The Diversity of Private Slaving Strategies in Classical Athens

by

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Abstract

To a degree, classical Athenian slavery is very easy to describe. It was a system that attached rights of ownership to particular individuals within Athens' polity, legally defined as a distinct status group: *douloi*. Nevertheless, the legal definition of slavery does not in and of itself account for some of the different characteristics of slavery as it appears in different examples throughout classical Athenian history. In order to provide a more nuanced picture of slavery and its consequences, this PhD discusses Athenian slavery from the perspective of slaveholding strategies: the varying ways in which classical Athenian slave-owners employed slaves and the different methods of coercion they applied as appropriate to these varying uses. This approach is drawn from the work of Joseph Miller, who tried to eschew definitions of 'the institution of slavery', in favour of a more dynamic progression of varied, though interrelated, historical phenomena. In so doing, this thesis sheds light on both the complexity of Athens' slave system and its equally complex interaction with Athens' society and economy. It also helps describe the wide and often commented on variation in the lives of Athenian slaves.

With the exception of its first chapter, this study is based around case studies of specific slaving strategies in a particular source, to capture the inherent individuality of slaving strategies from example to example. However, I use wider sources, mostly from Athens but also from other historical slaving societies, to note differences between similar examples of enslavement and contextualise these individual examples within the broader history of Athens and of slaving. The selection of case-studies, moreover, is meant to provide further scholarship on forms of Athenian slavery that have not been studied in much detail before.

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Though I am to be held accountable for any remaining mistakes in what follows, this PhD owes a vast debt to the input of a number of individuals. Stephen Hodkinson has supervised my major academic projects from my undergraduate degree until his well-deserved retirement in 2018. Whatever success I have had in higher education so far is, to a truly unmeasurable extent, dependent on his meticulous and critical yet consistently supportive feedback throughout the years. Steve always went above and beyond the duties of a supervisor; it has been a privilege to have him. I have also had a long relationship with my third supervisor Kostas Vlassopoulos, in whose undergraduate class I developed my interest in Athens and Athenian slavery. Kostas' input has been irreplaceable, and I am grateful that he agreed to remain my supervisor despite his move away from Nottingham. The unendingly insightful suggestions of my second supervisor Andrew Bayliss have also been very much appreciated, and I am also grateful for the invaluable support of Edmund Stewart, who replaced Professor Hodkinson as my first supervisor in the final year of my PhD.

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provided me with advice and support throughout my doctoral research. Due to restrictions of space, I will say only that they know who they are and that I hope that they know how grateful I am to them.

List of Abbreviations

BMCR	Brynmawr Classical Review.
D-K	Diels, H. and Kranz, W. (1952), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin.
FGrHist	Jacoby, F. (1923–1958), *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, Berlin and Leiden.
K-A	Kassel, R. and Austin, C. (1983-2001), *Poetae Comici Graeci*, Berlin.
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae*
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*
SGDI	*Sammlung der Griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften*
West	West, M. L. (1989-1992), *Iambi et Elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantata*, Oxford.

All abbreviations of journal titles are from the list proffered by *L'Année Philologique*. All abbreviations for ancient sources are from the list in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (fourth edition).

Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.

Introduction

> It may well be… that no general theory of slavery is possible given that the core of the phenomena to which we attach the term — the transfer of full rights in a person — is so simple that the idea can arise again and again in quite disparate… structural contexts. (Kopytoff, 1982, 224)

> Understanding that a person was a slave is not the end of the story but the beginning, for the slave's history was derived from experiences that differed from place to place and time to time and not from some unchanging transhistorical verity… Yet, because slavery was such a powerful, all-encompassing relationship, scholars have often been transfixed by the commonalities that slavery produced. (Berlin, 1998, 3)

As Kopytoff and Berlin note in an anthropological study of slavery and a study of slavery in the history of the colonial USA respectively, the shared legal status imposed on slaves — though undoubtedly a crucial feature of their lives — often obscures the more complex reality of the history of slavers and of enslaved persons. Though these writers had in mind historical differences across large geographical areas and time, their observations are also true of the history of enslaved persons within a single society.

This thesis intends to examine the history of divergent experiences that comprised the history of slaves in classical Athens, in as much as our limited evidence allows. It also outlines a variety of reasons for this divergence by reference to the different strategies in which masters employed slaves. In order to lay the groundwork for my subsequent discussion, however, I will first provide an overview of some gaps in modern scholarship and then, in a following section, explain the methodology drawn from comparative slavery studies that I propose to employ to address them. The final section of this introduction will provide an outline of my chapters, justify my choice of particular case studies in later chapters, and discuss some other issues relevant to my overall discussion.

The Diversity of Athenian Slaveries in Modern Scholarship

The bibliography on Athenian slavery is exceedingly long. Slavery was a crucial component of Athenian society and it permeates any category of ancient evidence one might care to name. Slaves frequently appear in Athenian texts of all genres and descriptions, as well as inscriptions and art.[1] As such, slavery features prominently in modern discussions of Athens' law, economy, or culture and society more generally.[2] While there is still no book-length treatment of Athenian slavery, there have been several studies of various aspects of it and Athens features heavily in many of the numerous books on ancient slavery published since the mid-1950s.[3]

Statements in Athenian literature sometimes portray slaves as a homogenous group and often in a universally derogatory manner.[4] Several studies of slaves have accordingly focused on enslaved persons as a single group in opposition to freepersons.[5] Of course, in one respect, the slaves of

[1] Visual representations aside, scholars have struggled to study enslaved persons from the perspective of archaeology (Morris, 1998). Thompson (2003) and Morris (2018), however, admirably marry the literary evidence to that of physical remains. A few more focused examples include Davidson (1997, 86–90); Morris and Papadopoulos (2005).

[2] Much of the most prominent recent work on the Greek economy, which subscribes itself to the school of New Institutional Economics (NIE): Bresson (2016, esp. 15–27) Ruffing (2016); Ober (2016, 5–6); Scheidel et al (2007), has not satisfactorily integrated slavery into its analysis (Vlassopoulos, 2016b; Lewis, 2017b, 2).

[3] See Shaw's introduction to the new edition of Finley (1980).

[4] E.g. Demosthenes (22.55); Plato, *Gorg.* (43a–b); Xenophon (*Symp.* 2.3–4); cf. Millet (2007, 195–6); Kamen (2009); Finley (1980, 186–9) with Herodotus (4.1–4); Vogt (1974, 7–24). Aristotle famously argued that the divide between free and slave was based in their natural suitability for these roles throughout the first book of his *Politics* (Millet, 2007; Garnsey, 1996, 12–16; 107–127; Brunt, 1993; Smith, 1983, 110; cf. below, 118 n. 71).

[5] Wrenhaven (2012); duBois (2003, *passim*; 1991, 62–4); Doblhofer (1992, 18–23); Cartledge (1993, chapter 6); Hunter (1992); in Greek art, Himmelmann (1971, 21–43); in physiognomic thought, Weiler (2002); in Greek drama, Wiles (1988).

Athens did comprise a homogenous group as a single status of rightlessness individuals in Athens' law.[6] My intention is not to argue with the undoubted significance of this fact. This remains a study of slavery, by which I mean that it is concerned with how the subjection of persons to this legal status worked in practice and how it affected the lives of those subjected to it. Ancient representations, however, are at least partially reflections of slaveholding ideology rather than historical reality, and even in the eyes of contemporary Athenians, a complex and diverse set of attitudes towards enslaved persons is observable in our evidence.[7] Athenians were perfectly capable of recognising the variety of slave circumstances and acknowledging the reasons for this variation in their *deliberate* utilisation of different methods of coercion. Aristotle, for one, stated that there were several "types of slaves" defined by their "work" (*Politics*, 1277a37-8) — he gives slave craftsmen as an example thereof.

In truth, it is something of an injustice to scholars of classical Athenian slavery to suggest that they have exaggerated the similarities between slaves to the same extent as their counterparts studying Atlantic slavery. Indeed, the enormous differences between slaves in Athens and the ancient world generally (which mark these slave systems as truly distinct from those of the modern Americas) render such a characterisation obviously incorrect. Perhaps the most famous expression of the variety of slave conditions is Finley's description of a "spectrum of statuses" in the ancient world (1973, 64–5), which noted the diverse range of *de facto* privileges and opportunities which slaves held. Over half a century ago, Westermann wrote that the "treatment and living conditions of slaves

[6] Hunter (2000); Todd (1993, 190-1); Harrison (1966, 172).

[7] Few of the authors referenced in n. 5 above argue for uncomplicated or universally derogatory opinions on enslaved persons, and many studies bear out the varied representations of different types of slaves. E.g. Fisher (1995, *passim*) notes that a degree of honour was said to be due slaves — especially those in important positions in Athenian households; Himmelmann (1971, 43–4) discusses the diversity of artistic depictions of slaves and its relation to slave occupations and positions.

varied according to… changing economic uses of slave labor, to the extent that no general rule can be laid down" (1955, 1). Garlan, in his *Slavery in Ancient Greece* (1988), dedicated three and a half pages to the subject of how differing occupations of slaves (outlined at 60–73) affected the status of different groups of slaves (145–148), and other works on ancient slavery have since followed suit.[8] Generally speaking, these accounts differentiate between slave bankers, managers and commercial agents, independent craftsmen, domestic slaves, and mining slaves. They also note the higher level of privileges afforded to the first groups compared with the latter ones.

It is obviously well recognised that the different occupations to which slaves were assigned had important effects on their lives. However, the exact causes and effects of this phenomenon are still lacking an extended treatment. Many of the discussions listed above are summaries. The others suffer from examining Athenian slavery alongside slavery in Rome or the Greek world more generally, often stripping Athenian slavery from its unique historical circumstances. Probably the most comprehensive book on Greek slaves is Klees' *Sklavenleben im Klassichen Griechenland*, which collects a vast array of sources on Greek slavery and uses them to highlight various aspects of the lives of Greek slaves. Klees' coverage of the Greek world more broadly, however, often makes it difficult to properly assess the heterogeneity of slaves across different *poleis* and time periods. The same obscuring of slave heterogeneity is also clear from his organisation of the book by aspects of

[8] Fisher's first of two chapters on Athenian slavery is organised into discussions of individual groups of slaves (1993, esp. 47–57); Andreau and Descat (2011, 12), who also briefly mention the varied experiences of slaves throughout their discussion of slave occupations (66–91); Schumacher (2001, 239), whose second chapter consists of a lengthy excursus on slave occupations across Greece and Rome; Hermann-Otto (2009, 88–100) provides a survey of a few choice occupations and individual careers of Athenian slaves; Rihll (2011, 61–69); Tordoff (2017, 225–32).

slaves' lives, because many of these aspects were dictated by the specifics of their exploitation by their master.[9]

The fact of the matter is that slave status and, by extension, the institution of slavery itself, is difficult to capture in its complexity with broad characterisations. As one highly influential study on African slavery argues: "It is apparent… that as the complexity of the society increases and the use of 'slaves' becomes more varied, so there is greater variation in their social position… It becomes increasingly difficult to find a single pattern that will cover them all" (Kopytoff and Miers 1977, 46; cf. 57-8).[10] The same is true of Athens. Marxist scholars, in fact, have argued that despite their shared legal vulnerability, the diversity of slave conditions was such that ancient slaves — including those of Athens — cannot be considered as constituting a class in Marx's sense of the world (Utchenko and Diakonoff, 1970, 9; Christiansen, 2002).[11] Nafissi puts it well. "Any positive determination of [Athenian slaves] is… strictly absent in the general category itself, but will have to be found in particular slaves and their particular functions as bankers, domestics, miners, and so on" (2004, 398).

Kamen's *Status in Classical Athens* (2013) is probably the most detailed attempt to resolve this difficulty in scholarship on Athenian slavery. It describes enslaved persons as occupying one of two different socio-economic groups: slaves and privileged slaves (chapters 1 and 2). Attempting to

[9] Huemoeller (2018) criticises Hunt (2018b) on the basis that though he notes the incredibly diverse functions of slaves at various points throughout his handbook on Greek and Roman slavery, he does not examine this diversity in a systematic way.

[10] For similar remarks on Roman slavery, e.g. Bradley (1994, 1-10); Brazilian slavery, Klein and Luna (2010, 116–21).

[11] De Ste Croix believed that the complete subjection of slaves to their master's interests was enough to define them as a class, though he acknowledged that the diversity of slave circumstances complicates the issue (1981, 41–5, esp. 44–5).

categorise slaves by binary dichotomies, however, still does not capture the many examples of slavery and how they affected the lives of slaves.[12] More fruitful than identifying a limited set of status groups is a discussion of the specific privileges and restrictions that masters offered and imposed on their slaves and vital to this identification is outlining the strategies in which different enslaved persons were employed. Much ground has already been covered in this respect by studies of particular groups of Athenian slaves.[13] These studies, however, do not fully incorporate their conclusions into a wider framework of divergent Athenian slaveries. There are also many distinct strategies that have not been the subject of academic focus, which I will provide more attention to in this thesis.

Though the diversity of practices subsumed under the guise of Athenian slavery has not been studied systematically at any length, we have seen that it is vital to understanding the history of the institution as a whole. There is, in other words, room for discussion about the innumerable uses to which slave-owners put enslaved persons in classical Athens, the effects that this had on their lives, and how the uses and conditions of slaves relate to the context of classical Athens in particular. Part of this thesis is intended to both expand on the work of scholars who have tried to describe the

[12] As Davies has pointed out, sociologists have long moved past construing the status of an individual as a set point along a spectrum; instead, they described it as subject to a multitude of different factors and varying across different social contexts (2017).

[13] Book length treatments include Lauffer's two volume work on silver mining slaves (now a single book: 1979); Cohen (1992, chapter 4) and Trevett (1992) on banking slaves. Essay length studies include Rihll on mining (2011); Shipton (1997) and Deene (2011) on banking; Carlsen (2002) on slave agricultural managers; Perotti on slaves rented to another owner (1976; cf. Valente, 2013) and those who worked independently of their masters (1974; cf. Fisher, 2008; Kamen 2016). In 1960 Kazakévich had already published an essay in Russian that clarified much of the terminology regarding these two groups of slaves and their social conditions (now translated into English: 2008) and another on slave agents (1961).

multitudinous existence of slaves beyond their legal status and to assess the legitimacy of describing a shared experience of Athenian slavery in any form.

Furthermore, while the occupations of slaves have been the primary focus of analysis on the diversity of slaveries, this diversity is better viewed as subject to the particular method of coercion to which slave-owners subjected enslaved persons. The occupation of a slave certainly played a prominent — perhaps the most prominent — role in dictating what was different about the character of his or her own experience of slavery, but it was not the only factor. In order to try to better study the methods of slave exploitation in Athens, I propose to employ the methodology outlined by the historian of African and comparative slavery, Joseph Miller.

Slaving Strategies

The term "slaving strategies" is drawn from Miller's essay "Slaving as Historical Process" (2008, 70–2 *et passim*), which was later developed in his book *The Problem with Slavery as History* (2012). Miller's work is intended largely as a criticism of comparative approaches to historical slavery which treat the subject as a single historical phenomenon. The basis of comparative studies of slavery, obviously enough, functions on the idea that slavery constitutes a comparable method of human exploitation repeated by different cultures throughout history. In order to define and thereby to better articulate patterns of human behaviour in history, many scholars, particularly from the social sciences, have consequently approached the subject by picking out similarities in order to create "taxonomic imperatives", in the words of Vlassopoulos (2016a, 5–6). This is equally true of comparative studies of slavery, which have consistently applied themselves to formalising various all-encompassing definitions of historical slavery. To Miller this approach obscures the very different processes that gave rise to slavery at different times and in different places throughout human history and "excludes historical context by definition" (2012, 20). Miller has attempted to move the focus of slavery scholarship onto the historically specific contexts that led to it. Hence his use of the

active verb “slaving” and the term “strategies” — which highlights the deliberate and active role of the slaver in continuing this process. In his own words: “motivated human action, carefully contextualized, is… the starting point for my understanding of slaving” (2012, 8).

Miller is particularly critical of the highly influential book of Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death* (1982), which attempted to find a sociological definition for slavery across historical societies. In this book, Patterson defined slavery as “the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons” (1982, quotation at 13; cf. 21-7; 35–45). Though he is undoubtedly to be commended on observing these traits in countless examples of slavery that stretch across human history, the criteria on which Patterson bases his definition have received many valid criticisms. It is true that many slaves were forcibly removed from their native communities and retained (or were born into) a permanent state of divorce from formal ties to kinship.[14] Nonetheless, using natal alienation as a definitional criterion obscures the community and familial bonds which slaves have formed with others around them — insecure though these bonds may have been. Equally, though slave status was regularly a mark of dishonour, dishonour itself never marked them as distinct from other members of the community, nor were slaves denied access to honour without exception.[15] In other words, though natal alienation and dishonour were regular features of slavery, the unilateral and total application of these features to enslaved persons, which is implied by their use as a definition, is ahistorical.

[14] For the basis of Patterson’s “natal alienation” in the writings of Moses Finley, Lenski (2018b, 48–9).

[15] In ancient Greece, Fisher (1995; below, 118–19; 160). Toledano offers the same critique using evidence from the Ottoman Empire (2016).

The better-known and more widely-accepted definition delineates slaves as human property.[16] Various scholars, most famously Patterson (1982) but also notably Kopytoff and Meirs (1977), have argued in the past against the validity of the property definition.[17] Likewise Miller believes that the property definition only properly applies to slaves in the capitalist societies of modern history.[18] David Lewis, however, has recently argued for the legitimacy of a definition of slaves as property throughout history (2016b; 2018b, chapter 1). My own expertise is too limited for me to assert the universality of property as a concept (and hence its usefulness in defining human bondage) across human history.[19] I am, however, convinced by Lewis' argument that slavery amounted first and foremost to a property relationship in classical Athens (2016b, 38–40; 2018, 39–48) and the classical world more generally.[20] Athenian slavery allowed the attainment of legal rights to a person through methods of property transfer — "a slave could be bought, sold, traded, leased, mortgaged, bequested, presented as a gift, pledged for a debt, included in a dowry, or seized in a bankruptcy" (Davis, 1966, 32). Treating persons as property, I would argue, remains the only valid definition of slavery in Classical antiquity.

A definition of a category, however, is different from a description of the objects or concepts that fall within its remit and does not necessarily provide a good representation of their true character. In

[16] The League of Nations defined slavery in 1926 as "the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised". For the history of this definition and various objections to it, Weissbrodt (2002, 5–18).

[17] For references to and discussion of the debate, Lewis (2017a, 32–4; 2018, 26–9).

[18] "Property was thus a metaphorical— in fact, technically legal— aspect of slaving in the commercialized circumstances that arose from the distinctively capitalistic contexts of these recent times" (Miller, 2012, 34).

[19] See Patterson's rebuttal (2017, 266–70), though it is worth noting that Lewis' position has recently been supported by an expert on slavery in small-scale societies (Cameron, 2018, 155–6).

[20] As Chatterjee (2017) argues for South Asian societies. Harper and Scheidel (2018, 92–3) endorse Lewis' argument for ancient Rome.

the words of Hodkinson, cautioning against the application of cross-historical definitions to the status of Sparta's helots, "some considerable compression of actuality is inherent in the very process of classification" (2008, 287). Property, moreover, has "all the variability of any big, important cross-cultural category" (Harper and Scheidel, 2018, 92) — it is the flexibility of property as a legal concept that has allowed it to be so widely applied to societies across history by Lewis. Accordingly, some academics now object to the legal definition on the grounds of its limited usefulness, because the legal reality of slavery only provides a part of reality in a wider sense (Vlassopoulos, 2016a, 13; cf. Temperley, 1996, 146–7). So, for example, while legally speaking a slave was the property of a master, the relationship between the two as it was played out in reality was likely to have been conceived of by both parties in more human terms, as the domination of one over the other (Vlassopoulos, 2011a).[21] The legal status of slavery, however, cannot be divorced from the status of slaves or the function of slavery as a whole. In practical terms, it represented the Athenian community's sanction of the complete domination over the lives of slaves by those who owned them. It is worth restating that I will emphasise the practical consequences of this shared legal status at different points throughout this thesis.[22]

On one level, then, slavery could be described as the coercion of certain individuals by those who had gained property rights over their person. However, the nature of that coercion and the benefit it was intended to confer varied. This is most obvious in studies of cross-cultural slavery, but as we

[21] I agree with Lewis that the use of the term enslavement (*douloō*) in Greek literature to describe different forms of domination besides slavery proper is a metaphorical usage of the term rather than an indication of a different meaning when the word and its cognates are used to refer to enslaved persons (2018b, 61–9). Nevertheless, the importance of domination to the wider concept of slavery explains why the term was so easily mapped onto discussions of e.g. interstate relations.

[22] For carefully considered remarks on differentiating between legal and general history, Crook (1996), who notes the importance of recognising the influence of both on the other.

have noted, the same difficulties lie in describing Athenian slavery — a reflection of the multiple slaving strategies in Athenian society and others, which Miller does not discuss in detail.[23] The benefit of Miller's approach, nevertheless, is its ability to construct the reality of slavery which is often subsumed into its definition, in a manner which properly takes into account the motivated human action which engenders it. I believe that it can be directed towards the study of slavery in a single society. By attempting to focus on the different strategies which resulted in slavery in different contexts, I aim to better represent the diversity of slaveries that took place in Athens during its classical period, by surveying a large amount of evidence from across Athens' classical history. I use the term "strategy" to mean both the use of a slave to achieve a particular goal and the way in which the slave is coerced to do so — what Harper has termed the "aims and techniques of domination" in his book on slavery in late antiquity (2011, chapter 5). The aim of this thesis, in other words, is to categorise and differentiate between different "slaving strategies" which took place in Athens during the fifth and fourth century BC and, in so doing, to portray the complex and dynamic nature of slavery in Athens.

One criticism which has been made of an approach focusing on "slaving" is that it necessarily focuses on enslavers as historical agents rather than on those who are enslaved (Lovejoy, 2013). This is a valid criticism, but only if the agency of slaves is not carefully considered as a significant factor in informing the development of different slaving strategies. To be clear, slaveholders could not control every aspect of a slave's life and many probably did not care to. But the extent to which slave owners *did* try to direct the actions of their slaves to their benefit was considerable and often in

[23] Miller's work is concerned with the development of slavery in different contexts, rather than its varying features in a single society. "The strategies of slaving I have cited should be understood as defining these varying historical contexts only in the limited historical sense of becoming the politically efficacious, hence motivating of responses, uses of slaves amidst the great variety of strategies followed in every historical context" (Miller, 2012, 69).

contradiction to the desires of their slaves; as Xenophon wrote in his biography of the Persian King Cyrus the Great, "slaves serve their masters against their wills" (*Cyr.* 8.1.4).[24] Masters achieved this primarily through the threat of violence, relying on the tacit support of the free Athenian community to enforce their right to do so. Xenophon makes this clear in his *Hiero* (4.3) as does a passage of Plato's *Republic*, which describes the deference of household slaves to their master disintegrating if the household were magically transported to a remote location (578e–579a; Herman, 2006, 73).

In certain situations, however, the threat of violence was not always enough to prevent slaves from acting in opposition to the domination of their master and, in these situations, we often find slave resistance. Slave resistance was not restricted to full-blown revolt, of which there was none that we know of in Athens' classical period, but also consisted of acts conducted by smaller groups or individuals.[25] Perhaps most notably, slaves ran away, a fact best evidenced by the treaties between cities to prevent them from escaping permanently (Bresson, 2016, 228; cf. Theophrastus, *Char.* 18.8). Open resistance such as this would no doubt be faced with serious consequences. We have a story from the orator Antiphon about an Athenian slave boy stabbing his master, which states that had the identity of the boy in question not been discovered, all the enslaved persons in the household would have been executed (5.69). This is a sobering reminder of the repercussions which any attempt to return violence with like would have had for slaves, who were surely aware of this fact.

Other forms of resistance (such as sabotage, truancy and theft), were more difficult for masters to detect, though more so in some strategies than others. In certain situations, slaves consequently gained some small measure of power to use against their master, rendering it more profitable for masters to provide them with incentives to motivate their good work. This is what Hunt (2017) calls

[24] Similarly, a speech of Lysias takes for granted the idea that slaves will hold animosity towards their masters (7.35; cf. Euripides, *El.* 633).

[25] On Greek slave resistance and its various forms, Hunt (2017); McKeown (2011); Cartledge (2001, 138–40).

a “collaborative strategy” between master and slave, though he rightly emphasises their limits (in terms of advantages for slaves) and one-sidedness (in favour of slave-owners).

Specific slaving strategies, then, took account of and adapted to slave agency in their conceptualisation and implementation. What is more, the specific conditions of slavery imposed by a master on their slave (as well as their ability to enforce them), including the individual agency enslaved persons were allowed, depended on the requirements of different strategies. In other words, the limits of slavery were partially defined by the terms of a slave’s enslavement itself, a statement which will be reinforced by evidence in following chapters. It is for this reason that I do not consider Miller’s approach incompatible with the reality of slave agency. Besides which, attempting to understand the motivations of slave-owners is far from an invaluable exercise. Understanding forcibly coerced exploitation, or exploitation in general, is unquestionably as relevant in the modern world as it always has been.

Structure and Content

The first chapter of this dissertation provides a broad overview of some of the main divergences in different slaving strategies that took place in classical Athens, structured around some of the most important dichotomies in the different methods of exploiting slaves. This will help contextualise the more specific examples in later chapters within a wider framework of Athenian slaving strategies. As well as outlining some of the main ways in which slaving strategies varied, this chapter will address some of the broad reasons for this diversity, by examining in more detail the concept of strategies as I am employing it in this thesis and the underlying motivations which inspired and developed them.

The second and third chapters take as their subjects the slaving strategies of two households which differed in terms of their wealth. These chapters will examine how the interests of a single Athenian *oikos* (household) pursued several separable (though interlinked) slaving strategies. Both are largely

focused on specific case studies; the second chapter will examine the elite household described in Xenophon's *Oikonomikos* and the third the less affluent household of Euphiletos from Lysias' *Against Eratosthenes*.

To an extent, the discussion in both chapters will be driven by the evidence each of these sources provides and the emphases of their authors. Though case studies form the backbone of these chapters, I also discuss the application of the circumstances they describe to wider practices of Athenian slavery. Both case studies also describe agriculturally based households, partly because this was the economic activity with which most Athenians were concerned and (partially owing to this first fact) because it is agricultural households that are most prominent in our evidence.[26] I have, nevertheless, attempted to suggest how the strategies discussed in these chapters might have resembled and differed from those of non-agrarian households.

Having discussed the strategies of individual households, I will move on to discuss more specific examples of slaving strategies. Chapters 4 and 5 will discuss, respectively, strategies in which slaves were under the direct control of a slave-owner and those in which a master gave this control to another in return for a monetary return. Chapter 4 will compare and contrast the use of slaves in commercial mills with the use of slaves as commercial agents and financial managers, whereas Chapter 5 will consecutively examine the renting of slaves to another master, independent slaves working on their own, and the use of slaves as tenant managers of large properties. My discussion of the majority of these strategies will be focused on specific case studies, again with a view towards demonstrating their place in Athens' wider system of slavery. My discussion of milling slaves is an

[26] Despite Athens' position as one of the most significant trade ports of the Eastern Mediterranean, and the existence of extensive mining, manufacturing and service industries (to be covered in the following chapters), agriculture remained the means from which the majority of Athenians drew their livelihood (e.g. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1256a.39–41).

exception in this regard, since the sources for this particular slaving strategy are distributed across a wide range of scanty evidence.

My selection of strategies for discussion and specific case studies is meant in the first place to provide the reader with a good idea of the diversity of Athenian slaveries and the effects they had on slave lives. I have chosen, however, to omit several examples of slaving strategies which appear to have been particularly prominent in Athens, and/or had particularly unusual effects on the lives of the slaves they were subjected to. This is partially due to reasons of space and partially because these particular strategies have received scholarly attention in the past, to which I have little to add.

One notable exclusion from my thesis is a discussion of Athens' silver mining slaves, who have generated several extensive (though, admittedly, inconclusive) studies.[27] I have also avoided extended discussion of Athens' famous slave bankers, who have similarly received considerable academic attention (above, 6 n. 13). Another group of slaves I have not mentioned are those involved in child care — wet nurses and educators — which have received mention in studies by Wrenhaven (2012, 113–9; 123–7) and Golden (1990, 145–50), who notes the meagre evidence for such slaves (147).[28] There is more that could be done with this final group within the framework of this thesis, but unfortunately there is not the space. I have also decided to exclude from my main analysis the many public slaves owned by the Athenian state (Ismard, 2015; Jacob, 1928) — hence the "private" in my title. Though these strategies will not form the subject of extended discussion, where relevant, I will draw on them for comparisons with the strategies I discuss in detail.

[27] Lauffer (1979); Conophagos (1980); Rihll (2010); Thompson (2003, 144–156). Morris has discussed the archaeological remains of Athens' mining region and what little they can tell us about the slaves who lived there (1998; 2011, 177–190).

[28] On iconographical evidence, Ruhfel (1984, 61–72), though see Chatzidimitriou (2005, 144–5).

After my initial chapter describing some of the main variations in slaving strategies, each of my proceeding chapters has two main functions. The first is to describe the strategies in question and the second is to describe the effect of these strategies on the lives of slaves. In describing different slaving strategies, I examine both the goals of slave-owners and the ways in which they used enslaved persons to achieve them. The strategies which were possible or desirable to different slave-owners, moreover, would have varied depending on their circumstances and their resources. As well as their individual wealth, the occupation and skill-set of an owner, their access to certain tools, commercial and social networks, and other slaves, would all have played a part in determining what strategies were pursued and how.

Strategies, of course, would also have varied depending on the disposition of different masters. This is a hard factor to meaningfully quantify, but one whose importance was recognised by contemporary Athenians. Theophrastus' *Characters*, for example, often discusses how certain (comically exaggerated) personality types result in different behaviour towards, and treatment of slaves. A good example is *The Distrustful Man* (*Apistos*), who goes to unnecessary lengths to keep an eye on his slaves (18.2; 8).[29] The abilities, experiences, and background of individual slaves also would have played a part in the formation of strategies. While some slaves were born in Athens,

[29] Some characters provide overly harsh or unwarranted punishment to slaves. *The Penny-Pincher* (*Mikrologos*) deducts the cost of a pot broken by his slave from the latter's rations (10.5) while *The Boastful Man* (*Alazōn*) disguises his poverty by blaming a lack of money on his slave (23.8). *The Obtuse Man* (*Anaisthētos*) unwittingly punishes a slave for his own mistake (14.10). Other characters provide what Theophrastus thought to be unnecessarily good treatment of slaves. *The Country Bumpkin* (*Agroikos*) helps his slave woman grinding grain, while *The Late Learner* (*opsimathos*) pays his slave for something — though the text is damaged, we can assume it was thought to have been unnecessary. *The Shameless Man* (*Anaischuntos*) feeds his slave well from another's table. All translations of titles here and below are from Diggle (2004).

many others were imported from non-Greek lands and would not have adapted as well to the conditions of their slavery.[30]

Chapters 2 and 3, which focus on household strategies as a whole, first describe these strategies and how they relate to particular household goals in a wider sense. Then, at the end of each chapter, will follow a section discussing the effects they had on slaves. Chapters 4 and 5, since they discuss multiple strategies, are divided into subsections which first describe a strategy and then continue by discussing the slaves subjected to it. In discussing the impact of different strategies on slaves, I would rather not be bogged down in discussions of "status". Instead, I am asking a more general question less attached to sociological models: what did differences in examples of Athenian slavery affect the *lives* of Athenian slaves? In her study of Athens' poor, Taylor similarly advocates a focus on factors which affected the capabilities of individuals' attempts to achieve their desires (2017, 19–22 *et passim*). Taylor's book was published after the initial formulation of this thesis, but I find her approach to be very similar to my own and one that appears a productive way to examine the diverse impacts which the institution of slavery had on slaves.[31]

A few additional points deserve consideration. Firstly, this study covers Athens' Classical period, which I use in a very loose sense to mean the 200-year period comprising the fifth and fourth centuries BC. There is enough surviving evidence from Athens' society during this time — largely literary, but also epigraphical, iconographical and archaeological — to make a study of this kind feasible. Nevertheless, 200 years is a long period of time and the surviving evidence (though

[30] On Athenian slaves unable to speak Greek, see the well-known passage of Plato (*Meno*, 82b). On the role of war and piracy in the slave trade: Garlan (1987); de Souza (1995, 188). More recent work has emphasised the role of permanent trade links in Athens' slave supply (Lewis, 2016b; 2011; cf. Zuchtriegel, 2018, 165–6; Gavriljuk, 2003).

[31] Taylor discusses the application of her framework to slaves (23–4; 218), though a fully developed analysis is outside the scope of her work.

comparatively considerable for the ancient world) does not allow much room to track significant changes in Athenian slaving practices over time.[32] These practices almost certainly changed in ways we cannot observe, and I have done my best to stay aware of this likelihood by clarifying the specific time frame of my discussions and providing evidence of broad continuity or reasons to believe that strategies may have developed where I have found myself able.

Secondly, we do not know how many slaves lived in Athens or worked in any sector of its economy at any one point. Scholars have suggested overall numbers, but these guesses — educated though they may be — remain guesses and consequently have varied quite widely.[33] Quantitative analysis of

[32] It is clear that many of the cultural practices that made up the institution of slavery in classical Athens predate this period — though the evidence is not available to discuss it in any detail. Though Finley famously argued that the development of classical Greek slavery was tied to political movements in the sixth century BC (1981a, *passim*; cf. Garlan, 1988, 38–40; Fisher, 1993, 15–20; Cartledge, 2002; Andreau and Descat, 2006, 33–49; Osborne 2007, 300; Zurbach, 2013, 975), several authors have found fault with Finley's logic and pointed to the prominence of slavery in archaic literature of the late eighth century (Rihll, 1996, 91–100; Harris, 2012; Lewis, 2018b, 118–9).

[33] The Athenians themselves seem either not to have known the number of their slaves or been willing to considerably exaggerate them. On Ktesikles' infamous record of 400,000 slaves, below (133 n. 5). The figure of more than 150,000 slaves derived from a fragment of Hyperides (4) is also reckoned too high by most scholars, though Andreu and Descat accept its accuracy in arguing for a population of 200,000–250,000 enslaved persons (2011, 44). In 1924, Sargent calculated a figure of 70,000–100,000 for the fifth century and 60,000–70,000 for the fourth (1971), while Gomme estimated 115,000 for the fourth century (1933) and Lauffer approximately 90,000 in the fifth (1979, 150–2). Proponents of a low level of slave ownership in Athens (below, section 3.2) have argued for figures lower than 50,000, on which, Whitby (1998, 182–3), who argues for the rough figure of 100,000 on the qualitative assessment of the importance of slavery to Athens. Similarly Hunt (2018a, 64–9), who prefers a broad range of 60,000–120,000.

the number of slaves in different strategies is therefore impossible, though I have attempted qualitative assessment at several points.

Finally, I will frequently draw on comparative history throughout this thesis. My intention is not to map the reality of another period of time onto Athens ahistorically, but rather to use wider history as a way of raising questions about our Athenian evidence by "providing models… developing hypotheses… identifying patterns… [and] in refuting generalisations" (Golden, 1992, 311) and of attempting to place Athenian society within the scope of slaving as a global phenomenon.[34]

[34] For examples of comparative history fruitfully directed towards the study of ancient Greek slaves, Hodkinson (2008); Cartledge (2001), with respective discussion of methodology (286–291; 132–4).

Chapter 1

Divergent Slaving Strategies: An Overview

In order to underscore the complexity of processes fitted into the single typology of slavery, the chapters following this one comprise case studies of particular slaving households and slaving strategies. Valuable as these individual examples are in their own right, however, they are more so when used to illuminate patterns of human behaviour, informed by knowledge transferred across communities and generations and underpinned by formal institutions, which inform the direction of social history as a whole. In order to place our case studies in a broader context of slaving in classical Athens, this chapter will outline some of the main variations in slaving strategies in our evidence, with the goal of establishing their key divergences and outlining the rationale behind their formulation and implementation. The question of what the execution of these strategies meant for the lived experiences of slaves is touched on throughout this chapter but will be examined in more detail in subsequent ones.

The term 'strategy' refers to a plan to achieve a goal, the feasibility of which (and therefore the likelihood that it will be repeated within a given society) is subject to varying cultural and infrastructural contexts which need to be accounted for to properly understand historical action. A strategy, by definition, starts with a particular purpose in mind: a general outcome which the actor in question works towards through particular actions — such as the accumulation of rights over resources, and the use of these rights and other means at the actor's disposal to acquire comfort and security, as well as social capital.[1] These motivations, when stated in such broad terms, are recognisable in societies across world history, but are as influenced in their specifics by historical

[1] I use the term 'social capital' in a Bordieuan sense to refer to the accumulation by individuals (often as part of a collective, such as a family unit) of valuable relationships from communities around them (Bordieu, 1986). For some criticisms of this approach, and alternative theories of social capital, see Tzanakis (2013).

context as is their implementation. Understanding them is an important part of understanding slaving strategies in general. A large part of this chapter is therefore concerned with outlining the motivations behind different Athenian slaving strategies and the social forces which drove them. It also, however, represents an attempt to describe some of the main variations in slaving strategies which resulted from these contrasting motivations.

This overview will draw on the work of Vlassopoulos (2016a), who has highlighted the diversity of strategies practised throughout the history of slaving, their importance in understanding the specific configuration of slavery in different contexts (14–16), and their influence on the relationship between masters and their slaves (21). My discussion in this chapter is divided into four parts and will attempt to apply Vlassopoulos' work to a specifically classical Athenian context, making some additions to the strategies he lists which I believe to be relevant. The first will contrast direct exploitation of a slave by his or her master with slaves whose master ceded the right to exploit them directly in return for a rent (indirect exploitation). The second distinguishes between slaves who are closely supervised and those who are placed in a position of trust, and the third between slaves whose work requires comparably high levels of skill and those whose work does not. My final section will provide an overview of various sexual slaving strategies in classical Athens, placed in this chapter because it expresses well the broad differences in slaving strategies that Athenians practised, even when we restrict our purview to only one type of exploitation.

1.1 Direct and Indirect Slaving

An important distinction between slaving strategies noted by Vlassopoulos is between the exploitation of slaves "through labour processes that are under the direct control of the master", and "labour processes which are under the control of the slaves, who work on their own as

cultivators, artisans or traders, and surrender to their masters a part of their earnings" (2016a, 15).[2] As Vlassopoulos notes, this distinction is regularly used as a way of distinguishing slave labour from serfdom as a mode of production.[3] That these two systems of exploitation existed side by side and were applied to enslaved persons in Athens has been commented on extensively. Andreau and Descat (2006, 89–90), for example, distinguish between these two forms of slave exploitation, but also differentiate them from the exploitation of slaves through a supervisor. In this case, an important distinction to make is that the supervisor (who might be a freeman or another slave) would himself be either under the direct control of a slave-owner or returning him a rent for the slave.[4]

Garlan's differentiation between 'direct' and 'indirect' slavery provides a useful typology (1988, 69–71), though he does not define either term. I offer the following: in cases of direct slave exploitation, a slave-owner assumes all rights over the profits arising from his slave's labour, which usually implies his own involvement (or that of a supervisor in his direct employ) in the work to which that labour contributes. Indirect exploitation concedes right to the profits of a slave's labour (formally or informally) to a second party, who provides the master with a regular payment: a rent on the body of the slave. The second party can be the slave himself (as in the particularly noteworthy strategy highlighted by Vlassopoulos), or a third party. In consecutive order, we will first discuss direct slavery, with a particular focus on the varying motivations which drove it, and then indirect slavery, its advantages and disadvantages compared with direct slavery, and the various practices it entailed.

[2] As argued by Max Weber (1978, 383); cf. Lurhagi, (2011, 276–7).

[3] E.g. Bush (1996, 3); Engerman (1996, 21–2); Wickham (2005, 260–2); Whittaker (1987, 113–9).

[4] Cf. Herrmann-Otto (2009, 94–5); Krytatas (2005, 73–4).

1.1.1 Direct Slaving and its Various Motivations

Direct exploitation is the form most regularly associated with the modern concept of slavery, largely because it describes how slavery was most commonly configured in the New World, our most familiar reference point. In Athens, too, masters commonly retained direct control over their slaves' labour. Within the category of direct exploitation, Vlassopoulos distinguishes between "the use of slave labor to create *leisure*, by employing slaves for the drudgery required for the maintenance of households (personal attendants, the hewers of wood and drawers of water, the cooks and the nannies), and the employment of slave labor for the production of *wealth* in plantations, workshops and mines" (2016a, 14, original emphasis). The following section will outline these two strategies and the occasional overlap between them, before examining another category identified by Vlassopoulos: slaving for the creation of prestige (ibid, 13). Another motivation behind slaving — the sexual exploitation of slaves — will be examined in more detail in the final section of this chapter.

Slaves were often employed, under the direct eye of their master, in tasks which might broadly be described as domestic work. Of the tasks this entailed, the most physically demanding, if not the most time-consuming, was the grinding of grain.[5] On the relationship between this task, slavery, and the ideal of a citizen lifestyle, a fragment of the fifth-century Athenian comic poet Pherekrates describing a mythical past is particularly illuminating:

> At that time there was no slave for anyone, no Manes nor Sekis, but the women had to toil with all the chores of the house themselves. Then, in addition, they would grind the grain early in the morning, and the village echoed as they worked the mills.
>
> (Fr. 10 K-A, adapted from Storey, 2011)

Aristotle and Pherekrates clearly conceived of slavery as a means by which citizen women could relieve themselves from the more exhausting tasks entailed in the upkeep of a household. I would

[5] On the grinding of grain, below (section 4.1).

argue, furthermore, that a similar rationale can be observed in the employment of slaves in agriculture or other work from which households drew their means of sustenance.

Our literary sources often hold up exemption from manual labour or the need to work for a living as a desirable ideal (Ober, 1989, 195–6). Xenophon, for one, was fond of describing a group within society "who are able to buy slaves and relieve themselves of work" (*Mem*. 2.3.3) or "who were able to live by the labours of others" (ἄλλων ἐργαζομένων τρέφεσθαι: *Cyr*. 8.1.16). The desirability of belonging to this group was based on the more frequent opportunities it provided to pursue activities which we characterise under the broad umbrella of leisure; in a recent book on *penia* — a concept which roughly translates as 'poverty' — Taylor notes an absence of leisure as one of its characteristics (2018, esp. 34–6). Fisher, for example, has drawn attention to wealth as one way of participating in athletics and associated erotic liaisons and intellectual activity (1998). It is also clear that political participation was a vital part of the underlying ideal of citizenship and a source of individual pride (Blok, 2017, 41–3) and Athenians sometimes construed the concept of *penia* as the inability to perform civic duties (Markle, 1985, 269–71).[6] Harris, moreover, has argued that slave-ownership allowed Athenians to educate their children in literacy (1989, 103).

Indeed, the ability to increase the amount of leisure or politics an Athenian could practise was likely to come foremost from the ownership of slaves, as the passage of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* quoted above suggests. In a similar vein, Aristophanes' *Assemblywomen* (593) and Aristotle's *Politics* (1252b15) describe the condition of *penia* partially by the absence of slaves. In the corpus of Lysias, a defendant attempts to elicit sympathy from the jury by complaining that, although he is old, he must continue to work because he has not yet been able to buy a slave (24.6). As far as the motivations behind slave-ownership are concerned, the emphasis here is on the acquisition of a

[6] Political participation or obligations would have varyingly been an occasional (such as participation in the Assembly or in the city's law courts), or a more frequent (such as membership of the *boule* and magistrate positions), or a long-term (military service) drain on the available time of Athenian citizens.

more comfortable life, rather than wealth. The same can be said about Menander's *Dyskolos*, in which a character marvels in consternation at the misanthrope Knemon:

> "This property of his is worth about two talents, and he farms it still all by himself, without a man to help — *no family slave*, no hired hand from the area, no neighbour — it's all done by him, and him alone."
>
> (328-33, tr. Arnott, 1979–2000, vol. I, emphasis mine)

What elicits surprise from the play's characters is not the untapped potential of a large field, the profits of which could be increased by additional labour, but rather the fact that its owner is performing the work of maintaining it himself.[7] The Aristophanic comic hero Chremulos fantasises about universal wealth among Athens' citizens and the comfortable life it will allow them to have (*Pl.* 505–18). When the personification of *penia* asks him who will perform necessary menial roles, Chremulos replies that slaves, purchased from foreign traders, will do so (517–23).

The purchase of a single or a few slave(s) was unlikely to have exempted the free members of a poorer Athenian household from manual labour entirely. It would still, however, have allowed them the ability to reduce their workload and enjoy a more comfortable life as well as enabling them (occasionally if not regularly) to participate in politics and activities of leisure.[8] It may also have spared them the discomfort and dishonour of performing unpalatable tasks. On this point it is worth bearing in mind the conclusion of Osborne on the wider political importance of slavery in Athens. "Only if citizens", he writes, "could be exempted from the obvious subservience to others involved in

[7] Indeed, unmentioned here is the fact that not all of Knemon's property *was* being farmed (163).

[8] The argument that widespread slave ownership better enabled Athens' citizens to participate in the direct democracy of the classical period has a long pedigree in scholarship (e.g. Hansen, 1987, 149–50 n. 232; Jameson, 1977/8, 140; Thomson, 1955, 204; 226–7). The supervision of slaves, however, remained a task to which an owner still had to commit (see below, 115–16).

domestic labour and from the degradation of performing physically constricting and scarcely tolerable tasks such as working in the mines was it possible for them to maintain that they all were equal and all equally had an active role to play in sustaining democracy" (1995, 37; cf. de Ste Croix, 1981, 141–2). As well as being desirable as a more comfortable existence, we can easily imagine that the leisure which slavery allowed Athenian citizens, their wives, and their children had important social connotations for the ideal images of their particular social groups.

However, slaves did have value as economic investments. More generally, Desmond (2006, 31–4), arguing against Austin and Vidal-Naquet's contention that the definition of wealth was based on leisure (1977, 16), notes that such views are confined to elite Socratic circles and points to more positive attitudes towards work and its ability to generate capital in other sources. Austin and Vidal Naquet's argument, it should be noted, was drawn from the model of an embedded economy most famously articulated by Finley, who maintained that the ancient economy was distinct from that of modern, capitalist ones, in that it was not dictated by disembedded economic motivators (1973).[9] The accumulation of wealth, in Finley's view, took second place to social morals in dictating production processes in the ancient world and growth was consequently stagnant throughout classical times. Recently, however, studies have shown that there was a level of sophistication inherent in the Athenian economy, driven by some knowledge of market-forces and a desire to act rationally upon them (e.g. Loomis, 1998, 253-4; Christenson 2003). Others have emphasised the prominence of markets and economic growth in our classical evidence.[10]

Ancient Athenians, in other words, were very much concerned with surplus generation, and although the sources which lament the absence of slaves do so exclusively with reference to the desirable lifestyle slave-ownership offered, we should be careful about assuming from these limited

[9] Cf. Millet (1991; 2001); Meikle (1996).

[10] On markets, Harris and Lewis (2016); Bresson (2016). On archaeological remains, Marzano (2017); Morris (2004); Kron (2005) on human bone density.

remarks that strictly economic considerations never played a role. To craftsmen such as the one in Lysias 24, it is hard to imagine that the ability to increase his productive output through the purchase of a slave would not have been appreciated for the economic opportunity it was. Similarly, if less markedly, in the sphere of agriculture, a permanent increase in available labour would have economic advantages too.[11] The purchase of slaves as a means of expanding a labour force for a business under the direction of its owner can also be observed in literature. In the sphere of agriculture, the *Oikonomikos* of Xenophon and the *Oikonomika* of Pseudo-Aristotle are perhaps the clearest examples and will be examined in Chapter 2. Additionally, inscriptional evidence from the Erechtheon accounts shows ten slaves receiving payment for the same craft as their masters, who also appear in the inscriptions as the recipients of pay for work on the same column as their slaves (Randall, 1953, 200; 202 table 2).[12] The way that these enslaved persons were listed relative to their master in the list suggests his involvement in their work and collection of pay.[13]

Economic motivations are extremely difficult to separate from other motivations, since the underlying purpose of capital accumulation is often the things it can buy, such as comfort, security, or indeed, social prestige. As such, several ancient Greek historians have argued for a new definition of embeddedness, one which recognises the basis of all historic economies in their respective societies more generally, rather than viewing this as a fundamental difference between the ancient and modern world (Lewis, 2018a, 20–5 *et passim*; Foxhall, 2007b, 23-4). Market forces are not now, nor have they ever been, truly separable from social relations. It should also be noted that the

[11] As argued below (section 2.1.1).

[12] Five slaves belonging to Simias (*IG* I^2 476, 200–205), two to Laossos (225–6), three to Phalakros (229–31), one to Ameiniades (234–5).

[13] At the same time, three slaves are listed belonging to a master who does not appear in the inscription (*IG* I^2 476, 202–3; 206–7; 210–11). These slaves were probably either working independently or were rented to another craftsman for the completion of the projects.

motivations behind different examples of slaving might be diverse. The purchase of a slave to provide their masters with leisure and purchase as a capital investment, for example, need not be mutually exclusive, if a master used it as an opportunity to excuse himself from his labour occasionally while continuing to work most or some of the time.

Although the accumulation of social capital (prestige) through the leisure slavery allowed was probably a large part of what made this leisure desirable to Athenians, we can further distinguish prestige claimed from the ownership of slaves in itself, rather than through the effects of their labour. In terms of slavery as a global, cross-cultural phenomenon, Vlassopoulos sees the latter motivation as one of the most important motivations for slaving (2016a, 14).[14] An important aspect of this strategy is its visible advertisement of either the ownership of expensive slaves, or a scale of slave ownership, or even of slave ownership itself. This advertisement, for obvious reasons, was made publically.

A few contemporary sources attach social prestige to being accompanied by (for a male slave) an *akolouthos* (attendant), or (for an enslaved woman) a *therapaina* (maidservant).[15] A key example is Demosthenes' *Against Meidias*, in which the orator paints the defendant — the titular Meidias — as a self-serving, *hubristic* man. Meidias is accused of conspicuous shows of wealth, including demonstrations of his extensive ownership of slaves: "he [Meidias] swaggers around the marketplace, taking three or four attendants (*akolouthoi*)" (21.158, tr. Harris, 2008). Demosthenes adds the following to his condemnation:

[14] Stilwell (2014, 18) highlights the importance of slaves as a form of prestige in African societies and Cameron (2018, 166–7); Synder (2018, 179–8) for indigenous North-American ones.

[15] As well as the passages below, see for *akolouthos*: Aristophanes (*Av.* 73); Antiphon (2.1.4); Thucydides (7.75.5 with Hunt, 1998, 89). *Therapaina* has a broader meaning indicated by its translation, though it also refers to slaves: Herodotus (3.134.5); Andocides (1.67); Demosthenes (47.70).

> You [the jurors] should not show any respect or admiration… nor consider it a mark of his desire for honour if someone builds conspicuously or acquires many female maid servants (*therapainai*) or beautiful furnishings, but only if a man shows his distinction and pursuit of honour in those things in which all of you have a share.
>
> (ibid, 159)

Although the ownership of a large number of slaves in a private context might be seen as a way of attempting to gain prestige from the community, it is the public display of wealth through large slave retinues in which we find the clearest evidence of slaving for this purpose. The orator Apollodorus was also derided for being accompanied by three attendants (Demosthenes, 36.45) and a similar attitude to that expressed by Demosthenes is recorded in a line of Menander, in which the play's hero ridicules his wealthy rival-in-love for being accompanied by 50 slaves (*Kolax*, 35B, Arnott, 1979–2000, vol. II).

Phocion's wife was admired for her austerity in being accompanied outside the house by only one maidservant, if Plutarch's anecdote from his *Life of Phocion* (19.2) can be trusted.[16] This implies that amongst Athens' wealthy women, larger slave retinues were generally the rule — indeed, the indulgent wealth of Clytemnestra in Euripides' *Electra* is highlighted by the numerous enslaved women who accompany her (315–16; 998–1003). Another example, from Theophrastus' *Characters*, describes an attempt to earn prestige through possession of a single exotic slave attendant: *The Microphilotimos* (lover of petty honours) is described as acquiring an Ethiopian *akolouthos* (21.3).[17]

The derision with which these shows of slave ownership are treated by our sources might suggest at face value that Athens' democratic ideology prevented the accumulation of prestige through large

[16] We have no way to judge the veracity of this story and, connected as it is with a popular later tradition of Phocion's austerity (Tritle, 1988, 30–3), we might well suspect that it was a later invention.

[17] On Greek attitudes towards black ethnic groups, Snowden (1970, esp. 1–7; 169–82).

slave retinues and households from being a viable strategy. Implicit in these references, however, is the assumption that men might, at the very least, *try* to gain social prestige through showcasing slave-ownership, and be awarded it too. In the case of *Against Meidias*, for example, we might question whether Meidias intended this show of wealth for the average member of a citizen jury, to whom Demosthenes addresses his criticism. To borrow the terminology of Stewart (1994), we might suggest that Athens' elite were subject to their own specific "honour group", that dictated their behaviour according to social norms particular to their class. Athenians outside the members of the city's elite might have looked unfavourably on the behaviour described here, but an expected standard of behaviour related to the scale of slave-ownership might have existed amongst Athens' rich — or in networks of wealthy individuals stretching beyond the borders of Attica.

In certain contexts, however, we can imagine that democratic ideology was a prescriptive factor in the number of slaves advertised publicly by Athens' elite. Elites looking to establish themselves as political leaders, for example, would have attempted to cultivate an image that appealed to voters in the assembly. Another such context was that of Athens' law courts, as aptly demonstrated by the case of Meidias; wealthy Athenians may well have been conscious of the fact that lavish shows of wealth on their part would have given potential prosecutors grounds to attack their *ethos*.[18] The fact that even three slaves might be considered exorbitant is proof enough that in Demosthenes' time nothing approaching slave retinues of the size evidenced in Rome could be found in Athens.[19] But in

[18] On the democratic attitudes of popular courts, Ober (1993, 483; cf. 1989, 206–8); Canevaro (2016b, 47–8) and, on Aristophanes' *Wasps*, ibid. (57–9); Kron (1996, 76).

[19] The 50 slaves mentioned by Menander must be exaggerated for comic effect, although we might also hypothesise, based on the probable increase in wealth disparity and the circumscribed power of democratic institutions during the period when Menander was writing (Green, 2003, 6), that larger slave retinues became more common. *Kolax* was written during the regime of Demetrius of Phaleron (Arnott, 1979–2000, vol. III,

certain cases the evidence nevertheless suggests that wealthy Athenians attempted, as Meidias purportedly did, to gain prestige through advertising the number of their slaves.

