπίγειον καὶ οὐράνοιον, πρόσκαιρον καὶ ἀθάνατον, ὁρατὸν καὶ νοούμενον, μέσον μεγέθους καὶ ταπεινότητος). … A living being, provided for here and being transferred elsewhere, and, to cap the mystery off, being made god (θεούμενον) by her inclination towards God.[457]

In the passage above, Gregory describes the mixed existence of the *eikon* with great aplomb. He draws upon ideas about the cosmos, angels, and kings in order to paint a picture of the magnificence of the human *eikon* and her likeness to God. I shall discuss below the descriptions and titles which are most relevant to the *eikon*, highlighting how Gregory draws on biblical themes and ideas; I begin with the concept of "microcosm."

4.6.1 *Microcosm*

Gregory "depicts creation as brought to unity within the human microcosm."[458] In doing this, he draws on a tradition which includes

[457] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 124-26.

[458] Doru Costache, "Seeking Out the Antecedents of the Maximian Theory of Everything: St Gregory the Theologian's Oration 38," in *The Cappadocian Legacy: A Critical Appraisal*, ed. Doru Costache and Philip Kariatlis (Redfern, NSW: St Andrew's Orthodox Press, 2013), 225-42, 233. For further attention

theologians such as Philo, Origen and Basil, who incorporate this idea into their writings.[459] The concept links to the Old Testament which presents the temple as the microcosm of the world.[460] Paul develops this idea in the New Testament, where he depicts the people of God as temples of the Holy Spirit.[461] Macaskill has argued that early Christians promoted the idea of the human person as microcosm because the concept "acquired a distinct connection with redemptive Christology."[462] He draws this conclusion from reading the works of Irenaeus, who developed the idea of Christ initiating a new creation, which is known as 'recapitulation.' Christ, whom the New Testament represents as the new/second Adam, redeems God's whole creation:

> … therefore does the Lord profess himself to be the Son of Man, recapitulating in himself that original man out of whom woman was fashioned, in order that, as our race went down to death through a vanquished man, so we may ascend to life again through a victorious one, and as through a man death received the palm [of victory] against us, so again, by a man we may receive the palm against death.[463]

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to Gregory's microcosm, see Tomáš Špidlík, *Grégoire de Nazianze* (Roma: Pont. Institutum Studiorum Orientalium, 1971), 104-07; Bernhard Wyß, "Gregor von Nazianz: ein griechisch-christlicher Denker des vierten Jahrhunderts," *MH* 6 (1949): 177-210.

[459] *Her*. 31.155; *Cels*. 6.63; *Hex. Hom.* 11.14.

[460] Gregory K. Beale, *The Temple and the Church's Mission: A Biblical Theology of the Dwelling Place of God*, NSBT (Leicester, UK: Apollos, 2004), passim; Scott W. Hahn and David Scott, *Temple and Contemplation: God's Presence in the Cosmos, Church, and Human Heart* (Steubenville, Ohio: St Paul Center for Biblical Theology, 2008), 336.

[461] Or. 2.97, SC 247, 216.

[462] Grant Macaskill, "Adam Octipartite/Septipartite," in *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha: More Noncanonical Scriptures*, ed. Richard Bauckham, James R. Davila, and Alexander Panayotov (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 3-21, 11.

[463] *Haer*. 5.21.1; translation in John Behr, *Irenaeus of Lyons: Identifying Christianity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 169.

The redemptive theme of recapitulation is evident in Gregory's work, as we shall see next. As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, for Gregory, Christ's battle and victory over sin and Satan is cosmic.[464] Throughout his orations and poems, Gregory presents the unity and harmony bestowed on humanity as constantly under threat. Satan's attacks on the human *eikon* are often with a view to destroying her harmony. In a poem in which Gregory laments that the Evil One has plagued him with disease, he describes vividly that the intent of Satan is to disturb the harmony with which he was first created.[465] Thus, when Gregory describes the human *eikon* as a microcosm, he incorporates the idea of Christ's restoration of humanity. Furthermore, he reminds the reader of the harmonious mixture of material and spiritual realms. This is also pertinent to his depiction of the human person as "another angel."

4.6.2 *Another Angel*

Moreschini argues that Gregory appeals to the human person as "another angel" simply because she serves and adores God, and because her soul is of the same spiritual nature as the angels.[466] Whilst his arguments are correct in part, I believe that Moreschini misses the full significance of Gregory's intention when he refers to the human person as "another angel." Earlier in this chapter, when I discussed Gregory's approach to angels, I cited his description of the angelic realm being that which is closest to God. Therefore, in referring to the human *eikon* as "another angel", Gregory demonstrates his high regard for her. In order to build a broader picture of Gregory's purposes, first, I shall consider the strands from which Gregory draws his approach. After this, I shall demonstrate Gregory's consistency in comparing human

[464] Or. 44.4, PG 36, 609D-612C; 38.13, SC 358, 130-34; Ep. 101.5 (101.19 SC), SC 208, 44.

[465] Carm. 1.2.50, PG 37, 1385, 5-10.

[466] Moreschini, SC 358, 126, n1.

persons to angels; before I move on to discuss the implications of this move.

Gregory follows an ascetic tradition where the goal of human existence is to become like an angel; for example, Origen depicts humans becoming like angels at the eschaton.[467] However, Gregory departs from theologians like Origen when he does not wait until their telos to bestow the honour of being angelic upon humans, but establishes humans like angels at their creation.[468] In making this move, Gregory presents humans as "angelomorphic," a term which Mueller defines as "someone or something [who] is depicted as angelic."[469] Scholars have traced this tradition back to Ezekiel and his apocalyptic vision of the angelomorphic or anthropomorphic figure on the throne, the early Christian interpretation of which was that Ezekiel saw the pre-incarnate Christ as the Logos.[470]

Interest in angelology became greater in the last few centuries before Christ, which is evident in the translation of the Septuagint.[471] Golitzin argues that the glory bestowed on the first human persons in paradise and the representation of humans as angels are predominant themes shared by fourth-century Christian writings and extra-biblical literature of the Second Temple period.[472] This is true for Gregory's

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[467] *Cels*. 4.29.

[468] Benjamin P. Blosser, *Become Like the Angels* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 2; Mark J. Edwards, *Origen Against Plato* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 100-02.

[469] Elijah N. Mueller, "Temple and Angel: An Outline of Apocalyptic Themes in John of Damascene," in *Apocalyptic Thought in Early Christianity*, ed. Robert J. Daly (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Publishing Group, 2009), 240-49, 241, n6.

[470] Jarl E. Fossum, *The Image of the Invisible God: Essays on the Influence of Jewish Mysticism on Early Christology* (Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitätsverlag Freiburg, 1995), 7-8.

[471] Deut 32:8; 33:2; Ps 8:6; see Richard N. Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 7.

[472] 1 Enoch 71.11; 2 Enoch 30.11; T. Levi 4.2; Alexander Golitzin, "Recovering the "Glory of Adam": "Divine Light" Traditions in the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Christian Ascetical Literature of Fourth-Century Syro-Mesopotamia," in *The Dead Sea Scrolls as Background to Postbiblical Judaism and Early Christianity:*

work, since his description of the human person as another angel at creation is also found in 2 Enoch 30:12, alongside his designation of her as a mixture of invisible and visible realms, an *eikon* of God, microcosm, and a ruler. The number of parallels suggest that Gregory could have come into contact with 2 Enoch, if indeed it existed in Greek.[473] Gregory and 2 Enoch share a similar vision of the human person as 'divine' at creation, encompassed in the idea of being "another angel."[474] Both apply the notion of the human person as angelic in order to indicate her brilliance and likeness to God.

The survival of 2 Enoch in over twenty Slavonic manuscripts points to its popularity, although since the texts date back to no earlier than the fourteenth century, original dating is complex.[475] Generally, scholars favour a Jewish authorship due to the absence of concretely Christian allusions, with Böttrich going so far as to designate it as a, "true witness of early Judaism."[476] Scholars categorise 2 Enoch as an "apocalypse" [477] because it contains "revelations of heavenly mysteries"[478] and its theology has a mystical dimension. Gregory and 2

Papers from an International Conference at St. Andrews in 2001, ed. James R. Davila (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 275-308; Bogdan G. Bucur, "From Jewish Apocalypticism to Orthodox Mysticism," in *The Orthodox Christian World*, ed. Augustine Casiday (Oxford; New York: Routledge, 2012), 466-80, 475.

[473] On this question, Mueller argues "Gregory Nazianzus the elder was originally part of a Judeao-Pagan cult, which could easily have had similar scriptures," "Temple and Angel," 244. This is not a credible suggestion, nor does it account for the particular parallels found in 2 Enoch 30:12.

[474] Crispin H.T. Fletcher-Louis, "2 Enoch and the New Perspective on Apocalyptic," in *New Perspectives on 2 Enoch: No Longer Slavonic Only*, ed. Andrei Orlov, Gabriele Boccaccini, and Jason Zurawski (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 127-48, 136.

[475] Michael A. Knibb, *Essays on the Book of Enoch and Other Early Jewish Texts and Traditions* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 56.

[476] Christfried Böttrich, "Recent Studies in the Slavonic Book of Enoch," *JSP* 9 (1991): 35-42, 40.

[477] Michael E. Stone, "Apocalyptic Literature," in *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period: Apocrypha, Pseudepigrapha, Qumran, Sectarian Writings, Philo, Josephus*, ed. Michael E. Stone (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1984), 383-437; Fletcher-Louis, "2 Enoch," 127.

[478] John J. Collins, "Early Judaism in Modern Scholarship," in *The Eerdmans Dictionary of Early Judaism*, ed. John J. Collins and Daniel C. Harlow (Grand

Enoch converge on this point also, since the human person as "another angel" opens up the potential for sharing in God's mysteries and becoming like God. Regarding the overall vision of 2 Enoch, Fletcher-Louis writes, "apocalypses have the same theological anthropology that naturally leads to the hope for a kind of deification."[479] He argues, along with other scholars, that 2 Enoch is primarily about a recovery of Adam's "lost divine glory," which as I shall demonstrate in Chapter Five, is a predominant theme in Gregory's work.[480] Thus, I suggest that Gregory was incorporating such traditions into his work, when he compares the human person to "another angel."

Moving on from Gregory's inspiration, I shall demonstrate Gregory's consistency in comparing humans to angels. For example, he describes people of high moral character, such as Athanasius, as being angelic in appearance and mind.[481] Gregory depicts humans as angels not only at the beginning and during their lives, but also at their death. In the funeral oration for his father, Gregory writes that his father is now closer to God, being worthy of angelic rank and confidence.[482] Gregory also appeals to the argument of a human person attaining angelic rank, when he lays out his ideas about who should be permitted to theologise.[483] Added to this, Gregory refers to his own role as that of an angel hymning praise:

> Mortal man is your glory anew (σὸν βροτὸς αὖ κλέος ἐστιν),
> whom you placed here as an angel,
> composing songs of praise of your splendour, O Light.[484]

Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 1-25, 10.

[479] Fletcher-Louis, "2 Enoch," 136.

[480] Ibid., 139. See also Russell, *Doctrine of Deification*, 77.

[481] Or. 21.9, SC 270, 128.

[482] Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 529, 89-91; 1.2.2, PG 37, 577, 720-24.

[483] Or. 28.3, SC 250, 106; cf. Exod 7:1.2; Cor 12:3-4.

[484] Carm. 2.1.38, PG 37, 1327, 25-26.

In her translation of the poem above, Abrams renders ἄγγελος as "messenger." However, I suggest that "angel" is more suitable, since the preceding lines speak of angels singing around the Trinity.[485] Also, at the end of the poem Gregory sings like an angel himself; therefore, it is less likely that he would have had "messenger" in mind when angels are a prevalent theme all through the poem.[486] The angelic practice of singing celebratory songs is not only possible for Gregory; rather it is open to all human persons, especially virgins.[487] Praising God in song comprises one of the chief purposes in human existence.[488] However, if we were inclined to think that life on earth as "another angel" is easy, Gregory corrects us. When he writes about singing as an angel to the Trinity, Envy, a frequent epithet for Satan, makes an appearance, always watching Gregory's speech.[489] Through drawing attention to Envy, Gregory makes it clear that for a mortal the angelic life is always under attack, which I shall demonstrate in the following chapter.

Contrary to Winslow's statement that Gregory does not equate "either pre-lapsarian or redeemed humanity with angels," I argue that Gregory depicts intentionally the human person as "a new kind of angel."[490] She is like an angel in the way that she performs similar functions to the angels such as singing praises to God. Her "newness" or "otherness" lies in Gregory's belief that the human *eikon* is both spiritual and material; she is "mixed" and, more significantly, she alone images God. Relating this back to Chapter Two, where I argued that Gregory portrays humans as breathing *eikones* of God in contrast to pagan statues and paintings, which are not living, I argue that humans are the only created beings able to function as God's visible *eikones*, precisely because they are a mixture of spiritual and material realms.

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[485] Abrams Rebillard, "Speaking for Salvation," 343.

[486] Carm. 2.1.38, PG 37, 1325-1329, 1-52.

[487] Or. 18.4, PG 35, 989B.

[488] Or. 44.10-11, PG 36, 617A-621C.

[489] Carm. 2.1.34, PG 37, 1321-22.

[490] Winslow, *Dynamics of Salvation*, 49.

Therefore, the human person is a 'different kind of angel,' because she visibly images God on earth, in a manner that the angels cannot because they are invisible.

I shall explore further implications of Gregory's comparisons between human *eikones* and angels in the following chapter, when I discuss his use of the "garments of glory" tradition. Next I turn to highlight the significance of the human *eikon* as "king over that which is on earth."

4.6.3 *King*

Gregory applies consistently the concept of kingship as a further metaphor which denotes the uniqueness of the human *eikon*. In a sermon that is addressed to the "anxious citizens of Nazianzus and the angry ruler," Gregory explores the theme of ruling in connection with the *eikon* of God.[491] Gregory directs his remarks to the prefect, whom he identifies as the *eikon* of God.[492] In the passage below, Gregory reveals that every single human person images God:

> You rule with Christ and you govern with Christ, the sword is from him to you, not for use, but for threats. May you keep it as a purified offering to the one who has given it to you. You are an *eikon* of God, and you lead the *eikon* by the hand, governing here and being transferred towards another life (ἐνταῦθα οἰκονομουμένην, καὶ πρὸς βίον ἄλλον μεθισταμένην).[493]

Like the author of Genesis thousands of years before him, Gregory

[491] The dating is uncertain, but most likely around late A.D. 373 or early A.D. 374, after the emperor Julian's reign; see Martha Pollard Vinson, *St. Gregory of Nazianzus: Select Orations* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 85.

[492] Or. 17.8, PG 35, 976A-B.

[493] Or. 17.9, PG 35, 976B-D.

observes provocatively in this passage that not only prefects and leaders image God, but rather this is the privilege of every human person. Gregory is consistent in propounding this belief throughout his writing, and maintaining the connection between being an *eikon* and being a king. In *On New Sunday*, where he reflects upon being created as God's *eikon*, Gregory argues that the earth was created for human *eikones* in the same way that a palace is built for a king:

> Nor is it surprising that a human person was the last creature to be brought forth, yet even so received the distinction of God's *eikon* and the touch of his hand: quite properly, for when a palace destined for a king is under construction (ἔδει γὰρ, ὥσπερ βασιλεῖ, προυποστῆναι τὰ βασίλεα) it must be completed before a king is escorted to it, his retinue already in full attendance.[494]

Two features concerning the passage above require attention. First, Gregory applies *eikon* as a term which suggests magnificence and likeness to God, for it is only through being God's *eikon* that the human person is compared to a king. Secondly, the concept of the human *eikon* as a king on earth relates to the idea of humans ruling on earth as God rules in heaven.[495] This follows a tradition of reading Genesis 1:26-7 in light of Psalm 8:4-8, where the psalmist writes:

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[494] Or. 44.4, PG 36, 609D-612B; Carm. 1.1.8, PG 37, 451, 60; 1.1.4, PG 37, 423, 99; 1.2.1, PG 37, 528, 82. Also, see Ps 19.1; Wis 13.5; Rom 1.20. Gregory Nyssen writes in a similar manner: *Op. Hom*. 4, PG 44, 136C, "For as, in ordinary human use, those who make images of rulers both mould the figure of their form, and represent along with this the royal rank by the vesture of purple, and the image is commonly called a king, so human nature, too, as it was made to rule the rest, was, by its likeness to the King of all, made as if it were a living image, sharing with the archetype in both rank and name…" unpublished translation kindly shared by Fr. Andrew Louth.

[495] This has been a predominant view in Old Testament research since the 1960's; see Stephen L. Herring, "A "Transubstantiated" Humanity: The Relationship between the Divine Image and the Presence of God in Gen. I 26f.," *VT* 58 (2008): 1-15, 1; Prüum, ""eikon"," 248. For a review of the relevant literature, see Wayne Sibley Towner, *Genesis* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 28.

> What are human beings that you are mindful of them, mortals that you care for them? Yet you have made them a little lower than God, and crowned them with glory and honour. You have given them dominion over the works of your hands; you have put all things under their feet, all sheep and oxen, and also the beasts of the field, the birds of the air, and the fish of the sea, whatever passes along the paths of the seas.

The metaphor of kingship, royalty, and dominion has also long been discussed in relation to the God who creates in Genesis 1:1-2:3, alongside the Ancient Near Eastern tradition whereby the *eikon* of God is associated with the king.[496] This is followed in the New Testament, which refers to Jesus, the *Eikon*, as Lord and ruler.[497] Writing on Genesis 1, Wenham argues that the description of humankind made as God's *eikon* points to the function of "God's vice-regent on earth."[498] This resonates with Gregory's interpretation of the human *eikon* in the passage above and demonstrates further how Gregory applies *eikon* to highlight similarity to God, as he does with respect to Christ.

Whilst royal comparisons may pay tribute to the *eikon*, feminist theologians have critiqued this approach by arguing that it results in a view of the *eikon* of God as solely male.[499] With this in mind, I shall

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[496] W. Randell Garr, *In His Own Image and Likeness: Humanity, Divinity, and Monotheism* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2003), 191-200; J. Richard Middleton, *The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Publishing Group, 2005), 70-74; Marc Z. Brettler, *God is King: Understanding an Israelite Metaphor* (Sheffield, UK: JSOT Press, 1989).

[497] Col 1:15-20. Gregory describes Christ the identical *Eikon* as ἄναξ; it is usually translated as "king;" see Gilbert, *On God and Man*, 55; Meehan, *Three Poems*, 33. Also, see Carm. 2.1.13, PG 37, 1238, 140; 1.1.37, PG 37, 520, 2; 1.1.5, PG 37, 429, 65; 2.1.51, PG 37, 1396, 36.

[498] Wenham, *Genesis 1-15*, 32.

[499] Rosemary Radford Ruether, "Misogynism and Virginal Feminism in the Fathers of Church," in *Religion and Sexism*, ed. Rosemary Radford Ruether (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), 150-83, 153; Lone Fatum, "Image of God and Glory of Man: Women in the Pauline Congregations," in *Image of God and Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition*, ed. Kari Elisabeth Børresen

examine Gregory's view of the *eikon* in relation to gender, arguing that he applies metaphors such as kingship in order to denote the royal position of the *eikon*, rather than to suggest that the *eikon* is male. From a consideration of his work it becomes clear that Gregory regards both male and female as imaging God equally. Added to this, as I stated in the introduction to this chapter, Gregory reveals further ideas about the human *eikon* as a unified, dynamic, living physical *eikon* through his discussions of female *eikones*.

4.7 Female *Eikones*

In the following section I demonstrate that a) Gregory presents women as *eikones* of God, since Gregory takes care not to represent God according to gender; b) Gregory argues that women should be treated justly on the basis that they are God's *eikones*; c) women reveal the *eikon* dynamically in both body and soul; and d) defacing this *eikon*, for example, by means of cosmetics, reduces the *eikon* of God to an idol (εἴδωλον).

In Basil's *Hexaemeron*, which Gregory praises and Nyssen is reported to have edited, women are mentioned explicitly as being created *eikones*.[500] Nonetheless, it is Gregory who receives the most praise for his treatment of women as God's *eikones,* as we shall see shortly.[501] Generally, views in the fourth century are mixed regarding whether or not women are God's *eikones*.[502] Particular interpretations

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(Oslo: Solum Forag, 1991), 56-138, 67.

[500] Or. 43.67, SC 384, 272-74; Socrates, *HE* 4.26. Scholars have debated the author of Homilies 10 and 11, since they appear in Basil and Gregory Nyssen's works; see PG 30, 9A-61D and PG 44, 274A-298B respectively. More recently, scholars suggest Basil as the author of Homilies 10 and 11; see Philip Rousseau, *Basil of Caesarea* (Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1994), 318.

[501] George H. Tavard, *Woman in Christian Tradition* (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 91; McGuckin, *Intellectual Biography*, 334; Elisabeth Behr-Sigel, *The Ministry of Women in the Church*, trans. Fr. Stehpen Bigham (Pasadena, California: Oakwood Publications, 1991), 90-91.

[502] The difference between the Cappadocian Fathers' and the Antiochene

of Paul's first letter to the Corinthians (11:7) mean that early church fathers such as Diodore of Tarsus refuse to allow the possibility of women imaging God:

> Therefore the blessed Paul said rightly that the man alone is the image of God and his glory, but the woman is the glory of the man.[503]

Prior to and alongside Paul, the idea that men image God and women are the glory of men is evident in two streams of interpretation. First, it appears in pseudepigraphal literature, which interprets the creation narratives as specifically designating Adam to be the individual who was created as God's *eikon*, rather than generic humanity. This interpretation occurs by collapsing the two creation narratives in Genesis together, where Adam is created as God's *eikon* (Gen 1) and Eve is made afterwards from Adam's rib (Gen 2).[504] Secondly, Philo presents a male *eikon* by explaining that the spiritual intellect (νοῦς) is superior to the sensory (αἴσθησις) realm, where the former is regarded as a male quality, and the latter as a female quality.[505] Scholars who ascribe the *eikon* to the spiritual intellect (νοῦς) have suggested that since νοῦς was

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Fathers' views of women are highlighted by Nonna Verna Harrison, "Women, Human Identity, and the Image of God: Antiochene Interpretations," *JECS* 9, no. 2 (2001): 205-49; McLeod, *Image of God*, 223; Nonna Verna Harrison, "Women and the Image of God according to St. John Chrysostom," in *Dominico Eloquio: Essays on Patristic Exegesis in Honor of Robert Louis Wilken*, ed. Paul M. Blowers (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 259-79, 262-63. For further work on the subject of women and God's *eikon,* see David G. Hunter, "The Paradise of Patriarchy: Ambrosiaster on Woman as (Not) God's Image," *JTS* 43, no. 2 (1992): 447-69.

[503] Diodore of Tarsus, *Fragments on Genesis* 1:26 (PG 33:1564C–1565A). Translation; Harrison, "Antiochene Interpretations," 209.

[504] 4 Ezra 6:54, 7:70; Sibylline Oracles 1: 5-37; Jubilees 3:1-35. See Anders Hultgård, "God and Image of Woman in Early Jewish Religion," in *Image of God and Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition*, ed. Kari Elisabeth Børresen (Oslo: Solum Forag, 1991), 35-55, 39-42.

[505] *Opif.* 165; *Spec.*1.200-201; see Richard A. Baer, *Philo's Use of the Categories Male and Female* (Leiden: Brill, 1970), 39ff.

a male quality, consequently the *eikon* was also perceived to be male.[506] Since this view does not appear in Gregory's works, he cannot be criticised on this basis.

A further idea relating to how women image God emerges in the patristic approach to asceticism, where holy women were said to have become "manly."[507] Whilst there is insufficient space to explore Gregory's views on asceticism in this project, I must comment briefly on the concept of the "manly woman" in his writing.[508] For example, in his oration *In Praise of the Maccabees*, drawing from the second book of the Maccabees, Gregory presents Eleazar's mother as having "the soul of a man in the body of a woman (ὦ ψυχῆς ἀνδρείας ἐν γυναικείῳ τῷ σώματι)."[509] Gregory is able to make this move without any sense of confusion because he and the other fathers were writing within a highly rhetorical context where gender was understood to be fluid to a certain degree.[510] Whilst 'male' and 'female' designated particular qualities, such as courage and intellect versus weakness and ignorance, the fathers believed that human persons could shift and move between

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[506] Fatum, "Image of God and Glory of Man," 67. Also, see *Marc*. 3.34; *Spec.* 30; *Haer*. 5.32.1; cited by Ruether, "Misogynism," 153.

[507] Kari Vogt, ""Becoming Male": A Gnostic and Early Christian Metaphor," in *Image of God and Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition*, ed. Kari Elisabeth Børresen (Oslo: Solum Forag, 1991), 172-87, 181.

[508] John A. McGuckin, "Gregory of Nazianzus," in *Encyclopedia of Monasticism*, ed. William M. Johnston (New York: Routledge, 2013), 552-54, 553. For further comments on Gregory's asceticism, especially with regard to his practice of silence, see Bradley K. Storin, "In a Silent Way: Asceticism and Literature in the Rehabilitation of Gregory of Nazianzus," *JECS* 19, no. 2 (2011): 225–57, 225. The impact of asceticism on the human as the *eikon* of God is absent from scholarly writing in general and would benefit from further research. This is evident from the lack of citations in the index of Vincent L. Wimbush and Richard Valantasis, *Asceticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 623-28.

[509] Or. 15.4, PG 35, 916B, see 2 Macc 7:21. This idea is also present in Or. 43.57, SC 384, 246-48; Carm. 2.1.11, PG 37, 1029-1166. Gregory's work transcends gender; see Vasiliki M. Limberis, *Architects of Piety: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Cult of the Martyrs* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 159.

[510] Peter Brown, *The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 10.

them.[511] Ideas such as these have led many feminist theologians to denounce the "whole patristic and mediaeval tradition" on the basis that all the fathers "rejected the possibility that women were equally theomorphic."[512] However, it is possible to take a more positive approach to the problem of female 'manliness.' Harrison observes astutely that the language of women 'becoming male' is far from affirming "culturally entrenched misogyny" but rather, a way of transcending it.[513] The implications of Harrison's approach are that when Gregory implies that great women are more like men, it is his intention to affirm rather than to denigrate them.

Generally, Gregory is consistent in affirming that women image God. His belief in equality originates in his view of God as genderless. Thus, for Gregory, gender is accidental rather than essential to being created according to the *eikon* of God.[514] Gregory implies in a number of ways that the *eikon* is not associated with a particular gender. As I have just observed, Gregory's God has no gender; therefore, when God creates an *eikon* of Godself, that *eikon* incorporates both male and female.[515] Furthermore, scholars have argued that the genderless nature of the *eikon* reflects the Septuagint, since a singular human person (ἄνθρωπος) is created as the *eikon* of God in Genesis 1:26-27,

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[511] Susanna Elm, "Gregory's Women: Creating a Philosopher's Family," in *Gregory of Nazianzus: Images and Reflections*, ed. Jostein Børtnes and Tomas Hägg (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum, 2006), 171-92, 173; Maud W. Gleason, *Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), passim.

[512] Rosemary Radford Ruether, "The Liberation of Christology," in *Feminist Theology: A Reader* ed. Ann Loades (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1990), 138-48, 139; Elizabeth A. Clark, *Women in the Early Church* (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 1983), 15.

[513] Harrison, "Male and Female," 447; Nonna Verna Harrison, "Feminine Man in Late Antique Ascetic Piety," *USQR* 48, no. 3-4 (1994): 49-71, 49.

[514] Warren Smith, *Passion and Paradise: Human and Divine Emotion in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa* (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2004), 42.

[515] For a survey of the impact of the doctrine of the Trinity on gender in the fourth century, see Virginia Burrus, *Begotten, Not Made: Conceiving Manhood in Late Antiquity* (Redwood, California: Stanford University Press, 2000).

after which God "made them male and female."[516] The consequences of this are that whilst humans are God's *eikones*, they are gendered as creatures, not as *eikones* of God. This notion is reflected in Gregory's work when he speaks of the *eikon* at creation as "God's breath."[517] Further to this, as I discussed earlier in this chapter, Gregory describes the human person as a "new kind of angel."[518] Since angels are genderless, the genderless nature of the *eikon* is also implied by Gregory's comparison of humans with angels. This leads Gregory to advocate strongly that both men and women should practise virginity, if they desire to live the life of angels.[519] This relates back to God, since the Holy Trinity is virginal in its very nature. In this case, for Gregory, as for the fathers generally, virginity is connected with incorruptibility, for example, the eternal or imperishable nature. Christakis observes that for Gregory, virginity is not only about taming sexual desire,

> but also purity of all senses. It requires pure thought, deliverance from all passions, love for the neighbour and for God.[520]

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[516] Phyllis A. Bird, "Sexual-Differentiation and Divine Image in the Genesis Creation Texts," in *Image of God and Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition*, ed. Kari Elisabeth Børresen (Oslo: Solum Forag, 1991), 11-35, 17.

[517] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 124.

[518] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 124.

[519] Or. 16.2, PG 35, 936A-938B; 37.10, SC 318, 292; 40.18, SC 358, 234; 43.62, SC 384, 258-60; Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 523, 11; 1.2.6, PG 37, 644, 5-9. "Virginity approximates the life of the angels by eliminating desires of the body and renouncing marriage, property, and power in order to be free to cultivate the life of the mind and direct desire solely toward union with God," Christos B. Christakis, ""Parthenia": The Teaching of the Cappadocian Fathers on Virginity" (Ph.Diss., King's College, London, 1996), 201. Also, see Susanna Elm, *'Virgins of God': The Making of Asceticism in Late Antiquity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 156-57; François Bourassa, *Excellence de la virginité: arguments patristiques* (Montréal: Facultés de théologie et de philosophies de la Compagnie de Jésus, 1953), 36-37; Peter Brown, *The Making of Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978), 289. Gregory's approach to the virgins in his care is demonstrated by his concern for Amazonia after she has fallen ill; see Ep. 159, Gallay, *Lettres 2*, 50.

[520] Christakis, "Virginity," 182.

The result of Gregory's preference for virginity is that gender is not the predominant focus of being created according to God's *eikon*. Rather, Gregory's motivation lies with the life of the *eikon*. For example, in *In Praise of Virginity*, Gregory explains that human persons image a God who lives forever:

> With immortal hands he established my form,
> (χείρεσιν ἀθανάτῃσιν ἐμὴν ἑστήσατο μορφήν)
> To it he imparted his life. He shot spirit into it,
> (τῇ δ' ἄρ' ἐῆς ζωῆς μοιρήσατο ἐν γὰρ ἔηκε
> πνεῦμα)
> Which is a portion of the unseen Godhead.
> From soil and breath he made a mortal human,
> *Eikon* of the Immortal, for the nature of spiritual intellect is queen to both (ἐκ δὲ χοὸς πνοιῆς τε βροτὸς γένετ', ἀθανάτοιο
> εἰκὼν ἡ γὰρ ἄνασσα νόου φύσις ἀμφοτέροισι).[521]

Unlike Nyssen, Gregory does not state that the *eikon* is genderless, nevertheless, it is clear that this is his intention, both from the poem above and throughout his work. Feminist theologians have criticised this, arguing that if we view the *eikon* of God as genderless, then we portray the human person as androgynous.[522] However, Gregory believes that the human person images God both individually and collectively; he does not envisage an androgynous human person at creation, rather he understands that human nature represents a single

[521] Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 529, 92-97. Gilbert translates "lordly" here; see *On God and Man*, 92. However, the text reads ἄνασσα, which is a feminine noun meaning 'queen', see *PGL*, 120. It is possible that Gregory is recalling Herodotus' (*Hist*. 3.38) personification when he writes, "it is, I think, rightly said in Pindar's poem that custom (νόμος) is lord (βασιλεύς) of all." I am indebted to Nick Wilshere for pointing me towards Herodotus.

