MUSICAL STAGE THEORY

A NOVEL ACCOUNT FOR THE ONTOLOGY OF MUSICAL WORKS AND THE AUTHENTICITY OF MUSIC

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Abstract

Listening to music is one of the most common human activities. Yet, answering the question 'What is a musical work?' has kept many scholars busy. In this thesis, I present a novel account for the ontology of musical works: Musical Stage Theory. Traditional theories describe musical works as abstract entities, as Platonists claim, or as classes of performances, as in the Nominalist tradition. Musical Stage Theory, instead, argues that the work *is* the performance. Delineating this account will help me also in defending a contextualist interpretation of authenticity in musical performance.

I propose this account as an alternative to mainstream and well accepted views on the nature of musical works with a specific intent: suggesting a way to analyse the identity of musical works which gives due relevance to musical practices and, at the same time, is grounded on a solid ontological basis. The original contribution brought by Musical Stage Theory is twofold: first, it gives promising prominence to the sonic/performative dimension which, in a sense, has remained as an afterthought in alternative theories. Second, it promotes an active collaboration between the disciplines of music and philosophy, supporting philosophical investigations with musicological considerations and case studies.

In order to achieve this second goal, in the thesis I adopt a multivalent methodology. In addition to a more traditional philosophical approach, I support conceptual analysis with the results obtained from interviews conducted with musicians and theorists on their understanding of musical authenticity. After presenting the benefits of Musical Stage Theory against more traditional theories in the ontology of music, I apply its theoretical framework to actual musical phenomena and case studies, showing how Musical Stage Theory can change the way in which we approach the study and perception of music. I conclude with the proposal of a contextualist interpretation of the notion of authenticity in musical performance, justifying it on the basis of the nature of musical works as defended by Musical Stage Theory.

Related Publications

An article based on some of the material in Chapter 3 of this thesis has been published by the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* ('Every Performance is a Stage: Musical Stage Theory as a Novel Account for the Ontology of Musical Works', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 76 (3): 341-351, DOI:10.1111/jaac.12579.). My thanks go to the editors of the journal and to the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Part of the discussion of Chapter 4 on computer-generated music has been published in a collective volume by Springer ('Creative AI: Music Composition Programs as an Extension of the Composer's Mind', in Müller, Vincent C. (ed.), *Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017* (SAPERE; Berlin: Springer, 2018), DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-96448-5_8).

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Introduction

The ontology of music is a vast field and the question ‘What is a work of music?’ has raised debates that still endure. This thesis – at least its first part – situates itself in this area of enquiry. The question from which I start is, in fact, ‘What is the nature of what we commonly call a ‘work of music’? In this introduction I will provide an overview of the questions that guide my research. I will detail the reasons why I believe finding an answer to these questions is important, and I will discuss the benefits and challenges brought about through interdisciplinary research in the fields of philosophy and music. I will then explain the methodology used for carrying out this research and conclude the introduction with a summary of the main topics addressed in the chapters of the thesis.

1. What is a Musical Work?

The initial aim of my research was to propose a novel interpretation of the notion of musical authenticity, one that was better suited to account for actual ways of performing and listening to music. Soon, though, I realised that in order to give an informed reading of musical authenticity I also needed to take a stance in respect to the ontology of musical works. It was indeed impossible to argue for the conditions of authenticity that govern musical performance without defining what a musical work is. I, thus, revised my project and instead of focusing only on the question ‘When is a performance authentic?’ I started to ask what would become a central research question: ‘What is a musical work?’. For the next few years my research was motivated by a desire to produce a new and compelling account of the nature of musical works which respected actual musical practices. Authenticity was still present as a subsidiary question, though. And indeed, one of the main advantages of proposing a novel account of musical ontology is that of providing an alternative explanation for musical authenticity, which is consistent with the ontological layout presented.

There are, therefore, two research questions that underpin this thesis: ‘What is a musical work?’ and ‘When is a performance authentic?’. I address the first question

in Chapters 1, 3, 4, and 5, while I devote Chapters 2 and 6 to the question of authenticity. As I already hinted, the rationale behind this research is to propose an account of the notions of 'musical work' and 'authenticity' which is not only consistent and thorough but also able to inform the interpretation of these notions with a compelling analysis of the practices through which music is performed and received by the audience.

The way in which I conduct this research is twofold. On the one hand, I apply analytical tools to construct a solid and consistent ontology of musical works, which I call Musical Stage Theory. On the other hand, though, I do not neglect to acknowledge actual musical practices and to inform the theory with this understanding. Given the plenitude of elaborate and insightful views about the ontology of musical works already existing in the literature, a question that the reader may reasonably ask is 'Why should we need another theory?'. In what follows I will explain how my position stands in respect to other views and the reasons why I believe that a new theory, and in particular Musical Stage Theory, is needed.

1.1 Wider Context

Owing to its hybrid nature at the boundary between philosophy and musicology, this research inserts itself into more than one debate in the literature. In regard to the ontological analysis of musical works, it naturally places itself within the debate which has interested analytic philosophers since the late 1960s. At the same time, though, given my commitment not to neglect the analysis of different musical entities and practices (improvisation, recording, computer-based performance and composition, etc.) my contribution also adds to these other discussions in musicological and philosophical literature.

As to the issue of authenticity, this notion has been extensively investigated both by musicologists and philosophers. Interest in this topic developed mainly after the resurgence of studies on Early Music at the end of the 19th century and, even more widely, during the mid-20th century. Musicologists began this venture with studies on performing practices in the 1960s, which were then taken up by philosophers.[1] The

[1] Nelson Goodman is one of the first to address this theme in his research. See Goodman 1968.

peak of interest in musical authenticity in philosophical literature occurred in the 1980s and 1990s with the research of Stephen Davies and Peter Kivy.[2] More recently, with a few exceptions, the debate over authenticity has waned, despite the fact that no consensus on the nature of authenticity has yet been reached.

In this Introduction, I will not offer a lengthy review of the literature addressing this topic, since in Chapters 1 and 2 I survey the literature on the ontology of musical works and authenticity before offering my personal contribution to the debate in the following chapters. What is relevant here, though, is how I engage with the existing literature and what position I take in respect to it.

As will be clearer from what follows, the accounts of ontology and authenticity that I propose are intended to offer alternatives to existing views. Musical Stage Theory takes a revisionist stance in respect to previous accounts and aims to address their shortcomings. This does not mean that I object to every aspect of these other views. As I explain in Chapter 1, I acknowledge that they have their own merits. For example, type-token theories are well suited to provide elegant explanations of the repeatability of musical works, while Musical Perdurantists strive to give a better account of creatability than their rivals (even if they are not completely successful in their attempt). The fault I identify in all these theories, however, is their failure to adequately inform their accounts with real-life modes of performance and reception. In other words, the frameworks of their theories are unable to incorporate interpretations of actual musical phenomena such as, for example, the pervasive presence of improvisation or the contextual assessment of the judgement of authenticity for musical performances.

My contribution to the literature on these topics thus follows this path: it sets out to enrich the debate on the ontology and authenticity of music not just by adding a further theoretical approach but also by attempting to find ways to deal with practical realities. The declared aim of the thesis is to propose a new account for the ontology of musical works. But this is not the only, and perhaps not even the most important, aim. I do not wish Musical Stage Theory to be simply the latest philosophical view on how to understand the nature of musical works. Rather, I hope that it will have an actual impact on how musical works are performed, studied, and received.

[2] See Davies 1987; 1988; 1988a; 1991; Kivy 1995.

1.2 Rationale of the Research

As will be explained in Chapter 3, Musical Stage Theory brings performance to the fore. Musical works should not be looked for in some Ideal realm, nor should they be identified with the actions of composers or with collections of multiple performances. Practice comes first. Still, Musical Stage Theory does not stem only from the wish to give due consideration to the sonic aspect of music. It also aims to account for our musical practices and the ways in which music is conceived and played better than other theories. What if we could go back to the 1700s and hear the same Sonata for cembalo played differently each time by its composer? And what if we could see musicians playing a Partita per Liuto without any score (the transcription of the performance being available only afterwards)? Would it change the way we conceive musical works? These scenarios are not imaginary. This is how music was understood before the rigid idea of the Work arose in the early 19th century. Most of these 'Works' are now played in a standardised way, just as if they were composed with the rules governing musical practice at the end of the 19th century.[3]

By casting the act of performance in a central role, Musical Stage Theory revolutionises the ideal of 'Classical music' in which the performance always comes after the work. In this way, Musical Stage Theory also seeks to overturn the way in which music is now approached by philosophers, musicologists, players, and conductors. Musical Stage Theory acts as a bridge between the disciplines of musicology and philosophy, and between them and the world of practitioners. As I will explain when addressing the challenges I faced in writing this thesis, musicologists and philosophers seem to talk two different languages. While philosophers, in the analytic fashion, aim to build consistent and robust theoretical structures with which to categorise the phenomena of the world (in this case, music), musicologists generally prefer not to build barriers between concepts and they analyse the singular phenomena instead of compartmentalising them. Both these antithetical approaches have benefits as well as flaws (from which, I admit, my thesis is not exempt). A common flaw of the philosophical approach is to try to draw clear-cut edges around concepts which are in reality much fuzzier and resistant to unequivocal

[3] As I will discuss, the Historically Informed Practice tradition, which aims to respect the performing practices of Early Music, also fails in its intent because it fails to acknowledge how approaches to music were completely different in the past.

definitions. For their part, musicologists run the risk of missing out on meaningful results by focusing only on particular and disconnected facts. Adding to these difficulties in communication is the difference between theorists in general (both philosophers and musicologists) and musicians. Often, in their eagerness to build coherent theoretical constructions, theorists fail to address and account for the actual needs and practices of musicians. For what concerns for musicians, as the interviews I conducted will show, they rarely stop to think about why they made certain choices, and how they might justify them.

Musical Stage Theory sets out to fill these gaps. It starts from an acknowledgement of the relevance of performers' choices for the nature of musical works, it accounts for the different practices adopted in different periods and genres, and, lastly, it tries to include this particular and practical data in a consistent theoretical framework. The rationale behind the willingness to account for individual practices is dictated by the conviction that, in analysing a social phenomenon like music, the consideration of actual practices cannot be neglected. The design of a theoretical framework in which to include them, on the other hand, is useful to promote dialogue between the various actors and to analyse different musical events through the same tools.

In line with the aim that motivates the presentation of Musical Stage Theory as a novel view on the nature of musical works, is the proposal of an alternative account for the concept of authenticity. Like the notion of musical work, the notion of authenticity has been influenced by the ideals that governed musical practice in the 19th and 20th centuries. I argue for the need to move the debate about authenticity forward. A performance of a Scarlatti Sonata can be authentic because it respects the instructions written on the score, as a representation of the composer's idea about the piece, because it makes use of period instruments, or because it is true to the performer's philosophy of playing, and so on. But which of these requirements is more relevant than the others? Would we be able to list them hierarchically? In Chapter 6 I will defend a contextualist idea of authenticity: there is not one single authenticity but many and their assessment depends on contextual factors. For example: score-compliance may be the preferred requirement of authenticity if we need to play a Mozart Concerto in front of a panel for a competition. But, arguably, that performance would lack personal authenticity, which may be preferred in another context, for example in an album that promotes innovative interpretations of the piece.

In this section I outlined the rationale behind my research and, more generally, how it stands in respect to other views expressed in the literature. But I have not addressed how the collaboration between the fields of philosophy and music will be conducted, what benefits it brings to the research, and what challenges arise from it. This is addressed in the next section.

2. Music and Philosophy: Benefits and Challenges

From the presentation of the aims of the research in the previous section, the interdisciplinary nature of the project should already be clear. The twofold approach to the research questions on the ontology and authenticity of music, which are philosophically consistent and at the same time musically appropriate, is intended to demonstrate how philosophical theory and musical practice can be combined to arrive at results that are fruitful for both fields. They are two interwoven threads that run throughout the thesis.

In this section, I will discuss how the pursuit of interdisciplinary research brings with it evident benefits but also some challenges. The benefits brought by the interdisciplinary approach should already be partly evident from the aims that I presented in the previous section. One challenge that I recognise is the resistance between musicologists and philosophers of music to collaborate. This may be an inevitable consequence of the aforementioned diversity of research approaches that characterise the two disciplines: while philosophers seek generalisations and well-built theories, musicologists and, more obviously, musicians, tend to study individual examples and the contexts which surround them.

The attempt to reconcile these two directions of research can undoubtedly bring relevant benefits, which may even mitigate the flaws within the two disciplines. I tried to exploit the training I received in both philosophy and music – as a pianist alongside my philosophical studies – to embark on an attempt to synthesise the rigour of philosophical theory with the richness of detail of musical studies.

The major benefit that I believe results from these interdisciplinary connections is the possibility of fulfilling the aim of creating an ontological theory that challenges the claims of other theories while remaining in touch with the vagaries of real-world

musical practices. Musical Stage Theory is considerably more flexible than other theories, which tend to abstract from practice, and is thus better suited to account for the diversity and context-dependency of musical practice.

My aim is to appeal to every actor involved in the musical market. Performers can resort to Musical Stage Theory to reflect on the way in which they engage with other performers' renditions of a score and to acknowledge the value that their original contribution can bring. Conductors can justify their diverse choices of orchestration, dynamics, tempi, or balance in a symphony on the basis of the audience in front of them. Musicologists can consider the usefulness of employing a framework which provides explanations for a variety of different musical phenomena. And, finally, philosophers can acknowledge how the analysis of individual practices can make their theoretical structures more compelling, as opposed to weakening them. The ramifications of my reconsideration of musical ontology will hopefully help to bridge the gulf between theory and practice, with benefits for both.

Predictably, this combination of theory and practice also presents some challenges. The most basic one concerns differences between the specialist language associated with the disciplines. Depending upon the nature of the research conducted in different parts of the thesis – usually more strictly controlled for philosophy and more descriptive for music – the sections devoted to philosophical analysis (Chapters 1, 3, 6) are more bare and precise in style, while the sections which consider musicological aspects and musical case studies (Chapters 2, 4, 5) are more discursive and anecdotal. This difference could lead to two unwelcome consequences. The first being a lack of harmony within the structure of the thesis as a whole, and the second being the difficulty for musicologists to understand the philosophical chapters and vice versa. To try to avoid these pitfalls, I open each chapter with a short scene involving a dialogue between friends. These overtures are intended to offer plausible real-life scenarios and to introduce in plain words the topic to be addressed in the chapter.[4] This device will hopefully help the reader to engage with the discussion and to understand the importance of addressing the topic.

Another challenge, more troublesome than the first, is to try to enhance the research in one discipline with that in the other, without misrepresenting either nor betraying

[4] I wish to thank the Royal Literary Fund, since the residential creative writing workshop I attended played a relevant role in considering the stylistic part of my thesis. I thank also the Midlands3Cities/AHRC for funding my participation to the workshop.

their intents. This difficulty has proved a very real problem over the past few years whenever I presented my work at conferences devoted to musicology and philosophy. Usually, musicologists agree with the aim of my work and appreciate the need to acknowledge actual musical practices in the construction of a theoretical framework, but they seldom understand the philosophical requirement of framing these different events within a coherent and homogeneous theoretical structure. On the other hand, philosophers usually seem suspicious when I introduce the contentious claim that every individual performance must be considered a work, but they eventually relax once they see that this claim can be justified on a well-grounded analytical foundation.

I try to meet this challenge in my research by showing in each chapter how the two fields can benefit from a dialogue with each other. For example, in Chapter 4 I discuss how analytical considerations stemming from Musical Stage Theory can help to address the issue of creativity in computer-generated music. Besides any theoretical interest that this discussion may generate, it can also make a significant contribution to the practical debate on copyright attribution. Conversely, in Chapter 5 I show how the analysis of musical case studies can help to reinforce the ontological framework of Musical Stage Theory and to corroborate its validity by engaging directly with musical discourse.

The philosophy-music duality not only brings benefits and challenges to my research, but also leads to a duality in the methodology I adopt. The next section will address extensively the methodological choices I make, inserting them into a wider context of methodological analysis in the field of analytical aesthetics. What may seem a digression from the central topics of the thesis is in fact necessary to explain why I made certain choices in structuring my ontological theory, and to understand how I position my research within the spectrum of descriptivist and revisionist theories.

3. Methodology

In this section I provide an overview of the discussions over methodology in the ontology of art, and of music in particular. I start from a relevant and useful question about the identity of musical works, which has been questioned by Amie Thomasson. After having stated my position in this respect, I analyse the problematic clash between

the appeal to intuitions for answering ontological questions and the necessity of providing these answers with metaphysical foundations. At their extremes – a total compliance with intuitions we bear in respect to musical works, as opposed to metaphysical constraints – both positions present inconsistencies that are difficult to reconcile. I will explain how my stance occupies the middle ground and how the novel account for musical ontology I propose can avoid the issues encountered by the two radical positions.

In the third part of the section I address a critical distinction that I deem necessary to tackle before getting deeper into the thesis, namely the distinction between what we consider an 'artwork' and a 'musical work' and how these two concepts overlap, if they do. In the last part I discuss the distinction between descriptive and revisionary ontology, addressing the reasons for subscribing to one side or the other. I end the section with a description of how my account places itself in regard to them, and whether it is necessary to put forward a new account of musical ontology in addition to the ones that are already available.

Before launching into a discussion of the question 'What is a work of music?', I feel the need to specify the tradition I refer to and why. As explained in Chapter 1, the debate over what to consider a 'work of music' has deep roots. Following the publication of Lydia Goehr's *Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* (1992), one repertoire gained predominance over others in studies on the subject. I too follow this established approach. Most of the examples that I will present in the following chapters are taken from so-called Western Art Music. But it is crucial to note that Musical Stage Theory is meant to apply equally well to every musical tradition. The notion of musical work as we use it was, in fact, shaped by how music was conceived and presented throughout the 19th and 20th centuries in the western world, i.e. as a body of autonomous artworks that should be preserved intact and unchanged for posterity. But limiting the idea of what music is to such a narrow period and area is hard to justify. Music exists beyond the Western Classical tradition and I argue that any concept of musical work should take account of this.

3.1 What is the Ontology of Art?

Within the fields of aesthetics and philosophy of art, focusing attention onto the ontology of artworks has raised mixed responses. While many theorists are concerned with questions about the nature of artworks, other deem ontological issues worthless. Yet, the interest in ontology plays a relevant role in the development of analytic aesthetics. This emerging area of philosophy, in fact, 'required that all potential sources of nebulosity be expunged.'[5] Determining exactly what nature a work of art is supposed to have seems to agree with this quest for analysis.

Amie Thomasson defines the enquiry on the ontology of art in this way: 'Determining the ontological status of works of art involves determining the conditions under which a work of art comes into existence, remains in existence, and is destroyed (persistence conditions) and also the conditions under which works of art are one and the same (identity conditions).'[6] Debates on the ontology of art thus have implications for both the practical and the theoretical field. Spelling out what a work of art is, is not only relevant at a merely speculative level, but it also guides practical choices such as those that must be taken in curating and restoring art.[7] Yet having the last word on the matter is not an easy task. Indeed, as Thomasson claims and as I will discuss in the next section, when analysing the nature of artworks many different elements need to be considered. Alongside these we should also consider the practices that are involved in talking about and dealing with artworks.[8] But we cannot expect our practices to be immutable and consistent and, as a result, 'where our practices are not determinative we shouldn't expect determinate answers.'[9]

All this vagueness and haphazardness leads Thomasson to argue that '"What is the ontological status of the work of art?" is an ill-formed and unanswerable question.'[10] That is, we should stop trying to find a unique answer to this question, applicable to all art forms. It would be sufficient to find an answer for the individual arts, e.g. paintings, works of music, sculptures, etc. I agree with Thomasson on this point as I do not believe it possible to find a single answer that explains the ontological nature of all kinds of artworks. Musical works, novels, paintings, ballets, each possesses

[5] Gardner 2014, 233.
[6] Thomasson 2006, 245.
[7] See Ibid.
[8] See Ibid., 249.
[9] Ibid., 250.
[10] Ibid.

distinctive characteristics which make them distinguishable from other ordinary objects and artworks. Therefore, it is useless to find a unified answer. I do not presume that the new account for the ontology of musical works I present could explain the ontological status of other forms of art as well. During the thesis I will draw parallels with other art kinds, but only as a tool to clarify a concept or to highlight similarities.

To conclude this section, before addressing the conflict between intuitions and metaphysics in the ontology of art, I want to turn to one last issue, that of the desiderata of ontologies of art. Many theories in the ontology of art individuate some desiderata that are deemed essential requirements for the interest and soundness of the theory proposed. Theorists are keen to show how their theories can account for those desiderata. In Chapter 1, I too will individuate three desiderata for the ontology of musical works. In the thesis I will discuss how Musical Stage Theory addresses each of them, with a specific focus on Epistemological Grasp as the desideratum that, in respect to the other two, better demonstrates the value of Musical Stage Theory. An objection that may arise concerns the aptness of subscribing to a theory on the basis of its arbitrarily chosen desiderata. Robert Stecker, for example, argues that 'appeals to desiderata do not exhaust the grounds for choosing among these ontologies.'[11] I agree that an appeal to the desiderata individuated as prerequisites is not enough to argue for one ontology over others. However, I believe that if they are insufficient, the desiderata offer nevertheless a relevant starting point. They pick out some of the distinctive features that we believe an artwork should possess. As for the arbitrariness of the choice of desiderata, it is not a choice based on personal preference. Usually, as I said, desiderata highlight some intuitions that we have in respect to those artworks or some structural necessities that they should present. In the next section I am going to discuss the clash that may emerge between these intuitions and the metaphysical requirements we ascribe to artworks.

3.2 Intuitions vs Metaphysics

In the previous section I mentioned that the desiderata set as requirements within many ontologies of art can derive from our intuitions in respect to artworks. Yet, as

[11] Stecker 2009, 375.

Thomasson has pointed out, these intuitions may vary or be vague. How could the appeal to intuitions comply with the requirement of ontological cogency? As a starting point, I believe it is widely accepted – with some exceptions – that we have some intuitions about the ontological features that artworks should possess.[12] In relation to musical works, for example, we can have the intuition that they come into existence, that they possess a sound structure and so on.[13]

Theorists who allow for such intuitions also believe that we should necessarily take them into account, even if it means that we have to partially revise them: 'most people admit we can't consistently hold on to all our intuitions.'[14] The issue that theorists who want to base their ontology on intuitions need to face, is that intuitions may be contradictory and difficult to include within a rigid framework. That is why a revisionary stance in respect to intuitions is needed: 'we should actuate a '"revision" or "regimentation" of the folk concept to enable a move from several possible ontologies of music to one.'[15] But a revisionary approach is not the only stance we can take in respect to intuitions. Guy Rohrbaugh, for example, claims that instead of revising intuitions we should explain and include them in the framework of our ontology.[16]

It is then possible to individuate at least three standpoints regarding intuitions: (i) acknowledge their existence but do not adopt them as essential component of the ontology (this is what David Davies does, according to Andrew Kania),[17] (ii) acknowledge intuitions and revise them in order to include them within the ontology, (iii) acknowledge intuitions about the ontology of artworks and try to explain them through the ontology itself. In section 3.4 it will become clear how these revisionary or descriptivist stances in respect to intuitions influence the approach that theorists adopt in regard to the ontology of art in general.

In order to contain the issue of multiplication and vagueness of intuitions, a possible solution is to ground the ontological theory at issue on a solid metaphysical basis. The intrusion of metaphysics in aesthetics is not always welcome.[18] The worry is that what

[12] See Kania 2008, 431.
[13] See Stecker 2009, 376.
[14] Kania 2008, 432.
[15] Stecker 2009, 384.
[16] See Kania 2008, 432–433.
[17] See Ibid., 431.
[18] See Gardner 2014, 237.

can be explained in detail no longer holds artistic interest.[19] Principles of metaphysics that are usually applied to objects of everyday life, however, can be useful in tightening up the vagueness that results from the mere appeal to intuitions. I will discuss in more detail how this 'metaphysical constraint'[20] is applied in revisionary ontologies in the thesis. Here I want to address one of the objections that has been raised against it. Kania argues that the way metaphysics deals with ordinary objects is not directly relevant for the ontology of artworks. In contrast to ordinary objects, in fact, artworks are cultural artefacts, the nature of which depends on learned codes and practices and linguistic attitudes.[21]

Even granting that fundamental metaphysics cannot help when we are dealing with complex cultural entities like artworks, it is nevertheless true that some metaphysical tools and methods can be useful in regimenting the ontology of artworks.[22] Part of the issue may be solved by looking at the distinction between artworks and musical works that I discuss in the next section.

In structuring my novel account of musical ontology, in Chapter 3 I apply an independently motivated metaphysical theory, i.e. Theodore Sider's Stage View.[23] The aim in proposing a new account in this field is in fact twofold: I intend to present an account which gives due relevance to actual musical practices and intuitions and which, at the same time, is grounded on a solid ontological basis. From what emerged in the previous discussion, this could be seen as an almost impossible combination. Yet, I believe that obtaining this result is indeed possible. As I will explain in Chapter 3, I manage to account for both common intuitions and the need for a solid ontology by individuating two different concepts of musical work: the work-as-performance, which constitutes the ontological basis of the theory, and the work-as-construct, which responds better to our intuitions but does not play the role of basic ontological entity in Musical Stage Theory. If the matter so far is quite vague, it will become clearer when I will address the details of Musical Stage Theory.

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[19] See Gardner 2014, 245.
[20] Kania 2008, 436.
[21] See Ibid., 437; Stecker 2009, 382; D. Davies 2009, 162.
[22] I will address this objection again in Chapter 3.
[23] See Sider 2001.

3.3 Artworks and Musical Works

I mentioned above the distinction that we should draw between what we call 'art' and what we call 'musical work'. As Thomasson points out, the ontological kinds of art vary throughout time, as some forms of art disappear and others are introduced.[24] What we call 'art' depends on multiple factors. What is labeled as art now would not have been recognised as such one hundred years ago or even now in a different culture, and vice versa. For this reason Thomasson suggests that 'the question of how "art" is to be defined must be distinguished from the question of what the ontological status of works of various kinds is.'[25] The difficulty we meet in making this distinction derives from the fact that we are used to consider musical works, paintings, or sculptures as inseparable from the aura of 'artwork' that surrounds them. However, we need to remember, for example, that pieces of music that we now call artworks were not regarded as such. In the past, music was generally considered to be merely a craft. What we are used to calling musical work is a result of the 'classical music' tradition invented in the 19th century. The link between music and art as we understand it now, however, is not valid for many cultures and periods.[26] It is thus safer to distinguish between the two concepts of 'artwork' and 'musical work'. The concept 'musical work' exists independently of whether we consider it art or not. An improvisation on the lute in the 14th century would not have been considered an 'artwork' by contemporaries, yet it may be considered an 'artwork' now. The same can be said for a piece composed by computer software: we may struggle to define it as an 'artwork' but it is less contentious to call it a 'musical work'.[27] In this sense, the concept of musical work is less embedded with cultural practices and traditions than the concept of artwork. It can thus be a more suitable concept to be analysed with the tools provided by metaphysics.

In the next section I will trace the distinction between descriptive and revisionary ontologies of art. The appeal to intuitions and metaphysics mentioned above works as a fence between the two positions. I will conclude by presenting my stance, thus setting the premises for the new account I intend to propose.

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[24] See Thomasson 2006, 251.
[25] Ibid.
[26] In Chapter 5 I will give more detailed examples of that.
[27] In Chapter 4 I will provide reasons for accepting or refusing this claim.

3.4 Descriptivist vs Revisionary Ontologies

Kania identifies two lines in the ontology of music, corresponding to the distinction made by Peter Strawson between revisionary and descriptive metaphysics.[28] Descriptivists are concerned with the description of our beliefs and thoughts about musical works. For descriptivists, then, the appeal to intuitions is crucial for the ontology of music. The extreme consequence of descriptivism, as Kania puts it, is the claim that there is no such thing as a musical work, only the representation that we give of it.[29] If the artistic practice constrains the ontology to this extent, then 'ontologists of art are also (or should be) engaged in a more descriptive than revisionary project.'[30]

David Davies adopts an approach of this kind for his ontology of music. As a starting point Davies poses the pragmatic constraint (PC): 'PC has a normative dimension, in that it does not require that ontology conform to our practice per se, but to those features of our practice that we deem acceptable on reflection.'[31] The premise of his theory is that reflection on our artistic practices should help us to individuate the features that make up the ontology of a musical work.[32] That Davies places himself on the descriptivist side of the spectrum is clear also from his rejection of a revisionary ontology: 'no acceptable ontology can require that we revise the basic conception of artistic appreciation to be found in that practice.'[33]

Revisionary ontologies of music grant that we have some intuitions concerning musical works, but they revise them to create a better and more consistent theory. Instead of a pragmatic constraint, they impose a 'metaphysical constraint' to their accounts in order to make them '*metaphysically respectable.*'[34] To propose a revisionary approach to the ontology of musical works, and thus to abandon actual intuitions, a theorist should have good reasons to motivate this move. Thomasson indicates some of the possible reasons that could encourage some to follow the revisionary path.[35] The first is that a revisionary theory is needed to contain the lack

[28] See Kania 2008, 434.
[29] See Ibid., 439.
[30] Ibid., 434.
[31] Davies 2009, 162.
[32] See Kania 2008, 430.
[33] Davies 2009, 163.
[34] Kania 2008, 436.
[35] See Thomasson 2006, 252.

of precision that inevitably derives from our language about art. A second justifying reason to be revisionary is to solve the inconsistencies of our practices. Only in this way would it be possible to explain why our talk about art does not necessarily match our ontological convictions.

I believe that both positions on this spectrum have some flaws. On the one hand, the descriptivist approach fails to provide a consistent picture about the identity of works that could help us in classifying the regularities that we can experience also in our practice. On the other hand, revisionists are too hasty in getting rid of some of our intuitions. I take a stance in the middle of this spectrum. Because of the multitude of intuitions and linguistic attitudes towards musical works, I believe that the descriptivist approach does not lead to useful results. However, our intuitions about musical works need to be acknowledged and kept in consideration. Although the account I propose is in its structure revisionary, it deals with the ways in which we commonly think and speak about music. The consideration of our linguistic and artistic practices should act as starting point for an ontology of musical works, but some kind of reorganisation is needed.[36]

In this section I have outlined the main standpoints in respect to the methodology for the ontology of musical works, and I have explained where I place myself in this respect. The drive behind my proposal comes from the desire to reconcile an ontological foundation with the appeal to intuitions, and also from what I believe is the necessity of providing an ontology of musical works which is suitable not only for the paradigm of classical music but for all musical traditions and times.

3.5 Interviews

To conclude this section, I need to describe one alternative methodology applied in my research. I mentioned more than once how a new account of both the ontology of music and the authenticity of performances aims to reconcile theory and practice. And what better way could there be for having first-hand contact with musical practice than interviewing performers on their ideas regarding authenticity? I therefore conducted

[36] In this I agree with Dodd (2010) who believes that revising our folk conception of musical works helps to get rid of the inconsistencies that are necessarily implied by it. I go farther than Dodd in trying to address empirical practices and shape my ontological theory after them.

interviews with fifteen performers, conductors, researchers, and philosophers from the UK, Italy, and Canada. I asked questions on the ways in which they approach the issue of authenticity in performance and on whether their practice is somehow informed by their theoretical position on the matter. I will talk about the results extensively in Chapter 2 and, to a lesser extent, in Chapter 4. This direct contact with practitioners' approaches to performance was essential to inform an account of authenticity which was not limited to how the notion is interpreted in the literature or by past musicians. Although the responses I received do not help us to obtain a clear answer in regard to what is the most widely adopted notion of authenticity, they nevertheless provide evidence to show how the problem of a lack of consensus and clarity on authenticity is real and present.

The combination of traditional methodology used in analytic philosophy with experimental methods of gathering data serves the overall aim of the thesis to combine tools and knowledge from the different areas of theory and practice.

4. Summary of Chapters

4.1 Chapter 1

The first chapter of the thesis is devoted to the analysis of recent theories which address the first of the two research questions that guide my research: 'What is a musical work?'. This analysis focuses on how different theories account for three main desiderata for the ontology of musical works, which I claim to be essential: repeatability (Rep), creatability (Creat), and epistemological grasp (Grasp).

The requirement of (Rep) is based on the intuition that musical works must be repeatable, since multiple events can qualify as their performances. (Creat) refers to the ordinary belief that musical works are creatable entities that need to be actually brought into being by an act of composition. Finally, (Grasp) calls for the need to have contact with the work in order for us to be able to claim that we 'know' it. Positing these desiderata will be useful in Chapter 3, when I present my account of the ontology of musical works: Musical Stage Theory, the view that a work is a performance.

Indeed, Musical Stage Theory will have as one of its principal aims that of giving a better account of (Grasp) than the other theories available.

The theories I consider are type-token theory and Musical Perdurantism. The type-token theory elegantly accounts for the desideratum of (Rep) but it struggles to meet the other two. The other theory I present, Musical Perdurantism, is proposed by Caplan and Matheson precisely with the intent of responding to the flaws of the type-token account in relation to (Creat). The decision to focus on these two theories is twofold. First of all, they are authoritative representatives of mainstream (type-token theory) and alternative (Musical Perdurantism) theories of musical ontology. Secondly, they are the principal opponents that the theory I will present in Chapter 3 attempts to counteract.

After having shown the urgent need to propose another theory which can account for the contact we have with musical works, in the second part of the chapter I consider the role that the interpretation of the performer plays in the ontology of performances. In particular, I will analyse the ontological profile of performances, ask in what sense it is possible to claim that a performance is either correct or incorrect, and suggest how the concept of interpretability can help us to make sense of the differences between one performance and other performances derived from the same act of composition.

4.2 Chapter 2

Although it momentarily puts the investigation concerning analytic ontology on the side, Chapter 2 mirrors Chapter 1 in providing an overview of the literature available on the topic of authenticity. The discussion in this chapter reaches the conclusion that the debate on authenticity has reached a point of stalemate.

First, I consider how different theories address the issue of authenticity from an ontological point of view. What emerges from this comparison are the various implications of this multifaceted topic and the inevitable multiplicity of accounts that can be given of it. I then proceed with an account of the history and development of the Early Music Movement (EMM) and its later offshoot, the Historically Informed Performance (HIP) movement. It was with the developments of these movements, in fact, that research on authenticity gained strength. I explore the reasons that led to the raising of concerns over how we can establish the authenticity of a performance, the

actual changes that this new attitude brought to performances, and the consequences of these changes.

In the last part of the chapter, I focus on the contemporary state of the debate among professional performers in regard to authenticity. Here I use the data collected from a number of interviews conducted with musicians in the course of my research. This will help me to get a firsthand and up-to-date view on the current discussion on the topic. I try to keep the analysis of the topic of authenticity as objective as possible. The critical discussion on whether the traditional account of authenticity represents an achievable or even desirable aim will be left for Chapter 6.

4.3 Chapter 3

In this chapter I return to the analytic investigation by proposing an alternative answer to the question 'What is a musical work?' in opposition to those already available in the literature. Here I present for the first time an entirely new account of the ontology of musical works: Musical Stage Theory. This proposal has a twofold intent: first, to suggest a way to analyse the identity of musical works which gives due relevance to musical practices, and second, to ground this analysis on a solid ontological foundation.

The first part of this twofold aim is achieved by showing how Musical Stage Theory is able to explain in a straightforward manner our epistemological contact (Grasp) with musical works. The second part is achieved by grounding Musical Stage Theory on an independently motivated theory on the ontology of persistence: Theodore Sider's Stage View. In the chapter I outline Sider's Stage View, focusing in particular on the aspects that are beneficial for the development of Musical Stage Theory.

I then proceed to a defence of Musical Stage Theory itself, outlining the points of contact with Sider's view and the inevitable adaptations that need to be made. Musical Stage Theory posits the view that a musical work *is* a performance. It is neither, as the Platonists claim, an abstract and eternal entity, nor a class of performances, as in the nominalist tradition. For this reason, Musical Stage Theory is easily able to explain how we can say that we 'know' a work by listening to it. Nevertheless, according to Musical Stage Theory the way we group performances together also plays a relevant role for explaining our linguistic attitudes in relation to musical works. This is why, in

addition to the work-as-performance, I allow for a wider concept of ‘musical work’, which I call the work-as-construct. Later in the paper, I discuss how Musical Stage Theory can respond to some potential objections that may be raised against some aspects of its ontology. I set out to show how Musical Stage Theory is able to defend itself by consistently resorting to the same strategy which can, in line with the theory as a whole, be closely aligned with a strategy used by Sider.

Finally, the last part of the chapter is devoted to outlining the benefits brought by the adoption of Musical Stage Theory as an ontology of musical works. In addition to the benefits of giving due relevance to actual musical practices and of providing an account of our grasp of musical works, the contextual nature of the relation which allows us to shift reference systematically from the work-as-performance to the work-as-construct allows a greater flexibility in evaluating performances and grouping them together. As Chapter 6 makes clear, a further advantage of Musical Stage Theory is that it provides the ontological framework for an alternative, and arguably better, way of accounting for authenticity in musical performance.

4.4 Chapter 4

This chapter complements Chapter 3 in the ontological discussion about the nature of musical works. Indeed, for the sake of completeness of the ontological analysis, in this chapter I discuss the ontological profile of recordings and software-based performances, and how the advent of technology in music led to a reconsideration of parts of its ontology. More specifically, I demonstrate how Musical Stage Theory is able to account for the nature of musical recordings and computer-based performances and compositions.

In the first part of the chapter, I give an overview of the development of recording technology, discussing the benefits that the recording and reproduction of music entails but also its disadvantages. Regardless of its pros and cons, it is undeniable that the changes brought about by the use of recording technology have resulted in a reconsideration of the ontological profile of music.

The second part of the chapter is devoted to the highly topical issue of computer-based music. The use of software and AI has expanded the possibilities for both composers and performers, giving rise also to new musical trends and genres.

Nevertheless, the use of technology for this purpose has occasioned controversial consequences, especially the question as to whether a machine can create a musical work. Musical Stage Theory engages with the debate regarding AI and creativity, arguing that there is a need to reconsider the terms we use when addressing this topic. Technological devices for performing raise similar concerns: can a synthesizer produce a 'performance'? This section will allow me to continue the discussion on the role of intentionality in music started in Chapter 1. Throughout the discussion I also make use of the opinions on musical recordings and software-based performances expressed by the musicians I interviewed during my research, which I introduce in Chapter 2.

My claim is that recordings and computer-based performances and compositions cannot be considered works-as-performances, since they do not comply with the requirements set by the ontological profile of performances. Nevertheless, they can still be recognised as part of the work-as-construct, since they provide the audience with the necessary information for them to say 'I know work X'.

4.5 Chapter 5

This chapter analyses a series of case studies to show how we can apply the theoretical considerations given so far to actual musical practices. Musical Stage Theory, as already mentioned, aspires not only to have internal consistency and a logically satisfying framework, but also to be an effective tool to analyse and contextualise musical works in their relation with the audience. What emerges from the discussion carried out in this chapter is that Musical Stage Theory is more suitable than other views for providing an account of the status of musical works, especially in musical traditions beyond Western Classical music. In Chapter 3 I not only broaden the concept of 'work' but I also re-inform it with a different meaning. In this chapter, I show how the features that have been traditionally attributed to the concept of work are not applicable to many music traditions.

In particular, through the case studies I argue how traditional accounts of the ontology of musical works struggle to deal adequately with the pervasiveness of an improvisational element in many musical styles, both within and outside of the Western Classical tradition. By identifying musical works as performances, instead,

Musical Stage Theory effortlessly accommodates improvisations among musical works and, as a consequence, it is more suitable than other views for providing an account of the status of musical works.

4.6 Chapter 6

In the last chapter, I close the thesis by answering my second leading research question: 'When is a performance authentic?', proposing an alternative interpretation of the concept of authenticity in musical performance. I will suggest how a reconsideration of the terms involved, as established by our uses, and an acknowledgement of the relevance of contextual factors in shaping the criteria behind the assessment of authenticity, result in the legitimisation of a multiplicity of authenticities.

The novel account of authenticity I propose is grounded on the ontological layout of Musical Stage Theory. While at the level of work-as-performance the notion of authenticity seems to lose its regulative role, the contextual assessment of the relation at the basis of the shift of reference between work-as-performance and work-as-construct justifies a contextual assessment of the notion of authenticity. I thus justify the otherwise arbitrary conclusion reached by Peter Kivy (1995) through the ontological background of Musical Stage Theory. The final aim of the chapter will be not only to give new momentum to the debate regarding authenticity but also to defend the right of performers not to be constrained by this alleged authenticity.

Chapter 1

Theories on the Ontology of Musical Works

It's 2004 and the BBC Orchestra is giving a performance of Cage's 4'33'' *at London's Barbican Centre. Clare and Annie have their tickets ready for the lady at the entrance to check them.*
'Enjoy the concert', she says.
'I doubt it', mutters Annie. Clare had dragged her to what Annie would call a farce rather than a concert.
The musicians tune up and sit in silence. The only sounds that can be heard are some coughing and the rustling of the pages as the musicians turn them after each of the three movements prescribed by Cage. At the final applause Clare turns to Annie:
'Brilliant, isn't it?'
'Brilliant? How could you even call this gimmick a musical work?'
It's always like this with Clare, she likes experimental pursuits.

Why are Clare and Annie disagreeing on whether *4'33''* is a musical work? Is not the fact that it is being performed at a concert enough to make it a musical work? The disagreement of the two friends over calling *4'33''* a musical work depends on the regulative role that they think the concept of musical work plays. The features which an object should display in order to be called a 'work' are different for Clare and Annie. This tension is not exclusive to them. It threads through all the literature concerning the nature of musical works. This chapter addresses the different views held by scholars on what is and what is not a musical work.

Overview

Musical entities are regular occupants of our everyday life. We come into contact with musical examples while queuing at the supermarket or strolling along the road, if a car with the radio on passes by. For this reason, most people take for granted the

interactions we have with music. But, just as Saint Augustine pointed out in relation to time, the more we question the nature of musical works, the more difficult it seems to find an answer. Musical works, in fact, are not easily amenable to metaphysical analysis and theorists struggle to account for the peculiarities that identify them.

The first chapter of this thesis is devoted to the analysis of the recent theories which address the compelling question: 'What is a musical work?'. This analysis will be followed by a consideration of whether these theories offer a satisfactory answer, or whether they are in need of revision. I will argue that this necessity is urgent.

In section 1 I identify three desiderata which I deem should be satisfied by consistent theories about the ontology of musical works. I then give an overview of the most significant theories concerning the nature of musical works: type-token theory in section 2 and Musical Perdurantism in section 3. In sections 4–6 I move to an assessment of how these views account for the three desiderata listed in section 1. What emerges from this analysis is that the type-token view fares better in respect to the Repeatability (Rep) desideratum while Musical Perdurantism offers a better account of Creatability (Creat) than its rivals. However, none of them manages to satisfactorily account for all three desiderata without resorting to a heavy-handed revisionist approach. Finally, in section 7 I will discuss the ontological profile of performances, the criteria according to which we can define them as correct, and the amount of interpretability which is left to performers.

1. Three Main Desiderata

I specify three desiderata which I deem necessary for every theory on the ontology of musical works. These desiderata are the expression of common-sense beliefs about musical entities. Complying with these requirements, thus, not only provides consistency to the whole theory, but also has the advantage of meeting the expectations concerning the everyday experience of music. I should acknowledge that the categorisation of these desiderata as presented in the following sections is neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Other desiderata, in fact, can be deemed relevant for the purpose of analysing the identity of musical works. I will address some of these in section 7 on interpretation and performance. At this stage, the motivation behind the

present restriction of the main desiderata to only three is the following: the choice of these three desiderata is useful to address the different approaches that the theories on musical ontology hold and, later, to propose an alternative account.

(1) Repeatability (Rep). Intuitively, musical works are repeatable since there are multiple events that can qualify as their exemplars. We are used to linking various sound events that we listen to and relating them to the same concept of 'work'. From this ordinary process of connecting events, the repeatability of musical works has been taken to entail the distinction between the work and its instances. Indeed, this distinction seems to be supported by a Master argument: a work and its exemplars do not display the same features and therefore, from Leibniz's Law, they are distinct.[37] For example, while it can be reasonably said that a performance takes place in London or ends in *pianissimo*,[38] the same properties cannot be attributed to the work.[39] As a consequence, in line with Leibniz's Law, traditional theories argue that work and performances are distinct entities. Given this dichotomy between work and performance, these two objects must own different natures, and one of the aims of the ontology of musical works is to find out which features characterise them and which kind of relationship exists between works and performances.[40]

(2) Creatability, persistence, and end of existence (Creat). It is an ordinary belief that musical works are creatable entities that are not available before being actually brought into being through an act of composition. Once the work gains the status of 'existent', it then goes on to occupy its place among other ordinary existents, and presumably it continues to do so until it ceases to exist. In the same way as for the other desiderata, how this issue is addressed by each theory depends on how the nature of musical works is conceived. What does not change is the urge to give an account for the commonsensical view of the composer as a creator and of the musical work as a creatable object.

(3) Epistemological grasp (Grasp). 'Have you listened to the latest work by Babbitt, John?' 'Yes, I attended the premiere on Sunday night!' 'It's a masterpiece, isn't it? It

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[37] See Wollheim 1980, 10. I will come back to this issue in section 4.1.
[38] See Wolterstorff 1975, 115. See also Kivy 1993.
[39] I have silently shifted from exemplars to performances. The distinction between the two will be addressed later in section 7.
[40] I will address the distinction between work and performances also by taking into account two important issues: (i) the existence of unperformed works, (ii) the role of the score. In Chapter 3 I will address the question whether it is possible to consider an unperformed score a 'work'. I will instead address the role of the score and the relationship between score and performances in section 7 and in Chapter 5.

gave me goosebumps!'. This is a common dialogue which might be overheard on the tram between two colleagues commuting to the office. In this and similar situations it is common to refer to what we listened to as 'the work'. Yet, what we have perceived is, strictly speaking, a sound event. Therefore common sense seems to be committed to the idea of grasping a work through epistemological contact with its instances. As we shall see, different theories give different explanations of this initial intuition.

The three desiderata I have listed sum up the main issues every theory of musical ontology should address. However, as I will discuss in the next sections, none of the theories which have addressed this issue so far manages to satisfy all the three desiderata, focusing instead on complying with only one or two of them.

In the following sections, I will identify two families that subsume the main views on musical ontology and their main variants. The first family, type-token theories, elegantly account for the desideratum of (Rep) but struggle to meet the other two. The other family of views I present, materialistic views such as Caplan and Matheson's Musical Perdurantism, were developed precisely with the intent of dealing with (Creat), the desideratum they feel is left unaddressed by type-token views. As I will explain in more detail, however, Musical Perdurantism faces problems when confronting the two other desiderata. In Chapter 3 I will propose a view about musical works that is different from both the type-token and materialistic views and that will deal with all the desiderata: Musical Stage Theory.

2. Type-token Theories

Theories within the type-token family claim that musical works are abstract types and that performances are their concrete instantiations, or tokens. The wide label of 'type-token theories' subsumes narrower distinctions which gave rise to debates within the type-token community. One of these distinctions concerns (i) those who consider the sonic profile as sufficient for the identity of the work of music and (ii) those who add to the sonic profile also a contextual element. The first approach is known as 'sonicism', the second as 'contextualism'. As we shall see, relatedly, type-token theories have a different view when it comes to creation. But this will have to wait for now.

2.1 Sonicism

Both sonicism and contextualism are articulations of the mainstream, but by no means exclusive, view of structuralism, i.e. the hypothesis that works are, or include, sound structures with features that are transmitted to performances via a normative relation. This structure is considered by sonicists as the necessary and sufficient element in order to appreciate the work and to determine its aesthetic properties and hence its identity. However, even among sonicists there is a lack of agreement on what these essential properties are.

Peter Kivy is a supporter of pure sonicism. He claims that neither timbral properties, nor means of production are essential to the individuation of the identity of a musical work.[41] His assertion is based on the observation that the attitude towards instrumentation before and after the classical era was quite liberal. Equally, the composer is not always guided by a precise idea of the timbral quality of the piece she is composing. As a consequence, pure sonicists argue that sound structures should determine merely pitch and duration.

Even though he adopts the core points of sonicism, Julian Dodd defends the importance of timbral features in a musical work. According to Dodd, *acoustic indistinguishability*[42] is the necessary ground for work identity. I should point out that, for Dodd, the fulfilment of this requirement does not entail the use of the specific performative means indicated by the composer.[43] Notwithstanding this difference, pure and timbral sonicists take the identity of a sound structure as necessary and sufficient. Other type-token theories deny sufficiency. I turn to a brief sketch of two main positions with this view.

2.2 Levinsonian Contextualism

As I mentioned in the last section, sonicists consider only intrinsic properties as essential to a musical work, leaving aside contextual ones. That the composition of a

[41] See Kivy 1993, 86 *et seq.* Other works in which he expresses his views about music, and music identity in particular are: Kivy 1987; 1995.
[42] See Dodd 2007, 202. See also Dodd 2000; 2002; 2004a; 2010.
[43] See Dodd 2010. The importance of this distinction will emerge later on.

piece of music *W* was undertaken by a certain composer *Y* in time *z* is therefore not relevant for determining *W*'s identity.

Jerrold Levinson challenges the sonicist claim that the information provided by the sound structure is sufficient for the identity of musical works. He then proposes an alternative version of type-token theory, known as contextualism. His argument is based on Fine Individuation: musico-historical individuation criteria are relevant to the determination of the artistic and aesthetic features of the work.[44] As a result, he defines the work of music as a complex structure-as-indicated-by-X-at-t,[45] composed at a determined time *t* by the composer *X* and such that means of performance are integral to it.

Note how Levinson's particular solution to Fine Individuation not only denies the sufficiency of sound structure but puts forward a particular additional requirement on top of the contextual element. This is the rejection of (pure or timbral) sonicism: means of performance are also essential. I will return to this point separately.

The strictness of Levinson's claims has led some scholars to propose a milder version of contextualism. Stephen Davies claims that the historical setting in which a piece of music is created is an essential feature of the musical work's identity. However, he argues that Levinson's contextualism reaches too radical conclusions. The element towards which Davies mainly addresses his criticism is the specification of both means of performance and the composer's identity as substantial properties of a musical work. As for the inclusion of performance means, Davies argues that they not always represent a constitutive feature of a musical work.[46] During certain periods of the history of music, for example, the use of a particular instrument is not constitutive. The decision regarding which instrument provides the best rendition should be taken on a case-by-case basis, according to the *thickness* of the musical work. A work of music is *thick* if almost all of its properties are constitutive, otherwise, if the work's essential properties are few in number, it is *thinner*. Also Levinson's necessary requirement of the composer's identity is rejected by Davies.[47] According to the latter, it is the musico-historical setting that is relevant for the identity of the musical work, not the composer's identity. In Davies' account, it is therefore possible

[44] See Levinson 1980, 14. See also Levinson 2011.
[45] See Levinson 1980, 79.
[46] See Davies 2001, Chapter 2.
[47] See Ibid., 76 *et seq.*

for two composers to compose the same musical work if they share the same musico-historical location.[48]

2.3 The Contextualism of David Davies and Gregory Currie

The contextualist inclinations of Levinson and Stephen Davies are shared also by Gregory Currie and David Davies, who develop them, however, in the direction of a distinctive action theory. Currie argues against Levinson's definition of musical works as indicated structures (with reference to the problematic relationship between indication and creation, a matter that I will deal with later) and suggests an explanation of works of art as action types. An artwork, and therefore also a musical work, is an action type individuated by a structure together with the heuristic path of the person *X* at time *t*.[49] The heuristic path through which the artwork is created and its structure allow the distinction of one artwork from another. For example, they allow us to distinguish between a painting, a sculpture and a musical work. The person *X* and time *t*, instead, are *open places*,[50] not constitutive for the identity of the artwork. Therefore, in opposition to Levinson's and Stephen Davies' theories, it is possible for different composers at different times to compose the same work.

Although he agrees with the main claims of action theory, David Davies considers musical works not as types but as originating performances in which determinative features of the art-historical setting are incorporated.[51] The product of the performance is the *focus of appreciation,* while the artwork is the composer's creative performance in bringing the artwork into being. The importance of the context in Davies' theory, in opposition to aesthetic empiricism, is exemplified by his account of the *pragmatic constraint*, through which he claims the primacy of the appreciative practice on the ontology and thus a direct involvement of the conditions of creation and fruition.[52]

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[48] See Ibid., 79. For similar worries see also Anderson 1982.
[49] See Currie 1988, Chapter 3.
[50] See Ibid.
[51] See Davies 2004.
[52] See Davies 2009, 161 *et seq.* For other views on the type-token distinction applied to musical works, see also the following literature that I do not have the time to address here: Bachrach 1971; Harrison 1975; Howell 2002; Nussbaum 2003; Sharpe 1979; Walters 2013.