Outside Athens' elite, even being accompanied by a single slave would have allowed the community to identify one as belonging to a certain social group — that of a slave-owner. Men are regularly accompanied outside their home by slaves, usually a single attendant (e.g. Antiphon 2.1.4). Women too were often accompanied by slaves, as Phocion's wife supposedly was. *The Aneleutheros* (stingy man), as characterised by Theophrastus, will not use his wife's considerable dowry to buy her a *therapaina*, but he *will* rent a girl to accompany her when she makes outings (*Char.* 22.10). Perhaps here we have a reflection of the social capital that could be accumulated by appearing publicly accompanied by a slave, which the *Anelotheros* was attempting to get cheaply. Representations of women on classical grave *stelai* often show them attended by slaves and, as Wrenhaven has argued, this can be best interpreted as a way of advertising wealth (2012, 107).[20] Advertising wealth is far from a peculiarity of Athenian society. What is more interesting is that in these representations it was done by depicting slave-ownership in particular. We might reasonably suggest that a level of prestige may have been attached to slave-ownership itself in a slave society such as classical Athens, and it was specifically this, rather than wealth in a more general sense, which these women were advertising. The same goes for other Athenians who made their slave-ownership publicly visible.

Unlike other forms of wealth advertisement, slavery was specifically an advertisement of the ability to buy complete power over a human being. Slaving strategies were distinct in this same respect from other economic investments, investments in a more comfortable life, and the acquisition of sexual partners. That holding power over persons was a motivation behind slaving in itself has been suggested by Patterson (1982, 88), but is very difficult to show from the evidence. Certainly, no

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162), who introduced legislation limiting extravagant shows of wealth in several ways (Habicht, 1997, 55–56), but none of this regulation (so far as we know) limited shows of slave-ownership.

[20] On the identification of the depicted attendants as slaves, Oakley (2000).

Athenian source admits to this as a reason for enslaving (duBois, 2003, 192). In better documented slave societies, the mistreatment of slaves beyond the requirement of coercing their labour is telling evidence, but we have little of such from classical Athens.[21] Fourth-century Athenians (Aeschines, 1.97; Demosthenes, 21.47; 49) claimed that the city's law against *hubris* protected slaves from abuse, but this is a highly controversial contention that will be dealt with below (185–7). We have cases in which citizens violently abused slaves who were not their property, which have survived only because of their relevance to law-court cases preserved in Athenian oratory.[22] How often such behaviour was directed against slaves owned by the perpetrator is difficult to say, but one suspects that it was frequent. Aristotle believed that people (especially the rich and young) frequently deliberately humiliated others in order "to demonstrate their superiority" (*huperechein*) (*Rh.* 1378b). The regular control over the lives and work of slaves required by direct exploitation, moreover, was well suited to those who wished to take pleasure in the power they had been awarded through Athens' system of slavery.

In certain cases, slaves were exploited clearly towards only one or two of these goals. A good example is the *therapaina* which Theophrastos' *Aneleutheros* chooses not to buy for his wife, notable for her clear portrayal as an expenditure rather than an investment. There is an opposition here, in other words, between slaves bought as a capital investment, and those purchased essentially as a unit of consumption — either as a means of achieving a more comfortable life, or as a conversion of economic capital (money) into social capital (the prestige gained from slave ownership). As such, the use of term *therapaina* and *akolouthos* may be considered as describing a

[21] None of Theophrastus' Characters are described realising their total control over slaves for its own sake, but rather out of stupidity, or for petty economic reasons, or to save face (above, 16 n. 29).

[22] A particularly vivid account is provided in a speech by Demosthenes (54.4) and see also the treatment of the public slave Pittalakos in Aeschines' *Against Timarchos* (1.58–9).

distinct strategy — wherein slaves accompanied their masters, probably waited on them in private, and performed domestic duties for them as well.

On this point, it is worth highlighting the difference between slaving in elite and in sub-elite households. More specifically, there was increased specialisation of servile roles in elite households, made possible by a larger demand for work they generated and the larger number of slaves they employed (Fisher, 1994, 50; Garlan, 1988, 62).[23] Though this observation has been made about the occupations which slaves were assigned, it was equally true of the core motivations behind the purchase of slaves too. In large households we might expect to see a sharper divide between slaves designated to economically productive tasks or otherwise, and also see the creation of specialised supervisory and management roles.[24] Slaves in smaller households, contrastingly, were more likely to be exploited towards a higher variety of purposes. Therefore, to get a sense of the strategies behind the ownership of individual slaves in Athens' poorer households, a more complex interaction of different motivations, resulting in its own particular strategy, needs to be described. Either way, all these strategies resulted in the regular direction of slave labour by their master towards different ends.

In cases of direct exploitation, the slave-owner assumes all right over the benefits generated by the labour of slaves; in both a *de facto* and a *de jure* sense, directly exploited Athenian slaves "did not

[23] Specialisation, when possible, has several advantages for a slave owner. For one thing, it allows a slave to develop increased experience in his or her role, and for another, as Bradley (1994, 73) observes, it aids the assigning of blame.

[24] There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the high number of unproductive jobs found in Roman households (e.g. Bradley, 1994, 58–66; Harper, 2011, 105) was a common feature of Athenian households. Entertainers, for example, are regularly hired rather than owned and the same seems true of professionally designated cooks: *mageiroi*, on the evidence of Menander (e.g. *Aspis* 217, 223-4b; *Dyskolos*, 264a; Krieter-Spiro, 1997, 28-30; Dohm, 1964).

own the product of their own labour, nor the means of their labour" (Alston, 2011, 3). A character in Xenophon's *Oikonomikos* makes this same observation on the relation of slaves to a household's means of production:

> "Slaves are involved with their owners' property only to the extent that they carry, look after, or guard it; but they cannot use any of it unless the head of the household gives it to them; whereas everything belongs to the owner to use each thing as he or she wishes."
>
> (9.16, tr. Pomeroy, 1994)

As a consequence, directly-exploited slaves were dependent on their master to supply their needs, and generally earned "nothing but their keep and [retained] nothing from the product of their labour apart from the odd bonus to put toward their savings" (Garlan, 1988, 67). Or, in the contemporary words of Hyperides, "if a slave gains any success or brings in earnings, his owner enjoys the benefits" (3.22). However, as Garlan's final remark makes clear, direct exploitation did not invariably mean that comforts beyond mere sustenance — including but not limited to money — could not be enjoyed by such slaves. For the most part, however, these benefits were enjoyed only with the approval of the slave's master, who could, and often would, use them as a strategy intended to control the slave. Indeed, a common feature of direct slave exploitation is that slave-owners retain control over several aspects of their slaves' life towards their own ends, of which control over material comforts is only one prominent example.

1.1.2 Indirect Exploitation

Contrastingly, in cases of indirect exploitation, masters concede control over several particulars of a slave's life, as well as the right to the full benefits of their labour, in return for a regular rent. As such, it invariably represents a strategy of wealth accumulation. We can identify two main forms of indirect exploitation in classical Athens, whose differences have been most clearly set out by

Kazakévich (2008, 352–6).[25] Both forms of exploitation are terminologically identifiable in Theophrastus' *Aischrokerdēs* (*The Shabby Profiteer*), which describes payment received from the ownership of a slave as *misthos* (*Characters*, 30.17) and *apophora* (15) at two separate points. As Kazakévich argues, the former of these terms, or its cognate verb *misthoun* (i.e. to earn a payment from), is used to refer to the leasing of slaves to a temporary master (2008, 378–9).[26] The latter term, *apophora*, is understood by scholars to denote a payment obtained by a slave-owner as a portion of a slave's independent earnings. Over a century ago, Smith and Wayte defined it as such, although to them *apophora* could also be flexibly used as a synonym for *misthos* (Smith *et al.*, 1890/1, 138), a notion which has persisted in scholarship over the past century.[27] In fact, in all cases of the term's use, *apophora* refers more specifically to the first type of payment identified by Smith and Wayte, as a close examination of the sources provided by Kazakévich has shown. Firstly, "in the exploitation relation connected with the term *apophora*", she writes, "the slave-owner received this payment not from a third party for the slave but from the slave himself" and, secondly, "another characteristic of *apophora* relations is the evident possession by the slave of means 'from' (*apo*-) which to make the payment" (354-5).[28] As such, it is evident from Theophrastus' language that his

[25] The article was originally published in Russian in 1960 but was translated into English and republished in 2008.

[26] As is clearly the case in Xenophon (*Vect.* 4.14–15); Demosthenes (27.20; 28.12). Additional examples in Kazakévich (2008, 378–9).

[27] Similarly Thalheim (1895), and more cautiously Schmitz (1996). In addition to the examples cited by Kazakévich (2008, 350), as late as the 1990s both Edwards (1995) and MacDowell (1998) assumed in their translations of Andocides that an *apophora* collected for a slave in Athens' silver mining region (1.38) was for a slave rented out to someone else. There is no supporting evidence for their conclusion except the fact that we know that many mining slaves *were* exploited in this manner.

[28] Kazakévich also noted that *apophora* was also used in contexts other than Athenian slavery during the classical period to describe "payments exacted from a juridically free population" (i.e. Herodotus, 2.109;

Aischrokerdēs was imagined both renting out a slave while away from Athens (17) and also allowing another slave to earn an income independently in order to extract from him a regular fee (15).[29]

Literary evidence furnishes several examples of slaves being rented out to another owner. According to the Old Oligarch, the influx of foreigners to Athens as a result of its empire in the fifth century allowed citizens to profit from renting their slaves to them, presumably as porters and servants (1.17). Theophrastus' *Characters* suggests the existence, by the end of the fourth century (Diggle, 2004, 36–7), of a market for hiring slave servants which could guarantee both a temporary female attendant on a regular basis (22.10) and part-time work for a male slave while his master was away (30.17). Other examples outside the service industry can be found across Athens' economy in oratory. Two passages of Demosthenes describe separate contracts for the hiring of two (27.20) and three (28.12) craft slaves; and another speech by the same author hints at the renting of slaves to cope with the labour demands of the agricultural calendar (53.20–1).[30]

Another area in which this form of exploitation appears to be prominent was Athens' silver mining industry. If Xenophon is to be believed, the purchase of slaves specifically to be rented out to prospective miners was an economic strategy from which many of Athens' richest derived a large amount of their income (*Vect.* 4.14–15). A more complex example on a smaller scale is described in Demosthenes' *Against Pantaenetus*, in which the defendant is described as paying a regular fee for

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Thucydides, 5.31.2–5). "Common to these… cases is the fact that apophora is paid from (*apo*-) means put or left at the disposal of the payers, to a person or collectivity recognized as master of those means or of the persons using them or of both" (355-6). Plutarch, moreover, describes the payments made by Spartan helots to their masters as *apophora* (*Mor.* 239e; *Lyc.* 8.4). Although this is likely to be a later invention (Hodkinson, 2000, 126; Ducat, 2002, 202–4), this passage still connects the term to rent extracted from a self-supporting slave population.

[29] Diggle (2004, 517), *contra* Ussher (1960, 240).

[30] This example is somewhat problematic, however, and will be discussed below (189–90).

the use of a mining operation, which included 30 slaves, to its two joint owners (37.4–5).[31] These two men are described as putting up the money as a loan for the defendant to purchase the operation, on which the property acted as collateral, the rent served effectively as interest, and the defendant retained the right, for a period of time, to repay the loan and assume full ownership of the property.[32] When the defendant defaulted on his rent, however, the plaintiff and his friend made their ownership of the shop plain by seizing it and halting the production of its slaves (25–7). Visible in this speech is the use of slaves both as security for a loan and as the means of making an investment in property ownership with an eye to a return. An interesting case also appears in the first speech of Hyperides, which describes one Ariston providing the money for the purchase of slaves, which was undertaken by a Theomnestos who hired them out and returned to Ariston an obol a day (1.2). This, siginficantly, was the same return which those who invested in mining slaves received. As both a long- and short-term strategy, then, the purchase of slaves could be converted into a direct return through claiming a financial compensation from the exploitation of their labour by someone else.

In the mid-1970s Perotti also distinguished between this indirect form of exploitation and that of slaves paying an *apophora* to their master (1974; 1976). Although both groups shared a commonality in their separation from their master, she argued, the latter were the only group who could actually be called independent. Perotti identified this more privileged group of slaves with the *chōris oikountes* (those living apart), referred to by Demosthenes as a group called up for Athenian military service (4.37).[33] Kazakévich, however, had questioned this identification based on the lateness of the sources from which it is largely derived, on the illegitimacy of separate living as a definitional element in slave status, and on the puzzling logic behind the suggestion that only this

[31] The mines themselves were owned by the Athenian state.

[32] By an agreement called *praxis epi lusei*, on which see Harris (2006a).

[33] Perotti (1974, 50); Cohen (2000a, 145-50; 149).

category of slaves was drafted into the Athenian army (2008, *passim*). Since the publication of her article in English, this argument has received the support of several historians who have added their voices to others who had expressed doubt regarding the traditional understanding of this term.[34] Regardless of what they were called, however, scholarship has long agreed that a relatively independent group of slaves lived in Athens, who, in contrast to other slaves, could be said in some sense to own the means of their labour and to retain some of the profits from it.[35]

Perhaps the key passage in understanding the *apophora* comes from the political pamphlet of the Old Oligarch, who connected the *apophora* to slave wealth, when explaining why the Athenians "allow the slaves to live luxuriously [in Athens], and, some of them in a grand style" (1.11, tr. Marr and Rhodes, 2008). According to him, the Athenians allowed their slaves to become wealthy "with good reason. For where there is a naval power, economic reasons make it necessary for us to be slaves to our slaves in order to take their earnings [*apophoras*] and to manumit them" (1.11).[36] As Bechtle notes, an understanding of the context of independently-earning slaves is crucial to grasping its meaning (1996, 545). Bearing this in mind, the logical conclusion we can draw from the Old Oligarch is that slaves who were obliged to pay the *apophora* could keep whatever was left over for their personal use. Significantly, then, whatever income *apophora*-bearers were able to retain depended on how much money they could generate from their trade.

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[34] Canevaro and Lewis (2014); Kamen (2011). Earlier sceptics include Fisher (2008, 122); Klees, (1998, 143). Cohen is one scholar who remains unconvinced (2015, 172).

[35] See most recently Kamen, who terms property owned by slaves, including capital earned from their business, as a "slave allowance" (2016, esp. 414–9). Importantly, however, a slave's possession over this allowance was not legally recognised (below, 212).

[36] The relation of slave wealth to Athens' necessities as a naval empire is puzzling, but can largely be separated from the rest of his argument. For an interpretation, Klees (1998, 143).

From the point of view of an Athenian slave-owner, this system was an excellent incentive to ensure the diligent work of their slaves. A slave's success would be especially profitable to a master if there were cases where the *apophora* was calculated as "a proportion of the profits of [the slave's] trade", as MacDowell believes it may have been (1978, 81); but even at a set rate, as seems to have been the case with some shoemakers who paid an *apophora* to one Timarchos (Aeschines, 1.97), there is no reason to suggest that it could not be raised if appropriate. It would, at the very least, have further ensured that masters continued to receive a regular income. There was also another way in which their masters could financially benefit from their slaves' success: through offering them the chance to purchase their manumission (Kyrtatas, 2011, 107).

Having access to capital would have also allowed slaves to run their businesses independently, spending their own money on acquiring the materials, equipment and personnel necessary for their various trades. In other words, a system whereby slaves retained the profits of their labour allowed them to be completely autonomous in their various occupations, and this in itself would have been desirable for slave-owners, because it allowed them to remove themselves from the care of supervising slaves and managing businesses. The *apophora* provided slave-owners with a regular source of income, while simultaneously allowing them to engage in the time-consuming pursuits of politics and leisure or the management of other businesses.

This understanding of the benefits of the *apophora* system can be supported by comparative evidence, and in particular by scholarship on the Roman slave *peculium*, to which it has been compared by Love (1991, 133ff). This was the name given to the money which Roman slave-owners allowed their slaves to hold and to use at their own personal discretion. The *peculium* not only allowed slaves to function independently in their own businesses but was also seen to have provided personal incentives for the slaves (Kirschenbaum, 1987, chapter 2).[37] Although any "slave allowance"

[37] Roth (2010) discusses legal and social aspects of the *peculium*.

in Athens was never formally recognised to the extent the *peculium* was, it functioned in a similar way (Kamen, 2016). The advantages of owning autonomous slaves were obviously appreciated by slave-owners in antiquity, and to varying extents later in history too, where they became a feature of many chattel-slave societies (Cohen, 2000, 131-2).[38]

The main advantage to indirect slavery for masters was that it minimised their personal input in a revenue stream derived from investments in slaves, and there are several reasons why Athenians would have found this advantage necessary or desirable. Those Athenians who could afford to do so may have tried to diversify the sources of their income (Kron, 1996, 143–155), probably as a risk management strategy (cf. Christensen, 2003, 48–9 n. 35). As such, their expertise would not have been sufficient to directly exploit all of their slaves. Similarly, options for investment may often have been limited and seized opportunistically as they arose. One such option was to acquire a slave, or slaves, skilled in a profession of some kind; and this created its own problems arising from the locational necessities of their work.[39] Athenians living in the countryside or less densely populated urban areas looking to invest in artisanal slaves, for example, could theoretically work them nearby, but the goods necessary for manufacturing would have to be brought from, and finished products transported to, a potentially distant market. It would make much more sense to house a slave in a more suitable location full-time, and indirect slaving strategies would make this a viable alternative, as with the settlement of slaves in a distant agricultural plot.[40]

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[38] This was even true of certain slave-owners in the Antebellum South, particularly those with skilled slaves working in urban contexts (Moes, 1960, 184-5; Matison, 1948, *passim*).

[39] For individual slaves exploited under a system of *apophora* payments, below (section 5.2). The ownership and sale of craft slaves is described in Aeschines' *Against Timarchos* (1.97) and is detailed on the Attic Stelai — see in particular the single Carian goldsmith (below, 62).

[40] This argument was formulated by Osborne (1991, 244-6) using the *phialai* inscriptions. Unfortunately, these inscriptions, long believed to refer to a process of manumitting slaves, are poorly understood and

Indirect exploitation may also have allowed elite Athenians to escape a negative stigma which we often find associated with craft production and commerce, which Burford argued was a consequence of their direct participation in these trades (1972, 156–7). That such a stigma existed has long been argued by historians such as Finley (1981c, 194; cf. Jones, 1952, 18-19) and used to explain the derogatory statements directed at certain citizen's sources of wealth. The vast majority of these, now collected and studied by Kron (1996, 69–110), mock a politician's involvement in banaustic occupations and/or trade. Kron notes that these references did not sway elites from investing in crafts and that they do not appear to have been confined to a class of "new money". In addition to the fact that most elite Athenians benefitted from investment in craft production, Kron and others show that they all did so through the ownership of large numbers of slaves (Davies, 1971, 404; Acton, 2014, 163).[41]

This scholarship is nevertheless unclear about the various ways in which an elite Athenian or his family may have participated in these businesses. On the one hand, we have the likes of Nikias and Demosthenes, who owned mining and manufacturing slaves respectively, but exploited them purely through the collection of rent.[42] This, however, does not preclude a more direct role in slave workshops by other elites. A particularly telling comment by Xenophon's Socrates describes the son of Anytos, a politician who had inherited enormous wealth in a tanning business from his father

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interpretations of them are problematic. A suggestion has recently been made that the inscriptions have nothing to do with the process of manumission (Meyer, 2010, 22–8), but this explanation is not entirely satisfactory (Vlassopoulos, 2011b). Caution suggests that this evidence should be avoided until a satisfactory solution is found. However, although the evidence he uses may be questioned, the argument Osborne makes is nevertheless logical, for the reasons discussed in the main text.

[41] Lind's study of Kleon notes that in many cases, many of these politicians can be shown to have inherited these businesses and considerable wealth from their fathers (1990, 88–93), though he believes the way in which they were organised cannot be ascertained (90).

[42] On Nikias and Demosthenes, below (section 5.3).

(Davies, 1971, 41), as being "educated as a tanner", and therefore living a "servile way of life" (*douloprepēs diatribē*: *Apol*. 29–30; cf. Plato, *Apol.* 29c–d). Socrates' remark very much suggests a direct role by Anytos' family in their business, which marks him as distinct from his contemporary Nikias and Demosthenes in the fourth century. Indeed, Xenophon's comments on Anytos mark a notable contrast with a tradition passed down to the fourth-century AD philosopher Libanius, which claimed that Demosthenes and his father never learned the trade of their slaves (*Orations*, 42.1).

Kron's argument that this derision owed more to a politician's brand of politics has much merit to it; as he points out (1996, 87), one political enemy of Demosthenes slandered him as a knife-maker (Demades Fr. 75, 16–20).[43] To certain elites such as Xenophon (similarly Theopompos 115, *FGrHist*. 115 F 25), however, the overly practical education of the likes of Anytos was undoubtedly dishonourable. Demosthenes, it should be noted, held a reputation as one of the most well-bred and high-status of Athenian men (τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν; Theopompus 115, *FGrHist.* F325), as, similarly, did Nikias (Plutarch, *Nic.* 2.1). The exploitation of slaves through rent, in other words, may well have been a strategy for escaping negative associations with baunastic sources of money.

Unlike the category of direct slavery examined in the previous section, indirect exploitation of enslaved persons always represented, in an immediate sense, a financial investment in human capital. At the same time, indirect slavery served as a means for wealthier Athenians to achieve a higher status, either by providing them the time to pursue politics and other activities associated with leisure or by allowing them to dissociate themselves from craft production and commercial activity. It is important to distinguish between the two different forms of indirect exploitation — renting out slaves to another owner and allowing them to work independently — because these occurred under different circumstances and had different consequences for the slaves involved in

[43] Kron finds two instances of agricultural occupations being mocked: Eukrates was derided as a bran- and oakum-seller (Aristophanes, *Eq.* 254–5; fr. 646 K-A) and Lysikles as a sheep-dealer (Schol. Aristophanes, *Eq.* 132). Neither, however, refers to more regular practices of Athenian agriculture.

these strategies. Crucially, directly-exploited slaves and those rented out to a temporary owner were similar in the control held over their labour processes, and also in their lack of rights to the profits/benefits accruing from their labour. *Apophora*-bearing slaves, on the other hand, controlled much of their own labour and held some (*de facto*) rights to the profits of their labour. The different effects of these strategies will be further explored in Chapter 5.

1.1.3 Animal Husbandry and the Direct and Indirect Exploitation of Slaves

Having now distinguished between direct and indirect slaving strategies, I propose to use this dichotomy to explore the exploitation strategies applied to enslaved shepherds. There is, in truth, very little evidence for Athenian slave shepherds, but two case studies will allow us to deliberate on their socio-economic positions through cautious speculation. In so doing, I will better clarify some of the practical differences between direct and indirect exploitation and the reasons for the selection of one over the other, and clarify the point made in my introduction (7) that the occupation in which a slave is exploited alone is an inadequate description of a slaving strategy.

Animal husbandry was an important source of wealth for many of Athens' elite (Howe, 2008, chapter 2; Hodkinson, 1992). There was a market in Athens for all the various goods which animals produce, reinforced by considerable demand for sacrificial victims by private and public bodies (Hodkinson, 1992, 56–8; Plato, *Leg.* 5.743d).[44] Xenophon in the *Memorabilia* describes one Nausikudes maintaining his considerable wealth through (amongst other things) the ownership of pigs and cattle (2.7.6), but the most commonly kept type of animal appear to have been ovicaprines

[44] On the economics of animal sacrifice, Bielawski (2017, 110–40) and Jameson (1988), who notes that epigraphic evidence only records sacrifices financed by large associations, while private sacrifices and donations of animals are absent from our evidence (89–90). Parker (2011, 124–165) provides an overview of the significance of sacrifice to ancient Greeks.

(sheep and goats). Herds of these animals are more regularly referred to in literary sources and records of animal sacrifices (Jameson, 1988, 99–100).[45] Of the few classical Athenian shepherds we know of, moreover, all were slaves (Hodkinson, 1988, 55) with one exception (Lysias, 20.11).[46]

Slavery and animal husbandry have long been intertwined, and what has been particularly notable about slave shepherds in comparison to other slaves is their relative reprieve from the constant control of a supervisor. This is because of the nature of their work, which often takes place in pastures, away from regular supervision. Shepherding, at the same time, requires a certain amount of care, and it would be important for slave-owners to keep their enslaved herdsmen invested in their work (Scheidel, 2008, 107; 110–11) — Xenophon has Socrates state that one would not trust their livestock to an untrustworthy slave (1.5.2).[47]

Consequently, slave shepherds have often been singled out for minor — but still notable — advantages. Morgan, for example, argues that in contrast to Jamaica's plantations, on its cattle pens there was "a distinctive, and on the whole more favourable, slave experience" (1995, 50). In the Caribbean generally, in fact, Stinchcombe has argued that the frequent use of slaves in animal husbandry resulted in a higher rate of manumission on certain Spanish islands in the 18th century (1995, 925). At least partially in order to ensure the diligence of their slave herdsmen while in far-

[45] In two instances, we hear of the ownership of sheep (Demosthenes, 47.52; Lysias, 20.11). A fragment of Antiphanes suggests that wool was plentiful in Attica (Fr. 177 K-A) and Athenaios claimed that Athens was famous for its soft-wooled sheep (5.219a; 12.540d). In a speech of Isaios, we hear of a herd of goats (Isaios, 6.33). Another literary source (11.41) and in a line of the Attic Stelai (*IG* I^3 426, 58–63) record mixed herds of sheep and goats. As the Greeks were aware (Aristotle, *Hist. an*. 596a.14–16), sheep and goats graze different plants and can advantageously be herded together.

[46] As shepherds often were in the Greek world generally (Roy, 2012).

[47] As well as caring for animals and making sure that they did not stray and become lost, Plutarch suggests that in the time of Solon at least, wolves were a serious problem for Athenian residents in the country (23.4).

away pastures, we are told in Varro's *De Re Rustica*, Roman flock owners often sent female slaves with them (2.1.26, 10.6-7). An earlier passage (1.2.17) states, furthermore, that flocks were considered a part of a slave's *peculium*, which they had a financial interest in preserving.[48] This, as discussed above, is evidence of a slaving strategy of indirect exploitation.

No Athenian slave we know of was tasked with responsibility over a herd of the size given to the head shepherds of Roman elites, which might contain thousands of animals. Nevertheless, in Menander's play *Epitrepontes*, we find an example of a slave shepherd called Daos, who had considerable independence in his day to day life; and possibly independence of means as well.[49] Daos, while tending sheep alone in the countryside near the village in which the play was set, discovered an exposed baby (243–5). Initially, according to his account of events, he had planned to bring the baby up, but eventually balked at the idea when he considered the cost of doing so (251–6) and passed the baby on to another slave (258–74). As we learn, Daos had kept some tokens he found with the baby, which he had intended to sell (334–5) — probably the reason why Daos is in the village with the tokens during the scene in which this story is related.

One surprising feature of this account is Daos' independence in it. He has made a trip into town during the day and was apparently free to raise the child without any say from his master, who is never factored into the account at all. The fact that he considers raising the baby is interesting for another reason too. His financial inability to do so is construed as an insurmountable difficulty rather than a complete impossibility. This suggests that, though Daos does not have much money, he does have some, probably derived from his independent control over a flock of sheep. Of course, Daos is a fictional character, whose story suspiciously resembles that of other shepherds in several mythical traditions.[50] But we should remember that there were numerous choices which Menander could

[48] Indeed, the term *peculium* is itself derived from the term for cattle (Ulpian, 15.1.5.3).

[49] Though the text does not state that Daos is a slave, this can be inferred from his name.

[50] Some are even referred to in the play (327–334; 341–3). Cf. Herodotus (1.110); Sophocles (*OT.* 1134-40)

have made with regard to the setting and action of his play, and the apparent realism of his plays, recognised by ancients and observable today, suggest that the choices he did make were often likely to be drawn from his knowledge of contemporary Athens.[51] Giving a slave *de facto* ownership over a flock of sheep and the chance to profit (if only marginally) from it would be an excellent way to keep such an isolated enslaved person invested in their work — as Roman slave-owners purportedly did.

The shepherds described in Varro's *De Re Rustica* took their flocks into the mountains of central Italy during the summer months, a process called transhumance in modern English which has been practised by many societies throughout history. The way in which animal management was practised in Athens remains the subject of debate, however. One view argues for pastoralism (the shepherding of animals into uncultivated fields for grazing) as well as for large-scale transhumance.[52] Although transhumance has been the predominant animal management strategy in the history of modern Greece, evidence of its existence in classical Athens is limited.

One piece of evidence is the shepherds who raise Oedipus in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* (1134-40), who spend the summer in the region of Kithairon with their flocks. Though the play itself is contemporary to classical Athens, it is difficult to discern to what extent the various components of the Oedipus myth was passed to Sophocles from a different time period and/or region of Greece.[53] More convincing is a passage of Thucydides which describes an ancient treaty between the Athenians and the Boiotians stipulating that the region of Panakton in North-West Attica be reserved as mutual grazing land (5.42). Clearly, classical Athenians were at the very least familiar with the concept of transhumance and it is likely that it was a strategy practised by at least some

[51] For Menander as historical evidence, below (212–3).

[52] Skydsgaard (1988); Moreno (2007, 22–3).

[53] Cf. Hector's slave shepherds in the purportedly Euripidean *Rhesus*, who watch flocks around Mount Ida (e.g. 282–289). We should equally be sceptical of how the setting and transmission of the myth on which this play was based from an earlier era affected its content.

contemporary herd-owners. Howe's suggestion that the choice to do so might be dependent on the size of an individual's flocks relative to the resources they controlled and the proximity of private winter grazing land to wild pasture seems reasonable enough, though, as he himself notes, Athenian sources do not provide evidence of herds large enough to necessitate transhumant movement (2008, 61-3).[54]

A more recent view argues for the keeping of animals in symbiosis with the cultivation of crops, where smaller herds are kept on a farmstead year-round, grazing on the stubble of crops and cultivated fodder or processed crop wastage and providing manure (Hodkinson, 1988; Garnsey, 1988, 94). A clear description of integrated animal husbandry and crop cultivation, though extant in non-Athenian sources outside the classical period (e.g. Aelian, *On the Characteristics of Animals*, 16.32; Hodkinson, 1988, 45-6), has not survived in our classical Athenian evidence. There are nevertheless good reasons to think that this strategy was widely practised, including the relatively small sizes of Athenian herds (Hodkinson, 1988, 62) tied to the lower rainfall and population density of Attica (Chandezon, 2003, 401-3). There is also the fact that Theophrastus repeatedly noted the value of pulses for animal fodder and Aristotle described the feeding of animals with the waste of olive pressing. Theophrastus also discussed the benefits to crops of (in one case, specifically animal) manure (*Inquiry into Plants*, 2.7.4; Hodkinson, 1988, 49). All these sources indicate not only crop

[54] Howe's emphasis on the importance of pasturing rights as a factor behind inter-state conflicts leads him to read this as a pretext behind the Megarian decree which led to the Peloponnesian War (124; Thucydides, 5.42), but this is conjecture. The fact that flocks are sold separately from farms in Isaios (6.33) and the Attic Stelai, which has been listed as evidence of a predominantly pastoral rather than an integrated strategy of animal husbandry (Skysgaard, 1988, 79; Howe, 2008, 61), might well be a result of the fact that flocks are an easily separable piece of valuable property, rather than that they were conceived of as a separate sphere of activity to farming.

cultivation geared towards animal husbandry, but also a more intensive brand of animal husbandry than is possible when practising transhumance.[55]

Crucially, an enslaved transhumant shepherd would be difficult for a master to monitor. A slave shepherd employed to look after flocks who were let out to pasture on a nearby farmstead could be more easily directly exploited. Arguing for integrated animal husbandry at Athens, Hodkinson (1988, 46–7) refers to a law-court speech which describes a slave of the speaker tending a flock of 50 sheep near the home of their owner (Demosthenes, 47.52). The sheep were of a soft-wool breed and were, therefore, likely to be both very valuable and in need of close observation to make sure they did not damage their coats. As Hodkinson notes, the proximity of this herd to the farmhouse in which the speaker's family resided is striking. The speaker's opponent had purportedly seized the sheep for the payment of a debt, before moving on to the farmhouse, which was warned of their imminent arrival by neighbours who had witnessed the seizure of the flock (57). Since the pasture in which these sheep were kept was far from isolated, it would have been easy for a master to keep an eye on his slave's labour — checking up on the condition of the flock and the attentiveness of the slave. The neighbours mentioned in the speech, furthermore, could have provided another means of informal supervision. In positions such as this, a slave shepherd might have been exploited without much incentive (beyond the threat of pain) to keep him invested in his work.

In truth, our conclusions regarding slave shepherds are limited by our evidence. We can only really speculate about the position of the slave shepherd in Demosthenes 47, who is only referred to in passing in the speech. Similary, if real-life shepherds reflected in the character Daos did have *de facto* right to their sheep, then the specifics of such a relationship are beyond our knowledge.

[55] Archaeology of the remains of domesticated Roman animals consistently shows remarkably large bone size, which Kron has attributed to intensive animal husbandry strategies (2009, 176-85) and which he believes they inherited from Greece (2002, 65-7). Unfortunately, the Greek archaeozoological evidence is insufficient to fully support this position.

However, we can say that while certain strategies of keeping animals close to a farm might provide masters with the ability to exploit their labour without much reward, other husbandry strategies we have evidence for would have been better suited to a system which allowed slaves to marginally profit from their own labour. This system would give slaves more personal freedom and though they would still have a relatively low quality of life, it may also have given them a chance to save money to buy additional comforts and eventually freedom. An approach focusing on divergent slaving strategies, in this way, allows us to explore the socio-economic conditions of enslaved shepherds in a more complex fashion and the reasons why, in different scenarios, different forms of slavery existed in classical Athens.

1.2 Slaves in Positions of Trust

Loyalty (a word indicative of the slave-owners' perspective from which we are often forced to approach the topic of slavery) appears consistently throughout history as one of the most valuable traits desired of slaves. Behind this truth is the necessary trust which masters were often forced to place in their slaves, which could not always be mitigated through violence or by the threat thereof. This subsection will discuss certain slave positions, relative to others, which required particular trust on the part of masters.

One particularly notable example of such a strategy was the use of slaves as supervisors and general managers of different operations. The most common word used to designate such a slave was *epitropos*, a term denoting someone to whom responsibility for the management of an object, over which they had no claim of ownership themselves, had been designated.[56] It is often found, in the

[56] *Epitropos* was used in a variety of different contexts to mean "one to whom things are entrusted". In general terms: Plato (*Phaedrus*, 239c), as guardians of children: Aeschines (1.13); Demosthenes (36.22; 38.12); Hyperides (6.42); Lysias (32.22); Plato (*Laws*, 6.766c; *Theatae*, 165a; *Alcibiades* 1.105e); Thucydides (2.80.6),

context of Athens' private economies, referring to property managers who (in almost every example in which the status of an *epitropos* can be ascertained) were slaves or freedman. The distinct situation of such slaves in comparison to others is highlighted in a passage of Pseudo-Aristotle's *Oikonomika* which describes two categories of slaves within Greek households: "Slaves are of two kinds; they are either an *epitropos*, or a labourer (*ergastēs*)" (1.1344a25-6).

To gain a more nuanced understanding of the social and economic role of the *epitropos* in classical Athenian society, we may turn first to Aristotle's *Politics*. The philosopher defined the relationship between slaves and masters, relative to their various tasks within the household economy, as follows:

> All such fields of knowledge (i.e. manual labour) are the business of slaves, whereas a master's knowledge consists in knowing how to put his slaves to *use*; for it is not in his acquiring of slaves but in his use of them that he is master. But the use of slaves is not a form of knowledge that has any great importance or dignity, since it consists in knowing how to direct slaves to do the tasks which they ought to know how to do. Hence those masters whose means are sufficient to exempt them from the bother employ an *epitropos* to take on this duty, while they devote themselves to statecraft or philosophy.
>
> (*Politics*, 1255b30-7, tr. Sinclair, 1981)

Earlier in this chapter (1.1.1), we noted that slave-ownership was often driven by Athenians' desire to extricate themselves from manual labour, which is evident from this passage. We also noted slave-ownership's value as a means of facilitating participation in politics and leisure, and here Aristotle notes a difficulty with slaving for this purpose — that the *supervision* of slaves remained a necessary task to which masters had to commit. Those who could afford to, Aristotle tells us, could

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for regents and military commanders: Aeschines (2.29); Xenophon (*Cyropaedia*, 4.2.35), as executors of wills: Diogenes Laertius (5.11).

mitigate this necessity through the employment of an *epitropos*. There is no indication in this passage that the *epitropos* Aristotle has in mind is a slave, but we can conclude that this was probably the case, considering the widespread use of slaves as *epitropoi* in literature we have already examined and will move on to examine in this section.[57] Besides these points, it is worth noting the fairly straightforward fact that the delegation of management positions within the holdings of wealthy Athenians was often necessitated by the extent of their property-holdings and by their frequent geographical separation.[58] As both a way of facilitating leisure time and of expanding productive property, *epitropoi* were thus a vital part of Athenian strategies.

The duties of *epitropoi* differed from example to example, as did the occupations in which they were employed (Carlsen, 2002, 117-8), a fact which is reflected by the wealth of modern translations for the term. The essence of the *epitropos*' role, in other words, seems to have been their entrustment with responsibility, rather than any specific set of jobs. Translations often emphasise the common supervisory aspect of their role: "overseer", "supervisor" or "foreman" (e.g. Pomeroy, 1994, 171; Murray, 1939: Dem. 27.19). However, the position denoted by *epitropos* often also included organisational or administrative work, leading some translations to render it "steward", "bailiff", or "manager" (e.g. Rathbone, Brill online; Rackham, 1944: Aristotle, *Politics*, 1.1255b). De Ste. Croix preferred to refer to individual *epitropoi* collectively as "the overseer or manager", highlighting his own understanding of the different responsibilities which such slaves could be assigned (1981, 140; 505; similarly Klees, 1998, 9; Kamen, 2013, 23).[59]

[57] Thus, as "assistants in the class of those things pertaining to action", *epitropoi* might be considered, in terms of Aristotle's definition of slavery more widely, "second-order tools" (Karbowski, 2013, 339).

[58] On fragmented land-holdings, below (108, 59).

[59] In German scholarship, *epitropos* is sometimes translated as "Aufseher" (e.g. Victor, 1983, 96) or, alternatively, "Gutsverwaltner" (e.g. Audring, 1973).

One particularly noteworthy variation between different *epitropoi* is their subjection to a system of either direct or indirect slavery. *Epitropoi*, as described in Xenophon's *Oikonomikos*, for example, are directly exploited, a fact evidenced by the consistent role which their master played in overseeing their work and distributing necessities and rewards to them (below, section 2.2.3). Other sources, however, indicate that slaves were used for the management of independent, rent-paying properties. In Demosthenes' first speech against his guardians, the orator describes a freedman *epitropos* named Milyas in charge of the knife-manufacturing workshop which his father had owned (27.19), and Acton has recently argued that this workshop functioned under an *apophora*-bearing relationship. As he observes (2014, 255), this resolves the issue of how Demosthenes could conceive of the workshop as providing him with an unfluctuating annual income (27.9).[60] Acton's suggestion is further supported by the tradition which claimed that Demosthenes and his father never learned the business of their manufacturing slaves (above, 42).

There is also the head (*hegemōn*) of Timarchos' shoemakers, who, we are told, paid 3 obols per day to his master, one more than the other nine or ten slaves who worked under him (Aeschines, 1.97). While relationships of this second kind (discussed in more detail below, section 5.3) automatically guaranteed a financial incentive for the slaves involved, slaves who were exploited directly in a position of trust often had to be motivated in different ways. The *Oikonomikos* of Xenophon is probably the clearest expression in Athenian sources of how and why such a system might be set up, and it is partially for this reason that I have chosen to discuss this text in detail below (Chapter 2).

Other positions of trust, beyond the management of profit-orientated businesses, are evidenced in our Athenian sources. Cox has observed a hierarchy of slaves in Menander's comedy by the orders

[60] This a problem which puzzled earlier commenters on the speech (Finley, 1973, 166; McDowell, 2004, 20). Acton also notes that the large amount of money it would have required to feed these slaves is also something which must have been organised by Milyas, from the workshop's overheads (2014, 259-60). Acton's position has recently found cautious support from Kamen (2016, 418).

provided by some slaves to others (2013, 163–4). Within the domestic setting of the household, one prominent example is the *tamia*, a female slave tasked with an important organisational role (below, 111–14). Another possible addition to this category was the *trapezopoios*, known only through fragmentary and inscriptional evidence, who appears to have been something like a butler: an overseer of domestic workers, particularly in the kitchen (Pritchett and Pippin, 1956, 279).[61] A scene in Menander's *Phasma* also describes a slave hiring a cook for a wedding (57–74, Arnott, 1979–2000, vol. III).[62] In Menander's *Sikyonioi*, we see the use of slave agents as relays of personal business related to the family — a slave is sent to Sikyon to inform his mother about his master's arrival in Athens and carries back to Athens details of her death (120–6).

What sets all these slaves apart was not only the relative importance of the tasks set them, but the level of independence with which they operated. As such, their work depended on a level of trust between master and slave, an idea foregrounded in a story preserved in the corpus of Demosthenes. We learn from *Against Olympiadoros* about an elderly Athenian man named Komon, who owned a particular drug-grinding slave named Moschion, "whom Komon used to regard as especially loyal to him" (*ὃν μάλιστ᾽ ἐνόμιζε πιστὸν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι ὁ Κόμων*), and who had knowledge of Komon's affairs (48.14, tr. Scafuro, 2011). Clearly, this slave was in a particular position of trust relative to the other slaves in Komon's household (48.12), and we might speculate that the knowledge he was privy to

[61] See Athenaeus (4.170d–e); Pollux (3.41; 4.13). Notably, the sale of a *trapezopoios* was recorded in the fifth-century Attic Stelai (*IG* I^3 422, 71–3). Unsurprisingly for a slave in a position of trust, he is listed as *oikogenes* — i.e. born in the household of his master, although so was the cheapest slave in the inscription (who was a donkey driver: 74–6).

[62] The text is badly damaged. However, although the discussion between slave and cook appears mainly to have served an expositional function, a heated back and forth between the two (68–74) and a well-preserved question about a choice of menu (73–4) suggest this interpretation.

was provided to him because of his role in managing it.[63] We know from wider evidence that slaves were not the only option available for help in the administration of the household or the supervision of its workforce. Extended family might provide another source of management personal, as could friendships and neighbourhood communities, but these should not be viewed as a suitable substitute for the full-time labour demanded of an *epitropos*.[64]

A more viable alternative was a hired freeman, although these are virtually absent in our evidence. As is often remarked, an apparently more frequent choice of slave over hired managers may also be the result of the views expressed in our literature which saw as inherently servile any work "that required regular and repetitive service for a single employer on an ongoing basis over a continuing period— what we would term a 'job'" (Cohen, 2006, 100, with references; Scheidel, 2002, 182; de Ste. Croix, 1988, 40). Owing to this fact, the argument goes, the free population of Athens did not seek such positions in any great number. The most informative passage is from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, where Socrates and a citizen named Eutherus discuss potential ways for the latter to earn money (2.8.3-5). Socrates suggests Eutherus employ himself as a manager on another's estate, to which the latter replies that he could not do so, as "it would be difficult for me to make myself like a slave" (4). It is nevertheless difficult to tell to what degree we should see these attitudes towards extended labour for another as indicative of widespread (rather than elite) ideology; or whether we should take them seriously as a sufficiently strong attitude to stop citizens from making a living in this way (Vlassopoulos, 2016c, 673–5; Scheidel, 1990). The very fact that Xenophon

[63] For more on this slave, below (189; 197–8).

[64] Other citizens as temporary guardians of property: Demosthenes (53.4, and of finances: 49.7, 60). Cf. Gallant (1991, 156-8).

mentions this as an option, furthermore, tells us that it was one open to citizens and other free labourers and suggests that it was a position which some occupied.[65]

There are, however, reasons to suggest that Athenians would have preferred trusted slaves regardless of the willingness of other citizens to hire themselves out for such roles. As Harper observes, "slave labor and free labor are not necessarily exact substitutes… Slavery gave the owner a set of long-term property rights in the slave; wage labor was a type of contract, of variable duration, between the employer and the laborer for the labor itself" (2010, 213). The key point here is that slaves, unlike freepersons, could more safely be considered a permanent solution to a required management role, with all the advantages that entailed, including the reduced transaction costs of finding and replacing suitable candidates (ibid). Of course, slaves could run away. This was a risky decision on their part, however, and it would have been in a master's best interests to provide slaves in positions of trust with enough incentive not to do so. Slaves could also, in certain situations, save up money and buy their freedom (e.g. Pseudo-Xenophon, *Ath. Pol.* 1.11). In this case, a master would recoup the cost of their initial investment — and possibly earn a little extra by charging slaves more than their market value, as they were legally entitled to do.[66]

Cohen has argued that because "manumission at Athens imposed on the freedman no continuing, legally sanctioned obligation toward his former master", providing a slave with his freedom might be less preferable to slave-owners than offering them other advantages instead, whilst ensuring their continued work (2000a, 145). This argument is, however, not exactly correct. We might point to

[65] It has even been argued that this passage is a fairly straightforward indication of an increase in permanently-hired managers following the Peloponnesian War (Audring, 1973, 114-5).

[66] This suggestion cannot be proved from classical Athenian evidence, but see Cole (2005) on manumission prices in 18th– and 19th–century Louisiana. While under Spanish rule, slaves were legally guaranteed a market price for their freedom (1013), but after the revocation of this law under US rule, prices for manumission became decidedly unfair (1019–1024).

post-manumission *paramonē* obligations, evidenced in the fourth century, as a means by which the continued labour of a valuable slave could be retained after their manumission (Canevaro and Lewis, 2014, 99–110; Kamen, 2013, 32–42; Fisher, 1993, 68-9; cf. Zelnick-Abramovitz, 2005, 222–248).[67] The wills of philosophers preserved in Diogenes Laertius demonstrate this process in action. A particularly intriguing example comes from the will of Theophrastus, which stipulates that a long-since manumitted (and apparently privileged) couple be allowed 2,000 drachmae and be given a slave girl, but also that the husband continue to oversee the maintenance of a temple and its surrounding area (5.2.54). We might imagine that similar conditions were offered to slaves in positions of trust in order to provide them with their freedom, whilst binding them to their master's service for a period of time or their remaining life.[68]

Another difference between slave labour and free labour was the connection of the slave's wellbeing to his master's household, or rather, his or her connection *only* to it. In theory and often in practice, slaves were legally and socially responsible only to their master. They had no conflicting loyalties with other households, and their wellbeing was consequently tied to the basic economic unit of the Athenian household. In this way, they differed from hired labourers. Athenian slave-owners may consequently have seen them as a naturally more reliable source of management delegation. This point is strengthened by studies which foreground the level of trust, even within an extended family, which was limited to the members of the same *oikos*. Foxhall references several

[67] If Canevaro and Lewis (2014) are correct that the *chōris oikountēs* referenced in Demosthenes (4.36) were a sizeable group of slaves released from *paramonē* obligations, then we can posit the existence of *paramonē* obligations even earlier in Athens' history.

[68] Although freedom with such a *paramonē* clause might seem something of an empty gesture, receiving the legal status of a freedman would still have been desirable for a number of reasons. For one thing, it freed them from the fear of being sold or confiscated. In the application of penal law too, slaves were liable for corporal punishment, while in contrast a freedman was punished with a fine (Hunter, 2000, 8-10; cf. Todd, 2000a).

sources which indicate that slaves might be more trusted than family members or friends. A passage of Theophrastus' *Characters*, for example, caricatures a distrustful man who does so (4.2). These sources viewed this level of trust in slaves in a decidedly negative way, but nevertheless, Foxhall sees the *oikos* as furnishing "the limits of trust", and points to several intra-kin disputes between different *oikoi*, along with parallels in wider history, as supporting evidence (2007b, 51–2).[69] In his short synthesis of slavery in world history, Turley noted the frequent use of slaves as a means of exerting political authority in centralised political systems, "precisely because of their status… as [they were] complete dependents on the ruler" (2000, 66-7). This was equally true within Athenian households.

For one final reason why slaves might be preferred to hired freemen in management positions, we might point to the unlimited power of the master to punish them in any way he might see fit, including demoting them to a position of less privileged servitude (Kamen, 2013, 26–7). Evidence for the role of violence in coercing slaves in positions of trust will also be returned to in the following chapters.

Pseudo-Aristotle, as we saw above, saw slaves as occupying one of two distinct groups relative to their role in the household. As both ancient and modern readers have seen it, his distinction amounts to distinguishing between slaves "in positions of trust, and the labourers" (tr. Armstrong,

[69] "Since much of our evidence for functioning relationships within extended families in Classical Athens comes from law-court speeches, and since kinsmen who took their affairs to the law courts were by definition at odds with each other, frequently over inheritances, the surviving evidence may well overemphasize disputes at the expense of family solidarity, but the disputes were there" (Roy, 1999, 3). Humphreys uses the exact same phrase as Foxhall in her study of kinship patterns (quoted by Roy): "limits of trust [were] based on co-residence at some stage in a nuclear family unit" (1984, 87).

1935).[70] This is an oversimplification on the part of Pseudo-Aristotle, as we have and will continue to see, but it brings out well the importance of trusted enslaved persons in positions of authority to contemporary Athenians and their distinctiveness from other slaves. These separate roles are described shortly afterwards, when Aristotle's student contrasts these two types of slaves as "those who undertake more of a freeman's work" with "those labouring with their hands" (1344a28-9; 30-1). We might posit, on the basis of his teacher's view on the matter, that the assumption by the *epitropos* of what would otherwise have been his master's duties in directing the labour force and management of his *oikos* warrant this description of his role. We have, however, seen how extended work for another of any kind was considered slavish, and another way to look at this passage is to examine the social status accorded to slaves with authority as a necessity of the particular slaving strategy in which they were employed. This is a topic that will be expounded in the following chapters.

1.3 Skilled and Unskilled Labour

The division between skilled and unskilled labour has a long pedigree in discussions of the work of slaves, no less than in discussions of workforces more generally. An aspect of the division of labour, it differentiates between occupations which require a lengthy period of training in order to be executed, and those which do not. The former is therefore usually considered more valuable, and the monetary price placed on that value in an economy is termed a "skill premium". In almost any type of work, experience is a valuable factor and any division between skilled and unskilled must, by

[70] Similarly the first-century BC epicurean philosopher Philodemos. In his discussion of 1.1344a, he refers to the *epitropoi* whom Pseudo-Aristotle calls the "freest" (*eleutheriōteros*) as the "most trustworthy" (*alēthinōteros*) (9.29). As Victor put it in his commentary on the Aristotelean *Oikonomikos*: "Die stellung des *epitropos* ist eine Vertrauensstellung, für die Ehrlichkeit eine Voraussetzung ist" (1983, 143).

necessity, be made on arbitrary grounds. True though this may be, it is nevertheless worth highlighting this opposition as a way of understanding some of the differences in the labour to which slaves are assigned. I will here consider some evidence for a higher value placed on more skilled labour by slaves and then discuss how the issue of skilled labour affected slaving strategies.

1.3.1 Athenian Distinctions between Skilled and Unskilled Slaves

A well-known, though contentious, passage of Thucydides demonstrates that classical Athenians viewed the value of slaves along a skilled and unskilled dichotomy. During the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia, he tells us, more than 20,000 Athenian slaves escaped, "many of whom" (*τούτων τὸ πολὺ μέρος*, alternatively: "the majority of whom", Hornblower, 2008, 591-2) were *cheirotechnai*" — literally "skilled of hand" (7.27.5). Less significant here than the accuracy of Thucydides' numbers is the meaning of *cheirotechnai* and his purpose in mentioning it. Although its exact meaning has been the subject of debate, de Ste. Croix's translation of "skilled workmen" seems most plausible (1981, 506).[71] A large part of the reason for preferring this translation, and also the significance of it to the subject of skilled and unskilled slave labourers, was explained by de Ste. Croix: "this best suits Thucydides' meaning here… the loss was all the more keenly felt because the deserters were mainly skilled workmen" (ibid.).

[71] The term is often best translated as "artisan" (e.g. Xenophon, *Mem.* 3.11.4; Aristophanes, *Pl.* 533), as it is sometimes is in this passage (Dent, 1910). A broader meaning, however, is supported by Thucydides' other use of *cheirotechnai* to describe the Athenians as the most experienced Greeks at naval combat (6.72.3), as de Ste. Croix notes, and other sources which use the word to distinguish the skilled practitioner of medicine (Sophocles, *Trach.* 100; Hippocrates, VM. 7). Scholars have also argued that Thucydides is referring to mining slaves (Lauffer, 1979, 141; Thompson, 2003, 134).

We cannot know for sure exactly what kind of slaves would qualify, in Thucydides' opinion, as technically experienced. It is nevertheless worth hypothesising on this point, a task which can be aided by a small amount of information about the varying values of Athenian slaves; as Xenophon noted, the differing values of slaves to their masters could be expressed in the amount that the latter were willing to pay for them (*Mem.* 2.5.2) — by their market price, in other words.[72] The evidence for slave prices in classical Attica has been examined by Pritchett and Pippin (1956, 276–8) and is summarised here. Xenophon seems to have believed that a slave suitable for work in Athens' mine could be purchased for 180 drachmae (*Vect.* 4.23) — a figure that closely resembles the average price of slaves as preserved in the Attic Stelai (*IG* I^3 421–30) over half a century earlier.[73] Higher prices are recorded across fourth-century court speeches, a fact which leads Pritchett and Pippin to conclude that there was an inflation of slave prices generally, but also that this discrepancy arises from the skilled artisanal work of the slaves in the later sources (277). A few additional remarks may be added to their analysis.

One notable outlier in this data comes from Demosthenes' valuation of his father's blade-manufacturing shop (27.9), which values its slaves at "mostly 500 to 600 drachmae, and none less than 300".[74] Another workshop of his father, which made furniture, consisted of slaves priced much lower than this at 200 drachmae (ibid), the same price as another slave mentioned in the corpus of

[72] As in other slave societies (e.g. Harper, 2010, *esp*. 226; 228).

[73] In his *Poroi* (4.23), Xenophon calculates that the revenue from 1,200 slaves providing an obol per day (cf. 4.14) could be used to purchase 6,000 slaves over 5-6 years. If the income of all additional slaves purchased with the revenue per year is factored into this process in subsequent years, we derive an average slave price of 180 drachmae (Gauthier, 1976, 156–7).

[74] For the purposes of present discussion, the two largest outliers have been neglected (Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.5.2; Demosthenes, 59.29). Both valuations constitute unusual circumstances, which will be examined, along with its effect on their monetary value, at 67 and 240–1 respectively below.

Demosthenes (41.8). This may well be an indication that the former group had been trained in a more difficult trade, a fact which is supported by the greater income which they provided Demosthenes' father per year (27.9).[75]

Surprising, considering our other examples, is the valuation of two adult enslaved men in the fourth century at 125 drachmae in a speech by Apollodorus (Demosthenes, 53.1).[76] As well as warning us against postulating a standard 180–200 price for slaves from our limited evidence, this passage also suggests that we need to look closely at the context in which the price of different slaves has been ascertained in our evidence. Indeed, as the value of slaves in court speeches was judged by a self-interested party, we might doubt their accuracy. For example, Apollodorus' case was aided by the low value of the two slaves, which he portrays as evidence of his lack of financial motivation in bringing the suit to court. Admittedly, he claims that his opponents had decided on the price; but even if this is true, we might also point out that the defendant had a stake in lowering the price of his slaves too, to minimise the effect of his supposed fraud — which Apollodorus might have cleverly turned to his advantage. Demosthenes, contrastingly, had good reason to exaggerate the worth of his blade-making slaves.[77] Of course, these estimates could not be so out of proportion as to risk the suspicion of the Athenian jury, and, all things considered, the price of Demosthenes' blade-making slaves is still remarkable.

