TWO-WAY BRIDGES AND ONE-WAY ROADS

COMPARING U.S. AND CANADIAN APPROACHES TO MINORITY COMMUNITIES AND COUNTERTERRORISM BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11



Puentes de Doble Vía ("Two Way Bridges"), Durham, North Carolina

Name: Francesca Speed

Student ID: 4288939

Supervised By: Dr. Maria Ryan and Dr. Paul McGarr

Department of American and Canadian Studies, University of Nottingham

February 2018

ABSTRACT

After the attacks of 9/11, it became imperative for domestic security and intelligence services in the United States and Canada to engage with Muslim communities to combat homegrown Islamist extremism. This represented a shift in the pre-9/11 approach, which had seen these services largely avoid engagement with visible minority communities in their respective jurisdictions. This thesis examines the differences in the pre- and post-9/11 approaches to terrorism emanating from minority communities in North America, and focuses particularly on the ways in which the United States and Canada have chosen to interact with Muslim communities after September 11. This thesis offers an analysis of these approaches, and how they differ from those to minority communities in an era of secular terrorism. It argues that the methods chosen by the two countries are divergent and require different characterisations, and that the Canadian approach has thus far been more effective in countering homegrown Islamist extremism.

This thesis has a final word count of 34,101.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Never has the phrase ‘it takes a village’ felt truer than in the writing of this thesis.

Firstly, I owe an extraordinary amount of thanks to my supervisors, Dr. Paul McGarr and Dr. Maria Ryan, for their endless patience throughout this process. Without the guidance you both have provided this thesis would be an incomprehensible mess; thank you for helping me to shape my ideas, even when I wasn’t entirely sure what those ideas were. The time and support you have both provided this year has been invaluable.

Maddie, thank you listening (or at least pretending to listen) to me moan and complain about how this will never get finished, and having the faith to then tell me that I’m wrong. Thank you for reading parts of this thesis, despite it being so wildly different to your own interests. Thank you for being my rock when I needed it, and know that my love and gratitude is limitless. When my belief in myself wavered, yours never did, and there is nobody in the world I would rather have as my sister.

Lastly, to my Mum and Dad. I struggle, sometimes, to find the words to express just how grateful I am to have you both as my parents; there are things the English language just cannot properly convey. Thank you for the late nights and the inconvenient phone calls. Thank you for reading draft after draft after draft, even when you were tired from work and would probably rather do anything else. Thank you for being my sounding boards, and my unshakeable support system. Knowing that I have the two of you, and Maddie, in my corner is what gets me through the days where I can’t always see the light at the end of the tunnel. Thank you for your unwavering belief in me, not just this year, but always. I wouldn’t be the person I am today, if I didn’t have the most extraordinarily supportive and loving parents in the two of you. My gratitude for everything you do for me is endless. I love you.

CONTENTS PAGE NUMBER

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1 - ‘THIS IS WAR’: CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 17

CHAPTER 2 - ‘DESPICABLE ACTS OF TERROR’: THE UNITED STATES AND HOMEGROWN ISLAMIST TERRORISM AFTER 9/11 39

CHAPTER 3 - A NOT-SO PEACEABLE KINGDOM? HOMEGROWN ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN CANADA AFTER 9/11. 66

CONCLUSION 95

BIBLIOGRAPHY 100

INTRODUCTION

'Terrorism…is theatre.'[1]

~ Brian M. Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the

President, RAND Corporation

On 11 September 2001, hijackers flew two airplanes into the World Trade Center. A third crashed into the Pentagon, whilst a fourth was brought down in a Pennsylvanian field after passengers managed to regain control of the aircraft. It was the worst terrorist attack in history, and for Muslim Americans, it was about to get even worse. The effect of the tragedy was instantaneous: Islamic schools were evacuated after receiving threatening telephone calls, bomb threats were sent to businesses and mosques, and the Council on American-Islamic Relations advised Muslims who wore traditional Islamic clothing to '"stay indoors for the immediate future."' A Molotov cocktail was thrown at a community centre in Chicago, gunshots were fired at an Islamic centre in Dallas, a man in Huntington, New York tried to run a Pakistani woman over with his car.[2] The FBI estimated that hate crimes targeted at Muslims soared by 1600% in the days following 9/11.[3]

In Canada, the fears of backlash against Muslims for the attacks on the Twin Towers also simmered.[4] In Montreal, a mosque was firebombed, threats of raping Muslim children were sent to a mosque in Hamilton, Ontario.[5] Already inflamed tensions exploded even further,

---

[1] Quoted in Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 32.
[2] Robert Tomsho, Barbara Carton, Joe Periera, Patricia Calahan and James Dorsey, "A Day in Terror: Islamic Americans Grapple with Quick Backlash," *Wall Street Journal*, 12 September 2001, Accessed: 25 September 2017; Stuart Miller, "Violent Attacks on Arab Americans," *The Guardian*, 14 September 2001, Accessed: 25 September 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/14/september11.usa14>.
[3] "Many Minority Groups Were Victims of Hate Crimes After 9/11," *Bell State University*, 9 October 2003, Accessed: 25 September 2017, <https://web.archive.org/web/20081211050839/http://www.bsu.edu/news/article/0%2C1370%2C-1019-12850%2C00.html>.
[4] Barbara Crossette, "After the Attacks: In Montreal; A Sense of Foreboding in Canada's Diverse Muslim Community," *New York Times*, 16 September 2001, Accessed: 25 September 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/16/us/after-attacks-montreal-sense-foreboding-canada-s-diverse-muslim-haven.html>.
[5] Miller, "Violent Attacks"; Susan McClelland, "Rising from the Fire," *Maclean's* 114, No. 3 (2001): 56.

however, in the aftermath of a speech by University of British Columbia professor Sunera Thobani. At a conference, Thobani argued that America's foreign policy was 'soaked in blood,' and that the nation President George W. Bush was calling on in the aftermath of the attacks was a 'bloodthirsty, vengeful' one. The public outcry that followed concentrated on the fact that Thobani was an immigrant, and argued that this made it inappropriate for her to make such criticisms. For some, Thobani's comments, and the fact that she felt able to make them, was a sign that diversity in Canada had gone too far.[6]

In the sixteen years since 9/11, Muslims in North America have continued to face adverse reactions in the wave of terrorist attacks committed by Islamist extremists. Efforts to contain retaliatory rhetoric have not been aided by the fact that those attacks are now being perpetrated by homegrown terrorists, which this thesis defines as citizens and permanent residents of the United States and Canada who have been radicalised to, and committed acts of, violent extremism, rather than by foreign nationals as was the case with 9/11. Despite this, Muslim communities in North America have become an integral part of the fight against homegrown Islamist extremism, especially given the rise of the lone wolf terrorist: Muslims are called upon to help identify changes in the behaviour of their community members that might indicate radicalisation, and report their concerns to security authorities.

The relationship between Muslim communities and domestic security services, however, has not always been a prosperous one. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was criticised for its lack of personnel capable of speaking the Middle Eastern languages that these new terrorists conversed in, and its field agents hardly reflected the communities in America that now took centre stage.[7] If the FBI could not immediately set to the task of rooting out Islamist extremism, it could be argued, Muslim Americans would

[6] Kent Roach, *September 11: Consequences for Canada* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2003), 119-120.
[7] Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *The FBI: A History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 16.

have to help. Though the Bureau did improve the cultural and linguistic diversity of its analysts and field agents, however, the role that North America's Muslim communities were expected to play in counterterrorism efforts continued unabated.

The diversity of intelligence and security personnel in Canada has been an issue since the establishment of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1984. Despite Canada being officially bilingual, CSIS' early personnel were predominantly Anglophone, reflecting the linguistic homogeneity of its predecessor, for which many of the first CSIS agents had previously worked.[8] Furthermore, the first major intelligence operation CSIS conducted was into a radical organisation of Sikh nationalists, and an agency that lacked speakers of one of the country's official languages was hardly likely to have sufficient diversity to conduct investigations into immigrants from the Asian subcontinent. In the United States, efforts to improve personnel diversity in the FBI so as to better reflect the U.S. population reached the point that former Director William Sessions kept a tally card on him that indicated the number of female and African American agents the Bureau hired during his tenure.[9]

The largely homogenous make-up of security and intelligence employees poorly reflected the diverse composition of the North American population since before 9/11, and thus made interacting with visible minority communities challenging for those agencies. In Canada, these challenges are reflected in the early efforts of CSIS, whilst in the United States there is little indication that they were even recognised. The rise of Islamist terrorism necessitated a change in policy, in this regard: for the first time, the minority status of a terrorist group was publicly acknowledged after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, but it would take the tragedy of 9/11 for the importance of engaging with Muslims in North America to be recognised in practice.

---

[8] Geoffrey R. Weller, "The Internal Modernization of Western Intelligence Services," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 14, No. 3 (2001): 304.
[9] Jeffreys-Jones, *The FBI*, 14-15.

Therefore, this thesis argues that an evaluation of the pre-9/11 approach to terrorism emanating from a range of minority groups demonstrates broad themes and connective trends, that can then be mapped onto an analysis of how security and intelligence services in the United States and Canada approach Muslim communities in relation to the specific threat of Islamist extremism. It is important to note that only federal security and intelligence services are considered in this thesis, thus the focus on the FBI for discussions regarding the United States, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and CSIS for Canada. These organisations, however, are recognised to not be the only ones with responsibilities for counterterrorism work, with local police forces, such as those in New York City, Toronto and Montreal also playing a significant role.

An evaluation of prominent post-9/11 terrorist attacks and attempted attacks by lone wolf Islamist terrorists since 2009 finds that these themes and trends evolve in response to the rise of religious terrorism, and clearly demonstrate a decisive shift in the approaches taken by domestic security and intelligence services to Muslims in North America, as compared to those taken to minority communities in an era dominated by secular terrorism. This analysis concentrates on assessing the methods employed by security agencies to engage Muslim communities in the United States and Canada, and persuasively contends that the two countries adopt very different approaches: engagement in the United States is characterised by a noticeable effort to outsource responsibility for collecting intelligence on those who might be moving to Islamist extremism to local Muslim communities, with little evidence to show that this is supported by determined efforts to improve community-security relationships. Alternatively, Canada's approach to engagement is characterised in this analysis as outreach, as is evidenced by government initiatives designed to improve the integration of all minority communities into the fabric of Canadian society, and to more directly develop positive community-security relationships. The impact of these systematic efforts is directly seen in the

case studies considered, which themselves paint a very different picture to that produced by an evaluation of the United States. These distinctions more broadly prove that there is no homogenous North American approach to engaging with Muslim communities in an era dominated by concerns of Islamist extremism, and ultimately conclude that concerted efforts at outreach to these communities have proven to be a more successful approach to counterterrorism thus far. In looking to the future, this thesis additionally concludes that systematic efforts of outreach that encompass an array of minority communities will leave domestic security and intelligence services better positioned to adjust to the fears and uncertainties of tomorrow when the threat of Islamist extremism begins to fade.

Key to any definition of 'terrorism' are the ideas that it is (a) violence that is politically motivated; (b) that it is aimed against civilians or non-combatants, and; (c) that the purpose of this violence is to induce fear in and influence the behaviour of, a broader target audience. Whilst every definition is phrased slightly differently, these three components are essential to the consensus understanding of what 'terrorism' is.[10] For clarity, this thesis will take its definition from that put forward by Bruce Hoffman: 'terrorism' is henceforth taken to be 'the deliberation creation and exploitation of fear, through violence or the threat of violence [aimed at civilians] in the pursuit of political change.'[11] Additionally, as this thesis centres on homegrown terrorism, it understands this phenomenon to be violent actions undertaken for the purposes of forcing political change, carried out by citizens or residents of the countries in which the action occurred.

The debate around terrorism, therefore, centres in large part not on *what* it is, but on *who* is responsible for it. Whilst there is agreement that non-state actors – organisations such as

[10] For the definition of terrorism contained in the U.S. Code: 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (LII), Accessed: 25 September 2017, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2331>; for the definition in Canada, see: *Criminal Code of Canada*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, § 83(01), Accessed: 25 September 2017, <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-46.pdf>.

[11] Square parentheses added. See: Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 40.

Islamic State, for example – can be perpetrators of terrorism, if states themselves can be similarly culpable is a contentious argument. Those who argue that states can be terrorists define terrorism by the *action*, those who contend otherwise define it by the *actor*. Hoffman, for instance, has argued for a need to differentiate between state and non-state terrorism because state violence is governed by 'rules and norms of accepted behavior that prohibit the use of certain types of weapons…and proscribe various tactics and outlaw attacks on specific categories of targets.'[12] This argument, however, ignores that 'terrorism' first came into common usage during the French Revolution to refer to violence enacted *by the new state* against dissidents as a means of consolidating power.[13] This etymological history provides one key point distinguishing state *terrorism* from state *violence*, as the latter could be used to refer to military operations conducted overseas: state terrorism involves the use of violence against individuals the state is responsible for. A definition of state terrorism advanced by Ruth Blakeley takes two of the fundamental components of a definition of 'terrorism' generally, adding to them the idea that the violence is conducted 'against individuals that the state has a duty to protect,' and that this violence 'must be perpetrated by actors on behalf of or in conjunction with the state[.]'[14]

With the general debate outlined, this thesis concentrates on acts of terrorism that are perpetrated by non-state actors within the United States and Canada. More specifically, it focuses on an analysis of how those countries approach terrorism by homegrown extremists. In the post-9/11 period, the focus on this front has been on homegrown Islamist extremism, which has in turn led to a contentious reframing of terrorism in political rhetoric, particularly in the United States, from considering the threat to be emanating from terrorism as a

[12] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 25-27.
[13] Hoffman actually covers the frequently-changing etymology of 'terrorism,' tracing the history of its usage from the French Revolution to the post-9/11 period. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 3-17.
[14] Ruth Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South* (London: Routledge, 2009), 30. Other discussions of state versus nonstate terrorism are as follows: Richard Jackson and Samuel Justin Sinclair, *Contemporary Debates on Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2012).

methodology, to seeing it as coming from radical Islamism more specifically; in effect, the threat shifted from the action to the actor. Evidence of this can be found in documents such as the United States' National Counterterrorism Strategy, which declares 'war' on al-Qaeda rather than the tactic of terrorism that organisations such as this employ.[15] This reframing forms part of the justification for the focus on homegrown Islamist terrorists in this thesis.

Finally, there are two other phrases used throughout this thesis that require definition. The first of these, community-security relations, is used to refer broadly to the relationships that exist between minority communities and domestic security and intelligence, but is understood to be progressive in nature. Thus, the analysis on community-security relations that is conducted in this thesis starts from the premise that they can be beneficial to both minority communities and domestic security and intelligence services. Secondly, the phrase 'bridge building' is used in reference to efforts at improving relationships between minority communities and domestic security services that are aimed at increasing open and collaborative dialogue, and that work to build more equal partnerships when it comes to counterterrorism, rather than one-sided arrangements.

Although there is plentiful scholarship on both intelligence and terrorism studies, neither field has yet to delve into discussions of the impact that minority communities can have on domestic intelligence and national security concerns; this is quite remarkable, given the long history of immigration and continually shifting racial and ethnic demographics of both the United States and Canada. Regarding the U.S., diversity is almost exclusively referenced in admonishments of the lack thereof within the intelligence community, and the impediments that this can bring to effective representation of, and service to, domestic populations.[16] Outside

[15] United States, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, 2011, Accessed: 27 June 2016, 2, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf>. See also comments by General Jack Keane, referenced in Chapter Two.
[16] Robert Callum, "The Case for Cultural Diversity in the Intelligence Community," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 14, No. 1 (2001): 25-48; Geoffrey R. Weller, "The Internal Modernization

of this, ideas of 'culture' and 'identity' tend to arise most commonly in discussions of the 'culture' of an intelligence community and the 'identity' of different agencies.[17] Such conversations are rarely seen in corresponding literature on Canada.

On the matter of domestic intelligence in the United States, a key focus of this thesis, scholarship tends towards the debate between demands for personal liberty and a need for national security, or concerns regarding the ethics of domestic intelligence collection.[18] These works do not, however, consider the impact of societal diversity on intelligence collection itself. The sensitive nature of interaction between security services and minority communities generally is rarely considered: works that do look at this focus understandably on interactions with Muslims, and are more often located in discussions of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programmes, than works dedicated to intelligence collection.

In the exceptionally narrow field of Canadian intelligence study, focus tends to be placed on the initial creation of CSIS as a civilian intelligence agency, the responsibilities it was given and the oversight put in place to oversee its activities.[19] Relatedly, literature on the RCMP has concentrated primarily on the abuses committed by Canada's federal police force and its officers that led to CSIS' establishment.[20] Other emphasis has been placed on the legislative responses to 9/11 and the two unrelated attacks in October 2014, though these are not specific

---

of Western Intelligence Agencies," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 14, No. 3 (2001): 299-322.

[17] Gregory F. Treverton, "Terrorism, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Learning the Right Lessons," *Intelligence and National Security* 18, No. 4 (2003): 121-140; Adam D.M. Svendsen, "The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Change: Addressing US Domestic Counter-Terrorism Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security* 27, No. 3 (2010): 371-397; Arthur S. Hulnick, "Intelligence and Law Enforcement: The "Spies are Not Cops" Problem," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 10, No. 3 (1997): 269-286.

[18] Jeffrey L. Baker, "Domestic and National Security: A Fourth Amendment Perspective," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 12, No. 1 (1999): 1-17; Amitai Etzioni, "NSA: National Security vs. Individual Rights," *Intelligence and National Security* 30, No. 1 (2015): 100-136; Jennifer Sims, "Intelligence to Counter Terror: The Importance of All-Source Fusion," *Intelligence and National Security* 22, No. 1 (2007): 38-56; Treverton, "Terrorism, Intelligence and Law Enforcement."

[19] Richard Cleroux, *Official Secrets: The Inside Story of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1991); Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, *Confronting the Enemy Within: Secret Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004); Philip Rosen, *The Canadian Security Intelligence Service* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2000).

[20] Cleroux, *Official Secrets*; Jeff Sallot, *Nobody Said No: The Real Story of How the Mounties Always Get Their Man* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1979); Rosen, *Canadian Security Intelligence Service*.

to the impact of this legislation on Canada's intelligence structure.[21] Even works based on a country with a Multiculturalism Act do not really pay significant attention to how that diversity might affect domestic intelligence and security operations.

With respect to studies of terrorism, many published works position terrorism as a foreign problem, something that can occur on domestic soil but that is imported from overseas. The issue of homegrown terrorism has been too infrequently considered in a North American context, though growing concerns regarding homegrown terrorism in the United States, especially since 2009, should help fill this void.[22] Its most extensive coverage appears in histories of the FBI, but these are not intended as comprehensive studies of this phenomenon.[23] In Canada, homegrown terrorism has received academic attention, but this is scarce even in comparison to the scholarship that exists on Canadian intelligence.[24] Rarely in this material, however, is it recognised that some of the terrorist groups that have existed in North America, especially in the twentieth century, come from minority communities, and the challenges that racially and ethnically diverse societies like those of the United States and Canada can have on security and intelligence practices.

---

[21] Kent Roach, *The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Roach, *September 11: Consequences for Canada* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2003); Martin Rudner, "Challenge and Response: Canada's Intelligence Community and the War on Terrorism," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 11, No. 2 (2004): 17-39; Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, *False Security: The Radicalization of Canadian Anti-Terrorism* (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015).

[22] Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2008); Peter Neumann, *Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2016). Homegrown terrorism in a European context has been the subject of much more extensive academic attention. See, for example: Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (London: Pan Books, 2003); John Horgan, *Divided We Stand: The Strategy and Psychology of Ireland's Dissident Terrorists* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Stefan Aust, *Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the R.A.F.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Jillian Becker, *Hitler's Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang* (Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2014).

[23] Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2002); Jeffreys-Jones, *The FBI*; Bryan Burrough, *Days of Rage: America's Radical Underground, the FBI, and the Forgotten Age of Revolutionary Violence* (New York: Penguin Books, 2015).

[24] Kim Bolan, *Loss of Faith: How the Air India Bombers Got Away with Murder* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2005); Zuhair Kashmeri and Brian McAndrew, *Soft Target: How the Indian Intelligence Service Penetrated Canada* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1989); John McCoy and W. Andy Knight, "Homegrown Terrorism in Canada: Local Patterns, Global Trends," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 38, No. 4 (2015): 253-274; Steve Hewitt, "Cold War Counter-Terrorism: The Evolution of International Counter-Terrorism in the RCMP Security Service, 1972-1984," *Intelligence and National Security* (2017): 1-17.

The academic material on homegrown terrorism from minority groups in the United States that does exist often focuses on the post-9/11 period and the threat of Islamist extremism.[25] Many of these works also focus on incidents that are connected to terrorist organisations overseas, with al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS) the most common groups discussed. The move away from group-affiliated to group-inspired terrorism and the associated rise of the lone wolf perpetrator has prompted the incorporation of this phenomenon in academic material.[26] Works that look at pre-9/11 homegrown terrorism generally are scarce, and those that look at terrorism from minority groups even more so. Those that do exist tend to look at groups in isolation or in broader histories that focus on the FBI.[27] In Canada, the focus has traditionally been on Quebec separatist terrorism and the October Crisis in the 1960s and 1970, though these do often come in histories of the RCMP.[28] The 1985 Air India bombing has received some academic attention, but this is generally in reference to the early failures of CSIS as an organisation.[29]

There are obvious gaps, therefore, in the existing field of scholarship on both intelligence and terrorism. The diversity of both the American and Canadian populations makes the absence of any sustained research on how that diversity affects the practices of intelligence and security services glaringly obvious. Notably, diversity itself is only ever given attention outside of

---

[25] For example: Peter Bergen, *The United States of Jihad: Who Are America's Homegrown Terrorists and How Do We Stop Them?* (New York: Broadway Books, 2016); Ali H. Soufan, *The Black Banners: Inside the Hunt for Al Qaeda* (London: Penguin Books, 2011); Risa A. Brooks, "Muslim Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the Threat?" *International Security* 36, No. 2 (2011): 7-47.

[26] For example: Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad*; Marc Sageman, "The Next Generation of Terror," *Foreign Policy*, No. 165 (2008): 36-42; Lorenzo Vidino, "Homegrown *Jihadist* Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?" *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32, No. 1 (2009): 1-17; Jason-Leigh Striegher, "Early Detection of the Lone Wolf: Advancement of Counter-Terrorism Investigations with an Absence or Abundance of Information and Intelligence," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism* 8, No. 1 (2013): 35-53.

[27] Burrough, *Days of Rage*; Michael González-Cruz, Alberto Marquez Sola and Lorena Terando, "Puerto Rican Revolutionary Nationalism: Filiberto Ojeda Ríos and the Macheteros," *Latin American Perspectives* 25, No. 6 (2008): 151-165; William Rosenau, ""Our Backs Are Against the Wall": The Black Liberation Army and Domestic Terrorism in 1970s America," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36, No. 2 (2013): 176-192.

[28] Cleroux, *Official Secrets*, Reg Whitaker, "Apprehended Insurrection? RCMP Intelligence and the October Crisis." *Queen's Quarterly* 100. No. 2 (1993): 383-406.

[29] Bolan, *Loss of Faith*; Kashmeri and McAndrew, *Soft Target*.

references to intelligence personnel when noting that one aim of Islamist terrorists is to present to Muslim communities worldwide the idea that Islam is 'under siege' from the West, thereby hoping to recruit others to their cause. Where previous studies looked at minority groups in isolation, my research views them as part of a broader trend of terrorism in North America and the challenges that this has posed to intelligence and security services. This thesis intends to fill some of the gaps in the current literature, by looking at how Canada and the United States approached terrorist emanating from a range of minority groups in the pre-9/11 period and how the themes that emerge from this analysis can be mapped on their approach to jihadist terrorism in the post-9/11 era.

When tackling subjects like intelligence operations or counterterrorism, there are a few significant challenges that must be overcome in trying to locate pertinent source material: most notably, intelligence and security organisations operate largely in secret, especially when it comes to their counterterrorism work. Classified primary material, therefore, tends to be released decades after-the-fact on account of national security concerns and to prevent overlap with ongoing assignments. As this then informs secondary literature, the field of intelligence studies tends to be history-oriented: currently, for example, works on the Cold War dominate academic attention. However, the growing pool of unclassified and open-source material like Commission reports and news articles has gradually allowed for more contemporaneous contributions to scholarship, and it is this material that has provided the backbone of this thesis.

For source material on the United States, the Government Publishing Office (GPO) website was an invaluable resource. Three of the terrorist attacks discussed in Chapters One and Two were subject to Congressional hearings, as was a clemency offer extended to one of the organisations considered in Chapter One. These hearings often called as witnesses current and former members of U.S. security and intelligence agencies, thus providing insights that would otherwise have been difficult to obtain. Hearing transcripts also often contained additional

information in appendices, such as prepared statements, written responses to questions, and report summaries. Access to the transcripts of these hearings therefore provided a vital foundation to formulating the arguments advanced in this thesis.

Away from the GPO, government websites were another good resource, even considering the inherent biases in the information they provide. This was particularly the case with Chapter Three, given the absence of a Canadian equivalent to the GPO: information on the two government programmes discussed came initially from the Government of Canada website, and furthered by evaluative reports on those programmes as far as they had been subject to such analysis. Access to information on these initiatives allowed for a further dimension to the arguments put forward both in Chapter Three specifically, and the thesis overall. This material was all open-source and publicly available, as were the hearing transcripts retrieved from the GPO. Also found on government websites, particularly regarding Chapter Two, were unclassified reports released following two of the case studies discussed in that chapter. These reports came from Congressional committees, a special Commission and the Inspectors General of the relevant agencies within the U.S. intelligence community. Discovery of this evaluative material ensured that an argument could be put forward that considered events both before and after these attacks.

Media reports constituted a final general repository of primary material. For contemporaneous news reports relevant to Chapter One, database searches were conducted via ProQuest, which provided access to newspapers from across the United States. Google's own newspaper archives contained back issues of some Canadian newspapers, allowing for two different perspectives on events transpiring during the waves of Quebec separatist violence in the 1960s. Media articles for the two post-9/11 chapters necessitated looking at each individual newspaper's website, some of which only allowed a limited number of articles before being locked behind a paywall. However, this challenge was overcome by scoping a broader array of

newspapers, which ultimately provided a greater number of perspectives dependent on the political leanings of each newspaper, but also a greater well of information from which to draw evidence for the argument this thesis sets out.

Accordingly, this thesis adopts a methodological approach to source material that relies on evaluating official government publications and contemporaneous news reports, and conducting close readings to tease out the relevant information from the accounts being put forward. In taking this approach, this thesis brings together a broad array of material to produce the first analysis that considers these cases in respect to one another, both within the United States and Canada in isolation, but also transcending the 49th parallel, as evidence of a broader trend in North American security and intelligence operations regarding the approaches taken to terrorism by minority groups prior to, and Islamist extremism specifically after 9/11.

This thesis utilises a hybrid format of thematic analysis and case studies to evaluate the trends in pre-9/11 approaches to terrorism from minority communities, and then to chart the evolution of the most prominent of these trends in the post-9/11 period, including how they map onto interactions between North American domestic security and intelligence services, and Muslim communities in the United States and Canada. These trends are examined exclusively within the framework of homegrown terrorism. A thematic approach brings together otherwise disparate groups and events into a uniquely comparative study that is designed to draw out similarities and differences in the approaches taken by intelligence and security services to minority communities, but also provides greater scope for making transnational comparisons than simply viewing each case or country in isolation. Moving to the use of distinct case studies in the two substantive chapters on the post-9/11 period allows for closer analysis of the approaches to engagement through case-specific lenses, broadening the capacity for analysis to how far each country is consistent in their approach to community-security relationships, and comparisons between the United States and Canada more generally.

