Factors Critical to Peacekeeping Achieving Stability: Learning from the African Union's Peace Operations

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In memory of my sister Josephine and father Alexander, two very peaceful souls

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To all who believe in a Just World and the Dignity of Humanity

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THESIS ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the factors that determine the provision of stability in peacekeeping operations and the peacekeeping operations of the African Union (AU). It makes theoretical and empirical contributions, and supports the claim that the AU has been effective in peacekeeping.

Theoretically, this study offers a comprehensive list of factors drawn from extant peace literature which influence peace operations meeting the basic objective of protecting lives and keeping areas stable. Beyond the majorly discussed factors of contingent size, funding, international collaboration, local participation, mandate and peacekeeper training, this study also examines issues of domestic political elite, field leadership, force integrity, impartiality, international political will, lead state, local women participation, size and resources of territory and timing. In bringing these factors together, this study expands the peacekeeping debate on what matters for stability in conflict areas.

Empirically, using the peace support operations (PSO) of the AU, this study identifies those factors most and least significant for the provision of stability in conflict areas and ranks them based on their impact. Contrary to extant peace literature where mandate, funding, international collaboration, local initiative and size of the contingent are at the heart of creating stability in conflict areas, this study advocates the indispensability of domestic elite cooperation, local initiative and international political will. These were the only factors consistent in all successful AU PSO's. Conversely, where any of these three factors were lacking, the AU missions failed. This study therefore argues that these three factors are central to the provision of stability in peace operations in the short term.

The short term method of evaluation which revolves around the cessation of violence and provision of security is adopted as the standard for peacekeeping's effectiveness. This is because the AU often leaves peacebuilding which is evaluated over the long term to the United Nations (UN). So, having achieved stability in four of its six peace operations, this

study concludes that the AU has been fairly effective as Africa's chief peacekeeper.

Other findings exhumed by this study include the necessity of force integrity to large contingents, and the need for a lead state if missions are to succeed in complex theatres demanding prolonged operations.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission in Mali
AFM	Army Field Manual
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	African Union Mission for the Support to the Elections in Comoros
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AND	National Army for Development (The Comorian National Army)
APF	African Peace Facility
APPMs	Armed Political Parties and Movements (Burundi)
APRD	Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy
APSA	AU Peace and Security Architecture
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASF	Africa Standby Force
ASWJ	Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a
AU	African Union
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Department
BONUCA	UN Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic
CAR	Central African Republic
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CESDP	Common EU Security and Defence Policy
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFC	Ceasefire Commission
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMICC	Civil-Military Coordination Centre
CMCA	Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DDDC	Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSRCC	the Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission
EC	European Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States

EDF	European Development Fund
ES/NCDRR	National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FRODEBU	Front for Democracy in Burundi
GoS	Government of Sudan
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
GTC	German Technical Cooperation
HCFA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
HoM	Head of Mission
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	IGAD Peace and Support Mission to Somalia
IGO	Inter Governmental Organisation
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JAES	Joint AU-EU Strategy
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JWP	Joint Warfare Publications
KPCS	Kimberly Process Certification Scheme
MAES	African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MDSF	Malian Defence and Security Forces
MFUA	Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad
MICEMA	ECOWAS Mission in Mali
MICOPAX	ECCAS Peace Consolidation Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURCA	UN Mission in Central Africa
MINURCAT	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSCA	Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MIOC	African Union Observer Mission in Comoros
MISCA	African-led International Support Mission in Central African Republic
MNCs	Multinational National Corporations
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MPA	Azawad People's Movement
MSA	Mission Subsistence Allowance
MUJWA	Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDF	National Defence Force (Burundi)
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

NIF	National Islamic Front
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGC	Oslo Gender Conference
OIF	Organisation Internationale del la Francophonie
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
PALIPEHUTU-FNL	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People - National Forces of Liberation
PCC	Police Contributing Country
PCRD	Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PSO	Peace Support Operations
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RPI	Regional Peace Initiative
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SADC	South African Development Community
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAPSD	South African Protection Support Department
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SNA	Somali National Army
SNM	Somali National Movement
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SRRC	Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TGoB	Transitional Government of Burundi
TNG	Transitional National Government
UFDR	Union of Democratic Forces for Unity
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMOGIP	United Nations Mission in India and Pakistan
UNOB	United Nations Office in Burundi
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSGSR	United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNTAM	UN Technical Assessment Mission
UPRONA	Union for National Progress (Burundi)
WHO	World Health Organisation
WASB	Western African Standby Brigade
WSLF	Western Somalia Liberation Front

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The number of Africans estimated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to have been displaced by conflict in 2015 is 14.9 million. In sub-Saharan Africa, the number of refugees displaced by conflict increased for the fifth consecutive year to 3.7 million. Nearly two million Libyans, more than a quarter of the population have been forced to flee to Tunisia to escape a civil war that claimed some 3,500 lives between January 2014 and April 2015 (Lévesque, 2015). It is a sad irony that some of these refugees are hosted by countries that are themselves unsafe, a fact buttressed by terrorist attacks in Tunisia, Chad and Kenya (Romdhani, 2014; Amnesty International, 2015a; Amnesty International, 2015b). Drawing on such data, scholars of African conflict point out that of the many challenges facing the African Union (AU) and Africa, the quest for peace and security is the most pressing (Curtis, 2012a: 1: Dersso, 2014: 1).

Africa has been a hot bed of violent conflicts with increasing civilian casualties, and peace operations are increasingly conceived as the principal international instrument to curb them (Williams, 2010: 1; Bove and Elia, 2011: 700; Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 68). Since a major reason for the setting up of the AU is the provision of peace and security, the AU has sought to bolster its capabilities through partnership with the international community (Cottey and Forster, 2010: 52; Curtis, 2012a: 1; Gowan and Sherman, 2012: Gaibulloev et al, 2015: 2; Davies, interview 2016). This study examines how effective the African Union (AU) has been at reducing insecurity and providing stability in conflict areas and goes on to make policy recommendations directed at making AU peacekeeping more effective. Authors who have found policy recommendations useful include Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (2006) and Williams (2010a and 2011).

Despite the AU's growing reputation in peacekeeping (Khadiagala, 2014: 164), and its status as the oldest continental peacekeeper (Brosig, 2012: 292), it is surprising that no study has exclusively assessed its performance through its six peacekeeping operations. This study serves to fill this gap. Reputed scholars such as Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams, Adebajo Adekeye,

Benjamin de Carvalho, Jakkie Cilliers, Cedric de Coning, Tim Murithi and Funmi Olonisakin have done extensive work on AU peacekeeping, but have not undertaken a comprehensive assessment of AU operations.

The AU's six peace operations are Burundi (2003), Comoros (2003), Sudan (2004), Somalia (2007), Mali (2013) and the Central African Republic (CAR) (2013) and they all have varied outcomes (Abiola, interview 2014). While some wound up successfully (Burundi, Comoros and Mali) and others dismally (Sudan and CAR), one is still on-going with no clear exit strategy (Somalia) (Williams, 2014; Lynch, 2014a; Davies, interview 2016). As noted by Paul Williams (2010a: 8), 'peace operations in Africa have revealed some of the best and worst dimensions of peacekeeping'. Since the AU is not much into peacebuilding which it often leaves to the UN, this study's concept of success revolves around the immediate impact of peacekeeping which is the cessation of violence and the provision of security and stability.

Research Question

Analysing these operations and the reasons for their success or failure reveals the influence of a wide range of factors some of which are critical in tipping the balance between success and failure. Some factors contribute significantly and others minimally. In identifying these elements and ascertaining their impact on peace operations through the missions conducted by the AU, this study answers the following research question: What factors matter, and to what extent, to enable AU peacekeeping missions improve security and provide stability in conflict areas in the short term?

While this study aims to answer this question, the later sections of this introduction highlight the argument and layout of this research. Presented first is a summary of the argument of this study on what makes for effective peacekeeping. This is followed by the research hypotheses where the peacekeeping factors to be tested are listed. Next is the methodology which makes a case for this study's approach and the need for having a yardstick on which effectiveness is measured. This study's limitation and contribution to academics come next. This introduction concludes with a synopsis of each case study.

Argument

This research examines the effectiveness of the AU in making conflict areas stable. This is done through assessing all six AU peace operations. As noted by scholars, factors effective in one venue might play out differently in another venue (Curtis, 2012a: 3; Jowell, interview 2016). Creating a comprehensive list of these factors and determining what matters most, requires covering a wide range of missions. Examining a large number of cases increases the potentials of the research in identifying patterns and making valid generalisations (Diehl and Druckman, 2013: 12).

My findings query traditional peace literature which places mandate, funding, international collaboration, local initiative and size of the contingent at the heart of peacekeeping's effectiveness (O'Hanlon, 2003; Pan 2005). Experts contend that unclear mandates often give rise to the provision of porous security and doom the peace operation to failure (Jett, 2001: 39, Dallaire, 2005: 374; Sitkowski, 2006: 2, Jacobson, 2012: 3-4). When security is uncertain, missions may have to stay for much longer than envisaged without pre-set times for their winding up (De Carvalho and Ettang, 2011: 6). Poor funding undermines the performance of operations (Murithi, 2008; Aning and Edu-Afful, 2013). On international collaboration, the argument here is, no one organisation can go it alone (Feldman, 2008: 269-270). So, partnering with other International Government Organisations (IGOs) and willing international actors becomes an ever greater necessity. Failure to do this leads to shortage of manpower and other much needed resources. For local initiative, authors argue that peace operations will fail if the local populace whom they are meant to protect do not see it as their own and are unwelcoming of it. Participation of the local people in the peace process is conceived as a cornerstone to the success of peace operations (Andrieu, 2010: 540; Breidlid and Stensland, 2011: 30). For contingent size, the argument made is that small peacekeeping units do not provide strong enough deterrents to spoilers (Walter, 1997: 340-341; Pickering and Kinsangani, 2006: 363).

This study acknowledges the importance of these factors, but contends that they are not all critical to peacekeeping creating stable environments. This is most exemplified in the AU missions in Burundi (2003) and CAR (2013). In

Burundi, with the exception of local participation, the traditional factors were lacking, still the mission achieved stability. In CAR, in spite of wide international collaboration and a mandate that tallied with the capacity of the mission, the AU operation failed to make the area stable.

The factors identified and treated in this study as enabling peace operations achieve stability in mission areas are ranked based on their significance and in the following order: *most significant, very significant, quite significant, less significant* and *least significant*. Factors *most significant* for peacekeeping providing stability are international political will, national elite cooperation and local initiative. They are categorised as such because their presence is consistent with successful operations and the absence of any of them makes it almost impossible for peace operations to succeed. Contrary to traditional thought, these factors have the most impact on peace operations providing stability. Marco Jowell (interview, 2016) refers to these three as the make or break factors of peace operations. Traditional thought however accepts the vital significance of local participation to the peacekeeping process.

It takes the political will of the international community to sustain peace operations, the cooperation of national political elite to make it acceptable to the people and local people acceptance and participation to make peacekeeping productive. The importance of these factors has been alluded to by authors, but seldom placed at the heart of peacekeeping's success (Arce, 2001; May, 2003; Peake et al, 2004; Langholtz, 2010; Hehir, 2012). Even the Brahimi report (UNGA, 2000) which is acclaimed to have redefined peacekeeping through its support for robust and force oriented operations is not exempt from this trend (Bellamy and Williams, 2008: 186-187).

Next on the ranking scale are the *very significant* factors and these are funding, size of contingent, timing and duration, women participation, field leadership and impartiality to the mandate. They are very significant because while they matter for success, they do not necessarily guarantee it. The peace operation in Burundi was successful despite poor funding and a grossly undersized contingent. The AU mission in Somalia has so far managed some semblance of stability in spite of low women participation in the peace process and its ill timed entry.

Next is the *quite significant* category which consists of mandate. This factor contributes majorly to peace operations success, but is not at its core so missions could also succeed without them. Marco Jowell (interview, 2016) supports this when he argues that 'the mandate comes to naught when the peacekeepers or the local authorities fail to observe them'.

The *less significant* category includes the size of mission area and international collaboration. Michael Amuzu (interview, 2014) contends that the size of mission territory does not matter much to peacekeeping success. While the size of Darfur has militated against providing security, the size of Somalia has not prevented AMISOM from making gains and providing security over large areas. Also, while collaboration has been key to the AU success in Somalia, the same collaboration has had averse effects in CAR. These less significant factors do not have a strong influence on mission outcomes.

At the bottom of the ladder is the training of peacekeepers for expanded roles and this is the *least significant* factor. It carries the least impact on missions thereby indicating that specialisation matters more for effective peacekeeping.

Unavoidably, the terms peacekeeping, peace support and peace operations are fluidly used in this study. While peacekeeping is the generic term used for peace operations by scholars, what the AU really does is peace support (Abiola, interview 2014; Alghali, interview 2014; Kromah, interview 2015; Agwai, interview 2016). In its strict sense, peacekeeping is done when there is a peace to keep in which case the factions at war have agreed to stop fighting and work toward peace (Goulden, 2002; Cross interview, 2013, Agwai, interview 2016). Peace operations in this context help to facilitate truces. Peace enforcement occurs when the factions are unwilling to stop the violence. So in order to stem a human catastrophe, the international community acts and forces the groups to stop fighting while protecting vulnerable populations (Evans, 2008; Pattison, 2008; Richmond, 2013). Since this is done forcibly, peace is enforced. Peacebuilding consists of post-conflict reconstruction of institutions and infrastructures, as such it is given to medium and long term processes (Johansen, 1994; Autesserre, 2012; Curtis, 2012b; Hultman et al, 2015). Peace Support Operations (PSOs) are a combination of all three (Makinlay, 1996; Abiola, interview 2014; Kromah,

interview 2015; Agwai, interview 2016). Given that this thesis focuses on what facilitates stability in the short term, greater attention will be paid to the PSO areas of peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Effectiveness in the context of this study is the ability of peace operations to keep conflict areas secure and stable in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Stability in conflict areas is explained as the 'freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety and lives' (Druckman and Stern, 1999: 2; Dorn, 2013: 1). In Somalia for example, recent sporadic attacks are reminders that the conflict is still ongoing, but the AU has significantly improved security, and lives are more secure. For this reason, the AU operation there has so far been deemed effective (Wiklund, 2013a; Gadin, interview 2014; Sandi, interview 2014; Williams, 2014).

Research Hypotheses

There are factors particular to each conflict that greatly affect the chances of peacekeepers resolving them (Jett, 2001: 61). This study brings all these factors together in as much as they affect achieving stability in the short term. These factors are drawn from existing peace literature and accounts from varied peace operations. For example, the large size of Darfur is conceived as a major difficulty facing the mission there (Kilpatrick, interview 2013). Just as well, the swift and effective AU operation in Comoros has been adduced to the small size of the country (Pham, 2008; Svensson, 2008b). This factor is discussed within this study's hypotheses despite the lack of attention it has received from authors as an influencing factor in peace operations. The justification of these factors is discussed in greater detail in chapter three.

The hypotheses factors are categorised as emanating from organisational bureaucracy and field experience. Mandates for example are products of organisational bureaucracy. They are political compromises struck between the coordinating organisation and stake holders on the conduct and objective of the peace operation (Stambaugh, 2001; Jowell, interview 2016). Field factors are those influenced by events on the ground of which local participation is a good example. While these factors are presented in the table

below, it is worth mentioning that the dichotomy between bureaucratic and field factors is not always so clear cut. The institutional factors constitute table 1(a) and the field factors constitute table 1(b). The hypotheses were formulated on the premise that the existence of each factor leads to stability. The use of counter hypotheses profers other possibilities and thus problematizes the discourse for better analysis.

Table 1(a) Factors Emanating from AU HQ/Bureaucracy

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY
Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.	Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre.
Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.	Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly.
An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.	Integrity of forces strengthens the unity within peacekeeping missions.
Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.	Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.
The international community's utilisation of authority and resources, provides assurance for conflict settlement.	International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.
Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.	Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.
Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.	Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.

Table 1(b) Factors Emanating from the Field/Ground Realities

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY
Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.	The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.
Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.	Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process.
Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.	A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.
Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.	Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.

Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.	Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.
The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.	A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.

Methodology

The AU serves as the case study of this research on Africa because it is the continental IGO that has been involved in peacekeeping the longest, and yet too little has been written of its peacekeeping efforts (Brosig, 2012: 292). Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are subsumed under the AU. Their experience at peacekeeping which began in 1990 with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia is seen by some scholars as part of the AU's conflict resolution history (Olonisakin and Ero, 2004: 234). This implies that no regional IGO has been involved in peacekeeping for as long as the AU. While scholars such as Adebajo (2011) have covered all UN missions in Africa (fifteen at the time), none has attempted to cover the AU's six.

Another reason for the choice of the AU is the fact that every region in Africa, save for Southern Africa has had an AU peacekeeping mission in place, each with its own set of dynamics. So, in assessing what matters for stability in mission areas, the AU missions provide a wide variety of challenges which augurs well for verifying patterns in order to establish valid claims.

In testing its hypotheses over a series of missions, this study strengthens its claim towards making generalisations as advocated by scholars (Seybolt, 2008: 15; Diehl and Druckman, 2013: 12). Scholars who have adopted this approach in their studies on peacekeeping include Dennis Jett (2001), Taylor Seybolt (2008), Virgina Page Fortna (2008), Adekeye Adebajo (2011) and Isiaka Badmus (2015).

This research adheres to the admonition that possessing a framework provides clear standards for assessing peace operations success rather than assume that success or failure is self evident (Diehl and Druckman, 2013: 11). In evaluating the AU effectiveness at peacekeeping, this study aligns with

Paul Diehl (1993) and Duane Bratt (1996) who contend that effectiveness should be assessed based on peacekeeping's *immediate impact* - the *short term* approach. They argue that since peacekeeping is about protecting lives, evaluations should be based on immediate achievements such as ceasefires, conflict cessation, provision of security and the impact on the local population. This humanitarian centred approach also encompasses handling refugee problems, disarming and reintegrating militants. Adoption of the short term approach for this study is also influenced by the AU being less involved in peacebuilding which is more amenable to *medium and long term assessments* (Coleman, 2011: 519-520; Curtis, 2012a: 5). Utilisation of the short term metrics of assessment, situates this study within the problem-solving approach to peacekeeping.

Problem-Solving as the Approach Which Drives the PhD

The issues discussed in this study revolve around the effectiveness of African Union peacekeeping in terms of saving lives and providing a secure environment. The thesis is based on the assumption that when security is poor, the other aspects of peacekeeping stay moribund. It concludes with policy recommendations on how to improve peacekeeping effectiveness. With this as a central theme, the problem-solving approach rather than the critical perspective approach, provides the most appropriate framework for this study.

Problem-solving theory is about taking the world as it is, and making suggestions on how world politics could be improved. It accepts the parameters of the present world order and simply tries to resolve problems that arise within it (Johnston, 2005: 2). Critical theory questions the role of institutions which make policy decisions. It takes a critical stance towards the social reality that it investigates by providing grounds for criticisms of the institutions and practices that make up that reality, justification for its alternatives, and so bridges the divide in social thought between explanation and justification (Pugh, 2004: 39).

Problem-solving aims to develop appropriate responses by existing institutions to enable stability. It looks at how peacekeeping operations are organised and

how successful operations are in providing stability. It is mainly concerned with the politics and techniques of peacekeeping, lessons learned from operations and prescriptive agendas for improving performance in these areas (Pugh, 2004: 39). This study, in line with the problem-solving theory, analyses the interaction of factors which enable peacekeeping adapt to conflict variation (Diehl, 2005: 243). One such operational variation is the mandate to protect lives, especially endangered populations, which often necessitates the use of force in peacekeeping.

The problem-solving theory has received its share of criticisms. The uncertainty and complexity of the interactive effects of peacekeeping's multiple factors makes sophisticated analysis difficult (Diehl, 2005: 243). Roland Paris (2000) and Michael Pugh (2003) acknowledge the contribution of problem solving to policy development, but note that the attention it is given, leaves the literature on peace operations too limited in the scope of its inquiry to build a mature academic study of peace missions. This systematically imposes limitations on the ability of scholars to think outside the box.

Another issue raised against the problem-solving approach is not with the content of the theory itself, after all the concept of working with what you have to make existing conditions better is logical, but it is with the hierarchical structure the theory tries to preserve. Critics contend that this approach does not interrogate the existing international structure and by accepting it as reality, reinforces its underlying values and structures (Cox 1981; Pugh 2004: 41). Though this structure may have its demerits, a major advantage of the problem-solving approach is in exploiting this system to promote the preservation of life especially in areas of conflict.

Negative Peace as the Main Target of Peacekeeping

There are two types of peace: negative and positive. The literature on peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes is mainly concerned with attaining some degree of positive peace through the strengthening of state institutions in the hope of preventing a return to conflict. These processes are pursued within the ambit of the liberal peace approach. This approach is anchored on the arguments that; there will be diminished disposition to war in states

where democracy and capitalism successfully interact; and the right to property and a notion of the common good indicate the need to preserve the state in order to safe guard these values. Thus, when state structures function to facilitate these norms, positive peace exists (Galtung, 1969: 186; Gleditsch et al, 2014: 149). Advocates of critical theory see the imposition of liberal democracy, the rule of law and free market worldwide as violent sides of the liberal peace because states that do not share in these norms will be treated differently (Pugh, 2004; Pereira, 2011).

However, as noted by Patricia Shields and Joseph Soeters (2015: 2), 'in a society at war, the first stage of peace begins as the end of personal violence and absence of war (negative peace)'. This is the theoretical theme of this study as discussions and processes of positive peace will come to naught, if negative peace is not first achieved. I argue that the protection of life and provision of security which is conceived as peace in the negative sense, should be the major objective of peace operations. This study is therefore a reminder of the importance of negative peace to peacekeeping processes and debates.

Collection of Data

To augment the use of texts and official documents, thirty six semi-structured interviews were conducted. Fifteen of these were conducted between March and April 2014 during my field research at the AU headquarters in Addis-Ababa. Five were conducted in the United Kingdom (Nottingham and London), twelve were done over skype and four in Nigeria. With my research focusing on AU peace operations, my interview population was meant to be weighted with respondents from the AU. With the missions in Burundi and Comoros long since concluded, their operations offices had been scrapped. Of the AU missions existent at the time of my field research, offices and staff of the Sudan and Somalia missions were more accessible. Of the large number of AU personnel contacted prior to my trip to Addis, several were not on ground for the duration of my field research and only two agreed to interviews via skype. Several authors interviewed attest to the difficulties faced by African scholars doing research in Africa (Ibaba, interview 2015; Obi, interview 2015). To

compensate however, peace experts were sourced from research institutes such as the International Peace Institute, Peace Operations Training Institute, Royal African Society, African Peacebuilding Network, Niger Delta Studies Centre and the Gowon Peace Initiative. Interviewing African and western military and civilian field operatives who have worked with the AU, UN and EU, along with AU diplomats and other peace operations experts, helped curtail biases that would have been inherent in interviewing a specific population. The use of diverse populations was meant to strengthen objectivity.

The use of texts, archives, the internet and interviews in this study indicates the triangulation method in research. Triangulation refers to using multiple approaches to generate better understanding of a given phenomenon (Sands and Roer-Strier, 2006: 238; Turner et al, 2015: 1). In reference to the use of diverse populations for interviews, triangulation entails looking at a phenomenon from different perspectives to get a more accurate view of it (Neuman, 2000: 521; Sands and Roer-Strier, 2006: 238). Thus, the views of interview respondents were used to support or counter traditional thought, fill gaps, and address new perspectives. Neuman and Kreuger (2003) and Grinnell and Unrau (2005) endorse triangulation as a means of enhancing the rigor of social research.

Limitation of Study

In assessing the effectiveness of the AU in its peacekeeping responsibilities, this study identifies and tests for factors that foster the provision of stability in peacekeeping operations. Issues such as reasons for the AU's choice of intervention considering the existence of other conflicts in need of its expertise are excluded from this research. Nor does this study dwell on the AU's diplomatic efforts in pre and post conflict periods (Williams, 2011: 12-13). These areas would make fertile ground for some other scholarly enterprise.

While this study focuses on the AU's provision of stability and its influencing factors, missions undertaken by institutions such as the UN, EU and NATO are

excluded. However, the findings of this research will certainly be relevant to them.

Academic Contribution

Irrespective of increasing literature on the AU it is still an under-researched organisation (Haastrup, 2013: 788). Majority of texts on the AU focus on its institutional framework and capacity, leaving little attention to the dynamics of its peace operations on the ground (see Coleman, 2011; Brosig, 2012; Williams, 2011; Vines, 2013). The book by Isiaka Badmus (2015) which assesses the role of the AU in peacekeeping treats three of the case studies contained in this research. My study therefore provides a more encompassing analysis of AU operations. More significantly, both studies approach AU peacekeeping issues from two very different perspectives. While Badmus' book examines the functionability of the AU's security apparatuses, which is why he devotes a whole chapter to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), this study examines what makes peacekeeping work using the AU operations as verification tools.

When attention is given to AU operations, the focus is often on the success, failure or problems of particular missions (Aboagye, 2007; Massey and Baker, 2009; Armstrong, 2013; Ingerstad, 2014a). The AU has a burgeoning reputation in peacekeeping and it is argued that it changed the face of this enterprise through its successful use of force, a strategy that has influenced UN missions into taking offensive initiatives such as its stabilisation operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Jowell, interview 2016). This thesis is the first study that analyses all the operations of the AU.

In focusing on how the AU has fared as peacekeeper, this study also identifies those factors that impact on peacekeeping outcomes and delineates what is important and what is not for effective peacekeeping. When factors affecting peacekeeping outcomes are discussed, seldom has any text treated more than six. Discussions largely revolve around mandate, funding, international collaboration, local participation, international political will and size of contingent (see May and Cleaver, 1997: 15; Pan, 2005: 4). This study attempts to bring into one, the factors that affect peacekeeping outcomes. In

bringing all these strands together, this research expands on the academic literature on peacekeeping as it makes a detailed assessment of what makes for stability in peacekeeping environments.

Through setting criteria for effectiveness, then ascertaining and testing the factors that determine effectiveness over a variety of case studies, this study designs a rank order that situates what matters most for effective peacekeeping. In adopting this approach, this study fulfils the exhortation of Diehl and Druckman (2013: 12) that 'researchers must construct some common standards and indicators for success in order to compare performance across missions and draw generalisations'.

A study of such magnitude on the AU has been long overdue owing to the organisation being the longest and most involved in peacekeeping among regional IGO's. In filling the gaps mentioned above, this study develops a standard for African Peace Studies and provides a template on which peacekeeping organisations can examine their approaches and make them better. This study and its findings will hopefully be a useful source of reference for academics, policy makers, field operatives and organisations involved in peacekeeping.

Thesis Outline

Having provided the layout, argument and structure of this project in this chapter, chapter two examines literature that discuss major issues of peacekeeping and the role of major international actors. Chapter three is the conceptual framework for this study. This chapter uses peace literature and expert's views on what promotes stability in peacekeeping to establish a comprehensive set of hypotheses.

The analysis and assessment of the AU's performance in all its six peace operations are done from Chapters four to nine. Chapters four to seven will treat the successful missions of Burundi, Comoros, Somalia and Mali in that order. Chapters eight and nine will focus on Darfur and CAR. These operations provide a wide enough platform to ascertain trends in successful or failed operations, and to assess the effectiveness of the AU in providing stability in its mission areas. Each of these chapters is divided into: a brief presentation

of the crisis and the period of AU intervention, and an evaluation of effectiveness based on this study's hypotheses/counter hypotheses.

Chapter four examines the AU mission in Burundi (2003). The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was the first of the AU's peacekeeping operations and it stabilised about 95 percent of the country, which makes it an AU success story. It lacked adequate manpower in terms of troops, was grossly under-funded, and was given a mandate beyond its capacity. Inspite of the deficit of these traditional factors, AMIB succeeded in bringing an end to violence and securing lives. This mission presents the clearest indication that the traditional factors are not central to success or to achieving stability in mission areas. Three main factors served as the hinge on which stability was achieved: a responsive domestic political class, responsible mission leadership both at state (South Africa) and individual (field commanders) levels and a resilient local population, especially women organised for peace. The presence of a committed lead state and AU support was international will enough to see AMIB through. This case study is a clear example of what matters most for successful peace operations and the provision of stability in mission areas.

Chapter five examines the AU's peace support in the Comoros (2003). The traditional factors - mandate, funding, collaboration, size of contingent, and those proffered in this study – international political will, local population support and domestic elite cooperation, hold true for the Comoros. The small size of the target area (Anjouan) played to the advantage of the peace support force which was deployed to preserve the territorial integrity of the state. The Comoros experience also depicts that while field leadership is strategic to peace operations making a positive impact, the relevance of a lead state for the success of a mission does not necessarily hold true.

Chapter six examines the AU peace operation in Somalia (2007): The presence of the conventional factors and those upheld by this study all played to the advantage of AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and made it the success it has been so far. This chapter also espouses the importance of local citizens and host government support to peace operations even when the latter is weak. The AU peacekeeping experience in Somalia also shows how vital the initiatives of field commanders and lead states are to reaching

mission objectives. The apt utilisation of mandate, funds, size of contingent, force integrity, international political will and domestic elite support have seen AMISOM make good progress.

Chapter seven focuses on the AU's peace operation in Mali (2013): While the majority of case studies in this research deal with rebel groups, the situation in Mali as the one in Somalia, depicts the AU's response to terrorism, it was also about safeguarding Mali's territorial integrity which came under threat from Islamic Extremists. This case study, just like in Burundi, reflects the importance of a lead nation to the success of peacekeeping operations. The cooperation among Mali's local elite and the willingness of local elders to plug gaps through activating local peace initiatives assisted the French and AU peacekeeping contingents in providing stability, it would have been almost impossible for the mission to have succeeded without these.

Chapter eight analyses the AU-UN hybrid mission in Sudan's Darfur (2004). The joint AU-UN operation has been dismal largely because of the host government's lack of cooperation and the international community's lack of political will to take on the government of Sudan. These two factors have greatly impaired local initiative thereby incapacitating peace processes in the present and truncating hopes of such processes in the near future. This proves just how critical these factors are for stability in mission areas. Of note too is the fact that except for wide international collaboration, the other conventional factors of mandate, funding and force size have been deficient. Despite the large size of the force in Darfur, it is inadequate still for the territory and population. The lack of force integrity further compounds the difficulties in creating stability. Despite its failures, the mission in Darfur arguably improved a grim security situation. The Darfur peacekeeping experience exemplifies the argument that broad international cooperation does not necessarily transpose to vibrant international political will.

Chapter nine examines the peace operation of the AU in CAR (2013): Central to the analysis in this section are the factors of domestic elite, field leadership, local participation and international collaboration, especially the influence of bad neighbours. The peace operation's mandate in CAR was tailored to mission capacity thus making it appropriate, but still the mission

failed to achieve stability. CAR mirrors the non-workability of a peace operation when the local populace are given to violence, local political elites lack the will to steer the ship, regional dynamics are opposed to stability and mission leadership fails. While the AU mission in CAR preserved lives, it failed to provide security and stability and this is majorly due to the deficit of the three factors proposed in this study.

Chapter ten consists of the summary of findings and ranking of factors. The factors most influential in each of these missions are highlighted and compared to other missions. Since this study analyses the impact of factors on peace operations, policy recommendations are made on what factors to prioritise to enhance the provision of stability.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on peace operations grew significantly at the end of the cold war, and this is attributable to three factors: the surge of new operations since 1999, the release of the UN's Brahimi Report in 2000 and the events of September 11, 2001 (Johnstone, 2005: 1). The failure of the UN in Rwanda (1990-1993) and Bosnia (1995) prompted the Brahimi report which advocated a shift from the traditional approach of peacekeeping which rested on the principles of host state consent, neutrality and minimum force, to a more robust and forceful approach bordering on the use of force to protect civilians and enforce peace where necessary. The justification for this transition was forged on humanitarian precepts and had at its foundation, the protection of civilians who had increasingly become the victims of civil wars.

Much of peacekeeping literature focuses on the need of the international community to prevent human catastrophes or to prevent conflict areas from becoming terrorist enclaves which has been a major goal in the global war on terror since the September 11 attacks. This study fits into these contexts as the peace operations in Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Darfur and Somalia were humanitarianly driven to stop the carnage in these countries, while deployments to the Comoros, Mali and Somalia were to preserve the territorial integrity of these states and prevent the latter two from becoming terrorist bases. However, even when peace operations are about preserving territory and shoring government authority in mission areas, the underlying aim of peace operations are the projection of liberal values, protection of life and provision of security (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996; Hultman, 2013).

Debates on these issues, the challenges they present, and the strategies of major actors involved, in as much as they relate to effectiveness, are the focus of this chapter. These debates are classed into three major themes, though some belong to more than one:

- Effectiveness in peacekeeping
- Motives and aims of peacekeeping
- Peacekeeping actors

The debate on effectiveness examines peacekeeping's approaches, challenges and evaluation. The discourse on motives and aims dwells on state behavior and the justification for intervention. The debates on actors revolve around the reasons and challenges of inter-governmental organisations (IGO's) involved in peacekeeping in Africa.

In discussing these themes, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first section is a table of peacekeeping themes, the corresponding debates and authors. The second section is the review of these author's views. Excluded from this chapter are discussions of this study's hypotheses factors. These are extensively discussed in chapter three.

Themes and Authors

Table 2.1 (below) highlights the themes, corresponding debates and authors and it is formulated to facilitate better comprehension of the review undertaken in this chapter.

Table 2.1 Literature Review Themes, Argument and Authors

Themes	Debates	Authors
Effectiveness in peacekeeping	Peacekeeping's traditional approach rests on the tenets of state consent, minimum force, and neutrality. In keeping with these tenets peace keepers are seen as credible mediators, and such perceptions facilitate effectiveness.	André Bächtiger, Alex Bellamy, Barbara Walter, Bruce Russet, Charles Hunt, Donald Dominick, Daniel Levine, Gerald Eisenkopf, James Sloan, Laurie Nathan, Lilac Gilady, Martha Finnemore, Michael Doyle, Michael Greig, Michael O'Hanlon, Michael Pugh, Nicholas Sambanis, Norrie MacQueen, Patrick Regan, Paul Diehl, Paul Williams, Steve Wright, Stuart Griffin, Thomas Princen, Thorin Wright, Tobias Berkman and Victoria Holt
	The robust approach which advocates force, considers large and well equipped contingents as more appropriate to contain spoilers, stem civilian casualities and be more effective.	
	The national interest of states which is placed above the objectives of the mission sometimes	Alex Bellamy, Andrew Cottey, Anthony Forster, Aysegul Aydin, Brian Frederking, Dursun Peksen, Jerzy Ciechanski, John

	stands inimical to peacekeeping meeting objectives.	Ruggie, Michael Lipson, Patrick Patterson, Patrick Regan, Paul Diehl, Paul Williams and Payton Knopf
	Peacekeeping missions come with certain unintended effects such as sex trafficking and development of a peacekeeping economy. The larger these missions and the longer they stay, the greater these problems.	Alex Bellamy, Arturo Sotomayor, Cedric de Coning, Charles Smith, Chiyuki Aoi, Cynthia Watson, Deborah Norden, Fiifi Edu-Aful, Heather Smith, Jone Baledrokadroka, Kathleen Jennings, Kwesi Aning, Michael Carnahan, Natalie Hudson, Paul Williams, Phillip Cunliffe, Ramesh Thakur, Stuart Griffin, Susan Willet, Vanessa Kent and Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović.
	Long term metrics should be used in evaluating the success of peace operations, but since the time span required to ascertain effects vary, it is a problematic method to use. Alternatively, short term metrics like cessation of violence and provision of security seem more apt.	A.B. Fetherston, Cedric de Coning, Chiyuki Aoi, Daniel Druckman, David Quinn, Devon Curtis, Duane Bratt, Emizet Kisangani, Francis Fukuyama, Ian Johstone, Jeffrey Pickering, Kathleen Jennings, Lisa Hultman, Maja Garb, Michael Lipson, Paul Diehl, Paul Stern, Philipe Le Billon, Robert Johansen, Vanessa Kent and Virginia Fortna.
Motives and Aims of peace-keeping	States participate in peacekeeping to foster their national interest.	Alan James, Alex Bellamy, Colin Flint, Ghazi-Walid Falah, Mark Duffield, Martha Finnemore, Michael Barnett, Michael Pugh, Paul Williams, Phillip Cunliffe, Robert Rubinstein and Stuart Griffin,
	States involvement is characterised by the need to preserve the statusquo in the international system.	Alex Bellamy, Bruce Russet, David Chandler, Lise Howard, Jennifer Hazen, Jutta Weldes, Laura Zanotti, Mark Laffey, Martha Finnemore, Michael Barnett, Norrie MacQueen, Oliver Richmond, Paul Williams, Thomas Friedman, Virginia Fortna.
	Peacekeeping is under-taken to foster liberal	Alex Bellamy, Deborah Meyers, Eyal Ben-Ari, Gareth Evans,

	values such as democracy and human rights.	James Pattison, Kathleen Newland, Kobi Michael, Lisa Hultman, Luke Glanville, Martha Finnemore, Mary Hampton, Paul Williams, Roland Dannreuther, Stephen Krasner and Stuart Griffin,
	Peacekeeping is used to fill the gap when a state fails in its responsibility to protect its citizens. Such intervention can have a negative impact as it could prolong conflict and suffering.	Abu Bakarr Bah, Aidan Hehir, Alan Kuperman, Alex Bellamy, Anke Hoeffler, Erik Melander, Frédéric Mégret, Gareth Evans, James Pattison, Jean-Paul Azam, Kemi Ogunsanya, Kwezi Mngqibisa, Lisa Hultman, Luke Glanville, Marlies Glasius, Oliver Ramsbotham, Oliver Richmond, Paul Williams, Pupavac, Vanessa, Thibaud Lesueur, Thierry Viroulon, Tom Woodhouse and Valentin Robiliard.
Peacekeeping Actors: UN, peacekeeping and the need for regional actors.	The UN is the world's chief peacekeeper, but state interests affect its peacekeeping decisions. It derives its legitimacy from harmonising the different states interest. The UN depends on regional organisations like the AU to reduce its peacekeeping burden	Adam Smith, Adebajo Adekeye, Alex Bellamy, Birger Heldt, Brian Frederking, Dennis Jett, Jerzy Ciechanski, Katharina Coleman, Laura Neack, Laura Zanotti, Leandro Elia, Maurice Marnika, Michael Lipson, Michael Pugh, Oliver Ramsbotham, Paul Diehl, Peter Wallesteen, Robert Rubinstein, Thomas Jacobson, Tom Woodhouse and Vicenzo Bove.
The AU and its peacekeeping challenges.	AU peace operations are linked to the basics of the responsibility to protect. However, it lacks the capacity for robust and lengthy peacekeeping which has made it reliant on international partners. The AU is just as effective as its collaborators make it.	Adebajo Adekeye, Alex Bellamy, Andrew Cottey, Anthony Forster, Benedikt Franke, Bruce Baker, Cedric de Coning, Clement Adibe, Funmi Olonisakin, George Oliver, Gerry Cleaver, Gilbert Khadiagala, Jason Warner, Joao Cravinho, Karin Bogland, Katharina Coleman, Kristiana Powell, Kwasi Tieku, Kwesi Aning, Laurie Nathan, Malte Brosig, Maria Lagerström, Marnika Maurice, Paul Williams, Robert Egnell, Romain Esmenjaud, Roy May, Simon Massey, Solomon Dersso, Stefan Gänzle, Stephen Baranyi, Tim

		Murithi and Vasu Gounden.
The EU and its role in Africa.	The EU's role in AU affairs is borne out of its political and historical involvement with Africa. While helping to plug the security deficit in Africa, the EU also aims to counter rival economic interests on the continent, and carve out a greater foreign policy role for itself.	Adebayo Adedeji, Alex Bellamy, Andrew Cottey, Anthony Forster, Arthur Boutellis, Benedikt Franke, Bruno Charbonneau, Catherine Gegout, Charles Pentland, Damien Helly, Garth le Pere, Gilbert Khadiagala, Jake Sherman, Kamil Zwolski, Paul Williams, Richard Gowan, Rob de Vos, Stefan Gänzle and Toni Haastrup.

Effectiveness in Peacekeeping

Approaches

Scholars have classed peacekeeping into two major approaches, namely the traditional or Chapter VI, and the robust or Chapter VII, but they remain divided on which is more effective. The debate on this issue has been whether peacekeepers should only use the soft Chapter VI approach or if they should wield a stick as demanded by Chapter VII operations in order to enforce compliance with agreements when necessary.

Since it is the obligation of the intervener to be seen as impartial in order to assist in the maintenance of long term settlements by the parties, authors adduce that traditional peacekeeping which upholds neutrality is a more effective approach (Donald, 2002: 21; Macqueen, 2006: 234; Levine, 2010: 1). Under the traditional approach peacekeepers are mandated to administer, monitor or patrol conflict areas usually with the consent of the parties to the dispute, and nearly always under the provisions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Peacekeeping under this traditional approach, acts as a buffer between conflict parties and is governed by the trinity tenets of consent, impartiality/neutrality and minimum force. Authors note that given the limited size of these early missions, they were never meant to use force even if they wanted to (Diehl, 1993: 4-5; Donald, 2002: 21; Pugh, 2004: 47, Bellamy et al, 2010: 13; Levine, 2010: 1).

One argument in favour of traditional peacekeeping holds that due to its emphasis on confidence building in mediation, the less forceful peacekeepers are the more likely they will be seen as partners, and they would less likely be targets (Sloan, 2011: 21). Another maintains that since credibility and authority emanating from moral stature significantly matter in mediating disputes, an intervener will almost certainly fail to gain the confidence and cooperation of disputants against whom it applies force (Princen, 1992; Nathan, 1999). Authors in this school of thought argue that though short-term stabilisation results of robust operations may be positive, the long term repercussions could be negative (Wright, 2005: 60; Hunt, 2013: 4). They contend that the modern force posture of peacekeeping and humanitarianism are opposing tenets hence humanitarians maintain a distance from robust peace operations to safeguard their credibility (Pugh, 2004: 50).

Authors in support of the robust/Chapter VII approach are of the view that the majority of violent conflicts since the end of the cold war have been intrastate and are better settled with some degree of coercion (Walter, 1997: 336, Donald, 2002: 21; O'Hanlon, 2003: 10, Holt and Berkman, 2006: 93-94; Williams, 2010a: 3). They assert that 'neutral policies are largely incapable of contributing to the termination of a conflict … neutrality during an ongoing conflict may be insufficient to convince the actors that stopping the fighting is in their best interest' (Regan, 2002: 72; Eisenkopf and Bächtiger, 2012: 17). Consent does not guarantee success which is why peacekeeping had to shift from its traditional orientation to more robust and vigorous efforts to effect peace (Gilady and Russet, 2005: 393; Doyle and Sambanis, 2007: 495; Wright and Greig, 2012: 128). Proponents contend that the changing landscape of conflict (from inter-state to intra-state), made preserving the principles of consent, neutrality and minimum force almost impossible as the desire to save lives and the need for force took precedence (Holt and Berkman, 2006; Levine, 2010). The restraint on force advocated by Chapter VI missions, beyond making peacekeeping operations inefficient also increases peace keepers risk rate in volatile areas while neutrality emboldens spoilers and increases civilian casualties (Ciechanski, 1997; Jett, 2001; Dallaire, 2005).

This study acknowledges that the traditional approach is still useful in certain conflicts, but advocates for robust operations in view of the brutal nature of modern intrastate conflicts. The robust approach however comes with its own set of challenges some of which impact negatively, albeit unintentionally on mission areas.

Challenges to Peacekeeping

Peace authors contend that one major challenge to peacekeeping is the national interests of states which often impedes international goodwill and prevents peacekeeping organisations from matching rhetoric with action (Patterson 2008; Diehl and Frederking, 2010; Knopf, 2011). States do not always act with the intention of conflict management, but rather base their decisions on strategic considerations other than the well-being of the country experiencing the conflict (Bellamy and Williams, 2009; Aydin, 2010; Cottey and Forster, 2010). They reckon that the ensuing fit between intention and practice of peacekeeping organizations denotes a weak political will which produces doctrinal lapses and porous mandates that often leave peacekeeping missions ineffective and prolonged (Ciechanski, 1997; Ruggie, 1997; Lipson 2007). When intervention is prolonged, conflict intensifies and human suffering increases (Regan, 2002; Peksen, 2012).

Another challenge facing peacekeeping is its demand that peacekeepers should lay down their lives for foreigners. This is quite an un-natural inclination even for soldiers who are well trained. This expectation is placed at the core of the many failures of peacekeeping and the reason why peacekeepers often cower in the face of armed opposition and do not protect women and children (Jacobson, 2012: 4). This makes it difficult to justify peacekeeping as wise or in the safety and best interests of the people it is purportedly meant to protect. As such, the peace and safety attributed to peacekeeping is an illusion. From this view point, the absence of filial connections between peacekeepers and civilian populations in mission areas makes it difficult for peacekeeping to live up to its responsibility to protect (Williams, 2010c: 32-33).

Unintended Consequences

Supporting the humanitarian focus of peacekeeping is the argument that examining security with the state as the focal point is not reflective of the multifaceted concerns that have come to be conceptualized as human security (Hudson, 2005: 791). Recognising this shift in emphasis to humanitarian needs, academics contend that the unintended impact of peace operations leaves populations of host communities exposed and vulnerable to varying forces (Aoi et al, 2007; Willet, 2010). They acknowledge that though no mission has yet failed as a direct result of the unintended consequences generated, many have had their effectiveness questioned (Aoi et al, 2007: 168).

Where there is military presence there is demand for prostitutes and authors have gone on to examine this phenomenon from the perspective of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of local women of host communities (Aoi et al, 2007: 171; Bellamy et al, 2010: 364; Smith and Smith, 2011: 126). Some authors have taken the debate further and examined the impact of the zero-tolerance policy of peacekeeping organisations which prohibits the exchange of money, goods and services between peacekeepers and the local populace for sex, in curbing SEA (Kent, 2007; Jennings and Nikolić-Ristanović, 2009). These scholars identify the constrains in imposing norms and implementing compliance in view of the cultural diversity of peacekeeping personnel and the fact too that peacekeeping is often conducted in societies where poverty prevails and regard for liberal norms is minute. They note that the zero-tolerance policy towards SEA has been caught between protecting local populations and protecting the image of peacekeeping operations from disrepute (Jennings, 2008: 36 and 45).

The sex industry is but a part of the wider peacekeeping economy. Another unintended phenomenon according to scholars is the creation of parallel economies – one which serves the local populace, and which is adversely affected by the other which serves the needs of peacekeeping missions (Aoi et al, 2007: 170). They argue that the dependence of the local economy on the peacekeeping economy affects the capacity of the former to sustain itself in the aftermath of peacekeeping operations and prompts the elongation of the mission to prevent the collapse of the host economy and a rapid return to

conflict (Carnahan et al, 2006: 9; Aoi et al, 2007: 170; Aning and Edu-Afful, 2013: 18).

Contributing peacekeepers enables healthy benefits to the TCC. These include improving the military hardware, the combat and negotiating expertise of troops from these countries and raising the state's international profile (Norden, 1995: 436; Watson, 2005: 61). Authors have pointed out the downside of this gesture of TCC's. They argue that by contributing troops to peacekeeping, despotic governments for example, are given access to international aid (Aoi et al, 2007: 172; Sotomayor, 2007: 176-178; Baledrokadroka, 2012: 109). The experience garnered by troops in combat and community relations during peacekeeping missions are sometimes harnessed into perpetuating their home country's dictatorial regimes when they return (Cunliffe, 2014; Sotomayor, 2014). This shows that unintended consequences go beyond peacekeeping mission areas.

Evaluating Effectiveness in Peacekeeping

Due to the variety of interpretations that have developed over the years, it is difficult to set a standard for success for peacekeeping (Druckman and Stern, 1999; Johnstone, 2005; Maley, 2013; Garb, 2014). Assessing the impact of intervention is not straight forward since much depends on the purpose and size of the intervention and how far into the postwar era assessments should go (Pikering and Kisangani, 2006: 363). In attempting to resolve this problem, academics have categorised assessments into short and long term variants (Diehl and Druckman, 2013). This categorisation tallies with Francis Fukuyama's (2004) three distinct phases of peace operations namely: (a) the initial stabilisation of a war-torn society, (b) the recreation of local institutions of governance, and (c) the strengthening of those institutions. Short term evaluations are indicative of the first phase that entail conflict cessation, protecting lives and keeping environments secure. The second and third phases are concerns of long term evaluation since they consist of peacebuilding, infrastructural and institutional reconstruction within the host community, and the viability of these institutions.

Short Term: Short term evaluations assess the connection between actions taken by field operatives, conflict reduction and achieving stability

(Fetherston, 1994; Johansen, 1994). In evaluating the success of peacekeeping operations in this regard, authors have proffered several metrics. These include, assessing if the mandate was fulfilled, if the specific accomplishments were met and immediate impact of the operation on the local population (Diehl, 1993; Bratt, 1996).

Some authors question these criteria arguing that on the issue of mandate, there is the problem of clarity and interpretation (Druckman and Stern, 1999: 2). The accomplishment criterion, they argue, leaves open the question of just how many accomplishments it would take. In reference to impact on the local population they advocate that the criterion begs the question and ignores the impacts on the broader political processes that may have larger impacts on the lives of the local people. Supporting this critique, Chiyuki Aoi et al (2007: 6) contend that while the intent of peacekeeping may have been achieved, it may propel other problematic issues which question the initial success. From this perspective analysing peacekeeping's effectiveness based on immediate outcomes such as providing security and enabling stability is premature (Fortna, 2004: 269).

Long-term: There is the contention that peacekeeping success should be rated on factors such as government obligations to uphold norms of peace, function-ability of democratic institutions, the prosecution of war crimes and professionalism of peacekeepers (Johansen, 1994). This approach is adopted by Devon Curtis (2012a and b) who assesses the success of peacebuilding in Burundi based on the vibrance of its transitional justice, economic and democratic reforms ten years after the end of conflict. Other authors who favour the long term approach argue that success should be based on the duration of peace after the exit of peacekeepers (Fortna, 2008; Hultman et al, 2015). One advantage of this approach, contends this school of thought, is it accommodates peacekeeping externalities which refers to the duties assigned peacekeepers and the unwarranted effects that come with them (Lipson, 2007; Kent, 2007; Jennings, 2008; Le Billon, 2008).

Since it is unknown how long it would take for these long term effects (such as respect for rights and firm democratic institutions) to take root, short term assessments become a necessary stop-gap in the evaluation process. Not

knowing how far into the post conflict period researchers have to look to determine if peacekeeping has been successful is a major problem with the long term assessment (Pickering and Kisangani, 2006: 363). Supporting this assertion, David Quinn et al (2013) contend that the immediate impact or short term assessment is a more realistic metric of evaluation.

For evaluation studies on AU peace operations such as this, the short term approach is more amenable. Since the primary aim of AU peace operations is to keep environments secure and protect lives, it will be inappropriate assessing its impact using long term metrics. For studies focusing on the impact of peacebuilding which manifests over a long period, the long term approach becomes the viable option.

Motives and Aims of Peacekeeping

Individual states participating in peacekeeping have done so for a variety of reasons ranging from troop remuneration, national prestige, derivation of international aid, to strengthening a regimes hold on power. These motives are usually connected to debates of national intersts or the need to preserve the international system. However, there are authors who maintain that states undertake peacekeeping responsibilities for liberal and humanitarian objectives.

Promoting States National Interests

Peacekeeping is argued to serve certain aspirations which favour the powerful states and as such, intervening to promote an order to protect a status quo that suits them is quite common. Authors in this school hold that the major powers act on the maxim that they have the special responsibility of maintaining peace and security in a system where they occupy privileged positions (James, 1996: 172; Duffield 2001; Finnemore, 2003: 8). They maintain that peacekeeping as a multilateral initiative provides legitimacy for the pursuit of the interests of these states and changes in these interests determine the path peacekeeping takes (Pugh, 2004; Bellamy et al, 2010). Since the interests of these states come first, peacekeeping has seen a sliding toward re-enacting earlier practices of imperial policing where the concerns of

international actors are placed ahead of those of local communities in mission areas (Rubinstein, 2010: 457). A supporting view notes that peace operations serve a narrow problem solving purpose of doctoring the global political economy within a framework of liberal imperialism and raises suspicions about whose interest peacekeeping really serves (Flint and Falah, 2004: 1391; Pugh, 2004: 39).