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[75] The 32/3 blade manufacturers returned 3,000 drachmae per year (93.75/91 per slave) and the 20 furniture manufacturers 1,200 drachmae (60 per slave).

[76] Further on these slaves, see below (189–90).

[77] For an entirely different reason, there is good reason to suspect the price of 200 drachmae attached to the furniture-making slaves: their supposed value relative to the profit they generated presents them as more than half again as productive an investment as the blade manufacturers (Davies, 1971, 128–30). This is probably explicable by the fact that the loan on which the furniture makers acted as security, from which the figure of 200 drachmae a slave was derived, was only a portion of their overall value (Harris, 2006a, 179–181).

Naturally, the circumstances of individual sales, including the leverage which parties held over each other — of which a fluctuating market value of slaves must surely have been an important part — no doubt resulted in a variety of different slave prices across the classical period of Athens' history. However, it is clear (even from a limited sample size) that skill premiums affected the price of slaves in the Attic Stelai, which have the advantage as evidence of being derived from a single time period and a single process of determining the value of a group of slaves (i.e. by auction). The prices for the slaves vary considerably, often with little indication of what it was that decided their price. There are, however, a few exceptions.

In seven of our surviving examples (*IG* I^3 422, 73; 76; 78; 207; 426, 13–15), a slave is listed along with the occupation that he had performed for his previous master. Only in four of these has the price they were sold for been recorded. A *trapezopoios* sold for roughly 50 drachmae over the average price for a male slave, possibly a reflection of his trusted position in the household of his old master.[78] More surprisingly, a Carian goldsmith sold for double the male average.[79] It is difficult not to believe that the technically difficult but extremely valuable skill that this slave possessed was what raised his price — all the more so if he had built up a reputation for his work. On the other hand, the sale of two donkey-drivers are recorded as below the average price for a male slave at 140 (IG I^3, 422, 74–6) and 150 drachmae (206–7). Although these slaves were recorded and therefore presumably advertised with relevant experience, that of the donkey drivers appears not to have attracted much enthusiasm from bidders. In conclusion, although any quantifiable estimate is impossible considering the nature and paucity of our evidence, we can still observe the increased value of skilled slaves in classical Athens by reference to their higher market value.

[78] On the meaning of *trapezopoios*, above (53).

[79] See Pritchett and Pippin for the references and further discussion (1956, 278–9).

1.3.2 Skilled Labour and Slaving Strategies

It is important to distinguish between strategies that exploited slaves with a particularly skilled profession and those which exploited slaves purely for their manpower. To a free-worker on the labour market, the ability to engage in skilled labour is generally valuable first and foremost to their person; to a slave worker, it strictly translates as valuable to his or her owner. This, however, does not necessarily mean that it is *never* of some benefit to a slave. A crucial study by Fenoaltea differentiated between what he termed "pain intensive" and "care intensive" servile occupations (1984). Pain intensive work consists of simple, undifferentiated tasks, which can be carried out with minimal training and instruction and be easily supervised (either by observation or by the inspection of work). Fenoaltea argued that slaves employed in this work could be easily exploited through supervision and the threat of violence. On the other hand, "care intensive work", which is highly differentiated and takes years of practice to conduct to a good standard, is performed poorly in high stress conditions and is more susceptible to various forms of sabotage. Fenoaltea therefore suggests that violent coercion is not that effective a motivator on its own for labour of this sort. As he and others have argued, the high number of skilled slaves in Graeco-Roman civilisation resulted in higher levels of privilege and manumission rates in these societies compared to modern slave systems.[80]

As we have discussed, Athenians placed a high value on the professional skills of their slaves, a fact which surely reflects the importance of slaving strategies connected to skilled labour. Competition for reputation was a key economic strategy of free skilled practitioners (Stewart, forthcoming). Similarly, the reputation earned for consistently high-quality work from a slave would be of value to their owner, who might want to encourage this as much as possible. The case of the Carian goldsmith is an interesting one to consider. In order to get the most profit out of his technical skill and build his reputation, his owners may have been forced to provide him some manner of positive

[80] E.g. Findlay (1975); Zimmern (1928, 122). Cf. now Scheidel (2008).

incentives, according to Fenoaltea's model. However, it is difficult to know to what extent close supervision by a master, or a supervisor with a vested interest in motivating a slave's work, may still have been preferred to a system of positive incentives where possible, even for the skilled work of slaves. Of course, the supervisor would have to be technically qualified to assess the labour of the slave. Furthermore, the manufacturing of a particular good as a process consists of several differentiable tasks, many of which are unskilled, such as the disposal of waste and the transport of materials. The same is often true of agriculture. Especially in larger operations, a division of labour could be used to exploit slaves in easily monitored, unskilled labour, while reserving positive incentives for those who performed more skilled work.

It is worth reemphasising the way in which ease of supervision in particular affects the implementation of different slaving strategies, as this is a concern which stretches beyond a skilled/unskilled dichotomy. In the Caribbean, for example, the largely creole and coloured "slave drivers, mechanics, and stockmen were freed more often than were less skilled slaves" (Stinchcombe, 1994, 925). As Stinchcombe observes, however, such phenomena can be explained not only by reference to the skill involved in different types of labour, but also by the possibility of their close supervision. Since the occupations slaves practised in Athens were incredibly diverse, the idea that they might be divided into a category of either skilled or unskilled labour is somewhat reductive and needs to be qualified with reference to the specifics of their work, as will be attempted in following chapters.

1.4 Sexual Slavery as Divergent Strategies

Speaking of slaving as a global phenomenon, Elbourne remarks "that the obligation to provide sex might be seen as a central characteristic of enslavement" (2015, 9). The same is true of ancient Athens and fits well the domination which masters held over their slaves in other areas of life (Fischer, 2010, 64-7; Klees, 1998, 161-3). In Chapter 3, I will consider the sexual exploitation of slaves

in an owner's household (158–9). This present discussion is focused around strategies geared specifically to the sexual exploitation of slaves. Rather than just being a feature of Athens' society, "the sexual use of slaves [became] *institutionalized*", as in the Roman Empire (Harper, 2011, 284, emphasis his). Sexual slavery in Athens is now well studied following a surge of academic interest in ancient prostitution over the past 20 years.[81] As such, I have chosen to limit my comments on it to this smaller section, which will nevertheless serve as a means of demonstrating how several distinct strategies, corresponding closely to the differences outlined above, formed around the sexual exploitation of slaves.

1.4.1 Prostitution

Probably the most frequent way in which classical Athenian slaves were subjected to regular sexual exploitation was in the sphere of prostitution. Our literary sources make frequent reference to availability of purchasable sex for its resident male population. The term prostitute, today and in many other historic societies, disguises a range of different working conditions and socio-economic positions which those who sold sex might hold. This is also reflected by different Athenian terms for those who sold sex (Kapparis, 2011; Davidson, 1997, 73-97; McClure, 2003, 9-26). Much debate has gone into describing the exact meaning of the term *hetairai* as opposed to the more general term for a prostitute: *pornai* (e.g. Cohen, 2006, 97-9), and the issue is still controversial. Where appropriate, I have made reference to these two terms and others but have largely based my discussion on descriptions of prostitutes practising their trade, rather than interpretations of Athenian terms.

The most common kind of prostitution in Athens probably consisted of the sale of a single act of sex (Davidson, 1997, 73-97). Comic fragments describe brothels as a place to find cheap sex (ibid., 84;

[81] Davidson (1997, part 2); Kurke (1999); Hartmann (2002); Hamel (2003); McClure (2003); Faraone and McClure eds. (2006); Glazebrook and Henry eds. (2011); Cohen (2015); Kapparis (2018).

Philemon, fr. 4 K-A), though they appear to have been varied; visual and archaeological evidence suggests "that some hoped to keep clients around and perhaps even catered to wealthier customers" (Glazebrook, 2011, 43 *et passim*). The sex workers that brothels employed were likely to be slaves. In one excavated building in Athens' Kerameikos, identified as a classical brothel, "the women who inhabited these corridors were foreigners, almost certainly slaves, who left traces of the devotion to foreign goddesses in the form of little statuettes. These, together with the jewellery found on the site, suggest they had come from Thrace, Anatolia and Syria, the usual suppliers of slaves to Athens" (Davidson, 1997, 86, cf. Glazebrook, 2011, 50; Cohen, 2015, 2–5). The word *pornē* is often associated with *doulē* in our sources (Cohen, 2015, 46–8) — an ideological construct, to be sure, but one probably partially based on Athenian reality.[82] Nor were all slave prostitutes women. According to Diogenes Laertius, the philosopher Phaedon was placed in an Athenian brothel after the sack of his city of Elis and his subsequent sale into prostitution (2.105).

The best documented forms of prostitution in classical Athens were those practised by its more expensive prostitutes, whose names and stories are preserved in surviving texts through their patronage by the rich and the famous men of Athens.[83] As sex was certainly one of the services which these women provided, they are considered prostitutes. Nevertheless, their services extended beyond the act of sex alone and often included (for want of a better word) companionship, even if the desire of men for relationships of this kind was itself based on an initial sexual attraction. It was the distinction between the number of their partners, and the commoditisation of their company (and not just sex) which distinguished these women from other prostitutes in classical Athens (McClure, 2003, 11–18). Due to the association of high-class prostitutes with exorbitant wealth, they may well have been viewed as a marker of status as well.

[82] Examples in Citti (1997).

[83] Famous examples include Theodote (Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 3.11) and Aspasia (Plutarch, *Per.* 24.3-10; Kennedy, 2014, 68-96).

It is this rough sketch of prostitution which is commonly associated in contemporary Athenian literature and modern scholarship with the term *hetaira*, a female equivalent of the common word for a male friend (*hetairos*), which is often appropriately translated into English as "courtesan". While many if not most of Athens' most famous prostitutes were free *metics*, others were slaves. By far the most detailed example of the prostitution of a slave woman comes from the speech *Against Neaira* by Apollodorus, which describes, in its lengthy narrative section, the life of a famous courtesan after whom the speech is named, who started her life enslaved to a female brothel owner named Nikarete in the city of Corinth ([Demosthenes], 59).[84]

If the services of brothel prostitutes were characterised as cheap, those belonging to Nikarete were anything but. The speech describes some of the relationships which Neaira and the other girls who worked in the same brothel maintained during their slavery. Their clients came from amongst some of the most famous figures in Corinth and others came from foreign city-states, including Athens, where Neaira lived out her later life. She was famed for her attractiveness (26), her clients sometimes took her to symposia or to public events, even outside the city of Corinth (21-5), and she was purchased as an adult for an astounding 3,000 drachmae (29).

Notably, it was not just her natural beauty that made her so valuable to her owner, but her training for the role of a high-class prostitute. Neaira was bought, along with several other enslaved girls, by Nikarete when she was young and cheap. According to Apollodorus (59.18–26), Nikarete covered the cost of her upkeep for years during her training and then exploited her sexually once she had reached an appropriate age.[85] The sale of Neaira to her lovers once she was nearing the peak of her value, was supposedly another explicit facet of Nikarete's strategy (19; 29). Although her exploitation as a prostitute made her age relative to value unusually low, it is still worth pointing out

[84] For a detailed study of Neaira's life, Hamel (2003).

[85] For what the training Neaira received might have looked like, Kapparis (2018, 47–63).

how the sale, or in other circumstances the manumission of slaves after a period of time, might be factored into a long-term strategy of this sort.

Neaira, in other words, was exploited under a strategy aimed at selling her body to wealthy clients at exorbitant prices. She should be considered highly skilled in her occupation, a fact reflected in the price of 3,000 drachmae which her lovers paid to own her (29), and her skills led to significant advantages for her. The patronage of her famous lovers allowed her to acquire the financial means to eventually buy her freedom, which, according to Apollodoros, she did with their contributions and some money she had managed to acquire during her time in slavery. Of course, the legitimacy of using Nikarate as an example of the strategies of Athenian slave-owners might be reasonably questioned. Strictly speaking, she was an example of a Corinthian rather than an Athenian slave owner. We might also wonder how accurate Apollodorus' knowledge of her actions, let alone the motivations behind them, actually was. Nevertheless, the fact of the matter is that Apollodorus thought that his description would strike his audience as a believable slaving strategy. His description therefore stands as evidence of Athenian slavery, though Nikarete's slaves were no doubt exceptional in the extent of their fame.

Nikarete seems to have been directly involved in her business (she sets the price for the use of her girls at 28), and many of the slaves in brothels were probably exploited directly by their masters. In other cases, however, slaves could be exploited through a supervisor or by a third party who rented the brothel. The sixth speech of Isaios provides interesting details regarding the owner of a brothel and the organisation of this establishment. One Euktemon, the inheritance of whose property was the subject of the speech, owned considerable property in real estate, livestock, and slaves (33–4), including a brothel in the Peiraius, run by a freedwoman of his (*apeleuthera… autou*: 6.19). One of the slaves working in this brothel, named Alke, eventually replaced this freedwoman as its manager (19–20). The text does not specify if Alke was ever manumitted (Kazakévich, 1961, 12–13), but either

way, here we have evidence of the use of servile figures in a strategy of prostitution management, which entailed particular trust between them and their master.

Alke had lived a long life in prostitution. We are told that she only became a manager when she was too old for her body to be sold and after she had been married to a freedman for a period of time. She must have had considerable experience in the business and have gained the trust of her master. We are told that Euktemon regularly visited the brothel to "collect the rent" (21), which might indicate his assumption of all profits accrued by the establishment. However, the word "rent" in this passage is an appropriate translation of the term *enoikion*, which elsewhere refers to the payment made by the tenant of a property (e.g. Demosthenes, 48.45; Plutarch, *Sull.* 1.3–4). As such, it seems likely that Alke was exploited indirectly as the quasi-owner of the brothel and returned some of its profits to Euktemon. Slaving strategies of this type will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 (5.3).

Musical entertainers were often prostituted in Athens too. A particularly common example is the *auletris*, a musical performer often linked to sexual services (Davidson, 1997, 91–2; cf. Coccagna, 2011, 115-8). Visual and literary evidence often depicts such performers at symposia (e.g. Xenophon, *Sym*. 4.50-60). Though male citizen participants do not always interact with the entertainers in a sexual way, it seems likely from other sources that in many cases, performers (both male and female) were available for sex (Pellizer, 1990, 180–2; McClure, 2003, 21-2).[86] In Theophrastus' *Characters*, for example, a slave is told to fetch an *auletris* from a brothel (20.10). In two anecdotes related by Athenaeus, we are told that entertainers were auctioned off after the party had ended (13.607d–f); the first of these states that this was common practice.[87]

[86] We also have references to *hetairai* at symposia (Hamel, 2003, 8-10).

[87] Goldman (2015) has argued that the *auletris* was first and foremost a performer rather than a prostitute. However, he is forced to concede that several sources unquestionably show a connection between these two roles — though others are more ambiguous.

Training slaves in musical instruments, to exploit them as entertainers and to increase their allure in order to exploit them sexually, was a distinct slaving strategy. Isokrates referenced schools for the training of *auletreis* and said that young men spent too much time around them, a clear reference to the sexual associations made with these musicians (15.287). As McClure notes, musical performers sometimes carried a low reputation and at other times a high one (2003, 21–2). In Menander's *Epitrepontes*, a slave "harp-girl" (*psaltria*) is hired from a "pimp" (*pornoboskis*) on an ongoing basis to live with an Athenian in his house for the large sum of 12 drachmas a day (136-7), evidence of another means of exploiting slave prostitutes for financial gain, beyond the sale of their company for a limited period of time.

As well as in brothels, prostitutes could also be found in the streets of Athens. In a law purportedly of Solonic origin, Athenian sex workers were placed outside the protection of the law on adultery, defining them as "those who sit in a brothel or those who walk to and fro in the open" (Demosthenes, 59.67 with Davidson, 1997, 77; 78–83).[88] Men are described as buying the sexual services of *auletreis* in public spaces too (Metagenes, fr. 4 K-A; Theopompus *FGrHist.* 115, fr. 290). The likelihood is that many were slaves, as were the prostitutes staffing Athens' brothels. The question of how these workers were motivated to work cannot be answered confidently. Quite possibly, they were accompanied on the streets by pimps, who ensured they took on clients and handed over their earnings. Otherwise, slaves might be left to work the streets independently, in return for an *apophora*. Comparative evidence from 19th century Brazil can be used to support this position. A study of court records from Rio de Janeiro details the stories of slaves who were exploited in this way, as opposed to the many who were purchased by both reputable and disreputable brothels (Graham, 1991, 671–9). These stories also demonstrate that independence, though probably desirable to many slaves, does not necessarily equate to privilege (673–4), an

[88] ὁπόσαι ἂν ἐπ᾽ ἐργαστηρίου καθῶνται ἢ πωλῶνται ἀποπεφασμένως. Cf. Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.2.4); Glazebrook (2011, 42).

important fact to bear in mind when considering the effect of different slaving strategies in Athens. Aristophanes twice has his characters refer to prostitutes roaming the streets of Athens, and in neither case are the conditions they work in positively represented (*Eq*. 1397–1404; *Peace*, 164-5).

Although defining any concrete boundaries between them is difficult, slave-owners, through training they might give to their slaves, by the locations at which and by the clientele with which they might have them work, engaged in different strategies within the sphere of Athenian prostitution. A market for cheap sex is evident in our sources, but other slaves received training in the arts of seduction, or in a musical instrument, at least partially to enhance their sexual allure (cf. Cohen, 2014, 191). While some slaves were closely monitored in brothels, we might also speculate that certain slaves were forced into prostitution in relative independence in their day to day lives. In these various ways, slave-owners were able to profit economically from the varied market for sex in classical Athens.

Though impossible to quantify, the scale of slave prostitution in Athens appears to have been considerable and incorporated much of what would be separate entertainment services in the modern world. To a degree, the utilisation of a slave's sexual labour through their prostitution was comparable to utilising their labour for other means, from the perspective of a slave-owner. This statement needs to be qualified, however, with some notable differences. Rather than selling the product of their labour, masters sold the body and the person of slave prostitutes directly. As well as the fact that other methods of exploitation were unlikely to leave female slaves liable to pregnancy, one can plausibly imagine that many sex acts of free men with slave prostitutes were violent in nature and liable to cause injury to the prostitute. On the other hand, these relationships occasionally resulted in feelings of infatuation, possessiveness, and even genuine affection on the part of patrons, which slave prostitutes could work to their advantage. Rather than the care-intensive nature of her work *per se*, it was more prominently her relationships with powerful men

that Neaira used to gain her freedom. The advantages this reality created for sexually exploited slaves, as well as their limitations, will now be further examined.

1.4.2 Concubinage

So far we have been concerned primarily with the financial value of sexual exploitation through prostitution. But this strategy arose from the value of the sexuality of slaves as a purchasable commodity to Athenian men. Part of the mechanics by which slavery catered to these desires we have already seen; and it seems worth pointing out that an Athenian man who bought the services of an enslaved prostitute played as equal a role as their slave-owner in this particular process of exploitation. Athenian men might also sexually exploit slaves by purchasing them outright and keeping them as personal sex slaves, or — to use words with less cynical connotations perhaps more appropriate in certain cases — lovers and mistresses. Modern scholars usually use the word concubine to describe these persons, because it captures well the fact that they lived in long-term relationships of dependency, separable from formal marriages. The Athenian word often used to describe the female subject of such relationships is *pallakē* (McClure, 2003, 18-21), though as with the terminology used of prostitutes, the delineation of *pallakē* is hard to pin down and distinguish from that of a *hetaira* hired for a lengthy period of time (Grace, 1968, 34-6; Klees, 1998, 165).[89]

Neaira's story demonstrates how many parties with differing interests in rights to their person might have affected the overall trajectory of a slave's life. The eventual sale of Neaira, as discussed above, was an essential part of Nikarete's business model. Two of Neaira's lovers bought shared ownership of her from Nikarete, supposedly because the pair wanted to keep enjoying her sexually and thought that this was the more financially sound way to do so (29–30).[90] To be sure, they recuperated two

[89] "Clear boundaries between nonmarital [Athenian] sexual relations… are often elusive" (McClure, 2006, 6).

[90] A similar Athenian example is preserved in the corpus of Lysias (4.10).

thirds of the money they spent on her some time later when they decided to settle down and offered Neaira the chance to buy her freedom.[91] She did so with a substantial contribution made by one Phrynion, an Athenian lover of hers (31-2). Presumably, he did so out of some form of affection for Neaira, but his actions as they are described later in the speech indicate a more self-serving motive**.** Neaira lived with Phrynion for a while where she was put through a variety of degrading sexual acts in public places as, interestingly, a result of Phrynion's desire for social prestige — *philotimia* — accumulated from the possession of such a beautiful woman (33; Dover, 1974, 233). He also physically abused her (37).

Neaira eventual fled Phrynion, but some years later (when she returned to Athens after having spent two years in Megara: 34), he attempted to seize her, and try to force her to resume her position as his concubine (39). Neaira was defended by the man with whom she was living at the time, one Stephanos, and the issue was resolved by arbitration, with both parties conceding her freedom, but allowing Phrynion sexual rights over her (49). The question is, if Phrynion had purchased Neaira's freedom from her owners, rather than her person, what right did he have over her at all? It might be the case that Neaira's status as a freedwomen at all was in question and that neither side of the dispute was confident enough in their case to take the issue to court. One feels, however, that if there were any suggestion that Neaira was a runaway slave, Apollodorus would have used this fact to strengthen his case. A more convincing answer, to my mind, is the suggestion that Phyrnion's payment for Neaira's freedom carried with it explicit commitments which she had towards him, similar to the *paramonē* clauses found in other evidence (above, 55–6; cf. Kamen, 2014, 296).

Whether or not Neaira was under legal compulsion to remain with Phyrion, it is worth considering the socio-economic vulnerability of newly-manumitted slaves, who, with little if any personal property and no family to shelter and protect them, might be bound to the person who put up the

[91] Apollodoros claimed that her owners waived the extra third of her value.

money for their freedom in a *de facto* sense. They could, of course, try to make a living practising the trade which they had performed as a slave. Neaira prostituted herself in Megara in order to live independently of Phyrnion, but found this option financially untenable considering her age at the time, forcing her to return to a life as the mistress of an Athenian citizen (37-8). It might have been necessary (or just easier), to remain as the dependant of the man who had legally freed them. We might here note the importance of manumission to slaving strategies generally. Not only did it provided a good incentive for slaves to perform their role well, but freeing a slave did not necessarily signify the end of their subjection to exploitation strategies. In many cases, manumitted slaves may still have been bound (legally or economically) to dependence on their master's household as a direct consequence of their past slavery.

Neaira's story following her purchase from Nikarete is a good example of the two strategies open to Athenians who wished to acquire a slave concubine: "to buy the slave's freedom or simply to buy the slave. The first alternative carried obvious risks… and meant denying yourself the possibility of realizing the resale value when you got bored" (Davidson, 1997, 99).[92] These two options are weighed up in Hyperides' speech *Against Athenogenes*, in which an Athenian bachelor named Epikrates bought a slave family and their independently-run perfume shop from an Athenian metic named Athenogenes, hastily agreeing to a formal contract which bound him to some considerable debts previously incurred by the slave and his business (Hyperides, 3.6-9). The explanation for this ill-advised acquisition is as follows. We can infer from what remains of the speech that the events building up to the purchase in question began when Epikrates (the speaker) fell in love with the son of a perfume seller called Midas, a slave of Athenogenes, and decided to buy his freedom in order to keep the boy as his lover. According to Epikrates, however, his initial plan to free only the object of

[92] Additionally, a convenient medium for an Athenian man between sharing the object of his consistent affections and buying her outright was to rent her for a period of time, as in Menander's *Epitrepontes* discussed above (70).

his affections was altered when Athenogenes "sent me the boy, who said that he would not live with me unless I had his father and brother freed" (24). Epikrates' plan was further altered when Athenogenes convinced him to buy ownership of the family, rather than their freedom:

> "I will show you how nicely I'll treat you. You are going to put money down for Midas and his sons' freedom. But I will sell them to you, so that no one can seduce the boy away from you, and so that the slaves won't cause you any trouble, out of fear of what could happen to them. Most importantly, in our previous arrangement, they would think that their freedom was the result of my efforts, but if you buy them and set them free yourself later, they would be doubly grateful to you."
>
> (Hyperides, 3.5)

The purchase of a slave could provide Athenian men with exclusive, unrestricted sexual access to them. Neither the slave, nor any other party, had any legal power to limit these rights in any way. This was a prospect which Epikrates apparently found appealing, and many other Athenians would have felt similarly, we can imagine.

As Davidson notes, the other reason why Athenians may have decided to buy slaves for sexual exploitation, as opposed to paying their master for temporary sexual rights over them, was that it might be more cost-effective — especially if they sold the slave some time later. This is the reason Apollodorus gives for Neaira's purchase, and it is notable that in this case, the alternative to letting her buy her freedom which he imagines her owners considering was her "working under a pimp" (59.30). In Antiphon's speech *Against the Stepmother*, we hear of a man who planned to sell his *pallakē* to a brothel, presumably because he had grown tired of her (1.14). This prospect worried the woman enough for her to poison her master — though purportedly under the impression she was giving him a love potion — which led to her execution by torture (15–20). The fact that her lover meant to sell her and the violent execution she suffered make it extremely likely, to my mind, that

this *pallakē* was a slave and remained so for her entire life, though the speech does not say explicitly that she was and others (Bushala, 1969) have doubted this.[93]

Epikrates, for his part, represents himself as always having intended to free the boy who had won his affections. His aim in doing so, moreover, was allegedly to win the boy's gratitude. Since this statement was crafted to help explain the reason for his purchase of the slave's family (which could not be construed as a financial acquisition), we might doubt his description of his intentions. Other literary evidence, however, provides similar examples of Athenians purchasing their lover's freedom (Kamen, 2014). We have already seen the example of Neaira and Phrynion, which suggests that the manumitted slave might be forced into concubinage, possibly by legal stipulations in their manumission.[94] Aristophanes' *Wasps* furnishes another example (1351–3), as does a speech in the Demosthenic corpus (48.53; 5). Considering these examples, it is unsurprising that Epikrates expected an Athenian jury to believe that he might have spent all his savings and borrowed money from his friends (3.5), in order to buy a slave to keep as a lover, whom he eventually planned to free.

The role which female concubines occupied is in some ways comparable to that of a wife, with the important caveat that no legitimate heir, who could be accepted into the Athenian citizen body, would come from their union. Non-citizen women, including slaves and freedwomen, could never become wives in a legitimate, legal sense.[95] Above all, our sources list the procreation of legitimate

[93] Grace similarly, though more cautiously, suggested that the power of a *kurios* over a free non-citizen woman might be similar to that of a master over their slave (1973, 27).

[94] We need not read too much into the absence of reference to *paramonē* clauses in Epikrates' explanation, as their existence as a third option only weakens the speaker's case.

[95] Some evidence might suggest that the children of *pallakai* who were of citizen birth could potentially be given inheritance rights in certain cases (Mossé, 1991) or even citizenship (Sealey, 1984, 113-6). This was decidedly not true of the children of slaves, and any attempt to legitimise them by registering them with their

children as the remit of a legitimate wife (Patterson, 1990; e.g. Demosthenes 59.121–2) and, due to the particularly stringent citizen laws at Athens, slave women could never be used by Athenian slave-owners to give birth to legitimate children.

There are a few exceptions (e.g. Plutarch, *Per.* 37), but this is nevertheless a noteworthy aspect of Athenian slavery, considering that one important aspect of the sexual labour of enslaved women throughout history has been their reproductive capacity. Lape has argued that the restriction of citizen rights to the children of legitimate marriage, "By attaching legal disabilities to bastardy… effectively discouraged aristocrats and the wealthy [i.e. those who could afford to maintain concubines] from producing excessively large families. In so doing, the legislation foreclosed a source of elite power; it was no longer possible to convert material resources or economic power into reproductive power and hence into political power" (2002, 131–2). Of course, the citizenship law in the mid fifth century was primarily about the restriction of citizen privileges at a time when these were increasing. However, Lape's argument provides cause for reflection on how notions of *eugeneia* and the consequent restriction of this particular slaving strategy were tied to Athens' democratic values as they developed throughout the archaic and classical period.[96]

This section has outlined the diverse number of ways in which enslaved persons were sexually exploited in classical Athens. In certain respects, these different sexual slaving strategies had similar

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father's deme was illegal, and punishable by the enslavement of the child ([Aristotle], *Ath. Pol.* 42.1; Demosthenes, 59.16).

[96] The frequent sexual relationships between masters and slaves would nevertheless have often resulted in children, a problem recognised in Plato's *Laws* (930b; Klees, 1998, 164). The only reason that we know the stories of Neaira and Alke is because they eventually entered relationships with Athenian men, who allegedly (and illegally) introduced their children into the Athenian citizen body. Perhaps other fathers did similarly. The potential repercussions, however, were severe, and it seems unlikely that slaves were bought (or freed) and kept by Athenian men for the purpose of creating heirs.

effects on slaves. For one thing, the status of freewomen came to be partially conceived of by their sexual chastity outside of the marriage bed, in sources beginning in fourth-century Athens and continuing well into the Roman Empire (Harper, 2017, 114–19; Perry, 2014, *passim*). Honour for women consequently came to be attached to the concept of chastity itself, an ideal which slaves were forcibly denied. Sexually exploited slaves, whatever their circumstances, were thereby accorded shame by the societies and their lack of choice regarding their sexuality no doubt served to constantly remind them of their second-class status. Apollodoros relates the demeaning sexual behaviour that Neaira was forced into not to elicit sympathy from his Athenian jury (as it would have done to a modern one) but to make them feel outraged that the children of a woman who had experienced such things had been admitted into Athens' citizenship.

At the same time, the feelings of affection that developed from these relationships often had advantages for slaves and probably gave many a certain amount of leverage to improve their lives through their lovers. Nevertheless, the effects of different sexual slaving strategies should not be underestimated. These affected, for slave prostitutes, the conditions in which they worked and the clients they had access to. The multiple strategies for keeping slave concubines meant that in different circumstances slaves might be freed (but probably subjected to varying degrees of dependence on their lover after their manumission), owned (with the possibility that they might be resold) or rented from another owner. All of these had ramifications on the safety of a slave's position. The ultimate power still lay with a master, on whose choice of exploitation strategy, amongst other things, their comfort and security depended.

Conclusion

We began this chapter by distinguishing between direct and indirect exploitation as two distinct types of slaving strategies. Direct exploitation employed slaves for a variety of different purposes under the control of their master: not only as a means of removing a slave-owner from manual labour or of raising their prestige in a community, but also as a means of deriving a profit from their

work. As an economic slaving strategy, furthermore, the main advantage of direct exploitation was pointed out by de Ste Croix, and though his statement refers to agricultural estate management, it was equally true of direct and indirect slavery (which is essentially a tenancy agreement on the body of a slave): “leasing cannot be expected to yield nearly as much profit as working land directly with slave labour — provided the landowner can acquire not only ordinary working slaves but also a thoroughly competent steward, assisted where necessary by ‘slave drivers’” (1981, 172).

However, direct exploitation also required masters to invest time in the supervision of slaves. This could be mitigated through the direct exploitation of particularly trusted slaves in positions of responsibility, as de Ste Croix noted, but this strategy itself necessitated some form of regular oversight from a slave-owner. Indirect slavery, on the other hand, exempted a master from any involvement in his slaves’ labour beyond the collection of a rent, which might have been more or less desirable to slave-owners depending on various circumstances we have discussed.

The second and third sections of this chapter distinguished the majority of slaves from those in positions of trust and those whose work was particularly skilled. As I argued, these distinctions constituted divides between the types of strategies in which slaves were exploited, which were noted by contemporary Athenians themselves. The strategies that sought to use slaves in positions of trust or for skilled labour correspondingly employed more positive methods of coercion than other slaving strategies. These methods and the effects they had on the lives of slaves will be examined in more detail in the following chapters.

My final section examined the divergence of sexual slaving strategies. Though sexual slavery in its various forms was driven by similar motivations (the sexual desires of Athenian men and the desire to financially profit from them) and had some comparable effects for the lives of slaves, there were important differences in the configuration of these strategies. Though the evidence is not as clear as we would like, it suggests that slaves were exploited both directly and indirectly in brothels and in Athens’ streets. Amongst these slaves, some were trained in musicianship or seductive techniques —

presumably in order to raise their value to their masters. The story of Alke's rise from a prostitute to replace a freedwoman as the manager of her brothel, is evidence of slaves in positions of particular trust in Athens' sex industry too. There were also discernibly distinct strategies for acquiring a slave as a concubine, which allowed Athenians to gain differing amounts of control over the object of their desires. Even within the context of sexual slavery, then, we can see the existence of divergent slaving strategies that were a defining feature of Athenian slavery more generally. The following chapters will examine individual examples of these strategies in more detail.

Part 1

Slaving Strategies of Agriculturally based Households

Chapter 2:

Xenophon's *Oikonomikos* as a Case Study in the Slaving Strategies of Elite Households.

A speech (probably incorrectly) attributed to Demosthenes (42) and probably delivered to a jury around 330 BC describes the property of a man named Phainippos. The speech almost certainly exaggerates Phainippos' wealth, but it appears to have been considerable, and this wealth was based on the exploitation of a large agricultural estate. In addition to selling timber from this estate (7), Phainippos grew barley and grapes, which he sold on the market for profit (20; 31).[1] For this reason, the speech represents uniquely clear evidence for the capital accumulation strategies followed by an owner of landed property in Athens (Osborne, 2010, 107–13). Many other wealthy Athenians grew crops, as the Attic Stelai record, and Phainippos' strategies were unlikely to be unique.[2] Demosthenes 42 is a short speech, and it does not refer to the labour force necessary for this large-scale cultivation and sale of agricultural produce, with the exception of three donkey drivers (7).[3] As to who comprised the labour force of Phainippos' estate — or those like it — and how they were organised, a more informative source may be Xenophon's *Oikonomikos*.

[1] On the estate, de Ste Croix (1971); Davies (1971, 553–4).

[2] Pritchett and Pippin (1956 with references) detail and discuss the sale of agricultural properties (261–76) and produce (180–203) in these inscriptions. Osborne (1988) has also argued that the considerable renting of public land (281–7) indicates the desire of wealthy individuals to exploit farmland for profit (289–92).

[3] Osborne believes this is indicative of the fact that no permanent labour force — slave or otherwise — was based on the estate at the time, because if there had been, the speaker would have mentioned it to further highlight the wealth of the speaker (2010, 108). He may well be right, but it seems to me that unless this

The *Oikonomikos* is the most detailed account of an Athenian household we possess. It describes, amongst other things, how the wealth of this household was derived from agriculture and through the labour of a number of slaves. It also describes how these slaves should be managed and motivated to perform the work required of them. As such, it provides an excellent means to explore the various strategies in which slaves were employed within elite Athenian households. However, it is not without its problems and, as will become evident, it is unclear to what extent the household in the *Oikonomikos* resembles that of most elite Athenian *oikoi*. Wherever I know of wider evidence from Athens and comparative history that can be used to support the description provided by Xenophon or my interpretation of it, I have referenced it. I have provided evidence for practices contrary to those Xenophon details at the end of each subsection.

This chapter is organised in the following way. The first section will briefly discuss the *Oikonomikos* as a historical source. Its second will consider in detail the strategies followed by this household in three subsections, the first of which will examine the agricultural model Xenophon describes and the place of slave labour within it. The second subsection will examine the female domestic sphere described in the house, its importance, and its exploitation of female slaves. The third and final subsection will examine the management of the household's agricultural and domestic sphere, including its delegation of responsibility to certain slaves. A final section will consider the different experiences which the various strategies of the household created.

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hypothetical workforce was exceedingly large, it would have expressed little that the size of the estate and its output (which the speaker does mention) did not.

2.1 Xenophon's *Oikonomikos* as historical evidence

The second and main section of Xenophon's *Oikonomikos* describes a conversation on household management (*oikonomia*) between Socrates and an elite citizen by the name of Ischomachos. Socrates asks questions on the subject, and Ischomachos, in his responses, describes the running of his agriculturally based household, and its domestic sphere managed by his wife. The couple live in the city or possibly a town, but own plots of land in the countryside (11.15). Ischomachos held considerable wealth. The text is in no place specific as to the exact amount of property which he was imagined holding, but if he is the same man mentioned in Lysias' *On the Property of Aristophanes* (19.45), then his estate was believed to have been worth the extraordinary sum of 70 talents in his lifetime (Davies, 1971, 265–8). Either way, Xenophon's Ischomachos has farmland consisting of several plots, and numerous slaves — the implication at 12.2 is that several (at least three) supervisors would be necessary to oversee his agricultural workers on different fields (*agroi*). Additional female slaves, working in the domestic sphere of the household, are also referenced in the dialogue, though their number is just as difficult to quantify.

We should, of course, not automatically take the *Oikonomikos* as an exact portrayal of a wealthy Athenian household. Ischomachos' household is a fictional one; a model for the purposes of instruction, and caution suggests that particular emphasis be placed on this philosophical, advisory nature of the text. There is also a minority, but prominent, trend in Xenophontic scholarship to read his works as ironic presentations which subtly undercut the overt messages they conveyed. It does not matter for the present discussion whether Ischomachos the character speaks for Xenophon (see references in Kronenberg, 2009, 37 n. 2), or is rather a subtle criticism of contemporary Athenians who were driven by the accumulation of wealth, as some have suggested.[4] What matters more is whether he was meant, in some capacity, to reflect a real Athenian landowner and, whatever else it

[4] The idea originated with Strauss (1970, esp. 182–5); cf. Kronenberg (2009, 62-6); Danzig (2003, 69-73); Stevens (1994, 132-4); Strauss (1970, 182-5).

is, the *Oikonomikos* of Xenophon "presents a coherent and consistent exploration of economics in theory and practice" (Hobden, 2017, 168). The *Oikonomikos* provides a believable account of an Athenian household — one which bears striking similarities to management handbooks which followed, not least of which is the other fourth-century handbook on estate management written by a student of Aristotle (*Oikonomika*).[5] Xenophon spent much of his life on campaign and exiled from Athens, farming an estate in Skillous (*Anab.* 5.3.7), but he grew up in an elite Athenian household in late fifth-century Athens (ibid. 3.1.5–8), where the dialogue of the *Oikonomikos* is set. With due caution and the support of wider evidence, Xenophon's *Oikonomikos* therefore makes a useful case study of the slaving trategies of Athens' wealthiest farmers.

2.2 Ischomachos' Strategies

Before discussing the agricultural practices and corresponding labour demands of Ischomachos' household, it is worth examining the overall goals of his estate management. If Aristotle is to be believed, self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) was the upper-class Athenian ideal (*Pol.* 1256b.40-1258a.18). Though this statement has been taken to represent the Athenian norm, academic consensus is now moving away from this position.[6] As will be discussed further below (105–6), a level of self-sufficiency may well have been desirable to Ischomachos' household. This, however, is never stated explicitly, and it is clear from a straightforward reading of the *Oikonomikos* that according to Ischomachos, "profit is the chief goal of estate management" (Pomeroy, 1994, 51-2). Xenophon's introductory chapters largely problematize its later discussion as the means of increasing (*auxein*) an

[5] Many of the similarities between the two are likely the result of a direct literary influence, possibly the lost *Oikonomikos* of Antisthenes (Victor, 1983, 187-92). However, there are enough substantial differences between the texts to demonstrate that they were equally the product of independent thought.

[6] Bresson (1987); Harris (2013c, 192-4); Jameson (2002b, 167); contra Finley (1973, 161–4); Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977, e.g. 13-6; 108); Cartledge (2002).

estate, though they also argue that farming is the noblest way to do so (4.2–5.20).[7] Much later in the text, explicitly commercial profits are stated to be the goal; Xenophon has Ischomachos describe the purchase and improvement of different plots of agricultural land as an economic strategy he pursues, as his father had before him (20.21-29).[8] Although Ischomachos is keen to emphasise moralistic motivations as the main driving force behind transforming derelict land into profitable farms (23, 25-6), he nevertheless consistently refers to its monetary benefits (21-2, 23).[9]

This motive was surely not limited to the sensibilities of Xenophon's Ischomachos. We have already seen the real-life example of Phainippos and modern scholarship has pointed to the financial obligations imposed on the richest of Athens' citizens as indicative of their need to regularly obtain liquid wealth from their property, including their agricultural holdings (Osborne, 2010, 113-18 *et passim*; Harris and Lewis 2016, 27-8). Moreover, as Hodkinson notes, "Athenian contributors [of liturgies] were… willing collaborators, indeed competitors, in this system, since by advertising their public-spirited generosity, by contributing more than the required minimum and by adding other voluntary benefactions besides, they both safeguarded their collective domination over property-ownership and advanced their individual claims to public respect and political leadership" (1992, 54; cf. Wilson, 2000b, 48). Achieving financial gain through agricultural management was Ischomachos' aim, and we have good reason to assume that he was representative of many of Athens' elite in this

[7] Socrates also argues that moral failings that lead to a dilapidated estate (1.13–23).

[8] Despite Finley (1981b, 71-73), there is evidence to suggest that the purchase of and improvement of land was very much a strategy pursued by Athenian investors. As well as the *Oikonomikos*, see Demosthenes (55.11). On the legal apparatus of Athens for the transfer of real property, Harris (2016); Aeschines provides a description of how an heir might allow agricultural land to become derelict (1.98).

[9] In the dialogue itself, although Ischomachos gets the final say, Socrates is quick to sarcastically imply that his supposed "love of farming" is equivalent to a grain merchant selling his wares out of love of produce (20.28-9).

respect.[10] This aim, however, was dependent on a large amount of labour carried out by the slaves who occupied the bulk of his workforce.[11] The remainder of this section will concern itself with outlining the various labour demands of Ischomachos' estate, and the ways in which he managed it.

2.2.1 The Labour Demands and Management of Ischomachos' Agricultural Production

This subsection will detail the agricultural work for which Ischomachos employed slaves, in order to better inform the subsequent discussion regarding the methods of their exploitation. Its purpose is also to demonstrate that Ischomachos' agricultural strategies were compatible with a system of large-scale, direct slave exploitation. This has been questioned, primarily on the grounds that farming is a seasonal occupation that requires labour only at peak moments in the year.[12] However, as Jameson has argued throughout his career (1977/8; 1992; cf. 2002a; 2002b), there were many potential uses of a full-time labour force throughout the year in increasing crop yields.[13] This has been much-debated over the past few decades and is encompassed within a debate on the prevalence of either an extensive (using minimal labour) or an intensive agricultural model in

[10] On rational economic thought in Xenophon, Figueira (2012, esp. 677-8 on the *Oikonomikos*).

[11] Ischomachos refers to his workforce as *douloi* (10.9) and *oiketai* (12.19). Both are unambiguously terms for slaves. Wood has argued that *oiketēs* might not necessarily refer to slaves (1988), but, as Lewis (2018b, appendix) and Harper (2011, 513–18) have shown, *oiketēs* is used unambiguously in hundreds of instances to refer only to slaves. Although it offers one instance not discussed by Lewis or Harper, where the term seems to refer to the members of a household more broadly (*Laws*, 8.844b), a study of the terminology for slaves in Plato corroborates the conclusion that when Xenophon referred to *oiketēs*, he meant slaves (Fragomichalos, 1979, 541-4).

[12] E.g. Wood (1988); Lenski (2018a, 130–1).

[13] The more complicated issue of whether or not this made sense to Athenians outside the city's elite, will be discussed below (section 3.2).

classical Athens.[14] As I hope to show, the *Oikonomikos* is evidence of a particular form of intensive agriculture practised in Athens and facilitated through the use of slave labour.

Ischomachos grew a number of crops, the most significant of which was grain (16.9-18.9).[15] Additionally, he grew olives and grapes (19.1–19). The harvesting of these crops at different points in the year would have required the most labour. As well as harvesting itself, the crop would have to be processed — seeds would have to be threshed and winnowed before their storage, and olives and grapes pressed into oil and wine respectively. Certain techniques and technologies would have made this process easier. Grapes could be crushed by foot and olives in a pestle and mortar (Curtis, 2009, 379–80), but the ownership of crushers and presses might be an attractive option for large households.[16] Importantly, however, the operation of these machines would still require demanding manual labour. Finally, these goods would have to be transported to a market.

These are all fairly unskilled tasks which require large amounts of human labour, all over a very short period of time. Crucially, however, they were spread throughout the year. Grain was harvested in the summer months and the harvest of grapes and olives would spread these periods of peak labour demand from the late summer to potentially the early spring.[17] What is more, Ischomachos deliberately planted grain at different points between the onset of autumn and winter so as to

[14] Halstead, (1987, 83–7) and the summary of McHugh (2017, 21–7). Aspects of the debate are dealt with below.

[15] Sometimes, in less arid microclimates, this might be wheat, but was more usually barley (Theophrastus, *Hist. pl.* 8.8.2), which had less chance of failing in dry climates (Hodkinson, 2000, 142-4), like that of Attica.

[16] A rotary crusher has been found at Olynthus, and an olive pressing scene is preserved on a sixth-century Attic vase (Curtis, 2001, 305-7). Wine presses are difficult to differentiate from olive presses, but their use for this purpose is indicated by presses found in areas unsuitable for the cultivation of olives (Savvonidi, 1993).

[17] Grapes were harvested in mid-September (Hesiod, *WD*. 609-10), and olives might be harvested at any point from autumn until the early spring (Isager and Skydsgaard, 1995, 40).

harvest his crop at different times (17.6). This had many practical advantages, one of which was that it was well suited to a permanent labour force of slaves.

Planting itself, of course, was another labour-intensive period of the agricultural calendar, which was proceeded by the ploughing of fallow fields at several points in the spring and summer on Ischomachos' estate (16.10–14). During this process, slaves would separate weeds from the soil (16.15). After planting, they were required to plough the first shoots of the crop into the ground as fertiliser (17.10). Then there was the planting of fruit trees and vines — not a necessary concern every year, but still the best way to raise the value of a property.[18] Both require manual labour for the digging of ditches in which to plant cuttings, as Ischomachos explains (19), and their survival afterwards also depends on consistent attention throughout the year. For the first and second year after its planting, the olive tree, for example, requires an additional input of water (Foxhall, 2007b, 110–2). Vines, similarly, need to be directed as they grow, in order to ensure their even spread across the ground, or on supporting trees or other structures (Theophrastus, *Caus. Pl*. 13.2-4).[19]

After their planting, crops continue to benefit from the input of labour throughout the year. Weeding around sown grains is recommended by Ischomachos (17.11-5), as is manuring (20.3).[20]

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[18] Six of the land leases collected by Osborne instruct tenants to plant trees (1987, 42-3).

[19] For a detailed overview of the different methods of vine planting and directing in the ancient Mediterranean, Brun (2003, 29-41). The removal of top soil is forbidden by the conditions of two leases (*IG* II^2 2408; II^2 2492), suggesting that this was a relatively common strategy in Athens. This would be most beneficial for vines, as the richness of soil is important to their yield (Amouretti, 1992, 78).

[20] Manuring is frequently referred to in other literary sources (e.g. Menander, *Dys*. 584; Aristophanes, *Lys.* 1174; Theophrastus, *Hist. Pl.* 8.7.7). The *Oikonomikos* refers to fertiliser (*kopros*) at several points (16.12; 17.10; 18.3), although the word has a broad meaning and it would seem that it is mainly vegetable waste which Xenophon had in mind. The importance of human and animal waste should, however, not be underestimated (Owens, 1983, 48-50); a law of Solon supposedly outlawed the theft of specifically animal

Vines in particular, as has often been said, needed a great amount of attention to provide a good yield throughout the year (e.g. Hanson, 1999, 167–75; Forbes, 1976, 9), and in this instance, wider literary evidence presents us with examples of slaves being used for their cultivation (Morris, 2005, 153). Foxhall's study of olive cultivation has also emphasised the care and effort needed to maintain profitable olive trees (2007b, 121–124). In particular, digging around olive trees, as well as vines, is a productive use of a farmer's time. For this reason, Foxhall specifically highlights the importance of (slave) labour for their cultivation in ancient Greece (72–5). These tasks are not mentioned in the *Oikonomikos*, but they would have represented possible uses for an agricultural slave workforce throughout the year.

Though he provides a fairly detailed description of farming, Xenophon is not as specific about the means by which he claims to have made the most profit: from the development and sale of cheap land. In order to hypothesise what this might have entailed, we might turn to the evidence of archaeology. Using the recordings of Bradford (1956) and aerial photography from the second world war, Moreno has identified an area of some 30 kilometres of terraced land in the ancient *deme* of Euonymon and those of Halimous and Aixone surrounding it, much of the construction of which can be dated to the classical period on the evidence of recovered pottery and inscriptions (2007, 54-5). The archaeological evidence of intensive farming in the *deme* of Euonymon closely matches that provided by extensive survey archaeology in Atene, analysed by Lohmann, who noted heavy terracing spread throughout the area (1992, 51).[21] Lohmann also suggests a classical date for

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dung (Fr. 56a, b, Leão and Rhodes, 2015, 106). A fragment of Deinarchos preserved in the Oyxhrynchus Papyri records the exchange of 700 drachmae for *kopros* between the sanctuary of Eurusakes and an unknown party (2744, col. II, 15-17).

[21] Foxhall has questioned the claim that these were constructed in the classical period (2007b, 62-5; 1996). Depending on the interpretation of relevant sources, literary and epigraphic evidence for terracing is either largely post-classical, scarce, and problematic (Price and Nixon, 2005, 668-70, 690) or non-existent (Foxhall,

farmhouse dams and retaining basins (48), which he views as a means of protecting crops from winter floods.[22] Construction of a water supply might be achieved through the digging of wells.[23] Moreno's study also identifies mounds of stone spread throughout the countryside, and dated to the classical period, as indicative of the clearance of land across the countryside (51-3) — another use for slave labour which was suggested by Jameson long ago (1977/8, 128), in addition to the construction of terraces (1992).

This archaeological evidence points to the creation of farmland on a massive scale in the classical Athenian countryside. Together with the *Oikonomikos*, Athenian texts provide evidence for how the process we can see in the archaeology worked on the ground — through the enslavement of predominantly male persons forcibly put to work for the private interests of Athenians who planned to farm the fields they created or to sell some of them as Ischmachos and his father did. In a passage of Herodotus, the Persian soon-to-be king Cyrus makes his countrymen work on clearing away thorny bushland, in order to demonstrate the "slavish labour" (*ponon douloprepea*) they would be able to avoid if they revolted from the Medes (1.125-6). Although set in Persia, "This story is written for a Greek audience, and [it is telling that] the labour that Cyrus chooses as characteristically slave-like is work on the land" (Harvey, 1988, 48). When Euripides wanted to portray the fear of a future in slavery, one of two fates he envisaged was being forced to prise up and remove (*mochleuein*) stones from the ground (*Cyc.* 240).[24] As well as the construction projects mentioned above, slaves could

2007b, 66-8). Lohmann's reasons for a classical date, though not conclusive, remain convincing, however (1992, 51). For the different advantages of terracing, Rackham and Moody (1992, 124).

[22] Cf. Demosthenes (55.10-12), which describes the building of a wall to divert excessive seasonal water flow away from the crops of a farm (Foxhall, 1996, 46-7).

[23] Possibly also of cisterns. At least one has been discovered on an attic farm (Goette, 1995, 184–5) though this probably has more to do with the ore washing facilities also located at the site.

[24] The other fate was working in a mill (below, 173).

also be used to provide manual labour for more complex ones, such as the farmhouses identified by survey archaeology and the ubiquitous rural towers dotted throughout the Athenian countryside, though some professional help from outside the household would be required.[25]

There are certain practices generally associated with intensive agriculture and evidenced in other Athenian sources that are conspicuous in their absence from Xenophon's account, most prominently integrated animal husbandry.[26] There is also the fact that Ischomachos followed a system of biennial fallow, wherein land lies fallow every other year so as not to exhaust the nutrients of its soil (16.13). An alternative would have been an annual crop of all land through extensive manuring and another the planting of nitrogen fixers, such as legumes or pulses (as a dietary supplement or for animal feed), which pull nitrogen from the air and use up less of the ground's nutrients (Garnsey, 1988, 94; cf. Sarpaki, 1992, 70–3). Some of the crop could then be sown into the field to further fertilise the soil (Theophrastus, *Hist. Pl.* 8.7.2). This practice is made a requirement of tenants by three fourth-century inscriptions recording the lease of land (*IG* II^2 1241; II^2 2493; I^3 252, 12-3 with Moreno, 2007, 327-9), whilst another forbids it (*IG* II^2 2498).[27] Similarly, Xenophon does not mention it in the *Oikonomikos,* but there is good reason to suggest that irrigation — either by carrying water or diverting water flow — was carried out by certain farmers in Athens.[28]

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[25] Such as the carpenter mention by Socrates in the *Oikonomikos* (12.3).

[26] Though it is twice mentioned amongst agricultural activities (5.3; 7.20). On integrated animal husbandry and agriculture, above (47–8).

[27] Since pulses and legumes have a high chance of crop failure when cultivated in water levels anywhere below the average rainfall of modern-day Athens (Moreno, 2007, 15–17), crop rotation may only have been feasible in fields of an irrigable size, or with access to a natural or manmade water supply.

[28] Hanson (1999, 62); Jones and Margaritis (2008, 161-2). More cautiously Horden and Purcell (2000, 244-5); Oleson argues for occasional "light irrigation" (2000, 207-8). Ancient authors knew the benefits of watering for increasing crop yields (e.g. Theophrastus, *Caus. Pl.* 3.8.3), and in a telling passage, Xenophon likened the water

The absence of these strategies from the *Oikonomikos*, however, does not indicate that Ischomachos or Athenian farmers generally were not interested in increasing their crop yields through the use of additional labour. Rather, they indicate that the ways in which a farmer might do so varied from example to example. There is no universal set of agricultural practices evident in our sources, in other words, and the best way to read these contradictions is as a representation of the variation in Greek methods of farming not just from region to region, but from household to household, as McHugh has recently argued (2017, 153-6). Ischomachos' farming strategies were intensive in many ways, if not in others, and, in his case, relied on a labour force of enslaved men.

The choice of different agricultural strategies would have been dependent on the resources available to an individual farmer, his preferences and strategies for the future, and the micro-ecology of his plot. There was probably similar diversity between the labour forces of wealthy Athenian farmers. Hired labour was certainly an alternative to slave labour — although it does not feature in the *Oikonomikos*, certain literary sources suggest that it was an important part of the Athenian economy (Vlassopoulos, 2016c, 670-3), often as a supplement to slave labour (Plato, *Euthyph*. 4c). Many Athenians probably did utilise hired labour for their land, especially around the harvest, and we also have evidence of what appears to be the sale of an unharvested crop to pickers.[29]

There were several advantages to having a core, permanent labour force of slaves, however. Although his study is limited in its scope by the evidence available, Scheidel, for example, has suggested that comparatively high wages and the low cost of slaves would have sustained a

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channels carrying water from the Tigris to "those in Greece which carry water to millet fields" (*An.* 2.4.13, cf. Plato, *Leg.* 6.761a-b). Krasilnikoff (2002, 55), on the other hand, has argued that "these [literary] examples do not… provide hard evidence for the existence and utilization of irrigation techniques in the Classical period (cf. Bresson, 2016, 160). See below, however, on the likelihood of theoretical knowledge being applied practically.