Therefore, Chapter One looks at both Canada and the United States in the period from the 1960s to the turn of the century and the September 11 hijackings. The potential challenges of such a broad time span are mitigated by the thematic approach, which ensures that superfluous information is set aside in favour of material directly pertinent to the intention of the chapter, which is to establish broad trends in the approaches by Canadian and American intelligence and security services to terrorism from minority communities prior to the rise of Islamist extremism and 9/11. An array of different terrorist groups from a variety of racial and cultural backgrounds across both countries is intentional, as in this period the focus was on secular terrorism and, as such, there was no particular terrorist group or cause singled out for concentrated counterterror efforts. This chapter evolves naturally from a thematic analysis to a consideration of distinct case studies as it moves into the 1990s and the rise of Islamist extremism. This signals both the focus for the rest of the thesis, and the reasoning for it, as it was following the World Trade Center bombing – the first major instance of Islamist terrorism in North America – that there was a noticeable shift in rhetoric that acknowledged the connection between Islam and Islamism, but that nevertheless made sure to delineate between the two, and between the actions of extremists and law-abiding Muslims in the United States. The second case study considered in this chapter is that of the Millennium bomber, chosen because its cross-border elements provide support for a comparative study such as this. Importantly, this case starts to signpost the Canadian approach to engagement that is then further expounded on in Chapter Three.

Chapter Two narrows in scope to looking at the United States in the period after 9/11. The use of case studies continues through both this chapter and Chapter Three. This allows for a nuanced analysis of key events, which combine for an assessment that the United States demonstrates a change in their approach to minority communities after 9/11, and that the relationship between domestic security and intelligence services and Muslim Americans in this

period is characterised by an outsourcing of intelligence collection, unaccompanied by efforts to build towards positive relationships between security authorities and those communities. The focus on Islamist extremism in this chapter and the next is justified by the prominent position afforded this threat in the assemblage of national security concerns in North America, particularly as it pertains to issues of homegrown domestic terrorism in the twenty-first century to date. The cases considered in this chapter are the 2009 Fort Hood shooting by Major Nidal Malik Hasan that killed thirteen people; the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing by the Tsarnaev brothers that killed four and injured over two hundred; and the 2015 San Bernardino shooting by Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik that killed fourteen people. These cases have been chosen because they are the three most prominent attacks in the United States that have been explicitly linked to homegrown Islamist extremism: this emphasis is why other major terrorist attacks, like the 2016 Orlando shooting are discounted from the analysis in this chapter.

Finally, Chapter Three moves north of the border and focuses on Canada in the post-9/11 period, once again deploying a case study approach to this analysis. Research into Canada's approach to minority communities generally revealed the existence of top-down initiatives designed to integrate new immigrants into Canadian society, and to help improve the relationships between minority communities and domestic security and intelligence services. Alongside three case studies of terrorist incidents, two of these programmes are also considered, one with explicit ties to security and intelligence practices and the other with more general applications. Considered in this chapter are the Multiculturalism Program, run by the Department of Canadian Heritage with the aim of improving integration to facilitate a socially cohesive society, and the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, an initiative that brought together representatives from different minority groups and government representatives to discuss the implications of national security concerns for Canada's minority communities. Furthermore, the terrorism case studies selected for this chapter are the 2013 VIA Rail plot, in

which two individuals plotted to bomb a VIA Rail train running between Toronto and New York; the 2014 October attacks, in which one Canadian solider was killed after being run down by a vehicle in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, and another soldier shot dead whilst on sentry duty at the National War Memorial in Ottawa; and the 2016 Aaron Driver incident, in which an explosive was detonated in a taxicab when security services tried to arrest Driver in Strathroy, Ontario. As with the United States, these are three of most prominent cases of Islamist extremism in Canada after 9/11. A fourth case study, that of the Toronto 18, is discussed in the introduction to this chapter, but is not included in the main analysis because it involved a terrorist cell: the cases in both Chapter Two and Chapter Three are all either lone wolves or pairs of attackers, and smaller groups or individuals such as these present a new dimension to the homegrown Islamist threat in North America. In Chapter Three, the argument advanced is that the Canadian approach to engagement with Muslim Canadians is distinct from that in the United States: evidence of systematic efforts to improve community-security relationships with a variety of minority communities, including Muslim Canadians, concludes that the engagement witnessed in this chapter should thus be characterised as outreach.

‘THIS IS WAR’: CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MINORITY COMMUNITIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

“If we have to patrol this city in tanks, that’s what we’ll do. This is war.”[1]

~ Edward J. Kiernan, President of the New York City branch of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, 1969-73.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, were a watershed moment in the history of terrorism in the West, especially in North America: the scale of the attacks, the methods used, and the loss of life were all unprecedented. They also shattered the veneer of invulnerability that had surrounded the American ‘homeland’ since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. As a result, the history of terrorism on the North American continent prior to 9/11 has been either forgotten entirely or considered too different to the post-9/11 era to teach us anything about the terrorism of today. Significantly, this history is almost exclusively comprised of homegrown terrorist attacks, whereas 9/11 constituted an act of international terrorism.[2] To emphasise this apparent neglect of twentieth century terrorism, Edward J. Valla and Gregory Comcowich conducted a survey of the articles published between 2001 and 2007 in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* and *Terrorism and Political Violence*, two journals that they consider to be the ‘main publishing venues for scholarly articles on the topic of politically motivated violence.’ They counted 187 articles in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, and 189 in *Terrorism and Political Violence*: of these, three and six articles respectively focused on extremism in the United States or domestic terrorist groups. The clear majority, especially in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, centred their arguments on the international facets of terrorism.[3]

---

[1] Quoted in: Bryan Burrough, *Days of Rage: America’s Radical Underground, the FBI, and the Forgotten Age of Revolutionary Violence* (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 197.

[2] William Rosenau, ““Our Backs Are Against the Wall”: The Black Liberation Army and Domestic Terrorism in 1970s America,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36, No. 2 (2013): 176.

[33] Edward J. Valla and Gregory Comcowich, “Domestic Terrorism: Forgotten, But Not Gone,” in *Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency*, ed. Jeffrey H. Norwitz (Newport, RI: US Naval War College Press, 2008), 179.

Not only does the past have much to say about terrorism in general, it also has plenty to offer on the subject of homegrown terrorism, which has emerged as a significant issue for domestic intelligence and security services in the post-9/11 period, especially with the establishment and rise of terror groups like al-Qaeda and, more recently, Islamic State (ISIS) which utilise tools such as communication technologies and the Internet to radicalise and recruit to their cause individuals from diasporic communities. They have also found success in drafting converts from outside 'at-risk' communities; this will be the subject of discussion in later chapters.[4] In part, the rise of homegrown terrorism in relation to jihadist extremism can be linked to systems implemented after September 11 to prevent a similar attack from reoccurring.[5] Nevertheless, to argue that concerns regarding homegrown terrorism began after 9/11 is a fallacy: homegrown terrorists and terror groups were a near-constant concern for local police services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during the second half of the twentieth century.

This chapter considers how the United States and Canada have navigated pre-9/11 domestic terrorism threats emanating from a range of different minority groups, and evaluates the common themes that emerge from that analysis with a view to mapping these where possible onto post-9/11 security and intelligence practices in Chapters Two and Three. Groups, organisations and causes considered in this chapter's analysis are: the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) in Canada, a violent Quebec separatist organisation that was active primarily, though sporadically, between 1963 and 1970, and was ultimately responsible for between 170 and 200 bombings resulting in eight deaths and many more injuries;[6] Sikh nationalism in

[4] Richard Aldrich, "Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem," *Intelligence and National Security* 24, No. 1 (2009): 33; Emily Winterbotham and Elizabeth Pearson, "Different Cities, Shared Stories," *The RUSI Journal* 161, No. 5 (2016): 54-65.

[5] Some of these methods are outlined in brief on page forty-one (Chapter Two).

[6] The number of bombings varies according to source. Judy Torrance and Ted Robert Gurr suggest the number is approximately 170, whereas Andrew Potter suggests it exceeds 200: Judy Torrance, *Public Violence in Canada, 1867-1982* (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queens University Press, 1986), 37; Ted Robert Gurr, "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies,*

Canada, focusing on the Babbar Khalsa and the bombing of Air India flight 182 in 1985, in which all 329 passengers and crew members were killed;[7] the Black Liberation Army (BLA) in the United States, a Black nationalist group that emerged in 1971 with the brutal shooting of two New York City Police Department (NYPD) officers. The BLA was only active for three years, but its actions resulted in at least twenty deaths, making it one of the most lethal terrorist organisations of the period, and;[8] the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Puertorriqueña (FALN), an extremist organisation dedicated to Puerto Rican independence that would eventually be linked 'to over 150 bombings, attempted bombings, incendiary attacks, kidnaps, [and] bomb threats,' and were ultimately culpable for six deaths and injuries to at least seventy others over the course of ten years.[9]

The cases in this chapter span most of the second half of the twentieth-century, from the 1960s to the turn of the new millennium. This is not to say that terrorism did not exist in North America before the 1960s – labour anarchists were utilising many of the same methods as far back as the 1880s – but the number of groups, the number of causes, and the subsequent pervasiveness of bombings in North America sharply increased about this time: for many Americans in the 1970s, especially in New York City, bombs simply became a fact of life.[10] Importantly, this is also the period when the *language* surrounding this kind of activity changed, shifting from less weighted terms like 'extremists' to the politically and morally loaded descriptor of 'terrorists'. Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall suggest that this shift in language occurred in the United States around 1972, in the aftermath of revelations about the

States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 88; Andrew Potter, "The Very, Very Brief History of Violence in Quebec," *Maclean's* 120, No. 7 (2007): 10.

[7] R. W. Apple, Jr., "329 Lost on Air-India Plane After Crash Near Ireland; Bomb is Suspected as Cause," *New York Times*, 24 June 1985, Accessed: 13 March 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/24/world/329-lost-on-air-india-plane-after-crash-near-ireland-bomb-is-suspected-as-cause.html?pagewanted=all>; Kim Bolan, *Loss of Faith: How the Air India Bombers Got Away with Murder* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2005), 8-11.

[8] Burrough, *Days of Rage*, 173-175; Rosenau, ""Our Backs Are Against the Wall,"" 177.

[9] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Examining Certain Implications of the President's Grant of Clemency for Members of the Armed Force on National Liberation (the FALN)*, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 1999, 1.

[10] Burrough, *Days of Rage*, 398.

FBI's counter-intelligence program, COINTELPRO. They posit that, during a public relations crisis for the Bureau in which it sought to revise and repair its public image, 'it became urgently necessary…for any hint of overt orientation for subjects' politics to be driven from agents' vocabularies, preferably in favor of a term which would "inspire public support and confidence" in the Bureau's political mission.'[11] For Churchill and Vander Wall, this term was 'terrorism,' citing a 1972 communiqué from FBI Director L. Patrick Gray to the Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) in Albany:

> The word selected was "terrorist," applied here to members of the Black Panther Party *cum* Black Liberation Army who had months earlier still been designated as "agitators" and "key extremists." …The public, which experience had shown would balk at the idea of the FBI acting to curtail political diversity *as such*, could be counted on to rally to the notion that the Bureau was acting only to protect them against "terror."[12]

Although the Bureau's politically repressive activities would continue after the supposed 'death' of COINTELPRO, such a linguistic shift gave the FBI the 'terminological licence by which to pursue precisely the same goals, objectives and tactics attending COINTELPRO,' under the guise of a much more sinister threat to the United States than political diversity.[13] The introduction of such a phraseology, and the subsequent ubiquity of its deployment against groups and individuals seen as acting against mainstream American society, is proof of the Bureau's success at inserting it into the lexicon for everyday Americans. Conversely, the vocabulary of terrorism was already in use in Canada, a country just emerging from a decade spent dealing with the violent actions of Quebec separatists.

This chapter argues that five key themes emerge from analysis of these groups that are demonstrably present in an analysis of post-9/11 security practices. These themes are as follows: the idea of visible versus invisible minorities in North America; cultural literacy and illiteracy; the importance of community-security relations, especially given the insular nature

---

[11] Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret War Against Dissent in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2002), 306.
[12] Churchill and Vander Wall, *The COINTELPRO Papers*, 306.
[13] Ibid., 306.

of some minority communities; the need for security and intelligence services to have diverse personnel that reflect the pluralism of North American society, and; the spectre of an overarching conflict. The final two case studies in this chapter concentrate on the rise of Islamist terrorism in North America, which is the focus of the rest of this thesis, and begins to assess how the security practices outlined in the preceding analysis are adapted for a new era of terrorist activity.

This chapter also argues that the 1993 World Trade Center bombing represents a low watershed moment for a consideration of how minority groups affect the practices of security and intelligence services. It was following this attack that rhetoric from security and intelligence leaders began to publicly delineate between the views and actions of terrorists, and those of Muslims in North America. Previously, this had been of little concern for domestic security services in either the United States or Canada. This shift was precipitated by the move from secular to religious terrorism, as extremist organisations were making their own public pronouncements linking their ideology to that of a major world religion. A high watershed moment would come with the attacks of 9/11, which forced Muslims in North America into an unwanted spotlight.

Themes in Domestic Terrorism Investigations into Minority Communities, 1960s-1980s.

The idea of visible and invisible minorities runs through all four of the cases considered for analysis, though in regard to the BLA and the FALN, this theme is less overt than in the cases of the FLQ and Sikh extremism. Three of the four cases involve groups from visible minority communities in North America. The FLQ is the outlier in this respect: French Canadians occupy a unique position in Canadian society, being as well-entrenched and long-established as their English counterparts. Crucially, French and English Canadians are also culturally very similar, with the most obvious differences being religion (French Canadians are largely Catholic, compared to the Protestantism common of English Canadians), and language. To that

point, Canada is an officially bilingual country. In short, French Canadians are an invisible minority within Canada, which is a significant addendum to consider when assessing the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Security Service's successes against the FLQ and Quebec separatism. Although the Anglophone Security Service can be commended for managing to seriously restrict the FLQ's activities in all of the group's incarnations, they did have the assistance of both the Montreal City Police and the Quebec Provincial Police, two Francophone services that would have been far more attuned to the climate in Quebec than the RCMP.[14] Furthermore, even without joint operations, it must be remembered that, whilst French Canadians are a minority within the Canadian population as a whole, they are the significant majority in Quebec, which arguably means that the RCMP Security Service had no choice but to navigate linguistic differences.

By contrast, the cases of Sikh nationalism, the BLA and the FALN all involve visible minorities. Moreover, there is no minority group in the United States that holds a position in American society comparable to that held by French Canadians in Canada, despite Native Americans being in the country long before the first European settlers and African Americans being almost as long-established as white Americans due to the slave trade. Puerto Rico became a U.S. colony in 1898, and Puerto Ricans gained U.S. citizenship in 1917; on the other hand, the 1950s marked a zenith in migration from the island to the mainland, so Puerto Ricans occupy a strange position of being both reasonably well-established but also a relatively new migrant group by the time of the FALN's emergence in 1975.[15] Similarly, Sikhs in Canada

[14] Al Palmer and Paul Dubois, "Police Clamp Down on FLQ, Quiz 15 Men," *The Montreal Gazette*, 13 April 1963, Accessed: 1 April 2017; "Terror in Quebec Viewed as Futile: Separatists Embarrassed by Smashed Bomb Ring," *New York Times*, 23 June 1963, Accessed: 1 April 2017; Reg Whitaker, "Apprehended Insurrection? RCMP Intelligence and the October Crisis," *Queen's Quarterly* 100, No. 2 (1993): 383-406; Reg Whitaker, Gregory S. Kealey and Andrew Parnaby, *Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada from the Fenians to Fortress America* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 277-279. The FLQ's existence is one of different phases, with varying incarnations broken up by mass arrests. The first wave was in 1963, the second c.1966-c.1968, and the third c.1969-1970.

[15] "Puerto Rico – History and Heritage," *Smithsonian*, 6 November 2007, Accessed: 20 September 2017, <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/puerto-rico-history-and-heritage-13990189/>; Jeffrey Acevedo,

were also still considered a new immigrant community by the 1980s, despite having had a presence in Canada since the 19th century. In none of these cases did security and intelligence services engage with the cultural differences of their targets: this is seen in the case of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's (CSIS) investigation into the Babbar Khalsa before the Air India bombing, and with the FBI's failure to understand the movements for Black and Puerto Rican nationalism that the BLA and the FALN saw themselves as part of. Regarding the CSIS investigation into the Babbar Khalsa, there is robust evidence to state that the status of Sikhs as a visible minority had a direct, if negative, impact on the ability of CSIS agents to collect intelligence on the Babbar Khalsa; this is tied directly into the theme of cultural literacy and illiteracy that follows. In contrast, the only evidence that security and intelligence services in the United States ever even acknowledged that both the BLA and the FALN came from minority communities was in one comment from an NYPD officer following the FALN's bombing of Fraunces Tavern. The officer commented on the NYPD's lack of contacts inside the Puerto Rican community as a reason for why they were unprepared for the FALN's emergence.[16]

This lack of acknowledgement would noticeably shift after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, as rhetoric from FBI officials began to publicly delineate between terrorists and Muslims in the United States in a way that they had not for either the BLA or the FALN. After 9/11, when fears over the threat of Islamist extremism reached a fever pitch, government officials were relentless in making public distinctions between adherents of Islamism and those of Islam, anticipating the backlash that Muslims in the U.S. would face after the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. This is markedly distinct from their silence when confronting terrorist action from fringe groups in African American and Puerto Rican communities. In

"Puerto Ricans Leaving Island for U.S. in Record Numbers," *CNN*, 2 May 2016, Accessed: 20 September 2017, <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/02/americas/puerto-rico-exodus/index.html>.

[16] Selwyn Raab, "F.A.L.N. Terrorists Tied to 10 Bombings in Region," *New York Times*, 7 February 1975, Accessed: 1 April 2017.

Canada, the post-9/11 approach to Muslim Canadians unified, so to speak, the approaches to terrorism from minority groups seen in the cases of the FLQ and of the Babbar Khalsa. Whereas investigations involving a visible minority had presented a significant challenge in the 1980s, after 9/11 security and intelligence services approached Muslim Canadians with the same sense of duty that was seen in their investigations of an invisible minority in the 1960s: navigating the differences of a minority group was no longer seen as optional.

Tied into this theme of visible and invisible minorities is that of cultural literacy and illiteracy. As noted above, with the FLQ, the RCMP Security Service faced very little by way of cultural difference. By contrast, CSIS had to deal with the challenge of investigating a relatively new immigrant community that had retained their preference for the cultural and linguistic traditions of their homeland. A wiretap on the telephone of Talwinder Singh Parmar, leader of the Babbar Khalsa, was complicated by Parmar's use of his native language, Punjabi, and physical surveillance ran into difficulties when traditional Sikh dress caused CSIS agents to confuse Parmar with another member of his group, and subsequently lose sight of their target.[17] Whilst an inability to speak Punjabi is understandable, a lack of familiarity with cultural traditions like traditional dress is less so; if charged with investigating members of a Sikh community, it is reasonable to expect agents to familiarise themselves with elements, like clothing, that might otherwise present a surmountable challenge. In this, this theme is inextricably connected to the next – the importance of community-security relations – as cultivating a relationship with Sikhs in the Vancouver-area could have helped CSIS agents in this instance attain even a basic level of cultural awareness that their counterparts in the RCMP Security Service did not need when investigating Quebec separatists.

[17] "'Canada Was a Haven for Terrorists Before Air India Blast," *Outlook India*, 5 May 2007, Accessed: 23 April 2016, <http://www.outlookindia.com/newswire/story/canada-was-a-haven-for-terrorists-before-air-india-blast/470569>; Ken MacQueen and John Geddes, "Air India: After 22 Years, Now's the Time for Truth," *Maclean's* 120, No. 20 (2007): 16-20; Bolan, *Loss of Faith*, 57-58.

The idea of cultural literacy and illiteracy is not an obvious one in pre-9/11 groups in the United States, but this theme nevertheless becomes increasingly important in the later chapters of this thesis. Cultural literacy is of particular importance in one of Chapter Two's case studies, where an already devout Muslim radicalises to extremist violence; in this case, his non-Muslim colleagues and superiors were unable to distinguish between behaviour and rhetoric typical of devout faith, and that symptomatic of radicalisation. Equally, two of the cases in Chapter Three involve white converts to Islam, where a lack of familiarity with Islam on the part of family members meant that they too were unable to make distinctions in acceptable action. Furthermore, and linked once again to the theme of community-security relations, this thesis contends that post-9/11 community-security interactions in the United States are characterised by an effort to outsource intelligence collection and responsibility for positive community-security relations to Muslim Americans. One argument for this might be that Muslims in North America are best positioned to making necessary delineations between devout faith and extremism, but basic cultural literacy amongst wider society could help relieve this burden. Moreover, additional awareness regarding distinctions between Islam and Islamist extremism may have the beneficial impact of reducing fears amongst Muslims in North America of reprisals after homegrown terrorist attacks.

A third theme, that of community-security relations is also intrinsically connected to the two previous themes analysed. All four cases provide evidence that emphasises the importance of positive relationships between minority communities and security services, especially as police engagement with minorities is a very sensitive topic. However, in only one of the case studies, that of the FLQ, were security and intelligence services able to successfully recruit human intelligence sources from both the terrorist group under investigation and from the wider

French Canadian community.[18] In contrast, the only evidence that the wider communities are even considered in the U.S. is in the aforementioned quotation from an NYPD officer, who complained to the *New York Times* about a lack of sources within the Puerto Rican community to whom the police could turn for information.[19] Likewise, CSIS's regional director in Vancouver was asked after the Air India bombing why the agency had not been able to find a Punjabi speaker locally that could translate tapes recorded from wiretaps on Talwinder Parmar's telephone. His response was that 'it was hard to find suitable Punjabi-speaking workers whom CSIS trusted.'[20] This speaks to an agency mistrust of immigrants from the Asian subcontinent that is reflected in some police treatment of Muslims after 9/11, particularly in cases of ethnic and racial profiling.[21]

The case of the BLA evidences the necessity of improving relations with minority communities. Assata Shakur, arguably the group's most infamous member, contends that 'the idea of a Black Liberation Army emerged from conditions in Black communities.…The concept of the BLA arose because of the political, social and economic oppression of Black People in this country.'[22] One aspect of those 'conditions' in the 1960s and 1970s was the

[18] One FLQ member who cooperated with authorities was Carole de Vault, who later wrote a book about her role as an informant during the October Crisis: William Tetley, *The October Crisis 1970: An Insider's View* (Quebec: McGill-Queens University Press, 2007), 183; Carole de Vault and William Johnson, *The Informer: Confessions of an Ex-Terrorist* (Toronto: Fleet Books, 1982). After the demise of the FLQ, the RCMP Security Service retained clandestine interest in separatist activities in Quebec, and paid Claude Morin – who would become René Lévesque's Deputy Premier in his Partis Québécois provincial government – as an informant in the 1970s: Whitaker, Kealey and Parnaby, *Secret Service*, 314.
[19] Raab, "F.A.L.N. Terrorists."
[20] Bolan, *Loss of Faith*, 72.
[21] See for example: Conor Friedersdorf, "The Horrifying Effects of NYPD Ethnic Profiling on Innocent Muslim Americans," *The Atlantic*, 28 March 2013, Accessed: 20 September 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/03/the-horrifying-effects-of-nypd-ethnic-profiling-on-innocent-muslim-americans/274434/>. For cases of mistrust of Muslims working in law enforcement, see: Ashifa Kassam, "Canada Spy Service Workers Sue Agency Over Alleged Racist, Sexist Bullying," *The Guardian*, 15 July 2017, Accessed: 20 September 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/15/canada-security-intelligence-service-racism-sexism-lawsuit >; Spencer Ackerman, "Muslims Inside FBI Describe Culture of Suspicion and Fear: 'It Is Cancer,'" *The Guardian*, 22 March 2017, Accessed: 20 September 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/22/fbi-muslim-employees-discrimination-religion-middle-east-travel>.
[22] Assata Shakur, *Assata: An Autobiography* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1987), 169.

violence between African Americans and the police.[23] Likewise, the 2010s have been characterised in part by police shootings of African Americans, and protest movements like Black Lives Matter that respond to those shootings with demands for change. If CSIS's refusal to engage with the Sikh community in Vancouver before the Air India bombing highlights the potential short-term dangers that accompany a lack of positive community-security relations, the BLA and the legacy of its self-professed goals point to the long-term impact of failures to build bridges with minority communities.

Community-security relationships is the key argument of this thesis in Chapters Two and Three, specifically the differences in the American and Canadian approaches to Islamist extremism and Muslims in North America. In the cases of the BLA and the FALN, the FBI was able to recruit informants from within the organisations themselves, but not from the wider communities, unlike the RCMP Security Service's more successful efforts against the FLQ. There was also a lack of human intelligence in the investigation into the Babbar Khalsa. Chapter Two underscores that, following 9/11, security and intelligence services in the United States sought to engage with Muslim Americans by effectively outsourcing responsibility for identifying, collecting intelligence on, and reporting individuals that seem to be radicalising to extremism. The lack of human intelligence from the wider communities in the pre-9/11 cases points to a fundamental problem with this outsourcing effort: what happens if the wider community has no intelligence to provide? Chapter Three asserts that Canada takes an alternative approach to community-security relations, with outreach efforts that seek to build positive relationships that encourage two-way communication.

The importance of personnel diversity on the part of domestic security and intelligence services is a fourth key theme that emerges. Only in the case of the FLQ is the RCMP Security

[23] For example: Bryan Burrough, "Today, A Softer Response to Police Violence than in 1960s and '70s," *Los Angeles Times*, 2 May 2015, Accessed: 31 August 2017, <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0503-burrough-violent-revolution-20150503-story.html>.

Service's linguistic homogeneity a nonfactor in its ability to perform its role, though the collaborative effort between the RCMP and Francophone provincial and local police departments likely played a key role in this regard. Whilst a lack of cultural literacy amongst CSIS agents was a major factor in the agency's failure to prevent the Air India bombing, so too was a lack of diverse personnel. Equally, this case points to the importance of having personnel reflective not just of a country as a whole, but also of specific regions: there was a Punjabi translator working in CSIS's Ottawa office to whom wiretap recordings were sent, but the presence of a large Sikh community in British Columbia argues for the necessity of having a translator in those offices as well.[24] Similarly, States with large Spanish-speaking populations in the U.S. have a greater need for Spanish-speaking members of law enforcement than do areas of the country without that particular linguistic requirement.

Furthermore, an anecdote from the BLA investigation points to the importance of diverse personnel: James Motherway, an NYPD lieutenant, recalls being told that they were not allowed to go into Harlem after nightfall because of concerns that they might 'cause a riot or shoot someone.' A second detective mentioned that a wiretap on the telephone of a BLA member's aunt revealed she should be meeting with her nephew, 'and we couldn't tail her because it was nighttime in New York.'[25] As stated previously, the BLA saw themselves as a response to the conditions of African Americans and in African American communities; law enforcement with diverse personnel can be more aware of conditions affecting local minority communities that might in turn affect how those communities interact with security services. The two case studies of Islamist extremism in the 1990s that follow highlight criticisms that were levelled at the FBI after 9/11 regarding the Bureau's hiring practices.

[24] Bolan, *Loss of Faith*, 72-73; Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, 19 February 2007, Accessed: 25 March 2017, <https://members.ialeia.org/files/docs/dossier2_ENG.pdf>.
[25] Quoted in Burrough, *Days of Rage*, 240-241.