3. Materialistic Theories

In opposition to the theories we have explored so far, which can all be loosely grouped under the label 'type-token', materialistic accounts reject the idea of musical works as abstract entities that stand on a different ontological level to their concrete occurrences. Musical Perdurantism will be my main exemplar of materialism because of its intriguing relation to the view I will eventually defend in Chapter 3.[53]

Ben Caplan and Carl Matheson[54] are proponents of Musical Perdurantism. They regard the debate on the ontology of musical works through a perspective informed by an account of temporal parts.[55] Musical works are described as perduring entities: performances are temporal parts and their fusion constitutes the work of music. The musical work is thus a perduring 'worm' that lasts through time thanks to the performances which constitute it. This innovative account shifts the focus from works as abstract entities to works as concrete objects. Unfortunately, however, as I will explain in more detail when addressing the desiderata, the identification of the musical work with a fusion of its members raises some metaphysical problems that are related to the essentiality of the members for the identity of a group.[56]

Another exemplar of materialism is Guy Rohrbaugh's theory, which seeks to account for the modal and temporal flexibility of artworks.[57] His criticism is directed

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[53] Goodman's nominalism could, at least in spirit, fall into this section. Classes are in fact, among abstract objects, the nearest to material objects, see Goodman 1968. Chris Tillman is a supporter of musical materialism as well but, instead of perdurantism, he supports an endurantist picture of musical works where works coincide with their manifestations. He claims, in fact, that musical endurantism does not incur in the same problems that are raised against Musical Perdurantism and musical materialism in general, see Tillman 2011.

[54] See Caplan and Matheson 2006.

[55] A similar view is adopted by Peter Alward (2004), according to whom musical works are continuants and performances are temporal stages.

[56] For a view which engages with Musical Perdurantism, see Aliyev 2017.

[57] See Rohrbaugh 2003, 178. Modal flexibility is a desideratum that some theorists of musical ontology adopt but that I have left out from my three essential desiderata. The modal flexibility of a work of music is based on the assumption that some compositions could have been composed in a different musico-historical setting without losing their identity. This assumption is in contradiction with Levinson's claim according to which works composed in different contexts are different even if their sound structure is the same (Levinson 1980, 24). David Davies argues in favour of a work-relativity of modality (Davies 2004). It is possible for some musical works to present a greater modal flexibility than others (Davies 2004, 20 *et seq*.). For example, a composition that contains explicit connections to prior works, in the form of reference or parody, is less modally flexible than a musical work that is composed by a musician totally unaware of the previous or contemporary musical context. Davies maintains that, unlike Levinson's indicated structure theory, his performance theory is compatible with the account of the work-relativity of modality as the properties of the generative performance, i.e. the musical work, vary on a case-by-case basis. In 'Modality, Individuation and the Ontology of Art' (2008, 513–515) Caplan and Matheson defend the Contextualised Product Theory, showing that it can accommodate the modal flexibility theory by appealing to adequate characterisations of musical works.

above all against a platonistic account of musical works as types, on the grounds that it is incompatible with modal flexibility. Rohrbaugh thus claims that artworks should be considered as historical individuals persisting through history. Like all individuals, people included, artworks may have had different properties, may have undergone change through time, and may have entered in to and exited out of existence.[58]

In these sections I have given an overview of the profile of the views on musical ontology that will provide natural points of confrontation for my view: type-token theories and Musical Perdurantism. In the next section, I will address how these theories address each of the three desiderata I listed in section 1: repeatability (Rep), creatability (Creat), and epistemological grasp (Grasp). As I aim to show, none of them manages to account satisfactorily for all three desiderata. They all need to resort to revisionist moves.[59]

4. The (Rep) Repeatability Desideratum

The (Rep) desideratum stems from the intuitive belief that a musical work can be performed many times through multiple instances. In this section I discuss how the type-token theory and Musical Perdurantism account for this requirement. As will be shown, the type-token theory has an effective way of dealing with this desideratum, while the materialistic nature of Musical Perdurantism make the task more difficult for its supporters.

In most cases modal flexibility is in conflict with Platonistic views that identify the musical work with an eternal and unchanging type (see Dodd 2007).

[58] For other materialistic views regarding musical ontology, see Trivedi 2002; Tillman 2011.

[59] There are, of course, other views. An extreme solution is Ross Cameron's nihilism (2008a). I take it to be even more distant from commonsensical views on musical works. He claims that there is no need for the world to contain entities such as musical works in order to make the sentence 'there are musical works' true. It is sufficient that abstract sound structures play the role of musical works when we are referring to them. In this case, composers do not create new entities, but they simply provide instructions for the performance of abstract sound structures. Another extreme view is Aaron Ridley's who challenges the worthiness of engaging with an ontological discourse about music (see Ridley 2003).

4.1 Type-token Theory

The urge to address the issue of repeatability of musical works has led many authors to build their ontology on what seems the most straightforward model for explaining a one-many relationship, i.e. a model based on a universal-particular polarity. In what follows I will develop this idea, providing details that are not immediately needed but that will become useful when the discussion moves on to the proposal of a new theory for the ontology of musical works.

Richard Wollheim is a pioneer in the application of a type-token distinction to the ontology of musical works.[60] Works of music, and works of art in general, are not physical objects but 'generic entities' or types.[61] A single type is then related to a multiplicity of concrete tokens, which in the case of music are identifiable with performances. The relationship between type and tokens is more intimate than that which occurs between a class and its members or between a universal and its instances. Just as in the case of universals and particulars, types and tokens can share some properties. For example, the property of 'being red' can be predicated of both redness and red things. So too can the property of 'beginning with a semiquaver rest' be predicated from both a work and a performance.[62] But the intimacy of the relationship between type and token is given by the additional transmission of properties between them: 'all and only those properties that a token of a certain type has necessarily, i.e. that it has in virtue of being a token of that type, will be transmitted to the type.'[63] Thus, while the property of beginning with a semiquaver rest is essential to the token-performance and is transmitted to the type-work, the property of being red which is essential for the particular red thing cannot be transmitted to the universal redness. The repeatability of musical work is thus explained by Wollheim resorting to a general-particular relation which, as will be addressed in more detail while considering how the type-token theory deals with the desideratum of (Grasp), also allows us to interpret the particular closeness between a work and its performances.

Wollheim's account of the type-token relationship was later revised by Nicholas Wolterstorff. Just like Wollheim, Wolterstorff explains the feature of repeatability

[60] See Wollheim 1980.
[61] See Ibid., 65.
[62] See Ibid., 66.
[63] Ibid., 67.

through a distinction between general and particular. However, instead of types and tokens his target are kinds and examples. The subtle differences in the characterisation of these entities is underlined by Stephen Davies: 'a kind stands as a concept the propositional content of which (subjunctive conditional) specifies the nature of its instances without its being a collection of those instances; a type is an abstract individual which possesses and shares the definitive properties of its tokens.'[64]

The main difference between Wollheim's and Wolterstorff's theories consists however in the fact that while Wollheim talks of properties shared by types and their tokens, Wolterstorff deems that what is at issue are not properties but predicates. Wolterstorff points out that in many cases 'a sharing of a predicate does not have, underlying it, a sharing of a property for which the predicate stands.'[65] He compares musical kinds to natural kinds and argues that, as the grizzly possesses the property of being something that growls, the same property cannot be possessed by the Grizzly as a natural kind. Thus, a sharing of some predicates between a kind and its examples does not always lead to a sharing of properties between them.

Between the property correctly predicated of examples and the property correctly predicated of the work there is a systematic relation: the sharing of predicates between kinds and examples, both natural and art kinds, is *analogical.*[66] As we will see more accurately while addressing the (Grasp) desideratum, the individuation of the relation between work and performances as analogical allows Wolterstorff to answer the problem of attribution of sonic features to the work as a kind.

Although different in some respects, the theories elaborated by Wollheim and Wolterstorff are the baseline for all supporters of a distinction between works as abstract objects and performances. Subsequent structuralists look up to these two authors as 'elegant practitioners'[67] who provided thoughtful answers to the ontological problems of musical works. The assumptions which emerge from the description of the type-token theory as described by Wollheim and Wolterstorff are (i) that a musical type is a universal entity which constrains the sonic properties of its tokens and (ii) that a musical work can be identified with the type, i.e. an abstract entity individuated by structural properties essential both to the work itself and to its performances.

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[64] Davies 1991, 28.
[65] Wolterstorff 1975, 127.
[66] See Ibid., 126. On Wolterstoff's argument, see also Predelli 2011; Dodd and Letts 2017.
[67] See Kivy 1993, 57.

The type-token model in all of its applications to theories of musical ontology provides a satisfactory answer to repeatability. The duality universal-particular is in fact perfectly suited to give an account of the one-many relationship which characterises musical works. In the next section I will discuss how a materialistic account such as Musical Perdurantism places itself in regard to this desideratum.

4.2 Musical Perdurantism

Caplan and Matheson are not concerned with providing a specific explanation of the desideratum of repeatability, since they propose their account with the intent of suggesting an alternative to the issues that type-token theorists have in relation to (Creat). In the absence of the direct voice of the authors, I can only analyse the concept of (Rep) according to how I would address it if I were a musical perdurantist.

For Musical Perdurantism, the work is a fusion of performances. The work is thus a unique object, i.e. the fusion, which in itself cannot be repeatable. Following a rigid interpretation of Musical Perdurantism, it therefore seems that it cannot account for (Rep). The identification of the musical work with a fusion of performances prevents Perdurantism from individuating a one-many relationship that could explain repeatability. The musical work is a unique fusion and, by itself, it is not repeatable. Instead of being instances of the work, performances are here constituents of the 'worm'.

To allow for a charitable interpretation of how Musical Perdurantism could account for (Rep), the part-whole relation which stands between performances and their fusion can act as the traditional vertical relationship of (Rep). For the type-token theorists works are instantiated by many performances. For Musical Perdurantism, instead, the oneness of the fusion is not strictly speaking repeated through its components, but each performance somehow exemplifies some of the features of the fusion. In any case, the lack of a fully satisfying account of (Rep) is balanced by the alleged fulfilment of the (Creat) desideratum by Musical Perdurantism.[68]

[68] Other views on repeatability which have not been addressed here are by Franko 1989; Walters 2013.

5. The (Creat) Creatability Desideratum

5.1 Platonism

The second desideratum that theories on the ontology of music should take into account refers to the creation, persistence, and, perhaps, end of existence of musical works. One of the assumptions that we posit in relation to works of music is that they come into being with an act of composition performed by a composer. This desideratum has proved to be particularly problematic from the viewpoint of a particular version of type-token: the platonistic idea that, being exemplifiable abstracta, musical works are eternal.[69] In order to comply with commonsensical beliefs, though, these theorists propose replacing the notion of creation and of coming into being with the notions of 'discovery' or 'creativity'.

In his defence of musical Platonism, Kivy replies to Margolis' objection that an artwork 'cannot be a universal because [in part] it is created'[70] by identifying the act of composition with an act of discovery. According to Kivy, considering the composition of a musical work as an act of creative discovery instead of an act of creation is neither counterintuitive, nor does it subtract value from the composer's role. Just like scientific breakthroughs, musical composition consists in discovering and selecting material and information that already exists but which is still to be uncovered: 'it is the revealing, needless to say, of what has always been there, but which no one has yet had the genius and creative imagination to see; and it is all one whether the discovery is a scientific or a musical one.'[71] The godly halo that surrounds the composer as a creator is a product of Romantic culture, not an essential feature of musical composition.

Dodd pursues this platonic outlook and employs the traditional argument of property-sharing as a way to demonstrate that types are eternal and, incidentally, only indirectly perceivable entities. Following Wollheim's claim that every token is property-associated to types, Dodd states that 'Types exist eternally because a type's existence at a time *t* is guaranteed by the existence at *t* of the property of which it is the associate, and because all properties exist eternally. That is to say, the conclusion

[69] For this debate see Predelli 2001; Deutsch 1991; R. Cox 1985.
[70] Quoted in Kivy 1993, 38.
[71] Ibid., 43.

that types are eternal existents follows from (28) For any type *K* and any time *t*, *K* exists at *t*, if its property-associate, *being a k*, exists at *t*', and (29) All properties exist at all times.'[72] The non-creatability and eternity of musical works thus derives from the claim that the properties which are transmitted from tokens to types, and all properties in general, are eternal.[73]

Following Kivy, Dodd claims that we do not need to think that musical works are creatable, because it is enough to believe that they stem from an act of creativity. However, creativity is not the only motivation for our intuition. Most of us have intuition of creation. Platonists are left with an uncomfortable bullet to bite. This conclusion is in fact explicitly shared by some type-token theorists such as Levinson who, far from rejecting creativity, claims that it is consistent with the type-token approach.[74]

5.2 Contextualism

The counterintuitiveness of the sonicist consequence that musical works are eternal and thus uncreated entities is indeed the first argument developed by Levinson in his attempt to build a theory which preserves the benefits of the type-token distinction, getting rid of only its troublesome consequences.

The creatability requirement stems from the argument that the denial of the creatability of musical works claimed by sonicists is in conflict with two of the 'most firmly entrenched'[75] beliefs about artworks: i.e. the fact that (i) art is an activity that involves a process of creation by an artist and that (ii) we confer great value to art as an activity and to artists on the basis of their role as creators. It is then not enough to

[72] Dodd 2007, 60.
[73] Dodd's claim is based on what Caplan and Matheson call the 'Principle of Instantiation': 'A property F exists at a time t if and only if there is a time t* such that t* is either before, after, or identical to t and F is instantiated at t*.' As the two authors point out, however, in order to argue for this principle, it is necessary to believe that certain properties are uninstantiated and that these properties are transcendent, i.e. that they do not exist in the same world as us. If properties are eternal, in fact, it derives that the property 'being a dinosaur' still exists nowadays. Yet, being no dinosaurs by now on the Earth, the property must be transcendent. Yet, as Dodd himself asserts, uninstantiated properties do not exist (see Dodd 2000, 436). Only properties which are actually instantiated can be recognised as such. Dodd's two claims about the eternal existence of properties and about the impossibility of uninstantiated properties are thus incompatible. Hence, it follows that Dodd cannot successfully claim for the non-creatability of musical works (see Caplan and Matheson 2004, 128).
[74] See also Predelli 2001.
[75] Levinson 1980, 8.

address the compositional process as a process of selection and discovery, however creative this selection is. Musical works are 'brought into existence' by composers and they did not exist beforehand. Levinson grants that sonic structures can pre-exist the act of the composer's creation.[76] Thus, in order to be recognised as created entities, musical works cannot be identified with pure sound structures and they should be identified instead with initiated types, that is with types individuated by an act and a context of composition in addition to a sound structure.[77]

The conviction that musical works are entities which could not exist without a composer is deeply entrenched in our common sense about musical works. Contextualists recognise this last conviction as solidly grounded in our musical considerations but their proposal of considering works as initiated types is not as satisfactory as it may seem. Their conclusion, in fact, manages only to show that works are 'brought into being'. But is it enough to satisfy our notion of works as created? Although 'initiated', in the contextualist account musical works are still types. And types cannot avoid being abstract entities. In contrast to the sonicist account, in the contextualist view the composer regains her status, but the status she regains is that of a selector, not of a creator *tout-court*. By Levinson's own admission, sound structures are already existing when the composer writes the score. What makes works 'initiated' types is the fact that without the composer these sound structures would have been left floating in another dimension. Even if the contextualist account makes an effort to come closer to common beliefs about musical works, it struggles to succeed fully in accounting for our confidence in the necessity of the act of composition.

The replacement of abstract sound structures with material entities such as fusions of performances facilitates the job for musical perdurantists in relation to the (Creat) desideratum. However, as I will discuss in the next section, it is possible to argue that not even Musical Perdurantism manages to settle the problem entirely.

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[76] See Ibid., 7.

[77] Anderson (1985) shares Levinson's idea of types as indicated entities. In order to preserve the type-token distinction and, at the same time, to account for the creatability of works, he proposes a distinction between descriptive and normative kinds. For every normative kind K_n there exists a descriptive kind K_d, identified by the same properties as K_n but non-normative within the work. This can explain why it is possible to assert that the notes which constitute a musical work already existed before the composer wrote the work, but are made normative only when the work is actually composed. A norm-kind is thus a previously existing descriptive kind created by an intentional operation. The claim of the eternal existence of kinds should then be restricted to descriptive kinds, without falling into the counterintuitive conclusion that musical works, as norm-kinds, are eternal and non-created entities. The act of indication carried out by the composer consists then in a selective process which turns descriptive into normative properties.

5.3 Musical Perdurantism

The denial of the creatability of musical works is one of the claims of the type-token model that clashes against prevailing beliefs. In the article 'Can Musical Works Be Created?' (2004) Caplan and Matheson address two requirements that, they argue, none of the standard views about musical ontology satisfies. The first of those is indeed the creatability requirement.

Caplan and Matheson argue that considering the work as a fusion of the composer's compositional activity, 'performances of the work, and such things as copies of the score and recordings'[78] satisfies both the creatability requirement and the persistence requirement. Perhaps. I have already voiced some misgivings about Musical Perdurantism in regard to (Rep) and I will later suggest other problems. I can concede that perdurantism can deal with (Creat) but one additional worry deserves to be mentioned before I conclude.

The theory they propose is further developed in a later article, 'Defending Musical Perdurantism' (2006). Here the authors claim that 'musical works persist by perduring: that is by having different temporal parts at every time in which they exist.'[79] While in the first account of the theory performances, copies of the score, and recordings are all parts of the work, in this later article Caplan and Matheson restrict the temporal parts to performances. The relation that links them together is described as 'the appropriate continuity relation for musical works.'[80] The authors do not provide further details, since they argue that, just as perdurantists do not need to specify if the continuity relation about persons is of a spatiotemporal or psychological kind, settling the question about what kind of relation this is before adopting the view is not necessary. The similarity between Musical Perdurantism and perdurantism about persons, professed several times in the article is however based on a false assumption. People and musical works are two ontologically different entities: while persons can be classified as continuants, since the temporal parts of which they are composed follow one another without interruption, the performances of a musical work are temporally and spatially scattered. Thus, the continuity relation that holds for people cannot hold for musical works and vice versa.

[78] Caplan and Matheson 2004, 133.
[79] Caplan and Matheson 2006, 60.
[80] Ibid.

According to the last version of the account, the musical work is a fusion of performances. It comes into being, therefore, when the first performance is played, persists through the performances, and ceases to exist when the last performance is played. Even if in this way Caplan and Matheson manage to provide a more definite account for the desideratum of (Creat), it can be argued that it still fails to comply with the commonsensical beliefs we hold in respect to musical works. Even before being performed, in fact, the act of composition brings into being an entity which we commonly refer to as 'musical work'.

The first version of Musical Perdurantism, which, as seen above, includes the components of the fusion also the score, could account for the fact that musical works are created when the set of instruction for the performance is created. By allowing only performances in the fusion, instead, Musical Perdurantism are saddled with the counterintuitive claim that a musical work comes into being with its first performance.

6. The (Grasp) Epistemological Grasp Desideratum

The last desideratum I am going to address is that of (Grasp). I will devote quite a lot of attention to this desideratum, since it is relevant for the later development of Musical Stage Theory which I put forward in Chapter 3. The (Grasp) desideratum asks for the accessibility of the work, where I intend this accessibility as an immediate one. It is undeniable that the issue of how we can come into contact with the entity 'musical work' should be of primary importance for all theories in the ontology of music. In this section I will discuss how both type-token theories and Musical Perdurantism struggle to give a satisfactory explanation of (Grasp).

6.1 Type-token Theory

It is usual for us to say that we have listened to a musical work after having attended a concert, listened to the radio, or reproduced a song on our MP3 player. Yet, according to mainstream theories, what we do in all of these cases is listening to a performance of the work, a concrete event, a token of the type. The general-particular

distinction of the type-token model is optimal in order to account for the multiple renditions of a work but it raises the problem of how is it possible to have an epistemological grasp on abstract and eternal entities like types. The question at stake is: how can we know the work only by hearing its concrete instances? In general, theorists of the type-token model answer this question via the characterisation of the metaphysical link between type and tokens.

As I mentioned while introducing the type-token theory, Wollheim defines the relation between the type and its tokens as more intimate than that occurring between a class and its members, or a universal and its instances. For Wollheim the claim that the essential properties possessed by tokens can be transmitted to types makes the attribution of physical properties to abstract tokens unproblematic:

> The harmlessness of denying the physical-object hypothesis in the domain of those arts where the denial consists in saying that works of art are not physical *objects*. For though they may not be objects but types, this does not prevent them from having physical properties. There is nothing that prevents us from saying that Donne's *Satires* are harsh on the ear, or that Dürer's engraving of St Anthony has a very differentiated texture, or that the conclusion of 'Celeste Aida' is *pianissimo*.[81]

According to Wollheim, then, listening to a performance and being aware of its essential properties are sufficient to have a grasp on the essential nature of the work itself. However, if the transmission of properties between type and tokens assures the completeness of the experience of the type through its tokens, the attribution of physical properties to abstract objects as types remains troublesome. The essential nature of tokens, typically their sonic profile, seems to possess only concrete features: we perceive a performance by listening to it with our ears. How can a concrete perception tell us something about abstract features of the work, then? As it happens in the discussion about the general problem of universals, this consideration leads to a vicious circle of infinite regress.

Wolterstorff further elaborates Wollheim's claim about the link between type and tokens by defining artworks as norm-kinds:

> Many, though not all, kinds are such that it is possible for them to have properly formed and also possible for them to have improperly formed examples. Let us call such kinds, *norm*-kinds. […] Now in the case of norm-kinds we have

[81] Wollheim 1980, 71.

> application for the concept of some property *being normative within* a certain kind. *Def. 11*: The property *p* is *normative within* the norm-kind *K* = df *k* is a norm-kind, and it is impossible that there be something which is a properly-formed example of *K* and lacks *P*.[82]

As I will explain in the section about performances, the attribution of normative properties to the work is relevant not only for determining its essential features, but also for distinguishing correct from incorrect performances. The identification of correct examples of the work appoints significance to the work itself, allowing its determination: 'P when truthfully predicated of W stands for the property of being such that something cannot be a correct example of it without having the property of being P.'[83] The consequence of this reciprocal enrichment, however, is that some doubts about the directionality of the determination of normative properties have been raised. Is it due to the normative properties dictated by the type that we individuate its correct examples, or is it by determining what we consider as correct examples of a kind that we are able to indicate the normative properties? The nature of the kind-example relationship, as well as the essence of the work as a kind in Wolterstorff's account is vague.

In Wolterstorff's theory, what enables him to defend the possibility of coming into contact with the work is the analogical relation which occurs between kinds and examples. The analogic relation is described by Wolterstorff by saying that 'if the predicate stands for two different properties with some systematic relation between them, then the predicate is used *analogically.*'[84] Applying this principle to music, it is possible to explain how we can attribute to the work predicates of its performances:

> […] what one means when correctly predicating "has a G sharp in its seventh measure" of some performance of Bartok's Fifth is that in its seventh measure there was an *occurrence* of the G sharp pitch. But the quartet itself does not consist of sound-occurrences. So I think it must be admitted that we have not discovered a systematic identity but only a systematic relation between the property designated by some predicate when it is correctly predicated of some art examples and the property designated by that same predicate when truly predicated of the art work. Our conclusion must be that the sharing of predicates between art works and their examples pervasively exhibits *analogical* predication.[85]

[82] Wolterstorff 1980, 56–57.
[83] Wolterstorff 1975, 126.
[84] Wolterstorff 1980, 58.
[85] Ibid., 61.

Describing such relation as analogical entails that the linguistic expressions predicated of a musical work can be interpreted as they were actually related to correct examples of the work: if it is predicated of a Symphony that it ends in *pianissimo*, it is analogically true that the Symphony-example has the property of ending in *pianissimo*, and *vice versa*.[86]

Peter Kivy defends musical Platonism from parallel objections.[87] One of these objections, put forward by Joseph Margolis, deals with the attribution of physical properties to abstract objects.[88] Margolis says that an artwork 'cannot be a universal because [in part] … it possesses physical and perceptual properties.'[89] Kivy claims that the counterintuitive consequences that seem to derive from embracing a type-token distinction dispel 'if one lets musical Platonism really sink in psychologically.'[90] The author addresses the issue of the attribution of sonic properties to works following the traditional path indicated by Wollheim and Wolterstorff. He claims that making a statement about a performance as an instance of the work is sufficient to attribute the same property to the work, since, in order to be a correct instantiation of the work, performances need to possess the properties we attribute to them. Even if works, as abstract entities, cannot display sonic properties, performances of the works can:

> When we say "The 49th Symphony of Haydn is passionate," we are […] saying something *about* the work construed as a universal or kind): we are predicating passion of it, as of a universal or kind, even though we are not saying that it has the heard property of passion. This may be enough, it appears to me, to accommodate our intuition that when we say "The 49th Symphony of Haydn is passionate," we are not only saying something about correct performances of the work but something about the work itself.[91]

The counter-objections Kivy has to face at this point are similar to those against Wollheim's theory: even if the relationship between type and tokens can be individuated in a sharing of essential properties, it is difficult to get a grasp on what kind of entity the type is, and whether the normative relationship is univocal or mutual

[86] Predelli (2011) criticises Wolterstorff's interpretation of predicates as ambiguous and proposes instead to interpret them as generic statements sensible to background variations.
[87] See Kivy 1993.
[88] See Ibid., 36.
[89] Quoted in Ibid., 36.
[90] Ibid., 38.
[91] Ibid., 37–38.

between types and tokens. No matter how deeply Platonism sinks in psychologically, the blurriness of the type-token relationship cannot be avoided.

Another exponent of sonicism, Julian Dodd, tries to overcome these objections by drawing upon a version of Quine's 'deferred ostension': the individuation of tokens is enough for the individuation of the related type, so that it is possible to 'listen to a work of music by listening to one of its performances.'[92] Thus, Dodd addresses the first possible objection to this claim, which stems from the consideration that, as an abstract object, the type cannot possess sensorial properties.[93]

> The moral for the audibility of works of music, qua types of sound-event, should be obvious. A work of music, thus construed, can enter into causal relations derivatively by virtue of being a type of sound-event: a type whose token events can feature as relata of causal relations. Hence, given that the objects of perception are just those things that causally effect how things perceptually seem to us, this means that the type/token theory is not precluded from saying that works of music, in addition to their tokens, may be heard. Far from it. In fact, a work of music, though abstract, can be heard precisely because it is a type of whose tokens are performances, playings, and other sound-events that can cause us to have certain auditory experiences. The work itself counts as a bona fide object of hearing because the event that initiates the causal chain leading to an auditory experience—a sound-event—is one of its tokens.[94]

According to Dodd, then, it is possible to attribute to a musical work audible properties thanks to the fact that we listen to one of its token performances. Again, it can be argued that this viewpoint does not provide an exhaustive account of the nature of the work as an abstract type.[95]

The type-token structure that worked so well for dealing with (Rep) now prevents type-token theorists from giving a satisfactory account of (Grasp). Musical Perdurantism, on the other hand, identifies musical works with concrete entities. In the next section I will consider whether this is enough to account for the desideratum of (Grasp).

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[92] Dodd 2007, 12.
[93] See Caplan and Matheson 2006.
[94] Dodd 2007, 16.
[95] In dealing with the epistemological issue, all versions of sonicism are committed to the empiricist claim that the sonic profile is the necessary and sufficient feature in order to individuate a musical work. The same cannot be said in regard to musical contextualism. Levinson does not specifically address the issue of the attribution of sonic properties to musical works, however I think it is safe to say that he agrees with Wolterstorff's individuation of normative properties of the work.

6.2 Musical Perdurantism

Musical Perdurantism rejects the identification of musical works with abstract objects, thus getting rid of the objection according to which it is impossible to get a grasp on abstract entities. However, even if it is a materialistic account, Musical Perdurantism still has trouble in finding a satisfactory answer to the issue of (Grasp).

According to Musical Perdurantism, musical works are fusions of temporal parts where these temporal parts are performances. When listening to a performance, then, we are listening only to a part of the work of music. From this consideration derives the most compelling objection for musical perdurantism: the Objection from Perception. Julian Dodd raises this as one among other objections:

> […] if a performance is a temporal part of a work, it follows that it is impossible for an audience at such a performance to hear the work in its entirety. Any given performance of the Fantasia is but a temporal part of the work, and to have heard the whole piece would have required an audience member to have audited all of its constituent temporal parts.[96]

Dodd argues that, even if Musical Perdurantism subscribes to a materialistic account, it is impossible to grasp the musical work in its entirety if performances are only temporal parts of the whole.[97]

The first reply given by the authors appeals to the principle of 'deferred perception' – analogous to Quine's 'deferred ostension' – according to which it is possible to perceive the work by virtue of perceiving one of its performances. Unfortunately, this principle cannot help the musical perdurantist, since it is in turn dependent on the presence principle: 'one can perceive all of an entity *x* at a time *t* in virtue of perceiving an appropriately related entity *y* at *t* only if *x* is "wholly present" at *t*.'[98] The presence principle is not applicable to the musical work as it is regarded by perdurantists, since it is not present in every moment of its existence. Accordingly, Caplan and Matheson need to retreat to the claim that a perdurantist about musical works 'is no worse off

[96] Quoted in Caplan and Matheson 2006, 61.
[97] A potential objection is that there is no 'entirety' for musical works. Even knowing every aspects of a work, there will still be something that we learn with a new performance or a different way of listening to it.
[98] Caplan and Matheson 2006, 63.

here than a Perdurantist about Persons is.'[99] As I already said before, I do not consider this reply to be adequate.

In the previous sections of the chapter I have shown how both type-token theorists and musical perdurantists meet several difficulties in complying with the three desiderata that I have set at the beginning. These unsatisfactory results are the starting point that led me to the proposal of a novel theory for the ontology of works, which I will present in detail in Chapter 3. The next section of the chapter, instead, is devoted to the discussion about the nature of performances and their correctness criteria. Intertwined to it there is also the compelling issue of intentionality, a substantial topic which will keep me busy later on in the thesis and which I sketch here in only its key elements.

7. Performances and Interpretability

In the first part of the chapter, I addressed how two authoritative theories in the ontology of musical works, type-token theories and Musical Perdurantism, account (or fail to account) for my three desiderata: (Rep), (Creat), and (Grasp).

I mentioned that the choice of these three desiderata does not imply that it is not possible to individuate additional desiderata for the ontology of musical works. For reasons that will become apparent as I proceed in the thesis, in this second part of the chapter I want to consider another possible requirement, the requirement of interpretability (Interp). In the following sections I will analyse the ontological profile of performances, in what sense it is possible to claim that a performance is correct or incorrect, and how the concept of interpretability helps us to make sense of the differences that occur between performances.[100]

[99] Ibid.

[100] It may be argued that the common use of the term 'interpretation' in regard to musical works is premised on the ideology that works are abstract entities. Instead, the interpretation of a work can be seen as a tautology: in order for a work to be contained in the mind of someone it must be performed, it always has a voice. In this sense, 'interpretation' is a necessary precondition for the existence of the work. On this, see the discussion on Musical Stage Theory in Chapter 3 and Predelli 1995.

7.1 Ontology of Performances

In our ordinary life it seems that we have no difficulty in recognising when we are listening to a performance or talking about it. Things get more difficult, however, when we have to determine their ontological status. In light of the discussion on correct and incorrect performances that will occur in the next sections, and also in light of the proposal of the account that I will present in Chapter 3, Musical Stage Theory, I sketch here a few commonsensical ideas of performances. Some of them will occupy centre stage in later chapters.

I assume that a performance is an event which in turn can be understood as a fusion of zonally coinciding events or as a fusion of events connected by a dominant causal flow but spatially and/or temporally scattered. A performance is in fact divisible in temporal (e.g. the movements of a Sonata) or zonal (e.g. a performance of a band walking around the city) parts which are events themselves. As events, performances share most of the features which characterise accomplishments:[101] performances occur in time, have a goal, have temporal boundaries, can be complete or incomplete, and can be done quickly or slowly. To be of particular interest in relation to a work, a performance should in fact be complete, from the first to the last note of the relative score, in accordance with the goal of providing a correct rendition of the score itself. In addition to the features they share with general accomplishments, musical performances also possess other essential components: they need to be shareable and they include the presence of performer(s), instrument(s), and an audience. As a consequence, they involve issues relating to their mental properties, and in particular their intentionality.

7.2 Interpretability

The requirement of (Interp) of performances stems from the underdetermination of composer's instructions: many of the properties displayed by performances are not part of them.[102] For example, the tone color of each note, many dynamical shifts,

[101] See Vendler 1957; Kenny 1963.
[102] See Goodman 1968, Chapter 5.1. For a type-token theorist they are not constitutive of the sound structure.

variations of tempo, are all features which a performance may have even if they are not prescribed by the score.[103]

The performer's intervention on the underdetermination of the score is what is commonly referred to as 'interpretation': 'The performer makes the score accessible not only by giving a sensory specification of the notational elements but also by adding to them, "socialising" them, with the nonscored liberties of interpretation.'[104] Due to the lack of exhaustive directions on the score, performances of the same work can differ in various respects from one another. These differences can occur not only in small details but also in relevant features like the choice of instrumentation. This obviously led to many discussions concerning the possibility of distinguishing a correct from an incorrect performance, and a performance from a non-performance. Unless we adopt a rigid account of musical works like Nelson Goodman's, according to which the musical work is the class of performances compliant with a score,[105] it can be difficult to determine a set of conditions which identifies a correct performance. The individuation of this set depends on the nature attributed to musical works and on the essential features of their structural make-up.[106]

In my CD collection there are at least three versions of Bach's *Goldberg Variations*, I have heard my piano teacher playing them twice, and I have watched several videos on YouTube of Glenn Gould's performances. Each of them is notably different from the others, not only due to the interpretation given by the performer but also from the means of reproduction through which I listened to them. Nevertheless, I was aware of listening to the same musical work, i.e. the *Goldberg Variations*. How is it possible? In this preliminary assessment of the work-performance relation, I discuss (with an eye on the development in Chapter 3) three relevant dimensions: sound-compliance, intentionality, causality.

[103] At least in the case of traditional score music. Much more on scores in Chapter 5.
[104] Krukowski 1987, 51–52.
[105] See Goodman 1968, 186.
[106] I find myself in agreement with Predelli when he states the inevitability of interpretation: works are essentially subject to the interpretation of performers (see Predelli 1995).

7.3 Sound-compliance: An Overview

As stated in section 4.1, Wollheim describes the relationship between work and performances using the transmission of properties from tokens to types. But, while there is the possibility for many properties of tokens to be transmitted to the type, this should not necessarily happen:

> In the case of *some* arts it is necessary that not all properties should be transmitted from token to type: though it remains true that for any single property it might be transmitted. The reference here is, of course, to the performing arts […] in such cases there is essentially an element of *interpretation*, where for this purposes interpretation might be regarded as the production of a token that has properties in excess of those of the type.[107]

The element of interpretation which characterises the relation between musical works as types and performances as tokens, in fact, leaves space for personal interventions on the musical work on the part of performers.

In order to be considered an instance of a work, a performance needs to comply with certain correctness requirements, the strictness of which varies depending on the viewpoint on musical ontology embraced. However, a correctness requirement does not rule out the possibility that a performance is a performance of a determinate work even if it displays some minor mistakes. It is thus relevant to address the issue of the degree of determinacy of the correctness requirement according to different authors, and whether it is a necessary and sufficient condition for connecting a performance to a work.

I already mentioned (section 6.1) that one of the developments on Wollheim's theory brought by Wolterstorff is the identification of artworks as norm-kinds. The normative properties an artwork possesses determine which occurrences of the kind are correct and which are incorrect: it is thus possible for a musical work to have correct and incorrect performances: a Sonata can be executed without following all of the normative properties of a work which can be used as criteria of correctness in producing the work.[108]

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[107] Wollheim 1980, 71.

[108] A consequence of this view is that according to the author improvising is not composing (Wolterstorff 1980, 64). In order to compose a work the composer needs to select a set of criteria of correctness, while during an improvisation there are no criteria that are consciously followed. A discussion about the issue of improvisation will be explored in more depth in Chapter 5.

Compliance with the correctness requirement is the principal criterion recognised by all sonicists as the key one in order to individuate instances of the work. Wolterstorff,[109] Kivy,[110] and Dodd[111] refuse however to ascribe to this requirement the same strictness demanded by Goodman. The latter claims that only the performances that are totally compliant with the score can be considered correct.[112] According to the other authors mentioned, instead, it is not necessary to follow all the indications provided on the score in order to perform a work,[113] rather it is sufficient for a performer to follow an adequate number of them: 'Performances that produce an adequate number of the right notes, and fulfil an adequate number of the other requirements of a "correct" performance, may range in quality from great to terrible, unified to eclectic, but not from performance to nonperformance or performance parts.'[114]

The considerations over the correctness of a performance are further complicated by the divergences between pure and timbral sonicists. I already addressed in section 2.1 the main claims of the two views. While for the pure version of sonicism the sound structure that individuates the work is constituted only by pitches and rhythm, a timbral version of sonicism includes timbral properties among those constitutive of the work. Yet, in this view, a Beethoven's Sonata could be reproduced by a synthesiser able to recreate the timbre of a 19th century piano and still be a correct token of the Sonata: 'our pre-theoretical intuitions have it that a performance of the *Hammerklavier* Sonata on a Perfect Timbral Synthesiser, indistinguishable to the ears from a performance on a piano, would be no less satisfactory a performance of the piece.'[115] Nevertheless, both versions of sonicism embraced by Kivy and Dodd allow for a degree of freedom on the part of performers. The correctness requirement determines in which terms the correspondence to the normative measures is adequate and, inside this range, the performer can give a personal contribution to the rendition of the work. In this respect sonicism tries to approach common sense intuitions.

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[109] See Ibid., 76.
[110] See Kivy 1993, 51.
[111] See Dodd 2007, 32.
[112] See Goodman 1968, 186–187. The strictness of Goodman's requirement is due to his desire to avoid slippery slope processes that could gradually transform a performance of a work into a performance of another work.
[113] According to Wolterstorff it is possible to perform a work without following at all the prescriptions, since mental renditions are possible (see Wolterstorff 1980, 76).
[114] Kivy 1993, 51.
[115] Dodd 2007, 205.

As I discussed in section 2.2, Levinson takes even further the revision of the profile of musical works as canvassed by sonicists by including the choice of performing means among the requirements for the individuation of a musical work. Not even the specification of timbre required by Dodd's timbral sonicism is sufficient: the sound structure of a work cannot be divorced from the instrumentation through which it is exemplified. According to Levinson, structurally indistinguishable W1 and W2 are distinct if they prescribe different means of performance. Using again the example of Beethoven's *Hammerklavier* Sonata, Levinson claims that its cragginess and sublimity are conferred to the piece by the characteristics of the piano. The same piece played on a synthesizer would not display the same qualities.[116] The same can be said for a piece specifically written for violin, like Paganini's *24 Caprices*, performed on another instrument. The violinistic virtuosity that should be displayed by a performance of the piece is altered by the choice of an instrument with different characteristics.[117]

Stephen Davies individuates downsides in both sonicism and contextualism.[118] While sonicism does not take into consideration relevant aspects of our experience of musical examples, contextualism, at least in Levinson's version, is not flexible enough in the distinction between features of the work and features of performances. Although Davies agrees with sonicists in individuating musical works with abstract objects, he argues that it is impossible to attribute to all musical works, across different genres and contexts of composition, the same ontological character.[119] The author proposes instead to replace all the previous definitions of musical work with the following one: 'a musical work is a performed sound structure as made normative in a musico-historical setting.'[120] As seen in section 2.2, the structural make-up of the work can be thin or thick in properties according to different degrees: the thinner a musical work is, the fewer the normative requirements that a performer has to respect.[121] She is then allowed to intervene on the structure of the work with additions or personal touches in her performance without it resulting in an incorrect one.

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[116] Levinson 1980, 17–18. Dodd replies arguing that any property of the work that is not directly connected to its timbral-sonic structure is a property that is not possessed by the work, but instead by either the composer or the act of composition (see Dodd 2007, 185–186). Thus, according to Dodd, in order for a performance to be properly performed, it needs not make use of specific instruments (see Dodd 2007, 230).
[117] See Levinson 1980, 18.
[118] See Davies 2008, 374.
[119] See Davies 1991, 37.
[120] Davies 2001, 98.
[121] See Davies 1991, 26.

According to Davies' view, then, the conditions for the authenticity[122] of a performance are mutable according to a totality of aspects that include the composer's prescriptions, the social conventions of the contexts of composition and of fruition, the audience's expectations, and so on.[123] Musical works are irreducible to a pure sound-structure made of rhythm and pitches as stated by sonicists. The acknowledgement of different levels of detail that inform the ontology of musical works allows one to justify the sensible difference of approach that is useful to have toward musical works of different periods. In most Early Music, for example, instrumentation is not constitutive of the ontology of musical works and, thus, the use of period instruments is intended by Davies more as advice than as prescription.[124] Compositions of the Romantic era, instead, have thicker structures, since composers began to provide on the score detailed indications for the performer, not only tempo and dynamics, but also indications of expression. The thicker musical works became in the past 200 years, the more determinative instrumentation becomes, too. The transmission of sonic properties between work and performances is thus influenced by the relative thickness of the sound structure of the work.[125]

In addition to considerations about sound structure and contextual factors, there is another element which is relevant for the analysis of the correctness of a performance, i.e. the intentionality of the performer. In the next section, I am going to discuss how various authors include this concept in their analysis of the identity of performances. The attention devoted to the intentionality requirement is motivated by the importance that considerations over intentionality will assume for Musical Stage Theory later on. In what follows, I will focus especially on some thought experiments that Levinson uses to deliver his idea in this respect and on how the intentionality requirement is linked to two other requirements: the sound-compliance and the causality requirement.[126]

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[122] The concept of authenticity and its ramifications will be more deeply analysed in Chapters 2 and 6.
[123] See Davies 1991, 36.
[124] See Davies 2001, 70.
[125] More about this in Chapter 5. It can be argued that 'thin' 18th century scores were performed just as thickly as later ones. Only, the instructions reside in oral tradition rather than on paper.
[126] I will adopt similar requirements in Chapter 3 when discussing how we are able to group performances together.

7.4 Intentionality and Causality

The distinction between correct and incorrect performances is elaborated by Levinson by introducing the concept of intentionality among the criteria of correctness. He claims that: 'An *instance* of a musical work W is a sound event which conforms *completely* to the sound/performance-means structure of W and which exhibits the required connection to the indicative activity wherein W's composer A creates W,'[127] while 'A *performance* of a musical work W is a sound event which is intended to instantiate W – i.e., represents an attempt to exemplify W's S/PM [sonic/performing means] structure in accordance with A's indication of it – and which *succeeds to a reasonable degree.*'[128] The class of performances only partially overlaps with the class of instances of a work. This entails that some performances, i.e. the incorrect ones, are not instances. Conversely, it also has to be noticed that, according to this view, correct performances are instances, but some instances fail to be performances because they do not conform to the intentional requirement. The instance of a musical work is an ideal performance which stands as a standard the performer should try to comply with, while a performance which presents mistakes beyond a reasonable degree cannot be considered an instance of the work. For Levinson, such a reasonable degree is 'marked by the ability of an informed and sensitive listener to grasp, at least roughly, what S/PM structure is struggling to be presented.'[129]

Levinson's definition of 'instance' introduces another property performances should have in order to be correct, i.e. a causal-intentional connection between the performance and the composer and/or the work. Some of the theories in musical ontology recognise a role for intentions as necessary for the work-performance relation.[130] In the rendition of a work, according to these authors, a performer has to

[127] Levinson 1980, 26.
[128] Ibid. There is an interesting parallel here with the explanation of language in construction grammars where the communicative intention of a speaker equates to its function. A construction in linguistics must thus have an intended meaning that can reasonably be understood by a competent listener. On this see Gjerdingen and Bourne 2015.
[129] Levinson 1980, 26, fn. 33. This account, although it conforms to common sense, is inevitably bound to the relative experience of individuals. A possible development of this idea is given by William Webster through his analysis of the concepts of violation and deviation: 'x is a violation of the score iff x is an omission or an alteration of a relation in one of the two dimensions of the work [tonal and rhythmic organisation] and x is such that if it were continued throughout the realisation, work recognition would be lost. y is a deviation from a score iff y is an addition, alteration or omission of a relation in one of the two dimensions of the work and y is such that even if it were continued throughout the realisation, work recognition would be retained' (Webster 1974, 62–63).
[130] See Wolterstorff 1980; Levinson 1980; Predelli 1999; S. Davies 1987; Currie 1988.

exhibit her intention to produce a performance, and indeed a performance of that work. The wind blowing through a canyon and producing a melody does not constitute a performance, but only an occurrence:[131] the intentionality of the performer is therefore an essential requirement of a performance. This requirement can be analysed in two aspects: the first implies the performer's intentionality without a necessary causal relation with the history of composition; the second one displays a causal connection to the historical properties of the composition and to the composer herself.


The clash between causal and intentional relations is explained by Levinson through a thought experiment.[132] Ted intends to play a waltz he has never heard written by the unknown composer Strausson (henceforth S).[133] Let us suppose that someone substitutes the scores and gives Ted a score of the waltz written by the dadaistic composer Duchamper (henceforth D). D's waltz displays the same sound structure as S's waltz. In this situation, Ted's performance is not *causally* related to S's waltz. The relation that exists between Ted and S's waltz is instead an *intentional* relation, as Ted *intends* to perform S's work. According to Levinson, in any case in which intentional and causal criteria are in conflict, the former will determine the identity of the performance. Therefore, for Levinson, Ted is performing S's waltz even if he is reading D's score.

Charles Nussbaum[134] analyses this thought experiment and disagrees with Levinson: it is the causal provenance of the score that trumps the alternative causal path, even if Ted misinterprets it. Either D's waltz was lifted from S's score or it was not. If it was, then there is a continuous causal chain between S's waltz and Ted, since D's work is based on S's. If it was not, the reference to Dada is useless. Unless Ted has committed the piece to memory, the causal provenance of the score trumps the alternative causal path (S's) and Ted is performing D's waltz. Nussbaum then proposes a variation of the thought experiment to object against Levinson's claim. Supposing that S's piece is for piano for four hands and one of the two players unknowingly substitutes it with D's score, then the two performers would be implicated in the

[131] See Wolterstorff 1980, 74.
[132] See Levinson 1980a, 377.
[133] These are not the names used by Levinson.
[134] See Nussbaum 2003.

performance of two pieces, while reading from the same score; this is at least counterintuitive.[135]

The distinction between the three requirements according to which a performance may be deemed correct[136] – sound-compliance, intentionality and causal relation – can be clarified through another thought experiment. Ted is invited to a dinner party and he plays the score which is on the piano: Duchamper, Sonata n.1. The night after, Ted's friend Annie is invited to another dinner party at the same house and she sits at the piano. The night before Ted was quite tipsy and he changed the title on the score he played: instead of 'Duchamper, Sonata n. 1' he wrote 'Strausson, Sonata n. 2'. Annie has never heard of either S or D and she starts playing the piece. While Annie has the intention to instantiate S's Sonata n. 2, Ted has the intention to instantiate D's Sonata n. 1. However, the result of the two performances is the same, i.e. a sound event which instantiates the structure of D's Sonata n. 1.



According to the *sound-compliance* and the *causal relation* requirements, Annie performs D's Sonata n. 1 even if her intention was to perform S's Sonata n. 2 because her action is a sound event indistinguishable from the instantiation of the structure of D's Sonata n. 1. On the contrary, for the *intentions*-relative requirement Annie does not perform D's Sonata n. 1, even if the result of her action is a sound event

[135] According to Stephen Davies, the performer's intention is not essential to performance (see Davies 2001, 166). Y's work is the one performed if who has substituted the score knew of the identity of Y's and Z's scores. There is a robust counterfactual dependence between Z's and Y's works, since the substitution would not have been made if the two works had not shared the same structure.

[136] It has to be noticed that all these requirements imply also a reasonable degree of sound-compliance.

indistinguishable from the instantiation of the structure of D's Sonata n. 1, because her intention was to instantiate S's Sonata n. 2 instead.[137]

As mentioned, the causal-relative theory includes also a connection between the performer and the act of composition of the work. This connection can be presented according to different degrees. According to the weaker account, the identity of a musical work depends on the sum of the constraints and influences of the tradition of performance in vogue at the time of composition without a specific relation to the composer's identity. This view is expressed by Levinson in the reformulation of his definition of a work of music, and by Anderson's version of Levinson's theory.[138] The requirement of the relation to the composer becomes tighter when the correctness of the performance is judged in respect to the composer's instructions.[139] The stronger account enhances the composer's authority and claims that the performer has a moral obligation toward her will.[140] Kivy argues that the performer's obligation toward the composer's intentions requires not only the respect for the score – intended as written instructions of the sound structure − but also of other information acquired in indirect ways, for example through critical articles of the period, biographies, treatises on performance, and so on.

Predelli defines Kivy's approach moral-intentionalism and he notices its incompatibility with the author's Platonism in respect to the identity of the musical work.[141] Usually, supporters of Platonism share a sound-compliance theory in regard to the work-performance relation. As the sound structure is the necessary and sufficient property for the identity of the work, it is enough for the performance to be compliant with the work's structure. However, the causal-relative theory, entailed by the moral faithfulness toward the composer's instructions claimed by Kivy, requires from a performer the awareness of further information than the mere sound structure. From this observation derives the inconsistency pointed out by Predelli: while in the analysis of the identity of the musical work Kivy deems as relevant only its sound structure, in the consideration of the relationship between work and performance he

[137] Here it can be argued that the whole issue amounts to the arbitrariness of semantic signifiers: they all intend to play the score they see. This may well be true, but suppose that Annie has heard people commenting on Strausson's Sonata n. 1 in the past even if she never listened to it. When she sits at the piano, then, she 'intends' to play the idea that she had formed in her mind about S's Sonata n. 1 on the basis of those comments.
[138] See Levinson 1980, 23; Anderson 1982.
[139] See S. Davies 1987, 39.
[140] See Kivy 1993, 104–105.
[141] See Predelli 2006.

appeals to further requirements which also implicate the performer's approach to the work.[142]

As explained, then, with only a few exceptions, such as Kivy's moral-intentionalism, sonicists tend to opt for a sound-compliance theory in the consideration of the work-performance relation, disregarding the causal-intentional relation with the original act of composition advocated by contextualists. For example, referring to the case of the wind blowing and producing music, Dodd claims:

> Suppose, by some gigantic fluke, a sound-sequence were produced naturally (perhaps by the wind rattling through an empty house) that was recognisable as note-for-note facsimile of the sounds indicated by Marsalis's score for *In This House, On This Morning*. Would not this also count as an instance of the work? To my mind, there is no harm in treating such a pattern of sounds as a genuine token of *In This House, On This Morning*. First, […] it would seem to be true that the work could be heard in the concrete sound-pattern, even though this pattern is produced without the intervention of human actions.[143]

David Davies is more careful in approaching this issue. With reference to the distinction he individuates between provenential and epistemic instances, he claims that the historico-intentional relation between the performances and the compositional activity is relevant only for the provenential instances of the work, while epistemic instances are not constrained by the history of production of the work. The notion of epistemic instance, in fact, 'picks out a particular role that something can play in the appreciation of an artwork in virtue of its manifest properties alone.'[144] Following this view, the wind that produces a melody by blowing through a house can be considered as a correct epistemic instance of a musical work.

In this last section of the chapter, I presented interpretability as a further possible desideratum for the ontology of musical works. The interpretation of the score is indeed a necessary task which performers need to carry out, given the underdetermination of the score. The issue of interpretation is also related to the

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[142] Kivy's inconsistency can be extended also to his indifference toward performance means. This requirement might not be relevant for those pieces which were composed by the author without a definite instrumental profile (for example works that do not indicate on the score a definite instrumentation) but in the vast majority of cases, at least after the 18th century, the instruments for which the work had been designed are clearly stated on the score. Therefore, the faithfulness to the composer's instructions should keep into consideration also the instrumentation. If the requirement of the inclusion of performance means − borrowing Levinson's expression − is correctly included in the moral-intentionalist view, then it is inconsistent with Kivy's consideration of the musical work as a pure sound structure, without timbral properties nor instrumental design.

[143] Dodd 2007, 34.

[144] Davies 2010, 421.

features of a performance which allow us to judge its correctness. The distinction between correct and incorrect performances, and the different criteria used by scholars to determine it, will be useful for the discussion about authenticity which will occupy Chapter 6. The requirement of intentionality, instead, introduces the analysis of Chapter 4 on the role of intentionality in respect to the development of musical technology.

Conclusion

This chapter aimed at providing an overview of the main theories on the ontology of musical works. I focused mainly on the type-token theory and Musical Perdurantism as representatives of traditional accounts, and as the main opponents which I will challenge in Chapter 3. In the course of the chapter, I showed how these theories attempt to address the three desiderata of (Rep), (Creat), and (Grasp). I argued that none of them manages to account for all three desiderata without resorting to costly revisionist strategies. It will be my aim in Chapter 3 to address the difficulties that these theories meet in this respect by suggesting an alternative way to arrive at an ontological definition of a musical work: Musical Stage Theory.

In section 7, I discussed how scholars identify the criteria needed for distinguishing performances from non-performances and correct from incorrect performances. These criteria will be useful for the later analysis on how it is possible to determine what is an authentic performance. The next chapter is indeed already preliminary concerned with the issue of authenticity in musical performance. Here I will talk about how authenticity is analysed in the literature and discuss the major phenomena in the history of music which have shaped the concept of authenticity so far. My final claim will be that no consensus has been reached on what authenticity is and that, instead, a clear picture on authenticity would be welcome. This claim will lead me to the suggestion for a novel account of authenticity which I will discuss in Chapter 6.