[29] As is described in two speeches of Demosthenes (18.262 with Wankel, 1974, 1154; 53.21 with Kazakévich, 1961, 10).

rationale of agricultural slave-ownership which was rather peculiar to Athens (2005, 13-14). If he is right, slave ownership would have made economic sense even within a restricted agricultural calendar. Furthermore, as noted in the previous chapter, there are signs that social capital could be accumulated by the ownership of slaves. Such a sentiment is absent from the *Oikonomikos* (which makes no mention of slave attendants, for example), probably because Xenophon considered shows of wealth to be contrary to the moral message at the core of the text.[30]

Nevertheless, the *Oikonomikos* portrays slave-ownership as an invaluable means of increasing an estate's wealth. The *Oikonomika* of Pseudo-Aristotle is even clearer on this point (1.1344a.23–5) and, though rather scarce, there are scraps of literary evidence we have examined that indicate that slavery was heavily connected to agriculture in the mind of Athenians. With this labour force, an Athenian landowner could minimise or remove the need for hired labourers during peak periods of the agricultural season.

Osborne has mapped the peak points of the agricultural year onto our Gregorian calendar (1985, 15), which aptly demonstrates a consistent demand for agricultural labour, on a farm growing multiple crops, spread throughout the year. Osborne's calendar does not, however, account for the building of basic structures, nor the maintenance structures and tools would require. Nor does it account for the uses of labour in providing intensive care for crops throughout the year. This is still a controversial point; it is true that the demonstration of knowledge of different agricultural practices in our sources tells us little about the frequency with which they were employed across different farmers and regions.[31] The knowledge of both the benefits of different crops and ways to improve

[30] In describing the layout of his house, for example, he describes it as decorated modestly and primarily arranged to suit a practical purpose (9.2).

[31] See similarly Isager and Skydsgaard's scepticism regarding the translation of Theophrastus' considerable knowledge of legumes into presuppositions about wide-spread crop rotation (1995, 112), as well as the planting of alfalfa for animal fodder by sub-elite classical Greek farmers (Isager, 1988, 81-2).

their yield, however, can surely not have been entirely theoretical (Hodkinson, 1988, 69 n. 3), and it is at least worth highlighting the *potential* use of labour to increase productivity which the very existence of these strategies makes clear. It seems likely, in conclusion, that slaves were often utilised on the estates of Athens' wealthy for intensive agriculture.

2.2.2 Domestic Production Strategies

While chapters 11-21 of the *Oikonomikos* detail the fictional household's agriculture strategies, the preceding discussion describes a separate sphere of production equally important to the household's well-being (chapters 7-11). It focuses on the duties of Ischomachos' unnamed wife (or more accurately, her training for them as a new bride). The management of matters outside the house are under the remit of Ischomachos, while those inside the house are under the remit of his wife (7.3).[32] The former, as we have seen, exploited predominantly enslaved men to provide both the manual labour and its supervision as the basis of a strategy of intensive agriculture. The discussion will now look at how the household's domestic sphere exploited the labour of predominantly enslaved women to ensure the upkeep of the *oikos*.[33] Though these spheres were distinct, they were closely linked under the wider strategies of Ischomachos' household.

[32] Thus, the first section of chapter 11 introduces the switch with the following request from Socrates: "I think I've heard all I need to know about your wife's activities for now… But now please tell me about your own" (tr. Pomeroy, 1994).

[33] The division of labour by gender into an entirely male agricultural workforce and an entirely female one is a broad generalisation rather than an immutable separation. 7.35 suggests that some men (see the use of the masculine relative pronoun) will remain in the house under the supervision of Ischomachos' wife, and we might similarly suspect that many enslaved women on rich estates might have occasionally worked in agriculture (see below, 106).

The upkeep of Athenian households demanded a vast amount of human energy, which was usually drawn from the city's female population (Pomeroy, 1975, 72). Much of Athens' production in general was carried out by the available labour of individual households, for the exclusive benefit of their members. Such tasks were conceived of as taking place within the household rather than external to it, as is evident from Ischomachos' explaination regarding why he believes the work of women is well-suited to them remaining inside: "The nursing of new-born children requires shelters, and so does the preparation of bread and grain, and likewise, making clothing out of wool" (7.21, tr. Pomeroy). The tasks listed here, which bear little to no direct relationship to market exchange, have been termed "maintenance activities", defined as "a set of practices that involve the sustenance, welfare and effective reproduction of all the members of a social group… that regulate and stabilize social life" (González-Marcén *et al*, 2008, 3 *et passim*). This definition captures well their regularity in and importance to societies throughout history.

In studies of Athenian women such tasks are often referred to as the "ideal" woman's work (Scheidel, 1995, 205-7; Herfst, 1979, 101-114).[34] Although they have little relation to liquid wealth *per se*, the importance of these tasks should not be underestimated. As Pomeroy remarks, "domestic labour has economic value even if it lacks exchange-value" (1994, 52).[35] Modern economists have struggled with how to express this truth in a quantifiable form, but it is now becoming increasingly accepted that domestic work is equally important for a household's well-being and should be considered as under many of the same economic pressures as its wage-earning labour power (Folbre, 1982; Beneria, 1992). Perhaps most crucially for the subject of this current chapter, Folbre highlights domestic work as a form of labour susceptible to exploitation (ibid). If

[34] Cf. on visual evidence, Lewis (2002, chapter 2). Vivante (2007, 96–108), who lists these tasks almost exactly as Xenophon did, notes that they "have been remarkably similar across cultures and time" (95).

[35] See below, however, for the possible market orientation of slave textile production and slave reproduction strategies (99–104).

capitalist economic thought has undervalued domestic work over the past two centuries, Xenophon was under no such illusion — Ischomachos describes the concerns of himself and his wife not only as mutually dependent on each other, but as of equal importance too (7.39-40; 7.13).

In the *Oikonomikos*, we can infer from three passages detailing the duties of Ischomachos' wife that female slaves were involved in the processes of domestic production. We are told, for one thing, that she will supervise the bread-maker (*sitopoios*) at her work (10.10).[36] As to the status of this woman — whose description might well refer to a temporary role rather than a full-time occupation — further passages suggest that she would have been a slave. When he married her, we are told that Ischomachos' wife had experience in textile manufacture and (tellingly) had "observed how wool-spinning are given to female slaves" (*therapainai*: 7.5–6). Ischomachos also says that she will train enslaved women in this skill (7.41). The clearest statement to the effect that Ischomachos held several enslaved women, however, is found in a passage that discusses their sleeping arrangements (9.5), in which we are told that he and his wife keep male and female slaves in separate quarters at night, so that he can control their ability to reproduce with each other. These passages, which describe female slaves utilised for tasks closely following Ischomachos' list of female jobs noted above, will form the basis of the following discussion.[37]

One of the most important aspects of domestic production would have been to keep the members of its household nourished, and classical Greek literature demonstrates that this task was often regarded as the preserve of women (e.g. Thucydides, 2.78.3), often in a domestic context (Plato, *Resp.* 5.455c-d; specifically slave women: Herodotus, 3.150). As well as the reference to a bread-

[36] Though it has a male ending, *sitopoios* is more clearly a feminine noun in other contexts (Herodotus. 3.150; Thucydides. 2.78; Thephrastus, *Char.* 4.7).

[37] Other aspects of domestic labour are addressed in the following chapter (section 3.3.1).

maker, another to various cooking implements (9.7; 9) suggests that food was often prepared in Ischomachos' household.[38]

The diet of Athenians consisted largely of wheat or barley (Forbes and Foxhall, 1982, *passim*) and was eaten in the form of bread or porridge. The most time-consuming job in the preparation of these foods was the grinding of grain, which will be examined further in Chapter 4. Grain, however, was by no means the only thing which Athenians ate. The other major supplements to their diet were grapes/wine and olives/oil, but literary and archaeological evidence suggests that the diet of an average Athenian was more diverse than the traditional picture of the Mediterranean triad would suggest.[39] Athenians generally, but especially elites such as Ischomachos and his wife, should therefore be imagined having several different types of food prepared for them, which would have involved a whole range of different processes of cleaning, mixing, grinding and crushing, and boiling, baking or roasting.[40] Part of the process of cooking, in the ancient world as today, would also have

[38] The lack of any evidence of specified cooking areas and the limited finds of cooking apparatus in domestic settings have suggested to Foxhall that Greek households did not cook large quantities of food at a time. She argues, therefore, that cooking was generally conducted on a day-to-day basis within the household (2007a, 240).

[39] A fascinating study of isotopes in human remains excavated from 3 grave sites in Athens indicates that, particularly in the classical period, proteins from animal products, fish and possibly legumes were a significant part of the Athenian diet (Lagia, 2015, 123–36). On meat and the production of sausages, Ekroth (2014, 223–231), on the market for fish, Davies (2016, 23–27); Dumont (1976/7), on beans and legumes, Garnsey (1998a; 1998b, 210–1). A sense of the vast array of foodstuffs, including vegetables, herbs, fruits, nuts and various animal products on sale in the Athenian market is provided by the collection of Lewis (2016b, 282–4).

[40] The *Oikonomikos* twice makes reference to apparatus intended specifically for preparation of grains (*sitopoiikos*) and separately to tools meant for cooking in a wider sense (opsopoiikē: 9.7).

entailed the washing of cooking implements, as well as the storing of various foodstuffs and its distribution to members of the household.

Another important aspect of female domestic work was textile manufacture. As with cooking, our sources indicate that this was perceived by contemporaries as quintessentially women's work (e.g. Plato, *Alc.* 126e).[41] As we noted above, Ischomachos' wife was trained in all the various stages of fabric production: spinning, weaving, and possibly dyeing too.[42] Though, like the mythical figure of Penelope, Ischomachos' wife was pictured at the loom (10.10), her experience was probably most regularly employed in her other task, the supervision of slaves. At 7.36, Ischomachos describes one of the chief tasks of his wife to her: "And when wool is brought in to you, you must see that clothes are produced for those who need them".

Female slaves working within its domestic sphere, in other words, produced a significant amount of the clothing needed by the members of Ischomachos' household.[43] This passage and others depict wool-working as an occupation practised near-universally by Athenian women across status boundaries (e.g. Xenophon, *Lac.* 1.3) and textile manufacture as "part of a cycle of homebased production" (Jenkins, 2003, 75; Reuther, 2006, part 2). Since the ratio of labour time between

[41] For iconographic evidence, Williams (1983, 95–6).

[42] A passage of Aristophanes describes citizen women dipping wool into blue lupine dye (*Eccl.* 215). Finishing was one stage of textile production which was usually outsourced to commercial fullers (Wild, 2009, 475–6). Spantidaki provides a detailed study of the various stages of textile manufacturing in Athens (2016, 32–96).

[43] As well as clothes, bedding/coverings (*strōma*) are mentioned at 9.3 and 9.6, which may have been produced in the house. Especially when talking of elite households, however, we should consider the likelihood that textiles, especially of particularly fine quality, might be bought from professionals working in Athens (Loftus, 1998, 15–7). Literary evidence refers to imported clothes in Greece as early as the 8th century and, by the Roman period, a cross-Mediterranean trade network providing high quality textiles supplemented home-based production (Benda-Weber, 2013, 172–3).

spinning threads and weaving in textile production is, on the basis of comparative evidence, roughly 10:1 (Barber, 1994, 87–8), most slaves would have been employed in spinning.

As well as pointing to the economic value of domestic work conducted for consumption in the household, Pomeroy suggests that the production of textiles described in the *Oikonomikos* might be geared towards sale in the market. In support of her position, she puts forward considerable evidence of the exchange value of such work (1994, 61–4). This position has recently been restated in very similar terms by Harris (2013b, 185–6). There is, however, no clear evidence from the *Oikonomikos*, and little from other literary sources, to corroborate this hypothesis. One exception comes from a passage of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, which describes a man named Aristarchos, on Socrates' advice, utilising the labour of his large *oikos* of female family members to start a textile business (2.7.2–12).

This passage shows that the idea of converting homebased textile manufacture into a profitable market industry was considered by Xenophon to be not only a feasible but a beneficial strategy (apparently equally so for the now productively employed women!). Though it also suggests that he thought the idea was original enough to warrant special mention, the women of Aristarchos' household are contrasted with manufacturing slaves (2.7.4; 6–7) and it it appears to be the notion of setting citizen women rather than slaves to work in market-oriented production, rather than the idea of converting domestic workers in general to this purpose, which supposedly had not occurred to Aristarchos.

Wool-working may only have been conducted on a largely household consumption base, as appears to have been the case in most Olynthian households.[44] There was clearly a commercial market in

[44] There is widespread evidence of wool-working, but only in two houses is there evidence of it on a commercial scale (Cahill, 2005, 58). Surprisingly, in the houses belonging to the "upper-class" (as Ischomachos' house would have been in Athens), there is a "curious absence of household industry", including textile manufacture (ibid, 59).

Athens for textiles, however, and particularly business savvy slave-owners might have seen in this fact an opportunity to further exploit the labour of their domestically employed slaves. A study of the archaeological evidence points out that numerous loom weights discovered in the domestic setting of two excavated classical Athenian houses indicate wool-working as a commercial enterprise, in addition to evidence of larger, specialised textile manufacturing workshops (Tsakirgis, 2016, 172–6). From what we know of large-scale manufacturing in Athens, it is likely that the workers involved in these operations were slaves. As to their gender, it is a reasonable guess that they were mostly or entirely women.[45] Davidson has argued that the regular association of slave prostitutes with wool work in literary, iconographic and archaeological evidence suggests that this trade was used to exploit all the available time of otherwise employed slaves (1997, 88–90), as we might therefore suspect it was in the domestic setting of the household too.[46]

The work of Roth has drawn attention to intensive wool-working as a means of heavily exploiting the female slave populations of the Roman *villa* (2007, 99–118), and perhaps we should take seriously the argument that this strategy was undertaken in the domestic setting of large Athenian *oikoi*.[47] Roth points to the fact that flocks of sheep attached to Roman villas would have made this production strategy all the more attractive (ibid. 114–7). It may not be a coincidence that one real-life Athenian household we know for certain kept several female slaves (Demosthenes, 47.56) also

[45] This assumption can be further supported by the fact that wool-working is a valuable skill, and one that takes years to learn. Many enslaved were probably imported to Athens with these skills and a large market for female domestic slaves may have tilted owners in favour of training enslaved women for this role.

[46] Admittedly, we cannot know for certain that the women depicted in the artist representations he analyses were slaves, but further on the link between prostitution and wool working, Cohen (2015, 46–8); Wrenhaven (2009, 271-8); Williams (1983, 97).

[47] Although Ischomachos apparently does not keep flocks of sheep or other animals attached to his estate, we know from other evidence that Athenian landowners often did (above, section 1.1.3).

kept a flock of sheep for their wool (47.52). Even on a 'for household consumption' basis only, however, the time required from a domestic labour force to produce sufficient textiles would have been considerable (Carr, 2000, 165).

Another facet of Roth's model explaining the exploitation of female slaves in the Roman countryside is the effect of slave reproduction strategies. She argues that an equal number of enslaved women kept alongside men would allow reproduction to be a valuable strategy, so long as these women could also be exploited in a commercial enterprise compatible with the demands of childcare, such as wool-working (2007, 10–18). In fact, female slaves in the *Oikonomikos* were exploited for their sexual and reproductive capacity, but not primarily as a method of reproducing slave labour and (by extension) property. Rather than facilitating the reproduction of his slave household as a whole, Xenophon instead recommends that such relationships be restricted, so as to offer them as a privilege to those slaves who showed loyalty to their master (9.5).

The relative restriction of sexual rights within the household marks a distinct difference between Xenophon's *Oikonomikos* and discussions of slave-management in other slave systems.[48] This may well be explicable by pointing to the low cost of slaves in classical Athens, in comparison to other societies (below, 94). As de Ste. Croix argued, family arrangements conducive to slave breeding would have lowered the rate at which the labour of slaves could be exploited. To him, the

[48] For ancient Greece, see the anecdote attributed to Gellias of Akgragas by Stobaeus (4.19.48). In Rome, see the measures recommended by Columella to encourage his slave women to have children (*Rust.* 1.8.19). In the American South, slave-owners rarely interfered so directly in their slave's relationships, and preferred, as supposedly did Gellias, merely to allow slaves the opportunity to procreate on their own terms (Fogel and Engelman, 1974, 78-86). Slave reproduction strategies, however, were part of the rationale behind the facilitation of plantation slave couples, as the remark of the early 18th century planter Nathaniel Pope makes clear: "Nothing is of more advantage to my sons, than young breeding negroes" (Morgan and Nicholls, 1989, 235).

fluctuating prominence of slave-reproduction as a strategy across different times and places would have arisen out of judgments on the profitability of producing slave children against the risks and loss of labour therein (1981, 231).[49] In any case, slave reproduction would have been a very long-term, and inherently risky investment. If we factor in the cost of maintaining unproductive slave children, the fact that both pregnancy and childcare would have limited the working time of productive female slaves, not to mention the risk of their death in childbirth, it might be seen as an even less attractive option for slave-owners.[50] What is more, a study of slave families in ancient Greece points out that formal relationships between slaves consistently appear to have been the exception rather than the rule (Schmitz, 2012, 75–96). There are, in short, several reasons why we might not find it surprising that certain Athenian slave-owners might have advocated restricting sex and reproduction amongst their slaves, rather than widely encouraging it.

The pseudo-Aristotelean *Oikonomika* represents a slightly different take on slave reproduction within the household. In this source, although there is no mention of restriction of sexual rights, the children of slaves are viewed as valuable to their masters not as financial investments, but as potential hostages (1.344b.17-8). As Hans Klees noted, however, both sources have in common the fact that they both view sexual relationships amongst their slaves exclusively as a means of controlling the slaves on their estates towards other ends (1998, 156). The sexuality of female slaves was often, we should imagine, exploited as an incentive for male slaves. The occasional addition of

[49] De Ste Croix's position can be further supported by Scheidel (2005), who argues for comparatively low prices for slaves in Athens on the basis of grain prices and wages used as a point of comparison with other ancient Mediterranean societies. The evidence on which this conclusion is based, however, remains patchy at best, and we have no real alternative way to test the purchasing power of different currencies across the historical contexts Scheidel discusses. On the dangers of drawing far-reaching conclusions about slave reproduction strategies from isolated literary sources, Bradley (1987).

[50] Cf. Hesiod's advice to acquire a slave women unburdened with children (*WD*, 602–3).

extra property and labour through slave children would no doubt have been a desirable side-effect of this strategy, but the emphases of both Xenophon and pseudo-Aristotle suggest at the very least that they did not consider it the primary rationale behind the ownership of enslaved female domestics in Athens.

The household of a rich landowner like Ischomachos comprised not only a nuclear family, but also contained numerous dependents. In exploiting slave labour on a large scale, it expanded the number of people in its household, and consequently was forced to maintain them. The domestic sphere of Ischomachos' household, though separate in terms of the labour force which worked in and supervised it, was nevertheless closely intertwined with its agricultural sphere. In Ischomachos' fictional household, female slave labour was vital for providing the food and clothes not only for his family, but also for the slaves whose labour provided the agricultural goods and liquid wealth on which the domestic sphere of production depended. Each sphere, in other words, was vital for the well-being of the other.

As we will discuss in more detail below, it is likely that many of Ischomachos' slaves were imagined being kept on the barest possible subsistence. Their upkeep, then, would require simple and small meals (probably consisting of porridge or bread made from barley) as well as simple clothing, which were not only comparatively cheap in terms of the materials they were made of but also in terms of the labour it would take to produce them. However, this was not true of all the household slaves. As we will see in the following section, the existence of a slave hierarchy would require that more labour be spent on making the lives of the slaves at its top more comfortable.[51]

To what extent this depiction of the exploitation of female slaves for home-based cycles of production mirrored that of actual Athenian households is difficult to say for certain. We know, for example, that textiles could be purchased in Athens' market, but judging the extent of home-based

[51] On the unequal distribution of food in Athenian households, Garnsey (1999, chapter 7).

production "must lie in that known but great unknown, domestic slaves" (Tsakirgis, 2016, 171).[52] The *Oikonomikos* is uniquely detailed in its description of the function of a domestic sphere, and even it gives us no tangible idea of the scale of slave exploitation that was imagined in Ischomachos' *oikos*. Unlike its agricultural sphere, we cannot draw on Pseudo-Aristotle's *Oikonomika* to support the *Oikonomikos*' description of the work of female slaves either. To be sure, we have some additional examples of slaves producing foodstuffs in their households. These are referenced in Chapter 4 within a comparison of home-based and market-based production of flour (174–8). To anticipate an argument made there, we might speculate that the purchase of food in Athens' market would have been more desirable for those households who could not grow it themselves. One key thing to observe about Ischomachos' household at this point is that, in terms of maintaining its members, it is largely a self-sufficient unit, although not entirely so. Ischomachos' household certainly engaged with the market, to which slaves are described being sent (8.22).[53] As Ischomachos tells his wife, agriculture provides the household's necessities (*epitēdeia*), which included grain, wine and oil; whilst the women's work cared for and distributed them (7.20–1).

Beyond the idea that self-sufficiency was valued in and of itself, there are economic measures which might have sustained a household economy of this sort. Growing a variety of different crops, including grain, had the advantage of avoiding disaster through crop failure, but also of avoiding the consequences of a lapse in supply, and (on the other side of the same coin) ensuring a suitable market for surplus of some kind. A domestic economy able to process what was needed for the *oikos* members in house, moreover, eliminated the costs of labour and transport which would have arisen

[52] The Spartans, according to Xenophon, used exclusively female slaves for wool-working (*Lac.* 1.4), possibly an indication of wider Greek practice.

[53] Interestingly, Aristotle recognised that at the level of the *polis*, trade was an inevitable nescessity which he factored into his notion of desireable *autarkeia* (Bresson, 1987).

from doing so through the market (Bresson, 2016, 200–1).[54] Another advantage to a household of domestic slaves on an agricultural estate could have been their contribution to restricted periods of intense labour, especially the harvest. If not in the actual gathering, then in the processing and storage of crops, the presence of a workforce of slave women might, in this way, have contributed significantly to the labour requirements of agricultural work.[55]

2.2.3 Managing the Household and its Labour

According to both Ischomachos and the author of the *Oikonomika* attributed to Aristotle, a master should leave as little of the running of their agricultural production to another as possible.[56] Xenophon's Ischomachos is interested in and knowledgeable about the process of farming and he personally inspects and instructs the work of his slaves at points (11.16). Similarly, in the domestic sphere, the role of Ischomachos' wife is repeatedly stated to be a supervisor of domestic tasks (7.35). She also plays the primary role in the organisation of the household's material goods — in

[54] A story had been handed down to the first century AD about Perikles' selling all his agricultural produce at once every year and then buying household necessities as they were needed, in order to closely manage his finances (Plutarch, *Per.* 16.4). This is portrayed as eccentric, however, and is probably evidence that such a practice was not the norm.

[55] Athenian women were involved in threshing, at the very least (Athenaeus, 14.619a). For this and other references to women in agriculture, which are particularly prominent in relation to harvests, see the evidence from across the ancient world collected by Scheidel (1996, 1–4).

[56] Both authors demonstrate this point by reference to an allegorical anecdote that was attributed to either a Persian (Pseudo-Aristotle, 1345a2–5) or a foreign king (Xenophon, 12.20), who, when asked what was most important for the rearing of a good horse, replied: "the eye of his master".

their storage, inventory and rationing (7.36).[57] As with domestic work in general, the importance of this role should not be understated. As Harris points out, furthermore, because the market-oriented production of the *oikos* was usually not physically separated from its base in the family residence, the work of women in the house was intricately tied to the well-being of whatever business the household pursued (2013c, 196–7; cf. Foxhall, 1998, 128–31).[58] As the heads of their household, both husband and wife are depicted as the primary managers of their estate, each in their respective spheres.

Nevertheless, neither was able or willing to oversee all of the considerable activity that must have taken place on a day-to-day basis in their household. Ischomachos, for one thing, also valued leisure which regularly prevented him from adhering to the ideal of an active farmer. He spends time improving and maintaining his skill at horsemanship (11.17–18), conducts business, and (as in the context of the dialogue) meets friends in the city (7.2; 11.15). Though it is not mentioned in the dialogue, the demands of participating in Athens' army would have been another — in fact, probably the most — significant reason why elite male Athenians would have been unable to attend to their farmland personally. Political participation, similarly, would have placed demands on the time of elite men. When Socrates questions Ischomachos about how he is able to take time away from attending to his farmland, Ischomachos replies that he has supervisors, *epitropoi*, who do so in his absence (12.2).

As to how an *epitropos* might be acquired, the following passage suggests that asides from buying an experienced one, an Athenian might obtain an untrained man and train him to be a good *epitropos* oneself (12.2–3). This was the preferable option according to Ischomachos. The fact that *epitropoi*

[57] These include wool, clothing and food (ibid.). In a more extended description, bedding, furniture, wine (9.3), tools for sacrifice (9.6), and various implements for cooking, bathing and dining (9.7).

[58] Similarly Cohen (2002, 105–6), using literary evidence bearing on the conceptual rather than physical connection between *oikos* and business.

were, in this particular instance, assumed to be slaves, is implied by the suggestion that they might be bought (*ōneisthai)*, implicit if not explicit in both the options which Socrates considers in this passage (Pomeroy, 1994, 316–17). This description and the proceeding discussion also imply that an *epitropos* would ideally have lived in his master's household for a considerable amount of time. Ischomachos talks about judging the receptiveness of slaves to an explicitly set out system of incentives over time — making this system clear to the slaves (13.9) and learning which ones responded to it (14.8). Pseudo-Aristotle agreed, adding that it was best that slaves be brought up (*trephein*) in the household as youths (*neoi*: 1.1344a.25–6).

In Chapter 1, we discussed the position of *epitropoi*, whose occupation was in a supervisory and managerial capacity, as important examples of slaves in positions of trust (above, 49–52). Their main function, according to Aristotle, was to allow citizens to follow the proper pursuits of their status — activities of leisure and politics. *Epitropoi*, however, were also key in providing the supervision inherently necessary for the operation of a household as large as that described in the *Oikonomikos*. Furthermore, the geographical separation of many households' agricultural holdings would have made it even more unfeasible for a wealthy Athenian to personally oversee all his fields.[59] Especially on fields which might be a particularly long distance from the main *oikia* of Ischomachos and his wife, it might have made sense to have slaves housed on them during periods of high labour demand, or even full-time.

[59] On the evidence for fragmented land-holdings in Attica, Osborne (1985, 48–52); Pritchett (1953, 255–6). Scholars have posited several explanations for this reality. Foxhall (2007b, 57) points to both the city's system of partible inheritance (cf. Campbell and Sherrard, 1968, 329–30) and "the opportunistic acquisition of land" as explanations. Finally, as Gallant has pointed out, peasant communities throughout history have regularly regarded land fragmentation as a beneficial risk-management strategy, and the fragmentation of Athenian landholdings is likely to have been welcomed (and not resisted) by Athenian farmers, if not pursued as a conscious strategy at times (1991, 42–5; cf. on Ischomachos' holdings specifically, Pomeroy, 1994, 54).

This final suggestion can be cautiously supported with epigraphic evidence. On a farm belonging to a certain Timesios in the Agrileza valley, a damaged fourth-century calendar engraved in stone has survived, along with a partially legible three-line inscription underneath it, which Langdon and Watrous have suggested should read "An[…]ōros, *epitropos* of this estate" (1977, 170).[60] They argue, on the basis of this inscription and the small size of the remains of the farmhouse, that the *epitropos* was permanently based here (cf. Carlsen, 2002, 120). We also have several land leases which stipulate residency on their grounds by their wealthy tenants. This is rather puzzling, and Jones' suggestion that slaves may have been the residents imagined by these terms provides a plausible explanation (2000, 79–80; 83). There is nothing in the *Oikonomikos* that suggests that slaves were settled on farms full-time — in fact, we are told that male slaves are sent to their work from the main house by Ischomachos' wife. However, this need not be taken to refer to all slaves all year round, and keeping slaves housed near fields would have obvious advantages for an elite landowner. Of course, arrangements of this kind would give slaves a surprising amount of autonomy and would work effectively for slave-owners only if such slaves could be trusted to work diligently, or if they were overseen by an *epitropos* who could.

Xenophon's *Oikonomikos* makes it clear that key amongst the duties of his *epitropoi* was the supervision of the manual labourers working on the farm (13.4; Klees, 1998, 110). Providing them with the ability to motivate these workers, he explains, was an important part of an *epitropos'* training, and he describes at length the system of reward-based incentives a slave-owner might use to encourage his slaves to work, and encourage his *epitropoi* to employ in turn (13.6–12, cf. 12.12;

[60] ΑΝ[…]ΩΡΟΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΟΠΟΣ [Χ]ΩΡΙΟΥ. Only the second line reading "*epitropos*" remains fully legible, but the first is clearly his name, and Langdon and Watrous restore a chi before the legible section of the last line, so that it reads the possessive genitive *chōriou*.

21.8–9).[61] An extended discussion (12.3-15.1) details the training of a competent supervisor, and provides an interesting contemporary analysis of the key components of a good *epitropos* (summarised at 15.1). It is clear from the wording of this section (and should be obvious anyway) that Xenophon saw these character traits as desirable in all his slaves and made an effort to develop them across his enslaved workforce. Nevertheless, the overall framing of this discussion as advice on how to train *epitropoi* makes it equally clear that, however beneficial it was that all slaves had these qualities, it was far more important that they were possessed by those in positions of authority.

One quality listed by Xenophon is knowledge of the work over which they preside (13.2). A point which arises from the discussion of section 2.2.1 above is the sheer variety of different agricultural tasks which slaves would have to perform throughout the year, all requiring their own particular and varying levels of expertise. By using supervisors with experience in agricultural techniques, Xenophon could expect his slaves to be productively directed towards completing tasks which required a good deal of knowledge. Although Ischomachos portrays farming as a simple trade (15.10–13), we would probably do better to imagine *epitropoi* as highly skilled agricultural workers. The question of whether or not they and their workers were specialised in different areas of agriculture is an interesting one, but very difficult to answer. This would certainly have some practical advantages, but it might also be the case that they were assigned work over a particular area (rather than specific crop), and the workforce was likely to be moved about to meet various labour demands as they arose.

As well as the ability to command men (13.4), Xenophon also lists “loyalty” or goodwill to their master (*eunoia*, 12.5), concern for productive work (12.8-9), and “honesty” or a sense of justice

[61] We might also suspect, as does Klees (1998, 182), that slave overseers were responsible for the corporal punishment of slaves. This was certainly a job expected of many roman *vilici* (Varro, *Res Rusticae*, 1.17.5; Columella 1.8.16).

(*dikaiosunē*, 14.2-3) as traits he looks for in an *epitropos*.[62] No matter how technically qualified a slave might be for this position, Ischomachos claims, if he will not work productively towards his master's benefit or is inclined to steal from his master, he cannot be an effective manager. Xenophon is drawing attention to one of the key problems with a system of management delegation through forced labour. As well as the fact that their work would often be care-intensive, the fact that slave *epitropoi* often worked independent of supervision by their very function and were responsible for important aspects of their master's household economy meant that they would have possessed a larger capacity to disrupt the productivity of their owner's estates through truancy, sabotage and theft.[63] Therefore some degree of trust had to exist between master and slave in relationships of this kind.

A similar relationship of trust between master and slave is evident in Xenophon's description of Ischomachos' *tamia*, a word which is often translated as "housekeeper". The *tamia* is a particularly interesting servile figure, and one who has received little attention in secondary literature. The word has roots in the archaic period, where the related term *tamiē* was used to describe female slaves in positions of authority in the Homeric poems.[64] Unfortunately, the text of the *Oikonomikos* is not as detailed as we might like about what daily responsibilities of the *tamia* might entail, but it does provide a few examples, from which we can make some general conclusions.

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[62] I use Pomeroy's translation (1994) of *eunoias* and *dikaiosunē* as "loyalty" and "honesty" respectively. Both capture well, I believe, the meaning in which they are presented within the context of master-slave relationships in the text.

[63] See above on slave resistance (12–13) and care-intensive labour (63–4).

[64] Odysseus' nurse Eurykleia is described as a *tamiē* (2.345), which referred to her significant organisational and supervisory responsibilities in the *Odyssey* (Thalmann, 1998, 64). It is also used to describe the leader of Hector's slave women in the *Iliad* (6.381; 390).

According to two passages of the text, the *tamia* appears to have held responsibilities in managing the household inventory. When she first appears, she is being taught the household's storage system (8.10) and appears again at the end of a section outlining the organisation of domestic tools (9.6-10). This latter section adds that she is responsible for recording how the different implements are stored, as well as being given the responsibility of distributing them to the slaves of the household as needs required and keeping track of them thereafter (9.10). In a later passage, the *tamia* is mentioned again, this time as the person who measures out rations for the slave workforce (10.10).

Evidently, part of the *tamia*'s job was to keep track of the property of the household, making sure that tools and stores were organised, maintained, and rationed appropriately. Keeping inventory over items produced in the house (cooked food and clothes) also would have meant that the *tamia* would have been well placed to micro-manage the daily tasks of the household's domestic slaves. An active role in directing the overall production of the *oikos* is further suggested by the *tamia*'s distribution of tools to different slaves as required, and her collection and storage of them after their use. We can therefore postulate that the *tamia* played a key role in both the overall organisation of the household and the supervision of different tasks taking place within it. These two responsibilities, interestingly, closely resemble those of Eurykleia in the *Odyssey* (2.345–48; 22.395–6; 20.147–59), who shares responsibility with Penelope for training Odysseus' other enslaved women (22.422–3). The *tamia*'s role would have been vital to its agricultural sphere as well, as manager of the distribution of tools, food and clothes to those working in it. This might be organised in tandem with *epitropoi* (possibly, but not necessarily using Ischomachos and/or his wife as intermediaries) in overseeing the overlap between the household's two spheres of production.

The *Oikonomikos* is clear about the role of Ischomachos' wife in overseeing the tasks assigned to the *tamia*.[65] Unlike her husband, she would not have expected political, military, and social obligations to remove her from this role on a regular or extended basis. As with Ischomachos' inability to supervise his many slaves across many fields, however, the size of the domestic sphere may have meant that his wife could not provide constant supervision to all of its production either. Furthermore, there are several situations, though rarer in their occurrence and shorter in length than those we can stipulate for a citizen man, in which we can imagine a citizen woman being unable to directly participate in the running of her household for a period of time. Festivals generally, as well as female-only festivals in which elite citizen women would participate are one example, as are periods of pregnancy and childbirth.[66] Women might also fall ill or decide to make social calls. In situations such as these, having someone able to manage the household's domestic affairs would be crucial. I suggest that the *tamia* was important for this reason too; indeed, the fact that some level of independent responsibility would have been designated to her is evident from a passage of the *Oikonomikos* describing her selection and training (9.11-3). The *tamia* is picked for her self-moderation, we are told, as well as her ability to be coerced into loyalty by a system of punishments and rewards, which indicate to my mind that this process describes the creation of a position of administrative, organisational, and probably supervisory responsibility.

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[65] She is explicitly described overseeing the distribution of rations by the *tamia* (10.10), and similarly is expected to have a good knowledge of the household inventory (9.2–10). Because the text describes the instruction of Ischomachos' wife, our knowledge of the *tamia*'s daily work is limited to tasks in which Ischomachos' wife was directly involved, giving the probably incorrect impression that everything the former did was supervised by the latter.

[66] Whilst a study of female festivals makes clear that "with one exception [they]… were apparently a 'day' or 'days' out, and their husbands and home beckoned at the end of the day and the rites" (Dillon, 2002, 138), it also points out that the three day exception, the *thesmophoria*, took place during the busiest time of the agricultural year (110–1).

Xenophon also puts in the mouth of Ischomachos a particular slave management strategy, utilised in ensuring the loyalty of his *tamia*, which deserves highlighting:

> "We [i.e. Ischomachos and his wife] taught her to be loyal to us by giving her a share of our joy when we were happy, and if we had any trouble, we called on her to share it too. We trained her to be eager to improve the estate by taking her into our confidence and by giving her a share in our success" (9.12, tr. Pomeroy, 1994).

It is never stated outright that the *tamia* is a slave, though this has widely been assumed with good reason. Certainly, this passage strongly suggests that this is the case, focused as it is on her incorporation into the household unit — it is difficult to imagine a female resident of Athens, unless a slave (or a freedwoman) to whom such a remark could apply. There are also notable similarities between the discussion of the *tamia* and that of the *epitropoi*, who *are* explicitly slaves. Note the following example, in which Ischomachos applies to his *epitropoi* a policy very similar to that of his *tamia* quoted above:

> "And how on earth do you teach loyalty to you and yours to the man you've chosen [i.e. to be an *epitropos*]… "by rewarding him whenever the gods grant us an abundance of some good thing" (12.6-7, tr. Pomeroy, 1994).

In other words, by involving them in the management of his household and by tying their wellbeing to its success, a slave-owner like Ischomachos might hope to keep his slaves invested in the continuation of this success, when they legally had no rights to any of the property they used and maintained.

To Ischomachos, the employment of supervisors was at least partially an example of the productive specialisation of roles within the household: "It makes a great difference to the profitability of agriculture, when labourers are available, and plenty of them too, that one man is concerned about whether the labourers are working during the working hours, whereas another is not concerned

about this" (20.16, tr. Pomeroy, 1994).[67] The passages listed above, however, demonstrate that the value to a wealthy Athenian landowner of having reliable slaves, in both the household's agricultural and domestic sphere, was far more than just this. Through the use of enslaved *epitropoi*, Ischomachos and his wife were attempting to ensure their property was productively managed, and this strategy required a specific master-slave relationship based at least partially on trust. Of course, the commitment of a slave to the household which supported them was entirely dependent on their receiving some form of benefits from its success. Significantly, Ischomachos picks up on this and advocates that rewards be attached specifically to the overall welfare of the household. Towards this end, both the household's *tamia* and its *epitropoi* are singled out amongst other workers as the beneficiaries of certain privileges — an indication of their masters' need to trust them.

The emphasis which Xenophon and Pseudo-Aristotle put on the direct role of the heads of the household is interesting to consider in its relation to wider Athenian social history. Indeed, advocates of an ironic reading of the *Oikonomikos* often see a contradiction between this and Ischomachos' other statements to the effect that he can trust his slaves (Danzig, 2003, 70; Ambler, 1996, 127). A recent book by Petley (2018) recounts the life and times of the English-Jamaican planter Simon Taylor, who made a fortune growing sugar cane, with which he hoped to integrate his extended family into English aristocracy (esp. 27–31). Taylor's success was as much down to luck as anything else (78–81), but it was at least partially a result of his direct and diligent management of his estates. As Petley notes, while many of those who had inherited wealth like that of Taylor were touring Europe in their twenties, he was studying business. While other plantation owners hired managers and chose to live in England (in certain cases, pursuing successful political careers), Taylor resided in Jamaica. He was something of an oddity in this regard, and one wonders if the figure of

[67] On Xenophon's similar views on the division of labour in manufacture, see his *Cyropaedia* (8.2.5).

Ischomachos would appear the same way to us, if we had more detailed records of the lives of elite Athenian landholders.

An emphasis on the importance of direct management, like that of Xenophon and Pseudo-Aristotle, would only have made sense in a society where inconsistent involvement by a property owner in his estate was a regular feature of aristocratic strategies. One could even argue that this advice would only be valuable in a society in which that was regularly the case. Similarly, historians of classical Athens have drawn attention to the important role Athenian wives played the overall organisation of their household (Blundell, 1995, 140-1, with references).[68] Nevertheless, the hardworking wife of Ischomachos is an ideal, and there surely must have been elite women who used their wealth to remove themselves from domestic work of any kind.

What is more, there were means of drawing a regular income from land that did not require the effort of direct exploitation. One was to lease the farm to a free tenant, or perhaps to arrange a sharecropping agreement (Lewis, 2018b, 271–3).[69] Another was to give a slave — an *epitropos*

[68] The importance of citizen women's role in household management can be further demonstrated by their involvement in sizeable transactions (Harris, 2006b, 343–5) — a technically illegal act (Isaeus, 10.10) — and despite laws preventing their ownership of property (De Ste Croix, 1970). On the similar role played by women in Greece's archaic age, most discernibly the organisation of and control over household storage, Van Wees (2005, 30). In an infamous analogy by Semonides of Amorgos, the first listed attribute of the "the woman from the bee" is good management of her husband's livelihood (Fr. 7.85). Cf. Xenophon's similar analogy in the *Oikonomikos* (7.33–4), and a fragment of Demokritos (68 Fr. 227, D-K).

[69] On leasing of land by private individuals, Lysias (7.4-11); Macdowell (1978, 149–1). Wood (1988, 76–7) was correct, I believe, in interpreting 1.3–4 of Xenophon's *Oikonomikos*, where Socrates and Critobulus debate a freeman working the land of another for profit, as referring to a hypothetical leasing of said land. This is suggested by Critobulus' remark that he could earn profits from the farm's surplus after making "necessary payments".

perhaps — de facto rights to the property and draw an *apophora* from them. There is no evidence for a relationship of this kind in the sphere of agriculture, and it may well be the case that the prestige attached to farming in Athens meant that farming was more likely to be a direct occupation, as Acton asserts (2014, 251). However, fragmented landholdings and independent slaves in other economic areas were such a distinct aspect of Athenian property holdings, that I would be truly surprised if slaves were never left in complete charge of agricultural properties under *apophora* relations. It is probably safest to say that how much, and in what way, an Athenian might decide to remain personally involved in his economic affairs, probably varied from case to case. For an owner who was competent and willing to provide the supervision necessary for the direct exploitation of their land, this was likely to be the most lucrative system of management.

As well as a propensity for direct management of his investments, Simon Taylor also resembles Ischomachos and the ideal land-owner of Pseudo-Aristotle's *Oikonomika* in the way in which he managed the slaves on his estate. For one thing, he deliberately diversified the ethnic origins of his African slaves (Petley, 2018, 60), as Pseudo-Aristotle recommended an estate manager should (1.1344b.18–19).[70] Taylor also, like other planters, created what Petley describes "as distinctions of 'class' between enslaved people on his estate" (2018, 60), at the top of which were drivers, who were marked as distinct from other slaves by their Christian names and held privileges including better food and clothing (60–3). However, while Jamaican absentee planters hired white, free managers to oversee their estates at the highest level, in Athens such independent and powerful positions were likely to be occupied by household slaves too. The considerable control which *epitropoi* often held over aspects of their master's property (examined in Chapters 4 and 5) would

[70] Plato also saw this as a good measure for reducing rebelliousness amongst slave populations (*Leg.* 6.777c-d). In the attic stelai, the origins of slaves that are preserved do support the idea that the slaves of a household were from disparate ethnic backgrounds, although it is difficult to tell the extent to which this was deliberate rather than merely the consequence of Athens' diverse slave supply.

have been unthinkable in Jamaica. As far as the portrayal of Ischomachos and his wife is concerned, however, their direct role in slave management is presented as crucial to their slaving strategies. This can be best evidenced in their system of awarding and restricting privileges, to which we will now turn in more detail.

2.3 Ischomachos' Slaves

2.3.1 The Household's Slave Hierarchy and the Lives of Slave Workers

Pomeroy's commentary on the *Oikonomikos* argues that the picture of slavery it presents is mild and at times somewhat progressive, even (1994, 65-7). Indeed, the section outlining the training of slaves provides a full-acknowledgment of their capacity for human virtues (whilst, it should be noted, also assimilating them to domestic animals at 13.7-8), and focuses predominantly on positive rewards rather than punishment.[71] While explaining to Socrates the best way to train his agricultural slaves in honesty, Ischomachos says the following:

> "If I learn of [slaves] who are induced to be honest not only because of the advantages they gain through being honest, but because of a desire to be praised by me, I treat them as if they were free men, not only do I make them wealthy, but I even honour them as if they were gentlemen (*kaloi… kagathoi*)" (14.9-10, tr. Pomeroy, 1994).

[71] Aristotle found himself in disagreement with Xenophon about the particular virtues which a slave could possess: he believed that both leadership and self-moderation were found exclusively in free men (Deslauriers, 2006, 55-6). As Deslauriers also points out, however, Aristotle did believe that slaves possessed *human* virtues connected to their ability to obey rather than command (54; *Pol.* 1259b.21-6; 1259b40-1260a2). Therefore, although his views on natural slavery force him to arbitrarily overlook some of the qualities that would make a slave in a position of responsibility particularly valuable to their owner, Aristotle did recognise that a master would value a slave that they could trust, and on this point, he was in agreement with Xenophon.

This sentence highlights the importance to Xenophon of advocating positive reinforcement to elicit loyalty from his slaves. As to what this system of rewards looked like: Xenophon seems to have envisaged slave-owners providing their slaves with money (presumably the meaning of "make them wealthy"), probably small gifts and bonuses for exemplary work or after a bountiful harvest.[72] Ischomachos also seems to have suggested that slave-owners might treat their slaves with dignity and respect, and he says earlier in the dialogue that he praises them for good work (12.16). Similarly, both better clothes (13.10-11) and sexual privileges with other slaves (9.5) are offered as rewards.

To what extent, however, were these different advantages available to all slaves rather than mostly or entirely to the *epitropoi* on whose trust Xenophon was dependent? Again, much of what is recommended by Ischomachos is explicitly intended to be taken as applying to the correct management of slaves in general, rather than just those in positions of authority. However, as we have seen, the emphasis of the discussion is repeatedly returned to the qualities which should be instilled in an *epitropos* specifically. That differential treatment of slaves might be necessitated by their varying positions is expressed more clearly, if in less detail, by Pseudo-Aristotle. After differentiating between normal workers and *epitropoi*, he describes the latter as "those whose work is more of the free" and goes on to recommend that masters "provide honour to [them], and plenty of food to the workers" (1.1344a30-1).

Xenophon is effectively describing the creation of a hierarchy within his slave household, one in which those at the top (his *epitropoi*, picked from his "best" slaves) are better treated, live more comfortably, and whose status is visibly marked by their better clothing. It is worth highlighting two things about this hierarchy: 1.) inherent to this system is the chance for promotion and certain comforts which came with it, but with the important caveats that this would take years of loyal service, and that such positions would not always be necessary, and would be scarce in comparison

[72] This is not a peculiar practice. It is suggested in Menander's *Heros*, for example, that a domestic slave living in the house of his master might have some money put aside (6).

to more taxing manual labour, and 2.) that it could ensure regular supervision of the more numerous slaves at its bottom, allowing Ischomachos to more easily exploit them.

Regularly supervised slaves could be made to perform exhausting work for long hours and for very little reward, allowing them to be kept on bare subsistence. We can probably infer this, for example, from Ischomachos' claim that he provides his *epitropoi* with "good things" when he has them (12.6-7), the implication being that most of the time, he does not. Again, Pseudo-Aristotle is more explicit: "men cannot be ruled without a wage of some kind, *and food is the wage of a slave*" (1344b.2-3, emphasis mine). Just as many slaves were prevented from forming sexual relationships, when we read that Xenophon distributes clothes of differing qualities to his slaves, we can probably take this to mean that many of his slaves would have been clothed as cheaply as possible. The fact that poor living conditions were a consistent feature of historical examples of agricultural slavery makes it probable, in my opinion, that we can read these circumstances into Xenophon's *Oikonomikos* too. In section 2.2.1, I argued that the full-time, yearly demands of intensive farming justified the choice of a slave over a hired (or tenant) workforce. Slavery, for landowners like Ischomachos, would also have been beneficial because it ensured workers who could be made to do exhausting and unappealing work for long hours and no payment other than basic sustenance.

Xenophon's reward-centred approach to slave-management is conspicuously consistent with manuals in Rome and in the Ante-Bellum US South, which tend to obscure the more brutal reality of slave-owning practices (Dal Lago and Katsari, 2008, 196-9).[73] Furthermore, as Fisher notes, although the importance of punishment is minimized in the text, it is still mentioned at several points (1995,

[73] This approach is also consistent with a wider argument, spread throughout Xenophon's works, that willing obedience was the best way to command men (Buxton, 2017, esp. 131). A desire to fit the content of the *Oikonomikos* into this wider argument could have counted amongst possible "philosophical reasons for downplaying slave resistance" which McKeown (2011, 174) suggests influenced Xenophon's writing on slavery.

57, with references; esp. 14.5-8).[74] Earlier in the text we are also told that some masters physically restrain their slaves to prevent them from running away (3.4). The most telling example, however, comes from another of Xenophon's Socratic dialogues:

> "Who would care to have a man in his house who is never willing to work and has a weakness for high living? Let us examine how harshly masters treat such slaves. Do they not correct their immorality with hunger… chain them so that they can't run away, and remove their laziness with blows? What do you do when you observe these faults in your slaves?" "I chastise them", he said "and make their lives terrible, until I force them to submission" (Xenophon, *Mem.* 2.1.16-7).

Noteworthy here is the (apparently) well-recognised stereotype of an unproductive, untrustworthy slave, a figure who is very much present in the section of the *Oikonomikos* focused on slave-management, often as the antithesis of the loyal slaves who are rewarded in the passages cited above (i.e. 9.5; 12.16; 13.10-11; cf. 12.14; 14.8).

The discussion of the *tamia* indicates a similar hierarchy amongst the female slaves of the domestic sphere of the household. However, the *Oikonomikos* mentions several *epitropoi* and only a single *tamia*. This fact is probably reflective of a smaller need for supervisory duties in the female sphere of production, which can be explained by reference to several factors which differentiated it from its male counterpart. Firstly, we might point to the role of an Athenian wife in managing the household (above, 112–13; 116). Additionally, there is the fact that unlike agricultural work, domestic production would be mostly confined to a single, comparatively small area, making close supervision of slaves' work all the easier to oversee. Finally, it might be the case that fewer domestic workers

[74] On the punishment of classical Greek slaves, see Klees (1998, chapter 6); in Athens, Hunter (1994, chapter 2). Also Hunt (2016), who notes the importance of public punishment to social control (141–3).

were envisaged in the household than those working in agriculture, although this is difficult to support from the text.[75]

Whatever the reason behind it, the consequence of the household only employing one *tamia* for the female slaves of the household was the absence (bar one) of structural positions of trust which they might hope to be promoted to and enjoy the privileges of. That is not to say that systems of reward would not be in place to provide benefits to female slaves who showed particular loyalty and motivation towards their work. On the whole, however, we can imagine that the majority of female slaves would be stuck in a system which exploited their labour as much and as cheaply as possible.

Above all, Xenophon's text presents us with a logical if overly rose-coloured image of slave exploitation, with the goal of exercising control over his enslaved workers through positive incentives and violence. Xenophon, to be sure, would have his reader believe that Ischomachos' slaves should enjoy some comforts and privileges, and no doubt some slave-owners preferred a more reward-centred approach than others. Even so, these rewards are described as deliberate concessions meant only to preserve and to motivate the workforce that was required to maintain his agricultural property (similarly Tamiolaki, 2012, 579-80). Pomeroy notes with approval a passage which describes Ischomachos' wife taking care of sick slaves personally (7.37), but even this is said to be beneficial for its utility in establishing power over slaves.

1.2.2 Slave Relationships and the Lives of Trusted Slaves

Ischomachos' system of management delegation, across a large property and a great number of (often distant) agricultural plots, however, meant that not all his slaves could be treated as harshly. This practice of placing slaves in positions of trust, it seems clear from the text, allowed slaves to gain particular advantages for themselves as part of a cooperative strategy between themselves and

[75] This being said, the acquisition of female slaves intended for domestic production is made clear by passages discussing their training by Ischomachos' wife (7.41–2).

their masters. Fifth-century Athenian evidence for a household structure of this kind is slim, but a fragment of Aristophanes' *Peace II* refers to both an *epitropos* and a *tamia* among other subordinate members of a household (255 K-A). Neither was this system of management peculiar to Athens. Burford compares classical *epitropoi* to Eumaios in the *Odyssey* (1993, 174) and, as we have already seen, the *tamia* similarly has parallels in the Homeric poems (111). The position of *epitropos* as described in the *Oikonomikos* has been compared to the *vilicus* as described by the Roman agronomists, who, it should be noted, drew direct inspiration from their earlier Greek counterparts (Carlsen, 2002, 122-4). Roman agrarian writers also drew attention to the importance of picking the right man for this position and record the necessity of offering incentives to these men as well (ibid; e.g. Varro, *Rust.* 1.17.7). The *tamia* can be considered in terms similar to that of the *vilica*, a female slave with an important role in overseeing the domestic work of the Roman villa (Roth, 2004).

A surprising absence from the list of rewards provided by Xenophon is manumission. Pseudo-Aristotle, contrastingly, saw its benefits as a strategy of control, and even recommended that a basic timetable for manumitting a slave should be provided him or her (1344b15-8). It is tempting to read this difference between the sources as a divergence in the slaving practices being advocated, though the absence of any mention of manumission from Xenophon's *Oikonomikos* could equally be an incidental, rather than a deliberate exclusion. It is also worth restating that post-manumission obligations were a possibility for Athenian masters (above, 55–6).

Ischomachos' suggestion to give trusted slaves a direct stake in the household's success is worth elaborating on. The identity of slaves, as modern studies have pointed out, were defined in relation to their *oikos* (Golden, 2011, 136). Symbolically speaking, this has the effect of making the slave an insider of the purest form in their household (Levi, 1974, 6–12) and this sharing of interests between slaves and their masters may have made slaves more trustworthy than other Athenian residents to a slave-owner's eyes. It is, however, the more common label of "outsider" applied to slaves (beyond the *oikos*, that is) which is more important as a tool in examining the lived experience of slaves.

Without the extended kinship networks and lack of any legal rights available to other residents of Athens, slaves, including those in positions of trust, had no means to protect themselves.[76] Although they could draw some individual pride from being an integrated member of their household, slaves were still obviously capable of being exploited by it, and probably the most important point to stress is that they had no choice in the matter. This, more exactly, was a crucial aspect of the logic behind the use of slaves for important positions.

This image, however, does not truly do justice to the reality of slave life as a whole. Although legally bound only to the other members of their household, slaves, like humans everywhere, would have used what opportunities they could to interact with communities and form relationships outside their household.[77] Especially from their movement in Athens' "free spaces", associations might form between slaves and other residents of Athens, enslaved or otherwise, from which they might occasionally be able to draw support (Vlassopoulos, 2007). Not every slave, however, would be able to access these spaces. The seclusion of domestic slaves, for example, in the household in which they worked would have had the consequence of limiting their ability to form relationships outside its boundaries, with occasional exceptions. Male agricultural slaves, though closely supervised as well, were not as confined to the household, and might be able to form relationships outside the household. Interactions with hired help, neighbours, and many other people moving about the

[76] Meillassoux (1991, 27–31) puts forward a similar argument against that of Kopytoff and Miers (1977, *passim*) that African slavery is best understood as a relationship of kinship. Turley (2000, 91), contrasting the use of slaves for the execution of policy in centralised political systems (quoted above, 57) with the *dēmosioi* of Athens, notes that such slaves are appropriate for such a role because they are politically unaffiliated. In fact, he is referring to a different manifestation of the same attraction to using slaves in such high-ranking positions: their isolation which, from a different perspective, makes their inclusion in a household the only relationship on which they can depend.

[77] Hunt (2015) analyses possible evidence for such in the form of expressions of ethnic identity.

countryside would have been unavoidable, and *epitropoi* would probably have been expected to deal with residents such as these on a daily basis.