Preserving the International System

A fundamental role of peacekeeping is as regulator of the state-based international system. Preservation of the international system by the maintenance of its basic state building blocks is the principal classical function of peacekeeping (Richmond, 2004: 147; MacQueen, 2006: 235; Zanotti, 2006: 152). This school of thought asserts that international interventions function as part of an international disciplinary security regime used in normalising states that are perceived as potential sources of instability to the international community as a whole or to a region in particular (Bellamy and Williams, 2009: 43). The attempt to normalise states is hinged on the concept of mutual democratic pacifism which holds that peace is better sustained between democratic nations (Russet, 1995; Friedman, 1999).

Consequently, peacekeeping is employed to ensure states remain or are transformed into democracies, and link securing peace to universalizing democracy (Chandler, 2004: 59-60; Barnett and Finnemore, 2005: 172; Laffey and Weldes, 2005: 61). Several authors while sharing this view object to this practice on the grounds that peacekeepers cannot be effective peacebuilders and that democracy can only be viable when it is established from within rather than from without. For this reason, institutions shored up by peacebuilding endeavours remain fragile (Hazen, 2007: 325-326; Fortna and Howard, 2008: 293).

Promoting Liberal Norms

By getting involved in peacekeeping, states sometimes place liberal values over national interests (Newland and Meyers, 1998; Hampton, 2005). One scholar avers that 'intervention looks odd from the conventional perspectives on international politics because it does not conform to the conceptions of

interest that they specify' (Finnemore, 2003: 55). She argues that it will be difficult to calculate state benefit or accuse states of benefiting when the reduction of human suffering as a result of their actions is apparent. Using the intervention of the U.S. in Somalia as an example, she asserts that it was a clear case of intervention without obvious interests.

Peacekeeping practices and norms emerge from prevailing global norms that legitimise certain practices and de-legitimise others. Peacekeeping's support for democracy lends credence to the view that it is shaped by a global culture. Peacekeeping's hasty democratisation of mission areas is derived from its conformity to the ideological reorientation of the organisations involved (Paris, 2003).

Another reason why the international community resorts to peacekeeping can be found in the liberal ideology of human rights (Michael and Ben-Ari, 2010: 658). Authors of this school qualify the need for intervention in terms of rights and security, namely; religious toleration, minority rights, human rights, international stability. When these are threatened, then the international community has the right to intervene to keep the peace (Krasner, 1999: 111; Evans, 2008: 284; Pattison, 2008: 128; Hultman, 2013: 60). Authors who justify peacekeeping on humanitarian grounds hold that states have a responsibility to protect their own population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing (Bellamy et al, 2010: 29-30: Glanville, 2011: 233). When they manifestly fail to do so, the international community acquires a duty to protect vulnerable populations in what is known today as the responsibility to protect (R2P) (Bellamy, 2008; Dannreuther, 2008; Bellamy et al, 2010).

Compensating for State Failure and the Responsibility to Protect

With emphasis on the safety of individuals, the R2P focuses on that area of human security that is concerned with the alleviation of chronic threats and stresses on protection from downward disruption (Glasius, 2008: 32; Seybolt, 2008: 12). States draw their legitimacy from their ability to protect their citizens and when they fail at this task, the international community reserves the right to intervene to fulfil this function (Bellamy, 2008; Diehl and PharaohKhan, 2010).

With the increase in intrastate conflicts in the post Cold War era, belligerents usually target civilian populations causing astronomic casualties rather than target other militia groups or government forces (Ogunsanya and Mngqibisa, 2000: 2; Azam and Hoeffler, 2002: 482; Bellamy et al., 2010: 35). Due to the impact of this phenomenon on civilians there is growing support for humanitarian intervention on the grounds that, even when establishing peace fails, peace operations are tasked with curbing the worst excesses and alleviating the most acute deprivations at the least (Melander, 2009: 390; Bellamy and Williams, 2012: 541; Bah, 2013: 7; Vircoulon and Lesueur, 2014: 3)

One interpretation sees the R2P as the responsibility of a state to its citizens. Academics within this school argue that a state's sovereignty and legitimacy are dependent on its ability to respect and protect the rights of populations in its care (Bellamy, 2008: 615; Bellamy et al, 2010: 29-30: Glanville, 2011: 233). The other interpretation conceives it as international response to avoid shocking episodes of inhumanity such as genocide and ethnic cleansing (Diehl and PharaohKhan, 2010: 111; Pattison, 2008: 128). Authors who hold this view contend that international intervention becomes necessary when states fail in their responsibilities to protect their populations from such atrocities and violations (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 73; Evans, 2008: 284; Richmond, 2013: 207; Hultman, 2013: 60).

The deployment of international intervention based on the R2P is conceived as challenging the Westphalian tradition of states exercising sovereighty over their territories (Pupavac, 2006: 256; Seybolt, 2008: 1; Robiliard, 2011: 25). Challenging the concept of international intervention on humanitarian grounds is the moral hazard theory which states that the R2P instigates rather than prevents genocide and mass atrocities (Hehir, 2010; Kuperman, 2008a; Kuperman, 2009). Kuperman (2008b: 219) notes:

> Rebellion is the most common trigger for genocidal violence, 'yet' some militants may rebel despite the risk of provoking state retaliation because they expect any resulting atrocities to attract intervention that facilitates their rebellion. Ultimately, intervention may help their rebellion succeed.

The contention is the R2P prolongs suffering by encouraging repressed groups to continue armed resistance and reject reasonable negotiated settlements (Kuperman, 2009: 285). Moral hazard theorists hold up this view as one of the major reasons for the onset and prolongation of the conflict in Darfur (Kuperman, 2009: 285-292; Robiliard, 2011: 23). Another critique against the R2P holds that it has become too reliant on international rescue such that civil society has neglected decisive roles they could play in protecting themselves (Mégret, 2009: 580). There is also the contention that since the powerful states decide on intervention in weaker states, such intervention challenges the concept of equality of sovereign states (Pupavac, 2006: 256).

These criticisms of humanitarian intervention seem rooted in the uneasiness about violations of sovereignty. It is almost certain that if states adhere to their responsibilities to protect their populations, there would rarely be the need for violent insurgencies or peacekeeping interventions in the first place. When states fail, intervention becomes necessary to stem civilian casualties from the conflict that may ensue.

Peacekeeping Actors

UN Peacekeeping and the Need for Regional Actors

One major debate on UN peacekeeping is its success or failure as the world's chief security officer. Another debate examines the UN's ability in managing states interests while striving to provide security in conflict areas. Also is the issue of regionalising peacekeeping which some authors see as burden sharing, while others see it as the UN passing the buck.

Irrespective of its failures, problems and critiques, authors agree that UN peacekeeping does boast some impressive figures. They note that where UN peacekeepers are deployed, the likelihood of war reigniting fell by 75 to 85 percent compared to cases where no peacekeepers were deployed. In post-Cold War cases where UN deployments concurred with the belligerents, the likelihood of war was reduced by as much as 86 percent. Though for large and complex multidimensional operations which were often deployed to areas with unstable consent and lingering violence, the figure remained above 50 percent (Bellamy et al, 2010: 1).

Not all academics see the UN as successful in this endeavor. These scholars maintain that today's UN operations with grander mandates than earlier operations are far less effective. This owes largely to peacekeeping being used as a vehicle for pushing the national interests of members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) who decide on missions and the mandates they carry (Neack, 2004: 42; Rubinstein, 2010: 465; Adebajo, 2011: 1-2). Much of the UN's failure in peacekeeping is attributed to this pressure of state politics especially within the UNSC (Ciechanski; 1997; Jett, 2001: 39; Diehl and Frederking, 2010). To understand UN peacekeeping therefore there ought to be an understanding of the role of politics and state interests (Berdal, 2003: 8-9; Bove and Elia, 2011: 699).

The UN's ability to recognize, shape and influence the differing interests of its members has strengthened its legitimacy in peacekeeping (Lipson, 2007; Smith, 2011). This is buttressed by the observation that the demand for international deployments has not diminished, nor has the demand for UN involvement (Berdal, 2003). Mats Berdal (2009: 9-10) notes that one of the most striking aspects of international peacekeeping 'is the extent to which the UN has been reviled, written off and dismissed, only to be recalled and entrusted with new peacekeeping responsibilities'. This indicates that while the UN is viewed as lacking the capability and political will needed for robust peacekeeping, it still commands the principal and unique advantage as a vehicle for collective action which provides it with legitimacy in conflict.

Authors who advocate the UN as effective attribute this to the organisation's consultative shared decision making which enables the coordination of its interests with that of its member states and regional organisations in containing threats to peace (Kegley Jr, 1998: 28; Aydin, 2010: 49-51). To aid this collaborative process, authors insist on the formation and building of common norms. The reason being that since some difficulties in collaboration among UN members are occasioned by cultural barriers, possessing common norms carries a more proactive role in terms of bridging differences and mobilising energies for sustainable peacekeeping (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2005: 141; Woodhouse, 2010: 486; Powell and Baranyi, 2012: 2).

The legitimacy and responsibility of the UN has stretched it beyond its limits and given rise to the need for regional actors whom it has committed itself to aid and train to undertake peacekeeping tasks in their respective regions (Olonisakin and Ero, 2004; Zanotti, 2006; Coleman, 2011). The benefits of this cooption, authors assert, is the utilisatiion of comparative advantage. Since regional organisations are closer to the scene and possess more local knowledge, they are better able to adapt to local conditions, reach decisions faster and dispatch peacekeepers quicker than the UN would (Marnika, 1996; Wallensteen and Heldt, 2010; Gowan and Sherman, 2012). Also, since the UN rarely deploys in places where there is no peace to keep, it falls on the shoulders of such regional organisations to force the peace if and where necessary to make situations conducive for the UN to come in (Coleman, 2011: 519-520).

However, academics remain divided on the use of regional organisations for peacekeeping ventures. Some commend this collaboration stressing that when the parties pool their comparative advantages they heighten the degree of success (Olonisakin and Ero, 2004; Maurice, 1996). Others see this relationship as one of necessity since there may be no other practicable way for the international community to stop atrocities it can no longer stomach than through regional initiatives (Coleman, 2011: 520). Authors who question this relationship argue that the UN possesses greater international legitimacy and practical experience at peacekeeping than any regional arrangement (Pugh, 2004), so deferring peacekeeping to regions is the UN dodging its responsibilities (Berman and Sams, 2000). Besides, such arrangements are avenues for hegemons to entrench their regional dominance (Pugh, 2003: 32; Coleman, 2011: 520).

The AU and its Peacekeeping Challenges

Armed rebellion and internal conflicts remain the major sources of threat in Africa, and many question the ability of the AU at keeping the peace due to is capacity deficit (Williams, 2011: 20-22; Dersso, 2014: 34; Warner, 2015: 63). Inspite of this handicap, the AU is conceived as a viable partner provided it gets the needed support from its better resourced partners and other stake holders (De Coning, 2010: 3; Williams, 2011: 23). However, the relationship

forged often leads to the debate of ownership of AU peace operations and the need for the AU to be less dependent on external assistance.

The AU peace operations primarily revolve around the R2P, namely preserving lives and keeping environments secure (Powell and Baranyi, 2005: 2; Powell and Tieku, 2005: 937 and 947: Murithi, 2009b: 92). Some authors submit that beyond these primary goals, the AU's criteria for intervention appear to be threefold: 'bridging operations to fill a gap before a larger force can deploy; operations that no other body is willing to undertake; and operations to reverse unconstitutional changes to power' (Massey and Baker. 2009: 19). Fulfilling these criteria demand robust operations which are complex and expensive, and with the AU lacking in resources, it is generally held that it can only manage short interim missions, and is wholly dependent on other organisations, most of whom are better resourced (Oliver, 2002: 111-112; May and Cleaver, 2007: 18; Cottey and Forster, 2010: 58-61; Coleman, 2011: 524; Williams, 2011: 11).

Not all authors agree that the AU is given to short interim missions only. Hussein Solomon (2012: 23) contends that though the AU undertakes interim missions that act as a prelude to long term UN involvement, in practice the AU has had missions lasting much longer. He highlights the Somalia and Sudan missions where the AU has been involved for eight and twelve years respectively.

The AU compensates for its lack through several processes. First, the continuity and collective experience derived from the AU's internal collective action of working with and harmonising its Regional Economic Communities (RECs) capacities have made the AU a skilled negotiator and peacekeeper (May and Cleaver 1997; Murithi 2008; Williams, 2011; Brosig, 2012). Based on this collective action, some academics contend that the AU's peacekeeping operations will be only as effective as regional mechanisms allow them to be (Nathan, 2010: 3; Olonisakin, 2010: 57, Williams, 2011: 20).

In view of the AU's internal workings, authors contend that closer cooperation between the AU and its REC's has given rise to certain tensions (Gounden et al, 2010; Williams, 2011; Khadiagala, 2012). One of such tensions notes Paul Williams (2011: 14), is the unwillingness of states to cede autonomy to the

AU Commission out of being wary of the latter wielding too much influence. He asserts too that regional interventions such as may be undertaken by the AU may ignore critical post-conflict components such as demobilization and restructuring the armed forces due to paucity of funds and expertise. Such lapses leave gaps in peace processes and could propel instability.

Exacerbating this lack of faith in internal cooperation is the view that the AU and its REC's do not have the needed capacities for extensive and complex operations as is required for robust operations (Oliver, 2002: 111-112; Bogland et al, 2008: 38-39; Coleman 2011: 519-520). For this reason, the second process of partnering with better resourced external international partners such as the UN and EU has been decisive for the AU to succeed at peacekeeping (Adibe, 2003: 80; De Coning, 2010: 3; Adebajo, 2011; 13, Cravinho, 2011: 125). Other authors point out that while such cooperation provides considerable international legitimacy and wider support, these external partners sometimes define the peace and security efforts on the continent thereby undermining the authority of the AU (Bellamy and Williams, 2008: 194; Esmenjaud, 2009: 3-4; Aning, 2010: 45; Cravinho, 2011: 125; Franke and Gänzle, 2012: 90). This has led to the AU being apprehensive about engaging its bigger partners too closely because they are constantly concerned about ownership of the mission and about their voice being drowned out.

The EU and its Role in Africa

The EU's role in Africa is borne out of its political and historical involvement with the continent (Gegout, 2005; Adedeji, 2012). Renewed EU involvement in Africa is directed at securing economic interests and wielding greater influence through bridging the security deficit in Africa (Charbonneau, 2009; Franke and Gänzle, 2012; Haastrup, 2013). Through development of the continent's security apparatus, the EU has been a major player in AU affairs where, beyond providing funds, expertise and materials for peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction, the EU also provides troops (Bellamy and Williams, 2009; Gowan and Sherman, 2012; Boutellis, 2013: 132).

Apart from its immediate neighbourhood, it has been noted that sub-Saharan Africa seems to be the sole region where the EU undertakes its responsibilities

of ensuring world security (Helly, 2009: 55; de Vos, 2012: 119). Some authors have attributed this renewed EU interest in Africa to the need to counter Chinese and American influence as well as carve out a greater foreign policy role for itself (Franke and Gänzle, 2012: 93; le Pere, 2012: 258). While Catherine Gegout (2005: 429) defers to economic interest, international prestige and colonial ties, others advocate that it is to help bridge the increasing security deficit in Africa (Pentland, 2005: 923; Charbonneau, 2009: 549). One argument presents EU-AU relations from a perspective of shared goals rather than a master–servant relationship. This view debunks the notion that imposing EU norms is the priority for engagement (Khadiagala, 2012: 218; Haastrup, 2013: 785 and 795). Stressing that EU strategy must be understood in the context of Africa's regional imperatives, Toni Haastrup (2013: 791) contends:

> The AU requires the EU's support to develop the AU as a regional actor. This support is given through a specific inter-regional arrangement achieved through constant dialogue and joint projects. This arrangement is characterised ... on the principles of equality, partnership and local ownership. While this approach to regionalism welcomes a European input, it emphasises support for Africa's local imperatives and processes.

It is acknowledged that the EU has been committed to supporting the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as a main step towards strengthening Africa's crisis response (Helly, 2009: 54; Williams, 2011: 10). The EU has supported AU peace missions through its Africa Peace Facility (APF) and also within the framework of special relationships with Africa's REC's (Gegout, 2009: 405-407).

Several obstacles which hamper the capacity of the EU within this framework have been identified by scholars: (i) the absence of a formal relationship between the AU and its RECs which has hampered the effectiveness of direct EU support (Helly, 2009: 54; Williams, 2011: 11); (ii) The implementation of realistic national foreign policies in Africa for which the EU has earned criticism from Africa's leaders thus making them less willing to accept EU recommendations (Helly, 2009: 53; Adedeji, 2012: 83); (iii) Lingering colonial interests of some EU member states which rubs off on the sincerity and legitimacy of EU policies toward Africa (Helly, 2009: 46; Adedeji, 2012: 91; Boutellis, 2013: 128). Despite these drawbacks, it is acknowledged that the

EU has done a lot, but could do better in improving the quality of its assistance (Helly, 2009: 53).

Since EU deployments to conflict theatres have been relatively small, deployed for only short periods and confined to limited geographical areas, the potential impact of its operations remain limited (Bellamy and Williams, 2009: 20). The contention here is, the use of time frames rather than facts on the ground as guides for exit strategies is highly problematic, because it encourages spoilers to temporarily withdraw and reorganize rather than engage in a genuine process of conflict resolution (Bellamy and William, 2009: 50). Some authors however contend that, what the EU lacks in troop delployment, it makes up through other avenues such as funding, training peacekeepers, providing logistics and air lift capacities for peace operations (Bellamy and Williams, 2009: 40; Cottey and Forster, 2010: 58).

The EU also adopts the strategy of assisting African governments into developing their polities in order to reduce the possibilities of disenchantment and insurgency within their borders. This approach of the EU to issues of security comes on the backdrop of its philosophy of developing systems rather than confronting insurgents (Pentland, 2005: 923; Zwolski, 2012: 71).

Conclusion

This review of literature focuses on peacekeeping's effectiveness, motives and aims, and actors. The objective is to highlight debates related to this study's discourse on the provision of stability in conflict areas.

The major contention of proponents of traditional peacekeeping is that peacekeeper neutrality and the minimum use of force sustains mediator credibility. An intervener will fail to gain the cooperation of disputants against whom it applies force. Authors in support of robust peacekeeping contend that passivity, as demanded by neutrality, in modern day conflict theatres serves the interest of parties resistant to peace, and increases human suffering. Coercion is inevitable if atrocities are to be prevented by peacekeepers.

Authors have pointed out that despite best intentions peacekeeping generates certain unintended effects within the target area and beyond. These include the increase in sex trafficking, production of a dual economy, and the

manipulation of peacekeepers expertise by their home governments in sustaining autocratic regimes. Unfortunately, international institutions responsible for peacekeeping have little control over these consequences.

Peacekeeping institutions have had to cope with the challenge of harmonising states interests that impact on the provision of stability in conflict areas. Beyond promoting their national interests, certain states use peacekeeping to preserve a favourable statusquo in the international system, spread liberal ideals and support humanitarian norms. The legitimacy and authority of international peacekeeping organisations derives partially from its ability to harmonise these different motives and aims into a cohesive whole.

Since peacekeeping operations have become the responsibility of international organisations, this review focused also on the major players involved with peacekeeping in Africa, namely the UN, AU and EU. For the UN, the quality of intervention it renders is dependent on the collaboration of its members and the politics within its Security Council. For the AU, a major issue outside its capacity deficit, is its legitimacy to intervene in conflicts. This is addressed through the AU's cooperation with its REC's and external international partners. For the EU, its intervention in African conflicts is argued to be as a result of colonial linkages, protecting its interest in Africa through boosting the continents security apparatus, and to remain a major player in global politics.

CHAPTER THREE

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: EXAMINING FACTORS FOR EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING

This chapter offers a comprehensive list of factors which influence the provision of stability in conflict areas. These factors serve as the hypotheses of this study. They are used in the following chapters to test the efficacy of the African Union (AU) in peacekeeping. These factors are drawn from existing peace literature. They are categorised as emanating from organisational bureaucracy and field experience. This dichotomy is not so clear cut as these factors sometimes overlap. The categorisation of these factors as shown in table 3, is meant to facilitate this study's analysis.

Table 3 Factors Affecting Peacekeeping Outcomes

SOURCE	THEMES
Organisation's Headquarters	Mandate, Funding, Size of Contingent, International Collaboration, International Political Will, Timing and Duration, Peacekeeper Training.
Field Realities	Local Initiative, Women Participation, Strategic leadership in the Field and Presence of Lead State, Preference for Impartiality over Neutrality, National Elite Cooperation, Size and Demography of Mission Area.

Discussions in this section will follow the arrangement in the table which depicts the order in which experts in extant literature generally believe they affect peacekeeping operations. For this reason, mandate and funding are treated first in the first bloc and peacekeeper training treated last. Local participation which is widely acclaimed as significant is treated first in the second bloc, while local political elite cooperation and size of mission area are discussed last. Local women participation is placed next to local initiative not because its importance is widely accepted, but more because much of local participation involves women.

These factors are arranged based on their significance in extant peace literature.

Factors Emanating from Organisational Bureaucracy

These elements emanate directly from peacekeeping organisations. Drawing on the views of scholars, this section examines how these factors affect peacekeeping operations in meeting their short term objectives.

Mandate

H: Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.

CH: Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre.

Mandates are deemed indispensable to peacekeeping achieving stability in conflict areas because they guide the conduct and set the parameters for peacekeepers. They are important tools upon which the success of any peace mission depends. The hypothesis examines the need for mandates to tally to situations on the ground and the need for transitioning in order to adapt to changing situations if they are to be effective. The counter hypothesis argues that untailored mandates relieves peacekeepers of the burden of being restricted to specific instructions and provides them the opportunity to act based on their assessment and discretion.

H: By defining the purposes of its deployment, mandates help the mission to maintain a clear idea of what is expected from it and what is not (Hussein, 2012: 7). Experts are divided on what a precise mandate for peacekeeping should be, since peacekeeping does not operate on the rule of *one set of mandates fits all operations* (Fortna and Howard, 2008: 292). Mandates are considered precise when they are flexible and can tally with realities on the ground and when the capacity needed to achieve them in personnel, expertise and materials are adequately provided for. For example, while a Chapter VI mandate would be too weak for a volatile situation, a Chapter VII mandate would definitely be considered too aggressive for a situation more amenable to monitoring. So different mandates are suited to different conflict theatres. There is some consensus among authors on what is needed to make the actualisation of mandates feasible. These are: (i) a *comprehensive assessment* of the situation on ground; (ii) setting *realistic objectives* based on these assessments in view of available resources; (iii) the *timely renewal* of

mandates as the situation on the ground evolves; (iv) creating a *standard for action* arising from the fact that specific orders could be interpreted differently by the different national contingents (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009: 10-11).

Mandate transitioning is key to peacekeeping success and for this flexibility is needed. Many peacekeeping missions began as Chapter VI missions and evolved into Chapter VII missions as dictated by situations on the ground (Kilpatrick, interview 2013). When peacekeepers are requested, 'the mandate has to be agreed upon by the factions at war. Such a scenario necessitates a *Chapter VI* mission which consists of peacekeeping in the traditional sense' (Cross, interview 2013). This involves 'deploying military contingents to monitor, supervise and verify compliance with ceasefires, ceasefire lines, withdrawals, buffer zones and related military agreements' (Findlay, 2002: 5). This mode of peacekeeping which has had its own share of successes has been observed to apply usually in conflict between nations where their professional armies are expected to abide by certain conduct.

Peacekeepers on a Chapter VI mandate are restrained from the use of force except in self defense, and are compelled only to observe ceasefires and separate the warring inter-state forces (Langholtz, 2010: 18). War lords and militants who have no obligation to war conventions seldom stand intimidated by the presence of peacekeepers operating on a Chapter VI mandate. The result of this mix is often catastrophic (Mansaray, 2009: 42; Jacobson, 2012: 3-4). When such situations give rise to the need to avert circumstances such as genocide or worsening security, the mandate may change the intervention into a *Chapter VII* mission.

Chapter VII mandates signal a more forceful approach to peacekeeping where the threat or use of force is authorised to bring about peace. The use of force is deemed permissible when the occasion offers a reasonable prospect for success, confines the duration of the operation, contains the probable casualties and has the support of the international community (Kegley Jr, 1998: 33-34). An effective mandate, while tailored to realities on ground, should also be flexible enough to adapt as ground realities change. The timely adoption of tailored mandates, it is argued, greatly reduces the number of casualties recorded during periods of peacekeeping (Dallaire, 2005: Sitkowski,

2006). The number of lives preserved justifies tailored and timely mandates, since the essence of peacekeeping is to save lives and create a safe environment.

CH: Seldom has support been given by scholars and field experts to untailored mandates. There is the consensus instead that untailored mandates are often the result of political meandering and they usually bog down peacekeeping (Stambaugh, 2001: 4). 'The drafting of mandates is an intensely political process, driven by various considerations that are not relevant to the use-of-force issue' (Findlay, 2002: 7; Jowell, interview 2016). This is most evident in Chapter VII mandates which are heavily dependent on international support to sustain (Kegley Jr, 1998, 33-34). The mandates that derive from these political compromises seldom bode well for peacekeeping operations and they leave peacekeepers more exposed to danger (Guehenno, 2008: 4; Gadler, 2010: 585-586; Hussein, 2012: 8-9). Such situations may prompt field commanders to take relevant intiatives which sometimes yields positive results.

A good example is peacekeeping troops in Darfur whose Rules of Engagement (ROE) prevented them from challenging rebels despite the volatility of the environment and rising civilian casualties. They circumvented this problem by deploying to villages and escorting local women on their daily chores such as wood and water fetching and on market days in order to protect them (Patterson, 2008: 17; Badescu and Bergholm, 2009: 298). This initiative which was necessitated to protect lives was not a part of the mandate, yet produced positive results which ensured that in areas where these peacekeepers were deployed they had some success in keeping these areas secure (Pattison, 2008: 128). Also, referring to the situation in South Sudan, Maria Ferrante (interview, 2014) contends that peacekeeper discretion compensates for mandate deficit and has helped reduce human casualties and provided security in certain areas. Supporting this, Marco Jowell (interview, 2016) notes that peacekeeper assessment and initiative in the field affect peacekeeping outcomes more than mandates.

Funding

H: Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.

CH: Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly.

Funding refers to peacekeepers remuneration which boosts or dampens morale of troops, the provision of logistics and how best missions should be funded for operational effectiveness. It takes funds to train, equip and sustain peacekeepers during operations and to keep missions running. Every peacekeeping operation has three components to it – the military, police and civilian - and it takes funding to maintain them. The military must be well equipped to create security. The police component must be robust enough to keep law and order in the major areas. The civilian component lays the groundwork for political resolution and organise the infrastructure to transition that country from war. This makes funding a critical component (Curtis, interview 2014; Dundun, interview 2014; Mitchell, interview 2014). Majority of experts remit that the quality and success of peace operations is largely dependent on funding (Williams, 2011: 12; Hampton, 2014: 1). Some experts however disagree (Kilpatrick, interview 2013).

H: The availability of adequate funds strengthens the capacity of a mission and increases its chances of success (Williams, 2011: 16, Curtis, interview 2014). Most scholars agree that when funds are limited, missions are placed at a high risk of failure especially when materials needed to get the job done are in short supply (Cilliers, 2005: 69; Murithi, 2008: 81; Jeng, 2012: 228).

Two issues have largely dominated the discourse on peacekeeping funding in relation to effectiveness and these are the remuneration of peacekeepers and the acquisition of relevant military hardware and logistics. On personnel remuneration, Kwesi Aning and Fiifi Edu-Afful (2013: 20) posit that poor remuneration of peacekeepers could make peacekeepers lose focus and prompt them into pursuing business interests in a bid to break even. When this happens, peacekeepers manipulate the extension of missions in order to protect their business interests. The provision of sub-standard military hardware makes missions struggle at best, jeopardises the prospects for success and prolongs the duration of the mission (Berman, 2003: 200; Esmenjaud, 2009: 11).

Funding is argued to be more effective when the troop contributing countries (TCCs) involved in peacekeeping provide the necessary equipment for their troops, and the funding institution in turn pays these countries for both men and equipment (Asante, interview 2014; Okuonghae, interview 2014). This is opposed to a situation where a participating country only sends troops, while the coordinating organisation equips them (Feldman, 2008: 269-270; Vircoulon, 2013: 2). The former has been noted to be more productive because the troops on the ground know what they need and are familiar with the weapons from their home countries (Ellery, interview 2013). They also have better communication with their native countries to respond to these needs (Franke and Gänzle, 2012: 98). Funding makes sense when it meets the needs of the mission and produces results. When equipment such as heavy military hardware are available, but inappropriate for a mission, they do not only become wasteful but also a burden (Feldman, 2008: 270).

CH: Exemplifying the counter hypothesis, Hutchful Eboe (1999) points out that despite severe funds strain experienced by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), its peacekeeping operations recorded quite a number of successes. Tony Curtis (interview, 2014) points to the downside of robust funding using as reference the UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) where very little was achieved in view of the time and funds invested.

> There was a lot of money to be made … the Special Representative of the Secretary General stood there year after year making these amazing amounts of money and nothing was happening. It appeared as if they were not motivated to work themselves out of a job. Why would you if you are making upwards of $200,000 a year for not doing anything then you are going to continue to do nothing.

The argument here is, UNMEE achieved nothing because its robust funding favoured its officials. This situation would likely have been reversed had staff remuneration been austere. The example provided by Tim Cross (interview, 2013) supports this:

> So many of the experiences of peacekeeping operations in Africa end up in a situation where the AU troops and others from other nations end up not being able to look after themselves. Still they get out and make a difference to the problem they have gone out to solve.

These austere situations could be the tonic behind the commitment of AU troops attested to by James Ellery (interview, 2013) and Beverly Mitchell (interview, 2014). This commitment could then be understood within the context of, the earlier AU missions achieve stability, the earlier they can transition to a UN mission which is always better resourced.

James Ellery and Steven Kilpatrick (interviews, 2013) also contend that what can be termed adequate can never be fully provided. So, while funding is always going to be important, it should not be of much concern provided the basic needs of the military force are met. They contend that the problem has been an over reliance on 'great swathes of logistics support. As long as troops have the basic necessities ... then they have got what is required' (Ellery, inrterview, 2013).

Character of Contingent

H: An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.

CH: Integrity of forces strengthens the bond within peacekeeping missions.

Contingent size is usually held as one of the cardinal factors for peacekeeping success. Reasons for these are presented in the hypothesis which argues for the size of contingents to be proportional to the population of the mission area. In the counter hypothesis, it is noted that while size may be important for peacekeeping to generate stability in conflict zones, the capabilities of a large contingent in meeting its targets is largely dependent on the composition of its forces.

H: Scholars such as Barbara Walter (1997 and 2001) and James Dobbins et al (2005: 244-245) support the argument that when intervention has been decided, it should be done with a large contingent to project force credibility. Supporting this position, Michael O'Hanlon (2003: 10 and 32), Lisa Hultman et al (2013: 1-3) and Kwaku Asante (interview, 2014) contend that though a smaller number of elite soldiers can sometimes handle discreet tasks, the broader problem of stabilizing a country requires significant forces. For such stability operations and difficult missions, a modest intervening force should need an average of one soldier for every 200 members of a country's civilian

population (O'Hanlon, 2003; Dobbins et al, 2005). In some cases, the recommended ratio is 1:50 and 1:100 (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 69). The reason for this, O'Hanlon (2003: 31) argues, is to ensure that intervening forces are 'comparable in number to the largest likely internal foe they might face. With comparable numbers, as well as superior skills, mobility, and firepower, intervening forces would then be well placed to dominate the ensuing battles'. Dobbins et al. (2005: xxiv and 232) point out that lower force-to-populations peace operations have been accompanied my much higher casualty levels, and missions with high casualty levels are usually the least successful. Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman (2006: 76) contend that 'an operation with too few forces could limit assistance to civilians outside specifically identifiable areas or exclude those in neighbouring towns'.

The most consistent finding from an array of studies is that peace is more stable after decisive military victories as opposed to stalemate truces (Fortna, 2004: 273; Doyle and Sambanis, 2005: 4). This finding also applies when peacekeeping contingents are compelled to peace enforcement and the need to curtail or neutralise antagonistic factions is paramount (Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 68). Such decisive military victories are better assured with a well trained contingent superior in numbers and armaments to factions opposed to the peace. This need for stability in conflict areas cannot be underscored especially if the role of peacekeeping is to create a secure environment which prevails even when the mission winds up (Pickering and Kinsangani, 2006: 363; Etekpe, interview 2015). For peacekeeping to be effective, much depends on the size of the contingent.

Large contingents are not only necessary to ensure military victories or force the peace in arenas of uncooperative factions, the size of a contingent also enhances its peacekeeping role as a sturdy assurance mechanism and provides credibility to peace settlements (Williams, 2010a: 3-5; Hultman et al, 2013: 2). On the various debates on why civil strife often seems intractable, one line of thought contends that it is as a result of each faction being sceptical of the other reneging on negotiated settlements. In the absence of a guarantor powerful enough to ensure that they stay faithful to the rule, these parties keep fighting (Walter, 1997: 340; Jill, 2003: 2-3).

Walter (1997: 340-341) advocates that for an intervening party to be perceived as credible in ensuring negotiations are honoured, the intervener should have enough forces on the ground to curtail the breakout of conflict without having to send for reinforcements. In similar fashion O'Hanlon (2003: 10) notes, 'once a decision for intervention is reached, it is generally preferable to send forces promptly and in decisive quantities. Such an approach conveys resolve, discourages resistance and improves the odds of success'. This is reaffirmed in the Brahimi report (see UNGA, 2000: 1) which states, 'no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force'.

The presence of a large peace force is apparently considered a necessary deterrent for conflict parties to cease hostilities and increases the propensity for stability (Van der Lijn, 2009: 50; Wright and Greig, 2012: 131; Sullivan and Karreth, 2015: 270).

CH: Large however does not necessarily translate to more efficient in military terms and this is clearly expressed by military experts. James Ellery (interview 2013) says:

> If you make a troop contingent with many nations it is much weaker. In some theoretical instances the total is greater than the sum of the parts, the reverse applies with troops. The more contingents you have the weaker it is. You have obviously got difference in language, logistics, fighting method, all sorts of things.

This lack of force integrity exists when a multinational force is made up of many TCC's, a situation prevalent with large peacekeeping contingents. It gives rise to diverse modes of operation and interests which hinder efficiency (Pavšič, 2013: 3). Just as sharing language, culture, religion and values can bond troops, difference in these areas can create numerous obstacles ranging from acceptable meals to gender discrimination. It becomes difficult and expensive creating a cohesive force from widely disparate nationalities (Feldman, 2008: 268-269). Such cultural and social diversity within units do not augur well for mission efficacy especially when certain units share strong cultural and religious affiliations with spoilers within the mission area (Forsberg, 2008; Zirker et al, 2008). Peacekeeping units will find it difficult developing a common doctrine, systems, tactics, techniques and procedures (Williams, 2011: 11). This is because, the greater the diversity, the lesser the

bond which motivates the coordination of troops to achieve set goals (Lee, 2005: 84-85). Thus a correlation exists between the size and composition of a peacekeeping contingent and its ability to save lives (Bellamy et al, 2010: 2; Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 75).

International Collaboration

H: Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.

CH: Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.

This section examines collaboration in peacekeeping which is induced by the need to reduce the burden on coordinating organisations, utilise comparative advantage and provide international legitimacy (Oliver, 2002: 99-101; MacQueen, 2006: 152; Wallensteen and Heldt, 2010: 145). The hypothesis supports the argument that in view of the benefits of burden sharing, comparative advantage and international legitimacy, international collaboration is significant for peacekeeping's effectiveness. The counter hypothesis shows the flip side of international collaboration as authors argue that cooperation could be detrimental since it brings together nation states and regional organisations pursuing different interests. Expansive collaborations could result in a clash of interests which yields mission sterility. This implies that missions are likely to provide stability when such collaboration is restricted.

H: Collaboration is an essential part of peacekeeping irrespective of whether it is carried out by the UN or by regional organisations such as the AU (Derblom et al, 2008: 15-16). Collaboration in peacekeeping is twofold. On one hand is the partnership that exists between the organisations themselves (external/horizontal), while on the other is the collaboration that exists between these organisations and their member states (internal/vertical) (Gowan and Sherman, 2012; Sullivan and Karreth, 2015). The latter will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters dealing with AU peacekeeping as it bears significantly on the structure and division of its peacekeeping machinery.

The use of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) has been beneficial to both global and regional organisations. While it enables the UN for example, to reach wider areas with less stress, it also provides for regional organisations such as the AU, the much needed legitimacy to intervene in the affairs of its member states (Derblom et al, 2008; Gowan and Sherman, 2012). In addition, external collaboration also provides the expertise and funds needed for the effective prosecution of peacekeeping operations. Since regional organisations are closer to the scene and possess more local knowledge, they are better able to adapt to local conditions, reach decisions faster and dispatch peacekeepers quicker (Wallensteen and Heldt, 2010). Such IGO cooperation has also been commended on the grounds that it has often prevented civil conflicts from spilling beyond national borders (Olonisakin, 2010: 62).

CH: The less the number of international actors involved in peacekeeping, the greater the likelihood for mandate precision and political cohesion since diverse interests are limited. As already discussed, ambiguous mandates have often been traced to political compromises arising from too varied international interests (Stambaugh, 2001: 4).

Bearing in mind the formation of peacekeeping forces is dependent upon the contribution of member states, peacekeeping contingents and processes are made porous by the absence of political cohesion among these contributing states (Hudson, 2000: 29; Novosseloff, 2012: 12-13). Here, the concept of force integrity discussed in the previous section arises. The less contributors involved in peacekeeping and the less diversity the contingent enjoys, the better for mission efficiency (Feldman, 2008: 268-269).

This issue of the number of international collaborators is aggravated when there exist's distrust and rivalry among participating states (Mays, 2003: 13). Consequently, the concept of "safety in numbers" does not always work when it comes to international collaboration. When collaborating actors pursue divergent interests in the face of conflict, the intervention apparatus is left wanting. The probability of this occurring is higher when the actors are more and national caveats from these countries can significantly constrain operations (Marshall, 2009: 7). Tim Cross (interview 2013) notes: 'Some

states will support other states in their grouping … other states in the same area will be on the other side of that argument. Some states will support rebel movements … other states will support the government'. The assertion that "the more international collaborators there are, the better for peacekeeping outcomes" becomes improbable. A lot depends on the actors that make up the numbers and what each wants (Curtis, 2012a: 13; Gowan and Sherman, 2012: 2). This makes stability through peacekeeping more feasible with lesser actors.

International Political Will

H: The international community's utilisation of authority and resources, provides assurance for conflict settlement.

CH: International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.

The willingness to act usually depends on the authority to act (Holt and Berkman, 2006: 57). The concept of political will in this discussion is 'the willingness of states to become involved in the conflict management aspects of a crisis despite the potential costs in casualties, monetary expenditures, and domestic public approval' (Mays, 2003: 3; Abiola, interview 2014). One issue which is critical to the early establishment of security and which is ultimately a function of political will is rapid deployment when the decision to deploy has been made (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009: 18). For as Chris Bagamba (interview 2014) notes, waiting for support before the commencement of an operation could allow the situation get out of hand. The counter hypothesis argues for the disadvantages of robust external interference, and also highlights the benefits of minimal external intervention.

H: International political will is the determinant of whatever gains are made during peacekeeping (Bagamba, interview 2014). Adebajo Adekeye (2011: 7) places it as one of three key factors for peace operations success. Since contributing states dictate the role their peacekeepers play during missions, the political will of these actors determines the success of missions (Jowell, interview 2016).

Using data from the 2006 and 2007 Human Security Brief, Devon Curtis (2012a: 2) attributes the decline in armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa

between 1999-2006 to international effort towards ending wars and preventing them from restarting. Some scholars argue that a deficit in international political will is the second major inhibitor to peacekeeping operations. This deficit occurs largely due to states interests (Bellamy, 2011: 4; Wright and Greig, 2012: 131).

National interest makes it difficult for states to put their forces in harm's way in the protection of strangers (Bellamy, 2011: 4; Jacobson, 2012: 6; Pugh, 2013: 400). It is also responsible for the haphazard commitment of the major powers to peacekeeping missions which is evident in the supply of low calibre firepower and the concentration of intervention mainly in areas of strategic economic value (Gegout, 2005: 428 and 439; Franke and Gänzle, 2012: 93 and 97). Once national interest goals have been fulfilled, international political will plummets even if humanitarian needs still persist. The failure of international political will in peace operations gives rise to what has been termed the commitment gap (Wentges, 1998: 5; Lipson, 2007: 14). Here, peace operations become dysfunctional when the pressure to act in response to humanitarian crises is met by symbolic responses devoid of the necessary field and diplomatic resources (Lipson, 2007: 14).

CH: Due to active international commitment, civil society neglects decisive roles in helping themselves even in cases where they are likely to produce better results (Mégret, 2009: 580). Success in peace operations is better ensured by strategies that take a bottom-up approach through encouraging an active civil society (Andrieu, 2010: 537).

Government agencies acting with the right intent could produce negative results (Koopman, 2003). Active international political will is no different and this sometimes inhibits peacekeeping. International road maps to peace, for example, could undermine effective local strategies at mitigating threats (Gorur, 2013: 11-12). The tensions generated by misunderstandings between peacekeeping's international actors and host communities often impedes effectiveness (Khadiagala, 2014: 164). Even where such tensions do not exist, the danger of negative outcomes arising from the robust implementation of international peace programmes still remains (Nathan,

1999: 2; Omach, 2012: 89). Such miscues have been observed in the Democratic Republic of Congo:

> In an attempt to reconstruct state authority in the eastern part of the country, various international peacebuilding agencies had decided to assist the Congolese police in deploying officers to some of the most unstable areas…. In theory, mobilising a greater law enforcement presence in an unstable area would secure it…. In reality, the situation made a bad situation worse (Autesserre, 2014: 3).

This view is also supported by Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein (2007: 531) who contend that stability and reintegration of combatants in certain situations are better achieved utilising local dynamics than internationally funded programmes.

Debates justifying the counter hypothesis can also be made from a converse perspective. Whatever the motive, Western nations were copious in their interventions in African conflicts from the early days of African independence up until the 90's (Bellamy and Williams, 2009: 39-43; Adebajo, 2011). This display of interest in African affairs relegated to the background the need to build the continent's security mechanisms. Declining Western interest toward the end of the 20th century galvanised Africa into developing its security mechanism at the turn of the century (Cilliers, 2008:7; Attah-Assamoah, 2010: 65; Blocq, 2010: 292). Hence Bukun-Olu Onemola (interview 2016) says 'AU peacekeeping in the last decade and its components are still crystalising …. Even in mandate formation there is a lack of depth because of experience, but the good thing is they are building on their experience and getting better'. The concept here is that less involvement of Western instructors in African peace operations overtime would provide the opportunity to harness African expertise in this area (Hampton (2014: 4-5). Had peacekeeping in Africa been wholly left to Western forces as was the case till the 90's, Africa's contribution to peacekeeping would likely be insignificant compared to what it is today, and the expertise of its peacekeeping personnel would likely be low.

Timing and Duration

H: Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.

CH: Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.

The debate in this section revolves around the appropriate and most effective time for peacekeeping to get involved in conflict and the right time for a mission to exit. These concepts are discussed together in line with the view of experts that a successful end is almost impossible without a successful beginning (Stambaugh, 2001: 3-4; UNSC, 2010). It is important therefore that a mission transitions and draws down at the right time to avoid over-dependency by the host country on one hand, and to ensure that it leaves the country in a stable state (Dobbins et al, 2005: 228; De Carvalho and Ettang, 2010: 11).

H: One pertinent question in humanitarian intervention is not whether military force should be used, but when should it be deployed (Bah, 2013: 7). Timing intervention is one of the most difficult aspects of peacekeeping especially if it has to be done when the conflict is intense (Davies, interview 2016). Some scholars argue for a period before hostilities start on the basis that such timing saves lives, is cost efficient, carries more options and leads to greater stability (Zartman, 2005: 201). The contention is, when fighting starts factions at war seldom ask for a mediator until a hurting stalemate has been reached (Walter, 2001: 8-9; Zartman, 2005: 202). A second position argues that peacekeepers should only intervene when their services have been sought (Goulden, 2002: 335). At this point the prospect of success at minimal cost is high (Gegout, 2005: 429). So, whether in a stalemate or before the commencement of conflict, the factions should be the ones to first seek peace, in which case, the peacekeepers get involved because there is a peace to keep. Entry into a conflict at this stage meets with a higher degree of success. A third position contends that the launch of a peacekeeping mission depends on 'a convergence of international, regional, and national demands: the interests of key Security Council members; the willingness of local warring parties to cooperate; and the support of neighbouring powers – particularly hegemones' (Paterson and Saunders, 2012: 2).

The discussion above indicates the issue of entry is seldom straight forward. Cases where peacekeepers are requested by the belligerents often give rise to Chapter VI missions. Chapter VII missions which are usually enforcement missions 'do not necessarily require the consent of belligerents' (Fortna, 2004: 270). Peacekeepers in such cases have to force the peace. So for missions which from the outset are designated as Chapter VII missions, when becomes the right time for intervention? Using Rwanda as an example, a case is made for early robust deployment (Feil, 1998; Dallaire, 2005):

> In Rwanda, the robust and prompt deployment of force could have made a major difference. Before the genocide began, a robust preventive force could have been effective.... Even if a preventive deployment had not been tried, intervention after the genocide began could have saved 200,000 or more victims (O'Hanlon, 2003: 13).

A preferable point for third party involvement to force the peace would suggest a period when spoilers and vulnerable factions have been established (Gegout, 2005: 429). The peacekeepers go in to protect the vulnerable group and negotiate their rights within the polity. A good example is the temporary truce forced by the UN between the Kurds and the Iraqi government by sending 17,000 troops to protect Kurdish camps against attacks by Saddam Hussein (Walter, 2002: 11). Entry is also appropriate once spoilers to the peace such as terrorist groups on one hand, and those working to preserve the peace on the other have been determined. The interveners get involved to assist the faction supporting the peace to contain the spoilers.

On duration and exit times, some experts contend that the setting of deadlines make for more efficient handling of peace operations. Their perspective is in line with the idiom "work expands to fill allotted time". In other words, the pace and scope of work are directly related to the time allowed. They are of the view that groups get more done when working with a deadline. Admore Kambudzi (interview, 2014) and Chris Bagamba (interview, 2014) assert that the setting of time frames provides some psychological boost to peacekeepers and spurs them into getting the job done. The lack of a deadline allows tough jobs to stagnate or groups to amble toward the goal (Stambaugh, 2001: 11). In reference to peacekeeping, the lack of a deadline serves as a major reason why missions have reached an astronomical high

since operations such as in Cyprus and India/Pakistan have existed for almost fifty years with no end in sight (UNSC doc. SC/980, 2010). They argue that though peacekeeping exit deadlines should be fairly rigid, their duration should be feasible and in accordance with the task of the mission. Tony Curtis (interview, 2014) supports this strongly:

> Since there is a lot of money to be made, open ended missions that are not tied to some measure of effectiveness saps resources and encourages a lackadaisical approach in peacekeeping and it is what gives peacekeeping a bad name. When a peacekeeping mission is five, six, seven, eight years on and nothing has been achieved someone has to ask the question "why" because there are lots of money going to these missions.

For such experts, peace operations ought to be tied to achievable and scalable tasks if they are to be effective.

CH: Some experts contend that it is impractical to devise specific exit schedules before an operation begins (O'Hanlon 2003: 24). UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon notes that though 'exits must be equally well considered from the outset of a mission ... peacekeeping missions should not stay longer than necessary, but should also be wary of withdrawing prematurely only to have to return because of renewed violence' (UN News Centre, 2010).

Zartman (2005: 202) shares this view when he states that peacekeepers 'need to take time to finish their job … they should leave as soon as they can but stay as long as they must'. Gustavo de Carvalho and Dorcas Ettang (2011: 55) contend that 'once the new post-conflict arrangements are in place and the risk of relapse is at acceptable levels, peacekeeping operations can draw down, hand over their responsibilities and withdraw'. In highlighting the disadvantages of compelling peacekeepers to work to set deadlines, Marco Pinfari (2011: 684) notes that 'such time pressure may force peace processes to failure or drastically reduce the quality of the output'. These views virtually illustrate that mission duration should not be pre-empted at the start, rather, this should be dependent on the realities on ground.

Training for Expanded Roles

H: Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.

CH: Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.

There is the view that 'if you have adequate force size, but you do not have the training, then you are running into trouble' (Onemola, interview 2016). There is little doubt that soldiers assigned to peace operations need to retrain in order to keep with the increasing variety of mission demands (Leeds, 2001: 92; Hampton, 2014: 2). While some experts advocate that such training should focus on specialisation especially as it relates to troops and providing security, others contend that peacekeepers should be trained to fit the expanding roles of peacekeeping. This section examines the debates of both schools.

H: A large force drawn up from different cultural backgrounds and called upon to deliver on the expanded nature of contemporary peacekeeping would require some standard of training, selection and performance to ensure a basic level of interoperability in order to function as a team (Kidwell and Langholtz, 1998: 89; Duffey, 2000: 144; Hampton, 2014: 2). The rules governing peacekeeping conduct emphasises the relevance of negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation as being preferred to the immediate use of armed force. Peacekeepers are called upon to supervise cease-fires, patrol demilitarised zones, block the flow of weapons, assist in demilitarisation and disarmament, protect civilian personnel, aid workers and local non-combatants, facilitate post-conflict reconstruction of everything from roads to governing institutions (Neack, 2004: 41; Chivvis and Martini, 2014: 68). These situations in which state-based militaries find themselves during peace operations is very different from the war-fighting scenarios for which they were trained (Aall, 2000: 122; Leeds, 2001: 95; Bellamy et al, 2010: 363).

Unlike war-fighting, peace operations often require sensitivity and empathy, attributes that may have been discouraged by military training. In this sense, the traits that make good warriors do not necessarily make good peacekeepers (Bellamy et al, 2010: 363). Therefore, the peacekeeper needs to possess beyond his traditional combat disposition, a variation of responses

within a conflict zone such as negotiating skills if peace operations are to succeed (Leeds, 2001: 95; De Carvalho and Ettang, 2010: 9). These requisite skills experts argue can be acquired through training (Goodwin, 2005; Baly, interview 2013).

CH: Majority of military personnel interviewed advice caution as such expansion of roles may be giving the soldier too much to do. They are of the view that, what military forces are meant to be good at is creating security (Ellery, interview, 2013; Kilpatrick, interview 2013; Curtis, interview 2014). The provision of security is more vital now in view of the observation that the shift in organised violence from interstate state to intrastate has seen a rise in cultural (ethnic or religious) militias (Harleman, 1998; Duffey, 2000). The resulting conflicts are often violent because the people involved believe they are fighting for the survival of their way of life against an enemy that is perceived as maximally threatening, so there are fewer rules (Kimmel, 1998: 58). This gives rise to indiscriminate attacks on civilians including massacre, torture and rape and the indiscriminate use of child soldiers as these groups tend to fight to the finish (Doyle and Sambanis, 2005: 3; Cahn, 2006: 337; Collier, 2010: 7). Soldiers are best left to focus on the provision of security to stem the rise of civilian casualties in conflict.

Then again even where expansion of duties as suggested by the hypothesis is necessary, it takes time as it often needs a change of mind set and this is not easy (Cross, interview 2013). Rather than expand the task of the military, it is wiser to leave it to the organisations and agencies that have a better grasp of the conflict in context. The military's lack of expertise in conducting such activities would rub off on the mission were such roles mandated to them (Hazen, 2007: 329).