Chapter 2

Authenticity in Musical Performance

Tonight Clare is going to a concert with Annie and Pete. The program boasts 'The authentic performance of Handel's Messiah.*' Clare and her friends all love authentic performances and they cannot wait to listen to an authentic rendition of Handel's masterpiece. They sit on the wooden benches of Great St. Mary's Church in Cambridge and wait for the music to work its magic. Clare, Annie, and Pete sit, deeply absorbed, for the whole duration of the* Messiah*. They applaud the performers and the conductor and then join the slow queue to exit the church.*
'How could they claim it to be authentic when they used sopranos instead of boy trebles?' comments Pete.
'Using sopranos is actually alright. What I couldn't stand was the choice of tempi. The arias were deadening!' says Clare.
'What I want is to hear authenticity in the emotions,' chips in Annie, 'and what I got tonight was only scholarly pedantry.'

Pete, Clare, and Annie all claim to love authentic performances. Yet, they seem to have different concepts of what authenticity is. This quick exchange of opinions mirrors the actual debate on authenticity. Everybody agrees on the value of authenticity, but where is the common ground on what it is?

Overview

In this chapter my aim is to provide a general survey of the debates stirred by the concept of authenticity and to explore the attitudes that aestheticians and musicologists bear in respect to it. The deeper and more relevant purpose of the chapter, though, is to show how the discussion on authenticity in music has reached a point of stalemate. The questions around which the research revolves remain those that triggered the debate in the first place: 'How can we judge a performance as being authentic?'; 'What

are the features of an authentic performance?'; 'Is one feature more relevant for authenticity than others, or are they all on a par?'. Conflicting answers have been given to these questions, as I will go on to show. There is, however, one aspect on which they seem to converge. Funnily enough, in the available literature there seems to be a consensus on *not* having a consensus about what we should mean by the concept of authenticity. This is where I tentatively plan to step in with my proposal. In Chapter 3, I will develop a novel account of the ontology of musical works: Musical Stage Theory, whose main claim is that the work *is* the performance. Then, in Chapter 6 I will address how Musical Stage Theory can help to unlock the stalemate that has been reached in regard to the analysis of authenticity.

As mentioned above, in this chapter I am not concerned with giving an evaluation of the different views on authenticity. This will be one of the purposes of Chapter 6. What I hope to achieve here, instead, is to convey a broad picture of the current debate on the theme and also to promote ways to break free from what, at the moment, seems to be an intellectual dead-end. The style of this chapter will be quite different from that of Chapter 1. Instead of exploring ontological questions in an analytic fashion, in this chapter I mainly address musicological concerns with the issue of authenticity. What may seem like a digression does in fact serve to pave the way for my view on authenticity based on Musical Stage Theory, which I will outline in Chapter 6.

In section 1, I am going to consider how different theories address the issue of authenticity from an ontological point of view. In order to do so, I will focus on the views proposed by the main scholars in the field. What will emerge from this comparison are the various implications of this multifaceted topic. This inevitably results in an expansion of the different accounts that can be given of authenticity. Section 2 will be devoted to the history and development of the Early Music Movement (henceforth EMM) and of its later offshoot, the Historically Informed Performance (henceforth HIP) movement.[145] These movements possess the virtue of having brought to the attention of researchers and musicians what was then the neglected issue of authenticity in musical performance. I will explore the reasons that

[145] Here a specification is needed. EMM and HIP indicate two different strands. With EMM I mean the growing interest in the music of the past which has its origins even before the 19th century (for example, Mozart's interest in the music of J.S. Bach). This interest can be noticed also nowadays, in any musician or listener who is interested in music composed in the past. The HIP movement, instead, refers more specifically to an interest in the performing practices needed in order to deliver an 'authentic' performance. This is the strand I am more interested in for the sake of the discussion on authenticity.

led to the raising of concerns over how we can establish the authenticity of a performance, the actual changes that this new attitude brought to performances, and the consequences of these changes.

The literature I will focus on in sections 1 and 2 mainly dates back to the 1980s and 1990s, years during which the discussion on authenticity was invigorated by conflicting views that emerged from the growth of the HIP movement. In section 3, in turn, I will focus on the contemporary state of the debate among professional performers in regard to authenticity. In order to do so, I will discuss the ideas of contemporary conductors and musicians. I will also use the data collected from a number of interviews conducted with musicians in the course of my research. This will help to get a firsthand and up-to-date view of the state of discussion about the topic.

1. Philosophers on Authenticity

The analysis of the concept of authenticity in music does not trouble only musicologists and musicians who are directly concerned with musical practice. Philosophers who work on the definition of the identity of musical works need to address this topic as well. In order to give an idea of how thorny the issue of authenticity is, I start with a quotation from Jerrold Levinson. Talking about the idea of authenticity as expressed by Stephen Davies, Levinson says: 'The authenticity of a performance of a work is a matter of faithfulness to the determinative intentions publicly expressed in a score by a composer.'[146] Within what seems at first sight a linear claim, there lies a foundation of indeterminacy that needs further explanation.

This is what Levinson does by specifying in the footnotes what he means by the terms used. The first is 'faithfulness': 'Faithfulness here should be understood as something like *manifestly attempted* compliance with the prescriptions of a work, and not necessarily compliance that is *completely achieved.*'[147] The concept of 'intention', instead, has to be delimited in order for it not to be overloaded with different meanings: 'these intentions are understood broadly enough to comprise what would be

[146] Levinson 2011, 393.
[147] Ibid.

understood to be required in a given musical culture even when not explicitly notated in a score.'[148]

I will cover in more detail what Stephen Davies and Levinson think about authenticity. For now, this quote shows how an apparently common concept can be loaded with indeterminacy, vagueness, and multiple implications. From this claim, it can already be seen how the analysis of authenticity in musical performance calls into question different elements that a performer has to confront: the composer's intentions, the score, and a class of ideal performances at the least. If this is the case, why limit the search to one authenticity and not to many?

This is the solution proposed by Kivy in his book *Authenticities* (1995). In this important study, Kivy puts forward five different ways to define the concept of authenticity, starting from the definition of the term given in the Oxford English Dictionary: '1. Of authority, authoritative. (Possessing original or inherent authority.) 2. Original, firsthand, prototypical. (Opposed to copied.) 3. Really proceeding from its reputed source or author: of undisputed origin, genuine. (Opposed to counterfeit, forged.) 4. Belonging to himself, own, proper. 5. Acting of itself, self-originated, automatic. (The spontaneous or authentic motions of a clockwork.).'[149]

On the basis of the five definitions of authenticity given by the OED, Kivy structures the first part of his book around 'Authenticity-as-Intention', 'Authenticity-as-Sound', 'Authenticity-as-Practice', and 'The Other Authenticity', in which the last two definitions collapse. For the sake of clarity, in the next sections I will explicitly refer to these kinds of authenticity as Authenticity-as-Intention, Authenticity-as-Sound, Authenticity-as-Practice, and Personal-Authenticity. These different ways of accounting for authenticity will return also in later sections, when I will focus on the views about authenticity expressed by contemporary musicians. It will then be interesting to observe how the discussions in this respect partially overlap.

[148] Ibid.
[149] Kivy 1995, 3.

1.1 Authenticity-as-Intention

Authenticity-as-Intention refers to an understanding of authenticity as 'faithfulness to the composer's intentions.'[150] According to this first interpretation of the term, then, a performance is authentic if it respects the composer's own ideas about the work. Stephen Davies is one of the main supporters of this version of authenticity. In his article 'Authenticity in Musical Performance' (1987), Davies argues for an idea of authenticity in which the most relevant elements that should be taken into account by performers are 'the intentions publicly expressed in the score by the composer (where those intentions are determinative and not merely recommendatory of performance practice).'[151] With this proviso, Davies acknowledges the possibility for different performances, all equally authentic. This is possible because of the intrinsic underdetermination of the score. It is in fact impossible for a composer to notate all the instructions that she would like the performers to follow.

In his analysis of Authenticity-as-Intention, Kivy points out the downsides and flaws of this perspective. According to Kivy, even if it may be beneficial for the authenticity of the performance to take into consideration the composer's intentions, this should not result in following them to the letter; 'because in order to follow *literally* someone's wishes and intentions, whether musical or any other kind, one must interpret them, and to interpret them one must reunderstand them relative to the conditions under which they are to be realised.'[152] In doing so, he agrees with another scholar of authenticity in musical performance: Richard Taruskin. The latter critically analyses the role that authenticity plays within the EMM and suggests a radically challenging interpretation of the movement itself: there is no such thing as historical authenticity because it is impossible for us not to have our own biased views on the themes we address. I have chosen to postpone this discussion to section 2.6, where Taruskin's views will help me in summarising my conclusion on the concept of authenticity. Full respect for the composer's intentions seems thus impossible to

[150] Kivy 1995, 9. In the following sections I will focus on the views expressed by Levinson, Kivy, and Stephen Davies. This is done for reasons of space and also because these authors sum up the more common views held in respect to the topic. References to other relevant works will be made in footnote.
[151] Davies 1987, 39.
[152] Kivy 1995, 45. For other discussions about the notion of authenticity in music, see Dodd 2012; Donington 1989; Dutton 2002; Jackson 1997; LeHuray 1990; Sagoff 1978.

achieve and, in some cases, it can also result in a departure from other kinds of authenticity, such as Authenticity-as-Sound.

1.2 Authenticity-as-Sound

As well as highlighting the relevance of the composer's intentions, Davies argues that the quest for authenticity 'may be characterised as aiming at the production of a particular *sound*, rather than at the production of, for example, the social ambience within which the music would or could be presented by the composer's contemporaries.'[153] This means that the acoustic properties of a performance are the only things that matter for its evaluation as authentic. Thus, the model of performance that the performer should strive to obtain is not a specific performance or the performance of the piece as it was supposed to be played by the composer's contemporaries; rather, sound prevails over the contextual attributes surrounding each performance: 'In striving for authenticity, the performer aims at an *ideal* sound rather than at the sound of some actual, former performance.'[154]

At the beginning of the section on Authenticity-as-Sound, Kivy specifies that there are two different senses in which we can interpret it: 'historical authenticity', which seeks to recapture the original sounds as they could be heard during the period of the composition of the piece, and 'sensible authenticity', which is about how these sounds were not merely heard but interpreted. While the first kind of authenticity calls for respect for the original instruments and venues, obtaining 'sensible authenticity' is trickier. Kivy gives the following example: 'when Bach's audience heard the opening movement of the *St. Matthew Passion*, even with the (from our viewpoint) modest numbers at the composer's disposal, the massed forces of double chorus and double orchestra must have had an impressive, almost overwhelming effect on them, much like the effect Berlioz's *Requiem* still has on us.'[155] If what performers want to obtain is the effect that those sounds produced on the audience at the composer's time, then, in some cases at least, they have to depart from 'historical authenticity'. This

[153] Davies 1987, 40. The reference to diverse authenticity values made by Davies can be considered as consistent with his views on the ontology of musical works which should be adapted according to the 'thickness' of the work. See Chapter 1, section 2.2.
[154] Davies 1987, 42.
[155] Kivy 1995, 53.

conclusion is inevitable, given the fact that between Bach's contemporaries and us a lot of different musical traditions have shaped our ears. We are more tolerant of dissonance, for instance, having become accustomed to 20th-century innovations. Kivy here reflects in some ways ideas voiced at the extremes of the HIP movement. One of its aims, in fact, has been that of allowing us to hear the sounds of the past, yet the supporters of the movement rarely consider whether we may hear them 'sensibly' or only 'historically'. The notion of 'historical sound' is thus more complicated than it seems and far more difficult to achieve.

1.3 Authenticity-as-Practice

With the interpretation of Authenticity-as-Practice, Kivy tries to fill the voids left by Authenticity-as-Sound. Authenticity-as-Practice refers in fact to the respect not only for historical sounds but also for the performing practices of the time. For one thing, this calls into question the use of period instruments. This will be central to the discussion of the history of HIP in the following section. As seen in Chapter 1, section 2.2, Levinson considers the use of period instruments essential for the identity of musical works and he includes it also among the essential aspects for an authentic performance: 'performances are partly authentic in virtue of being performed *on the instruments for which they were intended* (or envisaged), for a reason wholly *other* than, and *distinct* from, their thus procuring a *sound* that matches what an ideal contemporary performance would have delivered.'[156] What Levinson claims is that the use of period instruments is important not only at the level of historical and contextual interpretation of the work, but also on the expressive content of the performance at issue.[157]

Kivy develops Levinson's idea by introducing into the discussion the so-called 'wig problem': 'If wigs, frock, coats, and buckle shoes were part of the eighteenth-century musical scene, must I not insist that no authentic performance can be without them?'.[158] Kivy then gives a practical example to explain how this issue can affect actual and present performances. Haydn's *Farewell* Symphony prescribes that in the

[156] Levinson 2011, 394.
[157] See Ibid., 399.
[158] Kivy 1995, 102.

last movements musicians stand up, blow out the candles that lit their stands and leave the stage.[159] In this case, the fact that performers turn off electric lights instead of candles may seem a 'wig argument'. But the act of blowing out candles can also have an aesthetic effect if it accompanies the slow movement at the end of the piece in a more graceful manner than the act of turning off electric lights. For Kivy, deciding whether similar cases constitute a wig argument or not is a matter of considering whether the authenticity that performers want to achieve is a means for getting a specific sonic result or is an end in itself, just to rebuild the original setting of the performance. In this last case, external elements such as venue and visual components seem to be crucial for a complete reconstruction.[160] It is in this respect that the wig argument gains its strength: is it really worth it?

1.4 Personal-Authenticity

The understanding of authenticity as 'Personal-Authenticity' is perhaps the interpretation of the term that we are more accustomed to in our everyday language, at least outside of the musical field. Indeed, Personal-Authenticity has to do with the individual interpretation that the performer can give of the work, and refers to the performer's attitude of being true to herself. For Kivy, performers can rightly be seen as 'arrangers' in their process of interpreting the work. The role of performers thus seems to acquire a greater relevance than the one it had in the other kinds of authenticity discussed so far.[161] Kivy's concern is thus that of considering whether the notion of Personal-Authenticity can be compatible with other authenticities. As for the compatibility between Personal-Authenticity and Authenticity-as-Sound, Kivy's answer is an unequivocal 'No'. Authenticity-as-Sound consists in fact in the replication of a performance which has already been executed by others and it can scarcely leave space for personal interpretation. In this framework, Personal-Authenticity can only be seen as a 'consolation prize.'[162] Similar considerations can

[159] See Ibid., 104–105.
[160] I will address the issue of venues in section 2.5.
[161] As we will see, this is also the interpretation of authenticity which the performers I interviewed privilege over the others. This is of course partly due to the focus that this account of authenticity places on the performers themselves.
[162] See Kivy 1995, 140.

be applied to the compatibility between Personal-Authenticity and Authenticity-as-Practice, the aim of the last being the imitation of past performing practices.

Things can be slightly different when considering Authenticity-as-Intention. In fact, it is not always the case that the composer's intent is for performers to follow their instructions to the letter: 'part of the network of wishes and intentions that has motivated the composition and performance of Western music (at least since the beginning of the modern era, if not before) are wishes and intentions that performers achieve, if they can, Personal-Authenticity: individual style and originality.'[163] Personal-Authenticity can thus be included *de facto* among the different ways in which authenticity in musical performance can be interpreted. As will be clearer from Chapters 3 and 6, the novel account of musical ontology I am going to present, Musical Stage Theory, provides an interpretation of authenticity which gives due relevance to Personal-Authenticity. By deeming the performance the musical work, indeed, the performer gains the active role of 'creator', while the comparison with previous performance styles or with the composer's intentions loses its predominance.[164]

From the review of some of the major theories on musical authenticity, it appears that philosophical literature is divided over the question of whether there is one feature more important than others for judging a performance authentic. Many of the considerations that have been made are related to practical aspects of performance, such as the use of period instruments or the respect for historical performing practices. These aspects are crucial to the HIP movement, which emerged at the end of the 19th century with the intention of restoring the performing practice of ancient works of music. In order to understand the origin and development of authenticity, then, in the following section I will give an overview of the history of the movement, the reasons behind it, the changes it brought, and its consequences.

2. History and Development of the Debate on Authenticity

The concept of authenticity in music first arose in the late 19th century, as a result of an increased degree of reflection on and awareness of the background to historical

[163] Ibid., 141.
[164] On Personal-Authenticity see also Bertinetto 2013.

works of music. In more or less the same period, the great 'complete' editions of composers such as Bach, Handel, Palestrina, and Monteverdi were published (e.g. the *Denkmäler der Tonkunst* edition).[165] These 'Urtext' editions established the 'Masterworks' in their purity and absoluteness. From the late 18th to the early 19th century, the first biographies of great composers were also published: Forkel's biography of J.S. Bach (1802), Niemetschek's biography of Mozart (1798), Schlosser's biography of Beethoven (1827), and others. These biographies contributed to the formation of the idea of the composer as creative Master and as an almost mythological figure. These publications are integral to the evolution of the concept of musical work as the product of an unaccountable creativeness.

After an overview on the origin and development of the EMM, section 2.2 will be devoted to Lydia Goehr's concept of musical work.[166] Goehr's interpretation is particularly relevant for the impact that it had on discussions on both the nature of musical works and the issue of authenticity. I will then explore the reasons for the success of the EMM and HIP movements, the changes they brought, and the consequences for the musical field in general.

2.1 Overview

The aim of this section is to provide an overview on the key aspects of the EMM so as to pave the way for the later discussion on its reasons and consequences.

Mendelssohn's revival of Bach's *St Matthew Passion* in 1829 is usually taken to be a seminal moment for the widespread interest in music of the past, which led ultimately to the explosion of the EMM in the early 20th century. What Mendelssohn achieved with the performance of Bach's work was to show how the music of the past could be 'modern', in the sense that it could be brought back to life and made appealing to the audience centuries later. Mendelssohn's revival has its origins in German culture of the 19th century. The search for a musical identity was in Germany a consequence of the search for a national, political, and social one. The British preserved the 'ancient musick' of Handel and Geminiani throughout the 18th century, and the Italians

[165] Published in Vienna by Österreichischer Bundesverlag.
[166] See Goehr 1992.

preserved Palestrina and plainchant in churches, but the German interest was quite different: it was motivated by a search to refute the dominance of Italian musicians in the past and to replace them with an alternative narrative, grounded on a 'German Palestrina' who would allow the formation of a national heritage. The quest for a national identity, then, is one of the motivating factors that led to the inception of the EMM. The perception of the past as a recognisable entity, independent from the present but somehow related to it, is among the reasons why, as I will discuss, the later EMM was so successful.

The origins and development of the movement are deeply intertwined with historical facts and ideologies of the 19th and 20th centuries. It is not my aim here to investigate the precise circumstances which lurk in the background. What is relevant is stressing the historical complexity upon which the EMM emerged and recognising its relevance for the characteristics and reasons of the movement itself. The acknowledgement of living in an epoch detached from previously established traditions brought with it also the desire to create a new identity for the present. The EMM itself can be interpreted as an attempt to found a musical identity in which musicians and the public could recognise themselves. Even if, ironically, the identity that was sought was found in the past.[167]

Another factor to be considered is the development of numerous professional musical institutions, or Collegia Musica, throughout Europe, with the Schola Cantorum of Paris and the Collegium Musicum of Leipzig as two of the most widely known examples. Within these schools a concept started to emerge, which no-one had previously considered: the concept of authenticity. Before the late 19th century, the music of the past was seldom performed with a concern for how it originally sounded.[168] Either the music was played following the style of contemporary music or it was introduced as a sort of exotic oddity to entertain the audience.[169] Only with the first scholars and musicians devoted to a 'faithful' recreation of the Early Music, was the concept of authenticity infused with some of the features that we recognise today.

[167] I will come back to the search for an identity as a reason for the origin of the EMM in section 2.6, when assessing the interpretation that Taruskin gives of authenticity,

[168] With the exceptions of Catholic Church services in Italy which often combined Medieval, Renaissance, Baroque and modern styles and of other similar cases.

[169] See Kenyon 1988, 34. One exception that is worth mentioning is the case of the monks of Solesmes and their attempt from 1833 to recreate the original sound of medieval plainchant. See Bergeron 1998.

Among these musicians, two names stand out: Arnold Dolmetsch and Wanda Landowska. Dolmetsch is recognised as the father of the cult of musical authenticity.[170] In his treatises on performance practice he advocated the quest for authenticity, meaning primarily the composer's intentions and expectations for the work. Despite the eccentricities of his career, which led many to undervalue his books and activities, his contribution to and influence on future generations of musicians is undeniable. His studies on the performance practice of the 17th and 18th centuries were in fact milestones for many performers and scholars who succeeded him. In addition to his books on performing practice, Dolmetsch restored period instruments which were, in his words, an essential part of the revival of Early Music. But Dolmetsch did not limit himself to the restoration of old instruments, he also made 'improved' copies of them. He suggested changes and improvements which paved the way for his successors in the study and reconstruction of old instruments.[171] The English school was particularly renowned for this, with Canon Francis Galpin as one of the most important exponents.[172] The reconstruction and improvement of old instruments is perfectly consistent with Dolmetsch's idea of a revival of Early Music, which should not only be studied and understood in terms of authenticity but also brought to life for the audience of the present. Dolmetsch gained more and more followers during the 1950s and this led to the transformation of what initially was only an interest for the music of the past with, to a more invested quest for authenticity, the key feature of the HIP.

Wanda Landowska is the other great figure of the early EMM. Despite being recognised as an exponent of the revival of Early Music, she always made clear that what she wanted to achieve was not a faithful reproduction of the ways in which performers played in the past. Instead, she proclaimed the need to do justice to the author, without suppressing the freedom of the interpreter:[173]

> I search for one that seems logical and beautiful to me, one that does justice to Bach's prosody by being punctuated in the right places. I am aware that the

[170] See Kenyon 1988, 39.
[171] See Lawson and Stowell 1999, 9; Kenyon 1988, 41.
[172] See Kenyon 1988, 41.
[173] In later sections and in Chapter 5 it will become clearer how before the 20th century the freedom of the interpreter, instead of being a sign of departure from the authenticity of the piece, was a required element for being respectful of the composer's idea of the work. The great majority of works, in fact, prescribed a certain degree of contribution on the part of performers. This is also one of the main ideas behind the proposal of Musical Stage Theory.

> disposition of the registers in the harpsichords of Bach's time differed somewhat from those of my Pleyel. But little do I care if, to attain the proper effect, I use means that were not exactly those available to Bach.[174]

Landowska foreshadowed modern attitudes in her defence of the interpreter's freedom. She did not agree with the claim that overshadowing the performer's personality for the sake of the purity of the work would result in a better, and more authentic, rendition.

The dichotomy between authenticity as complete respect for the score and authenticity as partially informed by the performer's contribution was to accompany both the EMM and HIP throughout their histories. Some conductors, such as Stokowski and Furtwängler, rebutted the claim that authenticity meant unconditional respect for the score. They dismissed the most extreme claims of historically informed performing practice.[175] Others, like Toscanini and Leonhardt, did however prioritise respect for the instructions provided on the score and tried to achieve that as an aim. As the discussion in the next sections will show, this quest for authenticity as total respect for the score cannot be pursued without difficulties.

To endorse the more extreme claims of the HIP one must overcome not only theoretical but also practical obstacles. As the 20th century proceeded, the HIP gained in strength.[176] Its apex was reached in the 1970s and 1980s thanks to the rise of a concomitant factor: the development and improvement of recording technology. As I will address in more detail in section 2.3, in fact, the use and reproduction of recordings made it possible to achieve the ascetic purity that, for some musicians, became the aim of an authentic rendition of a work. Also, it allowed the audience to experience music in a more intimate environment, as if replicating the environment for chamber music of the Renaissance and Baroque periods. In Chapter 4 I will extensively address the role of recordings in the overall ontology of musical works.

The search for Authenticity-as-Sound and Authenticity-as-Intention, to borrow Kivy's terminology, is thus the drive behind the development of the EMM and its later offshoot, HIP. But, in order to define authenticity, it is also necessary to have a concept of the work of music, against which this authenticity must be valued. In the next section I will talk about Goehr's concept of the identity of musical works. The reason

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[174] Quoted in Kenyon 1988, 39.
[175] See Lawson and Stowell 1999, 12.
[176] The reasons for the origins of the movement addressed in section 2.3 will show why it proved to be so appealing to audiences in the last century.

for presenting her account is because of the relevance it had for the future development of the discipline, as well as for its perspective on the EMM and HIP.

2.2 *Goehr's Interpretation of a 'Work of Music'*

Goehr's defines the work as '(i) […] an open concept with original and derivative employment; (ii) that it is correlated to the ideals of a practice; (iii) that it is a regulative concept; (iv) that it is projective; and (v) that it is an emergent concept.'[177] By 'open concept', Goehr means that it does not admit of an absolutely precise definition, a definition that is abstracted from the practices in which the concept might be applied or used. The openness of the concept, however, does not mean that it is impossible to find an identity to musical works. Indeed, 'Its identity is preserved by the continuity that is guaranteed at any point in time if the concept's present use is appropriately connected to its previous uses.'[178]

Goehr then goes on to criticise the identity conditions that have so far been used to determine the concept of work. They are, in fact, based on a biased view of music, distorted through the lens of the classical tradition.[179] As seen in Chapter 1, section 7.3, when assessing the arguments that other theorists put forward for determining the correctness of performances, compliance with scores is an ideal which is deemed relevant for recognising a performance as correct. Yet, as Goehr points out, perfect compliance is an ideal in the classical tradition of music that is not shared by other traditions in other periods and in other cultures. The concept of musical work cannot thus be individuated through the identity conditions provided by compliance with the score.[180] It should instead be recognised as regulative concept that guides the practice of music. Through their regulative force, concepts can help our practices to achieve and retain stability. In the case at issue, regulative music concepts stabilise musical practice and they manage to do so because they suggest to the users of the concepts that certain actions rather than others need to be undertaken. Individual musical works,

[177] Goehr 1992, 90.
[178] Ibid., 95.
[179] This is a point that will become relevant in the later section on the assessment of the EMM and also in Chapter 5.
[180] I will address the role of the score for authenticity in section 2.5.

instead, can be said to exist only as fictional objects, i.e. as projections of the regulative work-concept.

The regulative strength of the concept of musical work is what enables performers to know what and how to perform in order to comply with the concept of work itself. And this explains why, according to Goehr, the concept of musical work is an emergent one (not in the metaphysical sense of 'emergence') and, in particular, it emerged as a concept regulative of musical practice only at the end of the 18th century.[181] A regulative concept emerges when it acquires a stable meaning so that it is possible to understand its function. Before acquiring a stable meaning, in fact, it is doubtful that a concept would have the necessary strength to regulate our practice. And it was only at the end of the 18th century that 'persons who thought, spoke about, or produced music were able for the first time to comprehend and treat the activity of producing music as one primarily involving the composition and performance of works.'[182] Before this time, she claims, the concept of musical work did not regulate musical practice.

Only at the beginning of the 19th century did scholars and musicians start to think of the music of the past as a corpus of pieces that needed to be preserved and curated. At the same time, 'since about 1800, it has been the rule to speak of Early Music anachronistically; to impose retroactively upon music concepts developed at a later point in the history of music. Implicit existence has become here a matter of retroactive attribution.'[183] It is only with a retrospective view that people began to refer to past music as 'works'. The work-concept that they were imposing on Early Music, the idea, that is, of compliance with the score and with other requirements, was not adopted before that time.

Goehr does somewhat overstate her claim, however. The concept of 'work' can, in fact, be traced at least as far back as the early 18th century. More or less faithful performances of Handel's 'works' were, for instance, commonly heard in British 'academies' from the 1750s onwards. Following the dismal failure of Cherubini's 1786 version of *Sabino* at the King's Theatre in the Haymarket, London, for instance, the management instituted a policy of fidelity to the work. They began to shun the usual practice of commissioning a maestro to arrange and edit opera scores, cutting

[181] See Goehr 1992, 100–112.
[182] Ibid., 114.
[183] Ibid., 116. For a discussion on Goehr's view see Butt 2015; Cook 2013; Weber 1997.

and replacing numbers at will, and to discourage star singers from making their own insertions and deletions.[184]

Though not entirely accurate in all respects, Goehr's claims do match up with one of the reasons that contributed to the birth of the EMM: a generalised change of perspective on the music of the past and on history in general. In the next section it is my aim to delineate the historical, cultural, and musical reasons that brought about the origins of the movement.

2.3 Reasons

As the name suggests, the EMM originated with the intent of reviving the musical traditions of the past. In the 19th century the present began to be recognised as the end of a progression that 'stretches straight backwards.'[185] According to this view, the people living in the present are the legitimate heirs of their predecessors and they take up from where they left off. The conception of the past is thus connected also to an idea of progress: being at the end of a continuum that constitutes the past enables contemporaries to build up new knowledge from past experience that has already been tested.[186] Another consequence of the identification of the past as an entity per se is the feeling of distance that comes with it. As I mentioned, before the development of the HIP movement and its vision of the past, Early Music was usually performed, if at all, according to the normal style of the times. There was thus no attempt to strive for an authenticity in respect to the practices that were in vogue at the time of composition. The distance from the music of the past was not perceived with the same intensity as it was after the growth of the HIP movement: the music of the past and the music of the present were part of one and the same tradition, regardless of the year in which the pieces were composed.

The apparent contradiction that comes with this change of attitude, however, is that the more the past was perceived as something distant and unreachable, the more the willingness grew to interpret and understand it: 'We, […] interact with it [the past] in a more detached and objective way. We no longer 'bring it up to date', for we have no

[184] See Price, Milhous, and Hume 1995, 402.
[185] Kenyon 1988, 58.
[186] A possible objection is that, in a less optimistic way, the 'past' has always been used to bolster power structures of the present.

clear idea of what 'up to date' means. Ironically, however, as our understanding of the present becomes increasingly obscure, our view of the past appears to clarify.'[187]

A motive that may explain the rise of the EMM and even more of the HIP movement is a widespread culture of restoration. The culture of restoration was already well established in many European nations in the 19th century. It can be identified during the Napoleonic period in France, in the return to the past in search of a nationalist sense of community in Germany, and in the nostalgia for past culture and traditions that was widespread in England.[188] The HIP movement thus fits into a pattern that permeated many aspects of culture. The relevance of a culture of preservation and renovation of the past is perfectly consistent with the ideals of the HIP movement. As we will see in more detail in the next section, this restoration was conducted through the recreation of period instruments,[189] the care for the history of musical editions, the search for original venues in which to perform and so on.[190]

The possibility of actualising this restoration was due also to a parallel phenomenon in the late 19th-early 20th century: the improvement of technology. Technological modernisation, in fact, made it possible to achieve unprecedented results. In particular, recording technologies allowed musicians to fix their interpretations and preserve them for the future, one of the aims of the HIP movement. These developments acted both as one of the reasons for the rise of the movement and, given the importance that was given to its role, also as one of its consequences. Recordings allowed 'authentic' renditions of works to be fixed forever. As the performance became a permanent object, the pressure to achieve perfection grew, thus reinforcing the drive for a pure authenticity.

Lastly, the proponents of the HIP movement supported its claims also in opposition to the mainstream musical tradition of that time. The HIP movement reached its apex when the Romantic movement had been the affirmed musical tradition for many decades. The Romantic taste was thus well accepted and it was informed by ideals which do not reflect those of the HIP movement. While the Romantics promoted the interpreters' freedom, the HIP movement regarded respect for the instructions provided by the composer as one of the main values of an 'authentic' performance.

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[187] Kenyon 1988, 68.
[188] See Butt 2002, 166.
[189] See Ibid., 68.
[190] See Lawson 1999, 33.

A second ideal that the HIP movement held in opposition to the mainstream traditions of the Romantic period was to redeem music from elitism and to fight against the focus on the individual, which was a result of the Romantic cult of virtuosity. However, as Butt points out, despite claiming to appeal for equality between musicians and to wider access for audiences, the actual result of HIP movement was the opposite. Early Music became a niche within the musical milieu that appealed to a restricted group of well-informed people. And the ideal of purity in performance, with the consequent rigidity that it entailed, certainly did not help the HIP movement to reach a wider audience than the mainstream tradition.[191]

Now that some of the possible reasons for the origins of the HIP movement have been suggested, in the next section I will look at the changes that it brought to the musical landscape of that time.

2.4 Changes

In this section, I will focus on two changes brought by the rise of the HIP movement: the use of period instruments and the study of original manuscripts and editions.

When talking about the early stages of the EMM, in section 2.1 I introduced Arnold Dolmetsch as one of the preeminent figures. One of his major contributions was indeed the focus that he put on the use of period instruments for obtaining an authentic rendition of the work.

The reason behind their use, of course, is the quest for authenticity. As seen in section 1, scholars like Levinson deem the use of period instruments an essential component to determine the authenticity of a performance. It is only through the use of instruments that were played at that time, or faithful reproductions of them, that it is possible to achieve the level of historical accuracy that is needed in order to play authentically. Now, all major conservatories provide classes in performing practice on period instruments. Even if we take this possibility for granted, it was not so before the middle of the 20th century. While nowadays playing Bach on a piano raises long debates, it was of no concern a few decades ago. The use of period instruments is another sign of the change of perspective on the role of the past.

[191] See Butt 2002, 9.

This interest in the original conditions of composition, together with the declared quest for authenticity, led to the second important change brought about by the HIP movement: the study of original manuscripts and the interest in the history of musical editions. Before the 19th century, there had been few attempts at providing reliable editions of music repertories. Some examples can be found in the 18th century, but their purpose was mainly to include excerpts of past works in the histories of music.[192] This enthusiasm was the result of a wider philological interest towards the texts of the past.[193] The intervention of the editor should then be minimal in the case of the Urtext, in order to make the medium between composer and performer as transparent as possible.

Even if the transparency of the medium can be understood in a context in which the purity of the work is the ideal to reach, Urtext editions were objects of concern for both musicians and scholars.[194] The score is underdetermined by its nature, and it is impossible to indicate on the score every piece of information that performers could need in order to give a rendition of it. Also, the notation is often purposefully left incomplete by the author and this was even truer in the case of early repertories where improvisation was a common practice. The criticism that was then put forward in relation to Urtext editions was that they did not offer to the performers the necessary information that they needed in order to interpret a repertoire that was so culturally and temporally far from them.[195] The result was that 'musical editing became from the 1920s onward increasingly prescriptive rather than descriptive.'[196]

Scholarly editions thus departed from the purity of the Urtext and the editor became a sort of pre-interpreter, fitting within the chain that led from the act of composition of the score to the performance of it.[197] What these editions lacked, however, was the inclusion of all the variants that the original edition went through and the possible interpretations that could be given on the score. From the extreme purity of the Urtext and its lack of information necessary to performers, the editing tradition then reached another extreme, running 'the risk of introducing the precepts and prejudices of the editor's own time, thus obscuring or obliterating altogether the composer's

[192] See Kenyon 1988, 86. For example Corelli's scores of Op. 5 which I will analyse in Chapter 5. They aimed to present the pieces 'as Corelli played them' but not as he notated them.
[193] I already mentioned in section 2 the publication of the first great complete editions in the 1870s.
[194] See Kenyon 1988, 91.
[195] Not everyone, though, agrees with that (see LeHuray 1990, 8).
[196] Kenyon 1988, 92.
[197] See Ibid., 93.

intentions.'[198] A classic example of the dangers of the Urtext approach is cited by Robert Gjerdingen in the article 'Mozart's Obviously Corrupt Minuet' (2001). He shows how the editors of the NMA (New Mozart edition) made changes to the 'Urtext' to correct what looked to them, from a 20th century harmony point of view, like mistakes. But Gjerdingen shows that they were not mistakes: norms of harmonic theory current in the 1950s were assumed to operate in the 1780s.[199]

An alternative path that was followed at that time in order to obtain information about the piece was the study of treatises of the period. Treatises on performing practice, notation, interpretation, and so on are the most direct way of accessing instructions about how to perform a work. However, as Lawson points out, musicians should avoid making the mistake of considering treatises as immutable and of possessing universal validity.[200] In many cases, in fact, treatises prescribe only what was considered as the correct convention for the immediate circle of the author or, sometimes, even only the author herself. In addition, it is not the case that all the performing conventions of the time were fixed in treatises. Performing practices were far less static than they are in the modern classical tradition. Treatises should be instead assessed in conjunction with other available sources and interpreted in a non-partisan way.

The most immediate changes that can be observed as a result of the HIP movement thus relate to the tools that can be used to reach a sought-after authenticity of performance: the use of period instruments and attention to the original text. Indeed, in addition to these major changes there are many subtler ones that accompanied the development of the HIP movement and that, even if less directly observable, brought relevant consequences in the musical scene, irreversibly affecting the performance and fruition of music. The next section is devoted to outlining these consequences and contextualising them within the culture that produced the HIP movement.

In the next section I will also assess whether the requirements indicated by the HIP movement as essential for an authentic performance are obtainable and/or desirable. In particular, I will focus on the ideals of the respect for composer's intentions, notation, period instruments and venues. I will conclude the section with the challenge

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[198] Lawson and Stowell 1999, 37.

[199] Note how these interpolations by the editors might have an effect on ontological considerations: if we assume a sonicist stance, in fact, a change in the pitch or rhythm of the original work would result in the change of constitutive features of the work itself.

[200] See Lawson and Stowell 1999, 23–25.

presented to the HIP movement by Richard Taruskin. The discussion over the validity of the values promoted by the HIP movement will show how the ideal of authenticity which results from them is not desirable, nor does it reflect the musical practices of the period. This conclusion calls for the necessity to develop an alternative account of authenticity which acknowledges the role of performers and of the contextual factors which affect the audience's perception. Chapter 6 will indeed be devoted to this novel interpretation of authenticity.

2.5 Consequences

As the HIP movement gained more and more supporters, the idea of Early Music that was spread among the audience started to be imbued with the ideal of authenticity promoted by it. For the audience of the time the music of the past was regulated by a set of rigid rules and instructions that the performers should follow in order to give a correct rendition of it. The direct consequence that the EMM had on the audience, then, was to spread a standard idea of the Early Music tradition that actually reflected the vision of the promoters of the movement.

The EMM sponsors an ideal of performance as the achievement of the authentic nature of the work. In order to reach this authenticity, the necessary steps include respect for the score, for the composer's intentions, and for the performing practices of the time. The performer's role, thus, is that of following obsequiously what the edition or the treatises prescribe. The obvious consequence of this practice is that performances are deprived of the interpretative contribution that performers could bring to them. If an ideal of purity and authenticity should be met, then, according to the dictates of the HIP movement, this should happen at the cost of the performer's freedom.[201]

[201] Harnoncourt would not agree with this. He is famous for his activity as both musician and scholar of Early Music. In his many reflections on the value of the recreation of Early Music today, he was very realistic in respect to the possibility of achieving this result and he also cast doubt on whether or not some kinds of restoration would be desirable. In particular, he was against an idea of historical performance in which the subjectivity of the performer is obscured in favour of an alleged authenticity. He claims: 'The outcome is found in those familiar musical performances which are often historically impeccable, but which lack all vitality. Clearly, an interpretation that was historically uninformed but musically alive would be preferable.' (Harnoncourt 1988, 16)

An obvious difficulty in respecting the composer's intentions and notated instructions arises from the fact that the score is underdetermined and does not contain all the instructions needed in order to perform a piece. Our knowledge and understanding of the traditions of earlier times are not sufficient to fill the voids on the score.[202] Indeed, it seems impossible to do that even with the works of contemporary composers, although we share the same cultural background.

Moreover, as I noticed before, even granting that we could do that, it is not right to claim that it would always be the best possible option. It is not every composer's intention for performers to play following a set of given prescriptions. The ideal of total respect for the composer's intentions comes from the Romantic idea of the composer as genius. But there is a way of being authentic to the work even without a pedantic respect for an ideal that it is improbable that we could ever reach, anyway. In fact, 'One of the unthought-of things the great composer assumed, wanted, and needed was the conviction and passion of great performers.'[203]

The consequence of the underdetermination of scores is that there is an unavoidable contribution on the part of performers in order to transform what is on paper into sound.[204] Notation has progressively and consistently evolved throughout the history of music. The conventional idea of the score, one in which pitches and durations are indicated as well as tempi and phrasings, is actually the layout that scores had in the classical period between the late 18th-early 19th century. Indeed, these indications were not present before the 18th century, when they became more detailed also to cater to the amateur market.[205] Until the late 18th century, in fact, scores were often purposely left incomplete by composers who expected performers to fill in the voids that they had left.[206] The most famous cases are Baroque compositions with a continuo accompaniment on which performers could create different kinds of harmonisations and ornamentations.

Ornamentation is another element that was not prescribed in full, or indeed at all, in Early Music. Performers were left the freedom to choose which kind of ornaments would be more suitable for the execution of the piece. Only at the end of the 18th

[202] See Harnoncourt 1988, 32.
[203] Kenyon 1988, 25.
[204] This consideration applies also when there is no score: even in copying a previously played exemplar there will be differences.
[205] See LeHuray 1990, 6.
[206] See Butt 2002, 106.

century did composers start to indicate them in the score, either for making the performance of them possible also for amateurs not trained in ornamentation technique or for a greater control of the rendition of their piece.[207] For the reasons mentioned so far, it can be argued that the authenticity of a piece cannot really be judged on the basis of the respect for the notation nor on the composer's intentions.[208]

The ideal of total authenticity brought with it also radical requirements, such as the choice of a venue with acoustic features as similar as possible to those of the venues in which Early Music was performed, the use of materials dating back to that period in the reconstruction of instruments, and so on.

The possibility of performing music written by composers of the past on instruments that were available at their time certainly has an appeal. In addition, period instruments generate new sounds and new ways to play, regardless of whether or not these are 'historical' (e.g. fortepianos have quicker decay, allowing more pronounced slurs, and the damper pedal can be raised for longer because low notes are not so reverberant).

However, besides the desirability of performing Early Music on period instruments, what should be considered is whether it is possible to achieve this. Harnoncourt praises the use of period instruments because they enable musicians to expand the range of expressive possibilities.[209] However, he is also wary in suggesting their use if musicians are not sure about their quality. He in fact notices how many of the copies and restorations that were made in early times resulted in instruments which did not have the features that original instruments had. Instead, the consequence that the diffusion of these instruments had was that 'audiences became accustomed to interpreting their chirping and tinkling as "original sounds".'[210]

It is plausible to say that the willingness to rebuild perfect copies of original instruments will always remain an ideal. It is in fact idealistic to build an instrument in the exact same way as it was built in the past and with the same materials. A difference in the wood for the harmonic table or in the hair for the bow results in a

[207] See Lawson and Stowell 1999, 68–69.
[208] With this I do not want to deny that some practices advertised and developed by the HIP movement are indeed historically correct and accepted as such (e.g. starting a trill on the upper note). My intention is only to highlight how the respect for the score and for the historically correct interpretation of it is doubtfully enough for achieving authenticity in the performance. For other discussions on music ornamentation, see Dolmetsch 2005; Fubini 1994.
[209] See Harnoncourt 1988, 76.
[210] Ibid., 71.

massive difference in the sound of a violin. Sure, we still own some original copies of period instruments. But, even if they are in perfect condition, there are other factors which need to be taken into account. For example, in order to obtain a perfect compliance with the sounds of the past musicians should also be aware of the numerous changes in pitch and in the temperament that happened in the last centuries. The common pitch that was used in the past, the A at 440Hz of today, differed not only according to the period but also geographically. In the 16th century every parish in Europe could have its own pitch without the need for other areas to agree on a common one. It was only with the increased mobility of musicians and, at last, with the first recordings that a common pitch was established.[211]

In order for the sounds of the present to reflect those of the past, the other necessary condition is the overall acoustic features of the venue in which performers play: 'Original sound conditions are thus of great interest to a musician for they make an essential contribution to the understanding of a work, above and beyond purely aesthetic considerations.'[212] Especially for church music, some composers wrote their pieces thinking of the conditions in which they would have been performed (for example, the polychoral character of the music played in San Marco in Venice). It is therefore important to be conscious of the sound conditions of original venues in order to being able to adapt the performance in the event that similar sound conditions cannot be obtained.

However, what needs to be noted is that the sound conditions of a venue are determined not only by the structure of the venue itself but also by the overall environment. Listening to music sitting in a silent hall is a modern custom. Before moving to the concert hall, music was played in open spaces, in Churches, streets, theatres, or in smaller, private halls. The audience usually did not sit in silence to listen to the music. Music, especially without voices or secular, was conceived more as a background sound or as diversion, in agreement with the interpretation of music as an everyday activity.[213] In more recent times, what changed is not only the venue but also the attitude of the audience in relation to music. As Leppard points out, the listening conditions are changed but we are changed as well: 'If Bach's cantata *Wachet auf* can finally only fully reveal its vitality by being played in St Thomas's Church, Leipzig,

[211] See Lawson and Stowell 1999, 84.
[212] Harnoncourt 1988, 79.
[213] See interview n. 7.

with the instruments and voices that the composer had at his disposal, and on the 27th Sunday after Trinity (which occurs very seldom, only twice in Bach's lifetime), we should hear it at its best very rarely indeed.'[214] It thus seems that, besides the difficulty of obtaining it, not even the respect for the listening conditions of the time, including the use of period instruments and of original venues, is enough to reach the authenticity that the HIP movement claims to aim for.[215]

All the constraints which result from the ideal of this kind of authenticity have as most immediate consequence the limitation of the freedom of performers. However, as I mentioned, this was not always what composers wanted from their works. It seems that, in these cases, the respect for the score and for original listening conditions conflicts with the respect for the composer's intentions. But how is it possible to set a hierarchy between these two requirements if also the notation is interpreted as an example of the composer's idea of the piece? Getting rid of freedom of interpretation does not seem the right way to advocate authenticity, since a large part of the communicative aspect of music is made possible thanks to the freshness of perspective that is given to the piece by different performers. Should we then dismiss this concept of authenticity as it has been formulated so far and understand the interpretation of the past conducted by the HIP movement in a different way?

The possibility of reaching the ideals promoted by the HIP movement has been questioned by many. Recreating the past is not always possible: sometimes, the past remains silent because it does not provide us with enough information.[216] Sometimes, even if we have the information we need, we lack the tools to recreate it. From these considerations comes the claim that what we can reach through our attempts in restoring past traditions is at best a counterfeit.[217] But, more importantly, even granting that the recreation of past musical traditions is feasible, it is not certain that it is desirable.

In the next section I am going to outline the major points of critique that Richard Taruskin raises against the radical claims of the HIP movement.

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[214] Leppard 1988, 74.
[215] The discussion on the relevance of the venue can be extended to other art forms. Relevant examples are site-specific art, installation art, and land art. On this see Kaye 2000.
[216] See Dunsby 1996, 15.
[217] See Morrow 1978, 243.

2.6 Taruskin on Authenticity

Thanks to Taruskin's interpretation of the concept of authenticity in the light of the HIP movement, studies in musicology or philosophy of art often put the word authenticity in scare quotes. In his fundamental article *The Pastness of the Present and The Presence of the Past* (1988),[218] Taruskin questions the meaning that has been given to the concept of authenticity. Authenticity, that is, mostly based on the purist respect for the score and for the composer's intentions in general. But most of all, in this work Taruskin suggests an alternative reading of the HIP movement and of the reasons for its origin.

Taruskin's central thesis is that '"historical performance" today is not really historical; that a thin veneer of historicism clothes a performance style that is completely of our time, and is in fact the most modern style around; and that the historical hardware has won its wide acceptance and above all its commercial viability precisely by virtue of its novelty, not its antiquity.'[219] The ideal of a reconstruction of the past is thus fake and unobtainable according to Taruskin. There is no way in which our modern perspective on the past can be transparent. The label of 'historical performance' is incorrect, since what is expressed is a modern approach and a modern interpretation of the music of the past.[220] The active participation of the present in the reading of the past is, as we will see, what motivates Taruskin to reject the ideal of authenticity as it has been presented by the HIP movement. Performances of Early Music are a way in which it is possible for past music to live again and this necessarily implies that they partly embody the values of our modern times. The present and the past are intertwined in the reconstruction of the music of the past through the performances and interpretations of the present. From this consideration comes the claim that 'The pastness of the present is as much implied by it as the presence of the past.'[221] Besides this, another indication of the mistake that is behind the origin of the dispute is the lack of consensus even within supporters of the HIP movement itself. Taruskin brings as an example the choice of tempi for the performance of Early

[218] In Kenyon 1988, 137–207.
[219] Ibid., 152.
[220] See Ibid., 193.
[221] Ibid., 157.

Music.[222] Comparing the recordings by masters such as Leonhardt and Harnoncourt, it is clear that 'if one of them should happen to be re-creating the music of the baroque, the other is baying at the moon.'[223] This shows that the universality of the ideal of authenticity that is advocated by the HIP movement is a red herring.

What needs to be noticed is that Taruskin does not reject the HIP movement as a whole. He recognises the benefit that it had in terms of the focus that it placed on the revival of a tradition that was going to be forgotten. Historical research on music also helps musicians to open up their horizons and interpret music with a fresh perspective. Similarly, the use of period instruments, thanks to their unfamiliarity, can help musicians to break the bounds of their performing routine. What Taruskin instead questions is the claim by the HIP movement that we should recreate the past in order to achieve authenticity.

As I have discussed in previous sections, the ideal of authenticity embraced by the HIP movement is founded on a set of requirements that privileges respect for the notation and the composer's intentions. As we have seen, many scholars and musicians question the possibility and desirability of complying with these requirements as strictly as the movement prescribes. Taruskin is on the same line in this respect. He is sceptical of the possibility of knowing the composer's intentions regarding her work. More to the point, the ideal of the composer's intentions is not the correct way of characterising authenticity. Indeed, Taruskin considers the appeal to intentions by performers as 'an evasion of the performer's obligation to understand what he is performing.'[224] In this respect Taruskin agrees instead with Landowska's approach and with her interpretation of authenticity as an understanding of the work in which the personal contribution to performers is an essential component.[225]

Authenticity is thus better understood as an internal authenticity, in which what is valued is not the compliance with sonic requirements but the spirit of the work as it is expressed through the performance.[226] Taruskin complains that the misconception that surrounds the interpretation of authenticity has made it difficult for both practitioners

[222] The lack of consensus seems to be a thread which links past and present debates over performance and authenticity together.
[223] Kenyon 1988, 204.
[224] Ibid., 146.
[225] See Ibid., 146–147.
[226] See Ibid., 148.

and the public to understand it in its true meaning.[227] As it is presented by the HIP movement, authenticity is just another name for purism.[228]

Taruskin offers a provocative reading of the development of the HIP movement as an application of a modern perspective to Early Music, rather than an historical reconstruction of it. He also suggests a possible reason for its origins, shared by other scholars as well: quoting Donald Grout, Taruskin indirectly suggests that 'Musical Archaism may be a symptom of a disintegrating civilization.'[229] The HIP movement would have had its roots, then, in the lack of modern music traditions. The quest for an authenticity in respect to music of the past can be interpreted as a reflection of an absence of a musical culture in which to identify.[230] Lacking musical progress, the HIP movement has opted to focus on a musical tradition that had its success and development in the past. The appeal to requirements for obtaining authenticity in performance can be thus interpreted as a lack of confidence in the strength of our contemporary interpretative means.[231]

The origin of the EMM, thus, could also be seen as a defensive reaction. Classical music culture was still the one which led the musical panorama and nothing seemed to hurt its predominance. The revival of the music of the past was then used to try to resuscitate a stalled 'museum' culture built by the Classical music tradition. A return to the past to look at the future.[232]

Is there then a necessity of conferring a new meaning upon the concept of authenticity? I will devote the next section to the current state of debate about authenticity. As it will be clearer also from the discussion on the interviews I conducted, a consensus on the answer to the question 'What is authenticity?' is far from being obtained.

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[227] See Taruskin 1984, 3.
[228] See Ibid., 9.
[229] Quoted in Kenyon 1988, 141.
[230] See Butt 2002, 10; Lawson and Stowell 1999, 4.
[231] See Kenyon 1988, 67.
[232] Interestingly, now some performers trained in this Classical music tradition feel that the role has been overturned. See section 3.2 for some examples from the interviews I conducted.

3. Current Debates on Authenticity

3.1 Gardiner, Norrington, and Maisky

Authenticity occupied a central role in debates in musicology and aesthetics in the last decades of the 20th century. No definite answer was reached as to what this authenticity looks like, though. The aim of this section is to consider a few of the attitudes which contemporary musicians have in this respect. I will start with a quick review of the thoughts of three of the main names in the current panorama of authentic performance: John Eliot Gardiner, Roger Norrington, and Mischa Maisky. This debate will prepare the way for an analysis of the results I received from interviews conducted with performers and conductors.

Suppose that you walk into a concert hall and see a harpsichord, a viola da gamba, and other period instruments on stage. One of your possible thoughts might be: 'There must be an authentic performance going on tonight.' This thought would be induced by the sight of period instruments, which we are used to correlate with what we call authentic performances. But, is the use of period instruments enough to make a performance worthy of the attribute 'authentic'? J. E. Gardiner is one of the most acclaimed conductors of performances with period instruments. What we would normally expect from such an expert in the field would be a clear-cut account of what it means for a performance to be authentic. This is not the case, though. In an interview at Carnegie Hall in 2015, in fact, he claimed that 'Authenticity simply means it's true in its own terms.'[233] Every musical experience can be considered authentic and even performances which do not make use of period instruments can be deemed as authentic as those on period instruments: quite an unexpected claim from one of the leading figures in the HIP movement. This suggests that, once again, as we saw in previous analyses of Kivy's arguments for authenticities, the use of period instruments – as well as other parameters used for judging a performance as authentic – cannot give us a full picture of what authenticity is.