Slaves would have formed important relationships with other slaves in their household, which they could draw on for support, no doubt. Yet, in the grand scheme of things, these would only have intensified their dependence on their household and its masters. This both includes — in fact, is evidenced by — and is all the more true of, the sexual and familial relationships which Ischomachos allowed his slaves to form as a strategy of control. Pseudo-Aristotle's statement to the effect that slave children were valuable hostages is particularly telling. It does seem that the separation of slave children from their mothers was, or at least could be, considered unusually cruel. Hyperides certainly expressed this sentiment in a recently discovered fragmentary speech (Jones, 2008, 20). But the relationship between mothers and their children was not a legally recognised right, and the implication of pseudo-Aristotle's and Hyperides' statements is that owners had the power to separate slave children from their parents, if they desired to do so.[78]

Either way, if a slave could be incentivised to work productively by the dependence of certain privileges they enjoyed being based on the success of the household, how much more so when their friends, their spouse and their children, and the permanence of these relationships, were entirely dependent on the household as well?[79] On this note, it does not seem too out of the question to suggest that we view the assignment of sexual and reproductive rights as a tool meant to incentivise both male and female slaves in the *oikos*. Neither Xenophon nor pseudo-Aristotle is clearly specific

[78] Schmitz (2011) has convincingly argued that the sale of a mother and children is recorded in the Attic Stelai (*IG* I^3 442, 195-7), strengthening the historicity of Hyperides' statement. However, we might then wonder under what circumstances two other children were sold separately in the same document (*IG* I^3 441, 45-6)?

[79] Bradley similarly argues that in the Roman Empire, the privilege of slave family incentivised the work of slaves and sustained differences between them, strengthening the control which masters held over slaves (1984, chapter 2).

about the gender of the slaves who are allowed to reproduce in return for good behaviour, and the offer of sex and family would have been a good incentive for both partners.[80] The *tamia*, as the most obvious example of a "good" female slave whose work needed incentivising, is an interesting example to consider in this regard. On the one hand, she is picked in the first place partially for her sexual probity (9.11), but we might wonder how much she might still desire sexual relationships and family and use her position to negotiate for these.

One further question to be asked about these sexual relationships is how they worked in practice. It could be the case that women were simply given to (or allowed to be with) their partner in the men's lodgings, and intercourse between the two took place in a room full of other slaves. On the basis of comparative evidence from Southern American plantations, we should take this possibility seriously (Gutman, 1976, 83). However, if my suggestion that the slaves of the *Oikonomikos* might have been imagined living on separate fields under the supervision of an *epitropos* is correct (above, 108–9), then it might be the case that female slaves resided with them under different roofs too.

This is a speculative reading of the text, but Ischomachos' reference to separate slave quarters (9.5) only discusses that with which his wife is concerned — the domestic layout of the couple's main house. This suggestion also makes practical sense, as female slaves, residing with and probably accountable to an *epitropos*, might be given responsibility over domestic work for their partners, and possibly for the slave-workforce they oversaw. This would allow domestic production and organisation of resources to take place in closer proximity to the workforce who depended on this

[80] Pseudo-Aristotle refers explicitly to female slaves begetting children, although this does not mean that he did not see these children as valuable hostages for their fathers as well as their mothers. Xenophon refers to the awarding of sexual privileges to his slaves in the plural, and it is difficult to tell whether he is in fact referring only to his male slaves (he uses a male noun) or both his male and his female slaves. The verbs he uses to describe these privileges: *paidopoieō* and *suzeugnumi* can be used to describe both male and female partners, as evidenced by Plato (*Leg.* 868d) and Aristotle (*Pol.* 7.1335a16) respectively.

labour whilst also being carried out by a skilled domestic worker.[81] In situations such as these, we might find a comparison to the family units in which Roth has suggested the agricultural slave workforce of Roman Italy lived (2002, *passim*).

We should also note that the advantages offered to slave *epitropoi* may not have been quite as beneficial as they appear at first glance; in particular, Ischomachos' statement that he will "make [his *epitropoi*] wealthy" may well be "intended to suggest a tone of humorous exaggeration" (Fisher, 1995, 57). We might, in the absence of more tangible evidence, compare the *epitropos* to the servile slave-drivers of the American South, who were traditionally considered cruel instruments of their master's agency, reaping benefits for themselves through the betrayal of their fellow slaves. In reality, this image does not hold up to historical scrutiny (Van Deburg, 1979, 29). The privileges which slave-drivers received were rather meagre (15-6) and, just like others of their status, they were frequently subjected to violence (104–5, with n. 23).

The perceptions of slave-drivers recorded by other slaves, however, do reveal how reviled these figures often were (ibid, 97-100), and one wonders how similarly slaves in Athens might have felt about their own supervisors.[82] Living in an enforced and competitive hierarchy would have limited comradeship between slaves (thereby disrupting cohesive resistance — one of the benefits of such a system for slave owners like Ischomachos, we might imagine) and, in this respect, it was unlikely to have been pleasant even for those at the top. On the other hand, Berlin has noted how increased dependence by planters on slave-drivers allowed the latter to negotiate not only better lives for themselves, but of slave communities as a whole (1998, 154; 315-6). Perhaps *epitropoi* were

[81] In Varro's *Res Rustica*, female companions are provided to distant shepherds both as a sexual incentive and to cook, organise, and collect firewood (2.10.7).

[82] The opening scene of Aristophanes' *Wasps* depicts two slaves complaining about another slave in their household abusing his power over them (1–84). Though an allegory for Athens' political situation at the time, this scene "may well have been mirrored in many a private household" (Vogt, 1974, 8).

sometimes an intermediary in negotiations between an elite master and his slave workers, or were otherwise able and inclined to help their fellow-slaves when they could. Focused as it is on the perspective of the elite farmer, and not his human chattel, the *Oikonomikos* of Xenophon, though an invaluable text, leaves us with many such unanswered questions about the lives of the slaves who feature so heavily in it.

Conclusion

The *Oikonomikos* is a uniquely valuable source for the inner workings of an elite Athenian household based on slavery. It describes the exploitation of enslaved persons towards commercially geared agriculture and in a connected domestic sphere. There are, however, several notable absences from it as well. As well as certain agricultural strategies, other notable exclusions include the use of hired labour and the leasing of land, commercial production of textiles (unless this should be inferred indirectly from the text), and widespread facilitation of slave reproduction (an explicitly rationalised exclusion). The reasons for the absences could be various. They may at times reflect a particular opinion of Xenophon, coincidence, or arise from what Vlassopoulos has described as the social *imaginaire* — a restriction of our literary evidence to only "discursifs sur certains aspects de la réalité" (2016c, 661).

Similarly, the ways in which Ischomachos exploited his slaves, not only in the choice of agriculture over some other industry, but in the way the slave workforce was motivated and management responsibility delegated, cannot be taken as evidence of Athenian practice more generally. I have suggested, for one thing, that elite landowners need not have been so directly involved in their estates as Ischomachos and his wife were presented as being. Neither should we transpose the particular details described in the *Oikonomikos* onto classical Athenian households as a whole: concluding, for example, that Athenian slaves had different clothes depending on their status within

the household. Wider evidence does not really allow much specific, let alone quantitative, conclusions about the lives of different slaves on the estates of elites.

Nevertheless — and exceptional as it is — the value of the *Oikonomikos* as either an economic handbook or a moral guide would be hard to imagine if it did not resemble a real-life household. It should therefore be considered strong evidence of one of a number of slaving strategies taking place in Athens during its classical period, idealistic though its presentation may be. By its acknowledgement of the importance of positive incentives, the *Oikonomikos* suggests that the position of trust in which certain slaves lived might often have provided them with the negotiating tools to acquire material rewards, a measure of dignity, sex, and perhaps even a family. Some or all of these advantages were probably extended to many slave managers, and other enslaved persons in positions of trust throughout Athens. On the other hand, slaves living under such managers probably lived lives devoid of much except work and sustenance.

The question of whether such a system of direct exploitation by elite Athenians was applied to economic spheres outside agriculture is an interesting one. As I argued in Chapter 1, there is evidence to suggest that wealthy Athenians did sometimes remain involved in manufacturing — an especially clear example being the tanner Anytos (above, 41–2). Granted, craftwork is often very skilled, but so is much agricultural work. Perhaps a slave hierarchy like that described in the *Oikonomikos*, managed closely by a slave-owner and his family and offering the possibility of upwards social mobility for its workers, was used to directly exploit slave artisans. We cannot say for certain, but it is worth restating that although it required input from a slave-owner, such a strategy was likely to be far more lucrative than a system of rent payments. According to Plato (who admittedly had a biased opinion), the reason why the wealthy Anytos objected to his son being trained in philosophy was that it was not financially profitable, unlike his training as a tanner (*Apol.* 29c–30b).

Chapter 3:

Euphiletos' Slaving Strategies, Sub-Elite Households, and the Social Value of Slave-Ownership

A particularly prominent factor affecting the choice of certain slaving strategies was the variability of wealth. Whereas in the previous chapter, we considered the strategies of direct exploitation practised by an elite household, this chapter examines the slaving strategies of sub-elite *oikoi*. Since, however, the very existence of sub-elite slave-ownership has been a controversial topic, the first section of this chapter will contextualise the problem in demographic debates, and the following will examine the evidence for widespread slavery in classical Athens. In this second section, I will also consider the motivations behind slave-ownership for smaller, agriculturally-based households generally. After this, the following section will further consider the slaving strategies of sub-elite slave-owners by examining the strategies of the household of Euphiletos from Lysias' *On the Murder of Eratosthenes*. As in Chapter 1, I will then discuss what the speech can tell us about the lives of slaves. Finally, I will discuss Euphiletos' household in relation to others in ancient Athens.

As will be shown below, the household strategies of elite and sub-elite slave-owners bore several similarities, in addition to some clear differences. Regarding these strategies, Xenophon's *Oikonomikos* provides a good framework within which to discuss the direct exploitation of slaves for wealth accumulation and, as such, the previous chapter was predominantly focused on this aspect of Athenian slavery. While this chapter's second section will similarly argue for the value of slavery in wealth accumulation strategies of sub-elites, its case-study-focused section will consider in more detail the social value also attached to slave-ownership, which, as argued in chapter one, was a vital aspect to the motivations behind slaving in classical Athens.

3.1 Athenian Wealth Distribution and the Feasibility of Widespread Slave-ownership

What follows is a synthesis of several demographic studies by modern scholars of categories of wealth across Athenian *oikoi* in the classical period. This will enable me to quantify numerically the resources available to different households as demonstrated by the value of their property holdings.[1] Before doing so, however, the unavoidable limitations imposed by the available evidence need to be addressed. First, none of the numbers arrived at in this section should be considered precise. They are based on figures that are clearly approximations and are interpretable in numerous ways. Secondly, although the city's large population of resident non-citizens were often slave-owners, I know of no tangible way to assess the wealth distribution of Athens' *metics*. I have therefore restricted my focus specifically to Athens' citizens.

About the top and bottom strata of the Athenian citizenry, only a little need be said for the purposes of the present discussion. Athens' elite can be categorised for our purposes as those of its citizenry liable for war taxes and liturgies, as Aristotle identified them (*Pol*. 1291a33-34). The evidence collected by Davies indicates that the ownership of property amounting to between 3-4 talents was the lower limit at which Athenians entered into liturgy obligations during the fourth century (1971, xxiii–xxiv), although he likely underestimates the number of liturgy payers to be 300 (1981, 17–28) — a more likely figure is 1,200 (Isocrates, 15.145; Demosthenes, 14.16).[2] That households in this

[1] The most crucial study is Kron (2011), which draws on Davies (1981, chapters 2 and 3). Burford Cooper's study of landownership distribution (1977/8), recently adopted with slight modifications by Bresson (2016, 143–4), provides a further collection of sources and insights.

[2] For this position and a recent summary of the debate, Canevaro (2016a, 47–63). As the analysis of Gabrielsen sets out: "by setting the number of men annually required to perform trierarchies at 1,200, Periandros's law of 358/7 seems to have formalized a previously unofficial though practically used definition of the size of the propertied class" (1994, 180). The key point is that performance of one of an estimated 400 Athenian liturgies per year exempted the individual from having to perform another for 2 years (Isaeus, 7.38), even before the

group owned slaves is not in doubt. At the other end of the spectrum, we have an earlier figure (403 BC) of 5,000 for Athens' landless in a lost speech of Lysias recorded by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Lys*. 32). This is the number who would supposedly have been disenfranchised if citizenship had been restricted to "those with land" (τοῖς τὴν γῆν ἔχουσι). Kron (2011, 131) has rightly argued that this should be taken to mean these citizens did not own land of any kind, rather than agricultural land, as has sometimes been assumed (below, 142). As perpetual rent-payers, these citizens should be viewed as Athens' poorest. It is clear from our literary evidence that not every citizen owned a slave (Aristophanes, *Eccl.* 593; Aristotle, *Pol.* 1252b15) and is difficult to imagine that any citizen family invested in a slave before they did so in land, especially considering that the prices listed in the Attic Stelai (*IG* I^3 421–30) demonstrate that small houses could be bought for less than the average price of a slave.[3] The slave-ownership status of both these categories of citizens, therefore, is not in question.

Eighty-two years after the figure of 5,000 landless citizens was purportedly recorded by Lysias, the Athenians were forced to adopt an oligarchy by the Macedonian regent Antipater in 321 BC, and citizenship was restricted to those who met a property qualification of 2,000 drachmae (Diodorus Siculus, 18.18.4-5). Diodorus claimed that the revised citizen body consisted of 9,000 men. If this passage reports events fairly correctly, we can first postulate an additional wealth band of citizens, who had between 2,000 and 18,000 (the number at which one would qualify to pay liturgies) drachmae, who numbered around 8,000 (i.e. the liturgy payers subtracted from the total of 9,000 citizens in 321 BC). This group is sometimes considered as equivalent to Athens' hoplite force; the non-elite who could afford to buy the necessary equipment and take the time away from their

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establishment of *symmoria* which formally drew on a set group of 1,200 individuals in 356/7 (cf. Ruschenbusch, 1987; 1978; Mossé, 1979).

[3] Considerable evidence for house and slave prices has been collected by Pritchett and Pippin (1956, 270–3; 277–8).

livelihood to participate in campaigns, though if it is to be identified as such, it should only be so in the loosest possible sense.[4] Interestingly, historians have pointed out that Diodorus' figure is identical to earlier ones for the number of hoplite warriors at Marathon nearly 170 years earlier (Bresson, 2016, 143) and the number of hoplites recorded by a census in 411 BC (Burford Cooper, 1973, 171). One noteworthy observation about this group is the broad spectrum of wealth it covered; those nearer its top owned nearly 9 times more than those at its bottom.

What, then, of the remaining citizens? Diodorus, in the same passage, tells us the citizens disenfranchised by the restriction of citizenship in 321 numbered 22,000, giving us a total of 31,000 citizens before the Athenian defeat by Antipater. Plutarch, on the other hand, describing the same event, puts the number at 12,000, giving us a total of 21,000 (*Phoc.* 28.4), a figure which appears supported by a census recorded in a fragment of the historian Ktesikles (*FGrHist*. 245, fr. 1), conducted by Demetrius of Phalerum, who took power in 317 BC.[5] In the past, scholars have

[4] "Such distinctions [by modern scholars] treat the property qualification as if it were a figure determined by a reasoned analysis of statistics… rather than a figure imposed by a foreign conqueror and his entourage of Athenian yes men" (Bayliss, 2011, 71). O'Sullivan (2009, 27; 115–6) and Poddighe (2002, 109–40) remain sceptical of any identification of this group with a "hoplite class".

[5] The census, as it is preserved in Athenaeus, also lists 10,000 metics and 400,000 slaves (*oiketōn*). The latter number is incorrect, as David Hume pointed out in a 1742 article ([1987], 427–431). Historians have recently attempted to salvage the value of this figure by suggesting that Athenaeus was incorrect in his interpretation of *oiketēs* as slaves, and that the term meant household members in a wider sense. Against this translation of the word, see above on the terminology (87 n. 11), the fact that considerable overestimation of slave numbers was feasible to an ancient (O'Sullivan, 2009, 111 n. 13) as well as Bresson, who points out that 400,000 is *still* too high a number, even for all the members of a household (2016, 459 n. 144, cf. Oliver, 2007, 86–7). The figure, in short, is an error (Sargent, 1971, 14–24), but does not mean that Ktesikles' more reasonable numbers for citizens or metics were by extension fabricated, as the means of acquiring these would have been much more feasible (O'Sullivan, 2009, 111–2).

preferred Plutarch's figure (e.g. Davies, 1981, 34; Burford Cooper, 1973, 171). However, on the basis of Athens' military strength during the Lamian war, the requirements of the Council of Five Hundred and the number of ephebes, and on the carrying capacity of Attica's farmland, Hansen has convincingly argued that acceptance of the larger number provided by Diodorus is more logical (1986; 2006).[6] This leaves us with a figure of 22,000 citizens disenfranchised by the reform, around 17,000 of whom (assuming some continuity from the end of the fifth century) owned land, though at the exclusion of Plutarch and Ktesikles' accounts.

However, an intriguing suggestion made by O'Sullivan allows us to reconcile Hansen's calculations with the fragment of Ktesikles and to identify an additional two wealth bands for Athenian citizenship (2009, 109–12).[7] According to Diodorus, when Demetrius of Phalerum took power he halved the property requirement of citizenship to 1,000 drachmae (18.74.3). O'Sullivan argues that the 21,000 citizens recorded by the census may refer to Athens' new citizen body proper after the introduction of a lower property qualification of 1,000 drachmae when Demetrius of Phalerum took power (Diodorus Siculus, 18.73.3) and indicate the re-enfranchisement of 12,000 individuals who met the new property qualification. Van Wees has put forward a similar argument.[8] However, his

[6] Thus, Kron (2011, 130) and Bresson (2016, 143) modify the calculations of Davies and Burford Cooper respectively to accommodate Hansen's work.

[7] Hansen (2006, 38–43) himself believes that the census may have been counting only citizens eligible for military service, or that mass migration from Attica following the disenfranchisement of 321 (Plutarch, *Phoc*. 28.4; Diodorus, 18.18.5), had massively depreciated the city's population.

[8] Particularly, that the purpose of the census was to assess the new citizenry after the introduction of the new property qualifications (2011, 101–2). The main objection to this interpretation is the absence of *atimoi* in the census — where, in other words, were the 10,000 or so disenfranchised citizens, considering the fact that metics and slaves were recorded in this census too? O'Sullivan suggests that the three numbers were derived separately for different purposes and compressed together by Ktesikles or his source (2009, 111–12). Van Wees, on the other hand, believes that the citizens who remained disenfranchised were expressed in the

suggestion that 1,000 drachmae was a property qualification for holding offices and not for citizenship itself (which he suggests was much lower) has not found much support.[9] Under O'Sullivan's interpretation, the number provided by Plutarch has some meaning as a representation of the citizens who were temporarily disenfranchised between 321/2 and 316/7 and becomes a more understandable error.[10] If this interpretation of the evidence is accepted, the minor modifications by Kron and Bresson to the arguments of Davies and Burford (above, 130 n. 1) require further modification in favour of more citizens holding property worth between 1,000 and 2,000 drachmae.[11] A table detailing Kron's reconstruction, and another adjusted for O'Sullivan's argument detailed above, are provided (tables 1 and 2).

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figure given for the metic population (2011, 102–6). His suggestion that the metic population provided in the census was otherwise too low is reasonable, but only if we accept that it referred to households rather than adult individuals, against which, Whitehead (1977, 97).

[9] Van Wees' argument here functions around some unusual language in Diodorus' report of the second property qualification of 316/7 (2011, 96–101).

[10] The figures of Plutarch and Diodorus are often thought to have been derived from the same source (e.g. Gallo, 2002, 39), and "it is tempting to conjecture that Demetrius himself may have emphasised this expansion of the citizen body… and that the figures known to Plutarch and Diodorus… [may] have come from him" (O'Sullivan, 2009, 112).

[11] Bresson adds the extra 5,000 to the number of landless citizens. Kron does not explain his distribution of the extra 5,000 citizens in a larger amount to Athens' poorer landowners, but I suspect this was done to bring the generation of his gini coefficient in line with the societies he compares Athens to in the second half of his essay, the similarity of which, he argues, supports the legitimacy of his numbers (130). In fact, the similarity between Kron's Athenian coefficient and that other societies proves nothing, because Kron's study effectively elides from his calculations the majority of Athens' poorest: its slaves. These results, which do have value as an indicator of Athens' wealth distribution amongst its citizens, cannot be usefully employed as a comparative tool with more recent societies (cf. Bresson, 2016, 145).

Table 1. Athenian Wealth Bands (405–321 BC) According to Kron (2011).

Group	**Number of Households**	**Wealth Range (Drachmae)**	**Slave-Owners?**
Liturgy Payers	1,200	18,000–24,000 +	Yes
Hoplites	7,800	2,000–18,000	Easily feasible
Middle Stratum	7,000	1,000–2,000	Feasible
Poor Landowners	10,000	(200 +)–1,000	Unlikely for most
Landless	5,000	- 200	No

Table 2. Athenian Wealth Bands (405–321 BC) Adjusted for O'Sullivan (2009).

Group	**Number of Households**	**Wealth Range (Drachmae)**	**Slave-Owners?**
Liturgy Payers	1,200	18,000–24,000 +	Yes
Hoplites	7,800	2,000–18,000	Easily feasible
Middle Stratum	12,000	1,000–2,000	Feasible
Poor Landowners	5,000	(200 +)–1,000	Unlikely for most
Landless	5,000	- 200	No

As we have seen above (60–1), the price of a male slave was about 200 drachmae. Is it likely, then, that sub-elite Athenians held slaves as part of their property? I will start with Athens' poorer landowners, who owned property valued between (roughly) 200–1,000 drachmae. A cheap house in Athens cost under 200 drachmae.[1] With one adult slave, that would account for 400 drachmae of property, without taking into account any of the furniture, clothes, or other personal effects which small home owners like these undoubtedly owned. We would also have to figure in tools, stock and, in many situations, farmland and domestic animals. It is hard to imagine a family prioritising a slave over any of these things, and I therefore think it is reasonable to extend the non-slave-owning class to this group, or at least to all but the very richest of it.

Moving to the next wealth group, however, I think that at double the 1,000 drachma limit, at the very top of this particular strata, slave-ownership starts to look a lot more feasible. As Bayliss has argued, 2,000 drachmae could buy a lot in ancient Athens — those who just failed to meet its property qualification were far from the impoverished mass of citizens which they are sometimes made out to be (2011, 72). Essentially, though, for families of this group who owned a single slave, that slave would constitute at least 10% of their overall property. The question then becomes, how valuable was a slave to an average Athenian family?

3.2 The Extent of Small-Scale Slave-ownership in Athens

As no record of the number of slave-owning families in Athens has been passed down to us, the only way we can properly assess the extent of sub-elite Athenian slave-ownership is by qualitative discussion of individual sources. Since this is an uncertain basis on which to construct historical arguments, the interpretation of this evidence has led to much debate in the past 70 years regarding

[1] These prices are derived from Pritchett and Pippin's exhaustive study of the Attic Stelai (1956).

the true extent of slave-ownership across Athens' population.[2] The fact of the matter is, however, that several literary sources seem to portray slave-ownership as a fairly common feature of Athenian households.

Thucydides, for example, describes a payment of two drachmae made to Athenians at the siege of Potidaea — one for themselves, and one for their slaves (3.17.4) — seeming to imply that the entirety — realistically therefore the majority — of the Athenian hoplite militia were accompanied by a slave that they owned. In the comedies of Aristophanes too, slave-ownership is a universal feature of all the poet's citizen heroes, despite their often-moderate financial means (Levy, 1974, 32–4). About a century after Aristophanes started his career, the short caricatures of Theophrastus similarly assume slave-ownership as a matter of course: 18 out of 30 of his *Characters*, short as each individual example is, are described as owning slaves.[3] Between the writing of these two sources, Apollodorus, in an appeal against his step-father Phormion (a manumitted slave), appealed to an Athenian jury in the following words:

> "Therefore, I'll tell you how I think you all would best form a notion of the enormity of the wrongs I have suffered: just think to yourself of a slave you left behind at home, and then imagine yourself treated by him as I have been by Phormion. It doesn't matter if yours is "Syrus" or "Manes" or whatever name each has, while this fellow is "Phormion." No, the circumstances are the same: they are slaves and this fellow was a slave; you are masters and I was master".

[2] The history of the debate is summarised by Lewis (2018b, 180–3); Tordoff (2013, 16-23); Fisher (1993, 37-47).

[3] It might be argued that these caricatures were drawn exclusively from wealthy elites, but on this point, *The Alazōn* (Boastful Man), who owns a slave (23.3; 8) is an interesting counterexample. Although he boasts of vast wealth, we are told that he rents his house (9), an example of considerable poverty in other sources (Lane Fox, 1996, 130).

(Demosthenes, 45.86, tr. adapted from Scafuro, 2011)

In Osborne's words (though spoken with caution): "the implication… is that any Athenian citizen over thirty with enough free time to appear in the courts could reasonably be expected to own a slave" (1995, 29, with Lysias, 5.5). Above all, this consistent ubiquity of slave-ownership across Athens' literary genres suggests that a large part of Athens' population owned slaves.

Osborne supported this literary evidence for the distribution of slave-ownership with one key piece of non-literary evidence able to further illuminate the issue: a fragmented epigraphic list of the crews of several triremes, on which the names of slave rowers, along with various officers, *epibatai* (marine hoplites) and non-Athenian rowers, are inscribed in separate and demarcated lists (1995, 29–30). The slaves are identified alongside the name of their master, who can occasionally be identified on the same trireme list, and it is clear from this evidence that not only the wealthier officers (most notably the two trierarchs who are named for each ship) but also the presumably less wealthy *epibatai*, were frequently slave-owners.[4] The names of roughly 32 citizen rowers (probably the poorest men on the list) are preserved on column 7 (*IG* I^3 1032, 175–207), none of which correspond to a near-complete list of slaves for the same ship (228–75). Similarly, a preserved list of 24 free non-citizen rowers (421–47) did not contribute any of the 31 slaves listed on the same ship (449–80).

Interestingly, however, the inscription does in other places suggest that some rowers contributed slaves to his fleet. There is a Euphronion "who lives in" (*epi*) Sounion (226) and was accompanied by his slave on the same ship (244).[5] Euphronion is likely to be a metic because his name is not listed

[4] Osborne restricted his analysis to a document containing only part of the recovered inscription (*IG* II^2 1950), although the study of Herzogenrath-Amelung (2017, 56) reaches the same general conclusion about the entire restored text (*IG* I^3 1032; Laing, 1965).

[5] A restoration at line 326 may furnish us with another example of a rower (in this case undoubtedly a citizen) accompanied by a slave (Herzogenrath-Amelung, 2017, 56).

with a proper demotic and appears where, judging from elsewhere in the document, non-Athenians should be listed.[6] Archedemos of *Peparethos*, the metic master of a slave named Timagoras (134), was also listed on the same ship (85). Furthermore, the names of four citizen rowers (88, slaveowner at 102; 178, slave-owner at 364–5; 184, slave-owner at 460; 203, slave-owner at 458), and another from *Peparethos* (428, slave-owner at 248), are recorded amongst the listed slave-owners, but on different triremes (Graham, 1998, 98–9; Tordoff, 2013, 28–9). If this is a coincidence, it is certainly a remarkable one.[7] It is admittedly difficult to think of reasons why these slaves should be placed on different ships from their masters, though one might suspect that a desire to spread strong and experienced rowers across the ships (e.g. Potts, 2012, 48–9) may have played a part. Masters may also have objected to working side by side at the same task with their slaves.

These naval lists do not provide hard evidence to support the Old Oligarch's claim that that Athenian rowers took their slaves on campaign (1.19), another literary source that can be used to support the idea of widespread slave-ownership. It does, however, suggest that there might be a kernel of truth to the Old Oligrach's claim, and demonstrates that the ownership of slaves could be extended far into the general population. Even if Graham's identification of five slave-owning rowers is incorrect, that of 12 out of 20 *epibatai* is near certain. What is more, if we accept that rowers contributed slaves to other ships, it becomes noteworthy to this investigation how little of the total catalogue – only sections from five out of ten columns – have been preserved. Neither should we automatically assume from this evidence that freemen listed without slaves were not slave-owners. Many who

[6] This argument is articulated by Bakewell (2008, 144), who notes that apparent inconsistencies in the list may support the suggestion that Euphronion was a citizen.

[7] None of the names are particularly uncommon, according to the online database of the *Greek Lexicon of Personal Names* (http://www.lgpn.ox.ac.uk/, accessed 12/03/2018) the least attested is Nikoboulos (428; slave owner at 248), which is evidenced another two times in fifth-century Attica, and four times in the first half of the fourth century. However, on high individuation of citizen names, Robertson (2008, 87).

owned only a few slaves may have seen more value in leaving them at home to care for their households in their absence (Herzogenrath-Amelung, 2017, 56).

Though rare in recent years, a few notable studies have previously played down the extent of Athenian slave-ownership, to the exclusion of the literary evidence, which they see as distorted by an ideology of the elite.[8] The reasons advanced for this position are often based on the incompatibility of slave-ownership with the perceived ethos of Athenian sub-elites. Athenian farmers have often been seen as occupying one of two very distinct categories: the wealthy, who possessed the capital to expand and diversify their agricultural strategies, and small-scale subsistence farmers, who focused on producing the nutritional needs for the survival of their family (i.e. subsistence farming). Those who have made the argument that slave holding was limited in Athens have based it around the idea that the strategies suggested by Jameson (above, 87), by which Athenians may have utilised higher amounts of (slave) labour to improve productivity of land, would not have made sense within the context of subsistence farming, which is not concerned with the accumulation of profit, but with providing sustenance to a family unit.[9] According to this

[8] For the argument that oratory and comedy over-represent elite views, Dover (1974, 34–7). He is followed by Wood, who argues that the comedy of Aristophanes is utopian in its presentation of slave-ownership (1988, 173–5). Against these arguments, Lewis (2018b, 183–5) with Canevaro (2016b). On the populist rhetoric of Athenian oratory, above (30 n. 18), on the basis of which it is difficult to imagine that assumptions on the wealth of dikasts could be all that exaggerated.

[9] The most extreme position is that of Wood, who downplays the use of slaves in agriculture by even wealthy farmers (1988, chapter 2). Similarly, Sallares argues that "self-sufficiency" (*autarkia*) was the driving force behind agrarian production (1991, 297-300) and for limited slave-ownership (53-60; cf. Ameling, 1998; Audring, 1974, 454; Ober, 1985, 22-3). Gallant emphasises the impracticality of agricultural slave-ownership and argues for a low(er) number of slaves (1991, 31-3), but writes: "[Wood] oversimplifies a complex problem" (33) and "all but the poorest… households *sought* to own slaves" (31).

strategy, in which extra labour input is necessary only during the harvest, slave-ownership (which requires another mouth to feed throughout the year) does not make sense.

This argument against moderately widespread "sub-elite" slave-ownership has been most recently tackled by Lewis (2018b, 180–93). His argument is not that many Athenians did not work for mere sustenance, nor, for that matter, that many did not own slaves, but that we should recognise the possibility for financial enrichment in intensive agriculture practised on family farms. The core of the argument is that the 28,000 or so Athenians not liable for liturgies in the fourth century should not be considered a homogenous body of peasants.[10]

Moreover, the surely incorrect assumption that the 5,000 landless citizens mentioned by Dionysius of Halicarnassus referred to Athens' non-agricultural citizenry (above, 132), has, by subtracting it from an estimated population, been unfairly used to stress inequality in the division of Athens' land (Foxhall, 1992, 156; Osborne, 1992, 24).[11] It is worth returning briefly to the extensive creation of farmland documented by aerial photography and survey archaeology discussed in the previous chapter (above, 90–1). Moreno and Lohmann, indeed, both emphasise the cultivation of olives far beyond the needs of a family, intended for sale in a market. Much of this agricultural work was no doubt carried out in service of Athens' liturgy payers, but such is the scale and the spread of this intensive land management that it cannot have been entirely funded by the rich. Archaeological

[10] As Jameson put it over two decades ago: "For those who could farm successfully above the subsistence level I continue to think the use of slave labour, in addition to that of themselves and their families, was common" and "the very notion of subsistence as the predominant element, and even a significant element, in Athenian society is at stake" (1992, 143). On different types of sub-elite farmer, Gallego (2007, 8–13).

[11] As Lewis argues, not all wealthy Athenians owned agricultural land (an excellent case in point being Demosthenes, as we learn from a speech of his: 27.9-10), although many would have (Foxhall, 2002, 218-9). Calculations based on this figure were used by Ameling to justify his argument for limited slaveholding (1998, 293).

evidence suggests the existence of markets spread throughout the landscape of classical Attica (Harris and Lewis, 2016, 12–13, citing *Archeaology* magazine, Nov/Dec 2007, 49–52; Kakvogianni and Anetakis, 2012) and scattered references in the plays of Aristophanes, collected by Lewis (2016a), provide us with literary accounts of the many agricultural goods for sale in them .[12] Should we really assume that only the very top social strata in Athens engaged with these to a significant degree?

In 1993, Rosivach published a thought-provoking comparison between small-holding agricultural slavery in Athens and the Northern American colonies. He points to the "family slavery" of the Northern colonies, where hiring labour was difficult, to criticise the position of those who doubt the value of slaves as a source of agricultural labour outside the plantation model. In his words: "The use of slaves in the northern colonies shows… that slavery is not… incompatible with small-scale subsistence agriculture" (553). In fact, the case for the use of slave labour can be made even more strongly than Rosivach does, because of his mistaken belief, reflected in his use of "subsistence farming", that less wealthy Athenian farmers did not engage in market-oriented production. Similarly, in the North American colonies, "beyond doubt many farmers did produce largely for themselves and relied on barter to augment the deficiencies in their household production. They did refer to products sent to market as a surplus, implying that they aimed to feed their families first. Still, other farmers, large and small, grew crops for town consumption and the Atlantic trade. They benefited from extensive marketing systems radiating from the port towns and from Britain (Bushman, 1998, 351-2). We can probably assume a large number of Athenian citizen agriculturalists farming larger areas than has previously been thought and striving to produce surplus for local markets through methods of intensive agriculture.

[12] Although archaeological and literary evidence strongly suggests that Attic agricultural products were not sold abroad during the classical period (Bresson, 2016, 404-5), we should in no way underestimate the demand generated by Athens' urban markets. A large non-agrarian population is suggested by the imports of grain on which Athens depended (below, 174 n. 8; Hunt, 2018a, 71–2).

Finally, as we have seen in Chapter 1, the appeal of slave-ownership extended beyond merely its possible economic benefits (section 1.1.1). A forthcoming article by McHugh draws attention to the physically taxing nature of pre-industrial agriculture. She argues that rural communities might have provided practical and emotional support to reduce the burden of this work. Additionally, for those with the means, the help of a slave or slaves would have been a desirable way to do so. Leisure, status attached to leisure and to slave-ownership itself, and even an attraction to holding power over another person, were strong motives behind slave-ownership.

Those who argue that slave-ownership was not widespread in Athens must therefore show that it was economically impossible (which I have argued from demographic studies that it was not), rather than just unpractical (which, as Jameson and Lewis have argued, it was not either). For these reasons, I would argue that all (or at least the vast majority) of those in Athens' hoplite class, and many if not all of those who met the 1,000, but not 2,000-drachma property qualification imposed in Athens' early Hellenistic period, were slaveholders. The remainder of this chapter will examine the household described in Lysias' *On the Murder of Eratosthenes* as a case study demonstrating how the social, as well as the economic, value of slaveholding helped drive a rationale of wide-spread slavery.

3.3 Slavery in the Household of Euphiletos

Much of the narrative of Lysias 1 focuses on the domestic affairs of its speaker, the defendant Euphiletos (1.6–27). Euphiletos lived in an urban area, quite possibly in Athens itself, with his wife and baby son (6; 9) and owned a farm in the countryside (11; 13; 20; 22–3).[13] The family owned a slave girl, who features prominently in the speech (references below), and probably owned several

[13] Todd points out that the Euphiletos' broad references to "the country" (*agros*) where he goes to work, is usually used in oratory to oppose Athens (or the Peiraieus) to its hinterland (2007, 57 n. 53).

male slaves who worked in the countryside — though this is a controversial statement that will be justified later in this section (3.3.2). It is impossible from this limited and vague information to quantify the worth of Euphiletos' property, but the possession of land, a house, and several slaves indicate that he probably would have met Antipater's property qualification of 2,000 drachmae quite comfortably, putting him in the top third of Athens' citizenry.[14] Comparatively, then, he was quite well-off, but his household as it is described in the speech is certainly of a smaller size than the elite household of Ischomachos. The fact that he does not mention public benefactions is not as significant as some have made out in the past (Harris, 2013a, 129–32, *contra* e.g. Carey, 1989, 69), but it is nevertheless significant that Euphiletos states that his wife breastfed his baby rather than paying for a nurse (9), and the couple keep only a single domestic slave, in contrast to the many owned by Ischomachos.

There is significant room for argument, however, regarding the extent to which this speech accurately portrays a real Athenian family. It is possible that the speech emphasises Euphiletos' moderate means as a rhetorical weapon and it is difficult in general to determine exactly what is being obscured from the jury.[15] An extensive argument has also been made by John Porter that the speech is a rhetorical exercise rather than a real case (1997). This is a possibility that cannot be discounted, but Euphiletos' portrayal as a comparatively poor farmer, markedly different from the wealthy clients to whom Lysias would surely have been trying to advertise his skills, seems unusual.

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[14] Edwards and Usher's suggestion that Euphiletos worked as a hired labourer (1985, 224; Edwards, 1999, 56) seems unlikely given what we can gather about his household from the rest of the speech (Todd, 2007, 57; Carey, 1989, 69). Euphiletus denies that he committed the murder to "rise from poverty (*penētos*) to riches (*plousios*)" (4), but this statement is a rhetorical device and need not imply that he actually *was* impoverished (Weissenberger, 1993, 59 n. 2).

[15] Todd (2007, 58) argues that the accusation of *hubris* which Euphiletos levels at Eratosthenes is strengthened by his self-presentation as a modest man being mistreated by a wealthy one.

Either way, though it weakens the force of my argument if the characters of the speech were imaginary, it seems apparent that this family was at the very least supposed to seem realistic, whether to a jury or a prospective client of Lysias. Despite these difficulties, I have selected the household in Lysias 1 as a case study because it raises several interesting questions pertaining to the direct slaving strategies of smaller households and to their effect on particular aspects of the relationship slaves had with their masters.

3.3.1 Domestic Slavery

Euphiletos' slave girl features heavily in the speech because she acted as the intermediary between her mistress (Euphiletos' unnamed wife) and her mistress' lover Eratosthenes, which facilitated the affair that led to Eratosthenes' murder. We are told this in the first passage in which the slave girl is introduced (8), in which she is described as "the slave girl who goes to market" (τὴν θεράπαιναν τὴν εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν βαδίζουσαν). She is described with the exact same phrase later on when Euphiletos narrates how he came to learn of her role in the affair (16). The fact that this particular aspect of her role in the household is highlighted should not be taken as an indication that this was her primary function in the household, but rather viewed as a way for the speaker to explain to the jury how it was she was able to act as intermediary between the adulterers.[16]

[16] It has been argued that this phrase is meant to be taken as distinguishing her from other slave girls in the house (Lentakes, 2015, 56–7; Morgan, 1982, 115), and that the reference to a *paidiskēn* (1.12) delineates a different slave (Carey, 1989, 70). As Todd notes of the first description, "linguistically it could… be a descriptive phrase applied to the household's only maid" (2007, 96), and he fairly rebuts Cary's argument regarding the *paidiskē*, in part by reference to the fact that the term often has sexualised connotations which fit the context of the passage (58, with n. 56).

Nevertheless, the facilitation of the affair was dependent on her making this trip regularly.[17] This has important socio-economic connotations. For one thing, it demonstrates that Euphiletos' household utilised Athens' markets and would have required a way to earn the money necessary to do so. It also demonstrates how such market interaction might take place. Euphiletos could also go to market himself or accompanied by the slave girl; this is the presumably innocent-sounding pretext he uses to get the girl away from the household to question her (1.18). His agricultural work would keep him from doing so on a regular basis, however, and though Euphiletos' wife might also have gone, there are reasons why this would also have been an unattractive option. It would have regularly put her in public spaces and taken her away from the care of her new-born.

In several surviving Athenian sources, remaining outside the public eye was considered a womanly virtue of the highest order (e.g. Lysias 3.6-7; Thucydides 2.45.2).[18] Many scholars have in recent decades sought to distance Athenian women from the traditional image of their complete seclusion outlined by previous historians, but the sources used to maintain this position refer almost exclusively to poorer families.[19] The relevant point, which has not been missed by commentators (e.g. Cohen, 1989, 6; 9), is that slavery facilitated adherence to this ideal. Keeping their wives within the household also served a more immediate utility to Euphiletos and other husbands at the cost of their wives, by making adultery more difficult. This is highlighted in the speech itself:

[17] Similarly in the *Oikonomikos*, slaves are described as able to easily find things in the market out of regular experience (8.22).

[18] For widespread seclusion, Gould (1980) and more recently Llewellyn-Jones (2003, 192-3), who argues for separation of gendered social and economic roles rather than complete seclusion.

[19] For poorer women in Athens' public communities and markets, the key source is Demosthenes' *Against Eubulides* (57.34–5; 45; cf. Kosmopoulou, 2001; Schnuur-Redford, 1996, 213-24; Brock, 1994; Radermacher, 1928).

> "When I thought it right to get married, and I brought a wife into my house, for some time I took care neither to annoy her too much nor to allow her too much freedom; I guarded her actions as much as possible by watching her as much as would be considered reasonable" (6).

It was after he relaxed this control, supposedly, that Euphiletos' wife began her affair. The purpose of this statement is to deflect as much blame as possible from himself regarding her adultery, and it is probably for a similar reason that Lysias was keen to emphasise the fact that the couple's slave woman went to market.

Women are universally associated with water collection in our Athenian sources, and this is another task which might regularly take them out of their household (Cohen, 1989, 6–8).[20] As Brock has noted (1994, 339, n. 16), although several sources indicate that many free women collected water from the fountain themselves (e.g. Aristophanes, *Lys.* 327 — though see the description at line 330 of female slaves also collecting water from the fountain), it was often depicted as a servile occupation (Euripides, *El*. 107-8).[21] Lysias makes no mention of water collection in the speech, but it goes without saying that Euphiletos' house depended on it, not only for drinking and cooking, but also for cleaning and laundry.[22] Even without knowledge of the science which underscores the importance of cleanliness in modern societies, ancient Athenians recognised the value of hygiene (Lindenlauf, 2004, 94 *et passim*). The value of personal hygiene can be demonstrated by reference to

[20] In addition to the references below, on attic pottery, Fantham *et al.* (1997, 107–8).

[21] Herodotus describes both Greek (6.137) and Egyptian (3.14.2) slaves collecting water.

[22] Throughout the Greek world, laundry could be done at home in basins, or in public bodies of water (Crouch, 1993, 149; 191). Washbasins were used for personal hygiene, but also to wash dishes, as demonstrated by two figurines held in the National Archaeological Museum in Athens (ibid, 249-250, fig 17.8) and similarly a woman bending over a water basin on a late fifth-century Attic kylix held at the Museum of Metropolitan Art, New York.

Hippocrates' *Regimen* (e.g. 18), and by the survival of archaeological evidence pointing to the use of private bathtubs for washing (Ginouves, 1962, 175; Lucore and Trümper, 2013, 2).[23]

Of course, collecting water might take up varying amounts of time, depending on the facilities and location of different *oikoi*.[24] Euphiletos' house may have had its own water source. The Kerameikos excavations have uncovered eight wells in private houses (Stroszeck, 2017, 60). Many private cisterns, moreover, have been found in urban Athens, though the vast majority are dated to the fourth century (Klingborg, 2017, 106; Camp, 1982, 12).[25] Either way, the collection of water would still have been a task given to many female slaves, such as that owned by Euphiletos. A Solonian law preserved by Plutarch (*Sol.* 23.6) allowed anyone without a well to take up to 12 *choes* of water from that of their neighbours. This is nearly 40 litres of water (Mlasowsky, 2006) and, even as the upper limit of a fluctuating water requirement of an Athenian family, gives an impression of the large amount of time that might be spent collecting water on a regular basis.

Cleaning and other maintenance, like the preparation of food and wool-working (above, section 2.2.2), would have been performed at least partially by Euphiletos' wife. Indeed, the labour of free family members was vital to the workings of many Athenian households. As Aristotle put it, "the poor are forced by necessity to use their wives and children as servants, because they do not have slaves" (*Pol.* 6.1323a5–6), and Euphiletos' single slave would probably not have been enough to exempt his wife from all manual labour, especially considering the family had to care for a baby. As historians have stressed, even within a society whose members typically lived in monogamous man and wife couples, their labour needs and availability were far from consistent and depended on the

[23] The *Oikonomikos* refers to the storage of "tools used for bathing" (*tōn loutron*: 9.7).

[24] Archaeological finds demonstrate a wealth of public water sources throughout the city (Camp, 1982, 9-11), suggesting that very few urban Athenians were all that far from a fountain or well.

[25] Cisterns began to replace wells at this time, probably due to lowering or contamination of Athens' water table (Wilson, 2009, 288, cf. 2000a, 140).

life-cycle of the family (Gallant, 1991, chapter 2).[26] The labour available to a man and wife, or a man or wife with adolescent or slightly younger children, would have been far more than that of an Athenian bachelor, or a family with a pregnant wife or young children.[27]

In old age too, the same couple, or a widow or widower, might suddenly find themselves in need of additional labour (above, 24–5; Menander, *Dyskolos*, 328-9; Lysias, 24.6). The wider kinship group, as well as friends and neighbours, might be used to supplement the labour of a household, but the availability of these would have varied from context to context, and might be considered generally unreliable as a permanent solution. Of course, many with the means to do so would have bought slaves to increase their comfort, regardless of their circumstances. The point to stress, however, is that the labour of a household varied over time. This fact would have made the acquisition of a slave desirable whenever the opportunity arose, and means that there would have been particular periods of a family's life-cycle in which less affluent families may have been motivated to scrape together the means to acquire a slave.

We do not know under what circumstances Euphiletos acquired the slave girl, though her description as a *paidiskē* suggests she was quite young (1.12) and therefore, unless she was born in his household, was probably purchased at a point reasonably close to the action of the speech. Euphiletos had an elderly mother, who died shortly after the birth of her grandson (7), and the slave might have been purchased before his marriage to help her around the house. Equally, she might have been purchased for his wife as a wedding gift (possibly in anticipation of impending pregnancy), or when she became pregnant. The slave girl may also have entered the household as part of

[26] Circumstances might force families to live in larger groups than just a man, woman and their children (ibid. 22-6), like that of Aristarchos in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (2.7.2).

[27] A bachelor in Antiphon's *Against the Stepmother* lives with his slave mistress (1.14). This is described as a sexual relationship, but the slave concubine poured wine for him (19) and it is likely that she, like other *pallakai*, would have been expected to perform other domestic duties as well (Hartmann, 2002, 266–8).

Euphiletos' wife's dowry, or been purchased with it.[28] A young slave girl (whose age would indicate she was newly purchased) living in a house with adolescents (who represented a positive rather than a negative contribution to the household's labour) would seem a little more surprising to my mind.

One wonders about the extent to which slaves were bought and sold throughout the lifecycle of households, but there is very little evidence to support any interpretation one way or the other. We do not know, for example, how this young slave featured in the long-term plans of Euphiletos and his wife. Did they plan to keep her until she died, manumit her, or perhaps sell her once the care of young children was no longer a concern?[29] We cannot say for certain, but in all likelihood the financial situation of the household and its plans for the future would have played a part in the choice of one of these options.

Like the female slaves in Xenophon's *Oikonomikos*, the domestic slave in Euphiletos' house played an important role in the upkeep of the household. Though Euphiletos' wife was probably not exempt from the manual labour, the ownership of a slave probably allowed her to avoid particularly unpleasant tasks. It gave her some leisure too, as we see in a passage in which the slave looks after the baby while her mistress is with her lover (11). A slave would have allowed a family to perform the core of its domestic production as usual, despite the additional labour which the baby represented, and without having to be reliant on extended family or neighbours. This might have been an economic advantage, if it meant that milling and wool-working in the household could minimise the need for recourse to the market. It also meant, however, that a standard of housekeeping could be maintained. This would be vital for their respectability in the community,

[28] As was normal according to Theophrastus (*Char.* 22.10).

[29] Though certain enslaved women who were purchased as courtesans were sold when their masters grew tired of them or when they intended to settle down (above, 75–6), how indicative this was of other slaving strategies is difficult to say.

especially when hosting guests such as Euphiletos' friend who joins him for dinner (22–3), as well as gaining a higher social status by being publicly accompanied by a slave (above, 28–31).

Finally, as I have argued above, the enslaved woman the family owned would have afforded her a certain amount of social esteem by secluding her in the house. Contemporary Athenians would no doubt have viewed this as a means of upholding the respectability of a woman, to her benefit. This, however, was based on an ideology constructed by men and the attitudes of real-life women towards their seclusion have not been recorded. Though the agency of women should obviously not be discounted in the formation of household strategies as a whole, it should also be remembered that it was predominantly the male *kurios* who held the power in Athenian households — and of all the individuals in it, household strategies were most likely to represent his. Nevertheless, the use of an enslaved woman to facilitate her affair, against the knowledge and will of her husband, is a stark reminder of how the strategies of individuals within a household might conflict.

3.3.2 Agricultural Slavery

In an attempt to convince the jury that he did not premeditate a murder, Euphiletos argues that had he known about the affair and planned to lure the adulterer, Eratosthenes, into a trap, he would have "made ready slaves, and summoned friends" (θεράποντας παρασκευάσασθαι καὶ τοῖς φίλοις παραγγεῖλαι) (42). Most scholars are in agreement that Morgan (1982, 115) is incorrect to read the term *therapontes* as anything other than slaves, but the question of who these slaves are is another matter.[30] Commentaries on the speech acknowledge the possibility that these slaves belong to Euphiletos, but find it equally likely that he means he would have borrowed slaves from friends or hired them from a third party (Lentakes, 2015, 76; Todd, 2007, 141**;** Carey, 1989, 84). I, however, agree with Virginia Hunter's insistence that the slaves belonged to Euphiletos and with her

[30] On the term *therapontes* as "slave" in the classical period: Lenzman (1951, 57); Gschnitzer (1976, 87–93).

suggestion that they worked on his farm in the countryside, as evidenced by their absence from the narrative of the speech (1994, 211 n. 5).[31]

Hunter provides little in the way of argument regarding her interpretation, but I think that a cogent one can be put forward, based both on the passage itself and on corroborative evidence. Euphiletos' statement contrasts the preparation of slaves and the rounding up of associates as two separate acts conducted on two different groups. If his statement was meant to be read as "I would gather my friends and their slaves", it is certainly a peculiar way to phrase it. Admittedly, the hiring of slaves might be phrased as a differentiated action. For one thing, however, this would represent an unusual use of the verb *paraskeuasein*; for another, paying money to hire slaves seems like an extreme reaction to the circumstances, when Euphiletos clearly could more or less get the help he needed from his friends for free. For these reasons, I would argue that reading the passage as referring to additional slaves of Euphiletos' is more reasonable.

What has often puzzled scholars about this speech is the fact that that Euphiletos, who appears to have headed a relatively modest household, was able to purchase the services of Lysias.[32] To explain this, certain scholars have argued for a connection between Eratosthenes the adulterer and Eratosthenes of the 30 tyrants, whose confiscation of Lysias' family property and execution of his

[31] Wilamowitz thought so too, but argued that they were millers (1923, 59), which he surmised from Euphiletos' threat to put his slave in a mill if she did not cooperate with him (1.18). This could just as easily refer to her sale to a miller, however. For the likelihood that Euphiletos' slaves were agriculturally employed, below (152–5).

[32] We do not know much about the payments made to professional logographers (Dover, 1968 15-8), but a passage of Aristophanes' *Clouds*, though clearly exaggerated, implies that they could charge extortionate amounts (473-4, cf. Kennedy, 1963, 127). That Lysias charged a considerable sum is inferred from his fame amongst contemporaries and from the fact that he reclaimed considerable wealth after the confiscation of his property in 403 (Carey, 1989, 3).

brother is recorded in Lysias' *Against Eratosthenes*.[33] This argument is supported by the facts that Eratosthenes is a rarely attested name and that both men came from the same tribe (Davies, 1971, 184–5). If there was a relationship between the two, the argument follows, then Lysias may have reduced the fee he charged Euphiletos for his services, or waived it entirely. This line of reasoning is most lucidly presented by Todd, who argues that the two were blood relatives (2007, 58–60).[34] The absence of any reference to the family history of Eratosthenes in the speech, however, counts against this interpretation (Davies, 1971, 185). Though Todd's counterargument that Lysias may have wanted to avoid insinuating an ulterior motive for the murder is a good one (cf. 2000b, 46), a better explanation may be that the shared names were a coincidence and that Euphiletos was not quite so poor as the narrative he delivered suggests. Furthermore, since he clearly had a number of friends, we might postulate that he was able to borrow additional money from them to pay Lysias' fee.

Either way, Todd's reason for doubting that Euphiletos had agricultural slaves living on the land are not as well-founded. He writes: "there is no indication of farm buildings sufficient for permanent residence, even by slaves" (2007, 141). Nothing specific about Euphiletos' land is mentioned at all, however, and we have good reason to think that some kind of shelter existed on it because, as Todd acknowledges, Euphiletos sometimes stayed there overnight (11; 20). He may have slept under the stars or carried an impermanent shelter with him, but either of these options would have been impractical. There is also wider evidence that make a situation of this kind seem more feasible, such as a passage of Aristophanes' *Peace* which demonstrates that individual slaves could be imagined working unsupervised at as skilled a task as caring for vines (1146–8).

[33] Cf. Porter's argument above (145).

[34] For the reasons stated by Kapparis (1993), I am happy to reject Avery's suggestion that the two were the same person (1991).

I have already discussed the possibility of slave *epitropoi* and the workers they supervised living separately on the lands of the elite (108–9), and another source worth mentioning is Demosthenes' *Against Kallikles*. In this speech we are told that Kallaros, one of several slaves of the speaker, had been indicted for building a wall on his master's property which caused damage to his neighbour's property (55.31).[35] The house is a farmstead, in which the speaker's mother lived (Roy, 1988, 59–60, cf. Langdon, 1991, 211); but, interestingly, we are told that Kallaros had been convicted on these charges (55.34). This means, at the very least, that an Athenian jury could accept that a slave might exercise relative autonomy in the agricultural work of his master's country home (Cox, 1998, 192-3). I would argue that this could only be a valid argument if the speaker did not reside there full-time and, in light of this evidence, the idea that Euphiletos may have housed slaves separately in the countryside does not seem so far-fetched.