[522] Feminist theologians argue that Nyssen employs "castrational equality." This is because he excludes both male and female from the *eikon*; Kari Elisabeth Børresen, "God's Image, Man's Image?," in *Image of God and Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition*, ed. Kari Elisabeth Børresen (Oslo: Solum Forag, 1991), 188-207, 198-99.

unity which is restored in Christ.

Gregory's view of Christ and how the human person images him is pertinent to this discussion, since Gregory writes of women imaging Christ specifically. Gregory is aware of Christ being distinctively male, since he refers to Christ's masculinity in *On Holy Pascha*, where he likens Christ to the male sacrificial lamb.[523] Harrison argues correctly that, for Gregory, Christ's maleness is allegorical rather than literal in this context.[524] Therefore, women are able to image Christ because Christ is God, and Gregory does not appropriate gender to God.[525]

In Chapter Three, I demonstrated that Gregory denotes Christ as the identical *Eikon*; next, I shall determine how Gregory includes women when he speaks of human persons imaging the Christ. The lines below are from Gregory's poem, *Against Women Wearing Ornaments*, in which Gregory lays out how Christian women should behave. Here, he refers to the Christian woman as an *eikon* of Christ, which reveals that Gregory does not consider Christ's masculinity as something which precludes women from imaging him:[526]

> The race of Pandora are shameless, but you, *eikon* of Christ,
> Must shine with wisdom and understanding (ἀλλὰ σὺ Χριστοῦ

[523] Or. 45.13, PG 36, 641A.

[524] "For Gregory the "maleness" ascribed to Christ in this sense actually refers to his virtue, which is universally human, and not his biology;" Nonna Verna Harrison, "The Maleness of Christ," *VTQ* 42, no. 2 (1998): 111-51, 131. Also, see Jay Wesley Richards, "Can a Male Savior save Women?: Gregory of Nazianzus on the Logos' Assumption of Human Nature," *CSR* 28, no. 1 (1998): 42-57. Richards offers a critique of Rosemary Radford Ruether, "Can a Male Savior Save Women?," in *To Change the World: Christology and Cultural Criticism*, ed. Rosemary Radford Ruether (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 45-56.

[525] Or. 31.7, SC 250, 286-88. Beeley confirms this; "Christ is born as a single entity," which Gregory describes using both neuter and masculine nouns, thus not "making either gender into a technical term," *Trinity and the Knowledge of God*, 130; Harrison, "The Maleness of Christ," 111. Beeley and Harrison counter the number of feminist theologians who have criticised Christ's maleness; see Ruether, "The Liberation of Christology," 138.

[526] Contra Elizabeth A. Johnson, "Redeeming the Name of Christ," in *Freeing Theology: The Essentials of Theology in Feminist Perspective*, ed. Catherine LaCugna (San Francisco: Harper-San Francisco, 1993), 115-37, 119-20.

εἰκὼν σωφροσύνῃ λάμπεο καὶ πραπίσιν).[527]

Gregory is so convinced that women are *eikones* of God in a manner which is not inferior to men that he employs this argument on behalf of equality for women regarding unfair divorce laws:

> There is one maker of man and woman (εἷς ποιητὴς ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός), one sod of clay (εἷς χοῦς) for both, one *eikon* (εἰκὼν μία), one law, one death, one resurrection, in the same way we were born from man and woman.[528]

In this oration Gregory goes on to show how women are of equal honour to men, to the extent that McGuckin observes, "the woman is the icon of Christ in this case."[529] However, whilst Gregory's ethics regarding women's rights in the divorce courts are outstanding, he does not promote freedom and equality in all areas of female life. For example, Gregory's approach to women's attire is extremely conservative. If we leave aside feminist issues, his discussions concerning women and cosmetics warrant consideration, since Gregory's thoughts about women's clothes and cosmetics reveal much about his notion of the *eikon;* namely, that defacing the *eikon*, for example, through the use of cosmetics, reduces the *eikon* of God to an idol (ἴδολον).

4.7.1 *Unpainted Eikones*

With great rhetorical flourishes in his orations, Gregory praises his mother Nonna and his sister Gorgonia, for their restraint in not

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[527] Carm. 1.2.29, PG 37, 893, 125-26; Knecht, *Gegen die Putzsucht der Frauen*, 25.

[528] Or. 37.6, SC 318, 284.

[529] McGuckin, *Intellectual Biography*, 334.

applying cosmetics or wearing expensive jewellery.[530] Gregory honours them in his orations because he considers that Nonna and Gorgonia are protecting themselves as *eikones* by choosing not to apply cosmetics.[531] It is difficult to reconstruct for whose benefit Gregory made these statements, since speaking out against the use of cosmetics was quite general in the Graeco-Roman world.[532] I suggest that Gregory's restrictions are connected primarily to supporting a non-extravagant and celibate life, since women applying cosmetics were considered to be excessively wealthy and susceptible to committing adultery.[533] So precious is the human *eikon* that she must reserve herself solely for glorifying God. Gregory argues that those who wear cosmetics are in danger of becoming more like idols or actresses on the stage than being *eikones* of God.[534] Moreover, Gregory believes that the use of cosmetics adulterates the *eikon*, as seen below in his poem *Exhortation to Virgins*:[535]

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[530] Or. 8.10, SC 405, 266; 18.8, PG 35, 993B-996A; Carm. 1.2.2, PG 37, 585, 85-90; 1.2.29, PG 37, 885, 15-20; Philip M. Beagon, "The Cappadocian Fathers, Women and Ecclesiastical Politics," *VC* 49, no. 2 (1995): 165-79, 171.

[531] Or. 8.14, SC 405, 276.

[532] For biblical disapproval of jewellery, see 1 Tim 2.9; 1 Pet 3.3. For further information on the use of cosmetics, see Ann M. Stout, "Jewelry as a Symbol of Status in the Roman Empire," in *The World of Roman Costume*, ed. Judith L. Sebesta and Larissa Bonfante (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1994), 77-100, 77; Anette Drew-Bear, *Painted Faces on the Renaissance Stage: The Moral Significance of Face-painting Conventions* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1994), 20. For an overview on cosmetics in Ancient Greece, see Michelle M. Lee, *Body, Dress, and Identity in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 67-69. Adornment was also discouraged because it was a means of power for women in the ancient world; Gary G. Hoag, "Decorum and Deeds in 1 Timothy 2:9-10 in light of *Ephesiaca* by Xenophon of Ephesus," *Ex Auditu* 27 (2011): 134-60, 145.

[533] *Against Wealth*, Carm. 1.2.28, PG 37, 856-884. Amongst fathers who disproved of women wearing cosmetics were Clement, Tertullian, Saint Cyprian, Ambrose and Jerome; see Alicia J. Batten, "Neither Gold nor Braided Hair (1 Timothy 2.9; 1 Peter 3.3): Adornment, Gender and Honour in Antiquity," *NTS* 55, no. 4 (2009): 484-501, 498.

[534] Or. 8.10, SC 405, 266; 18.8, PG 35, 993 B-C; 38.5, SC 358, 110; Carm. 1.2.2, PG 37, 538-39, 215-20; 1.2.3, PG 37, 637, 55-59; 1.2.19, PG 37, 885, 15-16.

[535] Gregory's authorship of Exhortation to Virgins is disputed; see Rudolf Keydell, "Die Unechtheit der Gregor von Nazianz zugeschriebenen Exhortatio ad Virgines," BZ 43, no. 2 (1950): 334-37. However, I contend that Gregory's

> Let another adulterate the *eikon* of God with coloured complexions,
> A breathing work of art, silent betrayer of things within...[536]
> (ἄλλη χρώμασιν είκόνα τὴν θεοῦ νοθευέτω
> πίναξ ἔμψυχος, σιγῶν κατήγορος τῶν ἔνδον)

Consider further Gregory's argument below in *Against Women Wearing Ornaments*.[537] Drawing on the Genesis creation narratives, Gregory imagines God's response to a woman who wears cosmetics as a means of enhancing her beauty. In a section of his poem, employing the rhetorical device of ethopoiia Gregory assumes God's voice, laying out what God would say to a woman who wears cosmetics:

> Who is and whence came the creator? Be gone, one who belongs to another!
> I did not inscribe you, dog! But I moulded an *eikon* of myself.[538]
> How is it that I have an idol in place of a dear form?[539]
> (τίς, πόθεν ὸ πλάστης; ἔρρε μοι, ἀλλοτρίη
> οὔ σ᾽ἔγραψα, κύων, ἀλλ᾽ ἔπλασα είκον᾽ ἐμοῖο
> πῶς εἴδωλον ἔχω εἴδεος ἀντὶ φίλου;)

Gregory's insulting use of "dog" (κύων) to describe a woman who relies on cosmetics to enhance her beauty is somewhat shocking for the majority of Western twenty-first century readers. It highlights that Gregory expects extreme submission regarding how women dress. It also demonstrates that interpreters must engage with all Gregory's

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customary use of the devil in this poem, along with his approach to the life of virgins is consistent with his thought elsewhere.

[536] Carm. 1.2.3, PG 37, 637, 57-59.

[537] Carm. 1.2.29, PG 37, 884-908.

[538] Gen 1:26 and Gen 2:6.

[539] Carm. 1.2.29, PG 37, 887, 46-48. For an alternative translation, see Moreschini et al., *Gregorio Nazianzeno: Poesie*, 1, 228.

work, rather than simply his orations, when making claims about his position on ethical concerns. For example, McGuckin and Tavard both praise Gregory for being a leader in female equality, yet they have not taken into account these poems.

Aside from the fact that the lines above are insulting to many readers, they reveal two significant points about Gregory's approach to the *eikon*.[540] First, his play on words around the idea of *eikones* and idols shows that Gregory considers the human *eikon* to be one which uniquely bears God's presence. The addition of cosmetics to a woman's body means that she is no longer an *eikon*, but rather an idol, a term which Gregory generally uses negatively.[541] The same idea appears in Gregory's funeral oration for his sister.[542] Secondly, the defacement of the *eikon* occurs through the body, which is why cosmetics are such an important issue for Gregory. This dispels yet again the arguments that Gregory presents the *eikon* as only that which is separate from the body and lends itself more to a reading that the *eikon* can function as a term for the whole human person, as I have been arguing throughout this project thus far.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter began with an explanation of why I suggest the phrase 'divine, yet vulnerable' as a means of summarising Gregory's approach to the human *eikon*. I explained that I have chosen this phrase, since I

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[540] "Die Gottesebenbildlichkeit ist hier durchaus körperlich, gewissermaßen naturalistisch aufgefaßt, wie es für die griechischen Kirchenväter trotz der zugleich vorhandenen Vergeistigung des Bildbegriffs bezeichnend ist", Knecht, *Gegen die Putzsucht der Frauen*, 71. Knecht affirms that εἰκών is the antithesis of εἴδωλον; ibid., 71.

[541] Or. 5.28, SC 309, 348; 8.10, SC 405, 266; 39.6, SC 358, 160; 40.38, SC 358, 284; Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 532, 136; 1.2.29, PG 37, 883, 372; 2.1.1, PG 37, 979, 123. On the basis of Gregory's use of the phrase εἴδωλον τοῦ καλοῦ (Or. 2.74, SC 247, 186), Anna Williams (*Divine Sense*, 93) suggests that Gregory applies εἴδωλον interchangeably with εἰκών. However Gregory does not refer to the human person as an εἴδωλον of God anywhere in his work.

[542] Or. 8.10, SC 405, 266.

aim to reflect Gregory's open approach as much as possible, whilst highlighting the most significant aspects of the existence of a human *eikon*. My use of 'vulnerable' refers to the way in which the human *eikon* is formed, and relates to how she is created with the capacity to become divine. For the *eikon* to transform matter or dust, the latter must be vulnerable; thus God creates the human person deliberately as a being who is vulnerable to God. Gregory presents this vulnerability to God as wholly good, since it enables the human person to reach her proper end; namely to become divine. Human vulnerability also incorporates a negative aspect in light of the devil's hatred of humans, as I shall determine in the following chapter. In order to begin to clarify Gregory's use of 'divine', I demonstrated Gregory's adherence to the doctrine *creatio ex nihilo.* The implications of this are that when Gregory speaks about the *eikon* as divine, he implies a divinity which is conferred, since God alone is divine in the proper sense. I explore Gregory's depiction of the divinity of the *eikon* in depth in Chapter Six.

Throughout this chapter, I have sought to draw attention to the uniqueness of the human person, since she is the only creature privileged with being created as the *eikon* of God. I examined Gregory's description of her creation as a means of exploring how this human *eikon* is unique. I highlighted that Gregory's description of the human *eikon* as the spiritual, intellectual soul at creation, has led scholars to conclude that Gregory applies *eikon* to the soul or the spiritual intellect alone. However, in light of the unity of Christ, the identical *Eikon*, I demonstrated that the *eikon* transforms the dust to form a dynamic human *eikon*; thus the *eikon* assumes the whole human in addition to being used to describe the soul. The results of this are as follows: the unity of the human *eikon* mirrors Christ's unity which, as I explored in the previous chapter, Gregory went to great lengths to depict. Furthermore, Christ is set apart from other *eikones* who are motionless (ἀκίνητος), but rather is "a being set in motion."[543] Likewise, Gregory's

[543] Or. 30.20, SC 250, 268.

description of the human *eikon* at creation is of one who is 'living.' Consequently, *eikon* expresses dynamic life and likeness to God, rather than an inanimate concept or object.

Moving on, I demonstrated further the unity of the human *eikon* and her likeness to God, by considering the biblical themes which Gregory applies to her at creation; namely, "microcosm," "another angel" and "king." Earlier in the chapter, I offered a brief overview of Gregory's high esteem for angels and exhibited their prevalence in his poetry and orations, highlighting that Gregory draws from biblical ideas concerning these "fiery spirits." Having shown how much Gregory admires angels, for example by describing them as simple like God, we see that Gregory pays the human *eikon* a great compliment by comparing her with the angelic host.[544] This comparison highlights aspects of shared functions, since both angels and humans are created to sing praises to God and to execute God's commands. Added to this, I observed that whilst human *eikones* and angels share the description "divine", Gregory describes humans alone imaging God. Since Gregory is careful to label angels consistently as invisible, it is clear that imaging God relates in some instances to visibility. Thus, being a mixture of spirit and matter or dust is essential to functioning as God's visible *eikon* on earth. Looking back to Chapter Two, where I argued that one aspect of being an *eikon* entails being comparable with a pagan statue or portrait, we see a stark difference between human and pagan *eikones*; for a human person to truly image God, she must be filled with God's breath, which sets her apart from all other forms of pagan *eikon*. I demonstrated this further towards the end of this chapter when I considered how Gregory writes about women as God's *eikones*. Gregory observes that the use of cosmetics reduces God's *eikon* to an idol, which he considers a negative movement since idols are breathless and consequently lifeless.

I have aimed to show that Gregory depicts the human person as

[544] Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 440, 12-16.

an *eikon* of God extremely positively. Whilst this is true when God creates her, she quickly falls into an existence which consists of perpetual struggles and trials. This change in circumstances is due to the fall of the angel Lucifer who, on being thrown out of heaven, makes it his mission to destroy the human person precisely because she is an *eikon* of God. This constant wrestling between the devil and the human *eikon* raises many questions regarding both the nature of the fall of Lucifer and his consequent existence. These are questions to which I shall turn in the following chapter, where I argue that, for Gregory, it is impossible to consider human existence as an *eikon* of God without simultaneously being confronted with questions about the spiritual forces of evil.

Chapter 5 The *Eikon* and the Devil

5.1 Introduction

> Come into paradise with Jesus in order to understand from what you have fallen (ὥστε μαθεῖν ὧν ἐκπέπτωκας).[545]

As exemplified above, Gregory makes explicit that a "fall" occurs in the life of the human *eikon*, the full consequences of which I shall explore later in this chapter. It is important to note that Gregory does not envisage the human *eikon* falling purely of her own accord, since he follows Irenaeus in his depiction of the human person in paradise as a child, who is innocent and easily beguiled.[546] The human capacity for freedom means that a fall is possible, but not inevitable.[547] The likelihood of the fall is increased by the human *eikon* sharing paradise with the devil, her deadliest enemy. The devil takes advantage of the human capacity for freedom and encourages this "child" to disobey the only commandment God gave to her:

> If we had remained the very thing which we were and kept the commandment, we would have become that which we were not, coming towards the tree of life, after the tree of knowledge. And what would we have become? Immortal and consorts with God (θεῷ πλησιάσαντες). But since death (θάνατος) came into the world through the envy of the Evil One (τῷ φθόνῳ τοῦ πονηροῦ), and filched the human person through trickery...[548]

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[545] Or. 45.24, PG 36, 656C.

[546] Or. 38.12, SC 358, 128; 39.7, SC 358, 160-62; 2.25, SC 247, 122-24; Carm.1.1.8, PG 37, 454, 104; *Dem*. 11-12; *Haer*. 4.38.3; see Matthew C. Steenberg, "Children in Paradise: Adam and Eve as "Infants" in Irenaeus of Lyons," *JECS* 12, no. 1 (2004): 1-22; Althaus, *Die Heilslehre des heiligen*, 66-67.

[547] Or. 14.25, PG 35, 889C-982B; 38.12, SC 358, 126; 37.13, SC 318, 298.

[548] Or. 44.4, PG 36, 612A-B.

Above, as elsewhere, Gregory's narrative depicts a dynamic human existence where God creates the human person with the capacity to become immortal and divine. In the previous chapter I described Gregory's perception of how God mixes God's *eikon* with the very dust of the earth in the formation of the human person. This renders the divine *eikon* vulnerable to a certain degree; thus the existence of the human person is divine, through the gift of the *eikon*, and vulnerable due to being composed of earth. At creation, this dynamic vulnerability of the human *eikon* is positive, since it entails that the human person is vulnerable to God, and thus through the gift of God she possesses the capacity to become divine. Paradoxically, in paradise this vulnerability whilst remaining positive, takes on a negative quality. Since the *eikon* is dynamic, she has the potential to grow in her divinity and likeness to God, but she could also fall away from God.

The devil's awareness that the human person is an *eikon* of God results in him being her enemy. She is the object of his envy, her vulnerability rendering her a possible target.[549] The devil's hatred of the *eikon* entails that her existence is one of challenge and struggle, a problem which Gregory bewails frequently. For Gregory, it is impossible to consider human existence without at the same time considering the devil, since his writing aims to make sense of his day-to-day experience, which occurs within a life of struggle.

Through a close consideration of the texts, I examine the nature of the existence which Gregory attributes to the devil. I argue that Gregory treats the devil as though he is literally 'real' rather than a metaphorical construction. By making this claim, I draw attention to Gregory's narrative of the struggle of the human *eikon* with a spiritual enemy; from here all kinds of questions and challenges ensue, such as the issue of dualism. In order to solve this, numerous scholars have sought to demythologise or deconstruct any talk of spiritual beings that

[549] For connections between the human *eikon* and warfare, see Carly L. Crouch, "Made in the Image of God: The Creation of אדם, the Commissioning of the King and the Chaoskampf of YHWH," *JANER* 16, no. 1 (2016): 1-21.

incline towards evil.[550] Rather than seeking to demythologise, through discussing Gregory's narrative and engaging with scholars who have considered these issues recently, I argue that Gregory's thought is not dualistic. However, the conclusion that Gregory's concept of the devil does not err towards dualism leads to a further question, namely, if Gregory considers the devil to be 'real', what form does the devil's existence take, if evil cannot exist of its own accord? In response to this, I build on Ludlow's recent work, since she is one of the few scholars to engage with Cappadocian demonology.[551] Drawing on Ludlow's thesis, I demonstrate that the devil and his demons are able to exist because they belong to God's good creation, since God created them spiritual beings. Ludlow suggests that the existence of the demonic beings is "liminal." Contrary to this, I contend that "liminal" implies the demons remain in a static state, whereas I shall demonstrate that they are dynamic like all created beings. Through a close consideration of the texts, I argue that Gregory envisages the devil and his demons to exist in a manner which means they are diminishing into non-being. Their 'falling' nature occurs through being cast out of heaven. Nevertheless, in spite of this, the devil and his fellows are capable of wreaking havoc upon the human *eikon*.

After establishing the reality and prevalence of the devil in Gregory's thought, I continue to explore the narrative of the *eikon*, beginning with Gregory's depiction of the fall (πτῶμα). My description 'divine, yet vulnerable' is particularly apparent through the tradition of biblical interpretation upon which Gregory draws in his retelling of the biblical narrative, and also through the behaviour of the devil towards the *eikon* both in and out of paradise. After establishing Gregory's perception of the fall, I move on to discuss Gregory's portrayal of the

[550] Derek R. Brown, "The Devil in the Details: A Survey of Research on Satan in Biblical Studies," *CBR* 9, no. 2 (2011): 200-27, 201.

[551] Ludlow, "Demons, Evil and Liminality," passim. See Chapter 5.2 for further references to Ludlow's work.

existence of the fallen *eikon*.[552] In her endeavour to live as a wounded *eikon* of God in the fallen world, the human person encounters resistance from a multitude of trials: the devil, demons, flesh, sin, passions, poverty and sickness all contribute to the struggle and complexities of being human. Moreover, she lives in a cosmos, which has been made subject to corruption, owing to the fall.[553] By exploring Gregory's narratives concerning these challenges to human existence, I argue that the devil plays an even more significant role in Gregory's thoughts about being human than we might expect, since Gregory's approach to the world (κόσμος), the flesh (σάρξ), and the passions (πάθη), demonstrate that when Gregory writes about these in a combative manner, he holds ideas in mind of the devil's involvement.

Thus, I conclude that the devil plays a significant role in the life of the *eikon*. If we are to be faithful to Gregory's ideas, discussions of the human person as an *eikon* of God should take place in the context of her fraught existence, in which she wrestles with spiritual enemies. With this in mind, I proceed to establish both the prevalence of, and the kind of existence attributed to, these enemies whom we find in the texts.

5.2 The Devil and his Army

Contrary to Ruether's argument that "the daemonological aspect, so prominent in non-hellenized Christian asceticism, is largely absent in Gregory," the devil's fall and its consequences occupy a vast space in Gregory's work.[554] Following the Christian tradition, Gregory equates Lucifer to Satan, the devil, and the serpent in the Garden of Eden, as I

[552] Or. 1.5, SC 247, 78; 2.25, SC 247, 122; 2.34, SC 247, 132; 4.2, SC 309, 88; 6.12, SC 405, 152; 10.1, SC 405, 318; 32.24, SC 318, 136; 44.2, PG 36, 609A; Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 456, 120-29; 1.1.10, PG 37, 470, 69-73; 2.1.30, PG 37, 1297, 170.

[553] Or. 4.15; SC 309, 108; 39.7, SC 358, 162; 45.29, PG 36, 661B-664A; cf. Rom 8:22.

[554] Ruether, *Rhetor and Philosopher*, 149.

stated in Chapter One.[555] Gregory weaves their narratives neatly together into the story of Christ's victory on behalf of humankind:

> … crushing Satan (Σατάν) quickly under our feet, whether falling like lightning from heaven on account of his former splendour, or fleeing like a serpent due to his later crookedness and his metamorphosis into that which crawls on the ground.[556]

Concerning Lucifer's fall, Gregory follows the tradition occurring in 2 Enoch and Origen, where Satan's downfall is attributed to his longing for the glory of God.[557] Gregory does not attempt to answer the question of how Lucifer came to be proud and hanker after a glory which was not his own, other than to comment that whilst it is hard to move them away from good, angels are able to turn to evil should they choose.[558] For Lucifer, choosing evil results in elimination from heaven. Once fallen, he does not work alone, but manages to gather up an army of rebel angels, which Gregory refers to as demons.[559] In naming them thus, Gregory follows the Christian tradition where demons are consistently evil.[560] Elsewhere in Greek literature demons are not regarded as being evil necessarily, but are more often intermediary beings.[561] For example, Plato views the demon's role as bridging the

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[555] Ἑωσφόρος, translated "Morning Star," Muraoka, *GELS*, 312. Lucifer is the common translation, taken from Latin, meaning "light-bearer."

[556] Or. 23.14, SC 270, 310; Carm. 1.2.1, PG 27, 531, 120; see Luke 10:18.

[557] *Cels*. 6.43. For a brief survey on Origen's view on angels and demons, see Carr, *Angels and Principalities*, 168-71.

[558] Or. 38.9, SC 358, 120.

[559] Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 444, 74.

[560] Edward Langton, *Essentials of Demonology: A Study of Jewish and Christian Doctrine, its Origin and Development* (London: Epworth, 1949), 88; Dale B. Martin, "When Did Angels Become Demons?," *JBL* 129, no. 4 (2010): 657-77; Andrew Louth, *Denys the Areopagite* (London: Continuum, 2001), 35; Basil Krivocheine, "Angels and Demons in the Eastern Orthodox Tradition," *Sourozh* 20 (1985): 32-41.

[561] Ferguson, *Demonology*, 35.

chasm between the divine and human.[562]

Gregory draws on two differing traditions which account for the appearance of demons on earth. First, in *On Spiritual Beings*, Gregory states that spiritual beings do not come from bodies nor do they enter bodies.[563] In this instance, demons stem from Satan's leadership when he draws angels into his rebellion. After this, they become his army and spend their time warring against humanity.[564] Added to this, following early church fathers such as Justin Martyr, Irenaeus and Clement, Gregory draws from a further tradition regarding the existence of demons on the earth.[565] In a poem where he offers advice to virgins, Gregory observes that whoever mixed the fleshless nature (angels) with flesh (humans) committed a sin.[566] He states that angelic desires produced great giants, which meant that the sins of heavenly beings took up their abode on earth. This tradition originates from Genesis 6:1-4, where the Septuagint translates the Hebrew phrase "sons of God" as "angels of God." These angels descend to have sexual intercourse with "daughters of men."[567] From there, 1 Enoch 15 interprets Genesis 6:1-4 as the origin of demons on the earth. The "angels of God" are called "Watchers", whose offspring with the women on the earth are giants, from whose bodies the evil spirits come forth. The overall aim of the evil spirits is to corrupt the inhabitants of the earth. Writing on this tradition, VanderKam states that Lactantius (c.a. A.D. 240-320) is the last writer to employ the Enoch-inspired myth, overlooking the fact that

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[562] *Symp.* 202d-203a. See Burkert, *Greek Religion*, 179-81.

[563] Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 440, 17-18.

[564] Carm. 2.1.50, PG 37, 1389, 55-60.

[565] *1 Apol.* 5; *Haer*. 4.16.2; *Dem.* 18; *Strom*. 5.1.10. For a full exploration of Justin's use of this myth, see Annette Yoshiko Reed, "The Trickery of the Fallen Angels and the Demonic Mimesis of the Divine: Aetiology, Demonology, and Polemics in the Writings of Justin Martyr*," *JECS* 12, no. 2 (2004): 141-71.

[566] Carm. 1.2.2, PG 37, 617, 490-97.

[567] Loren T. Stuckenbruck, "The Origins of Evil in Jewish Apocalyptic Tradition: The Interpretation of Genesis 6:1-4 in the Second and Third Centuries B.C.," in *The Fall of the Angels*, ed. Christoph Auffarth and Loren T. Stuckenbruck (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 87-118, 88.

Gregory refers to the tradition overtly in the fourth century:[568]

> The rebel powers (ἀποστατικαὶ δυνάμεις) subject to him [Lucifer] are craftsmen of evil in the flight from beauty and hosts of evil in us.[569]

Revealing his substantial preoccupation with evil spirits, Gregory offers a dramatic rendering of the multiple ways in which these sneaky demons intend to entrap the human *eikon*:

> From this, the evil beings shot up upon the earth; demons, attendants of the murderous king of evil, phantoms of the night, liars, wantons, teachers of sin, those who mislead others, drunks, lovers of sensuous laughter, stirrers of revelry, diviners, practitioners of ambiguity, argumentative ones, murderous wretches, inhabitants of darkness, hidden ones, shameless beings, sorcerers.[570] They call on approaching; they hate, whilst dragging away. They appear as night and light either without disguise or in ambush. While this is the way of the army, so it is the way of their chief (τοίη μὲν κείνων στρατιή, τοῖος δέ τε ἀρχός).[571]

Note that in the passage above, Gregory refers to the demons as an

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[568] James C. VanderKam, "1 Enoch, Enochic Motifs, and Enoch in Early Christian Literature," in *The Jewish Apocalyptic Heritage in Early Christianity*, ed. James C. VanderKam and William Adler (Assen, Netherlands; Minneapolis: Van Gorcum; Fortress, 1996), 33-101, 84. 1 Enoch 19:3 and Jubilees 10:1-2 later refer to evil spirits as demons.

[569] Or. 38.9, SC 358, 120-22; 45.5, PG 36, 629B; 22.13, SC 270, 248; 24.10, SC 284, 58; 37.7, SC 318, 284; 39.13, SC 358, 176; 40.10, SC 358, 216-18; Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 441-446, 37-97.

[570] φιλομειδέες and χρησμολόγοι are most likely allusions to Aphrodite and Apollo respectively; see Moreschini and Sykes, *Poemata Arcana*, 210-11. In doing this, Gregory follows a long line of patristic writers who equate heathen gods with demons; see *Cels*. 3.28.

[571] Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 444-445, 73-82.

army. This is due to military service being a popular metaphor for the Christian life in the early church.[572] This stems from Jewish apocalyptic thought, which discussed regularly the warfare between Satan and humankind. In line with this tradition, Gregory frames human existence within a constant wrestle against an army of powerful spiritual enemies.[573]

The idea of warfare between the human *eikon* and Satan is explicit throughout Gregory's work; see, for example, Oration 6, when Gregory speaks on the theme of peace. Gregory delivered this oration after reconciling his father, the bishop, with the local monastic community, where there had been a disagreement over the bishop signing a document whose orthodoxy was in question.[574] In this oration Gregory sets the spiritual battle in context by describing in detail how Satan was an angel who fell from heaven, after which he moves on to consider how Satan works towards disunity within the Church:

> Hiding himself in the dark quarter of discord, as far as I am concerned, and to those present using for the most part sophistry and cunning against each of us, opening a spot in us through skill, such as would suit himself, so that he might break in with the fullness of his strength, just like a chief with an army, when there is a break in the wall or line of battle.[575]

Gregory continues the theme of warfare throughout the oration and closes by reflecting on Ephesians 6:14, a pericope about spiritual

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[572] Gerald Bonner, *The Warfare of Christ* (London; New York: Faith Press; Morehouse-Barlow, 1962), 37; Schlier, *Principalities and Powers*, 41-69.

[573] Or. 2.22, SC 247, 118; 11.5, SC 405, 338; 17.9, PG 35, 796; 19.6, PG 35, 993; 22.13, SC 270, 248; 24.15, SC 284, 74; 38.5, SC 358, 110; 40.10, SC 358, 218; 40.14, SC 358, 226; et al. For consistency with the New Testament, see Norman Hepburn Baynes, "St. Anthony and the Demons," *JEA* 40 (1954): 7-10.

[574] Calvet-Sebasti, SC 405, 31.