Like Gardiner, Norrington is a founder of period instrument ensembles and a committed supporter of the value of the application of principles of 'authentic performance' also to Romantic Music. When in the 1980s he released a cycle of

[233] In https://launch.carnegiehall.org/BlogPost.aspx?id=4295013096.

Beethoven's Symphonies, conducting the London Classical Players, his choice of fast tempi raised controversies and debates. His true battleground, though, is the abolition of vibrato technique in the performance of Renaissance, Baroque, and even Romantic and late-Romantic music. This choice was led by the declared desire of achieving authenticity. But, despite this desire, the idea of authenticity that he conveys is not the traditional idea that we would probably expect. To cite just one of the views which he subscribes to, Norrington wants his music to connect with the audience, where this connection can also be expressed as bursting into laughter in the middle of a performance.[234] This is part of the authenticity of a piece, according to Norrington. Yet, this non-ordinary view would appear inappropriate to many, just like his choice of tempi or absence of vibrato.

The last musician whose ideas in respect to authenticity I will consider here is the cellist Mischa Maisky. In contrast to Norrington, Maisky is a supporter of the use of vibrato, even for Early Music. What he pursues in his performances is what he calls 'authenticity of emotions.'[235] There is no way that we can be sure how pieces sounded when they were performed in the past, according to Maisky. And even supposing we could find it out, why should we want to recreate something which was produced for the ears of people living in different times and a different culture? For the cellist, there is more than one way in which a piece can be performed. It is easy to see, then, how a concept of authenticity is difficult to recreate on this basis.

What emerges from a review of the ideas of Gardiner, Norrington, and Maisky is a similar conclusion to the one reached in previous sections. There seems to be no consensus on what authenticity is. The musicians go on expressing their ideas in respect to authenticity but no consensus on the matter is reached. The wealth of information about the past that we can access nowadays does not help in finding an answer to the question which opened the chapter. There is no single nature of authenticity unanimously recognised. In what follows, I will discuss whether this situation occurs also in the case of the musicians I interviewed.

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[234] In 'The Guardian', 26/07/2016.
[235] In www.musicalcriticism.com, 24 March 2009.

3.2 Interviews

During these interviews I questioned musicians about their idea of authenticity.[236] I conducted 15 interviews in total and, for the sake of clarity, I will analyse the results by dividing the interviewees into four main groups: mainstream performers (by which I mean performers who specialise in the Classical and Romantic Western tradition), HIP musicians (both conductors and performers), orchestral players, and scholars in the musicological field.

Before giving an account of the answers received from participants, I should mention the kind of questions that I asked them:

1. When you read a score for the first time, do you consider what would be the most authentic way to perform it?
2. Does your approach to the score change according to the period in which it was written? If yes, in what way?
3. What kind of influence does the audience have on your performance?
4. According to many scholars, these are the principal requirements for an authentic performance. I would like you to put them in order of importance, from the most to the least relevant:
    a. Use of period instruments;
    b. Respect for the performing traditions of the period;
    c. Respect for the composer's instructions provided on the score;
    d. Compliance with the audience's expectations;
    e. Respect for the composer's intentions according to the information you have been provided with (literature, letters, documents, essays, …);
5. Would you consider a performance of Bach's *Well Tempered Clavier* on a piano authentic?

[236] The interviews were conducted face-to-face. The purpose and procedure of the interview were clearly explained at the start and the participants signed a Consent Form where they agreed to be recorded. Then, the participants were asked to fill in a form indicating their level of musical education, their musical background, and their personal data. All responses are anonymised and the participants were given the option to end the interview at any time. These interviews were carried out with the support of the Midlands3Cities Doctoral Training Partnership. I received ethical approval to conduct the interviews from the Ethics office of the University of Nottingham on 4th June 2015. See Appendix 1 for an excerpt of the interviews.

A common thread running through all the interviews is the value that all respondents placed upon delivering an authentic performance. This shows that authenticity seems to bear a certain regulative value. Musicians do think about the most authentic way of performing the score that they must translate into sound. Yet, when it comes to expressing what this authenticity should actually sound like, there does not seem to be any agreement.

The mainstream performers interviewed agreed on the fact that they bring a different approach to the score depending on the period in which it was written (question n. 2). The historical period and musical style in which the composer wrote the score have an influence on the way it should be performed, if it is to be 'authentic'. Some examples:

> 'I must say that, almost automatically after years of study, I approach the piece in a different way on the basis of the period of the author. I would never play Mozart like Beethoven or Brahms like Stravinsky.'[237]

> 'If I approach a Romantic score I allow myself more freedom than I would do with a Baroque or Contemporary piece.'[238]

> '[When playing] I consider the composer and the period. Then it follows the thought about which would be the most authentic way to perform it.'[239]

HIP musicians appeared instead to be more aware that we do not have the means to be certain about performing practices of the past. A consequence of this is that we cannot rely only on the period in which the score was written for orientating our way of playing. What may at first seem a skeptical attitude in respect to the possibility of finding the correct way to perform, is instead an openness to different ways of performing: 'We are the audience of one of the biggest historical falsities, that of ancient music. […] There is not a single way of playing.'[240] As I will show in Chapter 5, it is indeed an historical mistake to believe that once the composer wrote a score, she had in mind *the* way to perform it. On the contrary, performers played a major role in determining the final shape of the piece. A certain degree of improvisation and freedom of choice was allowed, if not required, to performers. This is the idea that emerges from the three interviews with HIP musicians. Their conception of music is

[237] Interview n. 2, translated from the Italian by the author.
[238] Interview n. 1, translated from the Italian by the author.
[239] Interview n. 3, translated from the Italian by the author.
[240] Interview n. 5, translated from the Italian by the author.

more that of a 'necessary human activity.'[241] Recognised as such, the work loses part of the aura of untouchable absoluteness which the standard of 'Classical Music' wants to impose to it. Music is instead something which is shaped according to the role it plays and to the function that we want it to assume.

The idea that we make a mistake in rigidly interpreting the music of the past, as voiced by some strands of the HIP movement, is shared also by most of the orchestral players interviewed. They feel that the harshness of the choices imposed by a strict reading of HIP claims, limits the freedom of performers: 'One thing that concerns me is that the authentic movement has almost cut out my generation of players who play on modern instruments […]. They are so critical that I feel that as a generation we have lost the right to play this music.'[242] Shifting to question n. 4, respect for the composer's intentions and for the score are deemed equally relevant. However, this should not preclude the possibility for the performer to make individual choices and to give 'an informed personal interpretation' of the score.[243] What is unanimously accepted by the orchestral players, is the possibility of delivering an authentic performance playing on modern instruments. However, the knowledge of period instruments and the skills developed by performing on them is necessary for choosing to play music of the past on modern instruments and delivering an informed authentic performance: 'I think it is possible to make authentic performances on modern instruments obtaining a fabulous result. But you wouldn't have that result without having Early Music interpretations first.'[244] These comments do not always match actions, since, in the words of an orchestral musician, she is 'always playing at the demands of somebody else's idea.'[245] The 'feelings' of the performer cannot thus be always respected, since what needs to be respected is how the conductor interprets the piece.

What emerged from the interviews with mainstream performers is that the respect for the composer's instructions and intentions should always occupy the first place.[246] Then, everything else follows. The importance of the respect for performing traditions

[241] Interview n. 4, translated from the Italian by the author.
[242] Interview n. 6.
[243] Interview n. 6.
[244] Interview n. 6.
[245] Interview n. 7.
[246] It is worth mentioning how the relevance of the composer's intentions is also a matter of *whose* intentions, not intentions per se. Intentions are tied to a cultural hierarchy of status: Bach' instructions should be followed, Kreisler's not so much, Rogers's and Hammerstein's not at all.

varies in relation to the period of the composition of the piece performed and to other contextual factors. The concern for the period in which the piece was written is of major relevance for mainstream performers to such an extent that it can modify not only the choice of performing style or technique, but also the degree of respect for the score: 'With contemporary composers the respect for the score is not relevant, you should think about the respect for the composer's intentions.'[247] This claim has of course to do in part with the level of detail indicated on the score. As Chapter 5 will explain more explicitly, the quantity and precision of the instructions provided on the score by the composer change depending on the historical period. In contemporary music, for example, we can find extremely detailed scores as well as scores in which chance plays a key role.

Mainstream performers, unsurprisingly, agree with orchestral players on the fact that the use of period instruments plays a marginal role for the authenticity of the performance. What is surprising instead is that even HIP musicians waver in defending the relevance of the use of period instruments. Just as for the choice of what is the more authentic way to perform, so too is the choice of instruments largely deemed a matter of interpretation. We cannot recreate exact duplicates of the instruments used in the past and, even if we could, we would not know how exactly to use them. One of the banners of authentic performance, the use of period instruments, seems to collapse in the vagueness of the interpretation of authenticity: 'What we do is an interpretation of historical truth. And even if we were as historically informed as possible, […] it will nevertheless remain an interpretation.'[248] From these premises, it is no wonder that the unanimous reply to question 5 was that yes, Bach can be performed authentically on the piano: 'Bach is a case in which the performing traditions made it possible for authenticity to become something different.'[249]

What is this authenticity that we are striving to interpret, then? How can such different and hesitant accounts on the part of musicians trained in all styles and periods help us? Unfortunately, not even the scholars that I interviewed could help with this conundrum. They in fact share similar ideas to those expressed by the musicians: there

[247] Interview n. 1, translated from the Italian by the author.
[248] Interview n. 5, translated from the Italian by the author.
[249] Interview n. 1, translated from the Italian by the author.

is no single way to conceive authenticity: 'I find it hard to say what authenticity is. It has so many parameters that it is hard to see where it fits in.'[250]

We seem not to have moved forward from the debate of the 1990s. There are many features which can individuate a performance as authentic: respect for the score, for the composer's intentions, for the performing traditions, and so on. None of these features seems able to prevail over the others and this leads to confusion over the nature of authenticity: 'Authenticity can mean very different things in different contexts. It can be intended as the mediation between the audience and a tradition and not as the perfect reproduction of what the composer wanted. Authenticity is a two-place predicate. It is authenticity to something and you can fill the blank in different ways. There is more than one legitimate way of being authentic.'[251]

From this conclusion, three possibilities may result. The first one is to give an alternative account of what authenticity is. This is the solution which HIP performers seem to embrace. Authenticity can thus be described as being honest with our choices: 'Authenticity is being honest, having a personal approach within a coherent system and justifying your choices not on the basis of your taste.'[252]; 'I think that by exploring what people thought we can end up with a performance that's more authentic to us. I think this is the most important aspect of authenticity: doing something with integrity and honesty.'[253]

A second path which many musicians seem to take is to deny the existence of authenticity. Authenticity is nothing concrete, it is just an ideal which can never be reached:

> 'Authenticity does not exist, Leonhard played boringly for all his life, saying that we should not change anything, that music is what is written. But it's not true. It does not transmit you the joy of the performance. If you do not transmit joy, the musical activity as entertainment comes to an end.'[254]

> 'In practice getting something absolutely authentic is merely a concept. […] I think that [authenticity] is an ideal, I don't think it actually exists.'[255]

> 'Ideally every serious artist would try to be as authentic as possible but it is an ideal […]. Some people take the composer and the score by the letter, some people are much more free. There is no right or wrong answer according to my

[250] Interview n. 12.
[251] Interview n. 10.
[252] Interview n. 4, translated from the Italian by the author.
[253] Interview n. 9.
[254] Interview n. 4, translated from the Italian by the author.
[255] Interview n. 7.

> opinion. It's just how people think and how you are authentic completely changes in regard to your background.'[256]

> 'The limitations of our epistemology are so huge that it's impossible to arrive at anything that may be called authenticity. […] The use of language and the cultural assumptions are so different that it's almost impossible to reach authenticity. The idea of authenticity is useful as an analytical tool but striving for authenticity is useless because we don't know what we are aiming for.'[257]

As it is easy to see, some musicians embrace both ways of interpreting authenticity. Once more, this testifies to the confusion which surrounds the analysis of authenticity.

The third and final way which can be undertaken in the interpretation of authenticity is also the more radical one. Instead of denying the existence of authenticity as something concretely existing, it challenges its usefulness: 'I like the idea that there are no limits in what to be considered authentic. The concept of authenticity is of little use. It is more an historical concept.'[258] Authenticity thus loses its regulative role, it is just a concept which may be of historical interest but which does play no role in determining the performances of the score.

Conclusion

As it has been presented, the topic of authenticity in musical performance pervades both musicological and philosophical studies and it has triggered many debates. At the risk of oversimplifying the issue, it is possible to discern two main perspectives on how to interpret authenticity. According to one side, authenticity means respecting a set of pre-existent requirements that, in general, prescribe compliance with the composer's idea of the work and with its notation. According to the opposite view, authenticity should not be conceived as a strict concept which requires respect for an ideal work. Instead, a contribution from performers in the interpretation of the work is accepted, if not essential.

Supporters of the HIP movement seem to subscribe to the first meaning of authenticity. In order to provide an authentic performance, it is necessary to comply with the composer's prescriptions and with the performing traditions of the time.

[256] Interview n. 8.
[257] Interview n. 9.
[258] Interview n. 11.

Taruskin and other critics of a strict interpretation of the concept of authenticity, agree with the second meaning of it. It is unrealistic to aim for one single ideal of authenticity and, in the light of the many doubts that have been highlighted so far, it can be argued that this is a wrong-headed pursuit.

In this chapter I discussed the analysis of the concept of authenticity from the point of view of many parts involved in the debate: philosophers, past and contemporary scholars, mainstream performers, orchestra players, experts in authentic performance. From their words, a common image emerges: there is no single authenticity, and even if it were possible to find one, it is hard to see to what extent it plays a regulative role for performers. From what emerges from the interviews, the notion of authenticity that performers use is guided by reasons of self-interest. For example, an HIP performer will almost certainly say that period instruments are necessary for the authenticity of performances. As often happens in long-standing debates, the concept of authenticity has been invested with so many responsibilities and critiques that we are not even sure how to use it. This mixed and varied picture is certainly not reassuring but at least it provides me with an impulse for extending the debate and changing its direction. If no agreement for a single authenticity can be found and if it is difficult to describe how its regulative character works, then why should we insist on finding *one* authenticity? Why insist on entrusting a regulative role to it?

In Chapter 6 I will provide a novel contribution to the discussion about authenticity which, due to the mentioned lack of consensus, has reached a stalemate. I will support a contextualist view of authenticity, namely we judge a performance as authentic not in regard to a stable set of requirements but according to contextual, historical, or personal factors. In proposing this interpretation of the concept, I insert myself in the path opened by Peter Kivy with his defence of the validity of a multiplicity of authenticities. My contribution stands in the justification of what is an otherwise arbitrary solution on an alternative ontological account of musical works that I present in the next chapter: Musical Stage Theory. This view claims that a work *is* a performance, namely a sound object that we can easily access. In addition to independently motivated reasons for adopting this account, Musical Stage Theory has the benefit of grounding the contextualist view of authenticity that I will propose in Chapter 6 on a solid ontological basis: what a musical work is allows for contextually determined senses of authenticity.

Chapter 3

Musical Stage Theory

People gradually start flowing in, filling the hall twenty minutes before the concert starts. Clare has already taken her seat in one of the front rows. It's 1988 and a new figure is taking the stage of Classical Music by storm. Roger Norrington recently released the cycle of Beethoven's Symphonies, conducting the London Classical Players. But people say that he is not only conducting: he is reinventing Beethoven. Clare has not listened to the CD yet, it is still on her shelf. She first want to listen to him live, and tonight they are going to play her favourite piece: the Ninth.

The players start taking their seats, the public starts clapping. A few moments later, Norrington walks in waving at the cheering audience. Feebly, the strings make their ingress, complementing the long notes of the horn and clarinet. A few bars after, Clare is lost. The tempo is incredibly fast, faster than any performance of the Ninth *she has ever listened to. She sits in consternation, until the last note fades away and the audience bursts out, clapping enthusiastically. She leaves the hall, appalled. Once at home, without even taking the coat off, she throws Norrington's CD, still with its plastic cover on, straight in the bin.*

Clare's reaction might be excessive but it is interesting what it might suggest. If she did not recognise what she listened to as a rendition of her favourite piece, how could she relate it to other performances that she likes? And what is that she listened to? Why does it seem to have an autonomy from Beethoven's score to such an extent to induce her to angrily claim 'No, that wasn't Beethoven's *Ninth* Symphony!'? I propose a provocative answer: that is because what she listened to *is* the work. The performance is not an instantiation of an abstract and immutable work. It *is* the work itself. That is why performances, particularly the more peculiar and distinctive ones, seem to have a life of their own, autonomous from the score and from the composer. This is the claim that I intend to demonstrate in the chapter: the work is the performance.

Overview

In this chapter I defend Musical Stage Theory as a novel account of the ontology of musical works. Its main claim is that a musical work *is* a performance. The significance of my argument is twofold. First, it demonstrates the availability of an alternative, and ontologically tenable, view to well-established positions in the current debate on musical metaphysics. Second, it shows how the revisionary approach of Musical Stage Theory actually provides a better account of the ontological status of musical works.

After presenting the reasons why I deem it necessary to introduce a new account for the ontology of musical works, in part 2 I present Theodore Sider's metaphysical view. In part 3, Musical Stage Theory is developed against the background of his independently motivated move in the ontology of persistence.[259] In section 4 I respond to possible objections against Musical Stage Theory. Finally, in section 5 I more tentatively put forth considerations to show how Musical Stage Theory is not only a tenable alternative, but is in fact a better account of the ontological status of musical works than the alternatives currently on offer.

1. Reasons behind Musical Stage Theory

The theories on the ontology of musical works I presented in Chapter 1 have been formulated with the declared intent of addressing one specific *desideratum*: (Rep) for type-token theories and (Creat) for Musical Perdurantism. Even granting that these accounts are indeed successful in these respects, it seems clear that they relate to the other *desiderata* only indirectly and on the assumption of controversial revisionary approaches. In this chapter, I propose a novel approach to the analysis of the nature of musical works: Musical Stage Theory.

In our common linguistic practices, we seem to bear different attitudes towards musical works. For example, when I say 'Scarlatti's Sonata in D minor came after Chopin's Sonata in C minor,' I am uttering an acceptable and possibly truthful sentence if I am talking about the program of yesterday's concert but not if I am

[259] See Sider 1996; 2001.

referring to the years in which these pieces were composed. In this and similarly ambiguous cases, a term apparently devoted to designating a work of music seems to pick up a sound event (a performance) in one case, but something else (traditionally, a repeatable entity) in another reading.

Type-token theorists take the latter as straightforward: 'Chopin's Sonata in C minor' refers to a repeatable entity and the apparent reference to a performance is explained derivatively, as in '[The performance of] Scarlatti's Sonata in D minor came after [The performance of] Chopin's Sonata in C minor.' At bottom, this attitude is shared by views otherwise opposed to the type-token approach. For instance, musical perdurantists consider the work designated by 'Chopin's Sonata in C minor' as a perduring entity: performances are temporal parts and their fusion constitutes the work of music, whereas Nominalists take it to be a class of performances. For them just as for type-token theories, then, a revisionary reading of the sentence above is needed, as in the assumption of an implicit 'performance of' caveat.[260]

In this chapter I challenge the concept of musical work that has been taken as a model by traditional ontological theories and I turn this focus on its head: the work we refer to with 'Scarlatti's Sonata in D minor' is the sound event that literally occurred yesterday after Chopin's Sonata in C minor. It is our apparent talk about alleged repeatables (and, to a lesser extent, about creatability), then, that needs to be analysed and explained from the viewpoint of the theory I defend. In so doing, the view that I propose gives a promising prominence to the sonic/performative dimension, a dimension which, in a sense, has remained as an afterthought in alternative theories. Recognising the priority of the sonic aspect of music is one of the main drives behind my view.[261]

For reasons that will soon be apparent, I call my view 'Musical Stage Theory'. Its main claim can be summarised as follows:

> Musical Stage Theory: the musical work is a stage/performance connected by a privileged relationship to other stages/performances.

[260] See Caplan and Matheson 2006, 59–69; Goodman 1968.

[261] Here I focus on music but the same approach could allegedly be extended also to other performing arts such as dance and theatre. These art forms share indeed the same structure as music: a composer/author writes the instructions that performers should follow on a script/score. The same approach could less straightforwardly be applied to other multiple-instantiation artworks such as poetry, literature, and etching. Here, indeed, we have a material object which instantiates the work, not a performance as in the case of performing arts.

According to Musical Stage Theory, then, the work *is* a performance, i.e. an event we have sensory access to.[262] From now on, I will refer to it as work-as-performance. Every performance is thus a different work, even if, as I will explain, the act of grouping performances together according to a certain relationship also plays a role in our everyday notion of musical works.

By identifying works with performances, i.e. with sound events uncontroversially accessible by the senses, Musical Stage Theory accounts for the commonsensical commitment to the idea that we should be able to have (Grasp) epistemological grasp of musical works. As I will explain in more detail in section 5, in this way Musical Stage Theory addresses the worries other theories have in relation to how we can access musical works.[263]

The significance of this thesis is two-fold. In a first sense, it is intended to show the availability of an ontologically tenable alternative to well-established views in the current debate on musical metaphysics. In a second sense, it also aims to show the independent advantages of the identification of works and performances. I already mentioned how one of the advantages of Musical Stage Theory is that of providing a straightforward account of how we can have direct access to musical works. A second advantage that I will illustrate is that of providing a systematised way of describing the relationship which stands between performances, allegedly, of the 'same work'. This relation, what I will call the Repeatability-relation, allows for more flexibility in grouping performances together than other theories do.

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[262] Incidentally, note how this gives a straightforward account of propositions like 'Yesterday I listened to Chopin's Sonata in C minor.' I will outline this advantage of Musical Stage Theory later on in the chapter.

[263] I feel that here a cautionary note is needed. It can be argued that the strategy of privileging one desideratum over the others is worrying. If all parties to metaphysical disputes weigh the desiderata differently by appeal to intuition, the risk is of reaching an impasse: each of us ends up with 'one point' but nobody gets the 'full score'. My reply to this is twofold: first of all I do not intend to reject the relevance of other desiderata in respect to (Grasp). The recognition of musical works as creatable and repeatable entities is indisputable. In addition, the greater amount of attention devoted to (Grasp) is not justified merely on intuitions. In order for intuitions to be a strong enough basis for claiming the relevance of (Grasp), it should be the case that everyone – or at least the majority of people – share the intuition that, in order to have epistemic grasp on the work, it is necessary and sufficient to listen to it. But this is not the case: many people, for example, believe it sufficient to read the score in order to gain an insight on the work. This common belief is exactly what I am aiming to counteract: the focus on (Grasp) is justified by the intention of highlighting how the sonic aspect of the musical works is essential for grasping its nature and that no kind of other information can be a valid and exhaustive substitute for the acquaintance of the work.

In Chapter 6 I will finally bring together the threads of Musical Stage Theory and the discussion on authenticity I addressed in Chapter 2, and I will introduce a novel account of authenticity based on the ontological view I present in this chapter.

2. The Legacy of Sider's Stage View

My presentation of Musical Stage Theory, and, as a consequence, my explanation of how it overcomes certain apparent difficulties that ensue from identifying works with performances, takes as its starting point an analogy with certain views by Theodore Sider. The comparison with Sider's Stage View is particularly promising for Musical Stage Theory since it suggests an encouraging alley for overcoming similar prima facie shortcomings of the latter. In this section I describe the points of contact and contrast between Sider's view and my own, and the benefits which result from this theoretical connection.

Sider puts forward his Stage View, also known as exdurantism, in dialectic confrontation with other theories in the philosophy of space-time, namely endurantism and perdurantism, with the aim of providing a more satisfying solution to the puzzle cases of identity over time.[264] Endurantists describe objects as enduring or three-dimensional entities which are '"wholly present" at all times at which they exist.'[265] Enduring objects do not have distinct temporal parts, instead they occupy in their entirety each of the momentary spatiotemporal regions through which they persist. On the other hand, perdurantism adopts a four-dimensional approach and claims that objects persist through time by perduring, i.e. by having different temporal parts. Objects are thus described by four-dimensionalists as four-dimensional worms made up of the sum of different spatiotemporal stages.[266]

The Stage View defends the claim that ordinary objects such as people are instantaneous spatiotemporal stages. They are not three-dimensional entities as endurantists contend; yet, they are also not four-dimensional continuant objects which

[264] See Sider 1996, 433.
[265] Sider 2001, 3.
[266] Sider proposes the Stage View with the intent of solving puzzles regarding the identity of persons over time. Thus, from now on, when presenting aspects of Sider's approach, I will make examples with persons but this does not imply that the Stage View cannot be applied to other sorts of objects.

perdure through time, as in the four-dimensionalist claim. I suggest that a move parallel to the one that Sider makes from perdurantism to the Stage View can be made within musical ontology. In doing so, I place myself in direct dialogue with Musical Perdurantism. For Musical Stage Theory musical works are concrete entities, as it is also acknowledged by Musical Perdurantism, but they are not fusions of temporal parts (understood as performances). Musical Stage Theory indeed adopts an exdurantist approach and claims that the work is a single performance/stage connected by a privileged relationship to other appropriate stages/performances.

For Sider, the referent of a singular term such as 'Elizabeth II', namely Elizabeth, is an instantaneous spatiotemporal stage, which does not extend through time, but which is rather related by a counterpart relation to certain other past and future stages. As I shall explain, these aspects of Sider's view also provide a fruitful frame for the development of my main thesis. In particular, according to Musical Stage Theory, (i) musical works are spatiotemporal stages, just as continuants are in Sider's view; (ii) stages are connected by a unity relation which is described as a relation between counterparts similar to Sider's counterpart relation (the I-relation); (iii) although 'Chopin's Sonata in C minor' refers to a performance-stage, a systematic shift analogous to that invoked by Sider supports certain other readings of sentences involving that term; (iv) as in Sider's analysis of reference to people, this shift is contextually modulated, in a sense that will become clearer as I proceed.

One caveat before I continue with my analogy: Sider's stages are instantaneous while performances are temporally extended. This is not however a stumbling block for my analogy: as Katherine Hawley points out in her interpretation of the Stage View, a salient temporal interval may well be established, which allows us to set the boundaries of the stages according to our interests.[267] A performance-stage, in the sense relevant for Musical Stage Theory, can thus be described as the sum of all the instantaneous stages that constitute a sound event, the salience of which is determined by the complete performance, from the first to the last note prescribed by the composer's instructions.[268]

[267] See Hawley 2001, 59 *et seq.*

[268] I refer here generally to the composer's instructions not to exclude cases of compositions which do not result in a fully written out score.

2.1 The I-Relation

Sider's account reaches a prima facie impasse when dealing with temporal properties. For instance, intuitively, 'I was once a baby' seems like a true description of my past; yet, for Sider, this is not a true attribution of a past property to myself, since, strictly speaking, the occurrence of 'I' in that sentence refers to my present stage, which was not in existence a few decades ago. In order to overcome this difficulty, Sider appeals to an idea which, in its general form, will also play a central role in Musical Stage Theory: for Sider, the relation between *any* two stages of a single person is privileged in respect to the relation between stages of distinct persons. For example, 'my' baby stage or 'my' 20-years-old stage bear a closer relation to myself (i.e., to 'my' present stage) than to other objects, such as the number two or my mother's 30-years-old stage.[269]

Sider calls this relation the 'I-relation': 'If we accept the Stage View, we should analyse a tensed claim such as 'Ted was once a boy' as meaning roughly that there is some past person stage, x, such that x is a boy, and x bears the I-relation to Ted.'[270] The I-relation, thus, provides a way to explain how distinct stages are linked together more interestingly than others. Despite identifying the basic entities of our ontology with instantaneous spatiotemporal stages, however, Sider's Stage View also appeals to aggregates of stages or worms. This is beneficial to Sider for explaining how, in our talk, we sometimes seem to employ singular terms so as to refer not to instantaneous stages but to certain collections of stages. This happens, for example, when we ask how many people have been sitting at this desk for the last hour. Assuming the Stage View, our reply should be 'infinitely many stages'. But here Sider proposes a 'partial retreat' from the strict claim of the Stage View: 'The stage view should be restricted to the claim that *typical* references to persons are to person stages. But, in certain circumstances, such as when we take the timeless perspective, reference is to worms rather than stages.'[271] By allowing a shift of reference between spatiotemporal worms

[269] Sider's analysis of tensed claims is analogous to David Lewis' modal counterpart theory. The temporal operators used by Sider to explain how, for example, despite being a stage, I *was* once a child, are analogous to the modal operator 'possibly' used by Lewis to say that despite being five feet tall, I could have been six feet tall. This is possible because there exists a counterpart of mine in another possible world which is indeed six feet tall. I have the modal property of *possibly being* six feet tall just as my present stage has the temporal property of *once being* a child (see Sider 2001, 194–195). I will come back to the application of modal operators within Musical Stage Theory in section 4.
[270] Sider 1996, 437.
[271] Ibid., 448.

and stages, Sider still places his theory within the four-dimensional frame. The distinction, however, stands in the fact that, despite allowing for the existence of aggregation of stages or four-dimensional worms, Sider refuses to identify them with persons and objects in general.[272]

Interestingly, especially when it comes to some aspects of the Musical Stage Theory that I discuss below, this shift is contextual and interest-governed. In addressing the issue of counting coinciding objects, Sider claims that we can attribute different meanings to the same predicate depending on the speaker's interests. To illustrate this point, Sider partially modifies Lewis' example of coinciding roads. Suppose Jane wants to reach the farm and she asks us how many roads she must cross to get there. Jane and the farm are divided by a winding road and, in order to avoid misunderstandings, our answer should be 'three' even if the 'three' roads are connected miles away with each other. Instead of referring to the road, in this case we refer to road segments to facilitate our talk.[273] For Sider: 'The predicate "road" does not always apply to "continuant" roads – it sometimes applies to road segments.'[274] The 'harmless indeterminacy' which is implied by this relativisation involves a contextualist analysis of the truth value and of the target of the speaker's utterance.[275] This is analogous to the attribution of meaning to the predicate 'person'. While often it applies to person stages, it sometimes applies to worms such as in the case of timeless perspective.[276]

Sider believes that this partial retreat from the 'ivory tower'[277] of stage theorists does not severely undermine the worthiness of the Stage View if compared with the benefits that it brings. It, in fact, allows stage theorists to solve the cases of fission and coincidence, the two puzzles of identity over time which led Sider to propose a new view to analyse continuants and their properties. Just as in the example of the winding road, also the predicate 'person' can be applied differently according to the frame of reference: sometimes with 'person' we mean a person-stage, other times a person-worm. The problem of counting individuals in the case of fission can thus be solved, 'since in any possible case, no matter what episodes of fission or fusion the future or

[272] Ibid., 444.
[273] Ibid., 440–441.
[274] Ibid., 441.
[275] See Sider 2001, 199.
[276] See Ibid., 190.
[277] Ibid.

past holds, the current count of persons would be determined by the number of person stages present.'[278] Also the puzzle of coinciding objects can be tackled in a similar way. In the case of apparently coinciding objects – such as Tib and Tibbles, the statue and the lump, and others – what do coincide are two spacetime worms while the referent of the speaker's utterance is a single stage.[279]

2.2 Unrestricted Composition

While the shift of reference between stages and worms allows stage theorists to account for our commonsensical beliefs and our use of language, what makes it possible to grant the coincidence of spacetime worms and the identification of a person with a whole stage is the postulation of unrestricted composition. I will devote some words to the topic of unrestricted composition and to the particular analysis that Sider gives of it for two reasons. First, it is a core element of the Stage View. Second, the application of unrestricted composition, together with the contextualist approach which is implied by it, will provide interesting insights on many aspects of the ontology of musical works.

The Stage View claims that all objects are instantaneous stages. Following this claim, it is an obvious consequence to say that objects come into and go out of existence at every moment. In order to accept that 'objects *always* come into and go out of existence, no matter how bits of matter are arranged'[280] implies the acceptance of unrestricted composition. Lewis' argument for unrestricted composition states that there can be no vagueness in individuating where composition occurs. If there were vagueness, in fact, it would be indeterminate in a 'continuous series of cases' where composition stops occurring. In order to stop this slippery slope argument, Lewis' claim is that composition always occurs: 'The only intelligible account of vagueness locates it in our thought and language.'[281] Thus, composition is unrestricted and every class has a fusion.

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[278] Ibid.
[279] See Ibid., 191.
[280] Ibid., 120.
[281] Quoted in Sider 2001, 121. Stage theorists can apply *de re* or *de dicto* readings to cases of vagueness, for example when talking about where a mountain starts and where it does end. In this case stage theorists can relegate vagueness to the *de dicto* sphere and attribute a lack of clarity to our language and

Sider starts from Lewis' account of unrestricted composition to develop his own. Sider takes into account not atemporal fusions but 'diachronic' fusions; that is fusions of different classes of objects at different times.[282] Within this framework, the question 'Under which conditions do objects begin and cease to exist?' can be paraphrased by asking under which conditions there would be an object that exists only at specified times of the function. In even easier terms: can we identify every class of objects under any stretch of time $t_1 \ldots t_n$ as an object? Sider's answer is affirmative: every assignment has a minimal D-fusion, that is a D-fusion of *f* that exists only at the times in *f*'s domain.[283] Thus, it is possible to individuate an object for every interval of time of the function we take into account.

Thanks to this interpretation of Lewis' unrestricted composition, Sider can support the intuition behind four-dimensionalism and its claim that objects have temporal parts. Note however that this intuition ensues from our common way of defining continuing objects. And this brings us back to the contextualist argument I addressed in relation to the shift from worms to stages. As I mentioned, contextualism is embedded in the choice of reference to worms or to stages, in the counterpart relation which is adopted, and in the identification of the stage which is the target of the speaker's utterance: 'when a speaker makes an utterance at a point *p* of spacetime, she refers to temporal stages of worms at the time that contains *p*, where 'time' and 'temporal stage' are relativised to her frame of reference when she passes though *p*.'[284]

This indeterminacy cannot be avoided even by abstracting from single utterances, since at the time we apply considerations of the truth value of utterances to real world events it is impossible not to take into account the frame of reference the speaker adopts. But, as I already said, this indeterminacy is harmless. Rather, it can be useful when analysing the different linguistic approaches we bear in relation to continuants and their properties and, as I will explain in next sections, when considering aspects of the nature of musical works as entities.

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not to the structure of the world. Every spatiotemporal instant individuates an entity and our linguistic difficulties in referring to it do not pertain to the metaphysical level.

[282] See Sider 2001, 133.

[283] See Ibid.

[284] Ibid., 199.

3. Musical Stage Theory and the Stage View

The revisionary approach provided by the Stage View can be applied to the analysis of the ontology of musical works with interesting results. Its novel account on the topic of identity can in fact give a reading of the identity of musical works which, despite being highly revisionary and against *some* of our common intuitions, accommodates an analysis of the nature of works of music which is both nearer to actual musical practices and, at the same time, grounded on a solid ontological basis. Now that the core aspects of the Stage View as proposed by Sider have been introduced, I can explain how I intend to apply it to the construction of Musical Stage Theory.[285]

3.1 Comparison with Sider

From the definition of Musical Stage Theory it is already possible to see parallels with Sider's Stage View. Just as Sider identifies persons with stages, my claim is that the work of music is the single spatiotemporal stage of the performance.[286] From the

[285] Before I begin to get into the details of the account, I should specify what I intend by the term 'work'. As in many, if not all, other branches of philosophy, the terms used in aesthetics are often polysemous and need a clarification upfront. Especially the term 'work', since works of music are the focus of the enquiry. I understand the term 'work of music' broadly in order to encompass all those things that are in a musical medium and that we wish to call work. I do not limit the reference of the term to the narrow description of those works that fall under the classical paradigm or under a paradigm of any other sort. The understanding of the term as I adopt it here thus extends from pop songs to classical romantic pieces, from Baroque suites to rock music. I will later make further specifications on how we should define the term 'work' according to the different ways in which we interpret it ontologically speaking.

[286] One concern which may be raised in connection with the application of the Stage View to Musical Stage Theory has to do with the embeddedness of conventions inside the ontology of performances. As we have seen, in order to be recognised as a performance, a sound event must display a certain number of features (i.e. causal relation, intentionality relation, shareability). This calls into questions conventions that we apply to recognise the identity of some specific sound events as performances. Supporters of this objection (D. Davies, private conversation) claim that the application of performances prevents from identifying performances as stages. Siderian stages, as they say, identify the way in which the world is carved up and they should not be governed by conventions. A first way to counter this objection is by claiming that conventions are embedded in every kind of object, even in the objects which are used by Sider in his examples. A table, for instance, is just an aggregate of atoms and we recognise it as a table only because of our conventions in using it for certain aims. These conventions can be easily changed. For example, Duchamp's *Fountain* has lost its conventional use of urinal to gain that of artwork. But an even more compelling reply to this objection comes from Sider himself. 'Stage theory is in principle applicable to all entities, regardless of whether they're ontologically basic. So even if musical performances are non-basic, and partially constituted by conventions, one could adopt a stage theory for them' (Sider, email exchange). Among the conventions which partially constitute the existence of performances can be included the feature of temporal extension, thus explaining at the same time how performances can be considered as stages even if they are not instantaneous. Sider addresses the issue of whether metaphysics should only include the study of entities which compose the fundamental reality in a paper in reply to Elizabeth Barnes and Mari Mikkola concerned with

beginning, two specifications should be made. First, it is evident that identifying the stage with a temporally extended performance does not allow Musical Stage Theory to be grounded on instantaneous stages. But this does not constitute a serious obstacle to the structure of the theory, providing that we accept the principle of unrestricted composition.[287] As seen in section 2.2, following this principle, every collection of stages has a sum. For our purposes it is not necessary to accept the existence of sums for every kind of scattered objects. It is sufficient to individuate a salient interval which allows us to set the boundaries of the stage. As I already mentioned, this is what Katherine Hawley suggests in her interpretation of the Stage View.[288] The stage can be thus described as the sum of all the instantaneous stages, the salience of which is determined by the complete rendition of the composition.

Second, the application of Sider's view to Musical Stage Theory does not have the presumption of creating an exact parallel between the two accounts. This is primarily due to the fact that Sider is talking about persons, that is about continuing objects, while performances are temporally and spatially scattered. The Stage View should be considered a methodological tool for Musical Stage Theory and not a mirror image of it. For the ontology of musical works we do not need all the elements of the Stage View. The main structure of the Stage View can be described as threefold: (i) the first element consists in the claim that objects are instantaneous stages. Since this claim is introduced to explain the puzzle of identity though change, and given the fact that change can be continuous, instantaneous temporal stages are needed; (ii) stages are connected with each other and this makes them stages of the same 'object'. Sider describes this connection as an I-relation, I will later explain which kind of connection exists between performances; (iii) the Stage View claims that sortal predicates like 'is a tree' and proper names like 'Ted' apply to the stages rather than to the four-dimensional sum of them (unlike in perdurantism). Elements (ii) and (iii) can be applied to the analysis of the identity of musical works and element (i) is not necessary

feminist metaphysics (see Sider 2016). Also in this case, Sider's conclusion is that 'metaphysics certainly includes many questions other than those about fundamental reality' (Sider 2016, 1), thus allowing for an enquiry on entities which are partially based on conventions. The fact that performances include a certain degree of conventions, thus, does not seem to prevent them from being identified with stages.

[287] See Sider 2001, 120 *et seq*.

[288] See Hawley 2001, 59 *et seq.*

in this case: 'Indeed, if the world was much more boring and slow-changing, we would not even need instantaneous stages for ordinary material objects.'[289]

Moreover, the identification of both the performance as a temporally determined stage and of instantaneous stages within the performance can explain the kinds of change we attribute to musical works and within the single performance. This will be clearer once I have described which relationship links performances together. Suffice it to say here that it is possible to account for the double linguistic attitude we bear in respect to change in performances and in what we call 'work', for example, when we say that a performance was quiet at the beginning and loud at the end, or when we say that a work was very popular 40 years ago but not now.

3.2 The R-relation

The I-relation between stages allows stage theorists to comply with our ordinary talk about objects: what I strictly speaking am, that is, a present stage, is for Sider interestingly related to 'my' previous stages, thereby allowing for everyday attributions as in 'I was once a baby'. Similarly, Musical Stage Theory provides an account of certain features of our talk about works by appealing to a certain privileged relation among performances (that is, for Musical Stage Theory, strictly speaking among different works).

Every work-as-performance is related to its counterparts through an ontologically important relation: the Repeatability-relation (henceforth R-relation), i.e. the relation that reflects the intuitions that traditional theories explain in terms of exemplifiables and their instances.[290] So, although the work (say, Chopin's Sonata in C minor) is a performance-stage, this entity is related to other performances-stages by means of a privileged R-relation, parallel to Sider's I-relation.

According to Musical Stage Theory, the R-relation as a privileged 'horizontal' relation between different entities explains what is commonly understood as

[289] Hawley, email exchange.

[290] My R-relation should not be confused with Lewis' R-relation. Lewis distinguishes the R-relation from the I-relation in his *Survival and Identity* (see Lewis 1983, 58–60) where the R-relation refers to the mental continuity between person-stages and the I-relation to the relation which holds between the stages of a continuant person.

repeatability, that is, as a 'vertical' relation between a work-type and its exemplars.[291] For this reason, much of what traditional theories hold about the work-performance relation may be adapted to the alternative ontological outlook promoted by Musical Stage Theory. I propose the following as components of the R-relationship: (i) a causal relation which links works-as-performances together and/or which connects works-as-performances to the relevant act of composition, (ii) the intentionality of performers to play precisely that performance, and (iii) a sufficient degree of similarity between works-as-performances.[292] As I will explain in more detail below, we appeal to these requirements differently in different contexts when speaking of musical works.

The causal relation mentioned in (i) has two aspects: it is a relation between works-as-performances (for instance, between Vladimir Azhkenazy's and Lilya Zilberstein's performances 'of' Chopin's Sonata in C minor) and eventually a relation between performances and acts of composition (say, between Zilberstein's performance and Chopin's composition). So, it is by virtue of, say, Zilberstein's acquaintance with Azhkenazy's performance, and/or with Zilberstein's and Azhkenazy's common historical relation with Chopin's act of composition, that both events are described as performances 'of' Chopin's Sonata in C minor.

According to requirement (ii), the connection between performances involves the performer's intentions: the performer intends to initiate a sonic event precisely by virtue of the causal connection in (i). So, what is required is not only Zilberstein's acquaintance with Azhkenazy or her historical connection with Chopin, but also her intention that these relations guide her performance. Incidentally, this condition is also essential not only to support the causal relation described above, but also to rule out those cases of unintentional performances such as the scenario of the wind blowing through the canyon.[293]

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[291] In this respect, then, Musical Stage Theory follows Mag Uidhir in his proposal of replacing the standard notion of repeatability with the notion of 'relevant similarity', see Christy Mag Uidhir 2013, 165–197.

[292] It is necessary here to point out an important distinction between the causal connectedness posited by the R-relation and the one posited by the I-relation. In the case of performances, it is possible for two performances A and B to be independently connected to the act of composition without being causally dependent one from the other (e.g. the performer of A needs not to be familiar with the performance of B). In the case of the I-relation for continuants, instead, each stage is connected with the previous ones and stages from different branches are not connected despite having the same source.

[293] See Wolterstorff 1980, 74. See also Dodd 2007, 34 for a different view on this. For views about the role of intentionality in performance, see Levinson 1980a, 374 *et seq.*, and S. Davies 2001, 156 *et seq.*

Lastly, the similarity mentioned in (iii) requires that all suitably R-related performances share at least certain aspects of a sonic (harmonic, rhythmic, and melodic) profile.[294] This requirement allows for a certain degree of variability within the sonic profile of the performances belonging to the same group. Dynamics, tempo, timbral shadings are all elements which cannot be prescribed in an unequivocal way by the work-determining instructions. In this respect, performers have the possibility to adjust the sonic rendition of the composition according to their own preferences. Here as before, the details remain negotiable, since their specification is not an exclusive burden of Musical Stage Theory: for anyone, I suppose, there will be vague limits, at some point or another, where an utterly incompetent execution ceases to be a performance of anything.

Before I conclude this section, a few metaphysical words on (i) and the concept of causality are needed. Causality is one of the key features of the Repeatability-relation and it will also be relevant when addressing the issue of authenticity in the following chapters. It is thus worth devoting some time to the discussion about what we should intend for 'causality' in this context. As I described it, the causal relation is one of the key components of the R-relation and it connects both works-as-performances to a relevant act of composition and works-as-performances together. The nature of these relations is necessarily different. In the first case, in fact, the relation occurs between two different entities: a performance, and thus an event, and an act of composition or, more commonly, a score, and thus an object. In the case of the causal relation between performances, instead, the connection occurs between the same kinds of entities: performances, and thus events. A specification in this second case needs to be done. By causal relation between performances I intend particular cases in which a performer is not performing from a score, but she is recreating a performance that she has listened to in the past. More specifically, performer Y aims at recreating a performance P1 that she listened to in the past. Performance P1, in turn, was played by performer X by reading score S.[295] In this case, the original performance is

[294] See on this the debate between pure and timbral sonicism, Kivy 1993; Dodd 2007. See also Chapter 1, section 2.1.

[295] Or by recreating a previous performance. Here I refer to scores to make the analysis of the case easier, but there are also cases in which scores are not available, such as improvisations. In these particular cases, however, it is still possible to individuate a connection with an act of composition even if it does not result in a score and even if it happens simultaneously with the performance itself.

connected directly to performance P1 and indirectly to score S. This said, we can now move to the discussion about the nature of the causal relations in the mentioned cases.

Causality can be understood in terms of probability, deduction, regularity, explanation, counterfactuality, and so on. Due to the multiple interpretations that can be given of the correlation between entities and events, someone has also suggested to refrain from looking for *one* account of causality that could be applied to every instance of connection between events. I believe that the same can be done in the case of causality applied to the ontology of musical works. The immediate reaction when talking of a causal relation between a score and a performance[296] is sceptical: how can we talk of a causal relation between two different kinds of entities? We certainly do not want to claim that a score *causes*, strictly speaking, a performance, do we? A causal dependence of a performance from a score seems, stricto sensu, implausible. But we do not need to posit a causal relation between these two entities in the strictest interpretation of causality. What could not be denied is that if a performer reads a score in order to play the performance, then the score plays a relevant role in the final production of the performance itself.

There are indeed other ways to interpret the sort of causal relation appropriate in this instance. We can say, for example, that, barring the availability of other sources, the score is *necessary* for the performance to take place. The relation between score and performance would then be a sort of counterfactual relation of the form 'If score S was not available, the performance P would not have occurred'. This does not contradict the claim that the score is not *sufficient* for the performance to happen. Also musicians, instruments, the production of sounds, a common spatial location, and other elements are needed as well.[297] Even if it is objectionable to individuate a rigid causal relation between the score and a performance of it, it is nevertheless possible to claim for a counterfactual dependence of the performance from the relevant score.

The situation in the case of the causal relation between works-as-performances may seem less problematic since we are dealing here with the same sort of entities, i.e. performances. However, there can still be some reluctance in accepting a causal relation between a performance P and a former performance P1. As in the previous

[296] Again, I refer here to scores for the sake of simplicity but the argument could be extended to acts of composition in general.
[297] For more about what are the elements that inform the performance as an entity, see section 7 on the ontology of performances in Chapter 1.

case, in fact, the act of listening to performance P1 is *necessary* but not *sufficient* for P to take place. What is needed are other components such as instruments, players, sounds, and so on. If performer Y had not listened to the performance P1 by performer X, however, if would have been impossible for Y to perform P. The relationship that occurs between performance P and performance P1 is again a counterfactual dependence: 'If P1 had not occurred, P would not have occurred'. I believe that positing a counterfactual dependence of performances on scores and, in special cases, of one performance on another, is a viable way to explain why we can claim that the relationship that is at issue is a causal one.[298]

3.3 The R-relation: Context

To summarise, according to Musical Stage Theory a musical work, strictly speaking, is a sound event of a particular sort, i.e. a performance. This gives us a straightforward account of (Grasp). In the previous sections I already started to pay attention to one of the main issues met by my proposal, related to the idea of (Rep): if a work is a particular event, how can we speak of multiple instances of a symphony? As already hinted, this is not a stumbling block for Musical Stage Theory but can instead be seen as an advantage, since it paves the way to a contextualist assessment of (Rep).

As mentioned, the requirements of the R-relation are of interest independently of one's sympathies for Musical Stage Theory. In a type-token approach, for instance, they may express the necessary features for a sound event to qualify as a performance exemplar of a work.[299] Still, as I am about to explain, it is an advantage of Musical Stage Theory that these requirements can be assessed contextually: while the type-token relation is ontologically grounded, i.e., fixed once and for all by metaphysical regularities, the R-relation between performances or stages may intelligibly depend upon contextual factors, such as the interests of the speaker or the musical background that she takes to be appropriate.[300] For instance, the intentionality requirement

[298] Also Levinson talks about causal connections when addressing the issue of performances but he does not specify which interpretation of causality he adopts (see Levinson 1980).
[299] On the individuation of a performance as correct, see Goodman 1968; Kivy 1993, 51; Dodd 2007, 204 *et seq.*; Levinson 1980; S. Davies 1991.
[300] Admittedly, a contextual assessment of the correctness of performances and of their belonging to the group of 'performances of work X' is allowed also by other theories. Many type-token theorists, for example, grant that in order for a performance to be an instantiation of a type, it just needs to 'fulfil an

outplays the similarity requirement when the speaker knows that the performer has the intention to play the performance X but she fails to do so because she is making too many mistakes. Conversely, similarity and causality requirements outplay the intentionality requirement in the case of arrangements. Indeed, if Y is an arrangement of the work X, the performance of Y is causally-R-related and similarity-R-related to X since it is both related to the provenential history of X and it shares similar features with X. Yet, it is not intentionally-R-related to X because the performer has the intention to perform an arrangement of X and not X itself.[301] This analysis of musical arrangements also motivates why we can say 'This is Beethoven's *Fifth*' referring to someone whistling in the shower. However poor, it is nevertheless an arrangement that displays a causal and similarity relation with Beethoven's Symphony.

I already discussed how the R-relation is contextually assessed: the links that we establish between performances depend on the context and on the speakers' interests. In other contexts, though, we might not want to refer to performances at all. For example, when I say 'I enjoyed Chopin's Sonata in C minor yesterday night,' I refer to a performance-stage, that is, according to Musical Stage Theory, to what strictly is the work. Yet, in other cases I adopt a 'timeless perspective' as when I say, for example, 'Chopin's Sonata in C minor was performed many times in the late 19th century in Paris.' For, in this case, what is at issue is a talk directed towards a collection of R-related stages: a suitable stage/performance of it took place in Paris. So, while in the first example I refer to the work-as-performance, i.e., strictly speaking, *the* work, in the second example I am referring to what I call the work-as-construct.[302]

In the previous section I mentioned how the I-relation allows Sider to account for our references to apparent continuants, as when I say 'I was once a baby'. Thanks to a similar strategy, the R-relation allows Musical Stage Theory to explain our uses of

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adequate number' of the criteria of correctness (Kivy 1993, 51. See also Dodd 2007, 32 and Wolterstorff 1980, 76). This granted, in section 5 I will argue that the R-relation nevertheless presents some benefits for it allows more flexibility than rival theories in drawing the boundaries of the group of 'performances of work X'.

[301] On the other hand, if the performer is playing X and X is plagiarising Y, that is, a plagiarist has published X presenting it as her own creation but X is instead plagiarising another piece, namely Y, then the performance is intentionally-R-related and similarity-R-related to X but it is causally-R-related to Y instead.

[302] This shift also allows to give reason of the apparent clash between the claims of Musical Stage Theory and the expression 'performing a work'. The common use of the expression 'performing a work' is strictly incompatible with Musical Stage Theory's central claim, namely the idea that a musical work is not an entity which is performed — the work is the performance itself. By endorsing the shift between work-as-performance and work-as-construct, instead, the expression 'performing a work' can be understood as referring to the work-as-construct and not to the work-as-performance.

terms such as ‘Chopin’s Sonata in C minor’ in ways that do not seem to refer to a single work-as-performance, but rather to a collection of performances (as in Sider’s ‘worms’).

I posit the work-as-construct as correlated to the work-as-performance just as Sider takes worms to be correlated to stages. As stated, for Musical Stage Theory our terms for works primarily refer to stages, i.e., performances. Yet, according to Musical Stage Theory, our linguistic attitudes systematically shift between the level of discourse about works-as-performances to that of discourse ostensibly directed towards the work-as-construct. The work-as-construct is indeed a collection of performances, as well as of information we have in respect to the ‘work’, e.g. provenential and historical information, information on performing traditions, and so on.