Practical reasons for this situation can be posited too. I have argued that extra labour towards higher yields would be desirable for the average farmer no less than for Athens' elite landowners. The argument for various forms of intensive agriculture (outlined in 2.2.1) is often tied to the prevalence of farmsteads in the Attic countryside in which farmers lived full-time in order to work their land more assiduously. For example, the absence of large settlements in the area of the deme of Acharnae, suggests to Kellogg a pattern of dispersed settlement, including isolated farmsteads, which was better able to exploit the landscape (2013, 26-34).[36] Euphiletos is often cited as an example against a model of intensive agriculture, as he lives in an urban area and ventures out some distance to his fields (Osborne, 1985, 17).

Indeed, there were advantages to living away from the countryside, as Osborne has argued with reference to community in Athens (ibid, esp. chapter 1). This would allow him to better engage with his social circle of friends (e.g. 1.22–3) and, though it is not mentioned in the speech, it would make

[35] Though his master was the one ultimately liable (Todd, 1993, n. 35).

[36] For farmsteads and market production in Greece generally, McHugh (2017, 138–148).

political participation significantly easier too. It also would keep his household in proximity to Athens' markets, in which necessities and luxuries alike could be purchased with ease. This would be especially true if Euphiletos lived in Athens (above, 144 n. 13); but even if he lived in a rural town, proximity to his friends, participation in local deme politics, and access to markets of a smaller size would have been an advantage. The important point, however — which has significant ramifications for Athenian intensive agricultural strategies — is that a body of workers (Euphiletos' slaves) did live on his land full-time, even if Euphiletos did not.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that the client of Lysias 3 used the fact that he did not bring slaves with him to a physical confrontation as evidence against its premeditation (3.33). The considerable wealth of the speaker in Lysias 3 is apparent from reference to liturgies he has paid in the past (47) and it is therefore likely that he possessed several slaves. To suggest that he means that he would have brought someone else's slaves, rather than his own, requires considerable explanation. This source is also clearer than Lysias 1 about the role which these slaves were meant to play in the altercation. In this instance, the speaker brought an adolescent rent-boy with him, but stresses that this was a coincidence, and states that the youth was of no use to him in a physical confrontation.[37] He also reminds the Council of the Areopagus (to which the speech is addressed) that the boy could be tortured for evidence and might have given him up if he had planned the attack.[38] The argument seems to be that no-one in such a situation would risk creating a witness who could be compelled to speak against them in court, unless they could provide some kind of physical assistance in the fight.

[37] He exaggerates the slave's young age in this statement by describing the adolescent as a *paidion* (Todd, 2000b, 80 n. 8).

[38] On the *basanos*, or process by which the evidence of Athenian slaves could only be submitted by torture, Thür (1977).

This discussion makes it clear that the purpose of bringing enslaved persons to a conflict was not to provide witnesses for a proceeding court case, but to provide muscle.[39] At the same time, it raises the issue of the extraction through torture of the testimony of slave witness who accompanied a perpetrator.[40] Though any challenge to provide slaves for torture could be (and often was) rejected, this refusal would be used by their opponents against them in court. [41] Nevertheless, the use of slaves for additional manpower is a logical slaving strategy, especially for a party who believed they could act without legal consequences.[42]

Admittedly, because of the ambiguity of Euphiletos' statement regarding these hypothetical preparations, I doubt that everyone will find the argument I have laid out above entirely convincing. This ambiguity deserves an explanation in and of itself; Lysias was a professional, and a famous one, so we should assume he chose his words carefully. One of two possibilities presents itself. Firstly, it may have been the case that the statement was deliberately ambiguous, possibly with the intention of obscuring Euphiletos' wealth while simultaneously making its point. If this is the case, I would

[39] A comparative example can be found in the role which slaves played in the retinues of Roman aristocrats (e.g. Cicero, *Mil.* 26; 29).

[40] It might be suggested that the slaves of a third party would have been more difficult for the opponent to obtain in a challenge (1996, 4). Gagarin argues this on the basis of a passage of Antiphon, in which the speaker claims he will go as far as to arrange the torture of slaves belonging to other people to provide evidence (6.23). However, the unwillingness of corroborators to submit their slaves might be used as a rhetorical point, especially since financial compensation for permanent damage to a slave was often purportedly stipulated in the pre-torture agreement (Thür, 1977, 200–3).

[41] I would not go so far as Thür (1977, 309–11) and Gagarin (1996) in suggesting from our limited sources that torture never took place (cf. Mirhady, 2000; Hunter, 1994, 89–94; 1992, 293–4; Todd, 1990, 33), but it is clear that a litigant was free to refuse to have their slave tortured if they wished.

[42] Such as the assault on the public slave Pittalakos in Aeschines (1.58–61) or in the collection of debt (e.g. Demosthenes, 47.52–61).

argue, based on Euphiletos' representation throughout the speech, that it is more likely that Lysias was trying to gloss over the extent of his property, rather than imply out of hand that he was a wealthier individual. A second suggestion is that Lysias may have believed that the Athenian jury would understand this statement without the need for more precise language. If Lysias thought the statement was clear to his audience, and we assume for the sake of argument that the interpretation of it offered above is correct, then we can infer that such situations were relatively normal and that an Athenian jury would not be puzzled by the suggestion that an Athenian living in the city would have slaves living in his country properties.

I have argued that Euphiletos lived in an urban area and utilised slave labour located at least semi-permanently on his land to intensively farm it. In this way, the slaving strategy of his household was not that different from that of Ischomachos, and some speculation on the nature of its management will be explored in the following section. Limited as we are to a single reference to his slaves, we cannot say anything definitive about the scale of Euphiletos' slaveholding or the specifics of its management. It was, however, nothing on the scale of Ischomachos' holdings and, like his wife, it is difficult to imagine that Euphiletos was spared all manual labour, especially during the peak seasons of the agricultural year — as signified by the fact that he appears to spend all day at the farm and even remained there overnight from time to time. With the use of this slave labour, Euphiletos grew crops which, it would appear from his use of Athens' markets, were at least partially traded on the market for money. This would have allowed him to purchase necessities and comforts, including the female slave who helped maintain a standard of domestic work and raised the prestige of his household.

3.4 The Lives of Euphiletos' Slaves

Those familiar with Lysias 1 will have noted the absence in this chapter so far of one of its most relevant passages to Athenian slavery, in which Euphiletos' wife accosts her husband for making

sexual advances on their slave girl (12). A remark by Ischomachos similarly makes it clear that the slaves of his household were sexually available to him (10.12–13), and sexual abuse appears to have been a feature of the lives of many domestic slaves (Aristophanes, *Peace*, 1138; Demosthenes, 24.197 with Fisher, 1993, 56; Klees, 1998, 161-3). Though Athenian language demarcated slaves kept for the sake of sex (above, section 1.4), one suspects that part of the impetus behind the purchase of enslaved young women as domestic servants may have been to do with their sexual availability.[43] This shows the iniquitousness of a highly patriarchal system such as that of Athens, in which the purchase of a slave might be intended to prevent a wife's infidelity, whilst simultaneously facilitating that of her husband. As well as the obvious harm this would have caused to slaves, the stress which it must have put on family relationships (Golden, 2011, 149–51) and those between mistresses and their slaves (Glazebrook, 2017) has been commented on by scholars.

Though this is one aspect of the experience of domestic slavery that has been often commented with reference to Lysias 1, there are some further conclusions we can draw from the speech. The trusted slaves in the household of Ischomachos could be rewarded with sexual partners and family, finer clothes, unspecified "good things", money, and honour (*timē*) from their owner. These privileges created a hierarchy amongst the enslaved persons of Ischomachos' estate and functioned as a positive incentive for some slaves to keep others closely supervised. Simply because of the lesser means of a household like Euphiletos', many of the privileges offered to supervisors in the *Oikonomikos* were unlikely to be regularly extended to his slaves. We might question, for example,

[43] For comparable slaving strategies in colonial Benguela, Candido (2014, 276-8 *et passim*). The 11th-century Arabic writer Ibn Butlān, whose writings were partially based on those of earlier Greeks, wrote "they say: a lecherous man should not go looking for a slave girl. For a man who is sexually excited has no reason, as he will decide on first impressions" (*General Treatise on the Skills Useful for Purchasing and Examining Slaves*, tr. Swain, 2013, 270).

whether Euphiletos would be able to provide his slaves with sexual incentives, let alone family.[44] The odd dietary supplement and material comfort might be provided to slaves on Euphiletos' farm, but his willingness to do so would partially be limited by his wealth, as would their living space.[45] However, the recommendation of both Xenophon and Pseudo-Aristotle that slaves be given honour — treated respectfully, in other words — for not resisting the domination of their master probably did apply to slaves of smaller households as well.

The prospect of manumission was another feasible incentive for poorer slave-owners. I find the speculation of Jameson particularly thought-provoking in this regard. Poorer slave-owners, he writes, "may have been constrained [in their exploitation of slaves] by the care needed for the maintenance of productivity of small properties... No doubt the prospect of eventual freedom profoundly affected the relations between slaves and masters in the more intimate and less impersonal context of working together in house and field" (2002b, 172). One wonders if Jameson had figures from more recent slave societies in mind which support the theory that manumission was more prominent in smaller households.[46] His emphasis on the importance of close relations between masters and slaves in facilitating this difference, for one thing, reflects the explanation arrived at by Genovese on the American South (1974, 8–9).[47] Unlike the owners of large plantations, who distanced themselves from their slaves through the use of hired overseers, less wealthy

[44] However, relationships between slaves of different households is not rare in the history of slaving (Lewis, 2013, 413–4). Slaves might also have recourse to Athens' sex industry, as dramatized in two plays of Aristophanes (*Wasps*, 500; *Thesmophoriazusae*; 1195).

[45] Morgan points out that no room for the female slave existed in Euphiletos' house (1982, 118).

[46] In Brazil, for example, Klein and Luna (2010, 179); Read (2012, 167–8).

[47] "The personal element came most often into play when the outsider served in a small household rather than on a large estate" (Kopytoff and Miers, 1977, 51).

American slave-owners lived and worked with their slaves. Intimate relationships developed from these circumstances, which (according to this argument) led to higher manumission rates.

This is certainly a feasible explanation; but the effects of strictly practical considerations should be considered. Without a permanent, hired supervisor, we would expect some independence of action to be a prominent part of a slave's function. This, as the American evidence also makes clear in a more general sense, commonly resulted in positive incentives being offered to slaves, including manumission.[48] Commenting on data from Baltimore in the 19th century, Whitman wrote that manumission's "appeal as a strategy for securing bound labor was unquestionably greatest among small slaveholders, to whose economic well-being slave malingering or flight posed a greater threat" (1995, 345). This would have been no less true of the slave system of Athens.[49]

The independence of Euphiletos' slaves is clear from Lysias' speech. The slaves who lived alone in the countryside and the female slave who went to market alike had opportunities to exercise some freedom of movement outside the direct supervision of their masters. Hunt's recent study (2015) has emphasised how situations like this may have resulted in slaves participating in networks outside the household of their master. As Hunter similarly notes of Euphiletos' slave girl, the ability to travel around the market freely would have allowed her to form relationships with other slaves and free persons (1994, 72). Athens' market, moreover, is an area which Vlassopoulos has termed a "free-space", in which the absence of a face-to-face community would obscure the legal status of individuals, affecting the interactions between members of different legal statuses (2007). The participation of a slave in such a space may have provided a brief remit from the humiliation of her

[48] An increase of manumission rates in the Chesapeake Tidewater, for example, has been tied to increased mobility of slave occupations following the decline of tobacco plantations (Condon, 2009, 351–6).

[49] The use of slaves to provide the role of overseer in larger households, however, was largely absent from the American South. Its prominence in classical Athens probably resulted in high levels of manumission in wealthier households as well.

second-class status to which she was subject in her household. In the context of a rural farm, the status of individuals was more likely to be known by those they regularly encountered, but it would not have prevented slaves from forming relationships with neighbours, both slaves and free alike.[50] Though I already run the risk of over-speculating based on an off-hand reference, we might further speculate that a certain amount of travel away from the farm was considered a necessary part of the work of Euphiletos' male slaves.

However, the mobility of household slaves should not be exaggerated, as masters retained considerable ability to limit it. A timeframe was almost certainly imposed on trips to the market and on the completion of tasks on the farm. Like Ischomachos, who insists on the importance of a master's vigilance in observing the work of his slaves, Euphiletos did not live the life of a rentier and his regular trips into the countryside would have afforded him the chance to check on the work being performed by his slaves and that it was meeting his schedule. Even on a farm worked by two or three slaves, moreover, something like the hierarchy of slaves described in the *Oikonomikos* may have existed, where one slave was held accountable for the labour of the group and incentivised to oversee it properly through privileges awared him by his master.[51]

As well as providing a community which slaves might draw on for comfort and support, neighbours may also have represented a means — whether formally or through informal conversation — for a master to ensure that their slaves were performing the labour expected of them. The fear of Euphiletos' appearing unannounced and finding them taking advantage of their independence, of a slave informing Euphiletos in exchange for privileges, or of someone else observing such behaviour and telling him, all would have kept slaves from doing so regularly. The key thing to emphasise on

[50] Networks of slaves are discussed above (124–5) and below (220).

[51] Theophrastus' caricature of a distrustful man (*Apistos*) describes him sending a slave to observe another who has been sent to market (18.2). This is obviously a comically extreme reaction to fears about slave resistance, but it brings out the options open to a distrustful master well.

this point is the severity of the punishment they were liable for if caught. This is brought out by Euphiletos' treatment of his slave girl when he discovers her role in facilitating the adultery. If she would not cooperate with him, he tells her, he will have her whipped and sold to a mill (18; cf. below, 172–3). These threats were enough to earn the slave's complete loyalty after this point.

Before Euphiltos' slave is convinced that her master has discovered the adultery, she denies it (19), probably out of fear for the consequences of her own culpability in the affair. This raises the interesting question, however, of how the slave's cooperation in the adultery was achieved. It may speak to the slave's good relationship with her mistress, possibly formed or maintained by certain privileges. Threats made against the slave girl by the adulterers may equally have gained her assistance, or she may have acted out of spite for Euphiletos or boredom. She was apparently originally approached by Eratosthenes (an example, incidentally, of her ability to interact independently with persons outside her household), who may also have offered her something in exchange for her cooperation (20). Were this true, it would be interesting case of a slave using the contrary strategies of her owners to her own benefit. Of course, Euphiletos' threats demonstrate how risky such an attempt might be, but by cooperating with him in the end this slave woman, according to the speech, managed to escape any significant harm (18–9).

3.5 Variations in Smaller Household Slaving Strategies

Lysias is an interesting case study in the intersection between the strategies of masters and slaves, but how typical was the situation he describes? First, we might discuss Euphiletos' residency in an urban centre. Bresson has argued that the reliance on violently coerced slave labour in the ancient Greek world resulted in a pattern of dispersed agricultural settlement which allowed owners to monitor their slaves more closely (2016, 157). The case studies I examined in this and the previous chapter suggest the choice of an alternative to Bresson's strategy of utilising permanently-monitored slave labour. That is, to live at distance from one's farm and to keep slaves based there

on a more permanent basis. It is true that many agricultural households did live on their land and the ability to monitor slaves closely was no doubt an advantage of this choice.[52] Such households, however, would not be able to engage in the political and social world of Athens or its markets with as much ease as Euphiletos could. I know of no way to answer the question of how common it was for an Athenian farmer to reside in a farmstead rather than a town house, though it seems logical to assume that the distance of their land from Athens or another urban centre would have played a large part in dictating this; Athens controlled an extremely large territory and it is difficult to believe that every piece of farmland could feasibly be travelled to from an urban centre on a regular basis. Family and local tradition might have played a part in a choice of residence and, as the discussion on *epitropoi* in the *Oikonomikos* suggests (above, 110–11), the choice to leave slaves unsupervised in the country would be crucially dependent on a certain level of trust between a master and at least one of his slaves, which must have been built over time.

Slave-owners who resided on their farms, as Bresson noted, would be able to coerce their slaves through supervision of them to a degree that Euphiletos could not. However, there are other, temporary situations in which we can posit that the independence of a slave might be required, such as a journey away from the farmstead to see friends or family, to participate in politics on occasion, or (for much longer periods of time) to perform military service. This, no doubt, was also part of the rationale of purchasing slave labour in general (above, section 1.1.1). Furthermore, slaves in all households probably undertook tasks that put them outside their master's immediate control. As well as shopping and the collection of water, families in more rural locations may also have benefitted from, or even relied on, foraging to provide fuel for cooking fires, and probably wild fruits, vegetables, nuts and herbs for dietary supplements, as rural families have often done

[52] On literary evidence for owners residing on their farms, Langdon (1991); Roy (1988), and for epigraphic evidence, Jones (2000).

throughout history (e.g. Clark-Forbes, 1976).[53] Situations such as these would have made a trusted slave a valuable asset to his master and provided slaves with an opportunity to pursue their own strategies, if only in a limited sense.

Though Euphiletos' household, like that of Ischomchos, derived its means from agriculture, many other smaller households did so through artisanal work. As with a master residing permanently on a farmstead, the slaves of an artisan would live in their immediate residency. Though a wealthy household, that of Demosthenes described in the first of his speeches against his guardians is a good example. Demosthenes states that he inherited only one house — though an expensive one, valued by him at 3,000 drachmae (27.10), and he also mentions the ownership of some 50 male slaves (9), who appear to have lived in this house with his family (24).[54] If the excavations at Olynthos are anything to go by (Cahill, 2005, 55-8), the houses of Athens' artisans, whatever their size, would commonly have doubled as workshops. In these households the domestic sphere would have been so closely tied to the family's source of revenue as to be nearly inextricable. Demosthenes does not mention any domestic servants amongst his slaves, and Acton has argued that his slave artisans also performed domestic services as needs required (2014, 265–6). A handful of strictly domestic slaves and/or female attendants may simply be elided from the inventory Demosthenes provides (9–10), which is usually reckoned in the thousands of drachmae.[55] However, this speech should caution us about presuming the universality of a sharp divide between separate male and female "domestic" spheres, as described in the *Oikonomikos* of Xenophon and Lysias 1.

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[53] This, presumably, is what the slave girl whom Dikaiopolis discovers stealing his firewood is supposed to be doing in Aristophanes' *Acharnians* (271–275).

[54] American slave-owners kept large numbers of slaves (uncomfortably) in urban houses (Vlach, 1997, 151–8).

[55] The absence of slaves from the list of non-productive property is particularly puzzling (10.10). Compare the property list from Isaeus (8.35), which does mention two female slaves and a young girl, and conversely Isaeus (11.42–3), which makes no reference to slaves whatsoever.

Finally, there are the very poorest of Athens' slaveholding households — those who only owned only one or two slaves. Due to the elite-focused nature of our literary evidence, there is no significant evidence available to discuss this group in any detail, though households of this type must have existed.[56] As historians of Greek slavery have often noted, such slaves were likely used for a wide variety of different purposes within their household.

For those who could not own a slave outright, there were other options for acquiring one on a temporary basis. Lysias 4, for example, describes the shared ownership of a slave between two parties (10). Though in this instance the slave is a courtesan owned by two wealthy individuals, I can see no reason that joint ownership might not have been used as a strategy for poorer Greek communities to have access to slaves — although the conflicts such an arrangement might engender are apparent from the Lysias speech.[57] Furthermore, slaves may have been hired by a family that could not afford to buy one outright, especially during seasons and periods in the family life-cycle in which labour was in high demand. The renting of slaves will be examined later in Chapter 5, but it is worth noting that the respectability that arose from having a domestic slave (as well, presumably, as its practical advantages) led many poorer households to hire one in new world cities (e.g. Read, 2012, 84; Wade, 1964, 42).

[56] One exception is Chremulos, the hero of Aristophanes' *Wealth*, who has fallen into poverty but retains a slave (26–9; 1105). Though this suggests to my mind the likelihood of real-life Athenian analogues, the play is little further help in reconstructing social history; the fact that the slave is male rather than female, for example, is arguably governed by comic conventions.

[57] The court case arose from a dispute regarding the ownership of the slave herself. For the frequent joint ownership of slaves in Roman Egypt, Straus (2016, section 4).

Conclusion

I began this chapter by arguing, from demographic studies of Athens' wealth distribution, that it was feasible for at least a third, and possibly more than half of Athens' citizen households, to own slaves; and that the ubiquity of slave-ownership in literary sources and the social value of slaveholding they reflect were such that we should take this possibility seriously. Such a wide dispersal of slave-ownership would make the slave system of Athens unusual, to be sure, but it does have some parallels in modern history. As Wade's study of census records in the urban centres of the 19th-century American South has shown, up to, and even over, 50% of white families living in cities such as Charleston, Richmond and Mobile owned slaves in the first half of the century, the majority of which only held one or two (1964, 20–1).[58] This certainly does not prove that this was the case in Athens, but it shows that in other historical periods the social value of slave-ownership was of a strong enough appeal to attract even those of only moderate wealth.

Part of the attraction of small-scale slave-ownership lay partially in its ability to enable citizen women to approximate the ideal of the secluded, leisured wife, whilst simultaneously maintaining particular standards of domestic management. Not only, moreover, did slavery provide households with greater income-earning potential, but also (to a greater or lesser degree), it provided them greater freedom of movement to engage in social and political activities. Euphiletos' story, along with Lysias 3 also suggest another benefit of slave-ownership in Athens that has not yet, to my knowledge, been commented on — the use of slaves as muscle in physical confrontations.

The lives of slaves in smaller households were likely to be arduous and uncomfortable, governed by fear over the unbridled power which their masters held over their lives. The strategies of their masters, however, often required small, but significant, independence of action on the part of

[58] In this sense, it was a very different form of slavery than that practised in rural locations (ibid.), where, it should be noted, the vast majority of the population resided (Temperley, 1965, 67).

slaves. This would intermittently allow certain slaves the chance to pursue their own strategies, either in cooperation with their owner or outside his control.

Part 2:

Specific Slaving Strategies

Chapter 4:

Two Contrasting Strategies of Direct Exploitation:

The Use of Slaves for Milling and as Commercial Agents

The previous two chapters focused on the overall slaving strategies of Athenian households. In order to provide a broader analysis of some of the diverse strategies which might be placed in the category of direct slave exploitation, this chapter examines two specialised slaving strategies, which utilised slaves for purposes different in noteworthy respects from those discussed in the previous chapters. While the last two chapters have focused predominantly on agriculturally based slaving strategies, those discussed in this chapter cover a broader perspective by putting additional focus on slaving strategies in other spheres of production.

The two strategies I have chosen for this chapter, which are discussed in separate sections, are the use of slaves in Athens' mills and the use of slaves as financial administrators and commercial agents. The second section, as in previous chapters, focuses on a case study and then examines it in a wider context. The first, contrastingly, attempts to reconstruct a strategy from numerous references which are individually too limited to form the basis of a case study. It will be obvious from the outset that these two strategies bear little relation to each other. This is intended as a deliberate contrast, to better capture the divergence in slaving strategies and their effects. However, as I argue in my conclusion, the existence of both strategies in the same society means that we cannot fully understand one without reference to the other.

4.1 Milling Slaves

In our sources we find plentiful evidence of commercial milling. Two individuals are identified by their profession as a miller (*mulōthros*) in law-court speeches (Demosthenes, 53.14; Dinarchos, 1.23) and the philosopher Kleanthes supported himself by crushing grain when he arrived in Athens (Diogenes Laertius, 7.168–9). Other fragmentary evidence supports the idea that this was a common profession: there are testaments to millers in inscriptions and a mid-fourth-century comedy of Eubulus was titled the milleress (fr. 65 K-A).[1] Xenophon's Socrates claimed that a certain Nausikudes became rich from selling barley flour (*Mem.* 2.7.6). It is unclear whether Nausikudes obtained imported barley, bought it from Athenian farmers, or grew it himself, although the use of the rare verb *alphitapoiia* (literally the making of barley flour) suggests that it was by performing this task specifically that Nausikudes earned his wealth. On the other hand, the rest of the passage suggests that he owned quite considerable agricultural land, on which he could theoretically have grown the grain for his mill. Either way, it is explicitly through the ownership of slaves, Xenophon says, that Nausikudes was able to profit from this business.

Our references to millhouses (*mulōnēs*) themselves, indeed, make it clear that slavery played a vital role in supplying the manpower on which these enterprises depended. Nearly 100 years after Euphiletos' threat to throw his slave into a mill (above, 162), a distressed slave is presumed to be worried about suffering the same fate in Menander's *Heros* (2–3).[2] A fragment of Aristophanes suggests that the idea of slaves being punished by being sent to the mill was a literary *topos* by the time his *Babylonians* was performed in 426 BC (fr. 95 K-A). In other fragments of old comedy, a reference to "falling into the mill" was attributed to Eupolis (fr. 387 K-A) and Theopompus Comicus

[1] E.g. *IG* II^2 10995.

[2] Other Menandrian references to slaves in the mill: *Aspis*, 238–45; *Pk.* 277–8.

supposedly linked the mill to the place where slaves were tortured (*basanisterion*: fr. 64 K-A).[3] The Aristophanes fragment comes from the *Etymologicum Genuinem* (s.v. *zētreion*), whose Byzantine compiler believed that this reference to a mill described a place in which slaves were punished, whereas elsewhere it could refer to an actual grain-processing operation. The source in which Eupolis and Theopompus were preserved described it as a slave prison (*desmōterion*) in Chios and Achaea (*Etym. Magn.* s.v. *zētreion*).[4] Following especially this second source, Hunter believes that the term *mulōn*, when applied to the treatment of slaves, was a euphemism for a slave jail in Athens, in which disobedient slaves were shackled and corporally punished (1994, 171).

Klees is right, however, to argue that these passages probably refer to the sale or temporary rental of a slave to a genuine mill, despite the inarguably prominent role this played in slave discipline (1998, 189–92).[5] In the case of Euphiletos from Lysias 1, sale is implied by the claim that the suffering that his slave will suffer were she to be thrown in the mill will "never stop" (μηδέποτε

[3] The word here is *zētreion*, the meaning of which could be a mill, according to Pollux (7.19.2). Pollux knew of several words for the mill (including *mulōn* and *zētreion*) which could refer to a place in which slaves were punished (3.78).

[4] The writers of many later thesauri concurred. The orthography of Georgius Choeroboscus (s.v. *zētreion*) and the prosody of Aelius Herodianus (3.1.372.7–8) described it as meaning either a prison or a mill. The Suda (citing Eupolis), the lexicons of Hesychius, Photius, Pseudo-Zonaras and the Lexica Segueriana simply list it as a place in which slaves were punished (*kolasterion*, s.v. *zētreion*). Joannes Philoponus' list of synonyms lists one definition of *zētreion* as a place in which slaves are punished, although the second definition appears to have been lost in a lacuna of the manuscript. The *Etymologicum Magnum*'s reference to Chios and Achaea is unique and there is no suggestion that the term *mulōn* could refer to anything other than a mill.

[5] This may be the belief of the author of the Etymologicum Gudianum, regarding the term *zētreion* (s.v.). This depends on the translation of the conjunction *ēgoun* that separates its definition of the word as a slave prison and a mill proper in the text. It may mean "or", but it can also mean "more specifically", in which case the *zētreion* is described both as a slave prison and a mill.

παύσασθαι; 18). Unless we understand this as Euphiletos implying that his slave will be held in a cell for the rest of her life — which seems a drastic and uneconomic response — this implies that the "mill" in this instance was not strictly a slave jail. Furthermore, as Klees states, in Euripides' *Cyclops* the Satyr Silenus tries to frighten Polyphemos by claiming that Odysseus intends to enslave him (Polyphemos) and sell him to someone who will force him to remove stones or have him "thrown in a mill" (240).[6] Although this prospective fate is meant to horrify Polyphemos (and is surely emblematic of Athens' contemporary slave system), its motivation, in these circumstances, was not punitive. Similarly, we might note a passage of Dinarchus' prosecution of Demosthenes, which claims that a miller called Menon was condemned to death because he kept a free boy in his mill (1.23). The identification of Menon as a miller makes it clear that these conditions were those of an actual mill.

Dinarchos' speech was delivered in 323 BC (Worthington, 2001, 6-9). *Cyclops* was written in the late fifth century and has been plausibly dated to its final decade (Seaford, 1982). Though this date is not certain, there is no need to be precise; it should be clear by now that the unfortunate fate of mill slaves was a subject of Athenian literature throughout a great swathe of the classical period. There is more that can be deduced from these sources about what exactly that fate entailed, but beforehand, the extent of Athens' milling industry will be outlined below.

4.1.1 Commercial Milling and Spheres of Flour Production in Athens

Like many other pre-industrial, grain-based societies, that of Athens relied on a huge amount of manpower for the grinding of grain into flour, much of which was provided by slaves. The comic poet

[6] The reference to bread-makers taken on campaign from Athens' mills in Thucydides (6.22) need not refer to freemen, as many have assumed from the mention of a payment for their services; this could be a fee provided to their masters (Klees, 1998, 191–2 with n. 130).

Pherekrates, in a fragment quoted in Chapter 1 (23), imagined an earlier era without slaves in which free women had to mill their own flour. Interestingly, it is the absence of slaves in the domestic sphere of the household, rather than commercial millers, which Pherecretes portrays as the major difference between the Athens of his day and the mythical Athens of old. Though more direct evidence of household milling is sparse, it does exist. Theophrastus' "rustic man" (*Agroikos*) makes sexual overtures to the woman who makes bread for him (*sitopoios*) and ends up helping her grind grain (4.7). The woman is almost certainly his slave. Though the *Oikonomikos* does not refer as explicitly to milling, it does also refer to a *sitopoios* in the household (10.10), a role which evidently included the grinding of grain, at least in some circumstances (e.g. Thucydides, 6.22). It also refers to a *sitopoiikos* (9.7; 9) amongst household tools, which could refer to a milling device (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 6.2.31). Despite Pherekrates, it is likely that many poorer freewomen had to mill their own grain. Nevertheless, for those who owned domestic slaves, it would appear that this task would have been a regular duty of theirs.

One thing which Ischomachos and the *agroikos* of Theophrastus had in common was the ownership of farmland. From this, they would have been able to grow grain and, by processing it in-house, could have limited the costs of using Athens' market to provide them with sustenance.[7] This would have been true for many Athenian families, but not universally — as is suggested by the large-scale importation of grain to Athens throughout the classical period.[8] The extensive non-agricultural property of Demosthenes' family once again provides a good counter-example to the agricultural

[7] On the value of increased self-sufficiency, above (106).

[8] Garnsey (1985) and Sallares (1991, 97–8; 331–2) play down the importance of Athens' external grain supply by reference to the suitable carrying capacity of Athens' land. Nevertheless, literary sources such as Thucydides (6.20.4) in the fifth century, Demosthenes (20.31) in the fourth, and the inscriptional evidence below, indicate the importance of imported grain. Analysis is provided by Bresson (2016, 404–11); Moreno (2007, chapters 3 and 4); Oliver (2007, 17–22); Pazdera (2006, 84–96); Keen (2000); Whitby (1998, *passim*).

households that dominate the social history of Athens (above, 165). We should be careful, too, of suggesting that all Athenian farmers grew grain. Corrective evidence comes from a play by Aristophanes, which describes a character named Chremes selling wine from his vineyard and using the money to buy *alphita*: a barley flour (*Thesm.* 817–23). The joke here is the frequency of changes to money laws and it works equally well if the flour is replaced with any other product.

We can gather a sense of the role that commercial mills played in the distribution of grain through Athens' market from a passage of the pseudo-Aristotelean *Athenian Constitution*, which describes the role of a group of public officials called the *sitophulakēs*, as follows:

> These take care, first, that the unground grain (*sitoi argoi*) in the agora is sold justly, and, next, that the millers (*mulōthroi*) sell the [barley-]meal (*alphita*) in accordance with the price paid for the barleycorns (*krithai*) and that the breadsellers sell their loaves (*artoi*) in accordance with the price paid for the wheat (*puroi*). (51.3, tr. Rhodes, 2017)

It is somewhat surprising that barley is singled out as if it were the only grain which was bought as a flour. Both crops were important staples of the Athenian diet in a broad, if not an individual, sense.[9] It is worth noting that in all our literary sources, barley is distributed as *alphita* (Foxhall and Forbes, 1982, 44 *et passim*). Perhaps because of differences in the longevity of these grains in different stages of processing, we might postulate that one was preferred as an unprocessed grain over the other. This cannot have been such a motivator to corner the market for flour, however, especially considering the two were not direct substitutes. Barley was a much cheaper grain and was

[9] As inscriptional evidence makes clear, both barley and wheat were grown in Athens' countryside (*IG*, I^3 78, 6–7) and imported into Athens (*IG* II^2 1672 with Garnsey, 1988, 96–101; SEG 60.137, 9–10 with Stroud, 1998, chapter 1). The climate of Attica was much better suited to the farming of barley, which was more frequently cultivated as a result (above, 88 n. 15; *IG* II^2 1672). However, we do not have detailed evidence of grain imports from the Black Sea region, which were probably more considerable (Demosthenes, 20.31–2; Noonan, 1973, 233-4) and, because the climate was less arid, were likely to consist of a higher percentage of wheat.

considered less palatable (von Reden, 2007, 390). It was probably what the majority of poorer people — and slaves — ate.[10] Moreover, evidence collected from comedy by Lewis demonstrates the sale of both raw barley and wheat (2016a, 382), barley and wheat flour (384), and barley and wheat bread (385).[11] The examples chosen by Pseudo-Aristotle, then, should not be viewed as an exhaustive list, but rather a way of getting across through a few examples the idea that the *sitophulakēs* were responsible for the retail of both main forms of grain in all three stages of its processing — unground, ground, and cooked. Though the sale of unground grain in the market suggests that many households processed the grain they needed internally, the sale of flour equally suggests that other households did not.

Essentially, a Greek family had one of three choices when buying grain to sustain themselves. They could buy raw grain which would need considerable effort to process in a form which could be eaten. They could also buy it already ground from a miller, as Chremes did (cf. Aristophanes, *Vesp.* 301), which would save them considerable time but at a higher monetary cost. Alternatively, they could spend money on domestic slaves and have them process raw grain. It is also possible that those who grew grain passed on the work of grinding it to a miller, at the cost of a fee or a proportion of the final product. According to Halstead's study, this is how grain was processed in modern Mediterranean agriculture before its industrialisation (2014, 169–70).[12] Finally, at an even

[10] Hipponax of Ephesus described *maza* as "food for slaves" (Fr. 26, West).

[11] On the prevalence of barley cakes (*maza*) in our sources: Braun (1995, 28–34). There is a notable lack of *maza* sellers in our literary sources compared to sellers of bread. This may, however, be because of the higher status of the latter's goods drew more criticism from the comic sources (Wilkins, 2000, 167–8).

[12] This is despite the unfair prices which millers were thought to have charged: so unappealing was the notion of using family members to grind grain. I suspect, however, that the prevalence of domestic slaves (about whom there would have been less qualms about subjecting to an arduous task) probably played a large part in encouraging grinding within classical Athenian households.

higher cost, Athenians could buy bread. Naturally, bakers also needed a source of flour and it is likely that many kept a milling operation attached to their enterprise.[13] The specialisation of Athenian industry is such, however, that it seems more than plausible that specialised bakers sometimes bought their grain from specialised millers, who bought their grain from farmers or specialised grain merchants.[14] The baking industry, in other words, may have provided another potential source of custom for commercial millers.

Especially for those households who had to buy grain anyway, the decision to buy flour is an understandable one, as grain grinding is an unsavoury and time-consuming task. When distributed among a select group within a society as it often has been, it requires several hours of work for an individual every day.[15] One strategy, which (as we have seen) many Athenian households adopted, was to delegate this task to domestic slaves. Those who could not afford domestic slaves, however, might have bought flour whenever they could afford to rather than have family members expend the time and effort of performing this task. Depending on the labour available throughout the life-cycle of a family (see above, 159–60) and in certain circumstances when labour in the household was at a high demand, the attraction of milling within the household may have been less desirable at times, even among larger households.

[13] As in the *pistrina* of the Roman Empire, although literary and archaeological sources show no evidence of such an operation in Athens (Thompson, 2003, 188–98).

[14] For the specialisation of Athenian industry, see Harris (2002). For grain retailers, see the *sitopōloi* (grain retailers) who lend their name to a speech of Lysias (22; Todd, 2000b, 268-9).

[15] Amouretti notes a fairly short time of 15–20 minutes to process 900 grams by experienced millers using a millstone in modern Algeria (1986, 138), but Lang (2016, 282–3) notes several other accounts of times ranging from an hour, to several hours, to nearly a whole day to provide enough flour to feed a family. Times would have varied depending on equipment, as well as on the specific type of grain (Samuel, 2009).

As we saw in the previous chapter, Demosthenes' household contained 50 male slaves who were all skilled craftsmen and no domestic slaves worth figuring into the estate's worth. In a household of this type, which kept numerous amounts of slaves for a specific industrial purpose, we might postulate that masters would prefer their slaves' time be spent on performing their skilled work rather than grinding grain. Of course, Demosthenes' families could have purchased domestic slaves for the purpose of providing flour for his slaves, although for reasons we will turn to now, we can fairly speculate that mills were able to produce flour at a cheap enough price to make this an economically unattractive choice.

For one thing, it is possible that investment in specialised equipment gave millers a competitive advantage in flour production. Milling could be performed in a cheap pestle and mortar, which was also a fairly versatile set of equipment (Curtis, 2009, 373–4; 380; Moritz, 1958, 22–5) and would probably have been available to even a poor family. In order to make a finer flour at a faster rate, there was the more specialised saddle-quern millstone — two shaped stones used to grind grain between them. Though probably more expensive than a pestle and mortar, it would appear from the Attic Stelai that these were not unaffordable.[16]

The hopper mill, however, which uses a handle attached by iron to an upper grindstone in order to provide greater grinding force, is another matter. Several hopper mills dated to the classical period have been found across Greece (Frankel, 2003, 7) and one from the fifth century in Athens (Runnels, 1981, 296). Though a single find is obviously not proof that such devices were widespread, hopper mills made large-scale milling much more productive and archaeologists have discovered several in the better-preserved site of Olynthus, which was destroyed by Philip II in 348 BC. They would also have been more expensive than more rudimentary mill stones (though how much more expensive we cannot say) and would have taken up a more considerable and fixed space.

[16] "The upper stone of a saddle quern went for seven drachmai, two obols" (Foxhall, 2007b, 61; *IG* I^3 422, 290).

Finally, there is the cost of the labour in specialised mills against that of using domestic slaves. Although milling was an occupation which required limited skill and therefore did not benefit from technical specialisation in the same way as craft production, there are reasons for thinking that the labour necessary for specialised milling enterprises could be acquired and maintained at a comparatively low cost, as will be argue in the following section.

As Zuiderhoek has recently emphasised, one feature of the urbanisation of cities in the ancient world was the specialisation of manufacturing and other non-agrarian workers who came to rely on an agricultural hinterland and foreign trade in grain (2017, 134–40). Though there is much we still do not know about the processes of flour production and our limited sources point to a variety of differing strategies, it should nevertheless be clear that this specialisation created the economic conditions in which another economic specialisation — commercial milling — could thrive. Indeed, Storck and Teague have argued that the beginning of commercial milling was synonymous with that of industrialisation itself (1952, 71–5). But this efficient new system, the beginning of which should probably be located many years before the classical period, functioned with a high human cost.

4.1.2 Slave Milling as Strategy and the Lives of Slaves in Mills

The dejected state of slaves tasked with grinding grain was a reoccurring topic in Greco-Roman writings for nearly a millennium. It appears in possibly the earliest surviving example of this literary tradition, the *Odyssey*, in the words of a slave woman:[17]

> Twelve women worked these mills making flour of barley and of wheat, the marrow of men. The others had gone to sleep, having ground their wheat, but she alone, the feeblest, had not stopped. She stopped working her mill and, standing up, spoke a word, a sign for her

[17] Recent studies arguing for the chattel slave status of the *dmōes* in Homer include Lewis (2018b, 110–14); Harris (2012, 352–8); Ndoye (2010, 236–7); Fisher (1995, 49–50).

> master: “Father Zeus, lord of gods and men, you have thundered from the starry sky, yet there are no clouds anywhere: surely you are revealing a sign for someone. Bring to pass this word uttered by my wretched self. May the suitors for the last time feast today in the halls of Odysseus. They bring me sorrow with bitter labour as I make them *alphita*, may they dine here for the final time.” (20. 107–120)

As we saw in the previous subsection, by the time of classical Athens the unenviable fate of Odysseus’ slave described in this passage was no longer the result of a specific set of circumstances (she is forced to grind large amounts of grain on a regular basis in order to provide food to Penelope’s suitors who dine in Odysseus’ home during his absence) but the reality of many slaves working in commercial mills. The same motifs attached to slavery and milling appear in Latin and later Greek literature. Cicero was unsure whether or not a captured runaway slave had been thrown into a mill in a letter to his brother Quintus (1.4.14), the detestable conditions of a flour mill were famously described in Apuleius’ *Metamorphoses* in the second century AD (9.12), and the use of the mill as a punishment for slaves is referenced repeatedly in late antique sources (Harper, 2011, 138–9; 231). What is more, “the image of the mill slave as a stereotype of the most degraded of persons was found also in the ancient Near East” (Lewis, 2018b, 41 n. 49).

One of the main reasons for this continuity in representations of slave millers across these centuries and different ancient Mediterranean cultures was milling’s distastefulness as a job. In classical Athens, which never saw the advent of the rotary mill and the utilisation of animal and water power for milling which this eventually enabled, grinding of grain inevitably represented difficult, repetitive physical labour.[18] Indeed, throughout ancient history milling enterprises would have functioned at

[18] Rotary hand-mills appear to have been used by Carthaginians in the early fourth century BC and have been excavated in Sicily and dated to the third century (Curtis, 2001, 341–3). A mill utilising rotary motion has been discovered in excavations at Delos and dated to the 3rd century (Brunet, 1997). There is therefore no reason to think that classical Athenians utilised this technology.

the cost of tremendous amounts of exhausting physical labour. Even though the donkey mill and then the water-mill eventually gained prominence in the Roman Empire, Moritz (1958, chapter 8) and following him Thompson (2003, 189–90) have argued for the continued importance of hand-milling, based at least partially on the continued subjection of large numbers of slaves and convicts to mills as punishment.[19] Though archaeologists emphasise the quick rise to prominence of the water mill after its invention (Wikander, 2000, 371–2; 394–400), this does not mean that more primitive methods were altogether replaced, nor that prisoners could not be sentenced to grinding for the sake of punishment, despite its inefficiency.[20]

In addition to the work of grinding the grain itself, moreover, the tightly encased husks of both barley and emmer wheat need to be removed by pounding in a mortar with a pestle and a coarser flour could be made by pounding the endosperm in the same equipment (Villing, 2009, 323–326). Since *alphita* was associated with a less fine consistency (Moritz, 1949), it has been suggested that this was the way in which barley was frequently ground throughout antiquity, regardless of technological innovations (Moritz, 1958, 149–52).[21] Although the hopper mill would have increased

[19] By the fourth century AD, Roman convicts were regularly condemned to working in mills (Millar, 1984, 143–4). Moritz also notes finds of rotary hand-mills (1958, 97–8) and references to them in juristic writing of the late empire (102).

[20] English penitentiaries utilised prisoners to turn large treadmills for pumps — or the grinding of grain — in the 18th century (Shayt, 1989, 909–25). The usefulness of this device often seems to have been conceived of for its punitive, rather than productive, benefit (921–3).

[21] In the first century AD, Pliny notes that criminals were used to process grain with pestles and mortars in Campania (*NH*, 18.122) at a time in which donkey mills were prevalent in the region (Peacock, 1989). This, however, does not mean that barley was never ground with a millstone, only that human labour could be fruitfully employed to do so with less expensive technology. Aristophanes refers to a finely-ground white barley flour (Arnott, 1996, 425 with references). Wilkins discusses other evidence of different grades and qualities of barley flour (2000, 16–7).

the potential output of a single miller, it was still operated by considerable human effort. Storck and Teague reasonably suggest that the introduction of the hopper mill resulted in a shift from female to male labour in the grinding of corn (1952, 71). However, Euphiletos from Lysias 1 certainly believed he could find a mill willing to take a female slave, and several sources from late antiquity also suggest that women, as well as men, were widely exploited in mills (Harper, 2011, 138).

The dejected slaves of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, however, worked a mill that utilised animal power to turn a millstone. Feasibly, these slaves could have been using hand mills to supplement the output of the donkey mill, but either way, it is the horrific conditions of their workplace and their treatment by their master that has appalled later readers of this passage (Wiedemann, 1981, 176), rather than their exploitation for enervating labour. The slaves are covered in flour and their eyes are swollen from the unclean air. They also bear scars from whipping, are dressed in rags, have been tattooed on their foreheads, and are chained as they work. These last set of conditions bear similarities with the slaves sent to the mill in classical Athens, who are whipped (Lysias 1.18) and held in fetters (Menander, *Her.* 2–3). I would argue that this is evidence of a continuity in the types of slaves employed in mills and the methods of coercing them to do so.

This continuity can be explained by reference to three particular characteristics of ancient mill work, which were true of turning a millstone, driving an animal, or inserting grain into the mill and collecting flour from it alike. Firstly, though experience with assigned tasks would no doubt increase the productivity of slaves, the tasks required of slave millers were mechanical and repetitive, and generally unskilled. As an occupation, therefore, mill work fits comfortably into Fenoaltea's category of "pain-intensive labour", which can be coerced by the use of violence and the threat thereof (above, 63–4). Secondly, it could have easily been arranged that a mill slave performed their role entirely within the restricted space of a grinding room, in which only some mobility was necessary. And so, mill slaves could be shackled as they worked and, so long as their owner had enough demand for flour to keep them working day in and day out, it might suit their master's interests to

keep them forcibly held in the same place indefinitely. Both of these factors would have meant that, if they so desired, the master of mill slaves or an appointed supervisor could closely and easily inspect work as it was being performed. Work could also feasibly be evaluated at set points, because (thirdly) the work of mill slaves could be easily assessed by measuring output.

For mill owners, these factors would have allowed them to exploit slaves as part of a particularly brutal slaving strategy that had several advantages from their perspective. A master's ability to monitor his slaves' work accurately would mean that a slave would have little opportunity to avoid doing the labour assigned to them. Their refusal to do so, moreover, could be met with the threat of severe punishment, without drastically affecting the slaves' ability to perform the job they were tasked with. Finally, because slaves could be fettered while they worked, the fear of their attempting to flee would not have inhibited their masters from treating them in whatever way they desired.

Unlike many of the other slaving strategies which we have evidence for in Athens, no cost beyond the price of their purchase and enough food to keep them alive need have been spent on slaves living in mills, and rather than feeling compelled to promise manumission to slaves, owners could keep them in captivity until they could no longer work. Enterprises capable of profitably exploiting persons in this way could buy slaves who had shown themselves willing to resist their slavery without the worry that other potential slave buyers may have felt about doing so. We can only speculate about the effect which a slave's resistance might have had on his or her price on the market, but common sense suggests that it would have been comparatively low, unless the seller was able and willing to disguise their reason for selling a rebellious slave to a prospective buyer.[22]

[22] Lying in the market was illegal by Athenian law (Hyperides, 3.14) and might cause unwanted conflict between parties.

The ability to purchase and productively exploit slaves that others would not, probably meant that mill owners could buy slaves relatively cheap.[23]

Either way, this analysis helps explain the overlap between mills as a commercial enterprise and as a place of slave detention and punishment. Those looking to off-load a rebellious slave could have found a means of doing so in a mill. Millers, in turn, would be able to exploit these slaves through violence. For that matter, the means of disciplining and restraining slaves — whips, chains etc. — might also be included in specialised equipment which gave commercial millers a competitive advantage over domestic milling; Lewis (2018b, 41 n. 49) has noted a reference to a collar device which prevented mill slaves from eating the product of their labour (Aristophanes, fr. 314 K-A). In this way, throwing slaves into a mill was both an economically viable arrangement for slave-owners and an effective way of disciplining slaves. Of course, it was at least partially the unpleasantness of mill work itself which made it a suitable punishment. We cannot compare the conditions of an Athenian mill to all of those described by Apuleius, because such a detailed description of the former does not exist. Be that as it may, we can fairly say that forced confinement to a single room and endless labour would have been a horrific existence for anyone. It is also worth restating that in Athens, milling represented physically exhausting labour too.

Finally, there is the question of to what extent similar strategies that restrained slaves, monitored them closely and motivated them entirely through violence, were widely utilised in other sectors of Athens' economy. The extraction of silver ore from Athens' extensive mines might be one suggestion, if only because the conditions are thought to have been so terrible that it is difficult to

[23] An arrangement of this kind is described in Strabo (first century BC), who knew of a Roman mine in the Pontus worked by slaves who were sold because of their rebelliousness (12.3.40). A similar reason might lie behind Xenophon's belief that Athens could find many Athenians willing to sell their slaves for a state sponsored mining venture (*Vect.* 4.18). The fact that the slaves in Apuleius are tattooed may be an indicator that they had been disciplined (e.g. Petronius, 103).

imagine people working under them in any other circumstances. Xenophon seems to imply that such work would result in a high death rate (*Vect.* 4.14), a fact which was stated more explicitly by Strabo discussing slaves in the Pontus (12.3.40). Strabo also notes that the area of Laurion in general was bad for worker's health (3.6.12). Mining, it should further be noted, was another task to which convicts were put in later centuries of antiquity (Millar, 1984, 137–43).[24] In truth, we know very little about the conditions of mining slaves, despite the attempts of several studies to use the archaeological record to shed some light on them (above, 6 n. 13).[25] Other slaves occupied in hard labour — in quarries or fields, for example — might well have been exploited along similar lines, but if we are looking for the most degraded of Athens' slaves, the weight of our literary sources suggest that we should find them in Athens' mills. We do not know the actual numbers of such slaves, but the surprisingly large amount of evidence for the milling industry in Athens suggests that they were numerous.

We can only speculate what Athenians thought of men and women being condemned to such a fate. Certainly, the references in comedy suggest that it caused no real moral concern. It may be important that being sent to a mill is commonly presented as a fate which slaves deserve for their actions — a belief which goes a long way to justifying this mistreatment. This issue touches on a wider one, which has generated much debate in modern scholarship. That is, certain Athenian laws ostensibly protected slaves from abuse, a difficult fact to reconcile with the frequent and apparently

[24] Lauffer argued that, despite the terrible conditions in which they worked, the health of mining slaves in Athens would have been relatively well-looked after due to economic considerations (1979, 56–9), which earned him criticism from the USSR scholar Gluskina (1959; 184–7).

[25] Morris laments "the weakness of evidence" regarding mining slaves (1998, 211; cf. Morris, 2011). Rihll, for her part, cautions against the "the blinkers that associate everything found in the region with the immediate process of silver production" (2010, 210). Indeed, even the assumption that the buildings and gravesites that Morris draws his limited conclusions from were associated with mining may be misguided.

unmitigated abuse of slaves by their masters in other sources.[26] For one thing, there is some evidence that slaves could flee abusive masters and become suppliants at the altars of certain temples. Once there, they could demand to be sold to another master.[27] The treatment of slaves with *hubris* was also illegal according to Athenian law and Cohen has argued extensively that this protected slaves against abuse (2000b; 2014; 2015, 124–30; cf. Morrow, 1939, 229).[28] Other scholars have remained more sceptical, though to different degrees and for different reasons.[29]

On the basis of this evidence, Klees has argued that excessive punishment of slaves in Athens may been discouraged (1998, 203–11). Personally, I am not convinced. In his own addition to the debate on the illegality of committing hubris against slaves, Canevaro has adduced some comparative evidence which demonstrates how the cruellest of actions towards slaves was acceptable in the Atlantic world so long as it was construed as punishment (2018, 120). His wider point, which is well taken, is that context is vital to understanding how violence against slaves might be interpreted as socially unacceptable. From the opposite perspective, it is clear from this evidence that Atlantic

[26] Perhaps most notably, slave-owners held the power to kill slaves more or less with impunity (Antiphon, 6.4; Lewis, 2018b, 42; Allen, 2000, 111; Klees, 1998, 201–3; Todd, 1993, 190; Harrison, 1968, 171–2).

[27] Kamen (2013, 21); Naiden (2006, 373–4); MacDowell (1978, 81). As Lewis (2018b, 43) and Klees (1998, 209–11) note, we have no recorded case of this actually happening and therefore cannot properly assess how effective a system this was at mitigating abuse by masters. Hunt points out some further difficulties with accepting this law as widely benefitting slaves (2016, 153–4).

[28] Christensen (1984) similarly argues that both the supplication of slaves and the law on hubris were closely related and jointly served to provide slaves with a measure of protection against their masters. As with slave supplication, however, we have no certain evidence of this law being used in response to illegal actions against slaves (Canevaro, 2018, 100–1).

[29] The debate is well summarised by Dmitriev (2016, 66–8), whose clever resolution of the issue unfortunately bases its conclusion on the incorrect translation of *oiketēs* as “domestic slave” (above, 87 n. 11).

slave-owners could subject their slaves to even the most vicious of treatments without repercussions, so long as the slave was perceived to have acted in conflict with their obligations.

Klees, to his credit, is above all cautious about drawing conclusions on slave rights, or lack thereof, from so little evidence. He is also right to point out that excessive violence was generally deemed disadvantageous to the community as a whole. However, I would argue that the guise of corrective discipline might easily justify extreme punishments meted out to slaves — regardless of the appropriateness of the punishment to the misdemeanour they were correcting.[30] It is noteworthy that the institutions which are thought to have protected slaves only did so by the decision of Athenian citizens — (probably) temple priests in the case of slave supplication and an Athenian jury in cases of hubris — that the violence committed against slaves was unacceptable.[31] Of course, the obligations of slaves and the concomitant extent to which their actions were viewed as deserving of punishment were defined entirely by masters. They expected slaves to act entirely in their interests, regardless of their own needs or desires. Many of the slaves who worked in mills, then, probably did so because of past rebellious actions. Of course, it is likely that many others did not.

4.2 Slave Agents:

The work of mill slaves utilised none of their human capacity for independent action and decision-making. In other contexts, slave-owners did exploit this capacity, which allowed them to have slaves

[30] Herodotus claimed that the Persians were forbidden by law from doing crippling (*anēkestos*) damage to one of their slaves for a single, rather than a repeat, offence (1.137). The rather unsettling implication is that Herodotus imagined such a thing happening in Greek cities. Again, such drastic abuse is phrased as a semi-reasonable response to slave resistance.

[31] That temple priests were involved in adjudicating disputes between slaves and masters is suggested by Christensen (1984, 24; 26–7), on the basis of comparative evidence of similar cases

productively utilise their property (which included slaves themselves) in circumstances where a master could not feasibly do so themselves. As Kazakévich noted (1961, 3–7), there were two ways for a slave-owner to do so, which correspond to the categories of indirect and direct slave exploitation outlined in my first chapter.[32] One was to give slaves *de facto* ownership of property and draw a rent from them for its usage. Examples of this kind of exploitation will be discussed in the following chapter. The other was to allow slaves control over property, the benefits of which the slave in question had no right to in any sense. Such slaves would inevitably be in positions of trust; and we already have seen how such slaves were vital to certain aspects of the management of Athenian households in chapters two and three. The texts used as case studies in those chapters do not lend themselves to a discussion of financial management, but rather supervision of other slaves and organisation of the household.[33] In this section, however, I will expand on the conclusions made

[32] My discussion in this section owes much to Kazakévich's study. I find myself, however, in disagreement with her about some examples she cited as directly exploited slave agents. It seems clear to me, for example, that Midas the slave of Athenogenes (Hyperides, 4) controlled his own *de facto* property independently (16) and the case of Alke from Isaios 6 more debateably so too (19–21). My reasoning is explained above (69). Similarly the controversial case of Lampis, the slave of a man named Dion (Demosthenes, 34, 6; Kazakévich, 1961, 17–20), who is described as a *naukleros* — possibly meaning that he was a ship captain but probably meaning its owner (e.g. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 3.9.11) — and loans 1,000 drachmai of his own money (34.6). I do agree with Kazakévich's suggestion that Lampis' master Dion was probably not an Athenian (no demotic is provided in the speech) but a resident of another *polis* in the Pontus, where we are told there was much sorrow after Lampis' ship was shipwrecked (34.10). As Fisher (who argues that Lampis was a free metic) notes, it is significant that the speaker felt the need to state that Lampis lived in Athens (2008, 130).