[575] Or. 6.13, SC 405, 156.

warfare.[576] Like the author of Ephesians, Gregory thinks the battle is not against flesh and blood; rather it concerns the spiritual powers of darkness.[577] He exhorts his listeners to be "recognising only one war, against the Evil One and the ranks underneath him."[578] I will develop this theme later in the chapter, demonstrating further how Satan's principal target is the *eikon* and that he works through the world, sinful flesh and the passions. Gregory's consistent use of the battle imagery prompts questions regarding what nature of existence he attributes to the fallen angels; namely, does he lean towards dualism by referring so frequently to the battle of the human *eikon* with the devil and demons?

Before I argue that Gregory's approach to the devil and demons is not dualistic, I shall clarify my understanding of "dualism." This is a term which scholars have interpreted in varying ways.[579] Many scholars have discussed the dualism that Christianity inherited from Jewish apocalyptic, which is the concept that the present age is evil due to Satan having dominion over the earth. Young suggests that whilst a cosmic battle goes on currently, it will end in God's ultimate triumph, from which she argues for a "practical dualism" rather than an "ultimate dualism."[580] Since, for Gregory, God is the absolute power and always rules, Young is correct in arguing for no "ultimate dualism," although a "practical dualism" still implies that Satan might be a match for God.[581] This latter point does not align with Gregory's approach, who, as I shall demonstrate shortly, is adamant that God is supreme at all times. For

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[576] Clint E. Arnold, *Ephesians, Power and Magic: The Concept of Power in Ephesians in Light of Its Historical Setting* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), passim; Harold W. Hoehner, *Ephesians: An Exegetical Commentary* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2002), 825.

[577] On the authorship of Ephesians, see Hoehner, *Ephesians*, 3-60.

[578] Or. 6.22, SC 405, 174.

[579] For five kinds of dualism as cosmic, eschatological, psychological/ethical, anthropological and literary, see Antoinette Collins, "Dualism and the (LXX) Book of Genesis," *Phronema* 14 (1999): 45-52, 46.

[580] Young, *The Making of the Creeds*, 94.

[581] Trevor O. Ling, *The Significance of Satan: New Testament Demonology and Its Contemporary Relevance* (London: SPCK, 1961), 10.

the sake of being concise, I follow Edgecombe Hughes' definition below, since he summarises my understanding of dualism succinctly:

> Within and behind all reality there is the presence of not one but of two absolute and eternal powers which are irreconcilably opposed to each other.[582]

Edgecombe Hughes' definition of dualism exemplifies precisely what Gregory does not believe, for Gregory dismisses ideas of dualism where opposing powers of good and evil are equal to one another. In this and the previous chapter, I have demonstrated that Gregory maintains a strict sense of God as "One" and adheres to the doctrine *creatio ex nihilo* consistently, both of which illustrate Gregory's antipathy towards dualism. Gregory's aggressive attack on Manichaeism further reveals the idea that he does not consider Satan as an equal and opposite force to God.[583] Added to this, in *On Baptism*, adapting ideas of privation, Gregory states that evil does not exist by itself:

> Believe that no aspect of evil has either substance or royalty, or is without beginning, or has a substantial nature by itself, or comes from God (πίστευε μὴ οὐσίαν εἶναί τινα τοῦ κακοῦ μήτε βασιλείαν, ἢ ἄναρχον ἢ παρ' ἑαυτῆς ὑπόστασιν ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ γενομένην); but this is our work and that of the Evil One, which came in afterwards due to our lack of attention, not from the

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582 Philip Edgcumbe Hughes, *The True Image: The Origin and Destiny of Man in Christ* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 83.

583 Carm. 1.1.4, PG 37, 415-423. Gregory also attacks those who say there are many gods both good and evil; see Carm. 1.1.6, PG 37, 430, 5-6. For further information about the Manichees, see Iain Gardner and Samuel N.C. Lieu, *Manichaean Texts from the Roman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 11; Concetta Giuffré Scibona, "How Monotheistic is Mani's Dualism?," *Numen* 48, no. 4 (2001): 444-67; Geo Widengren, *Mani and Manichaeism* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1961). Manichaeism most likely has its roots in Zoroastrianism; see Susan R. Garrett, *No Ordinary Angel: Celestial Spirits and Christian Claims About Jesus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 121.

Creator.[584]

Consider also Gregory's approach to Christ's encounters with Satan. As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, Christ always rules in Gregory's description of the confrontations between Christ and Satan or his demons, thus demonstrating that God conquers Satan on earth as in heaven.[585] Furthermore, we must take into account Gregory's belief that God created the world intrinsically as 'good.' The demonic powers, along with sin, disrupt that goodness, but they do not take away its inherent value as created by God. Therefore, I conclude that dualism does not adequately describe Gregory's approach to the devil, demons or evil. However, if we are to conclude that Gregory does not err towards dualistic thought, the question remains concerning what kind of existence Gregory attributes to the devil and his minions? This is pertinent especially when we bear in mind the way in which Gregory emphasises that evil does not exist of its own accord, whilst maintaining a perpetual awareness of the war that Satan and his demons exert against the *eikon*.

When Gregory addresses Satan directly with statements such as "You have come, O villainous one! I know your plans," he does not appear to be employing Satan as simply a personification of sin or evil.[586] Kalleres and Ludlow have observed this, both arguing that Gregory envisaged demons as real spiritual beings.[587] Writing about Gregory's approach to demons in his poetry, Kalleres has observed correctly that Gregory speaks to and describes Satan consistently as

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[584] Or. 40.45, SC 358, 304; *Princ*. 2.9.2; *Hex*. *Hom*. 2.4; *Enn*. 1.8.1.

[585] Bonner, *The Warfare of Christ*, 29.

[586] Carm. 2.1.54, PG 37, 1397, 1; Or. 40.10, SC 358, 216-18; Carms. 2.1.50 – 2.1.60, PG 37, 1385 -1404.

[587] Ludlow, "Demons, Evil and Liminality," passim; Kalleres, "Demons and Divine Illumination," passim; Robert C. Gregg, *Consolation Philosophy: Greek and Christian Paideia in Basil and the Two Gregories* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1975), 151.

though he were a real entity, through whom evil entered the world.[588] In her commentary on the way in which Gregory addresses demons directly, Kalleres concludes that he "disclosed an intimate knowledge of the devil himself" and that his orations and poems "illuminate an intense personal demonology."[589] Certainly, Gregory did not write about spiritual warfare as an impartial observer:

> You have come to me again, Weaver of Wiles (δολοπλόκε), as you are known,
> nourishing yourself within the depth of my heart (βένθος ἐμῆς κραδίης ἔνδοθι βοσκόμενος),
> and through much strong shaking of this life,
> desiring to bring the holy *eikon* to bended knee
> (είκόνα τὴν ἱερὴν γνὺξ βαλέειν ποθέων).[590]

When we consider Gregory's speech above, which is consistent with discussions elsewhere in his work, we cannot reduce his words to simple rhetoric. Whilst she acknowledges this, Kalleres does not resolve the question concerning how the devil and demons are able to exist, given that Gregory does not attribute existence to evil, as I have already demonstrated. Ludlow, on the other hand, after establishing that Gregory considers demons to be real, considers the nature of that reality. Ludlow argues that demons are real in the sense that they were created good, along with all that God has created. She states that their wills alone are bad, whilst their ontology remains good. From this point, she argues,

> Demons occupy a liminal space: their wills are utterly opposed to God and thus evil, and yet these wills exist in a nature which is

[588] Or. 40.10, SC 358, 218; Kalleres, "Demons and Divine Illumination," 186.

[589] Kalleres, "Demons and Divine Illumination," 186.

[590] Carm. 1.2.50, PG 37, 1385, 1-4.

part of God's good creation.[591]

Ludlow moves on to argue that demons are not mid-way between good and evil but that their "existence paradoxically seems to entail the co-existence of both."[592] Thus, demons are hybrids in the sense that they are "neither one thing nor the other."[593] Whilst Ludlow is correct that the demons' wills are evil, I believe that there is more to be said about the nature of their existence. Ludlow's argument concerning the liminal space which demons occupy demands that demons remain ontologically good, therefore unchanged from their creation, even though their wills become evil. However, Gregory suggests that Satan is diminishing ontologically, rather than remaining unchanged, when he writes,

> But what persuades me both to suppose and say these things: that they are not immoveable, rather, they are hard to budge, is on account of the "Morning Star"[594] who was named thus because of his brilliance; both becoming and being named (καὶ γενόμενος καὶ λεγόμενος) "darkness" (σκότος) on account of his self-elevation.[595]

Through his use of γίγνομαι, Gregory stipulates that Satan was

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[591] Ludlow, "Demons, Evil and Liminality," 189. Ludlow draws her argument largely from Dale B. Martin, *Inventing Superstition* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004). Elsewhere, liminal is described as a "blurred borderland that is neither in the material world nor in the spiritual world but in both simultaneously;" Rosemary Guiley, *The Encyclopedia of Demons and Demonology* (New York: Facts On File, Infobase Publishing, 2009), 159-60.

[592] Ludlow, "Demons, Evil and Liminality," 189; Moreschini and Sykes, *Poemata Arcana*, 212.

[593] Ibid., 190.

[594] Is 14:12-15.

[595] Or. 38.9, SC 358, 120-22; Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 443, 59-62; *Cels.* 4.65; *Haer*. 4.41. For demons as "diminished" in Evagrius' thought, see Kevin Corrigan, *Evagrius and Gregory: Mind, Soul and Body in the 4th Century* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009), 92.

becoming something other than who he was at creation. One meaning of γίγνομαι, according to Lampe, may be "change the quality of."[596] Added to this, Satan is becoming "darkness," a metaphor which is key to Gregory's overall theology, since darkness is the diminishment and absence of light.[597] Gregory's application of "Light" as a metaphor for God has long been recognised by those who study our theologian's work.[598] At creation, Lucifer is a light second only to God; as I discussed in the previous chapter, angels are named secondary lights because they are closest in proximity to God.[599] In view of this, Lucifer's becoming darkness is significant, since it demonstrates that he is no longer close to God in the heavenly realm, furthermore, his ability to radiate light is diminishing. Therefore, rather than interpreting demons as occupying a liminal existence as Ludlow has argued, I suggest that Gregory considers their existence to be diminishing. I use the participle intentionally, since demons are dynamic and thus their movement is towards non-being rather than being in a static, diminished state.[600]

Part of Ludlow's argument depends on her stipulation that for the Cappadocians, "demons were also *good* to the extent that they were superior ontological beings (rational, powerful, etc.)."[601] She argues this because Gregory states that demons were originally created angels before human *eikones* were created. However, in *On Baptism*, Gregory demands that Satan bow down and worship him (and by inference all those who are baptised).[602] A demand for worship does not imply that

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[596] *PGL*, 315.

[597] "il demonio è e produce tenebra," Francesco Trisoglio, "Il demonio in Gregorio di Nazianzo," in *L'autunno del diavolo. "Diabolos, Dialogos, Daimon" convegno di Torino 17/21 ottobre 1988, volume primo*, ed. Eugenio Corsini (Milano: Bompiani, 1990), 249-65, 250.

[598] Alexis Torrance, "Precedents for Palamas' Essence-Energies Theology in the Cappadocian Fathers," *VC* 63, no. 1 (2009): 47-70, 62.

[599] Or. 38.9, SC 358, 120.

[600] Alden A. Mosshammer, "Non-Being and Evil in Gregory of Nyssa," *VC* 44 (1990): 136-67, 147.

[601] Ludlow, "Demons, Evil and Liminality," 192.

[602] Or. 40.10, SC 358, 218.

Gregory considers Satan to be his superior either morally or ontologically. Rather, it suggests the exact opposite, as I shall discuss further in Chapter Six when I evaluate in depth Gregory's demand. Furthermore, Gregory is consistent in his approach regarding the superiority of the human *eikon* over the devil and demons because of the victory won by Christ. As I outlined in Chapter Three, Gregory writes, "You have come, indeed, you have come O most Evil One, but you have been restrained."[603]

Regarding the place of this battle between the devil and the *eikon*, I argue that, for the most part, according to Gregory, it takes place internally, which is why Gregory accuses the devil of "nourishing yourself within the depth of my heart."[604] Gregory adopts the same approach in other poems: "Flee from my heart O deceitful one, flee at break-neck speed (φεῦγ' ἀπ' ἐμῆς κραδίης, δολομήχανε, φεῦγε τάχιστα)."[605] Whilst Ludlow suggests that for the Cappadocians demons wage war externally and internally, I would argue that Gregory's writing presents warfare as occurring primarily in the heart.[606] The demons' need to "nourish" themselves on human hearts suggests that, in order to maintain their existence, they must find nourishment, rather like parasites. This demonstrates further their inferiority to the *eikon*, since they need the *eikon* and not vice versa.

My final point regarding the diminishing nature of the devil relates, possibly surprisingly, to Origen's doctrine of the final restoration (ἀποκατάστασις), which commentators have argued Gregory follows implicitly.[607] Contrary to the general view, I observe

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[603] Carm. 2.1.60, PG 37, 1403, 1. The devil is understood more clearly through his treatment of the *eikon*; "I frutti prevalgono sulle radici; il demonio è osservato più nella sua azione e nei suoi moventi che nella sua natura," Francesco Trisoglio, *San Gregorio di Nazianzo: Un contemporaneo vissuto sedici secoli fa* (Torino: Effatà Editrice, 2008), 119.

[604] Carm. 1.2.50, PG 37, 1385, 2.

[605] Carm. 2.1.55, PG 37, 1399, 7; 2.1.1, PG 37, 996, 345; Or. 40.35, SC 358, 278.

[606] Ludlow, "Demons, Evil and Liminality," 199-200.

[607] Ilaria L.E. Ramelli, *The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 452;

that Gregory does not align himself explicitly with Origen's doctrine of restoration at any point; he applies ἀποκατάστασις on as few as six occasions, and not in such a way so as to suggest universal salvation.[608] Gregory refers to fire which burns forever (διαιωνίζω), therefore we cannot be certain of his thoughts regarding ultimate restoration.[609] However, if Gregory is ambiguous regarding the universal restoration of humankind, he adopts a much more explicit approach to his views on the end of the devil. Gregory assures his readers that God will bring to an end (καταλύω) the devil and kill him (θανατόω).[610] Ludlow's argument of the devil's liminal existence suggests that ultimately the devil must be restored because he is good ontologically. Contrary to this, Gregory explicitly states that God will ultimately annihilate the devil, which suggests that no goodness will remain at the end.

With all this in mind, contrary to Ludlow's suggestion that the demons exist liminally, I conclude that a liminal existence does not reflect Gregory's intentions when he considers the devil and his army, but that the devil's existence is more accurately described as 'diminishing.' I argue this with the caveat that a diminishing reality does not entail that the devil is less dangerous to human *eikones*. Rather it implies the opposite, since his diminishing existence increases the devil's hatred of the human race, and more specifically, his hatred of the Church.

With a clearer understanding of Gregory's view of the devil in place, I shall turn to Gregory's retelling of the "fall," highlighting the

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Brian Daley, *The Hope of the Early Church: A Handbook of Patristic Eschatology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 84; Meehan, *Three Poems*, 42.

608 For Gregory's use of ἀποκατάστασις, see Or. 30.4, SC 250, 230 (here Gregory is referring to an argument from the opposition); Or. 30.6, SC 250, 238 (his point is that Christ is God); Or. 31.27, SC 250, 330 (Christ's own return to heaven); Or. 40.8, SC 358, 212 (within the context of baptism on earth); Or. 41.11, SC 358, 338 (Christ's ascension to heaven); Or. 44.5, PG 36, 613A (Gregory is speaking about the Church). In Or. 2.36, SC 247, 134, Gregory refers to the final ἀνάστασις but does not imply that he is speaking about those outside the Church.

609 Or. 40.36, SC 358, 282.

610 Or. 24.9, SC 284, 56.

devil's involvement and the impact upon the vulnerable *eikon*.

5.3 The Fall

For Gregory, the *eikon* is wounded through the process of the fall, rather than being eradicated completely.[611] In the West, it is customary to think that humans are in need of a judge who will dispense pardon to them after the fall, whereas Gregory, following the Eastern tradition, envisages the *eikon* as being in need of a healer and a helper: "Since these things required a greater aid, an even greater aid befell."[612]

The consequences of the fall upon the *eikon* are multitudinous. Any notion that the fall leaves the *eikon* unaffected is dispelled by Gregory's language concerning Christ's purpose in dying on the cross: "to triumph over the serpent… and heal Adam and restore the fallen *eikon* (τὴν εἰκόνα πεσοῦσαν)."[613] Whilst at creation, human *eikones* are angelic rulers through their status as God's *eikone*s; for the most part, after the fall they lapse into an existence of perpetual struggle. In paradise, the devil is the principal enemy of Adam and Eve; outside paradise they experience the additional strain of being clothed with "garments of skin (χιτῶνες δερματίνους)."[614] Gregory understands these to represent a duller, more earthly flesh than before, the result of which is severe, since now human *eikones* struggle to apprehend God,[615] rather than functioning as those who are "initiated into that which is spiritual."[616] This negative shift might be described as growing

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[611] Or. 38.14, SC 358, 136; 1.4, SC 247, 76-78; 7.23, SC 405, 240; 16.8, PG 35, 944D-945A; 38.14, SC 358, 128; 40.7, SC 358, 210. See Moreschini and Sykes, *Poemata Arcana*, 67; Edmund J. Rybarczyk, *Beyond Salvation: Eastern Orthodoxy and Classical Pentecostalism on Becoming Like Christ* (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2004), 58.

[612] Or. 38.12, SC 358, 132. Gregory portrays healing as primary and pardon as secondary; see Or. 22.13, 270, 246-48.

[613] Or. 24.4, SC 284, 46; Carm. 1.1.9, PG 37, 460, 53-59.

[614] Or. 38.12, SC 358, 130.

[615] Or. 38.13, SC 358, 132.

[616] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 126.

"spiritual cataracts." Drawing from Romans, Gregory describes fallen human persons hyperbolically as murderers, adulterers, idolaters, and, worst of all in Gregory's mind, they experience mortality.[617]

It should be evident from this discussion so far that living as a radiant *eikon* of God is even more challenging after the fall than it was in paradise. Before I examine this challenging existence in more depth, I shall discuss briefly Gregory's view of how the fall occurs. Since Gregory emphasises different characters as being responsible for the fall at different points during his writing, a short commentary is necessary for gaining a picture of Gregory's thought overall.

As I have observed, Gregory follows Irenaeus in a number of aspects regarding the creation and fall of human *eikones*. Like Irenaeus, he takes a generous approach to their fall, suggesting that it stemmed from the immaturity of humans rather than from their outright disobedience.[618] Gregory assumes repeatedly his own responsibility for the sin in the world, as he ascertains that he himself has eaten the fruit from the forbidden tree in paradise, a notion which is central to the Eastern tradition.[619] In identifying with this initial consumption, Gregory sits in the tradition of the Eastern fathers whereby he displays an awareness of historical events, but tends "more to collapse history and read past events as present."[620] This highlights further how he interprets the creation narratives in Genesis, and the way in which he is able to read himself, and indeed every human person, into the account traditionally referred to as the "fall of humanity."[621] As I discussed in

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[617] Or. 38.13, SC 358, 132; see Rom 1:26-32.

[618] Or. 38.12, SC 358, 128. For an explanation of how this coheres with the Genesis narrative, see Bouteneff, *Beginnings*, 7.

[619] Or. 19.14, PG 35, 1060C-D; 22.13, SC 270, 248; 37.7, SC 318, 284; 38.12, SC 358, 128; Carm. 1.1.4, PG 37, 420, 54; 1.1.9, PG 37, 463, 82-86; 1.1.10, PG 37, 466, 16-21. See Moreschini, SC 358, 51; Winslow, *Dynamics of Salvation*, 69; Berthold Altaner, "Augustinus und Gregor von Nazianz, Gregor von Nyssa," in *Kleine patristische Schriften*, ed. Berthold Altaner (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1967), 277-85, passim.

[620] Louth, "The Fathers on Genesis," 574.

[621] Richard J. Clifford, "The Hebrew Scriptures and the Theology of Creation,"

Chapter Two, Gregory often sits between Alexandrian and Antiochene approaches to exegesis. In his reading of Genesis, Gregory leans more towards Origen's allegorical method.

In the biblical narrative, Eve, Adam and the serpent take lead roles in the drama of the fall. Likewise, Gregory's discussions of the fall move between these three characters, he himself identifies with Adam.[622] I have already demonstrated that Gregory is often generous in his approach to women, at least with regard to their identity as *eikones* of God. However, Gregory portrays Eve in a variety of ways, from relative compassion through to degrees of contempt, since she is described both as someone who "suffered as one who was more tender,"[623] and also as "an enemy" and "antithetic" to Adam.[624] Added to this, Gregory attributes no small degree of blame to the "malice of the devil," since it was the Evil One who tricked Adam and Eve into eating from the tree of knowledge.[625] This in turn led to their banishment from paradise.[626] In light of what I have demonstrated thus far, concerning the consistency in Gregory's writing of the devil's envy of human *eikones*, it is no surprise that Gregory portrays the devil as wanting to see them banished from paradise and destroyed.[627] However, I must emphasise that Gregory does not refer to the devil in order to deny human responsibility for sin, and does not imply that human persons

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Theological Studies 46, no. 3 (1985): 507-23.

[622] Or. 22.13, SC 270, 248.

[623] Or. 38.12, SC 358, 128.

[624] Or. 18.8, PG 35, 8993B.

[625] Or. 38.12, SC 358, 128; 36.5, SC 318, 250-52; 39.7, SC 358, 162; 44.7, PG 36, 613D-616A; Carm. 1.1.9, PG 37, 457, 9.

[626] Or. 39.13, SC 358, 176-78.

[627] Or. 6.10, SC 405, 146; 36.5, SC 318, 250; 40.10, SC 358, 216-18; 44.4, PG 36, 619B; Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 443, 65; 1.1.10, PG 37, 466, 16-20; 1.2.1, PG 37, 531, 120; *Haer*. 1.10.1; Daniel R. Schultz, "The Origin of Sin in Irenaeus and Jewish Pseudepigraphical Literature," *VC* 32, no. 3 (1978): 161-90; Gary A. Anderson, *The Genesis of Perfection: Adam and Eve in Jewish and Christian Imagination* (London: John Knox Press, 2001), 25-37.

might utter the excuse, "the devil made me do it."[628] Rather, he follows a biblical narrative where the serpent is responsible for the temptations, but at the same time maintains that human persons should resist those temptations.

I shall move on to examine the experience of the fall itself and its effects upon the *eikon,* considering first Gregory's retelling of the biblical narrative.[629] In Genesis, Adam and Eve's banishment from the Garden of Eden proceeds as follows: first, Adam and Eve eat the fruit from the tree of knowledge (Gen 3:6), after which they discover they are naked and experience shame (Gen 3:7-10), then the Lord makes garments of skins for them (Gen 3:21) and afterwards banishes them from the garden (Gen 3:23-4). Observe in Gregory's allegorical reading the series of events below in relation to the account in Genesis:

> …immediately, on account of the evil, all at once (ὁμοῦ) he was expelled from the tree of life and from paradise (Gen 3:23-24) and from God and he was clothed in garments of skin (χιτῶνες δερματίνους, Gen 3:20), probably the more earthly, duller flesh (παχύτης), both mortal (θνητός) and obstinate (άντίτυπος). And this first thing he knew was his own shame, and he hid from God (Gen 3:7-8).[630]

After Adam and Eve have eaten from the tree of knowledge, Gregory describes a number of actions occurring simultaneously: Adam is expelled from paradise, expelled from God's presence and clothed in

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[628] Don Cupitt, "Four Arguments against the Devil," *Theology* 64, no. 496 (1961): 413-15, 413; Or. 16.15-17, PG 35, 953C-957C; 22.13, SC 270, 348.

[629] Gregory follows a particular tradition of interpretation; see Heerak Christian Kim, *The Jerusalem Tradition in the Late Second Temple Period: Diachronic and Synchronic Developments Surrounding Psalms of Solomon 11* (Maryland, U.S.A.: University Press of America, 2007), 40-42; Derek Krueger, *Liturgical Subjects: Christian Ritual, Biblical Narrative, and the Formation of the Self in Byzantium* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 147-49.

[630] Or. 38.12, SC 358, 130.

earthly, dull flesh, after which he experiences shame for the first time. Note that in Genesis Adam is ashamed because he is naked,[631] whereas, for Gregory, being naked (ἁπλότης) is a good thing because it implies simplicity.[632] Gregory differs in suggesting that the first human is ashamed because he is covered in earthly, dull flesh (παχύτης).[633] Before I explore the implications of this, Gregory's use of παχύτης demands attention, since this interpretation of the nature of the "garments of skin" is key to Gregory's reading of the biblical narrative.

5.3.1 *παχύτης*

Lampe translates παχύτης as "grossness" or "materiality,"[634] which may be supplemented by Liddell, Scott and Jones, who highlight the notion of "dullness."[635] The concepts of materiality and dullness lead us towards understanding Gregory's intentions, but do not fully convey the sense in which Gregory appeals to παχύτης. Gregory's purpose becomes clearer when we consider παχύς, since it generally describes that which is "earthly" and "of this world."[636] This is imperative to Gregory's narrative, since it draws out the striking contrast between the depiction of the human *eikon* as "another angel" at creation and the description of her after eating from the tree of knowledge.[637] In short, she is created angelic and divine, with the potential of living forever, but

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[631] Gen 3:10, γυμνός.

[632] Or. 38.12, SC 358, 128.

[633] Gary A. Anderson, "The Garments of Skin in Apocryphal Narrative and Biblical Commentary," in *Studies in Ancient Midrash*, ed. James L. Kugel (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 101–43, 130. The same order appears in *In Praise of Virginity* (Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 531, 119-22), but is different in *On the Soul* (Carm. 1.1.8, PG 37, 455, 112-18), where the coats of skin are worn before departure from the garden. Since Gregory does not mention shame in *On the Soul*, the change in sequence does not imply a change in the object of shame being earthly flesh rather than nakedness.

[634] *PGL*, 1054.

[635] LSJ, 1351.

[636] *PGL*, 1054.

[637] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 126; 45.7, PG 36, 635C; Carm. 1.2.15, PG 37, 777, 156.

quickly becomes mortal. Concerning Gregory's use of παχύτης, Daley and Harrison note that translation is problematic, both settling on "coarse."[638] This translation is only loosely accurate and does not fully convey Gregory's intentions. It is important to take into account not only his particular use of παχύτης, but also his previous descriptions of the human *eikon* as naked (implying purity and simplicity) and angelic. Furthermore, Gregory himself explains that παχύτης causes the human person's "mortality."[639] Since Gregory is always concerned with presenting God as loving and compassionate, again, he follows Irenaeus in choosing to regard death as a gift for the couple who have been banished from paradise since it cuts off sin.[640] Nevertheless, the addition of the garments of skin, and consequent loss of glory, "is nothing but a shorthand way of referring to a cataclysmic shift in the ontological status of human persons,"[641] where the destiny of humanity has been interrupted by the jealousy of the devil, who compromised the theosis and divine life of the *eikon*.[642]

Whilst my analysis of Gregory's appeal to παχύτης has demonstrated the enormous impact of this thicker, duller and more earthly flesh upon the *eikon*, it does not explain fully Gregory's interpretation of the banishment scene in Genesis. I shed further light on Gregory's interpretation by exploring briefly the tradition which developed around the Genesis narrative, namely the "garments of glory."

5.3.2 *"Garments of Glory" versus "Garments of Skin"*

The tradition "garments of glory" appears in sources as varied as

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[638] Daley, *Gregory of Nazianzus*, 123; Harrison, *Festal Orations*, 50.

[639] Or. 38.12, SC 358, 130.

[640] *Haer*. 3.23.7; Or. 38.12, SC 358, 130.

[641] Anderson, "Garments of Skin," 143.

[642] Rousse, "Les anges et leur ministère," 147. See Or. 36.5, SC 316, 250-52; Carm. 1.2.14, PG 37, 755-765.

Rabbinic, Gnostic, Islamic, Manichaean, and particularly the Syriac Christian tradition.[643] It appeals to Adam's identity as a king and ruler,[644] being read in conjunction with Psalm 8:6, where humanity is crowned or clothed with "glory and honour" as I discussed in the previous chapter.[645] The tradition has a complex reception, taking numerous twists and turns which are beyond the scope of this study.[646] For the sake of my argument here, I shall focus on the strand which concerns the interpretation of the following Scripture passages: Genesis 2:25 (Adam and Eve are naked and without shame), Genesis 3:7 (Adam and Eve perceived their sin and felt shame), and Genesis 3:21 (the Lord gave them garments of skin). Due to its particular exegesis of these verses, the "garments of glory" tradition drew the conclusion that Adam and Eve lost a glorious covering before being given the garments of skin.[647] The key point for my argument is that Adam and Eve experience shame because of their loss of glory and the addition of their garments of skin, and not because they become aware of their nakedness, which

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[643] For example, Saint Ephrem, *Hymns on Paradise*, trans. Sebastian P. Brock (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1990). For further explanation, see Ross Shepherd Kraemer, *When Aseneth Met Joseph: A Late Antique Tale of the Biblical Patriarch and His Egyptian Wife, Reconsidered* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 266-67; Hannah Hunt, "'Clothed in the Body': the Garment of Flesh and the Garment of Glory in Syrian Religious Anthropology," in *Studia Patristica 64*, ed. Markus Vincent (Leuven: Peeters Press, 2013), 167-76.

[644] Crispin H.T. Fletcher-Louis, *All the Glory of Adam: Liturgical Anthropology in the Dead Sea Scrolls* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), passim; Stephen N. Lambden, "From Figleaves to Fingernails: Some Notes on the Garments of Adam and Eve in the Hebrew Bible and Select Early Postbiblical Jewish Writings," in *A Walk in the Garden: Biblical, Iconographical and Literary Images of Eden*, ed. Paul Morris and Deborah Sawyer (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992), 74-90.

[645] James L. Kugel, *Traditions of the Bible: A Guide to the Bible As It Was at the Start of the Common Era* (New York: Harvard University Press, 2009), 113; Sebastian P. Brock, "Jewish Traditions in Syriac Sources," *JJS* 30, no. 2 (1979): 212-32, 221-23.

[646] Andrei A. Orlov, *From Apocalypticism to Merkabah Mysticism: Studies in the Slavonic Pseudepigrapha* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 329-32.

[647] Peterson describes the effects of the garments of skin upon the human person as being a metaphysical change; Erik Peterson, "Theologie des Kleides," *BM* 16 (1934): 347-56.

is how the Genesis pericope is often read.[648]

The "garments of glory" tradition is evident in early church fathers such as Didymus the Blind,[649] John Chrysostom[650] and St. Ephrem, but is less overt in Gregory's work, leaving scholars to disagree over whether he knew of the convention.[651] Sykes argues that Gregory appeals to the tradition without offering any evidence to confirm his argument; added to this, Anderson's appeal that Gregory draws from this tradition is tenuous since he draws on Oration 38 only.[652] In light of this, I build my case for Gregory's use of the tradition by also considering his narrative of the fall in his poetry.