Consistently with my aim of developing a musical metaphysics that reflects our everyday intuitions about music, I do not take a stance when it comes to foundational ontological issues pertaining to what fundamentally, ‘deep down’ exists (specifically, in the case at issue, regarding whether either the work-as-performance or the work-as-construct has ontological primacy). An ontologically generous framework may well, in the end, admit affairs such as works-as-constructs within the inventory of what exists. The point of identifying musical works primarily with sound events, rather than with work-as-constructs, is that of reflecting an understanding of music alternative to the traditional views on the market, and better able to account for what we commonly say and do about music. In particular, interpreting certain types of thought and discourse as pertaining to works-as-constructs highlights its derivative, contextual, and interest-related nature, in contrast with the more solid, grasp-oriented evidence provided by our approaches to performances and suitable sound-events.

On the basis of the ontological theory I propose, it follows that sentences about works-as-constructs do not involve reference to any single entity. Thus, we need to analyse the sentence: ‘Chopin’s Sonata in C minor was performed many times’ in a different way: this sentence means that Chopin’s Sonata in C minor (the relevant stage) has the tensed property ‘having been performed many times’ by virtue of there being many previous stages Sn, such that (i) Sn have the property ‘being performed’ and (ii) Sn are R-related to the present stage.

As a result, the shift between work-as-performance and work-as-construct allows Musical Stage Theory to paraphrase apparently problematic statements such as:

‘Beethoven’s *Fifth* Symphony is a great work but you wouldn’t know it from last night’s performance’. The concern with how to paraphrase it may stem from the fact that, apparently, this sentence is showing a mismatch between the evaluation of the ‘work’ and of last night’s performance’, thus recognising them as two separate entities, a distinction which is rejected by Musical Stage Theory. Musical Stage Theory can accommodate this by resorting to the shift of reference between work-as-performance and work-as-construct. While the first part of the sentence is referring to the value of the work-as-construct (in relation to Beethoven’s corpus, the history of music, etc.) the second part of the sentence is referring instead to the properties of the work-as-performance. The incompetence of some performers does not undermine the worth of the work-as-construct but just that of the work-as-performance.

There are still many details that should be addressed in this respect. I confront them by addressing some objections to Musical Stage Theory in the next section.

4. Objections to Musical Stage Theory

Above I have begun to address a fundamental objection against Musical Stage Theory by focusing on an alternative, Sider-inspired picture of what we commonly call ‘repeatability’. So, although musical works are strictly speaking performances-stages, our occasional understanding and discourse about seemingly ‘repeatables’ may be explained in terms of systematic referential shifts, of the sort discussed above. Still, a few lingering objections may remain, some of which will be addressed here.

4.1 Unperformed Works

The first concern is that, if musical works are performances, then compositions which are never performed do not deserve the status of musical works. This concern is legitimate: unperformed compositions are not musical works for Musical Stage

Theory. However, this does not preclude ordinary assertions about so-called 'unperformed compositions' being at least loosely speaking true.[303]

Think of what we would commonly call an unperformed work – suppose that, say, Bob writes a score named *Blue Carpet* which never gets performed. Plausibly, Bob would not be willing to accept that *Blue Carpet* is not a work only because it still has not been performed. Strictly speaking, in terms of Musical Stage Theory, *Blue Carpet* is not a work. But I understand Bob's concern. It is in fact true that by looking at a score, even people who are only scarcely musically literate are able to get some information about the piece. For instance, they can know whether the piece is short or long, which instruments it calls for, whether the structure is simple or complex, and so on. *Blue Carpet*, according to Musical Stage Theory, is not a work of music. It is, nevertheless, a 'would-be work'. In particular, many among those with an access to Bob's score would understand the shape 'it' (that is, a performance that follows that score) would take. Although not a work, *Blue Carpet* bears all the characteristic features of something that provides the conditions for the existence of a particular work – that is, for the realisation of a performance.[304]

Indeed, the sense in which Musical Stage Theory deals with cases such as *Blue Carpet* may once again be further clarified by an analogy with Sider's theory. He addresses a similar problem when he takes into consideration sentences about stages that do not presently exist, for example 'Socrates was wise.'

> The sentence 'Socrates was wise' cannot be a *de re* temporal claim about the present Socrates-stage since there is no such present stage. Nor can we take it as being about one of Socrates's past stages, for lack of a distinguished stage that the sentence concerns. What we must do is interpret the sentence as a *de dicto* temporal claim. Syntactically, the sentence should be taken as the result of

[303] One could get around this worry by allowing that mental performances are works. In this way it would be possible to claim that also compositions which are never translated into sounds can be deemed musical works because they have been heard by the composer in her head or by whoever is able to hear sounds only by reading the score. But also allowing for mental performances as musical works is troublesome in certain respects. First of all, it is not obvious that every composer hears the notes of the composition in her own head when composing. There are some cases, for example, in which the structure is too complex to be distinctly mentally reproduced even by the composer, or cases in which the composer uses patterns or sequences of numbers to build the composition, thus without hearing melodic lines in the head. But, more cogently, mental renditions cannot be considered performances because they do not possess all the features which characterise the ontological profile of performances. In particular, mental performances involve neither production of sounds nor shareability. If a mental performance is heard only in the head of one person, in fact, it cannot provide interrelational information. See Chapter 1, section 7 for the discussion on the ontology of performances.

[304] There is a parallel here with naming and possible individuals in David Kaplan, 'Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice', in Hintikka, Moravcsik, and Suppes 1973, 490–518. For comments see also Salmon 1998. For the metaphysical background of the discussion see Kripke 1980.

> applying a sentential operator 'WAS' to the sentence 'Socrates is wise'; the resulting sentence means that at some point in the past, there is a Socrates-stage that is wise.[305]

Sider thus interprets these sentences as *de dicto* claims to which sentential operators are applied. I will call Sider's strategy the 'operator-strategy'. This move is analogous to the application of the modal operator 'POSSIBLY' in modal counterpart theory: 'According to modal counterpart theory, an object, *x*, has the property possibly being *F* iff some counterpart of *x* in some possible world has *F*. The temporal operators "was" and "will be" are analogous to the modal operator "possibly".'[306]

Musical Stage Theory can apply a similar operator-strategy to account for sentences which refer to unperformed works. Instead of using the modal operator 'POSSIBLY', I use the operator 'IN POTENTIA' to mean the potentiality for something that has not happened yet to happen in the future. So, were we to say, for instance, '*Blue Carpet* is an example of choral counterpoint,' when *Blue Carpe*t is a composition that has never been performed, our conversational contribution amounts to the claim that 'IN POTENTIA *Blue Carpet* is an example of choral counterpoint.' The act of composition, in fact, creates the conditions for a performance, and thus a work, to happen. Even if *Blue Carpet* cannot at the present be considered a musical work by Musical Stage Theory, still its composition creates the conditions for it to be performed in the future and, thus, to be a full-fledged work.

Through a similar strategy to the one used by Sider for dealing with sentences referring to non-present stages, Musical Stage Theory can account for our ordinary assertions about unperformed compositions as musical works. In the next section I will show how Musical Stage Theory can apply the same strategy for addressing a further apparent difficulty that it could meet in accounting for the creatability of musical works.

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[305] Sider 1996, 450.
[306] Sider 2001, 194.

4.2 Creatability

The second concern I would like to address is related to the compliance of Musical Stage Theory with the commonsensical feature of the creatability of musical works.[307] Following the austere account, namely Musical Stage Theory's central claim that the work is the performance, the temporal boundaries of the work are determined by its first and last notes. Interestingly, the strategy that I repeatedly applied to defend Musical Stage Theory against previous objections can once again yield its fruit. For instance, the claim we ordinarily express by saying 'Chopin's Sonata in C minor was created in 1828' means that Chopin's Sonata in C minor (the relevant stage) has the tensed property 'having been created in 1828' by virtue of a previous stage S, such that (i) S has the property 'occurring in 1828', (ii) S is R-related to the present stage, and (iii) no other R-related stage occurs prior to S.

Admittedly, this account yields the conclusion that Chopin's Sonata in C minor can truly be described as being created at the time of its first performance, that is, of S. This account of creatability could still be considered unsatisfactory if, as common sense perhaps intimates, the creation of the work is identified with its act of composition and not with its first performance. Indeed, according to Musical Stage Theory, barring cases in which an act of composition consists in a full-fledged performance, the composition is merely a set of instructions necessary to performers in order to transform it into sounds, but which by itself is not sufficient to qualify as a stage/work. An analogy: reading the leaflet with the instructions to assemble a table may well be essential for giving the scattered pieces the shape and functionality of a table, yet we would not sit around the leaflet to have dinner with our friends.

Nevertheless, even if it cannot be recognised as a work, the relevance of the act of composition is unquestionable: without it, it would be impossible to originate a sequence of performances, i.e. of works. In this sense, the act of composition is part of the work-as-construct, since it is part of the set of provenential information that we have in regard to the 'work'. Here, as in the case of unperformed compositions, I can apply the modal operator strategy and add the operator 'IN POTENTIA' to the sentence at issue. Musical Stage Theory can thus grant that when we say 'Chopin's Sonata in C minor was created in 1828,' meaning that it was composed and not

[307] Debates on this topic are wide. For an overview over the main players in this dispute, see Kivy 1993; Dodd 2007; Levinson 1980; Caplan and Matheson 2006.

performed in that year, we are applying the operator 'IN POTENTIA' to our sentence: 'Chopin's Sonata in C minor was IN POTENTIA created in 1828.' Whatever came to light in 1828 is not a full-fledged performance, but it has the potentiality to becoming a stage as understood in the austere sense.

Indeed, Musical Stage Theory fares better than its direct rivals, type-token theory and Musical Perdurantism, in addressing the creatability of musical works. The desideratum of creatability has proven to be particularly problematic for the first, given the type-token account of musical works as eternal abstracta. The type-token theorists typically reply that we do not need to think of musical works as creatable entities but instead as stemming from an act of creativity. However, this claim encounters well known difficulties. Without claiming that the problem is insurmountable, at least it shows that the type-token view is not in an ideal position. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Musical Perdurantism fares even worse in this respect: the identification of musical works with fusions has the counterintuitive consequence that musical works come into being when the first performance is played.[308]

By resorting to the shift to the work-as-construct, Musical Stage Theory manages to acknowledge the relevance of the act of composition. In addition, the adoption of the modal operator strategy allows Musical Stage Theory to explain in a systematised and consistent way the role of the act of composition as creation 'IN POTENTIA' and the case of unperformed compositions as 'would-be works'.

Thus far I have been talking about the reference for terms for musical works (such as 'Scarlatti's Sonata in D minor came after Chopin's Sonata in C minor') and its shifts, but I did so mostly from the metaphysical viewpoint: what was of interest was the status of their referents, as in my discussion of work-as-performance and work-as-construct. Still, the idea of shifts of reference may also raise semantic issues that need to be confronted. Just like in Sider's view 'person' sometimes refers to a stage and sometimes to a worm, in Musical Stage Theory 'work of music' sometimes refers to a stage, i.e. the work-as-performance, and sometimes to the work-as-construct.

Note first that the claim is not one of accidental ambiguity, as in 'bank' or 'bat' scenarios. The relationship between the interpretations of the linguistic uses of the term is clearly systematic. It is so in my account to no lesser extent than in traditional

[308] See Chapter 1, sections 4–6 for the criticism against type-token and Musical Perdurantism in respect to the desiderata of musical works.

accounts (which, as indicated, need to re-analyse 'Beethoven's *Fifth*' as 'a performance of Beethoven's *Fifth*' in some cases). A similar methodology applies to an apparent further problem, as in cases of presumed co-reference. Suppose we say: 'Yesterday, Beethoven's *Fifth*, a masterpiece of the Classic period, occurred after the Brandenburg VI'. In this sentence, the parenthetical clause identifies Beethoven's *Fifth* as a masterpiece of the Classical period which, over here, anachronistically comes before the Brandenburg VI.

The problem is that, if these are cases of co-reference, a decision must be made: either Beethoven's *Fifth* is a work dating back to the Classical period or it dates back to before the 1700s. But note firstly that this is as much a problem for alternative ontologies of musical works. It is, furthermore, a problem for pretty much any traditional account of other one-many scenarios: it is relatively uncontroversial that 'novel' has a work-reading and a physical object reading, but that we can say, for example, 'Austen's *Emma*, a beloved masterpiece, is on the top shelf.' The problem is there, but it is a purely semantic issue.[309]

5. Advantages of Musical Stage Theory

I already showed how Musical Stage Theory is an ontologically tenable alternative to other theories in musical ontology. In this last section, my aim is to provide some preliminary indications as to how, in a stronger sense, Musical Stage Theory is not only an alternative, but a better alternative. I will highlight three main advantages of Musical Stage Theory, some of which I have already hinted at above: (a) it straightforwardly accounts for our (Grasp) epistemological grasp on musical works; (b) it provides a regulative tool to group performances together, i.e. the R-relation, which provides a systematic strategy for overcoming prima facie shortcomings of Musical Stage Theory, and also allows for greater flexibility in referring to works and performances, and (c) it accounts for the widespread relevance that we give to performers in musical practice and in our everyday interaction with music.

[309] I will not enter the debate on which semantic theory is best to account for similar cases. On this see Predelli 2011; Dodd and Letts 2017.

As I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, an advantage of Musical Stage Theory is to straightforwardly account for expressions such as 'Yesterday I listened to Chopin's Sonata in C minor'. The main ontological views currently on the market at best justify this accessibility by recognising a sort of indirect epistemic contact with the work and by a heavy-handed rephrasing of common expressions. Type-token theorists strive to account for the grasp that we can have of the work by positing a kind of mediated (and arguably not well defined) relation of hearing a work-type *through* its tokens.[310] The traditional type-token view claims that listening to a performance and being aware of its properties is sufficient to have a grasp on the essential nature of the work itself. The main objection type-token theorists need to face is that, as abstract entities, works cannot enter into causal relation and possess audible properties. At best, they can enter causal relations *derivately* by resorting to a version of Quine's 'deferred ostension': the individuation of tokens is enough for the individuation of the related type, so that it is possible to 'listen to a work of music by listening to one of its performances.'[311] Despite securing a way to handle the type-token relation, though, what the type-token view cannot secure is the direct access to the work which common statements such as 'Tonight I listened to Beethoven's *Fifth* Symphony' seem to imply.

Indeed, even materialistically oriented views such as Musical Perdurantism struggle in this respect. According to Musical Perdurantism, musical works are fusions of temporal parts where these temporal parts are performances. When listening to a performance, then, we are listening only to a part of the work. From this consideration derives Dodd's Objection from Perception against Musical Perdurantism: it is impossible to hear works-qua-fusions in their entirety, only their temporal parts are accessible.[312] Nominalists and action theorists meet similar issues: neither a class of performances nor the composer's actions can typically be objects of acquaintance on the part of the audience.[313] The identification of the work with the performance posited

[310] See Wolterstorff 1980, 56 *et seq.*; Kivy 1993; Dodd 2007.
[311] Dodd 2007, 12. See Caplan and Matheson 2006 for objections against Dodd's version of deferred ostension, and Caplan and Matheson 2004, 126–128.
[312] As discussed in Chapter 1, Caplan and Matheson's ultimate, and arguably not well, supported, reply is that 'a perdurantist about musical works is no worse off here than a Perdurantist about Persons is' (Caplan and Matheson 2006, 63). For more details on perdurantism versus Platonism, see Dodd 2000; 2002; 2004a.
[313] See Goodman 1968; D. Davies 2004.

by Musical Stage Theory, instead, straightforwardly accounts for our access to the work: we can have direct grasp of the work by listening to it.[314]

A second advantage of Musical Stage Theory derives from its appeal to the R-relation. In previous sections, I presented the R-relation as the relationship which holds between different performances and underwrites claims about those performances being of the same 'work'. The use of the R-relation results in a two-fold advantage for Musical Stage Theory. Firstly, Musical Stage Theory adopts the same strategy for explaining our shift of reference from the work-as-performance to the other uses of the term 'work', and for grouping performances together. In this way, Musical Stage Theory provides a consistent and systematised strategy for accounting for the contextual assessment of our talk about music. This applies both when we want to count performances as performances of the same 'work' and when we refer alternatively to the work-as-performance or to the work-as-construct.

Furthermore, thanks to its being contextually modulated, the R-relation allows for a greater flexibility than other theories in grouping performances together. Analogously to Sider's use of multiple unity relations to explain puzzles of identity over time, the multiple requirements of the R-relation show that there is no single way to classify performances. It depends on the speaker's interests whether we should identify a performance as a performance 'of' Chopin's Sonata in C minor on the basis of the intentionality requirement even if it contains mistakes, idiosyncratic embellishments, and other departures from the score. Note that the aforementioned contextuality need not (and is not) a question of 'tolerance', as when we adopt a certain *lassaiz faire* in the exemplification of a type (as, say, in the case of a badly scribbled letter 'A'). It is, rather, part and parcel of Musical Stage Theory's account of the very nature of the metaphysics of musical works, and of our ensuing ways of talking about

[314] An objection that can be raised in relation to my reading of (Grasp) is that the performance by itself does not provide enough information to be considered the work on its own. It is true that the complexity of all the provenential and historical information that are linked to the concept of work we commonly adopt cannot be displayed by the performance as a sum of sounds. But the same can be said of every artwork. By merely looking at *La Primavera* by Botticelli, supposing that we do not know anything about the author nor about the context in which it was painted, we cannot fully understand the complexity of the symbolism which is embedded into it. Or, if we read *Beowulf* without knowing anything about nordic mythology nor about when and why it was written, we can have *only* a superficial understanding of it. But we would not deny that the painting or the poem are the works. My claim is that the same can be said for music. What we can immediately perceive is the performance and even if it does not provide all of the background information we can get from other sources, still this 'superficial' information is the most relevant one, the one that distinguishes music from all other kinds of art.

music. In this sense, Musical Stage Theory may stand in a better position than traditional type-token theories: at least as long as a musical work is being identified with a single type (as traditional type-theories allege), any deviation from the constraints of the type may well be tolerable, but are nevertheless a source of defectivity.[315]

The contextuality envisaged by Musical Stage Theory is not a tolerance of departures from fixed standards,[316] since univocal standards are nowhere to be found. There are no invariantly incorrect performances: each performance should be analysed following distinct and contextually assessed criteria. In this way Musical Stage Theory is closer to the actual (and admittedly fuzzy) practices of reception. This feature of Musical Stage Theory leads directly to its third advantage: it acknowledges the importance of musical practices and of performers for the nature of works.

As I anticipated, a third advantage of Musical Stage Theory is to give the concept of musical work a new meaning, better suited to interpreting widespread musical practices which are neglected by other theories. The ordinary concept of work that we refer to when making claims such as 'Chopin's works have been performed many times,' and which is assumed by type-token theorists as the model of musical work, is a legacy of the late 1800s fashion of isolating what was deemed Art from other expressions of human creativity. As a result, when we hear someone talking about a work of Classical music, the idea that pops into our minds is that of an entity that ought to be reproduced by respecting the composer's instructions and the performing tradition associated to it.[317]

The lens of the 'Classical music' tradition has been the medium through which both musicologists and theorists of the ontology of music interpreted the concept of musical work. But the immutability and the aura of untouchable authority which emanated from the works as commonly intended is distinctive only of a very limited period of time in the Western tradition. Before and after that, the work of music was interpreted as a flexible entity: from the Early Music practice of thoroughbass and partimenti,

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[315] Type-token theorists may adopt an alternative strategy. They could say that we refer to different sorts of types on different occasions: sometimes types are connected by one sort of relation, and sometimes by another. Despite leading to a proliferation of types, this may indeed be an option type-token theorists can take for advocating for contextuality.

[316] As in Peter Unger's contextual approach to 'flat': in many everyday scenarios, much counts as flat from the purposes of the conversation. Yet, 'flat' is absolute, in the sense that something is strictly flat iff it is perfectly deprived of bumps (see Unger 2002).

[317] For a discussion on the concept of musical work in history, see Kenyon 1988; Goehr 1992; Lawson and Stowell 1999; Butt 2002.

through accompanied music in the Early Classical period, up to more modern styles such as Jazz, a component of improvisation and unexpectedness has always been at the heart of music. As I will address in more detail in Chapter 5, theorists traditionally struggle to account for improvisation in their ontological theories because of its ephemeral nature. Musical Stage Theory is instead able to include musical improvisations within its framework. Improvisations are not lesser musical works than performances which are based on a set of instructions.[318] What counts for something to be a work, in fact, is that it is a sonic product, intentionally created and performed, and which is immediately graspable by a potential audience. In their immediateness, improvisations are musical works *par excellence*. They are created and, at the same time, performed by an intentional act of the performer and can be accessed by the public.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I proposed Musical Stage Theory as a novel account of the ontology of musical works and as an alternative to other views. The proclaimed aims of Musical Stage Theory are to be ontologically defensible and to explain the reasons behind our seemingly inconsistent linguistic attitudes towards musical works. Ontological tenability is reached by resorting to an independently motivated account given by Sider in the ontology of persistence: the Stage View. In the central part of the chapter, I showed how a parallel with Sider's view is beneficial for Musical Stage Theory to explain both the relationship between performances and the shifts of reference occurring in our language. The latter take place between the talk of the work-as-performance – what for Musical Stage Theory is, strictly speaking, the work – and the speech aimed at the work-as-construct. As explained above, the rationale behind this shift of reference is central also for replying to possible objections against Musical Stage Theory.

In addition to being a plausible alternative to other theories in the ontology of musical works, Musical Stage Theory may also appear to be a better alternative. As explained, Musical Stage Theory has the advantage of straightforwardly accounting

[318] See Chapter 5 for a discussion on improvisation.

for our epistemological access to musical works. Furthermore, the revision of the concept of musical work that it promotes, also has the favourable consequence of including different musical practices, and valuing the active contribution of performers.

In Chapter 5 I will address particular musical case studies to show how Musical Stage Theory can be successfully applied to the analysis of the nature of musical works. The last chapter, Chapter 6, will instead detail how the ontology proposed by Musical Stage Theory can be used to account for the concept of authenticity. As for Chapter 4, it has the aim of complementing the present chapter in the ontological discussion about the nature of musical works. In the next chapter I will indeed discuss the ontological profile of recordings and computer-based performances and composition. The main argument of the chapter will be that, even if recordings and computer-based performances and compositions cannot be considered works-as-performances, they can nevertheless be recognised as part of the work-as-construct. The systematic shift between work-as-performance and work-as-construct will therefore be beneficial to a completeness of the ontological analysis of musical entities.

Chapter 4

Recordings and Computer-Based Performances

'Hey Annie, listen to this. See what you think.' Pete hands her the headphones of his iPod.
'I like it,' nods Annie. 'Who wrote this work?'
'It is by Iamus, a Computer cluster which just released its first album. Isn't it exciting?'
'A computer? Well, then it's not a musical work,' argues Annie. 'It's just a collection of notes.'

What induced Annie to change her mind? What is the same piece found to lack once she knows that it was not composed by a human? Something that it did not lack before?

Music has been shaped by the development of technology. Since the last decades of the 19th century, recording technologies have allowed the reproduction of music and sounds inside the home, at least for those who could afford to buy a phonograph. This brought enormous changes to the musical environment, to the social aspects of producing and listening to music, and to the ways of making music itself.[319] The technological wave, in fact, did not concern only the process of musical recording but also composing and performing. Just a few years before, the possibility of listening in a living room to a concert attended one month before would have been unthinkable. The same can be said for the inclusion of synthesised sounds inside a musical work, or for the composition of a whole piece by a computer.

Overview

This chapter is intended to complement the ontological discussion about the nature of musical works set out in Chapter 3. For the sake of completeness, I discuss the

[319] See Day 2002, 139.

ontological profile of recordings and computer-generated performances. More specifically, I suggest a way to account for the nature of musical recordings and computer-generated 'performances' and 'compositions' within the broader outline of Musical Stage Theory.[320] I will argue that recordings and computer-generated performances cannot be considered works-as-performances, since they do not comply with the requirements set by the ontological profile of performances. Despite this, though, they can still be recognised as part of the work-as-construct. They, in fact, provide the audience with the information necessary for them to say 'I know the work X.' As for the analysis of computer-generated compositions, instead, we will need to consider a widely debated topic: that of intentionality in computers. The analysis conducted in this chapter will thus contribute to the completion of Musical Stage Theory as an ontological theory and to its capacity to account for musical entities of different kinds.

I will start the chapter by focusing on the most common and widely accessible form of music technology: recording. I will discuss not only the benefits that the recording and reproduction of music entails but also its disadvantages. Regardless of its pros and cons, it is undeniable that the changes brought by the use of recording technology have led to a reconsideration of the ontological profile of music. I will conclude the section by addressing how Musical Stage Theory can account for the nature of recordings. The second section of this chapter will be devoted to a different use of technology in the musical field: the employment of software for performing and composing. The use of software and other technologies has expanded the possibilities for both composers and performers, giving rise to new musical trends and genres. Nevertheless, the use of technology for this purpose has led to controversial consequences, especially in regard to the question as to whether a machine can create a musical work. Technological devices for performing raise similar concerns: can a synthesiser produce a 'performance'? This second section will allow me to continue the discussion on the role of intentionality in music started in Chapter 1, and to expand upon it through the analysis of computer-generated performance and composition. Throughout the discussion I will also make use of the opinions regarding musical recordings and computer-generated performances by the musicians I interviewed during my research

[320] I put these terms within scare quotes since, as we will see, it is disputable that they can be considered full-fledged performances or compositions.

and which I introduced in Chapter 2. The analysis of the ontological profile of these musical entities through Musical Stage Theory will then conclude the chapter.

A small caveat before I begin. Throughout this discussion, as elsewhere in the thesis, I assume as the background for the analysis what we call the Classical Music tradition, namely the set of ideologies and mental frameworks which developed at the end of the 19th and beginning of 20th century and led to the creation of a canon of Classical music. This ideology brings with it a set of beliefs which inform the interpretation of musical phenomena I will endorse here. The reason for endorsing it is not chauvinistic but is motivated instead by a desire to align my analysis with those found in the literature on recordings and music technology. Throughout the chapter, I will make occasional remarks to highlight the ideological framework of my claims.

Regardless of the influence that these considerations bear on the ontological shaping of works, the relevance of musical technology for our interaction with music should not be underestimated. My aim in the following sections is to reflect on this phenomenon and to identify its affordances within music-making.

1. Musical Recordings

Nowadays, almost everyone has been in contact with recorded music at least once in her life. The ubiquity and easy availability of recorded music has progressively shaped its modes of reception. If two centuries ago the only way to listen to music was through live performances, with the advent of recording technology this has become the rarer and more expensive way to listen to a piece of music. The habit of listening to a performance in almost religious silence, which became the common way of listening in the 20th century, was gradually replaced with the choice of listening to a recording inside a private house, in the office, or walking along the road.[321] In the following sections, I will discuss the influence of technology first on the reception and then on the production of music. The insights which will result from this analysis will

[321] See Day 2002, 205 *et seq*. As mentioned in the introductory section, this habit of listening is motivated by the ideology behind the formation of the canon of Classical Music which interpreted the musical works as untouchable entities worth of admiration and silent contemplation. I will return to this issue in the next section.

converge in the later assessment of the consequences brought to the ontology of recordings.

All the sections in this chapter have a similar structure. I will start with a historical overview of the phenomenon at issue, moving then to the consideration of how the literature accounts for it. Only at the end of the section, when all the historical and critical details will have been covered, I will propose my interpretation of the phenomenon and how it can be inscribed within Musical Stage Theory. My conclusion, as mentioned, will be that recordings are not works-as-performances but can nevertheless be included within the work-as-construct.

1.1 Influence of Technology on the Reception of Music

One important aspect from a listener's point of view when listening to either a recorded or a live performance is understanding the transparency of the medium, namely the directness and reliability of the vehicle through which she is listening to music.[322] Ideal circumstances – sitting in front of the performers with optimal acoustic conditions – have an ideal transparency.[323] Depending on the venue, of course, these conditions change, adapting to the contextual features of the room. Stephen Davies argues that this kind of transparency is impossible to obtain by listening to a recording: 'I am inclined to think that the placement of the microphones, if not the technological limits of transmission, affect the sound of radio broadcasts in a way that prevents the medium from achieving complete transparency. Moreover, differences in the phenomenology of the listening experience will remain, even if superior technologies improve on those of the early 21st century.'[324] According to Davies, then, listening to a recording instead of attending a live performance does not provide the listener with the richness of features and information owned by live performances. But do the differences displayed by recordings in respect to live performances detract from their value? What I intend to do now is to discuss not only what can be interpreted as the

[322] See Brown 2000.
[323] Also the 'ideal' nature of these listening conditions is motivated by the customs of concert goers developed in the Classical Music tradition.
[324] S. Davies 2001, 300.

disadvantages of recordings, namely the aspects in which they are lacking in comparison with live music, but also their advantages.

Andrew Kania lists a number of differences which occur between experiencing a live performance and a recording:

> (i) knowledge of the repeatability of recording; (ii) differences between the sounds of live performances and recordings; (iii) the lack of the visual element of live performances in recordings; (iv) the impossibility of interaction between audience and performer in the recording situation; and (v) the lack of the social and "ritual" elements of live performances when listening to recordings.[325]

Among these differences the lack of visual elements, the loss of interaction between audience and performers, and the lack of the social elements embedded into live performances can be seen as disadvantages of recordings. Deprived of the context of physical presence of both performers and audience in the same space recordings can lead to a sort of decontextualisation of the production and reception of music: 'The consequence of these processes, according to Fisher and Potter (1997), is the abstraction of music from its historical context. Music from many eras, cultures, and styles are juxtaposed, and their original functions and home situations are not explained or acknowledged.'[326] The work of music and its interpretation tend to collapse for the listener who has access to a disc collection. It is not infrequent, for example, to hear claims such as "Yesterday I listened to Callas and Di Stefano again" with more emphasis on the interpreter taken abstractly and independently from the context of production. The work is then abstracted from its historical context and what gains relevance are the different interpretations that have been given of it.[327]

The growing trend of disc collection, however, can also be deemed an advantage brought by recording technologies. Owing a large disc collection, in fact, allows the listener to have access to and to compare a much wider range of music at a cheaper price than that which would be necessary for attending the same number of live performances:[328] 'What is not denied is that recordings have given listeners opportunities to browse, to sample, to investigate masses of music of all periods in the way that was possible with literature, in books, but was not possible even to the most

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[325] Kania 2009, 29.
[326] S. Davies 2001, 333.
[327] That, instead, the composer and her act of composition should be the main focus of attention is an ideological belief derived from the Romantic cult of the composer.
[328] See Gracyck 1997.

expert and erudite score-reader with music.'[329] The progress of recording technology from the early 1900s increased at a rapid pace. It started with the reproducing pianos of the early 20th century, which allow us to listen to the performances of great Masters such as Debussy, Stravinsky, Saint-Saëns and Gershwin.[330] The quality of recordings greatly improved with the first gramophones and acoustical recordings. A further essential step was taken with electrical recordings, a technique developed thanks to the research into radio systems during the Great War. From the 1930s on it is hard to keep track of the changes in recording technique: the magnetic tape was replaced by the stereo recording in the 1950s, the cassette replaced the vinyl in the 1960s, and the CD replaced the cassette in the 1980s. The research in digital sound which began in the late 1960s was essential for the development of CDs and of subsequent systems up to the MP3.

A further change brought by the diffusion of recordings is a change in the function of music. For a start, the loss of context implied by listening to a recording detracts from the ability to appreciate the original function of the recorded music. Teaching music is lumped together with party music, concert music, Tafelmusik and so on. By listening to a CD of, say, the complete works by J.S. Bach sitting on the sofa in a 21st century living room, a listener struggles to discern the difference of function between pieces which were composed with educational purposes, such as *The Well-Tempered Clavier*, and party music such as the dance *Suites.*[331] With the diffusion of recordings and their adoption in different contexts, the number of functions that they perform gradually increased. Now we have recordings of concert music with the intellectual function of recreating the experience of listening in the past (as is the case, for example, in Medieval ensembles like the Orlando Consort), recordings with the function of mood enhancement or distraction (such as 'Adagio' CDs for relaxation), recordings played in shopping centres with the function of being a pleasant and unnoticed background for the shoppers (a similar function to Tafelmusik such as Mozart's *Serenades*), and so on.

Behind the multiplication of functions of recordings there is a commercial motivation. From the early economic reason of having 'the record in the shops before

[329] Day 2002, 216.
[330] The following discussion will refer to Day 2002, 12–22.
[331] A similar thing happens with art galleries where religious paintings are next to secular ones.

the music was published to create a demand for the sheet music versions'[332] to the more current motivation of selling compilations of relaxing music to be played in Yoga classes, much of the drive behind the publication of recordings with different functions is a commercial one. There can be many other motivations:

> Because they are asked to; for publicity, to become known; to support themselves and their families. Because conductors of major symphony orchestras cannot refuse to. Because younger musicians might learn something from their performances. Because they wish to realise their intentions more exactly than they ever can in a live performance; to maintain high standards in accuracy and in the time details in their live performances; to leave something behind them.[333]

This plenitude cannot but complicate and, at the same time, enrich the interpretation of the role played by recordings in history. Recording technology has often been described as a democratisation of music. If once only the rich bourgeoisie and nobility could afford to attend a whole season of concerts, with the advent of the phonograph and of its later developments a wider audience could duplicate the same experience at home.[334] The same holds true today even if the price of a ticket for attending a concert is proportionally cheaper. More than the price is the lack of time in our hectic society which makes many people prefer to listen to recordings than attending a concert.

This trend led music to be conceived more as an individual experience.[335] Paul Elie, in his book on the development and transformation of Bach's music in our time, describes the change in the listening experience due to the introduction of recording technologies: 'The record was symbolic in a deeper sense […]. In it some music made in small rooms went out into the world and then was brought back home by technology, there to roost in the small rooms − living room, bedroom, dorm room, finished basement − that were the sites of the modern person's imaginative life.'[336] Technology brought music once again to the intimate and private dimension, which was a characteristic of its earlier stages, when Chamber music was performed in the living rooms of private houses. And from the inside, technology brings music again to the outside: 'Now [1979] it was possible to listen to recordings anywhere. As the phonograph had taken music out of the concert hall and into the home, the portable

[332] Day 2002, 6.
[333] Ibid., 57.
[334] This is precisely what the piano and sheet music did from the 1760s.
[335] On the evolution of listening habits see also Day 2002; Weber 1997.
[336] Elie 2012, 296.

audio player − globally renamed the Walkman − took recorded music out of the home and into the street; now city life was an esplanade, the intersecting movements of bodies in space and time, point and counterpoint.'[337]

Recording technology brings the act of listening to music to a private dimension, promising with the Hi-Fi acronym to offer a faithful surrogate of the listening experience of live music. But, despite the recreation of intimate surroundings, musicians cannot aspire to let the audience live the experience of past times in which *live* music was enjoyed in different contexts. During the recording process, in fact, essential features are lost. For one thing, there are no performers playing live in front of the listener. But there are other consequences. For example, the mechanical sounds of the instruments, particularly present in ancient instruments, are canceled to achieve a purer sound by those musicians who share a formalist desire to create a non-human 'pure work'.[338]

A further element has to be considered when addressing the effects of recordings, i.e. the lack of the presence of both performers and audience in the same place. Studio recordings lack the social dimension which is characteristic of live performances. An aspect of this social dimension is the presence of an audience which witnesses the production of ephemeral sounds destined to disappear. This does not happen with recordings. The experience of listening is in fact very different in the cases of live performances and recordings. The listening experience of live performances is usually more attentive. Listeners are aware of the ephemeral nature of sounds and that they have only one chance to experience the communicative intention behind the sounds before they fade away. In the case of recordings, instead, listeners can listen to a recording nearly as many times as they want and this alleviates the pressure of having to understand everything the first time: 'performance necessarily involves a creative aspect (even if a composer's score is followed). In the live situation, this is added as and when the performance occurs, in the here and now. But when the real-time performance is recorded, this dimension is permanently fixed and thereby ossified.'[339]

The mainstream performers I interviewed almost unanimously claim that the experience conveyed by recordings is not comparable to that of live performances.[340]

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[337] Ibid., 296.
[338] The next section will focus more on this.
[339] S. Davies 2001, 304.
[340] Interviews n. 1 and 2. And, it could be argued, they could not say otherwise since their livelihoods depend on this.

This is not only due to the lack of the visual factor in recordings but also, and more importantly, to the presence of a filter between the performance and the listener.[341] The experience of music though a recording has as a drawback a lack of 'physical emotions,'[342] which are conveyed by a live performance instead. With this, arguably, the performers want to stress how the live presence of musicians and audience together, sharing the same space, allows the audience to experience stronger emotions thanks to the visual information they can access in addition to only the audible one. On the other hand, what is gained from recordings is a perfection and flawlessness which can rarely be achieved in a live performance.[343] Recordings thus remain useful sources but the difference in their properties in respect to live performances prevents them from being deemed equivalent.[344]

As emerged from the previous considerations, the practice of recording music brought considerable changes to the way in which audiences experience music. The differences between recordings and live performances are undeniable. But are they enough to justify an aesthetic and ontological difference between the two? In the next section I will focus on the influence that technology has on the production of music before moving on to answering this question in section 1.3.

1.2 Influence of Technology on the Production of Music

The use of technology has not only had an impact on the reception of music but also on its production. The awareness that the sounds they are playing are frozen and stored to be heard many times by different people has a psychological impact on performers. Directing the performance to a specific public in the room makes it possible for performers to cater the performance and to adjust it according to the audience's reactions, element that may lack in the setting of a recording session.[345]

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[341] Interview n. 3.
[342] Interview n. 1.
[343] Interview n. 1. It is even more so, of course, in the case of Pop and Rock music. Here I will limit myself to the analysis of instrumental Classical music due to space constraints.
[344] Interview n. 2.
[345] See S. Davies 2001, 309. In contrast to this, the results I got from the interviews I carried out with performers and which I addressed in Chapter 2 are almost unanimous in denying the impact of the audience in front of which they were playing on the way in which they played. See also Day 2002, 52–53.

Analogous differences can be observed among live and studio recordings.[346] There are in fact mainly two ways in which music is recorded: one is by recording a live concert or performance, the other is by hosting performers in a recording studio with no audience but only technicians and technical devices. As it is easy to guess, these two settings present different features and the latter, in turn, have a different impact on the way performers approach the act of playing.[347] The pianist Alfred Brendel has devoted many thoughts in his books to the relationship between performers and recordings.[348] In particular, he focuses on the impact that the context of a live, as opposed to a studio, performance can have on the way performers play:

> Brendel argues that the live context invites an approach to musical interpretation unlike that appropriate to the studio. With an audience present, the performer should project the work on a public scale, whereas in the studio he should think of himself as soliloquizing, or as communicating on a more intimate level. It is not (or not solely) that the musician before an audience is likely to play the same way as in the studio, but better. Rather, it is that the two contexts call for different approaches to the music's interpretation.[349]

The setting of a studio performance, in fact, makes the physical and emotional detachment between the performer and its audience even more obvious. Not only the immediateness and instantaneousness of a live performance are lost, what gets lost with a studio recording is also the social event of a live concert and the aura which derives from it.

Studio recordings have as a further obvious consequence the possibility for sounds to be directly modified by machines.[350] Performers can for example split a whole piece between many different sessions. The final result sounds like a continuous performance when, actually, it could have been recorded over many days or even weeks. This process of studio recording with multiple sessions and sonic alterations gives rise to significant differences in respect to the more direct and linear live recording. When technologies were less advanced, one of the struggles entailed by the recording process was that if performers made a mistake a few bars before the end of

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[346] See Day 2002, 33.
[347] For example, with the introduction of an automatic control of the balance of sound directly carried out by the machine, it is possible for performers to maintain the usual settings of live performances also in recording studios. Previously, instead, the number and position of instrumentalists had to be adapted to the desired sound effect (see S. Davies 2001, 314).
[348] See Brendel 1991.
[349] S. Davies 2001, 311.
[350] See Day 2002, 24. It should be mentioned that many performers use technology to alter live performances too, e.g. synthesised pianos, electric violins, voice modifiers, and so on.

the piece, they had to play it all over again from the beginning. The possibility of juxtaposing the best takes nullifies this issue. From the performers' point of view, the awareness that a mistake on their part does not oblige them to play the piece all over again lessens the anxiety and tension which characterises live performances and live recordings. This consequence can be appreciated by many, above all by those who see the quality of their performance diminished by excessive pressure. On the other hand, the lack of stress can also result in a performance lacking vibrancy. The mainstream performers I interviewed also remarked on the dissimilarities between studio and live recordings. The difference in the transparency of the medium still holds, but live recordings are able to maintain a vibrancy which studio recordings may lack.[351]

1.3 Moral Dimension of Recordings

A further consequence of studio recording concerns its moral dimension.[352] The alterations which a performance recorded in a studio is subject to raise the issue of whether it is morally right to present it to the public as a performance. The advancements in technology in the last decades, in fact, make it possible to adjust almost every parameter of a performance once it is recorded. As absurd as it may sound, it would even be possible to transform one performance completely into another by changing pitch, rhythm, tempo, and timbre, thus realising Goodman's prospected slippery slope argument.[353] To this extent, it can seem immoral to compare a performance played live without flaws by a musician from the beginning to its end to a recording made in multiple takes in which every mistake is canceled out.

The attitudes of performers in respect to the practices of modification occurring in the recording studio are different. Some, like Anne-Sophie Mutter, Alicia de Larrocha, and Pierre Boulez, dislike it.[354] Others, like Rachmaninoff and Stravinsky, instead, did not hide liking the possibilities offered by the recording studio to almost reach the 'artistic perfection'[355] and to give a rendition which was as nearest as possible to the

[351] Interview n. 1.
[352] On discussions about music and ethics, see Cox and Levine 2016; Cobussen and Nielsen 2016.
[353] See Goodman 1968, 187.
[354] See Day 2002, 27.
[355] Ibid., 49.

composer's idea.[356] Others simply did not divulge the fact that their recorded performances were the result of tens of takes.

Similarly, musicians display different attitudes towards recordings in general. The pianist Glenn Gould was a convinced supporter of the possibilities offered by the recording studio. A provocative character in the 20th century musical panorama, and musician and theoretician at the same time, Gould is mostly known for his interpretations of J.S. Bach's works. He created a new image of Bach, 'his own' Bach in which Gould's self was prevalent in respect to the aura of the old composer. Gould's merit has been that of modernising the widespread idea of Bach by playing his pieces also on the piano and by enriching them with his own touch. If this approach has been appreciated by many, it also raised several objections, especially in a period in which the Early Music revival was at its heights. The main criticism held against Gould was that of playing Gould instead of Bach, i.e. of failing to respect Bach's conception of his compositions. Gould was not concerned by these accusations, convinced as he was of the fact that the intrinsic underdetermination of the score grants to performers ample space for manoeuvre.

The desire to affirm the presence of the performer in an even stronger way led Gould to the apparently paradoxical choice of leaving the concert scene and devoting himself only to studio recordings. Gould's decision to abandon the concert hall did not mean a detachment from the audience. On the contrary, Gould believed that recording technology would help him to propagate his ideas in an even clearer manner. The performer's presence in Gould's recordings is very much heard. A prime example is the humming which goes along with almost every track and which asserts the primacy of the player. Gould devoted much effort to setting out his thoughts, in books and interviews regarding the various possibilities which the recording technology could offer him. Gould claimed that only a private and close listening, like listening to a recording, could allow us to grasp all the timbral and rhythmic shades which he deemed essential in his executions. This is the principal reason which explains the departure of Gould from the live scene. The recording studio also solved other concerns: the uneasiness he felt in performing in front of a public and the upsetting impossibility of correcting the mistakes made during live performances. The first concern was dictated by his anxious and slightly misanthropic nature, the second to

[356] Ibid., 84.

his perfectionism. The glam of the concert hall and the worship which performers were granted by the audience never appealed to Gould.[357] Those features which for the majority are the most attractive ones of live performances – unpredictability and risk – were instead for Gould the most disturbing.[358]

In addition, recording technologies amplified the role of the performer as interpreter, an idea shared by Gould. On the basis of this idea, he justified the recording of a work which had been recorded many times before, only if it delivered a different idea of the work. Gould wanted to extend the creative attitude of performers to listeners as well. He started to work on a project for a kit with portions of pieces performed according to different interpretations which listeners could mix at their will.[359] This is a prelude to the sophisticated software available nowadays for music composition and which I will talk about in the second section of the chapter. The barriers between composer, performer, and audience are nowadays looser, but in Gould's times thinking about the possibility of collaborations of this kind was extremely innovative.

An excessive arbitrariness in the use of recording and mixing technologies elicits discussion and criticism. Regarding this, Gould did not consider the integrity of a piece damaged by mixing-up of sections performed in different moments or even by different performers.[360] Gould regarded the use of mixing techniques in musical recording as similar to the use of cutting and pasting processes in the cinema. As in films the audience's eyes are guided by the director, Gould was able to guide the audience's ears. This position contrasts Sharpe's idea that the juxtaposition of portions of a work performed by different players has aesthetic and ontological consequences: 'It is permissible to substitute a section from a different performance if it is by the same artist but if the artist's interpretation has changed in the interim then it is not allowable. In other words a performance must be throughout a performance of a single interpretation.'[361]

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[357] See Gould 1986, 145.
[358] In contrast, Richter was more frightened of the microphones than he was of the audience and others shared his fright (see Day 2002, 46–49.) At the opposite end of the scale to Glenn Gould's attitude, an aversion towards the recording studio brought some performers to embrace the radical choice of never recording. The conductor Sergiu Celibidache is best known for deciding to take this path.
[359] See Bazzana 2004, 267.
[360] See Gould 1989, 56.
[361] Sharpe 1979, 438.

Performers are not the only ones to express their thoughts regarding the emergence of this new technology. Composers take a stance towards it, too. The Romantic idea of the composer as a creator who seems to materialise music from the void has deeply influenced our idea of the composer up to now.[362] The diffusion of recording technologies, and with them of the possibility of fixing the sounds on a disc 'with mathematical precision'[363] was a powerful tool in the hand of those composers, like Stravinsky, who did not look kindly on the interpretative intrusion of performers. Similarly, the composer Hans Heinz Stuckenschmidt welcomed the fixation of music on a disc to reach a precision which would not have been hampered by the role of the interpreter.[364] This attitude was not shared by all composers, though. On the contrary, some like Debussy, Brahms, and Copland were pleased to discover from some performances of their works features which they did not intend to include but which they preferred to the original version.[365] A consequence of the availability of recordings of performances of the same repertoire is indeed the possibility of keeping track of the changes in performing styles through the years.[366] This is not only a useful tool for comparing and analysing the evolution of performing styles but also to analyse the evolution of the role of the performer and of her relationship with the composer.

The discussion carried out in these sections showed how both the reception and the production of music have been deeply influenced by the development of recording technology. By listening to a recording instead of a live performance, listeners lack the social dimension which is one of the main draws of music as a social phenomenon. On the other hand, though, listeners have access to a much wider, and cheaper, selection of performances and of multiple renditions of the same score.

Also the production of music has been influenced by the use of technology. The exemplary case of Glenn Gould showed how the experience of performers can be modified by the possibilities offered by the recording studio. In the last decades, recorded music seems to have gained the upper hand over live music both for its economic convenience and for its accessibility. An ontology of music cannot therefore be deemed complete if it does not account for the ontology of recordings. This is my aim in the next section.

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[362] See Day 2002, 129–186.
[363] Ibid., 125.
[364] See Ibid., 125.
[365] See Ibid., 186.
[366] See Ibid., 193.

1.4 Ontology of Recordings

As explained in previous sections, recording technology influences the way music is enjoyed and produced. The consequences of these changes, however, may not be limited to aesthetic considerations but extended also into the ontological area. In Chapter 1, I discussed the features that sound events should possess in order to gain the ontological status of performances. In this section I am going to compare the relevant features of performances to those of recordings and see whether the differences are significant enough to justify an ontological distinction between recordings and performances. In what follows my intent is to suggest a possible interpretation for the ontology of recordings by including it within the general framework of Musical Stage Theory. In order to do so, I will compare the features of recordings with the ontological profile I suggested for performances, and more specifically for works-as-performances. On the basis of this, I will be able to assess the degree of departure of recordings from performances.

In Chapter 1, I delineated the main features recognised as constitutive of performances. Performances occur in time, have a goal, have temporal boundaries, can be complete or incomplete, can be taken quickly or slowly. To be considered as such, a performance should in fact be complete, from the first to the last note of the relative score, and its goal should be that of providing an apt rendition of the score itself. In addition, musical performances also possess other essential components: they include the presence of performer(s), instrument(s), an audience, and the production of sounds or, more generally, of sound waves. [367] It can be easily seen how many of these features are not shared by musical recordings. Recordings certainly occur in time and have a goal, but in addition to the goal of performances of delivering a verifiable rendition of the composition, recordings also have the additional goal of being reproduced more than once and by a large number of people. Recordings have boundaries but they can be modified anytime by stopping the reproduction or by playing it fast forward. The incompleteness of recordings can be due to, again, the act of stopping the reproduction. They can be played faster or slower by acting on the device of reproduction. But it is especially for the other features that performances and recordings differ from each

[367] See Chapter 1, section 7. This goal is not shared by other musical styles like Pop and Rock but, as I said above, I will limit the analysis here to intellectual instrumental music.

other. Recordings certainly share with live performances the production of sounds but they are not characterised by the presence of performers or instruments, if not in a derived way, and, as mentioned, the audience is of a different kind than that of live performances. In addition, I listed in the previous sections the different functions that recordings assumed and which are not shared by live performances. All the differences which can be noticed between the features of performances and those of recordings suggest that recordings are different objects from performances.

Recordings lack many of the features which make us recognise a performance as such. Stephen Davies recognises a basic difference between recordings and performances:

> Where the recording encodes an actual, live performance, the performance is a fully authentic work instance provided it follows and satisfies all the relevant work-determinative instructions. What is on the recording then is perhaps best regarded not as a work instance, but as a representation of a work instance – that is, a representation of the performance. Most recordings of works intended for live performances encode what I have called simulated performances, not actual ones. Is the simulated performance a fully authentic instance of its topic work? In one way, it is not. There is no actual, real-time, continuous playing event corresponding to what is instructed as work determinative.[368]

The notion of representation of the performance suggests the fact that, as we have seen, some of the characteristics of live performances are shared by recordings as well. At the same time, however, performances and recordings have many features which they do not share. For example, as Davies suggests, in the case of recordings there is no real time event which is occurring as in live performances.

As will be clearer from the next section when I will address how recordings can be included within the ontology of Musical Stage Theory, I do not deny that recordings provide the listener with information on the performance, and thus the work, even if the information they convey is not as complete as that delivered by live performances.[369] In this sense, recordings may well play the role of representing the performance. Just as reproductions of paintings provide us with a set of information about the painting itself, in a similar way recordings represent the performance, thus conveying information on some of its aspects.[370] The differences between recordings

[368] Davies 2001, 318.
[369] On the lack of visual information in recordings, see S. Davies 2001, Chapter 4; Levinson 2011, Chapter 16.
[370] See Gracyck 1997.

and performances are indeed noticeable but they can also not be deemed by everybody relevant enough to determine an aesthetic distinction. Many of the studies on the distinction between recordings and performances focus on the aesthetic instead of the ontological distinction. Alongside those who argue for an aesthetic inferiority of recordings in respect to performances,[371] others claim that recordings are as good as performances and that there is no aesthetic difference between the two.[372] Here I will not take a stance in respect to aesthetic considerations, even if, as I will mention in the next section, I believe that ontological distinctions affect also the aesthetic level. However, I will hint at the arguments used by those against an aesthetic distinction between recordings and performances.

With a series of thought experiments, Mag Uidhir objects against a series of arguments in favour of an aesthetic difference between recordings and performances: the lack of interaction between audience and performers, the repeatability of recordings against the non-repeatability of performances, and so on. His conclusion is that: 'There is no in principle aesthetic difference between a live performance and a recording of that performance. This suggests that recordings and live performances differ only with respect to the means of accessing/instancing the same performance.'[373] At the end of the paper he suggests to consider performances as types which can instantiate both live performances and recordings of live performances.

Similarly to Mag Uidhir, Gracyck argues that recordings are not inferior to live performances in the access they provide to works.[374] He recognises that this access cannot be complete in the case of recordings, since some information gets lost without the visual component provided by live performances. However, the easier accessibility to recordings and the improvements in technology which solve the limitations it had in the last century, counterbalance the possible deficits of recordings.

The relevance of the analysis carried out in this chapter, then, gains appeal also from the necessity of complementing the aesthetic considerations on recordings and performances with an ontological analysis. Before moving to the discussion on how recordings can be included within the ontology proposed by Musical Stage Theory, I

[371] See Dusman 1994; Ferguson 1983; Godlovitch 1993.
[372] See Mag Uidhir 2007; Gracyck 1997.
[373] Mag Uidhir 2007, 311.
[374] See Gracyck 1997.

will consider whether the ontological differences found between recordings and live performances are present also between live and studio recordings.