Factors Emanating from the Field

Peacekeeping practices go beyond orders from the coordinating institutions. They have also evolved from experience on the field. Discussed here are field factors and these are local initiatives, women participation, the role of impartiality and neutrality, as well as lead states and field commanders. Also treated here are factors completely outside the control of peacekeeping

organisations, but which are privy to the mission area and bear on peace outcomes. These include the local political climate and geography of the mission area.

Local Participation

H: Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.
CH: The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.

For some authors, local population support is the centre of gravity in any peacekeeping operation (Lauria, 2009b: 6). Attaining peace through local capacity initiative is still considered the most viable for the social and infrastructural reconstruction of society (Metcalfe, 2010: 7-8). Given its fundamental role, it is recommended that when possible, local actors should be empowered to ensure sustainability of the peace process (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000: 779; de Carvalho and Ettang 2011: 54). This section essentialises the importance of local initiative to peacekeeping achieving stability and problems that may arise.

H: The role of local citizens, just like the military, has undergone changes to adapt to the demands of peacekeeping in order to contribute to peace. Since one of the major aims of peace operations is to foster social attitudes that will prevent conflicts from turning violent, peace scholars agree that national and local ownership is critical to the successful implementation of the peace process (Langholtz, 2010: 48; Autesserre, 2014: 4). As such, contribution of local content to the peace process should not be undermined, as the means for managing and resolving conflict have always existed within social and cultural groups (Duffey, 2000: 143; Gizelis, 2011: 524). If peace operations are to be productive, civil society should be the primary target, and this demands that policies and strategies should take a bottom-up approach (Andrieu, 2010: 537, Autesserre, 2013: 21). Effective peacekeeping and post conflict rebuilding can only be achieved through the active participation of the local populace (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006: 34), though with peacekeepers and the international community jump-starting the process (Stambaugh, 2001: 6; Carnahan et al, 2006: 9). Jump-starting this process is facilitated through building effective communication and trust between all groups, even those responsible for the conflict (Etekpe, interview 2015).

Local initiative averts crises through facilitating negotiations to help uphold accepted solutions and to monitor and expedite it. Scholars aver that it exerts its influence through the development of alternate dispute settlement mechanisms such as arbitration and mediation which take place outside the domestic court system (Mutisi, 2009; Maphosa, 2009), as well as the use of faith-based organisations (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006; Breidlid and Stensland, 2011).

CH: Some scholars are of the view that the utilisation of local content in peace processes in conflicts that are based on ethnic or religious schisms might aggravate situations further (Aall, 2000: 131; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000: 780). Therefore, the smaller the local content supporting peace operations, the better for stability. The debate here is that not all horizontal networks contribute to the building of civil society. Mobilising bonding networks such as ethnic based or kin groups can actually increase the risk of conflict rather than contribute to the peace process (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 6; Gizelis, 2011: 524).

Similarly, Michael Woolcock and Deepa Narayan (2000: 7) note that 'without intercommunity ties that cross various social divides such as those based on religion, class, ethnicity, gender, strong horizontal ties can become a basis for the pursuit of narrow sectarian interests'. Intercommunity ties are often weak in post conflict societies as individuals and households are saddled with uncertainty, mistrust and contempt (Zukerman and Greenberg, 2004: 11). This heightens the possibility of local coordinating members of peace processes showing bias against certain groups and jeopardising the possibility for stability.

Women Participation in the Peace Process

H: Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.

CH: Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process.

This section does not delve into the exploitation of women for which peacekeepers and government policies have come under serious criticism (see Agathangelou and Ling, 2003; Cain et al, 2004; Cahn, 2006; De Coning et al,

2007; Jennings, 2008; Willet, 2010). It focuses on literature that analyse how the involvement of local women bolster peacekeeping. Natalie Hudson (2005: 788-789) and Frances Stewart (2010: 2) note that women are very often active in civil society, but are made less active in formal peace negotiations despite progress often resulting from pressure from active women's groups.

H: A study on factors likely to keep states stable discovered without pre-empting the role of gender that 'to a certain extent the correlation between gender development and stability mirrors the relationship between development and stability. Similar correlation was not found between democracy and stability' (Bernard et al, 2008: 8-9). This finding strongly implies that stability requires gender equity (Caprioli, 2000: 65; Cahn, 2006: 338). It is also strongly supported by the observation that 'there is no country or area in which peacekeeping is undertaken where there is gender equality' (Olsson and Gizelis, 2014: 525). The balancing of gender is therefore one of the fundamental organising principles of society because women, just as men are assets for sustaining stability (Zuckerman and Greenberg, 2004: 1). In speaking for increased women's participation in peace processes, Hilary Clinton observed that:

> Women" build coalitions across ethnic and sectarian lines, and they speak up for other marginalised groups. They act as mediators and help foster compromise. And when women organise in large numbers, they galvanise opinion and help change the course of history (Patrick, 2011).

And if this argument is faulted for leaning on sentiments, she gives credence to her claim with an anecdote about 'male negotiators in Darfur who could not agree on rights to a particular river. The stalemate ended when women who fetch water and wash laundry in the river pointed out that the river had already dried up'.

Economists agree that one of the pivotal factors for the success and sustenance of post-conflict development is the development of women (ICRW/CEDPA, 1998: 1). They are the ones to note the very salient needs of the more vulnerable members of a conflicting community since they act either as care givers or caterers (Ibeanusi, interview 2016). This also holds true for post conflict societies where many women would have lost their partners during conflict (ICRW/CEDPA, 1998: 1; Aning and Edu-Afful, 2013: 24).

Consequently, there are compelling economic arguments advocating that women play a greater role in post-conflict reconstruction. These arguments are made on the basis that:

> If the goal is to improve health, nutrition or education, reduce fertility or child mortality, stem the spread of HIV, build robust and self sustaining community organisations, encourage grass-roots democracy, and ultimately, temper extremism, successful efforts must target women (Coleman, 2004: 2).

These factors listed above, are prerequisites for a stable community and invariably reduce the possibility of a return to conflict. This implies also that if improving domestic situations is a potent remedy to curb the surge in violent intrastate conflicts, then there is no better way of achieving this than through women (Agbalajobi, 2009: 13; Gizelis, 2011: 525). It has been observed that Security Sector Reforms (SSR) and other such efforts like demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) undertaken to sustain peace in regions emerging from conflict are often done by grassroots organisations substantially staffed or formed by women (Kemi Ogunsanya and Kwezi Mngqibisa, 2000: 11; Metcalfe, 2010: 8). Scholars in support of women's role in peace processes advocate they must not only be seen as passive victims of armed conflict, but as capable actors as well (Cahn, 2006: 344; Detraz, 2012: 79-80, Autesserre, 2013: 21).

The most pragmatic reason why local women should be involved in the peace process relates to their impact on the durability of the peace itself. This assertion is based on the findings of a study that male and female mediators are equally effective at reaching initial settlements, but female mediators are more effective at mediating binding settlements (O'Reilly and Súilleabháin 2013: 5-6). Similarly, a 2009 study observed that peacekeeping operations in countries where women have relatively higher status have been significantly more stable. By contrast, such operations in countries where women have comparatively lower status are much less likely to succeed (Detraz, 2012: 83).

CH: There have been challenges of late to the maternalist view that women are indispensable to the peace process because they are naturally disposed to peace. This view holds that they are also as passionate and divided on political, ethnic and religious allegiances and given to conflict as men are

(Bouta, 2005; Krepel, 2011). The assumption therefore that men are aggressive and women peaceful is not only incorrect, but irresponsible (Hudson, 2000: 27-28). So having local women as part of the peace process is no guarantee it will be more effective compared to if they were exempted. Even when they are well represented, their contributions cannot exceed that of men (Onemola, interview 2016).

A similar argument is based on the premise that gendered qualities associated with masculinity and femininity are constructed and that there is no inherent difference between men and women (Caprioli, 2000: 54). Therefore, just like their male counterparts would, 'women who are at the peace table to represent a particular party or rebel group would primarily voice the interests of their faction' (O'Reily and Súilleabháin, 2013: 6).

Considered from the peacekeeper perspective, it is argued that gender balancing in peacekeeping contingents makes it more efficient. Women have better access to and are often better suited for security tasks pertaining to local women, and bring new ideas on issues pertaining to the family. However, the more traditionally paternal a society, the lower the tolerance for women in arms (Hudson, 2000: 27). In such an environment, gender balancing within military peacekeeping units will seldom elicit the support of the local populace and likely undermine stability.

Charismatic Field Leadership and Lead State

H: Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.

CH: A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.

The role leadership plays strengthens or weakens resolve, makes or mars operations, and spurs or repels cooperation. As noted by peacekeeping experts, the degree for success is high when peacekeepers are well led (Baly, interview, 2013; Cross, interview 2013; Amuzu, interview 2014; Kambudzi, interview 2014). Leadership in intervention is enacted at the international/state and the field/individual levels. These two levels will be discussed in this section in relation to their impact on peacekeeping.

H: Stability in peacekeeping is argued to be more dependent on the performance of individuals on the ground, who have been saddled with the responsibility of authority. Good military leadership has been alluded to as a factor that determines peacekeeping's success (Jowell, interview 2016). 'The most important person in a peacekeeping operation, whether small or large, is the one in charge' (Jett, 2001: 77). Experts contend that leaders needed for peace operations are officers who possess a military yet political mind, can take stock of the chaos and uncertainty, are comfortable with uneasy situations and handles them with calm without creating more problems (Leeds, 2001: 92-93; Cross, interview 2013).

The competencies of a strategic leader include identity, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, mental agility, world class warrior, and professional astuteness (Lauria, 2009b: 2-4). All these help the force commander to win popular support for the mission among the local people and harmonise the different interests of the contingents into a common goal, thereby building mutual confidence among them (Lauria, 2009b: 8). The Report of the Panel on UN Peace operations (the Brahimi Report) states:

> Effective dynamic leadership can make the difference between a cohesive mission with high morale and effectiveness despite adverse circumstances, and one that struggles to maintain any of those attributes. That is, the tenor of an entire mission can be heavily influenced by the character and ability of those who lead it (UNGA, 2000: 16).

The above listed strategic leadership qualities needed by commanders on the ground sometimes stand inimical to the success of peacekeeping missions. In regions where leaders are intolerant of opposition, a popular head of a peacekeeping mission may be seen as a threat to local authority and removed. Such breaks in continuity have been described as a recipe for disaster when implementing peacekeeping operations (Stambaugh, 2001: 4). Charismatic commanders may consider themselves as fighting a war and aim to pummel the opposition to submission and establish a territory (Cross, interview 2013). Such leaders worsen already tense situations (Hayes, 2000: 2). This never augurs well for stability.

CH: Every peacekeeping mission is dependent on the contribution of states. But such multinational collaboration is hardly ever without hitches ranging

from lack of funds to late deployment of national contingents to the coordinating organisation. Pending when these issues are sorted, it becomes expedient for a state to take the lead (Roux, 2013: 2). This mantle is often taken by the regional powers within these organisations. This resort to quick action by a regional power (lead state) is to curtail the regional contagion or diffusion effects of such conflicts as they reduce rates of economic growth both in the directly affected countries and their neighbours (Doyle and Sambanis, 2005:3).

The lead state by acting promptly is expected to enhance the mission's ability in saving lives. An example here is South Africa's early deployment under the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in April 2003, well before the arrival of other countries contingents six months later, in one of the AU's most successful missions. This approach to peacekeeping is amply supported by the belief that 'peace enforcement operations should rest with a coalition of the willing*, led by one nation* or regional organisation' (Oliver, 2002: 99).

The practise of having a lead state has had its own share of criticisms. Neo-realists are sceptical of such intervention on the basis that regional powers use it as an opportunity to expand their influence and solidify their grasp on the region (Martin, 2004; Smith, 2005; Watson, 2005). A lead state's involvement in conflict through peacekeeping affords it the opportunity to protect or engineer a status quo that suits it (Finnemore, 2003; Pugh, 2004; Bellamy et al, 2010). Peacekeeping therefore provides the legitimacy - the much needed cover for its interference (Nardin, 2003; Gowan and Sherman, 2012). Experts such as Kwaku Asante (interview 2014) see it as increasing the complexity involved in peace operations. Kwaku Asante states: 'if we have a situation where a certain state brings more men and the other brings more money, which is the lead state? Such confusion should be avoided'. He asserts that peace operations are better led by the coordinating organisations and not states.

Impartiality over Neutrality

H: Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.

CH: Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.

This section assesses the significance of impartiality and neutrality especially in conflicts consisting of amorphous religious/ethnic groups where civilian casualties are often high (Azam and Hoeffler, 2002: 462; Doyle and Sambanis, 2005: 3).

Though peace authors have been clear on the issue of consent and force, the terms neutrality and impartiality are used interchangeably. This arises from the fact that both terms were initially seen as inseparable and later synonymous (Donald, 2002: 22; Yamashita, 2008: 616). In more recent time, neutrality is interpreted as not affecting the political situation at all, while impartiality is interpreted as applying influence in an even-handed manner (Mattelaer, 2008: 19). Being impartial does not necessarily guarantee neutrality. A judge in a court case is expected to be impartial, but the impartial application of the law is seldom neutral. Neutrality on the other hand, is conceived as not taking action against any side's interest, an approach that coheres nicely when peacekeepers are serving as an assurance mechanism (Donald, 2002: 22; Levine, 2010: 3). Such was the case in the Suez Crises of 1956 and 1973, and Namibia in 1989 (Diehl, 1993: 8).

H: When peace has to be kept especially in the face of one or more insurgent groups, some scholars argue that neutrality has to be sacrificed for impartiality (Asante, interview 2014). This is because neutrality in the face of atrocities helps the killers and not the victims (Regan, 2002: 71; Udombana, 2005: 1149). So, impartiality in this context would mean protecting the vulnerable group (refugees, vulnerable ethnicities/cultures), and supporting groups that are committed to the peace.

Peacekeeping forces must apply impartially the mandate given them and it would be difficult for them to stay neutral between parties that obey that mandate and those that oppose it (Goulden, 1993: 455; Levine, 2010: 3). Section fifty of the Brahimi Report states: 'In some cases, local parties consist not of moral equals, but of obvious aggressors and victims and peacekeepers

may not only be operationally justified in using force, but morally compelled to do so' (UNGA, 2000: 9).

Also in defence of this impartial bias some scholars have drawn on compelling evidence to contend that interventions which support the host government are likely to be expeditious than interventions that oppose it (Regan, 2002: 55). This view rests on the logic that:

> Interventions challenging the incumbent government result in bloodier civil wars and use higher levels of force than those supporting it. These results are partially explained by the fact that, at least initially, governments often have more resources at their disposal than the opposition. Providing additional military resources to the government, in this case in the form of fighting troops, tilts the military balance toward government forces even further. The result often is a relatively rapid end to internal fighting (Pikering and Kisangani, 2006: 364-365).

A catch-22 situation arises with the influence of this factor on an operation. Scholars have noted that the greater the dependence on host nation support, the less the likelihood of the peacekeeping mission staying neutral (Mattelaer, 2008: 17). The AU's peace enforcement missions in the Comoros and Mali which were in support of the government are good examples.

CH: Not all authors are convinced about sacrificing neutrality for impartiality for peacekeeping to achieve its desired end in the face of uncompromising spoilers. This school of thought holds the view that in sacrificing neutrality, coordinating organisations of international peacekeeping sacrifice their credibility as well. The credibility of such organisations in intervention is hinged on a presumed maintenance of non-partisanship (Pugh, 2013: 407). Sacrificing neutrality, they also warn, increases the risk of damage to the organisation's reputation. Partisanship of the intervener, no matter the justification carries the tendency of reprisal attacks which draws the agency deeper into the conflict, and if a military defeat is suffered at the end, the damage done is irreparable (Nathan, 1999: 2-4; Hunt, 2013: 3-5). They advocate therefore that despite its shortcomings, maintaining a posture of neutrality always serves a peacekeeping mission and its organisation better.

Domestic Political Elite

H: Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.

CH: Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.

The importance of local political elites to peace operations achieving stability will be discussed in this section. Peake et al (2004: 16) observes that surprisingly few texts devote their analysis to the importance of local political elite in peacekeeping. This factor whose significance is sparsely treated in peace literature emerges in this study as one of the cornerstones to successful peacekeeping.

H: It should be noted that better results are achieved when there is unanimity among national elites about the peace process (Gurses and Rost, 2013: 472). Government machinery, institutions and networks such as the media, schools and grassroots agencies are utilised by the peacekeepers in rebuilding and facilitating programmes such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (Langholtz, 2010: 48; Langholtz, interview 2013). Such processes form the basis for the conception that local government partnership is significant in fostering peace processes (Williams, 2005; Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). When local political actors live up to their responsibilities and lead by example, it reinforces the incentives for the people to cooperate and minimises the transaction costs associated with successful collective action (Arce, 2001: 115-116).

What mars and affects peacekeeping the most are the power struggles within a country which places barriers to its impacting positively (Baly, interview 2013). This assertion dwells on the premise that if national and local ownership are critical to the successful implementation of the peace process then violent political tensions among local elite complicates and stifles the benefits of peacekeeping (Dorussen and Gizelis, 2013: 694-696). Any attempt to improve peacekeeping will not matter if a country's leaders and resources conspire against peace (Jett, 2001: xvii; Adebajo, 2011: 7; Durant and Weintraub, 2014: 523). It is not the place/role of peacekeeping to calm such power struggles, so peacekeepers are placed in a serious dilemma. Maria Ferrante (interview 2014) a humanitarian worker in South Sudan states:

> The situation changed where the country itself became part of the conflict… The government is not welcoming the peacekeepers anymore because they perceive the peacekeepers, right now as we speak, as a threat…. So these poor guys (peacekeepers) are really struggling.

When peacekeepers find it difficult to achieve their aims of assisting countries in the transition from violent conflict to a stable and self-sustaining peace, the motivation for decisive action to end the conflicts diminishes (Bellamy et al, 2010: 232; Wright and Greig, 2012: 130). Thus, in order to avoid such strenuous circumstances, every effort should be made to foster trust and cooperation between national actors (Langholtz, 2010: 48). Domestic elite are vital to the provision of stability.

CH: The issue here is not about host state consent, but about peacekeepers going it alone. When neither government nor opposition forces present viable alternatives for fostering peace, peacekeepers are by this counter hypothesis encouraged to boycott local political elites in their quest for stability. Contributions from scholars such as Jean-Paul Azam and Anke Hoeffler (2002: 462) and Ken Menkhaus (2014: 162-163) xray the harm of weak or oppressive governments and opposition groups to stability. Such contributions indirectly support this counter hypothesis.

The United Nation's Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) is the closest example of peace operations fulfilling the assertion of this hypothesis. However, despite the major overhaul of the Cambodian political system, UNTAC still had to negotiate with the brutal Khmer Rouge, the royalist faction loyal to the former King Norodom Sihanouk and the other smaller factions (Buerger, 1994: 7-8; Ledgerwood, 1994: 3). This example is still reminiscent of the view of Paul William (2010: 2) that peacekeeping operations should not be embarked upon without concrete negotiations preceding them.

Size of Mission Area

H: The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.

CH: A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.

The argument that the size of a mission territory affects peacekeeping's efficiency is inferred from texts and the accounts of peacekeepers on the difficulty in covering large swathes of territory. Some experts however do not conceive this as a determining factor, but contend instead that mission outcomes are affected much more by the target area's mineral wealth. The debates for both these factors will be examined in this section.

H: Basically the debate here is, the smaller the size of a mission area and its population, the more cost effective and straight forward peacekeeping operations tend to be. Intense as the conflict in Rwanda, the belief was rife that the genocide could have been stemmed with as little as 5,500 troops since Rwanda is a small country (Dallaire, 2005: 374). Morten Bøås and Liv Torheim (2013: 418) state in relation to the French peacekeepers in Mali that while defeating the Islamists terrorists may have been easy, stabilising the vast territory will be difficult. Similarly, but from a converse view point is the assertion by experts that one of the early handicaps of the peace operation in Darfur (up till 2008) was the presence of just approximately 7,000 troops to patrol an area the size of France (Pan, 2005; Holt and Berkman, 2006; Kilpatrick, interview 2013). This imbalance between available peacekeeping personnel and size of the conflict area highlights the incapacities of the mission and why achieving stability has been impossible.

CH: A major factor that protracts or minimises the duration of conflict which in the long run bears on stability is a territory's mineral resources. High-value natural resources such as oil, timber, hard minerals and opium are often sources of tension and violence. Resource production areas and trade routes are commonly hot spots for armed groups (Etekpe, interview 2015; Ibaba, interview 2015). For countries rich in mineral resources, conflicts are often prolonged due to major foreign powers and their internal agents who utilise the conflict for the exploitation of resources (Hintjens, 2006: 610; Franke and Ganzle, 2012: 96). For this reason, conflicts such as in Ivory Coast known for

cocoa were brisk when compared to others such as Sierra Leone known for diamonds. This contention explains the difficulty and time it has taken to bring the conflict in the DRC to an end.

> The Congo is known as a geological scandal. You find over there all kinds of minerals and resources that the world needs today in a time of high technology: gold, diamond, copper, cobalt, uranium, coltan (used in mobile phones, laptops and satellites), manganese and timber. The Congo has the second biggest rainforest in the world after the Amazon. Unfortunately, the exploitation of all these resources and the conflict they fuel carry a significant cost (wa Mussangu, 2008).

With over 5.4 million dead and over 2 million displaced, the deadliest conflict since World War II and after nineteen years of UN peacekeeping efforts, the Congo is currently home to the largest and most expensive UN peace operation in the world with 21,189 uniformed personnel which includes an intervention brigade of 4,500 civilians and an annual budget of $1.456 billion (see MONUSCO web page). Had the Eastern DRC regions of Ituri and Kivu which have been most affected by the violence been devoid of their valuable minerals, the peacekeepers would likely have brought order to this region.

A strong correlation exists between the mineral wealth of a country and the protraction of conflict within its borders (Pottier, 2003, De Koning, 2011; Le Billon, 2012). For this group of scholars, it is not the size of the conflict area that impacts on peace operations, but issues pertaining to the distribution of natural resources within the target state and national interest of the major powers (MintPress News, 2012).

Conclusion

The issues discussed largely revolve around the military aspects of peacekeeping whose role it is to provide security. When security is poor, the non-military aspects of peacekeeping stay moribund. None of the hypotheses factors alone guarantees achieving stability in mission areas. Peacekeeping is a mixed bag of factors. You have to bring these factors together – funding, mandate, size, regional cooperation, impartiality, training and others to make peacekeeping work (Cocodia, interview 2016; Onemola, interview 2016). The size of a contingent for example matters little if the mission is lacking in funds

or good leadership. Similarly, leadership will matter little if the mission is unable to win the support of and galvanise local participation. Every peacekeeping mission demands some level of interoperability of these factors, however some factors matter more for certain missions than others.

In the following chapters, this study will test the importance of these factors on peacekeeping's effectiveness using the AU peace operations. At the end of this evaluation, these factors will be ranked in accordance with their general impact on peace operations.

CHAPTER FOUR

BURUNDI (2003-2004)

Since independence in 1962 Burundi has experienced on and off, latent and manifest conflict which have led to over half a million deaths. Its conflict has been largely ethnic based with fighting mainly between the Hutu majority and the minority Tutsis (Lodge, 1999: 1). Prior to the intervention of the African Union in 2003 the Tutsis held political power, dominated the Burundi National Defence Force (NDF) and were quite repressive. This prompted the Hutus into forming rebel groups in order to obtain greater relevance within the system (Ndikumana, 2005: 5-7). The conflict in Burundi, over and above ethnic diversity, was fuelled by control for state power. Political exclusion therefore, and not clashing civilisations, was the key to conflict in Burundi (Lemarchand, 1997: 176; Khadiagala, 2003: 216; Piombo, 2010: 245-246).

The crisis necessitated the deployment of an AU peacekeeping force in Burundi, and the experience was the first in a series of AU missions which aimed at stabilising conflict areas before handing over responsibilities to the United Nations. A unique feature of the peace operation in Burundi in comparison to other AU missions was its retainment of the Chapter VI mandate on which it was deployed throughout the operation. This indicates that the Chapter VI mandate which warrants neutrality worked for the AU intervention force in effectively containing the crisis.

AMIB succeeded in stabilising most of Burundi amid its shortcomings (Svensson, 2008b; Murithi 2009, Rodt, 2011). This chapter argues that the mission in Burundi debunked the centrality of the traditional factors postulated for effective peacekeeping, namely precise mandate, funding, contingent size and international collaboration to effective peacekeeping. These factors were in deficit, yet the mission succeeded. Central to to the effectiveness of the AU were resilient international will, good field leadership, a collaborating domestic elite and local peace initiatives represented largely in the efforts of Burundian women.

Discussions in this chapter are divided into two sections. Section one deals specifically with the crisis that prompted AU peacekeeping intervention and the function of the AU peacekeepers. Mention will be made of the AU's

diplomatic efforts since this had some bearing on certain aspects of its peace support operation. The second section consists of evaluating AU peacekeeping using the hypotheses of this study.

The Crisis in Burundi and AU Peacekeeping

The Crisis

Burundi's colonial history shows that its Belgian masters had implanted and manipulated ethnic divisions which carried on through independence (Ndikumana, 2005: 3; ACCORD, 2007: 15). With independence on 1 July 1962, Tutsis became threatened by a Hutu majority and the prospects of democratic rule which is determined by majority votes (ACCORD, 2007: 15). This was the bane of instability in Burundi, and the major conflicts of 1972 and 1993 caused the greatest political and social upheaval (Boshoff, Very and Rautenbach, 2010:3).

In 1972, Hutu insurgents crossed into southern Burundi from Tanzania and carried out a systematic persecution which led to approximately 3,000 Tutsi deaths. The indiscriminate reprisal of the Tutsi-led government left between 100,000-300,000 Hutus dead within a spate of three months with hundreds of thousands more displaced or exiled (Rodt, 2011: 3; Ndayizigiye, 2005: 18). In 1988, the response of the Tutsi led government of Pierre Buyoya to a Hutu uprising left approximately 20,000 Hutus dead (Rodt, 2011: 6). The tension that followed led to the amendment of the constitution in 1992 to allow for multiparty elections. Elections were conducted in June 1993 and won by Melchoir Ndadaye, a Hutu (Political Economy Research Institute, 2014). In October of 1993, just after four months in office, Ndadaye was assassinated by a faction of the military. While some scholars attributed this to Tutsi officers (Nowrojee, 2004: 6) others claimed Hutu officers were responsible (Piombo, 2010: 247). The assassination of President Ndadaye prompted revenge attacks on Tutsis all across the country and precipitated Burundi into a full scale war by the end of the year as Hutu militias engaged the National Defence Force (NDF) in a decade long civil war that claimed more than 200,000 lives (Nowrojee, 2004: 6).

Urged by the Carter Centre, mediation began in November 1995 under the leadership of Tanzania's former president Julius Nyerere, along with the presidents of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the DRC in what was known as the Mwanza Peace Process. Despite his international stature, Nyerere faced issues of mediator neutrality as he was considered pro-Hutu since he could not be dissociated from the Tanzanian government which had shown tacit support for certain Hutu militia (Nindorera, 2012: 19). This perceived bias contributed to his inability to bring all the major rebel groups to the negotiating table (ACCORD, 2007: 16). In 1999, Nyerere passed away and was succeeded by Nelson Mandela as mediator (Boshoff et al, 2010: ix-x; Piombo, 2010: 251).

In 2000, a multiparty Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed, with the support of the Regional Peace Initiative (RPI) and the international community (see Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000). South Africa took the initiative of creating a platform facilitating the democratic transformation of these processes. Nelson Mandela used his influence to get the government of South Africa to mandate the deployment of the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) in October 2000, to provide protection to designated returning leaders (Aboagye, 2004: 10; Nindorera, 2012: 24). It has been argued that this deployment which grew from 701 to 1,266 played a vital role in enabling the peace process to continue (Hendricks and Lucey, 2013: 2). Culminating these events, a Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) was formed in November 2001 (Boshoff et al, 2010: ix-x; Political Economy Research Institute, 2014: 2).

The peace processes were consolidated with the signing of two ceasefire agreements in 2002. These later agreements were perceived as the climax of the Arusha Accord (UNSC, 2002: 2). The first on 7 October, was between the TGoB and the Burundi Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs). The second on 2 December 2002 was between the TGoB and the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) (Aboagye, 2004: 9). However, a third group, the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-National Forces of Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL) refused to sign, insisting rather on direct negotiations with the Tutsi-controlled NDF (AU, 2003b: 3).

The December 2002 agreement was violated almost immediately and fighting continued, though sporadically until November 2003 when they signed protocols renewing their commitment to a cease fire and began incorporating CNDD-FDD members into the government and the army. With the international community's intention to deploy a peacekeeping force from January of 2003 and the UN's unwillingness to deploy into conflict areas without a comprehensive and all-inclusive ceasefire, it was left up to the AU to intervene (Boshoff et al, 2010: x; MacQueen, 2006: 205; Aboagye, 2004: 10).

Peacekeeping in Burundi

The peace operation in Burundi was unique in two respects. First, it was the first peace support operation (PSO) wholly planned by the AU. Second, despite lacking the traditional factors of precise mandate, adequate funding and a robust contingent, the AU succeeded in ending the conflict and providing stability. This it achieved through a sturdy political will, cooperation from domestic elites and peace initiatives of the local population especially, Burundian women.

In January 2003, the AU authorised the dispatch of a small military observer mission to monitor the December 2002 ceasefire. A month later, at an extraordinary summit, the AU approved the larger peacekeeping mission, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) (Nowrojee, 2004: 6). AMIB was established with the desired outcome of facilitating the implementation of the ceasefire agreements and creating a stable defence and security situation that is well managed (Boshoff and Vrey, 2006: 13). Having accepted the challenge, AMIB was the first operation wholly initiated, planned and executed by AU members (Murithi, 2008: 75). In some quarters, it was deemed a testing ground for indigenous peacemaking and peacekeeping (MacQueen, 2006: 205).

AMIB was deployed to operate for a year, on the understanding that the UN would take over peacekeeping responsibilities (Powell, 2005: 26). Deployed on 2 April 2003, the bulk of its troops came from South Africa which played the lead state. It was the first to deploy and rapidly too by virtue of already having 700 troops in Burundi through the SAPSD (Department of Defence,

Republic of South Africa, 15/07/2014). The other major TCC's, Ethiopia and Mozambique, did not deploy until September and October 2003. South Africa had 1,600 troops, Ethiopia 980 and Mozambique approximately 280 (Boshoff and Francis, 2003:1). Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia also sent small military observer contributions (Boshoff and Vrey, 2006: 14). In all, it took six months for AMIB to reach its contingent strength of just 3,335 persons of which 3,128 were soldiers (Svensson, 2008a: 12-13). AMIB was provided with the following mandate:

- Act as liaison between the parties.
- Monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.
- Facilitate the activities of the committees responsible for the establishment of a New National Defence Force and Police Force.
- Facilitate Safe passage for the parties during their planned movement to the designated assembly areas.
- Secure identified assembly and disengagement areas
- Facilitate and provide technical assistance to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes.
- Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance
- Co-ordinate mission activities with the UN presence in Burundi and
- Provide VIP protection for designated returning leaders. (see Boshoff and Francis, 2003: 41-42; Kumar, 2008: 123-124)

The goal of AMIB's mandate was to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, support and advise on DDR initiatives, make conditions favourable for UN peacekeeping, and contribute to Burundi's overall stability (Rodt, 2011: 10). So, soon after it started operations, AMIB had to work alongside the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) of the World Bank. AMIB's other collaborators were, the UN Office in Burundi (UNOB), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (ES/NCDRR). Together they made up the joint planning group (Boshoff et al, 2010: 54).

To cope with the number of ex-combatants, AMIB was compelled to set up cantonments for the DDR exercises, and it was expected they would accommodate and disarm approximately 300 people daily. Here, AMIB's underfunding was glaring as the lack of facilities meant the mission would fall

far short of this target. The first cantonment area which opened in June/July 2003, could only take a total of 200 ex-combatants (Svensson, 2008a: 14). The mission was so underfunded, there was limited food, infrastructure or medical supplies as AMIB barely had the resources to support its own forces. That the DDR and the cantonment strategy survived at all, was largely due to the funding of foreign partners such as the EU, the World Health Organisation (WHO), UNICEF and the German Technical Cooperation (GTC) (Svensson, 2008a: 14).

Apart from running the cantonment sites, AMIB was involved in helping Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees to return home, and in facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. It also established a Civil-Military Coordination Centre (CIMICC) with the purpose of consulting with NGO's and humanitarian agencies on the matter of operational requirements of humanitarian delivery (Svensson, 2008a: 14).

After several months on the ground,

> Senior AMIB officials drafted rules of engagement (ROE) to allow their troops to use force to protect civilians in imminent danger of serious injury or death. In accordance with these ROE, troops could intervene with force to protect civilians in cases of genocide and mass killings along ethnic lines, although they required prior authorisation from military and civilian officers (Powell, 2005: 26).

In February 2004, a UN evaluation team concluded that conditions were appropriate for establishing a UN peacekeeping operation in the country (Murithi, 2008: 76). On 25 March 2004, AMIB's mandate was renewed for one month till 2 May, 2004. On 5 May, the mandate was extended to when the UNSC was ready to take over the responsibility (Panapress, 2004). AMIB's deployment ended on 31 May 2004 and was followed by the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) into which AMIB troops rehatted (Svensson, 2008a: 14).

Outside the reintegration of ex-combatants, the re-settlement and re-integration of IDP's and refugees into their communities had not been adequately addressed, making this an additional burden for the UN takeover mission (Murithi, 2008: 75). The protection of civilians was also a sour area as

government troops and militia groups were guilty of targeting civilians, 'even in areas where AMIB was present' (Powell, 2005: 27).

However, the very fact that the UN considered the situation on the ground stable enough to take over, was indication of AMIB's commendable effort. On this, most scholars agree as it stands noted that around 95 percent of Burundi was relatively stable by the time AMIB ended its mission (Agoagye, 2004: 14; Powell, 2005: 3; Rodt, 2011, 11). The AMIB experience shows that, a fairly small mission can make a large contribution in creating stability and building the peace (Svensson, 2008a: 15).

Evaluating AU Peacekeeping in Burundi

Widely rated as successful, the AU mission in Burundi served as a test run for subsequent missions. Throughout its period of operation, despite inadequate funding and personnel, AMIB succeeded in de-escalating a potentially volatile situation and brought stability to most parts of Burundi (Murithi, 2009a: 6). However, the gap between capacity and mandate affected the implementation of its DDR process.

Except for local participation, the other factors of mandate, funding, size of contingent and international collaboration widely held to be central to effective peacekeeping were lacking in Burundi. Critical to AMIB's success were force integrity, international political will, good field leadership, a committed lead state, local elite cooperation and local citizens support. Had all the traditional factors been structured to mission requirements, AMIB would likely have fared better. However, without them, it achieved stability still. AMIB's lapses especially in the processes of DDR and the resettlement of IDP's show it was not the all round success scholars heralded it to be (see Aboagye, 2004; Powell, 2005; Rodt, 2011).

In line with the aim of this study, each factor proposed as affecting stability in peacekeeping is tested in order to ascertain the degree to which they determined AMIB's effectiveness. The sections highlighted in table 4 (a and b) below indicate the hypotheses that hold true for the mission.

Table 4.1(a) Factors Emanating from AU HQ/Bureaucracy

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY
Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.	**Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre.**
Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.	**Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly**
An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.	**Integrity of forces strengthens the bond within peacekeeping missions.**
Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.	**Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.**
The international community's utilisation of authority and resources, provides assurance for conflict settlement.	International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.
Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.	Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.
Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.	Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.

Table 4.1(b) Factors Emanating from Field/Ground Realities

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY
Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.	The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.
Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.	Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process.
Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.	*A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.*
Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.	**Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.**
Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.	Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.
The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.	A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.

Key: Bold = Valid Hypothesis; Normal = Invalid Hypothesis; Italics = Inconclusive

Mandate

H: Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.

CH: ***Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre.***

AMIB's mandate hoisted a multiplicity of tasks on a mission that was under-manned and under-resourced. The mandate was deemed untailored because its demands outstripped AMIB's capacity, and it failed to specify AMIB's definite role (AU, 2003a: 2-3). In spite of the violence, AMIB was clearly not an enforcement operation as the mandate did not include a strong enough possibility to use force. The AU Ambassadors forum which was responsible for peacekeeping at the time demanded that the use of force was restricted to self-defence and where necessary, to 'secure the freedom of movement of "AMIB's" personnel and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence (AU, 2003a: 3; Svensson, 2008a: 12). Due to the mandates lack of designation, some scholars viewed AMIB more as a peacebuilding initiative since it was tasked with implementing and supervising DDR processes, and resettling IDP's and returnee refugees to their homes (Murithi, 2008: 75). Another view holds that AMIB was a traditional peacekeeping mission, deployed to enforce the 2000 Arusha Peace Accord rather than to curtail an immediate crisis. This position is held based on the fact that AMIB's mandate also included protecting government buildings, paving the way for elections in 2004 and monitoring Burundi's post-war transition to democracy (Nowrojee, 2004: 6-7; Pavšič, 2013).

The operational confusion created by AMIB's mandate is summed up by Kristiana Powell (2005: 28): 'With less than 3,500 personnel and in the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire, AMIB was tasked with quartering some 25,000 combatants and assigning 45,000 more to barracks …. AMIB was assigned a nearly impossible mission'. As Tony Curtis (interview, 2014) notes: 'A rule of thumb for peacekeeping is that a mandate should not outstrip its resources'. The mission in Burundi broke this rule since the mandate was not tailored to realities on the ground. Had AMIB's mandate focused on the protection of civilians, monitoring the ceasefire and assisting in negotiations, its capacity might have been adequate. But having to cope with the task of

securing high ranking officials and protecting designated disengagement areas and conducting such disengagement meant stretching an already thin force (Svensson, 2008a: 18).

Undaunted by its thin force and equipment shortage, AMIB set up a cantonment for demobilised combatants at Muyange in July 2003. While this may have been within its mandate, AMIB commanders had to frequently improvise means to ensure smooth running of the camps and promote good relationship with the factions. For example, AMIB had barely enough resources to feed its own, yet when a member of the FNL died from illness, AMIB troops collected money among themselves to help the family for the funeral (Boshoff et al, 2010: 64). Compensating for mandate deficit still, AMIB's force commander adopted the use of seminars to create better cohesion and to ensure that all TCC's operated the same baseline information thus promoting the "one force" concept (Boshoff et al, 2010: 69). AMIB troops also spent much time in briefing all factions about the Joint Operations Plan (JOP) which covers pre-disarmament, disarmament, combatant verification, demobilisation and serves as an MOU between the peacekeepers and the factions. In operating such an open policy, AMIB maintained very good relationships with the armed political parties and movements which contributed to the underlying confidence of all participants in the process (Boshoff et al, 2010: 70). These cordial arrangements on the ground made it possible for the different factions to work together (Boshoff et al, 2010: 71).

In terms of the overall fulfilment of its mandate, AMIB may have fallen short, still the mission was fairly successful since it stopped the bloodshed and ushered some degree of stability. The AMIB experience indicates that mandate deficiency could propel peacekeeper initiative into achieving stability.

<u>Funding</u>

H: Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.

CH: ***Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly.***

There is the argument that 'as long as troops have the basic necessities, which translates to being able to accommodate, feed, transport and protect themselves, then they have got what is required' (Kilpatrick, interview 2013).

While this view disputes the central role often ascribed to funding, it could explain the drive behind AMIB forces given that they accomplished their task with the barest of necessities and the mission was extended just once for one month.

To finance the mission, the AU set up a trust fund (AU, 2003c: 2). AMIB had a budget of $110 million for its mandated period of one year for which it only got $50 million in pledges and $10 million paid into the trust fund. At the end of its mandate in May 2004, after fourteen months on the ground, AMIB's budget amounted to $134 million (Aboagye, 2004: 13; Svensson: 2008a: 13).

The US assisted the deployment of Ethiopian troops with $6.1 million, while the UK provided $6 million to aid the deployment of the Mozambican contingent (Aboagye, 2004: 13). The EU provided the most significant external contribution of $33.6 million and also funded food supplies. The German Technical Cooperation (GTC), World Health Organisation (WHO) and United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) gave money too for the purpose of providing food (Svensson, 2008a: 14). Considering the DDR programme was an aspect of AMIB's operations that suffered due to paucity of funds and personnel, the $33 million offered by the World Bank for this purpose would have been very useful had it not been caveated. The condition for disbursement was on the TGoB meeting certain standards of accountability and ascertaining who the combatants were (Boshoff et al, 2010: 56). Due to this caveat, the money was not disbursed until December 2004 after AMIB had rounded up.

The AU's policy that TCC's would have to sustain their troops for the first two months of deployment was detrimental to AMIB. Many African countries did not fancy this condition and only few could afford the cost (Boshoff and Francis: 2003: 44). This led to a lack of adequate equipment, food and medicine. 'AMIB had barely enough food for its own forces. Over Christmas, Ambassador Mamadou Bah who was head of the mission, managed to raise some funds from private sources to provide meat' (Boshoff et al, 2010: 64). Compounding this issue was the fact that at AMIB's inception, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) had not been set up. This came into existence in December 2003. Even when the AUPSC came on board, bearing in mind

that the department was new and still learning the ropes, it coped with a lack of managerial capacity and technical knowhow to facilitate the financial and organisational components (Powell, 2005: 28; Pavšič, 2013: 2).

Due to the austere conditions and financial constrains experienced in AU missions, expectations run high among AU troops and TCCs for the transition of AU missions to UN missions (Mitchell, interview 2014). For this same reason, more African countries and troops are involved in UN missions than in AU missions (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 2). The prospect of shortening austere times through enabling the transition from an AU to a UN mission spurs troops into being effective. AMIB personnel were no different. Working under the perception of re-hatting to the blue beret, the AU collaborated closely with the UN and the two organisations were able to come to a consensus on the requirements for resolution and their respective roles for delivering on this agenda (Powell, 2005: 28-29).

Though some of AMIB's shortcomings could be attributed to a lack of funds, the argument has been made that had AMIB received more funding it would not have mattered because the mission's human resources was stretched and could not have achieved more than it did. This view holds that, more money would not have solved the problem of providing stability as there were many other areas lacking capacity that could not have been resolved through quick fix donations (Svensson, 2008a: 18-19).

AMIB's operation does not underscore the importance of finance since most TCC's would have been unable to deploy in the first place, it however shows that a peacekeeping mission can provide stability even when under-funded.

Character of Contingent

H: An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.

*CH**: Integrity of forces strengthens the bond within peacekeeping missions.***

For the small mission that it was, and the short time it ran, AMIB was fairly effective thereby debunking the notion of troop-civilian population proportionality for effective peacekeeping.

For a country with a population of 7.2 million at the time and approximately 20,000 combatants, a 3,000 manned peacekeeping mission was meagre (UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2004; Pavšič, 2013: 2). By virtue of these figures, the ratio of AMIB troops to the Burundian population was 1:2300, as opposed to the 1:200 recommended by experts (O'Hanlon, 2003: 32). AMIB's contingent size, in terms of numerical strength was grossly inadequate to effectively conduct DDR and security functions. Instead of the planned 20,000 ex-combatants, AMIB could only take care of several hundreds. This was in part due to the lack of troops to safeguard the cantonment areas (Svensson, 2008a: 15-16; Rodt, 2011: 12). This also explains why the mission was originally not laden with a mandate to protect civilians.

For all the funding that the AU and its partners could muster, a larger AMIB contingent would have run the mission into chaos. AMIB was intended to be widely multinational, but the planned contingents from Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal were never deployed due to the tense situation on the ground (Rodt, 2011: 10). So, for the small mission that it was, and the short time it ran, AMIB's personnel managed with the thin resources available and were fairly effective. The AMIB experience thus gives credence to the assertion that what a mission needs most is not force of numbers. After all, large contingents such as in Darfur (see Chapter 5) have been known to fail at peacekeeping.

Noticeably, the integrity of forces thesis played to the advantage of AMIB. Reiterating the words of James Ellery (interview, 2013):

> If you make up a troop contingent with many nations it is much weaker. In some theoretical instances, the total is greater than the sum of the parts, the reverse applies with troops. The more contingents you have, the weaker it is. You have obviously got difference in language, logistics, fighting method, all sorts of things …. The more complicated the operation the more important it is, as it were, to have integrity of forces. Very very important consideration.

AMIB was made up of 56 percent South African troops and 34 percent Ethiopian troops with Mozambique making up the rest. With both South Africa and Ethiopia being English speaking, the language hurdle was largely overcome. With such a small number of troop contributing countries,

differences were not extensive and force integrity was assured. This made it easier for the operation to be based on standardised doctrines required for the successful conduct of peace operations (Aboagye, 2004: 15).

International Collaboration

H: Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.

CH: ***Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.***

International collaboration for the AU is indispensable due to its weak finance base and the expansive demands of peacekeeping. On this issue, AMIB's fortune was mixed grill. Support within Africa was not widespread among member states of the AU and this was responsible for AMIB's shortfall in personnel. External support also left much to be desired, still it contributed immensely to AMIB fulfilling its objectives.

Beginning with support from within, two reasons have been averred for its lack. First of these is the argument that the situation on ground deterred countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal from deploying troops (Rodt, 2011: 10). Despite the expertise of Nigeria and Ghana in such situations and irrespective of being among Africa's top peacekeeping TCC's, on this occasion they declined to participate in the absence of a ceasefire (ACCORD, 2007: 25; Svensson, 2008a: 25; Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 10). A plausible reason could be that Burundi was not a part of the West African region to which they belong. A second reason for the lethargic response from within was the AU's request that TCC's would shoulder the financial burden for the first two months of deployment (Boshoff, 2003: 5). Ethiopia for example, indicated it would not deploy without receiving sufficient finances (Aboagye, 2004: 13; Boshoff and Francis, 2003).

The AU taking the lead in Burundi despite collaborating with the UN was not borne out of ambiguities in the October 2002 ceasefire agreements, but in recognition of the UN's norm of not deploying into combat zones (AU, 2003c: 2). This is corroborated in article III, sections 1 and 2 and article IV, section 1 of the December 2002 agreement which stipulates that the African mission shall be responsible for verifying and monitoring the ceasefire (UNSC, 2002:

3; Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD, 2002: 3).

The mission in Burundi was initially conceived as an interim bridging mission in preparation for a larger longer-term multidimensional UN peace presence. It however evolved into a form of longer-term partnership between the UN and AU rather than a simple takeover (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 10). The success of this transformation set the pace for subsequent AU-UN mission transitions. It should be noted too that due to limited international involvement, there were seldom clashes of interest among the coalition of the willing. This unity of purpose served the mission well.

International Political Will

H: ***The international community's utilisation of authority and resources, provides assurance for conflict settlement.***

CH: International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.

While AMIB may not have had immense international support such as the AU missions in Mali, Somalia and the Central African Republic, it is obvious the international community took enough notice of Burundi and assisted. This was enough to tilt the balance of peacekeeping towards creating stability in the country (Ogunsanya, 2007: 29).

With fighting seldom abating despite a decade of negotiations, most international actors along with the UN seemed reluctant to get involved in an unstable Burundi. Ethiopia and Mozambique's inability to deploy on the basis of funds, six months after the commencement of AMIB's operations, buttresses the seeming lack of political will that greeted AMIB.

This study conceives international political will as 'the willingness of actors to deploy rapidly and become involved in the conflict management aspects of a crisis despite the potential costs in casualties, monetary expenditures and domestic public approval (Mays, 2003: 3; Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009: 18). So the AU persevering through ten years of negotiations, as well as South Africa's commitment to creating stability, was enough international will to enable AMIB succeed. The thrust here is, though there might not have been

many international actors in Burundi, but international will was certainly not lacking.

Timing and Duration

H: ***Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.***

CH: Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.

Timing in intervention is about picking the right time to get involved in a conflict and scholars agree that this is when the prospect of success is high at minimal cost (Gegout, 2005: 429). With warring factions amenable to peace after ten years of diplomacy and Burundians war weary, the environment was ripe for intervention.

Timing was influential to success in the case of AMIB. The entire Burundian population and its political class had become conflict weary and needed help, an external mediator to broker and sustain the peace (IRIN, 2003; Reliefweb, 2005; Wolpe, 2011: 59). This scenario is amply explained in the thesis that war weariness facilitates negotiations and resolution to conflict (Walter, 2001: 8-9; Zartman, 2005: 202). Such periods of war weariness become the appropriate time for intervention as the mediator gets the needed support from the parties involved (Goulden, 2002: 335). With ten years of diplomacy, 25,000 combatants bogged down in a hurting stalemate and willing to negotiate, and a war weary population, the AU picked the right time to intervene and manage the peace.

Furthermore, the duration of the mission also played a role in AMIB's delivery of its mandate. Being poorly funded and with its resources stretched there was need to get the job done quickly and hand over to the UN. Setting a duration of twelve months within which AMIB was to fulfil its mandate, provided a sense of direction for the mission and the impetus to get the job done. As peacekeeping veterans interviewed aver, the pace and scope of work are directly related to the time allowed. Troops get more done when working with a deadline (Bagamba, interview 2014; Curtis, interview 2014). Admore Kambudzi (interview 2014) also supports this when he asserts that the setting

of time frames provides some psychological boost to peacekeepers and spurs them into achieving mission objective.

Training for Expanded Roles

H: ***Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.***

CH: Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.

The fact that scholars differ on whether AMIB was more a peacekeeping than a peacebuilding mission is indication that its mandate went beyond the provision of security and included development (Hendricks and Lucey, 2013: 2). Having just 43 civilians in its fold, it would have been almost impossible for AMIB to make the gains it did if its military contingent had not been skilled in other aspects of peacekeeping besides providing security.

Peacekeeping missions increasingly undertake a variety of tasks such as civil administration, policing, monitoring elections and human rights enforcement (Leeds, 2001: 92). In keeping with this trend AMIB's troops worked with UNICEF in the handling of child soldiers. They also worked with the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) and Joint Cease-Fire Committee (JCC) among others, in designing the DDR process (Boshoff and Vrey, 2006:16-17). Had AMIB's troops stuck to the provision of security leaving all other tasks to the 43 civilian staff, meeting the goals of the mission would have been more problematic. The AU's operation in Burundi depicts the need and supports the argument for peacekeepers to be trained in expanded roles.

Local Initiative

H: ***Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.***

CH: The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.

This hypothesis was one of the factors pivotal to the success of AMIB. Since much of recorded local initiative in Burundi centres around women's efforts, this shall be discussed under the hypothesis linking local women to effective peacekeeping.

Women Participation

H: ***Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.***

CH: Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process.

Irrespective of the lack of formal avenues through which they could participate toward peace, Burundi women proved themselves valuable allies in AMIB's quest for stability. Though women play important roles in conflict resolution in traditional Burundian society, these are often advisory and behind the scenes, especially in cases where their husbands are concerned (Ntahobari and Ndayiziga, 2003: 16). The prolonged war in Burundi shattered a lot of these stereotypes regarding men and women. Predominantly male roles such as mediation of conflicts, participation on the battle field and provision of court testimonies, were now played by women. Many women became heads of households and carried out the role successfully. This transmitted to politics too, where women became conscious of their capacity and interested in the life of the country and began to demand to be involved in decision making (Bitsure et al, 2011: 55). This change had implications for the Arusha peace talks and Burundi as a whole.

In June 1998, peace talks began in Arusha, Tanzania under the auspices of Julius Nyerere and with seventeen different political parties. When no civic organisations were authorised to participate, Hutu and Tutsi women decided to join forces to protest against exclusion. This is remiscent of the view that 'where women are not accorded their place in decision making, they claim the required space through some drastic actions' (Ibeanusi, interview 2016). The initiative of these women led to the creation of numerous women NGOs. These groups organised a wide range of activities, including a forum gathering women from different ethnic backgrounds, uniting women across the country and beyond to discuss strategies for national reconstruction (Ntahobari and Ndayiziga, 2003: 22; Ogunsanya, 2007: 29; Agbalajobi, 2009: 15). This delegation of women advocated, in line with the aspirations of Arusha, that the negotiations would:

- Foster peace and the social well being of Burundians.
- Lead to reconstruction and rehabilitation.

- Enable the repatriation and resettlement of refugees, displaced persons and those forcibly transferred.
- Help each individual victim of the crisis in Burundi (Gahama, 2002: 18).