The final theme that emerges from analysis of these groups is the idea of an overarching conflict. As all of these groups were active in their respective countries between the 1960s and 1990s, the spectre of the Cold War loomed large. In Canada, the RCMP Security Service and CSIS were staffed by personnel ideologically predisposed to viewing security threats through this lens. Furthermore, CSIS had only been established in the 1980s: it was a Cold War institution in a way that neither its predecessor nor the FBI were. One example of the Cold War conflict took precedence in Canada occurred the day before the Air India bombing in 1985, when CSIS agents were instructed to end their surveillance of the Babbar Khalsa's leader because a Soviet spy had arrived in the area and required their attention.[26] Additionally, the failure of CSIS to prevent the Air India disaster can be tied to the decades-long preoccupation with the Cold War and the struggle against communism: the agency had to shift to investigating something entirely unrelated, and the skills necessary to do so successfully simply were not there.[27]

In the United States, also, the Cold War had a hugely significant impact on how both the BLA and the FALN were seen by domestic security and intelligence services, and the FBI in particular. Like the RCMP Security Service in the 1960s and CSIS in the 1980s, the FBI and its personnel were prone in the second half of the twentieth-century to viewing threats primarily within the framework of the Cold War and the struggle against communism. The BLA was therefore viewed as having 'possible links to foreign terrorist groups and hostile governments,' and was considered by the Bureau to be an organisation of guerrillas who 'work[ed] toward revolution,' rather than terrorists that sought to 'focus attention on a particular grievance.'[28] Similarly, ties between the independence movement in Puerto Rico and Fidel Castro's communist regime in Cuba meant that groups agitating for Puerto Rican independence were

[26] Bolan, *Loss of Faith*, 62-63.
[27] Steve Hewitt, "Cold War Counter-Terrorism: The Evolution of International Counter-Terrorism in the RCMP Security Service, 1972-1984," *Intelligence and National Security* (2017): 12.
[28] Rosenau, ""Our Backs Are Against the Wall,"" 184.

seen to have the same connection. In the case of the BLA, efforts to position the group within defined Cold War parameters represented a fundamental mischaracterisation and misunderstanding of how the organisation saw itself.[29] The FALN is admittedly more complicated, as the group did have far-left communist leanings, though there is no evidence of any personal connection between group members and Castro's regime in Cuba.

The idea of an overarching conflict gets skewed slightly in the post-9/11 period. The nature of the September 11 attacks put Islamist extremism at the front of the queue, so to speak, when it came to conflicts for the twenty-first century. However, it quickly became apparent, as is noted at the beginning of Chapter Two, that the focus would be on jihadist terrorism specifically, rather than terrorism in all its forms. Thus, whereas the Cold War played out on occasion in proxy wars throughout the twentieth century, such as in Korea and Vietnam, the fight against Islamist terrorism would not be just one battle in the fight against terrorism in general, it would comprise the entire war.

These five themes represent the key ideas that emerge from analysis of four incidents of terrorism from minority groups in the period before the rise of Islamist extremism. This chapter and its focus on homegrown terrorism from minority groups has therefore pointed to: tensions that exist between visible and invisible minorities, and their treatment by security and intelligence services in this time frame; the significance of cultural literacy and the impact of this on the investigations considered; the lessons of these cases in regards to community-security relations and the argument they make for building positive relationships between minority communities and domestic security agencies; the related importance of diverse personnel sufficiently reflective of North America's pluralistic society, both nationally and regionally, and; the idea in the twentieth-century of an overarching conflict and the impact of this on how these extremist groups were seen, particularly in the United States. In looking at

[29] See footnote 18.

these themes in detail, this section has also provided some idea of how these can be mapped onto post-9/11 security and intelligence practices in specific relation to Islamist extremism and Muslims in North America. Some of the ideas raised in this section continue through the post-9/11 period, others develop and change.

Following is an analysis of two cases of Islamist extremism that occurred in the 1990s, a decade that marks the rise of this kind of religious terrorism. The first of these cases, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, represents a clear distinction in how domestic terrorism from minority groups is publicly discussed by law enforcement and intelligence officials, which is a rhetorical departure from not acknowledging the minority status of terrorist groups seen in the above analysis, to one that makes a sharp distinction between the actions of extremists and those of law-abiding Muslims in the U.S. The second of these cases, the attempted bombing in 1999 of Los Angeles International airport by Ahmed Ressam is included because it starts to mark out the differences in the Canadian approach to jihadist terrorism, particularly in how Canada's security services approach minority communities. These cases are considered separately, rather than as part of the thematic analysis that preceded them because of the concentration in this thesis on Islamist extremism and the response to this in the U.S. and Canada.

The 1990s and the Rise of Islamist Terrorism.

1993 World Trade Center Bombing

On 26 February 1993, a bomb detonated in the car park beneath the World Trade Center. Six people died instantly, and more than a thousand were injured. Islamist extremism had officially arrived on the American continent.[30]

[30] "World Trade Center Bombing 1993," *Federal Bureau of Investigation,* Accessed: 3 April 2017, <https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/world-trade-center-bombing-1993>.

In 2004, Special Agent Mary Doran testified that 'the FBI identified the first seeds of Islamically-justified terrorism in the United States in approximately 1989.'[31] However, two years previously, Dale Watson had acknowledged that it was the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 that caused the FBI to begin focusing investigative efforts 'on the then-emerging phenomenon of Sunni extremism and its operational manifestation in the radical jihad movement.' By September 11, 2001, therefore, the Bureau had had eight years to hire personnel with the necessary cultural and linguistic expertise for such a focus. That criticisms were levelled at the Bureau's lack of diversity after 9/11 throws some doubt on how much of the FBI's investigative effort was actually being diverted to Islamist extremism.[32] With that said, there is some evidence to support Special Agent Doran's testimony that Islamist extremism was at least a peripheral concern before the 1993 bombing. Reportedly, the FBI had a source within the cell itself, but he was 'deactivated' before the bombing took place. This source was 'reactivated' after the attack.[33] The identity of this source is not divulged in the source document, but a *New York Times* article names Emad A. Salem as an informer for the Bureau, who was to have assisted in the bomb-making but instead supply fake powder as opposed to actual explosives. The article alleges that this plan was scuppered by an FBI supervisor, 'who had other ideas about how the informer…should be used.'[34] America's domestic security

[31] Dale L. Watson, "The Terrorist Threat Confronting the United States: Testimony Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," *Federal Bureau of Investigation*, 6 February 2002, Accessed: 28 March 2017, <https://www.archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/the-terrorist-threat-confronting-the-united-states>; Mary Deborah Doran, "9/11/2001 Commission," *Federal Bureau of Investigation*, 16 June 2004, Accessed: 3 April 2017, <https://archives.fbi.gov/news/testimony/9-11-2001-commission>.
[32] Robert Callum, "The Case for Cultural Diversity in the Intelligence Community", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 14, No. 1 (2001): 25-48; Geoffrey R. Weller, "The Internal Modernization of Western Intelligence Agencies", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 14, No. 3 (2001): 299-322.
[33] Eleanor Hill, "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement: Hearing on the Intelligence Community's Response to Past Terrorism Attacks Against the United States from February 1993 to September 2001," *Federation of American Scientists*, 8 October 2002, Accessed: 3 April 2017, <https://fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/100802hill.html>.
[34] Ralph Blumenthal, "Tapes Depict Proposal to Thwart Bomb Used in Trade Center Blast," *New York Times*, 28 October 1993, Accessed: 3 April 2017.

agency arguably had the opportunity to prevent a terrorist attack and failed to do so, foreshadowing the aspersions cast on the FBI after 9/11.

One key anecdote supports both the necessity of culturally diverse security personnel, but also begins to point to the challenges that diversity can pose for intelligence collection, especially with the focus on Islamist extremism. Sheikh Omar Abdurrahman, a radical Islamic preacher later convicted of seditious conspiracy in relation to the bombing, had managed to obtain a tourist visa in 1990 from the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, despite being on the 'lookout list' – a list containing 'the names of people who are suspected of being involved in either terrorist activities or any type of illegal activities overseas.' This was due to a problem with transliteration from Arabic into English.[35] A similar issue would arise with the elder Tsarnaev brother in the investigation following the Boston Marathon bombings, which is one of the cases considered in Chapter Two: Russian intelligence provided the FBI with an alternative spelling to Tsarnaev's name, due to being transliterated from Cyrillic to Roman characters.[36]

This is the first terrorist incident discussed in this chapter where concerns of diversity become immediately prominent: this carries through into both Chapters Two and Three, with their focus on Islamist extremism and the relationship between domestic security agencies and Muslims in the United States and Canada. The reason for this concern is clear in a statement made by FBI Director William Sessions after the explosion, in which he said that 'the FBI's aggressive pursuit of all leads in this investigation does not mean that the seriousness of the offense will be used to justify intrusions into the lives of individuals simply because of their nationality or their religious beliefs.' While race and ethnicity may not have been enough to prompt such statements in the investigations into the BLA or the FALN, religion was clearly

[35] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, *World Trade Center Bombing: Terror Hits Home*, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993, 54-54.
[36] "Unclassified Summary of Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings," *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, 10 April 2014, Accessed: 31 May 2017, 8, <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICIG_Forum_Boston_Marathon_Bombings_Review_-_Unclassifed_Summary.pdf>.

another matter.[37] The perceived correlation between Islam and the actions of the Islamist extremists would become a conspicuous and notable problem, especially following 9/11, with Muslims in the twenty-first century increasingly forced to take collective responsibility for the actions of terrorists.

Director Sessions also claimed that one reason for the lack of international terrorism in the United States was the 'absence of alienated, isolated foreign communities,' and that foreign terrorists attempting to attack the United States from within '[do] not have that fertile ground where they can operate relatively free from interference because they're being protected by some small community or group.'[38] A similar refrain would be repeated after the September 11 attacks, with the integration of Muslims in the United States placed in contrast to their supposed lack of integration in Europe, and held up as a reason for the comparatively few attacks by Islamist extremists on American soil.[39] Terrorists hiding in minority communities was clearly being considered in 1993, though it is also obvious that, at this moment, Sessions believed that America's melting pot was keeping the population safe. In part, it was perhaps this belief that led Director Sessions on 9 March 1993 to refute concerns that the World Trade Center attack in 1993 was 'the beginning of a new wave of terrorism in the United States.'[40]

1999 'Millennium' Bomber

Even before 9/11 Director Sessions was proven incorrect. The 1999 Millennium plot was a bombing attempt on Los Angeles International Airport by Algerian citizen Ahmed Ressam on the eve of the Millennium celebrations.[41] This case is useful in a comparative study such as this, because Ressam was apprehended as he attempted to cross the US-Canadian border from

[37] U.S. Congress, House, Committee, Subcommittee, *Terror Hits Home*, 43.
[38] Ibid., 58-59.
[39] For example: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *The Fort Hood Attack: A Preliminary Assessment*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 18; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, *After San Bernardino: The Future of ISIS-Inspired Attacks*, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 2016, 45.
[40] U.S. Congress, House, Committee, Subcommittee, *Terror Hits Home*, 43.
[41] "Millennium Plot/Ahmed Ressam," *Federal Bureau of Investigation*, Accessed: 28 March 2017, <https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/millennium-plot-ahmed-ressam>.

British Columbia into Seattle. Ressam was resident in Canada at the time, which prompted a joint investigation between the FBI and the RCMP. It is for this reason that this case is being considered.

Ressam was apprehended by U.S. Customs officials on 14 December 1999 as he tried to cross the U.S.-Canadian border. According to a spokesman, Ressam initially attracted the attention of border security when he began acting nervously to routine questions; a subsequent search of his vehicle revealed 'several plastic bags contained more than 130 pounds of…urea and sulfate, as well as two jars of…nitroglycerine.' Urea and nitro-glycerine were two of the main ingredients in the bombs used at the World Trade Center in New York six years previously. Little about him was known by American intelligence officials, but the *New York Times* reported after the arrest that French antiterrorism officials had been looking at Ressam in connection with a group of Islamic radicals suspected of a series of attacks in northern France in 1996.[42] Later, intelligence gathered would also purportedly link to a terrorist training camp associated with al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.[43] It is probable that the transnational dimensions of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the foiled Millennium plot, and the September 11 attacks is what has prompted the focus on international terrorism in the secondary literature.

In an effort to determine the validity of the intelligence connecting Ressam to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, Canadian authorities reached out to members of the Algerian community in Montreal.[44] In 1999, there were over 150,000 Algerians living in Montreal, a number that would have made it much easier for Ressam to simply melt into the fabric of Canadian

[42] "Arrest at U.S. Border Reverberates in France," *New York Times*, 22 December 1999, Accessed: 4 April 2017.
[43] Christopher J. Chipello and David S. Cloud, "Ressam Spent Time in Terrorist Camps Linked to the Saudi Militant bin Laden," *Wall Street Journal*, 21 January 2000, Accessed: 4 April 2017.
[44] "Canadian Police Probing Algerian's Relationships," *Wall Street Journal*, 22 December 1999, Accessed: 4 April 2017.

society.[45] Seeking out diasporic communities for assistance in combatting terrorism is a practice, and debate, that continues today, especially with programs like the United Kingdom's PREVENT strategy. Community outreach would become common to the Canadian approach to countering Islamist extremism, as Chapter Three demonstrates. Although still a sensitive issue, evidence considered in Chapter Three suggests that the outreach effort by Canadian security agencies, particularly the RCMP, is less contentious than that in the UK.

According to one senior Canadian intelligence official Ressam had been known to CSIS, who had started watching him shortly after his arrival in Canada. This same source admitted that CSIS later dropped the investigation, noting that 'we had to drop it recently because of lack of resources. We just don't have the time and people to continue these investigations indefinitely.'[46] This represents a problem for Canadian security agencies more broadly, as they simply do not have the same resources as their American counterparts. In some ways, it is logistical information such as this that can warrant a comparative study, as the United States almost invariably makes an appearance in Canada's counterterror investigations and operations.

Likewise, Canada's immigration policies have made appearances in commentary on the security of the United States with regards to terrorism. One outcome of the Ressam arrest was questions relating to Canada's immigration policies and security practices, foreshadowing criticisms that would be levelled at America's northern neighbour after 9/11. According to *The Washington Post*, Ressam arrived in Canada in 1994 with 'a fake French passport and a criminal record for illegal arms sales,' and applied for refugee status, citing the outbreak of civil war in Algeria. Ressam did not attend a hearing for his refugee application, and a deportation order was issued in July 1995. This was later replaced with an order to register with

[45] John Kifner, "Terrorists Said to Hide in Canada's Melting Pot," *New York Times*, 24 December 1999, Accessed: 4 April 2017.
[46] Quoted in Kifner, "Canada's Melting Pot."

immigration officials every month, and when Ressam failed to keep several appointments, a second deportation order was issued in May 1998. He was arrested by Montreal police in September 1998 for the theft of a computer, but was released two weeks later after completing his jail term.[47] Detailing this information is important, as it evidences failures on the part of Canada's security services, that are unrelated to the impact of diversity on intelligence and security practices.

CSIS itself was also cautioning the Canadian government in the final years of the twentieth century about how Canada's open immigration policies were putting the country at risk of terrorism. Ward Elcock, the Service's director, told the Canadian Senate's Security and Intelligence Committee that 'terrorist groups are present here whose origins lie in every significant regional ethnic and nationalist conflict there is…The nature of our society and the related policies concerning refugees and immigrants make us particularly vulnerable to terrorist influence and activities.'[48] Before 9/11, though after the Air India tragedy, Canada's multicultural society was being looked at by intelligence and security officials as a potential security concern. Conspicuously absent here is any assurance that Canada was being protected by its 'mosaic', unlike the optimism of FBI Director Sessions that the melting pot was keeping America safe.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that there are five key themes that characterise domestic security and intelligence services' investigations into homegrown terrorism from minority communities in the United States and Canada in the pre-9/11 period, and that these themes can be mapped onto post-9/11 security and intelligence practices in those countries. Both cases of Islamist terrorism in this chapter show that there is more evidence of change in the approach taken by

[47] Steven Pearlstein, "Canadians Examine Lapses in Security," *The Washington Post*, 22 December 1999, Accessed: 28 September 2017.
[48] Quoted in Kifner, "Canada's Melting Pot."

domestic security and intelligence services as terrorism itself shifted from secular to religious in nature, though it would take the September 11 attacks for some of these criticisms, such as a lack of diversity in personnel, to truly take hold. The two chapters that follow focus specifically on the theme of community-security relations that was proven so important in the analysis this chapter provides. The case of the Millennium Bomber begins to demonstrate the approach taken in Canada after 9/11, with outreach to Montreal's Algerian community for information on Ressam being symptomatic of the efforts by CSIS and the RCMP to build positive relations with Muslim Canadians. Efforts of U.S. security organisations in the post-9/11 period to outsource intelligence collection to Muslim Americans – as will be outlined and evidenced in Chapter Two – has no precedent in the pre-9/11 era; following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the focus of FBI Director Sessions seems to have been on downplaying the idea of a potential new wave of terrorism and on ensuring that top-down rhetoric clearly distinguished between the terrorists that tried to bring down the Twin Towers and nation's population of Muslims.

This rhetorical shift marks one of the most significant changes from the period of secular terrorism that preceded the 1993 bombing. The move into an era where terrorists and terrorist organisations appeared to be most obviously defined by their religion, and the attendant problems with this association, prompted the first public assurances that ensuing investigations would not target people based on their religion, an assurance that would continue (though would eventually ring hollow) in the period after the attacks of September 11. Furthermore, the continued inclusion of these guarantees, with the vital addition of statements delineating Muslims in North America from terrorists, became even more necessary as the realisation dawned that the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center had, in fact, marked the start of a new wave of terrorism, and as the language around Islamist extremism subsequently began to shift towards referring to it as a struggle that would define generations.

‘DESPICABLE ACTS OF TERRORISM’: THE UNITED STATES AND HOMEGROWN ISLAMIST TERRORISM AFTER 9/11

‘September 11, 2001 forever changed the way we do business.’[1]

~Edward Davis, Commissioner, Boston Police Department

In its 2005-2006 *Threat Assessment for Domestic Terrorism*, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stated that it ‘investigates terrorism-related matters without regard to race, religion, national origin, or gender,’ acknowledging also that ‘terrorists represent a small criminal minority in any larger social context.’[2] Taking care to avoid tarring any entire subsect of society with the actions of a few became especially important after 9/11, with President George W. Bush himself ensuring that he delineated between the ‘fringe movement’ of the terrorists that brought down the Twin Towers and the religion of Islam.[3] However, with Sunni extremism taking up the FBI’s investigative focus in the aftermath of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the associated shift after the Cold War from secular terrorism to Islamist terrorism, it is understandable that Muslims in America felt that anti-terrorism policies in the post-9/11 era were aimed at them.[4]

Navigating and refuting these perceptions has become substantially more important in the twenty-first century, with nearly all the attacks (both successful and thwarted) in the United States after 9/11 being perpetrated by homegrown violent extremists, HVEs. In a 2016 *Wall Street Journal* article, Peter Bergen observes that,

---

[1] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings: Preparing for and Responding to the Attack*, 113th Cong., 1st sess., 2013, 69.
[2] Federal Bureau of Investigation, *A Threat Assessment for Domestic Terrorism, 2005-2006*, 18 September 2007, Accessed: 5 December 2016, 2, <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/402525/doc-30-threat-assessment-domestic-terrorism.pdf>.
[3] George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,” *Presidency Project*, 20 September 2001, Accessed: 27 June 2017, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=64731>.
[4] Tony Gaskew has conducted field research into the reception of such anti-terrorism legislation like the PATRIOT Act amongst a Muslim-American community in central Florida, revealing an increased sense of alienation and a diminished likelihood of cooperation with law enforcement authorities: Tony Gaskew, “Peacemaking Criminology and Counterterrorism: Muslim Americans and the War on Terror,” *Contemporary Justice Review* 12, No. 3 (2009): 345-366.

> Today's concerns about terrorism from inside the U.S. are rooted, ironically, in the success of efforts to thwart terrorist plots abroad. The last foreigner who came close to a successful attack on the U.S. was the "underwear bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian recruited by al Qaeda who tried to bring down a Detroit-bound American passenger jet on Christmas day in 2009.[5]

Bergen goes on to note the security changes implemented after 9/11, as government officials tried to ensure that such a catastrophic attack would never happen again, including expanded no-fly lists that prevent many would-be terrorists from reaching the United States. These efforts, however, were aimed at stopping international terrorist activity and preventing foreigners from entering the U.S. to carry out an attack: in short, all focus was on preventing a second 9/11. As such, organisations looking to commit acts of terror against the U.S. have increasingly looked to recruit American citizens or permanent residents to their cause, and encourage them to carry out attacks from within. Still, with government agencies able to monitor electronic communications of known terrorists, homegrown plots that receive coordination and assistance from groups abroad are also at risk of detection and prevention. Moving into the 2010s, however, HVEs have increasingly operated without any formal connection to foreign extremist organisations, opting for attacks that are 'inspired' rather than 'directed' by these groups, and making the detection of 'lone wolves' a challenge for domestic intelligence and law enforcement authorities. With groups like Islamic State (ISIS) making use of communication technologies like the Internet and social media, self-radicalisation is a new problem confronting security personnel in the United States and elsewhere in the West. Alongside the examples discussed in this chapter, the subsequent section on Canada in the post-9/11 period will also point to the difficulty of identifying and stopping lone wolf terrorists.

Overcoming distrust of law enforcement authorities among minority communities, specifically Muslim American communities in this instance, and navigating cultural

[5] Peter Bergen, "Can We Stop Homegrown Terrorists?" *Wall Street Journal*, 22 January 2016, Accessed: 12 June 2017.

differences thus become substantially more critical considering a threat environment increasingly dominated by self-radicalised homegrown extremists. In Congressional hearings following two successful terror attacks, the Fort Hood shooting in 2009 and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, both discussed herein, members of Congress and witnesses have called on Muslim Americans to report people they believe to be exhibiting extremist behaviour to authorities, as did President Barack Obama after the San Bernardino shooting in 2015. However, as some Muslim Americans have pointed out, 'in the age of online recruitment, it is hard for even law enforcement to detect terror plots.'[6] It can also be questioned whether such calls actually help to bridge the gap between security personnel and minority communities if people feel compelled by such continued demands to essentially spy on their neighbours. Outside of the United States, similar exhortations have been problematic: governments in Europe have faced pushback over demands for minority communities to be self-monitoring, and the UK's PREVENT scheme has been criticised for the 'spying on your community' stigma associated with it. There is also the important point that, following events like the Planned Parenthood shooting in Colorado in 2015 and the shooting in a Charleston church the same year, Christians and white Americans were not also asked to report worrisome behaviour.[7]

Despite 'right-wing terrorism, racial hate crimes, and the sovereign-citizen movement making up the majority of domestic terrorism incidents,' this chapter focuses on the phenomenon of Islamist extremism in the post-9/11 period in the United States.[8] This focus is

---

[6] Tamara Audi and Miriam Jordan, "San Bernardino Shooting Prompts Soul Searching Among U.S. Muslims," *Wall Street Journal*, 9 December 2015, Accessed: 12 June 2017.
[7] Audi and Jordan, "San Bernardino Shooting."
[8] Quoted in Benjamin Wittes, "Malevolence Tempered by Incompetence: Trump's Horrifying Executive Order on Refugees and Visas," *Lawfare*, 28 January 2017, Accessed: 27 June 2017, <https://lawfareblog.com/malevolence-tempered-incompetence-trumps-horrifying-executive-order-refugees-and-visas>. 'Sovereign-citizens' are part of a movement 'rooted in an ideology that rejects government authority and its most basic levels, from its power to tax to its enforcement of the law': Kevin Johnson, "Anti-Government 'Sovereign Movement' on the Rise in U.S.," *USA Today*, 30 March 2012, Accessed: 3 September 2017, <https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-03-30/anti-government-militia-groups-freeman/53873496/1>.

for two reasons: first, this thesis examines the relationship between domestic law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and minority communities in North America, and the ways in which they manage, or not, to negotiate the challenges that such diverse populations might pose to domestic counterterrorism efforts. For now, Caucasians are still the majority racial and ethnic group in the United States and as such are not included in this analysis.[9] Secondly, as noted above, the threat of violent Islamist extremism has been a major focus of the FBI's investigative attention since the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.[10] Indeed the National Strategy for Counterterrorism released in 2011 boldly proclaimed that the United States was 'not at war with the tactic of terrorism or the religion of Islam. We are at war with a specific organization – al-Qa'ida.'[11] In using rhetoric such as this, the U.S. government effectively makes the two concepts interchangeable: the War on Terror becomes a war on violent Islamist extremism[12]. These two factors, coupled with statements from figures like General John Keane, the former vice chief of staff to the U.S. Army, that Islamist terrorism 'is the most significant threat to the security of the American people that I have seen in my lifetime,' makes the case for a focus on Islamist extremism in the rest of this thesis.[13]

This chapter considers how three terror attacks perpetrated by homegrown violent extremists were managed by domestic intelligence and law enforcement organisations; in particular, the focus is on the reaction to the local Muslim American communities from security

---

[9] According to data from the U.S. Census Bureau, as of 1 July 2016, 76.9% of the American population identified as 'white alone': "Quick Facts," *United States Census Bureau*, Accessed: 27 June 2017, <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/RHI125216#qf-headnote-a>.

[10] Dale L. Watson, "The Terrorist Threat Confronting the United States: Testimony Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," *Federal Bureau of Investigation*, 6 February 2002, Accessed: 28 March 2017, <https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/the-terrorist-threat-confronting-the-united-states>

[11] United States, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, 2011, Accessed: 27 June 2016, 2, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf>.

[12] Such a conflation is possible despite the Strategy referencing "a range of foreign and domestic groups and individuals assessed as posing potential terror threats," mentioning Hamas and Hezbollah as examples by name. This is because the self-admitted focus of the Strategy is al-Qaeda, and this concentration is maintained throughout, even in the section that concentrates on the Homeland: United States, *National Security Strategy*, 4; 11-12.

[13] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack*, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 2011, 42.

authorities, including Congressional representatives, and the methods of engagement that are used. In two cases where the attacks were successful, there is enough information to assess the performance of intelligence and law enforcement both prior to and after the attack, because the perpetrators were individuals that federal authorities were aware of. In the case of the third successful attack, those responsible were not known in advance. These cases are the Fort Hood shooting in 2009, the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings and the San Bernardino shooting in 2015. The three successful terrorist attacks were chosen for their high-profile nature: in the instances of Fort Hood and the Boston bombings, Congressional hearings were convened to try and establish what led to the attacks, and why they were not prevented. The San Bernardino shooting was not the subject of a similar inquiry, but, like the other two, did receive extensive media coverage.

The gap between the September 11 attacks in 2001, and November 2009 when the first two of the chosen case studies occurred is intentional. The Fort Hood shooting was, at the time, considered 'the most horrific terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11';[14] it had the highest casualty total since the bombing of the Twin Towers. It also occurred at a time that would later be identified by a significant increase in the number of homegrown terror plots. The Congressional report on the shooting published in 2011 noted that 'from May 2009 to November 2010, there were 22 different homegrown plots, contrasted with 21 such plots from September 2001 to May 2009.'[15] A witness at one of the Fort Hood hearings referenced a RAND Corporation study that found that 'there were 46 publicly reported cases of radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism between September 11, 2001, and December 31, 2009': thirteen of those cases came in 2009 alone, a significant increase from an average

[14] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Management, *Lessons from Fort Hood: Improving Our Ability to Connect the Dots*, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., 2012, 1.
[15] Joseph I. Lieberman and Susan M. Collins, *A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2011). 18.

of four-a-year between 2002 and 2008.[16] Perhaps most significantly for the purpose of this thesis, however, 2009 marked the first successful attacks by homegrown violent extremists inside the United States.[17]

This chapter argues that, unlike much of the pre-9/11 period, the post-9/11 era brought an awareness amongst intelligence and security personnel, and also amongst legislators, that interaction and engagement with Muslim American communities is absolutely vital. The association of Islamist extremism and a major world religion necessitated top-down delineation between terrorists and their ideology, and Muslim Americans and their religion. Despite this acknowledgement and rhetoric, however, Congressional documents indicate that, when it comes to actually collecting intelligence and initiating contact between Muslim Americans and law enforcement, emphasis is placed on encouraging Muslim Americans to identify and report those suspected to have radicalised to violent extremism. However, little reciprocal emphasis is placed on intelligence and security agencies to improve relations with those communities, with only lip service seemingly paid to their role in such efforts and interactions. Therefore, this chapter concludes that engagement with Muslim Americans in the post-9/11 period is characterised by an outsourcing of intelligence collection.

Analysis of the Fort Hood shooting draws some slightly different conclusions, due to the attack being perpetrated by a member of the U.S military and against military personnel. Importantly, this case identifies that a distinction is seen between white supremacist extremism, and Islamist extremism, and that whilst the military is confident that it can recognise signs of the former, its guidelines for doing so are insufficient for recognising the latter. Crucially, this chapter finds that the reason for this is the connection between Islamist terrorism and Islam the

[16] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee, *A Ticking Time Bomb*, 4.
[17] Lauren O'Brien, "The Evolution of Terrorism Since 9/11," *Federal Bureau of Investigation*, September 2011, Accessed: 23 June 2017, <https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/september/the-evolution-of-terrorism-since-9-11>.

religion, and a pervasive lack of cultural literacy that risks mistaking signs of radicalising to extremism with signs of devout faith, or vice versa.