1.5 Live and Studio Recordings: Ontological Differences

As mentioned above, despite the fact of ending up being the same kind of product, i.e. a recording, the production process is very different in the two cases of live and studio recordings. The main features that differentiate them from each other concern: (a) the performing act, (b) the performance setting, (c) the kind of audience during the recording process, and (d) the alterations which the performance is subject to. As for (a) the performing act, while in live recordings performances are played from beginning to end without interruptions, studio recordings can be produced in multiple sessions. The (b) performance setting in the case of live recordings is the same of that of live performances. Live recordings are in fact realised by recording a concert or a live session. Performers are then able to maintain the positions they hold during a concert and also the venues are those characteristic of live performances. In the case of studio recordings the setting is very different. Recording in a studio does not only entail that the venue cannot be that of a live performance but also performers often have to place themselves in different positions relative to those they would hold during a concert, in order to facilitate the recording process and the sound balance. In addition, (c) while the audience of live recordings is the public attending the live performance that is recorded, technicians and sound engineers are usually the audience of studio recordings. Lastly, (d) while live recordings are not usually altered and the sounds produced by the live performance are kept as they are,[375] studio recordings are often altered in many ways, both by balancing the sounds and correcting mistakes and by pasting multiple takes together.

Live and studio recordings share the same differences in respect to performances regarding the features indicated in previous sections as characterising live performances. On the other hand, I argue that live and studio recordings should not be considered ontologically different. Live and studio recordings do not share the same

[375] Live recordings can be remastered, in order to improve the sound quality, though. But I do not consider this a significant alteration like those which are carried out in studio recordings.

process of making but what counts in respect of this analysis and in respect to the features identifying performances is the end product.

What matters, instead, is that the ontology of recordings tout-court needs to be distinguished from that of live performances. The peculiarities of recordings in respect to live performances are indeed too relevant to consider them as equal. In addition to the differences in regard to the characteristic features displayed by performances and discussed above, in fact, recordings and performances differ also in respect to three features which I identified in Chapter 1 as elements needed to distinguish performances from non-performances. These three features are: (a) causal relationship with the composition act, (b) intentionality of performers, and (c) shareability of performances themselves. While recordings are characterised by a causal relationship with the act of composition and by shareability, they lack the directness of the performer's intentionality. Or, to be more specific, recordings present additional intentions in respect to live performances. When recording a performance, in fact, performers do not only have the intention of performing that precise piece and to perform it for their public, an intention which they bear in the case of live performances. Performers may also have the intention to record their performance in order for it, for example, to be enjoyed by the largest number of people. The outreach and the intended function of the recording may influence the performer's intentions.

A recording can be reproduced many times while a performance is a one-off event.[376] This is in fact one of the most relevant differences between live performances and recordings: while live performances are ephemeral, recordings are fixed and accessible many times. In this sense, it may be noticed how ontological and aesthetic differences are interweaved: the reproducibility of recordings and the non-reproducibility of performances is an ontological difference which entails also an aesthetic difference: the ephemerality of live performances invites the audience to a more attentive listening while, on the part of performers, the pressure on not making mistakes in a live performance is bigger than in a studio recording. Performances and recordings are thus to be recognised as different objects, each one with different features, some of which may overlap at times.[377]

[376] See Mag Uidhir 2007, 302.

[377] Another possible way of interpreting recordings is to consider them as instanceable entities in a type-token fashion: a recording can in fact be instantiated many times, each time we press play on the reader.

I established that a recording cannot be deemed a performance, but can it be recognised as a 'work'? According to Musical Stage Theory musical works are performances. Therefore, it follows that if they are not performances, more specifically works-as-performances, recordings cannot even be deemed works. As showed above, recordings do not possess the features which are necessary for individuating something as a performance. The strictness of the central claim of Musical Stage Theory, works are performances, allows us here to give a clearcut judgement on the identification of recordings as works: recordings are not performances and, thus, they cannot even be deemed works of music.

This said, it is true that recordings provide us with some of the information also supplied by live performances. That is why I suggest that recordings should be included among the constituents of the work-as-construct. For example, I can say that I know Schubert's Sonata in A minor even if I have never listened to it live. In the same way as other elements which I included among the constituents of the work-as-construct, like provenential information about the work, the composing activity, the performing tradition, and so on, recordings provide information about the work which allow us to have an indirect acquaintance with it.

Musical Stage Theory is able to account for the ontology of recordings thanks to the shift of reference operated between the level of the work-as-performance and the linguistic reference to the work-as-construct. Even if, strictly speaking, they cannot be deemed works, recordings are recognised as useful elements for our knowledge about what we commonly refer to as 'the work'. The shifting strategy between work-as-performance and work-as-construct has once more proved to be successful for providing a complete account of the different components of music.

In the next section I am going to consider other musical entities which are becoming more and more common in our experience of music: computer-based performances and composition. I will analyse the features shared by these phenomena and which ontological consideration we may raise in this respect.

2. Technology and Music

In this section, I aim to develop the discussion on the influence of technology on music through an analysis of innovations in the field of software for music composition and performance. This analysis will involve also a consideration of the role of intentionality for the production and, in cases where software is used, for the creation of music. Since intentionality is one of the determining features of the nature of musical works, the consequences of the considerations about intentionality will have an impact also on the ontological analysis of musical works.

My aim here is not that of providing a history of the development of the use of technology in music. Yet, in order to have an idea of the rapid improvements which characterise this field, and also to provide a basis for the discussion in the following sections, I will mention here the most relevant stages of what is called computer music.[378]

2.1 The Development of Computer Music

The first electric instruments were invented during the 1870s and they were mainly based on the production of sounds by electromagnetical oscillations.[379] These techniques were developed in the early 20th century and adopted by the emerging artistic movements, like the Italian futurists or the adherents of French Musique Concrète, which used them to promote an idea of the progress and of the gradual industrialisation engulfing cities. The use of electric instruments expanded thanks to the invention of synthesisers which, like the Hammond organ, started to be used not only in so-called 'intellectual' music but also in popular music. The influence of electronic instruments on popular music reached its apex during the 1970s and it led to the emergence of a new range of musical genres which made of the use of electronic instruments their primary feature. The 1980s saw the rise of MIDI technology, a digital

[378] With computer music I mean here the general concept of music which employs software technology for its production and reproduction.

[379] The player piano, even if not powered by electricity, can be included in this review. The first prototypes were built in the mid–19th century and they consisted in a device which read a paper roll with punch holes. These rolls set in motion the corresponding hammer in the piano to hit the string. Even if non-electrical, it is still one of the first attempts at mechanising music with a semi-automatic system.

interface which allows multiple devices to communicate with each other. It is easy to see how the introduction of this powerful device constituted an enormous boost for the development of electronic music. By allowing quick communication between devices of different kinds, and thanks to the compactness of the information it could store, in fact, MIDI technologies multiplied the possibilities not only for recording and storing music but also for composing it.

Indeed, the possibility of composing music with the help of a computer is one of the major revolutions brought about by the interaction between technology and music. Up to the mid-20th century, the influence of technology on music was mainly limited to the processes of performing, recording, and editing music. The compositional aspect was still left to the human component. From this moment onwards, instead, also the act of composition was influenced by technology. This is the innovation that, more than others, as I will later discuss, entails the greatest reconsiderations for the ontology of musical works. The first software packages for composing music were programmed in the 1960s and now many programs of this kind are available to musicians. One of the greatest benefits they bring consists in a considerable reduction of the costs necessary to hire a large ensemble to listen to how a new composition sounds. Some programs, in fact, make a whole orchestra available to the composers who use the software. Other benefits are the amplification of creative possibilities, a wider availability of tools to be used in the sector of music education, and so on.

As I will address in more detail in following sections, the evolution of digital technology in computing research in the last years had repercussions also on the use of technology in music. Music and Artificial Intelligence are now tightly interconnected. There are many experiments, conducted by multinational companies like Google, aimed at improving the ability of machines in carrying out creative assignments like that of composing a musical piece.[380] These changes operate both at the level of the process of composition and at the level of performance. Technology can indeed be used as an aid by composers in various stages of the act of composition. But an even more widespread and well-known use of technology in music is during performance. In the following sections I will outline the different uses that software may have, first focusing on performance and later on composition.

[380] For example, see the Google Magenta Project, https://magenta.tensorflow.org/.

2.2 Software for Performing

In the introductory section, I mentioned how technology can be applied to music mainly in two different ways: for performing and for composing. In section 2.3 I will talk about the use of technology for composing music. In this section, instead, I will address the use of technology for performing music, highlighting its benefits and the issues it raises. In this respect, I will focus particularly on the consequences which the use of technology for performing has on the ontological considerations about musical works. Once again, the concept of intentionality is crucial and intentional acts are one of the aspects most threatened by the interaction of music with technology.

In order to produce music which is not just vocal, humans have always been in need of some kind of external tool: rocks or pieces of wood at the beginning, up to more and more complex instruments. With the evolution of instrument construction techniques, instruments which were able to play music on their own, i.e. without the need for a constant human presence, started to be built. It is the case, for example, of player pianos: self-playing pianos which reproduced music recorded on a roll of perforated paper.[381] These techniques, which at their introduction at the beginning of the 20th century were considered almost as products of magical craft, were gradually developed into modern ways of reproducing music. It is only from the mid-20th century, though, when music and computers came into contact, that musical instruments capable of producing music on their own without the need for human aid started to emerge.

Synthesisers are probably the best known example of technology-based performance. It is necessary here to distinguish between two different kinds of synthesisers: synthesisers for performance, activated and played by human performers, and MIDI synthesisers where, as we will see, the connection between performers and sounds is less direct. The first electronic instruments appeared already at the end of the 19th century but it is with the application of electronic music to popular music that they gained relevance and popularity. The Hammond Organ, used by pop groups such as Deep Purple, Pink Floyd, Genesis, and so on, revolutionised the use of keyboards in popular music. But there are even more extreme examples of synthesisers, some of which do not retain an instrument-like shape but are contained

[381] See Day 2002, 12 *et seq.*

in audio consoles or even in computers. Sound synthesisers, used also in the field of 'intellectual' music, and particularly by Musique Concrète in the 1950s, expanded considerably the timbral possibilities available to composers.

The use of synthesisers for performing music has been at the centre of the debate I mentioned in Chapter 1 between the timbral sonicist Dodd and the contextualist Levinson. In Dodd's words, the sonicist claim is as follows: 'Factoring in the thesis that musical works are norm-types, a musical work is individuated according to the condition a sound-event must meet to be one of its properly formed tokens. This being so, the sonicist's distinctive claim can be put thus: whether a sound-event counts as a properly formed token of W is determined purely by its acoustic qualitative appearance. Nothing else matters.'[382] Levinson's contextualism rejects this assertion and argues for the relevance of musico-historical individuation criteria in respect to the identity of musical works.

From the timbral sonicist's claim it follows that what is essential for assessing the nature of a musical work is merely its sonic profile. In this context, 'our pre-theoretical intuitions have it that a performance of the *Hammerklavier* Sonata on a Perfect Timbral Synthesiser, indistinguishable to the ears from a performance on a piano, would be no less satisfactory a performance of the piece.'[383] For the timbral sonicist, then, a piece performed on a synthesiser that is able to reproduce the exact qualitative appearance of a work has no less value than the same piece performed on a piano or violin. Nothing else but the purely sonic and timbral profile matters for the identification of a musical work. The performer's ability and interpretation, the quality and features of the instrument, the context and audience in front of which the piece is played are irrelevant to its ontological profile.[384]

The development of the MIDI technology in the 1980s brought this revolution forward. In the case of the synthesisers described above it is still the human performer who controls the instrument: to each human action corresponds a musical output. What changes in respect to more traditional instruments is the range of possibilities and options given to performers. In the case of MIDI synthesisers, instead, the performer

[382] Dodd 2007, 201.
[383] Dodd 2007, 205.
[384] The mainstream performers I interviewed all agree on the fact that synthesisers cannot produce performances comparable to those of a human performer. In the words of an interviewed musician, synthesisers do not produce a 'right' performance. They do not possess enough musicality, enough 'human' emotion to make their performances worthy of this name (interview n. 2).

does not play keys or strings directly, or at least this is not the only option she has. She can even get rid of the physical instrument and 'play' by writing strings of code. This, of course, leads to a more indirect control of the performer on the sound. This is the direction of electronic music that interests me for the sake of the discussion that follows, a direction which leads to a lesser interaction between human and machine, and to a progressive autonomy of the latter. In particular, what I will consider below is the ontological status of computer-based performances. Performances, that is, which are produced by computers by translating into sounds a score which is entered into the software as an input.

In order to assess the ontological nature of computer-based performances, the key topic to take into account is that of intentionality. The issue of intentionality is thus relevant for the discussion on computer-generated performances, as it will be for that on computer-generated compositions. This point is vital also for the assessment of the nature of computer-generated performances within Musical Stage Theory. The three parameters advocated by Musical Stage Theory to individuate something as a musical performance, in fact, are: (a) a causal relation to an act of composition, (b) the intentionality of the performer, and (c) shareability, i.e. the possibility of being accessible and shareable. The intentionality of performers in performing that specific work and not others is thus crucial to the ontology of the performance itself. A lack of intentionality in this respect results in a failure to identify something as a performance. In the case of computer-based performance where the computer is (almost) autonomous in producing sounds by elaborating a score adequately translated into a programming language, there is no intentionality from the part of the computer in producing these sounds. In sections 2.3. and 2.4 I will come back to the issue of intentionality and to how the philosophical debate on this topic can help us determining the ontology of computer-based performances and compositions. For the moment, I will discuss how the lack of intentionality bears on the nature of computer-based performances within Musical Stage Theory. Following the parameters mentioned above, it is possible to claim that:

1. In order to be a performance, X should be intentionally performed by a performer;
2. X is not intentionally performed;
3. X is not a performance.

As I have said, for Musical Stage Theory works are performances. It thus follows that:

4. X is a work of music *only* if X is a performance;
5. X is not a performance;
6. X is not a work of music.

This argument parallels the one made before in respect to recordings: if something cannot be deemed a performance, it follows that for Musical Stage Theory it cannot be a work. If this is true, however, how can we explain the commonsensical attitude to call 'performance', and 'work' the sounds produced by a synthesiser if they follow a score? Is there a way out? There is, and it can be found again in the shift of linguistic reference we commonly make in respect to musical works.

When we call something a work of music, according to Musical Stage Theory we can refer either to a work-as-performance or to the more general concept of work-as-construct. I mentioned that, since they lack intentionality, sounds produced by a computer-based system cannot be deemed a performance and thus they are not works-as-performances. But still, they can be considered part of the work-as-construct. Reproductions made by synthesisers, intended in the second sense analysed above, i.e. as software elaborating some lines of code to translate it into sounds, provide us with a certain level of information about the piece. For example, its sonic profile. We would then be partly right in claiming that a synthesised *Hammerklavier* is still the *Hammerklavier* – indeed a MIDI 'performance' of the *Hammerklavier* is still in the position of providing information about the Sonata. The synthesised *Hammerklavier* is the *Hammerklavier*, but not the *Hammerklavier*-as-performance, but instead the *Hammerklavier*-as-construct.[385]

This conclusion mirrors the one we reached for the analysis of recordings: even if we cannot recognise computer-generated performances as works-as-performances, we still can recognise them as part of the work-as-construct. Through its shifting strategy, Musical Stage Theory is then able to provide an ontological description, consistent with the main outlook of the theory, for recordings and computer-generated

[385] Providing that the synthesiser which performs the *Hammerklavier* is not directly played by a performer – such in the case of the Moog synthesiser. In this case, then the performance would be a work-as-performance.

performances. This is possible thanks to the inclusion within Musical Stage Theory of a detailed ontology of performances and to the central role played by the notion of intentionality for the nature of musical works.

In the next section I am going to discuss the use of technology for composing music. Just as in musical performance, so too in music composition does intentionality play a key role for the individuation of something as a musical work. I will then address the case of compositions by computer software to consider what kind of ontological nature can be ascribed to them.

2.3 Computer-based Composition

In the previous sections, I discussed the common and well-known use of technology for performing music. In this section, instead, I want to address the more problematic, but at the same time intriguing, use of technology for composing music. From the 1960s onwards, research has been applied to programs which could compose music by using algorithms. The exploitation of algorithmic procedures has been carried out with the double intent of providing creative hints to composers and of finding a procedure through which machines could be able to create music without human intervention. Artificial Intelligence (AI) composition can also improve the composer's efficiency by reducing the time needed to understand whether a musical idea can work, or not and by providing some suggestions when composers get stuck with the process of composition.

The compositional input at the root of these programs can start from the imitation of another composer's style, like the software developed by Steve Engels and Daniel Eisner.[386] Through statistical analysis, this kind of software is able to produce melodies which are similar in structure to works composed by other musicians but which, at the same time, constitute an allegedly different piece. More recent programs for composing, on the other hand, are not based on the imitation of a musician's style but on an evolutionary strategy which develops its own mechanisms for composing music. This self-learning technique is shared by many sectors in the AI field and has led to a vast improvement in the efficacy and 'creativity' of the latest programs.

[386] Presented at the Game Developer's Conference, San Francisco, 2011.

Examples of programs modeled on biology are Melomics109 and Iamus.[387] The latter produced the first album of music composed entirely by a computer: *Opus One* (October, 15 2010). The introduction of this revolutionary album in the musical panorama produced contrasting reactions, from amazement and admiration to contempt and disapproval.[388]

Certainly, an innovation of this kind in a traditional field like music could not but raise some discontent and fear. The fears are those which concern the accelerating pace of development of AI and its progressive process of independence from humans.[389] These concerns are relative to intellectual property, copyright, ethical policies and the fear that this 'superintelligence' might get out of control. The list is long and a discussion over this issue cannot be addressed here. The discontent which might surface, instead, has to do with the acknowledgement that recognising AI based compositions as music could lead to a decrease in the expectations about musical standards of quality. This is due to the convenience provided by the use of AI software for music composition. Moreover, human composers might not be willing to see their compositions and the compositions written by a robot equally judged as 'works'.

2.4 Intentionality

As for the ontological considerations about the identity and nature of musical works, computer-generated composition threatens them, too. When addressing the differences which stand between performances and recordings and between human and computer performances, I talked about the different approach they have in relation to intentionality. In the case of AI composition the conception of intentionality is even more relevant. One of the requirements of musical works identified in Chapter 1 is creatability: it is an ordinary belief that musical works are creatable entities that are not available before being actually created through an act of composition. I argue that this act of composition is necessarily intentional, namely the composer needs to possess the intention of composing that specific composition.[390]

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[387] See University of Malaga, http://www.geb.uma.es/melomics.
[388] See melomics.com/news. I will come back to other examples of software for music composition in the next section.
[389] See Chartfield 2016; Bostrom 2014.
[390] Anti-intentionalists instead reject the relevance of intentional processes in the creation of artworks. Anti-intentionalists in this respect subscribe to a strong version of the Intentional Fallacy (see Sirridge

The difficulty in addressing the topic of intentionality starts from the ambiguous usage of this term. In philosophical literature, intentionality refers to the power of the mind to represent something, to be about something. In its more common usage, instead, 'intentionality' refers to the act of consciously wishing to attend to the action that one is undertaking. For example, I may express my intentionality in playing Chopin's Sonata n. 2 by being conscious in my willingness or intention to play exactly this sonata. In what follows, I will use the term 'intentionality' in this second acceptation, meaning intentionality as the conscious intention of attending to an action. What I wish to examine is whether computers may be deemed able to possess this kind of intentionality.

In simplistic terms, we can give two opposite answers to the question "Can a computer be intentional?". Searle's reply is "No". His Chinese Room Argument challenges the claim made by Strong AI that computers can have mental capabilities similar to humans': the program used by the system to produce a meaningful output is not a mark of intentionality:

> Intentionality is a biological phenomenon […]. Whatever is that the brain does to produce intentionality, it cannot consist in its instantiating a program since no program, by itself, is sufficient for intentionality.[391]

Of a different opinion is Daniel Dennett. He proposes a strategy for understanding the behaviour of an entity:

> the predictions one makes from it [the Intentional Stance] are Intentional predictions; one is viewing the computer as an Intentional system. One predicts behavior in such a case by ascribing to the system *the possession of certain information* and by supposing it to be *directed by certain goals*, and then by working out the most reasonable or appropriate action on the basis of these ascriptions and suppositions. It is a small step to calling the information possessed the computer's *beliefs*, its goals and subgoals its *desires*.[392]

1978, 137). Wimsatt and Beardsley claim that 'the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art.' (Wimsatt and Beardsley 1946, 468). Their argument is limited to the analysis of the relevance, or irrelevance, of authorial intent in the evaluation of a work of art (of literature in this case). Their claim does not extend to ontological considerations, though. The irrelevance of authorial intentions is limited to the process of critique and analysis that is carried out on a work of art after it has been produced.

[391] Searle 1980, 424.

[392] Dennett 1971, 90.

By positing the intentional stance strategy, Dennett deems behaviour sufficient for the attribution of intentionality to an entity.[393] Following this view we can attribute *subject-dependent* intentionality to non-animal entities. More specifically, in answer to the question of whether a computer can create a musical work, we can attribute to computers a subject-dependent intentional creativity.

But it seems to be against our intuitions to consider subject-dependent intentionality sufficient for deeming a computer intentionally creative. It seems safe to claim that, following common sense intuitions, we would value the *Fifth* Symphony differently if, instead of by Beethoven, we learnt that it was composed by the wind blowing through an empty house. Rather, we sometimes speak of artefacts 'as if' they were intentional beings (for example, we may talk of the thermostat 'as if' it has the intention of regulating the temperature in the room) but this does not mean that they possess intentionality independent from our interpretation of their behaviour.[394]

The sources that have been used to give an overview of the debate about intentionality may seem outdated but the philosophical debate about this issue in the last decades has been mainly concerned with taking a stance in favour of either Searle's or Dennett's view.[395] What is missing is an up-to-date research able to keep up the pace with the impressive developments of AI. These include, among others, the research of the Google Company DeepMind which developed an AI model able to continuously learn and adapt to the inputs received from the environment. This model, known as reinforcement learning, allowed them to create the program AlphaGo which in 2017 beat the World n. 1 Go player. This event is a turning point in the history of AI, showing the world how machines can beat humans also in an area, broadly that of creativity, which was before allegedly considered exclusive property of humans.

If computers cannot be deemed able to possess intentionality, then, for the same reasons detailed above in relation to computer-based performance, they cannot even be deemed able to create musical works. The argument goes as follows:

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[393] See Ibid., 90. Here I limit the discussion to the works of Searle and Dennett but there clearly are many other views regarding this topic. For an extensive review see Siewert 2017.

[394] See Searle 1990. It may be argued that most of the conceptual difficulties that we meet in the definition and evaluation of creativity in computers comes from our apparent strive to anthropomorphise machines. From this comes also the criticism of inadequacy against the Turing Test. What the Turing Test does, in fact, is to measure the level of intelligence – or creativity – of a system taking as a model human-kind intelligence or creativity. Getting rid of this 'carbon fascism' (Pease and Colton 2011) may instead allow us to recognise and acknowledge other types of creativity other than the human one.

[395] See Hauser 1993; Jacquette 1989a; Whitmer 1983; Bloom 1996.

1. In order to be a musical work, X should be intentionally created;
2. Computers do not possess intentionality;
3. Computers are not able to create a musical work.

The conclusion reached is that if computers cannot have their own intentionality, then arguably they cannot produce musical works. As we are not likely to call a series of notes produced by the wind blowing through a canyon a musical work, it is similarly difficult to claim that a computer software can compose a musical work.[396] The fact that this last claim seems less extreme than the first one is due to the fact that, as Searle claims, we tend to transfer our own intentionality onto machines. That is, we extend the human intentionality employed for coding the composition program to the program itself. The notion of intentionality, as mentioned above, seems then to be *subject-dependent*. *We* attribute intentionality to machines, but they do not possess it independently of our attribution. At best, software programs can be deemed creative only insofar as they are part of a more comprehensive system formed by the program and the human agent(s).

The program can indeed be considered an extension of the programmer's or user's mind. Indeed, even though they are located outside of the human's head, AI programs are integrated into the cognitive process that leads to the production of music at such a deep level to be considered part of the process itself. In arguing for this claim I follow Clark and Chalmers' extended mind theory: cognitive systems extend beyond the individual and into the environment which surrounds her. The features and constituents of this environment are part of the cognitive system itself.[397] Similarly, computers can present intentionality only insofar they are an extension of the programmer's or user's cognitive machinery.

The results obtained from the consideration of the role of technology in musical composition reflects those obtained from the earlier analysis of technology in musical performance. In both cases, the impossibility of ascribing intentionality to a machine composing or performing music results in the impossibility of recognising its products as works of music. While in the case of computer-generated composition the lack of

[396] See Wolterstorff 1980, 74.
[397] See Clark and Chalmers 1998. See also De Souza 2017; Cook 2018.

intentionality is a non-negotiable cause for denying the ascription of ‘musical work’ to sounds produced by a computer, in the case of computer-generated performance, as seen, there is still hope. Beethoven’s *Hammerklavier* Sonata performed by a synthesiser can still be recognised as Beethoven’s *Hammerklavier-as-construct* as this performance gives us information on the piece. That is why we are able to include performances by synthesisers under the work-as-construct. Even if the lack of intentionality prevents us from considering them works-as-performances, they can still be deemed part of the work-as-construct.

Conclusion

In this chapter I discussed how the development of musical technology changed the way in which music is produced and received. In particular, I considered the ontology of the musical entities that have come into being as part of this development: recordings and computer-based performances and compositions. In the light of the ontological view I presented in Chapter 3, Musical Stage Theory, I argued that recordings cannot be considered works-as-performances. Nevertheless, for the amount of information they provide us with, they can be deemed part of the work-as-construct. A similar conclusion follows from the analysis of computer-based performances. Due to the lack of intentionality in the production of performances, they cannot be deemed works-as-performances. They can however be considered as part of the work-as-construct. More challenging is the discussion over computer-based compositions. The fast development of AI technology forces us into a continuous reconsideration of the place that these entities occupy within an ontological picture.

The whole discussion developed in this chapter is necessary given the rapid change in the outlook of the production and performance of music. The chapter thus occupies a relevant position within the whole thesis mainly for two reasons: (i) it plays a necessary role in providing a complete analysis of the current musical scenery; (ii) it shows how the ontology of musical works proposed by Musical Stage Theory is apt to describe the nature of recordings and computer-based performances. The next chapter will be of further help to expand the scope of Musical Stage Theory. It will, in fact, apply the theoretical considerations provided in the previous chapters to actual

musical case studies. The latter will be associated by the use of improvisatory practices. Their analysis will show how pervasive improvisatory aspects are within the Western music tradition. I will then argue that Musical Stage Theory is more appropriate than other ontological theories to account for this essential element for the nature of musical works.

Chapter 5

Musical Stage Theory in Practice: Improvisation

Pete walks out of the concert hall shaking his head. He was looking forward to a pleasant concert, listening to one of his favourite pieces: Corelli's Violin Sonatas *op. 5. But the performance was nothing like he was expecting. He often listens to the performance of the op. 5 by the Locatelli Trio on his iPod. Tonight, the violinist Andrew Manze and harpsichordist Richard Egarr were performing instead. Pete struggled to recognise the piece. The instruments were different of course, but he already knew that from the program. The real problem was that they completely changed entire sections, adding and modifying ornaments, cadenzas, and other elements as well. Pete did not like it. While walking, he thought he would have to listen to the right version once he got home.*

Why is the Locatelli Trio's version the 'right' one for Pete, while Manze and Egarr's is not? As I will argue in later sections, there is no right or wrong version. Corelli's op. 5, like many other works, has been published in so many versions that this fact alone could be used to justify the number of different renditions that it receives. More generally, this chapter is aimed at showing how the application of Musical Stage Theory to actual case studies can help to interpret cases similar to the one outlined above.

Overview

The target of the enquiry in previous chapters has been the nature of musical works. Chapter 1 was aimed to show how neither traditional nor alternative accounts of the ontology of music provide conclusive answers to the question 'What is a work of music?'. On the other hand, as we saw in Chapter 2, musicological studies concerned with one of the principal aspects of the identity of works, authenticity, are far from

reaching a satisfactory and unanimous conclusion. With the intent of finding a way out of these conundrums, or at least to provide alternative answers, I proposed in Chapter 3 a novel account for understanding what musical works are. Musical Stage Theory claims that the musical work is the performance, a temporal stage that can be directly accessed and enjoyed.

After the digression in Chapter 4 on music and technology, this chapter sets out to show how we can apply the theoretical considerations of Musical Stage Theory to actual musical practices. Musical Stage Theory, in fact, aspires not only to have internal consistency and a logically satisfying frame, but also to be an effective tool to analyse and contextualise musical works in their relation with an audience.[398] What will emerge from these considerations is that Musical Stage Theory appears more suitable than other views for providing an account of the status of musical works, especially in musical traditions beyond Western Classical music. This chapter plans to expand the scope of Musical Stage Theory. In Chapter 3, I not only broadened the concept of 'work' but I also informed it with a different meaning. Here, I will challenge the presumed need to rely on the notion of work as it was created over a century ago by the Classical tradition. This chapter, in fact, shows how the features that have been traditionally attributed to the notion of work are not applicable, not even to the music of the period in which the concept of work as it is traditionally intended was developed.

Before getting deeper into the analysis, it is worth saying what I mean by musical tradition. Like the notion of work, that of tradition also has a broad application. Here I will not use the term only in the sense of chronological periodisation of musical culture. I take tradition in its broad sense, to mean a musical style adopted in a certain period or area. Certainly, many of the better known traditions can be individuated as limited in time and following one another. However, there are also musical traditions that coexist but which pertain to different cultures or groups. Such is the case of musical traditions which are not part of Western culture, e.g. the Indonesian Gamelan, the Indian raga, Chinese or Arabic traditions, and many others. Taking into account the variety of all these different traditions would exceed the scope of this thesis, and certainly its length. For the sake of the discussion, then, I will consider the musical

[398] When not otherwise specified, for musical work in this chapter I intend the ordinary way of understanding of the term, i.e. not the interpretation of it as a performance as in the Musical Stage Theory reading, but what in Chapter 3 I called work-as-construct.

traditions of the Western world. In particular, the case studies I will focus on belong to the Baroque period, the Early Classical tradition, and to the modern Jazz tradition.

The interesting feature of the cases my analysis is going to focus on are not their distinguishing traits but instead a thread that links them together. They are all, in fact, associated by the use of improvisatory practices. As will be shown by the analysis of the case studies, composing and performing practices include elements of improvisation, either in the act of composition itself, or left to the choice of musicians at the moment of performance. This element of improvisation has often been overlooked by scholars. Instead, it provides the key for Musical Stage Theory to interpret these cases under a different light, i.e. without neglecting improvisation as an element which is essential for understanding the nature of the work.

Improvisation has attracted much attention and consideration in the literature. Due to their diverse natures there has been much debate over the question as to whether or not improvisations can be deemed musical works.[399] In the next section of this chapter, I will address some of the conceptual concerns that arise regarding musical improvisation. In particular, I will look at why it is difficult for ontologies of music to give an account of its nature. The case studies I will consider all display an element of improvisation, either in the act of composition, such as the practice of partimento, or in the performance, such as in Mozart's Accompanied Sonatas and Bill Evans' *Conversations with Myself*.

To begin with, I give here a vague and pre-theoretic understanding of improvisation. The principal feature I recognise as a prerequisite for improvisation is spontaneity. Spontaneity has to be understood in this context as the immediate creation of sounds happening simultaneously with the act of performance. A second feature which is usually attributed to improvisation, and which I will further discuss in later sections, is its non-repeatability.[400]

[399] See Bertinetto 2013; Alperson 1984 and the others referenced in later sections.

[400] As I will discuss later, the non-repeatability of the original improvisation does not affect the identity of improvisation, but that of the performances which use it as a model. That is, unlike what happens with traditional works, if an improvisation is used as a model for further performances, the latter cannot be deemed improvisations.

1. Conceptual Problems Concerning Improvisation

Generally, as I will address in more detail later on, all the problems concerning the definition of improvisation result from a desire to include it within a traditional 'work-like' description. If this aim disappears, then the other problems disappear and, as a result, it is still possible to analyse improvisations within an ontology of musical works; more precisely, within Musical Stage Theory.

We usually associate musical improvisation with creativity and with the thrill of choosing between infinite combinations of notes on the spot. But there is much more to it than that. Musical improvisation has kept many scholars busy trying to define its nature and to include it within an ontology of music.[401] Due to its hybrid and ephemeral nature, however, the task has proved difficult to accomplish. Improvisations, in fact, do not have a fixed and prescribed set of instructions, like written works of music. Neither are they amenable to the dualistic distinction between work and performance. In improvisation, work and performance coincide in the spontaneous act of the musician. But not everyone is willing to give improvisations the status of 'works', preferring instead to highlight their transitory identity. As I will explain later, Musical Stage Theory is instead able to include improvisations within its ontology of musical works and to assign them the status of works. It thus finds itself in a position of advantage in respect to other ontological theories which struggle to account for the nature of improvisation within their framework.

In the next sections, I will discuss the concerns raised in the literature about improvisations. These considerations mainly concern their ontological profile, but they reflect also a variety of other issues, such as the relation between live and recorded improvisations, the relevance of the public, the role of improvisation in the history of music and so on. This overview will hopefully be useful also for the discussions that will come up later in the chapter and which will look deeper into the relevance of improvisatory practices in different periods of the history of music.[402]

[401] See the discussion in later sections.

[402] I will be quick in the overview on the theories about improvisation, since the main point of the chapter is not criticising other views on improvisation but instead showing how Musical Stage Theory accounts for it. For a more detailed discussion on the topic, see Alperson 1984; 1998; Valone 1985; Brown 1996, 2000; Hagberg 1998; Gould and Keaton 2000; Sterritt 2000; Young and Matheson 2000; Bresnahan 2015; Lewis, Piekut 2016; Love 2016; Magnus 2016.

Despite the persistent presence of improvisatory practices in the history of music, improvisation has been left out of ontological considerations until recently. The difficulty of including improvisation in an ontological analysis is due to the fact that the ontologies of art normally target unchanging and well-structured objects that can be readily labeled as works. In Chapter 1, I discussed the difficulties in accounting for a cogent and coherent ontology of musical works due to the particular nature music has in respect to other arts, like painting or sculpture. When it comes to including improvisation in this equation, the obstacles are even greater. Improvisations are not well-rounded objects like paintings or sculptures, and they are not even entities instantiated by a performer, as the traditional accounts of musical ontology describe musical works. Ontologies which describe musical works along the type-token dichotomy, or as classes or fusions, are thus not adequate to account for the nature of musical improvisation. In what follows, I will briefly discuss how the major ontological theories regard the identity of improvisations and the hurdles they encounter.

1.1 Ontologies of Music and Improvisation

Ontologies of music have the tendency of confining the objects of their enquiry to recognisable limits which can help them in framing their nature. This widespread tendency is one of the reasons for the obstacles that theorists find in describing the nature of improvisations. How best to depict musical improvisations will be the focus of the following sections. Here I will account for the struggles encountered by ontologies of music and, ultimately, I will suggest how all these difficulties may be avoided by dismissing ontologies which need to confine improvisations within the traditional work-like frame.

Improvisations do not necessarily follow a score or a pre-established set of instructions. Before the performer improvised, that sequence of sounds may have existed, but it would never have been played in that particular way. It will never be played in precisely this way again, at least, without giving away its status as improvisation. Improvisations can indeed be used as models for subsequent performances. However, the performances which derive from an initial improvisation

cannot be deemed improvisations themselves. The relationship between the original improvisation and the possible instantiations which take it as a model, therefore, is not, strictly speaking, a repeatability relationship, as the concept of repeatability has traditionally been interpreted. In particular, theorists that prescribe a type-token distinction struggle to include improvisations within their theory. Type-token theories are characterised by the distinction between an abstract entity, the type, which is instantiated multiple times by concrete entities, or tokens. Admitting the possibility of several occurrences of a type would conflict with the nature of improvisation as a unique act.[403] Therefore, type-token accounts should be deemed unsuitable for accounting for improvisations.

A typical strategy for the type-token theorist is, following Alperson and Kivy, to interpret an improvisation as a unique token of a type.[404] For the type-token theorist, having only one token of a type is not particularly worrying. After all, there are many compositions that were performed just once. What differs in the case of improvisations, however, is that while in the case of an unperformed score, or of a score performed only once, nothing is against the possibility for it to be repeatable, improvisations are by their very nature non-repeatable.[405]

Theories which describe musical works as classes or fusions of performances, e.g. Musical Perdurantism, could account for improvisations only by allowing these classes to have just one element.[406] Theories which assign to the score, or to the set of instructions, an essential role for the identity of musical works, like Goodman's,[407] would struggle even more, given the fact that there is no set of instructions against which the correctness of a performance can be compared. As a result, the impossibility for an improvisation to be repeatable and its ephemeral nature lead many scholars to the conclusion that improvisations cannot be deemed musical works.[408]

For these reasons, an ontology of music which is able to include improvisations within the structure of its theory seems to be needed. Before I propose a possible way to solve this riddle, there is another aspect of the ontology of improvisations that needs

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[403] See Bertinetto 2013, 87.
[404] See Alperson 1984, 26; Kivy 2004, 99–101.
[405] This claim needs a specification. Improvisation in the 18th century was understood as the realisation of a schema which could, then, be instantiated many times in different 'token' improvisations. However, I see this not as a tokening of improvisations but as a tokening of a schema.
[406] See Caplan and Matheson 2006.
[407] See Goodman 1968.
[408] Kania, Stephen Davies, and Brown all agree in respect to this (see Bresnahan 2015, 578).

consideration, also in light of the discussion in Chapter 4: the relationship between live and recorded improvisations. The improvisational process involves the extemporaneous production of a sequence of sounds that does not follow a fully written out set of instructions. An essential component of this process is that it happens live. Also, the presence of an audience can play a key role in the practice of improvisation, since how the improvisation is led can also depend on the feedback the performer receives from the audience: 'You can't divorce playing this kind of music from the fact that there is an audience, you can't play it in a vacuum. It's got to be something that communicates otherwise it doesn't mean very much.'[409] If the presence of an audience does not make a difference on an ontological level, it can certainly be deemed an added value.

Both the elements of unfolding spontaneity of improvisation and the co-presence of the audience and of performers cannot be found in recordings of improvisations. In the present day, however, the dissemination of music through recordings is more and more prevalent in comparison to attendance at live concerts. This poses a question on the ontology of improvised pieces which are later recorded. In Chapter 4, I analysed the ontology of recordings, considering the difference between the nature of live and recorded performances and whether recordings need a different ontology to live performances. For considerations of these matters I therefore refer the reader to Chapter 4. What is at stake here, instead, is the more specific question over the recording of improvisations. Due to the lack of the elements mentioned above in the recording of an improvisation, many argue that the latter is poorer than a live improvisation.[410] Following this idea, when we listen to a recorded improvisation we are not really listening to an improvisation. We can still hear it as such if it is the first time that we are listening to it. But the performer is not there, performing live and choosing on the spot how to carry on in the performance. As it was with repeatability, the fact of being recorded does not alter the nature of the original improvisation. Yet, its reproduction cannot be deemed an improvisation. Once recorded, the improvisation would then lose its status of improvisation and gain instead through the technology the repeatability that it lacked as live performance. The recording of an improvisation can also work as a 'set of instructions' for other performers to recreate or develop it.

[409] Bailey 1992, 45.
[410] See Thom 1993, 172.

In this way, the recording acts as a type which is instantiated by performances based on it. As a result, recordings of improvised performances cannot be deemed improvisations themselves.

1.2 Musical Stage Theory and Improvisation

I already mentioned the need for an ontology which could account for improvisatory practices. None of the theories described above seem suitable for this. The following sections of this chapter are devoted to a series of case studies which aim to show how practices of improvisation permeate the majority of musical traditions. The urge to include improvisation within an ontological account seems therefore compelling. Musical Stage Theory seems suitable for this purpose and my aim in what follows is to show why.

The main claim of Musical Stage Theory is that musical works are performances. Every performance is a different work and, as I have discussed in Chapter 3, works-as-performances can be grouped together according to certain criteria. The identification of musical works with performances has the result that they cannot be repeatable, if for repeatability we adopt the traditional sense of having multiple instantiations. The impossibility of being instantiated more than once was one of the concerns that prevented other theories of musical ontology from accounting for improvisations. Musical Stage Theory does not have this problem. Within its framework improvisations can be deemed musical works as much as other performances.[411] Improvisations are not lesser musical works than performances based on a given score.[412] What counts for something to be a work, or more precisely a work-as-performance, in fact, is that it is a sonic product, intentionally created and performed, and which is immediately graspable by a potential audience. In their immediateness, improvisations are musical works *par excellence.* They are created and, at the same time, performed by an intentional act of the performer and can be accessed by the public.

[411] On a similar note, Bertinetto (2013) claims that, if the improvisation is a process which unfolds though time, then there is no point in trying to individuate an act of creation and a product. The two coincide: the product of improvisation and the process of creation are one and the same thing.
[412] As I mentioned briefly above, most improvisations are based on given patterns which play the role of instructions. There instructions, however, are not as prescriptive as fully written out scores are.

Of course, what improvisations still lack is repeatability. However, it should be remembered that at a straightforward level, according to Musical Stage Theory the work is the single performance. The possibility of grouping performances together – which explains their seeming repeatability – comes into play only when we consider the second level of the work-as-construct. Yet, improvisations are created with a different intent than other works of music. While a score written down by a composer has the potential of being performed more than once, an improvisation is conceived as one-off event. Due to this, considering improvisations at a work-as-construct level would be at odds with their own nature. Like improvisations, works-as-performances are one-off events and that is why Musical Stage Theory is suitable to account for the identity of improvisations.

As mentioned, the analysis of the case studies in the next sections will highlight how, in contrast with the scarce attention given to them in the literature, improvisatory practices are widespread in the majority of musical traditions. Discussions on the ontology of music are usually based on the 'classical' paradigm codified in the late 19th century. Yet, what happened during the mythologisation of the 'Classical era' does not reflect the musical traditions of other periods. Interpreting the structure of musical works through the Classical paradigm results in a biased consideration of what musical works are. The greater flexibility and fluidity of most musical practices cannot be understood within the rigid structure of traditional theories in the ontology of music. On the other hand, the revisionary approach of Musical Stage Theory is better suited to interpreting other traditions and that is what the cases I will analyse aim to show.

In the next section I will consider the case of improvisatory practices in composition. After having considered the points of contact between the two processes, I will discuss the improvisational element present in the practice of partimento. Section 3 will be devoted to an overview of the widespread practice of improvisation in the 18th century. The case studies here will be two: Mozart's Accompanied Sonatas and the many versions of Corelli's Violin Sonatas. The final section will consider the musical tradition which is more often associated with improvisation: Jazz. I will discuss what differs between the practices of improvisation in earlier traditions and in Jazz. As case study I will take Bill Evans' *Conversations with Myself*.

2. Improvisation and Composition

When talking about improvisation, our first thoughts concern improvisation during a performance. We are used to associating the idea of improvisatory practices with the image of a performer who starts playing her instrument without any score but instead following her own idea of how she should go on and play. However, the two processes of improvisation and composition have many traits in common. After all, what a performer does when improvising is to compose a new piece on the spot. Through the discussion on the relationship between composition and performance in improvisation, and through the case study of partimenti which I will present in section 2.1, I wish to highlight how in improvisation the acts of composition and performance are deeply interrelated. This combination which occurs in improvisation will pave the way for the consideration of how improvisatory practices actually contribute to the process of composition. They not only are common in the 17th and early 18th centuries, the period in which the practice of partimento was diffused, but instead they permeate many musical traditions, up to contemporary jazz. [413] The ultimate aim of this discussion will be to challenge the view that interprets the acts of composition and improvisation as two detached and extraneous activities.

As I will discuss in more detail in the next section, before the 19th century the score was conceived by both composers and performers as a sketch on which the composer notated a basic recipe for how the piece should sound. This sketch then needed an interpretative intervention on the part of the performer. The performer's active role was a necessary requirement in order for the work to be complete. During the 18th century, however, composers began to cater to a new market of amateurs, who were not always able to give such a worthwhile personal contribution to the score. In response, composers started to provide more and more details on the score. The integration between composition and improvisation thus decreased and the room left for the performers' expression was delimited by the control exercised by composers through the score. Despite the efforts of composers, though, the notation of the score was and remained underdetermined. It is impossible, in fact, to indicate on the score every possible shade of tempo, timbre, and expression from which the performer can choose.

[413] On this, see Clarke and Doffman 2018.

In the 20th century, it is possible to individuate two main directions in the development of the use of the score. On the one hand, there is the willingness of some composers to use notation of extreme detail. This is the case, for example, in some works by Brian Ferneyhough. On the other hand, aleatory and indeterminate musical notation are deliberately imprecise and leave the performer more choices in the process of performing. Similarly, in the mid-1900s, improvisation started to be gradually reintegrated within composition: for instance in some kinds of graphic notation by John Cage or Earle Brown's compositions, where the performer is provided with unusual suggestions, such as drawings, which she must interpret.[414] Even without considering extreme cases like these, though, a certain amount of improvisation is present in every translation of a score into sounds. As I mentioned, in fact, a score needs to be interpreted by performers and this interpretation certainly has aspects of improvisation in it.[415] Every time a musician performs a piece, in fact, she will make slightly different choices in regard to many aspects of it and often these choices are made on the spot, according to the mental and physical situation of the performer herself and to the inputs that she receives from the audience. I thus argue that it is necessary to acknowledge an influence of improvisatory practices on every rendition of a musical score into sounds. This acknowledgement will be the first step towards the deconstruction of the idea of composition and improvisation as two extraneous fields.

Composition is regarded as a lengthy process in which a composer writes a piece of music by revising and polishing it.[416] Improvisation is instead regarded as a real time process in which a performer uses her spontaneous creativeness to deliver a work. The main distinction between the two processes stands then in the level of control over the final result. While the composer has the time to evaluate which are the best choices for every particular passage, and to revise them if she wants, the improviser is constrained by time to make these choices simultaneously with the act of performance. This often results in a greater complexity and sophistication of the written compositions as opposed to real time improvisations. On the other hand, the ability to organise a musical structure at the same time as its performance is a criterion of

[414] See Bailey 1992, 60.
[415] As mentioned also in other chapters, the score is a text which essentially needs to be interpreted (see Predelli 1995; Dodd 2012). In this sense, the distinction between score and performance can be paralleled to the discussion between text and act.
[416] See Larson 2005, 241.

judgement that is not applied to written compositions. The audience will then be more prone to value an improvisation that presents a modest degree of sophistication in the organisation of its structure over a composition which has a refined complexity that the composer achieved in weeks or months of hard work. This is even more so when the improvisation is not a solo but involves more performers that need to be coordinated. Instantaneous creativity, then, is valued more highly than 'composed' expression.

The criteria of evaluation used by critics and by the audience are then another difference that distinguishes composition from improvisation. Aside from the evaluation of the complexity of the structure, the expression and spontaneity of the instantaneous creativity of composition/performance is a criterion that could be applied for the consideration of the value of improvisations but not of compositions. The spontaneity that could be showed during the performance of a written composition is in fact of a different kind and it is mainly ascribed to the skill of the performer. In the case of improvisation, instead, the processes of composition and performance coincide. Thus, the spontaneity of the performance is the spontaneity of the composition as well.

More interesting than their differences, however, are the similarities between the activities of improvisation and composition. First of all, it should be said that improvisation usually elaborates on conventional patterns. One of the main difficulties that a Classical performer finds when improvising, is the fact that musicians trained in improvisation learn the conventional patterns that they need to use when improvising. At the basis of most improvisations, then, there is a principle of composition. As I have pointed out in the case of interpretation in performance, the relation between improvisation and composition is a matter of degree. At one end of the spectrum we could place a totally free improvisation which does not exploit any kind of pattern on which to elaborate. At the other end, we have the composer sitting at her desk and thinking at the structure of her composition.[417] If the barrier between improvisation

[417] When we talk about improvisation we have in mind the image of a performer who goes on playing without following any given structure. However, this is only one kind of improvisation, free improvisation, which stands at one extreme of the spectrum. In the case studies analysed in this chapter, we will hardly ever find a maximal degree of improvisation deployed. Moreover, it can also be disputed that a completely free improvisation is possible. Every improvisatory practice, in fact, however seemingly free, is always constrained by a series of culturally encoded patterns which allow the performance to 'sound good'. Only if we had a random sequence of notes could we say that it is a 'pure' improvisation. But then the issue would be to account for the ontology of this random choice.

and composition falls, even the roles of composer and performer become much more intimate and interchangeable. The composer is also a performer when improvising, while the performer is free to be involved in the process of composition by participating in aspects of the creative process. As I mentioned above, this exchange between the activities of composition and improvisation was a usual practice before the era of 'Classical Music'. During the 18th century, for example, 'Professional musicians were trained through a system of thoroughbass […] which fused keyboard playing with counterpoint and improvisation and, in consequence, merged the process of composition with the act of musical performance.'[418]

Another example of the similarities between improvisation and composition is the telling legend behind the composition of *The Musical Offering* by Bach. History tells that in 1747 Frederick the Great gave to J.S. Bach during his visit to the King's residence in Potsdam a theme on which to improvise. Bach improvised on it a three-voice fugue and later sent to the King a set of pieces, entitled *The Musical Offering*, which included a six-voice fugue. Even though the final result as we have it is an elaboration on the original improvisation, if the history is faithful, Bach composed a fugue by improvising it.[419] Certainly not everyone would be able to equal Bach's ability, even in a culture where improvising fugues was common practice, but this shows the level of contact that can occur between composing and improvising.

The analysis of the differences and similarities between composing and improvising showed how intimate this link is. The case study which I will present now, the practice of partimento, will help to get a first-hand grasp on how this collaboration works.

2.1 Case Study: The Practice of Partimento

The first partimenti were already present in the 17th century as a shorthand form of notation, usually indicating only the figured or unfigured bass line. It was then adopted by the Neapolitan Conservatoires as a didactic tool through which 'students could gain proficiency in a variety of fields: continuo playing, improvisation, unfigured bass,

[418] Baragwanath 2012, 32.
[419] This example may be the most famous, but the practice of improvising fugues was common among organists of the time.

counterpoint, diminution, and fugue.'[420] For the sake of our discussion, partimenti are interesting, since they encourage the influence of improvisation on composition. Sanguinetti, the author of *The Art of Partimento,* a handbook on historical and practical aspects of partimenti, gives the following definition: 'a partimento is a sketch, written on a single staff, whose main purpose is to be a guide for improvisation of a composition at the keyboard.'[421]

This practice of notation was a quick tool to write down the essential guidelines for a piece. In the same way as with the thoroughbass, performers were then able to elaborate these lines with ornaments, diminutions, and imitations (some of the techniques I will consider in the next section when talking about improvisatory practices in the 18th century). They are also precious sources for the musical theory which developed in Italy during those centuries. Unlike in other countries, in fact, Italian theorists wrote very few treatises and essays and the material we have is constituted mainly of compilations of examples or, indeed, of partimenti.[422]

In their most rudimentary form, partimenti can then be understood as a link between composition and improvisation. They should be interpreted as musical *canovacci*, or sketches, that need the active role of performers to become works of music.[423] In their single line form they can in fact be considered as tools which are useful either as a mnemonic aid for performers or as didactic exercises.[424] It is only when their potential is unfolded by the ability of the single performer that they become works of music. The compositional aspect that stands behind the creation of the partimento line gives way to improvisatory practices when it is developed in a full work by performers:

> Almost every aspect of the final music can be contained, or hinted at, in a partimento: tonal direction, modulations, harmony, diminutions, imitations, texture, style, and more. There is however, no single correct solution; every partimento allows an unlimited number of possible realisations, according to the skills, taste, and degree of sophistication of the performer-composer.[425]

The masters that used and developed the technique of partimento and the rules that stand behind its application are not a matter for this thesis. Bringing up partimenti as

[420] Sanguinetti 2012, 6. Bach's famous 48 Preludes in the *Well Tempered Clavier* are indeed partimenti, see Byros 2015.
[421] Sanguinetti 2012, 14.
[422] See Ibid., 10.
[423] See Ibid., 167.
[424] See Ibid., 13–16.
[425] Ibid., 168.

an example of the interrelationship between composition and improvisation has a relevance for the argument of this chapter, though.

The practice of partimento shows how the ordinary idea of works of music as static and immutable entities does not in fact apply to the majority of musical traditions. The paradigm of the musical work as a complete work of art, created by the genius of a composer, is at best the result of Romantic thinking, and pertains mainly to those that remain the best known to audiences nowadays. However, as the example of partimenti shows, this paradigm cannot be extended to the entire history of music. Instead, the work of music was interpreted more as a flexible entity. Every rendition of the same set of instructions given by a composer would result in a totally different piece. The distinction is more blurred than what traditional ontologies wish to present. There are no clear-cut boundaries between text and act here, rather the two stand in a continuum. That is where Musical Stage Theory can help. The idea of the score as a mere sketch on which the performer could improvise her own distinct version fits well with the identification of the performance as musical work given by Musical Stage Theory. In the case of partimenti, as has been mentioned, there are multiple possibilities of realisation, each one different in various respects from the others but all connected by their origin. Equally, for Musical Stage Theory every performance is recognised as a musical work and performances are then grouped together also thanks to the relation they all have to a single act of composition.

The next section will look into how the practice of improvisation in composition developed throughout the 18th century. In particular, I will discuss the principal techniques used by performers to improvise on the suggestions given by composers in scores and how this affected the changing outlook of musical editions. The case studies I will consider are Mozart's early Accompanied Sonatas (1763) and the many versions of Corelli's Violin Sonatas (1700).