These initiatives encouraged the takeoff of organisations like the *Dushirahamwe* (let us reconcile) whose network succeeded in bringing together displaced, regrouped and refugee women to collectively identify the obstacles to peaceful cohabitation within the country (Ntwarante and Ndacayisaba, 2000: 9). These organisations in turn augmented the work of AMIB, helping in the process of re-integration and filling the gaps where they could. The peace effort in Burundi exemplifies the contention that while gender, peace and security issues are concepts that increasingly influence strategic thinking and policy development, women inclusion is still dependent on the lobbying efforts of women groups and NGOs that lobby from outside formal international structures (Willet, 2010: 149).

Irrespective of coming from the opposing Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups, the resolve of Burundian women to work together when the need arose, and influence the political class as they did so, provided the platform for AMIB's operation to succeed, setting the stage for stability (Gahama, 2002: 17-19). Acknowledging that peace operations cannot succeed without the support of the local populace, Burundian women, in spurring local initiative both at the grassroots and within government circles, contributed immensely to creating an environment that enhanced the workability of peacekeeping. Drawing from this experience, there is every reason to believe that such gender initiatives will yield greater dividends if formal spaces within local and international governmental institutions are created to harness and utilise them.

<u>Charismatic Field Leadership and Lead State</u>

H: Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.

CH: A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.

In relation to leadership on the ground, it is obvious that in the midst of shortages experienced by AMIB, the mission kept running due to the dexterity

of field leadership in the distribution of human and material resources. In one of such instances, AMIB's Head of Mission (HoM) Ambassador Mamadou Bah, used his office to mobilise resources from the GTC, EU, UNICEF and the WHO for the maintenance of the first cantonment housing ex-combatants in the DDR process (Aboagye, 2004: 11). Recognising the weakness of the mandate, AMIB field commanders on occasions had to act beyond its confines in order to get positive results. Observing that the mission was not given an explicit mandate to protect civilians, 'several months on the ground, senior AMIB officials drafted rules of engagement (ROE) to allow their troops to use force to protect civilians in imminent danger of serious injury or death' (Powell, 2005: 26). It is in reference to such leadership initiative that George Oliver (2002: 101) state's that 'it takes effective command and control … and a well-trained and disciplined combat capable force to effectively carry out peace enforcement operations'.

South Africa is increasingly viewed as a key regional actor in terms of peacekeeping and its lead role made the success of AMIB possible (Lucey, 2013a: 1). It took on the responsibility of restoring peace to Burundi right from when Nelson Mandela took over as facilitator of the Arusha peace process with the passing away of Julius Nyerere in 1999 (Svensson, 2008a: 11). The choice of Mandela was an indication of the confidence AU regional leaders had in him. While Nyerere saw world leaders as hindering peace efforts, Mandela effectively made these leaders a part of the solution rather than the problem by inviting them to join him in an effort to find a lasting solution to the Burundi problem (Boshoff et al, 2010: 16). Due to his failing health, Mandela was replaced as facilitator by South Africa's deputy president Jacob Zuma who had also been part of negotiations (ACCORD, 2007: 29).

From the deployment of the 700 soldiers of the SAPSD, to its 1,700 troop strength in AMIB, South Africa was the backbone of AMIB and showed more resolve than any other nation in ensuring AMIB was successful (Svensson, 2008a: 17-19; Hendricks and Lucey, 2013: 2). Though supported by partners such as the US, UK and the UN, 'South Africa led in assisting the AU with planning for the initiation of AMIB and was the first to deploy. It also substantially carried the can in terms of funds and resources for the mission and its SAPSD personnel formed the bulk of AMIB headquarters staff

(Aboagye, 2004: 11; Powell, 2005: 28; ACCORD, 2007: 29). South Africa's role as lead state evolved through a series of events as already explained in this chapter. When ONUB wound down in 2006, the South African contingent remained on the ground in form of an AU task force till December 2009 (ACCORD, 2007: 19; Department of Defence, Republic of South Africa, 15/07/2014). In all, a strong South African commitment to AMIB made up for limited contribution from the international community (Pavšič, 2013).

It is unlikely the mission in Burundi would have achieved stability without South Africa's political leadership, but the leadership on the field mattered just as much in view of the very difficult circumstances under which the mission was conducted. It is difficult to ascertain which of these factors mattered more.

Impartiality over Neutrality

H: Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.

CH: ***Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.***

The mission in Burundi was one where maintaining neutrality and impartiality was vital in reaching the mission's objective. A problem facing AMIB was the perception of bias. From the initial stages, AMIB was seen more as a South African force having been an expansion of the assimilated South African force sent to protect opposition political leaders under the terms of the Arusha Accords (Curtis, 2003: 4). South Africa, along with the AU, UN, and Rwanda had obliged the CNDD-FDD into unconditionally accepting institutional power sharing, the imposition of sanctions on the FNL Hutu militia, and support for the transitional institutions. These conditions were interpreted as obvious support for the stance of the Tutsi dominated Burundian government (Nowrojee, 2004: 6). These issues also fuelled the perception that the AU (and the UN) lacked the necessary neutrality needed for peacekeeper credibility (Gasana and Boshoff, 2003: 3-4).

One reason why Arusha made better progress under Nelson Mandela's facilitatorship was the fact that he was considered more neutral than Julius Nyerere who was accused of showing some bias for the Hutus (Boshoff et al,

2010: 8; Wolpe, 2011: 21). This tells the utility of neutrality to the success of peacekeeping in Burundi. To make headway therefore and get the parties to cease hostilities, it was necessary for AMIB to show neutrality in the discharge of its duties. For this reason too, AMIB was constrained when it came to protecting citizens when they came under attack from rebel or government troops.

Serving as a facilitator and peacebuilder, rather than an enforcer of the peace, AMIB had to take a neutral stance in order for it to function effectively. Recalling that neutrality denotes not taking action against any side's interest, keeping the peace under this mandate meant serving as an assurance mechanism (Levine, 2010: 3). The success of AMIB justifies the position that peace operations while being impartial to the mandate, should endeavour to be neutral. Since AMIB was deployed to monitor and sustain the ceasefire, being neutral in the exercise of its mandate, gave credibility to the mission and aided stability.

Domestic Elite Cooperation

H: ***Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.***

CH: Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.

If AMIB was successful, accounts of Burundi's transition from conflict to peace show a lot of the credit should also go to the commitment of the country's political class (AU, 2003c: 2). The commitment of Burundi's political elite can be analysed via two major events.

First was the acceptance and implementation of agreements such as the August 2000 Arusha Peace Accord and the October 2003 Pretoria Protocol which dwelt on power sharing by Burundi's political elites (The Pretoria Protocol, 2003; Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Document for Burundi, 2000). These negotiations and trade-offs between the TGoB, opposition parties and rebel groups created a fragile peace for Burundi's political transition (Vandeginste, 2009: 74-79).

A second important factor was the move to relinquish power by Pierre Buyoya. As president, Buyoya was also leader of the Tutsi dominated Union for National Progress (UPRONA). In November 2001, the power sharing arrangements of the Arusha accord were implemented and a transitional multi-party government comprising of UPRONA and the Hutu dominated Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) was inaugurated (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, 04/2010). The arrangement designated the head of UPRONA (Buyoya) as president of Burundi and the head of FRODEBU, Domitien Ndayizeye, as vice president for the first eighteen months. At the expiration of this period, that is 1 May 2003, Ndayizeye would become president and an UPRONA nominee would become vice president (Boshoff et al, 2010: 8).

In a continent of undemocratic leaders who extend their stay in office irrespective of constitutional provisions, negotiated arrangements, and dire consequences, Buyoya's stepping aside, though with some pressure from Mandela, was a rare and extremely important factor (Boshoff et al, 2010: 28). In view of the animosity between Tutsis and Hutus, an author noted that:

> This was an extremely important step, greatly strengthening the partnership between the Hutu-led FRODEBU and the Tutsi led UPRONA parties.... The Tutsi-dominated UPRONA party recognized that its interests and those of FRODEBU were linked. Both had a stake in going through with the transition as scheduled – to put more pressure on the Hutu rebels to cease fighting, and to establish FRODEBU's political pre-eminence vis-á-vis their more militant Hutu rebel political rivals (Wolpe, 2011: 69-70).

This recognition of the benefits of cooperation among Burundi's elite helped in great measure the peace process that AMIB was meant to facilitate.

AMIB rounded up its mission in Burundi on 31 May 2004. While this study does not stretch into the long term effects or gains of peacekeeping, it is necessary to make a brief note of Burundi today in order to drive the point home on the contribution of elite cooperation in peacekeeping. Having come to power in 2005, the present government of Pierre Nkurunziza is trying to extend its stay beyond its approved maximum tenure of ten years which expired in 2015. This already has pushed Burundi to the brink of another civil war (De Carvalho and Kumalo, 2014). With the random arrest of opposition

leaders which now threatens the peace process, there is growing concern that the conflict between Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD party and the opposition has left the Arusha power-sharing deal in tatters (Lucey, 2013b: 2; The Guardian, 2014a; Louw-Vaudran, 2014: 1). It took the cooperation of the political class, with some help from the AU and its partners to establish peace in Burundi. It might take the power struggles within this same political class to undo the peace in Burundi.

Size of Mission Area

H: ***The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.***

CH: A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.

Given that Burundi is a small landlocked country with a land area of approximately 30,000 square kilometres, the size of territory argument is plausible here. AMIB was able to cope despite its size and poor funding because it had charge over a small territory. For the larger areas of Somalia and Sudan, even when the AU missions had grown to 3,000 and 7,000 troops respectively, they were considered inadequate still because of the size of these mission areas (Wiklund, 2013a: 18). Had its mission area been any bigger, AMIB would have found itself too stretched to cope. Since Burundi is a small country, AMIB's small number of troops could manage the crisis. The size of the country certainly played to AMIB's favour.

Though poor, Burundi's deposits of gold and rare reserves of unranium neither precipitated nor contributed to the prolongation of its civil war, nor did they have any effect on AMIB's provision of stability (Yager, 2013: 1). Mineral resources have never been the source of conflict in a country where land and livestock are considered the main form of capital accumulation and are sometimes responsible for violent confrontation between groups (Hintjens, 2006: 603; Bundervoet, 2009: 364). In the case of AMIB, this section's counter hypothesis does not arise. Size was more the contributory factor to the outcome of the mission.

Conclusion

The mission in Burundi which was the AU's first peace operation donned a seemingly traditional peacekeeping approach, making it stand apart from the AU's later trend of peace enforcement. Interestingly, this was done within a hostile environment which accounts for the refusal of countries such as Nigeria and Ghana refusing to deploy and the UN opting to come in after stability had been achieved. With an undermanned and under-funded contingent, AMIB succeeded in bringing an end to the violence, secured lives and ushered in some stability.

The Burundi experience challenges the widely held view of the indispensability of mandate precision, funding and contingent size to the success of peace operations. While they indeed matter, they are by no means indispensable. Conversely, AMIB's experience shows that in the face of weak mandates and poor funding, resilient international political will, a willing local political class, the provision of avenues for women to contribute to peace and deft mission leadership, could be the difference between stability or chaos. Given the role played by political elite cooperation in achieving peace, it has taken this same factor to undo the stability achieved. This is the case of the recent spate of violence in the country.

In executing its mandate, AMIB respected and utilised the social and political currents within which it worked, over and above the use of force to ensure compliance. Given its limited force strength and poor funding, it may have had no other choice. Even if AMIB did have other options, the fact that it succeeded in creating stability in large parts of Burundi using this approach, is indication that it was the right one. In consonance with this is the strategic importance of forces integrity. The contribution of this factor to the overall success of the mission should not be undermined as it helped compensate for the dearth in troop numbers. While the existence of mineral resources in Burundi did not fuel the conflict or hinder the efforts of AMIB, the small size of the country played to AMIB's advantage given the size of its contingent.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE COMOROS (2003-2008)

This chapter examines the African Union's (AU) mission in the Comoros and its eventual invasion of the island of Anjouan in order to stabilise the situation in the country. Despite the level of success achieved, it has ironically been the AU's most obscure military operation. The US' invasion of Iraq in 2008 which captured global attention left the AU's invasion in the Comoros almost unnoticed (Wolfe, 2008: 1). Yet, the Comoros arguably presents till date the AU's broadest peace support effort. The AU's operation in the Comoros involved peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. The AU addressed grievances of the islands making up the Union of the Comoros, negotiated a new constitution and system of government, acted as an assurance mechanism, organised elections and robustly intervened to preserve the country's territorial integrity. It is also the only AU mission which began on an observer mandate and was elevated to a Chapter VI and then a Chapter VII mandate. Through these phases, the AU was involved in facilitating Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and undertaking Security Sector Reforms (SSR). As stated in chapter one, the AU undertakes peace operations as stabilisation measures until the responsibility can be passed to the UN, but the operation in the Comoros stands as the only exception from this norm since it began and ended with the AU (Williams, 2011: 17). It also stands as one of the AU's most successful operations as the factors propounded by traditional thought and those proposed by this study were duly harnessed along with others such as field leadership, timing and size of target area.

The AU's involvement in the Comoros began in 1997 with diplomatic negotiations to resolve secession issues (AUPSC, 2007c: 2). Later on, the AU undertook Chapter VI missions through the Observer Mission in the Comoros (OMIC) in 2003 and Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC) in 2006. However, in view of the fact that the Comoros invasion was the highpoint of AU involvement in the islands affairs, more attention will be paid to the African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES) which was in operation at the time of the invasion. It was under

MAES' watch that *Operation Democracy*, the AU's first military intervention mission, was launched in 2008 (The Geneva Academy, 25/08/2010).

The rest of the chapter is organised into two sections namely, AU intervention in which the crisis is discussed, and evaluation for effectiveness where the factors that enabled the success of the mission in Comoros are identified.

The Crisis in the Comoros and AU Peacekeeping

The Crisis

The Union of the Comoros otherwise known simply as The Comoros is an archipelago made up of a group of islands namely Ngazidja (Grand Comore), Mwali (Moheli) and Nzwani (Anjouan), Maore (Mayotte), and a group of minor islets situated at the northern end of the Mozambique Channel off the east coast of Africa. Annexed to Madagascar and colonised by France from 1912, the Comoros gained its independence in 1975 via the islands parliamentary vote. However, Mayotte abstained and stayed a French territory by virtue of a February 1976 plebiscite which was further ratified by a 2009 referendum. Today, Mayotte stands as the 101st department of France and is by far the archipelago's most affluent island as it boasts a GDP eight times that of the rest of the Comoros (Massey and Baker, 2009: 7-8). My discussion here focuses on the other three islands that make up the Union of the Comoros namely Anjouan, Grand Comore which is the largest island and houses the capital and Moheli.

Between independence in 1975 and the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU's) intense involvement in Comorian affairs from 1997, the Comoros had experienced twenty one successful or attempted coups, a testimony to its once beleaguered political climate (Massey and Baker, 2009: 10). In line with its policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs the OAU did nothing about these coups. This could be attributed to the fact that this was a period when coups were the norm for regime change in Africa, and the majority of Africa's leaders at that time were themselves beneficiaries of such coups in their countries.

In addition to political turbulence in the Comoros, the two smaller islands of Anjouan and Moheli became wary of the domination of Grand Comore and

tried to secede in 1997 (Pharm, 2008). In precise terms, Moheli and Anjouan actually declared independence from the Republic, with the Anjouans initially claiming they wanted to be re-colonised by France (Dwyer, 2008: 1). Anjouan's bid to secede would be better understood against the backdrop of being the poorest of the islands despite being the most economically viable:

> Anjouan is the country's most strategically relevant island, and control of the state can be achieved only through controlling Anjouan's wealth. The island hosts the only deep-sea harbour of the archipelago, which means that it controls most of the international trade and customs revenue.... Further, the majority of the members of the armed forces are drawn from Anjouan, which is also the location of the army's ammunition depot (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011: 36).

The OAU stepped in along with key actors France, the Arab League (AL) and the Organisation Internationale del la Francophonie (OIF) and organised the Addis Ababa International Conference in December 1997 (AUPSC, 2007c: 2). The task was to define a new constitutional framework to preserve the national unity and territorial integrity of the Archipelago. This diplomatic mediation succeeded in fostering national reconciliation through the 2001 Antananarivo Agreement which led to a new constitution. This agreement had fashioned a new electoral system which was informed by the need for a power-sharing mechanism to accommodate the various competing political and economic interest groups who were the basic cause of internal strife between the three islands (Ayangafac, 2008: 1). The new constitution created a complex federal arrangement which provides for a semi-autonomous government with an *island executive* (president) for each island for a five year term, and an over-arching Union presidency to be rotated every four years between the islands (IRIN, 2007a). The constitution stipulates that a primary election is to be held on the island that will hold the Union Presidency. The three candidates who receive the most votes then stand in a nationwide election with a simple plurality needed to win (Gounden, 2006: 54). Though this arrangement has been criticised for being far too expensive for such a poor nation the model appears to have settled the dust of political rancour and built confidence in the democratic process (Gounden, 2006: 54; Dwyer, 2008: 1; IRIN, 2008d). Supporting both assertions, the World Bank observes that 'while these achievements have allowed the

establishment of a more stable political environment, the resulting administrative structure has proven costly and cumbersome' (IRIN, 2008c; IRIN, 2008a; also www.worldbank.org/en/country/comoros/overview).

Despite the signing of the Fomboni Agreement, Mohamed Bacar who had been actively involved in negotiations regarding autonomy took over government in Anjouan through a coup that ousted the government of Said Abeid in August 2001. Though Bacar won elections as president of Anjouan in 2002, thereby legitimating his authority, tension and animosity still existed between Anjouan and the government of the Comoros. Reasons for the tension revolved around Bacar possessing his own military, and while openly promoting the agenda for the reunification of Anjouan with the Union of Comoros, he covertly impeded the implementation process (IRIN, 2007c; Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011: 46). This of course increased the distrust between both parties. The degenerating relations and heightening tensions led to the invitation and commencement of AU peace operations in 2003.

Peacekeeping in the Comoros 2003-2008

In 2003 and 2006 the Comorian government requested the assistance of the AU during its elections. In view of the 2004 elections which were for the local and national assemblies, the AU Observer Mission in the Comoros (OMIC) created in December 2003 was mainly to act as an observer and monitor the elections (AU, 2004: 9). Its duties were to:

- Build confidence among the Comorian parties with a view to facilitating a smooth transition as provided for in the 20 December 2003 Agreement.
- Help create the necessary security conditions on each of the islands of the Archipelago.
- Ensure that the condition for the use of the gendarmerie during the transition period were consistent with the letter and spirit of the 20 December 2003 Agreement, and that the Comorian Defence Force is not involved in the electoral process.
- Provide every possible assistance to facilitate the smooth conduct of the transition.

South Africa led this mission which comprised of 39 military observers drawn from South Africa, Benin, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Mozambique, Senegal

and Togo. It also had one police officer from Mauritania. These officers were deployed to the three islands and had a four month mandate from the date of deployment on 9 March 2004. OMIC succeeded in promoting the necessary conditions of serenity and security needed to facilitate the reconciliation process and electoral operations (AUPSC, 2004b: 4).

In 2006 the presidential elections saw the AU's involvement in the Comoros on a Chapter VI peacekeeping mandate. This was due to the fact that 'the political context prevailing in Anjouan, where the presidential primaries were to be held, was still unsettled and vigilance was required' (AUPSC, 2006: 1). Due to the de facto existence of two separate armies, one commanded by the Union and the other by the Autonomous island of Anjouan, both of whom mistrusted each other and would not stay neutral to ensure the proper conduct of the elections, the AU was requested to deploy a military force to ensure security. In response, the AU deployed a military force whose main task was to create a safe environment and provide technical and logistical support (AUPSC, 2006: 5). Consequently, with a contingent of 462 military and civilian police personnel, the mandate for the African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC) was to:

- Support the reconciliation process.
- Provide the necessary security before, during and after the elections.
- Ensure that the security forces were not involved in the elections.
- Protect its own personnel and civilians near the polling stations.

AMISEC commenced operations in March and was expected to complete its mission by 9th June 2006. It supervised an election which was free and fair and allowed for the first peaceful transfer of power in the country's history (US State Department, 2011: 1).

The second phase of AU involvement in the Comoros centres on events that led to the AU's invasion on Anjouan. The invasion was prompted by Bacar's refusal to cede power at the expiration of his tenure and his bid for secession which constituted a constitutional breach and threat to security. Other reasons have also been given for this standoff:

> The possibility of Anjouan as an autonomous or semi-autonomous entity, with its considerable economic and military powers, would be a nightmare to any Comorian politician as it would limit his or her ability to manoeuvre or dictate who gets what, when and how. The bottom line is that control of the union government without control over Anjouan's economy will prove a difficult venture (Ayangafac, 2008: 2-3).

With Anjouan being vital to the survival of the Comorian state, the crisis in the Comoros was certainly a contest for political dominance and economic power between elitist groups who see their interest sustained within the framework of centralisation and those who favour a loose federation (Ayangafac, 2008: 5; Deiwiks et al, 2012: 292). While Comorian president, Ahmed Abdallah Sambi represented the former group, Bacar personified the latter.

Secondly, had elections been held, Bacar likely would have lost. A lack of support for Bacar had grown since he had developed a reputation for violent intimidation which made the citizens disenchanted and desirous for change (National Post, 2008). His regime also had a reputation for torture, and the rape of both men and women (IRIN, 2008c). Such brutal methods of leadership led to about 3,000 fleeing Anjouan to neighbouring islands (IRIN, 2008e), and placed Bacar on the wanted list for crimes against humanity by the international courts (News 24, 2008a).

The ensuing electoral crisis paralysed the Union government and brought back the political volatility that had once been the hallmark of governance since independence from France in 1975 (Reuters, 2008; IRIN, 2008b). Consequently six years (2002-2007) of relative stability was disrupted, pushing the fragile state to the brink of disintegration once again.

Bacar's brazen affront over secession issues and non-cooperation with the Comorian state demanded a change in AU strategy in the Comoros. This change started with the implementation of sanctions, but the effects were mild at best despite the formation of the African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission (MAES) on 9 May 2007 (Vines, 2013: 100). Given up till 31 July 2007, MAES was authorised to:

- Assist the Comorian security forces to create a secure and stable environment for the holding of free, fair and transparent elections of the Presidents of the Islands

- Oversee and ascertain that the Comorian security forces play an effective role in ensuring that the elections are trouble-free, in accordance with international standards

- Monitor the electoral process

- Encourage dialogue among the Comorian parties

- Provide long-term assistance to strengthen the capacities of the Comorian forces and facilitate the effective restoration of the authority of the central government in Anjouan; (AUPSC, 2007d: 2).

In the aftermath of the failure of sanctions and in response to the Comoros government's request, the AU switched tactics and prepared an intervention force named operation democracy (IRIN, 2008g; Alghali, interview 2014).

For Operation Democracy launched on 25 March 2008, the AU deployed 1,500 troops. The following day MAES gained control of the Island and the central authority of the Union was restored on Anjouan (Vines, 2013: 100). In the course of the invasion, no more than three deaths were recorded (Masey and Baker, 2010: 15).

With the successful ousting of Bacar's secessionist regime in Anjouan, MAES was reduced to a contingent of 356 military and civilian personnel. It obtained a new mandate tailored to the functions of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR), the conducting of elections and provision of support for governance. In precise terms MAES mandate was:

- Assist the Comorian forces in ensuring the security of the elections in Ajouan.

- Devote attention to boosting security in Anjouan.

- Weapons Collection and integration of elements of the Anjouanese Gendarmerie into the Comorian National Army.

- To provide assistance to the Comoros in the field of governance and socio-economic development.

In addition, the mandate had a six month time frame within which these goals were to be achieved. The mission was expected to wind up at the end of October 2008 (AUPSC, 2008: 7).

Evaluating AU Peacekeeping in the Comoros

The intervention in the Comoros has been acclaimed a huge success for the AU (Pham, 2008; Svensson, 2008b; Hanson, 2009). It signalled the willingness to intervene in countries where political instability, violence, renegade leaders and rogue regimes threaten long term peace and security. The factors of host government support, mandates tailored to the needs of the mission, size of the mission area among others impacted on the mission in the Comoros. Though the mission was without a lead state, field leadership was strategic to its success. The table below presents this study's hypotheses and findings in the Comoros operation.

Table 5.1(a) Factors Emanating from AU HQ/Bureaucracy

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY
Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.	Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre.
Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.	Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly
An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.	Integrity of forces strengthens the bond within peacekeeping missions.
Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.	Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.
The international community's utilisation of authority and resources, provides assurance for conflict settlement.	International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.
Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.	Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.
Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.	**Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.**

Table 5.1(b) Factors Emanating from Field/Ground Realities

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY
Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.	The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.
Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.	Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process.
Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.	A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.
Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.	Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.
Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.	Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.
The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.	*A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.*

Key: Bold = Valid Hypothesis; Normal = Invalid Hypothesis; Italics = Inconclusive

Mandate

*H**: Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.***

CH: Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre.

During the AU intervention in the Comoros, the mandate was revised three times. Each revision was to enable the mission adapt to changing circumstances. The success of OMIC and AMISEC was largely due to the mandates which were tailored to the needs of the missions. In tailoring these mandates to situations on the ground, they allowed the peacekeepers to deliver on the expectations of the mission.

First was the mandate for OMIC from March-July 2004, which designated it as an observer mission (AU, 2004: 9). Due to situations on the ground, a Chapter VI mandate was issued on which AMISEC operated from March-June 2006 (AUPSC, 2006). Finally was the Chapter VII mandate given to MAES which deployed from March 2007 – October 2008 (AUPSC, 2007; AUPSC, 2008). The first two missions achieved their set goals of observing, then

conducting elections while keeping the peace. The third, MAES, succeeded in achieving its mandate which had to be revised on two occasions. MAES' first mandate dealt with the provision of security, conducting of elections, fostering reconciliation, and engendering integration of the Anjouan forces into the Comorian army. Bacar's recalcitrance in complying with AU negotiated agreements prompted the imposition of sanctions on Anjouan, and saw a revision of MAES mandate in October 2007 to include ensuring the enforcement of sanctions. The second revision of MAES' terms of engagement came post invasion in April 2008 with the function of assisting in governance alongside DDR and SSR reforms.

From OMIC in 2003 to MAES in 2008 AU, mandates never specified more than six functions for its peacekeepers. This approach tallies with the principle that 'a mandate should not outstrip its resources, because that is going to create false hopes and high expectations that cannot be met.… So a mandate must absolutely be matched by the resources available for the operation' (Curtis, interview 2014). This allows for greater efficiency in peacekeeping rather than a situation where peacekeepers are compelled to take on roles they are not suited for (Kilpatrick, interview 2013).

Funding

H: ***Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.***

CH: Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly.

The mission in the Comoros upholds the hypothesis, but this will be discussed in the international collaboration section since both were so closely interwoven and discussing them separately would be a duplication of sorts.

Character of Contingent

H: ***An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.***

CH: Integrity of forces strengthens the bond within peacekeeping missions.

Despite the success of the AU mission, the AU has come under some criticism for being too heavy handed. For the small ill-equipped Anjouan army, the AU has been accused of not applying the minimum force necessary by going in

with the large contingent it did (Time, 2008). The population of Anjouan at the time was approximately 277, 500, so a peacekeeping contingent of 1,500 troops comes down to one soldier per 185 persons. This tallies with the recommended number of one soldier per 200 persons (O'Hanlon, 2003: 32). The size of the contingent to the Comoros indicates the AU's adoption of the Brahimi Report recommendation that 'once deployed, peace operations must be based on robust doctrine, force posture and rules of engagement (ROE's) that do not cede the initiative' (Williams, 2010a: 3).

In line with the responsibility to protect principle which is directed at the protection of the civilians, the invasion saved the lives and averted the torture of Comorians who were victims of Bacar's tyranny (IRIN, 2008e: 2). However, while peacekeepers have a duty to protect civilians, they also are obliged to protect themselves especially when mortally threatened (Wedgewood, 2001: 71; UNDPKO, 2010: 34). The size of the AU force, for which Bacar's forces were no match, while ensuring swift victory, also minimised collateral damage as loss of life was at a minimum (Dwyer, 2008: 2; IRIN, 2008d: 2). This tells of the necessity and advantages of a larger and better equipped force, as opposed to the failed incursions by the small Comorian army which was twice beaten back by Bacar's forces (1997 and 2007) and with significant casualties too (IRIN, 2008g: 2; Ayangafac, 2008: 7).

Operation Democracy's 1,500 peacekeepers comprised of 750 Tanzanian troops, 600 from Sudan and 150 from Senegal. Experts like James Ellery (interview, 2013) contend that force integrity is upheld when states deploy in large numbers. Going by this conception, force integrity would consist in Operation Democracy's 1,500 troops being amassed from one state and not three. The mission in Comoros lacked in force integrity. However, in view of the size of the Island of Anjouan, the state of its small army and brevity of the invasion, operation democracy was not a complex mission hence force integrity seemed not to matter. Within this sphere, the size of the contingent becomes the major contributory factor to the AU's success.

International Collaboration

H: ***Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.***

CH: Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.

Under the Comoros scenario, it is difficult to separate international cooperation from funding. So the discussion here also suffices to evaluate the role of funding to the success of the operation.

International collaboration from within and outside the continent was a contributory factor to the success in the Comoros. Libya arranged the transportation of the Sudanese troops, and together with Morocco, provided equipment to the Comorian National Army for Development (AND). France provided some support with the airlifting of Senegalese troops to the Comoros which was the only assistance from outside Africa (Vines, 2013: 100). In other words, Libya and Morocco supplied AND with equipment, while Tanzania, Sudan and Senegal contributed troops. Hardly any organisation, scholars agree, can go it alone (Coleman, 2011).

The different interests of participating countries in the Comoros meant a clash of interest was almost inevitable. For humanitarian and diplomatic reasons South Africa and France pressed for continued negotiations while Tanzania and Sudan led the group that opted to respond to the AU's call for military action. This however did not dampen the need to bring the Comoros crisis to an end.

External counterparts such as the EU and the UN later played significant roles in the post conflict process. The EU provided MAES with funds (8.5 million euros) to boost its functions of overseeing and providing logistics for the 2008 elections (European Commission/EUROPEAID, 2014). 'The UN Peacebuilding Commission granted the Union government $9m from the Peacebuilding Fund to fund projects to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate former members of Bacar's militia' (Massey and Baker, 2009: 17). These have helped the political stability and growth of the Comoros. Such collaboration was essential to the success of operation democracy and the overall effectiveness of AU missions in the Comoros. As peace experts opine, 'for operations to be successful,

peacekeepers must be given the resources necessary to achieve their goals' (Williams, 2010a: 3).

International Political Will

H: ***The international community's utilisation of authority and resources provides assurance for conflict settlement.***

CH: International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.

What more than a year of diplomacy could not achieve in reining in Anjouan, enforcement achieved in a matter of days. International political will played a major role in the Comoros operation. This was most evident in the successes of OMIC, AMISEC, operation democracy and post invasion MAES as deployments were timely and the needed manpower and materials were provided. There was a lull however during the implementation of sanctions.

After a series of fruitless negotiations and proposals, sanctions against Anjouan's illegal authorities were implemented in October 2007 by the AU in a last ditch effort to get Bacar to yield and resolve the political deadlock (IRIN, 2007b). Almost simultaneously, on 10 October 2007, MAES' mandate was revised to include: supporting the implementation of sanctions imposed on Anjouan, assisting in the establishment of internal security on the island and the supervision of the disarmament and integration into AND (AUPSC, 2007a: 1; 2007b: 2). These sanctions which were largely economic consisted of air and sea blockades of the Island, and also targeted the Anjouan political leadership (IRIN, 2007b).

At this stage, international political will faltered as this mandate could not be effectively implemented: 'Efforts by the AU to negotiate a deal have failed to break the deadlock, as have sanctions targeting the freedoms and financial assets of Anjouan's leadership' (IRIN, 2008h). One major reason for this failure was the shortage of assets for effective implementation. The naval blockade for example could not have been effective when all the AU deployed in enforcing its sanctions was 'a single boat equipped with two deck-mounted machine guns and a few fast patrol boats' (National Post, 2008). Not surprisingly, the sanctions against the rebels did not bring the expected results (IRIN, 2008h).

A major test of international political will in peace operations, some authors argue, is the ability to rapidly deploy forces (Leroy and Malcorra, 2009: 18). Such fervent political will was displayed all through the Comoros mission by the AU coalition. 'The force generation was quick and the mission reached the number of troops that was needed to accomplish its mandate' (Svensson, 2008b: 23). That the AU stuck with its option for the use of force despite the protestations of South Africa and the preference for continued dialogue by France, was indication of its willingness to halt the secession of Anjouan and put an end to the dispute (Time, 2008). South Africa which is one of the few major TCC's to the AU, had all along led diplomatic negotiations for a peaceful settlement of issues on the island. The point here is that the division that existed within the AU as a result of differences in opinion did not affect the overall commitment to the mission. This showed fervent will to the cause of the Comoros by members of the AU even when it meant going to war.

Timing and Duration

H: ***Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.***

CH: Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.

Three factors indicative of the right time for intervention were manifest in the decision to launch Operation Democracy. First, the host government had requested intervention. Second was the rational calculation by the AU that objectives will be achieved in a short period of time with minimal costs. Third was the low hostility level (IRIN, 2008d: 2; National Post, 2008: 2; Aydin, 2010: 50-54).

With each review of mandate for the mission in the Comoros, a time frame was placed. This arguably gave the mission focus and a sense of purpose. AMISEC had a three month mandate from March – June 2006 to oversee elections. MAES was initially constituted as an electoral mission and had from 9 May – 31 July 2007 to achieve its mandate. The mandate could not be achieved within this time frame due to the deteriorating security situation caused by Bacar's roguish tendencies which led to the AU adopting the enforcement option. With the invasion successful, the MAES mandate was

revised and given a six month period from April – October 2007. A major part of this mandate was the supervision of elections which it did and which was considered free, fair and transparent.

Placing time limits on the Comoros' mission and the successes recorded affirms the argument for setting time frames. It also strengthens the position that 'open ended missions that are not tied to some measure of effectiveness saps resources and encourages a lackadaisical approach in peacekeeping' (Stambaugh, 2001: 11; Curtis, interview 2014).

Training for Expanded Roles

*H**:** Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.*

CH: ***Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.***

Prior to the AU's Operation Democracy, the Comorian national army had conducted a reconnaissance mission in Anjouan. The intelligence provided from this mission aided adequate planning for the invasion (AUPSC: 2008: 4). The MAES contingent was placed under the command of the Head of AND, Lt. Col. Mohamed Salimou who was also a part of its planning process. This continuity, utilisation of comparative advantage and precise chain of commanded allowed for cooperation and interoperability among the different contingents that made up Operation Democracy. The Comoros mission supports the argument that the possibility of success increases when peacekeepers are well trained, equipped and well led (Hayes, 2000: 2; Ellery, interview 2013)

At the end of the invasion, in April 2007 the intervening troops withdrew leaving behind a MAES contingent consisting of 356 military and civilian personnel. The military component was to provide security for the civilian component and other services such as assisting the DDR and SSR processes. The civilians on the other hand had the task of overseeing the election process, helping with administration and supporting inter-Comorian dialogue (Svensson, 2008b: 22). The utilisation of each unit's specialisation in the mission in Comoros contributed immensely to its success.

Local Participation

*H**: Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.***

CH: The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.

From the little information provided by commentators about the role of local participation during the AU's peace operation in the Comoros, its contribution to success can be justified.

The interim government was sworn in on 31 March 2008, three days after Operation Democracy, and transitioned peacefully after credible elections were held on 29 June (Masey and Baker, 2009: 16). This is an indication of public support. Though Ahmed Sambi's preference for an invasion was attributed to the support he had within the AU, media reports also show that his government had come under pressure from the Comorian public for such an action (IRIN, 2008i: 2)

The local populace was accepting of Operation Democracy, supported the interim administration, participated in the elections and sought redress of wrongs suffered under Bacar through appropriate channels (IRIN, 2008a; Freedom House, 2013: 1). This exercise of solidarity and civic responsibility helped MAES in its peace efforts. Bearing in mind too that MAES' staff strength was reduced post invasion to a combination of 356 military and civilian personnel, achieving its mandate (which it did) with such a small contingent was only possible because of local assistance (Svensson, 2008b: 22). Put differently, 'there is some truth to the idea that elites must cooperate for peacekeeping to bring and maintain peace, so too there are ways that local citizens may subvert efforts to facilitate peace' (Neack and Knudson, 1999: 527). Local support played its part in ensuring the success of peacekeeping in the Comoros.

Women Participation in the Peace Process

*H: **Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.***

CH: Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process.

While accounts of local participation in Comoro's peace operation have been sparse, women participation has been less so.

Possessing a largely Islamic population, women's participation it seems would not rank on the priority list of the government. On the contrary, on a list of twenty two Arab states the Comoros is rated best in recognising women's liberty and encouraging their political participation (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2014b). Such participation will likely include peace negotiations.

In the Comoros, approximately twenty percent of ministerial positions since the advent of democracy is held by women and they are also custodians of land (Boros, 2013). This is indicative of the high participation of women in policy and social issues both in government and at the grassroots levels. This scenario tallies with the findings of a 2009 study that peacekeeping operations in countries where women have relatively higher status have been significantly more stable. By contrast, such operations in countries where women have comparatively lower status are much less likely to succeed (Detraz, 2012: 83). This amply supports this study's hypothesis that the more women are involved in the peacekeeping process, the more successful such processes are likely to be (Ogunsanya and Mngqibisa, 2000: 11; Metcalfe, 2010: 8). The ensuing stability in Comoros' post conflict process lends credence to these views.

Charismatic Field Leadership and Lead State

H: ***Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.***

CH: A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.

The military invasion of the Comoros was devoid of a lead nation. The coalition was made up of contributing nations with none acting as the lead state. Had South Africa been a part of Operation Democracy, it likely would have played the lead role having spearheaded diplomatic negotiations all along. As noted by Emma Svensson (2008b: 25), 'the AU planned and conducted the Comoros invasion without any of the three countries usually seen as key players in peacekeeping – South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya – playing a part'.

While lead nations are often relied upon in peace operations, for example, Nigeria in the Liberia (1990) crisis, and France in Mali (2013), experience has shown too that sometimes they complicate and compromise the peace process. A good example is Nigeria's complicity in the conflict in Sierra Leone (Jetts: 2003). In other words, the presence of a lead state is not always beneficial for a peace operation. South Africa which had played lead nation in negotiations all along was opposed to Operation Democracy.

In the absence of a lead state, MAES fulfilled its mandate and effectively too. Here credence is given to strategic field leadership. A major goal of peacekeeping is to prevent or stem human casualties in conflict. Leadership strategies on the field ensured this was maintained as Operation Democracy evolved. Through its planning and execution, field leadership ensured the mission secured the support of Comorian's, even those on the affected Island of Anjouan (National Post, 2008). First was the spy missions to assess the strength of Bacar's troops which assisted in effective planning for the invasion. To ensure collateral damage was minimised, 'a day before the assault, helicopters dropped leaflets on Anjouan warning that the operation was imminent and urging the population to stay at home' (IRIN, 2008d). These strategies paid off as only a few civilians were wounded barring civilian deaths during the invasion (Pham, 2008: 3). This too was a feat for the AU force considering the door to door searches they conducted for Bacar (National Post, 2008). The two deaths recorded were Tanzanian soldiers who had drowned during the landing on Anjouan (Massey and Baker, 2009: 15). Leadership in the field certainly contributed to the success in the Comoros.

<u>Impartiality over Neutrality</u>

H: ***Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.***

CH: Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.

In taking sides with the central government of the Union of the Comoros to consolidate its territory and bring about peace, the AU sacrificed neutrality. Since the AU was working on the maxim of keeping the Union of the Comoros together, it was impartial to the mandate. The AU's soft approach through diplomacy emboldened Bacar in obstructing the peace. In staying impartial to

its mandate (securing the peace and preserving Comoros' territorial integrity) the AU had to adopt a tougher stance against Bacar in its support for the central government of the Comoros.

The intervention in the Comoros supports the thesis that operations that side with host governments are often swift and have a higher degree of success since government machinery is placed at the disposal of the intervener (Regan 2002: 55). It is postulated in certain quarters that AU interventions are more solidarity interventions which emanates from a tacit belief of oneness among Africa's political elites (Wolfe, 2008: 3; Tieku, 2009: 2-3). Such solidarity deployments, some argue, remain a feature of post-Cold war sub-Saharan Africa' (Coleman, 2011: 528). It is debateable if this was the case in the Comoros in view of Bacar's human rights abuses and the need to keep the Comorian state intact. However, from the perspective of this analysis, the AU was impartial to preserving the peace, but not neutral in its approach and this paid off.

Domestic Political Elite

H: ***Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.***

CH: Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.

The political class of Grand Comore and Moheli, alongside those of Anjouan who were being persecuted by Bacar, approved of the AU military operation. This solidarity among Comoros' elite provided a convenient platform for the rapid success of operation democracy.

Prior to the invasion, Bacar had obstructed peace and threatened the territorial integrity of the Comoros. His antiques and refusal led to the government of the Comoros requesting assistance from the AU to address the situation and forcibly too (AUPSC, 2008: 1). Having asked for assistance, the government of the Comoros was obligated to assist the AU in its efforts. This collaboration contributed to the success of the operation.

Comorian elites were in unison with its President, Ahmed Sambi over issues of governance and the need to rein in Anjouan. Even members of Anjouan's elite

class supported the invasion due to Bacar's nepotistic and brutal tactics which threatened their wellbeing and was detrimental to the socio-economic life of Ajouan (IRIN, 2008c; Ayangafac, 2008: 6). Having grown weary of political infighting, the support of local elites while paving the way for Operation Democracy, also ensured the smooth transitioning of the interim government and the success of elections three months later under the supervision of MAES (Masey and Baker, 2009: 16-17; IRIN, 2008f: 2).

The unity among Comoros' political class also pervaded and galvanised its military as government forces conducted reconnaissance missions to ascertain the strength of Bacar's forces. Bacar however stated that the two attempts were not reconnaissance missions, but failed invasions by the Comorian government to oust him and reclaim the island (Anyagafac, 2008: 7). Whatever the true story is, the intelligence gathered from these missions proved useful to invading AU forces (IRIN, 2008e: 2).

Size of Mission Area

H: The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.

CH: A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.


Buttressing the size factor is the observation that common to swift rebellions are the limited geographical opportunities offered by the terrain which relatively affects the fighting capability of forces. Consequently, the geography of a territory significantly shapes the outcomes of war (Buhaug et al, 2009: 545-546). For this reason, the AU launched its operation from Moheli which was much nearer to Anjouan (Fig. 5.1 below shows the map of the Comoros).

A day before the assault, helicopters dropped leaflets on Anjouan urging citizens to stay at home. This strategy helped minimise casualties (IRIN, 2008d: 2). On March 25, the AU peacekeeping contingent made up of troops from Sudan (350) and Tanzania (450) launched a seaborne assault. The operation went smoothly with amphibious landings made by five zodiac boats supplied by Libya and Morocco. Four of these landings were in Anjouan's capital Mutsumudu, while the fifth was in Domoni on the east coast. These

two main towns were captured with minimal resistance. Troops from AND also quickly secured the airport (IRIN, 2008d: 1; Massey and Baker, 2009: 15). Had Ajouan been much larger, the operation would likely have been more complex to prosecute.

Besides the AU's swift military victory, successfully conducting elections and effecting stability with a contingent as small as MAES typifies a link between size of mission territory and mission effectiveness (AUPSC, 2008: 7). Acknowleding this link, some authors contend that the AU's lack of practical military capacity would have it struggle to marshal the necessary military capabilities for intervention, except against the smallest of its member states (Williams, 2011:5). This view holds true judging from the peace operations debacle of the Central African Republic and the tedious progress in establishing security in Somalia irrespective of the external assistance provided. It is no coincidence that these are much larger territories.

Figure 5.1 Map of the Comoros



Courtesy Googlemaps

The availability of valuable minerals attract multinationals/foreign investors whose interference intensify and protract the conflict (Baly, interview 2013; Amuzu, interview 2014; Ibaba, interview, 2015). This concept applies to the Comoros whose major products are vanilla, cloves and ylang-ylang which

account for 95 percent of export earnings (World Bank, 2014a). This lack of mineral resources, as argued by these experts would have made involvement in the Comoros conflict unattractive to external actors whose interference would otherwise have prolonged the conflict.

It may be difficult to reach a consensus on which mattered more for the AU's success in the Comoros: the size of Anjouan or the entire islands lack of valuable mineral resources? Based on the experience of the Comoros, peacekeeping operations would likely achieve stability in mission areas where both attributes (small territory and valuable minerals deficit) are prevalent.

Conclusion

The findings of this chapter affirm the importance of the conventional factors of funding, international cooperation, contingent size, local participation and mandate to effective peacekeeping. These factors were very much in place and utilised through the mission in the Comoros. This chapter's findings also butresses the contention of this study that salient to effectiveness too are host government support, international political will and local participation. Small and weak the Comoros might be, but the support of its political class and people for the intervention, and the will of members of the AU to address the conflict contributed significantly to the operation's success. The mission in the Comoros also shows the influence that the size of a mission territory alongside a shortage of valuable minerals can have on an operation.

The support of the Comorian government was necessary because it was in tandem with the wishes of the Comorian people. This enabled the free flow of support from Comoros' civic society to the different phases of AU operations. Scholars agree that 'the response to the presence of militias and rebel movements in any place and at any level is determined by the interests being advanced and protected' (Munene, 2010: 430). Bereft of mineral resources, the Comoros' only strategic value is its adjacent location to an important sea route (Svensson, 2008b: 16), so there was not much interest to protect here. The most likely factor that galvanised AU intervention therefore was the political will to keep the Comoros intact. In line with the mineral resources and conflict extension thesis, and in view of the size of the Comoros, this

study's analysis stays undecided on which of these was more responsible for the success of the AU.

Women and other citizen's contribution to AU's effectiveness were inferred from events such as the success of elections, the quick return of stability and the prominence of women in government. Observable too is the success of the AU inspite of the absence of a lead state. This points to the dispensability of this factor in certain operations.

World Bank statistics show that the Comoros experienced a three percent annual economic growth rate between 2008 and 2014 (World Bank, 2014b). Also for a country that experienced twenty-one military coups between 1975 and 2001, to have stayed free of this phenomenon for fourteen years now is a feat worth commending. This tallies with the findings of Alex Bellamy et al (2010) that interventions broadly supported by local elites and the people have greater prospects for durable stability.

The involvement of the AU has allowed some political stability which guarantees security and minimises the possibility of a recurrence of conflict. Elections conducted in the Comoros since 2005 have been fairly successful, ensuring that even if the Comoros cannot be perceived as a liberal democratic state, at least it has the status of an electoral democracy (Freedom House, 2015). The Freedom House 2015 rating gives the Comoros a score of nine and eleven on a scale of twenty in electoral process and political participation respectively. The AU mission in the Comoros was indeed effective when viewed against the criteria of preserving lives and providing stability (Ramuhala, 2011: 50-51). Considering the number of factors that played to the advantage of the AU, a successful outcome was anticipated.

CHAPTER SIX

SOMALIA (2007 till date)

This chapter briefly examines the conflict in Somalia which began in 1991, and depicts events leading up to the AU's involvement through the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007. Presenting these events enables an appreciation of the challenges of AMISOM and the gains made in providing stability in Somalia. It also provides an understanding of strategies adopted by the AU in its bid to establish peace in this region.

Experts generally agree that the AU operation in Somalia has so far been a success story (Curtis, interview 2014; Gadin, interview 2014; Williams, 2014; Davies, interview 2016). There is a lot to achieve still before Somalia's conflict regions can be considered really secure and stable. That the UN has not taken over eight years into AU intervention justifies this claim. Al-Shabaab, the major insurgent group against the government of Somalia, though weakened, is still a threat. However, the intensely hostile situation on ground at the commencement of AMISOM's intervention in 2007 and the relative calm in recent time, give cause for optimism. If the AU's involvement in Darfur since 2004 is attributed to its hybridity partnership with the UN, its intervention in Somalia since 2007 queries the conception among scholars of African conflict that the AU is given to short stabilisation missions (Oliver, 2002; Coleman, 2011). The duration of the Somalia mission justifies the assertion that 'peacekeepers are more likely to stay the course as the capacity of the mission increases, the costs and risks of peacekeeping diminish, and traction towards peace is observed' (Wright and Greig, 2012: 127). So far, AMISOM has been fairly effective in making Somalia secure and stable.

The progress of AMISOM in creating stability is not surprising considering that it effectively utilised the factors of field leadership, funding, international political will, local participation, mandate, size of the contingent and support of the domestic elite. These will be discussed in detail along with the other factors that serve as the hypotheses of this study. AMISOM was deployed into a war zone, and its experience shows in clear terms that when peacekeeping degenerates into war-fighting, achieving stability depends largely on the

following: a robust mandate that tallies with ground realities; a host government and people supporting the peace; an equipped, resolute and large contigent possessing force integrity and projecting credible force; and an international community willing to sustain the process.

The two sections of this chapter consist of a brief history of the current conflict and the AU's peace enforcement operation, and an evaluation of the AU's performance.

The Crisis in Somalia and AU Peacekeeping

The Crisis

The conflict that has dominated the Somali landscape since 1991 is the result of an interplay of multiple historical, social and political processes that have shaped the political and socio-economic structure of the country (Farah et al, 2002: 326; Moeller, 2009: 8). South-Central Somalia has been the main theatre of this conflict which has been sustained and fuelled by contests for economic and political control and inter-clan rivalries. A generation of Somalis has now come of age without knowing a single year of peace (Saferworld, 2014).

When colonial powers determined the borders of Somalia in the 19th century, many ethnic Somalis found their enclaves become part of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, making them minorities in these countries (Hesse, 2014: 8). The imposed partition and loss of territory ensured the Somali state was born irredentist - the ambition of unifying all Somali nation into one nation state – pan-Somalism (Meredith, 2006: 465; Moeller, 2009: 8; Dersso, 2009: 2). Its territorial claims to Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti placed it on a collision path and made relations with its neighbours sour (BBC News Africa, 2013a). Having instigated the *Shifta* war with Kenya (1963-67) and the Ogaden war with Ethiopia (1964, 1977-78), Somalia was seen as a security threat within the region (Moeller, 2009: 4; Hesse, 2014: 8-9). Ethiopia and Somalia have ever since, encouraged insurgency within each others territory, which made relationships between both countries increasingly frosty.

The demise of the Somalian state began with the miscalculations and repression of Siyad Barre's military regime (1969-1991) especially after the defeat by Ethiopia during the Ogaden war (Hansen, 2003: 3; Moller, 2009: 10-11). By the time he was removed from power on 26 January 1991 by the United Somali Congress (UFC), Somalia was a deeply fragmented society (Haims et al, 2008: 13).

Barre's exit from power created quite a power vacuum which opposition factions were unable to fill because none of them had the power to dominate the other groups militarily (Eriksson, 2013: 19). Unable to reach some form of negotiated settlement, the factions kept fighting each other for different motives. While most of the major factions fought for domination, the smaller ones fought for survival (Third World Resurgence, 2011; Towsend, 2012). From 1991, Somalia ceased to function as a state, taking a semblance instead of Hobbes' state of nature:

> All of the main Somali clans ... almost all the minority groups are involved in the Somali conflict. Each clan has its own faction or is part of a coalition of factions. Some groups have dominated the others, forcing the oppressed to look for and use any other means it can to survive in lawless Somalia, thus making each and every clan an actor in the conflict (Farah et al, 2002: 326).

The wars which began as struggles for control of the government, quickly degenerated into predatory looting, banditry and occupation of valuable real estate by victorious clan militias. Warlords power bases depended on a chronic state of insecurity so that their clan constituencies needed them for protection. These gun totting individuals saw war, plunder and extortion as their only livelihood (World Bank, 2005:11).

The clan system is intrinsically woven into the fabric of Somalia's political landscape. It is often said that 'the average Somali is loyal above all else to his clan' (International Crisis Group, 2002: 3; Meredith, 2006: 465). The clan provides indispensable social services including justice and security and various political forces resort to it for political ends. Just as well, it is also a source of division and has been one of the major factors that sustained the conflict. (Dersso, 2009: 4). Al-Shabaab, the major antagonist in the Somali crisis is a product, a mechanism of this clan rivalry (Hesse, 2014: 12).