[33] Some financial administration of the property entrusted them may well have been a feature of the *epitropoi* imagined in Xenophon's *Oikonomikos*. This was the case with the *vilicus* in Cato's *De Agricultura* (56) and was even true of certain slave drivers in the US South (Van DeBurg, 1979, 9; 12).

there through an examination of the use of slaves in household finances, with a specific focus on those who acted as their master's proxy in financial transactions.

In Chapter 1 (53–4), I discussed the case of a slave called Moschion (Demosthenes, 48.14–19). As we know from the lawcourt speech that preserves his story, Moschion was a slave who was trusted by his master Komon and was privy to his master's affairs, including the location of the household's savings. The speech does not refer to Moschion's role as a supervisor (which he may or may not have been) but it certainly implies he had a role in the household's administration. In Menander's *Aspis*, similarly, a slave called Daos demonstrates a detailed knowledge of the property and business relationships which his master had obtained as a mercenary abroad (194–200).[34] A slave of the banker Pasion knew the details of a financial agreement made by his master (Isokrates, 17.11). These sources show that slaves had an important role as organisers of financial matters. They do not directly state that slaves were involved in setting up or managing household relations between third parties, but there are reasons to think that slaves in their position were utilised as agents in this way. For example, a story about Perikles claimed that he entrusted the administration of the income and expenditures of his exceptionally large oikos to a slave, Euangelos (Plutarch, *Per.* 16.5). A large part of Euangelos' role must have involved overseeing transactions between Perikles' household and third parties.

Kazakévich (1961, 10–11) pointed out another example of slave agents from the corpus of Demosthenes (53). In this speech, Apollodoros (the speaker) attempts to demonstrate to a jury that two slaves named Kerdon and Manes are the property of his opponent, Arethousios, by describing the relationships which Arethousios had with the men (19–21). As well as describing how he came to possess them (19–20), Apollodorus describes how Arethousios profited from Kerdon's and Manes' labour. We are told that Arethousios received wages (*misthoi*) whenever Kerdos was rented out and

[34] Interestingly, he goes on the say that while these matters are within the proper remit of a slave, such matters as family marriages and inheritances are above his station to comment on (200–8; Cox, 2013, 163).

accepted legal liability for his actions while he was working for another (20). In this instance, Kerdon was clearly let out to another owner. Directly afterwards, however, Apollodoros says the following:

> Whenever they [the two slaves] bought up the produce of an orchard, or hired themselves out [or, hired others as laborers] [*misthointo*] to reap a harvest, or undertook any other piece of farming work, it was Arethousios who made the purchase or paid the wages [*misthoumenos*] on their behalf. (21, tr. Kazakévich, 2008, 379, parentheses in original).[35]

It is clear, in the first place, that Kerdos and Manes were responsible for buying crops on behalf of their master. However, the reference to renting is more difficult and has been taken in the past to mean that the slaves rented out their own labour (e.g. Perotti, 1976, 184–5) — an understandable assumption considering the reference to other farmwork in the following clause. This translation is also concurrent with the earlier statement regarding the collection of Kerdon's wages, but we might ask why Apollodoros would feel the need to repeat this statement. It may also be notable that in the earlier statement, it is only Kerdon who is said to have been earning wages. Kazakévich (1961, 10) points out that the verb *misthoō*, when used in the middle voice as here, never carries an intransitive meaning in extant literature.[36] Instead, the passage can be read as stating that Kerdon and Manes were renting or hiring something else — though what that might be is still unclear.[37] Regardless, this passage is interesting evidence for the use of slaves as commercial agents acting directly for their master.

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[35] ὁπότε … οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὗτοι ἢ ὁπώραν πρίαιντο ἢ θέρος μισθοῖντο ἐκθερίσαι ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν περὶ γεωργίαν ἔργων ἀναιροῖντο, Ἀρεθούσιος ἦν ὁ ὠνούμενος καὶ μισθούμενος ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν.

[36] I can find no evidence to the contrary. The active voice, often accompanied by a reflexive pronoun, is used instead (e.g. Demosthenes, 23.150; 18.21; 262).

[37] Kazakévich suggests that they were hiring labourers to harvest the aforementioned crops (ibid) and Valente (2013, 96) that they were hiring produce — though the exact meaning of this second proposal is a little unclear to my mind.

One considerable impediment to the direct involvement of Athenian property-owners in their business arrangements was the distance over which such transactions often took place. Overseas trade was one area in which distance required the use of intermediaries between Athenians and the third parties they dealt with. An interesting example comes from Demosthenes' *Against Phormion*, in which a metic by the name of Chrysippos (the speaker) describes how he invested in goods to be bought in Athens and delivered to the Pontus (34.6). On the ship with these goods, he sent a letter to both a friend and a slave of his who was wintering (*paracheimazonti*) in the Pontus, with details of the contract he had made and instructions to inspect the cargo (8). While slave-owners were away from Athens, they similarly used slaves to manage their transactions while abroad. This is evidenced in the case study provided below, which will serve as a means of outlining the practical side of using slave commercial agents and the reasons for their prominence in Athenian society.

4.2.1 Antigenes from Demosthenes' *Against Pantainetos*

In Demosthenes' speech *Against Pantainetos*, we are told that a slave called Antigenes took control of a silver-mining workshop which was partially owned by his master, when its lessee, Pantainetos, failed to pay the rent due on it (37.25). Antigenes, apparently, had also earlier seized from a slave of Pantainetos the money meant to be paid to the Athenian state for the leasing of the mine, which led to Pantainetos defaulting on this tax (22). Possibly for this reason and because the store was part-owned by some creditors whom Antigenes' master, Nikoboulos (the speaker), mentions only in passing (11–12), Pantainetos sued Nikoboulos for damages occurred during his forced removal from the workshop. The speech itself is a counter-indictment initiated by Nikoboulos.

According to Pantainetos, Antigenes was acting on the orders of his master. What is interesting about this story is that Nikoboulos claims to have been in the Pontus — probably on business — at the time of the dispute (6), and therefore denies culpability for his slave's actions (23; 25). Nikoboulos provides witnesses to the fact that he was abroad, and he must have needed someone

to manage his business arrangements while away. It seems clear that this is exactly what Antigenes was doing. For one thing, the issue of misappropriated tax can most easily be explained by suggesting that Antigenes was in charge of collecting the rent owed to Nikoboulos (MacDowell, 2004, 175). As to the seizure of the workshop, if Nikoboulos was outside of Athens at the time, it is unlikely that he ordered this action himself, though he may have left instructions for Antigenes to do so while he was away. Another possibility is that Antigenes did so largely on his own volition. This would have been an appropriate action for a default on the payment of rent, presuming his seizure of Pantainetos' tax payment was accidental (if he had mistaken it for the rent) or invented — and not deliberate.[38]

Nikoboulos attempts to shift the blame for the seizure of the mine not onto Antigenes himself, but onto Euergos, his partner in the ownership of the mine (23). Euergos had previously lost a suit brought against him by Pantainetos for the same charges brought against Nikoboulos (6-7). His involvement in this dispute therefore seems clear. So, however, does the involvement of Antigenes; it was he, rather than Euergos or one of the latter's agents, who initially stopped production in the workshop. The fact that Nikoboulos was also accused (while purportedly still in the Pontus) of stopping the slaves in the workshop from working indefinitely (37.26-7) and then processing and seizing the silver ore it had accumulated (28) suggests that Antigenes was involved in these events as well, although the speech does not say so. It was in Nikoboulos' interest to present the role of his slave as minimal. Part of his case is that responsibility for the seizure of the mine should lie squarely with Euergos (who had already been convicted and therefore had nothing to lose by these accusations). MacDowell has suggested that Euergos directed Antigenes in these actions (2004, 175), but if this is the case, Nikoboulos had ample opportunity to make this unequivocal and chose not to do so.

[38] This speculation explains the narrative of the speech without believing the rather dubious claim of Pantainetos (22) that the mine owners — or Antigenes himself — were conspiring against him.

Referring to Antigenes' role in reclaiming his master's property, Nikoboulos asks the jury: "but what citizen would give up his property to a slave" (50)?[39] We might ask this question today, the answer to which is likely to lie in the authority designated to Antigenes by his master. Indeed, Demosthenes' *Against Kallikles* preserves a comparable statement. In this speech, a slave and his master were both taken to court in separate cases for the construction of a wall that had caused property damage to their neighbour's property (above, 154). Arguing against the validity of two cases being initiated against his household, the speaker notes: "But really, what slave would enclose his master's property if his master hadn't ordered him to do it" (55.32, tr. Bers, 2003)? Presumably, however, the speaker's opponent believed that he could convince an Athenian jury that a slave might have had this level of control and so the story nevertheless highlights the independence with which slaves might have operated on their master's land, as argued in Chapter 3. These rhetorical questions seem likely to have been designed to obscure the independent authority with which different slaves operated on behalf of their masters. Nikoboulos was probably trying to exploit prejudices held by the jury against slaves, in order to suggest that his opponent's narrative of events was improbable and to make him appear feeble.

In other words, just as a slave could be left to manage the agricultural property of his master independently, others managed their master's financial arrangements with third parties, presumably under the mutual understanding that the slave represented his master's interests. This could be done either by introducing the slave to business partners, or by the use of some identifier that demonstrated the slave's agency for their master. Perhaps most obviously, a document with a

[39] Paley contended in his commentary on the speech that the speaker may here be referring either to Antigenes' seizure of the rent owed to the state (1898), or the seizure of the mine. The former appears to be the interpretation of MacDowell (2004), who translates "*tōn autou*" as "money. However, since it was another slave rather than Pantainetos himself who handed over the rent, it seems probable that Nikoboulos is referring to the seizure of the mine in this sentence.

particular seal — or a signet ring itself, would suffice.[40] As Lewis has pointed out (2018b, 174), a passage of Aristophanes describes the authority of a master designated to a servant by awarding him a signet ring (*Knights*, 947-8).[41] Nikoboulos possessed such a seal (40) and it may have been through this that he was able to designate enough authority to Antigenes to seize the mine in his absence.

Like early Roman law, that of ancient Athens appears not to have developed a legal concept of indirect agency (Harris, 2013b, 107–11; contra Cohen, 2018, ; 1992, 98–101), which meant that Athenians could not be held liable for a free agent's independent contracting with a third party. By extension, an agent had no legal authority to enter into such a contract for them, or to enforce its terms on behalf of a principal. The actions of slaves, on the other hand, were always the legal responsibility of their masters.[42] This made them particularly well suited to be business agents and, by the same token, the institution of slavery has often been seen as an inhibitor to the development of a concept of indirect agency in classical Athens and in Rome.[43] As we saw in Chapter 1, there were

[40] Plentiful literary and archaeological evidence demonstrates that rings with this function were very much a feature of classical Athenian society (Boardman, 2000, chapter 5; 446–7 on practical usages). There is not enough evidence to assess exactly how regularly households made use of such rings, however (237).

[41] In Plautus' *Pseudolus* (646–8), a slave is sent to make a prearranged purchase for his master with a letter and a token as evidence that he represents his principal. Whether or not this particular detail was taken from the play's Greek original, we cannot know.

[42] Harrison (1968, 173–4) has argued that slaves could be held separately liable from their master, as seems to be implied by Demosthenes (55.32; cf. 37.51; cf. Cohen, 2018, 59). Todd (1993, 187 n. 35) is more sceptical, and rightly so, because neither example states that a master would not be liable for these actions, as seems to be the explicit implication of a statement elsewhere in Demosthenes (53.20).

[43] Harris (2013a, 112). On the limitations of indirect agency in Roman law, its drawbacks, and the role slavery played in maintaining this system, see Aubert (1994, 46–50); Kirschenbaum (1987, chapter 1), though

other advantages to the use of trusted slaves in such positions, namely: a slave's dependence and identity were forcibly limited to the household of their master, who also held the power to punish slaves in any way they saw fit (above, 185–7).

The story of Antigenes demonstrates how a slave-owner might use his slaves to keep an eye on his business arrangements where he could not. A slave in this position, moreover, might be expected to take certain actions independently should the need arise and be given the authority to do so. In this way, Nikoboulos would have been able to maintain a vested and active interest in his business while he was away from Athens. It is probably at least partially for this reason that we find slaves with such an intimate knowledge of their master's affairs in ancient Athenian literature more generally.

4.2.2 Slave Agents in a Broader Context and their Lives

Athens (as far as we can tell) lacked the specific terminology that the Romans developed to demarcate slaves designated with different levels and areas of responsibility (Aubert, 1994, 1–2; 183–99). Indeed, a lack of distinct terminology of any kind applied to slave financial administrators hinders a succinct discussion of the topic (Kazakévich, 1961, 3).[44] Though the evidence is not clear on what exactly the role of different slaves entailed either, we can note, for example, the difference between the control over Perikles' household given to Euangelos and the limited responsibility awarded to Antigenes by Nikoboulos.

The primary persons responsible for the management of Athenian households were the heads of such households and their wives, and this seems to have been equally true of the management of

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measures were later taken to expand the actions an agent could legally take on behalf of his principal (Aubert, 1994, chapter 2, *passim*).

[44] The term *epitropos* or *epistatēs* might feasibly have been used, but where they survive, they seem to refer to positions with a more supervisory role (above, 49–52).

finances and commercial contracts. The most elite of classical Athenian households were not comparable in size to their counterparts in the Roman Empire; by far the majority of *oikoi* could feasibly be managed by its free members — though in certain cases only with the occasional help of slaves. Nikoboulos was clearly the primary manager of his financial interests and Antigenes, for the most part, appears only as a temporary representative of his interests. The case of Kerdon and Manes (above, 189–90) may also suggest that for many slaves, overseeing financial transactions for their master was not a full-time job but a temporary responsibility performed alongside other work — including (in this case) wage labour. It was, furthermore, Kerdon and Manes' master who was depicted as ultimately responsible for making the purchases which they oversee.

There are particular situations, however, in which the direct role of a master in forming or overseeing these relationships would have been less feasible than others. Though we might question Euangelos' exact historicity owing to the lateness of Plutarch as a source, Perikles' exceptional political career and in particular his 15-year stint as a general (Plutarch, *Per.* 16.3) provides a good explanation for why he would delegate so much control over his financial matters to a slave. Some significant control over the collection of payments and control of outgoing expenditures is probably implicit in the example of Moschion (above, 53–4; 188–9) too. Such an arrangement would be advantageous for his master, especially considering Komon's old age and the fact that he remained head of a large amount of property.

In other words, a time-consuming political career or the difficulties of old age might give rise to a situation in which slaves were designated particular responsibility over the affairs of the household, including its finances. The demands of politics, military service, and the pursuit or leisure, are other reasons why an Athenian would want to remove themselves from the responsibility of financial administration, which apply to the use of slaves in positions of trust more generally and have been discussed in Chapter 1 (section 1.1.1). As is frequently the case, our evidence points to a variety of strategies dependent on different circumstances.

We know very little about the lives of slave agents, but they should be considered reasonably skilled workers. An ability to balance books and to read and write would have been helpful, if not crucial, to their work.[45] Additionally, it is worth restating that their masters must have held large amounts of trust in them. Of course, other agents could be used to monitor the actions of slaves, if masters did not feel absolutely sure of their loyalty. Family were no doubt one such source of supervision, as were free contacts outside the household. It is telling that Chrysippos from Demosthenes' *Against Phormion* contacted a friend as well as his slave when he needed his cargo examined in the Pontus (Demosthenes, 34.6). Another source was different slaves, who may have been happy to inform on their fellows if they thought it could elevate their own position. According to Theophrastus, *The Distrustful Man* (*Apistos*) will send a second slave to market to check that another is paying a reasonable price (18.2), though this is portrayed as unreasonable behaviour.

Nevertheless, positive incentives, including material possessions, family, and the promise of freedom, as well as the threat of punishment, should be considered vital to these arrangements too. This is especially true of slaves awarded particularly noteworthy control over the household, like Euangelos and Moschion. As Auber notes of the Roman *actores*, who oversaw the financial administration of their master's household, the possibility of them cheating their master was both considerable and costly. Consequently, "good faith on the part of the manager was always expected and sometimes acknowledged. Conversely, drastic punishment was meted out to those who succumbed to the temptation" (1994, 190). As no details of his fate have been passed down to us, we have no idea how Antigenes' master reacted to his actions. In this regard, the case of Moschion is more instructive. As we are told, Moschion took advantage of his privileged position to take money from his master's savings (Demosthenes, 48.15), showing the possibility for a slave in a position of trust to use this position to their benefit, contrary to that of their master.

[45] They must also have been able to speak Greek. Only slaves living in Athens for several years were likely to have been used as agents.

We know of Moschion's embezzlement today because he was suspected of it and had the truth tortured out of him by the inheritors of Komon's estate after his death (16-8). Harris is right to point to Moschion's torture as indicative of one way in which slaves in positions of trust could be incentivised not to cheat or mismanage the property of their owners in a way that free workers could not: by their subjection to coercive interrogation and severe corporal punishment (2002, 83).[46] Also worth noting is the fact that another reason for designating responsibility may have been to make the process of assigning blame easier — it was probably Moschion's privileged position relative to his old master that gave him away. We may, however, question the ability of slave-owners to always discover the (possibly subtler) mismanagement of their affairs by their slaves. The carrot, as well as the stick, was therefore vital to relationships of this kind. Nevertheless, Moschion's story also illustrates the transience of such slave positions, in that any relationship of trust built between master and slave was secure only so long as the master held ownership over the slave.[47] Neither was there any guarantee that the same master might allow a slave to remain in such a position either, if their circumstances and disposition altered over time.

[46] The master's power to punish his slave was near-absolute (above, 185–6), but this was not true of freepersons, who had recourse to the city's courts. See further Hunter (2000, 8-10) on status distinctions in Athens' penal law.

[47] Personal relationships between the slave and their owner's friendship group and wider family could well have mitigated occurrences such as these. Many slaves in positions of trust would also have been manumitted on the death of their owner and their *de facto* ownership of certain possessions and monies guaranteed in their deceased owner's will. Aristotle, for example, provided his slave Ambracis with the promise of 500 drachmae and the "servant girl she already has" (Diogenes Laertius, 5.14, cf. 5.54; 72-73). Other slaves, however, were not manumitted, and Moschion appears to have been amongst their number. Potential difficulty in establishing the status of slaves after their owner's death (and whether or not they could therefore be inherited) is suggested by a fragment of Isaeus (Fr. 18, Forster, 1927).

The privileged position of slave agents was inherently insecure. Earning the indemnity of their master could result in its revocation at any point — and the consequences of such a revocation were dire. Antigenes' actions on behalf of his master could easily have dissatisfied his master, but assuming he believed his actions were justified, he probably acted under the assumption that his *inaction* would have had this result. A comparable situation can be found in one of Jesus' parables in the gospel of Matthew, in which a slave is punished for preserving money left to him by his master while the latter was abroad, instead of investing it (25.14–30). There is also the fact that, as a witness of the events the speech describes, Antigenes was purportedly offered for torture by his master (43). Supposedly, the opposition refused Nikoboulos' challenge to do so — and we have reasons to question whether Antigenes was ever in any real danger.[48] Nevertheless, it is clear that being privy to their master's arrangements put slaves in a vulnerable position as potential informers (Hunter, 1994, 71–90).[49]

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to juxtapose two remarkably different types of direct slave exploitation, which utilised slave labour for different reasons and created two very distinct experiences of slavery. On the one hand, high demand for the product of simple and undifferentiated labour led to slaves being exploited in conditions which required no incentives beyond pain. In stark contrast to this first strategy, I have argued that the use of slaves as commercial agents not only required them to be independently reliable but also benefited from slaves' ability to use their human intuition and

[48] For the torturing of slaves for testimonies and the controversy surrounding its actual application to slaves, above (157, n. 41).

[49] Whatever the likelihood of their regularly being tortured (which may have been higher were a master unhappy with them), from the speeches of Antiphon we find a case of a slave witness being purchased from his owner and murdered by those whom he might incriminate with his evidence (5.34–6; 47).

ingenuity. This provided certain slaves with a measure of power to shape a better life — usually in collaboration with their master but sometimes in direct opposition to his interests.

Nevertheless, their position was extremely precarious for a number of reasons and the ultimate power still lay with their master. Indeed, the threat of violence was key in enforcing the domination of the master over his slaves in both strategies, even if it is more easily apparent in the case of mill slaves. Moschion's story demonstrates this well. Though we are not told what eventually became of him or Antigenes, considering the prominence of mills in discussions of slave punishment, there is a chance that this is where one or both of them ended up. Even if slave status never actually resulted in being subjected to a mill or some other form of pain-incentivised labour, being put in such a position was always a possibility for those of slave status alone.

The significance of this fact was not lost on contemporary Athenians. Apollodoros asserted that his stepfather Phormion, a manumitted slave banker, should have been placed in a mill for his mismanagement rather than awarded his freedom and control of the bank, as he had been (45.33). Elsewhere in the same speech, Apollodoros offers a lengthy attack of Phormion's status as an ex-slave (71–86) and it is not for nothing that he reminds the jury of the fact that, under different circumstances, Phormion could have lived out his life in a mill (Trevett, 1992, 174–5). The vulnerability to performing painful and degrading millwork would have been a powerful symbol of the second-class status of which slavery consisted.

This, then, was one consequence of denying a certain cross-section of Athens' population the rights that other members of its society possessed: labour could be utilised for manual tasks at the lowest possible cost for other members of society, though at a tremendously high cost for Athens' slaves. Because of this fact, other slaves could be provided a choice: either to risk suffering a fate like that of mill slaves, or to enjoy a more comfortable life by acting to the best of their abilities in their master's interests. As I argued at the end of section 4.1.2, Athenians expected nothing less than this from their slaves and any action to the contrary justified a violent response — or condemnation to brutal

exploitation — in their eyes. In this way, although these strategies were remarkably different, they were inextricably linked within the wider framework of Athens' slave system.

Chapter 5

Indirect Exploitation: Slaving for Rent Extraction

In Chapter 1 (1.1.2), I argued that we can identify indirect exploitation as a particular set of slaving strategies, which had in common the slave-owner's wish to exploit their slaves for a monetary return with minimal personal investment in their businesses. In strategies of this kind, the master temporarily sacrificed their right to the labour of the slave, in return for a payment. There was, moreover, significant diversity within this subset of strategies. Even though indirect slaving strategies had very similar overall goals, differences between their implementation had important implications for the lives of the slaves subjected to them.

Indirect exploitation strategies can be divided into two distinct categories: 1.) the renting of slaves to a third party and 2.) allowing slaves to work independently on the condition that they made a payment (*apophora*) to their masters. My first section will examine the first of these categories and my second and third sections will examine two distinct examples of the second. Each section begins by summarising some of the main evidence for the group of strategies in question but goes on to focus primarily on a particularly instructive case study. In consecutive subsections, we will examine the slaving strategy applied to a particular slave or (in section two) a slave family, then discuss how this strategy affected the life of the slave/s, and briefly contextualise the conclusions drawn from these specific case studies within a wider group of slaving strategies.

5.1 Leasing and Renting Slaves

There is considerable evidence, much of which we have already discussed, for classical Athenians leasing slaves to a third party in return for a payment (*misthos*). In Chapter 1 we noted literary sources from the fifth century BC to the late fourth pointing to a market for the renting of slaves as porters and attendants, in addition to cases of slaves who were rented out on a more permanent

basis to others who made use of their labour (36–7). On the basis of comparative evidence, I further suggested in Chapter 3 that families who could not afford to buy a slave outright might have rented one to help with the household's domestic production. There is no contemporary evidence to support such a claim (though see Theophrastus' *Aneleutheros*, who hires an attendant for his wife: above, 31), but neither is there any clear evidence for what one would think was the most common context in which slaves were hired — for agricultural labour during the busy periods of the agricultural year, particularly the harvest.[1]

In a property list from an inheritance speech of Isaios (8.35), we are told that one Kiron left to his heirs a number of *andrapoda misthophorounta* — literally "slaves earning wages". This phrase, which is also used by the Old Oligarch (1.17), is often viewed as a discernible category of slaves (Perotti, 1974; Kazakévich, 2008, 349–50; 353–4), though it is unclear whether contemporary Athenians used it in this way. Both passages in which we find it might simply use *andrapoda misthophorounta* as a way of describing how the slave-owners in question drew an income from these slaves.[2] In as much as *andropoda misthophorounta* nevertheless did represent a distinct group of slaves, it seems prudent to distinguish between those who were occasionally rented out to supplement work for their master, those who were rented out to contractors for their labour on a regular basis (e.g. porters and attendants), and those who were rented out as part of a more permanent arrangement.

This final subcategory is particularly interesting because, in the vast majority of cases, the third party who rented the slave would have been responsible for feeding, housing, and coercing him/her to perform their labour on a daily basis. The enslaved person, in these instances, would have little to no regular contact with their owner and the third party would, to all practical purposes, function as the

[1] Though see a possible example above (Demosthenes, 53.19; 189–90).

[2] Compare Euphiletos' "θεράπαιναν τὴν εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν βαδίζουσαν" (above, 146).

slave's master. I examine this particular strategy in this section, through discussion of a letter written by a slave, which will facilitate an examination of some of its more unique aspects.

5.1.1 Lesis' Letter

A personal letter, written on lead, discovered in a well in the Athenian agora, and dated to the fourth century BC, provides a fascinating glimpse into the life of a slave named Lesis, from whom the letter was addressed.[3] I quote Harris' translation (2004, 157):

> Lesis is sending [this] to Xenokles and his mother (asking) that they by no means overlook that he is perishing in the foundry but that they come to his masters (*despotai*) and that they have something better found for him. For I have been handed over to a thoroughly wicked man; I am perishing from being whipped; I am tied up; I am treated like dirt — more and more.

From the letter, we can gather that Lesis is employed in a foundry (*ho chalkeos*), which may feasibly refer to any form of metal-working (Jordan, 2000, 97), under the "wicked man" he mentions, who subjects him to severe treatment. Clearly, this is part of some arrangement out of Lesis' control, as indicated by his request that his mother and a man named Xenokles convince his *despotai* to find something better for him.

Lesis' name is not Attic, and Jordan argued in the letter's *editio princeps* that he was a metic apprentice to the foundry keeper (one of the *despotai* mentioned in the inscription or someone under their employ) on the basis that he believes himself (through his mother and Xenokles) to have some ability to alter his conditions (ibid. 97–8). Harris, however, has convincingly argued that Lesis was a slave, largely because *despotēs*, when used to describe the relationship of a person to

[3] On the dating of the letter and its discovery, see the remarks of its initial publisher, Jordan (2000, 93–5).

another, is restricted to the master of a slave (2004; Harvey, 2007). Under his interpretation, Lesis has been given to the foundry by those who retain ownership over him — the *despotai*. Lesis clearly thought that his mother and Xenokles had enough influence with his masters to help him: a possibility which Jordan himself could not discount (2000, 97). As to Xenokles' relation to Lesis and his mother, Harris is probably right that he could not be Lesis' father, since he is not addressed as such, and suggests that he may be his mother's new master or *prostates*, if she had been freed (2004, 163). He notes that he might also be simply a friend of hers too — I would suggest that he may have been another slave in Lesis' household, one in a position of trust who had particular influence with their masters.[4]

The reference to plural *despotai* is curious and is as of yet uncommented on. One would expect that a single *despotēs*, the head of Lesis' household, would be the one to whom pleas for a better set of circumstances would be addressed. The multiple masters may refer to the head of the household and his free relatives — a wife or sons, perhaps.[5] It may also refer to Lesis' joint ownership by multiple households, for which there is some evidence in classical Athens (above, 166). There is, in fact, much that we cannot say for certain about Lesis' condition from this brief letter, a fact which will become apparent as this discussion progresses. Through certain logical inferences, however, we can narrow down our interpretations to a few possibilities. Even if a single understanding is impossible, we can draw some interesting observations on the particular slaving strategy to which Lesis was subjected.

An important question to ask is who wrote the letter; Lesis, or someone else? Harris appears to take it as a given that Lesis did and cites examples of literate slaves to strengthen his point (2004, 160–1). However, though the possibility of Lesis' literacy is not surprising in light of his legal status, it *is*

[4] The fact that the letter is addressed to them both suggests that "they are… living at the same address, or... are in regular contact" (Harvey, 2007, 50).

[5] On the role of women in household property management, above (116).

surprising in light of his circumstances. The letter is well-composed and, if Lesis did write it, this would indicate that his master had allowed him significant time and resources during his upbringing to learn letters — a surprising assumption if he intended to put him in a foundry.[6] On the other hand, Jordan argues that Lesis had a scribe write the letter — a fair proposition and one that he argues is supported by comparative evidence from Roman Egypt and marks left on the letter cuts, which suggest the tool used for the inscription was a *stilus* normally used for writing in ink (2000, 93). He also notes that the text describes its sender in the third person, although this may merely be a convention of address.[7]

If Harris is right, then this letter gives cause to reflect on the importance of literacy not just in classical Athens generally, but also as a feature of its slave system.[8] Literacy would certainly have been a valuable skill for a slave to possess, crucial as it was to those who acted as agents for their masters or who otherwise managed their households. Accordingly, slave-owners may well have generally seen the education of slaves as a way to increase the potential value of their human property. The suggestion that Lesis had someone else write the letter raises its own questions. If it was a professional scribe as Jordan suggests, how did Lesis find the means to hire him or the time to visit him, especially considering his claim that he was regularly being forcibly restrained? I provide some further speculation on this point further below.

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[6] A fragment of the fourth-century comedian Theophilos implies that learning letters was a special privilege for a slave (fr. 1, K-A with Harris, 1989, 111 n. 207).

[7] We do not possess enough personal letters to hypothesise on this point. The only other two from classical Athens that have been published follow the same pattern, but this may indicate that scribes composed these too. Thomas, similarly, expresses uncertainty that the letter is written by Lesis (2009, 25).

[8] An older argument for limited literacy amongst the Athenian population (Harris, 1989, chapter 4) has been questioned by scholars who believe that it was an important feature of Athens' society and that of other Greek democracies (Missiou, 2011; Pébarthe, 2006).

Lesis presumably made a labour contribution of some kind to the foundry and, in return, his masters received some benefits on their part. What that contribution was and what benefits Lesis' master received remain unclear. As Harris states, the fact that Lesis was a slave does not discount the possibility that he was there to learn a trade in exchange for helping around the workshop — as a slave apprentice, so to speak (2004, 161). There are no comparable examples from classical Athens, but, be that as it may, it is a logical possibility and would provide interesting evidence for how slave-owners sought to increase the skillset of their slaves and thereby their value.[9]

However, the notion that Lesis was an apprentice was proposed by Jordan to explain the former's lack of power to change the arrangement he was in. It is also connected to the fact that Lesis is thought to have been quite young (Jordan, 2000, 93 n. 10), perhaps primarily on his identification of Lesis as an apprentice, but also possibly inferred from his appeal to his mother. Yet, in light of the likelihood that Lesis was a slave, I see no reason to think that he could not have been an adult, who still may have seen his mother as someone who might have the influence that he did not to alter his situation.

Lesis might equally have been hired by the foundry head for money returned to his masters (Harris, 2004, 161). We have seen that, in contrast to slave apprenticeships, there is good evidence for this strategy, including two examples of craft slaves rented by manufacturing operations managed by Demosthenes' guardians (27.20; 28.12). The fact that Lesis was hired make it unlikely that he worked independently and returned an *apophora* to his masters.[10] This, coupled with his punishment, suggests that his temporary master supervised him closely in a relationship of direct exploitation. Our evidence for the direct employment (as opposed to rent extraction) of slaves in classical Athens' manufacturing sectors is surprisingly thin, as discussed at various points in Chapters 1 through 3.

[9] For the value of skilled labour reflected in slave prices, above (section 1.3.1).

[10] The same applies to the slaves rented by Demosthenes' guardians, who worked under a freedman supervisor (below, 228).

Lesis' letter is excellent evidence of one slaving strategy open to craftsmen who needed extra labour for their business: to arrange for temporary rights to a slave.

It would be useful to know in exactly what capacity Lesis was exploited in this foundry. He may have already been a trained metalworker. If he was literate, he may even have been rented partially to help keep inventory and balance books. He might also have been hired to perform unskilled labour around the workshop. One is tempted to think that the particularly violent coercion he was subjected to is indicative of his use in a less skilled occupation, based on the model put forward by Fenoaltea (above, 63–4). However, though this model, I would argue, does reflect broad structural trends, it seems naïve to assume that slaves who were exploited for skilled labour were never coerced with extreme violence.

5.1.2 Slaves let out on Hire and Natal Alienation

In the short time (comparatively speaking) since the publication of this letter in 2000 and the identification of Lesis as a slave, scholars have pointed to several ways in which it can shed light on our picture of Athenian slavery. Perhaps above all, the letter is unusual in representing the actual words of an Athenian slave.[11] Not only that, but it gives us a first-hand account of an experience of slavery — one that demonstrates the brutality to which slaves were subjected (Harvey, 2007). Legally speaking, it is evidence that a third party hiring a slave retained the right to discipline them severely if they saw fit (Lewis, 2018b, 45). On this point, I would note that it strengthens the arguments of Kazakévich and Perotti that slaves rented to another master were distinct from those who worked independently in return for an *apophora* (above, 37). In respect to the daily control exerted over them by a party with rights to their person, slaves in a comparable position to that of Lesis were no different to slaves exploited directly by their masters. In other respects, however, they

[11] The epitaph of Atotas is another rare exception (below, 244).

were. This is reflected in the other main conclusion scholars have drawn from this letter, to which we will now turn.

In formulating his sociological definition of slavery, Patterson identified natal alienation, the "alienation of the slave from all formal, legally enforceable ties of 'blood' and from any attachment to groups or localities other than those chosen for him by the master" (1982, 7), as one of its main criteria. This aspect of slavery can be seen clearly in Lesis' conditions; as Harris notes, it documents the forced separation of a son from her mother, a situation neither has the authority to remedy without recourse to Lesis' masters (2004, 164). The renting of slaves, like the sale of slaves, was likely to have separated slaves from their family, friends, or whatever community they may have managed to form. In his contribution to a recent introduction to ancient Greece textbook, Tordoff similarly uses the letter of Lesis to examine the powerlessness of Athenian slaves. As he writes, "slavery has broken Lesis's family apart and that his owners treat him — entirely legally — as a source of money, to be put out for hire with little or no concern for his well-being" (Tordoff, 2017, 218; 221–2).

However, as I indicated in my introduction, I find Patterson's insistence on the total applicability of natal alienation to be somewhat misleading. Lesis' letter does detail the lack of legal rights which slaves had to their familial bonds, but it equally makes clear that these bonds existed. Moreover, though Lesis is in a position which highlights his legal status as property, his human agency is evident from the letter just as his humanity is evident from his ties to his mother. For whatever it is worth, Lesis believed that his mother and Xenokles at the very least *may* have been able to protect him from some of the worst excesses allowed by Athens' slave system. Though we cannot be certain whether Lesis' belief was realistic, it is worth considering the connection which enslaved persons who were rented out would often have retained with their owners and their household — in which

they sometimes would have been raised or lived for a considerable time.[12] These connections would obviously have remained and would have been desirable for slave-owners who retained an interest in the slave as their property. It may even be the case that Lesis was able to write the letter or dictate it to a scribe because his masters, his mother, or Xenokles, had deliberately provided a way for him to contact home.

Of course, an interest in slaves as property would only have gone so far towards mitigating abuse. Irreparable damage was likely to have drawn a serious response from the slave's owner, but otherwise many would probably not have cared enough to intervene and risk losing their monetary return on the slave. Comparable cases to that of Lesis are recorded in *The Narrative of William W. Brown, a Fugitive Slave*, from the 19th-century USA. Brown remembered how, when his master was residing in St. Louis, "I was also hired out there to Major Freeland, who kept a public house… There were ten or twelve servants in the house, and when [Freeland] was present, it was cut and slash — knock down and drag out. In his fits of anger, he would take up a chair, and throw it at a servant; and in his more rational moments, when he wished to chastise one, he would tie them up in the smoke-house, and whip them; after which, he would cause a fire to be made of tobacco stems, and smoke them" (chapter 3). Like Lesis, Brown complained to his master "of the treatment which I received from Major Freeland; but it made no difference. He cared nothing about it, so long as he received the money for my labour". Brown knew of another slave called Aaron who likewise made a complaint to his master about his mistreatment at the hands of a man who had hired him, which similarly fell on deaf ears (ibid.).

[12] Jordan (2000, 92–3) follows Vinogradov (1971, 95–6) in believing that the lead letters that we have were thrown away before being delivered, as otherwise the lead sheet would have been reused. The reuse of materials is a good explanation for why we have so few letters, but I see no reason to assume that the letter might have been thrown out after having been delivered, for whatever reason (Harvey, 2007, 150).

Like Brown and Aaron, Lesis may have overestimated the kindness of his masters. In certain cases, however, slave-owners may have been more protective over their slaves. In the early modern USA, we might point to a paternalistic ethos as a possible reason for masters (occasionally) to intercede on behalf of their abused slaves, and comparable lines of thought existed in ancient Greece too.[13] Again, cruel treatment of slaves is a documented feature of Athenian society but, as I argued in Chapter 4, this sometimes appears to have needed justification from those who administered it. I imagine that violent treatment of slaves would be far easier for slave-owners to justify in their own behaviour but (since these justifications were illogical) would be less so in the actions of someone else — particularly if the slave-owner and the renter of the slave were not well acquainted. At the same time, we might postulate that cruel treatment was more likely to be meted out to rented slaves by their temporary owner, who did not hold an interest in their person as property. Lesis' story, like the account of William Brown, certainly supports this suggestion.

5.1.3 Other *Andrapoda Misthophorountes*

The case of Lesis provides insight into the lives of slaves who were rented for lengthy periods of time. As we have seen, however, in the category of slaves whose labour was rented from their master, there was much variety. Unlike Lesis, slaves who were rented for a brief period of time would presumably have resided with their master or in some accommodation he provided for them. They would, accordingly, have been more regularly able to associate with any kin in the household and their masters would probably take the more regular responsibility for disciplining them or otherwise coercing them to perform the labour required of them. Of course, owners always retained

[13] Plato thought that treating slaves overly cruelly was disadvantageous for their master (*Leg.* 6.777a–b; cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, 2.1269b.10–11; Fisher, 1995, 58–61) and Xenophon favoured positive rewards in his *Oikonomikos* (above, section 1.2.1).

the ultimate legal responsibility for the actions of their slaves (Demosthenes, 53.20; Lewis, 2018b, 47), which probably translated into practical responsibility for their actions, even if not on a daily basis. The right to sell a rebellious slave and doubtless the right to punish them in the most egregious of ways would have been retained solely by their master, too.

In many ways, this brand of indirect slavery was not all that different to direct slavery, with the exception that the person who exploited the slave directly did not have ownership over their person. In many ways, the effects it had on the lives of slaves (their subjection to close supervision and violence) would not have been substantially different either. However, Lesis' letter demonstrates some peculiar features of a more long-term strategy of this type. Most notably, this strategy disrupted slave family and community. It was similar in this regard to the sale of slaves, though its effects were not as total or permanent.

Either way, and whatever his masters might have thought about his circumstances, in Lesis' attempt to gain help we can see the semblance of an identity, complete with natal ties from which he could hope to find support. Noteworthy is William Brown's emphasis on the value he put on his familial ties which, despite considerable practical difficulties, he maintained while being rented to several different owners (esp. chapter 4). Legally unrecognised and frequently disrupted though these ties might be, they existed and should not be overlooked.

5.2 *Apophora* Paying Slaves

Many slaves and slave families, as we saw in Chapter 1, worked independently of their masters and provided them a portion of their earnings. Some of these worked in large operations, such as the shoemakers inherited by Timarchos (Aeschines, 1.97), which will be discussed in more detail in the following section. As we know from a handful of examples, however, other slaves worked on their own or in an independent family unit. In Hyperides' *Against Athenogenes*, we learn of an

independent perfume business run by a slave, who had a number of sons. A shoemaker called Aristarchos, whose sale is recorded in the Attic Stelai, is another example. Aristarchos was sold along with several pieces of furniture which are listed as belonging to him. This indicates his ability to acquire property which, though legally the property of his master, could be conceived of in a non-technical sense as belonging to him (*IG* I^3 426, 24–39; Pritchett and Pippin, 1956, 281). His ownership of furniture, moreover, strongly suggests that he was living and operating independently. Perhaps the most extended example of an individual, independent slave operation comes from Menander's *Epitrepontes* and will now be analysed as a case study of this particular slaving strategy.

5.2.1 Syriskos and his Wife in Menander's *Epitrepontes*

In *Epitrepontes* a slave who works as a charcoal burner stumbles into the action of the play along with his wife in order to pay an *apophora* to his master Chairestratos.[14] Though he is a fictional character, his portrayal was almost certainly drawn from real-life slaves. Antiquity credited Menander's plays with reflection of reality; there is a famous quote by Aristophanes of Byzantium on the matter: "O Menander and Life, which of you took the other as its model?" (Menander, test. 83 K-A). Another, by the Roman rhetorician Quintilian, is equally telling; "so perfect is [Menander's] representation of actual life" (*Institutio Oratio*, 10.1.69).

Of course, these writers were probably referring more to "the types or classes of characters or behaviour that gave Menandrean comedy its familiar qualities of stylised verisimilitude", rather than implying "that his plays are realistic in any direct or immediate sense" (Halliwell, 2002, 288). Indeed, allowances should be made for any exaggeration or distortion of reality to drive the plot of *Epitrepontes*, and to provide the laughter which was, after all, the main purpose of comedy.

[14] Syriskos' status as a slave is demonstrated in line 469, his occupation in line 257, his relationship with his "wife" (*gyne*) in line 269, and his payment of the *apophora* in line 380.

Nevertheless, Menander's plays appear to take place in a setting meant to represent a realistic backdrop of contemporary Athens. What is more, Menander could feasibly have made Syriskos and his wife freedmen, or poor metics.[15] Much of the reason for picking the characters he did, I would think, was that they reflected types of persons one might feasibly find in real-life Athens.

Modern scholars accordingly believe that as long as due caution is maintained, Menander's portrayal of his slaves "can… help us to imagine and reconstruct the life experiences of real slaves in Athens" (Bathrellou, 2014, 44; cf. Proffitt, 2001, 158–61). Or, as Golden puts it, "Syriskos had real-life analogues" (2011, 144). By examining Menander's portrayal of a slave couple living in his fictional construction of Athens, therefore, we can draw attention to how the real-life slaving strategy it reflects might have worked in practice.

The argument that Syriskos and his wife were intended to be a realistic depiction of a rural slave couple fits well with the occupation they are given. Charcoal was a product consistently in demand in classical Athens, and charcoal burning was accordingly a common profession of those who lived outside Athens' urban centres (Olson, 1991, 412).[16] As a fuel source, charcoal was not only preferable to firewood but was also crucial to the processes of smelting and metal-working.[17] Furthermore, the materials necessary for charcoal burning (primarily wood and earth) could be freely acquired around a rural estate, making it a source of income that required little capital overlay and was therefore "well suited to the very low-level entrepreneur" (Olson, 1991, 413). It would,

[15] Importantly, the status of the baby (a citizen heir) they adopt would still have been in danger, thus keeping the conflict of the play intact.

[16] The eponymous Acharnians who form the chorus of Aristophanes' play are characterised as charcoal burners (994–9; cf. Philullios, fr. 13 K-A; Andokides, fr. 4) and in the same play charcoal is listed along with vinegar and oil as an example of commodities which the protagonist Dikaiopolis is tired of being harassed to buy (34-5).

[17] Particularly in iron-working, which has a higher melting point than copper, silver, or gold, since charcoal burns at a higher temperature and is more easily controlled (Veal, 2013, 45).

equally, be well suited to a rent-paying slave, whose master would not need to invest in their equipment with the exception of land in a rural location with easy access to wood. An Athenian who supervised the production of a farmstead or an estate may have directly exploited the labour of slaves towards charcoal production. An Athenian with a small and distant piece of land near forests could also earn a regular income from its possession by placing a slave charcoal-burner on it.

As I noted in Chapter 1 (40), distance between an area in which a slave was exploited and his master's residency was a key factor in informing the development of indirect slaving strategies. We might now consider this point in a little more detail, in light of comparative studies that highlight distance as a factor in the development of societal slaving systems. Woods, for example, explores how the issue of distance affected the divergent development of ancient Athenian and Spartan slavery (1982, esp. 205-8). She argued that the large distance between helot farms throughout the southern half of the Peloponnese, often far away from their owners in Sparta, fashioned a form of slavery which provided them with notable autonomy in their daily lives. In Athens, contrastingly, Woods saw the more limited geographical area in which slavery was contained as responsible for a more closely controlled slave population.

While it may be true that helots were usually more independent from the regular supervision of their masters than the average Athenian slave, this comparison paints a rather simplistic picture of both forms of slavery. As well as the rent-paying slaves in Athens, there are references to helots employed in households and personal service in and around Sparta, explicitly under the direct control of their masters (Hodkinson, 1997, 46–53; Paradiso, 1997).

This is not to devalue the conclusion of Woods on how the practicalities of different forms of control — of which distance is undoubtedly a very important factor — might affect different forms of slave exploitation. Instead, her discussion, which seeks to examine slave populations by their distance to a ruling, political power centre, can be redirected to accommodate a model seeking to explain diversity within, rather than between, different slave systems. A power centre may comprise a state,

but it may also be a community, a household, or an individual slave owner. Hodkinson has also argued that distance played a key role in determining the rent-based system of helot slavery in Messenia. On the basis of additional comparative evidence, he argued that helots exploited on estates in and around the Eurotas valley, however, might feasibly be exploited through more direct means (2008, 302–9).[18]

The separation of Syriskos and his wife from their master's urban household is clear from the play; he lives far enough away to warrant him and his wife staying in his master's house during their visit (378–9).[19] As such, their story is evidence of a slaving strategy that sought to exploit slave labour in an area distant from their master, on a scale that was unsuited to supervising it himself or directing supervision by employing an overseer. In addition to the fact that establishing a system of rent payments allowed a slave to function independently, by allowing them to possess whatever surplus remained, it also provided slaves a financial incentive that obviated the need for their close supervision. This made the *apophora* an excellent tool for exploiting slaves at long distances.[20]

Another reference to an *apophora* comes from the corpus of Andokides, which describes a man named Diokleides journeying from Athens to the district of Laurion to collect the payment from a slave there. The distance between master and his slave is clear in this source too — though, unlike Syriskos' master, Diokleides travelled to his slave to collect his rent rather than having his slave come to him. The reasonable assumption that many modern scholars have made is that the slave is a miner, because of his residency in Athens' mining region, although the speech does not say so and

[18] On Spartan landholdings, Hodkinson (2000, 135–45).

[19] Syriskos' separation from his master's *oikos* is further emphasised when Onemisos, the slave of Chairestratos' neighbour, does not recognise him (Cox, 2013, 169).

[20] Indeed, Plutarch called the payment made by the helots to their Spartan masters an *apophora* (*Mor.* 239e), though Ducat argued that this is likely to have been "a concept developed in the Hellenistic period… with the intention of presenting a favourable image of 'Lycurgan' Helotism" (2002, 204; 202-3).

Diokleides could feasibly have employed the slave in another trade catering to the large population that would have resided in Laurion at the time.[21] Nevertheless, for those who wished to invest in silver mining through the exploitation of slave labour, there was little flexibility about where these slaves could work. This is why, no doubt, so many recovered leases for silver mines were made by Athenians living near the *polis'* silver deposits in southern Attica (Osborne, 1985, 112–3). Regardless of whether Diokleides' slave was involved in mining, several strategies of indirect exploitation *were* formulated to exploit slaves in Athens' silver mines, as will be discussed in section 5.3.

Returning to Syriskos and his wife, we might ask how the union between the two came to be. Slave marriages themselves are attested in our evidence, though we do not know how common they were. We have already noted the slave family belonging to Midas, who, like Syriskos and his wife, operated an independent business. In the opening scene of Menander's *Heros*, a slave describes his desire to marry a woman in his master's household:

> Daos: She's really noble-minded, Getas, modest too.
>
> Getas: So what about you? What are you doing about it?
>
> Daos: In secret, by Heracles, I have not approached her, but I have spoken to my master, and he has promised me that she will be given to live with me when he has spoken about it with her brother.
>
> (*Heros,* 40–45)

In this passage, Daos says that his master has promised him permission to live with her (*sunoikiein*), a verb which, though ambiguous in its direct meaning, was used to describe legally binding marriages between citizens (Patterson 1991, 56–9) and can be translated as "to marry". Similarly,

[21] E.g. Kamen (2016, 417); Lauffer (1979, 107–8); additional references above (35 n. 27) and cf. also above (185 n. 25) on the problems with over-associating evidence from the region with mining.

Syriskos' description of the woman he lives with as his *gunē* (269), which technically means woman, also carries the meaning of a legitimate wife in the context of citizens' unions. It is striking that Menander makes no linguistic distinction between these legally unrecognized unions and that of citizen marriages.

It is worth emphasising that Daos is the initiator of this arrangement, but also that it is organised by his master, whose permission Daos appears to require (Krieter-Spiro 1997, 60; 122). Even if a slave with independence and means might be able to arrange a marriage outside his master's household, their master might reserve the right to approve it. For a modest *apophora*-bearing slave like Syriskos, the most likely option is that he was provided with a wife from his master's household.[22] We can suggest some purely economic reasons why slave-owners might decide to do this. For example, the marriage could contribute to the direct labour of the *apophora*-paying slave's independent business or to the (in no way unproductive) domestic work of his or her independent household. This situation might involve each spouse being expected to earn their own separate *apophora* or the couple being expected to make a larger single payment. Slave-owners may also have been attracted to the economic benefits of slave reproduction within the context of an independent slave household, which would have willingly covered the labor and revenue costs of raising its own children.[23]

There are good reasons to think that the arrangement of such slave marriages was often the result of other considerations. Comparative evidence can be found in the historian Mathew Hopper's analysis of early-20th-century documents recording pearl-diving slaves who had fled from their masters in the Arabian Gulf (2014). Because of its dangerous and generally unpleasant nature, pearl-

[22] This may be suggested by a line of the play which uses a plural participle to describe the couple paying an *apophora* to "young master Chairestratos" (380).

[23] As in the vast majority of slave-owning societies, the children of slaves like Syriskos and his wife would also be slaves, as *Epitrepontes* itself makes clear (469).

diving has often been largely reserved for slaves.[24] As close supervision of a pearl diver's work is, for obvious reasons, impossible, it is an extreme example of a slave occupation for which violent coercion is not all that effective on its own.[25] Masters therefore often preferred a system of positive incentives for pearl-diving slaves, including allowing them to retain some of the profit from their work, the promise of eventual freedom, and (in the Gulf States) providing divers with wives.

As Hopper notes, these slaves used their relatively independent lives and the profits they accrued for their masters, in tandem with their ability to run away, to negotiate for wives and families. For a slave-owner, facilitating these relationships was a way to keep their slaves happy and ensure their continuing work. For the slaves, their value to their masters allowed them a measure of influence to negotiate for their human desires for sex and family. This negotiation happened not just between individual masters and slaves, but over time and across the slave-owning society, by the establishment of accepted cultural norms, such as certain slaves' prerogative to property or family.

In ancient Athens, as we saw in Chapter 2 (102; 125), certain masters saw the sexual desires of the slaves living within their households as a means of controlling them. It is likely that a similar rationale was applied to slaves who lived independently as well. The independence of means and mobility of slaves like Syriskos may well have led to their ability to negotiate terms of their livelihood, as did the pearl divers in the Arabian Gulf. One notable difference between slaves in the Arabian Gulf and in ancient Athens was the mediation of the British consulship in disputes between masters and slaves (Hopper 2014). I nevertheless believe that fear of independent slaves (especially

[24] A fascinating glimpse into the lives of slave pearl divers in the Caribbean can be found in Warsh (2010, esp. 353–5), which outlines a contrast between the horrific conditions of their work with the mobility and economic incentives necessarily offered to certain members of its workforce.

[25] Contrast the treatment of slave pearl divers with slaves employed in date farms, who could be shackled to prevent their escape (Thomas 1931, 238).

those who believed themselves to be particularly mistreated) becoming runaways would have been a very real concern for Athenian masters.[26]

Much as we might like to know how Menander imagined that this couple learned to burn charcoal, how they became the property of Chairestratos, and under what circumstances they were set up independently in a quasi-family situation, the play provides no hint at the answers to these questions. Nevertheless, it provides our most detailed example of a slaving strategy that can be observed in our evidence, the specifics of which I have outlined in the proceeding paragraphs. Like renting out slaves to a third party, this strategy had the advantage of requiring little of a slave-owner's time, but it was different in certain respects. Unlike renting out a slave, setting them up independently required investment in tools and property on the part of a slave-owner, although how much would depend on the occupation the slave was involved in. For this reason, as well as the fact that slaves had freedom of movement and means, it would have borne further risks that whatever investment was made in the strategy would be lost. Furthermore, as will be discussed further below, slave-owners were still legally responsible for the actions of their independent slaves.

However, allowing slaves the ability to live independently also had advantages. For one thing, an *apophora* could conceivably be expected to be larger than a *misthos* for renting a slave. Though we possess very few figures for payments of both kinds, they bear out this suggestion.[27] For another, an independent slave business might be expected to return a more regular rent without much interruption. Finally, a slave could have acquired manumission through his earnings, a possibility which the Old Oligarch portrayed as a direct (and in his opinion unfortunate) consequence of the

[26] Evidence for slave runaways is discussed above (12).

[27] We have only one figure for an *apophora* payment in Athens from Aeschines' *Against Timarchos* (1.92), which claims that skilled shoemakers paid 2 obols per-day to Timarchos and the supervisor of their workshop (who was also a slave) paid 3 obols. Two figures for rented slaves, on the other hand, were 1 obol per day (above, 37).

apophora system (above, 38). This would allow a master to reclaim the value of their slave and, despite the Old Oligarch, we also have reason to think that the purchase of freedom would not inevitably entail the end of a slave's dependency on their master (above, 55–6; 74 ; below, 239).