3. Improvisation Practice in the 18th Century

The examples discussed in the last section hinted at how the activities of composition and improvisation are tightly connected. This section will focus on the widespread application of improvisatory practices, especially within the Baroque and early

Classical periods. In the 18th century, improvisation was seen as a normal practice in performance. In what follows, I will give a quick overview of the principal techniques that were used by performers to elaborate on the instructions provided by composers. This continuous development of the 'work of music' through different renditions of it clashes with the emergent industry of musical publishing, which was directed at an emerging market of wealthy amateurs. The 18th century is in fact characterised by an increasing desire to commodify the instructions that earlier, through the interpretation of performers, resulted in a different rendition each time. Corelli's Violin Sonatas are a classic case of how the history of a piece might change through its published editions.

Despite the constraint of editions, improvisation without scores was common until the 1900s and beyond.[426] In particular, aspects of improvisation are present in the genre of the accompanied Sonata, a genre in which the young Mozart was a master. Using it as an example, what I aim to show is how, contrary to what is usually believed, even within the European professional tradition a large degree of flexibility was granted to performers and wished for by composers.

This section thus expands the deconstructive aim which was started in the previous section. There, I challenged the idea that composition and improvisation are two opposed activities. Here, I will show how improvisatory practices shaped those pieces which we now group under the label of 'musical works', as understood in the Classical tradition.

3.1 Ornamentation

In the 17th and 18th centuries the practices of thoroughbass and of partimenti necessitated ornamentation of the written score: 'Hardly a single form of vocal or instrumental music of that time is conceivable without some degree of ornamentation, sometimes written down but much more usually added in performance: the *passaggi* of the Italians, the *agréments* of the French, the *graces* of the English and the *glosas* of the Spaniards.'[427]

[426] Horowitz, Rachmaninov, Godowsky, all used to improvise.
[427] Bailey 1992, 19.

The written part of the music was conceived only as an aid for the performer, a recipe to be loosely followed, while the interesting aspects of the performance consisted in the personalisation through ornamentation and other techniques. The theory behind these elaborations constitutes a large subject in its own right and it is not within the scope of this section to give an account of it. The number of studies on this fundamental aspect of music witnesses its importance at the time. [428] Ornamentation usually acts at the level of the melodic line, leaving intact the harmonic structure. Depending on the type of ornamentation, and on the genre to which it is applied, it can superimpose additions onto a melody or develop it more radically: 'The former, called *agréments*, *wesentliche Manieren* or *abbellimenti*, consist of trills, turns, slides, appoggiaturas and similar items which leave the contours of a melody intact. The latter, called doubles, *willkuerliche Veraenderungen* or *passaggi*, are more like some practices in Jazz, where almost anything that works with the set chord progressions can be substituted.'[429] It was up to the performer to know which kind of ornamentation was best suited for a particular style or genre and for this reason every performer at the time was trained in extemporising techniques.[430]

The lack of training makes it difficult for modern performers to recreate the use of ornamentation as it was performed in the past. The study of treatises on this topic can help to understand how this practice was carried out, but it is unlikely that they can teach the flexibility and freshness of improvisation. This feeling of extemporaneity was supremely valued at the time, thus the performer's role was an essential part in the final result delivered to the audience:

> As with free ornaments, it hardly matters how much is actually improvised, and how much is memorized or written out by the performer or the editor. It only matters that it should have the fresh and flexible feeling of an improvisation. Some movements lend themselves readily to an improvised improvisation; others present opportunities of which the fullest advantage can only be taken by working out a part on paper. Such a worked-out part, however, can itself often be improvised in performance, and may not reach its best until it has been played many times.[431]

Gradually, composers started to note down on the score the ornaments and embellishments that they deemed suitable for each passage. This was done in order to

[428] For more information about ornamentation, see Donington 1963; Neumann 1993; Brown 1976.
[429] Zaslaw 1996, 95.
[430] See Donington 1963, 94.
[431] Ibid., 224.

allow amateur musicians who were not trained in ornamentation techniques to perform the piece in an appropriate style. This resulted in a continuous updating of the published versions of a piece, as ornaments were added or changed at the behest of publishers. During the 18th century, publishing was a growing industry and engraved scores replaced manuscripts. What differentiates the two, however, is the audience to which they were addressed. Publications were aimed at a particular market, wealthy enough to afford them. Manuscripts were used by professionals and apprentices.

Corelli's *Sonate a violino e violone o cimbalo*, op. 5 (1700) went through a long history of re-publication in many European cities. The variation shown by the different editions of this work will be discussed in the next section as an example of the evolution that pieces were subject to as a result of the use of a different set of ornamentations. This case study will help me to stress the relevance of improvisation for the history of a piece.

3.2 Case Study: Corelli's Violin Sonatas

The wealth of editions of Corelli's op. 5 offers an example of the evolution that a piece of music could undergo through the renditions marketed by publishers. These versions usually claimed to represent the 'true' way that Corelli performed, a way to experience the maestro in your own home. They were seldom intended as records of individual performers. Corelli's op. 5 was published more than 50 times all over Europe. The motivations behind this treatment, unusual for the 18th century, are various. The one that interests us the most in the context of this chapter, however, is that the op. 5 contained pieces that required a customised and tasteful manner of realisation. That is why a performance that followed the score exactly was inconceivable, even by the worst amateur.

Thanks to the wealth of published editions of Corelli's op. 5 that we possess, we are able to compare the ornamentations that have been notated on the score. Looking at one of the examples provided by Zaslaw in his article, it is possible to notice the variety of different approaches in the ornamentation of the same section.[432] Some of the ornamentations are just embellishments of the melodic line, others almost conceal

[432] For the analysis of the editions of Corelli's op. 5 I will use Neal Zaslaw's study (Zaslaw 1996).

the melody behind an intricate elaboration of fast notes. The reason for these differences in ornamentation is due to the fact that some of them represent the exercise of students and amateurs, others the work of professional musicians trained in improvisation. What can be noticed, though, is that 'generally speaking, as the 18th century progressed, the notated ornaments for op. 5 grew denser.'[433] This may be due, as Zaslaw suggests, to the fact that the sonatas were played slower as the 18th century passed by. But, another possible interpretation of the change in the density of ornamentation could be the increasing abilities of amateurs. While at the beginning of the 18th century their training did not allow them to play like professionals, with the widespread musical education of later decades the distinction between amateur and professional performance began to blur.

The range of ornamentation applied to Corelli's op. 5 documents how this work was likely to be played and taught at that time. As for the evidence that we possess about how Corelli himself used to play and teach it, instead, we have to rely on a set of ornaments that are attributed to him and on commentaries on his playing. Zaslaw and other scholars are sceptical towards the trustworthiness of the first ones, since their graceful idiomatic nature contradicts the descriptions of Corelli performing. Corelli's performances were in fact described by his contemporaries as inflamed by 'Dionysian wildness.'[434] However, we should not rely too much even on these sources. As I mentioned in the previous section, the style and structure of ornamentation may differ according to the venue, context, or audience of the performance. A performer was expected to have a personal 'voice', to perform all music as a direct personal communication. Thus, the descriptions of Corelli's passion in improvising may not contradict the sober ornamentations noted on the published edition. This edition was indeed meant to reach a wide variety of musicians and should therefore be as comprehensive as possible.[435]

Knowing how Corelli performed his own works may be of historical interest or, for the Early Music Movement, it can also be a valuable information in the search for authenticity. However, the number of editions of op. 5 testifies to the many instantiations of what would later be fixed as a single entity: the work. Within a culture so deeply influenced by the Classical idea of the immutable work as ours, it is difficult

[433] Zaslaw 1996, 100.
[434] Ibid., 111.
[435] See Ibid., 109.

to understand the value of improvised ornamentation, which was an essential feature of music at the time. And it had its own advantages:

> One advantage is that no two performances would ever be the same, lending an air of adventure sometimes lacking in modern concerts. Another is flexibility in adjusting the music to varying circumstances: in larger, more resonant venues or on solemn occasions fewer and slower ornaments would work well; in smaller venues, in front of connoisseurs or on festive occasions more profuse and more rapid ornaments would serve better.[436]

The flexibility of music through the succession of performances concerned also the works by masters like Corelli that are now considered untouchable. Each performance stood by itself, enriching and completing the work started by the composer. Once more, Musical Stage Theory can be useful to incorporate and interpret this phenomenon within a coherent ontological frame. The autonomy that performances had, thanks to the wealth of ornamentations and elaborations deployed by performers, is consistent with the idea that the performance itself embodies the work. This reinforces the main claim of Musical Stage Theory: the work is the performance.

3.3 Improvisation in Accompanied Sonatas

Improvisation was a widespread practice also in the genre of accompanied music. Because the published sonata was meant for amateurs, its piano part was fully written out. This distinguishes it from professional music, which was normally left as a partimento. The ability of accompanists was judged through the gracefulness and sophistication of the elaboration of the bass or of the editor's parts. Again, improvisation was an essential skill to be developed in this environment: 'No realisation, after all, is sacrosanct: whoever made it, and however well, it is only one working version out of the unlimited possibilities. That is the best of figured bass.'[437]

The development of the musical publishing sector was largely addressed to an audience of amateurs who were not trained in improvisatory practices. The same piece could then be presented in different forms, depending on the ability of the performer and on the edition that was used: 'The accompanied sonata was in this sense not so

[436] Ibid., 96.
[437] Donington 1963, 224.

much a fixed and self-contained 'work' as a mode of performance based on a core keyboard part and adapted to suit the occasion.'[438] From now on, I will focus on accompanied keyboard music, since the case study I will use as an example of improvisatory practices is Mozart's Accompanied Sonatas.

3.4 Case Study: Mozart's Accompanied Sonatas

Corelli's op. 5 documents the way in which the common practice of improvisation shaped the evolution of a piece, by way of the many and varied editions published of it. Mozart's Accompanied Sonatas show how flexible performance practices, geared towards the particular social function of a genre, can undermine the modern notion of a fixed work, preserved in a score.

The genre of accompanied keyboard music was particularly acclaimed in the 1760s for its ability to adapt to different performance situations and to accommodate the varied capabilities of performers. The keyboard part consisted of a fully written-out score, which was thus suitable for amateurs to present themselves as able to play like expert improvisers.[439] It emulated the sonata with thoroughbass accompaniment, commonly heard at courts, in which the bass line was left unfigured for the professional musicians who were able to extemporise on it. The keyboard part could then be accompanied by one or more instruments, depending on the availability of musicians among the participants. The genre of the accompanied keyboard sonata was mostly liked by the European middle class for its social role and its flexibility. Just as the range of ornamentations we have seen for Corelli's op. 5, also accompanied sonatas could get different treatments according to the level of mastery of those who performed them.

The young Mozart, or better his father, exploited the fame of this genre in his tour throughout Europe in 1763-1764. He performed and published a set of 16 accompanied sonatas, dedicated to prominent members of European courts. Some of the latter were amateur musicians who could enjoy themselves and their court by playing these sonatas with different sets of accompanying instruments. These sonatas

[438] Baragwanath 2012, 27.
[439] See Ibid., 26.

have been interpreted as the first works by Mozart and, as such, as immutable musical works composed by the Maestro. But the reality that stands behind the composition of these sonatas is quite different.[440] At the time in which Mozart and his family traveled Europe bringing these sonatas from one court to another, the success they had was founded more on the performance of the sonatas than on their publication. What constituted their success was the skill in improvisation that Mozart showed during his performances, not the fact that a seven/eight-years-old boy published a set of sonatas. It was again the Classical framework which led to the interpretation of these sonatas as fixed works and not as an advertisement of the skills of a young boy and an homage to European courts by his sharp father. The young Mozart was only a particularly talented example of what musicians used to do in that epoch. Scores were intended as a suggestion on which performers could elaborate and show their skills, not as untouchable documents of the genius of a composer.

Through the examples provided in the previous sections, I wished to show how the common and widespread idea of the work of music as an immutable entity contradicts actual historical practices. The choice of improvisation as a thread between the analyses of different traditions is a tool to show the approach that musicians had – and many still have – towards music. The score is not a finished product but instead it needs the intervention of the performer to be completed. Each performer can intervene in a different way and thus every performance stands (or at least should stand) by itself, with its own features and distinctive characteristics. As suggested, Musical Stage Theory can account for that, identifying each performance as a musical work in its own right. The constraints of the Classical tradition prevent us from considering other musical traditions in the light of their actual practices. Musical Stage Theory, instead, allows us to acknowledge the relevance of improvisatory practices for both the acts of composition and performance in various traditions with no detriment for the consistency of the ontology adopted. The variability of one performance from other performances with the same set of instructions as a model does not prevent to conceive them as works on their own, though connected one with another.

In the next section I will skip a couple of centuries by exploring the tradition which the practice of improvisation is most commonly associated to: the Jazz tradition. As

[440] See Ibid., 29.

in the previous sections, I will use a case study to show the practical application of improvisatory practices: Bill Evans' *Conversations with Myself*.

4. Improvisation in Jazz

Improvisation was an essential feature in many different traditions until the ideology of 'Classical Music' banished it to the sidelines. Then, improvisation experienced a period of neglect and decline in European culture, even if improvisatory practices continued to be present in the act of interpreting the score by the performer. It was only in the 20th century that improvisation saw a resurgence and it was mainly due to the role it played in Jazz.

Improvisation is certainly fundamental to Jazz music. As in earlier traditions, in Jazz the processes of improvising and composing merge into one. The improviser is at the same time the composer of the piece that she is playing and the improvisation can involve different aspects, from melody to harmony, from rhythm to expression. What is the difference between improvisation in Jazz and improvisation in earlier periods, if any? Many of the features of the improvisatory process are shared by these traditions. The thrill and freshness derived from the extemporaneous creation of music, the interconnection between the processes of improvisation and composition, the elaboration on a given pattern are all characteristics that can be valid for Jazz and earlier improvisation techniques. What changes is the range of improvisation techniques and the social role of music.[441]

Just as in Baroque performance practice, Jazz too plays around a fixed pulse.[442] Rhythmic play is then central to both performance practices and this of course reflects also on improvisation where the improvised flourishes of the melody respect a fundamental pattern with a grounding pulse. Indeed, the variety of components involved in a Jazz improvisation and the feeling of freedom that the performer delivers has led to the common misconception that Jazz improvisation is created ex nihilo. This is due partially also to the fact that usually Jazz players do not follow a score. However, this does not mean that they are not following a given pattern. Jazz players are trained

[441] On jazz improvisation see Baker 1988; Reeves 1989; Berliner 1994; Monson 1996; Hagberg 1998, 2008; Brown 2000a; Magnus 2016.
[442] See Hudson 1994.

in knowing how to improvise on a series of harmonic successions, often informed by a known melody.[443] In group improvisation this ground is given by instruments such as bass, piano, and drums on which the soloist can improvise in a more flexible way. Jazz improvisation is then regulated by rules just as improvisation in earlier styles.

These rules started faltering when conventional Jazz evolved into avant-garde offshoots, like free Jazz. A way to distinguish conventional Jazz from these other kinds of Jazz 'is to describe the improvisation in conventional Jazz as being based on tunes in time. The simple mechanics are that the improvisation is derived from the melody, scales and arpeggios associated with a harmonic sequence of a set length played in regular time.'[444] By giving up time and tunes as tracks, the later offshoots of conventional Jazz resulted in it being more difficult to appreciate for the public.

Solo improvisations in conventional Jazz require the same degree of discipline as solo Baroque improvisations. Of course, the musical and social context has changed. In Early Music, improvisation was an integral part of performance, thus it was not interpreted as an alternative to traditional ways of doing music. Jazz improvisation, instead, came about at a time when Classical music was seen as an elevated expression of a culture enjoyed by an elite. As centuries before, improvisation is still intended to surprise the audience and to maintain its interest. It is at the same time an expression of the skills of the performer. Unlike improvisation in the Baroque period, though, the origin of the Jazz tradition is also partly explained as an alternative to traditional Classical music. In addition, Jazz music has its roots in black music and culture and it was often seen as a vessel of the rights of black people against racism.[445] This aspect of protest which is intrinsic in the Jazz tradition has influenced also the context within which it moves and is interpreted.

My aim is then to show how the ontology proposed by Musical Stage Theory is well suited to include Jazz within an ontological framework, acknowledging at the same time its variability. In the following sections I will limit myself to an example of the interconnection between composition and improvisation within the Jazz tradition: Bill Evans' album *Conversations with Myself*. The analysis of improvisation in Jazz will provide additional material to the discussion about the relevance of improvisation

[443] Usually through the aid of fake books which contain only the basic chords. As with the case of partimenti, fake books are intended for professionals to guide their improvisation.
[444] Bailey 1992, 48.
[445] See Alperson 2010, 279.

in composition and performance. This leap from the 18th to the 20th century will allow me to strengthen the claim that improvisatory practices should not be neglected by theories on the ontology of musical works. That is why, once again, at the end of the section I will suggest Musical Stage Theory as a viable solutions to return to improvisation the relevance it deserves.

4.1 Case Study: Bill Evans' 'Conversations with Myself'

In Bill Evans' *Conversations with Myself* the processes of composition and improvisation converge. Evans recorded this album in studio, recording a piano track first and then other tracks on it. Evans walked into the studio without any score to read from, thus this piece is usually interpreted as entirely improvised. However, as Steve Larson suggests, many features of the piece problematise the clear-cut distinction between composition and improvisation.[446]

The two sections that Larson considers are the improvisations on Thelonius Monk's *Round Midnight* and on the song *Stella by Starlight.* Various elements of sophistication in the improvisation made by Evans may be regarded as composed. For instance the structured transposition of segments of the original piece and the consistent use of imitative techniques and repetitions.[447] Surely, there must have been some elements that Evans had planned before entering the studio. This can be seen, for example, in the harmonisation at the level of the bass line. This line of accompaniment, called 'comping' in Jazz, has the same role as the thoroughbass in Baroque compositions.[448] The performer can improvise her solo above this bass line. The tracks that Evans recorded on the accompanied one show a degree of elaboration that is usually ascribed to composed music.[449] The level of attention that Evans puts into the improvised solo parts, as well as in the dialogue between the superimposed tracks, show how much thought and discipline can be put in improvisation: 'Thus, I feel confident in describing Evans's apparently "instantaneous" improvisations as the

[446] For a detailed analysis of the piece, I refer the reader to Larson's study (Larson 2005).
[447] See Larson 2005, 244–267.
[448] See Ibid., 247.
[449] See Ibid.

result of years of preparation. […] The real work of producing such improvisations happens not on stage or in the recording studio, but in the practice room.'[450]

The example of the process in creation of Evans' *Conversations with Myself* argues against the traditional understanding of improvisation and composition as two distinct processes. The definitions of improvisation and composition that I have given at the beginning of the chapter can then be revised as Larson suggests:

> I now understand improvisation as the real-time yet preheard – and even practiced – choice among possible paths that elaborate a preexisting structure, using familiar patterns and their familiar combinations and embellishments. And I now understand composition as putting together musical elements and storing them – whether in memory, notation, or sound-recording media – in a way that allows, but does not require, revision.[451]

Improvisation, composition, performance: these three practices which are nowadays assumed to be unrelated and even incompatible merge in the examples discussed in this chapter. The problem which this collaboration represents for theories which deem musical works repeatable entities does not threaten Musical Stage Theory. According to this view, the work *is* the performance. Improvisations, as the discussion in previous sections has shown, are performances tout-court. Musical Stage Theory thus can explain their nature by describing them as works-as-performances. Also the co-presence of performance and composition in improvisation is not an obstacle for Musical Stage Theory. Works-as-performances, in fact, are not defined in respect to a prior act of composition or a set of instructions but only in respect to the accessibility of the performance and the intentionality of the performer. Improvisation need no more be an outcast from the ontology of music but finds a legitimate place alongside other, more 'traditional', works as works-as-performances.

Conclusion

This chapter has been devoted to an examination of various aspects and implications of the practice of improvisation, using case studies from the 17th and 18th century and

[450] Ibid., 258.
[451] Ibid., 272.

the Jazz tradition. The overall aim has been to show that the practice of improvisation is widespread in most traditions, across many times and places. When talking of improvisation we often refer to a marginal aspect of improvisatory practices. The common view of improvisation relates to the image of a performer who starts playing without following any pre-determined set of instructions, in the free flow of her imaginative creativity. Although this is a way in which improvisatory practices may be delivered, so-called free improvisation, in almost every musical tradition there are more or less explicit improvisatory practices. In section 2, I discussed the close link between improvisation and composition and, in particular, the practice of partimenti, a widespread form of shorthand notation during the 17th and early 18th centuries which provided a basis for performers to elaborate a full-fledged piece. The custom of elaborating the bass line through ornamentations and other figurations was common since the beginning of the notation system in music. It was only at the end of the 18th century, in fact, that composers started to notate their scores in much more detail, thus limiting the freedom of expression of performers.

Before the 1900s, scores were never performed exactly as they had been published, unless by rank amateurs. The case study of Mozart's Accompanied Sonatas has been presented as an example of the flexibility of this genre where the instrumental composition and the level of personalisation of the score could be decided on the spot, depending on the availability of performers and on their skills. From this example we start to see how the history of music has accepted erroneous ideas of compositional and performing practices of the time, which neglect the flexibility that they actually presented. Mozart's Accompanied Sonatas have been interpreted as the first published masterpiece of the young Mozart, but are better understood as snapshots of a season of concerts around Europe. The same goes for Corelli's op. 5 which, far from being an immutable and fixed work, continuously changed through numerous editions, each one presenting new and more elaborate versions of the score.

These examples (and there are many others which I could not include in this investigation), build up the conviction that the idea of still and immutable works is in contradiction with the flexibility and repeated mutations that they actually go through. Improvisation plays an important role in this process of evolution, making each performance an active actor in the identity of the work.

The revisionary nature of the claim given by Musical Stage Theory that musical works should be identified as performances arises in contradistinction to the idea of

'work' transmitted by the 'Classical' tradition that we most commonly have in mind when thinking about music.[452] If we acknowledge the relevance of improvisatory practices and of other practices of elaboration of the score, the identification of what we call 'work' with the single rendition given by the performers would not sound as counterintuitive as it may seem. In conclusion, I believe that the difficulty in interpreting the majority of musical traditions through traditional theories of the ontology of music can be solved by taking into account the actual practices of the period and by modifying the consideration of the nature of musical works accordingly. With its focus on the delivery of the piece instead of the process of its composition, Musical Stage Theory is able to account for the flexibility applied to music throughout its history.

This flexibility has an obvious impact also on the examination of the concept of authenticity. In this chapter and in Chapter 3, I deconstructed the notion of musical work as it has been conceived as a consequence of the ideology of Classical Music. In the next chapter, I will put the concept of authenticity through a similar process, deconstructing its traditional understanding and rebuilding a new one in the light of Musical Stage Theory.

[452] I am referring here to 'intellectual' music, not to popular traditions.

Chapter 6

Authenticity Remastered

At the beginning of Chapter 2 we left Clare, Pete, and Annie debating outside of Great St. Mary, Cambridge, why they did not find the performance of Handel's *Messiah* authentic as it was advertised.

'Authenticity of emotions is not what authenticity is about' offers Clare in response to Annie's comment about the lack of authenticity in the Messiah.
'Authenticity is the respect for the composer's instructions, and they didn't respect them since they changed all the tempi.'
'But how could you possibly know what Handel wanted exactly?' counters Pete. 'Authenticity is respect for the instruments and for the performing practices in vogue at the time when the piece was composed.'

Borrowing Kivy's terminology, Personal-Authenticity, Authenticity-as-Sound, and Authenticity-as-Performance are all in evidence here. But if Clare, Annie, and Pete do not agree on what authenticity is, how can they all love authentic performances? What do they mean by that? By informing the concept of authenticity with conflicting meanings, there is a risk that it becomes an empty word which anyone can fill with their preferred meaning, thus negating its regulative value. What if authenticity, in the form that each protagonist in the debate desperately wants to give it, does not exist? What if the regulative role is played by something else?

Overview

The strategy I adopted in previous chapters, specifically in Chapters 3 and 5, was to consider a well-established concept, i.e. 'musical work', deconstruct it, and suggest an alternative interpretation. The aim of Chapter 5 was to apply this new understanding of the term 'musical work' to different musical practices and to show how it is more

suitable for interpreting them than the concept which was previously available in traditional ontological theories.

I am going to apply a similar strategy in this chapter. I will consider another concept which has occupied the centre of many debates in philosophy and musicology: that of authenticity. In Chapter 2 I discussed how authenticity has been interpreted in the literature. What emerged was a lack of consensus around what authenticity is and how should we individuate its central features. Most of the difficulties met by theorists when dealing with the concept of musical work and with its implications are due to a desire to confine its description within a rigid framework. Once freed from these limitations, the explanatory role of the concept manages to cover many aspects which once were inaccessible, e.g. the relevance of improvisatory practices. The same applies to authenticity. In the literature there has been an attempt to find a single way to characterise authenticity in music and to determine its regulative role. What I suggest in this chapter is that we should abandon this quest, which so far has not produced any widely accepted results. Instead, we should acknowledge that there is no *single* interpretation of authenticity. I suggest how a reconsideration of the terms involved and an acknowledgement of the relevance of contextual factors result in the legitimisation of a multiplicity of authenticities.

In the first part of the chapter, I describe the regulative role played by authenticity in our common talk about music. This role is informed by a variety of criteria that we recognise as determinative of the notion of authenticity and that influence the reception of authenticity by an audience. The abundance of criteria behind judgements of authenticity results in multiple ways in which to interpret the concept. This is reflected also in past and current debates in both philosophical and musicological circles. As seen in Chapter 2, these debates are characterised by a lack of consensus over which criterion for assessing authenticity is more relevant than the others.

In section 2 I propose an alternative account of authenticity, grounding my considerations on the claims of Musical Stage Theory. The main claim of Musical Stage Theory, i.e. that works are performances, seems to imply that the kind of authenticity that performances can display is, straightforwardly, Personal-Authenticity. What identifies a performance, and thus a work, in fact, is its accessibility as a sound object, not its relation to the composing history or to past performing practices. In what follows I will go into more depth about what I mean by

Personal-Authenticity and what this concept implies for the approach performers take towards a piece of music.

However, it should be recognised that in our engagement with music we still ascribe a regulative role to the concept of authenticity, which does not seem to be covered by the notion of Personal-Authenticity. I will then propose a contextualist interpretation of authenticity. In doing so, I follow the path opened by Kivy, but I will justify an otherwise arbitrary contextualist claim through the ontology presented by Musical Stage Theory. Indeed, I will show how the three features of causality-relation, intentionality-relation, and similarity-relation which inform the R-relation also subsume the normative features which are traditionally ascribed to authenticity. More precisely, the causal connection is, in equal measure, related to what was referred to in Chapter 2 as Authenticity-as-Intentions, Authenticity-as-Sound, and Authenticity-as-Practice. The intentionality relation is related to Personal-Authenticity, and the similarity relation to Authenticity-as-Sound. The role that is granted to authenticity is the same role that the R-relation plays. It allows us to group performances together and to recognise a performance as worthy of being part of that group, or, in other words, to deem it 'authentic'. This regulative role, the role which is commonly entrusted to authenticity, is then played by the R-relation.

The final aim of the chapter is not only to give new momentum to the debate regarding authenticity but also to defend the right of performers to be free from the constraints imposed by this supposed authenticity. As long as the basic requirements determined by the R-relation are respected, then performers can claim to have delivered an authentic performance.

1. Authenticity: Its Nature and the Debates

When listening to a musical performance we judge its value on the basis of a variety of different features: the skill of the performers, how it stands in relation to other performances, how much it moves us, and, indeed, how authentic it is. In this section, I will address in which respects we may judge the authenticity of a performance. What is unquestionable, though, is that the concept of authenticity plays a regulative role in respect to our engagement with performances. The normativity inherent to the concept

is what allows us to judge whether a performance is within or outside the category of 'authentic' performance.

Being included in the set of authentic performances requires the performance to respect certain requirements that we recognise as features necessary to its status as authentic.[453] In this respect, conventions play a determinative role for orientating our judgement.[454] When the programme of a concert or a CD cover promote the performance as 'authentic', they certainly set expectations on the part of the public. When taking her seat inside Great St. Mary's Church to listen to Handel's *Messiah*, Clare will already have in mind a more or less well formed idea of what the criteria for an authentic rendition of the *Messiah* would be. The set of normative features inherent to the concept of authenticity predisposes the listener to having certain expectations before listening to a performance. And these expectations are hard to ignore, alter, or override.

As already mentioned in the discussion of Chapter 2, these criteria gradually formed through the decades. They began to exercise their strength in respect to the judgement of authenticity when the concept of authenticity itself gained relevance in the late 19th century as a result of an increased degree of reflection on and awareness of the backgrounds to historical works of music. The interest in a faithful recreation of Early Music promoted by the Early Music Movement has then been developed until now, together with a more specific interest in the performing practices needed to deliver an 'authentic' performance. As seen from Chapter 2, this later evolution of the

[453] In this respect, authenticity plays a similar role to the one played by musical styles. For example, for us to be able to recognise a performance as a performance of a Baroque composition we need to find specific features in it, e.g. the use of counterpoint, a particular use of ornamentation, specific harmonic variations, dramatic contrasts, etc. Similarly, a normative role is played also by narrative genres in the literature. Readers are able to group narrative works together under a specific genre on the basis of special features in a way comparable to the process that listeners go through when classifying music styles. See Liao 2016 for a more detailed analysis of the normative role of genre.

[454] As pointed out by Liao (2016), a similar mechanism informs the aesthetic appreciation of a piece. The acceptance of a piece by the audience may be dictated by its concordance with musical conventions and by the audience expectations. Take the case of Stravinsky's revolutionary *The Rite of Spring* (1913) which 'caused a riot in the theatre on its premiere' (Liao 2016, 473), since the audience was not used to such sonorities and harmonies. This myth has been later debunked by Taruskin (2012). He points out that it was the dancing that provoked fury, not the music. Aside from its accuracy, the example makes a valid point, though. Not only in music but also in other arts what does not respect the established conventions is initially not well received by the audience, since it does not align with their expectations. This may also be a tentative analysis of why the public seems so detached from contemporary Classical music. The reason may be lying in the fact that this kind of music is not convention-concordant with the musical rules and styles which we are accustomed with. As a consequence, the performances of Contemporary music result expectation-discordant and, therefore, they are not appreciated by many.

movement is known as Historically Informed Practice (HIP).[455] The search for the perfect realisation of the score and for the composer's intentions is the driving force behind the HIP. This idea of authenticity determined the conventions with which our expectations for an authentic performance align. The nature of authenticity as a relational concept – i.e. a performance is authentic in respect to something, either the score, the composer's intentions, or other parameters – shapes the notion of authenticity even now. This, however, has the consequence of making the promotion of alternative criteria for determining a performance as authentic difficult to accept for an audience. The result is a limitation of the leeway left to performers for producing well received performances.

The conventions that contribute to structuring the concept of authenticity may be different and, as a result, the concept of authenticity itself may be interpreted in a different way. For instance, the respect for the score and for the composer's intentions need to be weighed against other criteria which could be equally or even more relevant for the appreciation of a performance. The expectations over the authenticity of a performance may vary depending, for example, on the style to which it belongs: we would not apply the same criteria for evaluating the authenticity of a Jazz solo and of an early Classical Sonata. Or they could vary depending on the context of the performance. Clare is judging tonight's performance strictly because she read on the programme that it is supposed to be an authentic performance of Handel's *Messiah*. Probably she would not be so harsh if she were to judge the performance of the same piece played by her school's orchestra and choir.

As it is easy to guess, the multiplication of the conventions which shape our expectations has the result of multiplying also the ways in which we understand authenticity. This has indeed been shown also by the discussion carried out in Chapter 2 regarding the many different views philosophers, musicologists, and musicians hold in respect to the authenticity of performances.[456] Even though this does not question the usefulness of authenticity as a concept that regulates our attitudes, it may question

[455] I will not dwell here on the reasons behind the development of the HIP movement or on all the consequences that it had for the musical panorama. This would require another full paper if not an entire book. Here I am interested instead in the bearings that the HIP movement had for the shaping of the authenticity concept.

[456] See S. Davies 1987, 39–42; Levinson 2011, 394; Dodd 2012; Bertinetto 2013. I will come back to Dodd's view on authenticity when addressing Personal-Authenticity in more detail.

the strength of the concept itself and our capacity to find *one* way to interpret it. This could even lead us to think that there is not one single authenticity, but many.

Kivy notoriously solves the conflict precisely by refusing to stand for one single authenticity. Instead, he suggests four different ways to define the concept: 'Authenticity-as-Intention', 'Authenticity-as-Sound', 'Authenticity-as-Practice', and 'The Other Authenticity'.[457] For the sake of clarity, in the next sections I will explicitly refer to these kinds of authenticity as Authenticity-as-Intention, Authenticity-as-Sound, Authenticity-as-Practice, and Personal-Authenticity.

The first authenticity, Authenticity-as-Intention refers to an understanding of authenticity as 'faithfulness to the composer's intentions'. Authenticity-as-Sound refers instead to the respect for the composer's instructions, i.e. the set of instructions provided on the score necessary to convert written notes into sounds. The third meaning of authenticity, Authenticity-as-Practice refers to the respect not only for historical sounds but also for the actual practices which were put into place for achieving it. [458]

But the most relevant notion for the purpose of the discussion that will come later is Kivy's fourth understanding of the term as Personal-Authenticity. Personal-Authenticity has to do with the individual interpretation that the performer can give of the work.[459] The role of performers thus seems to acquire a relevance that the other kinds of authenticity did not acknowledge. Instead, Personal-Authenticity can for Kivy be *de facto* included among the different ways in which authenticity in musical performances can be interpreted. As I will make clear in later sections, the novel account of musical ontology I am going to present provides an interpretation of authenticity which gives due relevance to Personal-Authenticity. By deeming the performance the musical work, in fact, the performer gains the active role of 'creator', while the comparison with previous performance styles or with the composer's intentions loses the predominance it has for other accounts.

I also anticipated that the interpretation of authenticity that I will detail in the next section agrees with Kivy in identifying a multiplicity of authenticities. The two claims do not contradict each other. When I illustrated Musical Stage Theory in Chapter 3, in fact, I explained how the strictness of the central claim of the theory is partially

[457] See Kivy 1995, 3. See also Chapter 2 where I discuss Kivy's view on authenticity.
[458] See Ibid., 9 *et seq.*
[459] I will analyse in more detail the features and implications of Personal-Authenticity in section 2.1.

mitigated through positing the R-relation. The same goes for authenticity: at face value for Musical Stage Theory authenticity is Personal-Authenticity but the concept still plays a regulative role which is informed by contextual factors. In what follows, I discuss in more detail how authenticity can be interpreted within Musical Stage Theory and how its regulative role can be explained through the contextual assessment of the R-relation.

2. Musical Stage Theory and Authenticity

In Chapter 2 and in the section above I outlined some of the ways in which authenticity is interpreted by philosophers and musicians.[460] The diverse picture that emerged showed how the quest for a single kind of authenticity has so far been unsuccessful. The criteria used to assess authenticity differ according to the person who uses them and even to the context in which they are used. If reaching one authenticity is highly improbable, then why not acknowledge the existence of many? This is what Kivy does and this is also what I want to defend. In order to do this, however, I will take a different route than Kivy. I will justify the legitimacy of the existence of more than one authenticity by including the concept within the bigger picture of the novel account of the ontology of musical works I presented in Chapter 3: Musical Stage Theory.

To quickly summarise what was discussed in Chapter 3, the aim of Musical Stage Theory is to challenge the concept of musical work that has traditionally been taken as a model by ontological theories: the work we refer to with the expression, say, 'Chopin's *Sonata in C minor*' is a sound event, namely a performance. According to Musical Stage Theory the work *is* a performance, i.e. an event we have sensory access to. Every performance is thus a different work, even if, as I explained, the act of grouping performances together according to a certain relationship also plays a role in our everyday notion of musical works.

The identification of works with performances gives to Musical Stage Theory advantages which are independent from the explanation of authenticity. At the same

[460] It is worth specifying here that I intend my interpretation of authenticity to apply not only to Western Art Music.

time, though, Musical Stage Theory provides an account of other features of our talk about works by appealing to a certain privileged relation among performances (that is, for Musical Stage Theory, strictly speaking among different works), namely the R-relation.

Necessary as it was to summarise the principal points of Musical Stage Theory, what is relevant for the purpose of this chapter is to see how authenticity can fit in this picture and what the benefit is of explaining it through Musical Stage Theory. As previously said, for Musical Stage Theory the work is the performance.[461] What is needed for something to be recognised as a work, then, is just to be a sound event that can be immediately accessed. In this picture, the performance is not judged in respect to previous renditions of the same score, to the composer's instructions or intentions, to the performing traditions, or to the use of period instruments. The majority of views about authenticity that we analysed above, then, are excluded from the consideration of Musical Stage Theory taken at face-value. The performance stands by itself and we do not need to judge it as authentic in respect to sound, intentions, or practice, since in order to be deemed a work it does not need to be included in a web of historical or contextual relations.

There is one kind of authenticity which is still valid, even within the strict layout of Musical Stage Theory, though: Personal-Authenticity.[462] I described above Personal-Authenticity as the authenticity of the performance in respect to the individual interpretation given by the performer. This kind of authenticity is still a valid criterion in respect to which the audience can judge the authenticity of a performance. This idea of authenticity, as I mentioned, is different from the traditional idea of authenticity as the respect for parameters such as compliance with the score or with the composer's intentions, which gains more consensus in musicological and philosophical literature. It is, however, nearer the concept of authenticity which is adopted in our common discourse, namely authenticity as genuineness, as a transparent display of intentions and meaning.[463]

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[461] Where for performance I intend a sound event possessing the features outlined in Chapter 1, section 7.

[462] Understood in Kivy's meaning of the term. The reason of this specification will be clearer from the next section.

[463] It is with this connotation, also, that the notion of authenticity is adopted in discourse about Pop and Rock music where the judging criteria are more interested in the emotions conveyed and in the involvement of the audience in a musical dialogue than with a faithfulness to original instructions or practices. I will talk more about this in section 2.2 when discussing Bartel's example.

I will devote the next section to a more extensive consideration of Personal-Authenticity. In particular, I will discuss the comparison proposed by Dodd between his Interpretive-Authenticity and Kivy's Personal-Authenticity. In the sections that follow, I will instead explain how Musical Stage Theory is able to account for the regulative role that we commonly ascribe to authenticity and which is not subsumed under Personal-Authenticity.

2.1 Personal and Interpretive Authenticity

In his article 'Performing Works of Music Authentically' (2012), Dodd argues in favour of the relevance of a particular kind of authenticity, what he calls *interpretive authenticity*. This is 'a way in which *e* can be faithful to *W* in performance that consists in *e*'s displaying understanding of *W*: that is, in *e*'s interpreting *W* in a perceptive or insightful way.'[464] The notion thus indicates the synthesis of the thought processes that underpin a performer's decision-making process, e.g. knowledge of styles, knowledge of ways to realise notations, previous experiences, etc. Dodd contrasts this value of authenticity with *score-compliance* authenticity which, as the name suggests, presents authenticity as the accurate rendition of a score into sounds. While this second value of authenticity is well recognised within the Western Classical music tradition – and, indeed, it is one of the principal interpretations of authenticity put forward by the HIP movement – the importance of interpretive authenticity is less well acknowledged. Dodd disagrees and instead claims that the insights provided by interpretive authenticity on works are to be preferred to a rigid respect for the instructions provided on the score. Deviations from the score are thus to be allowed if they make it possible for the performance to provide a better understanding of the work.[465]

In this paper, Dodd only hints at the divergence between his interpretive authenticity and Kivy's Personal-Authenticity. In a recent talk, instead, he goes into more depth into this discrepancy.[466] Here I will report the key points of this discussion, since they will be relevant for my interpretation of authenticity within Musical Stage Theory. Kivy describes Personal-Authenticity as being true to the performer's artistic

[464] Dodd 2012, 486.
[465] See Ibid., 492.
[466] Talk at the RIP seminar at the University of Nottingham, Department of Philosophy, 21/01/2018.

values in the performance.[467] Dodd qualifies interpretive authenticity, and the understanding of the work that it provides, as a performance value. On the other hand, he does not consider Personal-Authenticity a performance value. He motivates his claim by showing how Kivy's argument is undermotivated: the individual style and originality transmitted to a performance by a specific interpretation can be achieved not only through Personal-Authenticity, as Kivy claims, but also through what Dodd has presented as interpretive authenticity. Moreover, blindly following her own personal style in performances of different repertoires may lead a performer to provide uninteresting and self-centred performances. Thus, Dodd's final claim is that seeking Personal-Authenticity, understood merely as following one's own style, cannot be deemed a performance value. Interpretive authenticity, instead, with its richer connotation, may trump other authenticities and take the lead for delivering a more profound understanding of the work.

As will be clearer from the following sections, in which I detail my contextualist solution, I agree with Dodd's claim that 'our practice is characterised by concern for a variety of faithfulness to the work – a breed of authenticity in other words – that potentially diverges from score-compliance and, where it does so, can override it.'[468] I therefore share his view that interpretive authenticity may, and should, trump other kinds of authenticity if what we want from the performance is an insightful and well-informed rendition. I will return to Dodd's view and to possible objections to it in section 2.5. Here, instead, I would like to specify how I qualify the Personal-Authenticity that I address in the chapter. What I mean by Personal-Authenticity is more in line with Dodd's definition of interpretive authenticity than with Kivy's version of the term. In what follows, I will refer to Personal-Authenticity as the contribution that the performer's informed interpretation of the score brings to the audience's understanding of the work. Personal-Authenticity is thus not just the personal style of the musician coming to the fore in performance but a deeper musical insight. What I do here, thus, is to combine Dodd's concept of interpretive authenticity with Kivy's term.

[467] See Kivy 1995, 123.
[468] Dodd 2012, 496.

There is however a context in which Kivy's definition of Personal-Authenticity may apply.[469] Personal-Authenticity defined as the respect for the performer's artistic personality can be a performance value in the case of free improvisation. When improvising freely (even if following some rules, as seen in Chapter 5) the performer is indeed expressing her own personality and philosophy of performance without the need to respect any score, performing practice, or composer's intentions.[470] For all other cases, though, Personal-Authenticity as I understand it expresses a wider and richer idea which includes the expression of the performer's personality as only one of its many elements.

The emphasis that the interpretation of Musical Stage Theory gives to authenticity as Personal-Authenticity shifts the focus of the criteria for determining authenticity from the original act of composition to the personal contribution made by the performer. In the next section, I will show how this contribution is a key aspect for shaping musical pieces and for the audience's appreciation of them. This is proved not only by the relevant role played by performers for the final shape of musical works throughout the history of music, but also by studies on the perception of the repeatability of works by the audience, to be discussed in the next section.

In Chapter 5, I argued that the role of performers has been underestimated in music literature. I discussed some case studies which showed how in the history of music the performers' intervention through improvisatory practices was essential for the final profile of the work. In the next section I will further support this claim by discussing an experimental study conducted by Christopher Bartel, aimed at testing the influence that the performer's personal contribution has on the work as perceived by the audience. The results of the experiment are concordant with my position: the performers' intervention is essential for determining the nature of the work. In section 2.3, instead, I will explain how Musical Stage Theory can also account for the regulative role that is commonly ascribed to authenticity, thus expanding the discussion from Personal-Authenticity to other kinds of authenticity.

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[469] This case is not addressed by Dodd since he clearly states that he will limit his analysis to Western Classical music (see Dodd 2012, en. 1), while I extend the bearings of Musical Stage Theory also to other traditions.

[470] This consideration does not apply to improvisation in other styles, such as in the Baroque continuo or in the cadenza, since here the performer needs to respect the conventions of the style and not just her own personality.

2.2 The Relevance of the Performer's Contribution

The focus on personal authenticity advocated by Musical Stage Theory brings forward the aspect of creative input conveyed by the performer, which is seldom emphasised in traditional theories about musical works. The connotation of this creative input partially overlaps with the features of the improvisatory practice described in Chapter 5. The case studies analysed there have shown how the performer can vary nuances, expression, and tempi while playing, thus merging the acts of composition and performance.

Historically, improvised practices are present in the vast majority of musical traditions, e.g. in the Baroque period with the practice of ornamentation or with the notational practice of partimenti, in the Early Classical period with the flexibility left to performers of Accompanied Sonatas, up to the jazz tradition, which has become an emblem of improvisatory practice. As pointed out in Chapter 5, the improvisatory component, and the creative input on the part of the performer that comes with it, is often neglected by analyses of the nature of musical works and performance, especially in the philosophical literature, where improvisation is treated as an entity separate from performances derived from a written score. I believe that the influence of the performer's contribution to the identity and appreciation of performances is underestimated. This belief is not only supported by examples in musical history but also by studies on the intuitions we receive about the repeatability of musical works.

In his paper 'The Ontology of Musical Works and the Role of Intuitions: An Experimental Study' (2017), Christopher Bartel analyses and discusses the results of an experimental study designed to test the audience's intuitions over the notion of repeatability of works. As I already mentioned in respect to Musical Stage Theory and as Bartel also points out: '[repeatability] holds that musical works are a kind of thing of which there can exist genuine multiple instances. Repeatability is often appealed to as one of the central motivations for believing that musical works are abstract entities.'[471] If the intuition of repeatability as a kind of vertical relation is correct, then the notion supported by the type-token theorists of the composer as creator of an entity which is only imperfectly instantiated by concrete renditions gains weight. If, instead, the results of the experiment concerning these intuitions do not reflect the traditional

[471] Bartel 2017, 350.

idea of repeatability, then there is hope for performers to see their creative contribution recognised. For the purpose of the discussion of Personal-Authenticity, the results of Bartel's study help to clarify the relevance of the audience in recognising the creative contribution of performers. In his study, Bartel asked participants to judge whether the 'pair of closely related recordings, performances, or compositions […] were recordings, performances, or compositions of the "same song" or "different songs".'[472] The pairs of songs that Bartel asked the participants to listen to presented three kinds of differences: '(1) provenance difference – pairs of works that sounded nearly identical but differed in their provenance, (2) affective difference – pairs of works that differed in their perceived emotional tone and provenance, and (3) connotation difference – pairs of works that differed in their lyrical content, perceived emotional tone, and provenance.'[473] The final purpose of the study was to test whether the participants considered any of these differences relevant enough to count against the repeatability of works.

The case of provenance difference did not offer sufficient evidence for audiences to judge the two songs in question as different. The recordings, in this specific case of *Back in Black* played by AC/DC and Dirty Deeds, were judged by 62% of the participants as two instances of the same song. A different result was obtained in the case of affective and connotative difference. In the case of affective difference, the two recordings were by Dolly Parton and Whitney Houston, both singing *I Will Always Love You* but conveying markedly different emotions. Notwithstanding the fact that the melody and lyrics of the two recordings are identical, 61% of the participants judged the recordings to be two different songs, thus arguing against their repeatability. An even clearer result was obtained in the case of connotation difference, where the recordings of *Hurt* by Nine Inch Nails and Johnny Cash, with partially different instrumental arrangements and lyrics, were judged as recordings of two different songs by 81% of the participants. The conclusion that Bartel draws from this result is that the participants' intuitions concerning the repeatability of works are in conflict with the notion of repeatability advocated by the main theories of the ontology of musical works:

[472] Ibid., 353.
[473] Ibid., 355.

> The conception of repeatability that is evinced by the participants' responses here is quite restrictive. The participants acknowledge fewer cases of repeatability than most philosophers of music would. Participants seemed to regard emotional tone and lyrical content to be essential qualities of songs. Only in cases of provenance difference did the majority of participants judge the examples to be two recordings of the same song.[474]

What is evinced from the study is the value given by participants to the creative contribution of the performers. The influence of performers on the profile of the work in question was in fact enough for the participants to claim that the recordings of the 'same song' were indeed two different works. Provenance difference between the songs did not lead the majority of participants to recognise them as different works as affective and connotation difference did. The history of composition of the work was not as relevant as the performer's contribution in judging the two as different songs. The result therefore argues against the idea of the composer as the only creator. The performers have equal, if not greater, impact on the nature of the work than the composer. As anticipated, Bartel's conclusion supports the importance of the creative intervention, or 'improvisation' of performers. As a consequence, it also supports the legitimacy of Personal-Authenticity as a significant kind of Authenticity, on a par with the other kinds. Given the essential role played by performers in shaping a musical work, it is worth evaluating the authenticity of the work itself on the basis of the personal interpretation given by the performer. Finally, the result of this study is equally supportive of the main claim of Musical Stage Theory: different performances, even of the same score, are different works. The intuitions of the participants legitimate a horizontal rather than vertical relation of repeatability: performances are not instantiations of an abstract work but are instead works of music themselves.[475]

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[474] Ibid., 361.

[475] A possible, and understandable, concern that may be raised is that similar considerations would not apply in the case of Classical Music. Bartel himself addresses this worry in the paper (see Bartel 2017, 353–355). He claims that this is a concern that can be overcome, though. He refers to Stephen Davies' ontology of musical works which 'conceives of works from all musical traditions as following a similar pattern when it comes to the instantiation of works in performances' (Bartel 2017, 354). Pop songs and works of Classical Music are subject to the same notion of repeatability: 'songs are musical works just as classical compositions are, the difference being that songs are ontologically thinner than classical works' (Bartel 2017, 354). The characterisation of Pop songs as thin works of music may be right to some extent, but a few lingering concerns remain. In the evaluation of the repeatability of a Pop song, in fact, a great deal of consideration is given to the role played by the interpreter, while in the case of Classical Music it is the respect for the score which usually constitutes the primary criterion for determining its repeatability. In addition, there are other elements which in the case of Pop or Rock music may be deemed to contribute to the overall 'authenticity' of the performance and which normally are not valued as such in the Classical Music environment, it is the case of the leather jacket in Rock

Personal-Authenticity, as discussed above, offers a workable way to interpret authenticity according to the main claim of Musical Stage Theory. Yet, if this is the case, the notion of authenticity loses its other regulative aspects, i.e. the authenticity in respect to the score, the history of production, etc. In the next section, I will discuss how a regulative role for our engagement with musical performances can still be accounted for, even within Musical Stage Theory. What will need to be considered, though, is whether this role is played by authenticity or by some other concept, namely the R-relation.

2.3 Authenticity as a Guide?

In the previous section I argued that if we follow the strict claim of Musical Stage Theory then Personal-Authenticity is the kind of authenticity that should normally be adopted. This claim, which may seem quite revisionary at first, is a consequence of the central proposition of Musical Stage Theory, namely that the work *is* the performance. Being a sound event that we should not necessarily analyse as connected to other performances or to its provenance history in order to grasp, the performance also does not need to be assessed as authentic in respect to a set of instructions, to the composer's intentions, or to other contextual factors.

However, as we have seen, although being a value in itself, Personal-Authenticity does not cover the full spectrum of normative action that authenticity plays within our common talk about music. We would not wish to deny that Clare has a valid point in judging the authenticity of tonight's performance of Handel's *Messiah* by paying attention to the tempi that performers are using. But what is it that plays this regulative role, if not authenticity? When outlining the main points of Musical Stage Theory, I mentioned the R-relation as one of its core elements. I described the R-relation as a horizontal relation between performances which, thanks to its constitutive features,

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music. Also in the case of Classical Music we may bring the focus of our attention to the interpreter's contribution, e.g. in the case of Operas or of famous musicians. For example, we speak of Callas' Norma or of Gould's Bach. But certainly this is not the norm. Or, as seen in the case of Haydn's *Farewell Symphony*, the gestures and the attire of musicians may contribute to the authenticity of a performance even in Classical Music. Shifting the attention to Personal-Authenticity as a performance value I hope will help to bring to the fore the relevance of the role played by the performer also in the case of Classical Music.

allows us to group performances together and distinguish the acceptable from the unacceptable ones. The features which inform this relation are (i) a causal relation, (ii) the intentionality of performers, and (iii) a similarity relation. As claimed in Chapter 3, it is an advantage of Musical Stage Theory that these requirements can be assessed contextually: the R-relation between performances or stages can indeed intelligibly depend upon contextual factors, such as the interests of the speaker or the musical background that she takes to be appropriate. This allows Musical Stage Theory greater flexiblility than other theories in judging the aptness of performances to be included in the group of performances that provide a rendition of the same score. In this way, Musical Stage Theory manages to explain more clearly the variety of stances characterising our interaction with musical entities.

The R-relation allows Musical Stage Theory to account for musical propositions which do not refer to the single performance. It also explains the rules that we need to respect when comparing performances and when referring to a performance as a performance of a specific composition. In this sense, the R-relation plays a regulative role and, I suggest, this role is comparable to that played by the notion of authenticity. To demonstrate the similarity between the R-relation and authenticity, I will compare the features of the three requirements posited by the R-relation with the kinds of authenticity proposed by Kivy.

I will organise the discussion in the next sections according to the three requirements of the R-relation – causality, intentionality, similarity. First, I will show how these requirements are comparable to those involved in the assessment of authenticity. Then, I will provide further reasons for claiming that none of these requirements can be taken as absolute and more relevant than the others. Previously, I mentioned how the alternative interpretation of authenticity I propose is based on a reconsideration of the terminology incrusted by our uses and preconceptions. In what follows, I will analyse how the traditional interpretation of the terms used in conjunction with the analysis of authenticity has affected our views over authenticity itself.[476] I will question the possibility of achieving each one of these kinds of authenticity in full, questioning also the desirability of interpreting authenticity within

[476] I will refer here to the discussion of Chapter 2 over the development of authenticity and its interpretation within the literature. In this section, though, I will assume a more critical tone, questioning the possibility and desirability of a compliance with the criteria which are traditionally behind authenticity and proposing a redefinition and reanalysis of assumed paths.

such tight boundaries. Each kind of authenticity is equally relevant, and its relevance depends on the context within which it is evaluated.