Fort Hood, 2009

On 5 November 2009, Nidal Malik Hasan, a Major in the United States Army opened fire at the Fort Hood military post in Texas, killing thirteen people and wounding thirty-two others. Hasan himself was injured by return fire, paralyzing him from the chest down.[18] He was found guilty of thirteen counts of premeditated and thirty-two counts of attempted murder in August 2013 and sentenced to death by a military court.[19]

For a variety of factors, the Fort Hood shooting was the subject of a series of Congressional hearings, particularly in the Senate: it was one of the first successful attacks carried out by an HVE on U.S. soil; it had the highest casualty rate of any terrorist attack since 9/11; it was carried out at a military base, by a member of the United States Army; and, most significantly, all indications after the shooting pointed to a 'failure to the connect the dots,' in the words of Susan Collins, then the Ranking Member on the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.[20] FBI Director Robert Mueller ordered an internal review in the immediate aftermath of the shooting, and also requested in December 2009 that Judge William H. Webster, former FBI Director (1978-1987) and former Director of Central Intelligence

[18] Josh Rubin and Matt Smith, "'I Am the Shooter,' Nidal Hasan Tells Fort Hood Court-Martial," *CNN*, 6 August 2013, Accessed: 21 June 2017, <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/06/justice/hasan-court-martial/index.html?hpt=hp_t2>

[19] Associated Press, "Army Adds Charges Against Rampage Suspect," *NBC News*, 2 December 2009, Accessed: 21 June 2017, <http://www.nbcnews.com/id/34243082/ns/us_news-tragedy_at_fort_hood#.WUpc1mjys2w>; Associated Press, "Fort Hood Shooter Nidal Hasan Sentenced to Death," *CBC*, 28 August 2013, Accessed: 21 June 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/fort-hood-shooter-nidal-hasan-sentenced-to-death-1.1391606?cmp=rss>

[20] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *The Fort Hood Attack: A Preliminary Assessment*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 45.

(1987-1991), conduct an independent investigation;[21] the Webster Commission's Final Report was published with redactions in 2012.[22]

For the Senate Committee investigating the shooting, the main point of consternation was the treatment by the FBI of a series of email communications between Hasan and a radical Islamic cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, who was himself already the subject of a terrorism investigation by federal authorities. This was also a criticism laid out in the Webster Report. In December 2008, the Bureau's San Diego office intercepted the first of eighteen emails from Hasan to al-Awlaki and flagged it to the Washington Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF) for further consideration. After reviewing Hasan's military records, the JTTF concluded that the content of the emails was consistent with Hasan's medical research, and that assuaged concerns that he was involved in terrorist activity.[23] Investigating Committees in both the Senate and the House of Representatives felt as though those conclusions, especially when the communications were viewed alongside – in Congress' view – Hasan's problematic behaviour, were incorrect and represented a missed opportunity to prevent the shooting from taking place. However, given that Hasan's military record contained no references to such behaviour and that the FBI did not interview anybody in regular contact with Hasan, the Bureau could not have put those two sets of information together.

The behaviour in question stemmed, seemingly, from Hasan's devout religious beliefs. A classmate from Hasan's medical residency at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center divulged to Senate investigators that Hasan had questioned whether the teachings of his faith would permit him to engage in combat against other Muslims.[24] More importantly for the Senate

---

[21] "Former FBI Chief Picked to Lead Review," *CNN*, 8 December 2009, Accessed: 27 June 2017, <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/08/fort.hood.review/index.html>

[22] "Judge Webster Delivers Webster Commission Report on Fort Hood," *Federal Bureau of Investigation*, 19 July 2012, Accessed: 27 June 2017, <https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/judge-webster-delivers-webster-commission-report-on-fort-hood>. For the unclassified version of the report, see: <https://ia800501.us.archive.org/32/items/final-report-of-the-william-h.-webster-commission/final-report-of-the-william-h.-webster-commission.pdf>.

[23] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee, Subcommittee, *Lessons from Fort Hood*, 2.

[24] Lieberman and Collins, *A Ticking Time Bomb*, 27-28.

report, however, was a series of problematic conduct that occurred within just over a year that, the report opines, should have been ample evidence of Hasan's radicalisation. This behaviour includes: giving a class presentation that had to be stopped after outbursts from classmates over perceptions that it was supportive of violent Islamist extremism; justifying the actions of suicide bombers, and; suggesting that Osama bin Laden's actions may be justifiable in written proposals for class presentations.[25] The Senate's conclusion, however, is predicated on the belief that the military should have viewed Hasan's actions in the same way that the Senate did. Instead, the military saw virtue in his views, with one officer evaluation report noting that Hasan 'has shown capacity to contribute to our psychological understanding of Islamic nationalism and how it may relate to events of National security and Army interest in the Middle East and Asia.'[26] The military seems to have assessed that Hasan's views could be tolerated so long as his research could be beneficial. Unfortunately, misinterpreting Hasan's rhetoric and behaviour makes possible a conclusion that the military's assessment of Hasan was also predicated in part on cultural illiteracy, and the absence of knowledge capable of distinguishing between devout faith and conduct indicating extremist views. This is an opinion endorsed by an officer interviewed by Senate investigators, who proffered the view that Hasan was not discharged from service because of '"political correctness" and ignorance of religious practices.'[27]

Tied into both cultural ignorance and Senate criticisms regarding failures to 'connect the dots' is a comparison between Islamist extremism and white supremacy raised by General John Keane in Senate testimony. He was noting specifically the Department of Defense's 'longstanding policy of intolerance for organizations, practices, or activities that are

[25] Lieberman and Collins, *A Ticking Time Bomb*., 30-31.
[26] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee, Subcommittee, *Lessons from Fort Hood*, 2.
[27] Lieberman and Collins, *A Ticking Time Bomb*, 31.

discriminatory or extremist in nature,' and pointed to discoveries in the 1980s and 1990s of servicemember participation in white supremacist activities as an example.[28] He elaborated:

> What we found at Fort Bragg is that our policies were not clear in identifying what extremist behaviour was – in this case, tattoos, specific dress, racial rhetoric, Nazi symbols, etc. As a result, racial extremists were allowed to exist in our units. Twenty-nine soldiers were eventually eliminated from the service for exhibiting such behaviour[.][29]

General Keane concluded in his testimony that he suspected the military would need to revise its policies once again to account for the specifics of Islamist extremism, but the distinction that he draws between it and white supremacy – despite both being forms of domestic terrorism – bears further consideration. Taken with comments that servicemembers may have refrained from reporting Hasan or challenging him directly due to concerns regarding possible complaints of discrimination, the perceived differences between white supremacy and jihadist radicalism mirrors those identified in Chapter One between terrorism prior to and following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.[30] The rise of religious terrorism is tied directly to the rise of Islamist extremism, and is thus ostensibly connected to a specific religion practiced by a minority of people in the United States. Once again, this highlights the crucial need for cultural literacy, so as to keep religious extremism and religion from becoming interchangeable in the minds of mainstream society. On the other hand, secular terrorism – which translates to racial supremacism in the example provided by General Keane – has no such specific connections, and it can therefore be expected that a wider portion of society would be able to identify rhetoric and behaviour that falls outside acceptable parameters. Rhetoric advocating white supremacy is going to be more obvious to wider society than rhetoric advocating for Islamist extremism might, especially if it comes from someone known for their devout faith,

[28] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee, *The Fort Hoot Attack*, 5.
[29] Ibid., 6.
[30] Lieberman and Collins, *A Ticking Time Bomb*, 31.

as was Major Hasan. As General Keane himself noted, 'the association of Islamist extremism with a religion is part of the problem.'[31]

The Fort Hood shooting also provides strong evidence as to the inherent problems of outsourcing intelligence collection to Muslim communities in the United States when it comes to identifying and preventing lone wolf attacks. Hasan's shooting spree may have been prevented if the pattern of his behaviour outlined above was also being replicated among other servicemembers; as has been stated by intelligence and security experts, terrorist cells are easier to detect than individual extremists. As it was, the pattern of behaviour exhibited was limited to just Hasan, and his superiors in the military and agents with the FBI clearly felt that there were alternative explanations for his conduct. Furthermore, in wider society, those trying to detect potential lone wolves must contend with the protections afforded to U.S. citizens by the Constitution, which limits the actions that security services can take, even with evidence that an individual might be radicalising to violent extremism.[32] In particular, the First Amendment provides protections for freedom of speech, and against 'an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;'[33] these protections are not circumvented simply by outsourcing intelligence collection to Muslim communities. In the military, servicemembers' oath to the Constitution trumps their protections under it, including rights to free speech and free assembly, because of the importance of the mission coming first.[34] Even with these restrictions and within the confines of structured military life, Nidal Hasan managed to evade detection; if the Department of Defense managed to miss, or misinterpret, signs of radicalisation in an active member of the military, Muslims in the United States are facing the incredibly tall ask of performing better than a governmental department when it comes to

[31] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee, *The Fort Hood Attack*, 10.
[32] Lieberman and Collins, *A Ticking Time Bomb*, 7.
[33] Constitutional text taken from Kirk Ward Robinson and Christopher Eaton, eds., *Founding Character: The Words and Documents that Forged a Nation* (Los Angeles: Roan Alder, 2003), 85.
[34] U.S. Congress, Senate, *A Ticking Time Bomb*, 22.

identifying radicalised individuals. This was a request made of them in the aftermath of both the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013, and the San Bernardino shooting in 2015.

Boston, 2013 and San Bernardino, 2015

In April 2013, brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev exploded two bombs at the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three at the scene and injuring over two-hundred others. A police officer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology was killed later, as the brothers tried to escape the police. Tamerlan Tsarnaev was killed in a shootout with law enforcement authorities, while Dzhokhar was apprehended later, and eventually given the death penalty.[35] Much like the Fort Hood attack, the bombings at the Boston Marathon were subject to Congressional inquiry, though these tended to focus on the general response to the attack rather than why security services were unaware of the Tsarnaev brothers and their intentions. Thomas Carper, chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, stated that these were the 'first successful terrorist bombing[s] on U.S. soil since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack.'[36] Whilst the Boston Marathon attack was the first to be conclusively linked to terrorism, it should be remembered that it was not the first successful bombing in the United States since 9/11: in 2008, a bomb went off in Times Square, and in 2009, a homemade explosive was detonated outside a New York Starbucks. Notably, a motive for the Times Square bombing has not yet been determined or a perpetrator identified.[37]

Two years after the Boston Marathon bombings, fourteen people were killed, and twenty-two others injured when Sayed Farook and Tashfeen Malik opened fire at the Inland Regional

---

[35] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee, *Preparing for and Responding to The Attack*, 9; Deborah Kotz, "Injury Toll from Marathon Bombs Reduced to 264," *The Boston Globe*, 24 April 2013, Accessed: 21 June 2017, <http://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2013/04/23/number-injured-marathon-bombing-revised-downward/NRpaz5mmvGquP7KMA6XsIK/story.html>.

[36] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee, *Preparing for and Responding to The Attack*, 1.

[37] Dominick Tao, "Police Say 'Fight Club' Inspired A Bomber," *New York Times*, 15 July 2009, Accessed: 23 September 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/nyregion/16starbucks.html>; Marc Santora and Michael Schwirtz, "F.B.I. Cites 'Persons of Interest' in 2008 Times Square Bomb Case," 15 April 2015, Accessed: 23 September 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/nyregion/fbi-says-it-has-identified-persons-of-interest-in-2008-times-square-bombing.html>.

Center in San Bernardino, California, in December 2015. Like Tamerlan Tsarnaev, Farook and Malik were both eventually killed in a shootout with police. [38] A third suspected accomplice was later arrested and charged with providing the weapons used in the attack.[39] This was the worst ISIS-inspired attack by homegrown terrorists in the United States since the emergence of the so-called Islamic State circa June 2014.[40] The main subject for debate after San Bernardino was the use of social media as a platform for terrorist rhetoric and efforts by law enforcement to monitor both these sites and communication technologies more broadly.[41] Whereas Congressional hearings held after both the Fort Hood shooting and the Boston Marathon bombings had focused on the attacks themselves, hearings after San Bernardino concentrated either on the issue of ISIS' use of social media, or on the future of ISIS-inspired attacks in general.[42]

Taken together, both cases raise key questions about the U.S. approach to Muslim Americans after 9/11. They critique the approach taken by security and intelligence services to Muslim communities in the U.S. and provide evidence for why outsourcing intelligence collection is an erroneous choice, especially in the absence of concerted efforts to improve community-security relations, which are seen in neither of these cases. Evidence in the Boston Marathon incident also suggests that engagement of any kind was noticeably absent prior to

---

[38] Cindy Chang, "San Bernardino Shootings Cast a Somber Tone Over Muslim Conference in Chino," *Los Angeles Times*, 26 December 2015, Accessed: 21 June 2017, <http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-1227-islamic-convention-20151227-story.html>; Christopher Dean Hopkins and Laura Wagner, "Police Identify Suspects After Deadly San Bernardino Shooting," *NPR*, 2 December 2015, Accessed: 21 June 2017, <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/12/02/458196942/active-shooter-situation-reported-in-san-bernardino-calif>.

[39] "Enrique Marquez Jr. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Plotting Violent Attacks and Buying Firearms for Shooter in San Bernardino Terrorist Attack," *Department of Justice*, 14 February 2017, Accessed: 23 September 2017, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/enrique-marquez-jr-agrees-plead-guilty-plotting-violent-attacks-and-buying-firearms>.

[40] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, *After San Bernardino: The Future of ISIS-Inspired Attacks*, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 2016, 1, 19.

[41] Dave Lee, "Apple Ordered to Unlock San Bernardino Gunman's Phone," *BBC News*, 17 February 2016, Accessed: 28 June 2017, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-35593048/>.

[42] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, *ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization on the Internet and Social Media*, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 2016; U.S. Congress, House, Committee, Subcommittee, *After San Bernardino*.

the bombings, despite suggestions that one of the Tsarnaev brothers had become radicalised, and that after the attacks calls resumed for more involvement by Muslim Americans in counterterrorism efforts. Furthermore, both cases point to the problems with essentially singling out a minority group following a terrorist attack, as this can contribute to the already hostile public backlash that inevitably follows incidents perpetrated in the name of jihadist extremism. The Boston Marathon bombings and the San Bernardino shooting are thus considered in comparative perspective, and assess both the occasions in which rhetoric implies an outsourcing of intelligence collection and a critique of the implications that this can have in the aftermath of an act of terrorism.

Two years before the Boston Marathon bombings, Russia's Federal Secret Service (FSB) provided the FBI with information alleging that Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his mother, Zubeidat, were 'adherents of radical Islam, and that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was preparing to travel to Russia to join unspecified groups in Dagestan and Chechnya.' The JTTF in Boston conducted an assessment of Tamerlan and, finding nothing to suggest he had any connection to terrorism or posed a threat to national security, closed the assessment three months later.[43] As part of this assessment, agents interviewed Tsarnaev and his parents.[44] They did not, however, interview either Tsarnaev's former girlfriend, who had filed charges against him for assaulting her, or his then-wife. Both were interviewed after the bombings, during the process of which Tsarnaev's former girlfriend revealed that he had demonstrated a shift towards the tenets of radical Islam between 2006 and 2009.[45] During his own interview with the FBI, Tsarnaev mentioned that he attended a mosque in Cambridge, Massachusetts every Friday for prayer:[46] despite this, there

[43] "Unclassified Summary of Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings," *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, 10 April 2014, Accessed: 31 May 2017, 1, <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICIG_Forum_Boston_Marathon_Bombings_Review_-_Unclassifed_Summary.pdf>.
[44] "Unclassified Summary," 8.
[45] Ibid., 19.
[46] "Transcription of FBI Interview Notes with Tamerlan Tsarnaev," *The Investigative Project*, 23 April 2011, Accessed: 23 September 2017, <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/3286.pdf>.

is a noticeable absence of any Bureau interaction with members of his local Muslim community either before or after the attack. Whilst this could be because, in the same interview, Tsarnaev claimed he did not have many Muslim friends, this lack of any engagement by the FBI with the Muslim American community around Tsarnaev is markedly different from discussions after the bombings of the need for an 'engaged community,' the phrasing of which is ambiguous as to whom should be doing the engaging.[47] Interestingly, a report published by several Inspectors General after the bombing criticised the lack of interviews with Tsarnaev's then-wife and his former girlfriend, but made no mention of the lack of interaction with members of the Muslim American community.[48]

On this topic of community-security engagement, comments made in Congressional testimony after the attack lend further credence to the idea that U.S. intelligence and security officials have attempted to outsource intelligence collection to Muslim Americans: in one hearing, two different witnesses commented that members of Tsarnaev's mosque could have reported him to security authorities. Implicit in those statements is the belief that they should have done so.[49] Their comments were ostensibly regarding the fact that Tsarnaev was eventually asked to leave his mosque 'because he couldn't control his outbursts against speakers whom he considered too moderate.'[50] However, they speak to broader ideas about who is held responsible for initiating contact between Muslim American communities, and security and intelligence services. A second explanation for the lack of contact between the FBI and Tsarnaev's local imam during the initial intelligence assessment is that changes to Department of Justice guidelines necessitate that approval must be received from a Washington

[47] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, *Attacks on the Homeland*, 113th Cong., 1st sess., 2013, 43.
[48] The report was prepared by the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security: "Unclassified Summary."
[49] U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Attacks on the Homeland*, 11, 37.
[50] Alan Cullison, "A Family Terror: The Tsarnaevs and the Boston Bombing," *Wall Street Journal*, 13 December 2013, Accessed: 28 June 2017.

committee before agents can enter a mosque:[51] this does not, however, preclude agents from speaking to religious leaders outside of places of worship. Furthermore, there seems to be little recognition that reporting members of one's own community might not be well-received, a stigma that could be mitigated by established community-security relationships that seem to be absent in this case: evidence of the positive impact that community-security relations can have is discussed is Chapter Three.

One last point on this subject as it relates to the Boston Marathon bombings: the FBI was rebuked in Congressional hearings for not sharing Tamerlan Tsarnaev's previous intelligence assessment with the Boston Police Department. Senator Kelly Ayotte made the point that, as local police departments are more likely to first encounter individuals believed to be radicalising to extremism, they should be made aware if anybody is flagged in this regard.[52] The same sentiment, however, can also be applied to the communities surrounding potentially radicalised individuals. Short of over-policing communities that law enforcement considers to be 'at-risk' of radicalisation, community members and religious leaders are more likely to first encounter signs of extremism. This theory, however, is complicated by cases like the San Bernardino shooting.

Ostensibly, the San Bernardino shootings can be pointed to as an example of what can happen if suspected radicalisation is not brought to the attention of security and intelligence services, though this allegation is refuted by the fact that the Boston Marathon bombings occurred despite the FBI being aware of Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his shift to extremism. It is instead more accurate to argue that San Bernardino is itself a direct critique of efforts to outsource intelligence collection to local Muslim American communities. After the shootings, the FBI was left dealing with questions as to why neither perpetrator was known to authorities

[51] U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Attacks on the Homeland*, 65.
[52] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee, *Preparing for and Responding to the Attack*, 22.

before the attack.[53] By the logic expressed in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombings, members of the Muslim community in San Bernardino should have been aware of the duo's radicalisation, especially as Farook was supposedly a devout worshipper and regular attendee at the Islamic Center of Riverside.[54] However, Farook had reportedly stopped attending the mosque two years before the shooting took place, soon after his marriage to Malik, and all signs whilst he was there pointed to a devout Muslim who was serious about his study of the Qur'an.[55] Furthermore, it was only after the attack that federal investigators discovered evidence of their commitment to jihad, but this was in private email communications between the two and would not have been available to authorities unless they were specifically looking for them and had legal authorisation to do so.[56] Unlike both Nidal Hasan and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, who openly demonstrated support for radical Islamist causes (though in Tsarnaev's case, this was not discovered until after the bombing), Farook's radicalisation process was clearly an internal one. Whilst community members can be better positioned to identify worrying behaviour, there can be cases, such as with Farook, where indicators of radicalisation are hidden away. Although in this case there seems to have been very little law enforcement could have detected, this case nevertheless paints a good example of the problems of simply outsourcing intelligence collection to Muslim American communities.

The impact of these two terrorist attacks on Muslim Americans must be considered, outside of renewing calls for more involvement by Muslims in counterterrorism efforts. In hearings in the House of Representatives following the Boston Marathon bombings, comments were made

---

[53] Damien Palette, Devlin Barrett and Tamara Audi, "FBI's Comey Says California Killers Show Signs of Radicalization," *Wall Street Journal*, 4 December 2015, Accessed: 12 June 2017.
[54] Dexter Thomas, "San Bernardino Shooting Suspect Stopped Attending Mosque Two Years Ago," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 December 2015, Accessed: 24 September 2017, <http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-san-bernardino-shooting-suspect-serious-about-studying-the-koran-20151203-story.html>.
[55] Thomas, "Shooting Suspect."
[56] Al Baker and Marc Santora, "San Bernardino Attackers Discussed Jihad in Private Messages, F.B.I. Says," *New York Times*, 16 December 2015, Accessed: 24 September 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/us/san-bernardino-attackers-discussed-jihad-in-private-messages-fbi-says.html>.

regarding the importance of the Muslim American community in countering radicalisation and extremist ideologies:

> When law enforcement is unable to arrest an individual who might be subscribing to [extremist] ideology, it is incumbent upon others in our society to intervene. This burden disproportionately falls on the Muslim-American community, which is often in a much better position to identify individuals who are espousing the ideology of [violent Islamist extremism].[57]

Similar sentiments regarding the position of Muslim Americans were noticeably absent in criticisms of the FBI's lack of information sharing with the Boston Police Department: there were no equal criticisms of their lack of communication with Boston's Muslim community. Furthermore, use of words like 'incumbent,' especially preceding an explicit reference to the Muslim American community serves to link the two: the call thus becomes that it is incumbent for Muslim Americans specifically to intervene where law enforcement cannot execute powers of arrest. However, these calls are only justifiable where there is communication between security agencies and local communities: Muslim Americans cannot intervene with someone they do not know about. If a situation arises where an individual only becomes known to security and intelligence services because of their communication with others already under investigation (as Nidal Hasan was subsequent to FBI intercepts of his emails with al-Awlaki), but who otherwise exhibit no external signs of radicalisation (such as in the case of Syed Farook), then surely it is the responsibility of law enforcement to communicate this to local community leaders just as they expect local community leaders to communicate concerns with them. Statements such as the one above also inherently limit the role of security authorities to law enforcement and seem to strip them of any responsibility for community outreach, thus removing any responsibility for top-down engagement of any kind: an alternative approach to this is discussed in Chapter Three with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's National Security Community Outreach Program.

[57] U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Attacks on the Homeland*, 15.

Moreover, it can be argued that in discussing the role of Muslim Americans in counterterrorism efforts, and in using language such as that identified above when doing so, it only contributes to the backlash and scapegoating they face whenever an act of jihadist terrorism occurs. In calling for more involvement by Muslim Americans *after* an attack has occurred, it can leave the impression that a lack of involvement is partially responsible for why the attack took place. After the San Bernardino shooting, Aslam Abdullah, a Muslim scholar based in San Bernardino was quoted in the *Los Angeles Times* poignantly remarking that 'Islam and Muslims are on trial again,' referencing the burden of collective responsibility thrust onto Muslims in the wake of such incidents.[58] Despite attempts to outsource intelligence collection, security and intelligence officials and elected representatives have been consistent since the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in delineating between the actions of extremists and those of law-abiding Muslim Americans.[59] Abdullah's comments, however, indicate that this has not been entirely successful. Paradoxically, efforts by Muslim groups like the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) to condemn terrorism can also have the adverse effect of perpetuating '"false linkages between Islam and these acts of violence."'[60] In the aftermath of the shooting, CAIR reported that anti-Muslim hate crimes in the United States had escalated, including the beating of a shop owner in Queens, New York by a someone who 'promised to "kill all Muslims,"' and a severed pig's head being left at a mosque in Philadelphia.[61] Infamously, it was in response to the attack in San Bernardino that then-Republican candidate

[58] Sarah Parvini, Kate Linthicum and Taylor Goldstein, "Muslims Say the San Bernardino Shooting is a Critical Moment," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 December 2015, Accessed: 29 June 2017, <http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-muslim-community-responds-to-shooting-20151202-story.html>.
[59] For example: U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Attacks on the Homeland*, 40; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, *World Trade Center Bombing: Terror Hits Home*, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993, 43; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee, *The Fort Hood Attack*, 28.
[60] Quoted in Krithika Varagur, "Muslims Shouldn't Have to Condemn San Bernardino Shooting," *Huffington Post*, 3 December 2015, Accessed: 29 June 2017, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/muslims-san-bernardino-shooting_us_56605bb5e4b072e9d1c4e362>.
[61] Oren Dorell, "Muslims Report More Bias Cases Across USA," *USA Today*, 8 December 2015, Accessed: 24 September 2017, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/12/08/us-muslims-report-more-bias-cases-across-nation/76982412/>.

Donald Trump called for a ban on all Muslims entering the United States.[62] Such displays of societal hostility in the wake of terrorist incidents can serve to discourage cooperation between minority communities – in this case, Muslim Americans – and law enforcement authorities.

Reactions to the San Bernardino incident also highlighted the differences in perceptions of Islamist terrorism as compared to right-wing extremism, a comparison also made in the Fort Hood case. The December 2015 shootings occurred a week after a mass shooting at a Planned Parenthood clinic in Colorado Springs; earlier that year, Dylann Roof had opened fire on a black church in Charleston, South Carolina. In neither of those instances were American Christians expected to bear the same burden of collective responsibility that Muslim Americans faced after San Bernardino:[63] phrases like 'Muslim Killers' were trending on social media website Twitter, and featured prominently on the cover of the 3 December issue of the *New York Post*, which also spotlighted the shooting on its cover for three subsequent days.[64] Christianity is by far the most prevalent religion in the United States, with over 70% of Americans identifying themselves as Christian according to the Pew Research Center, compared to 0.9% who identify as Muslim:[65] as the majority, they are able to therefore avoid the same requirements and backlash asked of and faced by Muslim Americans in the aftermath of terrorist incidents.

---

[62] Steve Holland and Emily Stephenson, "Donald Trump Urges Ban on Muslims Entering U.S," *Reuters*, 7 December 2017, Accessed: 24 September 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump/donald-trump-urges-ban-on-muslims-entering-u-s-idUSKBN0TQ2N320151207>.
[63] Varagur, "San Bernardino Shooting."
[64] Associated Press, "One Year After San Bernardino Attack, City Aims to Prevent Muslim Hate Crimes," *The Guardian*, 1 December 2016, Accessed: 29 June 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/01/san-bernardino-shooting-one-year-later-muslim-hate-crimes>; Frances Kai-Hwa Wang, "Leaders Warn Against Stereotyping and Backlash After San Bernardino Shooting," *NBC News*, 3 December 2015, Accessed: 29 June 2017, <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/leaders-warn-against-stereotyping-backlash-after-san-bernardino-shootings-n473661>.
[65] "Religions," *Pew Research Center*, Accessed: 29 June 2017, <http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/>. Figures accurate on date of access; there is no date attached to the figures provided at this URL.

Regarding outsourcing efforts, however, comments like those from Erroll Southers, a former FBI agent, need to be considered. When asked about how security agencies can work with the Muslim American community, he offered the following:

> [T]he most important thing we can do right now is to build a bridge instead of a wall.…We want an engaged community. We want a community that feels comfortable and confident in sharing information. As we have seen time and time again,…a number of thwarted plots have come because we have an engaged community. So at this point bridges are very important.[66]

Whilst this seems like a step away from outsourcing and towards more collaborative engagement with Muslim Americans, Southers offered no suggestions on how to go about building those bridges. As mentioned in earlier discussions on the lack of engagement with the local community during the Boston bombings case, it also gives no indication as to whom responsibility for engagement falls: the community, or security services. The use of 'bridge' as a term would suggest that Southers feels both actors are responsible for improving community-security relations, but there is no tangible evidence of this being discussed beyond this point, nor is Southers pressed on this view any further in the Congressional hearing in which this quote was provided. This point then returns to ideas expressed at the outset of this chapter that only lip service is paid to the idea of more collaborative efforts at involving Muslim Americans in counterterrorism, whereas calls for their continued engagement continue without any real sense of what that 'engagement' is meant to involve. It is as much in response to this absence as it is the other evidence advanced in this section that this chapter argues for labelling the U.S. approach to engagement with Muslim Americans as one of outsourcing responsibility for intelligence collection.