The ambiguity lies in the fact that Gregory does not mention specifically any garments of glory during his recounting of the fall. Nevertheless, I believe that Gregory's ideas were informed by this tradition, and that he wove it subtly into his writing in two primary ways. First, recall that Gregory retold the narrative in Genesis in such a way that Adam and Eve were ashamed of their earthly, dull flesh, and not ashamed of their nakedness. This approach is identical to the "garments of glory" tradition, in which Adam is not ashamed of his nakedness, but rather his coat of skin. Secondly, as I have already discussed, Gregory describes the human person as "another angel" at creation on a number of occasions; whilst human persons were different from the angels in heaven, nevertheless, like angels, Gregory speaks of human persons metaphorically as lights which is comparable with human *eikones* shining gloriously.[653] This notion is explicit in his poetry:

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[648] Wenham, *Genesis 1-15*, 77.

[649] *In Gen*. See Peter D. Steiger, "The Image of God in the Commentary *On Genesis* of Didymus the Blind," in *Studia Patristica 42*, ed. Frances M. Young, Mark J. Edwards, and Paul Parvis (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2006), 243-48.

[650] *Hom. On Gen*. 16.

[651] For a negative argument, read Bouteneff, *Beginnings*, 174.

[652] Moreschini and Sykes, *Poemata Arcana*, 248; Anderson, "Garments of Skin," 129-30.

[653] Or. 40.5, SC 358, 206; Carm. 1.1.4, PG 37, 418, 33.

> The mortal human is your glory anew (σὸν βροτὸς αὖ κλέος ἐστιν), whom you placed here as an angel, composing songs of praise of your splendour, O Light.[654]

When Gregory describes the mortal human as God's glory, he recalls the "garments of glory" tradition where Adam was created as the glory of God. Hints of this tradition running through Gregory's work serve to remind us once more how highly Gregory regarded the human person at creation, precisely because she is made as God's *eikon*; furthermore, Gregory appeals implicitly to the tradition to highlight how the glory is dulled through the fall through the donning of the garments of skin.

Gregory adapts the tradition to incorporate his view of humanity's vulnerability. The "garments of glory" tradition is suggestive of an almost invincible quality regarding the first human persons, whereas Gregory presents them as both glorious, yet vulnerable as they listen to the devil's lies so guilelessly.

For Gregory, there is clearly a qualitative change in humanity's flesh, owing to the fall: nevertheless, both are vulnerable, the former is more open to the divine will and the latter is less able to apprehend God. Even whilst wearing the 'robe of glory,' the *eikon* apparently remains vulnerable to evil through the temptations of the devil, but even more so when thick, dull skin is worn. This results in a shift in the ontology of the human person, whereby through eating from the tree of knowledge they move from being "spiritually alive" [655] to being "mortal."[656] Hence, I argue that Gregory's ontology and epistemology are one and the same. The donning of earthly, dull and mortal flesh entails an epistemological breakdown for the *eikon* or, said another way, the fall "resulted in the loss of this delicate balance of noetic and

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[654] Carm. 2.1.38, PG 37, 1327, 25-26; 2.1.45, PG 37, 1366, 186; Or. 39.7, SC 358, 162.

[655] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 124.

[656] Or. 7.19, SC 405, 228; 24.3, SC 284, 44; 38.12, SC 358, 128.

sensory which had enabled man to know God."[657] Through the gift of the *eikon* at creation, the human person is able to "see and experience the radiance of God,"[658] whereas the earthly, dull flesh affects the *eikon* in such a manner that she no longer automatically relates to God.[659] This relates to the use of παχύνω in the Septuagint, where it is applied as a metaphor to denote that which is "mentally dull."[660] If we read παχύτης with this in mind, the effects of the fall become clearer still: unlike the angels and her former self, the *eikon* is now mentally dull regarding her ability to relate to and apprehend God. No longer is she wearing garments of glory, but instead thick, dull earthly flesh which prevents her from apprehending God:

> 'Heaven is high, but the earth is deep.' And who of those who have been cast down by sin shall ascend? Who, still being enshrouded by the gloom below and the dullness of the flesh (τῆς σαρκὸς τὴν παχύτητα) will meditate on the whole spiritual intellect purely with the whole spiritual intellect, and gaze upon that which is stable and invisible, whilst mingled with that which never stands still?[661]

Whilst being clothed with earthly, mortal, dull flesh and experiencing epistemological breakdown might seem consequence enough, the *eikon* has yet further challenges to face, namely a continued battle with the devil, the world, the flesh and the passions, to which I shall turn next.

5.4 Wrestling with the Devil

> From fornication and all other deadly sin; and from all the

[657] Kalleres, "Demons and Divine Illumination," 169.

[658] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 126.

[659] Or. 28.2, SC 250, 102-04.

[660] Is. 6:10; Muraoka, *GELS*, 541.

[661] Or. 2.74, SC 247, 186; 28.4, SC 150, 108.

deceits of the world, the flesh and the devil, *Good Lord, deliver us*.

The prayer above, found in the Litany of the 1662 *Book of Common Prayer*, gathers together the essence of Gregory's frequent prayers regarding the threats to the *eikon*; for the devil, sinful flesh and the world form serious obstacles to the *eikon* achieving her full divinity. Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the devil in Gregory's thought about the existence of the *eikon*. Here, I explore this narrative further by considering the continual battle with the devil, which focuses attention on the vulnerability and divinity of the *eikon.*

In Chapter One, I discussed the various epithets for the devil, the author of the maltreatment experienced by the *eikon*. In no less than thirteen consecutive poems, Gregory continues to depict the devil's assault upon the *eikon* using vivid language.[662] Six of the thirteen poems are entitled *Against the Evil One*, which offers an indication of Gregory's preoccupation with the work of the devil. In these poems, Gregory presents the constant temptation to sin as the means through which the devil attempts to destroy the *eikon*:

> And if the destroyer of the *eikon* trips me up (εἰ δὲ σκελίζει μ' ὁ φθορεὺς τῆς εἰκόνος),
> Who might become my guardian, save you, Lord?[663]

In the lines above the *eikon* is vulnerable and in need of help and protection from the temptations of the devil. Whilst the *eikon* is vulnerable to a certain degree, she is not expected to be passive in her response to the devil, since Gregory appeals to human responsibility and highlights that humans have the freedom to choose not to sin and

[662] Carms. 2.1.54-2.1.67, PG 37, 1397, 11 -1407, 8. For translations of the first eight poems as prayers, see Kalleres, "Demons and Divine Illumination," 161-68.

[663] Carm. 2.1.65, PG 37, 1407, 6-7.

to guard themselves:

> But if you, tongue, do not accept the mire (τὸν βόρβορον)
> But if at least you, hand, do not accept what is worse,
> Thus may the *eikon* in us remain imperishable (οὕτως ἄν εἰκὼν ἠμῖν ἄφθαρτος μένῃ).[664]

On the basis of the above lines, it is clear that Gregory envisages human persons as being responsible for resisting sin. The devil might seek to influence human persons but he cannot force them into sinning; rather there is a battle to be fought and won. Sometimes humans win their battle with the devil through making good choices, as seen below when Gregory states his determination to preserve the gift of the *eikon*, in spite of the devil's desire to destroy him:

> Strike the skin but the soul is unwounded,
> I shall render the divine *eikon*, the portion, to Christ,
> O Human-killer
> (…εἰκόνα θείην παρστήσω Χριστῷ, τὴν λάχον, ἀνδροφόνε).[665]

However, in spite of Gregory's best efforts, the *eikon* is not invincible and is subject to harm just like the body, because the human *eikon* is a unity. The poem entitled *Lament* demonstrates that the *eikon* is extremely vulnerable to the extent that she can be destroyed:

> The *eikon* is being destroyed (εἰκὼν κενοῦται): what word will offer help?
> The *eikon* is being destroyed (εἰκὼν κενοῦται): gift of excellent God.
> The *eikon* is violated (ὑβρίζετ' εἰκὼν)…[666]

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[664] Carm. 2.1.61, PG 37, 1405, 6-8. See Wis 12:1.

[665] Carm. 2.1.50, PG 37, 1389, 61-62.

[666] *Lament*, Carm. 2.1.61, PG 37, 1404, 1-3; 1.2.28, PG 37, 881, 340-45; 2.1.70,

Above, Gregory uses κενόω, which is well-known to contemporary biblical studies scholars because there has been much discussion concerning the way in which the author of Philippians (2:6) applies it to Christ; however, Gregory does not appear to have Christ's kenosis in mind at this point.[667] A significant difference between Christ and his *eikon* is evident here: Christ chose his *kenosis*, whereas Gregory's poem suggests that the human *eikon* is being destroyed against her will. I have chosen to translate κενόω as 'destroy' rather than 'empty' because four lines previously Gregory writes that the devil longs to kill human persons today as much as he wanted to kill them in paradise. Therefore, it follows logically that κενόω relates to the life of the *eikon*, since it is precisely her life that the devil longs to destroy. Whilst κενόω is often translated 'empty', Lampe includes 'destroy' in his list of possible translations, confirming that it is possible to translate κενόω thus.[668] Gregory uses κενόω to show that on succumbing to temptation, the human person's divine life begins to be destroyed, in the same way that the first *eikones* became mortal after eating from the tree of knowledge. The devil's interest in the life of the *eikon* supports my overall argument concerning the dynamic existence of the *eikon*. Through the schemes of the devil, Gregory reveals that the *eikon* does not remain statically imperishable; rather, she is subject to movement and change.

Unfortunately for the *eikon*, the devil is not the only challenge to her life, as I stated at the beginning of this chapter. The world and the flesh present further challenges, and, as I shall argue, relate closely to the devil himself.

PG 37, 1418, 1-5.

667 Cousar, *Philippians and Philemon*, 50-59; Nicholas T. Wright, "ἁρπαγμός and the meaning of Philippians 2:5-11," *JTS* 37, no. 2 (1986): 321-52.

668 *PGL*, 743, 1.A.4. Lampe highlights that Gregory employs κενόω in *On the Son* to denote destruction, contra Abrams Rebillard, "Speaking for Salvation," 420; Kalleres, "Demons and Divine Illumination," 167. Note that Paul also uses κενόω to mean nullify/destroy in 1 Cor 1:17.

5.4.1 *The World (κόσμος)*

As I discussed in Chapter Four, when Gregory reflects on God's creation of the world, he describes it in positive terms, observing the order and harmony in which the world was created. We also saw that at creation the human person was described as a microcosm and that this was decidedly positive. Conversely, here I am focusing on the occasions when Gregory refers to the fallen world negatively, standing in a long line of church fathers who use the concept of "the world (κόσμος)" as a means of making a direct contrast to that which is good.[669] In doing this, they follow Paul, when he makes such comments as, "Do not be conformed to this world" (Rom 12:2).[670]

Gregory's approval of withdrawal from the world is apparent throughout his orations and poetry, for example, in his oration *On Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria* where Gregory praises Athanasius concerning his time in Egypt during which he devoted himself to asceticism.[671] Gregory portrays Athanasius as finding a middle way of walking through rigorous asceticism and being in community, showing that Gregory himself was not inclined towards a totally solitary existence.[672] In walking the "via media," Gregory "defies Max Weber's categories of "world-rejecting" and "inner-worldly asceticism.""[673] On reading the texts, it becomes clear that when Gregory renounces the

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[669] *PGL*, 771, section C7c demonstrates the concept of "the world" as a metaphor for sin; also see Elizabeth A. Clark, *Reading Renunciation: Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 41; James E. Goehring, *Ascetics, Society, and the Desert: Studies in Early Egyptian Monasticism* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1999), 76.

[670] Or. 21, SC 270, 110-92.

[671] Especially Or. 21.19, SC 270, 148. For comments on Gregory's Athanasius, see Mossay, SC 270, 90-91.

[672] For the argument that Gregory was key in defining fourth-century asceticism, see Elm, *Virgins of God*, 375.

[673] Andrea Sterk, *Renouncing the World Yet Leading the Church: The Monk-Bishop in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press, 2004), 7. See Max Weber, *Sociology of Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 166–83.

world, he is rejecting the sin in the world, rather than the world itself; in other words, he is applying the term 'world' as a metaphor for sin. See this below:

> I have long desired to be dead to the world and to be alive to the life which is hidden in Christ (ἐβουλήθην ἐν καιρῷ μὲν παντὶ νεκρωθῆναι τῷ βίῳ καὶ ζῆσαι τὴν ἐν Χριστῷ κεκρυμμένην ζωὴν)…[674]

Here, Gregory is reminiscent of Paul, who writes about being dead to sin, but alive to Christ.[675] If we read Gregory in light of Paul, Gregory's use of κόσμος as a euphemism for sin is logical, because Paul often uses the term negatively since it became the place where sin is present.[676] For Gregory, this negative experience of the world relates to the devil; this is evident because Gregory calls him "the world-ruler."[677] See in the passage below where Gregory posits the devil as the world-ruler who should not be obeyed:

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[674] Or. 19.1, PG 35, 1044A. Dated to Christmas A.D. 374; see Paul Gallay, *La vie de Saint Grégoire de Nazianze* (Lyon: Emmanuel Vitte, 1943), 128.

[675] Rom 6:11, "οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς λογίζεσθε ἑαυτοὺς [εἶναι] νεκροὺς μὲν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ζῶντας δὲ τῷ Θεῷ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ." See Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, AYB (New Haven: Doubleday, 1993), 438.

[676] 1 Cor 2:12; Rom 5:12; Rom 12:2; 1 Cor 6:2; 1 Cor 2:8; James takes the same approach; see Ja 1:27; 4:4; Hermann Sasse, "κόσμος," in *Θ-K TDNT, Vol 3*, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), 867-98, 892.

[677] For Gregory using "world-ruler" as an epithet for the devil, see Or. 1.4, SC 247, 77; 8.12, SC 405, 272; 11.4, SC 405, 338; 14.21, PG 35, 884C; 17.9, PG 35, 976C; 19.6, PG 35, 1049C. For identification of the "world-ruler" with the devil in John 12:31, 14:30, see George R. Beasley-Murray, *John*, WBC (Mexico: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 2000), 263; Jutta Leonhardt-Balzer, "The Ruler of the World, Antichrists and Pseudo-Prophets: Johannine Variations on an Apocalyptic Motif," in *John's Gospel and Imitations of Apocalyptic*, ed. Catrin H. Williams and Christopher Rowland (London: T&T Clark, 2013), 180-99, 189. For the history of κοσμοκράτωρ, see Wilhelm Michaelis, "κοσμοκράτωρ," ibid., ed. Geoffrey William Bromiley (1966), 913-14. He relates this term to the devil in Eph 6:12. For world-ruler as a description of Caesar, see Or. 20.4, SC 270, 64; 39.9, SC 358, 166.

> Honour the unity, stand in awe of the archetype, live with God, not the world-ruler (κοσμοκράτωρ)… He was a murderer from the beginning. He overpowered the first human person through disobedience, and he brought in the life of labour, and he laid down law to punish and be punished, on account of sin.[678]

In the passage above, Gregory states clearly that the world-ruler is in opposition to God and yet earlier in the same oration Gregory commends the audience to submit themselves to their earthly rulers and does not indicate that this might compromise their submission to God.[679] Therefore, the world-ruler to which Gregory refers in the passage above must be the devil, since Gregory's description of the world-ruler as a "murderer from the beginning" is a direct citation from John 8:44, where Jesus is talking to the Jews unambiguously about the devil.[680] Whilst Gregory refers to the concept of the devil as the world-ruler infrequently, he applies the concept to the effect that those living on earth wrestle with a spiritual enemy who attempts to rule the world to their detriment. In light of this, when Gregory composes poetry with titles such as *On Dying to the World* we should be aware that behind this is the warning that the devil resides in the world.[681] This confirms why he urges repeatedly,

> Let us flee worldly desires, let us flee the world which leads us astray and the world-ruler, let us be cleansed by the Creator, let us honour the *eikon,* let us stand in awe of the call, let us change this life (τιμήσωμεν τὴν εἰκόνα, αἰδεσθῶμεν τὴν κλῆσιν, μεταθώμεθα τὴν ζωήν).[682]

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[678] Or. 17.9, PG 35, 976B-D.

[679] Or. 17.6, PG 35, 972D-973A.

[680] Contra Vinson, *Select Orations*, 91.

[681] Carm. 1.2.48, PG 37, 1384, 1-3.

[682] Or. 19.6, PG 35, 1049B-C.

Above, Gregory places the *eikon* as the reason for fleeing the world, since being made according to the *eikon* of God entails a certain responsibility to live in a particular way, which recalls human identity as being rooted in God. Gregory's approach to the world is echoed in his notion of flesh, as I demonstrate next.

5.4.2 *The Flesh (σάρξ)*

Contrary to a number of scholars who have concluded that Gregory's anthropology is dualistic, I argued in Chapter Four that the way in which Gregory presents the creation of the human person is as a unity due to his particular approach to the mixture (μίξις) of the *eikon* and dust, where God's divine *eikon* transforms dust or flesh, precisely because these are vulnerable to God.[683] I also highlighted that Gregory's high esteem for the *eikon* means that he envisages the body as being made spiritual by the *eikon*.[684] On occasion, Gregory continues to speak of flesh positively even after the fall, implying that through its unity with the *eikon*, it too can be lifted up to heaven: "…yet let the *eikon* be cleansed from impurity, and let the yoked flesh (τὴν ὀμόζυγον σάρκα) be raised up high."[685] In the same way, there are times when Gregory is positive that the *eikon* retains her predominance over dust/clay after the fall:

> Let not my soul journey over the earth, weighed down with dust like a leaden weight sucked into the depths;
> but let dust give way to the winged Spirit and *eikon* (πνεύματι δὲ πτερόεντι καὶ εἰκόνι χοῦν ὑποεῖξαι),
> as evil melts down like wax in fire.[686]

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[683] Contra Brown, *Body and Society*, 34; Ellverson, *The Dual Nature of Man*, passim.

[684] Carm. 1.2.18, PG 37, 787, 13-15.

[685] Or. 16.15, PG 35, 953.

[686] Carm. 2.1.45, PG 37, 1361-62; 2.1.45, PG 37, 1357-58; Or. 14.7, PG 35, 865C,

Gregory's presentation of flesh is confused by the fact that he sometimes speaks in negative terms about the *eikon* wrestling fervently against the clay in order to reassume her predominance. Below, he presents a different picture from the one we saw above where the *eikon* transformed the dust into that which is spiritual:[687]

> But you, fleeing the work of clay (ὕλης), in harmony with that which is above,
> As spiritual intellect is in harmony with spiritual intellect in the divine harmony
> And warring against the flesh you bring aid to the *eikon* (καὶ σαρκὶ πολεμοῦσα βοηθεῖς τῇ εἰκόνι).[688]

Lines such as those above lead scholars to conclude that Gregory's anthropology is dualistic, which does not take the whole picture of Gregory's anthropology into account.[689] In drawing the conclusion that Gregory's anthropology is dualistic, scholars overlook the occasions when Gregory is positive about the unity of *eikon* and flesh and assume incorrectly that Gregory is referring to the actual human body when he speaks about 'flesh' or 'clay.' Responding to this, I argue that when Gregory refers to flesh (σάρξ) alongside the *eikon* (εἰκὼν θεοῦ) in terms of wrestling or combat, he applies the terms metaphorically to denote the human struggle with sinful nature, and that he has in mind notions of the devil in the background.[690] Lampe concurs that often in the early church fathers' writing flesh (σάρξ) is used to mean "not co-terminous

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et al.

[687] Or. 32.27, SC 318, 142; 32.30, SC 318, 148.

[688] Carm. 1.2.3, PG 37, 634, 13-15.

[689] Gregory Telepneff, "Theopascite Language in the Soteriology of Saint Gregory the Theologian," *GOTR* 32, no. 4 (1987): 403-16, 415; Hofer, *Christ in Gregory Nazianzen*, 50-51; Ellverson, *The Dual Nature of Man*, 62-66.

[690] Or. 26.10, SC 284, 250; Carm. 1.1.10, PG 37, 469, 58; 1.2.3, PG 37, 634, 15; 2.1.28, PG 37, 1287, 1-2; 2.1.46, PG 37, 1378, 1-14.

with the body, but human nature viewed in active opposition alike to God and to the spiritual effects of grace."[691] This particular presentation of flesh echoes Paul when he writes, "For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in my flesh (σάρξ)."[692] Indeed, Gregory follows Paul so closely that what has been written concerning Paul's use of σάρξ could also be said of Gregory: "all parts of the body constitute a totality known as flesh, which is dominated to such a degree that wherever flesh is, all forms of sin are present."[693] The way in which the devil relates to the concept of sinful flesh appears in the poem *Against the Flesh*, where Gregory draws together flesh and Belial, another name for the devil:

> Deadly flesh, black sea of ill-minded Belial (σὰρξ ὁλοὴ βελίαο κακόφρονος οἶδμα κελαινόν),
> Deadly flesh (σὰρξ ὁλοή), root of branching sufferings,
> Deadly flesh, a companion of the cosmos which flows below (σὰρξ ὁλοὴ κόσμοιο κάτω ῥείοντος ἑταίρη),
> Deadly flesh, adversary of the heavenly life (σὰρξ ὁλοὴ ζωῆς ἀντίμαλ᾽ οὐρανίης),
> Flesh, hated and desired, sweet battle, mistrustful good,
> Always tasting of the human-slaying tree (ἀνδροφρονοιο φυτοῦ πάντοτε γευόμενη),
> Slimy filth, muddy fetters, heavy leaden weight,
> Unconquerable beast born from wrangling matter (ὕλης ἔκγονε μαρναμένης),

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691 *PGL*, 1224.

692 Rom 7:18; also see Rom 6:19; 2 Cor 10:2; Col 2:18; Gal 5:16 and *Cels*. 2.25.8. On this, read Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 173. For more on the variety of σάρξ in Paul, see Eduard Schweizer, "σάρξ " in *Σ TDNT, Vol 7*, ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Freidrich (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971), 98-151, 125-30; Bruce L. Martin, *Christ and the Law in Paul* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2001), 105; Bede Benjamin Bidlack, *In Good Company: The Body and Divinization in Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, SJ and Daoist Xiao Yingsou* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 8.

693 Danker and Bauer, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 915.

Evil boiling, both tombstone and fetter of your mistress
Of the heavenly *eikon*, which we have assigned to us from God
(είκόνος ούρανίης τὴν λάχομεν θεόθεν),
Will you not stop your shameless evil?[694]

This section of the poem serves to highlight how Gregory does not envisage the devil and the flesh as distinct from one another; rather he sees them as interwoven, with the work of sinful flesh being instigated by the devil.[695] Setting his vivid portrayal of the enemy of the *eikon* in the context of the biblical narrative, Gregory draws from Genesis 3:6, where the human *eikon* made the mistake of tasting fruit from the forbidden tree. As I have already discussed, Gregory interpreted the serpent in paradise as the same persona as the devil. Thus, the allusion to the forbidden tree recalls the devil, who was responsible for tempting the first human *eikones*. Whilst Gregory does not provide a systematic treatment of how sinful flesh and the demonic powers are enmeshed, he presents an idea that sinful flesh and the devil are constantly related; the devil tempts human *eikones* through their flesh, which leans in the direction of sin after the fall because it is covered with "garments of skin," as I have already discussed. This becomes clearer still in a poem where Gregory is concerned with the "sufferings of his soul."[696] He explains that through his spiritual intellect he is drawn toward good, but through flesh and blood he is drawn towards Belial. Through the lines below we see an aspect of how the devil and flesh work together, for the fallen flesh means that there is now a

[694] Carm. 2.1.46, PG 37, 1378, 1-11. Also see, Or. 2.91; SC 247, 206-08; 11.4, SC 405, 336-38; 24.15, SC 284, 74; 33.12, SC 318, 218; Carm. 1.1.9, PG 37, 456, 125-30.

[695] David Brakke, "The Making of Monastic Demonology: Three Ascetic Teachers on Withdrawal and Resistance," *CH* 70, no. 1 (2001): 19-48, 22. "I Cappadoci non ci hanno lasciato nessuna trattazione specifica sul male, sul peccato e sul demonio. Hanno combattuto i vizi, più che analizzare il vizio; erano teologi e moralisti, soprattuto e direttamente, in quanto pastori," Trisoglio, *Gregorio di Nazianzo*, 119.

[696] Carm. 2.1.45, PG 37, 1353-1378.

propensity to sin, which is exploited by the devil:

> The other consists of both flesh and blood, and it is willing
> To receive Belial, being drawn to nether darkness (ζόφος)…[697]

Gregory envisages a fallen world in which the flesh and the devil work together, since flesh is weak and easily manipulated by the devil, who attempts to draw the faithful into darkness. Gregory applies ζόφος to denote darkness, which is commonly used in Greek poetry to describe the underworld and later in Jude and 2 Peter to denote the place where God puts the angels whom God wants to punish.[698] Through this, the diminishing existence of the devil becomes clear once again, since Gregory positions him as belonging "below" rather than experiencing the fullness of existence which comes from being close to God. Furthermore, observe the complex existence of the *eikon*. As I demonstrated at the beginning of this section, Gregory speaks positively about the human person even after the fall on some occasions, portraying that on the one hand the divinity of the *eikon* after the fall is intact enough that the sinful flesh gives way, but at the same time the *eikon* is vulnerable to the temptation of the devil through the flesh. Rather than presenting his readers with a definitive conclusion about a static *eikon*, Gregory presents us with the complexities of human existence, the negative aspects of which Gregory explains by the presence of a spiritual enemy.

Unfortunately for the *eikon*, the devil does not only attempt to destroy her through the flesh, since he works also through the passions to offer a further challenge to the *eikon*; a challenge which requires no slight resistance.[699]

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[697] Carm. 2.1.45, PG 37, 1359, 75-76.

[698] 2 Pt 2:4, 17; Homer *Il.* 21:56.

[699] Contra J. Patout Burns, "The Economy of Salvation: Two Patristic Traditions," in *Doctrines of Human Nature, Sin, and Salvation in the Early Church*, ed. Everett Ferguson (New York: Garland, 1993), 224-46, 228.

5.4.3 *The Passions (πάθη)*

Gregory writes about Christ,

> He lit a lamp, his own flesh, and he swept the house, cleansing the world from sin, he sought the coin, the royal *eikon* confounded with passions (τὴν βασιλκὴν εἰκόνα συγκεχωσμένην τοῖς πάθεσι); he called together the friendly powers to himself, on finding the coin.[700]

The vulnerability of the *eikon* becomes evident further through the passions, since as we observe above, Christ came to earth precisely to seek out "the royal *eikon* confounded with passions."[701] The passions are relevant to this study in two ways since Gregory relates them both to the work of the devil and the *eikon*. Much of the debate relating to passions in the work of the early church fathers concerns whether the passions are neutral or intrinsically prone to sin, following Platonic[702] or Stoic[703] thought respectively.[704] Since the complexity of the passions and their classical heritage has been much discussed elsewhere, I shall refer only to the aspects of the passions relevant to my study on Gregory's approach to the devil and the *eikon*.[705] Much like his approach

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[700] Or. 38.14, SC 358, 136. Cf. Matt 18:12-14; *Haer*. 3.19.3.

[701] Also, see Or. 2.18, SC 247, 114; 2.26, SC 247, 124; 2.91, SC 247, 206-08.

[702] Plato varies on pathos; a positive stance can be seen in *Phaed*. 246ab, 253c -254b.

[703] John Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 31-36.

[704] It is debated whether Paul follows Stoic thought since he mentions passions on three occasions and on each occasion he is negative; 1 Thess 4:5; Rom 1:26; Col 3:5.

[705] It is beyond the scope of this study to survey Gregory's entire use of πάθη, although I note that in addition to passions, Gregory also refers to the passion of Christ; Or. 3.7, SC 247, 250; 4.7, SC 309, 98; 5.9, SC 309, 308; 32.23, SC 318, 134; Carm. 1.2.33, PG 37, 941, 176; suffering, Or. 18.22, SC 405, 296; 20.8, SC 270, 74; Carm. 2.1.19, PG 37, 1271-1279, 1-104; bad theology, Or. 27.6, SC 250,

to the world and the flesh, Gregory does not define the passions systematically, although Gregory does inform his reader that he conceives the passions internally and that they require restraint, pronouncing judgment upon those who yield to the passions.[706] Gregory argues further that sinful flesh works together with the passions, since the "fleshy person" is the "lover of passions."[707]

For a definition we may look to Evagrius, Gregory's early protégé, who writes about the nature of the passions as "a pleasure hostile to humanity, born of free will, and compelling the mind to make improper use of the creatures of God."[708] The only occasion upon which Gregory is positive about the passions concerns consolation; when people require consolation, we are not to be passionless (ἀπαθής).[709] Passions themselves may not be inherently evil, although they may be used by demons who desire to take up residence in a human person. This is evident in Gregory's poem *Against Anger,* where he writes, "I am full of raging anger, living with a demon (θυμῷ χολοῦμαι τῷ συνοίκῳ δαίμονι)."[710] Finally, Gregory makes clear that the passions, like evil

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84. God has no passions, Or. 25.17, SC 284, 198; Carm. 1.1.10, PG 37, 470, 64; angels have no passions, Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 525, 35-40. For an overview of passions from Plato to Stoicism and beyond, see Christopher C.H. Cook, *The Philokalia and the Inner Life: On Passions and Prayer* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2012), 47-57; Kallistos Ware, "The Meaning of "Pathos" in Abba Isaias and Theodoret of Cyrus," in *Studia Patristica 20*, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone (Leuven: Peeters Press, 1989), 315-22, 315; Teresa M. Shaw, *The Burden of the Flesh: Fasting and Sexuality in Early Christianity* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 44-48.

[706] Or. 2.30, SC 247, 128; 2.34, SC 247, 132; 25.4, SC 284, 164. For Gregory's judgment, see Or. 2.43, SC 247, 146.

[707] Carm. 1.2.34, PG 37, 963, 243. This betrays the Stoic influence; see Sorabji, *Emotion and Peace of Mind*, 394.

[708] Translation in Cook, *The Philokalia and the Inner Life*, 55. For the Greek text, see SC 438. Also, see Nonna Verna Harrison, *God's Many-Splendored Image: Theological Anthropology for Christian Formation* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 210), 75; Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms*, 152-55. Gregory Nyssen was also an active influence upon Evagrius; see Ilaria L.E. Ramelli, "Evagrius and Gregory: Nazianzen or Nyssen? Cappadocian (and Origenian) Influence on Evagrius," *GRBS* 53 (2013): 117–37, 130.

[709] Or. 7.1, SC 405, 180-82.

[710] Carm. 1.2.25, PG 37, 813, 1.

spiritual beings, must be fought:

> Let us wrestle against the rulers, against the authorities, against the hidden persecutors and tyrants, against the world rulers of this darkness, against the spiritual beings of evil in the heavenly realms, and amongst the heavenly beings, against the internal war, within us and in the passions (πρὸς τὸν ἔνδον καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τὸν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι πόλεμον), against those insurrections rising up on a daily basis.[711]

In the passage above, a war occurs in the passions since the devil attempts to destroy the *eikon* by making use of the weakness already present through the passions. As I observed earlier in the chapter, Gregory envisages the war against the devil as occurring within the human person. This points towards parasitic demonic activity which requires the human *eikon* as a means of continuing existence, which in turn furthers my argument earlier in this chapter that the devil and demons live a diminishing existence.