5.2.2 The Lives of Syriskos and his Wife

What then can we say about the lives of this slave couple, from their portrayal in the play and wider evidence? Perhaps most importantly, the couple live outside the regular control of their master, and this marks them as truly distinct from other slaves. For one thing, as Cohen has emphasised, independence of this sort would have offered them "respite from the continual indignity of living virtually without rights in a household controlled by others" (2000a, 150). Trips into Athens or some market in the countryside would be required and would give Syriskos and possibly his wife - if she accompanied him — a chance to build professional relationships as (roughly) equal participants in financial transactions.[28]

Their occupation, however, would have kept them in rural Attica for much of their lives. Charcoal burning requires access to wood on a regular basis and the process requires constant care and attention for days at a time. However, as two recent studies by Bathrellou (2014) and Cox (2013, 168–72) have argued, the interaction between Syriskos and the shepherd Daos (256–74) dramatizes associations between rural slaves who were unconstrained by their master's supervision. On a similar note, Hunt has argued that communities were built on associations like these, which provided slaves with various kinds of support and the chance to fashion their own identity as part of a collective (2015, 142–50). Unlike single independent slaves, a slave couple could also function as the economic partnership which marriage in Athens usually entailed. If Syriskos focused on charcoal production, his wife could focus on vital domestic work which otherwise would take up time or have

[28] Vlassopoulos' discussion of "free spaces" in classical Athens makes this point well (2007; above, 124).

to be outsourced to the Athenian market. In practical terms, then, the lives of Syriskos and his wife would look very much like any other poor Athenian family on a day-to-day basis.

We have already discussed the main scene involving Syriskos, when we examined the position of the slave shepherd Daos, another slave character in *Epitrepontes* (above, 45–6). To recap, Daos had discovered an exposed baby in the country and subsequently handed it over to Syriskos to raise. The play introduces both characters in a dispute over the possession of trinkets abandoned with the baby. Of interest are the lines in which Daos relates how he was convinced by Syriskos to hand over the baby: "he straight away started pleading… 'give me the child, and may fortune and freedom be yours. I've a wife' he said, 'her child died at birth'" (264-8, tr. Ireland, 2010). Syriskos' implied remorse at the loss of his own child, and his desperate hopes of replacing it, appear a surprisingly poignant recognition of the possibility of a slave's desire for fatherhood. Moreover, when Daos hands the baby over to him, Syriskos continues to fight throughout the play for its right to the possessions exposed with it (387-409; 442-63), and thereby the preservation of its future.

Syriskos' and his wife's independence as *apophora*-bearing slaves is an interesting point to consider in this regard. It is likely that the independent residence of such slaves, who were allowed to have partners and to raise a child separately from the control of their master, gave them the opportunity to form familial bonds unlike those who were allowed to reproduce within the more controlled environment of a citizen household. To slave couples such as Syriskos and his wife, like many couples throughout history, children could have represented not only an eventual means of support in old age, but also a powerful hope for the future that their children might live better lives than they did. It may well be the case that the value of children to real independent slaves is reflected in Menander's *Epitrepontes*.

However, the servile status of Syriskos and his wife had several major implications on their lives. Perhaps most obviously, there was the financial burden placed on them by their *apophora* itself. Kamen has suggested that our only figure for an *apophora* payment (Aeschines, 1.97) might have

comprised around 50% of the income of the craft slaves from whom it was drawn (2016, 416–17). This (as she notes) is speculative and how representative this case was of *apophorai* in a general sense we cannot say, but it is probable that the payment of this rent would have put a slave couple such as Syriskos and his wife under considerable financial pressure.

Two slave charcoal-burners were unlikely to acquire considerable wealth and they would no doubt have had to work extremely hard just to stay afloat. Syriskos' wife would not have been the secluded woman that is often a *topos* of elite literature. She probably helped Syriskos with his charcoal burning at points, though much of this work consists in watching covered piles of burning charcoal over a period of days — a task which would not require two persons when conducted on a family scale.[29] She may well have had to find other paid work whenever she could. Certainly, a speech by Demosthenes suggests that poorer women in Athens would be forced to work in the market, vending cheap wares or hiring out their labour (57.34–5; 45). Veal, furthermore, points out that charcoal burning is often a seasonal occupation — in which wood is harvested in the autumn and winter, then dried and charred in the summer (2014, 4). A charcoal burner like Syriskos might therefore also find himself with free time throughout the year, which he could spend earning wages to supplement the money he and his wife made from selling charcoal.

As well as the financial difficulties which it placed on their otherwise independent life, the status of Syriskos and his wife would have had additional legal disadvantages, such as their liability for interrogative torture. Slave status also entailed significant insecurity. The shoe-maker Aristarchos, whose sale and the separate sale of his property is recorded on the Attic Stelai (above, 213), is a clear example of this fact. Through no action of his own, Aristarchos lost his entire independent life, which was confiscated along with his person. Similarly, Timarchos' shoemakers were sold to another

[29] On the two methods of charcoal production, mound and pit burning, referred to by Theophrastus (*Hist. pl*. 5.9.4 and *Hist. pl*. 9.3.1–3 respectively), Olsen (1991, 412–4). Mound burning is slightly more efficient but requires a larger investment of time — and is therefore possibly better suited to a dedicated charcoal burner.

master when their master's estate lapsed into disrepair. While it is easy to speculate on the important implications of this for their lives, Aeschines (1.97) does not furnish any hints. He probably did not care and believed that the citizen jury to which the speech was addressed would not either.

Athenian law did not recognise the marriage of Syriskos and his wife, and their union existed only as long as their master willed it (Todd, 1993, 186). If he should fall into hard times, or decide it was better to separate Syriskos and his wife for any other reason, Chairestratos could comfortably do so. We can only imagine the anxiety that this insecurity caused for slaves — even those who did not suffer the additional anxieties arising from regular supervision by their master.

Through their financial independence, however, slaves like Syriskos and his wife may have hoped to escape these insecurities by purchasing their manumission. They might also have hoped to buy the freedom of their child, securing his protection from the insecurities of slavery and better guaranteeing his ability to support them later in life. To make this point, we have to venture yet again into evidence beyond the *Epitrepontes*. We know from statements like that of the Old Oligarch that slaves could buy their own freedom, but have virtually no certain examples of manumission by purchase in Athens. As a comparative example, we might examine inscriptions recording the manumission of slaves at Delphi. There are over 1,200 of these inscriptions, dating from the 2nd to the 1st century BC and the vast majority record a slave providing a sum of money to their master in return for freedom.

Slaves are rarely manumitted as family units and the majority of manumitted slaves were adults; though the percentage increased as time progressed; only 17% of recorded manumissions were children (Hopkins, 1978, 166 n. 54).[30] This suggests that the majority of adult slaves prioritised their own freedom before that of their children (ibid. 165; Zelnick-Abramovitz, 2005, 153) — a logical

[30] Some 20% of children were manumitted alongside a parent, usually a mother (Hopkins, 1978, 165; cf. Tucker, 1982, 228).

course of action, as it would guarantee their ability to earn an income which could later be used to free other members of their family.

However, this was not true of every slave family. The following inscription from this corpus details the purchase of freedom by a young maiden in 160/59 BC and provides an interesting example of the long-term strategies a couple like Syriskos and his wife might have followed:

> Timon son of Eudikos… releases a young female slave by the name of Meda, for two minas of silver, Meda entrusting this purchase to the gods, on condition that she be free and unable to be claimed as a slave by anyone for all time.[31]
>
> (*SGDI* II 1708, 3-10)

As is typical, the sum is recorded and the purchase guaranteed by divine authority, but we are not told where the money came from, and a young slave girl was extremely unlikely to come up with the sum of 200 drachmae on her own. The common suggestion is that parents were buying the freedom of their children, and this argument is supported by a unique provision in this particular inscription:

> Meda must take care of and provide for her own father Sosibios and her mother Soso, when she reaches the appropriate age, if Sosibios or Soso need to be cared for or provided for, whether they are still slaves or whether they have become free.[32]
>
> (12–18)

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[31] [ἀπέδ]ο[τ]ο Τιμὼ Εὐδίκου… σῶμα γυναικεῖον κοράσιον ᾗ ὄνομα Μήδα, τιμᾶς ἀργυρίου δύο μνᾶν, καθὼς ἐπίστευσε Μήδα τῶι θεῶι τὰν ὠνάν, ἐφ’ ᾧτε ἐλευθέρα εἶμεν καὶ ἀνέφαπτος ἀπὸ πάντων τὸμ πάντα χρόνον.

[32] τρεφέτω δὲ Μήδα Σωσίβιον τὸν ἴδιον πατέ[ρ]α καὶ τὰμ ματέρα Σωσὼ καὶ εὐσχημονιζέτω, ἐπεί κα ἐν ἀλικίαν ἔλθη, εἰ χρείαν ἔχοισαν Σωσίβιος ἢ Σωσὼ τροφᾶς ἢ εὐσχημονισμοῦ, εἴτε δουλεύοντες εἶεν εἴτε ἐλεύθεροι γεγονότες·

The condition of Meda's freedom was that she continue to care for her parents — who, significantly, were still slaves at the time. I would not be as cautious as Tucker (1982, 229–30) in ascribing Meda's freedom to money provided by her parents — surely this is the logical inference to draw from the *paramonē* clause in her manumission? Importantly, without this clause we would have no evidence of their role in Meda's manumission. Similar circumstances were probably behind the manumission of children elsewhere in this corpus of inscriptions, except undertaken by parents who did not feel the need to legally compel their children to support them. Of course, this is not evidence of the actions of Athenian slaves, but I think it probable that many enslaved couples like Syriskos and his wife may have acted similarly.

In many ways, Syriskos and his wife had a better deal than many other enslaved persons due to the strategy under which they were exploited; interestingly, Syriskos seems to embody many good virtues of a freeman.[33] Their independent income would also have offered them a chance to buy their freedom, and given them hope for the future of their progeny. However, the important thing to recognise is that ultimately, the ability of *apophora*-bearing slaves to profit from their labour, and to live independently, was not permanently guaranteed by their arrangement with their master. Despite the advantages to secure a better life which the *apophora* system offered slaves, they were still both physically and psychologically subject to a status that denied them legal security and gave another complete power over their lives. *Apophora*-bearing slaves may have been better placed than others to avoid this demeaning identity, and to fashion a more positive one based on their own autonomous lives. We should not forget, however, that to the slaves of ancient Athens, the *apophora* would also have been a financial burden, and a regular reminder of their degrading status, which made them largely powerlessness in the face of their master's authority.

[33] Particularly in his refined speaking style matched by his allusions to literature (Proffitt, 2011 163–4; Ireland, 2010, 117–8).

5.2.3 Other Independent Slaves

The independent family of Syriskos and his wife is a fascinating example of a particular slaving strategy, but we should not consider it representative of all slaves who earned money independently. Unfortunately, for one thing, we cannot really say how many such slave families there were in Athens. For another, as we will see in the following section, slaves who worked independently need not have lived independently too. Many would have resided in their master's household, if their occupation did not require living separately.[34] We also do not know how regularly independent slaves managed to acquire a spouse — though I have argued that many would have.

When we find *apophora*-bearing slaves in our evidence, they are often skilled craftsmen or managers. Since such work is "care-intensive", this fits well with Fenoaltea's model (above, 63–4), since the *apophora* gave slaves a personal investment in their work. However, considering the absence of any quantitative evidence regarding the occupations of *apophora*-bearers, we should not assume that all independent slaves were skilled, in positions of trust, or even (like Syriskos and his wife) geographically separated from their master's household. It is worth discussing a fragment of Menander which describes an amphora-carrying slave carrying an *apophora* (εἶτ' ἀμφορεαφόρος τις ἀποφοράν φέρων: fr. 326 K-A). Though Kamen is right to point out that "the humorous sound-play of the Greek" in this fragment makes the use of this limited phrase as historical evidence problematic, I am not so sure that she is right to argue a slave porter was unlikely to have been exploited under a system of *apophora* payments (2016, 418).

There existed a group of slaves in Brazilian urban areas who were known to their contemporaries as "escravos de ganho" (enslaved wage earners), who worked (and sometimes lived) independently of their masters in much the same way that *apophora* slaves did in Athens. Interestingly, "These slaves

[34] Indeed, this was a large part of Kazakévich's contension that the term *chōris oikountes* should not be associated with *apophora*-bearing slaves (above, 37).

spanned the occupational spectrum from the least skilled and most dangerous jobs to the most highly remunerative… Many [slave] porters, vendors, and semi-skilled and skilled artisans were self-employed and took care of their own housing" (Klein, 1986, 129). We might speculate that *apophora*-bearing slaves in Athens covered a similar spectrum of occupations — including some who made a living through hiring themselves for both menial and skilled work. Nishida also points out that the benefits that the "escrovos de ganho" appeared to have possessed were often superficial (2003, 20–1). Many were still subjected to regular physical violence when they failed to provide the extortionate payments their masters demanded. Those who gained their freedom often did so at the cost of years of hard work in slavery. This is worth bearing in mind when we consider the *apophora*-bearers of classical Athens, about whom, in truth, we know very little.[35]

5.3 Rent-Paying Slave Managers

This section will continue the discussion of *apophora*-paying slaves, though the slaving strategy under discussion here can be differentiated from that to which Syriskos and his wife were subjected by the scale of the investment which their masters entrusted to their independent management. As well as Timarchos' entrustment of his shoemaking workshop to a slave, a good example can be found in the property which Demosthenes inherited from his father, which has been used in previous chapters as a counter-example to the agrarian households which have received the bulk of our focus. As I noted in Chapter 1, Demosthenes drew an income from a blade-manufacturing workshop staffed by 32 or 33 slaves (27.9; above, 60–1). This workshop was managed by a freedman *epitropos* called Milyas (Demosthenes, 27.19) — from whom Demosthenes expected a consistent, yearly return. The fact that Milyas was a freedman might give pause to listing his story as a "slaving strategy", but since his work for his master appears to have been connected to his previous status as

[35] Similar reflections on Athens' street prostitutes can be found in Chapter 1 (70–1).

a slave, I think there is cause for approaching his employment from the viewpoint of slaving strategies. This is a subject which I touched on in Chapter 1 and will discuss in more detail below.

I have decided to focus the discussion of this section primarily on Sosias, a Thracian who appears to have been an enslaved manager of a large mining operation. Sosias has received little attention and his case is highly instructive in determining some of the strategies of property delegation practised by Athens' wealthiest. The references to him, however, are scant on detail. Much wider evidence for similar slaving strategies will therefore be utilised in this discussion and will allow us to cover some of the main variations in this slaving strategy. Therefore, whereas I ended the previous two sections by discussing some variations of the slaving strategy evidenced in their main case studies, this section will end by also discussing some variations in the lives of the slaves whom managers like Sosias and Milyas supervised.

5.3.1 Sosias the Mining Manager and the "Leasing" of Property to Slaves and Freedmen

Using the varied value of slaves to support a wider point about the relative value of friends, Xenophon's Socrates claims in the *Memorabilia* that the Athenian general Nikias paid a talent for the manager (*epistatēs*) of his silver mine (2.5.3). This extraordinary price dwarfs all the other figures for Athenian slave prices we possess today and, from the context of the passage, it appears to have been the highest monetary value attached to a slave that Xenophon was aware of. We might doubt the exactness of the figure, but it is still interesting that Xenophon believed that Nikias had paid such an exorbitant price (six times as much as what he believes to have been an extremely valuable slave elsewhere in the passage) for a mining manager.

As to the strategy in which he was exploited, this price implies that Nikias' manager played an absolutely crucial role in his mining interests and Xenophon also claimed in his *Poroi* that "Nikias… owned a thousand slaves and rented them out to the Thracian Sosias, on condition that Sosias

returned an obol a day for each man and kept the number of slaves the same" (4.14). The phrasing of this passage, and particularly the suggestion that mining slaves were "rented out" (*exmisthoun*) to Sosias, suggests at first glance that he was a freeman renting slaves for a mining operation. However, the idea that Nikias was, under this interpretation, renting out the expensive manager he had bought to a different person seems an unlikely conclusion to draw. A more convincing alternative is that Sosias and the expensive manager were one and the same person (Lauffer, 1979, 67–9; 77–87; Wilhelm, 1934, 19–20; Rihll, 2011, 69).

Wilhelm argued that Sosias was a freedman at the point in time Xenophon refers to in the *Poroi* (1934, 20; cf. Lauffer, 1979, 80). His conclusion was based on similar language of tenancy in Demosthenes' *For Phormion*, which describes how the banker Pasion "leased (*misthoun*) his bank and his shield factory to [his slave Phormion] after [Phormion] had been manumitted" (36.4). We also have substantial evidence of freed persons managing businesses elsewhere. As well as Phormion and Demosthenes' freedman Milyas, we are told explicitly that a brothel of Euktemon was managed by his freedwoman. Her successor, Alke, had been a slave of Euktemon and was possibly (though not certainly) a freedwoman when she took over the brothel (above, 68–9).

Another example from *For Phormion*, however, supports an argument that the verb *misthoun* could also be applied to those who retained the status of slaves. Four persons — probably slaves — were leased (*misthoun*) to Pasion's bank by his son Apollodoros for a period of ten years (36.13).[36] The fact that these men were slaves during this period can be inferred from the statement that they were "set free" (ἐλευθέρους ἀφεῖσαν) after the completion of their tenancy of the bank (14). Many

[36] One of the men worked in the bank before Pasion's death (Demosthenes, 49.44). Such a long-term connection between him and Pasion's family points to his being a slave of theirs. In all likelihood, he was attached to the bank when Pasion's property was split between his two sons (36.11); Apollodoros ceded control of the bank to his younger brother, but (as we see in this passage) managed the bank (presumably including its slaves) as the guardian of his younger brother.

believe that this might refer to the release of freepersons from obligations stipulated in their lease (Davies, 1972, 433; Todd, 1994, 137; Trevett, 1992, 38), though others maintain that the phrase unquestionably refers to the manumission of slaves (Scafuro, 2011, 379 n. 88; MacDowell, 2004, 157–8 n. 27; Cohen, 1992, 76; Harrison, 1968, 176).[37]

Fisher, who remains uncommitted on the issue, points out that the ambiguity of this phrase to a modern audience aptly demonstrates that an Athenian jury would hold certain "expectations of the possible status such lessees might have" (2008, 129). In terms of practical differences, it is difficult to see how such an agreement would have been any different from that between Timarchos and the enslaved head of his shoemaking shop, or Athenogenes and Midas. Terminological differences aside, the idea of slaves being "let" property, in other words, is not an issue which needs to be resolved. Considering this, the more natural translation of ἐλευθέρους ἀφεῖσαν should be accepted.[38]

The relationship between these bankers and their owner was essentially (and arguably entirely) identical to that of *apophora* relations, as Maffi has argued (2008, 213). Cohen's argument to the

[37] As Sandys pointed out (Sandys and Paley, 1910, *ad loc*), the same phrase is used four times by Demosthenes to unequivocally describe manumission (29.25; 31; 47.55; 72).

[38] One reason why scholars have been reluctant to see these men as slaves is the clause following the statement that they had been set free, which states that "at this time [Apollodoros] did not bring lawsuits against either them [the bankers] or him [Phormion]" (καὶ οὐκ ἐδικάζοντ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐκείνοις τότ᾽ οὔτε τούτῳ: 14). The idea of legal action brought against slaves, especially by their owners, seems improbable. The time period indicated by *tote* ("at this time"), however, might well indicate the period immediately following the banker's manumission, after which they had acquired legal personalities that could be actioned against (e.g. Harpokration, s.v. *apostasiou*). Demosthenes might here be stating that, as well as being happy with the management performed by his slaves up to the end of the lease (as indicated by their manumission), Apollodoros did not subsequently discover some issue and take the men to court.

contrary, due to the lack of reference to *apophorai* in the passage, does not follow (2018, 58).[39] A term for the payment made by the slaves to their owners is not mentioned at all. Were one used, *apophora* may well have been suitable. Even were some other word used, as in the case of Alke, where the payment returned to her master/ex-master is referred to as a tenant's rent (*enoikion*) (above, 69), there is no clear indication in the text that the difference in terminology describes a difference in exploitation system; if there are subtle differences in the terminology used to describe slave payments to their masters, we do not have the evidence to observe them.

However, our evidence does suggest that, like *apophora*-bearing slaves, Apollodoros' bank slaves were allowed to work independently in return for a payment to their masters. The same is partially true of Milyas, where (again) the payment is described in the context of a yearly profit (27.9), rather than an *apophora* payment (above, 52; cf. Kamen, 2016, 418). However, the term *apophora* applied strictly to the profits accumulated from a slave, according to lexicographers (ibid. 417 n. 6) and this is consistent with the small number of examples that we still possess. Its use to describe the rent provided by freedmen, therefore, may well have been inappropriate. However, its absence in the description of Sosias — like the use of the word *misthoun* — still does not really tell us anything about his status.

What we see in our evidence is a combination, in different sources, of both slaves and freed persons being awarded responsibility over considerable property by their masters/ex-masters in return for a proportion of that business' profits. That Sosias may have been freed at some point during his arrangement with Nikias is not, therefore, unlikely. If he had, however, we might ask what role he performed beforehand that (presumably) was reflected in his high price? What role did Phormion, Milyas and the manager of Euktemon's brothel perform in order to earn their manumission? The case of Milyas is particularly interesting. According to Demosthenes, his father had freed Milyas on

[39] On Cohen's interpretation of the different economic arrangement signified by *misthoun*, see directly below.

his death bed (29.25–6). We know that he was *epitropos* of the blade-manufacturing slaves shortly afterwards while Demosthenes' guardians controlled his property (27.19). We are also told that Demosthenes' father had expected a consistent yearly income from these slaves (27.9) — the basis of understanding the arrangement as an *apophora* arrangement. Although we are never told that Milyas was its manager at this point, presumably someone else was and it seems improbable that a change in management personal happened to coincide with the death of Demosthenes' father.[40]

Cohen (2018) believes that the term *misthoun* is used in the context of a master-slave relationship to refer to a lease that limited a master's liability for the financial prospects of a slave (cf. Talamanca, 2008). Cohen's main argument focuses on the fact that in *Against Athenogenes* (above, 74–5), the debt unwittingly passed on to the citizen Epikrates is described as belonging to Midas, the slave that he purchased. However, the terminology here does not necessarily reflect legal reality. Aristarchos' items of furniture, as we saw above (212), were listed as his possessions in a list that details its confiscation as the property of his master. I have discussed the apparent lack of slave legal agency in Chapter 4, and it seems to me that *Against Athenogenes* is good proof that masters held responsibility over the independent financial ventures of their slaves — otherwise why would Athenogenes underhandedly pass on this debt to another?

Cohen argues that Athenogenes did not feel confident that he could convince a jury of his lack of personal involvement in the business' collection of debts. We might give Cohen the benefit of the doubt and assume that Athenogenes was unable to acquire the legal sureties that a system of absolving legal responsibility over an independent slave must have depended on. Even if we also assume that arguing against his personal role in accumulating the deficit was riskier than tricking an

[40] Unless Demosthenes' guardians had wished to manage it through their own agents, which is obviously not the case. Perhaps Milyas' manumission coincided with his assumption of the managerial role, but this seems unlikely from Demosthenes' *Against Aphobos II* (29), which is concerned primarily with establishing Milyas' status as a freedman and makes no reference to his position as the workshop head in its argument.

Athenian citizen into buying them, this would effectively mean that Athenogenes *had* accepted liability for the debts. And yet, the whole basis for Cohen's argument is grounded in the speech's supposed recognition, through reference to debts belonging to Midas, that Midas had accrued them without his master's liability. This line of reasoning is convoluted and very simply resolved by assuming that the debts of an independent slave belonged *de jure* to the person who owned him.

Cohen argues that such a system would have overexposed masters and made the use of slaves in positions of financial independence economically irrational. True though this may be, it does not constitute proof that Athenians protected the liability of masters against their independent slaves, as the *peculium* did for Roman slave-owners.[41] The evidence of *Against Athenogenes*, rather, seems to point in the opposite direction, a fact which also fits better with the slave's lack of legal personality in Athenian law more generally (Todd, 1993, 187–8). This raises two interrelated questions: why did classical Athenian law never develop such protections, and why do we continue to find slaves in positions where they could independently accumulate monetary debts through borrowing or fraud, for which their masters would be held accountable?

There may well have been ideological reasons behind this legal situation. The slave's inferiority to the freepersons of Athens was a common *topos* of Athenian culture and was enshrined in his or her lack of legal personality. This aspect of Athens' laws protected the theoretically complete domination of the master over the slave and the slave's complete dependence on the master. There are also instances in which the full capacity of slaves to act independently of their masters is denied in law-court speeches, in circumstances where it seems very likely that slaves *could* exercise independence (Demosthenes, 37.50; 55.22; above, 192–3).

[41] In ancient Rome, slaves could conduct business on the basis of the *peculium* guaranteed by their masters, who were liable for financial debts only up to the extent of the *peculium* (Kirschenbaum, 1987, 2b esp. 52–3). Further on the *peculium*, above (39).

In an effort to explain the absence of any equivalent to the Roman *peculium* in our Athenian sources, Kamen has postulated that the opposition between slaves and freepersons in the minds of Athenians made them less willing to acknowledge the possibility of slave independence (2016, 426; cf. 2013, 231).[42] Of course, this issue may also be due to an accident of our surviving evidence, as Kamen notes, but I would suggest that this may also be a consequence of a real difference in Athenian and Roman law, maintained for the ideological reasons that she proposes. There was a disjuncture, in other words, between the ideology of slavery in Athens and the reality of independent slaves, which may have influenced Athens' laws in favour of the former, to the detriment of the function of the latter. This ideology — whatever its minor disadvantages — propped up Athens' slave system to the benefit of its citizen population on the whole.

There are also reasons to think that, in practice, the liability of Athenian slave-owners for their slaves was not as problematic for them as Cohen believes. For one thing, it would only ever have been an issue for Athens' wealthy, who possessed enough property to need to delegate its management to others. Consequently, it may never have generated enough political opposition to evoke a change in law. We might point out that (in contrast to, for example, the Roman Empire) the size of the property-holdings of even Athens' wealthiest social strata would rarely have been so big as to be completely outside the feasible control of the household's *kurios* and his networks of family, friends, and other slaves.[43] Even for the wealthiest of Athens' citizens, the fact that the city's law expected

[42] Fisher also highlights discomfort about independent slaves in Athenian sources (2008, 123–4 *et passim*). Davies (2017, 37–8 *et passim*) notes that reactions to wealthy slaves can be explained by what sociologists term "status inconsistency" or "status stress", which arise when expectations about an individual's person formed around their legal status conflict with the elements that make up their status proper (wealth, community membership, etc.).

[43] For example, Epikrates claims that Athenogenes received monthly accounts regarding the finances of his independent perfume businesses (Hyperides, 3.19).

their responsibility over every action of their slaves was not necessarily an insurmountable problem. The majority of independent slaves were probably given strict instructions about what they were allowed to borrow and from whom.[44] They also, surely, understood the serious consequences for them and their families, of defrauding customers or otherwise deliberately acting against their owner's wishes. We have seen what such consequences might have been in the previous chapters.[45]

Probably the most frequent risk which investors faced in the entrustment of property to another was not receiving a return on it or the loss of the investment itself. This was true of freepersons as much as it was of slaves, and slaves may well have been preferable to freepersons in this regard precisely because they could be more forcibly coerced. Another reason for preferring slave tenants was their inclusion in the *oikos* and their separation from the external family and community links to which freepersons were attached (above, 123–4). Without a strong impetus to create an established, legally recognised slave-allowance from which compensation could be made, there may also have been fear on the part of buyers and potential investors to do business with independent slaves. With their master (a legally recognised person) liable for any incurred debts, these risks would have been substantially alleviated, thus allowing independent slaves to function more effectively.

[44] Restrictions on lending on borrowing would be difficult in the banking sector, but reasonable for most occupations outside it. Cato the Elder advised his Roman audience to allow their *vilici* limited powers to extend credit and borrow money, and recommended a master look over accounts on a regular basis (5.3–4). Furthermore, slaves who needed money could borrow from their masters. Two freedpersons in Menander's *Heros* found themselves in debt-bondage due to money owed by their father to his ex-master (Menander, *Her.* 27–39); in his will, Lykon cancelled the debt owed him by a freedman called Syros (Diogenes Laertes, 5.73).

[45] The story of Moschion is an excellent case and point (above, 197–9), as is the existence of punishment mills (section 4.1) and see also Pseudo-Aristotle's recommendation to use slave children as hostages (above, 125).

Of course, the ability of Athenian slave-owners to monitor the financial practices of their slaves was more limited in certain cases. Especially in the fifth century, wealthy Athenians held property abroad, which was probably often managed by slaves.[46] Due to its size, the same was true of the operation that Sosias oversaw — the mining activities of 1,000 men. In order for a slave to hold financial independence in situations like this, considerable trust would have to be put in their person. This, I think, is part of the reason that Sosias was believed by Xenophon to have cost such a high price. Lauffer believes that this price is a reflection of Sosias' technical skill at the process of mining (1979, 28; 48–9) and this was no doubt partially true. As well as being skilled in finding veins and exploiting them, one imagines that Sosias was fluent in Greek and had probably shown himself apt in managing men and balancing finances. It is worth revisiting how, in Xenophon's *Oikonomikos*, these attributes are considered a crucial part of the ideal manager, but only so long as he could be trusted. Ischomachos says that the best way to acquire such a manager was to train one yourself, but the idea that a good manager might be bought is considered too (12.3).

We cannot know, of course, but one wonders what circumstances prompted Sosias' purchase. It may have been the death or failure of a previous manager (possibly Nikias' father?), or a result of Nikias' entry into political life. Perhaps Nikias had assigned these responsibilities to a number of persons and decided it would be easier to deal with one. The fact that Sosias was purchased at all indicates that Nikias did not trust any of the slaves that he owned to fulfil such a role. Indeed, very few men, I would imagine, could be reliably expected to manage what Sosias did. Whatever the

[46] The *Attic Stelai* record a confiscated vineyard on the island of Thasos (*IG* I^3 426, 43–51), which had previously belonged to Adeimantos. A single slave is listed amongst the confiscated property of this particular estate, and it has very reasonably been posited that he was its manager (Foxhall, 2007b, 40). If we assume that this suggestion is correct, then we can also assume that at such a distance, Adeimantos would have granted this slave considerable independence of control over the property he managed — although he may well have visited it on occasion or kept an eye on it through other agents too.

case, Sosias must have built an impressive reputation not only as a skilled mining manager, but one who could be trusted to work effectively. His price was, after all, only a tenth of the profit he returned to Nikias every year (Lauffer, 1979, 69) — a good investment in continuing this revenue stream. Furthermore, just as Ischomachos is described guaranteeing the trust of his *epitropoi* through positive rewards, Sosias' retainment of remaining profits was an important part of ensuring his trust.

Manumission undoubtedly played a crucial role in guaranteeing this trust.[47] Milyas was supposedly awarded his freedom for good service at the death of his master (29.25), but at other times, slaves may well have bought it with the money they earned independently.[48] Though direct evidence for purchased manumission in Athens is slim, it seems a likely outcome of slaves retaining independent means. The price of such freedom was likely to reflect the value of the slave — Sosias may have been expected to return to Nikias the talent the latter had paid for him.[49] This would have been a difficult task that may even have precluded his ability to acquire freedom. And if, as I have suggested, many slave managers continued to work in essentially the same position as they had before, we might ask how this relationship was altered by the manumission of the slave. What were the advantages and disadvantages of using a freedman, rather than a slave, as the effective tenant of property?

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[47] As Fisher notes, "there are indications that some Athenians at least had a perception of an increase in manumission through the fourth century" (2008, 125), a fact which he reasonably connects to the existence of independent slaves.

[48] Apollodoros' slaves are described being released after the end of their tenancy, but this need not be taken to mean that they did not buy their freedom, rather than that they were allowed to do so.

[49] This is the conclusion we can draw from the only description of the cost of a purchased manumission in our sources, from Demosthenes' *Against Neaira* (59.29–30).

Unlike with their slaves, owners presumably did not have to worry about the liability for debts incurred by their freedman, though they also lost their right to unlimited punishment over their person. In these two ways, the use of a freedman differed substantially from the use of a slave. However, the relationship between a master and a slave and a master and his freedman, was probably quite similar in other respects. The connection of the freedman/woman to the *oikos* of their master need not be considered severed by the act of manumission. Demosthenes (27.19) and Isaios (6.19), in describing freed managers, used a possessive adjective and a possessive personal pronoun respectively to describe their relation to the owner of the business: "our (*hēmeteros*) freedman", "a freedwoman of his (*autou*)". This evidence suggests that masters might expect a continued link with their manumitted slaves as well as their continued service in the supervision of property. It is worth mentioning again the possibility that *paramonē* clauses might be used to legally bind a manumitted slave manager to their work (above, 55–6).

Even absent legal compulsion, there are reasons why a slave would remain in their master's household. Independent slaves would often have had substantial links to community networks, but the closest thing they had to true kinship bonds was the household that exploited their labour.[50] We might also question the existence of an extensive labour market for long-term managerial positions for freemen, without which freedmen would probably be compelled to remain in their position for economic reasons.

I am suggesting that a wider strategy wealthy Athenians employed was to use slaves as independent managers over large investments of their masters, wherein they effectively acted as the tenant of this property. As a crucial aspect of this strategy, Athenians allowed slaves to build up personal wealth from this property, and probably planned to free them, but in so doing they sacrificed little of

[50] An interesting case is described in Demosthenes' *Against Evergus and Mnesibulus*, in which a freedwoman lives separately with her husband for a time, but returned to live in the household of her master after her husband's death (47.55).

the slave's dependence on their person and continued to utilise their labour in much the same way as before. As a whole, this strategy (if successful) had the advantage of establishing a permanent return on investments, with little need to find replacement staff. One suspects that another advantage to using slaves as tenants was that their master held more power to set the terms of the agreement in his or her favour (such as the ability to end it whenever they desired) — within limits set by their need to earn the slave's good service.

This strategy also utilised someone whose interests were grounded in the household of the investor, both before and after their manumission. In a certain sense, this strategy would also have kept the profits not returned in the form of an *apophora* within the wider sphere of the household. While the manager was a slave, whatever he earned could be appropriated if the master felt it necessary — the fact that we have no example of such certainly does not prove that this never happened.[51] Presumably, freedmen did have a right to the property they accumulated, but their close relationship to the household would still have made them a preferable recipient of the household's wealth than the member of another *oikos*. This is best exemplified in Pasion's marriage of his wife to Phormion, a practice supposedly common amongst bankers in various Greek *poleis* (Demosthenes,

[51] Theophrastus' *Shabby Profiteer*, who demands a share of his slave's money when he finds it in the street (30.9), also, "when he collects his share of a slave's earnings [*apophora*]… charges him for the cost of exchanging the copper coins" (30.15). In their inherent criticism of the Shabby Profiteer's behaviour, both these passages "assume slaves with a right to property" (Harrison, 1968, 168). They also, however, make clear the master's power to appropriate this property. The abuse described here, while frustrating for a slave, would not have been detrimental to his independent well-being. Nevertheless, he would have had to submit to it, just as he would have had to submit if his master demanded considerably more money from him on some other pretext, or on no pretext at all.

36.28–29).[52] It is unlikely that Athenian citizens of a more traditional lineage attempted to keep the profits earned by their freedmen within the immediate family in such a direct way (e.g. ibid. 30), but that does not mean that they could not draw on their wealth in a time of crisis.

What the case of Sosias brings out well is the real advantage which such a system of management had for Athenian slaves-owners — the complete removal of themselves from any and all concerns in their investments. This is exemplified in the stipulation that Sosias maintain the original number of slaves, by which Nikias absolved himself of all future financial and supervisory responsibility in his mining slaves. As well as his reputation as a gentleman (above, 41–2), Nikias' political and military career would have made close supervision of his own land and businesses difficult. By leaving his extensive mining business entirely in the hands of Sosias, he ensured a consistent and considerable income without the need to invest any of his time in it. The assurance that a slave like Sosias would continue to provide this revenue for his master, came in the first place from the reputation of the Thracian miner, for which he had presumably been purchased for a high fee.[53] It came in the second place from Nikias' power to punish Sosias in the most extreme ways for mismanagement and (connected to this) from Sosias' alienation from the community around him. Thirdly, it came from Sosias' personal investment in the business, from which the Thracian undoubtedly profited too.

[52] Plato describes with open hostility a similar circumstance, in which an impoverished man is forced to give his daughter in marriage to his newly manumitted slave out of poverty (*Resp*. 495e–496a), but how common such an event might be is very difficult to say.

[53] Sosias may well have gained mining experience before his enslavement in Thrace. I would imagine, however, that he had been in Athens for some time before his purchase by Nikias, because of the independence he exerted over the business as a whole. This, which is discussed further below, suggests that he was familiar with the intricacies of Athens' mining system and could speak reasonably good Greek.

5.3.2 The Life of Sosias

The fact that Sosias' alleged price dwarfs that of any other Athenian slave we know of is understandable considering the fact that the property he managed likewise dwarfs that given to any slave we know of. The 1,000 slaves whose work he supposedly held responsibility over were considerably more than the 32 or 33 slaves Milyas presided over, let alone the 9 or 10 slaves supervised by Timarchos' workshop head. In terms of its monetary value, the slaves entrusted to him alone held an aggregate worth of roughly 30 talents.[54] In addition, Nikias must initially have lent Sosias other property to carry on his mining operation. We do not know the value of Pasion's bank during Phormion's lease of it to compare with the capital entrusted to Sosias, but we do know that Phormion paid one and two-thirds of a talent to its owners per year (Demosthenes, 36.11), six times less than the ten talents Sosias paid Nikias (Lauffer, 1979, 69). Of course, the property's worth is not necessarily a direct corollary to the effort it would take to manage it, and we might spend some time speculating on the nature of Sosias' work.

Silver production can be divided into two processes: 1.) the extraction of ore from the ground and dressing it and 2.) the smelting of this ore into silver. It seems likely that Sosias was involved in this first process, since Xenophon cites him in *Poroi* as proof that considerable money could be made from the exploitation of Athens' silver-laden hills. Whether or not Sosias oversaw smelting operations is a different story. The implication of another passage of *Poroi* (4.49) may be that the Athenian state-owned smelting shops, but we know of at least one privately-owned furnace from state records (*SEG*, 12.100, 54). Archaeology suggests that furnaces generally "were probably built and run by specialist smelters or large mining concerns, but on a… limited and centralized basis" (Rihll, 2001, 118); all recorded smelting workshops were of a reasonable size and we have no evidence of dispersed smelting operations next to silver mines (138 n. 14). An operation of the size

[54] At a price of 180 drachmai per slave, as Xenophon appears to have valued them (above, 60 n. 73).

of Nikias' may well have included smelters, in which case Sosias must have been responsible for their highly specialised work.

Even if his responsibilities were restricted to ore extraction, Sosias obviously did not micromanage all of Nikias' miners himself. Even the largest of mine shafts, including an attached washery, would not occupy even a fraction of the total number of men Sosias directed. Consequently, we should imagine his charges spread throughout South-East Attika and, over the course of years, moving around as silver veins dried up. Sosias must himself have delegated responsibility to a number of trusted agents and overseers in order to keep his slaves working. Many of their number, I would imagine, came from the slaves rented out to him by Nikias. In other words, Sosias would have implemented his own slaving strategies. Though his control over other slaves was not peculiar in comparison to other slaves in positions of trust, Sosias' independence from his master would have given him significantly more power over their lives. He may have had to rent some of Nikias' slaves to other parties, if or when he could not productively use their labour directly. This would be an unproductive use of already hired slaves, but Sosias presumably did not have the power to rent only those he felt he could feasibly turn a profit from.

Not only in his dealings with potential renters of his workforce, but in other aspects of his business as well, Sosias would have had significant dealings with multiple freepersons. Unless he oversaw smelting operations, he must have developed relationships with persons who held responsibility for either private or public smelting. Furthermore, the upkeep of Nikias' mining operation must have required constant interactions with external Athenian merchants and craftsmen. Perhaps most importantly, he needed to provide food and clothing for his workforce, but additionally would need to replace tools and hire builders for e.g. new washeries — and this is assuming that he did not also oversee the smelting of silver.[55] Many transactions were probably carried out by agents under his

[55] The subsidiary products necessary for mining and smelting are listed by Rihll (2001, 116; 132–3).

employ, but Sosias was the one ultimately responsible for them. He would therefore have carried significant influence over other people's lives — not only the slaves under his charge, but with many freepersons and citizens outside Nikias' *oikos*.

Sosias probably also held considerable power through his personal wealth. Any attempt to quantify the profits he might have retained after his payment to Nikias would be problematic, but we can infer that he was dealing in extraordinary amounts of money on a yearly basis. Even were the rent extracted from him a large percentage of his gross profit, the amount he retained (even after his considerable outlays) would almost certainly have made him a wealthy man. We have, moreover, inscriptional evidence that points towards the existence of wealthy mining slaves. A well-known example is the miner Atotas, who left a grave epitaph written apparently in his own words (*IG* II^2 10051).[56] The luxuriousness of the monument indicates Atotas' wealth and he has consequently been compared to Sosias by Hunt (2015, 136–7). Though the expense of Atotas' grave stone is remarkable, we know of other foreigners, many likely slaves, who were commemorated in death, in addition to religious dedications made by slaves (*IG* II^2, 2937; 2940; Zoumbaki, 2005, 219–221).[57] This points to the use of slaves and freedmen in positions of trust in Athens' mining sector, similar to what we see in agriculture and manufacture. Thompson has examined evidence of separate quarters with differing degrees of luxury in archaeological sites in the Laurion area, writing "it is suggested that free and slave-workers were working side by side, the former… enjoying more comfortable conditions" (2003, 149). The evidence for slave hierarchies make it just as feasible that it was slave managers who enjoyed these better living conditions.

[56] Though Mitchel (2010, 95) writes "it is not at all clear whether [Atotas'] status was one of a resident foreigner [metic]… or whether he was a freedman, or a… privileged slave," other scholars have been less cautious; Raffeiner (1977, 14-16) confidently asserts, based on his job and occupation, that he was or had been slave (cf. Lauffer, 1979, 199; Bäbler, 1998, 95; Vlassopoulos, 2013, 130).

[57] Lauffer, (1979, 123-135) identifies over 100 grave monuments by non-Athenians in the Laurion area.

When the Old Oligarch wrote about wealthy slaves, to whom it had become necessary for Athenians to become "slaves to our slaves" (above, 38), he probably had the likes of Sosias in mind. Hyperbolic though it certainly is, there are reasons to take this statement relatively seriously. The strategy in which Sosias was employed no doubt gave him a large amount of leverage to fix certain advantages for himself in his arrangement with Nikias. The wealth he controlled, moreover, would have given him the ability to influence the wider Athenian community as well. Probably more than any other slaving strategy, then, the practice of leasing large properties to slaves allowed them to gain significant wealth and influence. As always, we do not know how many such slaves existed, but they were probably comparatively few, since this strategy was applied to (at most) a few slaves in only Athens' wealthiest households. The relatively large body of evidence for them is certainly a by-product of our elite-focused sources. However, it is important not to underestimate the effects of Sosias' legal status on his life. We have already discussed associated legal insecurities at length. Sosias was forced into an extremely complex and taxing job — and mining could be a risky business — with his relative freedom dependent on his success therein.

5.3.3 Variations in Leasing Agreements

Whereas the other managers examined in this chapter lived throughout the fourth century, Sosias was a contemporary of the Old Oligarch in the late fifth, pointing to some broad continuities in this particular slaving strategy. Nevertheless, the scale of Sosias' managerial responsibility and the amount of money he was able to earn from it makes him exceptional in our evidence. The fact that he appears to have been purchased for this role may also be unusual. Additionally, there are some variations not covered above that deserve attention, especially since they have a bearing on the lives of the slaves entrusted to servile managers.

We might note the physical separation of Sosias from the household of his master, a situation comparable to that of Syriskos and his wife, but very different from that of Milyas, who, as noted in

Chapter 3 (165), supervised slaves living and working in Demosthenes' home. I have also argued, following Acton, that these slaves functioned as domestic workers for the household in addition to their work as skilled craftsmen. If this suggestion is correct, then any informal rights to the slaves he was "leasing" from Demosthenes' family will have been subordinate to those of his master on a practical day-to-day basis. Though Milyas himself would probably have exercised some independence, especially after his manumission, he would have been much more closely tied to the household of his master than Sosias. The slaves he supervised, moreover, would be continually subject to direct exploitation strategies by their masters.

Admittedly, we know very little about the organisation of slave workshops or how they might have differed from each other. Acton has argued that the supervisor of Timarchos' shoemakers would have collected all the profits of his supervisees and returned the rent (set by the number of workers) to his master, retaining the surplus himself (2014, 168–9). Alternatively, each of the workers may have kept the profits of their individual work and returned a portion to their owner (Kamen, 2016, 416), a suggestion that better fits Aeschines' language.[58] In this case, the supervisor may have performed organisational duties conducive to the work of the slaves he oversaw and acted as insurance that they would pay their dues. Conversely, I find it improbable that Sosias was the head of 1,000 slaves each earning their own *apophora*, though he may have been the head of several supervisors who did so. It would be interesting to know how different methods of supervision influenced the relationships between supervisors and other slaves, or to know anything about these relationships at all.

[58] They (each of them) are the active subjects of "ἀποφορὰν ἔφερε" (1.97).

Conclusion

To summarise, rentier slaving strategies were a significant part of the wealth accumulation strategies of Athens' well-to-do. Unlike in the category of direct exploitation, in which we see a number of different motivations behind the act of slaving, indirect exploitation was exclusively concerned with the generation of a monetary return with minimal time investment on the part of the slave-owner. Even so, the means of achieving this goal varied and comprised several distinct strategies, which bear some similarities to those discussed in other chapters. Rented slaves were essentially subject to direct exploitation by another master; independent managers of property were very much like other slaves in positions of trust — as reflected in the fact that Milyas could be called an *epitropos*, the same term used to describe Ischomachos' supervisors. Independent slave families such as that of Midas or Syriskos and his wife lived very unusual lives compared to other slaves, but it is unclear to what extent their independence was the norm, compared to *apophora*-bearers who lived in the household of their master.

Despite these similarities, we have also seen how the different implementation of particular slaving strategies had differemt effects on the lives of slaves. In the case of Lesis, we can point to his separation from his family, but retainment of a link to a household other than the one directly exploiting his labour. For Athens' *apophora*-bearers, an independent income might give them the ability to acquire a more comfortable life, hope for the future, and the chance to escape some of the indignities suffered by directly exploited slaves. The lives of slaves like Syriskos and his wife would have been quite tough and, in certain respects, probably worse than the directly exploited *epitropoi* of a wealthy landowner. It is therefore worth differentiating between *apophora*-payers and slaves who were leased large properties, since the two are often viewed in similar terms. Kamen, for example, counts all *apophora*-bearers as privileged slaves (2013, chapter 2). While she undoubtedly makes some important observations about the varying status of slaves, the limits of this arbitrary dichotomy are well exposed by the variation within the category of *apophora*-bearers.

Conclusions

This dissertation has argued that the exploitation of slaves in classical Athens was governed by a number of distinct motivations and plans to achieve them and that an integral feature of Athens' slave system was a diversity of coersive strategies applied to slaves, closely related to the reasons for which they were exploited. Chapter 1 outlined some of the main variations in the reasons for and the ways in which slaves were exploited in classical Athens, which were further examined via case studies in the following chapters.

One such variation was the complex set of motivations behind the direct exploitation of slaves, two different sides of which were examined in Chapters 2 and 3. The account of slaveholding in Xenophon's *Oikonomikos*, discussed in Chapter 2, portrays slaving as a means of wealth accumulation in Athens' elite households. As we saw, Xenophon's ideal landowner would play a direct role in motivating the productive work of his slaves, by implementing a system of incentives and punishments. This system, at the same time, fashioned a slave hierarchy within elite households that helped the slave-owning class maintain control over their human chattel. In Chapter 3, we used Euphiletos' household in Lysias' *Against Eratosthenes* as a lens through which to examine slavery's ability to create a certain lifestyle. Though slavery's economic benefits were important, I argued that the social value obtained from slaving was an equally strong driving-force behind a culture of widespread slaveholding in Athens.

We have also seen how levels of trust placed in slaves and the skill of different forms of labour to which slaves were set comprised notable differentials between slaving strategies. We have frequently returned to these dichotomies throughout this thesis, but their influence on the trajectory of slaving strategies is especially clear from the contrast examined in Chapter 4. On the one hand, the unskilled, easily monitored work of mill slaves facilitated their brutal exploitation in a strategy that required no trust in their person. Contrariwise, masters placed considerable

responsibility in the hands of other slaves, who were skilled and held their trust, as evidenced in the enslaved financial managers and commercial agents discussed in section 4.2.

Another distinct set of slaving strategies were based around indirect exploitation — the renting of a slave's person either to a third party or to the slave himself/herself — which we examined in detail in Chapter 5. Though the strategies within this category are similar from the perspective of a master (allowing them a return on their human property without investing time supervising their labour) there were notable differences between them. Even amongst slaves who worked independently and returned an *apophora* to their masters, there were noteworthy variations in the amount of property slaves were initially entrusted with. Some slaves were provided nothing, or little beyond a small piece of land or tools — others, such as Sosias, were entrusted with the independent management of (sometimes astonishingly) large investments by their masters.

A few notable circumstantial factors bearing on the choice and implementation of slaving strategies deserve some discussion. Gendered work roles are one prominent example. We can see their effect on the work assigned to slaves in the households of both Ischomachos and Euphiletos. Women were also the more frequent subjects of Athenian sexual slaving strategies and appear to have been largely excluded from prominent roles in business. We find no female commercial agents in our evidence, for example, nor many female managers. This was a situation which, in Glazebrook's words, "offered… little opportunity for advancement" for the majority of female slaves (2017, no page numbers). There are exceptions. The (singular) *tamia* of Ischomachos' household was both trusted and privileged. Prostitution, as we saw at section 1.4, furnished opportunities for other female slaves to do well — such as Neaira, or Alke and her predecessor who managed their master's brothel independently. Nevertheless, as it restricted the wider societal role of Athenian women (Gierke, 2014, 44–52), gender bias often restricted the scope of enslaved women's roles within their master's household. Athens' mills, on the other hand, seem to have been comfortable exploiting enslaved men and women alike.

Another factor worth considering is distance. The area in which slaves were exploited and its distance from where masters commonly spent their time would have had an effect on the strategies a slave-owner could apply to them. We have seen the effects of distant landholdings, workshops, and commercial transactions on the development of positions of trust and indirect slaving strategies, where otherwise more oppressive systems of control could be utilised.

Indeed, the differing willingness or ability to supervise a slave's work — whether because of its technical intricacy, its performance at a distance from a slave-owner, the size of a household or the goals of a slave-owner — played a vital part in dictating variations in slaving strategies. This is, I think, an important observation on the role of supervision in historical methods of social control. Probably the most influential work on this subject, Foucault's *Surveiller et Punir*, famously argued that the early modern era saw an innovative shift in Western approaches to the discipline of those deemed to be acting outside the interests of society, wherein violent punishment (and its spectacle) was replaced by control of behaviour through regulation enforced by constant observation (1977). The opposition between these two alternatives — "the certainty of being punished [rather than] the horrifying spectacle of public punishment that must discourage crime" (9) — is worth considering from the context of Athenian slavery.

Violent punishment, as we have seen, played a huge part in forcing slaves across all strategies to work productively to their master's benefit. As important as the fear of violence undoubtedly was to the maintenance of slaving strategies, however, the value of frequent supervision by a slave-owner — of being able to hold a slave accountable for his or her acts of resistance, no matter how small, is equally clear from this study. In circumstances in which the supervision of slaves was not possible or desirable, masters adopted coercive strategies beyond the threat of violence in order to ensure their continued work. Though the panopticon was absent from ancient Greek thought and practical reality, the close supervision of individuals was nevertheless a prominent aspect of several slaving

strategies and the absence of such supervision in other cases was not filled merely by the extremity of punishment for misdemeanours.

Another factor was that of time. Newly-imported slaves, for example, would have required closer supervision during the period immediately following their arrival. Over time, they would have grown familiar with their surroundings and learned the tasks expected of them. Just as importantly, they would have developed a relationship of some kind with their master. This might be founded on their actively resisting their servile condition; but, considering the disciplinary means at a slave-owner's disposal, most slaves would probably have accepted the role they were forced into and attempted to use it to their advantage wherever possible.

For slave-owners, forming a relationship with a slave may have been equally important. In fact, the development of this relationship along with practical skills — what we may, from the perspective of a slave-owner, describe as the training of slaves — was an important, long-term aspect of many individual Athenian slaving strategies. This is clear from the recommendations of Xenophon and Pseudo-Aristotle's works on *oikonomia* that slave supervisors should be trained in the household and fits well the reliance of Athenians on trusted slaves more generally. The slaving strategies to which slaves were subjected will often have changed radically over time. Sometimes this was to the slave's benefit, if they rose up the hierarchy of their household, for example, or were manumitted. Other times the opposite was true. Slaves sold to mills are good examples in this respect, but generally speaking, the relatively good positions occupied by certain slaves were always insecure.

Insecurity relative to freepersons was undoubtedly an experience of slaves exploited in all manner of strategies, owing to their lack of rights in Athens' laws. Beyond this, however, their lives were remarkably varied and this socio-economic heterogeneity no doubt also contributed to preventing cohesive group resistance on both a societal and a household level. Indeed, even within the household of wealthy Athenians, a slave hierarchy apportioned certain privileges — comforts, money, and even the ability to have a family — to certain slaves at its top and not others. Those at

its bottom were likely to be closely monitored and experience little but work and punishment. In less wealthy households, where material comforts were less likely to be extended to even the most trusted of slaves, the promise of eventual manumission — perhaps the most crucial (if poorly documented) facet of Athens' system of control — would probably have been key.

If Lesis' letter is any indication (section 5.1), slaves rented to another owner were likely to suffer the exposure to violent coercion and indignities suffered by most directly exploited slaves. On the other hand, due to the peculiar strategy in which they were employed, *apophora*-bearing slaves lived lives absent the close supervision and control suffered by other slaves. They were also given the opportunity to affect their life for the positive through their independent means, though to radically different degrees, depending on their circumstances. A couple like Syriskos and his wife might hope for a family someday free of slavery. The manager of a large business like Sosias, on the other hand, held a surprising opportunity that few other slaves did — to become truly powerful within Athenian society.

Much of Athens' slave system appears to have been built around providing slaves calculated rewards for loyal service. Arguably, it was this that prevented any large-scale revolt in the classical period. Nevertheless, we should be careful in assuming that masters always honoured whatever promises they made. Neither can we really claim that mild treatment or positive incentives were a characteristic of Athenian slavery generally. Mill slavery gives real pause for thought on this count. For labour such as this (and there was a high demand for it) there were no economic reasons to provide positive benefits and there is no evidence that any were extended. Unfortunately, we will never know how many other slaves working in mines and fields, in brothels and sweatshops, or in the retinue of their master, experienced no hope for the future except to continue to live and to escape regular violence.

Even manumission, which provided certain legal sureties, did not provide freedom from dependence on an (ex-)master in many cases we have seen. Much of this rests on another prominent feature of

Athenian slavery: the concurrent incorporation of Athenian slaves into the household of their owners and their formal isolation from other kinship relationships and identity within the political sphere. This, I argued throughout my chapters, was one driving-force behind the preference for slaves over hired freepersons — another being a citizen ideology that resisted economic dependence on others.

Slaves were bought purely to be exploited to the benefit of their masters and the experience of many very closely fit that ideal. But Athenians' desire to expand the productive reach of their *oikoi* also created slaves who were essentially a second-class group of kin within their households, who sometimes managed to benefit from this membership. We have seen some of the multitudinous variations on this summary above.

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