Jointly, the Boston Marathon bombings and the San Bernardino shooting are both evidence and a critique of the efforts to outsource intelligence collection to local Muslim American communities. In the case of the Boston attack, there is very little evidence of engagement of

[66] U.S. Congress, House, Committee, *Attacks on the Homeland*, 43.

any kind before the bombings, despite the FBI having been informed of Tamerlan Tsarnaev's potentially radicalised views. Clearly, this is in direct contradiction to the calls from security officials and elected representatives after the attack for a more engaged community that feels able to take their concerns to law enforcement authorities. These calls can also contribute to the climate of backlash and resentment that Muslim Americans feel in the aftermath of Islamist terror attacks. In effectively singling out the community some already hold responsible, even with the best of intentions, it can help establish a link between perceptions of inaction by that community and the terrorist attack that occurred. The San Bernardino case most clearly illustrates this point, as there is clear evidence of a backlash against Muslims following this incident.

Conclusion

Unlike when dealing with secular homegrown terrorists in the pre-9/11 era, the cases outlined in this chapter clearly show that the post-9/11 period brought with it acknowledgement, at the very least, that Muslim communities in the United States necessitate engagement in order to help combat the threat of violent Islamist extremism; evidence from these cases, however, shows that this engagement is defined by an effort to outsource responsibility for intelligence collection onto Muslim Americans. In his prepared statement for a Congressional hearing into the Fort Hood shooting, Samuel Rascoff, an assistant law professor at New York University, emphasised in reference to the UK's PREVENT strategy that governments can lack credibility within Muslim communities.[67] While true, this can place significant onus on Muslims to discredit the ideology espoused by Islamist extremists, an extension, almost, to the already heavy burden of collective responsibility that Muslim Americans feel they carry. Furthermore, community leaders can face backlash if they do report

[67] U.S. Congress, Senate, *A Ticking Time Bomb*, 55.

members to law enforcement, much as they can face backlash from wider society and continued calls to do so if they do not.[68]

An analysis of the Fort Hood shooting raises the issues of cultural literacy and the dangers that can be posed by a lack thereof, especially with regards to distinguishing between individuals with devout faith and those expressing extremist views. The association of Islamist terrorism with Islam as a religion arguably necessitates a degree of education about the differences between the two, particularly among those tasked with protecting and maintaining national security, especially given the status that the threat of Islamist extremism has been given among national security concerns. That Muslim Americans fear backlash after an attack can in many ways be attributed to an inability to delineate between 'mainstream' Islam that most Muslims across the world adhere to, albeit on a spectrum much like other major world religions, and the ideology espoused by Islamist extremists. The differences are critical, and raising awareness of them amongst wider society can help oppose the narrative of a war between the West and Islam.

Both Fort Hood and San Bernardino critique the outsourcing efforts seen in this chapter: the specifics of Fort Hood show that outsourcing intelligence collection to Muslim Americans is effectively asking them to outperform a government department. One of the perpetrators of the San Bernardino shooting underwent his move to extremism without exhibiting any outward signs of this shift, making it impossible for anyone to identify that he had radicalised, even members of his local Muslim community. The Boston Marathon bombings and San Bernardino shootings are further evidence of the effort to outsource intelligence collection to local Muslim American communities, and the attendant problems with this approach both for intelligence collection itself, and for the impact that those efforts can have after an attack has occurred.

[68] U.S. Congress, Senate, *The Fort Hood Attack*, 28.

Efforts to outsource intelligence collection can also be seen in calls for Muslims in the United States to 'take ownership of the ideological battle happening within Islam itself.' By elevating the role of Muslims in counterterrorism as a means of delegitimising the Islamist argument that the West is at war with Islam, intelligence and security services divest themselves of responsibility for identifying individuals that might pose a threat.[69] Furthermore, it is notable that in the hearing following the release of the Senate's report on the Fort Hood shooting, the need for trust to be built among counterterrorism authorities was mentioned, but not the need for trust to be built between counterterrorism authorities and the communities they may find themselves investigating.[70] Coupled with the lack of communication with the local Muslim community around Tamerlan Tsarnaev, even whilst conducting an assessment of his potentially extremist views, it is evident that calls for Muslim Americans to engage more with intelligence and security services are intended to be a one-way street.

Moreover, this is also framed in a 'pre-attack' context. Despite an identifiable awareness of the importance of engaging key communities (in this case, Muslim American communities), and efforts to distinguish them from terrorists, there is very little evidence that considerations of the importance of dialogue between counterterrorism authorities and relevant minority communities extends to the period following an act of terrorism, aside from the necessary denunciations of anti-Muslim sentiment that might accompany an attack. Obviously, the aim of navigating the potential minefield that is the relationship between Muslim Americans and security services, made even trickier by rhetoric from the current President, especially during the 2016 presidential campaign, is to prevent attacks from occurring in the first place.[71] However, evidence discussed in this chapter suggests that preventing the next attack seems to

[69] Quote from U.S. Congress, Senate, *The Fort Hood Attack*, 27.
[70] U.S. Congress, Senate, *A Ticking Time Bomb*, 4.
[71] Jenna Johnson and Abigail Hauslohner, "'I Think Islam Hates Us': A Timeline of Trump's Comments About Islam and Muslims," *The Washington Post*, 20 May 2017, Accessed: 25 September 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-think-islam-hates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims/?utm_term=.d769b9d5009e>.

be the only focus of security and intelligence services, rather than working towards a collaborative relationship with Muslim Americans that can last beyond the current threat.

More broadly, the contrast between the lack of consideration given to the race and ethnicity of the homegrown terrorist groups discussed in Chapter One, compared to the vocal awareness of the need to disassociate Islamist extremists from 'ordinary' Muslims (notwithstanding the calls for them to play a prominent role in opposing jihadist rhetoric and countering radicalisation) is a stark one. Speculative though it may be, it is worth questioning whether the same emphasis and acknowledgement would be given – considering evidence from the pre-9/11 period – if the fight against groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS, and their proxies, was not one that dominated the conversation on security at both national and international levels. Be it in the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, or Congressional reports following major terror attacks in the United States, the enemy is defined as Islamist extremism, or groups that espouse such views: terrorism is seen as something with a uniquely Islamist character. This is contentious for definitions of domestic terrorism, as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argued in a response to the Fort Hood shooting report released by the Senate: what happens to instances of domestic terrorism that do not fit within the parameters of what is defined as '"America's enemy?"'[72]

Aside from the problem this raises, the identification of Islamist extremism as the opposition the U.S. is fighting, demonstrates the prominence of the issue for counterterrorism and national security discussions. In his prepared testimony to Congress following the San Bernardino shooting, General Keane equated the potency of the threat posed by Islamist extremism to the threat posed by communism before it. He commented that the fight 'against radical Islam will likely dominate the first half of the 21st century similar to the fight against communism, which

[72] See footnote 11 for source on *National Counterterrorism Strategy*. Also: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee, *A Ticking Time Bomb*, 131n1)

dominated the second half of the 20th century.'[73] With the 'war' against Islamist terrorism ostensibly such a critical one, it is imperative that intelligence and security forces find methods of engaging with all elements of the population within the United States, in a more collaborative method than has been shown here. They are a vital resource, and there is demonstrable proof of the advantages that can accompany a positive relationship between domestic security services and local minority communities: in November 2010, the FBI arrested Mohamed Osman Mohamud after he attempted to set off a vehicle bomb in Portland, Oregon. The Bureau learned the specifics of the plans through undercover agents, in place because federal authorities had been made aware of Mohamud by someone from the local Muslim community.[74] In the broader North American context, Chapter Three furthers this argument by presenting an alternative to the outsourcing that this chapter identifies as characteristic of the American approach to engagement with Muslim Americans.

Developing the tools to effectively and positively engage with minority communities is crucially important, not just in respect to Muslim Americans and the current threat of Islamist extremism, but also ultimately in preparation for future national security concerns. This chapter, however, has provided evidence that there is currently no systematic method of improving community-security relations, and that whilst rhetoric following terrorist attacks calls for greater engagement between Muslim Americans and security services, these are rarely accompanied by suggestions of how to accomplish this. Furthermore, there is also no evidence that any efforts in this regard have had the desired effect of improving relationships between Muslim Americans and law enforcement. The ability of domestic security and intelligence services to engage positively and collaboratively has long term implications that will outlive the fight against Islamist extremism: according to estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau, by

[73] U.S. Congress, House, Committee, Subcommittee, *After San Bernardino*, 10.
[74] Jerome P. Bjelopera, "The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations," *Congressional Research Service*, 28 December 2011, Accessed: 5 December 2016, 21-22, <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/402533/doc-38.pdf>.

2042, the United States will be 'a nation of minorities without a dominant racial or ethnic group.'[75] In order to perform their protective duties in the future, as well as in the present, intelligence and law enforcement personnel will have to adapt to shifting demographics within their domestic population.

[75] Task Force on New Americans, *Building an Americanization Movement for the Twenty-First Century: A Report to the President of the United States from the Task Force on New Americans*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 6.

A NOT-SO PEACEABLE KINGDOM? HOMEGROWN ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN CANADA AFTER 9/11

> 'There is a prevailing feeling among a complacent Canadian public that 'it can't happen here.'…According to one survey conducted a year after 9/11, an alarming 77 percent of Canadians think a terrorist attack could not occur here.'[1]
>
> ~Dwight Hamilton, "Know Your Enemy."

Even before 9/11, the argument for Canada as a 'peaceable kingdom,' and thus immune to the same threat of terrorism that the United States faced, would have been an inherently misleading one, and one that rewrote Canada's domestic history.[2] As Chapter One has demonstrated, Canada was by no means a bystander in the conversation surrounding homegrown terrorism in North America during the twentieth century: Quebec separatist terrorism during the 1960s proved the country's vulnerability to terrorism tied to domestic concerns, and the Air India bombing in 1985 showed that terrorism with international dimensions could also be wrought from within the Canadian state. Importantly, the latter of these two case studies demonstrated that Canada did not have to be directly involved in the affairs of another country, in this case the treatment of Punjabi Sikhs in India, for it to be affected by the violent turn such affairs could take. Thus, the idea that Canada's relative lack of international presence as compared to its southern neighbour affords it protection against retaliatory action is inaccurate. Variations of the peaceable kingdom theory have also been repudiated by terrorist attacks in places like Scandinavia, for example, where factors such as a relatively small international footprint, the absence of a history of overseas military intervention, and overt connections to peacekeeping operations have failed to insulate countries in the region from extremism.

---

[1] Dwight Hamilton, "Know Your Enemy," in *Inside Canadian Intelligence: Exposing the New Realities of Espionage and International Terrorism*, ed. Dwight Hamilton (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2011), 19.

[2] The idea of the 'peaceable kingdom' is mentioned briefly by Hamilton in the above cited chapter. Generally speaking, it refers to a perceived immunity to adverse occurrences in the world (in this case, terrorism), due to its relative lack of involvement in international affairs. It has also been used to distinguish between fighting wars and fighting against wars, with the latter supposedly offering some kind of peace dividend.

Nevertheless, the sentiment expressed in the epigraph is more understandable if tied directly to jihadist terrorism, rather than a threat of terrorism in general; after all, Canada did not have the same history of military intervention in the Middle East as the U.S. Prior to 9/11, with the notable exception of the attempted bombing of Los Angeles International Airport by a Canadian resident in 1999, there is very little evidence to suggest Canada was as preoccupied with the growing concern over radical Islamists as the United States. However, whatever 'immunity' or protection from Islamist terrorism Canada may have enjoyed evaporated in October 2001, with Canada being 'singled out as a potential target by Al Qaeda for its active participation' in the invasion of Afghanistan.[3] The 2015 decision by former Prime Minister Stephen Harper to send Canadian fighter jets to Iraq to help battle Islamic State forces was used as rationale for one of the terrorist attacks considered in this chapter.[4]

Canada also must contend with a disproportionate number of its citizens travelling abroad to fight alongside extremists as 'foreign fighters.' Referencing estimates from *The Washington Post*, John McCoy and W. Andy Knight note that seventy Canadians travelled to Syria in the period between December 2013 and October 2014, compared to 130 Americans during the same period: based on these figures, 'given that the U.S. population (roughly 320 million) is nearly ten times that of Canada's (roughly 35 million), there are approximately five times more Canadians per capita than Americans traveling to Syria.' Although these numbers are notably lower when compared to countries like Australia and Great Britain, the evidence supports a contention that for Canada, the foreign fighter phenomenon is more pronounced than in the United States.[5] In October 2014, the Commissioner for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) announced that they were monitoring ninety people in connection with national

[3] John McCoy and W. Andy Knight, "Homegrown Terrorism in Canada: Local Patterns, Global Trends," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 38, No, 4 (2015): 256.
[4] Laura Payton, "Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Warns in Video: 'You Gotta Be Careful,'" *CBC News*, 6 March 2015, Accessed: 13 July 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/michael-zehaf-bibeau-warns-in-video-you-gotta-be-careful-1.2984170>.
[5] McCoy and Knight, "Homegrown Terrorism," 256.

security investigations, including those seeking to travel abroad to fight with extremists:[6] in two of the case studies considered in this chapter, passports were named as contributing factors to the decision to conduct attacks on Canadian soil. Canada's intelligence and security forces must then contend with the potential that depriving someone of their ability to leave the country on national security grounds might well serve as a trigger for them to carry out an attack within the country.

The first instance of a homegrown terror plot connected to Islamist terrorism in Canada occurred in 2006, with the case of the so-called Toronto 18. In 2006, the RCMP, in conjunction with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), arrested eighteen young Muslim Canadian men in a string of raids across the Greater Toronto Area. The group were allegedly plotting a series of attacks across Ontario.[7] Although this case is not one that this chapter considers in detail, it is worth briefly mentioning it at the outset. Methods used to ultimately apprehend members of this group are not necessarily mapped exactly onto the cases examined in this chapter, but there are commonalities to be noticed. Notably, for the purposes of this thesis, the assistance provided by two members of the Muslim Canadian community: Mubin Shaikh and Shaher Elsohemy were employed by CSIS, and later the RCMP, as informants.[8] The Toronto 18 is not considered in further detail due to this case involving a terrorist cell, whereas the cases in this chapter all involve lone wolf attackers. As domestic security and intelligence agencies have had significant success in identifying and apprehending terrorist cells (the presence of several people makes detection more likely), this thesis concentrates on

[6] "Canada Lifts Terror Threat Level from Low to Medium," *BBC News*, 22 October 2014, Accessed: 13 July 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-29722094>.
[7] McCoy and Knight, "Homegrown Terrorism," 262; Adam D.M. Svendsen, "Re-fashioning Risk: Comparing UK, US and Canadian Security and Intelligence Efforts Against Terrorism," *Defence Studies* 1, No. 3 (2010): 323.
[8] Isabel Teotonio, "Toronto 18," *Toronto Star*, 2010, Accessed: 16 July 2017, <http://www3.thestar.com/static/toronto18/index.1.html>.

how these agencies engage with Muslim communities in North America to help solve the problem of lone wolf extremists.[9] .

This chapter analyses three recent cases of homegrown terror plots to assess how Canada's domestic security and intelligence agencies manage their relationship with Muslim Canadians. Also considered are two broader government initiatives, the Multiculturalism Program and the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, that aim to facilitate top-down engagement with minority communities beyond just Muslim Canadians. The Multiculturalism Program concentrates on assisting new immigrants with integration into Canadian society, whilst the Roundtable has a specific mandate of encouraging dialogue on national security matters and their implications for minorities in Canada. The three homegrown terror cases considered are the attempted VIA Rail bombing in 2013; the 2014 attacks in Ottawa and Quebec, and; the 2016 Aaron Driver case. These case studies were chosen for the direct contribution that they make to the conversation surrounding relations between Muslims in Canada and security services, and because they are the three most recent attacks and attempted attacks by lone wolf Islamist extremists; the latter two cases in particular remain very fresh in the public memory. The continued focus on jihadist terrorism in this chapter is justified by data recorded in the Global Terrorism Database, a project held at the University of Maryland: of the attempted and successful terrorist incidents the database lists as occurring in Canada between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2016 (the latest date the database currently goes up to), the majority of attacks with known perpetrators are attributed to Islamist extremism.[10]

---

[9] In their report on the Fort Hood shooting, Senators Joe Lieberman and Susan Collins write that 'lone wolves present a unique problem for law enforcement and intelligence agencies' due to the isolated and often internal nature of their radicalisation. Joseph I. Lieberman and Susan M. Collins, *A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2011), <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/library?c=112&type=reports>, 19.

[10] "Global Terrorism Database," *University of Maryland*, Accessed: 16 July 2017, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=&start_year=2000&start_month=1&start_day=1&end_year=2016&end_month=12&end_day=31&dtp2=all&country=38&count=100&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc&expanded=yes#results-table>.

Through the case studies and initiatives identified, this chapter argues that Canada adopts a different approach to engagement with Muslim Canadians than that taken by the United States as seen in Chapter Two. Whereas interactions between American intelligence and security agencies and Muslims is characterised by an effort to outsource, as the previous chapter has argued, this chapter asserts that Canada's chosen method of interaction is better considered as outreach. This linguistic change is necessitated by evidence pointing to both top-down and bottom-up engagement, with the impetus for building positive community-security relations placed on both sides of the equation. Relatedly, whilst this chapter does contain evidence of Muslim Canadians reporting potentially radicalised individuals to security services, there is equal documentation to support the contention that security services also reach out to Muslim Canadian communities for assistance in trying to deradicalise those identified. Although the methods of outreach that this chapter examines are specific to either individual case studies or, in one instance, to a particular geographic area, and are therefore not evidence of a systemic engagement effort (with the exception of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security), they are nevertheless indicators that domestic security and intelligence services in Canada have made efforts at building two-way bridges between themselves and Muslim Canadians, rather than the one-way roads preferred by their American counterparts.

Government Programmes

This chapter will start with a consideration of the two government initiatives, as these provide an opportunity to assess how far there is a systemic method of outreach to minority communities, beyond the ad hoc approaches identified in the cases of homegrown terrorism to be discussed. The focus on Islamist extremism present throughout this thesis carries through to the case studies evaluated in this chapter; these two initiatives, however, demonstrate that minority communities in Canada generally are given more consideration than they are in the

United States, and that dialogue on security-related issues must be had with all sectors of society.

Multiculturalism Program

The Multiculturalism Program aims to promote 'acceptance and integration into, and participation in, our society of Canadians from all ethnic, racial and religious backgrounds and acts to reduce isolation and exclusion.'[11] The Program lists three key objectives, though only two of these are relevant to this thesis; these are 'to build an integrated and socially cohesive society,' and 'to improve the responsiveness of institutions to meet the needs of a diverse population.' These objectives are fulfilled through the management and awarding of grants for community projects and through conducting public outreach.[12] Examples of such outreach include the Program's promotion of Black History Month and Asian History Month through the production of educational materials and social media content.[13]

One feature of the Multiculturalism Program is the provision of grants to help foster 'intercultural [or] interfaith understanding', which can help to improve cultural literacy, a key theme raised in the first chapter of thesis.[14] Lawyer and activist Hussein Hamdani has commented that radicalisation often stems from a lack of understanding of Islam, particularly among converts:[15] in the aftermath of the Aaron Driver incident, Driver's father told *CBC News* that he 'thought Islam was a good thing for him. Because he had stopped the drugs, he had

[11] Public Safety Canada, "2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada: Feature Focus 2014: Responding to Violent Extremism and Travel Abroad for Terrorism-Related Purposes," *Public Safety Canada*, 16 December 2016, Accessed: 3 July 2017, 38, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-eng.pdf>.
[12] Canadian Heritage, "Annual Report on the Operation of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act 2015-2016*: Diversity and Inclusion in Action," *Canadian Heritage*, Accessed: 26 July 2017, 6, <http://canada.pch.gc.ca/DAMAssetPub/DAM-PCH2-PCH-InstitutionalProfile/STAGING/texte-text/annualReport_Multiculturalism_1488833507317_eng.pdf>.
[13] Canadian Heritage, "Annual Report," 11-13.
[14] Ibid., 7.
[15] Kelly Malone, "Justice Powers or Community Outreach: How Canada Can Counter-Radicalisation," *CBC News*, 12 August 2016, Accessed: 26 July 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/how-to-counter-radical-extremism-1.3717914>.

stopped the drinking. He actually stopped smoking and swearing.'[16] When finding religion seems to have had a positive impact on someone's life, it may be more difficult for those around that person to accept that the 'same' religion is taking them down a questionable path.[17] Increased cultural literacy through programs designed to facilitate intercultural and interfaith understanding could help to mitigate the apparent conflation of Islam the religion with Islamist extremism.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the Multiculturalism Program works with both domestic and international partners. One key partner for the themes of this thesis is the Canadian Race Relations Foundation (CRRF), founded in 1996 to help work towards eliminating racial prejudice.[18] Further fostering interfaith communication, as part of the Foundation's *Our Canada* project – an initiative that considers Canadian values through lenses like faith and culture – Cross-Canada Workshops were held, utilising a broad network of faith leaders that the CRRF has access to.[19] The workshops were designed to help increase awareness and knowledge of different religious and cultural situations that might arise in the community or the workplace.[20] Workshops such as these that bring together community and religious leaders from across the country recognise the importance of regional differences, and deter efforts to view minority communities as unified single entities: Muslim Canadians living in the Maritime provinces (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island), for instance, may have different needs and concerns than Muslim Canadians in British Columbia.

---

[16] Rick McConnell and Andrea Huncar, "'I Wanted to Die Myself,' Says Father of Aaron Driver," *CBC News*, 11 August 2016, Accessed: 17 July 2016, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/aaron-driver-father-speaks-1.3717517>.

[17] I use quotation marks around 'same' here to denote that there is a difference between, in this case, Islam as practiced by most of the world's Muslims, and the version of the religion espoused by extremists that most Muslims stridently denounce.

[18] Canadian Heritage, "Annual Report," 13.

[19] Canadian Heritage, "Annual Report,", 14; "Faith and Belonging: One-Day Workshops for Diversity and Inclusion Champions," *Canadian Race Relations Foundation*, Accessed: 26 July 2017, <http://www.crrf-fcrr.ca/en/our-canada/cross-canada-workshops>.

[20] "Faith and Belonging."

Although the Multiculturalism Program is not directly relevant to how security and intelligence services interact with minority communities, it does represent an institutional effort to work towards integrating new minority immigrants and minority groups more fully into the fabric of Canadian society, which in turn can have long-term benefits for community-security relations. The more insular a minority community is, the harder it can be to develop positive community-security relations with the people in that community.[21] This then contributes to the lack of trust between minority communities and law enforcement that is so often derided. Whilst the Multiculturalism Program can be critiqued – for instance, how does Canadian Heritage decide on recipients for the grant money the Program allocates – it is nevertheless a positive indicator that the potential challenges of a pluralistic society are being considered, and efforts made to address them.

Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security

Where the Multiculturalism Program demonstrates efforts of outreach to minority communities outside of security and intelligence matters, the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security provides an explicit forum through which the Government of Canada and community representatives can engage in national security-related dialogue. The Roundtable was established in 2005 as a body that could review the impact of post-9/11 antiterrorism legislation on various minority communities in Canada, particularly with respect to sunset provisions included in the 2001 law.[22] The Roundtable also offered opinions on proposed legislation – for example as in the case of Bill C-51, antiterrorism legislation put forward following two terrorist attacks in October 2014 – but worked predominantly on ways of improving community-security relations.[23]

---

[21] Anita Khashu, Robin Busch and Zainab Latif, *Building Strong Police-Immigrant Community Relations: Lessons from a New York Project* (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2005), 9, <https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0017-pub.pdf>.
[22] Leo Adler, Interview with Author, 21 September 2017, Telephone. Henceforth referred to as 'Personal Communication.'
[23] Personal Communication.

In the 2012 Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Cross-Cultural Roundtable is considered part of the *Prevent* arm, which is designed to promote partnerships with local communities as a means of combatting radicalisation to violence.[24] Enshrining the Cross-Cultural Roundtable in a Counter-Terrorism Strategy institutionalises both the importance of positive community-security relationships and a method of working towards achieving and maintaining them. To this extent, the Roundtable has discussed with security and intelligence services the need to temper language when interacting with minority communities, and the need to reach out to them for recruitment. Further initiatives included holding meetings to introduce members of the RCMP, CSIS and the Roundtable as a means of demystifying the agencies and their work, and to encourage the two-way dialogue required for effective outreach.[25] One former member of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable spoke of the impact he felt the Roundtable had had on improving community-security relations, pointing to the fact that some of those arrested for terrorism offences were reported to authorities by their parents or other members of their communities as is seen in two of the case studies this chapter considers, and that there are cases of radicalised individuals being turned away from extremism due to improved collaboration between minority communities, particularly Muslim communities in this respect, and domestic security and intelligence services.[26]

Recommendations made by the Roundtable towards improving community-security relations had the tangible effect of leading to the creation of the RCMP's National Security Community Outreach Program (NSCOP).[27] The NSCOP comprises most of the RCMP's activities aimed at community engagement, and the initial rationale behind the programme was that active engagement and collaboration between minority communities and law enforcement

[24] Government of Canada, "Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy," *Public Safety Canada*, 9 February 2012, Accessed: 2 December 2016, 15, <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm-eng.pdf>.
[25] Personal Communication.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.

are vital for countering radicalisation in those communities.[28] On the specific task of engaging with Muslim Canadians, early ideas for the programme included training officers on culturally sensitive issues, such as Islam as a religion, and included tips on how to be culturally sensitive when interacting with Muslims.[29] Significantly, the NSCOP is part of the RCMP's National Security Criminal Investigations Program, tying community outreach directly into the imperatives of law enforcement.[30] Officers detailed to the NSCOP act as representatives of the RCMP to minority communities, both at cultural and targeted outreach events. Like representatives on the Cross-Cultural Roundtable, these officers also act as additional points of contact for minority communities, and as spokespeople for the RCMP in those communities following major incidents where community members may have questions.[31]

The existence of an initiative like the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security demonstrates a clear awareness of the need to engage with minority communities as a whole: the Roundtable is not entirely comprised of Muslim Canadians, but aims to be reflective of all sectors of the Canadian population.[32] The current focus on Islamist extremism can, as was seen in the United States in the previous chapter, result in Muslims feeling and being singled out. However, Islamist extremism has not always been the focus of national security officials, and will likely be eventually overtaken by another danger, as was seen with the threat of communism evaporating after the end of the Cold War. As this chapter will demonstrate, religious converts also pose a threat, and these can come from an array of different socio-economic and cultural backgrounds. In seeking to appoint members that are reflective of the entire Canadian

---

[28] Charlie Edwards, Calum Jeffray and Raffaello Pantucci, "Out of Reach? The Role of Community Policing in Preventing Terrorism in Canada," *The RUSI Institute*, February 2015, Accessed: 21 September 2017, 30, <https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201502_op_out_of_reach.pdf>.
[29] "Canada Confronts Radicalization Abroad and At Home," *WikiLeaks*, 26 June 2008, Accessed: 22 September 2017, <https://wikileaks.org/plusd/pdf/?df=38606>.
[30] Edwards, Jeffray and Pantucci, "Out of Reach?" 28.
[31] Ibid., 31.
[32] Factors that contribute to an applicant being selected for the Roundtable include 'gender balance; regional representation; official languages; age; visible minority; and persons with disabilities': "Terms of Reference of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security," *Public Safety Canada*, Accessed: 27 July 2017, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/crss-cltrl-rndtbl/trms-rfrnc-en.aspx>.

population, the Roundtable mitigates a fixation on Muslim Canadians, and can also help prevent Muslim Canadians from feeling as though they are being targeted, which has been a criticism of the PREVENT scheme in the UK.[33]

On the other hand, the fact that the Canadian Government felt that the Cross-Cultural Roundtable was necessary is telling in and of itself. In a press release regarding the Roundtable's very first meeting, former Deputy Prime Minister of Canada Anne McLellan offered the following comment: 'The Cross-Cultural Roundtable is an excellent opportunity for two-way dialogue between those who make national security policy and Canadians who are particularly concerned with the consequences of these policies.'[34] Despite the positive outcome of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable's creation, the recognition that national security policy, and specifically post-9/11 antiterrorism legislation, might negatively and disproportionately affect minority communities must not be ignored. One way to improve community-security relations would be to ensure that minorities in Canada do not feel like they are targets whenever new legislation is passed. Building relationships with different minority communities does not just benefit those communities, it also benefits the security and intelligence agencies responsible for protecting the whole country.