5.5 Resisting the Devil

Throughout the latter half of the chapter, I have demonstrated how Gregory presents the devil working through the world, the flesh and the passions. Attending to these in depth has highlighted the extent to which Gregory incorporates spiritual beings, their fall and subsequent war on the human *eikon* into his overall theology. Being aware that this narrative of warfare is rather bleak, Gregory offers a defence of why God allowed the devil to continue thus, and why Christ did not annihilate him completely. The reasons Gregory offers are three-fold: first, Christ wanted the devil and his minions to fight one another as a means of their punishment; secondly, those who struggle against the

[711] Or. 11.4, SC 405, 338; 2.91, SC 247, 206. Also, see Eph 6:12; *Princ. Praef*. 5.111.

demons for virtue would win eternal glory; and thirdly, the devil might deal out punishments "afterwards" to those who have followed him on earth.[712] Gregory's second point emphasises the free will of the human *eikon,* since she may choose whether or not to succumb to the temptations of the devil and his underlings, no longer being a slave to sin. However, Gregory does not account for the occasions upon which he himself attributes sickness, for example, to demonic activity; his justification for the continued existence of the devil does not explain certain physical illnesses which could hardly be resisted or be said to be within the human person's control.[713] Possibly, Gregory is aware of the inadequacy of his defence to a certain extent, which is why he laments the continued presence of the devil, in spite of having defended Christ's decision to allow the devil to continue to exist:

> Would that evil (ἡ κακία) be destroyed utterly, both the first seed of evil, and the Evil One who sowed the weeds in us while we were sleeping.[714]

In light of Gregory's lament above in which he wishes that the devil would be destroyed completely, I am inclined to suggest that his defence of why the devil remains is not wholly sufficient. He might have argued further that the devil remains because he serves as a perpetual reminder of the catastrophic outcome when created beings, angelic or human, choose to worship themselves instead of God.

Gregory situates his writing about the devil within the realm of his own experience which, for Gregory, demonstrates that the devil and his minions remain vigorous in their attempt to destroy the *eikon*. As a response to this, he offers multiple ways in which to combat the devil, which I shall summarise briefly.[715] The initial means of victory over the

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[712] Carm. 1.1.7, PG 37, 445, 80-95.

[713] Carm. 2.1.89, PG 37, 1442-1445.

[714] Or. 19.14, PG 35, 1060C.

[715] Ludlow argues that for the Cappadocians, the war against demons must be

devil is through Christ. As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, Christ, the identical *Eikon,* conquered the devil both through the pattern of his life and in defeating death. Through this, the human *eikon* is able to enter into Christ's protection by being incorporated into Christ's death and resurrection by the Holy Spirit at baptism, which I discuss in the following chapter.[716] Gregory writes frequently regarding further means of protection and resistance available to the human *eikon,* recommending vigilance:

> Keep yourself inaccessible, both in word and deed and life and thought and movement. The Evil One interferes with you from every side, he scopes you out everywhere, where he may strike, where he may wound. Do not let him find any corner laid open and ready for his blow. The purer he sees you, the more he is eager to stain you (ὅσῳ καθαρωτέραν ὁρᾷ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον σπιλῶσαι φιλονεικεῖ), for the stains on a brilliant garment are all the more visible.[717]

Whilst the *eikon* must be on her guard, vigilance is meaningless without faith in the Trinity and cooperation with God.[718] The nature of cooperation with God that Gregory advocates is the Christian life of asceticism.[719] Brakke has highlighted that asceticism as a means of victory over the devil is an area of research which is considerably lacking, since demonological theory has been deemed subjective in recent times. Thus, discussions of asceticism have turned towards

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"resisted by reason," *Demons and Liminality*, 199. This does not present the whole picture since Gregory offers a number of different means of protection and resistance throughout his work.

[716] Or. 40.10, SC 358, 216-18.

[717] Or. 37.12, SC 318, 296.

[718] Or. 2.21, SC 247, 116-18; 6.22, SC 405, 174-76; 11.4, SC 405, 336-38.

[719] Or. 16.15-16, PG 35, 953C-956D; 24.15, SC 284, 74; 36.6, SC 318, 254-56; see John Chryssavgis, *In The Heart Of The Desert: The Spirituality of the Desert Fathers and Mothers* (Indiana: World Wisdom Inc., 2008), 37-40.

topics which relate more closely to ideas of the body and the constructions of ascetic practices and institutions, such as monasteries.[720] This overlooks the primary worldview of the early church fathers, and more specifically, if we were to omit a discussion of the devil and demons when considering Gregory's theology and theological anthropology, his whole theological worldview regarding humankind would begin to unravel.

For Gregory, like church fathers before him, asceticism is concerned with resisting the devil, being built intrinsically into the Christian life, since it forms the way of the "new eschatological life granted in baptism within the confines of the present life."[721] In order to live ascetically, Gregory recommends fasting, tears, silence, care of the poor, resisting wealth, virginity, prayer, and making the sign of the cross, which together form the means of remaining alert to God and to the devil's schemes.[722] Furthermore, Gregory suggests that human *eikones* must attempt to know and understand their identity in Christ, which means that they are becoming divine.[723]

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that since she is "a living being… being made god by her inclination towards God," the human *eikon* incites envy from the devil.[724] This occasions a life of struggle and temptation

[720] Brakke, "Making of Monastic Demonology," 19-20.

[721] John Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 17.

[722] Resisting wealth, Carm. 1.2.28, PG 37, 863-881; 2.1.45, PG 37, 1362; against women wearing ornaments, Carm. 1.2.29, PG 37, 884-908; fasting, Or. 21.10, SC 270, 130; care of the poor, Or. 14, PG 35, 858A-909C; virginity, Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 521–578; 1.2.2, PG 37, 578-632; 1.2.3, PG 37, 632-632; tears, Carm. 2.1.34, PG 37, 1319; silence, Carm. 2.1.34, PG 37, 1307-1322; 2.1.35, PG 37, 1322-1325; prayer, Carm. 2.1.55, PG 37, 1399-1400; 2.1.65, PG 37, 1047, sign of the cross, Carm. 2.1.56, PG 37, 1401, 11.

[723] Or. 1.4, SC 247, 76-76; Carm. 2.1.54, PG 37, 1399, 3-4.

[724] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 126.

as the devil seeks to destroy the *eikon*, which occurs to such an extent that any consideration of the *eikon* must take place alongside a discussion of the devil and demons.

Having established the centrality of the devil to Gregory's theological anthropology, I raised the question of whether Gregory's constant referral to the devil and demons means that he leans towards dualism? Considering various responses to this, I argued that Gregory is not dualistic in his approach, since he is clear in presenting God as "One" who creates from nothing; thus evil does not exist of its own accord. However, arguing that Gregory does not err towards dualism raises further questions regarding the devil's existence. For, if evil is a privation of good, how does the devil exist? I proceeded to argue that the devil and demons could not be evil ontologically, since originally they were part of God's good creation; however, catastrophically, they fell away from the near presence of God and their subsequent malefactory role means that they are diminishing according to their existence. I drew this conclusion through considering the way in which Gregory discusses the devil both at the devil's fall and in relation to human *eikones.*

With a framework in place regarding how Gregory understands the devil, I moved on to explore the devil's role in the fall of the *eikon* and her subsequent banishment from paradise. Through the fall, the vulnerability of the *eikon* takes on a new feature. On the one hand, her vulnerability remains positive, since she continues to be vulnerable to God, but on the other hand, is negative since she is vulnerable to the devil.

Through Gregory's use of παχύτης and the particular sequence of events by which he describes the fall, I argued that Gregory appeals to strands of the "garments of glory" tradition of biblical interpretation in order to highlight both the glory and divinity of the *eikon* at creation and the consequences of the fall. The addition of the garments of skin implies an ontological and epistemological change in the existence of the *eikon* where she shifts from being angelic, spiritually alive and able

to apprehend God to being mortal, dull and struggling to know God.

After this, I explored the further challenges to living as an *eikon* outside paradise. A discussion of Gregory's use of 'flesh' and its war against the *eikon* revealed that, rather than being dualistic, Gregory follows Paul in using flesh as a metaphor for how sinful nature works against human persons. I argued that the occasions for Gregory's negativity towards the world originate from the biblical tradition that the devil is the ruler of the earth. This means that the devil is able to tempt the *eikon* through the world, the flesh and the passions in his endeavours to annihilate the *eikon*. The way in which Gregory positions the devil in the midst of discussions of the flesh and the world may cause scholars to question Gregory's understanding of the notion of personal responsibility with regard to sin. This concern is alleviated through Gregory's exhortations of how *eikones* are expected to wrestle with and resist temptation. Gregory does not present the devil as a "get out of jail free" card. For the contemporary reader, the devil's consistent attacks serve as a reminder of how Gregory's world is a place of spiritual activity and spiritual life, a theme which is pertinent in the next chapter, when I consider how the *eikon* engages in her restoration and theosis. Furthermore, the devil himself serves as a reminder of what happens to those who commit idolatry to the extent that he has done.

With regard to the divinity and vulnerability of the *eikon*, this chapter has shown that the description 'divine, yet vulnerable,' continues to serve as a phrase which encapsulates Gregory's approach to the *eikon*, where the effects of the devil's schemes and the taking on of παχύτης highlight how the vulnerability of the *eikon* becomes negative. We saw that the *eikon* is impacted by sin to such an extent that Gregory refers to the *eikon* as being subjected to the process of destruction. I shall explore the healing, restoration and theosis of the *eikon* in the following chapter, in which I discuss further how Gregory presents the 'divine, yet vulnerable' *eikon*.

Chapter 6 Restoring *Eikones* and Making Gods

6.1 Introduction

> Know from where you have your being, from where you draw breath, your ability to think, and greatest of all, your capacity to know God, to hope for the kingdom of heaven, the same value as angels, the perception of glory, which now is in mirrors and riddles, but then will be more perfect and more pure, for the potential to become a son of God, an heir together with Christ, even, dare I say, become divine yourself (τολμήσας εἴπω καὶ θεὸν αὐτόν)?[725]

Gregory closes his exhortation above with the bold suggestion that through Christ human *eikones* may become divine; how we interpret this forms the predominant discussion in this chapter. In the following pages, I enquire further into how the human *eikon* is healed and restored to her created potential of being able to become divine, having been wounded through the treachery of the devil.

Earlier, in Chapter Three, I demonstrated that only Christ, the identical *Eikon*, could conquer sin and the devil successfully. Entering into Christ's incarnation, death and resurrection effects healing and restoration for the human *eikon*; furthermore it renders victory over the devil for the *eikon*. For Gregory, the restoration of the *eikon* means that she can embark upon her theosis, which begins with the gift of the Holy Spirit at baptism.

In this chapter, I explore further the 'divine, yet vulnerable' existence of the human *eikon* by discussing four aspects of Gregory's thought which are essential to the theosis of the *eikon*: Gregory's theological anthropology, his doctrine of the Holy Spirit in which the Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son; his view of baptism

[725] Or. 14.23, PG 35, 888A.

as a sacrament where genuine transformation occurs; and the interaction between the devil and the human *eikon* before and after baptism. I argue that through examining these aspects of Gregory's thought we may describe the divinity of the *eikon* as ontological, functional and relational.

After a brief introduction to theosis, I begin by discussing how we might approach the progressive divinity of the *eikon*, highlighting two principal areas of scholarly disagreement. The first issue pertains to the sources of Gregory's understanding of theosis and the second concerns whether we should speak about theosis as metaphorical or literal.

With regard to the first question concerning the sources which feed into Gregory's concept of theosis, I shall demonstrate that whilst his influences were varied, his ideas are grounded in biblical themes. In response to the second problem of whether theosis is intended metaphorically or literally, I shall establish that it is possible to speak about the human person's divinity in literal terms. First, I argue this by recalling Gregory's theological anthropology. As we saw in Chapter Four, Gregory describes the creation of the human person in such a way as to suggest that matter or dust are vulnerable to God's *eikon* to the extent that they are transformed by the *eikon* to form a unified, dynamic living being. If we consider this together with the discussion of Gregory's view of 'mixing' in Chapters Three and Four, where we saw that the divine transformed the human, we may conclude that God created the human person specifically to be vulnerable to God. If, in addition, we consider the 'porous' worldview of the fourth century, we see that Gregory sets the scene for a genuine transformation of the wounded human *eikon*.

After this, I turn to Gregory's doctrine of the Holy Spirit, followed by his view of baptism and the interaction between the devil and the human *eikon*. Gregory goes to such great lengths to argue for the equal deity of the Holy Spirit that when he speaks of the deifying effect of the Spirit at baptism, he envisages the encounter with God as genuinely

transforming the *eikon*. Through considering these aspects of Gregory's theological vision, my argument gains further traction, to the extent that we may speak of the divinity of the *eikon* in literal terms. At the same time, I shall advance this discussion by asking a further question about the divinity of the *eikon*, namely, is Gregory's *eikon* ontologically divine, functionally divine, or both? In response to this, I argue that the *eikon* is both ontologically and functionally divine.

With these questions in mind, I shall proceed to offer a brief overview and introduction to theosis:

> Who will renew the creature, and set forth the *eikon*, and fashion creatures for the world above, and even greater than that, to say we will be god and make others gods (τὸ μεῖζον εἰπεῖν θεὸν ἐσόμενον καὶ θεοποιήσοντα)?[726]

By the fourth century, when Gregory was writing, the idea of a human becoming a god was well established in the church, although it was not defined explicitly until Dionysios the Areopagite, in the late fifth/early sixth century, undertook this task.[727] He suggested that "theosis is the attaining of likeness to God and union with Him so far as this is possible."[728] In the fourteenth century, Gregory Palamas defined an approach to theosis which distinguishes between God's energies and God's essence; this became the accepted approach to theosis in Orthodox theology, albeit interpreted with different emphases and received diversely by contemporary Eastern and Western

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[726] Or. 2.73, SC 247, 186. All Gregory's theosis vocabulary is listed in Kharlamov, "Rhetorical Application of Theosis," 123-27. I shall not repeat his work here.

[727] Dionysios wrote circa A.D. 500, adopting the name of Paul's convert in Athens (Acts 17:34). An unknown Syrian, he is also known as Pseudo-Dionysios.

[728] *On Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 1,* PG 3, 376A; trans. Russell, *Doctrine of Deification*, 248. Russell draws attention to the Platonic echoes in Dionysius' words.

theologians.[729] Gregory Palamas writes much later than Gregory Nazianzen, in a different historical context, responding to different theological problems. I am not engaging with contemporary debates concerning the Palamite doctrines of God and theosis, since these occur outside my primary area of research.

Early theologians such as Irenaeus and Athanasius understood the divinity of human persons in terms of a divine exchange.[730] Gregory adopted this approach to theosis amongst others, writing as follows:

> Let us become like Christ, since Christ became like us. Let us become gods for his sake, since he became human for our sakes (γενώμεθα θεοὶ δι ́αὐτόν, ἐπειδὴ κάκεῖνος δι ́ἡμᾶς ἄνθρωπος).[731]

Multiple strands are woven into Gregory's concept of theosis: ideas about God,[732] the Holy Spirit,[733] knowledge of God,[734] confession of correct doctrine,[735] pastoral responsibility,[736] baptism,[737] mystery,[738]

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[729] The notion of energies and essence as key to Palamas' doctrine of theosis has been challenged by Doru Costache, "Experiencing the Divine Life: Levels of Participation in St Gregory Palamas' *On the Divine and Deifying Participation*," *Phronema* 26, no. 1 (2011): 9-25; Anna N. Williams, "Light from Byzantium: The Significance of Palamas' Doctrine of Theosis," *Pro Ecclesia* 3, no. 4 (1994): 483-96.

[730] *Haer*. 5, Praef.; *De Incarn*. 54.

[731] Or. 1.5, SC 247, 78; 29.19, SC 250, 218; 30.14, SC 250, 256; 32.14, SC 318, 114; Carm. 1.1.11, PG 37, 471, 9-10; 1.2.14, PG 37, 762, 92; 2.1.1, PG 37, 971, 15-20; 2.1.34, PG 37, 1313, 83-84.

[732] Carm. 1.1.10, PG 37, 469, 56-61; Or. 23.12, SC 270, 304.

[733] Ors. 31, 40, 41, passim.

[734] Or. 14.23, PG 35, 887A; 28.17, SC 250, 134-36; 38.5, SC 358, 110-12.

[735] Or. 23.12, SC 270, 304; 31.4, SC 250, 282; 34.12, SC 318, 218.

[736] Or. 2.22, SC 247, 118-20; 2.73, SC 247, 186.

[737] Carm. 1.1.9, PG 37, 464, 90-94; Or. 40, SC 358, passim. See Hilarion Alfeyev, "The Deification of Man in Eastern Patristic Tradition (with special reference to Gregory Nazianzen, Symeon the New Theologian and Gregory Palamas)," *Colloquium* 36, no. 2 (2004): 109-22, 116.

[738] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 124-26. Theosis is perceived as a mystery which takes place within the human person "through God's supernatural power, and as

immortality, [739] the Christian life, [740] participation, [741] Christ's sufferings,[742] doing good,[743] and spiritual warfare.[744] Theosis is both present and eschatological, since becoming divine is a process which is only realised at the 'Final Day.'[745] The various strands mean that crafting a concise definition of Gregory's approach to theosis is challenging; nevertheless, I shall attempt a 'working' definition towards the end of the chapter, when I have discussed the key strands in greater depth. In describing the notion of becoming divine, Gregory was the first father to coin the term "theosis", which is accepted traditionally as an Orthodox doctrine, often known by Christians in the West as "deification" or "divinization."[746] While scholars apply the three terms synonymously, I use the transliteration "theosis" throughout this chapter, since this is what Gregory himself used.[747]

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such is essentially unutterable;" Georgios I. Mantzaridis, *The Deification of Man* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1984), 127.

[739] Or. 38.13, SC 358, 134; Carm. 1.1.8, PG 37, 452, 75.

[740] Carm. 1.1.2, PG 37, 622, 555-64.

[741] Or. 7.23, SC 405, 240; Frederick W. Norris, "Deification: Consensual and Cogent," *SJT* 49, no. 4 (1996): 411-28, 413.

[742] Carm. 2.1.34, PG 37, 1313, 83.

[743] Or. 17.9, PG 35, 976B-D; Harakas, "Presuppositions for Ethical Method," 97.

[744] Or. 2.22-25, SC 247, 118-24; 11.5, SC 405, 338-40; 17.9, PG 35, 976B-D; 40.10, SC 358, 216-18. For the breadth of Gregory's use of Pauline language in relation to theosis themes, see Oliver Langworthy, "Becoming Glorified, a Son, or a God: The Breadth of Deification in Gregory Nazianzen," in *Deification/Theosis Conference* (Leuven, Belgium: Unpublished, 29-31 January 2015).

[745] Or. 4.121, SC 309, 286-88; 14.20, PG 37, 881D-884B; 20:1, SC 270, 56-58; 43.48, SC 384, 226-28; Moreschini, *Filosofia e letteratura*, 34-36; Kenneth Paul Wesche, "The Doctrine of Deification: A Call to Worship," *Theology Today* 65, no. 2 (2008): 169-79, 176.

[746] Or. 4.71, SC 309, 184; Russell, *Doctrine of Deification*, 214; Daniel B. Clendenin, "Partakers of Divinity: The Orthodox Doctrine of Theosis," *JETS* 37, no. 3 (1994): 365-79, 369.

[747] For the opinion that theosis is essential to Gregory's theology, see Brooks Otis, "The Throne and the Mountain: An Essay on St. Gregory Nazianzus," *CJ* 56, no. 4 (1961): 146-65, 162-63; Winslow, *Dynamics of Salvation*, 178; Gilbert, "Person and Nature," 295; Philippe Molac, *Douleur et transfiguration. Une lecture du cheminement spirituel de saint Grégoire de Nazianze* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2006), 374; Alfeyev, "Deification of Man," 111.

A wide range of interpretations of theosis exist in contemporary Christian theology,[748] varying from "union with God"[749] with which most in the West are acquainted, to "becoming god," which is less familiar.[750] Whilst it continues through the Eastern early church fathers to the present day, we see little of theosis in the West by the twelfth century, other than in the writings of the Christian mystics.[751] The twentieth century witnessed a renewed interest in theosis amongst a great number of Western theologians, in particular those who were attentive to patristic theology, such as Myrrha Lot-Borodine, Hans Urs von Balthasar and Thomas F. Torrance.[752] The renewed attention was, and continues to be, due to the surge of interest in spirituality.[753]

Theosis makes a significant contribution to Western notions of soteriology and theological anthropology.[754] Whereas the West has

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[748] Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov, "Introduction," in *Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology*, ed. Stephen Finlan and Vladimir Kharlamov (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2006), 1-15, 1.

[748] Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, *One with God: Salvation as Deification and Justification* (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2004), 21.

[749] Ibid., 21; Lossky, *Image and Likeness of God*, 97; Benjamin Drewery, "Deification," in *Christian Spirituality: Essays in Honour of Gordon Rupp*, ed. Peter Brooks (London: SCM Press, 1975), 35-62, 36; Aristotle Papanikolaou, "The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition," *VTQ* 54, no. 1 (2010): 107-10, 107.

[750] Tollefsen, "Theosis According to Gregory," 258.

[751] Andrew Louth, "The Place of *Theosis* in Orthodox Theology," in *Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions*, ed. Michael J. Christensen and Jeffrey A. Wittung (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2009), 32-44, 33.

[752] One of the outcomes of the renewed interest in the doctrine of theosis has been the increase of published works on the subject, for example Gross, *Divinization of the Christian*; Douglas Fairburn, *Eastern Orthodoxy Through Western Eyes* (Louisville, Kentucky: John Knox, 2002). At the end of the twentieth century, corresponding themes between Aquinas and Palamas were demonstrated by Anna N. Williams, *The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[753] Norris, "Deification: Consensual and Cogent," 413; Roger E. Olson, "Deification in Contemporary Theology," *Theology Today* 64, no. 2 (2007): 186-200, 188.

[754] For an argument considering the contribution of theosis to evangelicalism, see Michael Paul Gama, "Theosis: The Core of Our Ancient/Future Faith and Its Relevance to Evangelicalism at the Close of the Modern Era" (Doctor of

tended to explore salvation in juridical categories, the East's focus on theosis leans more towards the restoration of the created identity of the human person and her subsequent potential.[755] Rooted in the belief that the human person is made in the image and likeness of God her potential is realised through theosis.[756] Gregory himself was aware that the notion of "becoming a god," or "becoming divine," was a challenging or even shocking concept to grasp, since he offered the proviso "dare I say" on more than one occasion when he spoke of theosis; but as Florovsky writes, "it is the only adequate phrase to express what is meant." [757] However, the question remains: what is meant when Gregory states that the *eikon* becomes a god?[758] I shall begin to shed light on this by considering Gregory's sources of inspiration.

6.2 Theosis: Whose Doctrine?

Theosis sounds very like apotheosis, the process through which the Roman emperor or people of distinction were made divine.[759] Note however that Christian theosis does not occur in Gregory's writing with a prefix. By using a neologism, Gregory expresses "becoming god" as a distinctively Christian belief; since it revolves around the person of

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Ministry, George Fox Evangelical Seminary, 2014). The well-attended conference on Deification/Theosis held in Leuven, January 2015, highlights the increased Ecumenical interest in the doctrine.

[755] Clendenin, "Partakers of Divinity," 369.

[756] Mantzaridis, *Deification of Man*, 15.

[757] Or. 14.23, PG 35, 887A; 36.11, SC 318, 264; 38.7, SC 358, 116; Georges Florovsky, "Lamb of God," *SJT* 4, no. 1 (1951): 13-28, 19.

[758] If we read as far back as Homer, often θεός is linked to acts of speaking; Walter Burkert, "From Epiphany to Cult Statue: Early Greek Theos," in *What is a God?: Studies in the Nature of Greek Divinity*, ed. Alan B. Lloyd (London: Duckworth 1997), 15-34. Nock suggests that the semantic field for θεός is so wide that it can be used to denote anything which is "the incalculable non-human element in phenomena;" Arthur D. Nock, "A Diis Electa," in *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, ed. Zeph Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 232-76, 260.

[759] For a review of the process, see Aleš Chalupa, "How Did Roman Emperors Become Gods? Various Concepts of Imperial Apotheosis*," *Anodos: Studies of the Ancient World* 6/7 (2007): 201-07.

Christ, the power of the Holy Spirit and the biblical notion of the human person made as the *eikon* of God.[760] In Chapter Four, I explored Gregory's notion of the creation of the *eikon*, upon which he bestowed many titles of honour. These portray how he viewed the gift of the *eikon* as the highest privilege of the human person. As we saw in Chapter Four, at the end of his poetic tribute to the creation of the *eikon*, Gregory describes her as,

> A living being, provided for here and being transferred elsewhere, and, to cap the mystery off, being made god by her inclination towards God (ζῷον ἐνταῦθα οἰκονομούμενον καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ μεθιστάμενον καὶ πέρας τοῦ μυστηρίου τῇ πρὸς θεὸν νεύσει θεούμενον).[761]

In the extract above and in a number of other orations and poems, Gregory interprets theosis in light of Genesis 1:26, the creation of the human person according to the *eikon* of God and in light of Christ, the identical *Eikon*.[762] As I have already discussed, this implies that a person is a living being and thus not static, but dynamic. As far as Gregory is concerned, the human person is alive in order to image God and become divine. As shown in the quotation above, how this occurs is primarily a mystery for Gregory although, in his orations and poems on baptism and the life that follows, we shall see that he offers practical advice on how to approach theosis.

It is important to note that Gregory develops his doctrine in light

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[760] Person of Christ and theosis, Or. 29.19, SC 250, 218; Carm. 1.2.14, PG 37, 762, 90; 2.1.34, PG 37, 1313, 83; action of the Holy Spirit and theosis, Or. 2.22, SC 247, 118-20; 14.23, PG 35, 887A; biblical concepts, Or. 23.12, SC 270, 304; 31.4, SC 250, 282; 40.9, SC 358, 334.

[761] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 126.

[762] Or. 1.4, SC 247, 76; 2.73, SC 247, 186; 4.121, SC 309, 286-88; 17.9, PG 35, 976B-D; 38.11, SC 358, 124; 38.13, SC 358, 132-34; 45.7, PG 36, 629D-632B; Carm. 1.1.4, PG 37, 423, 93-100; 1.1.10, PG 37, 469, 56-64; 1.2.9, PG 37, 668-669, 18-21; 1.2.14, PG 37, 762, 90-92; 2.1.12, PG 37, 1201, 485-495; 1.2.1, PG 37, 529, 96-97.

of his interpretation of creation in Genesis 1:26 and his understanding of Christ as the identical *Eikon*; thus theosis is grounded in Gregory's reading of Scripture. I find it interesting that scholarly discussions about Gregory's primary inspiration for theosis rarely reference the Bible.[763] Rather, scholars often focus on the belief that theosis is Platonic in origin.[764] For example, Andrew Louth suggests that the Platonic concept of "becoming like God as far as possible" (φυγὴ δὲ ὀμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) was so familiar to the fathers that Genesis 1:26 would have been heard in light of this.[765] Consequently, he argues that ὁμοίωσις in Genesis 1:26 would have been interpreted by the fathers as a process of assimilation like that found in Plato's *Theaetetus*.[766]

When speaking of our theologian however, we must bear in mind, as Maslov and Elm have both observed, Gregory does not actually appeal to Plato's phrase.[767] Maslov has suggested a further philosophical metaphor of Stoic origin as a precursor for Gregory's theosis: "*oikeiosis pros theon* or 'familiarity' with the divine, both pre-given and subject to self-conscious cultivation."[768] Maslov observes that whilst the phrase does not occur together with theosis, "Gregory combines each with the notion of ascent to God (*anabasis*)."[769] Gilbert

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[763] Other verses connected with theosis are marginally explored by Tollefsen, "Theosis According to Gregory," 258-59. The exception is Molac, *Douleur et transfiguration*, 104.

[764] Gross, *Divinization of the Christian*, 266; Hubert Merki, *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ. Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa* (Freiburg, Swizerland: Paulusverlag, 1952), 105.

[765] *Theaet.* 176a; Louth, "The Fathers on Genesis," 573; Sedley, "Ethics, Politics, Religion and the Soul," 309.

[766] Maslov, "Limits of Platonism," 448; Kharlamov, "Rhetorical Application of Theosis," 126. Furthermore, the Greek development of theosis through Neo-Platonic philosophers such as Plotinus differed radically from the earliest Christian notions of theosis; David Litwa, *Becoming Divine: An Introduction to Deification in Western Culture* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2013), 102-17.

[767] Maslov, "Limits of Platonism," 447; Elm, *Sons of Hellenism*, 178.

[768] Ibid., 178.

[769] Maslov, "Limits of Platonism," 450.

affirms this, observing that whilst Gregory never explains explicitly what it means to become a god, it is connected to the theme of journeying in some way.[770]

Whilst both scholars construct a detailed and well-researched argument, their omission of Scripture leaves their theses lacking. We must include Scripture in any appraisal of Gregory's theosis, if we are to build as complete a picture of the doctrine as possible. Elsewhere in the Old Testament, the explicit mention of human persons as gods occurs in Exodus 7:1, Psalm 82:6, (81:6 LXX), to which Jesus appeals in John 10:35, from all of which Gregory draws when discussing theosis.[771] I have already demonstrated the similarities in Gregory's work between Christ as the *Eikon* of God and the human person as the *eikon* of God, ideas which are evident in Paul's writing in the New Testament. Whilst much work remains to be done, New Testament scholarship has recently witnessed a number of published works on the concept of theosis in Paul, demonstrating successfully that the doctrine emerges from his work.[772] Since Paul does not refer to theosis specifically, Blackwell has suggested that theosis should be replaced by the neologism "christosis", on the basis that in Paul's writing, "believers are formed into Christ's image in death and life through a participatory triune divine encounter."[773] However, the term "christosis" is not suggestive of the Trinitarian nature of theosis, both in Paul and later fathers. The Spirit is crucial to the transformation of the human *eikon*

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[770] Gilbert, "Person and Nature," 273; Carm. 1.1.8, PG 37, 454, 99.

[771] Or. 40.6, SC 358, 206 and Ep. 101.7, (101.44 SC) SC 208, 54 respectively. See Carl Mosser, "The Earliest Patristic Interpretations of Psalm 82, Jewish Antecedents, and the Origin of Christian Deification," *JTS* 56, no. 1 (2005): 30-74, 58. Scholars have scoured Jewish sources to see how Jn 10:35 relates to Ps 82:6; James S. Ackerman, "The Rabbinic Interpretation of Psalm 82 and the Gospel of John," *HTR* 59, no. 2 (1966): 186-91.

[772] Blackwell, *Christosis*; Michael J. Gorman, *Inhabiting the Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul's Narrative Soteriology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009); David Litwa, *We Are Being Transformed: Deification in Paul's Soteriology* (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2012); Nellas, *Deification in Christ*, 115-59.

[773] Blackwell, *Christosis*, 263.

through the process of theosis. I shall demonstrate later in this chapter that the necessity of the Spirit in Gregory's understanding of theosis means that "christosis" is an unsatisfactory replacement. However, whilst I might disagree with his conclusion on renaming theosis, Blackwell has demonstrated successfully that the fathers were faithful in their interpretation of Paul's thought when they wrote about theosis.[774] This serves as a correction to those who have previously argued that theosis is a purely pagan doctrine and reveals that Gregory's interpretation of theosis does not contradict biblical themes; rather it endorses them.