Notably, not all of Somalia suffered this degeneration of law, order and security. By contrast, in the northwest and northeast of Somalia, the collapse of the central government did not precipitate the kind of mayhem that devastated the south (Menkhaus, 2014: 163). For a variety of reasons, such as more robust authority of traditional clan elders, greater political cohesion among clans, more support from businessmen to support the peace and more effective political leadership, the fighting never devolved into anarchy and generalised violence (Forti, 2011: 17-18). This region rebuilt modes of capacity to govern, managed the peace, and kept young gunmen under control (Menkhaus, 2014: 164). A modest economic recovery fuelled by import-export activities through their seaport helped to divert energies toward commerce and away from warfare (World Bank, 2005: 11). These devolved mechanisms and institutions in the form of cross-clan collaborations, regional grouping and ideological federations helped to close the governance gap in these areas (Forti, 2011: 18-19; Hoisington, 2012: 52).

Peacekeeping in Somalia

Attempts at bringing peace to Somalia led to a series of international meetings. The first two of these meetings were held in Djibouti in 1991 and aimed at re-establishing a Somali government. The Djibouti Conference in 2000 was among a long list of conferences aimed at finding a solution to the trouble in Somalia. The product of this conference was the creation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) which was meant to stand as the central government for Somalia (AMISOM, 23/05/2015). The TNG was short-lived since it was unable to gain full international recognition, local support or provide security for its members. At the 15th Somali National Reconciliation Conference in September 2003 (the 1st was held in 1993), the TNG was reconciled with its major opposition, the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) which was made up of warlords from different regions of the country. Initiated and endorsed by the sub-regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and supported by the AU, the Arab League (AL) and the UN, this reconciliation led to a new united movement which became the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The

TFG was the product of the "draft transitional federal charter" which was formally adopted by IGAD (AMISOM, 2014c).

> The TFG was established as the outcome of a three-year attempt to negotiate a solution to the conflict by the regional organisation the IGAD. The TFG was established with an interim five-year mandate to prepare Somalia for elections to be held in 2009. It was backed by Ethiopia, which had undermined previous attempts at forming a Somali government, but saw the TFG president as an ally who would not renew Somalia's claim on the disputed Ogaden region. The TFG was also supported by the US, who considered the TFG's fight against Somali Islamists an important element in its war on terror (Wiklund, 2013a: 12).

Following Ethiopia's forceful instalment of the TFG and in view of the caustic relationship between both neighbours, the TFG became deeply unpopular and increasingly isolated nationally, notwithstanding its support from abroad. Ethiopia carried out a series of military incursions aimed at degrading Islamist bases in Somalia occupied by elements of the coalition of local sharia courts known as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) from which eventually broke Al-Shabaab (Williams, 2009: 1-2). It was not until Ethiopia's invasion in 2006 that the group radicalised and was brought to prominence as a popular guerrilla movement (Townsend, 2012: 3).

In 2006, the AU approved of IGAD launching the Peace and Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) (AMISOM, 2014a). The operation never got off the ground because it lacked the capacity as well as the backing of the West and the UNSC who could provide it (Mays, 2009: 6-9). With the situation deteriorating, the UN in 2007 compelled the AU to get involved and bring some stability to the country, pledging the support that IGAD lacked (Mays, 2009: 30-31). The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) was created in January 2007.

AMISOM was deployed to Mogadishu primarily in support of the TFG which was the Ethiopian government's preferred faction in Somalia's civil war (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 16). Its deployment also served as an exit strategy for the Ethiopian military which had occupied Mogadishu in order to support the TFG. It was necessary for Ethiopia to leave if AMISOM was to make any headway. Ethiopia's long history of interfering in Somali affairs which had done more harm than good made it widely accepted that opposition

to the Ethiopian occupation was the single issue many of the Islamist insurgents could agree on (The New York Times, 2006). 'When that glue is removed, it is likely that infighting will increase, making it difficult for the insurgency to obtain complete military victory, or at least sustain it, and creating opportunities for political progress' (International Crisis Group, 2008: 1).

AMISOM's deployment was authorised for a period of six months in the hope of a UN take over, as was the case in Burundi. But this was not to be since the UN was unwilling to deploy into such a violent conflict area (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 15). However, in Resolution 1814, the UNSC expressed 'its willingness to consider, at an appropriate time, a peacekeeping operation to take over from AMISOM, subject to progress in the political process and improvement in the security situation on the ground' (Derblom et al, 2008: 46; UNSC, 2008: 3-4).

Mandated by UNSC resolution 1744 which the AU was obliged to implement, AMISOM had the following mandates:

- To provide support to the TFG in its effort to stabilise the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation.
- To promote reconciliation
- To facilitate humanitarian assistance
- To create the conditions for long term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia (AUPSC, 2007e: 2).

This mandate also required AMISOM to:

- Support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders
- Provide, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions and their key infrastructure to enable them carry out their functions
- To assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilisation Plan for Somalia
- Provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilisation efforts
- Monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation

- Facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

- Protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defence ((AUPSC, 2007: 2; UNSC, 2007b: 2-3)

In view of the tasks required of AMISOM, it became obvious that AMISOM was not a regular peacekeeping mission. It was saddled with the task of VIP protection, war-fighting, counter insurgency and facilitating humanitarian assistance, making it one of the most complex and multidimensional missions ever undertaken by the AU (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 15). This made funding an even greater necessity and the subsequent need for police and civilian staff ever more imminent.

AMISOM was deployed on 21 February 2007 with 1,600 Ugandan troops which was its sum total. By March, these soldiers were 'embroiled in a bloody struggle; caught between various anti-TFG forces – most notably Al-Shabaab – fighting for control of the city of Mogadishu' (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 16). Reinforcements eventually came in December 2007, in the form of 100 Burundian soldiers. By April 2009 (two years later), AMISOM had just 4,300 troops from Uganda and Burundi (Williams, 2009: 3). In 2010 it eventually reached its authorised troop strength of 8,000 and also had 50 police officers (Williams, 2010b: 1). Such slow troop generation made AMISOM one of the most challenging missions on the continent (Atta-Asamoah, 2010: 72). However, at the end of December 2010 there was an authorised increase of AMISOM's troop strength from 8,000 to 12,000 (Wiklund, 2013a: 23).

In August 2011 AMISOM made major breakthroughs with Al-Shabaab forces withdrawing from central Mogadishu. (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 16). This was a major turning point in AMISOM's military operations and the life of the TFG because from this point AMISOM went on the offensive while the TFG extended its area of control in the city (Wiklund, 2013a: 20). Prior to these advances, AMISOM had come under serious criticism for being too high handed and indiscriminate in its approach which seemed more like reprisal attacks than peace enforcement, and which left scores of civilians dead or wounded (Williams, 2009: 3; Aljazeera, 2010). Efforts and training were

necessary to curtail this phenomenon if AMISOM was to win the support of Somalis (The Nigerian Voice, 2012).

Between December 2011 and February 2012, the AU, UN and a variety of other partners worked together on a Joint Technical Assessment that subsequently produced new strategic and military *Concepts of Operations* (CONOPS) for AMISOM. The aim was to enable some synergy and relationship building with locals to ensure that AMISOM was safe and able to deliver the desired estate' (Sandi, interview 2014; Mills, 2014). The strategy agreed on was to consolidate on the gains made by AMISOM which necessitated a revised expansion of its mandate and which in turn required more personnel to achieve. The expanded mandate authorised:

- Establishing a presence in the sectors secured by AMISOM and to take all necessary measures as appropriate in those sectors in coordination with the Somali security forces to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia (UNSC, 2012b: 3).

- AMISOM shall act in compliance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law in performance of this mandate and in full respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia.

Consequently, on January 2012, an increase of AMISOM's troop strength from 12,000 to 17,713 was authorised (AUPSC, 2012b: 1; UNSC, 2012: 3).

At the start of June 2012, Kenyan troops re-hatted into AU troops and were absorbed into AMISOM (Al Arabiya News, 2012). With this development, a third major turning point was inevitable. In September 2012 AMISOM ousted Al-Shabaab from Kismayo and took control of the city. This port city had been a major source of funds for Al-Shabaab and was its last urban stronghold. Fighting alongside AMISOM were the Somali National Army (SNA) and members of the Raskamboni militia (IRIN, 2012; Sandi, interview 2014). Al-Shabaab's "official" checkpoints which in 2009-2010 were around the airport, were in 2013, pushed out of Mogadishu to the fringes of the country (Sandi, interview 2014). In March 2014 the SNA supported by AU troops began military operations in various parts of the country liberating the towns once controlled by extremists groups (Sabahi, 2014).

These military offensives were crucial for two major reasons. First, the offensive facilitated the extension of the Somali's government control over its territory (AMISOM, 26/06/14). Secondly, after twenty years of conflict, what Somalia needed was peace and to consolidate on capacity development (UNSC, 2013c: 2). After decades of war, piracy and famine, Somalis are now cautiously optimistic about the future. The Irish Times (2013) writes:

> For the first time in a very long time, people here have hope.... Parts of the battle scarred capital are experiencing a construction boom, with hospitals, homes, schools, shops and hotels rising from once rubbled neighbourhoods. Streets hum with cars and hawkers.

Evaluating AU Peacekeeping in Somalia

The utilisation of the traditional factors (funding, international cooperation, mandate and troop strength) and those propounded by this study as central for stability (international political will, local citizens and host government support) all impacted positively on AMISOM. The mission was at a standstill without funding and adequate troops to prosecute its objective. The availability of these and the adjustment of the mandate to utilise the impending advantage led to the progress made by AMISOM.

The inflow of troops and materials was the result of international cooperation and it has taken international political will to sustain it till date. This section also espouses the importance of local citizens and host government support to peace operations even when the latter has to be propped up. The AU peacekeeping experience in Somalia also shows how vital the initiatives of field commanders are to reaching mission objectives. AMISOM has received robust international support despite the absence of valuable natural minerals in Somalia. Arguably too, the lack of minerals has also limited external meddling in Somalia's conflict and reduced the complexity on the ground. Table 6.1 below reflects how this study's hypothetical factors influenced AMISOM's efficacy.

Table 6.1(a) Factors Emanating from AU HQ/Bureaucracy

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY
Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.	*Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre.*
Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.	*Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly*
An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.	*Integrity of forces strengthens the bond within peacekeeping missions.*
Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.	*Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.*
The international community's utilisation of authority and resources provides assurance for conflict settlement.	*International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.*
Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.	***Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.***
Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.	***Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.***

Table 6.1(b). Factors Emanating from Field/Ground Realities

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY
Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.	The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.
Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.	**Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process.**
Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.	*A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.*
Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.	Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.
Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.	Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.
The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.	**A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.**

Key: Bold = Valid Hypothesis; Normal = Invalid Hypothesis; Italics = Inconclusive

Mandate

H: ***Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.***

CH: Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre.

The Somalia experience exemplifies the argument that mandates are important tools upon which the success of peace operations depend (Kambudze, interview 2014). Despite suffering troop deficit at the start of its mission, some authors have pointed out that part of the problem was as a result of AMISOM having to work with a mandate beyond its capacity. The mandate was considered weak since it could not deliver the conditions for peace (Williams, 2009: 2; Wilkund, 2013: 22).

A second issue with the mandate which ensured a stuttering start for AMISOM has been termed the mandate confusion (Hussein, 2012: 10-11). This refers to situations where UN endorsements were contrary or disapproving of AU mandates leading to uncertainty on the part of peacekeepers on how to prosecute the mission. The Brahimi report clearly states that the UN should avoid deploying into conflict areas where there is no peace to keep, where peace enforcement or war fighting is what is needed for stability (UNGA, 2000: 10). With the AU being mandated by the UN, AMISOM at inception carried a typically defensive peacekeeping mandate, as Chapter VII mandates really are. Within its context, peacekeeping operations though robust, are authorised to use the minimum force necessary to secure the peace, not consolidate the advantage. Such mandates do not prepare missions for enforcement or proactive aggression which was what AMISOM needed considering the mission came under fire right from the start (Hussein, 2012:9). Similarly, Doye

The mission's gains really began with the review of its mandate in January 2012 which authorised it to take all necessary measures in the new sectors won and reduce the threat posed by armed groups (UNSC, 2012c). To further facilitate the mandate being achieved and consolidate on the advantage so far secured, the troop strength of AMISOM was duly expanded (UNSC, 2012d: 1-4)

From a political as well as humanitarian perspective, the first three objectives of AMISOM's mandate were geared toward building reconciliation, dialogue and ensuring the survival of the nascent Somali government (AMISOM, 2014c). This approach helped improve support for AMISOM and established its prominence among Somali's (AU Press Release, 2014a), bearing in mind the pessimism with which Somali's had welcomed AMISOM's involvement in the conflict. With a mandate that is work for the people oriented, political just as it was militaristic, AMISOM contingents were perceived more as liberators than occupiers (AU Press Release, 2014a).

Funding

H: ***Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.***

CH: Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly.

No doubt AMISOM struggled from the onset due to lack of funds. The Ugandan and Burundian troops were deployed into Somalia without funding from the AU (Bagamba, interview 2014). This correlation validates the hypothesis in question. The AU's short record of peacekeeping provides little evidence to suggest that it would have been able to deploy the 8,000 troops authorised to form AMISOM, let alone manage them without the necessary funds. When assistance was short in coming in mid 2008, the need for crucial equipment was partially met by scavenging assets from the defunct UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) (Williams, 2009: 2). It was at this point a lot of authors and observers, prior to 2012, had spelt doom for AMISOM, or at best remained sceptical of its progress (Townsend, 2012: 4-5).

The subsequent inflow of funds from the UN, EU and US, and land mark victories over insurgents, slowly turned the tide in its favour. While the EU facilitates AU PSO's through the African Peace Facility (APF) through which they directly fund the AU's ability to launch and sustain operations across the continent, the US focuses most of its support bilaterally on the TCC's (Gadin, interview 2014; Curtis, interview 2014). This enables them to quickly assemble, alert, deploy and utilise peacekeepers on the ground and even provide these contingents with the needed equipment for the task of

supporting the peace (Curtis, interview 2014). AMISOM is supported in terms of funding through approximately three streams.

> There is the Access Budget of the UN which is used to fund the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) that provides AMISOM with the logistical support. There is also the direct funding from the EU – The APF – which is given to the AU to pay for AMISOM troop, police and civilian overhead and operational costs. Then there is a third stream that comes in through a Trust Fund managed by the UN for AMISOM and it is based on voluntary contributions from member states and it is used to plug the gaps that exist in the Access Budget contribution and the funding that we receive from the AU. And then of course, there is the bilateral that goes to our member states and Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCC's and PCC's) that AMISOM does not have access to (Gadin, interview 2014).

So while African nations provided the troops, Western donors made available the resources. Today their support runs over $2billion, excluding aid and the financing of other African missions. The EU foots the bill mostly for AMISOM's salaries, while the US and Italian governments pay the bill of the $100 monthly stipend for the 11,000 members currently of the Somali Army (Mills, 2014). Though 'mission spending in Somalia has been 70-80 percent achieved' (Lotze and Faurie, interview 2014), there are still some funding related problems. For example, the UN does not reimburse for ammunition because in peacekeeping you are expected to fire only in self defense. 'Here (AU) we are fighting and our consumption of ammunition cannot be compared to peacekeeping missions. So how do you expect the TCC's to pay for that' (Fianya, interview 2014). Despite these policy related funding issues, the increase in the mission's funding has contributed hugely to AMISOM's ability in stabilising Somalia.

Character of Contingent

H: An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.

CH: Integrity of forces strengthens the bond within peacekeeping missions.

AMISOM struggled to make any impact during its first four years for several reasons. One of these factors was the size of its contingent as countries were slow, and reluctant to deploy their troops (Williams, 2013: 2-3). These were

obviously its more difficult years. That the bulk of these troops were from one country (Uganda) implies *force integrity*. Though not much gain was recorded, hardly any ground was ceded either. It certainly was no coincidence that the AU mission began stamping its authority on the Somali landscape with significant increases in its troop strength from 2011. Within the Somalia scenario, size of the contingent has been of great significance in AMISOM providing stability.

Up until September 2010 AMISOM had just 7,200 troops. By December 2010 the UN backed AMISOM in increasing its size from 8,000 to 12,000. Uganda responded to this by sending 1,800 soldiers, while Burundi sent in 1,000 (Hiiraan Online, 12/02/2012). Force integrity was not sacrificed for contingent size as Uganda and Burundi alone accounted for three quarters of the additional troops. With both these factors nurtured, AMISOM was able to improve on its provision of security (table 6.2 shows AMISOM's troop distribution per TCC at the end of December, 2014).

Table 6.2 AMISOM's Troop Distribution per TCC as at January 2015

Troop Contributing Country	Troop Strength	Assignment Area
Uganda	6,223	Sector 1
Burundi	5,432	Sector 5
Ethiopia	4,395	Sector 3
Kenya	3,664	Sector 2
Djibouti	960	Sector 4
Sierra Leone	850	Sector 2

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The improved provision of security had multiplier effects. It spurred the UNSC in January 2012 to authorise a further increase of AMISOM's troops to 17,731 (Reuters, 2012). It forced the streaming out of foreign fighters from Al-Shabaab (AU Press Release, 2014c; Times Live, 2012). It also encouraged the US to step up efforts in training and equipping AMISOM troops through its African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme

(Chicago Tribune, 2012; Curtis, interview 2014). These gains had Major General Fred Mugisha, the Commander of AMISOM (2011-2014) optimistic as he averred that 'Al-Shabaab is most likely going to implode in the not so distant future ... they are at their weakest.... A little more push and we will stabilise this country so that Somalis can live a better life' (Times Live, 2012).

In terms of how effective a large contingent with the resolve to get the job done could be, the AMISOM experience makes a strong case for numbers, but it also makes a strong case for forces integrity as well. As AMISOM troop strength increased and maintained force integrity in the process, Al-Shabaab was pushed out of Mogadishu and the surrounding areas thereby stabilising the area (Mills, 2014).

International Collaboration

H: ***Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.***

CH: Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.

The provision of men and materials through international collaboration has been critical to AMISOM. Though some of AMISOM's TCC's have been accused of contributing troops to protect certain national interests inimical to the goals of AMISOM, so far its experience has been a case of the more the merrier (Møller, 2009). An example of such collaboration is the ACOTA programme through which the US trains peacekeepers in their home countries and adequately equips them before they are deployed (Curtis, interview 2014). In Somalia, the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone were trained and equipped by the US (Sandi, interview 2014). Such collaboration has been vital to the gains made by AMISOM (Chicago Tribune, 2012). Similarly, the EU since 2010 has run a training mission in Uganda aimed at strengthening the SNA. These trained forces have worked with AMISOM to curtail Al-Shabaab (Wiklund, 2013b: 2).

AMISOM made very little ground while Uganda was its sole troop contributing country (TCC). With more countries living up to their pledges and others opting to join in the quest for a stable Somalia, AMISOM is seeing better days and Somalia has been the better for it. Currently AMISOM is made up of

thirteen countries with Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Uganda being the major troop contributors (AU Press Release, 08/06/2014).

The absorption of Ethiopian forces in to AMISOM has been cautioned against by experts in view of the tense relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia (The New York Times, 2006; Third World Resurgence, 2011: 5). The plausible fear of course is, it may damage the credibility of AMISOM and fuel factional fighting in Somalia (Khayre, 2014). No doubt Ethiopia has every reason to take whatever happens in Somalia very seriously. Ethiopian concerns about what a strong Somali state might do are quite understandable considering Somali's claims to the Ogaden region, and Ethiopia's occupation of Somalia from 2006-2009 (Eriksson, 2013: 103; Hesse, 2014: 9-10). Since both share a long border, refugee flows from Somalia risk upsetting fragile ethnic balances in Ethiopia. This raises concerns in Ethiopia about the level of violence in Somalia. Whereas a strong and hostile Somali state would be the worst conceivable option, and a strong and friendly one the preferred one, the government in Addis may have opted for the second-best solution: a weak state which is completely dependent on Ethiopian support (Moeller, 2009: 20; Solomon 2012, 23). Considering issues from this perspective, expanding cooperation to include Ethiopian forces in AMISOM was quite a gamble. But with local militias acceptance of Ethiopia's absorption (Sabahi, 2014), it can be argued that AMISOM's gains and increasing legitimacy, for now, have over-ridden historical animosity.

<u>International Political Will</u>

H: ***The international community's utilisation of authority and resources provides assurance for conflict settlement.***

CH: International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.

Despite the Djibouti Peace Agreement in 2008 which formed the basis of all the sixteen peace agreements on which AMISOM was established, there was scepticism between members of the AU about the wisdom of deploying into a violent, chaotic vacuum with no apparent peace or exit strategy (Djibouti Agreement, 2008; Sandi, interview 2014). Not wanting to put their troops into such a vortex of violence, few African countries were willing to contribute

troops to AMISOM. Compounding issues too was the perception among Somali's and even some AU member states that AMISOM was a tool of the West, given Washington's support for Ethiopia's campaign (The New York Times, 2006; Williams, 2009: 2-3). So at inception, AMISOM was seen as an ill-conceived mission since it suffered legitimacy issues and weak political backing. The AU struggled to secure promises of just over 60% of the authorised troop strength of 8,000 from its members (Williams, 2009: 1-2). The resultant slow troop deployment which was an indication of weak political will was certainly a major factor in AMISOM making so little impact in creating stability during the early period of its mission. It seemed to have provided a focal point for the insurgency as the fierce battles continued until mid-2011 (Williams, 2010b: 1; Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 16).

The gains made on the ground in later years as support increased is indicative of AMISOM's effectiveness thriving on the re-awakened will of the international community. From its inception which was fostered by IGAD, the AU and the UN, to its survival which has been effectively sustained by actors external to the AU, the impact of international will in Somalia has been awesome. Gadin (interview 2014) notes, 'the fact that AMISOM is a success story today is testament to the fervent political will of the international community' (Gadin, interview 2014). This view is reiterated by Hussein Solomon and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens (2012: 7) when they contend that:

> AMISOM is a body made up of African troops who have responded to an African crisis at the direction of an African political organization. The AU members have shown a willingness and desire to act swiftly and largely independently to ensure their own national security and protect lucrative tourism industries (Solomon and Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2012: 7).

Currently, AMISOM together with the SNA, and supported by several local militia have kept much of Somalia under control (Sabahi, 2014). For efficient monitoring, charge of these areas has been broken into sections of command. AMISOM Ugandan contingent is in Sector 1 based in the Lower Shabelle. Sector 2, based in the Dhobey is commanded by AMISOM Kenyan contingent; Sector 3 which is the Bay and Bakool region is commanded by AMISOM Ethiopian troops; Sector 4, the Hiiraan region is run by the AMISOM

Djiboutian contigent; Sector 5, based in Middle Shabelle is commanded by AMISOM Burundian contingent; Sector Kismayo and its environs is comprised of multinational forces from Sierra Leone, Burundi, Kenya and is commanded by Sierra Leone (AMISOM News, 2014). This shows that state contingents are large enough to secure and hold territory thus enhancing effectiveness in line with the force integrity argument.

Recalling that AMISOM had a difficult beginning, the will of its partners both international and regional have certainly propped it up. Assistance from the UN, the US and the EU, not undermining local support, have kept the engine of AMISOM working effectively. The AU on its part, in taking this as a learning curve adheres to international norms such as live-fire control to reduce civilian casualties and offering medical treatment to civilians and al-Shabaab militia alike (The Nigerian Voice, 2012; Mills, 2014).

Timing and Duration

H: Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.

CH: ***Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.***

AMISOM was given a mandate to make the Somalia polity stable for governance, protect installations and institutions and take charge of humanitarian aid. In view of the volatility of the environment and complexities in achieving its mandate, AMISOM was not given a time frame within which this was to be established. This lack of a time frame has not in any way dampened the strides of the mission as some experts have argued (Stambaugh, 2001: 11; Curtis, interview 2014).

It was hoped that after six months the UN would take over. Since there was no peace yet to be kept and the UN seldom gets directly involved in war fighting, it had to abdicate being majorly responsible for Somalia. If working with time limits really spurs personnel into effectiveness, then morale within AMISOM would have been low and little progress made having no end date to work with. In real time, the converse has been the case with AMISOM. Next to creating a better life for Somali's, what seems to spur the AU's troops to success in Somalia has been the need to create a stable environment and re-

hat from the green to the blue beret. Creating the situation for a UN takeover has been a tonic for success rather than a definite exit strategy and termination date (Mitchell, interview 2014). This is evident in the observation that most African TCC's/PCC's favour UN-led operations over AU operations. This is due in part to the superior logistical support package and troop contingent-owned equipment reimbursement rates (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 14).

In my time at the AU conducting interviews, the pervading perception among staff is, in the short term, AMISOM will remain in Somalia until 2016 to assist the federal government in the referendum on the constitution and future general elections. This does not point to a definite exit date still. While the non-provision of an exit date is yet to dampen the AU's resolve to succeed in Somalia, it does affect the mission's ability to plan (Mitchell, interview 2014). It is unlikely that the provision of deadlines for AMISOM would have made a difference.

Training for Expanded Roles

H: Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.

CH: ***Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.***

It can be argued that the success of the mission in Somalia can be attributed to the inclusion of the civilian component (UN political mission), thereby leaving the AMISOM troops to concentrate on securing areas. The AU has tried to ensure that it plays its rightful role when it comes to the military, police and civilians. 'The military continue to push out and make their gain, the police come in to hold the security situation with community policing, creating a situation where the civilian staff can come in and start the nation building' (Mitchell, interview 2014). While the police component for example is still emerging in AU PSO's, in Somalia, the police has been a major player in keeping the rule of law and keeping communities safe (Dundun, interview 2014).

AMISOM's military component on occasions had to go beyond its role of providing security. On one such instance the soldiers from Djibouti came to

the aid of civilians in Beletweyne and helped to organise evacuations after heavy rains caused flooding in the region (AMISOM, 2015a). AMISOM's civilian and police component have contributed immensely to the provision of stability through galvanising Somalis into supporting the peace. They have rehabilitated schools and provided other basic facilities such as water wells, trained civil service leaders, the local police force and encouraged civil society to take hold of their destiny while respecting human rights (AMISOM Review, 2013; AMISOM Review, 2014). Specialisation has been key to the AU's operations in Somalia.

Local Participation

H: ***Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.***

CH: The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.

International actors have struggled to piece together the complex Somali socio-political puzzle. Their priorities have been to unify, stabilise and democratise the Somali polity and they acknowle that it is almost impossible to facilitate peace in Somalia without the Somalis themselves (Townsend, 2012: 1; AU Press Release, 2014b).

Somalia is an ethnically and linguistically unified country, which is divided along clan lines rather than along ethnic or religious groups (Gizelis and Kosek, 2005: 371). Owing to the deeply rooted clan based relations in Somali society, and the conditions under which AMISOM started, winning the support of the populace has been a priority for the peace operation process. Beginning its campaign in 2007 with resistance from the populace, AMISOM unavoidably but slowly, set about the difficult task of winning the support of Somalis (Williams, 2009: 2; Williams, 2010b: 1). The benefit of this strategy was, AMISOM gained in local acceptance while Al-Shabaab's popularity among the local population waned leading to its decline in strength (NOAS, 2014: 17). Two of the four key strategic objectives of AMISOM revolved around local capacity building.

An AMISOM press release (2013) reports the collaboration between AMISOM and Somali contractors to start three projects which include the construction

of classrooms for 600 children and the refurbishing of primary school buildings for 300 children. This gesture definitely augments the Somali government's Go2School Initiative which provides free education. After two decades of conflict, Somalia's school enrolment rate are among the lowest in the world. Just four out of ten children are in school (AMISOM Press Release, 2013; AMISOM, 2014b).

Another example tells of the efforts of elders and leaders of thought in contributing to peace and how these have been harnessed by officers of the AU. Lydia Wantoyo Mutende, the Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in Somalia (DSRCC) commended leaders of the Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle areas on agreeing to form an interim administration overseeing the region. In response, they noted that 'AMISOM has a different culture from ours, but they have showed us time and again that we are all brothers and for this, we shall continue to support them and to work very closely with them' (AMISOM Press Statement, 2014). Such events are pivotal as collaboration between clans support the peace process. These developments could be viewed as offshoots of the strategies adopted by AMISOM after its 2012 review which recognised that operations should be conducted in conjunction with the TFG. This provides for the Somali government and its people, a sense of ownership of these operations (Gadin, interview 2014).

The efforts of Somali local capacity contributed immensely in preserving the peace. This study has already highlighted the role of elders in keeping a lid over conflict in the more stable regions of the north (Hoisington, 2012). These informal, local types of governance also present unique opportunities for peace operations and peace building. On 14 March 2016, a CCTV Africa News report attributed the resurgence of deadly Al-Shabaab attacks in 2016 to the breakdown of relationships between AMISOM and the local people as cases of rape and harrassment were on the increase. To stem this resurgence AMISOM peacekeepers have been encouraged to integrate more with the population to improve communication and prosecute those accused of these acts in order to regain the trust of Somalis. This strategy of integration was adopted by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and it helped peacekeeper civilian relationship

and the effectiveness of the mission (The Telegraph, 2006; Ellery, interview 2013).

Women Participation in the Peace Process

H: Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.

CH: ***Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process.***

Little has been mentioned in relation to local women's support for AMISOM's efforts. The UN Technical Assessment Mission (UNTAM) in Somalia lays emphasis on the need to encourage the participation of women in the peace process as well as prevent their being the victims of violent conflict (UNSC, 2013c). To also enhance the gains of its peace process, AMISOM has found need to work with women's groups in Somalia. Of recent is its collaboration with the Somali Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development, with a view to improving the country's judicial structures (AMISOM, 2014d).

Interestingly, while being patriarchal like most African societies and a Muslim country with its legal system based on Islamic Sharia, it is claimed that Somalia has relative spaces for women to engage in governance and be involved in the peace process. Abdi Mohamed (2003: 107) notes that the call for women participation in society's affairs emanates from Somali customary laws and traditions. This assertion is buttressed by James Gadin (interview 2014), the Political Officer for AMISOM:

> When the current government came into existence last year, in its first cabinet of ten ministers two were women holding very strong positions. The Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Minister for Social Issues. In the parliament it was legislated to reserve thirty percent representation. We did not achieve the percentage, but let's not forget that this has to be a process … we continue to encourage and to replicate this idea that they must constantly create room and encourage women to participate.

A different view holds that though Somali women are encouraged to participate in the peace process through active involvement in governance, they have had to contend with religious rigidities, stereotyped bureaucracies and poor security (Somali Current, 2015a). These factors restrict spaces for

effective women activism. Acknowleding the dearth of women participation in public processes and the hurdles faced, Zainab Hassan (Somali Current, 2015b: 1) asserts that even 'the future doesn't seem favourable for Somali women's representation'. When women's groups do exist to help the peace, they are often foreign and seldom local. One of such is the Global Enrichment Foundation whose founder Amanda Lindhout was a rebel detainee in Somalia. This organisation has managed the rehabilitation of women and children through education and has helped more than 200,000 women in Somalia and Kenyan refugee camps (Metro, 2014: 26). Too few of these NGO's have local origins or are funded locally. Local women need more participation space in Somalia. For this reason, Gadin (interview, 2014) notes that AMISOM encourages more women involvement in the Somalia peace process.

Despite the deficit of local women contribution, AMISOM has recorded remarkable gains in meeting stability. This indicates that women support has not been a factor for the gains of peacekeeping in Somalia.

Charismatic Field Leadership and Lead State

H: Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.

CH: A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.

In Somalia, individual strategic leadership was not lacking. General Ali Dini and Nathan Mugisha for example, worked to develop concept of operations which aligned the capability of AMISOM and the local security institutions. Leadership on the ground extended collaboration to non-state armed groups that were friendly to government such as the Sunnah wal Jamaah, a moderate religious armed group fighting against Al-Shabaab (Sandi, interview 2014). Recalling at this point that these militias were often clan based, support for AMISOM meant tacit support from the clans that these militias had close ties with. Gains made by the AU were not all borne out of formal negotiations or military incursions. These events in the field, beyond formal agreements and alliances, definitely made their contributions to AMISOM creating stability. Some experts also observed in this regard that the force in Somalia has shown resolve and has had a positive impact in allowing

governance to be introduced, and people living their lives away from the threat of violence (Kilpatrick, interview 2013; Dundun, interview 2014).

That the AU often relies on lead states is not in doubt (Lotze and Faurie, interview, 2014). While this was not much of a factor in the Comoros, it certainly was in the case of Somalia as Uganda took on the lead role. While Ethiopia's presence in Somalia, preceding the entry of AMISOM, did not help matters, Uganda taking over the mantra of lead state helped the cause of AMISOM in its nascent phase as it made it more acceptable. The Ugandan troops were able to weather the storm as they held ground against insurgent groups and protected members of the TFG even when it seemed AMISOM was sprawling (Kambudzi, interview 2014).

In Somalia, both political leadership in the form of the lead state and field leadership which builds conciliatory bridges have been critical to the gains of AMISOM. It is difficult to ascertain which mattered more. While the lead state factor got AMISOM going, leadership in the field has sustained it. Neither could not have achieved much without the other.

Impartiality over Neutrality

H: ***Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.***

CH: Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.

UN intervention in Somalia 1992-1995, while initially creating some succour, did not yield much dividends operating on its tenet of impartiality and neutrality (Agada, 2008: 49). The formation and operations of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and II, and the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) showed the inadequacy of UN missions to handle such a volatile conflict (World Bank, 2005:12; Sorensen, 2010: 13-15). Having failed in Somalia, the last of these missions (UNOSOM II) pulled out in 1995. On 24 September 2001, the UN withdrew its international staff from Somalia on the grounds that their safety could no longer be guaranteed (The Guardian, 2012b).

This series of events strengthens the argument that in cases of peace enforcement such as in Somalia, 'neutrality is impossible' (Lotze and Faurie,

interview 2014). Once the decision is taken to undertake peace enforcement, you cannot be neutral since some stakeholders are disinterested in peace.

AMISOM went into Somalia with the mandate to protect the TFG, get it off the ground and enable it exercise what authority it could muster. This already showed bias for a faction. Staying neutral as is demanded by the tenets of traditional peacekeeping, would have been next to impossible and would only have made the situation much worse. Under the Somali scenario therefore, impartiality to the mandate (ensuring a stable government and capacity building) was of greater relevance to the operation than staying neutral.

Domestic Political Elite

H: ***Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.***

CH: Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.

Domestic elite are important to the peace process and AMISOM has sought to utilise this. Jonathan Sandi (interview 2014) and Brian Hesse (2014: 12) point to the cordial partnerships between AMISOM and leaders of clan militias such as the Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ) and the Raskamboni Movement. These groups are either allied to the TFG or opposed to Al-Shabaab. The loyalty they command from their clans reinforced the acceptance of AMISOM among Somalis and helped in propelling stability. The current gains of these partnerships corroborates the discourse on the utilisation of rebels in navigating civil war outcomes (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000: 781; Peake et al, 2004: 17; Clayton, 2013: 609).

The TFG is not left out from this collaboration for peace by Somali's elite. Gadin (interview 2014), the AU Political Officer for AMISOM says:

> In 2012 we undertook a strategic review of AMISOM…. We realised four strategic objectives. The first is to reduce the threat caused by Al-Shabaab in Somalia which enables the government to expand its control across the territory. The second one is to build the capacity of the Somali National Army and the Somali Police Force. The third one is to help the government establish some governance in those places we recovered from Al-Shabaab and to provide basic service delivery, social services in those areas. The fourth one is long term, looking at elections in 2016.

Strategies one, three and four revolve around the TFG. The AU acts aware that AMISOM's success largely depends on whether governmental structures are able to deliver much needed public goods and services and provide security throughout liberated areas (Segui, 2013: 4). Analysts have observed that, though the TFG has made significant steps in bringing some regional administrations into discussions, its efforts to reach out to the broader Somali public, involve them in the process, and build genuine and widespread Somali ownership have so far been limited for obvious reasons (Saferworld, 2013).

The first TFG cabinet (replaced in 2012) lacked local support because of corruption and in-fighting. This lack of local support rubbed off on AMISOM's operations at the start (Williams, 2013a: 8; Mills, 2014). The current set of political elite in Somalia also seem to be charting a similar course with the country ranked as the second most corrupt in the world by IRIN (2014) and Transparency International (2014). They have been accused of systematic embezzlement, diverting humanitarian aid and colluding with pirates (Curtis, 2013: 79). An NGO, the Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers (NOAS) (2014: 14) remarks:

> The optimism at the time of the election in 2012 resulted in a nostalgic feeling and the return of many hopeful diaspora members…. This hope now has faded and fatigue has taken over. People have become more critical and the government's rating is not high…. The optimism linked to the new government has turned into disappointment.

Somali's elite staying this course could rub off negatively on AMISOM and undo the gains made as the latter might be perceived as propping up and colluding with corrupt regimes.

Recognising this risk and yet ceding to the salience of domestic elite in establishing peace, this study concurs with experts who contend that: 'to win the fight against Al-Shabaab, the international community must lean on the TFG and the National Constituent Assembly to be more responsive to Somali needs, and increase its capacity to do so where appropriate' (Solomon and Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2012: 9). In the absence of the TFG the gains made so far would have been much more tedious to achieve.

It is necessary to recall at this point that AMISOM's mandate was for all of Somalia and not for a part as was the case with Darfur in Sudan. From this perspective, it should be noted that the role of domestic political elite in the northwest and northeast of Somalia in keeping their areas calm ensured that AMISOM could concentrate its efforts on the central and southern regions experiencing violent conflict. In the autonomous regions of the north, governance has been more accountable (Forti, 2011: 17; Hoisington, 2012: 52). Their contribution reduced the amount of ground AMISOM had to cover and indirectly contributed to AMISOM's peacekeeping effectiveness. The devolved mechanisms and institutions in the form of cross-clan collaborations, regional grouping and ideological federations developed in these regions provide alternatives that can help local communities and peacekeepers overcome challenges in the wake of civil wars (Forti, 2011: 17-19; Gizelis, 2011: 524; Hoisington, 2012: 52). Leaders in these regions hold periodic meetings with AMISOM personnel to sustain a healthy rapproachment. AMISOM and the people of Central and Southern Somalia need not look too far for strategies on how to better harmonise clan interest in creating a vibrant and stable Somalian state.

Size of Mission Area

H: The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.

CH: ***A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.***

Somalia might extend over a large area, but ever since 2012 when AMISOM's funding and troops have reached an appreciable level, the gains have been steady. If success of peace operations is not determined by the brief space of time it takes to quell an insurgency, rout spoilers and get the machinery of government up and running, then slow and steady progress over a large land area should not be seen as inefficiency at peacekeeping. In as much as steady progress is made, then the size thesis for success does not hold in this case.

On the other hand, the country does not possess the more valuable natural resources like crude oil, cobalt and precious stones which scholars and experts claim often prolong and intensify conflict due to external or multinational

interests (Ferreira, 2010: 54). Therefore, the minimal interference of external actors such as multinational companies occasioned by the lack of valuable mineral resources has augured well for the management of peace.

It has taken AMISOM seven years and the lives of many peacekeeping troops to be the success it has been qualified to be despite all areas not yet secure and the mission still having some way to go (Wiklund, 2013a: 20). Despite the size of the mission area, AMISOM seems to have done fairly well in establishing security, preserving lives and providing some stability.

CONCLUSION

The mission in Somalia had two major objectives. First was to bring stability to a conflict ravaged society and expand the authority of the TFG. The second objective was to spawn the beginnings of democratic governance in the country. To do this, it was necessary to rein in rebel groups who had dominated the central and southern parts of the country, contain those who opposed this transition and protect citizens in the process. AMISOM has succeeded at this as the TFG wields authority in most major cities in Somalia and work with various clan militia in the maintenance of peace.

Despite lapses that exist in the AU's operations in Somalia, it is generally agreed that AMISOM has been a success story so far. Despite its complex political history, it provides a good testing ground still for the hypotheses of this research. Of the thirteen hypotheses examined, the Somalia experience supports three counter hypotheses namely, the issue on specialised training, running an open ended mission, and the resource thesis.

From the historical account of Somalia's crisis through the analysis provided of AMISOM's operations, four factors majorly interact at the core of the AMISOM's success. First is the mandate which specifies the duties of the peacekeepers. AMISOM really began making significant progress with the review of its mandate in 2012. Next was its ability to enforce security which would only have been possible with adequate and well equipped contingents boasting force integrity. To keep a sizeable multinational contingent operational especially in battle requires funding and the will of the international community to sustain it. These were not lacking. Finally, in order

to allow for stability through the security provided, local participation and domestic elite cooperation proved indispensable for AMISOM's success. However, a continued misapplication of governance by Somalia's political elite might see a fall in local cooperation and a possible reverse of AMISOM's gains.

Establishing a trend through the interaction of these factors in AU missions, allows for better understanding of what facilitates effectiveness in peacekeeping. That the AU is expanding and improving on security in Somalia, making it fairly stable and secure, classifies AMISOM as an effective peacekeeping operation.

CHAPTER SEVEN

MALI (2013)

The conflict which engulfed Mali in 2012 prompting the intervention of the AU in 2013 was a complex and multidimensional mixture of long-term fundamental grievances by diverse groups within the Malian state. Three distinct but inter-related events coalesced to produce this crisis. First was the secessionist tendencies by the Tuaregs in northern Mali for an independent state of Azawad. Second was the political crisis which was aggravated by the military overthrow of 2012 which further weakened the Malian state, and heightened Tuareg rebel hopes and activities towards secession. Thirdly was the hijacking of this Tuareg nationalist process by Islamist jihadists who attempted to take over Mali and establish a terrorist state based on sharia law. This last event prompted international intervention in the Malian crisis of which the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), France, the US and the European Union played pivotal roles in halting this slide into anarchy.

Most significant among the factors was France's lead state role which secured most of rebel captured territory before AU troops were deployed. Subsequently, much of what the AU peacekeeping force did in Mali was the police function of holding territory which had been secured by France. Being an AU mission still, events and peacekeeping factors leading to the provision of stability are worth studying. Though the AU has come under much criticism for its delayed deployment, experts generally agree that the operation in Mali was effective (Maiangwa, 2013; Mitchell, interview 2014). Given the utilisation of the traditional factors, those proposed in this study, and others such as impartiality, field leadership and local women initiative, achieving stability was expected.

The first section of this chapter examines the recent crisis, its basis and the period of intervention of the AU and its partners. This period carries up till the point where the mission in Mali is handed over to the UN. The second section analyses the variables at play which determined the success of the mission in view of the AU's peacekeeping's effectiveness.

The Crisis in Mali and AU Peacekeeping

The Crisis

Mali's crisis has been explained as a combination of the following: A political and social landscape replete with the challenges of poor governance, constitutional crisis, armed rebellion and growing criminality (Affa'a-Mindzie and Perry, 2013: 3; Sears, 2013: 445-446; Keys, 2013: 2): The rise of Islamist fundamentalism (Arieff, 2013: 6-7): The political fragility of Africa's Sahel, accentuated largely by the fall of Ghaddafi in Libya (Ewi, 2012:2; Fiott et al, 2013: 2; Gold, 2013: 7, Lecoq and Klute, 2013: 430).

Between Mali's independence in 1960 and the crisis under review, the country experienced two Tuareg rebellions (1962-64 and 1990-1991) (Lode, 2002: 59; Devon, 2013: 1). The Tuareg's demand for a sovereign state dates back to the colonial era under French rule despite the degree of autonomy enjoyed. With Mali's independence in 1960, the Tuaregs began to push toward their dream of establishing Azawad. This met with stiff opposition and repression from the southern block who dominated the corridors of power. This oppression eventually boiled over and became the first Tuareg rebellion (Alfellaga) in 1962 (Devon, 2013). Much of the second rebellion was as a result of the severe drought through the 1970s and 80s in which Mali lost 40 percent of its cattle and food production and which brought extreme hardship especially among the Tuaregs (Meredith, 2006: 276). This second rebellion was the expression of Tuareg resentment that the government in Bamako did not do enough (Lode, 2002: 56).

The third rebellion was not so much a rebellion, but rather an insurgency in which members of the Malian military were kidnapped and killed. The insurgency began in May 2006, when a group of Tuareg army deserters attacked military barracks in the Kidal region, seizing weapons and demanding greater autonomy and development assistance (Devon, 2013). Despite the government's attempts to quell this rebellion, the insurgency gathered pace in 2007 and was further exacerbated by an influx of arms from the 2011 Libyan civil war.

The political and security crisis that erupted in Mali in 2012, while owing its existence to traditional Tuareg dissatisfaction, had other precipitating factors.

One of these factors was the growth of organised crime and drug cartels which enabled drug barons convert their wealth into political influence and military power (Reitano and Shaw, 2013). American fears of al Qaeda affiliates taking over northern Mali through funds from drug money prompted the US to encourage the Malian government in late 2011 to re-establish full military control of the north of the country (Ellis, 2004: 460). This action evoked a Tuareg nationalist uprising which led to the formation of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in November 2011. The MNLA became the torch bearer of Tuareg nationalism (Keys, 2013: 4). It incorporated returning Tuareg mercenaries who had fought in Libya and who brought with them their combat experience as well as sophisticated weapons (Maiangwa, 2013: 6).

The MNLA's string of successes began on 17 January 2012 when it launched successful attacks on Malian army posts in the north. Embarrassed by their defeat and angry at the political class for a perceived lack of support, the military staged a coup on 22 March ousting the government of Amadou Toumani Toure (Haysom, 2014: 3; International Crisis Group, 2012b). This military coup further compounded issues and dealt a death blow to Mali's democratic process (ECOWAS Peace and Security Report, 2012). The coup took place only weeks before the April 29th presidential election in which Toure was to cede power. It created a power vacuum and provided the impetus for the MNLA in April 2012 to declare an independent state of Azawad which supposedly covered 60 percent of Mali's land area (Affa'a-Mindzie and Perry, 2013: 4).

Other groups that ravaged northern Mali at this time, capitalising on the weakness of the Malian state were the Ansar al Dine (Defenders of the Faith), believed to be the strongest Islamist group in terms of popular support and territory controlled; Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which has been active in Mali since 2003, using it as a base for its terrorist acts; and the Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) which is an off shoot of (AQIM); (Think Africa Press, 2012: 2; Maiangwa, 2013: 7-8; Haysom, 2014: 1; Laub, 2014). Founded in the 1990s in Algeria, AQIM's objectives in northern Mali were mainly financial. Using religion as a cover for its kidnapping of western citizens, drug and human trafficking in northern

Mali, AQIM ploughed the proceeds to financing its terrorist activities in Algeria. This strategy however changed with the Tuareg/MNLA uprising in 2012, at which point AQIM changed its focus to territorial control (Arief, 2013: 1-2; Lindell and Mattsson, 2014: 20-21). Figure 7.1 (below) presents the area occupied by these jihadists.

Figure 7.1: Conflict Map of Mali, 2012



Culled from BBC News Africa, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21014206

A weakening regime facilitates the growth of dissidents, which explains why revolutionary upheavals often emerge in the wake of military defeat (Buhaug, 2006: 695). In consonance with this view, AQIM moved swiftly and seized control of this increasingly lawless area (BBC News Africa, 2014a). By mid-July 2012, most major towns such as Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao were under Islamist control, experiencing the destruction of heritage sites and the implementation of strict sharia law which included torture and amputation. (Ewi, 2012: 2; Affa'a-Mindzie and Perry, 2013: 4). With the failure of the Malian army, external intervention was obviously needed to check the spread of these fundamentalist and barbaric rules.

Peacekeeping in Mali

Obvious that the Malian government could not handle the crisis alone, the international community intervened. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) denounced the coup and urged the junta to immediately relinquish power to the rightful government (The Guardian, 2012a; Maiangwa, 2013: 11-12). To force this, ECOWAS imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on Mali on 30 March 2012 and concluded launching a coordinated military operation to recapture rebel occupied areas of the north. This was to be achieved through the ECOWAS Mission in Mali (MICEMA). However, obstacles including the junta's hostility to foreign armed presence in Bamako, and lack of consensus with Algeria (a non-ECOWAS state) compounded issues and ensured this decision never went beyond the planning stages (Théroux-Bénoni, 2013: 1). Logistics and financial constraints also made it impossible to deploy in the absence of international support.

The AU suspended Mali on 23 March (AUPSC, 2012a: 2), and began playing a more active role from June 2012 (Mickler, 2013; Haysom, 2014: 4). It found it expedient to mediate and made some progress. Théroux-Bénoni (2013:2) notes:

> Firstly, differences with the Malian actors were overcome, allowing the development of a harmonised Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which gave the Malian army the lead role in the envisaged military operation. Then the AU sought to overcome Algeria's reluctance by making the mission a continental initiative, transforming MICEMA into the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Finally, and in order to facilitate the provision of support from the UN, the AU, in collaboration with the Malian government, ECOWAS and other international actors developed a strategic concept that framed the military action in a more global perspective.

These proposals, though facilitating breakthroughs in cooperation among the mediating actors also had several drawbacks. First, the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF) was in disarray and in no shape to lead operations, and its planned reorganisation by the EU had not begun (Arief, 2013:2). In addition, the transition from MICEMA to AFISMA was marked by tension between ECOWAS and the AU (Théroux-Bénoni, 2013: 2). However, under the subsidiarity provisions of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA),

the AU coordinated with ECOWAS to produce a united front and collaborative response in Mali (Mickler, 2013; Bam, interview 2014).

The subsidiarity principle was adopted by the AU in 2007 (AU, 2007: 15-17). A major aim of the subsidiarity principle is to regulate the powers of the central authority in relation to its units. So it advocates that the centre should not undertake action unless on matters for which it alone is responsible, or it is certain that action taken by the centre is more effective than action taken at the unit level. In effect, this tenet only applies when the centre and the units both have competence in the area under dispute (Møller, 2005: 4; De Sousa, 2013: 60). For this reason, it is claimed that the subsidiarity principle gives priority to the units. The responsibility is passed to the centre only when there is certainty of its greater efficiency or when the unit has shown its inability to deliver (Schilling, 1995: 2).

Applying the *subsidiarity principle* to the AU infers the allocation of power from the AU to its Regional Economic Communities (RECs). More explicitly, it applies to operations initiated by the AU using the regional brigades which are units of the continental African Standby Force (ASF), but under the command of the REC's (Franke, 2007: 3; Warner, 2015: 59). The REC's determine the state of the operation by virtue of the risks its member states are willing to take on issues such as finance and human casualties (Roux, 2013: 1; Bam, interview 2014).

AFISMA was to be drawn from the Western African Standby Brigade (WASB) which is the ASF's West Africa unit. However, the ASF was still more a concept than it was operational, thereby prompting the AU Peace and Security Department (AUPSC) to acknowledge that it was still going to take quite a while to get it up and running (Curtis, interview 2014). The political imbroglio and operational delays of the ASF precipitated three major events.

First, on 10 January 2013, twenty days after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2085 authorising the deployment of AFISMA, the insurgents capitalised on the delay of the ASF to commence operation and advanced towards Bamako. Alarmed at the capture of Konna, the Malian government sought France's help (Théroux-Bénoni, 2013: 2; Hampton, 2014: 2; BBC News Africa, 22/05/14).

This request prompted the second which was France's deployment of Operation Serval on 11 January. With 4,000 troops, France's Operation Serval dramatically altered the dynamics on the ground and greatly influenced international response. By the end of January all the major population centres in northern Mali had been retaken and the rebels displaced (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 3; Reeve and Pelter, 2014: 3).

The third outcome draws largely from the second. In order to show itself up to the challenge despite being unable to activate the ASF, AFISMA deployments were accelerated under a new programme where troops were required from a coalition of the willing to make up the contingent. 'So the forces that went in were from Troop Contributing Countries (TCC's) that had volunteered to go in to establish AFISMA (Curtis, interview 2014). Nigeria was the first to deploy troops on 17 January 2013. By 31 January, within two weeks of mobilisation, AFISMA had approximately 1,400 boots on the ground drawn from Chad and the ECOWAS region (Security Council Report, 2013b).

AFISMA's initial authorised troop strength of 3,300 was increased with the revised CONOPS of February 2013 to 9,620 (AU, 2013a: 5). By April 2013, AFISMA had twenty one TCC's and a troop strength of 7,464, with Chad and ECOWAS providing approximately 6,000 of that number. (Aljazeera Centre for Studies, 2013; Echoes of ECOWAS, 2013).