Away from the Cross-Cultural Roundtable, one other effort aimed at improving community-security relations that is worth brief discussion is the OWN IT Conference, a one-off conference held in Calgary in 2014 to try and understand why young Canadians choose to become radical extremists.[35] Organisers of the OWN IT Conference invited actors from all

---

[33] "Prevent Isn't Making Anyway Safer. It Is Demonising Muslims and Damaging the Fabric of Trust in Society," *The Guardian*, 10 February 2016, Accessed: 27 July 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/10/prevent-isnt-making-anyone-safer-it-is-demonising-muslims-and-damaging-the-fabric-of-trust-in-society>.

[34] "Inaugural Meeting of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security," *Government of Canada*, 7 March 2005, Accessed: 17 July 2017, <https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2005/03/inaugural-meeting-cross-cultural-roundtable-security.html>.

[35] "OWN IT Conference Looks to Tackle Extremism in Calgary's Youth," *CBC News*, 11 September 2014, Accessed: 17 July 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/own-it-conference-looks-to-tackle-extremism-in-calgary-s-youth-1.2763953>.

sectors of society, including educational and legal backgrounds, to attend as a means of trying to understand the dual phenomenon of conversion and radicalisation: Calgary itself has lost several of its residents, many of them religious converts, to conflict overseas when they left to become foreign fighters.[36] In attendance were representatives from the University of Calgary, the Muslim Council of Calgary and the Calgary Police Department; Abdul Souraya, one of the Conference's organisers, has stated that the purpose of bringing together such an array of different societal actors was so that they could adopt a collaborative approach to understanding radicalisation so that preventative methods can be developed. Though the Conference may be better described as bottom-up outreach, the conscious inclusion of security partners is evidence that the desire for positive community-security relations runs, at least in this case, in both directions.

2013 VIA Rail Plot

In April 2013, two men were arrested by the RCMP and charged with attempting to derail a VIA Rail passenger train running between Toronto and New York.[37] The suspects, Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser, were both sentenced to life in prison in September 2015.[38] This case, also known as Project Smooth, is put forward as an example of how effective outreach to Muslim Canadians and efforts to improve community-security relations can be in the specific context of countering homegrown terrorism. Significantly, whereas the Cross-Cultural

[36] Prominent examples of religious converts leaving Calgary to become foreign fighters include Damien Clairmont, and brothers Gregory and Collin Gordon: McCoy & Knight, "Homegrown Terrorism," 265-267; Nadim Roberts, "Gregory and Collin Gordon, Calgary Brothers, Join Ranks of Canadians Fighting for ISIS," *CBC News*, 28 August 2014, Accessed: 21 September 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/gregory-and-collin-gordon-calgary-brothers-join-ranks-of-canadians-fighting-for-isis-1.2749673>; "Damien Clairmont Killed Fighting With al-Qaeda-Linked Rebels in Syria," *CBC News*, 15 January 2014, Accessed: 21 September 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/damian-clairmont-killed-fighting-with-al-qaeda-linked-rebels-in-syria-1.2497513>.

[37] Michelle Shephard and Andrew Livingstone, "RCMP Arrest Two in Alleged Plot to Derail VIA Rail Train," *Toronto Star*, 22 April 2013, Accessed: 5 July 2017, <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/04/22/suspects_in_toronto_terror_plot_arrested_sources.html>.

[38] Diana Mehta, "Two Sentenced to Life in Train Derailment Terror Case," *The Chronicle Herald*, 23 September 2015, Accessed: 5 July 2017, <http://thechronicleherald.ca/canada/1312914-two-sentenced-to-life-in-train-derailment-terror-case>.

Roundtable represents an institutionalised effort to improve community-security relations nationally, evidence in this case clearly demonstrates that arrangements designed to improve relations and encourage outreach in both directions were also present on a more local level.

Following the arrests, the RCMP held two meetings, one with representatives of the community in Montreal where Esseghaier lived, and one with leaders and activists from a variety of different Muslim communities.[39] Furthermore, the press conference to announce the arrests began with the RCMP thanking Muslim leaders for their assistance in the case.[40] Such a gesture points to an effort to publicly recognise and endorse the importance of the community in counterterrorism work. Muhammed Robert Heft, the president and founder of Paradise Forever, an organisation that provides outreach to converts to Islam, and who attended the second of the meetings held, noted that such outreach efforts can go a long way in terms of improving community-security relations for counterterrorism efforts. They help to send a message that in targeting would-be terrorists, the police are not also targeting the community.[41] This can also help to counteract the idea of collective responsibility: if security officials themselves demonstrate an ability to differentiate would-be extremists from their communities, and in fact are seen to actively reach out to those communities, it may help to reduce a reactive climate of heightened Islamophobia that has been known, especially in the United States, to follow significant terror attacks. Indeed, the community leaders that made themselves available to the media following the RCMP's press conference noted that 'they were bracing for a backlash against Muslims.'[42]

---

[39] Edwards, Jeffray and Pantucci, "Out of Reach?" 35; The Canadian Press, "RCMP Spoke with Hamilton Muslim Community After Terror Suspect Arrests," *CBC News*, 23 April 2013, Accessed: 22 September 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/news/rcmp-spoke-with-hamilton-muslim-community-after-terror-suspect-arrests-1.1365562>.
[40] Faisal Kutty, "Muslims Hold Key to Fighting Terror," *Toronto Star*, 25 April 2013, Accessed: 5 July 2017, <https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/04/25/muslims_hold_key_to_fighting_terror.html>.
[41] The Canadian Press, "Hamilton Muslim Community."
[42] Shephard and Livingstone, "RCMP Arrest Two."

To this point, the success of Project Smooth was not just used by the RCMP to point to the vital role of the Muslim Canadians in countering Islamist extremism. Lawyer, activist, and a member of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security at the time, Hussein Hamdani, in an interview with the *Times of Israel*, offered the following comment about the arrests of Esseghaier and Jaser:

> But for the Muslim community, we would not be talking about an arrest today. This is evidence and proof that the Canadian Muslim community, rather than a community that should be seen as suspect, is in fact partners in peace and here is the proof of it.[43]

Hamdani was explicit in linking the outcome of Project Smooth to his hopes that it would prove to Canadians not to be mistrustful of the country's Muslim population. To this end, outreach that helps to improve community-security relations to the point that Muslim Canadians feel comfortable contributing to counterterrorism efforts not only has a positive impact on the work of the RCMP, but also on how Muslim Canadians are perceived. Muslims in the West have, on occasion, being criticised for seemingly not doing enough to help combat Islamist terrorism, and positive linkages between successful counterterrorism efforts and direct contributions from Muslim communities can help to counter these criticisms when they do occur. Where a direct connection between counterterrorism work and Muslim Canadians can be made, as it can in this instance, it can also help to dissuade the kind of potential backlash that community leaders were openly worried about. In the case of Project Smooth, such a response seems not to have materialised.

Pointing to the benefits of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable's efforts to improve community-security relations, it was a tip from a Toronto imam that initially drew attention to the suspects in this case.[44] In a subsequent media report, it was also observed that the imam's concern was drawn because of 'a zealous person's recruitment of impressionable youth,' which is precisely

---

[43] Charmaine Noronha and Rob Gillies, "Canada Plot Raises Questions on Iran Link to al-Qaeda," *Times of Israel*, 23 April 2013, Accessed: 5 July 2017, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/canada-plot-raises-questions-on-iran-link-to-al-qaeda/>.
[44] Edwards, Jeffray and Pantucci, "Out of Reach?" 34.

what government officials and elected representatives were outwardly hoping for from the Muslim American community in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombings and the San Bernardino shooting discussed in the previous chapter.[45] This case can be used to point to the benefits of the RCMP's approach as compared to that in the United States: the imam in this instance felt comfortable reporting an individual from their own community that was causing concern, and the absence of any comparison to this in Chapter Two's discussion of the U.S. is telling of the deficiencies to an approach that simply seeks to outsource intelligence collection rather than working on outreach to build positive community-security relationships.

Moreover, the outreach approach adopted by security and intelligence services in Canada, be it through the Cross-Cultural Roundtable or through other methods, has arguably had the added benefit of improving the element of trust in relations between the Muslim Canadian community and the RCMP in this instance. The imam reported an individual of concern, but it can be argued that security and intelligence services also trusted community leaders and representatives to raise those concerns. This differs from outsourcing because of the tangible efforts made to build that trust through community outreach. In this regard, the two meetings held by the RCMP were specifically seen by officers to be an exercise in further trust-building, both to assure meeting attendees that the community itself was not under suspicion (Muhammed Robert Heft's comments referenced earlier indicate that assurances given in this kind of forum find receptive ears), and to help improve chances of community cooperation and assistance in the future.[46]

Finally, this case is evidence that efforts to improve two-way communication were not just taking place nationally, with bodies like the Cross-Cultural Roundtable, but also on a local level. In the aftermath of the VIA Rail arrests, a Toronto-based lawyer indicated to *Global*

[45] Anna Mehler Paperny, "Meet the Lawyer Linking Police with Toronto's Muslim Community," *Global News*, 24 April 2013, Accessed: 5 July 2017, <http://globalnews.ca/news/508988/meet-the-lawyer-linking-police-with-torontos-muslim-community/>.
[46] Edwards, Jeffray and Pantucci, "Out of Reach?" 35.

News that he and his firm have acted as a go-between for Canada's security and intelligence services and the Muslim Canadian community, often at the request of community members, but on occasion when asked by security officials themselves.[47] The same news article references this law firm as having facilitated the imam's approach to security authorities with his concerns regarding the suspects.[48] The use of a third-party, particularly one with legal expertise, demonstrates acknowledgement that members of minority communities do not always feel comfortable speaking directly with law enforcement and intelligence personnel, regardless of outreach efforts, especially when it comes to reporting on a member of their own community. In engaging with Muslim Canadians through an unofficial bridge, security forces in this instance also exhibit awareness that, despite potential improvements in community-security relations, sometimes mediators are required to facilitate communication. A bridge such as this one also acts as a point of continuity for Muslim Canadians looking to reach out to domestic security and intelligence services, as law enforcement and intelligence personnel do not always stay in the same roles.[49]

The 2013 VIA Rail plot demonstrates the advantages of an outreach approach, not just through national bodies like the Cross-Cultural Roundtable, but also through more local efforts. The bottom-up outreach seen in the imam's decision to report his concerns to the RCMP, and the reception to the top-down outreach demonstrated in the meetings before the arrests were announced are proof of the benefits that outreach can lead to in terms of improving community-security relations, and also improving minority communities' perception of domestic intelligence and security services. Cases such as this help point to positive implications both in terms of encouraging further cooperation and in efforts to improve trust in and the perception

[47] Paperny, "Meet the Lawyer."
[48] Ibid.
[49] Edwards, Jeffray and Pantucci, "Out of Reach?" 44; Paperny, "Meet the Lawyer."

of Muslims in Canada more generally, regardless of how unwarranted any criticism they do receive may be.

Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec & Ottawa, Ontario, 2014.

On 20 October 2014, one Canadian soldier was killed and another wounded when Martin Couture-Rouleau ran them down with his vehicle in the Quebec town of Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu. Two days later, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed Corporal Nathan Cirillo in front of the national War Memorial in Ottawa before running into the Parliament buildings and engaging in a shootout with law enforcement personnel. Both Couture-Rouleau and Zehaf-Bibeau were converts to Islam.[50] It should be unequivocally stated, however, that no evidence was found by investigators to link the two attacks in any substantive way.[51] With that said, heavy focus in this chapter is placed on the case of Martin Couture-Rouleau, as his case most clearly demonstrates that the approach chosen by security and intelligence services in Canada to engage with Muslim Canadians is one of outreach. Like the VIA Rail incident, there is evidence that both top-down and bottom-up outreach occurred in this case. However, whereas the VIA Rail plot only demonstrated the impact of successful outreach efforts on counterterrorism, the Couture-Rouleau case expands this conversation to considering the impact it can have on efforts to counter radicalisation. Although the outreach methods discussed here cannot be decisively linked to systematic practices, they are nevertheless important for consideration and can also be taken as evidence in favour of an argument that security and intelligence services have not simply adopted a 'one size fits all' approach to outreach.

---

[50] Mark Gollom, "Michael Zehaf-Bibeau and Martin Couture-Rouleau: Their Shared Traits," *CBC News*, 27 October 2014, Accessed: 13 July 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/michael-zehaf-bibeau-and-martin-couture-rouleau-their-shared-traits-1.2812241>.

[51] Saeed Ahmed and Greg Botelho, "Who Is Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, the Man Behind the Deadly Ottawa Attack?" *CNN*, 24 October 2015, Accessed: 13 July 2017, <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/22/world/canada-shooter/>.

Likely due to his being a convert and therefore not necessarily entrenched in the local Muslim Canadian community – *The Globe and Mail* reported that he only occasionally attended his local mosque – it was Couture-Rouleau's parents that contacted law enforcement after becoming concerned over changes in his behaviour.[52] Like the imam that reported the VIA Rail suspects, Couture-Rouleau's parents engaged with law enforcement at the potential expense of their son. Unlike the imam, however, it seems that the parents reached out directly to authorities, rather than making use of a third-party.

Following Couture-Rouleau's parents' decision to report him to the RCMP, they in turn brought him to the attention of the imam at his local mosque, who made efforts to 'deradicalize his thoughts.'[53] This is significant, as it demonstrates an awareness that local community and religious leaders have a role to play, not just in collaborative counterterrorism as was seen in the case of the VIA Rail plot, but in efforts to deradicalise those already on the path to extremist action. Furthermore, it also indicates that Canadian security forces acknowledge some of the problems with efforts to counter radicalisation being imposed solely from the top-down, a key criticism of the UK's PREVENT scheme.[54] Although Canada did not have an official counter-radicalisation strategy in place at the time of efforts to deradicalise Couture-Rouleau, RCMP officers from the National Security Community Outreach Program (NSCOP) did also meet with him to try and turn him away from extremism.[55] In reaching out to Couture-Rouleau's

---

[52] Gollom, "Their Shared Traits"; Ralph Ellis, "Canada: Soldier Attack Suspect Radicalized," *CNN*, 22 October 2014, Accessed: 7 July 2017, <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/21/us/canada-soldiers-killed-officer-attack/>.
[53] Ian Austen, "Hit-and-Run That Killed Canadian Soldier is Called Terrorist Attack," *New York Times*, 21 October 2014, Accessed: 7 July 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/world/americas/canadian-soldier-run-down-in-what-officials-call-act-of-terror-dies.html>; Rene Bruemmer, "From Typical Teen to Jihadist: How Martin Couture-Rouleau Became Radicalized After Converting to Islam," *National Post*, 9 November 2014, Accessed: 7 July 2017, <http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/11/09/from-typical-teen-to-jihadist-how-martin-couture-rouleau-became-radicalized-after-converting-to-islam/>.
[54] Miqdaad Versi, "Prevent Is Failing. Any Effective Strategy Must Include Muslim Communities," *The Guardian*, 20 October 2017, Accessed: 23 September 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/20/prevent-isnt-working-inclusive-muslim-communities-counter-terrorism>.
[55] Bruemmer, "A Typical Teen"; A counter-radicalisation centre was launched in Canada in June 2017, though at the time of writing it was still without a designated special advisor to help shape a national counter-radicalisation strategy: Jim Bronskill, "Liberals Launch Counter-Radicalization Centre But Special Advisor to be Appointed Later," *Toronto Star*, 26 June 2017, Accessed: 22 September 2017,

local imam, the RCMP also implicitly helps to refute Islamophobic arguments that the entire religion is to blame for the actions of violent Islamist extremists. This is similar to the effect of briefing of Muslim Canadian leaders before the press conference announcing the VIA Rail arrests.

Moreover, outreach efforts from security services were not limited to just the imam. As stated, the RCMP also attempted, through the NSCOP and outreach officers, to engage with Couture-Rouleau and move him towards deradicalisation, though it is unclear what form the officers thought this would take.[56] Although understandably contentious, this can be just as important as involving local community and religious leaders: another criticism of the PREVENT scheme is whether counter-radicalisation work should be undertaken by the community (as social work) or whether it falls within the purview of law enforcement and intelligence services (making it security work).[57] By involving both sets of actors working in collaboration, as appears to have happened with Couture-Rouleau, such confusion can be avoided.[58] According to Rene Bruemmer's reporting in the *National Post*, 'RCMP outreach officers met with him several times over four months to try and change his way of thinking'; the last of those meetings occurred on 9 October, where police did feel as though progress was being made to counter Couture-Rouleau's radicalisation.[59]

Although these efforts unfortunately did not prove successful – only demonstrating further how difficult it can be to detect how far along the path of radicalising to extremist action someone is – the effort itself should be given merit. Involving officers from the NSCOP signals

<https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/06/26/liberals-launch-counter-radicalization-centre-but-special-adviser-to-be-appointed-later.html>.

[56] Bruemmer, "From Typical Teen."

[57] Hugh Segal and Serge Joyal, *Security, Freedom and the Complex Terrorism Threat: Positive Steps Ahead*, March 2011, Accessed: 19 July 2017, <https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/Committee/403/anti/rep/rep03mar11-e.pdf>, 14.

[58] Such an assumption is made possible because it was the RCMP that brought Couture-Rouleau to the imam's attention, despite evidence that the NSCOP and the imam met with Couture-Rouleau separately: Bruemmer, "From Typical Teen."

[59] Bruemmer, "From Typical Teen."

that the RCMP recognised the importance of continued outreach in this case, rather than simply providing Couture-Rouleau's name to his imam and simultaneously handing over responsibility for countering his radicalised views. Furthermore, that officers made repeated visits to Couture-Rouleau suggests that this was a threat that they took seriously and that attempts to deter him from extremism were not half-hearted, though we admittedly do not know the substance of those outreach meetings. Employing outreach methods to an individual identified as leaning towards extremism indicates that, at least in this instance, the RCMP recognised that simply engaging with the community, represented in this case by the imam, does not always go far enough; successful counterterrorism arguably must engage with both the community at large and radicalised individuals.

Given the outcome of the Couture-Rouleau case, and details of Michael Zehaf-Bibeau's attack on Parliament Hill, there is, however, a question to be asked regarding whether too much involvement by law enforcement or an alternative authority can actually push a radicalised individual towards taking action rather than turning them away from it. This question arises particularly in relation to Couture-Rouleau's confiscated passport, taken from him as he attempted to leave Canada to fly to Turkey, a common stopover for those eager to fight in Syria or Iraq.[60] Zehaf-Bibeau also experienced issues with his passport, though these seem to simply have been a delay in processing a replacement for his expired travel document.[61] Zehaf-Bibeau's case is a difficult one to assess due to an apparent history of drug abuse and mental health problems, and he had allegedly stated that his desire to leave Canada stemmed from a desire to treat his substance addictions.[62] However, if those looking to travel abroad as foreign

[60] "Canada Probes Michael Zehaf-Bibeau as Possible Suspect in Ottawa Shooting: Source," *Reuters*, 22 October 2014, Accessed: 13 July 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/22/us-canada-attacks-suspect-idUSKCN0IB2IX20141022>.
[61] Gollom, "Their Shared Traits."
[62] "Ottawa Shooting Suspect Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Had 'Very Developed Criminality,'" *CTV News*, 23 October 2014, Accessed: 13 July 2017, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/ottawa-shooting-suspect-michael-zehaf-bibeau-had-very-developed-criminality-1.2067255>

fighters are obstructed in doing so, the risk is run that they will simply turn to conducting attacks at home; a paradox in many ways because should citizens survive fighting abroad and return to their countries of origin, they may come better prepared to conduct an attack at home anyway. A former member of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable noted two cases of Canadians who were stopped at the Turkish-Syrian border because their parents had reported them to Canadian authorities: being prevented from joining extremist groups in the Middle East could have prompted those individuals to conduct attacks at home, though there is no indication that they did so.[63]

In this case, therefore, outreach was not limited to the RCMP's communication with the imam, as it seems to have been when investigating the VIA Rail plot, but extended also to the radicalised individual. There are no indications as to what may have prompted a change in approach from using undercover officers as a means of apprehending Esseghaier and Jaser to attempting outreach in an effort to deradicalise Couture-Rouleau. Although these attempts were unsuccessful in this case, they can nevertheless be taken as an indication that outreach continues to be a key aim for domestic security and intelligence services in Canada, especially given the continued use of officers from the NSCOP. Taken with the VIA Rail plot, this case study provides further evidence that outreach itself represents a systematic approach to engaging with minority communities for counterterrorism purposes, rather than being a one-off effort in response to a community member identifying individuals of concern.

Strathroy, Ontario, 2016

In August 2016, Aaron Driver was shot and killed by police after he detonated a homemade explosive inside a taxi, injuring both himself and the driver. He was allegedly carrying, and planning to detonate, a second explosive. Driver, who was known to Canadian authorities, was identified by police as the masked individual in a 'martyrdom video' uncovered by the Federal

[63] Personal Communication.

Bureau of Investigation, in which a threat was made against an urban centre in Canada. In the video, Driver pledged allegiance to Islamic State (ISIS), who subsequently claimed Driver as one of its 'soldiers'.[64] This case study is particularly interesting when considered following that of Martin Couture-Rouleau and the Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu attack in 2014, and comparisons will be made throughout this section. As will be demonstrated, outreach in the case of Aaron Driver, insofar as there was any, meant something very different than in both of the previous case studies, but it stands in particular juxtaposition to Couture-Rouleau and the concerted efforts made to guide him away from extremism.

In the case of Aaron Driver, security and intelligence personnel chose less personal methods of engagement than they did with Martin Couture-Rouleau: Driver was arrested in June 2015 and released eight days later on a number of bail conditions, including religious counselling and a ban on social media.[65] Aside from reporting to an RCMP officer, there seems to have been no human engagement with Aaron Driver on the part of law enforcement officials. This is difficult to understand given the efforts to deradicalise Couture-Rouleau, though it is potentially explainable by the court-mandated religious counselling, which Couture-Rouleau did not have. However, in an interview with *CBC News*, Driver alluded to the idea that it was the prohibition on social media that had had the most impact. He commented that he felt 'like [he was] living in a prison…without access to the internet.'[66] This is an interesting choice of words given concerns in some countries that radicalisation among prison inmates is a growing concern.[67] There is a difference between individuals who have been radicalised and those who have been radicalised-to-extremism; by isolating Driver from an online community he felt he

[64] "Canada Extremist Aaron Driver 'Was Planning Attack,'" *BBC News*, 12 August 2016, Accessed: 17 July 2017, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-37053521>.
[65] "Aaron Driver: Troubled Childhood, ISIS Supporter, Terror Threat Suspect," *CBC News*, 10 August 2016, Accessed: 3 July 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/aaron-driver-troubled-childhood-isis-supporter-1.3716222>.
[66] "Aaron Driver."
[67] "Extremism in Prisons to be Tackled by Specialist Task Forces," *BBC News*, 2 April 2017, Accessed: 26 July 2017, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39470210>.

belonged to may have actually pushed him to attempt to take action, which was an observation raised by Michelle Falk, a human rights professional based in Winnipeg.[68] It is conceivable that Driver's online activities were as far as he intended to go in expressing his support for ISIS, and by taking that away he felt forced to take alternative action. With that said, it is also the case that a new generation of terrorists have been radicalised online via social media, so the decision to restrict Driver's internet access is both logical and justified.[69]

Furthermore, there is little evidence that outreach efforts were made regarding the wider Muslim community in this case. There is, however, the suggestion that attempts to deradicalise Driver (rather than collect intelligence on him) were left solely to local leaders, again unlike the approach taken with Martin Couture-Rouleau, though there is an argument to be made that local religious leaders are far better placed than law enforcement officials to make efforts at deradicalisation. Driver was known by Muslim leaders in two different communities: Manitoba, where he initially came to attention under the pseudonym Harun Abdurahman, and in London, Ontario, close to where he lived in Strathroy. Dima Al-Sayed, from the Manitoba Islamic Association stated in February 2015 that leaders wanted to open dialogue with Driver (known then only as Abdurahman) to help combat the evidence of radicalisation seen online.[70] Similar efforts were undertaken by members of the mosque Driver attended in London, with leaders at that time also in communication with the police.[71]

This is the only indication of communication between the community and law enforcement pertaining to Aaron Driver, and it is unclear which party initiated this contact. Whilst it perhaps

---

[68] Jill Coubrough, "Civil Liberties Advocates and Defence Critics at Odds Over Aaron Driver Case," *CBC News*, 11 August 2016, Accessed: 17 July 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/cnaada/manitoba/aaron-driver-case-civil-liberties-defence-critics-1.3716942>.
[69] Marc Sageman, "The Next Generation of Terror," *Foreign Policy*, No. 165 (2008): 37
[70] "Manitoba Muslim Leaders Want to Talk to Suspected ISIS Supporter," *CBC News*, 23 February 2015, Accessed: 17 July 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/manitoba-muslim-leaders-want-to-talk-to-suspected-isis-supporter-1.2968638>.
[71] Ashifa Kassam, "Canada's Counter-Terrorism Efforts Face Scrutiny After US Helps Stop Suspect," *The Guardian*, 13 August 2016, Accessed: 17 July 2017, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/13/canada-counter-terror-aaron-driver-suspect>.

does make sense to leave counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation efforts to local and religious leaders because of the authority they hold within the community, it nevertheless begs the question as to why security services chose to take such a detached approach to Aaron Driver. Top-down efforts could have been made to provide Driver with counselling options alongside the dialogue mosque leaders were attempting to engage him in, especially after the requirement that he undergo religious counselling was revoked just two weeks after it was set, and was not reinstated when his bail conditions were replaced with a peace bond in February 2016.[72] The combination of religious engagement and perhaps more secular efforts may have proven successful in this instance even though it failed with Couture-Rouleau. Where media reports state that outreach officers were used to try and help Couture-Rouleau, they are noticeably absent from reports about Driver, especially when viewed in comparison. The differences in approach, from proactive engagement with both the community and the suspect to involvement only when law enforcement was required are entirely in juxtaposition to each other: Aaron Driver's arrest may be the deciding factor in this difference, given the initial bail conditions and then the terms of a peace bond. Martin Couture-Rouleau was subjected to no such restrictions.

This lack of engagement with Driver himself was, however, raised in the aftermath of the incident, with criticisms of the approach coming also from Christianne Boudreau, whose son left Canada to fight for terrorists in Syria where he was killed.[73] Boudreau is clearly of the opinion that engagement needs to come from top-down, that law enforcement and intelligence

[72] The Canadian Press, "Timeline: Aaron Driver's History of Radicalization," *CBC News*, 11 August 2016, Accessed: 22 September 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/aaron-driver-timeline-1.3717169>; "Aaron Driver." A peace bond can be issued against an individual when it appears likely that they will commit a crime, but where there are no reasonable grounds to believe one has been committed to date. Peace bonds are often accompanied by conditions, and any violation of those conditions is considered a criminal offence: "Peace Bonds Fact Sheet," *Department of Justice*, 1 August 2017, Accessed: 22 September 2017, <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/victims-victimes/factsheets-fiches/peace-paix.html>.