Observe below Gregory's reflection on the narrative of the human person as made in the *eikon* of God. Beginning with Psalm 8:5, and continuing with an abundance of Pauline ideas, Gregory clearly understands theosis to be the telos of the *eikon* which is apparent in Scripture:

> What is the human person that you are mindful of her?[775] What is this new mystery about me? I am small and great, lowly and lofty, mortal and immortal,[776] earthly and heavenly. I share these things with the world below, those things with God; these things with the flesh, those things with the Spirit. It is necessary for me to be buried with Christ,[777] to rise with Christ,[778] to inherit together with Christ,[779] to become a son of God,[780] indeed to be called God Godself' (θεὸν αὐτὸν κληθῆναι)…[781] This is the great mystery for us, that God wills this for us, having been made man

[774] Also see Gorman, *Inhabiting the Cruciform God*, passim.

[775] Ps 8:5.

[776] 1 Cor 15:53.

[777] Rom 6:4; Col 2:12.

[778] Col 2:13; 3:1.

[779] Rom 8:17.

[780] Jn 1:12; 11:52; Rom 8:14-16.

[781] Ps 81:6.

> on our account and become poor, that he might raise our flesh, and restore the *eikon* and fashion the human person anew (ἀνασώσηται τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ ἀναπλάσῃ τὸν ἄνθρωπον), that we might all become one in Christ, who was made perfectly in each one of us, as much as he is in himself…[782]

From the passage above, it is clear that for Gregory, becoming a god must be understood in light of Christ and the salvation history as narrated in the Bible. Theosis revolves around the created purpose of the *eikon,* who, after being damaged, is restored through Christ. This is not a theme drawn from either Plato or Stoicism and whilst Gregory is influenced undoubtedly by the philosophical worldview of the fourth century, it is difficult to dispute, from that which I have discussed thus far, that Gregory was inherently biblical in his thought.

Having established that Scripture is crucial to understanding Gregory's concept of theosis, I shall move on to discuss the problem of whether theosis is intended to be understood metaphorically or literally. First, I shall discuss the scholarly arguments pertaining to the discussion, ascertaining the current field of research. Here I build on my discussion in Chapter One, where I highlighted that scholars differ radically over how to understand the divinity of the *eikon*.

Varying attempts have been made at classifying the method of interpretation of theosis. One of the most recent was made by Russell who, extending the work of Gross, categorised the ways in which the early church fathers used theosis language as nominal, analogical, and metaphorical.[783] The metaphorical method comprises of two sub-categories: the ethical and the realistic approaches. The ethical approach involves attainment of likeness to God through ascetical endeavour; to be in the likeness of God means to possess divine attributes acquired through the imitation of Christ. In the realistic

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[782] Or. 7.23, SC 405, 238-40.

[783] For further categories of theosis as educational, ethical, mystical and ritual, see Collins, "Theosis and Theurgy," 192.

approach, theosis is participation in the divine that "in some sense" transforms the human person.[784] It appears that the ethical approach is behaving like God whereas the realistic approach entails becoming like God, where theosis effects a transformation in the person being deified, albeit still in the category of metaphor.[785] The nature of the transformation which takes place and how it occurs is unclear according to Russell's analysis. Reducing Winslow's six-dimensional and metaphorical approach,[786] Russell describes the application of theosis in Gregory's work as having "five different senses." They are: intermingling with God through the incarnation of the Son (Or. 1.5), baptismal (Or. 7.22), ethical (Or. 30.4), eschatological (Or. 7.21) and analogous (Or. 42.17).[787] Russell states that Gregory is only interested in theosis as imitation, overlooking the occasions when Gregory states that he participated in the *Eikon* (μετέλαβον τῆς εἰκόνος, καὶ οὐκ ἐφύλαξα).[788]

Russell follows scholars who err towards describing the divinity of the *eikon* as metaphorical and thus not 'real' because of an overemphasis on the only occasion on which Gregory states that the creature is not God:

> Let us say then, on the one hand, that a creature is "of God," (κτίσα δέ, θεοῦ μὲν λέγεσθω) for even this is a great thing to be said about us, but "God," not at all (θεὸς δὲ μηδαμῶς). Only then will I accept graciously that a creature is God, whenever even I

[784] Russell, *Doctrine of Deification*, 3.

[785] For an alternative classification, see Ivan P. Popov, "The Idea of Deification in the Early Eastern Church," in *Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology Vol 2*, ed. Vladimir Kharlamov (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2012), 42-82. He classifies Clement of Alexandria, Origen, the Cappadocians, Ps. Dionysius, and Maximus the Confessor as "idealist" which he claims is rooted in Neo-Platonist participation; ibid., 43-45.

[786] This consists of a spatial, visual, epistemological, ethical, corporate and social metaphor, see Winslow, *Dynamics of Salvation*, 193-98.

[787] Russell, *Doctrine of Deification*, 223.

[788] Or. 38.13, SC 358, 134; Russell, *Doctrine of Deification*, 214.

> become literally God. It is like this: If it is God, it is not a creature, for the creature is classed with us who are not the gods. But if it is a creature it is not God, for it began in time.[789]

As a result of Gregory's caution, demonstrated above, scholars often assume that Gregory speaks about theosis without meaning what he writes.[790] Further problems occur when claims are made regarding the divinity of the *eikon* being "real" or "not real" without any reasons defining why it might be either one way or the other. For example, Elm opposes Russell, contending that Gregory's theosis is "real" and not a "metaphor."[791] She builds her argument on the grounds that scholars overlook that Gregory's approach to theosis is worked out principally in two orations: *In Defence of His Flight to Pontus* and *Against Julian*.[792] However, Elm herself not only overlooks the orations where Gregory develops theosis in light of the creation of the *eikon*, the Holy Spirit, baptism, and the devil, but also she considers Gregory's theosis without any mention of Scripture, thus providing a purely philosophical approach.

I believe that it is possible to argue a literal/real interpretation of the theosis of the *eikon* and I seek to improve clarity about Gregory's concept of theosis by asking a further question: "Does Gregory present the *eikon* as ontologically or functionally divine, or both?" Said another way, "does Gregory perceive the *eikon* to be divine with regard to her being or divine in the way that she behaves like God, or both?"

The functional divinity of the *eikon* is clear through the fact that she is created to image Christ, thus her purpose is to behave like God.

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[789] Or. 42.17, SC 384, 86; see Emil Bartos, *Deification in Eastern Orthodoxy: An Evaluation and Critique of the Theology of Dumitru Stăniloae* (UK: Paternoster Press, 1999), 145. Note that Gregory's usual connotation of Creator/creature difference lies in the fact that creatures do not exist eternally.

[790] Or. 42.17, SC 384, 86.

[791] Elm, "Leadership as Theosis," 177-78.

[792] Or. 2, SC 247, 84-240, popularly entitled *On Priesthood*; Or. 4, SC 309, 86-292.

Added to this, I argue that through considering Gregory's theological anthropology, we may understand the transformation which occurs through theosis as ontological. By this I mean that God creates the *eikon* as vulnerable to God, with the purpose of becoming divine. Here, it is crucial to bear in mind that it is possible for Gregory to envisage a distinction between Creator and creature, whilst still maintaining that the *eikon* is divine, if we remember that the worldview in the fourth century was very different from the twenty-first century, as I shall explain below. This is a significant point that is repeatedly neglected in the scholarly discussions. Therefore, through a consideration of the fourth century worldview, I argue that Gregory's *eikon* is ontologically divine, without achieving ontological equality with God. After this, I shall discuss Gregory's doctrine of the Holy Spirit, his view of baptism and the interaction between the devil and the *eikon*; all of these contribute to our understanding of the ontological and functional divinity of the human *eikon*, and ultimately to a fuller picture of the *eikon*'s divinity.

6.3 "Porous Self" and "Buffered Self"

When discussing Gregory's approach to theosis, and consequently the language we employ when speaking about it, we must take into consideration the entirely different worldview of the pre-modern era. In order to identify some of the pertinent differences between Gregory's time and the twenty-first century, I point to the work of the Catholic philosopher, Charles Taylor. In his seminal work, *A Secular Age*, Taylor charts the move away from the position held in pre-modern societies, in which it is almost "impossible not to believe in God," to the position in which belief in God is "no longer axiomatic."[793] Since his overall project is complex, I shall refer only to those aspects relevant to this project, and only in the broadest terms. In his previous work

[793] Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 3.

Sources of the Self, Taylor explains that the shifts following pre-modernity come to bear in the way we view

> our thoughts, ideas, or feelings as being "within" us, while the objects in the world which these mental states bear on are "without." …[This] is a function of a historically limited mode of self-interpretation, one which has become dominant in the modern West.[794]

According to Taylor, this is radically different from the interpretation of the self in the pre-modern world, which he characterises as "porous."[795] He explains that the ancient and medieval philosophical life meant befriending the highest things to the extent that there was little differentiation between internal and external forces.[796] Said another way, the pre-modern self was characterised by "porous" boundaries between the self and external forces, rather than being surrounded by boundaries which are demarcated firmly.

Taylor summarises this pre-modern world as one of "enchantment."[797] By applying this term, like Taylor, I do not intend to invoke images of fairies and elves; rather, "the world of spirits, demons and moral forces."[798] In the enchanted world the human person was "open and porous and vulnerable to a world of spirits and powers."[799] This is a view with which Classical scholars concur:

> To the ancients the line of demarcation between god and man

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[794] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 111.

[795] Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 27.

[796] For a concise summary and critique of Taylor's thesis, see Samuel Kimbriel, *Friendship as Sacred Knowing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 10-34.

[797] "Enchantment is an antonym to Weber's application of "disenchantment" as a means of describing our modern condition;" Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 446.

[798] Ibid., 29.

[799] Ibid., 27.

> was not as constant and sharp, or the interval as wide, as we might naturally think.[800]

Thus, disenchantment constitutes the opposite of this; it forms the condition in which we live today, whereby the only place for thoughts or feelings is firmly within the boundaries of the "mind."[801] Through modernity and the rise of humanism, the "porous self" was displaced by a "disenchanted" view of the world and by the "buffered self."[802] Taylor explains that the "buffered self feels invulnerable before the world of spirits and magic forces."[803] The buffered self represents

> a very different existential condition… For the modern, buffered self the possibility exists of taking a distance from, disengaging from everything outside the mind.[804]

Since this "buffered self" is the self with which we are familiar in the twenty-first century, it is difficult to conceive, when considering theosis, that Gregory was writing in a pre-modern age with a "porous self", or a "vulnerable" self, the description which I have been applying to the human *eikon* throughout this project. The "porous self" means that theosis depicts transformation of an ontological order within the human person. She is so permeable or porous to the Holy Spirit that when she is baptised into Christ's death and resurrection the *eikon* can be described as a 'god' or 'divine.' Therefore, it is possible for human persons to share in God's life due to their propensity to permeability.[805] In Gregory's case this permeability is possible for a human person

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[800] Nock, "Notes on Ruler-Cult I-IV," 145.

[801] Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 30.

[802] Ibid., 27.

[803] Ibid., 548.

[804] Ibid., 38.

[805] Paul Gavrilyuk, "The Retrieval of Deification: How a Once-Despised Archaism Became an Ecumenical Desideratum," *Modern Theology* 25, no. 4 (2009): 647-59, 649.

precisely because she is made according to the *eikon* of God. However, human *eikones* might become godlike and divine, but they are still creatures distinct from their Creator, both in the present age and in the age to come, since theosis is the fulfillment of human nature rather than its destruction.[806]

If we add Taylor's description of a "porous self" to my discussion concerning Gregory's theological anthropology, where the human *eikon* is created as vulnerable to God, then we may say that Gregory envisages the transformation through theosis in real terms. With this in mind, I shall demonstrate that Gregory's theosis entails a gradual progression towards a deeper ontological divinity and at the same time, a more obvious divine functionality. In order to achieve this, I shall begin by considering Gregory's doctrine of the Holy Spirit, for it is through the Holy Spirit that the *eikon* participates in the restoration actuated by Christ.

6.4 The Holy Spirit and Theosis

> Soul, why do you delay? Sing praise of the Spirit...
> Let us stand in awe of the mighty Spirit, who is the same as God, through whom I know God,
> through whom God is present, and who forms me into a god in this world (καὶ ὃς θεὸν ἐνθάδε τεύχει).[807]

Below, I shall demonstrate that the two inseparable reasons for the Spirit's indispensability to the healing and theosis of the *eikon* are: Gregory's doctrine of God, and the Spirit's activity both in the Church and the lives of individual Christians; or, in other words, the Spirit's identity in the transcendent and immanent Trinity.[808] I argue this,

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[806] Kallistos Ware, *The Orthodox Church* (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1986), 168.

[807] Carm. 1.1.3, PG 37, 402, 1-4.

[808] Full-length studies on Gregory's approach to the Holy Spirit include

contra Opperwall's conclusion that Gregory's sole purpose in discussing the Spirit is to demonstrate the Spirit's work in the Church.[809]

I begin by laying out Gregory's argument for the Spirit's deity. As I discussed at the beginning of Chapter Three, Gregory upholds the Nicene Christian tradition of professing faith in one God:

> We have one God because there is one Godhead. Though there are three in which to believe, they derive from One and have reference to it. While one is not more, one is not less, than God. One is not before and another after. They are not split in will or divided in power (οὐδὲ βουλήσει τέμνεται, οὐδὲ δυνάμει μερίζεται). Nor does there exist that which is in things divisible. In short, the Godhead exists undivided in beings divided.[810]

Gregory's belief that God is One means that he fights vociferously for the deity of the Spirit in an attempt to persuade the other bishops to

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Thomas A. Noble, "The Deity of the Holy Spirit According to Gregory of Nazianzus" (Ph.D. Diss., Edinburgh, 1989); Daniel G. Opperwall, "The Holy Spirit in the Life and Writings of Gregory of Nazianzus" (Ph.D. Diss., Open Access Dissertations and Theses: McMaster, 2012). Both claim to be the first ever study on Gregory's approach to the Holy Spirit, but clearly Noble's study is the forerunner. Shorter overviews exist; see Philip Kariatlis, ""What Then? Is the Spirit God? Certainly!" St Gregory's Teaching on the Holy Spirit as the Basis of the World's Salvation," *Phronema* 26, no. 2 (2011): 81-102; Christopher A. Beeley, "The Holy Spirit in the Cappadocians: Past and Present," *Modern Theology* 26, no. 1 (2010): 90-119; Christopher A. Beeley, "The Holy Spirit in Gregory Nazianzen: The Pneumatology of Oration 31," in *God in Early Christian Thought: Essays in Memory of Lloyd G. Patterson*, ed. Andrew Brian McGowan, Brian Edward Daley, and Timothy J. Gaden (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2009), 151-62. For Origin's influence upon Gregory's pneumatology, see Noble, "Deity of the Holy Spirit," 25-30. Likewise, for Athanasius' influence upon Gregory's pneumatology, see Jan M. Szymusiak, "Grégoire le théologien, disciple d'Athanase," in *Politique et théologie chez Athanase d'Alexandrie. Actes du Colloque de Chantilly*, ed. Charles Kannengiesser (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974), 359-63.

[809] Opperwall, "Holy Spirit in Greg Naz," iii. The Spirit's relationship to ecology also challenges Opperwall's thesis; for a consideration of Gregory's cosmic pneumatology, see Bergmann, *Creation Set Free*, 154-71.

[810] Or. 31.14, SC 250, 302, translation adapted from Lionel Wickham and Frederick Williams, *St. Gregory of Nazianzus: On God and Christ: The Five Theological Orations and Two Letters of Cledonius*, PPS (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2002), 127-28.

acknowledge this doctrine. In an oration dedicated to the Holy Spirit, Gregory combats his opponents' criticism that he was introducing a strange and unscriptural God.[811] He argues his case for the Spirit by citing Scripture; for example, when discussing the Holy Spirit's unique identity that differentiates the Spirit from the Father and the Son within the Godhead, Gregory cites the occasions in the Bible where the Spirit proceeds in the Spirit's own right, rather than only at the bidding of the Father and the Son.[812] Since the Spirit is God, Gregory is adamant that the Spirit is a distinct identity (ὑπόστασις) and attempts to convince his opponents by listing the behaviour of the Holy Spirit in Scripture with expressions such as "He speaks, he decrees, he is grieved, he is vexed…"[813]

As far as Gregory is concerned, anything less than the Spirit's equality within the Godhead would result in a plethora of gods. Gregory argues that since God is One, the Holy Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son:

> What then? Is the Spirit God? Absolutely! Is he consubstantial (ὁμοούσιον)? Yes, if he is God.[814]

Gregory's language is thus explicit regarding the Spirit's consubstantiality, which contrasts with Basil, who, whilst arguing for the divinity of the Holy Spirit, refuses to support explicitly the statement that the Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the

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[811] Or. 31.3, SC 250, 278. See Noble, "Scripture in Defence of the Spirit," 101-23. For a discussion on the uses of Adam and Eve with the argument of the Holy Spirit; see Alexander Golitzin, "Adam, Eve and Seth: Pneumatological Reflections on an Unusual Image in Gregory of Nazianzus's Fifth Theological Oration," *ATR* 83, no. 3 (2001): 537-46.

[812] Or. 31.26, SC 250, 326-28; 25.15, SC 284, 194. For further comment, see Armstrong, *Later Greek Philosophy*, 445.

[813] Or 31.6, SC 250, 286; 31.29, SC 250, 332-36.

[814] Or. 31.10, SC 250, 292. This was a "radical claim to make"; Behr, *The Nicene Faith*, vol 2, 363.

Son.[815] Gregory's conviction that the bishops must declare their belief in the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit results in his resignation when he does not achieve his aim. In a poem entitled *On His Own Life*, Gregory provides a dramatic account of this event, in which he envisages himself making a sacrificial resignation to preserve unity in the Church:

> Now I become Jonas the prophet. I am giving myself as a victim for the safety of the ship, even though it will be a case of the innocent encountering the waves.[816]

Gregory's emphasis on the distinctiveness in personhood speaks to Western Christians in the twenty-first century as we continue to explore the nature of the Trinity. A consequence of our focus on relationality in the West is that the Holy Spirit can either be reduced to a mere bond of love between the Father and the Son or worse, overlooked almost entirely. [817] Gregory, however, is keen to demonstrate that the Spirit is equally God, rather than merely a bond of union between the Father and the Son. Before I move on to discuss the impact of Gregory's pneumatology upon our interpretation of the divinity of the human *eikon*, I shall briefly outline the roles of the Holy Spirit in the life of the Church, thus demonstrating the involvement of the Spirit.

The Spirit calls those who are pastors and bishops,[818] guides the leaders of the Church, [819] unifies the Church, [820] reveals correct

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[815] Noble, "Deity of the Holy Spirit," 46. A detailed discussion of the differences between Gregory's and Basil's terminology can be found in the footnotes to Noble's thesis (pgs. 260-61). See Ep. 102.1 (102.1 SC), SC 208, 70-72 for Gregory's comments on the travesty of the Holy Spirit being left out of the Creed.

[816] Carm. 2.1.11, PG 37, 1839-50; trans. Meehan, *Three Poems*, 128.

[817] Kallistos Ware, "The Trinity: Heart of Our Life," in *Reclaiming the Great Tradition*, ed. James S. Cutsinger (Downers Grove, Illinois: Intervarsity Press, 1997), 125-46, 133.

[818] Or. 33.13, SC 318, 184.

[819] Or. 12.2, SC 405, 350.

doctrine,[821] purifies through fire,[822] renews,[823] inspires preaching[824] and for Gregory particularly, the Spirit is one who plays him as though he were a musical instrument.[825] The work of the Holy Spirit does not end there, since it is through the Spirit that the "Father is known and … the Son is glorified and known."[826] Gregory applies knowledge (γνώσις) to describe the Spirit's revelation of the Father and the Son; thus he does not express knowledge in terms of a human person's intellect, but rather in terms of revelation of a relationship with God.[827]

John Egan has argued that Gregory's understanding of knowledge of God is also linked to his perception of light and illumination, since those who know God through the Holy Spirit are illumined.[828] I build on Egan's valuable contribution by observing that Gregory also connects both knowledge and illumination to the concept of life in the Spirit. I make this claim by drawing attention to Gregory's use of Psalm 13, which he applies as a means of stating that those who do not know God are in danger of death:

> If you are blind and without illumination, "illumine your eyes, so that you may never sleep in death."[829]

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[820] Or. 34.6, SC 318, 206-08.

[821] Or. 29.1, SC 250, 176.

[822] Or. 41.12, SC 358, 340.

[823] Or. 7.15, SC 405, 218; 8.20, SC 405, 290.

[824] Or. 12.1, SC 405, 348.

[825] Or. 12.1, SC 405, 348.

[826] Or. 41.9, SC 358, 336.

[827] For example, Matt 1:25 uses γιγνώσκω to explain that Mary and Joseph did not have sexual intercourse until after Jesus was born. Whilst Gregory clearly does not present this type of relationship through his use of γιγνώσκω, he would have been aware of its wide semantic field.

[828] John P. Egan, *The Knowledge and Vision of God According to Gregory Nazianzen: A Study of the Images of Mirror and Light* (Paris: Institut catholique de Paris, 1971), passim. His argument is supported by Beeley, *Trinity and the Knowledge of God*, 104. Also, see Plagnieux, *Saint Grégoire de Nazianze theologién*, 83.

[829] Or. 40.34, SC 358, 276; Ps 13:3.

Above, Gregory links knowledge of God and illumination to life, since those who guard against death remain spiritually alive. Accordingly, a further significant role of the Spirit is to bring life to the believer through knowledge of God.

Thus far, I have emphasised the lengths to which Gregory goes to argue that the Holy Spirit is consubstantially God, and I have demonstrated how Gregory presents the Spirit as one who brings life, providing significant gifts to the Church. With this in mind, I proceed to discuss how Gregory links the Holy Spirit intrinsically to the theosis of the human *eikon*. I make this move, highlighting that theosis must not be expressed on a Christological basis alone; rather it should be developed in conjunction with a robust pneumatology.[830]

In discussing the Spirit's identity, Gregory moves between the transcendent Trinity, which I have already demonstrated, the Spirit's economy within creation,[831] the Church, and the life of Christian individuals; this leads to his claim that the Spirit must be God, since it is the Spirit who deifies believers.[832] Gregory's confession of belief "in the Almighty Father, and in the Only Begotten word, and in the Holy Spirit who is also God,"[833] is crucial to theosis; for it means that it is God, Godself who deifies believers. See below how Gregory asserts this in various orations:

> If I was still worshipping a creature, or I was baptised into a creature, I would not be being made god nor would I have transformed my first birth (οὐκ ἂν ἐθεούμην οὐδὲ τὴν πρώτην

[830] The significance of the Holy Spirit is often overlooked; Myrrha Lot-Borodine, *La Déification de l'homme, selon la doctrine des Pères grecs* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1970), 12.

[831] Or. 41.11, SC 358, 338.

[832] This is an appropriate way to discern God at work; Hanson, *Christian Doctrine of God*, 783.

[833] Or. 12.6, SC 405, 360; 3.6, SC 247, 248-50; 21.37, SC 270, 190-92; 33.16, SC 318, 192.

μετεποιούμην γέννησιν).[834]

> Therefore the Holy Spirit is always participated in, but does not participate; perfecting but is not perfected, filling but is not filled; sanctifying but is not sanctified, deifying but is not deified (θεοῦν, ού θεόυμενον).[835]

> If he is ranked with me, how does he make me god, or how does he attach me to deity (πῶς ἐμὲ ποιεῖ θεόν, ἢ πῶς συνάπτει θέοτητι)?[836]

Through the Spirit's presence the language of theosis is set within the doctrine of God.[837] It is God who saves and deifies; theosis is a gift and not something which human persons are able to manufacture for themselves:[838]

> I, too, myself am an *eikon* of God, from the glory above, although I have been placed below (εἰκών εἰμι καὶ αύτὸς Θεοῦ, τῆς ἄνω δόξης, εἰ καὶ κάτω τέθειμαι). I am not persuaded that I am saved by one who is of equal honour. If the Holy Spirit is not God, let him be made God first and then let him deify me who is of equal honour to him.[839]

As I have already argued, the Spirit's deifying the *eikon* attracts the envy of the devil. Before moving on to demonstrate how the Spirit acts as a shield for the *eikon* when the devil attacks her, I must make one further

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[834] Or. 40.42, SC 358, 296.

[835] Or. 41.9, SC 358, 334.

[836] Or 31.4, SC 250, 280-82.

[837] Louis Bouyer, *The Spirituality of the New Testament and the Fathers*, trans. Mary P. Ryan (London: Burns and Oates, 1963), 348-50.

[838] Contra H. Wheeler Robinson, *The Christian Experience of the Holy Spirit* (London: James Nisbet & Co., 1928), 64.

[839] Or. 34.12, SC 318, 218.

point regarding Gregory's doctrine of the Spirit, which relates to the distinction between God and the newly-formed god. Theologians such as Zizioulas and Torrance have argued that the pre-Palamite distinction between God's energies and essence is evident in Gregory Nazianzen's work, and that consequently Gregory presents a picture in which the human *eikon* participates in God's energies but not in God's essence.[840] Torrance builds his argument on the premise that in speaking about the doctrine of God, both Palamas and Nazianzen apply the metaphor of light.[841] However, since many other authors, including biblical writers, apply light as a metaphor for God, this does not build a strong case for a specifically Palamite distinction of God's energies and essence in Nazianzen's work.[842] Torrance bases his argument upon the metaphor of light because Gregory does not apply frequently the language of activity (ἐνέργεια) in relation to God, and even when Gregory speaks of the ἐνέργεια of God, it is as a concession to his opponents.[843]

I observe that rather than focusing upon God's activity, Gregory speaks of God's power (δύναμις) on numerous occasions.[844] Gregory makes explicit that God's power precedes activity, thus any "activity presupposes power," a sequence which Gregory Nyssen also applies.[845] In his discussions of God's power, Nazianzen varies between

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[840] Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, 91, n 75; Torrance, "Palamas' Essence-Energies Theology," 61.

[841] Ibid., 61-63.

[842] For example, φῶς is given "theological rank" in John and 1 John; see Hans Conzelmann, "φῶς," in *Φ-Ω TDNT, Vol 9*, ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Freidrich (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 310-58, 343.

[843] According to a TLG search (10/06/2016, 11.16am) ἐνέργεια appears on only 27 occasions in texts which are regarded to be authentic to Gregory. See, for example, Or. 29.16, SC 250, 210. Here Gregory discusses the challenge from his opponents that Father must designate either substance (οὐσία) or activity (ἐνέργεια). Gregory argues that Father designates relation (σχέσις), moving on to say that if Father must designate activity then activity must also apply to begottenness.

[844] According to a TLG search (10/06/2016, 11.20am) δύναμις appears on 282 occasions in texts which are regarded to be authentic to Gregory.

[845] Or. 29.7, SC 250, 190. See Michel R. Barnes, *The Power of God: Dunamis in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 293.

descriptions of the power of God, the power of Christ[846] and the power of the Spirit.[847] Through his application of power, Gregory does not imply that being or nature lie behind power, either in his discussions of the Son or the Spirit:

> Each of the Trinity is in entire unity as much with himself as with the partnership, by identity of being and power (ἀλλὰ τὸ ἕν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ συγκείμενον οὐχ ἧττον ἤ πρὸς ἑαυτό, τῷ ταύτῷ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως).[848]

> …to persuade all humankind as best as I am able, to worship the Father, and the Son and the Holy Spirit, one divinity and power (τὴν θεότητά τε καὶ δύναμιν), for to God belongs all glory, honour, authority, for age upon age. Amen.[849]

> And we know the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit as God… but we know the name is one and the same; likewise we know one and the same nature and being and power of Godhead (οὕτω καὶ θεότητος φύσιν καὶ ούσίαν καὶ δύναμιν).[850]

In the examples above and throughout his corpus, Gregory does not distinguish between God's being and God's power in the manner that Torrance suggests when he speaks about energies and essence.[851]

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[846] Or. 2.98, SC 247, 216; 29.17, SC 250, 212; 30.20, SC 250, 268; 38.18, SC 358, 146.

[847] Or. 30.1, SC 250, 226; 31.26, SC 250, 326; 32.21, SC 318, 128; 41.11, SC 358, 338; 41.14, SC 358, 344; 42.22, SC 384, 100.

[848] Or. 31.16, SC 250, 306; translation, Wickham and Williams, 2002, 129. Also, see Norris, *Faith Gives Fullness*, 200.

[849] Or. 31.33, SC 250, 342. Also, see Or. 1.7, SC 247, 80-82; 22.12, SC 270, 242-44; 31.28, SC 250, 330; 40.41, SC 358, 292; 41.7, SC 358, 330; 43.67, SC 384, 272-74.

[850] Ep. 101.14 (101.68 SC) SC 208, 66.

[851] Supporting the argument that the Cappadocians do not purport a distinction within God between God's energies and God's essence, see Jean-Philippe Houdret, "Palamas et le Cappadocians," *Istina* 19 (1974): 260-71.

Rather, Gregory's distinctions lie between the relations of the Father, the Son and the Spirit.[852] Nor does Gregory imply that the human *eikon* is subsumed into God's being through her theosis; she retains her identity as God's *eikon* whilst she is becoming a god, as we shall see shortly.[853] This identity causes her problems with the devil, to which I turn next.

6.4.1 *The Holy Spirit and the Devil*

As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, the *eikon* has an enemy who is attempting to destroy her, namely the devil. Relating to the prevalence of the devil and demonic powers in Gregory's work, the final role of the Spirit that I shall discuss here, which is particularly pertinent to this project, involves the Spirit's function as a shield in the battle between the devil and the *eikon*.[854]

The Spirit's involvement in the theosis of the *eikon* means that the *eikon* moves towards being enlightened, and thus gaining life and increasing in her likeness to God. This evokes the envy of the devil, who steps in and attempts to lead the *eikon* into darkness and sin.[855] The devil does not want the *eikon* to fulfill her destiny in becoming a god, which means that any enlightenment and enlivening causes him great vexation. However, the *eikon* is not left without help and protection when the enemy is waging war on her:

> Don't be afraid of the battle. Protect yourself with water, protect yourself with the Spirit (προβαλοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα), in whom every

[852] σχέσις, Or. 29.16, SC 250, 210.

[853] Contra Børtnes, who argues that Gregory uses a double process of metaphor and metonymy, resulting in a move towards "a transcendent point where there is no longer any difference between eikon and archetype;" see "Rhetoric and Mental Images," 53.

[854] Or. 2.82, SC 247, 196-98.

[855] Or. 38.9, SC 358, 120-22; 40.34, SC 358, 276-78.

single burning missile of the Enemy (τοῦ πονηροῦ) is put out.[856]

Above, Gregory reveals his ideas about how the Holy Spirit functions in the war between the *eikon* and the devil. The Spirit protects the *eikon*, thus the narrative of this war is not consistently gloomy, but rather Gregory offers hope and reassurance that the *eikon* is not left to battle alone. However, Gregory does not envisage the devil attacking only each individual *eikon*, but also the devil attempts to destroy the Church. Observe this below through the way in which Gregory considers both God and the devil being involved in the discussion concerning the Trinity. Gregory goes so far as to suggest that those who do not profess that the Spirit is God are listening to demonic spirits:

> If, on the one hand, my friends, you do not confess the Holy Spirit to be uncreated (ἄκτιστον), nor to be eternal (ἄχρονον), this is clearly the action of an enemy spirit.[857]

The devil, commanding the army of enemy spirits, is as active in the battle over true doctrine as he is in other areas of believers' lives. It should not surprise us that Gregory is concerned about the devil's interference in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Since Gregory states explicitly that the Holy Spirit deifies the *eikon* and that the devil is envious of the theosis of the *eikon*, it is logical that the devil should attempt to interfere with the doctrine that provides a rigorous account of theosis.