Authorised on a Chapter VII mandate, AFISMA's terms of reference were:

- To contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security forces
- To support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north while taking appropriate measures to reduce the impact of military action upon the civilian population.
- To consolidate State authority through appropriate capacities and enable transitions to stability.
- To support the Malian authorities in their primary responsibility to protect the population.
- To create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of IDP's and refugees.
- To protect its personnel, facilities, premises, equipment and mission and to ensure the security and movement of its personnel (UNSC, 2012a).

By April, discussions of AFISMA re-hatting into a 12,600 strong UN peacekeeping mission had begun (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 3; AU, 2013a: 5). On 1 July, authority was transferred from the AU to the UN and forces from AFISMA officially donned the blue berets of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (UN News Centre, 2013). A month later, August 2013, Mali successfully elected its new president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in a process considered free and fair (International Peace Institute, 2013: 1). The success of the elections across Mali, bears evidence to the degree of stability that had been achieved and the efforts of AFISMA.

Evaluating AU Peacekeeping in Mali

The AU Peace Operation in Mali was successful in providing stability to the region. The French troops had done the bulk of the job of pushing back the Islamic Extremists (Maiangwa, 2013), leaving AFISMA to act more in a holding capacity. With the quick end to the insurgency and the security provided by AFISMA in its holding role, threats to life were dismantled and lives were made secure. Table 7.1 below reflects findings on the AU in Mali in view of my hypotheses.

Table 7.1(a) Factors Emanating from AU HQ/Bureaucracy

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY
Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.	Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre.
Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.	Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly
An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.	Integrity of forces strengthens the bond within peacekeeping missions.
Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.	Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.
The international community's utilisation of authority and resources provides assurance for conflict settlement.	International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.
Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.	Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.

Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.	**Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.**

Table 7.1(b) Factors Emanating from the Field/Ground Realities

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY
Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.	The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.
Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.	Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process.
Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.	**A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.**
Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.	Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.
Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.	Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.
The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.	**A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.**

Key: Bold = Valid Hypothesis; Normal = Invalid Hypothesis; Italics = Inconclusive

Mandate

H: ***Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.***

CH: Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre..

Deploying after French forces, AFISMA's role was to hold territory already taken by French and Chadian forces and for this the mandate was apt (Reeve and Pelter, 2014: 12). This holding role, contends Beverly Mitchell (interview 2014), is more a police function in PSO's. It adequately explains why AFISMA's mandate centred more on civilian protection (UNSC, 2012a). With its number of troops and the degree of funding there is little to suggest that AFISMA's mandate was beyond its capacity. Tailored to the realities on ground, its objectives were duly achieved thus contributing to the success of the peace operation in Mali. In line with its mandate, Issaka Souare (interview 2014) had this to say.

> The AFISMA troops have been on the ground despite the lack of equipment. Some contingents travel by road into very hostile environment … still they are there. To support its efforts in Mali, the AU decided to establish the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL) whose job mainly is to assist Mali first with the implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement and the national reconciliation process …. Having recognised the regional dimension of the conflict, the AU tries to promote regional cooperation between the countries of the Sahel in the security and development realms so that they would be able to gather to work on the root causes of the conflict. To this extent, the AU is involved in building the peace in Mali.

AFISMA's mandate was meant to revive the Ouagadougou negotiations of 2013 which aimed at securing presidential elections and inclusive peace talks between the government and rebel factions (Ouagadougou Accords, 2013; Théroux-Bénoni and Dakono, 2013). Achieving this helped the provision of stability in Mali.

Funding

H: ***Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.***

CH: Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly.

Contributions for AFISMA were made through the donors conferences held in Addis Ababa on 29 January 2013, and in Brussels on 15 May 2013 (Helly and Rocca, 2013; News 24, 2013b). The conference was necessitated by the absence of a UN support package (Boutellis and Williams, 2013: 3). While ECOWAS gave $10 million, the AU allocated $50 million from its budget in support of AFISMA, the first time in its history that such an action was taken in support a non-UN peace operation (AU, 2013b: 5).

Though the Addis Ababa donors conference raised $455 million which was half the estimated cost of running the mission, it would be difficult to really ascertain how much financial support AFISMA received (Aljazeera Centre for Studies, 2013; Security Council Report, 2013b). For example, Japan's donation of $120 million and Canada's $13 million were directed at humanitarian aid and not for AFISMA's troops (The Globe and Mail, 2013). Beyond the US' pledge of $96 million, it had already spent an estimated $8 million in its assistance to AFISMA (Security Council Report, 2013b; Aljazeera

Centre for Studies, 2013). The same applies to France which gave $63 million outside the cost of running Operation Serval, and Nigeria which donated $5 million outside the $32 million allegedly spent in contributions to AFISMA in providing clinics for the MDSF (Aljazeera Centre for Studies, 2013; News 24, 2013b). Outside the cost incurred in the training of the Malian defence forces, the EU donated $67.5 million to AFISMA. These funds were to be managed by the UN office in Mali through a UN trust fund for AFISMA (Security Council Report, 2013b).

From its onset therefore, AFISMA was not really short of funds and this helped its operationability. Walter Lotze and Adele Faurie (interview 2014) affirm that funding for AFISMA may not have reached the proportions experienced with AMISOM, but it was not starved of resources either. They point out that some degree of relativity is needed since different missions have different needs and ought to be funded differently. 'The mission in Mali received just about 50 percent or less of its estimated funds, still it achieved a high degree of success, and one cannot say the mission in Somalia was more effective than in Mali' (Lotze and Faurie, interview 2014).

Character of Contingent

H: ***An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.***

CH: Integrity of forces strengthens the bond within peacekeeping missions.

The French already had the bulk of the job done (Maiangwa, 2013: 3; Bøås and Torheim, 2013: 418). Irrespective of the acknowledged operational superiority of western forces, the inclusion of AFISMA's 7,400 troops definitely gave added muscle to the French Legion. Had AFISMA deployed on time, it is believed within the AU that they would have beaten back the Islamists as well (Fabricius, 2013; Souare, interview 2014). But the French had done this, and the added strength of AFISMA troops gave the Islamists no chance. This added number aided the rapid advance of the peacekeepers and allowed for stability in areas reclaimed.

In terms of adequate force numbers, this project has stuck with the prescribed peacekeeper – citizen ratio of 1:200 (O'Hanlon, 2003; Dobbins et

al, 2005). The Northern part of Mali, the area of the peace operation is principally inhabited by the Tuareg nomads, Arab nomads, merchants and the Songhoy sendentarists of the Niger river basin who together comprise approximately ten percent of Mali's estimated total population of 16 million (Lode, 2002: 56). This comes to approximately 1.6 million inhabitants in Northern Mali (The Telegraph, 2012). With the combined force of AFISMA and Operation Serval being 11,400, this breaks down to 140 civilians per peacekeeper. For the number of civilians needing security, the mission size was appropriate in keeping with its responsibility to protect.

AFISMA's 7,464 troops were drawn from twenty one countries. Such diversity barely bodes well for peacekeeping meeting its objective due to its lack of force integrity. AFISMA's success therefore made force integrity seem of little consequence in Mali. This perspective does not paint a true picture of the forces situation in Mali. The French troops had absorbed the greater intensity of the conflict. Though Operation Serval was not run by the AU, it is appropriate to point out that the speed with which French forces swept through Mali makes a strong case for integrity of forces which facilitates task cohesion. Task cohesion is expressed in the drive of troops working as a team to achieve set goals (Lee, 2005: 84-85). The significance of integrity of forces to the goal of saving lives and providing security in Mali should not be undermined.

However, considering that French troops had to work with AFISMA, the impact of force integrity on the wider goal of achieving stability is dampened. Thus, for the mission in Mali, force size mattered more.

<u>International Collaboration</u>

H: ***Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.***

CH: Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.

Paramount in the peace operation in Mali was France's direct involvement which reversed Islamist Extremists incursions as they were pushed back. This is reminiscent of the rapid end to the prolonged civil war in Sierra–Leone once Britain got directly involved (Fortna, 2008: 59-60, Sandi, interview 2014).

There was also the willingness of the international community to work with the Malian transition authorities (and vice versa), irrespective of the low level of legitimacy the regime enjoyed within and outside Mali (Théroux-Bénoni et al. 2012). International collaboration was certainly not lacking with the AU mission in Mali.

The donor conferences in Addis Ababa (January 2013) and Brussels three months later saw states cooperate under umbrella bodies such as the UN and EU, and on individual levels. Experts had warned that 'in the absence of rapid, firm and coherent decisions at regional, continental, and international levels … the political, security, economic and social situation in Mali will deteriorate' (International Crisis Group, 2012a). International cooperation was certainly needed to stem this decline and get Mali on the path to stability. One programme established toward this end was the EU Training Mission (EUTM) which focused on capacity building of the MDSF (Fiott et al, 2013: 1; Lindell and Mattson, 2014: 11).

France's intervention was also the start of international collaboration, and it was one which was forceful and direct. Several experts observed that, French and African troops had killed or captured significant numbers of fighters. The offensives pushed back the armed Islamists from the population centres and stabilised the situation in northern Mali (Lindell and Mattson, 2014: 31; Souare, interview 2014). Despite clashes of interest among AU members and within the EU, the operation in Mali and its rapid gains indicates how crucial external support still is to major peace support operations on the continent (Mickler, 2013).

<u>International Political Will</u>

H: ***The international community's utilisation of authority and resources provides assurance for conflict settlement.***

CH: International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.

The rapid deployment of peacekeepers and commitment to mission sustenance is seen as a measure for international political will. It has been acknowledged that the international community was slow to act in Mali, but when they did, it was done with zeal. AFISMA's massing of troops which had

dragged on for months prior to the sudden incursion of the rebels and France's sanctioned intervention, picked up pace in late January 2013 with over 3,000 troops deployed within two weeks. Another act depicting the commitment of the AU in reference to AFISMA was the deployment of civilian staff which is much more complex due to the varied expertise needed and tasks meant to be undertaken. As a UN official attests:

> To some degree the military seems easier to be up and running because it already exists. Whereas with the civilian component, you are talking about pulling experts from a variety of different fields, and a variety of different countries and areas, so those are not necessarily just ready to go....Unlike the military we can't just deploy them. These are civilians so you have to think about your safety regimes, where are you going to house them, how are you going to look after them, how are you going to transport them. So civilians, unlike the military that come as a group and unlike the police that come as a formed unit, civilians really do come as individual people (Mitchell, interview 2014).

Despite the complexities behind civilian deployments, the AU, in Mali, committed itself to working around the difficulties to get civilian personnel on ground in good time. Eustace Chiwombe (interview 2014), the AU's Senior Rostering Officer comments:

> We got 37 positions approved for AMISOM in July 2013. It is April 2014 and we do not have anybody on the ground.... It takes us (the AU) an average of six months to fill one position.... But when you look at Mali we have quite a number of positions that have already been approved and are on the ground.

This commitment concurred with the position of experts that the problem in Mali was more political than it was military (International Crisis Group, 2012b). The rapid deployment of civilian peacekeepers for AFISMA impacted on the role played by local initiative which was also pivotal in the success of the peace operation.

<u>Timing and Duration</u>

H: ***Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.***

CH: Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.

AFISMA was given a one year period to bring calm to Mali and wind up through handing over to the UN as is the expected norm for AU missions. This was however achieved in six months. AFISMA got its mandate in December 2012, and handed over to MINUSMA on 1 July 2013 (UNSC, 2012a; UN News Centre, 2013). The argument here is, working within a specific time frame provided focus for the task to be completed on time. Conversely, with or without this time limit, the direct foreign support received by the AU ensured reaching the goal in the quickest time possible. After all, France did not want to be bogged down in Mali (Aydin, 2010: 48; Pezard and Shurkin, 2013: 2; The Economist, 2013; Reuters, 2013c).

In as much as the operation was successful within the specified period, it can be argued setting a timeframe contributed to the mission's success. Also, with the Malian government and its people requesting assistance, France's need to protect its interests, and the international community ready to assist, the time picked for intervention was apt (Aydin, 2010: 51; Allison, 2014: 2).

Training for Expanded Roles

H: Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.

CH: ***Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.***

Scholars have argued whether Mali was deserving of a military action. It is argued that France's Operation Serval has opened an insecurity Pandora's Box resulting in the spread of terrorist groups across Africa's Sahel (Helly and Rocca, 2013: 4). In as much as the military option was taken, the engaged troops stuck mainly to their combat roles of repelling the Islamist extremists and protecting Mali's civilian population. The advance of the Islamists in Mali was effectively checked.

Just as well, part of the success of AFISMA, no matter how minute, was as a result of its civilian personnel who were on ground to handle related roles such as facilitating meetings, negotiations and reconstruction (Chiwombe, interview 2014). This gave the military the free hand to concentrate on the task of security that was rapidly achieved. The Mali scenario buttresses the

argument that specialisation rather than expanding roles, enhances peacekeeping's efficacy.

Local Participation

H: ***Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.***

CH: The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.

Local initiative has shown itself overtime to be a powerful tool in Mali's peace processes. In Mali's separatist war between June 1990 and March 1996, government sponsored initiatives at negotiated solutions with armed groups exacerbated rather than doused the conflict. This was because the war which had been waged through mobilising regional solidarity had slowly fragmented along inter-ethnic lines tearing apart inter-dependent communities (Lode, 2002: 56). Later talks created the political terms for peace, without the involvement of local guarantors of the settlement at the community level, implementation floundered. It took inter-community peacemaking efforts among groups of the north, those directly affected by the conflict, to open the path to national reconciliation. Inter-community relations achieved what political negotiations could not in conflict transformation and consolidation of the peace (Lode, 2002: 56).

In view of the belief that the chief risk to peace efforts and decentralisation as a long-term political solution is the exploitation of ethnic or tribal divisions, ultimately, the success of peace efforts in Mali has been to the extent to which heterogeneous communities of the interior have been willing to be integrated into mainstream policies (Armstrong, 2013: 3-4; Sears, 2013: 446-447; Lindell and Mattsson, 2014: 39-40). For the 2013 peace operation in Mali to possess some semblance of security in the short and long term, local inclusion in the peace process was vital. In the absence of international presence, durable security in the north had to be provided by the northerners themselves. In reference to this situation, Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin (2013: 2) contend that: 'only the northerners who have an unparalleled knowledge of the region and its inhabitants and who are uniquely placed to prevent the re-emergence of militancy, can provide, over the long term, the required degree of stability and security'. The understanding of

inter/intra communal relations and utilising them, would immensely assist the peace process (Sears, 2013: 445).

Women Participation in the Peace Process

H: ***Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.***

CH: Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process

From the role played by France in its exercise of Operation Serval, to the scramble for participation by the AU, and the handover from AFISMA to MINUSMA, the scenario seemed to provide little chance for women to be involved. The reason being, the bulk of the operation in Mali had more to do with war fighting as opposed to politicking and negotiations. As such, women participation would have been unlikely in accordance with Malian traditions that keep women far from conflict fields (UN Women, 2012). But this was not entirely the case.

A feature of Mali's turbulent history which has seen four major rebellions since independence in 1960 has been its relegation of women. This was exemplified during the presidential elections in 2007 in which Mali's first ever woman candidate received less than one percent of the votes cast (UN Women, 2013). This phenomenon is still prevalent in present day as 'Malian women represent only ten percent of parliament and are a mere eight percent of elected members to local government' (UN Women, 2013). It is apparent judging from this scenario that Mali has all along denied itself of the contribution of its women folk.

There have been attempts in recent time to plug this participation deficit. On 13 April 2012, amid the tension and insecurity posed by the 22 March military coup, women's groups, prominent among which was the Women's Association for Peace Initiatives organised a march in Bamako in support of secularism, the rights of women in the north, and in opposition to fundamentalism (UN Women, 2012). In the same year, the Women's Movement for Peace and Preservation of National Unity, launched a number of initiatives for assisting IDP's and sensitising the youth not to enrol in rebel movements (Johnson, 2013: 5). Such sensitisation was aimed at eradicating recruitment pools for

terrorist groups. Such strategies of influence and persuasion have been recommended as more effective than violence in the fight against terror (Cragin and Gerwehr, 2005: 13-14; Curtis, interview, 2014).

In May 2013, the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) launched an action plan which supported the Malian government increasing women's participation and representation in governmental and peace processes (UN Women, 2013). It will not be presumptuous to assume that such initiatives have contributed to building the peace in Mali. A reference point in this regard are the successful initiatives in conflict prevention and management in the Timbuktu region which have within their scheme, an increase in women's participation in peace processes (International Peace Institute, 2013: 7).

Women have continued to be limited both in number and in roles in peace processes, and researchers argue it is time to expand on their contributions (United States Institute for Peace, 2012: 3; Peacewomen, 2014).

Charismatic Field Leadership and Lead State

H: Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.

CH: ***A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.***

The success of France's intervention in Mali, taking notice also of the AU's initial lethargic response, supports the presence of lead states in peace operations. Though the AU still had a lot of work to do, France had done a good deal of the job on the ground. France's politicking to garner international support for the operation in Mali, and the role international cooperation played, places the eventual success more at the doorstep of lead state influence than on AFISMA's field commanders.

The French government stated that it responded swiftly (with the approval of the AU) to stop the extremists offensive which could create a terrorist state at the doorstep of France and Europe (BBC News Africa, 2013b). Justifying the claim of France is the conception within security circles that Africa's Sahel-Sahara is increasingly seen as the new frontier in global counter-terrorism operations as Africa's northwest enclave has witnessed an increase in

activities by jihadists groups. AQIM's incursion into northern Mali for example put it in control of a million square kilometres of territory bordering four other countries. Such events propelled the region into being a priority area for French counter-terrorism operations (Reeve and Pelter, 2014: 2-4).

Voices within the AU however are of the opinion that Operation Serval had been in the pipeline for months. These voices argue, that it is impossible to assemble a peacekeeping contingent in a matter of days as did the French in response to the plea of the Malian government (AU staff, interview 2014). A similar view contends that France's intervention was directed at protecting its investments in northern Mali and nothing more (Guzman, 2014: 4).

Whatever France's motives were, the French were pivotal to the operation in Mali achieving its objective. No doubt, the AU was committed to Mali in addressing the emergency situation generated by the terrorist threat, but at the time of the Malian government's request for assistance, the only recourse was the intervention of France. The AU has taken some stick for this and so much has been made out of France's lead role exposing the AU's conflict resolution inadequacies. But the involvement and lead role of France does not point to the incapability of the AU in addressing the Malian crisis.

As shown by experiences in Somalia and Burundi, the AU was willing yet there were delays in troop deployment, thereby prompting lead states to be called upon to fill the gap. Consequently there was South Africa filling the gap in Burundi and Uganda leading the way in Somalia. With the request made by Mali and France's readiness to play the role, the AU was only too willing to give the nod of approval (Helly and Rocca, 2013: 3; AU, 2013b: 1). It is interesting to note that a foreign nation had once been called upon to lead an AU operation. Before Uganda donned the gauntlet of leadership in Somalia, the AU had beckoned on Italy to play the lead state, but the Italians declined (Kambudze, interview 2014). So, if France had the wherewithal and the AU realised its indigenous forces still needed time to put its act together, then France's initiative with approval from the AU was appropriate. This in the long run served the mission well, for as an author notes about the crisis in Mali 'no one else seems to have the authority to act as interlocutor as the French' (Allison, 2014: 3).

Impartiality over Neutrality

H: ***Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.***

CH: Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.

Just like in Somalia, it would have been impossible in the face of terrorist threats for the peacekeeping forces in Mali to have been neutral in the execution of the mandate aimed at protecting citizens and preserving state sovereignty. Peacekeeper neutrality in such cases aid the perpetrators of violence to the detriment of civilians and constituted authority (Udombana, 2005: 1149). Neutrality in peacekeeping only applies when there is a peace to keep and the parties agree that negotiations remain key to resolving the crisis as was the case in Burundi (Levine, 2010: 3).

Large and ethnically diverse countries contain a higher number of peripheral and possibly marginalised groups. When these countries also possess remote and inaccessible terrain as well, then they are expected to favour secessionist insurgency (Buhaug, 2006: 691). This was very much Mali's case, which eventually spawned terrorism and the territorial acquisition by the Islamists fundamentalists which threatened the existence of the Malian state. Exercising neutrality in keeping the peace would have been impossible.

Secondly, invitation for intervention was made by the Malian government with the purpose of halting and repelling the terrorist incursion (The Africa Report, 2014). Subsequently, the mandate was to aid the Malian government in restoring stability to the country. As studies have shown, a regime confronting rebel forces that are equally as strong is six-ten times more likely to prevail with foreign combat support than without it (Sullivan and Karreth, 2015: 284). In order to preserve the sovereignty of the territory and ensure the security of Mali's citizens, it becomes understandable sacrificing neutrality for impartiality to the mandate. Addressing this issue, the UN peacekeeping doctrine states that 'the need for even handedness … should not become an excuse for inaction in the face of behaviour that clearly works against the peace process' (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2010: 33). This caveat in peace operations guidelines, allows for the use of force which aided the mission in Mali.

Domestic Political Elite

H: ***Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.***

CH: *Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.*

The international community was indeed slow to act over the situation in Mali (Ewi, 2012: 2). When it finally did, the international community was well aware of the importance of putting Malians at the helm of the decision making process. Despite the installation of civilian political authority the junta leaders were still the key players and effectively the de facto leaders of Mali (Francis, 2013). Just like in Somalia, the transition government in Mali was weak, lacked legitimacy, was without a parliament and was bereft of vibrant state institutions (International Crisis Group, 2012a; Bellamy, 2013: 4; The New York Times, 2013). Still, it provided a platform for the international community to work with in restoring stability to Mali. That the request for help was made by this civilian (transitional) administration made international military intervention possible and less controversial (Mickler, 2013).

The initial inability of Mali's political elite to field a united front was overcome by regional and international support which encouraged the forging of greater solidarity (International Peace Institute, 2013: 6; Helly and Rocca, 2013: 4). With international support, the Malian government developed a national response presenting a roadmap detailing plans on how to tackle the crisis. One of such plans was the return to constitutional rule through the July 2013 elections (Théroux-Bénoni et al. 2012).

Since a weak national government has been the bane of conflict in Mali, reinforcing local governance through devolving powers to grassroots communities is deemed an important response to strengthen state capacity (Moseley, 2013: 441; Annan, 2014: 10-11). Elected local leaders in areas in the North have devised initiatives for the prevention and management of conflict. Such initiatives include the promotion of women's participation, education and healthcare, and facilitating processes that ensure the emergence of young leaders perceived to be less corrupt, credible and closer to the grassroots (International Peace Institute, 2013: 7).

Developments under MINUSMA fall outside the scope of this study since these occurrences are under the watch of the UN. However certain developments depict how critical domestic political elite are to the success of peace operations. In May 2014, the peace process in Mali came under threat due to clashes between the army and rebels in the Kidal region. This resurgence of conflict was directly linked to the 'lack of progress in talks between northern groups and the government that stalled mostly because the main actors were reluctant to engage in meaningful dialogue' (ICG, 2014). Observers agree that it will take Mali's political elite to make the 2015 peace agreement work (Reuters, 2015; The Guardian, 2015).

Size of Mission Area

H: The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.

CH: ***A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.***

Mali is a landlocked country that covers a territory estimated to be 3.5 times the size of Germany and almost twice the US state of Texas (Lode, 2002: 56). Ranked as one of the fifteen poorest countries in the world, it is Africa's third largest producer of gold and one of the continent's largest producers of cotton (Thurston and Lebovich, 2013: 6-7, BBC News Africa, 2014).

If the size of the mission area were a major determinant behind the effectiveness of peace operations, then the mission in Mali would have been tedious due to its size, but it was not as the advance of French and AFISMA forces was rapid (Fig. 7.1 shows the large swathe of territory the French and AU forces had to reclaim from the Islamist insurgents). This contradicts the size thesis on peace operations.

Just as Mali's resources has made it a target for criminal gangs and terrorist groups, the need for France to protect its investments in northern Mali and the opportunity to expand have been adduced for its participation and rapid deployment in the crisis.

> France's military incursion with Western support was described as a "humanitarian intervention" which resulted in a race for Mali's natural resources. That was the plan after all. New drilling contracts have just been established after Mali's civil war was contained by the French military (Guzman, 2014: 4).

If the mineral wealth of a country plays a role in the duration and outcome of peace operations as inferred by the counter hypothesis, then this factor worked in favour of the Malian state.

Conclusion

Violent non-state actors within national borders are increasingly better armed, more mobile, more motivated, and at least as well networked internationally as the government forces opposing them (Bellamy, 2013: 5). The 2012 crisis in Mali was an apt representation of this disturbing phenomenon. This explains the quick defeat of Mali's western-trained national army by fast-moving, well equipped, and multinational Tuareg rebels and Islamist forces. It also buttresses the need for international assistance for affected states so they can adopt effective defence strategies which keep pace with the evolving capacity of these violent non-state actors (Bellamy, 2013: 5; Bøås and Torheim, 2013: 422; Massie and Morin, 2013: 480).

The Malian affair also reiterates a weakness of the AU in developing grand plans such as the ASF which it lacks the capacity to sustain. The experience provides a valuable lesson for the AU to stick with its current ad hoc solicitation for troops - a strategy more amenable to its capacity. Also manifest in this section is the danger of late deployment of intervention forces to conflict areas.

Of the factors under scrutiny, the operation in Mali foreground's the importance of a lead nation to the success of peacekeeping operations. Through Operation Serval, France played the role of lead state. The ensuing rapid success of the operation, while not putting African capacity in doubt, indicates that international collaboration still is a key part of the AU's peacekeeping machinery. This in no way substitutes the role, nor the need to harmonise national elite into sustaining the peace.

Bureaucrats within the AU and scholars of African conflict have tied France's involvement in Mali to protection of its interests. This points to the importance of natural wealth in defining peacekeeping outcomes. In the case of Mali and contrary to most expert views, this factor worked to the benefit of peacekeeping. The rapid gains of the French and the large expanse of territory covered, implies too that size, in this case was not an obstructing factor as is often cited in-part for the inadequacies of the peace operation in Darfur.

AFISMA was a peace enforcement mission wholly in support of the government of Mali. Like Somalia, it was about routing extremists, protecting sovereignty, stabilising the situation and securing lives in the process. In view of its mandate, it could not have been an operation hinged on neutrality. The support for the government, the cooperation among Mali's political elite and the willingness of local elders to plug gaps through activating local peace initiatives fostered the gains of Serval and AFISMA. It would have been almost impossible for the mission to have succeeded in stabilising Mali without these actors.

CHAPTER EIGHT

DARFUR (2004-2015)

The crisis in Sudan comprises the thorny relationship between north and south right from Sudan's independence in 1956 until the secession of the south in 2011; the sporadic tension on its borders with Chad and South Sudan since 2004; and the persistent conflict in Darfur which began in 2004 (Jooma, 2006; Boutellis, 2013). While the United Nations (UN) has run the peacekeeping operation in South Sudan since 2011, the AU has been twice involved in the peacekeeping mission in Darfur, first as the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (2004-2007) and later in its hybrid partnership with the UN - The United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (2007-2015).

The mission in Darfur has so far been among the least successful of all AU missions and provides the opportunity of applying this study's hypotheses in testing for failure in peacekeeping operations. In other words, if certain factors are believed to influence the efficacy of peacekeeping operations, the absence of these factors (as observed in Darfur) logically precipitates negative outcomes. The mission in Darfur provides a vivid example of the inefficiency of intervention when peacekeeping missions are placed at the mercy of state power.

Several features run unique to the peace operation in Darfur. It is the first hybrid mission planned between the AU and the UN with each having its sphere of responsibilities (Alghali, interview 2014). It depicts how devastatinlgy inefficient peace operations can be when the majority of effectiveness factors treated in this study are in deficit. Though the largest AU mission in terms of numbers, the contingent size was inadequate and this compounded its inability to provide security. Its lack of force integrity did not help either. The operation in Darfur operated a mandate beyond the capacity of the mission as the under-equipped contingent was provided with over 30 objectives. For the expanse of territory to be covered and the size of the contingent, the mission was underfunded and under-manned. While local participation was stifled, compounding issues and unique only to Darfur, women were employed to conspire against the peace. The Government of

Sudan as well as insurgent groups in Darfur were known to hinder peace operations efforts with impunity leading to high casualties among peacekeepers. With international political will also seriously lacking, the mission in Darfur was doomed to fail. While wide spread international collaboration and field leadership were among the few factors with positives in Darfur, they still had their setbacks. Among field commanders for example, cases of corruption were not rare.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first examines the Darfur crisis and the intervention of the AU and UN through peacekeeping. Within this section are sub-sections focusing on AMIS and UNAMID experiences. The second section deals with analysing the factors that have so far militated against the success of peacekeeping in Darfur.

The Crisis in Darfur and AU/UN Peacekeeping

The Crisis

Darfur lies in the west of Sudan where the pressure for land was worsened by environmental changes occasioning drought and desertification through the 1980s and 1990s (Ramuhala, 2011: 43). The struggle over diminishing resources led to clashes between pastoralists and farmers. As if these internal tensions were not enough, Darfur also suffered from the instability and conflicts that plagued its neighbours, particularly Chad and Libya. Porous borders affected Darfur during the Chadian wars of the 1980s, giving rise to militarisation in the region (Adar, 1998; Jooma, 2006; Sikainga, 2009).

The present crisis in Darfur started in February 2003, when two rebel groups emerged in Darfur to challenge the National Islamic Front (NIF) government. These were the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) which was covertly supported by Chad and whose members were dissatisfied with the Government of Sudan's (GoS) neglect and discrimination against Muslim African ethnic groups in Darfur (Boutellis, 2013: 132). Consecutive governments in Khartoum had long neglected the African ethnic groups in Darfur and did very little to prevent or curtail attacks by Arab militias against them (Ramuhala, 2011: 43). Frustrated from these attacks and the thought that their interests were not being represented in the ongoing

peace talks between Khartoum and the southern rebels, militia groups in Darfur, opted to force the attention of the GoS (Pavšič, 2013).

In February 2003, the SLA, then called the Darfur Liberation Front, demanded socio-economic development for the Darfur region, an end to tribal militias and a power-sharing government. These demands laid the foundation for SLA attacks throughout Darfur, damaging military equipment and looting fuel and supplies. In July 2003, the Khartoum government responded with heavy bombing by the air force and a large ground offensive comprising the Sudanese army and a proxy savage fighting force of Arab militias from western Sudan called the Janjaweed (armed horsemen) (Feinstein, 2007: 38; Lauria, 2009a: 2). The Janjaweed burned villages, killed and maimed men, ransacked food supplies and blocked international aid. They attacked refugee camps and launched what was affirmed a systematic campaign of raping African women (Sikainga, 2009).

In the first months of 2004 refugees continued to flee to Chad and the number of people made homeless in the fighting approached one million. In April, the Government agreed a ceasefire with the SLA and the JEM but still carried out occasional bombing raids and did not call a halt to the activities of the Janjaweed. This scenario aptly captures the genocide as social control thesis (Campbell, 2009). Though a peace deal was signed in March 2004, by late 2006, the Janjaweed had destroyed over 2,000 villages in Darfur (Patterson, 2008: 16).

Peacekeeping in Darfur

AMIS was set up as a compromise between the AU and the GoS in 2004 to monitor a ceasefire and also to prevent the conflict from spilling into neighbouring countries. Thus it was deployed on a chapter VI mission, but still lacked resources in funds and manpower right from the start (Ekengard, 2008: 14; Lauria, 2009a: 3). UNAMID on the other hand was established on a Chapter VII mandate and officially took over from AMIS in December 2007. Despite operating a more aggressive mandate and being better funded and manned, UNAMID fared no better than AMIS as both missions failed (Patterson, 2008: 18; Aboagye, 2009: 10). This shows that the success of

peacekeeping does not depend on mandate change or on increasing the number of boots on the ground (Williams, 2010a: 2; Vircoulon and Arnaud, 2014: 1).

AMIS

Compared to the AU's intervention in Burundi, the mission in Sudan was considered a litmus test. The AU Peace and Security Council authorised the deployment of AMIS specifically for the Darfur region (Birikorang, 2009:4). The AU got involved in Darfur in 2003 when it helped broker a cease-fire between the government of Sudan and rebel groups.

Worried over the influx of refugees into his country from the Darfur region, Chad's president Idriss Deby initiated the first foreign-led negotiations over Darfur which led to the signing of the Abeche Agreement on 3 September, 2003. Opening the door for continued comprehensive negotiations, the AU took over and its seven rounds of talks lasted until May 2005 with the final result being the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) (Lauria, 2009a: 3). The AU entered the negotiations with the goal of preventing the Darfur conflict from spreading into neighbouring countries as well as preventing it from stalling the ongoing peace process in South Sudan (Ekengard, 2008: 14).

The commencement of the AU's involvement in Sudan found it making some important breakthroughs. Its Chadian mediation team negotiated the N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) on 8 April 2004 (Pavšič, 2013). The signatories agreed to the cessation of hostilities, to create conditions allowing for the delivery of emergency relief, and to establish a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to monitor the Agreement along with a Joint Commission to which it would report. They also accepted an offer from the AU to monitor compliance. This led to the launch of the CFC with AMIS as its operational arm on 28 May 2004 (Human Rights Watch, 2006: 12). With Darfur the size of France, deploying fewer than one hundred military observers to monitor the agreement conveys how undermanned the force was right from the very start (Hanson, 2009). Worse still, with the ceasefire failing almost immediately, AMIS found itself monitoring the absence of a ceasefire, rather than its sustenance (UNSC, 2005: 2; Human Rights Watch, 2006: 14).

With the failure of the ceasefire, the AU, on 20 October 2004, proposed to increase the military component of AMIS to 2,341 alongside a police force of 815 officers. The mandate was also revised, concentrating on the security of Darfur's civilian population and on confidence building. It was expected that AMIS would reach its full strength by March 2005, but by mid-April, only 2,200 of the full 3,320 security personnel were in place (Human Rights Watch, 2006: 15-17)

As the AMIS mission unfolded, it became increasingly difficult to clearly define what type of mission it was. Expectations of AMIS far exceeded its mandate and capability. AMIS' initial mandate was for the peacekeepers to perform traditional peacekeeping functions, but the Darfur crisis proved the very opposite of what traditional missions were meant to handle (Birikorang, 2009: 5). In such a volatile situation and with its force heavily outnumbered, AMIS could not protect itself let alone protect civilians. With a troop strength of 2,000 as opposed to a 20,000 strong Janjaweed force, the odds of AMIS protecting civilians and disarming rebels was impossible (Pavšič, 2013).

With violence spiralling out of control, AMIS suffered casualties also. Between 2004 and 2007, 32 AMIS peacekeepers had been killed, 69 aid workers abducted, 37 relief convoys attacked, and 61 humanitarian vehicles hijacked (Patterson, 2008: 16). The worst of these occurred on 29 September 2007 when rebels attacked an AU base and killed ten soldiers, kidnapping 50 and seized tons of supplies including heavy weapons (Patterson, 2008: 18). It was apparent that there wasn't any well thought out idea about what was actually needed to handle the situation in Darfur (Ekengard, 2008: 18; Amuzu, interview 2014).

The specific order of providing a safe haven for the return of IDP's and refugees found AMIS personnel spread across protecting 34 refugee camps, with some containing as much as 120,000 people (Patterson, 2008: 17). Their Rules of Engagement (ROE) did not allow them to challenge rebel roadblocks. Compounding issues still for AMIS was the lack of clarity arising from the different views of the members of the AU about the mission's purposes and the caution not to diminish the sovereignty of the Sudanese Government (Holt and Berkman, 2006: 1-2; Pavšič, 2013: 2). Amid the

problems posed by its ambitious mandate and resource scarcity, AMIS had to cope with personnel corruption. It was noted by one of my respondents in Addis Ababa that poorly remunerated soldiers sold ammunition to rebels. In October 2006, two AU vehicles were intercepted while being illegally loaded on a plane for Nigeria, further damaging the reputation of AMIS as a protection force (Patterson, 2008: 17).

Despite AMIS' efforts, in 2005 the crisis was labelled "genocide" by Colin Powell then US Secretary of State (Aning and Danso, 2011: 171). In 2007 the Darfur conflict became even more complex. Arab tribes fought each other and rebel groups kept splintering. The IDP camps also became a source of insecurity as rebel factions brought arms into the camps and recruited fighters from among the IDP's (Ekengard, 2008: 16). AMIS, noted some authors, 'died a death of a thousand cuts in matters big and small' (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 178).

In June 2006 the UN and the AU agreed that a UN force should take over peacekeeping in Darfur. On 31 August, the UN called for a 20,000 strong force to deploy to Darfur by October to assist the AU (Patterson, 2008: 18). But in September 2006, the Sudanese government refused to accept this force, citing re-colonisation and infringement on its sovereignty (Patterson, 2008: 17; Lauria, 2009a: 4). This development prompted the AU to extend its mandate to July 2007 (Hanson, 2009). Facing severe material and manpower shortage, there was urgent need in Darfur to provide protection for the civilian population including two million people in 200 refugee camps across the region (Feinstein, 2007: 41).

China succeeded in pressuring Khartoum to accept the UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur after several diplomatic efforts to get Sudan's acquiescence failed (Feinstein, 2007: 41; Amnesty International, 2009). China had been a major economic player in Sudan, officially supporting the regime in Khartoum, providing weapons and insulating it from economic pressure and human rights accountability (Crisis Watch, 2007: 3; Aning and Lecoutre, 2008: 43-44). With China's new stance, Khartoum buckled and consented to a UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur (Hellstrom, 2009: 12-15; Wiharta, 2011). As the AU-UN hybrid mission will show, the acceptance of a peacekeeping

mission by domestic political elite is one thing, cooperating with peacekeepers is an entirely different issue.

AU-UN Hybrid Mission

UNAMID was formally established by the UN Security Council on 31 July 2007 through the adoption of resolution of 1769 (UNSC Doc. S/RES/1769, 2007: 3). This resolution authorised the establishment of UNAMID, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and for a period of twelve months. UNAMID, the first ever hybrid mission, formally took over from AMIS, becoming operational on 31 December 2007 and had the following at the core of its mandate:

- Protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers.

- Focus on the protection of civilians, the facilitation of full humanitarian access and the return of refugees and internally displace persons to their homes.

- Contribute to the restoration of security in Darfur, inter alia, through the implementation of the DPA.

- Contribute to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law and

- Monitor and report on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR)(Council on Foreign Relations, 31/07/2007; UNSC, 2007a: 13; Aboagye, 2009: 10).

In total however, UNAMID's mandate at inception comprised 33 functions which had been broken into four major areas (UNSC, 2007a: 13-15). UNAMID's mandate was a fusion of elements from the DPA, AMIS mandate, the UN Secretary General's Report of 28 July 2006 on Darfur which consists of twenty three mandated tasks, and relevant communiqués of the AU-PSC and the UNSC (UNSC, 2006: 11-13; UNSC, 2007a: 13). The mandate was extended on 31 July 2008 with the adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1828 for a further 12 months until 31 July 2009. With a targeted troop size of 26,000 the mission began with a force of roughly 9,400 most of whom re-hatted from AMIS. By November 2008 the total strength of UNAMID had reached 15,444. By mid 2011, UNAMID stood at 90 percent of its authorised strength making it one of the largest UN peacekeeping operations (http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10998).

With its mandate running up till 31 August 2014, its task was abridged to:

- Protection of Civilians
- Contributing to the Security of Humanitarian Assistance
- Monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements
- Assisting an inclusive political process
- Contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law (http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10998).

Despite possessing a greater number of armed personnel UNAMID was confronted with about the same hostility and problems as AMIS.

> Significantly, the warring factions had splintered to such an extent that as at October 2008, there were as many as twenty seven rebel groups.... Not only was the civilian population being attacked, but even the peacekeepers were under constant threat of attack from the factions.... These attacks against UNAMID peacekeepers have affected their ability to perform some of the functions of protecting civilians ... and ensuring durable peace, security and stability in Darfur (Birikorang, 2009: 10).

Amid these setbacks, UNAMID tried to live up to the euphoria that greeted its deployment and worked to make its presence visible in the IDP camps. It also continued AMIS initiatives such as the night and firewood patrols, and deployment to high tension areas. Inspite of these efforts, even UNAMID could not offer meaningful protection for the Darfuri population (Badescu and Bergholm, 2009: 300). Much of its failures were for very much the same reasons that AMIS was unable to make a difference. A report noted that the greatest hindrance to the success of UNAMID was its lack of troops which was about 9,000 at the time (The Guardian, 2009). With its 2015 force strength at 18,510 (16,200 military and 2,310 police), following reductions from 25,987 (19,555 military and 6,432 police) the fortunes of UNAMID has been no better (UNSC, 2013b: 4). A local daily captured the situation this way:

> Human displacement continues at a shocking rate with more than two million people newly displaced since UNAMID took up its mandate on 1 January 2008; displacement over the past two years has been especially great, exceeding 800,000 civilians; Humanitarian capacity and access have continued to contract; expulsions, withdrawals and severe harassment have continued ... what we are seeing in Darfur is an accelerating humanitarian

> disaster amidst sharply deteriorating human security and rapidly declining relief capacity (Sudan Tribune, 2014).

There was a resurgence of intense fighting from the start of 2013. Between 1 January and 25 May 2014, 321,929 persons were displaced in Darfur as fighting broke out involving the GoS, pro-government militia, rebel groups, and armed tribal militia. Observers claimed that the violence that once consumed Darfur had returned with a vengeance, resulting in civilian casualties and the large-scale flight of terrified men, women and children. (Reliefweb, 2014; Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2014a).

Though admitting difficulties, some UN officials insist on progress with the situation in Darfur, albeit slowly (UNSC, 2013b: 2; The New York Times, 2014; Sudan Tribune, 2014). While some bureaucrats and authors contend that UNAMIDs failings cannot be salvaged, others are of the view, that despite these failures, Darfur without UNAMID would be much worse off. Both these proponents however agree that the problem of Sudan cannot simply be solved by a peacekeeping mission (Lynch, 2014a: 4).

Evaluating AU/UN Peacekeeping in Darfur

Given that both AMIS (2004-2007) and UNAMID (2007-date) were operations conducted within the same environment, faced largely the same factors and produced similar results, providing separate analysis for AMIS and UNAMID will be a duplication of sorts. The violence under UNAMID's watch was just as bad as under AMIS' (Lynch, 2014c: 4). But for a few brief periods of optimism, authors of African conflict generally agree that both AMIS and UNAMID have been peacekeeping disasters (Gelot, 2012: 3). An author even referred to them as 'mission set up to fail' (Lynch, 2014a). Had the missions produced different outcomes, conducting separate analysis would have been appropriate. This evaluation therefore focuses more on UNAMID given that it has been for much longer, has been better equipped, and is more recent.

Though African troops are a major part of UNAMID, the AU is not involved in the day to day running of operations. The AU is rather involved in UNAMID more at policy level where joint meetings are held with UN officials to discuss political and peace strategies (Alghali, interview 2013).

Table 8.1 below assesses factors influencing peacekeeping's stability in Darfur.

Table 8.1(a) Factors Emanating from AU HQ/Bureaucracy

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY
Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.	*Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre.*
Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.	*Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly*
An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.	*Integrity of forces strengthens the bond within peacekeeping missions.*
Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.	***Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.***
The international community's utilisation of authority and resources provides assurance for conflict settlement.	*International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.*
Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.	*Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.*
Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.	***Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.***

Table 8.1(b) Factors Emanating from the Field/Ground Realities

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY
Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.	The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.
Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.	Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process.
Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.	A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.
Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.	Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.
Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.	Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.
The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.	A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.

Key: Bold = Valid Hypothesis; Normal = Invalid Hypothesis; Italics = Inconclusive

Mandate

H: ***Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.***

CH: Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre.

A major reason for the problems of peacekeeping in Darfur has been attributed to the failure of mandate. First, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which was negotiated with the GoS in February 2008 severely constrained the operations of the peacekeepers as too much control was ceded to the GoS (Badescu and Bergholm, 2009: 297; Mansaray, 2009: 37-38). Though the SOFA necessitated UNAMID's peacekeepers coming in on a Chapter VII mandate, it made the mission subservient to the GoS through dictates such as those contained in articles 47-49. A portion of this section reads:

> UNAMID shall cooperate at all times with the appropriate authorities of the Government …. UNAMID and the Government shall also assist each other in carrying out all necessary investigations into offences in respect of which either or both have an interest …. Each party shall notify the other of the disposition of any case in the outcome of which the other may have an interest (Agreement between the UN, AU and the GoS, 2008: 12).

Consequently, UNAMID could barely act without the knowledge or approval of the GoS. This certainly undermined the authority of UNAMID considering that the GoS had been complicit in fuelling the crisis (Mansary, 2009: 37; Williams, 2010c: 31). Accounts of UNAMID's operations portray the mission as "bullied" by GoS security forces and rebels alike, stymied by Western neglect, and left without the weapons necessary to fight in a region where more peacekeepers have been killed than in any other UN mission in the world (Lynch, 2014a: 2-3). UNAMID statistics show that from inception up until 31 July 2014, there has been 200 personnel fatalities - 137 troops, 42 police, 1 military observer, 3 international civilians, 16 local civilians and 1 other. Some scholars argue that missions with high casuality levels are often among the least successful (Dobbins et al 2005: 232).

In reference to the counter hypothesis, the conditions arising from the SOFA limited the initiative and freedom of action of the peacekeepers. This created a mismatch between the realities of the environment, the capabilities of the

mission and its mandated pre-disposition not to use force (Aboagye, 2009: 10 and 12).

Beyond the mandate being restrictive in its authorisation to use force, experts and observers considered it vague and thereby open to varied interpretations which hinder cohesion (Ferrante, interview 2014; Birikorang, 2009: 8). They contend that the language on civilian protection, for example, was ambiguous and without clear orders on how to interpret it, thereby making commanders hesitant to use force (International Crisis Group, 2005b: 18). Article 54(a) of UNAMID's mandate states: UNAMID is to 'contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians within its capability' (UNSC, 2007a: 13). The term imminent threat was interpreted differently across UNAMID's different national contingents. The mission in Darfur needed clearer mandates and operational goals (Pan: 2005, 02/12/2005).

Then again, being apportioned approximately 30 designated functions at the start was definitely too much for any peacekeeping mission let alone one that was understaffed. As a field operative warned in reference to the mission in Darfur, 'we ought to go back to the first principles and I think we were rather more ambitious than we ought to be' (Kilpatrick, interview 2013). Providing very ambitious mandates without the necessary capabilities to achieve leads to trouble (Guehenno, 2008: 4).

The mandate failure in Darfur dampened the propects for stability. This supports the hypothesis of precise mandates for success. The inability of the mandate deficit to prompt peacekeepers into manoeuvring, and the failure of the peace operation nullifies the counter hypothesis.

Funding

H: ***Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.***

CH: Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly.

Though better equipped than AMIS, UNAMID still lacked communications equipment, vehicles, airlift, logistics and intelligence capabilities. As such, it was unable to stop militia attacks (Patterson, 2008: 17). With the West ruling

out the idea of sending their forces, UNAMID was left largely manned by personnel from Troop Contributing Countries (TCC's) in Africa and Asia. These peacekeepers were poorly equipped, often unpaid and severely demobilised by lack of firepower and consequently could not effectively protect the citizens of Darfur (Melvern, 2006: 100; Feinstein, 2007: 43; Lynch, 2014b: 3). Comparing the scale of the mission and shortage of resourses, UNAMID was bound to fail.

Some of the setbacks of UNAMID include: the 250 poorly equipped police officers who used only four police cars which forced the mission to conduct fewer patrols and diminished its power to protect civilians and the peacekeepers: The lack of utility helicopters which meant that peacekeepers had to travel along dangerous and unfamiliar routes by road making them vulnerable to attacks and ambush by rebel groups: In 2008 over ninety vehicles were hijacked at gunpoint from the mission or NGOs in Darfur: Also in the same year, a platoon of peacekeepers was held hostage for more than five hours by one of the splintered rebel groups. These attacks against UNAMID peacekeepers affected their ability in ensuring durable peace, security and stability in Darfur (Birikorang, 2009: 10).

Every peacekeeping operation has three components to it – the military, police and civilian - and it takes funding to maintain them (Curtis, interview 2014; Dundun, interview 2014; Mitchell, interview 2014). The operation in Darfur, for its size and scope lacked funds and this directly affected its ability to provide security and protect civilians. Even the peacekeepers could not adequately protect themselves. This points to the importance of funding for stability.

Character of Contingent

H: An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.

CH: Integrity of forces strengthens the bond within peacekeeping missions.

Despite the significant increase from 464 to 3,320 soldiers and police via the resolution passed on 20 October 2004 (AUPSC, 2004a: 2), and a later increase to 7,500 by December 2005, AMIS still found itself overwhelmed.

(International Crisis Group, 2005b: 17; Patterson, 2008: 17). UNAMID's peak troop strength of 19,555 was just adequate for the protection of the estimated 2.7 million IDPs in camps (United Human Rights Council, 2014). However, in line with the recommended ratio of 1 soldier to 200 civilians of the host population (O'Hanlon, 2003: 32), UNAMID's peak troop strength was commensurate to a population of 3.9 million, which is roughly half of Darfur's 7.5 million. Logically, to have effectively monitored Darfur and keep the peace, a troop strength twice UNAMID's peak size would have been more appropriate. The argument has been proferred that what Darfur needs is a deployment upwards of 50,000 well trained and equipped troops (Holt and Berkman, 2006: 74). UNAMID's troop distribution is provided in table 8.3 below.

Though Darfur is in greater need of a political rather than a military solution, some form of deterrent such as a robust force is needed to create some stability until negotiations pull through (Guehenno, 2008: 4; Badescu and Bergholm, 2009: 293; Mansaray, 2009: 42). Despite its handicaps, in the few places where they were deployed, Darfur's peacekeepers had some success in keeping these areas secure, but in the large swathes of the region where there was no presence, the Janjaweed continued to terrorise and murder the local population (Pattison, 2008: 128). The argument here identifies with the view that even when under resourced, the presence of peacekeepers is essential for security (Sullivan and Karreth, 2014: 270; Vircouloun and Arnaud, 2014: 1). This implies that the size and strength of contingents to the overall success of the mission matters. UNAMID's short fall in troops (and materials as well) has not helped its operation in Darfur. Worse still is the recent pruning of its military personnel to 15,845 (UNSC, 2014a: 3). This unfortunately points to more difficult times ahead.

Beyond force numbers, yet linked to it, peacekeeping in Darfur had another problem. At its contingent peak of 19,555 troops, UNAMID had as much as 47 TCC's (www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml). As at 2015, UNAMID's troop strength of 15,784 was derived from 38 TCC's (see table below). With just four countries contributing over a thousand troops each, the majority contributed less than 200. This vast number of TCC's pre-empts a lack of force integrity and task cohesion arising from diverse modes

of operation, interests and mandate interpretation within UNAMID thereby stifling its efficiency (Hardt, 2010: 151).

Table 8.2 UNAMID Troop Distribution

No. of Troops	Troop Contributing Countries
3,300 – 3,000	Rwanda
3,000 – 2,700	
2,700 – 2,400	Ethiopia, Nigeria
1,200 - 900	Egypt
900 – 600	Burkina Faso, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania
600 – 300	Nepal, Pakistan
300 – 1	Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burundi, Cambodia, China, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Namibia, Palau, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Korea, Thailand, Togo, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

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The very diverse backgrounds has been a barrier among Darfur's police peacekeeping units (International Crisis Group, 2005b: 18; Pavšič, 2013: 3). While the high degree of illiteracy among troops worsened the language situation, culture and religious variance compounded issues (Feldman, 2008: 268-269). Widely diverse social and cultural units, military experts say, do not augur well for operational efficacy (Ellery, interview 2013). This issue is also aptly captured by Daniel Hampton (2014: 2) when he says, 'cohesion of the collective is a recurring constraint to sustainable peacekeeping capability'. This lack of cohesion was also evident in the willingness of UNAMID's African soldiers to be involved in combat, as opposed to their Asian counterparts who displayed an inertia toward same (Ellery, interview 2013, Amuzu, interview 2014; Fianya, interview 2014; Jowell, interview 2016). This adversely affected the combat readiness of UNAMID and made it more of a paper tiger (Kilpatrick, interview 2013). This deficit in integrity of forces caused by the varied mix of Darfur's peacekeepers certainly contributed to UNAMID's lack of effectiveness.