[73] Bill Graveland, "'I Cried': Mother of Man Killed in Syria Says Feds Failed Aaron Driver," *CBC News*, 13 August 2016, Accessed: 17 July 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/mother-of-man-killed-in-syria-says-feds-failed-aaron-driver-1.3720220>.

agencies need to take action and step in, rather than leave it all to communities to deal with. Whilst her view is understandable, especially given the circumstances surrounding her son's radicalisation to extremism, the volume of noted problems with the UK's PREVENT scheme mean that calls for top-down involvement in countering radicalisation should be treated with caution: execution is key, in this regard, and the intervention of security services into Muslim communities can easily slide from well-intentioned to heavy-handed.[74] Nevertheless, Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale also acknowledged that the Canadian government needs to engage more in community outreach:

> Our view is that the government of Canada has to get far more proactive on the issue of outreach, community engagement, counter-radicalization, determining how and what means the right, positive, constructive influences can be brought to bear to change what would otherwise be dangerous behaviour.[75]

The lack of engagement from the top is clearly evident if only in the lack of a counter-radicalisation program, despite the near misses with the Toronto 18 case, discussed briefly in the introduction to this chapter, the VIA Rail case and Aaron Driver, and the actual attacks in October 2014. University of Waterloo professor Lorne Dawson told *The Guardian* that the Driver case 'underscores the need for counter-radicalisation efforts in Canada,' though it can be asserted that this need was already apparent from the incidents that occurred, or nearly did so, before Driver's failed act of extremism.[76] Some progress has been made in this respect, with Canada's new counter-radicalisation centre opening in June 2017, though an actual counter-radicalisation strategy is still to be shaped.[77] The necessity of combining community

---

[74] For example: Dominic Casciani, "Analysis: The Prevent Strategy and Its Problem," *BBC News*, 26 August 2014, Accessed: 23 September 2017, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28939555>; Ian Cobain, "UK's Prevent Counter-Radicalisation Policy 'Badly Flawed,'" *The Guardian*, 19 October 2016, Accessed: 23 September 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/19/uks-prevent-counter-radicalisation-policy-badly-flawed>; Asim Qureshi, "'Our Criticism of Prevent Is Based on Fact, Not Myths," *Al Jazeera*, 4 July 2017, Accessed: 23 September 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/07/criticism-prevent-based-facts-myths-170703072558455.html>.

[75] Quote from Graveland, "Feds Failed Aaron Driver."

[76] Dawson quote from Kassam, "Canada's Counter-Terrorism Efforts."

[77] See footnote 55; Bronskill, "Counter-Radicalisation Centre."

support with a response from law enforcement is particularly important given the trend in Canada of high-profile incidents involving white converts to Islam.

The Aaron Driver case is therefore something of an outlier in regard to Canada's otherwise commendable outreach efforts to Muslim Canadians that were evidenced in the two previous case studies. In this instance, there is no tangible evidence of any kind of outreach, with the interactions that occurred better simply labelled 'engagement.' It is likely that Driver's 2015 arrest played a role in this change in approach, as none of the suspects in the previous cases had been arrested prior to their involvement in the terrorist plots or activity for which they were later either apprehended or killed. Though there is too little data to make a definitive judgement, a distinction might be made between proactive outreach seen in the VIA Rail and Martin Couture-Rouleau cases, and the reactive engagement witnessed with Aaron Driver. Certainly, there is no evidence of connections to the systematic outreach efforts that were present in the two previous cases considered in this chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the approach taken by Canada to engage with Muslim Canadians in response to homegrown terrorism differs remarkably from that of the United States: whereas the U.S. approach can be characterised as outsourcing, Canada's method can be described as outreach. Furthermore, outreach efforts are not confined to counterterrorism: government initiatives like the Multiculturalism Program and the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security demonstrate a more expansive view of the imperative to engage with all of Canada's minority communities, and are not just focused on the current threat of Islamist extremism. They also represent systematic efforts at outreach to minority communities, and recommendations of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable, as the body that concentrates on national security issues, play a role in two of the three homegrown terrorism case studies also considered

in this chapter. Notably, there are no comparable programmes or initiatives to these in the United States.

The cases of the VIA Rail plot and Martin Couture-Rouleau are proof of the positive outcomes that outreach can have on a collaborative community-security approach to counterterrorism, with the latter also providing insights into how these two actors might engage with each other on efforts to counter the radicalisation of individuals; although these efforts were unsuccessful in the case of Martin Couture-Rouleau, they can nevertheless be taken as a template for how synergised deradicalization might work in the future. Regarding outreach in terms of both counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation, the Aaron Driver case is a clear outlier, so much so that using the term outreach to describe the engagement seen in this case represents something of a misnomer. The most obvious reasoning for the drastic change in approach witnessed with the Driver case is his June 2015 arrest: in neither of the previous case studies had the suspects been apprehended on terror-related charges prior to the cases that this chapter considers.

In some ways, Canada's apparent success at developing an outreach strategy that has had positive implications on the country's domestic counterterrorism efforts might be linked to the ethnic makeup of intelligence organisations like CSIS: a 2011 report states that CSIS had 'advised the Committee that 13 percent of CSIS employees are visible minorities, compared to 16.2 percent of the Canadian population.' The report considered this 'constructive progress,' no doubt in reference to the heavily white, Anglophone and male composition that dogged the agency particularly through its early years.[78] It is unknown how accurate those 2011 figures are six years later, or how that thirteen percent is itself broken down. Despite recent accusations of racial and sexist harassment within the agency, having a workforce that is close to proportionately representative of wider Canadian society can help to shape the approach of

[78] Segal and Joyal, *Positive Steps Ahead*, 20.

CSIS to minority communities:[79] this, however, is of course dependent on those visible minorities being in positions to actively provide input to intelligence practices.

Although this chapter concentrates on the ways in which security and intelligence services have chosen to engage with Muslim Canadians, the persistent evidence of two-way communication means that it would be remiss not to briefly acknowledge some of the efforts made within communities to improve relations with law enforcement and intelligence authorities. The evidence in this chapter indicates that top-down initiatives have had a positive impact and, at least in these cases, have been positively received; with that said, there is also evidence that community-security relations have benefited from an explicit awareness and acknowledgement that communities themselves are engaging in efforts to detect extremism, and have made attempts to turn individuals away from radicalisation. Advantageously for those communities, public cognisance of these endeavours can also help to encourage a delineation between extremists and members of the religion they claim to be operating in defence of. To this point, the homepage of Paradise Forever, a support group for converts to Islam, states that its 'ambition…[is] to rid the world of its ignorance towards Islam and to counter the dual infections of terrorism and radicalization.'[80] There are also conferences like OWN IT, which was aimed at trying to understand why youth in Calgary were turning to extremism. There is also evidence pointing to a degree of receptiveness toward security intervention in cases where attempts by the local community to point a radicalised individual in other directions are unsuccessful: Muhammad Robert Heft, the president and founder of Paradise Forever, for instance, believes that if community efforts to deradicalise an individual do not work, then the police should be notified.[81]

---

[79] Ashifa Kassam, "Canada Spy Service Workers Sue Agency Over Alleged Racist, Sexist Bullying," *The Guardian*, 15 July 2017, Accessed: 20 September 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/15/canada-security-intelligence-service-racism-sexism-lawsuit>.
[80] "Home," *Paradise Forever*, Accessed: 27 July 2017, <http://thep4e.com/>.
[81] Shephard and Livingstone, "RCMP Arrest Two."

Engaging with minorities is vital for national security. Ensuring that minority communities feel included in the fabric of society can help mitigate some of the key concerns facing security officials, especially today. The cases considered herein are evidence that CSIS and the RCMP are aware of this, and have worked to build bridges with Muslim Canadians, and to re-establish foundations of trust that were severely rocked when Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen born in Syria, was arrested in the U.S. in 2002 and sent to Syria where he was tortured: this incident caused understandable problems in the progress that had been made in improving relations in the aftermath of September 11.[82] The outreach efforts that this chapter has discussed, both in the systematic approaches represented in the government initiatives and in the ad hoc methods that are seen on a case-by-case basis, demonstrate an approach rooted in an awareness of Canadian society as a whole, and of the need to engage all sectors of it for successful counterterrorism efforts both now and in the future.

[82] "Terrorism in Canada: Smoothly Done," *The Economist*, 25 April 2013, Accessed: 5 July 2017, <https://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2013/04/terrorism-canada>. Three further Canadian citizens have since been paid over C$30million collectively as compensation for the Canadian state's role in their being tortured in Syria and Egypt: "Ottawa Pays $31.3M to Canadian Men Tortured in Syria," *CBC News*, 26 October 2017, Accessed: 27 January 2018, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/torture-syria-31-million-1.4372689>.

CONCLUSION

Choices made following the attacks of September 11 changed the world, and continue to have implications for national security considerations in the United States and Canada, not just in terms of foreign policy – for example, President Donald Trump recently committed more troops to the U.S.' military footprint in Afghanistan, and Canadian Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan announced an extension to Canada's commitment against ISIS in Iraq – but also in terms of domestic security.[1] Islamist organisations have called for their ideological adherents to carry out attacks against Western countries, including the U.S. and Canada, in retaliation for perceived attacks by those nations against Muslims across the world.[2] In the sixteen years since 9/11, homegrown extremism has overtaken international terrorism as the main cause of Islamist terror attacks in the United States and Canada, and since 2009 those have increasingly been perpetrated by lone wolves. To combat this internal threat, domestic security and intelligence services have worked to engage with Muslim communities in North America and mobilise them as another component to counterterrorism efforts. As this thesis has demonstrated, this engagement has come in disparate ways: the United States has adopted a more 'hands-off' approach, preferring to call on Muslim Americans to gather intelligence on those exhibiting concerning behaviour and report them to the appropriate authorities; Canada has attempted outreach, hoping that systematic efforts to build positive relationships between minority communities and security services will in turn make those communities more responsive to calls for their assistance.

---

[1] David Nakamura and Abby Phillip, "Trump Announces New Strategy for Afghanistan that Calls for a Troop Increase," *The Washington Post*, 21 August 2017, Accessed 27 September 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-expected-to-announce-small-troop-increase-in-afghanistan-in-prime-time-address/2017/08/21/eb3a513e-868a-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.html>; "Canada Commits to Fight Against ISIS in Iraq for Another Two Years," *The Guardian*, 29 June 2017, Accessed: 27 September 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/29/canada-isis-iraq-mission-extended-two-years>.
[2] John McCoy and W. Andy Knight, "Homegrown Terrorism in Canada: Local Patterns, Global Trends," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 38, No. 4 (2014): 256.

One reason for the divergent approaches taken by Canada and the United States as demonstrated throughout this thesis could be the different ethos's of the two countries with respect to government: in Canada, a state-centred, collective approach is usually emphasised, which explains the presence of government-run programs like the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, whereas the United States has traditionally valued efforts led by individual states over those centred in the federal government. Furthermore, Canada has had an official policy of multiculturalism since 1971, which was then enacted into legislation in the 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act.[3] Article 3(1)(a) of this Act declares it

> '[T]o be the policy of the Government of Canada to recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage[.]'[4]

Preservation of diversity is therefore official government policy. The United States, on the other hand, has its historical notion of being a melting pot, in which a heterogenous population made up of immigrants ultimately forms a homogenous American identity by melting and blending all of the different elements together. Diversity contributes to what it means to be an 'American,' but it nevertheless is something that is eventually left behind. These disparate philosophies regarding societal diversity are likely to also have had an impact on the ways the domestic intelligence and security services of the United States and Canada have chosen to engage with minority communities in their counterterrorism investigations.

However, despite the differences in approach, one glaring point emerges in an analysis of both: intelligence collection, especially from minority communities, is hard. Navigating interactions and engagement with those communities for this purpose is even harder. The sensitive nature of relationships between domestic security services and minority communities,

---

[3] "Multiculturalism," *The Canadian Encylopedia*, 10 September 2014, Accessed: 3 February 2018, <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/multiculturalism/>.
[4] *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*, 1988, §3(1)(a), Accessed: 3 February 2018, <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-18.7.pdf>.

especially Muslims given the current focus on Islamist terrorism, means that there cannot be one correct approach, or that any one single approach is going to be effective in stopping every plot and potential plot before an attack is carried out. With that said, conclusions drawn in this thesis point to outreach, and efforts to build trust and bridges between security services and Muslim communities, having a greater chance for improving relations in the long-term, not just counterterrorism successes in the short-term. Moreover, having systematic programmes in place that aim to build those relationships with all minority communities arguably better prepares security and intelligence services for a broader array of potential future threats.

A broader point, however, that is not discussed in this thesis, is that radicalisation does not just occur in reaction to a nation's foreign policy, though this was the reasoning given in the aftermath of many of the case studies considered in this thesis. (It has been argued that Nidal Hasan was motivated to take action upon learning that he would be deployed to Afghanistan; Dzhokhar Tsarnaev told federal investigators that he and his brother had acted 'out of Muslim religious anger at the U.S.,' Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shouted 'for Iraq' after shooting Captain Nathan Cirillo, and Aaron Driver admitted that his radicalisation was motivated in part by what he saw happening in Middle East.[5]) Nevertheless, literature that considers the root causes of terrorism conclusively demonstrates that there is no blueprint for who might be susceptible to radicalisation and thus enticed into taking action. Broader social, economic and political conditions invariably play a key role to this extent.[6] Indeed, despite assertions prioritising anger

[5] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, *Lessons from Fort Hood: Improving Our Ability to Connect the Dots*, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., 2012, 12; Siobhan Gorman, Shallwani Pervaiz and Evan Perez, "Bomb Suspect was Put on Two Watch Lists," *Wall Street Journal*, 25 April 2013, Accessed: 12 June 2017; "Gunman Yelled 'For Iraq': Ottawa Shooting Eyewitness," *CBC News*, 23 October 2014, Accessed: 13 July 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/gunman-yelled-for-iraq-ottawa-shooting-eyewitness-1.2810689>; "Aaron Driver: Troubled Childhood, ISIS Supporter, Terror Threat Suspect," *CBC News*, 10 August 2016, Accessed: 3 July 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/aaron-driver-troubled-childhood-isis-supporter-1.3716222>.

[6] See, for example: Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century," *Political Psychology* 21, No. 2 (2000): 405-420; Jerrold M. Post, Farhana Ali, Schuyler W. Henderson, Steven Shanfield, Jeff Victoroff and Stevan Weine, "The Psychology of Suicide Terrorism,' *Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes* 72, No. 1 (2009): 13-31; Marc Sageman, 'The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,"

at foreign policy by the perpetrators, in the media reports following both of the attacks in Canada in October 2014 and after the Aaron Driver incident, a common refrain was that Martin Couture-Rouleau had fallen on hard times prior to his conversion, that Aaron Driver had had a troubled childhood, and it was speculated that Michael Zehaf-Bibeau had a history of mental illness and drug addiction.[7] It is exceptionally unlikely that domestic security and intelligence services will ever find a method of intelligence collection or a way of interacting with minority communities that will prove infallible. Unless the root causes of what drive people to radicalisation are addressed, there is always the possibility that one plot will slip through the cracks. As Brian Michael Jenkins of the RAND Corporation noted, when it comes to distinguishing between pathology and ideology, 'the two descriptions are not mutually exclusive – terrorism is not an activity that attracts the well-adjusted.'[8]

The research conducted in this thesis represents only a small step into a previously unexplored sub-field of the literature on terrorism and intelligence studies. Future research should consider a more detailed look at homegrown terrorism generally in the United States and Canada prior to 9/11, as this has largely been neglected in favour of studies on the post-9/11 era, especially in the U.S. More specifically, there is the potential for future scholarship on terrorism in this period that emanated from minority communities, such as the Black

---

Terrorism and Political Violence 26, No. 4 (2014): 565-580; Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko and Clark Mccauley, "Countering the Narrative: Strategy and Tactics in Countering the Storyline of Global Jihad," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 5, No. 1 (2010): 42-57.

[7] Rene Bruemmer, "From Typical Teen to Jihadist: How Martin Couture-Rouleau Became Radicalized After Converting to Islam," *National Post*, 9 November 2014, Accessed: 7 July 2017, <http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/11/09/from-typical-teen-to-jihadist-how-martin-couture-rouleau-became-radicalized-after-converting-to-islam/>; "Aaron Driver: Troubled Childhood, ISIS Supporter, Terror Threat Suspect," *CBC News*, 10 August 2016, Accessed: 17 July 2017, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/aaron-driver-troubled-childhood-isis-supporter-1.3716222>; "Ottawa Shooting Suspect Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Had 'Very Developed Criminality,'" *CTV News*, 23 October 2014, Accessed: 13 July 2017, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/ottawa-shooting-suspect-michael-zehaf-bibeau-had-very-developed-criminality-1.2067255>.

[8] The pathology versus ideology divide is expressed in Doug Saunders, "When Troubled Young Men Turn to Terror, Is It Ideology or Pathology?" *The Globe and Mail*, 24 October 2014, Accessed: 13 July 2017, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/lone-wolf-ideology-or-pathology/article21293910/>. Brian Michael Jenkins quote from the same source.

Liberation Army and the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional Puertorriqueña (FALN). Investigations into minority communities pose a clear challenge for domestic security and intelligence services, and the precedents set by investigations into such groups in this period is deserving of closer analysis, as are the groups themselves. Beyond this, consideration of non-Muslim minority communities after 9/11, and their interactions with security and intelligence services should not be forgotten, despite the focus on Islamist extremism. With the opening of a new counter-radicalisation centre in Canada, and the intended forthcoming of a counter-radicalisation strategy, the interplay between minority communities and security services in this regard could be a fruitful avenue of future research, beyond what has already been produced on the PREVENT scheme in the United Kingdom.

Ultimately, this thesis has proven that there is no one homogenous North American approach to engaging with minority communities in respect to counterterrorism, and has concluded that, of the two approaches considered, one that works towards building positive relationships between communities and security services has had greater success in preventing terrorist attacks by homegrown extremists. Future achievements in this field hinge on domestic security and intelligence services being able to interact with minority communities, not just Muslims, in a way that does not engender further mistrust and apprehension. Moreover, security services that have built positive relationships with all sectors of the population they protect will be better placed to deal with the challenges of a world where Islamist extremism is no longer considered the preeminent non-state threat. In this regard, it must be argued that greater long-term counterterrorism success and national security can be had by building two-way bridges with minority communities, than it can with one-way roads.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Government Sources/Official Publications:

"Archived – 40 Years of the Official Languages Act." *Department of Justice Canada*. Accessed: 9 March 2017. <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?m=/index&nid=480459>.

"Enrique Marquez Jr. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Plotting Violent Attacks and Buying Firearms for Shooter in San Bernardino Terrorist Attack." *Department of Justice*. 14 February 2017. Accessed: 23 September 2017. <https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/enrique-marquez-jr-agrees-plead-guilty-plotting-violent-attacks-and-buying-firearms>.

"Inaugural Meeting of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security." *Government of Canada*. 7 March 2005. Accessed: 17 July 2017. <https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2005/03/inaugural-meeting-cross-cultural-roundtable-security.html>.

"Judge Webster Delivers Webster Commission Report on Fort Hood." *Federal Bureau of Investigation*. 19 July 2012. Accessed: 27 June 2017. <https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/judge-webster-delivers-webster-commission-report-on-fort-hood>.

"Millennium Plot/Ahmed Ressam." *Federal Bureau of Investigation*. Accessed: 28 March 2017. <https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/millennium-plot-ahmed-ressam>.

"Most Wanted Terrorists: Joanne Deborah Chesimard." *Federal Bureau of Investigation*. Accessed: 3 April 2017. <https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/wanted_terrorists/joanne-deborah-chesimard/view>.

"Peace Bonds Fact Sheet." *Department of Justice*. 1 August 2017. Accessed: 22 September 2017. <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/victims-victimes/factsheets-fiches/peace-paix.html>.

"Sharing Information with the Public." *Canadian Security Intelligence Service*. Accessed: 17 July 2017. <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/bts/shrngpblc-en.php>.

"Terms of Reference of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security." *Public Safety Canada.* Accessed: 27 July 2017. <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/crss-cltrl-rndtbl/trms-rfrnc-en.aspx>.

"Unclassified Summary of Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings." *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*. 10 April 2014. Accessed: 31 May 2017. <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICIG_Forum_Boston_Marathon_Bombings_Review_-_Unclassifed_Summary.pdf>.

"World Trade Center Bombing 1993." *Federal Bureau of Investigation.* Accessed: 3 April 2017. <https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/world-trade-center-bombing-1993>.

Attorney General's Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations. 30 May 2002. Accessed: 7 December 2016. <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2013/09/24/undercover-fbi-operations.pdf>.

Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations. 29 September 2008. Accessed: 7 December 2016. <https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/docs/guidelines.pdf>.

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Department of State. *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*. January 2009. Accessed: 15 January 2017. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf>.

Canadian Heritage. "Annual Report on the Operation of the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act 2015-2016*: Diversity and Inclusion in Action." *Canadian Heritage*. Accessed: 26 July 2017. <http://canada.pch.gc.ca/DAMAssetPub/DAM-PCH2-PCH-InstitutionalProfile/STAGING/texte-text/annualReport_Multiculturalism_1488833507317_eng.pdf>.

Canadian Multiculturalism Act. 1988. Accessed: 3 February 2018. <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-18.7.pdf>.

Citizenship and Immigration Canada. "Evaluation of the Multiculturalism Program." *Citizenship and Immigration Canada*. March 2012. Accessed: 26 July 2017. <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/research-stats/multiculturalism.pdf>.

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. 19 February 2007. Accessed: 25 March 2017. <https://members.ialeia.org/files/docs/dossier2_ENG.pdf>.

Criminal Code of Canada. R.S.C., 1985. Accessed: 25 September 2017. <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-46.pdf>.

Doran, Mary Deborah. "9/11/2001 Commission." *Federal Bureau of Investigation*. 16 June 2004. Accessed: 3 April 2017. <https://archives.fbi.gov/news/testimony/9-11-2001-commission>.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. *A Threat Assessment for Domestic Terrorism, 2005-2006*. 18 September 2007. Accessed: 5 December 2016. <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/402525/doc-30-threat-assessment-domestic-terrorism.pdf>

Federal Bureau of Investigation. *The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland: An FBI Assessment*. 15 April 2004. Accessed: 5 December 2016. <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/402515/doc-19-terrorist-threat-to-homeland.pdf>

Government of Canada. "Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy." *Public Safety Canada*. 9 February 2012. Accessed: 2 December 2016. <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm/rslnc-gnst-trrrsm-eng.pdf>

Lieberman, Joseph I. and Susan M. Collins, *A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2011. <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/library?c=112&type=reports>.

O'Brien, Lauren. "The Evolution of Terrorism Since 9/11." *Federal Bureau of Investigation*. September 2011. Accessed: 23 June 2017. <https://leb.fbi.gov/2011/september/the-evolution-of-terrorism-since-9-11>.

Public Safety Canada. "2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada: Feature Focus 2014: Responding to Violent Extremism and Travel Abroad for Terrorism-Related Purposes." *Public Safety Canada*. 16 December 2016. Accessed: 3 July 2017. <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-eng.pdf>.

Public Safety Canada. "2016 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada." *Public Safety Canada.* 25 August 2016. Accessed: 25 April 2017. <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-en.pdf>.

Segal, Hugh, and Serge Joyal. *Security, Freedom and the Complex Terrorism Threat: Positive Steps Ahead.* March 2011. Accessed: 19 July 2017. <https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/Committee/403/anti/rep/rep03mar11-e.pdf>.

Steinbach, Michael. "ISIL in America: Domestic Terror and Radicalization," *Federal Bureau of Investigation*, 26 February 2015, Accessed: 27 April 2017, <https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/isil-in-america-domestic-terror-and-radicalization>.

Task Force on New Americans. *Building an Americanization Movement for the Twenty-First Century: A Report to the President of the United States from the Task Force on New Americans*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008. <https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Office%20of%20Citizenship/TaskForceonNewAmericansReport.pdf>.

United States. *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*. 2011. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf>

U.S. Code. (LII). Accessed: 25 September 2017. <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2331>.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. *After San Bernardino: The Future of ISIS-Inspired Attacks*, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 10 February 2016.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Homeland Security. *Attacks on the Homeland*. 113th Cong., 1st sess., 9 May 2013.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Homeland Security. *Crisis of Confidence: Preventing Terrorist Infiltration through U.S. Refugee and Visa Programs*, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 3 February 2016.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Management. *Lessons from Fort Hood: Improving Our Ability to Connect the Dots*. 112th Cong., 2nd sess., 14 September 2012.

U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice. *World Trade Center Bombing: Terror Hits Home*. 103rd Cong.., 1st sess. 9 March 1993.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. *U.S. Policy on Terrorism in Light of the FALN Members' Clemency*. 106th Cong., 1st sess., 21 September 1999.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. *A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack*. 112th Cong., 1st sess., 15 February 2011.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. *ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization on the Internet and Social Media*. 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 6 July 2016.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. *Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings: Preparing for and Responding to the Attack*. 113th Cong., 1st sess., 10 July 2013.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. *Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombing: Improving Intelligence and Information Sharing*. 113th Cong., 2nd sess., 30 April 2014.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. *The Fort Hood Attack: A Preliminary Assessment*. 111th Cong.,1st sess., 19 November 2009.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. *Examining Certain Implications of the President's Grant of Clemency for Members of the Armed Force on National Liberation (the FALN)*. 106th Cong., 1st sess., 15 September and 20 October 1999.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. *The Pardon Reform and Integrity Act: Report (to Accompany S. 2042)*. 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 9 March 2000, S. Rep. 106-231.

Watson, Dale L. "The Terrorist Threat Confronting the United States: Testimony Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence." *Federal Bureau of Investigation*. 6 February 2002. Accessed: 28 March 2017. <https://www.archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/the-terrorist-threat-confronting-the-united-states>.

Webster, William. *Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission on The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009*. 2012. <https://ia800501.us.archive.org/32/items/final-report-of-the-william-h.-webster-commission/final-report-of-the-william-h.-webster-commission.pdf>.

News Sources:

"Aaron Driver: Troubled Childhood, ISIS Supporter, Terror Threat Suspect." *CBC News*. 10 August 2016. Accessed: 3 July 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/aaron-driver-troubled-childhood-isis-supporter-1.3716222>.

"Arrest at U.S. Border Reverberates in France." *New York Times*. 22 December 1999. Accessed: 4 April 2017.

"Bomb-Torn Canada Exchange Reopens Using Chalk, Board." *Los Angeles Times*. 15 February 1969. Accessed: 1 April 2017.

"Bomb Rips Montreal Stock Exchange." *The Washington Post-Times Herald*. 14 February 1969. Accessed: 1 April 2017.

"British Spies Help Prevent al Qaeda-Inspired Attack on New York Subway." *The Telegraph*. 9 November 2009. Accessed: 28 June 2017. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/6529436/British-spies-help-prevent-al-Qaeda-inspired-attack-on-New-York-subway.html>.

"Canada Commits to Fight Against ISIS in Iraq for Another Two Years." *The Guardian*. 29 June 2017. Accessed: 27 September 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/29/canada-isis-iraq-mission-extended-two-years>.

"Canada Extremist Aaron Driver 'Was Planning Attack.'" *BBC News*. 12 August 2016. Accessed: 17 July 2017. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-37053521>.

"Canada Lifts Terror Threat Level from Low to Medium." *BBC News*. 22 October 2014. Accessed: 13 July 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-29722094>.

"Canadian Police Probing Algerian's Relationships." *Wall Street Journal*. 22 December 1999. Accessed: 4 April 2017.

"Canada Probes Michael Zehaf-Bibeau as Possible Suspect in Ottawa Shooting: Source." *Reuters*. 22 October 2014. Accessed: 13 July 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/22/us-canada-attacks-suspect-idUSKCN0IB2IX20141022>.

"Canada Was a Haven for Terrorists Before Air India Blast." *Outlook India*. 5 May 2007. Accessed: 23 April 2016. <http://www.outlookindia.com/newswire/story/canada-was-a-haven-for-terrorists-before-air-india-blast/470569>.

"Damien Clairmont Killed Fighting With al-Qaeda-Linked Rebels in Syria." *CBC News*. 15 January 2014. Accessed: 21 September 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/damian-clairmont-killed-fighting-with-al-qaeda-linked-rebels-in-syria-1.2497513>.