2.4 The Causality Requirement

The (i) causality requirement of the R-relation draws a link among performances and between performances and the act of composition. It is thus informed by the same requirements of the Authenticity-as-Sound, Authenticity-as-Intention, and Authenticity-as-Practice. A link with the act of composition asks for the respect for the composer's instructions and intentions. The compliance with these two parameters is what Authenticity-as-Sound and Authenticity-as-Intention are based on. Only by respecting what, say, Chopin indicated on the score of the Sonata n. 1 in C minor and/or his ideas about how it should be performed, in fact, is it is possible for a performance to be authentic in these two respects. The Authenticity-as-Practice, instead, is about the respect for the actual performing practices in vogue at the period of composition, in this case the practices of playing the piano in the 19th century. This last requirement can also be expressed as a causal link between performances. Only by referring to other performances, the ones thought to be prototypical can a performer achieve Authenticity-as-Practice. In order to better understand the role played by these three kinds of authenticity and to assess their achievability, I will consider them in more depth one at a time.

Score-compliance is the value of authenticity advocated by Authenticity-as-Sound. As mentioned in previous sections, score-compliance is the interpretation of authenticity traditionally adopted in Western Classical music.[477] As discussed already in Chapter 5, the score is an entity in constant evolution and the level of detail that it contains nowadays is far greater than that which it possessed three or four centuries ago. In Chapter 5 I provided the example of partimenti, an alternative form of notation diffused in the 17th and 18th centuries, which included only a guideline for improvisations by performers. Without looking for such extreme cases, scores in general are underdetermined and they were even more so when improvisatory practices made an essential contribution to the final shape of the piece. Interpreting

[477] See S. Davies 2001 for authenticity as score-compliance.

the faithfulness to the work as faithfulness to the notation is thus inaccurate.[478] The lack of precise instructions and the diffusion of improvisatory practices such as that of ornamentation, which for obvious reasons was rarely written down in full, make it impossible for modern performers to recreate an original performance just by reading the score.[479] To this must be added the aforementioned historical transformation of the aspect of scores. Elements such as tempi and phrasing were not indicated on scores before the 18th century.[480] Nevertheless, performers must have been compelled to make performative choices regardless of the lack of markings in the score.

Complete respect for the score may be possible to a certain extent but it is seldom desirable. Reproducing only what is recorded on paper would result in a performance that might sound poorer than a performance of the period. Still, if the score is insufficient to provide the performer with information about how to play, then perhaps the composer's intentions may help. Authenticity-as-Intention defines authenticity as respect for the original idea of the composer about the composition. Compliance with this may certainly add greater detail to the performance and, undoubtedly, it would be desirable to presume at least the possibility of hearing, say, the *Goldberg Variations* as Bach wanted them to be played. Yet, is it possible to reach this kind of authenticity? Without a direct connection with the composer, and even in cases where there is a connection, for instance with a contemporary composer who wishes to disseminate every aspect of her compositional ideas, this ideal of authenticity seem improbable. However talkative the composer, it is doubtful that we could have access to all of her intentions about the piece.[481]

As in the case of Authenticity-as-Sound, a complete adherence to the composer's intentions may also not be desirable. After all, the composer does not always know best.[482] The musicological literature conveys an idea of the style in which pieces by certain composers should be played, as if such matters were self-evident. However, in Chapter 5 we saw an example of how such assumptions may be wrong and biased. In the case of the composer Corelli, for example, witnesses report his style of playing as characterised by wild Dionysian rapture, while sets of ornaments attributed to him are graceful and refined. We cannot rely on accepted assumptions about the way of

[478] See Harnoncourt 1988, 70.
[479] See Lawson and Stowell 1999, 68.
[480] See LeHuray 1990, 6.
[481] See Harnoncourt 1988, 24.
[482] See Kivy 1995, 161 *et seq.*

playing prescribed by a composer, since it is likely that such assumptions do not correspond to historical truth.[483]

The third kind of authenticity, Authenticity-as-Practice, calls for respect for the performing traditions which were active at the time of composition. It can involve elements which extend from the use of period instruments, through the choice of venue, to the phrasing and expressiveness employed, and so on.[484] However, like the previous kind of authenticity, achieving a way of performing which is near to the one practiced by the composer's contemporaries may be desirable for some but arguably not possible. For starters, the reconstruction of period instruments is difficult to achieve given the incomplete instructions that we may have and the difficulty of accessing the materials which were once used. Even supposing that we do possess instruments identical to the original ones, the treatises and performance manuals cannot give us complete information about how to perform.[485] This is partly due to the already mentioned presence of improvisatory practices in performances, which cannot be fully reported and transmitted, to changes in temperament and pitch, and to differences in listening conditions and expectations.[486] As already mentioned, Bach's *St. Matthew Passion* cannot feasibly sound as grand to contemporary audiences as it must have sounded to Bach's. The change in expectations, already indicated as one of the reasons behind the multiplication of authenticities, also affects the way in which the audience perceives a performance, thus making the possibility of achieving authenticity harder.

This overview shows the complexity inherent in evaluating both the possibility and the desirability of achieving authenticity through the causal connection with either the score, the composer's intentions, or the performing practice associated with the piece. In the next two sections I will address the two remaining requirements of intentionality and similarity, analysing how the notions they involve changed through time.

[483] See Zaslaw 1996, 111. On the other hand, even when we possess something which could be deemed an authoritative source, such as Debussy's piano rolls, performers tend not to follow it because it departs from current taste and from the expectations that the audience could have of a determinate piece.
[484] See Levinson 1980.
[485] See Lawson and Stowell 1999, 24; Harnoncourt 1988, 32.
[486] See Lawson and Stowell 1999, 75–159.

2.5 The Intentionality Requirement

The (ii) intentionality requirement of the R-relation, as discussed, gives relevance to the performer's intentions to play that specific performance as an essential condition which complements the other two requirements. This requirement can be equated to the demands of Personal-Authenticity. It is indeed the intention of the performer, together with her personal interpretation, which informs the requests of Personal-Authenticity. The creative contribution of the performer comes to the fore here. The wind blowing through a canyon does not produce a musical work, since it does not possess intentionality, and, similarly, it is only by her personal intervention that a performer can display Personal-Authenticity.

Among the various kinds of authenticity, Personal-Authenticity is the one which receives less attention in the literature, at least the literature on Classical music. In previous sections, instead, I showed how Personal-Authenticity is the only kind of authenticity which remains valid within the strict understanding of Musical Stage Theory. Various remarks made in this thesis have pointed out the relevance of the performer's intervention for the nature of musical works. The identification of musical works with performances aims to highlight how the accessibility of the sonic profile is one of the major desiderata of musical works. And, in order for them to be accessible, performers are necessary agents. In addition, Chapter 5 showed through some case studies how improvisatory practices are widespread in music history and, as a consequence, how the performer's contribution is an essential aspect for the shaping of the musical work. The focus on Personal-Authenticity posited by the alternative interpretation of authenticity proposed by Musical Stage Theory stresses further the key role of performers.

As Bartel's study showed, listeners value the personal contribution of the performer equally and sometimes more than the melodic or lyrical profile of songs. Indeed, the audience is happy to assess two performances as different works if the contribution of the performers is sufficiently different, while melody and lyrics remain equal. As an additional factor, in Pop more than in Classical music the performers are deeply influenced in their performance by the kind of audience that faces them. The different setting and degree of involvement of the audience are part of the equation as well. While at Classical concerts the audience sits in silence (even if this was not what audiences centuries ago did during concerts), during Pop, Rock, or (some) Jazz

concerts the audience participates, expressing appreciation or disappointment for the performance. This feedback inevitably affects the performance and is, therefore, an essential part of the personal expression of the performer. The audience is thus one of the contextual factors that influence the authenticity of a performance. In Classical music the audience also shapes the performer's intentions, although in a more discreet way. Playing in front of an audience of children or in front of a competition jury, for example, is likely to affect the performer's playing in different ways.

In section 2.1 I addressed Dodd's proposal of interpretive authenticity as a performance value and contrasted it with Kivy's Personal-Authenticity. A possible difficulty should be noted, however, in regard to drawing boundaries that are too definite between these two kinds of authenticities. As emerges from the discussion so far, the performer's personality and her perspective on the work inevitably affect the rendition that she gives.[487] When Dodd claims that interpretive authenticity informs an understanding of the work, how can we distinguish the subjective understanding evinced by the performer from a more objective understanding of the nature of the work? How much do performer-authenticity and work-authenticity coincide? The acknowledgement of the relevance of the performer's contribution for the nature of musical works and for the assessment of authenticity posited by Musical Stage Theory questions a strict distinction between interpretive and personal authenticity. Instead, the two kinds of authenticity blend together, since no understanding of the work would be possible without the performer's take on it.[488]

For all of these reasons, I believe that the performer's intentions regarding a musical piece are not extraneous to its identity. Indeed, they may have more weight for the evaluation of the authenticity of a performance than the other criteria.

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[487] And inevitable is also the fact that works are necessarily interpreted, performers thus play an essential role for the final shape of the work (see Predelli 1995; Dodd 2012).

[488] An aspect in which I find myself in disagreement with Dodd is the consequence that his sonicist take may also have on the consideration of interpretive authenticity. Indeed, if two performances with the same sonic properties are identical, overlooking the means and ways through which they were performed, then the relevance of performers is compromised. Following Dodd's thought, in fact, it would not matter if a piece was performed by a human performer or by a machine: if the two performances are sonically indistinguishable, then the contribution brought by their interpretive authenticity will be identical. Given the essential role played by intentionality of the performer in Musical Stage Theory and my willingness to give due relevance to performers as actors in shaping the musical work, I believe that the notion of interpretive authenticity should focus not just on the sonic properties of the final product, but also on the process which leads to the performance.

2.6 The Similarity Requirement

The last requirement, (iii) similarity, asks for the R-related performances to be similar enough in their sonic profile. The same result is achieved by performers who want to strive for Authenticity-as-Sound. The first step for two performances of Chopin's Sonata n. 1 in C minor, in fact, is for the performers to follow the instructions indicated on the score.

When introducing the R-relation in Chapter 3, I already mentioned the vagueness inherent in the similarity for which it asks. The vagueness in determining the degree of similarity between two performances is partly due to the underdetermination of the score, from which they both derive. Different performers, in fact, could give equally correct renditions of a score despite changing some non-essential details, such as tempi, nuances, timbre, and so on. One criterion that could be adopted to determine the degree of similarity between two performances is the audience's recognition of them as performances of the same 'work'.[489] Yet, as Bartel's study has shown, the recognition of repeatability by the audience is less flexible than we might expect. The two performances of *I Will Always Love You* by Dolly Parton and Whitney Houston, for example, were not deemed similar enough by the participants to be considered the same song. The criterion of repeatability as traditionally assumed may be challenged by varying perceptions on the part of the audience. Bartel mentions the possible consequence that this could bear on a consideration of the copyright of the score. If Whitney Houston's version of *I Will Always Love You* is considered a different song to Dolly Parton's, then

> Whitney should have no need to pay songwriting royalties to Dolly, which in fact contradicts actual current legal practice. [….] students who defend this strong view will often accept the logical consequence and argue that current legal practices are in fact mistaken: these are recordings of two different songs, which they insist means that copyright law must change.[490]

The similarity requirement plays a substantial role in regards to judgements about royalties and copyright, since one of the determining criteria for deciding whether song A is infringing the copyright of song B is whether a high degree of similarity between

[489] It should be specified that in this chapter, when talking about the audience I do not have in mind a precise kind of audience. In this case, instead, I take it that this consideration should apply to a lay audience.
[490] Bartel 2017, 358.

A and B can be recognised. There is evidence that this perception of similarity changes through time. While variations on pieces of music were indeed judged as a normal practice which did not implicate any consequence for copyright matters, the gradual fixation of the 'work' as an absolute and immutable entity from the late 19th century onwards also had as a consequence stricter copyright rules.

A solution to this conundrum could, once again, be found in the contextual assessment of the degree of similarity. However, it may be argued that this is far from providing a definite solution to the difficulty of assessing the level of similarity between performances. The similarity between two renditions of the same score admits of degrees: it may oscillate between totally acoustically indistinguishable renditions and total freedom of both parts in interpreting the instructions provided. Unless one adopts an absolutist view in this respect,[491] though, it is difficult to place boundaries around what can be deemed acceptable and what cannot.

We are then left with the option of judging the performances by taking into account the context in which they sit and the audience's expectations. Musical Stage Theory can help in doing that with the individuation of the requirements of the R-relation and the acknowledgment of the legitimate flexibility performers may adopt to accommodate their rendition to specific situations.

From what has been said, then, it is possible to individuate a close correspondence between the requirements of the R-relation and the different kinds of authenticity as enumerated by Kivy. The (i) causality requirement has the same normative features as Authenticity-as-Sound, Intention, and Practice. The (ii) intentionality requirement has demands equivalent to Personal-Authenticity, and the (iii) similarity requirement and Authenticity-as-Sound both require a similarity between the sonic profiles of the performances.

The normative aspects which we recognise in the notion of authenticity and which help us to orientate our judgements over the performances we listen to are therefore the aspects also shared by the R-relation through its three requirements. Musical Stage Theory is thus able to account for the regulative aspect of authenticity and for our everyday linguistic exchanges.

The shift from Personal-Authenticity to a contextualist interpretation of authenticity can be paralleled and justified with the shift occurring between work-as-

[491] Like Goodman does (see Goodman 1968).

performance and work-as-construct. While at the level of work-as-performance, as mentioned, the value of authenticity that can be applied is only Personal-Authenticity, since no relation with other performances or historical information need to be posited, at the level of the work-as-construct other values of authenticity may be applied. Depending on the context or the audience's or performers' interest, in fact, authenticity as respect for the score, for the performing tradition, for the composer's intentions, or for a more individual understanding of the work – all information which add up to the work-as-construct – can be possible.

In addition, as I mentioned at the beginning, Musical Stage Theory is able to provide a re-interpretation of authenticity which offers benefits to the overall explanation of the concept. The three main benefits brought by this reconsideration are: (i) to give new momentum to the discussion about authenticity, (ii) to justify the existence of multiple authenticities on the basis of the contextual assessment of the R-relation, and (iii) the parsimony of explanation resulting from the interpretation of authenticity through the R-relation. I will address these benefits in more detail in the next section.

2.7 Benefits of Explaining Authenticity through Musical Stage Theory

The most obvious benefit brought about by the reconsideration of authenticity through Musical Stage Theory, is that of advancing the debate over the topic of authenticity which, as the discussion in previous sections showed, reached a stalemate. The analysis of authenticity by Musical Stage Theory, revisionary as it may seem, challenges the traditional role that authenticity has played, calling into question its application in musical discourse. The notion of authenticity, through the many discussions and arguments surrounding it, is now encrusted with meanings that are not necessarily the ones that reflect its actual role in musical practice. The conventions, and the subsequent audience expectations engendered by the notion within the HIP movement, fixed the meaning of authenticity as that of respect for the composer's intentions and instructions. But, as the review of Kivy's proposal has demonstrated, authenticity as it is actually interpreted is much more than this. The interpretation of the multifaceted nature of the notion of authenticity through the contextual assessment

of the R-relation given by Musical Stage Theory has the benefit of justifying the otherwise arbitrary conclusion reached by Kivy. The contextual nature of musical works as explained by the ontological framework proposed by Musical Stage Theory also justifies the contextual assessment of authenticity as one of the values we may ascribe to performances.

This leads directly to the second, and I believe most relevant, benefit of this analysis of authenticity: the legitimisation of multiple authenticities through the contextualism of the R-relation. When addressing the nature of the R-relation in Chapter 3, I mentioned how its requirements are contextually assessed. When evaluating a performance, in fact, we do not need to apply all three requirements at once. Their relative importance is influenced also by the context in which we are acting when assessing a performance. As I discussed, the notion of authenticity is contextually assessed. It depends on the criterion used for evaluating the authenticity of a performance and of the contextual factors which may influence its application. The criterion applied determines the audience's expectations for the authenticity of a performance and, consequently, changes the understanding of authenticity. The adoption of a multiplicity of ways to judge a performance as authentic is a feature of our musical discourse which finds an explanation in the influence that contextual factors have for understanding the nature of musical works. Just as we may relate performances together contextually, according to their common history of composition, intentionality of performers, or similarity of sonic profile, Clare and Pete can be equally right in their opposing claims on the authenticity of the performance of Handel's *Messiah*, even if they base their judgements on different criteria.

By explaining authenticity through the R-relation, then, Musical Stage Theory is able to justify why it is legitimate to have more than one authenticity. The existence of a multiplicity of authenticities is validated by a grounding aspect of the nature of musical works. The requirements at the root of our possibility of linking together performances are the same as those that allow us to judge their authenticity. More generally, a benefit brought by this novel interpretation of authenticity may be that of justifying a looser and more flexible approach in respect to performances and authenticity. As the interviews discussed in Chapter 2 showed, there is no consensus on which value of authenticity should be preferred over others. This shows that the concept of authenticity is far from playing the clear-cut regulative role that we seem to attribute to it. Instead, what plays a regulative role are considerations which may

differ over time and depend on various contextual elements, not excluding the acknowledgement of the type of audience.

The last, arguable, benefit of the revisionary interpretation of authenticity, is the parsimony of explanation. We do not in fact need to posit two different concepts, namely the R-relation and authenticity. One is enough. The R-relation can explain the regulative role which is normally ascribed to authenticity and, through its recognised contextual assessment, can also explain why there is more than one authenticity.

A great part of the debate over authenticity started because of a lack of consensus over which aspects of authenticity should be deemed more relevant and worthy than others. Should respect for the composer's intentions be more important than respect for the performing tradition? Or should Personal-Authenticity be more relevant, since it acknowledges the role of the performer? These and similar questions, which constitute an impasse for finding a definite explanation of what authenticity is, lose their sting within Musical Stage Theory. Each of these authenticities, in fact, bears the same relevance for the latter. The application and prevalence of one or the other is merely dictated by the context in which the judgement over authenticity is carried out. The R-relation, then, not only takes on the regulative role which is usually attributed to authenticity but it is also able to settle the debate over which kind of 'authenticity' is the most relevant.

As our linguistic and evaluative attitudes show, there is no single value of authenticity that should take a lead over the others. If I expect to listen to an HIP performance I may choose to value authenticity as respect for the instructions on the score. If, instead, I deem that Bach would have preferred his works to be played on a more versatile instrument, then I would rather listen to the *Goldberg Variations* played on the piano. Similarly, if I am listening to the n^{th} rendition of Beethoven's 'Hammerklavier' Sonata, then I may wish to listen to a performance where Personal-Authenticity comes to the fore. If, instead, I am listening to it for the first time, then I may prefer a plain, more straightforward performance.

Even if for Musical Stage Theory the R-relation assumes the regulative role which is usually ascribed to the concept of authenticity, this does not mean that in our musical discourse we should get rid of the attribute 'authentic'. Just as the term 'musical work' remains useful in everyday discourse as a loose and non-philosophical way to refer both to the work-as-performance and the work-as-construct, despite its meaning being reassigned by Musical Stage Theory, so too can the attribute 'authentic' still be used

to evaluate a performance. As long, that is, that it does not identify an absolute quality of performances but a quality which has to be assessed contextually. Musical Stage Theory thus accommodates the practicality of authenticity in regard to the work-as-construct and shows how trying to reach a consensus over one single authenticity is hopeless: there is not one authenticity but many.

Conclusion

In this chapter I addressed the second of the two questions that guided the research in this thesis: 'When is a performance authentic?' I started by discussing the normative role played by the notion of authenticity in our musical discourse. As we have seen, our judgements concerning the authenticity of performances are deeply influenced by contextual factors and external conditions. The multiplicity of influences which may affect our considerations regarding authenticity results in a proliferation of norms of authenticity. From this observation comes Kivy's proposal of a contextualist interpretation of authenticity: there is not just one authenticity but many. This conclusion mirrors the results observed in Chapter 2, when discussing the views on authenticity held by philosophers, musicologists, and musicians. The discussion showed that there is no consensus on deeming one interpretation of authenticity more relevant than others.

I agree with Kivy on the necessity of formulating a contextualist interpretation of authenticity. Unlike him, though, I try to justify what may otherwise be considered an arbitrary solution to the problem. With this aim, I ground my contextualist solution on the ontology proposed by Musical Stage Theory. The shift of reference occurring between work-as-performance and work-as-construct in the ontology of Musical Stage Theory impacts also on the consideration of authenticity. At the level of work-as-performance the value of authenticity that can straightforwardly be applied is Personal-Authenticity. The work-as-performance is in its individuality a sound event which can be analysed, taking into account only its sonic features and not the relation with a score, a composer, or other performances. Nevertheless, Musical Stage Theory accounts also for the normative role that is attributed to the notion of authenticity and which cannot be played by Personal-Authenticity. In doing so, we need to shift to the level of the work-as-construct. It is here that a contextualist interpretation of

authenticity can be given. I thus showed how the regulative role of authenticity can be explained through the requirements of the R-relation. Authenticity-as-Sound, Authenticity-as-Intentions, and Authenticity-as-Practice express similar demands to the causality-requirement. Authenticity-as-Sound can be compared specifically to the similarity-requirement, and Personal-Authenticity to the intentionality-requirement.

Explaining authenticity through the R-relation allows me to justify a contextualist interpretation on the basis of the ontology of Musical Stage Theory. Just as the R-relation was used to illustrate how the grouping of performances and our judgements on them can be contextually assessed, so too in the case of authenticity can the different requirements expressed by the R-relation demonstrate how we can apply the notion of authenticity differently in various contexts, depending on our interests or on the interests of the actors involved.

Conclusion

1. Summary of Aims and Contents

The research conducted in this thesis has been guided by two questions that have been widely debated in aesthetics: 'What is a musical work?' and 'When is a performance authentic?'. I devoted the first two chapters to discuss how these questions have been addressed in the literature. Traditionally, theories about the ontology of musical works answer the first question by identifying musical works with abstract entities instantiated by performances. In Chapter 3 I proposed to shift the focus on performances, putting forward Musical Stage Theory as an alternative theory for explaining the nature of musical works. The main claim of Musical Stage Theory is that the work *is* the performance. In this same chapter, I answered also one of the main aims of the thesis: promoting a collaboration between theory and practice. I argued that an ontological theory about musical works needs to be complemented and informed by musical practice, thus inserting the many aspects of the practice of playing, composing, and listening to music within a consistent theoretical framework. Musical Stage Theory manages to do so by grounding its ontological guidelines on the independently motivated theory about space-time proposed by Theodore Sider: the Stage View.[492] Works-as-performances are stages which can be grouped together according to a certain relationship, what I called the R-relation, which provides the requirements for identifying a performance as a rendition of a specific score.

Regarding the compliance with aspects of musical practice, in Chapters 4 and 5 I discussed how Musical Stage Theory manages to describe the nature of musical phenomena such as recordings, computer-based performances and compositions, and improvisations. Acknowledging the relevance of contextual factors for the final shape of musical works helps Musical Stage Theory to account for these musical practices. The requirements of the R-relation, namely causality, intentionality, and similarity relationship, are indeed influenced by the variation of the context in which performances are evaluated.

[492] See Sider 2001.

This contextualism is also at the basis of the proposal for a new account for the authenticity of performances which I outline in Chapter 6. Here I put forward a contextual interpretation of the notion of authenticity: there is not one single authenticity but many, depending on which factors are kept into account for assessing it. For example, a performance may be authentic because it is played on period instruments while, in another context, a performance of the same score, although not played on period instruments, may be deemed authentic because it is customised to the expectations of the public. This interpretation of authenticity is supported also by the results obtained from interviews I conducted with performers, conductors, and theorists from which no consensus on a single way of understanding authenticity emerged.

The wish to propose an account which provides a philosophically consistent view on musical works, giving at the same time the due relevance to actual musical practices, is one of the leading motivations behind this research. Besides this, I also wanted to promote a collaboration between music and philosophy by informing the description of the nature of musical works through the analytical methods and clarity of the first and the richness of information of the second. The promotion of this collaboration should desirably be applied not only to research on the nature of music but should also be extended to all enquiries on musical theory and musical practice. I believe that Musical Stage Theory is successful in promoting this interdisciplinarity and that it shows the benefits that this collaboration can have.

2. Implications of the Research

This research had as its main scope the presentation of an alternative ontology of musical works which was also able to provide a novel description of authenticity in musical performance. The thesis thus started with an ontological aim but it also has practical implications which I will outline in this section.

Shifting the focus from the notion of musical work as an immutable and transcendent entity (as the Classical Music tradition and Platonistic accounts shaped it) to the act of performing itself (as Musical Stage Theory proposes) carries with it numerous implications to the way in which musical works are approached and studied.

In the Introduction, I mentioned how I wanted Musical Stage Theory to appeal to all the actors involved in musical activities: performers, conductors, audience, and theoreticians. Here I will briefly outline how Musical Stage Theory can influence their mutual relationship, for the best.

2.1 Performers/Conductors

It goes without saying that the identification of musical works with performances has the beneficial consequence for performers of bringing to the fore the relevance of their role. The acknowledgement of the essentiality of their role for the final shape of the work gives performers freedom to experiment new ways of performing. Indeed, if the work is no more identified with an immutable and abstract entity which performers should strive to instantiate in the most faithful way, but instead with a flexible and variable entity whose features may change according to contextual influences, then performers are brought at the front of the stage.

The benefits I mentioned for performers can easily apply to conductors as well. Also conductors can in fact have more freedom in experimenting with their rendition of orchestral scores. These beneficial consequences obviously bear an influence also on the relationship between music and the audience.

2.2 Audience

The leeway granted to performers from Musical Stage Theory allows them to give renditions of a score which do not follow the tracked path. An actualisation of these renditions, especially of repertoires which have already been explored in depth by a multitude of performers, can have as a further consequence a renewed interest from the part of the wider public for this overplayed portion of music.

The contextual assessment of both the notions of ‘musical work’ and ‘authenticity’ within Musical Stage Theory has as one of its principal criteria the role played by the audience. The consideration for its needs and expectations partly shapes the work in its final form. An increasing focus on the audience means also an increasing focus on the interaction between musicians and the audience and, as a consequence, more

customised renditions. These consequences could not but be a benefit for the public of listeners.

2.3 Theoreticians

The more obvious advantage that should derive to theoreticians from the proposal of Musical Stage Theory as an ontological view is the contribution that it can bring to the debate on the matter. Besides that, the guiding principles of Musical Stage Theory should convince theoreticians, especially musicologists, to have a more critical approach towards treatises and, in general, to what is assumed as the 'traditional' performing practice. Instead, they should be more considerate of the context in which a performance, or an act of composition, is included, and judge its nature and authenticity on this basis.

Shaping the framework for an ontological theory which can subsume and explain different music activities brings beneficial implications also to the debate on authenticity in musical performance. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, the explanation of when a performance can be deemed authentic is not helped by an indifference towards musical practices which are involved with the assessment of this authenticity. Instead, an acknowledgement of the influence of contextual factors for the evaluation of authenticity helps, as shown, to interpret the linguistic and evaluative behaviour that we have in respect to the issue.

Lastly, a further implication that Musical Stage Theory can bring to the theoretical enquiry over musical works is the result of the collaboration between the fields of music, philosophy of art, and metaphysics which I set at the beginning as one of the main aims of the thesis. As already mentioned in the Introduction and in other sections, pursuing this collaboration would bring an advantage to research in all these fields, making it richer and exhaustive.

2.4 Composers

There is an actor which I did not mention within this analysis yet: the composer. Which benefit should the composer derive from Musical Stage Theory given that the role of

'work of music' has been taken away from her creation? As explained when outlining the structure of Musical Stage Theory, this theory is well-aware of the relevance of the composer's role for the work, despite identifying the work with the performance. Furthermore, also other, more traditional theories, like the type-token theory or even Musical Perdurantism, do not recognise the composer's action as the work.[493] The benefit that the analysis of Musical Stage Theory could bring to composers, instead, is to see their creation renewed under a different perspective each time a performer interprets it.

3. Further Directions

In the previous section I highlighted some of the beneficial implications that the research carried out in this thesis may bring. However, it is necessary to point out also its limitations. Most of these may be ascribed to the constrained size of this work, and thus may be covered by further directions of research.

Given the interdisciplinary nature of the research and the many different considerations that it involves in regard to the nature and social aspects of music, the directions for further research are numerous. Here, I will limit myself to indicating three possible topics: the first is purely metaphysical, the second would lead to a development of the collaboration between theory and practice started in this thesis, and the last involves and experimental approach to research.

A first line of further research that could be undertaken is a discussion on which theory about time would best suit the ontological layout of Musical Stage Theory. More precisely, it would be interesting to investigate which of the available theories would be the most appropriate to explain the temporal aspect of the nature of musical works as presented by Musical Stage Theory. The three main approaches that we can take towards time are presentism, eternalism, and the growing block theory. To briefly recapitulate what each of these views claims, presentism is the view that only present objects exist, eternalism claims that past and future objects exist just as much as

[493] Only D. Davies' action theory does that. See D. Davies 2004.

present objects, while for the growing block theory the past and the present exist while the future is progressively coming into being.

Within this thesis, I did not take a stance in regard to which of these theories would be the best one to complement the ontological description given by Musical Stage Theory. Analysing which of these three theories is better able to portray the temporal aspect of musical works would be beneficial, since it would allow us to have a deeper and more complete knowledge about the nature of musical works. As a consequence, it would strengthen Musical Stage Theory as a suitable and exhaustive ontological theory.

A second line of research that could be pursued would strengthen further the link between theory and practice started in this work. In more than one chapter I mentioned how the ontological analysis of musical works would help also to better understand some practical aspects of musical activities. One of these, and maybe one of the more relevant ones, at least on an economic point of view, is the issue of copyright. In Chapter 4, I briefly argued how the development of technology for music composition would lead to consequences on the matter of copyright, depending on whether computers are deemed on a par in respect to humans when considering matters of intellectual property. But this is just one of the more straightforward effects of ontological considerations on copyright regulations. There are more and subtler ones. For instance, the relevance that is given to the performers' contribution to the work could affect the attribution of royalties. If Whitney Houston's version of *I Will Always Love You* is deemed a different one than Dolly Parton's, then Houston would have the right to claim for a part or all the royalties for her version.[494]

This consideration would apply not only to performers but, even more so, also to arrangers. If the arrangement of a work has enough original features in respect to the work arranged, then its arranger should be entitled to perceive royalties for it. An example of this is Dallapiccola's *Sonatina Canonica* for solo piano. Dallapiccola composed this work by arranging Niccolò Paganini's *24 Caprices for Solo Violin,* Op. 1. The SIAE – Italian copyright society – refused to recognise Dallapiccola's claim to full royalties as the *Sonatina Canonica* was deemed an arrangement without creative attributes. Arguably, instead, Dallapiccola's work displays remarkable inventiveness in its dadaistic attempt to produce something new from given material. This renewal

[494] See Chapter 6.

is the product of interpretative work whose originality I believe should be acknowledged. Attributing the right value to the arranger's contribution would thus have consequences also on a legal point of view.

Copyright is just one example of how ontological features of musical works may affect more practical considerations about them. Among the benefits brought by Musical Stage Theory I mentioned its appeal to all actors involved in musical activities. Conducting a detailed analysis of how this ontology may affect the way in which these actors interact with music would thus help highlighting these benefits even more in all their implications.

The last line of research that I wish to indicate here is also the one that would probably require more time and effort to undertake. The importance to shift the focus on the relevance of the audience as a factor which influences the contextual assessment of works has been underlined in many parts of the thesis. It would certainly be interesting to research in more detail how exactly the audience influences the way performers play, for example through interviews and experiments conducted on both listeners and players. But it would also be intriguing to examine the situation from the audience's point of view, i.e. analysing the biases we as listeners bear in respect to certain ways of performing or certain repertoires and how these biases affect our reception of music. I already discussed an example of these biases when addressing computer-based composition and performance. The biased approach that we may have listening to a musical work is not only limited to music produced or composed by AI, it is instead much more extended. Examining the spread of this phenomenon would be extremely useful for a sociological analysis of the reception of music.

As I mentioned in the Introduction, Musical Stage Theory is not intended merely as an ontological theory of musical works. It is aimed at having a deeper impact on the way in which we approach musical works either by playing, composing, listening, or researching on them. The implications of the research and the further lines of enquiry that I quickly outlined in this Conclusion should hopefully give an idea of the extent of the impact that Musical Stage Theory can have on our modes of interactions with music. If the collaboration between theory and practice, between philosophy and music, is successful, then we can have the opportunity to better understand musical practices and to actually make an impact on them through a theoretical approach.

Appendix

Extracts from Interviews

Interview n. 1
07/08/2015, Bologna
Four mainstreams performers

CM: When you read a work for the first time, do you consider which would be the most authentic way to perform it?

G: For example when I play operas the first thing I do is playing the notes as they are written, with the solfeggio that is written and so on. After that, in a second moment, I look at what has been done in the performing practice.

CM: Does your approach to the work change according to the period in which it has been written? And if yes, in which way?

V: Yes, if I approach a Romantic piece I take more freedom in respect to a Baroque or contemporary piece.

A1: Yes…when I start studying a Romantic piece I first read it, then I address the most difficult parts and I do technical exercises on them, while as for a Classical piece or Bach I would not do it.

CM: I will now list the principal requirements which an authentic performance should respect according to many scholars. I would like you to put them in order of importance for you, from the most to the least important:

1. **Respect for the composer's instructions provided on the score (everything that can be included on the score);**
2. **Respect for the composer's intentions according to the information you are provided with (literature, letters, documents, testimonies, essays, …);**

3. **Respect for the performing traditions of the period;**
4. **Compliance with the audience's expectations (do they vary according to different kinds of audience?);**
5. **Use of period instruments.**

A1: I would swap 2 and 1, 1 at the same level than 3, then 4 and 5.

A2: Maybe 1 and 2 at the same level, then I don't know.

G: This one is interesting [4]. Because I have always thought about that but I would never put it at the top of the list. For example, in theatre in Italy the public always waits for the acute at the end of the *cabaletta*, while abroad they do it less. I would put it at the bottom with the period instruments.

V: Yes, 3, 4, 5 as 3, 4, 5, and then 2, 1…

G: But if I say that it depends on the kind of repertoire?

V: It depends also on the composers.

A1: With contemporary composers number 1 does not make sense, you should think about number 2. There are things which cannot be possibly performed by humans.

G: As for operas it is much more important for me to connect to the score in a first phase of study because the practice is so degenerated and full of tradition – much more than for the other repertoires – that I consider it a more relevant thing. But as for the final performance I deem it more relevant the connection with the composer than that with the score, even if the score is the link we have with the composer. Her intentions can be read in it.

CM: If you depart from the score because you think that the composer would wish that, is your performance authentic? More authentic than if you respected fully the score?

G: In the opera repertoire it is full of this kind of cases. It is obvious that the composer cannot write down everything.

A1: Yes, for me it is more authentic if you depart from the score.

CM: What do you think about the authenticity of Bach's works performed on the piano?

V: Bach is a case in which the practice made possible for the concept of authenticity to become something different.

A1: It has become a purer Bach.

V: Personally when I listen to Bach on the clavichord it is more difficult for me to follow the musical speech.

A1: It has transformed Bach's image. There are certain things that are virtuosic for a harpsichord and on the piano they become the image of a Bach who thinks about God, and maths, and abstract things. It becomes a purer Bach.

CM: Do you consider the recording of a performance just as a live performance?

V: No, unless you are in the perfect world.

A2: No.

V: In a live performance you perceive the full piece, while the studio recording you have cuts.

G: They are two different things. If you want to listen to the perfection you listen to a CD, if you want to perceive physical emotions…

A1: Even in Michelangeli, some flaws, small blemishes become beautiful things. If they cut them with a digital intervention they would have lost something. At least for us who have listened to Michelangeli's recordings for a long time, we are used to these flaws.

(Translation from the Italian by the author)

Interview n. 2
08/08/2015, Bologna
Mainstream performer/conductor

CM: When you read a work for the first time, do you consider which would be the most authentic way to perform it?

A: The first thing I do, speaking of conducting and so the study of orchestral scores and not piano scores, is to do some research on the piece and on everything which has to do with the origin of it: when it has been written, the composer, in which period of the composer's life it has been written, and so on. Then I must say that in an automatic way, after years of study, on the basis of the period or of the author, I approach the piece in a different way. I would never play in the same way Mozart, Beethoven, Brahms, or Stravinsky. Then, this concept of authenticity you are talking about is intertwined with a philological study of a piece. I am not a fanatic of the philology in the sense that I do not feel the urge to perform a piece like, for example, a Mozart's Symphony only with period instruments and so on. But it is true that a certain kind of articulation, a certain kind of tradition of practice exists and obviously I take it into account.

CM: Does your approach to the work change according to the period in which it has been written? And if yes, in which way?

A: It changes according to the piece and especially to the period, to the style.

CM: I will now list the principal requirements which an authentic performance should respect according to many scholars. I would like you to put them in order of importance for you, from the most to the least important:

1. **Respect for the composer's instructions provided on the score (everything that can be included on the score);**
2. **Respect for the composer's intentions according to the information you are provided with (literature, letters, documents, testimonies, essays, …);**
3. **Respect for the performing traditions of the period;**

4. **Compliance with the audience's expectations (do they vary according to different kinds of audience?);**
5. **Use of period instruments.**

A: So, well the composer's instructions on the score for sure. What do you mean by composer's intentions?

CM: That is what cannot be written on the score and that you can get from philological studies, essays, or letters.

A: Yes, this one yes. Both what is written and what is not…and also the performing traditions of course. And, then, yes the use of period instruments, even if I am not a fanatic about that. I could not choose between a Beethoven conducted by Gardiner or Harnoncourt. I think that the point is that we are not a public from the 18th century and that if we hear a seventh diminished…we have in our cultural baggage everything that happened after. So I don't know if we can combine your concept of authenticity with a concept of philology. Because another thing which is very important to consider is the effect it must have on the public. So, is it more important to give an interpretation or the fact that everything is perfect, that everything is in a perfect style? It is really difficult to say because, for example, the *First* of Beethoven begins in a way that for the public of that period was, oh my!, it begins with a seventh and not with the tonic! But after having listened to Stravinsky it does not make the same effect anymore. So what are we looking for? That everything is perfect or that it has an impact on the public? So I don't know, as for the instruments it is a delicate matter.

CM: Would you consider the execution of the WTC by Bach on a synthesiser which has the exact timbre of a harpsichord authentic?

A: I am a bit conservative but what worries me is not the synthesiser with its timbre, but the fact that if there is not a person behind then it cannot be considered right. I cannot believe that a synthesiser has the same musicality that a performer can transmit, a good performer.

CM: Do you consider the recording of a performance at the same level of a live performance?

A: So, even this is very complicated because the emotion that you have in a live performance is not the same on a disc. It is difficult because the recordings, the discs are a great source. Useful, nice, I am not one of those who say that we shouldn't record. But it is also true that the emotion that you feel in a live performance is not the same. You shouldn't arrive at the levels of Celibidache who at a certain stage of his life did not want to record anymore because he said that there were those high frequencies and the recording was not good…it depends even on the kind of recording. It is true also that part of the harmonics are lost. I consider it a very useful source, but anyway I consider that a good live performance gives you a different emotion. In a recording there is a filter, the fact that you don't have the performers in front of you. The fact that you don't perceive the same energy and you don't share it with others. But it is not to be despised.

(Translation from the Italian by the author)

Interview n. 3
13/08/2015, Bologna
Mainstream performer

CM: When you read a work for the first time, do you consider which would be the most authentic way to perform it?

L: Not at the beginning. After having read it then yes, but the first thought is not what is the most authentic way to perform it, but in which context it lies.

CM: So you consider the period in which it has been written.

L: Yes, the composer and the period. Then it follows the thought about which would be the most authentic way to perform it.

CM: So you look up for information…?

L: There is usually an opera number…maybe I already know it, maybe I have never studied or listened to it. If there is an opera number usually I look up at what it is, when it has been written. Maybe if it has been written just before the death [of the composer] or as a first opera. And then I start studying it.

CM: I will now list the principal requirements which an authentic performance should respect according to many scholars. I would like you to put them in order of importance for you, from the most to the least important:

1. **Compliance with the audience's expectations (do they vary according to different kinds of audience?);**
2. **Use of period instruments;**
3. **Respect for the composer's intentions according to the information you are provided with (literature, letters, documents, testimonies, essays,…);**
4. **Respect for the performing traditions of the period;**
5. **Respect for the composer's instructions provided on the score (everything that can be included on the score)**

L: The respect of the expectations at the end to be coherent. So, 5, 3, 4, 2, and 1.

CM: So the instrument and the expectations…

L: So, I place the respect for the instruments at the bottom because I think it is really difficult to make it possible. This (5) is at the first place for correctness and anyway the music is a language. When we play I think that we should read what it is written. And this (3) is at the second place but it could be even at the first. This (3) maybe can be unsure but it is at the top because the meaning of who composes is to write something with a message and that message should arrive. This (4) I put it at the third place, because it is part of the message, but it is not fundamental. I could see a big break between 5 and 3 and all the rest. It is like 5 and 3 are at the same level at the top and all the rest equally at the bottom.

CM: But if you are reading a manuscript from the Baroque period without the editor's intervention, would you consider the respect for the score fundamental and so you do not dare to add something personal, or are you are tempted to respect the performing tradition of the Baroque period and then to add things, change rhythm…?

L: No, let's say that if there aren't instructions on the score, I think we can do other things in the attempt to reach the respect for the composer's intentions but if these things are present I would not do the contrary. I would not do something against what it is written but this doesn't mean that I wouldn't do other things where they are not written, that is what I do actually. I would never subtract, but I would add. I don't see the adding as a tragic thing if it is an adding with a scope toward the traditional practice or to reach the 3, while I deem the contrary as a departure from authenticity.

(Translation from the Italian by the author)

Interview n. 4
03/11/2015, Skype
Early Music performer/researcher

[The questions asked to the participant were the same that have been asked to the others but the conversation flew more freely and there was no strict Q&A exchange]

Music is the act of performance, the score is not art. The performance is art. There is a difference between literature and theatre and in the same way there should be a difference between musicology and performing practice.

What we have on paper is only an idea. It is like the difference that stands between the cookbook and the cooked meal. Above all, the thing that is most distant from my way of working is the conception of music as art. When you play at a wedding, you're not doing art but a job. Music is a necessary human activity and it always has been. Not every work has been written with an intellectual purpose. I prefer to start from the music, I start from the object and then I think about the context. The printed version, the *vulgata* that circulates among the musicians, has its own value even if it is wrong and even if it is slightly different from the author's intentions. Fetishism for the manuscript is important from a musicological point of view, from a performance point of view, instead, I do not know.

Even the history of 415/430 Hz is a farce. These are all conventions that we have created for the market more than anything else. In my group we play at 436 Hz because Giuseppe Sarti did this research in St. Petersburg. In Paris in the same period they played at 435 Hz. We opted for 436 Hz which results from the study of Patrizio Barbieri. It's our choice, it's okay for Sarti but if you play Boccherini ... Authenticity is a historical-philosophical expression of humanity. Every teacher has his own idea, neither one nor the other is right. Authenticity is to be honest, to have a personal approach within a coherent system and to justify our choices not only according to taste. Because we indeed know something. For example, we know that the piano did not exist before 1770. According to objective criteria, everyone should develop a theory that must be consistent.

Authenticity does not exist. If you do not transmit joy, music as entertainment is over. Music is entertainment, so if you do not entertain people, people understand that something is wrong.

(Translation from the Italian by the author)

Interview n. 5
10/11/2015, Skype
Early Music conductor/researcher

[The questions asked to the participant were the same that have been asked to the others but the conversation flew more freely and there was no strict Q&A exchange]

The musical work exists as it is on the manuscript. The work is this for me. There is my interpretation of it, my ability to make it accessible to those who cannot read the notes, but the reality of the musical entity for me is the tradition of a piece.

We are witnessing one of the biggest historical deceptions, that of ancient music. The movement has completely lost its driving force, also the fact that we all play at 415 Hz is absurd. There is not a single way to play.

What we do is interpreting the historical reality. However, even if we are as historically informed as possible, it is clear that we do not have the recordings of the time and even if we had them we would not like them. Just look at the early 20th century recordings with singers who worked with Giuseppe Verdi. They know how to sing Verdi. If you ask a Verdi's aficionado to listen to these recordings, she will be disgusted. But there's nothing more authentic than that.

We live in a world where the Baroque recital is sung by the countertenor. And this is the worst thing you can do. This for me is emblematic of the distortion of the concept of authenticity. The voice of the countertenor cannot be compared to a natural voice because a certain type of tension is used. The use of the countertenor was intended to create an idea of distance in the listener. This is therefore an absolutely modern necessity. The problem is, what are we selling to the public?

(Translation from the Italian by the author)

Interview n. 6
12/04/2016, Leicester
Orchestra player, 2nd Violin

CM: Is being authentic in the pieces you play a concern for you?
E: It depends on the repertoire. Certainly yes for the Early Music.

CM: Do you have the feeling that now the interpretations are a bit stiff?
E: It depends where one works. There are some players who naturally understand what is required and there are players who do not understand it at all. Sometimes the conductors would look for authentic interpretations and other conductors like things long and joined and I get very frustrated. I used to play for this Chamber orchestra that does quite a lot of authentic types of interpretation and it was great. Everybody knew what to do. Some specialist conductors still play authentically on modern instruments and I very much enjoy that.

CM: Do you think that it is more important to be respectful of the score or to understand the composer?
E: It's kind of one and the same thing. In some scores the composer would not indicate everything because people would know how to play. If I were to play Bach I would try to use parts and not Peters editions.

CM: Should the performer have a major role in shaping the concept of authenticity?
E: Yes I think so. In every performance there is a part of personal interpretation and it becomes partly yours. You should make an informed personal interpretation. With more modern composers I'm sure that there are things that I don't know and I just play because I do things from the heart and maybe I am missing something. For me it's only the earlier music I would be concerned about.

CM: Is the concept of authenticity changing over time?
E: Roger Norrington, playing a vibrato in Elgar, I think that's a gimmick. For a while they said you shouldn't use vibrato in Early Music and now they say that vibrato is an

expression and so you should use it. So yes, I think it is shaping over time. I think it is possible to make authentic performance on modern instruments obtaining a fabulous result. But you wouldn't have that result without having Early Music interpretations first. So, it is progressive. I formed on the Baroque violin at college and that helped me when I came to play on modern instruments. It is the same with the pianoforte and the piano.

CM: Why has there been this concern for authenticity?

E: Maybe people are more interested in it, they have more time, there is more academic research, the standard is higher.

Interview n. 7
12/04/2016, Leicester
Orchestra player, 2nd Violin

CM: What is your stance towards the authenticity issue?
S: At my level of technical execution I am always playing at the demands of somebody else's idea. My training has taken care of what they might ask for. In that sense it isn't a worry for a performer because one has the material in her hand. We are ready to deliver on demand. As an orchestral musician who is playing for a conductor it isn't a worry. As an individual one has feelings. As a soloist, I would be concerned that I would have to make my mind up on what I am going to do. I wouldn't play on a Baroque instrument partly because I haven't played enough on that. Most violinists would read Leopold Mozart's treatise as a guide. But only some, because in every case personal expression as a soloist always interferes. I don't think that any soloist is 100% concerned with authenticity.

CM: Do you think that performers should play a more relevant role in shaping the concept of authenticity?
S: I wouldn't say they should, I think that many do. In practice getting something absolutely authentic is merely a concept and the more one is personally expressive, the more danger there is that one moves away from being authentic.

CM: The concept of authenticity maybe is not a fixed one…
S: I think it is an ideal, I don't think it actually exists. I worked with Harnoncourt and I don't think that even one as learned as that would tell you that there is such a thing absolutely. I don't really think that authenticity exists 100%. There is a willingness to embrace the style of a previous time. John Wilson is almost unique among 20th century interpreters and wants to achieve the authenticity of the Hollywood sound. To me it is a mere recreation. I don't think there is something authentic. I don't think they are the same thing.

CM: So authenticity is only playing mindfully.

S: I think you can't really get more than being coherent with your choice. One thing that concerns me is that the authenticity movement has almost cut out from my generation players who play on modern instruments and critics who write about the classical period and earlier. They are so critical that I feel as a generation we have lost the right to play this music. It's not that we can't play with integrity but people write as we should play like that. And this is one aspect of the authentic movement that really bothers me. Because it is in one's musical education. Classical music and Early Music should be reclaimed to be heard played on modern instruments and accepted. Authenticity can be given on modern instruments.

CM: Do you think there is a clash between Classical-Romantic and Early Music?

S: There is a clash. After three hundred years of fashion changing in housing, art, architecture, … I am not surprised that fashion in music is also changing. I think fashion has something to do with it. The authentic movement and its demand that one goes back to the original instruments has swung the debate too much on the other way and has stolen some ground that should be available to all musicians.

CM: Why this urge to search for authenticity?

S: People became curious of older instruments. Maybe people wanted to play something new. I greatly regret that the authentic movement has stolen this ground and that the contemporary movement is underrepresented.

Interview n. 8
12/04/2016, Leicester
Orchestra player, viola

CM: Is authenticity a matter of concern for you when you play or not?
G: Ideally every serious artist should try to be as authentic as possible but it is an ideal. Depending on the context or whether you are very nervous and then you only try to remember the music. Some people take the composer and the score by the letter, some people are much freer. There is no right or wrong answer according to my opinion. It's just how people think and how you are authentic completely changes in regard to your background…

CM: Should the concept of authenticity change in time?
G: I guess so, it isn't necessarily fixed in any case. There isn't one ideal of what authentic means because it depends on the context, the teacher, the school. I don't know how it would evolve but I think it would, because music always keeps evolving.

Interview n. 9
27/05/2016, Montréal
Baroque oboe player

[The questions asked to the participant were the same that have been asked to the others but the conversation flew more freely and there was no strict Q&A exchange]

One of the most important aspects of authenticity which I use in my philosophy of playing is a lifestyle authenticity. In the Romantic period composers had this elevated status in the society and so composers were set apart from workers. But in the 18th century composers were just doing their job. For me that really humanises composers. Bach was maybe non-human in some respects but from the other side he was just doing his job and supporting his family. I like bringing those people back to Earth. No matter what we do with instruments or other choices, most musicians have struggled to pay bills through history. They were just throwing things together without money and rehearsal. And this gives much more flexibility. Bach used small choirs because that was all they could afford. And I think there is some authenticity in this.

It's clear that using period instruments is important for me. With Bach you can play on just about any instruments and it works. But it's not like that with all composers. If you're playing less known composers who were making big use of temperament, on an equally tempered keyboard it is not going to have the same effect. This just lessens the impact. All those textural things, like singing without vibrato, … Whether or not we end up in anything we can call authentic I think that by exploring what people thought we can end up with a performance that's more authentic to us. I think this is the most important aspect of authenticity: doing something with integrity and honesty.

The limitations of our epistemology are so huge that it's impossible to arrive at anything that may be called authenticity. We have so much cultural baggage in history now and we're looking at things with a brain on the other side of an industrial and cultural revolution that it's impossible for us to actually being in the mindset of these composers. The use of language and the cultural assumptions are so different that it's almost impossible to reach authenticity. The idea of authenticity is useful as an

analytical tool but striving for authenticity is useless because we don't know what we are aiming for.

The Early Music Movement is a postmodern phenomenon which is reacting to what was happening at that moment. Minimalism and the Early Music Revival happened at the same time not by accident. They struggled to return to an earlier style, a tonal style, with fewer means (not complex tables of tones like serialism). A lot of new music is still lacking in style. Not individually, but there's no cultural homogeneity. I suppose there's an argument that says that's a good thing. It's more democratic maybe. It means that a composer that has completely different ideas can still find her way.

I would be inclined to say that authenticity has a place in the discourse but only in very relative contexts. For example being authentic to the lifestyle of the musicians, or other things. There is no universal blanket of authenticity that can be applied to all pieces. That's more a semantic problem.

[The following extracts are shorter, since the discussion on authenticity was only a small part of a wider discussion with the participants]

Interview n. 10
25/05/2016, Montréal
Philosophy professor

Authenticity can mean very different things in different contexts. It can be intended as the mediation between the audience and a tradition and not as the perfect reproduction of what the composer wanted. Authenticity is a two-place predicate. It is authenticity *to* something and you can fill the blank in different ways. There is more than one legitimate way of being authentic.

Interview n. 11
26/05/2016, Montréal
Choir conductor and professor

I like the idea that there are no limits in what to be considered authentic. The concept of authenticity is of little use. It is more an historical concept.

Interview n. 12
28/05/2016, Montréal
Early Music professor

I find it hard to say what authenticity is. It has so many parameters that it is hard to see where it fits in. The concern for authenticity that the Early Music Movement showed is a phenomenon in-between wars and it was used also in Germany to build a national style. But people also wanted to go back to the past because the contemporary music did not have homogeneity.

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