Barring the role of force integrity, it is apparent that shortage of troops contributed to the poor performance of UNAMID. This justifies the hypothesis that adequate troops improve the prospects for stability.

International Collaboration

H: Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.
CH: ***Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.***

For UNAMID, 47 TCC's ought to have been a boost for international cooperation. While such wide collaboration is laudable, what matters is not the number of countries participating, but the resolve to get the job done (Kilpatrick, interview 2013). This was lacking among UNAMID's participating countries and compounded the problems of the operation. If we were to work on the premise that the wider the collaboration the better for stability, then the achievements of UNAMID which had 47 TCC's and Police Contributing Countries (PCC's) should have been in sharp contrast to AMIS which had six.

James Ellery, a peacekeeping veteran and retired Brigadier of the British Army, asserts that integrity of forces is necessary for military efficiency. Consequently, the more contingents you have mixed in a peacekeeping force, the weaker it is due to difference in language, logistics, fighting method, interpretation of mandate and ROE's (Ellery, interview, 2013). This point partly explains UNAMID's troop challenges given its current 16,200 troops drawn from 38 countries.

Since international involvement in Darfur in 2004, international mediators found it difficult channelling the varied policies of interested states from the Western powers to China, and from Libya to Eritrea into a coherent workable strategy (Knopf, 2011: 2). The compromises reached in order to satisfy these different interests often gave rise to weak or spurious agreements such as the mandate under which UNAMID operated (UNSC, 2007a: 13; Terrie, 2009: 27). In the long run, these compromises borne out of satisfying widely varying interests proved detrimental to UNAMID achieving stability.

International Political Will

H: ***The international community's utilisation of authority and resources provides assurance for conflict settlement.***

CH: International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.

Political will toward addressing the issue in Darfur has been wanting (Feinstein, 2007: 43; Pattison, 2008: 128). Already I have mentioned how the varied political interest of the mediating external actors contributed toward the ineffectiveness of the peace operations in Darfur through policies which were heavy on compromises and subsequently rendered weak (Konpf, 2011: 2). The DPA which was accepted by the international community as a landmark in the Darfur peace process, but which carried no penalty for ceasefire violations, tells how negatively flexible negotiators were to accept any sort of agreement (Birikorang, 2009: 6). Drawing on the doctrine of Thomas Hobbes (1651, ed. by Tuck, 1991: 17), 'covenants without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all'. This explains why, despite the myriad of agreements and documents signed, the situation in Darfur seldom improved.

Not helping matters too were the series of events in South Sudan. Despite being instrumental in the creation of UNAMID, the US along with other major powers focused most of their diplomatic firepower on South Sudan's independence drive and largely abandoned efforts to enforce the raft of UN sanctions they had devised to compel Sudan to stop abusing civilians in Darfur (Seymour, 2014: 578-579). Soon as the US stepped back from Darfur, the sanctions started to fade from everyone's attention, throwing the leverage back to the GoS (Lynch, 2014a: 2). Outside the need to prevent the use of Sudan as a terrorist base by Islamic extremists, Sudan was considered a remote backwater and of no obvious strategic value to the US and its allies (Lynch, 2014b). With little or nothing at stake in Darfur, the international community was hardly committed enough (Franke and Gänzle, 2012: 96).

Ironically within Africa, taking cognizance of the dictates of the Constitutive Act on the right to intervene to stop human rights abuses, the AU has not done much in calling Khartoum to order either. Rather, it has opted for solidarity with Bashir despite his complicity in the crisis (Tieku, 2009: 2-3). Also, with Khartoum having strong government structures and a large army, the AU in view of its own capabilities, was not keen to be on a collision course.

In all, weak international political will contributed immensely in hindering both AMIS and UNAMID from stabilising the situation in Darfur.

Timing and Duration

H: ***Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.***

CH: Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.

During the life of the peace operation in Darfur, several peace agreements were signed, most of which specified deadlines for the end of the conflict or for cease-fires to take effect. These agreements were rapidly flouted since they either were not deemed comprehensive enough in addressing the problem, the conflict parties were unwilling to negotiate, or the deadlines were unrealistic (Nathan, 2006: 4-6). This little example shows that in conflicts where the interveners lack the wherewithal to impose its authority, time frames do not matter because a lot of what happens on the ground is determined by the disposition of the factions.

While the previous mandate of UNAMID ended on 30 June 2015, the current mandate extends to 30 June 2016 (UNSC, 2014a: 4; UNSC, 2015: 4). Often, mission duration is given along with a revision of mandate and change in force strength. This strategy has not changed the ill fortune of peacekeeping in Darfur for the thirteen years it has been in operation. If there is a lesson to be learnt here, it is that mission duration or the period of entry into a conflict does not make much of a difference if it is not backed by concrete political strategies (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009: 18; Williams, 2010a: 2; Amuzu, interview 2014).

There is the view that stemming human casualities shoud be the foremost determinant for choosing when to get involved in peace operations (Onemola, interview 2016). In line with this, the argument has been made that the international community should have been involved in the Darfur crisis earlier (Amnesty International, 2004: 4-5). No doubt, intervention was needed to stem the rising human catastrophe, but it would have been difficult for a peace operation to make a difference. Rtd. General Martin-Luther Agwai (interview, 2016) notes that the success of any peacekeeping mission depends on the agreement of all factions to support the peace. Concrete negotiations aimed at resolving crisis ought to precede the deployment of

peacekeepers (Williams, 2010a: 3). This component was missing in Darfur. Rtd. Colonel Michael Amuzu (interview, 2014) and Peter Okuonghae (interview 2014) note too that peace operations are conducted to assist governments that are about to fail in maintaining stability. The GoS was not in this situation and was opposed to a mission on its territory. Expectedly, it made things difficult for the peacekeepers. Agwai, Amuzu and Okuonghae agree that the peace operation in Darfur should not have deployed until all factions had consented to the peace. The timing was wrong.

With entry into Darfur ill-timed and the prevailing dynamics on the ground, duration has mattered little in helping peacekeepers focus to achieve stability.

Training for Expanded Roles

H: Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.

CH: ***Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.***

From the accounts proffered of peacekeepers in Darfur, it is apparent they took on roles beyond the provision of security. This did not help meeting mission objective. Supporting this argument, Abdelbagi Jibril (2010: 24) avers:

> UNAMID mandate should be focused on the protection of IDP's and war-affected communities as the most urgent need…. All other important tasks that UNAMID is currently required to undertake should be entrusted to other specialised bodies. These tasks include the support to economic development and reconstruction projects, monitoring and reporting … and above all the implementation of the practically non-existent peace agreements and the ceasefire arrangements including the DPA.

Already overwhelmed in keeping the peace, these additional tasks stretch UNAMID far beyond its limit. The concept of soldiers functioning in an expanded capacity may have worked in Burundi, but this has been detrimental to the operations in Darfur due to the lack of local domestic support and size of the mission area. This tells the uniqueness in planning for missions and the need to adapt to ground situations. It also gives more weight to the warning of military field experts on the need for caution in the responsibilities given troops by asking them to do more than they are trained for (Kilpatrick, interview 2013).

From accounts provided, peacekeepers in Darfur recorded successes when they stuck to their tasks of protecting citizens. This study already made reference to their ingenous and successful strategy of escorting Darfur women on their transactional chores. Though insufficient in numbers, the argument can be made that had the mandate demanded peacekeepers to adhere to their areas of specialisation, the mission would have been more effective.

Local Participation

H: ***Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.***

CH: The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.

It can be argued that one major reason why the conflict in Darfur still persists almost twelve years after it begun is the inability of local initiative to take root. The fact that the fighting has spread beyond the GoS and rebel groups, to include tribal militias against each other, paints a grim picture of how volatile the environment is. That hostilities are wide spread places constraints on local participation which thrives under a fairly secure environment and consolidates on the gains made by peacekeepers. The volatility of the region is attested to by a UNSC report which stated that an estimated 359,000 people were displaced between January and August 2014 (UNSC, 2014a: 2). Drawing from this report, it is not surprising that the Darfuris have since lost faith in UNAMID which ought to be the bridge in the peace process (Knopf, 2011: 2-3). Mustafa Abusharaf (2010: 78) asserts that in societies without the most basic structure of democracy and observance of human rights, violent acts have horrible implications. This provides too little room for any meaningful local initiative to manoeuvre for peace and make a difference in the process.

Despite this, a few local NGO's operate still in Darfur, but their survival has been dependent on foreign aid. The GoS has so constrained spaces for participation to the extent where such support is perceived as a threat to its sovereignty and the meddlesomeness of external forces in its affairs. One such incident was in 2012 when the GoS had planned taking action against fifteen local NGO's for being linked to funding from the US (Sudan Tribune, 2012). It is really difficult to think of local initiative in Darfur without

dependence on some foreign agency. This howeer raises the issue of how much of this local initiative is really local.

To fill this vacuum, there was the move of bringing a wide group of Darfurian stakeholders into consultation for launching the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) in 2008. The aim was to provide a forum accommodating all Darfurians into pushing a peace agenda. Unfortunately, this initiative has stalled (De Waal, 2014: 2). Currently there exists an informal process of consultation among Dafurian and Arab leaders which aims to complement peace processes. This endeavour met the approval of the AU (De Waal, 2014: 2). How far they can go, or what impact they will have is yet to be seen as violence persists.

A peace operation is not to substitute these political processes, but to support it (Guehenno, 2008: 4). In view of the role of local initiative to peace processes, this factor's deficit aided the inability of peacekeepers to create stability in Darfur.

Women Participation in the Peace Process

H: ***Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.***

CH: Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process.

Scholars who have written on Darfur's society assert that it is one of male dominance and female subordination (Kim, Torbay and Lawry, 2007; Zahariadakis, 2007. This has not helped the peace process. In Darfur, women are traditionally subservient to their husbands and the contribution of the women folk to peace is often done at family levels. The analysis in this section therefore is about the failure of peace in Darfur through the exclusion of women.

In most regions in Darfur, men make all the political and economic decisions. The Darfur woman is secluded at home and economically dependent on her husband and many aspects of her life are controlled by him (Zahariadakis, 2007: 1). So subservient are Darfur women, a study conducted on health and social attitudes in IDP camps revealed that 60 percent of women would

compulsorily seek the consent of a family member (likely the husband) before accessing a service as basic as health care. An additional seven percent noted that they would regularly, but not compulsory do same (Kim, Torbay and Lawry, 2007: 358). It is almost impossible under such stifling conditions for women to contribute to peace initiatives which are often done on public or social platforms. This explains why women have largely been excluded from the peace process, despite making up the majority of IDP's (Women for women International, 2006: 11; Kim, Torbay and Lawry, 2007: 358).

Aside the reasons proffered above, low literacy levels also severely limit women's access to open spaces to contribute to the peace process. Historically, Sudan has one of the lowest net school enrolment for girls in the world with female literacy varying from 24 percent in Western Darfur to 68 percent in Khartoum (UNICEF, 2004: 6; Mornochio, 2013: 4). Since education is one of the strongest predictors of status and the ability to mobilise resources, Darfur women have stood deprived of adequately making their voices heard. Even when women do, or attempt to initiate development programmes, they have their husband's disapproval to contend with (Women for Women International, 2006: 15).

Authors contend that certain factors foster women's participation in peace initiatives. These are: Recognition throughout society that women play a critical role in economic and political development; an active organised local women's NGO community that bridges the divide between the grassroots and the leadership; a commitment from the leadership at the highest levels to the full inclusion of women in civil society and government (Women to Women International, 2006: 15-16). In reference to the first and third, awareness in Darfur has not reached that level. As such, commitment to women's inclusion is low. It took the pressures of the April 2005 Oslo Gender Conference (OGC) to compel negotiating parties to admit women and women's organisations into the institutionalised process of implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) same year. (Women for women International, 2006: 11; Ogunsayna, 2007: 20). For the second factor, the social and political space for it to happen has not really been created.

Due to this lack of space, Darfur women seem confined to initiatives only at the family level. As opined by a Dafurian government official, 'women have formed their own societies to participate and contribute to wedding ceremonies which is an integral part of the Darfur communities' (Sudan Vision, 2014). But this has not helped the abating of conflict or bolstered peace initiatives.

Ironically, while the space for women contributing to peace is curtailed, ample space seems provided for those who glorify war. 'All Darfur is noted for its war singers "hakamas". They are princesses among people' (Sudan Vision, 2014). These are female traditional singers whose function is to praise male fighters by singing and whipping up strong emotions (Amnesty International, 2004). They stir up racial hatred against black men, women and children (The Guardian, 2004). As an observer noted, 'you cannot underestimate the importance of the hakamas ... the men cannot refuse to fight if the women tell them to' (The Independent, 2008). If in being stifled in their bid to commit to peace, women groups organise themselves into encouraging violence, then Darfur is left little hope if any for peace.

Acknowledging this danger, the hakamas singers in recent time are being prompted to devote themselves towards peace as the songs some of them now sing are given to bridging the ethnic divide (The Independent, 2008). Those who fathom and appreciate the value these women can bring to peace initiatives have sought ways of encouraging them. They believe that engaging women in rebuilding a nation's political and social structures is the most effective avenue toward creating lasting social change and stability. Having been known in the past to command audiences of up to 2,000 men, it is hoped that the hakamas singers could command this same influence under this new dispensation.

The constrained spaces for women, the role of groups such as the hakamas singers, and the sustenance of violence in Darfur, all signify the value of local women to peacekeeping achieving stability.

Charismatic Field Leadership and Lead State

H: ***Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.***

CH: A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.

In Sudan there was no lead state and it is debateable if the mission would have fared better having one. What was evident however was the role of military field commanders and this made a difference, when they led well or lacked in their responsibilities.

Bracing up to their lack of resources in men and materials and unable to cover large swathes of territory, between 2005 and 2006, AMIS commanders ordered deployments to prevent attacks on villages. They successfully carried out ad hoc protection measures such as accompanying women on their chores of water and firewood fetching and on market days from Janjaweed attacks (Patterson, 2008: 17; Badescu and Bergholm, 2009: 298).

The high casualty list recorded by AMIS and UNAMID is proof of the courage of troops deployed (Jibril, 2010: 11). A humanitarian worker notes:

> So very often you have the troops going into really busy and really dangerous areas. They don't have clear cut instructions and guidance. The typical situation is that somewhere out there, someone is attacking you, but you cannot respond unless you call the HQ and ask them if you can respond? But of course, when you are under fire, you don't have time to do that. You have to protect yourself. And if you respond to fire, you know that in a few minutes you are going to be in all main newspapers (Ferrante, interview 2014).

Under such circumstances, it really becomes difficult questioning the fighting morale of troops with their mandate exposing them further to such danger.

The corruption among some troop commanders did set the operation back and furthered the lack of resolve within the rank and file in their areas of operation. Pilfering of scarce equipment was not uncommon just as the allegations of dealing in ammunitions with rebels (Patterson, 2008: 17; Curtis, interview 2014). Such actions further incapacitated the operation through depleting stock while replenishing that of the spoilers. The lack of resolve among commanders also reflected in their unwillingness to deploy their troops. Stephen Kilpatrick states of his time as a peacekeeper trainer in

Darfur: 'My experience in Darfur and in South Sudan is that on occasions, troops have rather been reluctant to get out on the ground to be in a position to protect civilians. I think that is one of the biggest frustrations about the whole thing' (Kilpatrick, interview 2013). Peacekeepers in Darfur have been widely accused of passivity in the face of atrocities committed against civilians (Lynch, 2014c: 1-4).

These accounts show that when field leadership is poor, it contributes significantly to a mission's ineptude. Considering the shortage of peacekeeping troops in the area, one field commander's inability to lead well would likely have far reaching implications for the provision of security and stability in the designated area. When such officers are more than one, the mission is bound to suffer serious credibility issues and stability gets further adrift.

Impartiality over Neutrality

H: ***Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.***

CH: Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.

Despite AMIS deploying on a Chapter VI mandate and UNAMID on a Chapter VII, the underlying principles for both remained host consent, neutrality and minimal force. These principles were the driving force behind the inability of these missions to perform (Birikorang, 2009: 6). With all groups, government and rebels alike being spoilers with little or no commitment of bringing the conflict to an end, Darfur's peacekeepers have had to stay both impartial and neutral.

With a government that has been privy to the genocide within its borders, solidarity intervention on the part of the peacekeepers was next to impossible. On the other hand, if the intention to intervene had been to back the rebels against the injustice of the GoS, a major issue would have been the lack of a credible faction to work with (Knopf, 2011: 1-2). Then again the insurgents have been guilty of perpetrating human suffering just as well. Had the AU and the UN resorted to peace enforcement, experts are of the view that under the existing circumstances, such a decision may be construed for aggression on

the people of Sudan and may have led to a worsening of the crisis. (Guehenno, 2008: 4; Agwai, interview 2016). Consequently the need to be impartial to protecting lives and keeping the mission area secure was compromised by the need to stay neutral as demanded by the GoS.

The mission in Darfur thus supports the view that adopting neutrality in violent theatres constrains peacekeepers and makes stability difficult to achieve. This validates the hypothesis that sacrificing neutrality for impartiality works better for the provision of stability.

Domestic Political Elite

H: ***Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.***

CH: Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.

The lack of supportive domestic elite has been one of the biggest obstacles to the efforts of peacekeeping in Darfur: 'I think the thing that mars peacekeeping most of all on the ground is the power struggles within a country which often stops and puts barriers against peacekeeping being more successful' (Baly, interview 2013). True to this assertion, the GoS has not been supportive of the peacekeeping mission within its borders, and employs measures when possible to derail peace efforts (The Guardian, 2004; Birikorang, 2009: 6 and 11; Williams, 2010c: 31-32; De Waal, 2014: 2).

Peacekeeping veterans James Ellery (interview 2013), Michael Amuzu (interview, 2014) and Martin-Luther Agwai (interview 2016) averred that one major problem with Darfur was that Sudan was not on the verge of being a failed state and never requested any help. When the government is not a failure and it feels it is capable of handling its internal matter, they do not want any peacekeeping mission. That was the case in Sudan. Only when the sovereign state is completely broken down can an international organisation impose itself. This supports the assertion of Marrack Goulden (2002) that a peacekeeping mission should rightly be deployed at the invitation of an about to fail government. This largely explains the GoS' lack of support for UNAMID and the latter's difficulties in Darfur. Since government structures are still

vibrant, its policies that are at par with peacekeeping guidelines have created a lot of turbulence for the smooth operations of the mission.

This lack of support applies too to rebel movements (UNSC, 2014a: 3). They have been known to use talks to gain leverage and increase their popular standing by refusing to participate. Groups with little popularity, support or military strength use negotiations to gain legitimacy (Kuperman, 2008b: 219). All prohibited activities under article 24 of the DPA were flouted by belligerents and it became obvious that these agreements were signed by the factions in order to buy time to regroup and stockpile for the next round of fighting (Darfur Peace Agreement, 2006; Birikorang, 2009: 5). Khartoum on its part stays adept at manipulating the unwieldy mix of factions (Konpf, 2011; Centre on Law and Globalisation, 2014). Aid workers in Sudan have long since lamented that feeding civilians has been held hostage to feeding armed groups first. This is part of an established vicious cycle where, if the armed groups are not fed, they rob civilians. If the assistance is stopped, the children suffer the pangs most (Berkeley, 2001: 195-196).

When adversarial groups know their relative strengths in relation to peacekeeping missions, it enables them choose their tactics, non-permissive attitudes, withhold cooperation or be blatantly hostile towards such missions (Jett, 2001: 57; Aboagye, 2009: 4). The GoS and rebel leaders in Darfur have taken full advantage of the situation being well aware of the restrictive ROE's and poorly thought out mandate and made achieving stability virtually impossible.

Size of Mission Area

H: ***The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.***

CH: A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.

Darfur has a population of 7.5 million scattered over an area the size of France (UN, 2010: 4; Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2014a). For Amuzu (interview 2014), the importance of size to peace operations outcome is secondary to factors such as the presence of mineral resources. Some authors are of the view that mineral rich regions are often centres of

protracted conflicts due to the interests of multinationals and states for access to these resources (Pottier, 2003; Gegout, 2005; De Koning, 2011; Le Billon, 2012). With much of Sudan's oil wealth going to South Sudan at secession, there has been little incentive for the major powers and their agents to be involved in Darfur's conflict (Lynch, 2014a). This should have made the conflict less intense and quicker to resolve.

Though majority of experts assert that the size of a target area does not matter for the provision of stability in mission areas, most accounts that enumerate the difficulties of UNAMID often mention the size of Darfur (Pan, 2005: 3; Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2014a: 6). As Kilpatrick (interview 2013) notes, 'if you have only got as we did in Sudan, 7,000 troops in a huge country, then you are at a huge disadvantage. You are going to struggle from the outset'. In comparison, it took half that number to stabilise Burundi. Similarly, Mbaye (interview 2014) argues that what impacts an operation in relation to the size of mission territory is how the area is configured, which could be broken down into the level of development, access to areas, state of communications and the prevailing culture.

The large land size of Darfur has certainly contributed to UNAMID's struggles in providing security and keeping the area stable.

Conclusion

Darfur has been a nasty war, complicated and bloody which has morphed into a set of nasty and fluid local wars (De Waal, 2007: 7 and 11). It is therefore not surprising that the hybrid venture between the AU and the UN has not fared well. While a hybrid mission might help develop the capacity of regional organisations in handling conflict, one of its disadvantages is the difficulty in having a perfect mix from such coming together (Dundun, interview 2014). The difficulty of UNAMID has been, not because this mission is the first of its kind, nor because of the technicalities involved in such cooperation, but more because of the lack of host cooperation and the lack of international community's willingness to take on the GoS. These seem more important than anything else, which suggests that peacekeeping needs to be part of a viable peace process.

While some experts posit that the peace operation improved a grim security situation in Darfur, others remit that it failed outright (International Crisis Group, 2005b; Patterson, 2008: 17; Aboagye, 2009: 12). Presumably, the deduction of AMIS/UNAMID making an impact is made on the sympathetic premise that in view of its limited human and material resources, whatever little it did achieve was commendable (International Crisis Group, 2005a; Pattisson, 2008: 128). Irrespective of these conclusions, it is obvious that the mission was seriously impaired by its mandate, resources, leadership and piecemeal cooperation of the GoS.

Peacekeeping failed in Darfur because respect for state sovereignty was placed over respect for life. While UNAMID enjoys wide spread international collaboration, Sudan's resilience to international mediation implies a successful standoff to international liberal norms of which international peace operations are harbingers (Melvern, 2006: 95). The standoff by the GoS has prevented the provision of corridors and spaces through which local participation could facilitate peace processes. Consequently, the peace operation in Darfur has been denied the support of the local content it so badly needs to make the area stable. With international political will, local elite cooperation and local people participation in deficit, the conflict in Darfur has gone unabated. The loss of troops suffered serves as a stark reminder that peacekeepers should not be deployed to active war zones unless they are part of a viable political process for managing or resolving the conflict (Williams, 2010a: 3).

To turn the fortunes of UNAMID around, international political will has to be robust to effect compliance of the GoS. This will facilitate security and the spaces needed for local participation. When Dafurians see the peace as theirs to nurture, then the AU/UN mission will succeed in its objective of halting the conflict and making Darfur stable.

CHAPTER NINE

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (2013-2014)

For decades the Central African Republic has been troubled by military coups, rebellions, war and the looting of assets, leading to deep economic crisis in the country (Ghura and Mercereau, 2004: 3). None of these were as destructive as the conflict experienced from 2012-2014. Though recent events triggered this unrest, the seeds were sown over a long period given that poverty is linked to violence and CAR has been one of Africa's poorest (Atwood, 2003: 159-161: Østby, 2008: 143-144). The AU intervention in CAR was brief and scholars differ on its impact on the crisis in CAR. If deemed to have had a positive impact, there are reasons for it being so adjudged. Experts such as Alexis Arieff (2014: 3) and Mouhamadou Kane (2014: 316) refer to the number of lives saved. If it was deemed to have failed, experts such as Thierry Vircoulon and Charlotte Arnaud (2014: 1), and Mark Yarnell (2014: 4) base their analysis on the provision of security and the level of instability.

The analyses in this chapter show AU peacekeeping in CAR was dismal. With its troops inadequate to secure the peace, certain components of the peacekeeping contingent compounded issues still by tacitly aligning to factions involved in the conflict. This discredited the mission's image and stance of impartiality to the mandate. Also, most of the factors treated in this study were either in deficit or inappropriate for the situation on the ground. The mandate was tailored and had the protection of citizens as its top priority in view of the mass killings that were taking place. It was however inappropriate because these citizens were very much part of the militia and were themselves the perpetrators of the atrocities.

Overall, with the shortfall of the traditional factors and those proposed in this study, it was impossible for the AU's peace operation in CAR to be effective and foster stability in any form.

The first section of this chapter takes a brief look at the crisis in CAR, what instigated it and AU intervention. The second section involves the hypotheses evaluation.

The Crisis in CAR and AU Peacekeeping

The Crisis

Much of CAR's history has been replete with violent power transitions in a government that has little control outside the capital Bangui, leaving warlords and mercenaries to roam and use the rural areas for their operations. (Hanson, 2007b: 2-3; Ingerstad, 2012: 16). This has necessitated international interventions either orchestrated by the UN, the EU, France or Central Africa regional institutions from 1997 till date to create some semblance of stability. Reeve (2013: 1) argues that no country has experienced more military peace support interventions than CAR in the last two decades, yet none has been successful in restoring peace and security.

A survey among 1,879 respondents aimed at identifying the root causes of conflicts in CAR, had 61 percent attribute it to elite power tussles, 33 percent to poverty and 22 percent to ethnic divisions (Vinck and Pham 2010: 20). Meyer, (2009: 12-13) notes that 'the rise of instability since the end of the 1990s … was primarily motivated by general discontent over the worsened socio-economic situation'. From 1999 onward, the struggle for power between former presidents Ange-Félix Patasse and François Bozizé (the former's one time chief of staff), worsened an already tense security situation. When they were not directly involved, their loyal associates (local armed groups and foreign mercenaries) often were (Ingerstad, 2014a: 25). This power tussle made the state spiral into a series of conflicts which rendered thousands homeless and of which the north east of the country was worst hit. In 2008 there were signs of progress as the major rebel groups (loyal to Patasse) namely the Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD) and the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) signed a peace agreement with the Bozizé government. The context of this dialogue was to disarm and demobilise the rebels in return for jobs and money (Vinck and Pham, 2010: 6-8) and to run an inclusive government (International Crisis Group, 2013c: 1). Failure of the Bozizé government to keep with the terms of the agreement led to the birth of Séléka, a loose and fragile coalition under the leadership of Michel Am-Nondokro Djotodia in 2012 (Reuters, 2013d). The neglect of the rural areas especially in the north where the lack of opportunities was rife prompted many into joining rebel groups which they

viewed as a job opportunity (Ingerstad, 2014b: 1). The hatred this elicited for Bozizé provided a temporary adhesive for society (Reuters, 2013e). So obvious was the spite that 'all government and diplomatic circles in Bangui agreed that his solitary exercise of power prompted all his allies to join forces against him' (International Crisis Group, 2013c: 2).

Two factors have been analysed as being predominant in perpetuating instability. These are past experiences of instability (as noted above) and bad neighbours (Cilliers and Sisk, 2013: 73). Chad, the DRC and Sudan have interfered in CAR's politics for decades, and in recent time fighters from these countries stream into the rebel groups in the CAR, further exacerbating the crisis (Reeve, 2013: 4; Dersso, 2014: 6; Ingerstad, 2014b: 1). Diamonds in the north-east are at the heart of this problem and the international community has wilfully contributed to it by turning a blind eye on the flimsiest of pretexts and patronising the products mined there (International Crisis Group, 2011b).

Despite his presidency being propped up by South African troops, François Bozizé was overthrown on 24 March 2013 by Djotodia, which plunged the country into a dangerous crisis (International Crisis Group, 2013c; Dersso, 2014: 6; The Africa Report, 2014: 3). The Séléka group which took over was itself split between bush guerrilla leaders and exiled politicians leaving Djotodia with incomplete control over a group prone to fragmentation (Reuters, 2013e; Crisis Watch, 2013). The AU's suspension of CAR and imposition of sanctions on Séléka's leaders did not provide any headway in solving the crisis which spun rapidly out of control (Crisis Watch, 2013: 1). Djotodia declared himself president on 25 March, and under his watch Séléka embarked on a quest of looting and violence which did not stop even when he officially dissolved the group in September 2013 (Human Rights Watch, 2013: 12; Crisis Watch, 2013: 2; Dersso, 2014: 8-9).

Séléka which means *coalition* in the Sango dialect, was a coalition of five rebel groups made up of angry and disaffected people, and not really an Islamic militia as it is widely conceived (International Crisis Group, 2013c: 6-7; Kane, 2014: 313). Though most of its members are Muslims from the north (which experienced some of the worst neglect of CAR's government), but it has

within its rank and file, Christians as well as mercenaries from Chad and Sudan (The Star, 2014: 2). Not really answerable to central authority, the Séléka rebels 'moved from town to town, pillaging, raping and setting fire to entire villages ... they showed no mercy ... in the chaos and slaughter that spilled through the targeted towns, no one was spared ... being Christian or Muslim did not matter' (The Star, 2014: 1-2). With Christians making up eighty percent of the population, such arbitrary violence was bound to find them much worse hit, and this did not sit well with them. Some observers however aver that Christians were deliberately targeted while Muslims were spared. So despite the 100,000 Muslims who lived in Bangui having nothing to do with the Séléka, the Christian majority came to hate them too (Kane, 2014: 314; New Republic, 2014: 5).

The rise of the Anti-Balaka was to counter, or at least halt the terror unleashed by the Séléka, but even they were just as guilty in the senseless spread of violence (Dersso, 2014: 9-10; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2014: 2). Made up of village-level vigilante formations, forces loyal to Bozizé and criminal groups (indications of a loose command structure), the Anti-balaka also killed civilians in their numbers, raped, maimed and burned homes with more of their attacks targeting Muslim communities (Human Rights Watch, 2013: 12; Ingerstad, 2014b: 2). They also used child combatants and are currently the most feared group in Bangui (New Republic, 2014: 2-3). However, with Christians being worse hit by Séléka raids, the perception of Séléka as Muslim and Anti-Balaka as Christian has taken root. An Amnesty International (2013: 2-3) report notes:

> The majority of the country's population is Christian as was the former President Francois Bozizé. The head of the Séléka group, Djotodia, is a Muslim as are most of the Séléka forces. Many Christians seem to attribute responsibility for the Séléka's abuses to the Muslim minority as a whole; they seem to think that all Muslims are, at the very least, complicit in Séléka's abuses. And many Muslims too, seem willing to attribute anti-balaka abuses to Christians as a community.

The crisis in CAR is generally perceived as a religious crisis pitting Christians against Muslims. Its origin however, like in most African countries lies more in the socio-economic marginalisation of the people, especially those in the peripheral regions of the country (Mattelaer, 2008: 6). Apparently, the crisis

induced by poor governance of the Bozizé era, reached full bloom during the Djotodia administration for the very same reason, but this time, it polarised CAR. Writing of Bangui, a report notes:

> The Avenue de France marks a divide between two neighbourhoods, and the human remains belong to those who have, for one reason or another, strayed too far in the wrong direction.... North of the line is a neighbourhood inhabited almost exclusively by Christians now that its Muslim residents have either been killed or forced into exile. The Muslims who haven't fled the country live primarily just south of the Avenue de France. There, being a Christian is a condition nearly as fatal as being a Muslim is to the north ... and now nearly everyone is nursing a lethal grudge (New Republic, 2014).

Governance under Djotodia's rule was characterised by Séléka's brutality. Retaliation by the Anti-Balaka against Muslims aggravated economic collapse since majority of traders in CAR are Muslims (International Crisis Group, 2014).

Peacekeeping in CAR

The events presented in this section buttress the core of this study that the success of peace operations is practicably impossible when local elite cooperation is wanting, international political will is lacking and the local citizenry conspire against peace. The deficit of these factors along with others treated in this study made keeping the peace in CAR an almost impossible task. This section also depicts the futility of sending in peacekeepers into conflict zones without some political strategy at ending the conflict.

From the second half of 2013, it was obvious that the government of CAR had collapsed. The transitional government, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and Peace Consolidation Mission in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) could not prevent the descent into chaos especially in urban areas (International Crisis Group, 2013c: 12). On 18 July 2013, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) approved the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in CAR (MISCA) to stem the tide (European External Action Service, 2014b: 4). On 5 December 2013, the UN ordered the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission to CAR, which it did with MISCA taking over affairs from MICOPAX on 19 December 2013. The AU could rapidly

deploy in response to the UN's directive because the plan for a 3,600 strong AU intervention force which would absorb MICOPAX's troops had been decided upon five months earlier (Reuters, 2013b). This operation was to be supported by a French force of 2,000 troops, of which 400 had been stationed in CAR, in what was codenamed Operation Sangaris (Reuters, 2013a; BBC News Africa, 2014b).

Articles 28 and 46 of UNSC Resolution 2127 authorised the deployment of MISCA for a year on a Chapter VII mandate and subject to a possible UN take over based on a bi-annual review (UNSC, 2013a: 7 and 9; Vircoulon and Arnaud, 2014: 2). Construed as a peace enforcement mission from the start, its mandate consisted of five reference points which could be broken into three major assignments all of which centred around R2P tenets. These were: Providing security in protecting civilians and creating an environment conducive for humanitarian assistance; stabilising the country and restoring state authority; restructuring the security and defence sectors through disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR) programmes (UNSC, 2013a: 7).

By the end of January 2014, MISCA had 4,600 peacekeepers drawn from the MICOPAX troop contributing countries of Cameroun, Chad, Congo Brazzaville and Gabon, and an additional 850 troops each from Burundi and Rwanda, while Sangaris had 1,600 (The Guardian, 2014b; Ingerstad, 2014a: 50). From its deployment in December, the MISCA and Sangaris troops swung into operation, securing the capital and environs (The Africa Report, 2014). Though they quickly helped to prevent mass killings, security remained elusive in parts of Bangui, but more so in the countryside (The Nigerian Voice, 2014). By January 2014, less than a month after MISCA was deployed, CAR was in a full-fledged civil war (The Daily Star Lebanon, 2014: 7).

Pressured by the international community, Djotodia vacated the office of CAR's President on 10 January 2014. CAR's first female President, Catherine Samba-Panza was sworn in on 23 January, and being a woman, expectations were high both within and outside CAR on her ability to bridge the gulf (The Guardian, 2014b).

With Djotodia gone, the balance of power tilted in favour of the Anti-Balaka. Pressing the advantage of the Anti-Balaka further, French forces concentrated on disarming Séléka from the outset. Subsequently forced out of Bangui, the Séléka regrouped in CAR's north-east which they control, appointed a new leader and have created parallel security structures thereby accentuating the fears of CAR splitting in two (Arieff, 2014: 5). The exit of the Séléka from Bangui placed Muslims in the capital at the mercy of the Anti-Balaka. The protection provided for the Muslim minority population became a source of controversy.

> Neither the French nor the reinforced MISCA did enough to stop the Anti-Balaka, who filled the power vacuum created by the departure of Séléka .... Whether the Anti-Balaka is pursuing a deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing or collectively punishing the Muslim population for Séléka crimes, the result is the same: the disappearance of entire Muslim communities (Ingerstad, 2014a: 47-48).

On one hand, the French were accused by MISCA forces, especially the Rwandan contingent of being complicit in the face of crimes committed by the "Christian" Anti-Balaka (New Republic, 2014: 10). On the other hand, the Chadian contingent were accused of taking sides with Seleka rebels and being trigger happy against the Christian population. From the start of MISCA's operation Chadian troops facilitated the evacuation of tens of thousands of Muslims to Chad and the northeast of CAR (Arieff, 2014: 8). The latter could easily be interpreted as an implicit display of ties with Séléka. Then on March 2014, Chadian troops were accused of killing 24 (some reports say 30) "unarmed civilians" whom they claimed were Anti-Balaka militias that had attacked them (BBC News Africa, 2014b; Reuters, 2014b). The furor created by this incident led to the withdrawal of the 800 strong Chadian contingent from MISCA in April 2014.

Also in April 2014, breaking its rule of not deploying where there is no peace to keep, the UN through Resolution 2149 authorised the establishment of MINUSCA which took over from MISCA on 15 September 2014 (UNSC, 2014b: 7). This move was just as well since the government of Samba-Panza was unable to douse the turmoil which forced hundreds of thousands of Muslims out of the country. Allegations of nepotism in state appointments

which kept with the unproductive patterns of the past were levelled against her government (Azikiwe, 2014; Arieff, 2014).

Being caught up in an internecine conflict where the perpetrators were mostly civilians, and coupled with the distrust between MISCA and Sangaris troops, the overall impact of the operation was seriously hampered by practical impediments even though it saved thousands of lives (New Republic, 2014: 6; Azikiwe, 2014: 2). Insecurity pervaded CAR at the time of handing over to MINUSCA on 15 September 2014.

Evaluating AU Peacekeeping in CAR

Central to the analysis in this section are the factors of leadership, local participation and international collaboration especially the influence of bad neighbours. It reflects the non-workability of a peace operation when the local populace are given to violence, mission leadership fails, local political elites lack the will to steer the ship and regional dynamics are opposed to stability. In a nutshell, the AU mission in CAR preserved lives, but failed to provide security and stability.

At this point, drawing from the history presented above, the analysis in this chapter is provided with the aid of table 9.1 (a and b) below. The AU's operation in CAR was conducted as a stabilisation operation - a first step towards providing security. The evaluation below analyses the AU's inability in meeting this responsibility in CAR.

Table 9.1(a): Factors Emanating from AU HQ/Bureaucracy

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	**COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY**
Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.	Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre.
Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.	Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly
An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.	Integrity of forces strengthens the bond within peacekeeping missions.
Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.	***Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.***

The international community's utilisation of authority and resources provides assurance for conflict settlement.	*International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.*
Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.	*Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.*
Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.	Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.

Table 9.1(b) Stability Factors Emanating from Field/Ground Realities

HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY	COUNTER HYPOTHESES FOR STABILITY
Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.	The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.
Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.	Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process.
Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.	A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.
Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.	Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.
Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.	Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.
The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.	**A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.**

Key: Bold = Valid Hypothesis; Normal = Invalid Hypothesis; Italics = Inconclusive

Mandate

H: Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.

CH: Untailored mandates allow peacekeepers more room to manoeuvre.

The AU operation in CAR defies this study's hypothesis and counter hypothesis on mandate. In relation to the hypothesis, the mandate which was tailored to ground realities did little in improving security and failed in bringing stability. In relation to the counter hypothesis, there is no guarantee that an untailored mandate would have made a difference. In fact, quite a number of

contingents worked outside the mandate, but their actions made matters worse.

The five point mandate of MISCA was precise in its protection of civilians and in creating security for humanitarian efforts. Its terms of reference were very much in line with the concept of human security. While this precision to the rule aided the protection of civilians, it could not facilitate a positive outcome for the mission. This was because the civilians whom the mandates were meant to protect were the very ones committing the crimes. Arieff (2014: 3) notes; 'French and African forces are in nearly an impossible situation in terms of what to do, in very practical terms to be effective to prevent people from killing each other when they desperately want to kill each other'. This situation is reminiscent of the view that, due to the international community's commitment to prevent mass atrocities, local populations too often neglect means to help the peace (Mégret, 2009: 580).

Providing security against and disarming the Séléka was a less complex issue since it was made up of mercenaries and possessed a more military style orientation even if loosely structured (New Republic, 2014: 5). But for the Anti-Balaka made up of local vigilante groups, and who were allegedly part of the "Christian" civilian population and living within civilian camps, the situation was more complex and deeply problematic. For example, 'in the camp housing around 100,000 IDP's at the Bangui Airport and made up largely of Christians, youths roamed armed with machetes and clubs reinforced with nails' (New Republic, 2014: 13). Militia members melt into the population such that even if policing capacity were in existence, only limited impact could be expected (Arieff, 2014: 3; Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 04/01/2014: 4).

The likely alternative to evacuating the Muslim population would have been to protect them within CAR especially in Bangui. This would likely have resulted in high civilian casualties among the Christian Anti-Balaka who would have found the compulsion to attack irresistible. Such an outcome would have boomeranged on the integrity of the mission, placed the peacekeepers in bad light and ranked their actions as irresponsible. Experts largely agree that MISCA reduced the level of violence in parts of CAR, but struggled to protect

civilians and establish security (Arieff, 2014: 4; Yarnell, 2014: 4; International Rescue Committee, 2014: 1).

Right from the start of MISCA's operation, 'the risks of quagmire were high and prospects for a positive outcome dim' (US News, 2013:3). Though tailored to address the hazards on the ground, MISCA's mandate was unable to prevent the failure of the mission due to the conspiracy of the local people against peace. This shows that tailored mandates do not guarantee success. An untailored mandate however would have likely made matters worse.

Funding

H: ***Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.***

CH: Poor funding propels missions to get the job done quickly.

MISCA was far from self-sufficient despite international support received. From MISCA's date of authorisation on 5 December 2013, the UN had initiated plans for a trust fund to finance the mission. The US had pledged $40 million and the EU €125million ($156.25 million) through its African Peace Facility (Reuters, 2013a; European External Action Service, 2014a: 2). EU funding was used to establish Force Headquarters, Mission Headquarters, hire civilians and do all the things it took to establish an AU mission (Curtis, interview 2014). The EU also put boots on the ground, an exercise that reached full strength on June 15 2013 with 700 troops. For this operation, an additional €25.9 million ($32.38 million) was set aside which, though restricted to Bangui, was meant to support MISCA in providing security (European External Action Service, 2014b: 3; France Diplomatie, 2014). The US also provided 200 trucks and $100 million in logistics assistance to MISCA (Yarnell, 2014: 4).

MISCA's shortages were most obvious especially outside Bangui. In Kaga Bandoro for example, approximately 70 troops were stationed there with just a vehicle to work with up until the end of July 2014. There were severe constrains on patrols and the ability to engage community and armed groups in order to protect civilians (International Rescue Committee, 2014: 2). MISCA's forces lacked basic necessities which hampered motivation and the ability to work. This heightened the prospect for failure.

Character of Contingent

H: ***An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.***

CH: Integrity of forces strengthens the bond within peacekeeping missions.

O'Hanlon, (2003) and Dobbins (2007) argue that the more intense the conflict, the more adequate should be the number of troops meant to keep the peace. This was ignored in CAR. CAR is a republic with an estimated population of 4.6 million. Keeping the peace with 7,750 peacekeepers was quite an ambitious project because it boils down to a ratio of one peacekeeper to 593 civilians. Considering too that within the 4.6 million lies an estimated 600,000 IDP's, 1.7 million who faced starvation and 878,000 in need of immediate medical assistance, humanitarian access and protection, then 7,750 troops, while a seemingly impressive number, was inadequate for the task at hand (Vircoulon and Lesueur, 2014: 1; Yarnell, 2014: 4). This assertion is once again drawn from the recommended peacekeeper to citizen ratio of 1:200 (O'Hanlon, 2003: 32; Dobbins et al, 2005: 232).

Beyond contingent size, events surrounding MISCA also raised the salience of culture in troop mix (International Rescue Committee 2014: 2). James Ellery (interview 2013) advocates that, along with integrity of forces, cultural sensitivity among troops is a much needed recipe for efficacy. This implies that, the force's composition in terms of cultural beliefs and ethnic affiliations also matter especially in religiously and ethnically charged mission areas. This is so because intervening troops sometimes share in these constructed identities (Zirker et al, 2008: 316). Interviews with AU staff show the Union is not oblivious to this as language, cultural affinity, religion and even gender are taken into account when civilians are posted (Chiwombe, interview 2014). When it comes to providing troops where deployment is not on an individual basis as it is with civilians, but rather the drafting of contingents, it becomes a different matter (Mitchell, interview 2014). It becomes absurd to reject contingents, or turn down offers from TCC's on such socio-historical grounds, especially when the operation suffers from insufficient security personnel.

Events in CAR exemplified the polarisation and ethnic conflict thesis as certain contingents aligned with sections of CAR's population and rifts between peacekeeping contingents emerged (Forsberg's, 2008: 287-288; Security

Council Report, 2013a: 4). While French forces were accused by MISCA troops of siding with the *Christian* Anti-Balaka, MISCA's Chadian soldiers were accused of solidarity with the Séléka (New Republic, 2014: 6-10). In CAR, 'many Muslims trace their family origins to Chad and many CAR residents appear to associate the two identities, broadly referring to Muslims as Chadians' (Arieff, 2014: 8; Ingerstad, 2014a: 48). It was not long before the majority Christian bloc became suspicious of the Chadian contingent and a confrontation between both was inevitable. This led to the eventual withdrawal of the Chadian contingent from MISCA in April 2014 (Azikiwe, 2014: 2; New Republic, 2014: 6). The exit of the Chadians, while an attempt to save MISCA's reputation, increased the strain on its troops since it left mainly the Burundian and Rwandan contingents as the protectors of the Muslims against the Anti-Balaka (New Republic, 2014: 6). In view of socio-historical and political dynamics, MISCA's troop composition was deeply flawed.

Deficit in both troop size and force integrity impacted negatively on MISCA. It is difficult to ascertain which had a greater impact on MISCA's turbulent operation; its insufficient troop strength or the primordial affiliations of certain contingents? Recalling the contention of Alex Bellamy et al (2010: 2) that a correlation exists between size, troop composition and an operation's ability to save lives, it is evident the size and diversity of MISCA punctured its ability to create stability.

International Collaboration

H: Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.

CH: ***Limited international collaboration reduces the collision of national interests.***

For the most part of its history CAR has survived off the charity of the international community. It will not be wrong to say international collaboration via numerous interventions has sustained it up till present day (Reeve, 2013: 1).

Mark Yarnell (2014: 3-4) and Alexis Arieff (2014: 7-10) infer that international response to the crisis in CAR was late in coming, but it did come.

A series of contributions have been listed earlier in this chapter which will not be repeated here, but suffice to say, the US, the EU, the UN and France, alongside ECCAS member states contributed immensely to MISCA's operations (European External Action Service, 2014c: 3). Beyond sending troops, monies provided by the EU covered the cost of 'allowances, accommodation and feeding the troops deployed in the field (European External Action Service, 2014a: 2). Were this factor the major ingredient for success, arguably, MISCA would have succeeded.

Other issues plagued international collaboration over CAR. With a long history of animosity and fostering insurgencies in each other's territories, ECCAS was plagued by distrust among its members. This played a huge role in incapacitating MICOPAX and did same to MISCA (International Crisis Group, 2011a: 8). Also, in what might be termed international un-cooperation in CAR, the governments of Chad and Sudan had direct roles in supporting Séléka (Hanson, 2007a: 2; Ingerstad, 2014b: 2). Whatever political support the AU might have attempted to offer, was likely undermined by the interests and agenda of these States. This scenario buttresses the impact of neighbouring states on domestic conflict and how they also affect peace operations outcomes (Reeve, 2013: 4-5; Devon Curtis, interview 2014).

European cooperation was also not short of its own share of suspicion which mitigated action. France's clamour for the active participation of the EU and UN in the crisis, was viewed by many, not least the members of the EU, as an attempt to solidify its influence in the region using these international institutions as channels (Boutellis, 2013: 128; Arieff, 2014: 7). This view runs in tandem with the argument that while the yields of peacekeeping are sometimes reaped by the international community, other times, their yields are country specific (Bove and Elia, 2011: 701; Dijkstra, 2012: 456-457).

Despite enjoying international support, MISCA still did not succeed like previous interventions before it. With the wide array of support it received, clashes of interest among donor countries were inevitable and this undermined a lot of MISCA's efforts. While it is evident that wide international collaboration failed, it will be far fetched to assume that lesser international collaboration would have reversed the fortunes in CAR.

International Political Will

H: ***The international community's utilisation of authority and resources provides assurance for conflict settlement.***

CH: International political will deficit prompts local content to take responsibility for peace.

If international political will as measured by this study is the ability to robustly deploy irrespective of the cost, then in the case of CAR, this factor was missing.

The international community was reluctant to get deeply involved in CAR despite France's lobbying for it to do so. The perception of France's lobbying for intervention in CAR stemmed from its long history of interference in the country's politics, such as imposing presidents, to secure its national and private interests (Harshe, 1980: 173-174; May, 2003: 5-8). Though with less of such interests to protect in CAR in recent time, the region is still quite important to France in economic, strategic and military terms (Ingerstad, 2014a: 43). The pervasiveness of this line of thought contributed largely to the slow response of the EU and the UN in committing to the crisis in CAR despite France's pressures (Security Council Report, 2013a: 4). The distrust among members, the deployment of inadequate personnel and materials, and the pursuit of opposing interests by certain States, all indicate a serious fit in international political will.

With local people conspiring against the peace, local content as proposed by the counter hypothesis, could not compensate for the shortfall of international will. This deficit in international political will contributed immensely to the failure of MISCA achieving stability.

Timing and Duration

H: ***Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.***

CH: Leaving missions open ended prevents peacekeepers from being placed under undue stress.

The timing of intervention in CAR has generated a lot of controversy just as authors are at odds on the right time to intervene in conflict. Adopting the

hurting stalemate strategy in CAR would have led to the possible genocide against Muslims. To avoid such occurrences, the UN encourages regional organisations such as the AU to get involved in these conflicts earlier and create a situation conducive enough for the UN to step in (Oliver 2002: 99-101; Fortna and Howard, 2008: 292). This approach which was adopted in the deployment of MISCA helped in saving lives, but could not manage a stable environment.

As observed by the International Crisis Group (2013b), 'in the absence of an effective peacekeeping force, growing public exasperation led to increasingly frequent clashes'. Bearing in mind that MISCA took over control from MICOPAX which was on ground, Vircoulon and Arnaud (2014: 1) contend that:

> The impressive series of peacekeeping missions is an admission of failure. Ministering to the CAR for many years, the international community has been unable to arrest its fall into violence.... continuing its strategy of Russian dolls: each peacekeeping mission is absorbed bv a larger mission, as if the answer to the CAR crisis were reducible to a problem of force numbers.

An earlier transitioning from MICOPAX to MISCA would not have engendered stability since the dynamics of CAR's conflict goes beyond the realm of peace enforcement to address. As noted by some analysts, with the onset of the crisis, irrespective of when a peacekeeping mission had been deployed, the risks of a quagmire was high and a positive outcome dim (US News, 2013: 3).

All through the turbulence of the 90's and the start of the twenty first century, external interventions in CAR were subverted by local forces, forced into policy blunders that irked the masses into rebellion with the interveners conceived as imperialists. This state of affairs often constrained action of the international community as evidenced by the UN Mission in Central Africa (MINURCA) and the UN Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) (May, 2003: 6-9; Vircoulon and Lesueur, 2014: 1). With these experiences still fresh in the minds of the international community, it would have been a high risk gamble going into CAR any earlier. Despite the delayed entry of the international community, the fact that the peacekeepers were caught in the cross fire between groups and accused by the different factions of taking sides is indicative of fiercer opposition had they gone in earlier (New Republic, 2014: 10; The Daily Star Lebanon, 2014: 7).

The situation in CAR under MISCA's watch is a stark reminder that no matter how robust and determined a peacekeeping force, it cannot coerce into a (peace) process, people and movements who are not ready for that process. Brave and necessary as it might seem, such deployments run contrary to the warning that 'if you throw peacekeepers into the middle of a war "where the parties are not ready to negotiate" you are courting trouble' (Guehenno, 2008: 3-4). MISCA deployed into CAR at an inappropriate time resulting in its inability to facilitate peace. The effect of this hindsight made the setting of timeframes insignificant, and also made achieving stability difficult.

Training for Expanded Roles

H: Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.

CH: *Training peacekeepers for their specialised roles increases mission efficiency.*

One issue that plagued the mission in CAR was the controversial role played by troops which did not help in confidence building. The responsibility to protect and the human security discourse demand that irrespective of who is to be protected, the protecting group should carry out its duty as protector.