6.4.2 *The Spirit: In Summary*

I have presented a brief outline of Gregory's doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and the Spirit's movement both in the Church and the lives of individual

[856] Or. 40.10, SC 358, 216.

[857] Or. 41.7, SC 358, 328.

followers. We have seen that Gregory goes to great lengths not only to argue on behalf of the deity of the Spirit, but also to put forward numerous arguments concerning the Spirit's involvement in the life of the Church. These range from revealing a deeper knowledge of God, bringing life, protecting those who believe in God from the attacks of the devil, through to deifying the believer.

It is incomprehensible that Gregory would have envisaged the Spirit, as experienced in the Christian life, to have no real impact or effect upon the *eikon*. In light of this, I propose that Gregory's immense effort to argue the consubstantial deity of the Holy Spirit means that he views the Spirit's role in the theosis and protection of the *eikon* as more than a figure of speech. As far as I am aware, this insight has not been previously discussed amongst scholars. Whilst Beeley, Russell, Opperwall and Winslow all explore the role of the Holy Spirit in Gregory's understanding of theosis, they do not consider Gregory's understanding of theosis as effecting a 'literal' or 'real' transformation on the basis that the Holy Spirit is God.[858] Thus, my contribution extends this field of enquiry to incorporate the divinity of the Holy Spirit into how we interpret Gregory's discussion of theosis. This builds on my argument that Gregory's theological anthropology specifically demands that the human person is vulnerable to God. Gregory's worship of the Spirit suggests that he has a firm understanding of the God who genuinely deifies the 'porous' (vulnerable) self of the believer in a manner that can be said to be ontological. Relating Gregory's theological anthropology directly to theosis, I suggest that the *eikon* is vulnerable to the Holy Spirit to such a degree that the Spirit transforms the *eikon* into a god, as God intended at creation; thus the Spirit fulfills that which Christ made possible through his incarnation, death and resurrection and, furthermore what the *eikon* could not achieve for herself. Gregory envisages this transformation occurring in numerous

[858] For discussions of the role of the Holy Spirit in Gregory's doctrine of theosis, see Beeley, *Trinity and the Knowledge of God*, 263; Russell, *Doctrine of Deification*, 222; Opperwall, "Holy Spirit in Greg Naz," 48-54; Winslow, *Dynamics of Salvation*, 371.

ways, which begin primarily through baptism, to which I shall turn next.

6.5 Baptising the *Eikon*

> Let us become clean by our Creator, let us honour the *eikon*, let us venerate the call, let us pursue life (μεταθώμεθα τὴν ζωήν). Why do we make ourselves low having been born in the high place?[859]

Gregory generally depicts baptism as the occasion during which the *eikon* is restored to her former potential of becoming divine through the Holy Spirit. Indeed Gregory's view of the sacrament is so high that Winslow comments,

> Perhaps no other patristic author is as convinced of the necessity for baptism as is Gregory of Nazianzus, nor any so certain of the inestimable benefits conferred on the Christian by this rite.[860]

I agree with Winslow's conclusion above and extend his thoughts by considering baptism in light of Gregory's views on the Holy Spirit. Having concluded that the Spirit's restoration and theosis of the *eikon* is not merely a figure of speech for Gregory, I shall strengthen this argument by considering Gregory's presentation of baptism, the sacrament through which the Holy Spirit is bestowed.[861] Baptism

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[859] Or. 19.6, PG 35, 1049B-C.

[860] Donald F. Winslow, "Orthodox Baptism – A Problem for Gregory of Nazianzus," in *Studia Patristica 14*, ed. Elizabeth A. Livinsgstone (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1976), 371-74, 371.

[861] Gregory's baptism has attracted a certain amount of attention from scholars, who have approached it from a number of angles. For baptism and the Holy Spirit, see Noble, "Deity of the Holy Spirit," 61-74. For philosophical approaches to baptism, see Elm, "Inscriptions and Conversions," 1-35; Elm, "O Paradoxical Fusion!," 296-316. For baptismal practice, see Everett Ferguson, *Baptism in the Early Church: History, Theology, and Liturgy in the First Five Centuries* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 592-602; Ferguson, "Gregory's

begins the theosis of the *eikon*, which disproves the theory set out by Onica, who argues that the sacraments are only linked extrinsically to patristic theosis and that the doctrine can survive theologically without it.[862] I shall establish that Gregory understands baptism to effect a real change in the *eikon*, precisely because of the Holy Spirit's presence.[863] This broadens our understanding of the divinity of the *eikon*, although we shall see that the negative aspect of her vulnerability remains through the work of the devil and the persistence of the threat of sin.

6.5.1 *Practice of Baptism*

We cannot assume knowledge of the exact baptism rite which Gregory used, since no record of the liturgy that Gregory proclaimed in services has survived.[864] Bradshaw argues that liturgical practices in the fourth century were less standardised than has been thought previously; therefore, in order to represent Gregory's approach to baptism as faithfully as possible, I shall discuss the practice revealed in his oration *On Baptism.*[865] Gregory provides some information about the practice of

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Baptismal Theology and the Alexandrian Tradition," in *Re-Reading Gregory of Nazianzus*, ed. Christopher A. Beeley (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 67-84. For baptism and Christ, see Althaus, *Die Heilslehre des heiligen*, 153-80.

[862] Or. 40.6, SC 358, 206-08; Paul Onica, in the introduction to Gross, *Divinization of the Christian*, xii.

[863] Gregory writes that he is aware of five kinds of baptism. These are Israel's baptism in the cloud and the Sea, the baptism of repentance, baptism of water and the Spirit, baptisms of martyrdom and penance; see Or. 39.17, SC 358, 186-88.

[864] Bryan D. Spinks, *Early and Medieval Rituals and Theologies of Baptism: From the New Testament to the Council of Trent* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 47. For the Jewish precedents to the rites, see Henry Ansgar Kelly, *The Devil at Baptism: Ritual, Theology, and Drama* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 33-44. For a summary of Basil's teaching of the rite, see Spinks, *Early and Medieval Rituals and Theologies of Baptism: From the New Testament to the Council of Trent*, 47-49. For Nyssen's approach, see Ferguson, *Baptism in the Early Church*, 603-16.

[865] Paul F. Bradshaw, *The Search for the Origins of Christian Worship: Sources and Methods for the Study of Early Liturgy* (London: SPCK, 2002), x. For a succinct collection of the available initiation rites in the fourth century, see

the rite, which consists of "words and deeds."[866]

Gregory informs us that whereas baptism occurred most commonly at Epiphany, Easter and Pentecost, it could also take place at Theophany in Constantinople.[867] He did not think that very young children were guilty of sin, although for anyone wanting to belong to Christ a seal was necessary; consequently our theologian actively encourages the baptism of infants over the age of three. He does this through applying an analogy from Exodus 12:23-32, where the doorposts were anointed in order to keep safe the first-born.[868] Before the catechumens came to baptism they underwent rigorous preparation, followed by confession of sin and exorcisms.[869]

Whilst Winkler is not writing about Gregory in her summary of baptismal preparation, her words describe his thoughts accurately when she writes, "The preparation as a whole is viewed as a drama-like battle with Satan."[870] Only after the exorcisms does Gregory invite the catechumens over the threshold.[871] It is clear that Gregory understands the sacrament of baptism to represent the door into the Church,

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Thomas M. Finn, *Early Christian Baptism and the Catechumenate: West and East Syria* (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 1992).

[866] Or. 40.45, SC 358, 304-06. Gregory also refers to baptism in other orations and poetry, particularly Ors. 8, 18 and 39. Gregory was fearful that he himself had not been baptised when he experienced a fierce storm whilst at sea; Carm. 2.2.1, PG 37, 994, 322-26; McGuckin, *Intellectual Biography*, 55.

[867] Or. 40.24, SC 358, 250. Moreschini (SC 358, 16-22) has convincingly dated Oration 40 to A.D. 381. For an argument supporting dating in A.D. 380, see Jan M. Szymusiak, "Pour une chronologie des discours de S. Grégoire de Nazianze," *VC* 20 (1966): 183-89, 184-85. See also Maxwell E. Johnson, *The Rites of Christian Initiation: Their Evolution and Interpretation* (Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2007), 136.

[868] Or. 40.28-29, SC 358, 262-64.

[869] Or. 40.31, SC 358, 268.

[870] Or. 40.27, SC 358, 258. Gabriele Winkler, "The Original Meaning of the Prebaptismal Anointing and Its Implications," in *Living Water, Sealing Spirit*, ed. Maxwell E. Johnson (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1995), 58-81, 75. Also, see Edward Yarnold, *The Awe-Inspiring Rites of Initiation: The Origins of the R.C.I.A.*, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 9-11.

[871] Or. 40.16, SC 358, 230.

> While you are a catechumen, you are in the porch of piety. It is necessary for you to come inside, to stride across the courtyard, to observe the holy things, to peep into the holy of holies, to be born with the Trinity (μετὰ τῆς τριάδος γενέσθαι).[872]

As I observed in the discussion of the Holy Spirit, public confession of Trinitarian faith is vital at baptism,

> …the confession (ὁμολογία) of the Father, and the Son and the Holy Spirit. I entrust this to you today; in this I will baptise you together, and I will raise you up together. I give you this companion and patronage throughout all of life, the one divine nature and power found singly in three and bringing the three together as distinct, not inconsistent in essences (οὐσίαις) or natures (φύσεσιν).[873]

Gregory states firmly that people should not delay baptism. However, his statements concerning baptism are compromised somewhat in Gorgonia's funeral oration, when he was obliged to say that she was purified in spite of being baptised late in life.[874] Gregory's father was also baptised later in life; concerning which Gregory offers a dramatic rendition of events.[875] Elm has shown that the reason behind Gregory's urging folk to be baptised was because some people considered baptism such a profound act of purification that subsequent sin became an unpardonable impossibility.[876]

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[872] Or. 40.16, SC 358, 230-32. See Hilarion Alfeyev, "Membership of the Body of Christ: Sacraments of Initiation," *GOTR* 43, no. 1-4 (1998): 565-72, 567.

[873] Or. 40.41, SC 358, 292; 40.43, SC 358, 298.

[874] Or. 8.20, SC 405, 290.

[875] Or. 18.13, PG 35, 999C-1001B. For a discussion of Gregory's linking the charisms to baptism, see Killan McDonnell and George T. Montague, *Christian Initiation and Baptism in the Holy Spirit: Evidence from the First Eight Centuries* (Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 1991), 226-28.

[876] Elm, "Inscriptions and Conversions," 3.

Gregory extols the virtues of baptism at great length in his oration, *On Baptism*, in which he describes baptism as a gift (δῶρον),[877] grace (χάρισμα),[878] unction (χρῖσμα),[879] garment of incorruption (ἀφθαρσίας ἔνδυμα),[880] seal (σφραγίς),[881] and bath (λουτρόν).[882] Gregory's depiction of baptism as a bath relates to the purification of the *eikon* which takes place through the sacrament. In an allegorical reading of Luke 17:14, Gregory compares the cleansing of the *eikon* which occurs at baptism to the occasion upon which Jesus heals the lepers:

> If you were covered head to toe with leprosy (that formless evil), after you had been scraped clean from the evil matter and received the healed *eikon* (ἀπεξέσθης δὲ τῆς κακῆς ὕλης καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα σώαν ἀπέλαβες), show the purification to me as your priest.[883]

Gregory also refers to baptism as illumination (τὸ φώτισμα).[884] Whilst discussing the Holy Spirit, I highlighted that Gregory understands

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[877] Or. 40.4, SC 358, 202.

[878] Or. 40.4, SC 358, 202.

[879] Or. 40.4, SC 358, 204.

[880] Or. 40.25, SC 358, 256.

[881] Or. 40.4, SC 358, 204. σφραγίς recalls the typology which saw the prophylactic seal of the Spirit in baptism as an antitype of the blood of the Passover lamb which was sprinkled upon the doorposts of the Israelites; Geoffrey W.H. Lampe, *The Seal of the Spirit: A Study in the Doctrine of Baptism and Confirmation in the New Testament and the Fathers*, 2nd ed. (London: SPCK, 1967), 116; Alexander Olivar, "Reflections on Problems Raised by Early Christian Preaching," in *Preacher and Audience: Studies in Early Christian and Byzantine Homiletics*, ed. Mary B. Cunningham and Pauline Allen (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 21-32, 32.

[882] Or. 40.4, SC 358, 204.

[883] Or. 40.34, SC 358, 276-78.

[884] Or. 40.4, SC 358, 202. Illumination occurs in almost every section of Oration 40, also see Or. 39.1, SC 358, 150; 39.14, SC 358, 180. It is a usual name for baptism; Joseph Ysebaert, *Greek Baptismal Terminology: Its Origins and Early Development* (Nijmegen: Dekker and Van de Vegt, 1962), 158-78.

illumination as pertaining to life. The appearance of illumination in conjunction with baptism also denotes life, as seen in Gregory's description below:

> The Illumination is the brightness of souls, the transposition of life, a question of the conscience toward God.[885] The illumination is an aid in our weakness. The illumination is the renunciation of flesh, following of the Spirit, fellowship of the Word, amendment of the creature, a flood over sin, participation in light, an end of darkness. The illumination is a vehicle toward God,[886] a fellow traveller with Christ, support of faith, perfection of spiritual intellect, a key to the kingdom of heaven, exchange of life, abolition of slavery, release from chains, a remodelling of our very composition (συνθέσεως μεταποίησις).[887]

Above, baptism is the beginning of the process of entering into life, since Gregory envisages the sacrament as both present and eschatological. Elm has written extensively on Gregory's use of Platonic cosmology in relation to baptism, observing that his particular use of inscription language describes a moment of cosmological change alongside a lifelong process of conversion, concluding that whilst restoration begins at baptism, it instigates a process, rather than being a "one-off" event.[888] Elm does not connect the lengthy process to spiritual warfare, but I observe that since baptism begins a process of restoration rather than being a singular event, this means that the *eikon* remains vulnerable to the threats and disruptions of the devil.

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[885] For further examples of baptism representing life, see Or. 33.17, SC 318, 196.

[886] Concerning ὄχημα πρὸς θεόν, "its content is essentially to denote baptism as the action of the Holy Spirit raising the soul from earthly life to heavenly life;" Jean Daniélou, *Primitive Christian Symbols* (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1963), 88.

[887] Or. 40.3, SC 358, 200-02.

[888] For example, χαρακτήρ, σφραγίς, τύπος and γράμμα. See Elm, "Inscriptions and Conversions," 4.

6.5.2 *Sacrament and Symbol*

It should be evident from the discussion so far that Gregory expects baptism to have a tremendous effect upon the Christian, as long as it is carried out correctly and faith in the Trinity is confessed.[889] The fact that baptism is a sacrament plays a significant role in Gregory's expectation of the ontological transformation of the *eikon*. Observe below Gregory's explanation of the cleansing which occurs through baptism:

> Since we are doubly made, I mean of soul and body, and our nature is, on the one hand, visible, and on the other, invisible, so is the cleansing double; through water, I say, and the Spirit. Whilst being received bodily the one is seen and the other encounters it apart from the body and is invisible. While the one is symbolic, the other is true (ἀληθής) and cleansing the depths.[890]

Gregory's description above further confirms my argument concerning the necessity of human vulnerability to God. Gregory argues that the way in which water cleanses the body at baptism symbolises a 'real' cleansing of the whole human person. This is only possible because the human person is created to be vulnerable to God and thus able to receive cleansing in the whole of her being.

Gregory explains that baptism is at once both symbolic and true, because it consists of both water and the Spirit. For this reason we may consider baptism as a symbolic occasion through which a real

[889] Or. 40.45, SC 358, 304-06; Nonna Verna Harrison, "Gregory Nazianzen's Festal Spirituality: Anamnesis and Mimesis," *Philosophy & Theology* 18, no. 1 (2006): 27-51.

[890] Or. 40.8, SC 358, 212. Gregory is insistent throughout Ors. 39 and 40 that baptism must be in both the Spirit and in water because human persons are both body and soul and Christ is both divine and human.

encounter with the Spirit occurs.[891] Martos explains the juxtaposition of symbol and reality by discussing Gregory's understanding of the "seal." The early Fathers understood the biblical metaphor as a metaphysical reality. They thought that the seal must be real because the Scriptures speak of the realities of faith. However, it could not be a physical reality, since the Spirit makes no physical mark on a person's body. Therefore it was an invisible or metaphysical reality which was impressed on the image of the person who received it.[892] This relates to Charles Taylor's notion of the premodern, "porous" self which I discussed earlier in this chapter.

Not only does Gregory go to great lengths to argue for the deity of the Spirit, the same Spirit is present in the sacrament through which Gregory expects a transformation of the *eikon*. This explains why Gregory refers to the power (δύναμις) of baptism on a number of occasions.[893] In making this move he reminds the reader of the Spirit's power through which the human *eikon* is transformed during baptism.

Gregory implies that he views the Holy Spirit working through the Eucharist in the same way, although he does not offer an oration dedicated to the subject of the Eucharist, nor does he offer details about the rite itself.[894] On the few occasions he mentions the Eucharist, Gregory varies his descriptions of it as a mystery (μυστήριον), a sacrifice (θυσίας) and spiritual bread (πνευματικὸς ἄρτος).[895] Nevertheless, the little Gregory writes is significant because he refers

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[891] Tollefsen, "Theosis According to Gregory," 265; Don E. Saliers, "Symbol in Liturgy: Tracing the Hidden Languages," *Worship* 58, no. 1 (1984): 37-48, 40. In other words, "A ritual occurring in the phenomenal world may correspond to something in the noumenal;" Bell, *Deliver Us from Evil*, 280.

[892] Joseph Martos, *Doors to the Sacred: A Historical Introduction to Sacraments in the Christian Church* (London: SCM Press, 1981), 49; Evgeny Lampert, *The Divine Realm: Towards a Theology of the Sacraments* (London: Faber and Faber, 1944), 110-11.

[893] Or. 40.7, SC 358, 210; 40.21, SC 358, 242; 40.23, SC 358, 246; 40.26, SC 358, 258.

[894] Sterk, *Renouncing the World*, 138.

[895] Or. 2.4, SC 247, 90-92; 2.95, SC 247, 212-14; 4.52, SC 309, 156; 18.29, PG 35, 1020C-1021B; Ep. 171, Gallay *Lettres 2*, 60-61; Or. 14.1, PG 35, 860A.

directly to the healing and theosis of the *eikon* as a result of the consummation of the consecrated bread and wine. In an oration in which he discusses the ideal philosopher's life he writes,

> Come, stand with me at my side, close to the holy things and this mystical table as I celebrate theosis through these (δεῦρό μοι στῆθι τῶν ἱερῶν πλησίον καὶ τῆς μυστικῆς ταύτης τραπέζης κάμοῦ τοῦ διὰ τούτων μυσταγωγοῦντος τὴν θέωσιν).[896]

Through his comment above, Gregory suggests that participation in the Eucharist continues the theosis experienced through the Holy Spirit at baptism. Furthermore, physical healing illustrates the work of the Holy Spirit at the Eucharist. Gregory describes in detail how his father, mother and sister all experience healing from varying physical ailments through eating and drinking the consecrated bread and wine.[897] In the case of his father's healing at the Eucharist, Gregory refers specifically to the power (δύναμις) of the Holy Spirit, as he does when speaking about baptism.[898] This leads me to suggest that Gregory envisages the Holy Spirit's role in the Eucharist as intrinsic to the sacrament to the same extent as at baptism.

However, transformation through the power of the Holy Spirit, whether at baptism or the Eucharist attracts unwanted attention from the devil. Even after the seal of baptism and participating in the Eucharist, the human *eikon* remains vulnerable; the vulnerability is both positive because the human person is participating in God through the Spirit, but negative since she is vulnerable to the schemes of the devil.

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[896] Or. 25.2, SC 284, 160.

[897] Father, Or. 18.28-29, PG 35, 1017C-1021B; Mother, Or. 18.30, PG 35, 1021B-1024B; Gorgonia, Or. 8.18, SC 405, 284-86.

[898] Or. 18.29, PG 35, 1020C-1021B.

6.6 Baptism and the Devil

The devil is ever present before, during and after baptism. This is because Gregory envisages baptism as the sacrament through which the *eikon* receives the healing that Christ has actuated; for this reason Gregory describes it as "a restoration of the *eikon* wounded by evil."[899] Baptism increases the divinity of the *eikon,* acting as a safeguard and as a sign of authority against the demonic realm.[900] However, the illumination, purification and theosis brought about by baptism causes the devil's envy of the *eikon* as at creation.[901] Setting his oration *On Baptism* in the context of a battle, Gregory writes, "Therefore let us be baptised so that we might be victorious."[902] I shall illustrate that the divinity and vulnerability of the *eikon* become extremely apparent through the devil's behaviour at baptism. In light of this, it is surprising that the devil is so often neglected by scholars who write about Gregory's baptismal theology.[903]

The theme of spiritual warfare is even more prevalent throughout baptism than at any other time in the Christian life, since the devil does not want the *eikon* to begin the process of becoming a god.[904] Gregory explicitly states that those who delay baptism are allowing the Evil One to cheat them.[905] He attributes this to the devil's deceptive nature:

> He is actually darkness, but he feigns light (ὄντως σκότος ἐστί,

[899] Or. 40.7, SC 358, 210.

[900] Or. 40.4, SC 358, 204.

[901] For the relationship between light and purification, see Alfeyev, *La chantre de la Luminère*, 294.

[902] Or. 40.11, SC 358, 218.

[903] The only detailed consideration regarding Gregory's approach to the human *eikon* and the devil at baptism is offered by Kalleres, "Demons and Divine Illumination," passim.

[904] Or. 40.10, SC 358, 216; 40.16, SC 358, 230.

[905] Or. 40.14, SC 358, 226.

> καὶ φῶς ὑποκρίνεται). When he no longer has the strength for open warfare, he plots in secret and becomes an 'honest' adviser, although he is really evil.[906]

Gregory exhorts his audience to know the adversary's plot and defend themselves. He assures them that they do not fight unarmed, as I observed earlier in my discussion of the Holy Spirit who acts as a shield for the *eikon*. After a long tirade directed at the devil's schemes Gregory concludes by observing that the devil even attacks those who are young: "he attaches himself to all ages, to every form of life, let him be rejected on all fronts."[907] Here we see that life itself is under threat, since the devil is interested in all living *eikones*. The battle with the devil does not end in baptism in spite of the effectiveness of the sacrament, since the devil appears immediately afterwards:

> After baptism, if the pursuer and tempter of light (ὁ τοῦ φωτὸς διώκτης καὶ πειραστής) makes an assault upon you - and he will make an assault upon you, mark my words, for he even made an assault upon the Logos, my God… you have a means of conquering.[908]

Following Christ's temptation in the Gospels, Gregory offers examples of how those baptised will be tempted by Satan.[909] The logic of this is that in the Gospel accounts, Christ's temptations occur immediately after his baptism; thus Gregory demonstrates that those baptised should model their lives on Christ's life. This is where we see that the divinity of the *eikon* is not only ontological, but also functional since Gregory argues that the *eikon* should function in a divine manner throughout her life on earth. Said another way, Gregory believes that

[906] Or. 40.16, SC 358, 230.

[907] Or. 40.16, SC 358, 232; 40.17, SC 258, 232-34.

[908] Or. 40.10, SC 358, 216.

[909] Matt 4:1-11; Luke 4:1-13.

the newly baptised should offer the same response to the devil as modelled by Christ. First, Gregory observes that the devil attempted to persuade Christ to turn stones into bread when Christ was hungry.[910] Gregory informs those who are baptised that if the devil tries the same trick on them, they should

> resist him with the saving word, which is the bread sent from heaven and giving graciously life to the world (τὸν λόγον ἀντίθες τὸν σωτικόν, ὅς ἐστιν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ πεμπόμενος ἄρτος καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ τὸ ζῆν χαριζόμενος).[911]

After this, in Matthew's Gospel, the devil tries to tempt Christ into throwing himself off the temple in order to prove his divinity (Matt 4:5-7, Luke 4: 9-12); likewise Gregory writes, "If he should plot against you through empty glory… do not be brought down through exaltation."[912]

After warning those who are baptised that the devil is well-acquainted with Scripture and therefore particularly wily and evil, Gregory concludes his discussion of spiritual warfare by drawing from the example given in Matthew 4:8-10 and Luke 4:5-6, where the devil shows Jesus all the kingdoms of the world and offers to give them to Jesus if he agrees to worship the devil. During this final piece of advice, Gregory addresses the question of how those who are baptised should respond when Satan tries to tempt them to bow down and worship him (the devil). In Matthew 4:10, Jesus responds, "Away with you, Satan! For it is written, 'Worship the Lord your God, and serve only him.'" Whilst Gregory offers a slightly different answer than that which appears in the gospels, he does recommend a response which involves the newly baptised believers addressing the devil directly. Although Gregory addresses the devil in several prayers and poems, it is the only occasion in his public orations where Gregory suggests speaking to the devil in

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910 Or 40.10, SC 358, 216; Matt 4: 2-4, Luke 4:2-4.

911 Or 40.10, SC 358, 216.

912 Or 40.10, SC 358, 216.

this way:

> If he should overcome you with insatiate desire, tracing out all the kingdoms, in one moment of time and view as though they belonged to him, demanding worship, look down on him as one who is poor. Say, confident in the seal, 'I, myself, am also an *eikon* of God, I have not yet been thrown down through pride from the glory above, like you. I am clothed in Christ; I have been remodelled as Christ by baptism, you ought to worship me!' He will depart, I know well, yielding and being shamed by these words, as he was by Christ the first light, thus will he depart from those who are enlightened by that same Christ.[913]

In a single, fluid move, Gregory provides three reasons why the devil should worship the newly baptised; first, she is an *eikon* of God; second, she is clothed in Christ; and third, she is remodelled as Christ. These three explanations appear to correspond with the three stages of creation, baptism, and subsequent theosis, as revealed in Scripture. Observe these thus: as I discussed in Chapter Four, in his oration *On the Theophany*, Gregory follows Genesis 1:26 by depicting the human person at creation as God's *eikon*.[914] This forms the first reason why Gregory expects worship from Satan, since Gregory argues that God's *eikon* is worthy of worship. Gregory's second reason for expecting worship from Satan is "being clothed in Christ", a metaphor which relates to baptism in Paul's letter to the Galatians, "As many of you as were baptised into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ" (Gal 3:27). Thus, I conclude that Gregory follows Paul in his appropriation of

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[913] Or. 40.10, SC 358, 218. Ἐὰν ἐξ ἁπληστίας καταπαλαίῃ σε, πάσας ὑποδεικνύων τὰς βασιλείας, ὡς αὐτῷ διαφερούσας, ἐν μιᾷ καιροῦ ῥοπῇ τε καὶ ὄψεως, ἀπαιτῶν τὴν προσκύνησιν, ὡς πένητος καταφρόνησον. Εἰπέ, τῇ σφραγῖδι θαρρήσας· Εἰκών εἰμι καὶ αὐτὸς Θεοῦ· τῆς ἄνω δόξης οὔπω δι' ἔπαρσιν, ὥσπερ σύ, καταβέβλημαι· Χριστὸν ἐνδέδυμαι, Χριστὸν μεταπεποίημαι τῷ βαπτίσματι· σύ με προσκύνησον. Ἀπελεύσεται, σαφῶς οἶδα, τούτοις ἠττημένος καὶ ᾐσχυμμένος, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ τοῦ πρώτου φωτὸς οὕτω τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου πεφωτισμένων.

[914] Or. 38:11, SC 358, 124.

baptism as a sacrament which clothes the believer in Christ; this brings a renewed identity for the newly baptised as one who is a restored child of God. Gregory's third and final reason for Satan worshipping the newly baptised is because they have been "remodelled as Christ." Gregory uses μεταπεποιόω to describe this action, for which a probable translation is "change the quality of."[915] The overall notion is one of a change in the human person, who after baptism is worthy of worship.

Whilst Gregory's demand for worship has been described as a "self-professed divinity," he is speaking to all those who have been baptised, explaining that anyone who has been "sealed" is worthy of receiving worship from the devil.[916] In demanding worship, Gregory does not envisage himself or other believers committing idolatry, since he is strongly opposed to "that first and last of all evils, idolatry and the transfer of worship from the Creator to the creatures."[917] Therefore, the fact that he is commanding the devil to bow down and worship those who are baptised presents us with a conundrum. How is it that Gregory, who despises idolatry, would advocate that a human *eikon* should receive worship, even though she has been remodelled as Christ? What does he reveal through this expectation? Before I make my suggestions, I shall make a brief excursus on Gregory's use of "worship", since the way in which Gregory applies προσκυνέω is central to my argument.

6.6.1 *Προσκυνέω*

Gregory's appropriation of προσκυνέω, which I have translated as 'worship,' is of great significance, since it can be interpreted in varying ways. For example, Fulford has opted to translate προσκυνέω as "reverence"[918] whereas Harrison has retained "worship."[919] If we turn

[915] *PGL*, 860.

[916] Kalleres, "Demons and Divine Illumination," 163.

[917] Or. 38.12, SC 358, 128-30.

[918] Fulford, *Divine Eloquence*, 96.

[919] Harrison, *Festal Orations*, 106.

to Lampe, he offers a number of translations including, "make obeisance to an emperor, venerate, revere, worship deified men, adore, worship of pagan images."[920] Liddell, Scott and Jones offer a similar variety: "Make obeisance to the gods or their images, fall down and worship, throw a kiss to a god, do reverence to, respect."[921] Expanding our search to the New Testament reveals that προσκυνέω refers to reverence or worship paid to human persons; but that this meant that they were considered to belong "to a superhuman realm." [922] Whilst the range of interpretation is broad, it points towards an act of reverence being paid to a person or deity who is considered to be 'divine.'

In the eighth and ninth centuries, during the Byzantine iconoclast controversy, a distinction was made between προσκυνέω and λατρεύω; the former encompassed the worship of images and icons, whereas the latter was used for the worship of God alone.[923] However, this division occurred many centuries after Gregory was writing, therefore it would be anachronistic to assume he had this particular distinction in mind. Since my primary concern is how Gregory himself has applied προσκυνέω, I shall turn to the texts in which Gregory describes the action of προσκυνέω. He uses the verb on over ninety occasions and in a variety of ways, from attacking the worship of idols,[924] to defending the deity of the Holy Spirit.[925] Added to this, as I described in Chapter Four, Gregory applies προσκυνέω to describe the human person as a "mixed worshipper," which means that

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[920] *PGL,* 1174-76. Aristotle includes it in his list of ways to honour men who are famous for doing good, *Rhetoric* 1361a. For comments on Gregory's use of προσκυνέω in Oration 4, see Alois Kurmann, *Gregor von Nazianz: Oratio 4 gegen Julian. Ein Kommentar* (Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt, 1988), 270-73.

[921] LSJ, 1518.

[922] Danker and Bauer, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 82-83.

[923] *PGL*, 1032. Gregory often applies λατρεία to the service or adoration of God by angels (Or. 17.12, PG 35, 980C) and people (Or. 26.5, SC 284, 236; 11.6, SC 405, 342; 23.1, SC 270, 280; 37.18, SC 318, 304). On two occasions Gregory uses the verb λατρεύω apologetically to argue that one cannot serve that which is created rather than God; Or. 5.28, SC 309, 350; 37.17, SC 318, 306.

[924] Or. 4.81, SC 309, 206.

[925] Or. 40.42, SC 358, 296.

God mixes his breath with dust in order to form a unified, dynamic living person. A purpose of this newly created human *eikon* is to worship God.[926]

The most noteworthy occasion of Gregory's use of προσκυνέω, which relates to my discussion concerning Gregory's demand for worship from the devil, concerns his proclamation, "I worship the Father, I worship the Son, I worship the Holy Spirit (προσκυνῶ πατέρα, προσκυνῶ τὸν ὑιὸν, προσκυνῶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον)**."**[927] Since Gregory uses προσκυνέω to express his adoration of the Trinity and also in defence of deity of the Spirit, we may assume that he understands it to be an appropriate action to denote human reverence of God. By following the convention in the Gospels, and by choosing to use this particular verb to depict how the devil should be responding to the *eikon*, Gregory implies that he considers the *eikon* worthy of being worshipped in a manner akin to the way in which God is worshipped, or, said another way, Gregory considers the *eikon* to be 'divine' after baptism. In light of this, I shall return to the question which I posed at the end of the previous section, "How is it that Gregory, who despises idolatry, would advocate that a human *eikon* should receive worship, even though she has been remodelled as Christ?"

There are two responses to this: The first is that Gregory intended the devil to bow to the presence of Christ in the believer, and did not imagine that his reader would think he was suggesting that those baptised are now worthy of worship on their own account.[928] However, in his response to the devil, Gregory does not simply say, "I am an *eikon* of God;" rather he says, "I, myself, am *also* an *eikon* of God (my italics, εἰκών εἰμι καὶ αὐτὸς Θεοῦ)." The use of καὶ αὐτὸς implies that there is another *eikon* of God, which exists in addition to human

[926] Or. 38.11, SC 358, 126.

[927] Or. 37.24, SC 318, 318; 20.5, SC 270, 66.

[928] Thanks to Ben Fulford for this suggestion at the Society of the Study of Theology conference in Nottingham in April 2015 where I gave a paper concerning this question.

eikones. In the context of the oration, this other *eikon* can only refer to the devil or Christ. I reject the former, on the basis that Gregory does not actually refer to angels, fallen or otherwise, as *eikones* of God anywhere in his orations or poetry, as I discussed in Chapter Four. As I have argued throughout the project, Gregory follows Genesis in depicting the *eikon* of God as a privilege reserved for the human person who is modelled after the pattern of Christ. Hence, when Gregory says, "I, myself, am *also* an *eikon* of God" it is most likely that he would intend his reader to understand him as saying, "Christ is the *Eikon* of God and I am also an *eikon* of God." Therefore, I suggest that Gregory intends the devil not only to worship the presence of Christ within the restored, baptised *eikones*, but also to worship them on their own account, precisely because they are *eikones* of God like Christ.

After baptism, the *eikon* is worthy of worship because of the incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit through baptism. However, we are still left wondering; how does Gregory reconcile the devil's worship of the *eikon* with his strict understanding of a monotheistic faith? An explanation can be found in a pseudepigraphal tradition, of which I suggest that Gregory was aware, where it was legitimate to worship the *eikon*, namely, *Life of Adam and Eve*.

6.6.2 *Worshipping the Eikon*

As I established in Chapter 2.2, Gregory was in no doubt about the books of Scripture which he thought should be in the canon.[929] However, as I have already established, Gregory appealed to numerous extra-biblical sources to inform his poetry and orations. In light of this, I add here to those traditions and authors already proposed, a tradition upon which I believe Gregory drew. I suggest that informing Gregory's demand for worship from the devil is a pseudepigraphal tradition in

[929] Carm. 1.1.12, PG 37, 471-474.

which the human *eikon* is worshipped. Whilst in pseudepigraphal literature there are a number of works where a human figure is worshipped, only one of those to my knowledge connects the worship of the *eikon* to the fall of the devil, as Gregory has done in our passage under consideration, namely, *Life of Adam and Eve*.[930] It is the earliest extant "witness of a tradition in which Adam at his creation is worshipped by angels."[931] Defying conclusive agreement regarding dating, scholars argue as widely as from the third century B.C. through to the seventh century A.D.[932] It survives in a number of versions, all of which are concerned with the lives of Adam and Eve after they have been banished from the Garden of Eden until their deaths. It is the Latin version, *Life of Adam and Eve* (*Vitae Adae et Evae),* well known as *Vita,* which is most relevant to my argument.[933] Sanders has argued that some early Jewish and then early Christian communities must have thought highly of these pseudepigraphal texts as to share them so

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[930] Other sources in which a human figure is worshipped include, *Similitudes of Enoch*, Ethiopian *Enoch* 48:5, 62:6-9, 46:5; Alexander the Great's encounter with Jewish high priest in Josephus (*Ant.* 11:331-335); Simon ben Onias in *Sirach* 44:1-50:11, where a Jewish high priest is worshipped.

[931] Crispin H.T. Fletcher-Louis, "The Worship of Divine Humanity as God's Image," in *The Jewish Roots of Christological Monotheism*, ed. Carey C. Newman, James R. Davila, and Gladys S. Lewis (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 112-28, 114.

[932] Gary A. Anderson, Michael E. Stone, and Johannes Tromp, *Literature on Adam and Eve: Collected Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Michael E. Stone, *A History of the Literature of Adam and Eve* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992).

[933] For synoptic presentation of English, Armenian, Georgian, Greek, Latin, and Slavonic texts, see Gary A. Anderson and Michael E. Stone, *A Synopsis of the Books of Adam and Eve*, 2nd rev. ed. (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1999). For the most recent critical edition, see Jean-Pierre Pettorelli et al., *Vita latina Adae et Evae*, vol. 19, CCSA (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2013). The Greek version is entitled the *Apocalypse of Moses* (abbreviated here as *Ap.Mos*.) Also in circulation are the Slavonic *Life of Adam and Eve*, Armenian *Penitence of Adam* and a few Coptic versions in fragments. For the reception in the Syriac Christian tradition, see Sergey Minov, "Satan's Refusal to Worship Adam: A Jewish Motif and Its Reception in Syriac Christian Tradition," in *Tradition, Transmission, and Transformation from Second Temple Literature through Judaism and Christianity in Late Antiquity: Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Symposium of the Orion Center for the Study of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Associated Literature, Jointly Sponsored by the Hebrew University Center for the Study of Christianity, 22–24 February, 2011*, ed. Menahem Kister, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 230-71.

widely,[934] and from the dating of various manuscripts of the *Vita* tradition, we know that the "document enjoyed wide circulation amongst Christians."[935] Added to this, Cameron writes that with regard to the spread of discourse it is necessary to

> draw on a range of material far wider than what would eventually become the New Testament canon, if we are to do justice and if we do not wish to give a false impression of unity.[936]

However, since it is not clear exactly how the tradition was received, I shall attempt a "heuristic comparison," which compares themes rather than analysing identical language.[937] In the discussion that follows, I do not claim that Gregory was reading *Vita* or indeed that he was reading the Greek version from which the relevant fragment is missing, rather that the tradition relayed is one with which Gregory was familiar.

When Gregory says to the devil "you should worship me" he draws attention to the fact that unlike the devil, he has not fallen from heaven, saying, "I have not yet been thrown down through pride from the glory above, like you."[938] In *Vita* 12-14, the devil's refusal to worship the *imago* of God is a key component in the devil's banishment from heaven. God creates Adam as his *imago*, after which the archangel Michael calls the other angels to come and worship the *imago* of God:

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[934] James Sanders, "Why the Pseudepigrapha?," in *The Pseudepigrapha and Early Biblical Interpretation*, ed. James H. Charlesworth and Craig A. Evans (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 13-19.

[935] Michael D. Johnson, "Life of Adam and Eve," in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, ed. James H. Charlesworth (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1985), 249-95, 252.

[936] Averil Cameron, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 41.

[937] For this method, see Ann Conway-Jones, *Gregory of Nyssa's Tabernacle Imagery in Its Jewish and Christian Contexts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[938] Or. 40.10, SC 358, 218. Since the *Vita* text is in Latin rather than Greek, I shall use the Latin *imago*, rather than *eikon* when citing *Vita*.

"And having gone out Michael called all the angels saying, 'Worship the *imago* of the Lord God, just as the Lord God has instructed'."[939] The devil not only refuses, but assuming a rather arrogant position replies, "he ought to worship me."[940] Michael does not give up but intensifies his command, saying, "Worship the *imago* of God. If you do not worship him, the Lord God will become angry with you."[941] The devil's response is to continue to refuse to worship Adam as God's *imago*, the consequence of which is that he is cast out of heaven.[942] As Levison writes, "Adam's being the image becomes the source of enmity between Satan and himself."[943] In light of this, I suggest that Gregory is aware of the tradition where there is a conversation between Michael and the devil, when Gregory declares to the devil, "*You* ought to worship *me*," as though he is indignant that the devil has previously refused to worship the human *eikon* of God. In both *On Baptism* and *Vita*, the opponent of the devil and the devil himself are seen to be speaking in the first person and there is a symmetry with Michael demanding three times that the devil worship the *imago* of God, and Gregory providing three reasons why the devil should worship baptised followers as restored *eikones* of God.

It will be apparent that I have been comparing the Latin version *Vita* rather than the Greek version, *Ap.Mos.* due to the loss of the manuscripts for the relevant section in Greek.[944] However, the demand

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[939] *Vita* 14.

[940] *Vita* 14, "ille me debet adorare", see Pettorelli et al., *Vita latina Adae et Evae*, 459.

[941] "adora imaginem dei. si autem non adorare ris, irascetur tibi dominus deus" ibid. The passage in *Vita* simply, "illustrates the plausibility that the notion of Adam having been worshipped (and the Legitimacy principle it implies) had emerged in pre-Christian Judaism;" David Steenberg, "The Worship of Adam and Christ as the Image of God," *JSNT* 39 (1990): 95-109, 98. For Adam's created glory, see Robin Scroggs, *The Last Adam: A Study in Pauline Anthropology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 95-109; Fletcher-Louis, "The Worship of Divine Humanity," 112-28.

[942] *Vita* 16.

[943] Levison, *Portraits of Adam*, 178.

[944] For reasons why the Greek tradition would have been familiar with

for Satan's worship of the *eikon* occurs in Greek in the *Writings of Bartholomew*,[945] an elusive work which attained some popularity since it was transcribed in Latin and Coptic, Greek being the original language.[946] Stone argues that the missing chapters of this scene in *Ap.Mos.* would have been known by the author of *Writings of Bartholomew*; thus it is possible that Gregory received the tradition via the *Writings of Bartholomew*.[947] However, since the dating of this literature is sketchy, I suggest this tentatively. Gregory's apparent use of this tradition builds on my argument that his doctrine of theosis was informed strongly by Judeo-Christian ideas, rather than solely Stoic or Platonic thought.

In light of the *Vita* tradition, I shall return once more to the question "How is it that Gregory, who despises idolatry, would advocate

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chapters 11-17 of the Latin and a conclusion that the fall of the devil is an integral part of all the *Adam* books, see Michael E. Stone, "The Fall of Satan and Adam's Penance: Three Notes on the Books of Adam and Eve," *JTS* 44, no. 1 (1993): 143-95, 154-56.

945 For an overview of scholarship on Bartholomew, see James K. Elliott, *The Apocryphal New Testament: A Collection of Apocryphal Christian Literature in an English Translation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Also, see Jean-Daniel Kaestli and Pierre Cherix, *L'Évangile de Barthélemy d'après deux écrits apocryphes* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1993). The dating of the works is vague, which leads Elliott to suggest anywhere between second and sixth centuries. Also, see Émil Turdeanu, *Apocryphes slaves et roumains de l'Ancien Testament*, vol. 5, SVTP (Leiden: Brill, 1981). For a dating arguing somewhere in third century, see Felix Scheidweiler, "The Gospel of Bartholomew," in *New Testament Apocrypha: Volume One*, ed. Edgar Hennecke, Wilhelm Schneemelcher, and R. McL. Wilson (London: Lutterworth, 1963), 484-508. In spite of Jerome referring to a *Gospel of Bartholomew* in the prologue to his *Commentary on Matthew*, Wilmart and Tisserant have shown that there is no evidence that antiquity was familiar with the particular text which goes under the name of either *Gospel of Bartholomew* or *Writings of Bartholomew*; see André Wilmart and Eugène Tisserant, "Fragments grecs et latins de l'Évangile de Barthélemy," *RB* 10 (1913): 161–90, 321–68.

946 James K. Elliott provides an evaluation of the recent German translations of the New Testament Apocrypha; see "The 'New' Hennecke," *JSNT* 35, no. 3 (2013): 285-300. For linguistic discussion on "Proskynesis" and "Adorare", where Berte M. Marti argues successfully that the two words are the literary equivalent of one another, read "Proskynesis and Adorare," *Language* 12 (1936): 272-82.

947 For a comparison of the *Gospel of Bartholomew* which points towards the missing chapters in *Ap.Mos., s*ee Stone, *History of Lit. of Adam and Eve*, 21, n.60.

that a human *eikon* should receive worship?" In answer to this question I suggest that Gregory was aware of the tradition in which the *eikon* was offered worship by angels, and more specifically, the devil's refusal to worship the *eikon* made by God. As I discussed in Chapter Two, on certain occasions Gregory presents the human *eikon* as though she is comparable with a pagan *eikon*, but with a striking difference; namely that God breathes spirit into her and creates her according to the true *Eikon* Christ. Yet again, in this scene where he demands worship from the devil, Gregory approaches the human *eikon* as though she is literally a physical *eikon* of God. This means that Christ receives the glory when his *eikon* is worshipped in his place.

As I have argued throughout this project, I am challenging the numerous scholars who have pointed to Gregory's identification of the *eikon* as the spiritual intellect alone. According to this, Gregory's sense of self could be understood only in terms of a disembodied intellect when he states, "I am an *eikon* of God." However, when we consider the occasions upon which Gregory also identifies the *eikon* as the whole human person, we may assume that Gregory means his unified body and soul.[948] This is particularly clear in light of Gregory's interpretation in this scene where the human *eikon* is literally a physical *eikon* of God.

Gregory departs notably from the *Vita* tradition, which itself concludes with the death of Adam. Gregory offers hope of restoration in which the *eikon* is worthy of worship from the devil once more because of the healing actuated by Christ, effected through the Holy Spirit at baptism. Gregory expects that the *eikon* should receive worship from the devil as a sign of her identity, which is "becoming a god"; a god who is fit to receive worship on behalf of her Creator. Gregory's suggestion of the devil's worship of the *eikon* strengthens my argument that Gregory anticipates an ontological transformation through the process of theosis and denotes that the human person functions in a divine

[948] Also, see Or. 34.12, SC 318, 218. For different senses of self in ancient writers, see Richard Sorabji, *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and Death* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 32-53.

manner. It also emphasises both how theosis is constantly under threat, and that the *eikon* herself remains vulnerable.

The divinity conferred through baptism does not mean that the Christian is invincible, which is where the paradoxical existence of human life becomes apparent once more. On the one hand the baptised believer is restored to her created divine potential and worthy of worship by the devil, but on the other hand she is still extremely vulnerable, of which the devil himself and the human person's own propensity to sin are constant reminders.[949] For this reason, life after baptism continues to be one where the *eikon* wrestles with the devil and with sin.

6.7 Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, I have built on my previous argument that the dynamic existence of the *eikon* is 'divine, yet vulnerable.' I have discussed how we interpret the notion of a divine *eikon*, and more specifically, the theosis of the *eikon*, since this is an area of dispute amongst scholars. I began by outlining the most predominant questions amongst scholars concerning the divinity of the *eikon* which are a) the question of Gregory's primary sources and influences; and b) whether the divinity of the *eikon* which occurs through the process of theosis should be spoken of as metaphorical or literal? I expanded the latter question by arguing that scholars would be better served if they were to ask whether Gregory envisages the divinity of the *eikon* in ontological terms, functional terms, or both?

Answering a), I considered the various ways in which Gregory appealed to Scripture and pseudepigraphal writings. I argued that we should not overlook these sources when we consider Gregory's ideas about theosis, since offering a purely philosophical reading means that we miss aspects of Gregory's interpretation of the Judeo-Christian

[949] Contra Winslow, "Orthodox Baptism," 371.

approach to the *eikon*. Furthermore, Gregory functioned in the fourth century as an influential Christian bishop, whose excellent knowledge of Scripture is evidenced throughout his work; thus it is a nonsensical move to consider his work without any awareness of how he draws on Scripture. His consistent references to the devil highlight the manner in which he interprets the *eikon* in light of the narrative which he sees in the Bible and the Christian tradition.

Answering b), the problem of whether Gregory considers the divinity of the *eikon* in metaphorical or literal terms, I argued that Gregory presents the divinity and theosis of the *eikon* as a literal and ontological transformation. I arrived at this conclusion by approaching the question from four different perspectives. First, I recalled my argument in Chapter Four, where I demonstrated that Gregory presents God as creating the human *eikon* specifically to be vulnerable to God. This is evident through the way in which God creates the *eikon* as a mixture of the *eikon* and dust, where the *eikon* transforms the dust to form a dynamic, unified human *eikon*. I built on this argument by considering how the porous premodern worldview was radically different from the modern worldview. In order to explain this, I drew on the work of Charles Taylor who contends that the premodern self was considered to be porous or permeable to spirits, rather than invulnerable to the external world. The result of this for Gregory's doctrine of theosis is that when he speaks about the Holy Spirit deifying the human person, Gregory conceives theosis as 'real,' since the human person is porous to the Holy Spirit, precisely because she is made as the *eikon* of God. It is possible to speak of the divinity of the *eikon* in ontological terms because the fourth-century worldview was one in which the porous human person could be transformed by the Holy Spirit to the extent that she could be called god, without achieving ontological equality with God.

Secondly, I moved on to discuss Gregory's particular doctrine of the Holy Spirit. I highlighted that Gregory argues uniquely that the Holy Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and to the Son; thus he declares

that the Holy Spirit is God. This is significant because it is the Holy Spirit's role to deify the *eikon* through baptism. In light of this, it is impossible for the *eikon* to remain unaffected and undeified by the Holy Spirit's presence, since the Spirit transforms the human *eikon* ontologically.

Thirdly, I considered baptism as the sacrament through which the Holy Spirit deifies the *eikon*; I demonstrated that Gregory understands baptism to effect a real change in the believer. This builds on my argument that theosis can be spoken of as ontological divinity. The theosis of the *eikon* continues through participation in the Eucharist, care of the poor, asceticism, prayer and good doctrine. As I have already stated, discussion of these remains for a further project.

Fourthly and finally, I moved on to consider the interaction between the *eikon* and the devil at baptism. I highlighted that the devil goes to great lengths to prevent baptism because he understands that baptism is integral to the theosis of the *eikon*. Here, I analysed Gregory's unusual demand for worship from the devil. Gregory's conviction that those who are baptised should receive worship confirms further his presentation of the ontological and functional divinity of the *eikon*; ontological in the sense that the presence of the Holy Spirit through baptism genuinely deifies the believer, and functional in the sense that the devil should worship the *eikon* as one should worship God. I demonstrated the biblical and pseudepigraphal themes from which Gregory drew, arguing once more that it is to the detriment of interpretation if we consider philosophical sources alone for Gregory's work. The constant battle between the *eikon* and the devil is most aptly read in light of Judeo-Christian traditions, in which the devil is a prominent figure.

Additionally, I shall attempt a "working" description of the divinity and theosis of the *eikon*. I use the term "working" because my aim is to interpret Gregory as faithfully as possible; since he defines the divinity of the *eikon* as a "great mystery", it would be misleading to suggest too confined a definition. Drawing from all the examples I have

discussed thus far, the evidence demonstrates that Gregory's concept of theosis must be understood in light of both a robust theological anthropology and pneumatology, where the human *eikon* is divine precisely because God creates her to be vulnerable to God. The negative implications of her vulnerability are that the theosis of the human *eikon* cannot occur without a struggle, since the envious devil attempts to destroy her at every opportunity. The divinity of the *eikon* should be understood in terms of being spiritually alive, since her divinity is set apart from the divinity of pagan *eikones*, precisely because she relates ontologically to God. Theosis then depicts the dynamic process of God's intended ontological transformation of the human *eikon*. This is possible only through participation in Christ's life, death and resurrection, in which human *eikones* partake through baptism by the power of the Holy Spirit, accompanied by a life of communion with God.

With a clearer understanding of how Gregory envisages the divine and vulnerable life of the human *eikon*, I move now to my concluding chapter. Here I shall summarise my overall argument regarding Gregory's approach, pointing to where Gregory's approach to the human *eikon* offers a robust critique of contemporary theological anthropology.

Chapter 7 Conclusion

This project has sought to demonstrate that Gregory Nazianzen's approach to the *eikon* of God is multifaceted and complex; he theologises upon the ontology, relation, function and experience of human *eikones,* rather than only focusing upon the question, "what is a human *eikon*?" For this reason, I have summarised Gregory's approach as 'divine, yet vulnerable,' in the hope that this is succinct, yet open enough to allow for further enquiry.

Gregory's approach to the human *eikon* is inherently theological. He interprets human *eikones* in light of the following: Christ, the identical *Eikon*; the one God who is Father, Son and Holy Spirit; the cosmos and all created beings, both spiritual and 'mixed.' Gregory's unique approach depicts the human *eikon* in her day-to-day existence; which for Gregory involves struggling with the 'world,' the 'flesh,' and the 'devil.'

A closer reading of the texts has challenged the popular view amongst scholars that Gregory presents the human *eikon* solely as the soul or the spiritual intellect. Rather, I have argued that Gregory's vision of the human *eikon* extends much further than this; the *eikon* relates not only to the soul or the spiritual intellect but also to the whole human person, comprising a dynamic human *eikon*. I arrived at this argument from the following routes: in Chapters Three and Four I discussed Gregory's application of μίξις and κρᾶσις with respect to both the mixture of divine and human in Christ, and *eikon* and dust in the human person. Gregory's application of mixture language entails that the *eikon* transforms the flesh/body/dust to form a unified, single, dynamic human person, following the pattern of Christ, who is 'one.' Added to this, Chapter Three demonstrated that Gregory treats Christ as the identical *Eikon* in the flesh, thus presenting Christ as a physical *Eikon*, upon whom the human *eikon* is modelled. Gregory's description of Christ as a "living being" informs our understanding of physical human *eikones*, for a human *eikon* is also living and dynamic like Christ, which

sets her apart from pagan *eikones* that are static and lifeless in comparison.

In Chapter Two I discussed the occasions upon which Gregory refers to the human *eikon* as she occurs in Genesis, alongside the backdrop of contemporary ideas about pagan statues and paintings. I argued that Gregory was influenced to a certain extent by contemporary statuary, since he treats the human *eikon* quite literally as a breathing statue of God, who should be worshipped in the same manner as one would worship a pagan *eikon* or god. For example, I determined that when speaking about Basil at the altar, Gregory describes him as though he were a physical *eikon.* Building on this, in Chapter Four I explored Gregory's treatment of women who wear cosmetics, establishing that Gregory envisages the use of cosmetics as reducing the *eikon* to an idol. In Chapter Six I focused on Gregory's demand for worship from the devil, where Gregory expects the devil to worship him precisely because he is an *eikon* of God. In light of this, Gregory expects those who are baptised to be treated in the same way as one would treat a statue of a god, i.e. to be worshipped.

Through all these examples, observe that the *eikon* relates not only to the soul but also to the whole human person. This results in human *eikones* being literally physical *eikones* who bear the presence of God. I do not deny that Gregory presents the *eikon* as the soul or spiritual intellect on numerous occasions, however this project has shown that Gregory does not halt there; rather his ideas encompass both the soul and the unified soul and body together. Said another way, Gregory interprets *eikon* both metaphorically and literally. Gregory's view of the human *eikon* is also collective in the sense that it describes the dynamic nature of humankind, whilst at the same time describing each human person. Thus, Gregory's approach is open, offering a complex theological perspective of what it might mean for a human person to image God.

The second area of research I have challenged throughout this project concerns Gregory's consistent use of biblical and extra-biblical

material as the primary source of inspiration for the human *eikon*. Gregory's view of the human *eikon* entails not only complex metaphysics, but encompasses the whole of the biblical narrative. Within the context of Christ, the identical *Eikon*, he follows the human *eikon* from her creation through her fall, subsequent restoration and theosis. The root of Gregory's view of how the human *eikon* functions lies in Scripture. For example, his depiction of the human *eikon* at creation as a "king", whose function entails overseeing the earth, draws directly from the mandate given to the first human *eikones* in Genesis 1:26-28. Following this, having been banished from paradise Gregory locates the human *eikon* within a cosmological struggle against the devil and sin, which is read most clearly in light of biblical and extra-biblical literature. Although Gregory is undoubtedly influenced by philosophical sources, we must incorporate his application of the biblical narrative, if we are to be faithful to the fullness of his interpretation of the human *eikon.*

The third area where I have extended the boundaries of the current field relates to Gregory's description of the *eikon* as "divine." As I have demonstrated, this declaration has often confounded scholars, primarily because of its boldness. Generally, the conclusion is that Gregory cannot really mean what he is writing; consequently, his ideas are reduced to "empty rhetoric." Contrary to this, I have shown that if we consider together a) Gregory's theological anthropology in which God creates the human person specifically to be vulnerable (or porous) to the spiritual realm; b) Gregory's high pneumatology, and the lengths to which he goes in order to argue the consubstantial divinity of the Holy Spirit; c) Gregory's theological approach to baptism as the sacrament through which the Holy Spirit deifies the human *eikon*; and d) Gregory's interaction with the devil after baptism in which he demands worship from his enemy, then we must take Gregory's ideas about a 'divine' *eikon* seriously. We may understand the 'divinity' of the human *eikon* as ontological, functional, and relational where the human *eikon* both participates in and whose purpose is to function like the

identical *Eikon*, Christ. When we consider Gregory's positioning of the *eikon* in light of Christ, we must take care to hold at the same time Gregory's high pneumatology. Since the Holy Spirit deifies the *eikon*, we cannot faithfully speak of the divinity of the *eikon* without a strong account of the Spirit.

In light of all that I have discussed thus far, I return to the phrase 'divine, yet vulnerable,' as a means of summarising Gregory's view of the human *eikon*. I hope that it is sufficiently open enough to account for Gregory's continual questions concerning human experience, encouraging further investigation. 'Vulnerable' allows both positive and negative interpretations; the human *eikon* is vulnerable to God and thus 'divine', but she is also vulnerable to the demonic powers of darkness, together with sin. 'Divine', as I have already argued, is to be understood ontologically, functionally and relationally since it encompasses varying aspects of existence as a human *eikon*.

Moving Forward

This project paves the way for at least three viable areas of further research. The first continues to be located in historical theology and concerns the theosis of the human *eikon* after baptism. As I have already stated, space constraints have prevented me from continuing to explore the theosis of the human *eikon* after her transformation through the Spirit at baptism. Thus, this remains as "part two" of the wider project. Included in this work will be an analysis of the afterlife of the *eikon*, i.e. the life of the human *eikon* after her death until the arrival of the eschaton. Throughout this project, I have restricted my exploration of the human *eikon* to her life on earth. I have not pursued what happens after she dies, since this relates less directly to this current project. Whilst I am confident that the unified, dynamic, vulnerable and divine existence of the human *eikon* on earth continues through to the afterlife, this remains to be tested in a further study.

The second area considers the overlap between historical

theology and biblical studies. I have merely scratched the surface of the correlation between Gregory's ideas and those in the Bible and extra-biblical literature. Specifically, in relation to his theological anthropology, I have pointed to where Gregory has applied Genesis, Pauline theology, the "garments of glory" tradition, Enoch 2 and *Life of Adam and Eve*. This project has shown that Gregory's use of the concept of 'glory' is one shared with such literature, thus providing sufficient evidence that further enquiry would be profitable.

Finally, my reading of Gregory's work on the human *eikon* serves as a corrective to current discussions in Western theological anthropology. This is a critical work upon which I plan to embark next. It involves the following lines of enquiry: first, as I highlighted in Chapter One, contemporary scholars tend to view the human *eikon* (*imago Dei*) through a single lens, such as Christology, structure, relation or function. One of the many problems with the "single-lens" approach is that it is reductive and exclusive. For example, one might struggle to denote as an *imago Dei,* a person with a severe intellectual disability, if the framework posits the *imago Dei* as the intellect alone. Most theologians would agree that this is unacceptable.[950] If one works through the remaining categories for the *imago Dei* in Western theological anthropology, corresponding critiques ensue, since no category alone is wholly inclusive. Gregory's non-reductive approach to the human *eikon* avoids this trap, for his ability to hold together a metaphorical and literal interpretation of the *eikon* means that he describes more than just one aspect of being human; thus Gregory's multifaceted approach incorporates female, male, young, old, able or disabled. All human persons may participate in God and function as an *eikon* of God, precisely because they bear God's presence and point to their Creator. My second critique concerns the discussions in contemporary theological anthropology which often view human

[950] Erinn Staley, "Intellectual Disability and Mystical Unknowing: Contemporary Insights from Medieval Sources," *Modern Theology* 28, no. 3 (2012): 385-401.

existence in isolation from the world in which human *eikones* exist. This is problematic because it leads to a notion of the *imago Dei* as 'buffered.' For example, in the emerging field of vulnerability studies, scholars speak of the *imago Dei* as invulnerable.[951] They make this move because they mistakenly consider human relationships with other humans only, rather than also discussing human relationships with God in the context of the whole universe, and in particular, spiritual beings. In Chapter Six, drawing on the work of Charles Taylor, I explained that this is one of the negative effects of the Enlightenment. Contemporary engagement with early theologians such as Gregory repositions human *eikones* in the light of their relationship both with God and the world in which they inhabit.[952] Consequently, we have a framework whereby the human *eikon* is created as vulnerable to the Holy Spirit; hence she participates in God, as a 'spiritually alive' person. Moreover, the account of the human person as an *eikon* of God remains inherently theological, providing a robust account in light of Christology and Pneumatology.

Final Thoughts

This project's ultimate goal was to provide a thorough analysis of Gregory Nazianzen's account of being a human *eikon*, in the hope that with a comprehensive interpretation of Gregory's work, I will move on to a further work which both challenges and contributes to discussions in contemporary theological anthropology. For the reasons I have already mentioned, I believe that Gregory's approach warrants serious consideration. One final comment: as a Christian living in the West, I have grown up with what often appears to be a rather negative account of being human. Discussions of sin have often obscured the glory of

[951] Elizabeth O'Donnell Gandolfo, *The Power and Vulnerability of Love* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 204.

[952] "Vulnerability Studies" is an emerging "new field of interdisciplinary inquiry," see ibid., 3; Kristine Culp, *Vulnerability and Glory* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2010). Neither Culp nor O'Donnell Gandolfo account for the spiritual realm in their theses.

being an *imago Dei*. Gregory does not veer away from the problems of sin, nevertheless, following the Eastern Christian tradition, he offers a more positive account of how a human person may image God, incorporating into his account of the human *eikon* how she may become divine, through his doctrine of theosis.

On a practical note, it is imperative to reimagine continually how we both live and narrate the Christian story within each generation. Gregory's narrative of a 'divine, yet vulnerable' human *eikon* speaks more positively to postmodern people than a story that focuses predominantly on sin. Thus, I believe that Gregory's narrative of the human *eikon* contributes significantly not only to Western Christian theological anthropology, but also serves as a compelling retelling of the Gospel in the twenty-first century.

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