It is expected therefore that military training prepares troops to set aside biases in getting the job done. Arguing to the contrary, Daniel Zirker et al (2008: 314) note that ethnic affiliations and identities are synonymous with militaries in developing countries, which explains the misdemeanour of the Chadian contingent in colluding with Seleka (Amnesty International, 2014: 33-34). Chadians share lineage ties with majority of Muslims and minorities in northern CAR. The complicity of the French in attacks on Muslim civilians was seen as tacit support for the Christian Anti-Balaka (US News, 2013; Kane, 2014: 315). If this bias was occasioned by Séléka's culpability in French casualties (New Republic, 2014: 9), or because of religious differences, it illustrates that no matter how well trained armies come, it is difficult discarding stereotypes.

MISCA troops were consigned to their specialised role of providing security and failed at this task. On the expansion of roles, this is best surmised by the observation that 'in CAR, the intervening force cannot help but be concerned

solely with security matters narrowly defined' (US News, 2013: 2). There is nothing to indicate that they would have done better had they been trained and assigned to undertake expanded roles. There is every tendency their biases would have affected these functions too.

Local Participation

H: ***Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.***

CH: The less local participation there is, the less clan interests collide.

CAR's population is broken into six ethnic groups – the Baya, Banda, Sara, Mandjia, Mboum and M'baka. Christians make up approximately half the country's population with Muslim (15 percent), indigenous beliefs (24 percent) and other religions (11 percent) making up the rest (May, 2003: 1-2). Compared to countries like Nigeria with an estimated 250 ethnic groups, CAR cannot be classified as being widely ethnically diverse.

Peace authors have acknowledged the difficulty in promoting reconciliation in conflicts that are based on ethnic or religious schisms (Aall, 2000: 131: Fortna, 2004: 287). The utilisation of local content in such cases might even aggravate situations further as situations are hardly ever promising of rational cooperation among factions (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000: 780). This explains the inability of MISCA to put a lid on the crisis in CAR. The deepening animosity among the local population and the unwillingness of these groups to come to terms incapacitated MISCA (The Guardian, 2013a: 2-3).

Accounts given by authors and observers tell of the grim situation and how difficult it is for local participation to thrive in such a divided and hate filled society (The Star, 2014: 1-6). Worse still, these same civilians needed to foster the peace, were the same persons stirring hate as there was no differentiating them from the militia (Arieff, 2014: 3; New Republic, 2014, 12-13). As noted by Major Augustine Migabo, a peacekeeping veteran with the Rwandan contingent in CAR, 'the biggest challenge is changing the mind-set of the people' (The Star, 2014: 17). The crisis in CAR corroborates the thesis that peace processes with high local participation are associated with lower

levels of hostility, while little local involvement is associated with escalating violence (Gizelis and Kosek, 2005: 364)

Since MICOPAX, each succeeding international peace operation has been absorbed by a larger mission, but this has not been sufficient to influence the course of events (Vircoulon and Arnaud, 2014). While dwelling on the size of deployed peacekeeping contingents, adequate and early attention should have been paid to the absence or low level of local participation. The displacement crisis within CAR worsened the food security and comatose economy (Azikiwe, 2014: 2). The conflict forced farmers to miss two planting seasons. The flight of Muslim traders from urban centres and with them their businesses which had being the backbone of the economy, severely disrupted market systems (Yarnell, 2014: 2). These developments meant shortage of food, local materials and services needed to augment foreign supplies for the running of the peace operations. CAR therefore lost out on increased economic activity which would have been the product of MISCA spending and the effort of local services to meet demand. The existence of these supply and demand practices support peace and security objectives through offering local employment opportunities which would have made citizens stakeholders in peace (Carnahan et al, 2006:17; Oetzel et al, 2010: 352). Under the circumstances, the people had shut themselves out of being stakeholders.

With the course charted by the crisis, local participation was definitely difficult to harness in CAR. While some scholars argue against human wants as driver of conflict, they however accept that when poverty coincides with identity based cleavages, it yields and aggravates conflict (Atwood, 2003: 160; Deiwiks et al 2012: 292-293). Identity based conflicts are often the most intense and protracted (Sen, 2008; Koubi and Bohmelt, 2014). This is where CAR found itself. Despite this daunting task, religious leaders worked to fill the vacuum and bridge the gap (Ingerstad, 2014a: 50; Vircoulon and Lesueur, 2014: 1).

The religious leaders in CAR were not accomplices in the inter-communal violence. The leaders of faith traveled around the country to promote peace and non-violence. Joint efforts between Muslim and Christian communities on a local level contained the violence in some parts of CAR (Kane, 2014: 314;

The Daily Star Lebanon, 2014: 7). One example is the town of Bangassou, where the communities have created a mediation committee comprising members from both communities, which intervenes in order to mitigate tensions. In other cases, religious leaders have intervened and protected members of the other community. Catholic priests and nuns have devoted themselves to protecting Muslims when the international peacekeepers have failed to do so (Ingerstad, 2014a: 49).

One other issue which compounded the difficulties of the mission in CAR was the distrust between the local populace and the peacekeepers. Each section of the populace had built some level of distrust and disdain for certain peacekeeping contingents. This had been a fallout from the MICOPAX era (International Crisis Group, 2013a: 1-2; The Daily Star Lebanon, 2014). While the Anti-Balaka distrusted the Chadian, Rwandan and Burundian contingents, the Muslims and the Seleka rebels distrusted the French troops. Such suspicion hampers communication and makes it almost impossible for the peacekeepers to galvanise the local populace into peaceful initiatives. And as experts have stated, civil-military relations assist in the promotion of peace operations objectives and the promulgation of positive long-lasting solutions, thereby placing it at the core of stability in peacekeeping (Goodwin, 2005; Lauria, 2009b; Holshek, 2011).

Much of the discussion in this study on local participation centres on civilian efforts, in this case however, some mention ought to be made about the military. The feeling of disenchantment that had pervaded the country during the Bozizé era also ran deep within the military. This feeling explains in part the ease with which the rebels over-ran half of the country without much resistance from the national army. 'The national army had lost cohesion and the will to fight. Many of the soldiers simply dropped their weapons and melted into the bushes' (UNSC, 2013d). This was a clear indication of the depth of decay in the armed forces, and the lack of support for the government within the larger society. With the military in such a state, it definitely lacked the capacity to aid or consolidate on MISCA's activities.

MISCA's inability to harness local energies, whether civilian or military into supporting the peace in CAR, made achieving stability impossible.

Women Participation in the Peace Process

H: ***Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.***

CH: Peacekeeping operations can do without women since they bring nothing special to the peace process.

Women's contribution during the crisis was little or nothing considering that MISCA found itself deployed into a civil war situation, and left in a civil war situation without achieving stability. There were attempts however by MISCA to jumpstart women participation through bringing together a fairly large number of women groups already existent in CAR to promote social cohesion, post conflict resolution and a culture of peace (African Press Organisation, 2014). Under the banner "Coalition of Central African Women for Peace and Reconstruction", these women represented a cross section of CAR's society – Christians and Muslims, political leaders and peace builders (AUPSC, 2014).

However, there is no document, article or commentary that tells of the engagement of this group with CAR's civil society whom they represent and whom they were meant to galvanise toward peaceful co-existence. Apparently, this was more a symbolic gathering of CAR's civic society's resilience at weathering the storm than a pragmatic one. The environment has been too extreme for women groups to make any meaningful contribution. In fact, some of the violence were targeted at women despite the Libreville Peace Agreement clause specifically aimed at ending gender-based violence (Libreville Peace Agreement, 2008: 3; O'Reilly, 2013: 1). So attempts to create avenues for vital social engagements directed at fostering peace have floundered.

Just like in Darfur, women's contribution to peace and stability was not given much of a chance in CAR, and just like in Darfur, instability persisted under the watch of the peacekeepers. The non-participation of women and the failure of the peace operation makes a strong case for their role in peace processes and the need to have the relevant avenues created for this to happen.

Charismatic Field Leadership and Lead State

H: ***Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.***

CH: A lead state's early assumption of peacekeeping duties saves lives and curtails regional diffusion of conflict.

It would be difficult talking about the failure of MISCA and not apportion blame to field leadership. General Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military head of state and later civilian president of Nigeria recalls a military dictum which says, *there are no bad soldiers, only bad officers* (Vanguard, 2015: 5). This implies that, a unit is as bad as its commanding officer. However, certain texts had severally mentioned the positive roles of certain field commanders especially from the Rwandan and Burundi contingents who risked their lives to keep Muslims safe from Anti-Balaka attacks (New Republic, 2014). A lot of these reports too tell of the role of peacekeepers in incensing public outrage.

French forces were accused by their fellow peacekeepers of watching while Muslims were lynched by the anti-Balaka militia (New Republic, 2014: 9). Chadian soldiers were accused of high handedness toward CAR's Christian population to the point of outright brutality (Amnesty International, 2014: 33-34). MISCA's Congolese contingent were accused of intimidation, violence and abductions (Human Rights Watch, 2014: 1). The display of stereotypes by the French, Chadian and Congolese troops incensed resentment from different sections of society, making the task of providing security all the harder for the other contingents (New Republic, 2014: 10). This did not mend the split within the population and also did not help cohesion among the peacekeepers themselves as units distrusted the motives of the other (New Republic, 2014: 10).

The fact that these were recurring events and not one off incidents, points to the failure of leadership within the contingents. The failures of these contingent commanders widened the gulf between CAR's population and the peacekeepers and made stability more difficult to achieve. This sections analysis validates the hypothesis that when field commanders lead well, missions are more likely to provide stability.

France definitely took on a leadership role not only in deploying troops, but also in lobbying the international community into committing to CAR. It did

this on the premise that no 'one else will'. However, in view of anti-French sentiments in CAR, it is quite contentious if France was the right man for the job (International Crisis Group, 2013a: 1-2). While it drew international support which is critical to AU missions, its contingent did not instil confidence in the peace operation and this was the failure of leadership on the ground. The French troops disarming of Séléka from the outset has been termed a miscalculation on the part of the peacekeeping force since it placed the Muslim minority at the mercy of the Anti-Balaka (Ingerstad, 2014a: 46; Kane, 2014: 315).

There was also strong anti-French sentiment among certain MISCA contingents such as Rwanda and Burundi (New Republic, 2014: 9-10). So, between MISCA and Sangaris troops, there was friction from the start. The existence of such opposing poles is an indication of discord within the supposed peacekeeping allies and the ensuing suspicion of each other's actions definitely had drawbacks for the mission.

France's lead role did not augur well for the mission (International Crisis Group, 2013a: 1-2). However, the failure of the mission in CAR lies more with contingent commanders who could not work effectively together and also widened the gulf between CAR's population and the peacekeepers. Their poor leadership made stability more difficult to achieve.

Impartiality over Neutrality

H: ***Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.***

CH: Upholding neutrality portrays peacekeepers as trust worthy mediators.

With the Chadian contingent being a part of MISCA, it was distrusted right from the start (The Daily Star Lebanon, 2014: 7). The Chadians did not help issues either with their support for the Séléka rebels and attacks on Christians even in cases where the latter were not part of the Anti-Balaka militia. There are several accounts of Chadian forces in MISCA trucks opening fire indiscriminately on crowds killing scores of women and children (Amnesty International, 2014: 33-34). The French on the other hand were accused of complicity in the attacks by the Anti-Balaka on Muslims. It was as though pay

back for the killing of two Sangaris troops by the Muslims in Bangui. This certainly fuelled resentment between local Muslims and the French (New Republic, 2014: 9-10). Whatever reason whether in solidarity of kinship or as reprisal, MISCA's peacekeepers were reckless in their service to the mandate. Their partisan approach led to the failure to protect under MISCA's watch. 'The impartial use of force is one indication the peacekeepers are trying to reach their stated objectives' (Jowell, interview 2016).

With impartiality to the mandate sacrificed on the altar of partisanship, it made presenting a neutral posture much more difficult. The emanating distrust had a further debilitating effect on MISCA. Other contingents who were devoted to upholding the mandate lost credibility because of the actions of their partisan comrades (The Daily Star Lebanon, 2014: 7). Neither the inclusion nor the diligence displayed by the Burundian and Rwandan troops could reverse this deeply running distrust (International Crisis Group, 2013a: 2; The Star, 2014: 15 and 17). Even when these peacekeepers acted in defence of the Mandate and protected the vulnerable who in most cases were minority Muslims, they were accused of aggression and partisanship (Ingerstad, 2014a: 49; New Republic, 2014: 9).

In CAR's field of violence it was impossible to be neutral in view of the multitude of spoilers, but the inability of MISCA to convey an impartial posture played a major role in its failure to create stability.

<u>Domestic Political Elite</u>

H: ***Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.***

CH: Side-lining domestic political elite who were likely responsible for the conflict in the first instance.

The crisis in CAR is part of a regional conflict complex (Ingerstad, 2014b: 2), but internal governance and squabbles among state elite exacerbated the conflict. Much of CAR's present agony hinges on the fact that the best of its rulers have been no better than the continent's dismal mean (US News, 2013: 2). The government did not promote development, life expectancy has remained the same for the past thirty years, and the average number of years spent in school is below seven. Given these statistics, scholars generally agree

that CAR's conflict is the product of the failure of governance and CAR's political elite (International Crisis Group, 2013c). If failure in governance was responsible for the crisis, MISCA's success depended on a reversal of this trend.

Beginning with its big game players, there were indications that Bozizé was supporting the Anti-Balaka with weapons and economic resources, publicly referring to them as patriots (Ingerstad, 2014b: 2). The transitional president Samba-Panza, while enthusing national reconciliation could not drive for ethno-religious balance in the military and was accused of nepotism in state appointments (Arieff, 2014: 4). This perceived lack of political will to right the wrongs of the past did not help in curbing the impunity with which atrocities were perpetrated (Amnesty International, 2014: 12). This did not make the task of MISCA any easier as the result was the execution of thousands of Muslims with tens of thousands more forced to seek refuge and flee the country (Azikiwe, 2014: 1: Kane, 2014: 315). CAR's political elite have left it stuck in the "conflict trap" - the recycling of underlying conditions for conflict to remain intact and the unwillingness to free it from the mire (Dorussen and Gizelis, 2013: 692).

The major source of the current conflict in the CAR has been extensively described as the reaction of its peoples to exclusion and neglect by the state. This supports the argument that 'the system of redistribution within and among groups is the key to creating solidarity links between them, and its breakdown is liable to trigger political violence' (Azam, 2001: 430). When political elites opt to stay aloof of the problems of the state or perpetuate adversity, it incapacitates peacekeeping operations with lives increasingly put at risk due to the increasing levels of insecurity (Walter, 2001: 11).

<u>Size of Mission Area</u>

H: The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.

CH: ***A mission area's lack of valuable minerals deters foreign interference which exacerbates conflict.***

For a civil war where a lot of factors played against the efficiency of the peacekeeping forces, size it could be argued also played a part. CAR is

landlocked and covers an area of 622,980 square km which is approximately the size of France (Sy, 2013: 2). With 7,750 troops covering all of CAR, to provide good security was more than a herculean task. Some towns actually noted that peacekeepers drive by approximately once a month (Sy, 2013: 2; The Star, 2014: 12). However, when considering accounts of the inability of MISCA (and Sangaris) to provide security in the capital Bangui despite their force in numbers, then the *size of territory* hypothesis collapses. In other words, if, with the necessary manpower in a small area, security still could not be provided, then the excuse of a larger area certainly cannot hold. With the failure of this hypothesis, attention is turned to its counter.

With diamonds, uranium, timber and gold, CAR ironically remains one of Africa's poorest despite having a small population. Conflict fuelled by diamonds in CAR are not new (International Crisis Group, 2011b: 1-2). Illegal exploitation which was rife had fuelled corruption and deprived the state of much needed funds. Some 100,000 people are active in the mining sector, but the most involved have always been the country's presidents themselves. Patasse ran his own diamond mining company from the presidential palace, while Bozizé kept a tight control over the sector (The Nigerian Voice, 2014: 4). Indications were rife that Djotodia would have followed suit, an inference that explains his quest for power. Right from the overthrow of Bozize, Djotodia's Séléka rebels took control of the diamond industry (Huffington Post, 2013: 1-2). In CAR it is held that its leaders are first "diamond merchants" and have their minds only on the business of diamonds and nothing else' (The Nigerian Voice, 2014: 4). Struggles over the control of diamond mines and trade exacerbated the conflict. Reports suggest that Seleka came to power with the support of many discontented actors of the sector. The sale of these diamonds were used to fund their activities and majority of the peasant miners in the north were a part of the rebellion (Huffington Post, 2013: 2-3; International Crisis Group, 2014: 9).

A UN report on 5 November 2014 noted that 'gold and diamond sales are used to finance conflict in CAR' (Reuters, 2014a: 1). This is in spite of CAR's suspension from the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme in 2013. The KP came into effect in May 2000 to stem the flow of rough diamonds used by rebel movements in Africa to finance wars (UNGA, 2001: 1-2; BBC News,

2010). An estimated 140,000 carats of diamonds worth $24 million had been smuggled out of CAR since its suspension from the Kimberly Process on 23 May, 2013 (Administrative Decision on Central African Republic, 2013; Global Witness, 2014: 1). 80 percent of CAR's diamonds are of gem quality and ranked fifth in the world. Compounding issues is the fact that much less is known of CAR's gold where it is estimated that illegal exports might represent 95 percent of actual export which is estimated to exceed two tonnes per year (Matthysen and Clarkson, 2013: 6-7). Taking these into consideration, it is obvious why control of the diamond and gold trade in such an impoverished country is so important to warring groups and propels conflict prolongation.

CAR's gold and mining exploitation currently thrives on artisanal extraction (Matthysen and Clarkson, 2013: 27). This is due to the government's inability to keep industrial diamond mining companies in the country because of its labourious bureaucracy, stringent and costly conditions of doing business which shrink profits (International Crisis Group, 2010: 8). While Ambilly Etekpe (interview, 2015) contends that Multi-National Corporations (MNC's) contribute to endemic conflicts in states where they do business, at their most positive, they have been known to prevent disruptive conflicts from erupting in environments of heightened conflict risk (Ganson, 2011: 2). This as a result of a broadening of the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) of MNC's to include responsible business-conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction (Oetzel et al, 2007: 339). It is argued that MNCs face more responsibilities relating to channelling their efforts in the service of conflict mitigation and peace building (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010: 443 and 446). The contention here is that the activities of MNCs are expected to, and sometimes act as buffers and pacifiers in conflict prone areas. With their absence in CAR, the communities where these companies would have operated were left to their devices without shocks to cushion the impact.

Conclusion

Much of CAR's history has been replete with violent power transitions in a government that has little control outside the capital Bangui, leaving warlords and mercenaries to roam and use the rural areas for their operations. The

long years of neglect eventually fuelled ethnic grievances, religious intolerance and culminated in the civil war of 2013. In response to the call to intervene and stop the bloodshed, AU set up MISCA and deployed into CAR reiterating its growing reputation of deploying into areas many do not have a stomach for.

Like most peacekeeping operations, the conflict in CAR throws up its own set of dynamics. The fact that the forces of MISCA had to deal with civil militia groups compounded issues for the peacekeepers coupled with the distrust among the peacekeepers themselves. Though seldom mentioned in categorical terms, the AU mission in CAR was a failure arising largely from local dynamics, friction and poor leadership among peacekeepers, and suspicion between peacekeepers and locals. CAR creates a puzzle in the sense that, it is a situation where peacekeepers are assigned to preserve a state whose people were keen on destroying. It is a stark reminder that no matter how robust and determined a peacekeeping force, it cannot coerce into a (peace) process, people and movements who are not ready for that process (Guehenno, 2008: 3).

In CAR, we find once again a situation where women are unable to contribute to peace and the violence goes unabated. A similar tale as evidenced in Darfur. This only strengthens the view that the contribution of women in peace processes, while not tangible, does facilitate stability thereby aiding peace support interventions.

Central to the CAR experience are the factors of local participation and international collaboration (when it goes awry). It shows with dire consequences that a peace operation will not work when the local populace are given to violence, the mission is divided against itself and the local political elites lack the will to steer the ship towards peaceful shores. The story of CAR in its entirety tells of the need for responsibility in governance as the best means of addressing threats to life and creating stable environments and not in the sacrifice of peacekeepers.

CONCLUSION

This chapter first presents the findings of this study in tables 10.1 and 10.3, and a rank order of factors impact on stability in tables 10.2 and 10.4. These tables are analysed and their implications for stability discussed and illustrated in table 10.5. The chapter proceeds to provide a summary of each of the African Union's peace operations treated in this study and then profers recommendations.

In analysing the peace operations of the African Union, this study also sets to test the impact of the various factors on peacekeeping missions. Each operation where the hypothesis holds true is designated the value "V"=1. Cases where the hypothesis fails and the counter hypothesis is validated are assigned the value "N"=0. For example, the hypothesis on funding failed in Burundi since AMIB succeeded despite the paucity of funds. For the Burundi mission therefore, the funding hypothesis is assigned the value N. The inconclusive cases are assigned the value "X"=1. Assigning the value X=1 is based on the fact that in the cases where the analyses were inconclusive, the affected factors impacted on stability too. So we have, V=1, X=1 and N=0. The findings from the AU's four successful operations are captured in table 10.1.

Interpretation of Findings

Table 10.1 Result of Findings for AU Successful Peace Operations

Hypotheses	**AMIB**	**MAES**	**AMISOM**	**AFISMA**
Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.	N	V	V	V
Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.	N	V	V	V
An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.	N	V	X	V
Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.	N	V	V	V
The international community's utilisation of authority and resources provides assurance for conflict settlement.	**V**	**V**	**V**	**V**

Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.	V	V	N	V
Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.	V	N	N	N
Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.	**V**	**V**	**V**	**V**
Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.	V	V	N	V
Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.	X	V	X	N
Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.	N	V	V	V
Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.	**V**	**V**	**V**	**V**
The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.	V	X	N	N

KEY: V = Valid Hypothesis; N = Invalid Hypothesis; X = Inconclusive

From table 10.1 above, the hypothesis on domestic elite cooperation is assigned the value V for all four operations thus having a maximum score of 4. This indicates its strong significance for stability. The hypothesis on funding is assigned the value V for three of the four cases and gets a score of 3. This indicates it has a strong influence on the provision of stability, but is of lesser significance. Consequently, the more a factor is assigned the value V, the greater its significance to stability. The more the value N is assigned to a factor, the weaker its influence. So attaching a numerical value of V=1 and N=0, the impact assessment in table 10.2 illustrates how these factors rank in the provision of stability.

Table 10.2 Ranking of Factors for Successful Peace Operations

Impact Assessment	Score	Peacekeeping Factors
Most Significant	4	International Political Will Local Initiative Domestic Political Elite Cooperation
Very Significant	3	Mandates Funding Size of Contingent International Collaboration Timing and Duration Women Participation Field Leadership Impartiality over Neutrality
Significant	2	Size of Mission Area
Least Significant	1	Peacekeeper Training for Expanded Roles

Table 10.3 outlines the impact of the hypothesis factors or their absence on failed operations. The value V=1 indicates the validation of the hypothesis still. In this case, the absence of the hypothesis factor leads to mission failure thereby validating the factor's significance for success. N=0 indicates the non-validity of the hypothesis. In this case, the hypothesis factor is present, but the mission still fails.

Table 10.3 Result of Findings for AU Failed Peace Operations

Hypothesis	AMIS/UNAMID	MISCA
Mandates tailored to ground realities and mission capacity foster precision in operations.	V	N
Funding leaves missions adequately equipped and boosts peacekeepers morale.	**V**	**V**
An adequately sized contingent conveys credible force posture and discourages spoilers.	**V**	**V**
Wider international collaboration enhances mission resources and legitimacy.	N	N
The international community's utilisation of authority and resources provides assurance for conflict settlement.	**V**	**V**
Choosing the right time for entry and setting duration for operations boosts focus.	**V**	**V**

Training troops to fit expanded roles makes them better peacekeepers.	N	N
Active involvement of local people in the peace process allows for equity.	**V**	**V**
Active involvement of local women in peacekeeping facilitates comprehensive agreements.	**V**	**V**
Good field leadership wins local support and builds confidence among contingents.	**V**	**V**
Impartiality given prominence over neutrality due to the need to contain spoilers.	**V**	**V**
Domestic political elite support fosters local cohesion and places state machinery at the disposal of peacekeepers.	**V**	**V**
The smaller the size of a mission area, the easier it is for peacekeepers to monitor.	V	N

KEY: V = Hypothesis is Valid; N = Hypothesis is Invalid; X = Hypothesis is Inconclusive

Table 10.4 outlines the rank order of factors based on their impact on failed operations.

Table 10.4 Ranking of Factors for Failed Peace Operations

Impact Assessment	Score	Peacekeeping Factors
Most Significant	2	Funding Size of Contingent International Political Will Timing and Duration Local Initiative Women Participation Field Leadership Impartiality of Neutrality Domestic Political Elite Cooperation
Very Significant	1	Mandates Size of Mission Area
Least Significant	0	International Collaboration Peacekeeper Training for Expanded Roles

Table 10.5 below presents a comprehensive picture of scores from all six AU missions indicating the overall impact of peace operations factors on the provision of stability in mission areas.

Table 10.5 Comprehensive Ranking of Factors

Impact Assessment	Score	Peacekeeping Factors
Most Significant	6	International Political Will Local Initiative Domestic Political Elite Cooperation
Very Significant	5	Funding Size of Contingent Timing and Duration Women Participation Field Leadership Impartiality over Neutrality
Quite Significant	4	Mandate
Less Significant	3	Size of Mission Area International Collaboration
Least Significant	1	Peacekeeper Training for Expanded Roles

Discussion of Findings

The major argument of this study which is evident in table 10.5 is as follows: international political will, local political elite cooperation and local people participation are the most significant to peace operations achieving stability in mission areas. This runs through each case study.

Having tested for all these factors through the AU's six PSO's, international political will, domestic elite cooperation and local people participation stand out as the factors most influential for achieving stability. These were the only factors consistent in all missions where stability was achieved, and they were consistently absent in all failed missions.

Peace scholars contend that stability is better assured when there is unanimity among national political elites about the peace process and civil society support is secured (Andrieu, 2010; Langholtz, 2010; Gurses and Rost, 2013; Autesserre, 2014). International actors and the political will they muster determine the role peacekeepers play during missions which determines success (Adebajo Adekeye, 2011; Bellamy, 2011; Jowell, interview 2016). Collectively, these factors possess the greatest impact on stability in peacekeeping. This finding modifies much of extant peace literature which emphasises the centrality of mandate, funding, international

collaboration, size of contingent and local population involvement to the success of peace operations.

The case that best exemplifies this study's finding was the mission in Burundi. The traditional factors of mandate, funding, international collaboration and size of contingent were all lacking, yet the mission succeeded. The mandate was porous, international collaboration was limited, funding was very poor, and the mission was grossly undermanned. Considering the importance accorded these factors in traditional peace literature, AMIB should have been an outright failure. It is as though the human body without its major organs. That AMIB succeeded and commendably too having stabilised 95 percent of Burundi is proof that these traditional factors are not at the heart of peacekeeping's success. At the centre of AMIB's success in Burundi was domestic elite cooperation, local people participation, of which women were significant, and the political will exhibited by the AU and South Africa.

The mission in CAR produces the next significant result buttressing the argument of this research. The mandate for MISCA was precise in view of mission capacity and the responsibility to protect and there was ample international collaboration as well. Despite the presence of these factors the mission in CAR failed. This again questions the centrality of these traditional factors to peacekeeping's success. Noticeably in CAR, the factors of domestic political elite, local participation and international political will were duly absent.

Though the traditional factors may not be at the heart of achieving stability, they however make reaching this goal smoother. This is evident from the missions in Comoros, Somalia and Mali. AMISOM's push to regain territory began with the increase in troop strength to meet the recommended peacekeeper citizen ratio of 1:200, a re-evaluation of mandate and a fair amount of funding. Operation Democracy in Comoros was swift and successful having met the peacekeeper-citizen ratio, operated a precise manadate and was not short on funds.

Beyond the core argument of this study, there are other findings worth noting. First of these is, lead states matter in violent theatres needing lengthy peace operations to provide stability. Of the AU's four successful missions, the

operation in Comoros was the only one without a lead state. To conclude that lead states are not necessary for success, might be misleading. It should be noted that Comoros did not present an intensely violent theatre. The opposition was over-run in 24 hours. Given the size of Anjouan, the state and size of Bacar's army, a lead state was really not necessary for Operation Democracy. In contrast, for the more intense and protracted conflicts in Darfur, peacekeeping failed without a lead state. Though a lead state was present in CAR, its presence met with the disapproval of the other contingents and the local people. This fit increased the likelihood for failure. The intense conflicts of Burundi, Somalia and Mali which had lead states to marshal the peace operations ended as success stories for the AU.

When it comes to size of contingent and force integrity, four scenarios prevail. The Burundi experience showcases scenario one where in spite of troop shortage, force integrity compensated for AMIB to succeed. Scenario two is evidenced in the Comoros where MAES lacked force integrity, but enjoyed sufficient troop numbers, and the objective of the operation was achieved. AMISOM in Somalia highlights scenario three where a combination of both force numbers and force integrity helped create stability in a hostile environment. Scenario four relates to Darfur and CAR where AU operations failed with the missions suffering inadequate troops and lacking force integrity. From these four scenarios, it is evident that force integrity and size of contingent each contribute to effective peacekeeping.

There is a caveat though. While AMIB and MAES indicate that a peace operation could succeed either with force integrity or adequate size, AMIS/UNAMID and MISCA illustrate that lacking in both is a recipe for failure. Going by the former, it could be argued that possessing either force integrity or an adequately sized force might have changed the fortunes of MISCA given the duration of the operation and the size of the mission area. However, for the larger and protracted operations of Somalia and Darfur, the dynamics change. AMISOM barely made gains when its troop strength was inadequate even though force integrity was present. Unlike AMIB, force integrity was not enough for AMISOM to be effective. With the significant increase in its size and force integrity preserved, AMISOM eventually made good ground in stabilizing Somalia. For AMIS/UNAMID, considering the size of Darfur and the

intensity of the conflict, the gross lack of these factors have contributed immensely to its failure.

In essence, a contingent lacking in either size or force integrity (not both) could stabilise conflicts in small areas requiring short operations. Second, protracted operations in large and hostile regions demand adequately sized contingents possessing force integrity to create stability.

Below is a summary of the AU operations in the order in which they have been treated in this study.

Burundi (2003-2004)

The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was the first of the AU's peacekeeping operations. It was grossly under-resourced in terms of troops and equipment, yet it succeeded in bringing an end to violence and securing lives. Three main factors served as the hinge on which this feat was achieved: a responsive political local class, responsive mission leadership both at state (South Africa) and individual (field commanders) levels and a resilient local population, especially women desirous of peace. The presence of a committed lead state and AU support was international will enough to see AMIB through.

AMIBs experience also illustrates that in the face of weak mandates, inadequate peacekeepers and poor funding, a willing local political class, the provision of avenues for civil society (especially women) to contribute to peace and deft mission leadership, could be the difference between stability and insecurity. AMIB's ability at stabilising about 95 percent of Burundi makes it an AU success story.

Given its limited force strength, poor funding and ill conceived mandate, AMIB achieved stability through respecting and utilising the prevailing social and political currents to ensure compliance rather than the use of force. The fact that it succeeded in creating stability in large parts of Burundi using this approach is indication that it was the right one. In consonance with this is the strategic importance of forces integrity with the bulk of its troops coming from South Africa which held the mantra of lead state. While the application of this

same principle has helped the mission in Somalia, its deficit in Darfur has contributed to the difficulty of the mission there.

The mission in Burundi is one where the AU stayed both neutral and impartial. AMIB's success is indication that this strategy paid off and a pointer too that neutrality is still a relevant peacekeeping tenet even in areas of violent conflict. The principle of neutrality may have paid off in Burundi, but it had dire consequences for the forces in Darfur.

Comoros (2003-2008)

The intervention in the Comoros has been acclaimed as a huge success for the AU. It marked a significant step in AU peacekeeping being the only operation entirely planned and executed by the AU. It signalled the willingness of the AU to intervene in countries where political instability, violence, renegade leaders and rogue regimes threaten long term peace and security.

Of salience to the operation in the Comoros was mandate precision to ground realities. A unique feature of the Comoros operation was the various mandates on which the mission operated. AU peacekeepers in accordance with changing realities on the ground, functioned as observers, peacekeepers, peace enforcers and finally as peacebuilders. In reviewing its mandates as deemed necessary the AU showed its ability to adapt to conditions on the ground.

The operation in the Comoros validates the majority of hypotheses adopted in this study. Intervention in the Comoros was well timed having come on the heels of negotiations just like in Burundi, and at the request of the government as was done in Mali. Hence it had the support of the Comorian people right from the start. However, unlike the mission in Burundi and Mali where a lead state was vital, the Comoros experience depicts that peace operations can succeed without lead states. Contrary too to Burundi, the Comoros experience supports the counter hypothesis that training peacekeepers for specialised roles augurs better for stability.

Somalia (2007 till date)

The mission in Somalia is one of war fighting and peace enforcement aimed at bringing stability to a conflict ravaged society and expand the authority of the government. It intends to spawn the beginnings of democratic governance in the country. To achieve this, it was necessary to rein in rebel groups who had dominated the central and southern parts of the country, contain those who opposed this transition and protect citizens in the process. Despite the slow and arduous beginning of AMISOM, it is generally agreed that it has been a success story so far as these goals are being achieved.

The mission in Somalia supports the importance of the traditional factors. These five factors majorly interact at the core of AMISOM's success. First is the mandate which specifies the duties of the peacekeepers. AMISOM really began making significant progress with the review of the mandate in 2012. Next is its ability to enforce security which would only have been possible with adequate troops. To keep a sizeable multinational contingent operational especially in battle requires funding and the cooperation of the international community, and these have not been lacking. These have been possible because of vibrant international political will. Collectively, these factors have facilitated national elite cooperation and enabled spaces for local initiative. The local populace and AMISOM have developed a good working relationship and this has helped facilitate stability. While local participation is playing its role, more commitment is needed from Somalia's political class if AMISOM is to consolidate on its gains. Somalia is the only mission among the AU's successes where local women participation has been almost non-existent.

Mali (2013)

The crisis in Mali is indicative of the trend that insurgents/violent non-state actors within national borders are more mobile, more motivated, and at least as well networked internationally as the government forces opposing them. This case study also reflects the importance of a lead nation to the success of peacekeeping operations. Through Operation Serval, France played the role of lead state. The ensuing rapid success of the operation, while not putting African capacity in doubt, indicates that international collaboration still is a

key part of the AU's peacekeeping machinery and important to peacekeeping efficacy. This in no way substitutes the role, nor the need to harmonise national elites into sustaining the peace.

The African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) was a peace enforcement mission wholly in support of the government of Mali which requested it. Like Somalia, it was about routing terrorists, protecting sovereignty and securing lives in the process. In view of its mandate, it could not have been an operation hinged on neutrality. The support for the government, the cooperation among Malian officials and the willingness of local elders to plug gaps through activating local peace initiatives fostered the gains of Serval and AFISMA. It would have been almost impossible for the mission to have succeeded without local support.

While the mission in Mali is unique considering that the AU force played more of a holding role, its heavy dependence on a lead state (France), places it in comparison with Burundi (South Africa). Just like in Somalia, the objective in Mali was to push back the Islamic Extremists, so the mandates in these cases necessitated war fighting. International political will, local elite support and people participation were privy to the success of these missions.

Sudan (Darfur) (2004 till date)

First starting off as AMIS in 2004, the operation became a hybrid partnership between the AU and the UN in 2007 under the name UNAMID. Despite this change, the mission since its inception in 2004 has been unable to make the Darfur region stable.

The failures of UNAMID have hinged largely on the host government's lack of cooperation and the international community's lack of political will to take on the Government of Sudan (GoS). These two factors have greatly made the others moribund, proving just how crucial they are for achieving stability in peacekeeping operations. The standoff by the GoS barred spaces through which local participation and women involvement could facilitate peace processes. With AMIS/UNAMID denied the essential support of Darfur's local content which includes women, the peacekeeping operation in Darfur has struggled without hope. Where political elites have been the major barrier to

peacekeeping in Darfur, the support of this factor in Burundi, the Comoros, Somalia and Mali contributed majorly to the gains of the peace operations in these countries.

The issues of porous mandate and neglible funding have also contributed immensely to the problems of the peace operation in Darfur. Here, peacekeeping neutrality as demanded by the mandate failed with AMIS. This led to a revised mandate for UNAMID, but without the muscle to back it up and the GoS still in the driving seat, situations on the ground did not change. Though the mandate for AMIB in Burundi was inappropriate, it succeeded due to active international political will, a cooperative local political elite and an involved local population. The absence of these factors in CAR prevented MISCA from stabilising the country.

Compounding matters too was the large size of Darfur, the inadequate number of troops for the job and the problem of force intergrity due to the wide cultural diversity within military units. While Somalia also possesses a huge landmass, AMISOM has been able to cope and made massive gains because of its sizeable contingent in which force integrity is prevalent.

Central African Republic (CAR) (2013-2014)

Like most other peacekeeping operations conducted by the AU, the conflict in CAR throws up its own set of dynamics. The fact that the forces of the African-led International Support Mission in Central African Republic (MISCA) had to deal with civil militia groups compounded issues for the peacekeepers coupled with the friction among the peacekeepers themselves. Though seldom mentioned in categorical terms, the AU mission in CAR was a failure arising largely from local dynamics, friction among peacekeepers and suspicion between peacekeepers and locals. CAR creates a puzzle in the sense that, it is a situation where peacekeepers were assigned to preserve a state whose people were keen on destroying.

Central to the story and analysis of CAR among others, are the factors of local political elite, local participation, field leadership and international collaboration (when it goes awry). It shows in very strong terms that a peace operation will not work when the local populace are given to violence, mission

leadership fails and the local political elites lack the will to steer the ship towards peaceful shores. The story of CAR in its totality, tells of the need for responsibility in governance if lives are to be secured and not in the sacrifice of troops in green (or blue) berets.

The only other AU mission that suffered from a deficit in local elite support, local participation and international political will is the mission in Darfur and this failed too.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The AU has come a long way in providing security on the continent. Despite its flaws, it has changed the face of peacekeeping, proven itself able in providing security, and shown itself a dependable ally to its partners both within and outside the continent (Jowell, interview 2016). Though the AU has built a reputation for robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement, it does a little bit of everything. The operations in Burundi and Darfur classify as robust peacekeeping missions. Missions in CAR, Mali and Somalia border on peace enforcement. The mission in Comoros was a combination of traditional peacekeeping, observer missions, peace enforcement and peacebuilding.

The AU is reputed to undertake short-term missions which are often handed over to the UN. This is not entirely true. The AU finished the job in the Comoros over a period of five years, has been in Somalia for eight years and twelve years in Sudan. It is therefore more appropriate to conceive the AU as preferring shorter missions, yet keeping with mission durations as conditions dictate.

The AU deploys into hostile situations usually on the orders of the UN and with the goal of securing lives and creating stability. Adam Wolfe (2008: 3) and Thomas Tieku (2009: 2-3) accuse the AU of solidarity interventions such as in Comoros, Somalia and Mali. Its role in Burundi and CAR which occasioned regime change provides enough indication that AU interventions are more humanitarianistically driven than they are about protecting regimes (Powell, 2005; Murithi, 2009b; Coleman, 2011; Powell and Baranyi, 2012).

This study aligns with authors who agree on the importance of local participation for stability in peace operations (Duffey, 2000: 143; Gizelis and Kosek, 2005: 366; Gizelis, 2011: 524). This study also supports the view that local women contribute significantly to sustaining the peace. Their contribution to peacekeeping runs through three of the four successful missons (Somalia being the exception) treated in this study. Most glaring was the mission in Burundi where the bulk of recorded civil society peace initiatives were undertaken by women who ironically at the time, forced themselves into being part of the peace process. It is no coincidence that the two failed peacekeeping operations (Darfur and CAR) were environments in which women and the larger local population were denied the space to manoeuvre for peace.

The failure of the AU in CAR and Sudan was unavoidable given the salience of domestic political elite cooperation to the peace process and overall provision of stability. In essence, when local political actors who are meant to take the lead fail, local participation often fails with it. Frail as the structure of government in Somalia was, AMISOM still had political elites to work with and this made a difference as local initiatives followed suit. This study shows that when cooperation among the political elite lacks, as it did in Darfur and CAR, peacekeeping will not work. This study is particular on its use of the word *cooperation* and not *consent* as contained in the UN peacekeeping doctrine. Consent could be given, or coerced as was done with Sudan's President El Bashir, but when cooperation is withheld, it cripples the worth of consent.

Cooperation of domestic elite and local population initiative go hand in hand because as 'elites must cooperate for peacekeeping to bring and maintain peace, "so too" there are ways that local citizens may subvert elite-level efforts to facilitate peace' (Neack and Knudson, 1999: 527). For this reason, Ambassadors Charles Cocodia (interview 2016) and Bukun-Olu Onemola (interview 2016) contend that managing the internal dynamics of a mission area is more important for the success of peace operations.

Also indispensable to peacekeeping is the issue of international political will which a lot of authors skip as the backbone for funding. A good number of interview respondents, especially within the AU advocated funding as the

most pressing need of the AU. Some authors stress the need for adequately sized and well equipped contingents to provide strong enough deterrents to force the peace where necessary. Achieving these however, is dependent on the political will of the international community. For the AU, this community consists of its member states most of whom are poor and external donors such as the UN and EU who possess greater wherewithal and expertise. But these donors are also made up of member states who have other pressing needs and interests that bar their commitment even when they promise (Abiola, interview 2014). So when political will is lacking, funding and contingent size also suffer. The success of AMIB was largely dependent on the will of South Africa which played the lead role and a few other international actors like the US who paid for the deployment of troops from the other troop contributing countries.

A careful examination of this study and tables 10.1 and 10.3 above, show that where the three factors of international political will, domestic elites cooperation and local intiatives were lacking, the missions were wholly ineffective. These were the only factors consistent in all successful operations.

Issues of mandate, funding, size of contingent and international collaboration dominate most peacekeeping literature in view of what counts the most for success. This study shows these factors as relevant but not at the heart of peacekeeping success. Precise mandates and large contingents do not necessarily lead to effective peacekeeping. For mandates are but orders, and it takes well led troops who are well trained, and firm international political will to facilitate and sustain its desired impact (Jett, 2001; Feldman, 2008: 275; Adebajo: 2011: 7). On size, authors contend that the presence of a large contingent clearly is a deterrent in itself. But if peacekeeping troops, despite being well funded are unwilling to use force in self defence and in the protection of civilians who are themselves threatened, then they become something of a paper tiger – an unconvincing force (Kilpatrick, interview 2013; Jowell, interview 2016). So even when tailored mandates are provided for large contingents to implement, the absence of international political will and good field leadership seriously handicaps such missions and make them unlikely to achieve stability (Jett, 2001: 184; Adebajo, 2011:2; Jowell, interview 2016).

The AU is still on a learning curve. Evaluating its missions and reasons for successes and failures will help improve its peacekeeping strategies. The AU has done well so far despite its challenges, but as it is said in Africa when progress is made, but the goal has not been achieved, "it is not yet Uhuru".

The findings of this study lead to the following policy recommendations:

International effort should be directed at ensuring that peace operations succeed since failure damages the reputation of the coordinating organisation and diminishes its credibility as a mediator capable of creating stability. The commitment exhibited in the Comoros and Somalia missions should be replicated in all peace operations.

The AU should focus on capabilities necessary to generate the desired political effects. Eliciting the right cooperation from neighbouring states and RECs and prompting domestic elite into working for peace is vital for stability. These were some of the major failures in Darfur and CAR.

Peacekeepers should only be deployed into active war zones when the peace operations are part of a viable political process. This strategy was adhered to in Burundi, but neglected in Darfur.

Since host population acceptance is vital for peacekeeping's success, priority should be given to creating avenues to encourage their participation in the peace process. Nurturing civil-military relationship is key for stability in peacekeeping.

To foster civil-military relationship, the AU should apply greater discretion when requesting for or accepting deployments from TCC's. Historical, religious and ethnic affiliations should be taken into account to avert the danger of partisanship. The perceived support of Chadian peacekeepers for CAR's Muslims dented MISCA's impartial status and made stability more difficult to achieve.

Given the experience of women in organising for peace as observed in Burundi and Mali, and how dire situations become when they are exempted or conspire against peace such as in Darfur, the AU should ensure that local women groups are made a part of the peace process. Once fighting has been

curtailed, peacekeepers should encourage women to be actively involved in helping the peace.

In terms of deployment, where possible, the AU should negotiate with troop contributing countries to ensure their troops are deployed in concentrated numbers to an operation rather than spread the same number over several missions. An example here is Senegal with 2,227 in UNMISS and 795 in UNAMID. UNMISS arguably would be better served with 3,000 troops from Senegal, while UNAMID has one less component undermining force integrity.

This study shows that there is a link between the AU setting time lines for missions and sustaining the political will of donor organizations. Knowing how far into the future their assistance would go, donors are likely to sustain commitment to a cause. This enhances the prospects for effectiveness as shown in Burundi, Mali and the Comoros.

The AU should be wary of situations where belligerents, whether state or rebel forces, dictate the terms of the peace. This has been the bane of the situation in Darfur and the failure of peacekeeping as government forces and rebels truncate the efforts of UNAMID.

Peacekeeping is evolving and so too is our understanding of it. The issue of domestic elite cooperation was rarely discussed in peace literature prior to the debacle in South Sudan. Rtd. Gen Martin-Luther Agwai, having led three peacekeeping missions, holds this as the most significant factor that determines success or failure. 'The biggest obstacle to any peacekeeping operation is the inability to get all factions to cooperate' (Agwai, interview 2016). This has been the bane of peacekeeping failure in Darfur and CAR. Even in Somalia, Al-Shabaab's refusal to cooperate threatens security still and has prolonged the stay of AMISOM. Also, as evidenced in CAR, an unwilling local population can undo the efforts of its political elite, so their cooperation is vital. Finally is the will of the international community in supporting intervention aimed at facilitating the efforts of the local actors toward creating a stable polity. When these three factors are harnessed, the prospect of peacekeeping achieving stability is almost certain.

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Abiola, Seun (Co-ordinator Peacekeeping Unit, African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes) via Skype at 09.00 hours, 06/02/2014

Agwai, Martin-Luther (Deputy Force Commander UNAMSIL 2002, Deputy Military Adviser UNDPKO 2002, Chief of Defence Staff Nigerian Armed Forces 2006, Force Commander AMIS/UNAMID 2004-2009), at the African Leadership Centre, Kings College London, at 17:30 hours, 19/02/2016.

Alghali, Zinurine (Senior Policy Officer 14, Peace Support Operations Division), AU Commission, via Skype at 12.38 hours, 27/01/2014.

Amuzu, Michael (Retired Colonel Ghana's Armed Forces and Head of Sudan Desk, AU Peace and Security Department), in the Office of the Peace and Security Department of the African Union Commission, African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at 15:30 hours, 02/04/2014.

Asante, Kwaku (Senior Staff, AU Peace and Security Department) in the Office of the Peace and Security Department of the African Union Commission, African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at 14.38 hours, 02/04/2014.

AU Staff, via skype at 11:05am, 26 March 2014.

Bagamba, Chris (Mission Support, AU Peace Support Operations Division) in Room 208, Building A, African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at 10:15 hours, 03/04/2014.

Baly, Dick (Senior Advisor, UK Department for International Development), via Skype, at 17.30 hours, 21/11/2013.

Bam, Sivuyile Thandikhaya (Head, AU Peace Support Operations Division), in the Office of the Head of Peace Support Operations Division, Building A, African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa Ethiopia, at 15:00 hours, 03/04/2014.

Chiwombe, Eustace (Senior Rostering Officer, AU Peace Support Operations Division), in Room 708, Building A, African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa Ethiopia, at 09.54 hours, 02/04/2014.

Cocodia, Charles Okubotin(Nigeria's High Commissioner to Botswana and Permanent Representative to the South African Development Community 2011-2015), at Foreign Affairs Quarters, Abuja, Nigeria at 20:00 hours, 15/01/2016.

Cross, Tim (Rtd Major General, British Army), in Room C13, Law and Social Sciences Building, University of Nottingham at 16.00 hours, 10/10/2013.

Curtis, Devon (Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, University of Cambridge), via Skype at 14:00 hrs, 15/12/2014.

Curtis, Tony (Senior Military Advisor of the US Mission to the AU), at Paradise Garden, Adam's Pavillion, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at 10:35 hours, 05/04/2014.

Davies, Desmond (London Bureau Chief, Ghana News Agency), at the Elephant and Castle Shopping Centre, London at 15:10 hours, 08/03/2016.

Dundun, Rex (Police Chief of Staff AMISOM), on the First Floor Lounge of the Old Conference Building of the African Union, African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,at 14.55 hours, 01/04/2014.

Ellery, James (Retired Brigadier British Army, Head of MONUC 1999, UNAMSIL Chief of Staff 2001, Head of UNMISS 2006), at Queens Gate, SW7 London, at 11.00 hours, 15/11/2013.

Etekpe, Ambily (Coordinator, Yakubu Gowon Centre Nigeria 1997-2003), at Head of Departments office, Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Nigeria at 16.00 hours, 17/12/2015.

Ferrante, Maria (Humanitarian Worker with UNMIS and UNAMID), via Skype at 17:23 hours, 23/03/2014.

Fianya, Seth, (Group Captain, Ghana Air Force and Training Officer, African Standby Force), in Room 505, Building A, African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at 09:25 hours, 02/04/2014.

Gadin, James (Political Officer, AMISOM), on the First Floor Lounge of the Old Conference Building of the African Union, African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,at 14.20 hours, 01/04/2014.

Ibaba, S. Ibaba (Director, Niger Delta Studies Centre), at Niger Delta Studies, Centre, Niger Delta University, Nigeria, at 16:02 hours, 30/12/2015.

Ibeanusi, Kate (Founder, Initiative for Sustaining Family Unity), via Skype at 17:40 hours, 09/03/2016.

Jowell, Marco (Director, Africa Research Group), at Bloomsbury Coffee House, 20 Tavistock Place, London, at 11.05 hours, 29/01/2016.

Kambudze, Admore Mupoki (Head of the Secretariat, AU PSC, AU Commission), in Room 208, Old Conference Building, African, Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at 12:02 hours, 02/04/2014.

Kilpatrick, Stephen (Colonel British Army, Chief of Staff, Force Headquarters UNMISS, 2012-2013), via Skype, at 18.30 hours, 28/11/2013.

Kromah, Lamii Moivi (Research Fellow, Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operation, International Peace Institute (IPI)), via Skype at 17:00 hours, 04/03/2015.

Langholtz, Harvey (Executive Director of Peace Operations Training Institute, Virginia, USA), via Skype at 20.26 hours, 14/01/2014.

Lotze, Walter (Civilian Adviser, Peace Support Operations Division) and Faurie, Adele (Political Officer, Peace Support Operations Division), in Room 508, Building A, African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at 15:50hours, 03/04/2014.

Mbaye, Mamadu (Rtd Lieutenant Colonel, Head of Policy Development, AU Peace Support Operations Division), in Room 505, Building A, African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at 07:30 hours, 01/04/2014.

Mitchell, Beverly (UN Human Resources Planner to the AU), in the Meeting Room of the Peace Support Operations Department, 2nd Floor, Building A, African Union, Addis Ababa Ethiopia, at 14:00 hours, 04/04/2014.

Obi, Cyril (Programme Director, Social Science Research Council), via skype at 14:50 hours, 15/08/2015.

Okuonghae, Peter (Sudan Desk, African Union Peace and Security Department), at Paradise Garden, Adam's Pavillion, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at 17.08 hours, 07/04/2014

Onemola, Bukun-Olu (Nigeria's Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN 2008-2012), at Foreign Affairs Quarters, Abuja, Nigeria, at 21:10 hours, 15/01/2016.

Sandi, Jonathan (World Bank Senior Stabilisation and DDR Officer and Adviser to the AU), in the Peace and Security Department, African Union Commission, African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at 12.45 hours, 02/04/2014.

Souare, Issaka (Special Adviser to the High Representative of the African Union for Mali and the Sahel), via Skype at 10.04 hours, 26/03/2014.