"Extremism in Prisons to be Tackled by Specialist Task Forces." *BBC News*. 2 April 2017. Accessed: 26 July 2017. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39470210>.

"Former FBI Chief Picked to Lead Review." *CNN*. 8 December 2009. Accessed: 27 June 2017. <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/08/fort.hood.review/index.html>.

"Gunman Yelled 'For Iraq': Ottawa Shooting Eyewitness." *CBC News*. 23 October 2014. Accessed: 13 July 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/gunman-yelled-for-iraq-ottawa-shooting-eyewitness-1.2810689>.

"Harlow Murder: Polish Officers Patrol Streets Where Arek Jozwik Was Killed." *BBC News*. 15 September 2016. Accessed: 30 September 2016. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-essex-37374579>.

"Kaepernick Social Media Posts Laud Black Lives Matter, Black Panthers since Dating Activist DJ." *Fox News*. 30 August 2016. Accessed: 3 April 2017. <http://www.foxnews.com/sports/2016/08/30/kaepernick-social-media-posts-laud-black-lives-matter-black-panthers-since-dating-activist-dj.html>.

"Manitoba Muslim Leaders Want to Talk to Suspected ISIS Supporter." *CBC News*. 23 February 2015. Accessed: 17 July 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/manitoba-muslim-leaders-want-to-talk-to-suspected-isis-supporter-1.2968638>.

"No to Ransom Demand." *The Guardian*. 7 October 1970. Accessed: 1 April 2017.

"Ottawa Pays $31.3M to Canadian Men Tortured in Syria." *CBC News*. 26 October 2017. Accessed: 27 January 2018. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/torture-syria-31-million-1.4372689>.

"Ottawa Shooting Suspect Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Had 'Very Developed Criminality.'" *CTV News*. 23 October 2014. Accessed: 13 July 2017. <http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/ottawa-shooting-suspect-michael-zehaf-bibeau-had-very-developed-criminality-1.2067255>.

"OWN IT Conference Looks to Tackle Extremism in Calgary's Youth." *CBC News*. 11 September 2014. Accessed: 17 July 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/own-it-conference-looks-to-tackle-extremism-in-calgary-s-youth-1.2763953>.

"Prevent Isn't Making Anyway Safer. It Is Demonising Muslims and Damaging the Fabric of Trust in Society." *The Guardian.* 10 February 2016. Accessed: 27 July 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/10/prevent-isnt-making-anyone-safer-it-is-demonising-muslims-and-damaging-the-fabric-of-trust-in-society>.

"Puerto Ricans Get Maximum Terms." *New York Times*. 9 July 1954. Accessed: 4 April 2017.

"Sentence Commuted to Life for Collazo." *The Washington Post*. 25 July 1952. Accessed: 4 April 2017.

"Terror in Quebec Viewed as Futile: Separatists Embarrassed by Smashed Bomb Ring." *New York Times*. 23 June 1963. Accessed: 1 April 2017.

"Terrorism in Canada: Smoothly Done." *The Economist*. 25 April 2013. Accessed: 5 July 2017. <https://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2013/04/terrorism-canada>.

Acevedo, Jeffrey. "Puerto Ricans Leaving Island for U.S. in Record Numbers." *CNN*. 2 May 2016. Accessed: 20 September 2017. <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/02/americas/puerto-rico-exodus/index.html>.

Ackerman, Spencer. "Muslims Inside FBI Describe Culture of Suspicion and Fear: 'It Is Cancer.'" *The Guardian*. 22 March 2017. Accessed: 20 September 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/22/fbi-muslim-employees-discrimination-religion-middle-east-travel>.

Ahmed, Saeed, and Greg Botelho. "Who Is Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, the Man Behind the Deadly Ottawa Attack?" *CNN*. 24 October 2015. Accessed: 13 July 2017. <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/22/world/canada-shooter/>.

Apple, Jr., R. W. "329 Lost on Air-India Plane After Crash Near Ireland; Bomb is Suspected as Cause." *New York Times*. 24 June 1985. Accessed: 13 March 2017. <http://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/24/world/329-lost-on-air-india-plane-after-crash-near-ireland-bomb-is-suspected-as-cause.html?pagewanted=all>.

Arthanayake, Nihal. "Why GCHQ Needs to Fix its Diversity Problem." *BBC News*. 22 November 2016. Accessed: 25 November 2016.

Ash, Lucy. "Dagestan – The Most Dangerous Place in Europe." *BBC News*. 24 November 2011. Accessed: 28 June 2017. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15824831>.

Associated Press. "Army Adds Charges Against Rampage Suspect." *NBC News*. 2 December 2009. Accessed: 21 June 2017. <http://www.nbcnews.com/id/34243082/ns/us_news-tragedy_at_fort_hood#.WUpc1mjys2w>.

Associated Press. "Fort Hood Shooter Nidal Hasan Sentenced to Death." *CBC*. 28 August 2013. Accessed: 21 June 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/fort-hood-shooter-nidal-hasan-sentenced-to-death-1.1391606?cmp=rss>.

Associated Press. "One Year After San Bernardino Attack. City Aims to Prevent Muslim Hate Crimes." *The Guardian*. 1 December 2016. Accessed: 29 June 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/01/san-bernardino-shooting-one-year-later-muslim-hate-crimes>.

Audi, Tamara, and Miriam Jordan. "San Bernardino Shooting Prompts Soul Searching Among U.S. Muslims." *Wall Street Journal*. 9 December 2015. Accessed: 12 June 2017.

Austen, Ian. "Hit-and-Run That Killed Canadian Soldier is Called Terrorist Attack." *New York Times*. 21 October 2014. Accessed: 7 July 2017. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/world/americas/canadian-soldier-run-down-in-what-officials-call-act-of-terror-dies.html>.

Baker, Al, and Marc Santora. "San Bernardino Attackers Discussed Jihad in Private Messages, F.B.I. Says." *New York Times*. 16 December 2015. Accessed: 24

September 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/us/san-bernardino-attackers-discussed-jihad-in-private-messages-fbi-says.html>.

Barghout, Caroline. “Aaron Driver Defends ISIS, Attack on Parliament, But Denies He’s a Threat.” *CBC News*. 24 June 2015. Accessed: 17 July 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/aaron-driver-defends-isis-attack-on-parliament-hill-but-denies-he-s-a-threat-1.3124815>.

Barrett, Devlin. “Boston Hearing Delves into FBI Alerts.” *Wall Street Journal*. 9 May 2013. Accessed: 12 June 2017.

Bergen, Peter. “Can We Stop Homegrown Terrorists?” *Wall Street Journal*. 22 January 2016. Accessed: 12 June 2017.

Blumenthal, Ralph. “Tapes Depict Proposal to Thwart Bomb Used in Trade Center Blast.” *New York Times*. 28 October 1993. Accessed: 3 April 2017.

Botelho, Greg, Catharine E. Shoichet and Pamela Brown. “San Bernardino Shooting: Past Plot and Recent Loan are Latest Clues.” *CNN*. 9 December 2015. Accessed: 28 June 2017. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/08/us/san-bernardino-shooting/>.

Botelho, Greg, and Steve Almasy. “San Bernardino Shooting: Carnage was ‘Unspeakable,’ Police Say.” *CNN*. 4 December 2015. Accessed: 29 June 2017. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/03/us/san-bernardino-shooting/index.html>.

Bronskill, Jim. “Bill C-51: Environmental Activists, Aboriginals Fear Legislation Will Tread on Rights.” *Huffington Post*. 12 May 2015. Accessed: 29 June 2016. <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/03/12/reject-flawed-anti-terror_n_6854550.html>.

Bronskill, Jim. “Liberals Launch Counter-Radicalization Centre but Special Advisor to be Appointed Later.” *Toronto Star*. 26 June 2017. Accessed: 22 September 2017. <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/06/26/liberals-launch-counter-radicalization-centre-but-special-adviser-to-be-appointed-later.html>.

Bruemmer, Rene. “From Typical Teen to Jihadist: How Martin Couture-Rouleau Became Radicalized After Converting to Islam.” *National Post*. 9 November 2014. Accessed: 7 July 2017. <http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/11/09/from-typical-teen-to-jihadist-how-martin-couture-rouleau-became-radicalized-after-converting-to-islam/>.

Burrough, Bryan. “Today, A Softer Response to Police Violence than in 1960s and ‘70s.” *Los Angeles Times*. 2 May 2015. Accessed: 31 August 2017. <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0503-burrough-violent-revolution-20150503-story.html>.

Casciani, Dominic. “Analysis: The Prevent Strategy and Its Problem.” *BBC News*, 26 August 2014. Accessed: 23 September 2017. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28939555>.

Chang, Cindy. “San Bernardino Shootings Cast a Somber Tone Over Muslim Conference in Chino.” *Los Angeles Times*. 26 December 2015. Accessed: 21 June 2017. <http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-1227-islamic-convention-20151227-story.html>.

Chipello Christopher J., and David S. Cloud. "Ressam Spent Time in Terrorist Camps Linked to the Saudi Militant bin Laden." *Wall Street Journal*. 21 January 2000. Accessed: 4 April 2017.

Cobain, Ian. "UK's Prevent Counter-Radicalisation Policy 'Badly Flawed.'" *The Guardian*. 19 October 2016. Accessed: 23 September 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/oct/19/uks-prevent-counter-radicalisation-policy-badly-flawed>.

Coubrough, Jill. "Civil Liberties Advocates and Defence Critics at Odds Over Aaron Driver Case." *CBC News*. 11 August 2016. Accessed: 17 July 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/cnaada/manitoba/aaron-driver-case-civil-liberties-defence-critics-1.3716942>.

Crossette, Barbara. "After the Attacks: In Montreal; A Sense of Foreboding in Canada's Diverse Muslim Community." *New York Times*. 16 September 2001. Accessed: 25 September 2017. <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/16/us/after-attacks-montreal-sense-foreboding-canada-s-diverse-muslim-haven.html>.

Cullison, Alan. "A Family Terror: The Tsarnaevs and the Boston Bombing." *Wall Street Journal*. 13 December 2013.

Dodd, Vikram. "Terrorism Act: 'They Asked Me to Keep an Eye on the Muslim Community'." *The Guardian*. 23 May 2011. Accessed: 25 November 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/may/23/terrorism-act-muslim>.

Dorell, Oren. "Muslims Report More Bias Cases Across USA." *USA Today*. 8 December 2015. Accessed: 24 September 2017. <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/12/08/us-muslims-report-more-bias-cases-across-nation/76982412/>.

Efrati, Amir. "Imam Pleads Guilty in New York Terror Case." *Wall Street Journal*. 4 March 2010. Accessed: 12 June 2017.

Ellis, Ralph. "Canada: Soldier Attack Suspect Radicalized." *CNN*. 22 October 2014. Accessed: 7 July 2017. <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/21/us/canada-soldiers-killed-officer-attack/>.

Friedersdorf, Conor. "The Horrifying Effects of NYPD Ethnic Profiling on Innocent Muslim Americans." *The Atlantic*. 28 March 2013. Accessed: 20 September 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/03/the-horrifying-effects-of-nypd-ethnic-profiling-on-innocent-muslim-americans/274434/>.

Garza, Alicia. "A Herstory of the #BlackLivesMatter Movement." *The Feminist Wire*. 7 October 2014. Accessed: 27 March 2017. <http://www.thefeministwire.com/2014/10/blacklivesmatter-2/>.

Goel, Vindu. "A Brief Explanation of Apple's Showdown with the U.S. Government." *New York Times*. 26 February 2016. Accessed: 28 June 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/27/technology/a-brief-explanation-of-apples-showdown-with-the-us-government.html>.

Gollom, Mark. “Michael Zehaf-Bibeau and Martin Couture-Rouleau: Their Shared Traits.” *CBC News*. 27 October 2014. Accessed: 13 July 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/michael-zehaf-bibeau-and-martin-couture-rouleau-their-shared-traits-1.2812241>.

Gorman, Siobhan, Evan Perez and Alan Cullison. “Missed Signals Before Bombing.” *Wall Street Journal*. 11 May 2013. Accessed: 12 June 2017.

Gorman, Siobhan, Shallwani Pervaiz and Evan Perez. “Bomb Suspect was Put on Two Watch Lists.” *Wall Street Journal*. 25 April 2013. Accessed: 12 June 2017.

Graveland, Bill. “‘I Cried’: Mother of Man Killed in Syria Says Feds Failed Aaron Driver.” *CBC News*. 13 August 2016. Accessed: 17 July 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/mother-of-man-killed-in-syria-says-feds-failed-aaron-driver-1.3720220>.

Holland, Steve, and Emily Stephenson. “Donald Trump Urges Ban on Muslims Entering U.S.” *Reuters*. 7 December 2017. Accessed: 24 September 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump/donald-trump-urges-ban-on-muslims-entering-u-s-idUSKBN0TQ2N320151207>.

Hopkins, Christopher Dean, and Laura Wagner. “Police Identify Suspects After Deadly San Bernardino Shooting.” *NPR*. 2 December 2015. Accessed: 21 June 2017. <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/12/02/458196942/active-shooter-situation-reported-in-san-bernardino-calif>.

Johnson, Jenna, and Abigail Hauslohner. “‘I Think Islam Hates Us’: A Timeline of Trump’s Comments About Islam and Muslims.” *The Washington Post*. 20 May 2017. Accessed: 25 September 2017. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-think-islam-hates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims/?utm_term=.d769b9d5009e>.

Johnson, Kevin. “Anti-Government ‘Sovereign Movement’ on the Rise in U.S.” *USA Today*. 30 March 2012. Accessed: 3 September 2017. <https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-03-30/anti-government-militia-groups-freeman/53873496/1>.

Johnston, David. “Canada Seeks Friend of Man Held in Ferrying of Explosives.” *New York Times*. 25 December 1999. Accessed: 5 April 2017.

Johnston, David. “Fugitive in Trade Center Blast is Caught and Returned to the U.S.” *New York Times*. 9 February 1995. Accessed: 3 April 2017.

Kassam, Ashifa. “Canada Spy Service Workers Sue Agency Over Alleged Racist, Sexist Bullying.” *The Guardian*. 15 July 2017. Accessed: 20 September 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/15/canada-security-intelligence-service-racism-sexism-lawsuit >.

Kassam, Ashifa. “Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Efforts Face Scrutiny After US Helps Stop Suspect.” *The Guardian*. 13 August 2016. Accessed: 17 July 2017. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/13/canada-counter-terror-aaron-driver-suspect>.

Kaufman, Michael T. “Slaying of One of the Last Black Liberation Army Leaders Still at Large Ended a 7-Month Manhunt.” *New York Times*. 16 November 1973. Accessed: 3 April 2017.

Kifner, John. “Terrorists Said to Hide in Canada’s Melting Pot.” *New York Times*. 24 December 1999. Accessed: 4 April 2017.

Kotz, Deborah. “Injury Toll from Marathon Bombs Reduced to 264.” *The Boston Globe*. 24 April 2013. Accessed: 21 June 2017. <http://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2013/04/23/number-injured-marathon-bombing-revised-downward/NRpaz5mmvGquP7KMA6XsIK/story.html>.

Kutty, Faisal. “Muslims Hold Key to Fighting Terror.” *Toronto Star*. 25 April 2013. Accessed: 5 July 2017. <https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/04/25/muslims_hold_key_to_fighting_terror.html>.

Lee, Dave. “Apple Ordered to Unlock San Bernardino Gunman’s Phone.” *BBC News*. 17 February 2016. Accessed: 28 June 2017. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-35593048>.

Lewis, Paul. “San Bernardino Attackers Did Not Post About Jihad on Social Media. FBI Says.” *The Guardian*. 16 December 2015. Accessed: 28 June 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/16/san-bernardino-attackers-jihad-social-media-fbi>.

MacQueen, Ken, and John Geddes. "Air India: After 22 Years, Now's the Time for Truth.” *Maclean's* 120. No. 20 (2007): 16-20.

Malone, Kelly. “Justice Powers or Community Outreach: How Canada Can Counter-Radicalisation.” *CBC News*. 12 August 2016. Accessed: 26 July 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/how-to-counter-radical-extremism-1.3717914>.

Matas, Robert. “Unsolved Murder of Celebrated Air India Journalist Stains Canada’s Reputation for Press Freedom.” *The Globe and Mail*. 18 June 2012. Accessed: 30 March 2017. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/unsolved-killing-of-celebrated-air-india-journalist-stains-canadas-reputation-for-press-freedom/article4104879/>.

McClelland, Susan. “Rising from the Fire.” *Maclean’s* 114. No. 3 (2001): 56.

McConnell, Rick, and Andrea Huncar. “‘I Wanted to Die Myself,’ Says Father of Aaron Driver.” *CBC News*. 11 August 2016. Accessed: 17 July 2016. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/aaron-driver-father-speaks-1.3717517>.

McFadden, Robert D. “4 Killed, 44 Injured in Fraunces Tavern Blast.” *New York Times*. 25 January 1975. Accessed: 1 April 2017.

McFadden, Robert D. “Fugitive Puerto Rican Terrorist Arrested in Mexico.” *New York Times*. 28 May 1983. Accessed: 4 April 2017.

Mehta, Diana. "Two Sentenced to Life in Train Derailment Terror Case." *The Chronicle Herald*. 23 September 2015. Accessed: 5 July 2017. <http://thechronicleherald.ca/canada/1312914-two-sentenced-to-life-in-train-derailment-terror-case>.

Miller, Stuart. "Violent Attacks on Arab Americans." *The Guardian*. 14 September 2001. Accessed: 25 September 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/14/september11.usa14>.

Nakamura, David, and Abby Phillip. "Trump Announces New Strategy for Afghanistan that Calls for a Troop Increase." *The Washington Post*. 21 August 2017. Accessed 27 September 2017. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-expected-to-announce-small-troop-increase-in-afghanistan-in-prime-time-address/2017/08/21/eb3a513e-868a-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.html>.

Nixon, Ron. "U.S. to Further Scour Social Media Use of Visa and Asylum Seekers." *New York Times*. 23 February 2016. Accessed: 28 June 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/24/us/politics/homeland-security-social-media-refugees.html>.

Noronha, Charmaine, and Rob Gillies. "Canada Plot Raises Questions on Iran Link to al-Qaeda." *Times of Israel*. 23 April 2013. Accessed: 5 July 2017. <http://www.timesofisrael.com/canada-plot-raises-questions-on-iran-link-to-al-qaeda/>.

Palette, Damien, Devlin Barrett and Tamara Audi. "FBI's Comey Says California Killers Show Signs of Radicalization." *Wall Street Journal*. 4 December 2015. Accessed: 12 June 2017.

Palmer, Al, and Paul Dubois. "Police Clamp Down on FLQ, Quiz 15 Men." *The Montreal Gazette*. 13 April 1963. Accessed: 1 April 2017.

Paperny, Anna Mehler. "Meet the Lawyer Linking Police with Toronto's Muslim Community." *Global News*. 24 April 2013. Accessed: 5 July 2017. <http://globalnews.ca/news/508988/meet-the-lawyer-linking-police-with-torontos-muslim-community/>.

Parvini, Sarah, Kate Linthicum and Taylor Goldstein. "Muslims Say the San Bernardino Shooting is a Critical Moment." *Los Angeles Times*. 3 December 2015. Accessed: 29 June 2017. <http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-muslim-community-responds-to-shooting-20151202-story.html>.

Payton, Laura. "Michael Zehaf-Bibeau Warns in Video: 'You Gotta Be Careful.'" *CBC News*. 6 March 2015. Accessed: 13 July 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/michael-zehaf-bibeau-warns-in-video-you-gotta-be-careful-1.2984170>.

Pearlstein, Steven. "Canadians Examine Lapses in Security." *The Washington Post*. 22 December 1999. Accessed: 4 April 2017.

Perez, Evan, and Stephanie Simon. "Suspects Had Bomb Notes, U.S. Says/" *Wall Street Journal*. 21 September 2009. Accessed: 28 June 2017.

Potter, Andrew. "The Very, Very Brief History of Violence in Quebec." *Maclean's* 120. No. 7 (2007): 10.

Powell, Michael. "Using A Would-Be Subway Bomber to Justify Sweeping Surveillance." *New York Times*. 11 June 2013. Accessed: 12 June 2017.

Qureshi, Asim. "'Our Criticism of Prevent Is Based on Fact, Not Myths." *Al Jazeera*. 4 July 2017. Accessed: 23 September 2017. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/07/criticism-prevent-based-facts-myths-170703072558455.html>.

Raab, Selwyn. "F.A.L.N. Terrorists Tied to 10 Bombings in Region." *New York Times*. 7 February 1975. Accessed: 1 April 2017.

Roberts, Nadim. "Gregory and Collin Gordon, Calgary Brothers, Join Ranks of Canadians Fighting for ISIS." *CBC News*. 28 August 2014. Accessed: 21 September 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/gregory-and-collin-gordon-calgary-brothers-join-ranks-of-canadians-fighting-for-isis-1.2749673>

Ryan, Edward F. "Woman, 3 Men Captured After Firing at Filled Floor; Security to be Tightened." *The Washington Post*. 2 March 1954. Accessed: 1 April 2017.

Roberts, Nadim. "Gregory and Collin Gordon, Calgary Brothers, Join Ranks of Canadians Fighting for ISIS." *CBC News*. 28 August 2014. Accessed: 21 September 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/gregory-and-collin-gordon-calgary-brothers-join-ranks-of-canadians-fighting-for-isis-1.2749673>.

Rubin, Josh, and Matt Smith. "'I Am the Shooter,' Nidal Hasan Tells Fort Hood Court-Martial." *CNN*. 6 August 2013. Accessed: 21 June 2017. <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/06/justice/hasan-court-martial/index.html?hpt=hp_t2>.

Santora, Marc, and Michael Schwirtz. "F.B.I. Cites 'Persons of Interest' in 2008 Times Square Bomb Case." 15 April 2015. Accessed: 23 September 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/nyregion/fbi-says-it-has-identified-persons-of-interest-in-2008-times-square-bombing.html>.

Saunders, Doug. "When Troubled Young Men Turn to Terror, Is It Ideology or Pathology?" *The Globe and Mail*. 24 October 2014. Accessed: 13 July 2017. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/lone-wolf-ideology-or-pathology/article21293910/>.

Shephard, Michelle, and Andrew Livingstone. "RCMP Arrest Two in Alleged Plot to Derail VIA Rail Train." *Toronto Star*. 22 April 2013. Accessed: 5 July 2017. <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/04/22/suspects_in_toronto_terror_plot_arrested_sources.html>.

Shenon, Philip. "World Trade Center Suspect Linked to Plan to Blow Up 2 Planes." *New York Times*. 26 March 1995. Accessed: 3 April 2017.

Silber, Mitchell D. "Cross Country: How the NYPD Foiled a Plot to Bomb the Subways." *Wall Street Journal*. 5 May 2012. Accessed: 12 June 2017.

Tao, Dominick. “Police Say ‘Fight Club’ Inspired A Bomber.” *New York Times*. 15 July 2009. Accessed: 23 September 2017. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/nyregion/16starbucks.html>.

Teotonio, Isabel. “Toronto 18.” *Toronto Star*. 2010. Accessed: 16 July 2017. <http://www3.thestar.com/static/toronto18/index.html>.

Thomas, Dexter. “San Bernardino Shooting Suspect Stopped Attending Mosque Two Years Ago.” *Los Angeles Times*. 3 December 2015. Accessed: 24 September 2017. <http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-san-bernardino-shooting-suspect-serious-about-studying-the-koran-20151203-story.html>.

Tickle, Louise. “Gathering Intelligence on the Recruitment and Use of Informers.” *The Guardian*. 12 March 2012. Accessed: 25 November 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2012/mar/12/intelligence-recruitment-use-informers-secret>.

The Canadian Press. “RCMP Spoke with Hamilton Muslim Community After Terror Suspect Arrests.” *CBC News*. 23 April 2013. Accessed: 22 September 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/news/rcmp-spoke-with-hamilton-muslim-community-after-terror-suspect-arrests-1.1365562>.

The Canadian Press. “Timeline: Aaron Driver’s History of Radicalization.” *CBC News*. 11 August 2016. Accessed: 22 September 2017. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/aaron-driver-timeline-1.3717169>.

Tomsho, Robert, Barbara Carton, Joe Periera, Patricia Calahan and James Dorsey. “A Day in Terror: Islamic Americans Grapple with Quick Backlash.” *Wall Street Journal*. 12 September 2001. Accessed: 25 September 2017.

Varagur, Krithika. “Muslims Shouldn’t Have to Condemn San Bernardino Shooting.” *Huffington Post*. 3 December 2015. Accessed: 29 June 2017. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/muslims-san-bernardino-shooting_us_56605bb5e4b072e9d1c4e362>.

Versi, Miqdaad. “Prevent Is Failing. Any Effective Strategy Must Include Muslim Communities.” *The Guardian*. 20 October 2017. Accessed: 23 September 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/20/prevent-isnt-working-inclusive-muslim-communities-counter-terrorism>.

Wang, Frances Kai-Hwa. “Leaders Warn Against Stereotyping and Backlash After San Bernardino Shooting.” *NBC News*. 3 December 2015. Accessed: 29 June 2017. <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/leaders-warn-against-stereotyping-backlash-after-san-bernardino-shootings-n473661>.

Waring, Gerald. “British Aide Kidnapped in Montreal Kidnapped by Separatists.” *The Washington Post-Times Herald*. 6 October 1970. Accessed: 1 April 2017.

White, Patrick. “Via Rail Plot’s Alleged al-Qaeda-Iran Connection Spurs Alarm in U.S.” *The Globe and Mail*. 26 April 2013. Accessed:5 July 2017. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/via-rail-plots-alleged-al-qaeda-iran-connection-spurs-alarm-in-us/article22562189/>.

Wittes, Benjamin. “Malevolence Tempered by Incompetence: Trump’s Horrifying Executive Order on Refugees and Visas.” *Lawfare*. 28 January 2017. Accessed: 27 June 2017. <https://lawfareblog.com/malevolence-tempered-incompetence-trumps-horrifying-executive-order-refugees-and-visas>.

Working/Research Papers:

Belli, Roberta. “Effects and Effectiveness of Law Enforcement Measures to Counter Homegrown Terrorism: A Case Study on the *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional* (FALN).” *Final Report to the Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security*. College Park, MD: START, 2012.

Bjelopera, Jerome P. “The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations.” *Congressional Research Service*. 28 December 2011. Accessed: 5 December 2016. <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/402533/doc-38.pdf>.

Edwards, Charlie, Calum Jeffray and Raffaello Pantucci. “Out of Reach? The Role of Community Policing in Preventing Terrorism in Canada.” *The RUSI Institute*. February 2015. Accessed: 21 September 2017. <https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201502_op_out_of_reach.pdf>.

Hoffman, Bruce. *Terrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat to Nuclear Facilities*. Report for the United States Department of Energy. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1986.

Khashu, Anita, Robin Busch and Zainab Latif. *Building Strong Police-Immigrant Community Relations: Lessons from a New York Project*. New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2005. <https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0017-pub.pdf>.

Li, Peter S. “Cultural Diversity in Canada: The Social Construction of Racial Difference.” *Department of Justice Canada*. 2000. Accessed: 28 July 2016. <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/jsp-sjp/rp02_8-dr02_8/rp02_8.pdf>.

Martin, Philip. “The Global Challenge of Managing Migration.” *Population Bulletin* 68. No. 2 (2013). <http://www.prb.org/pdf13/global-migration.pdf>.

Totten, Robbie J. “Security and United States Immigration Policy: Two American Immigration Security Traditions and an Analytical Framework of National Security and U.S. Immigration Policy.” *Baker Institute*. 2013. Accessed: 5 December 2016. <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/event/03057230/LAI-pub-TottenSecurityImmigrationPolicy-040813.pdf>.

Wark, Wesley. “CSE and Lawful Access After Snowden.” Centre for International Policy Studies. University of Ottawa. June 2013. Accessed: 1 December 2016. <http://www.cips-cepi.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/WWP-FINALfinal.pdf>.

Miscellaneous - Internet Resources

“Canada Confronts Radicalization Abroad and At Home.” *WikiLeaks*. 26 June 2008. Accessed: 22 September 2017. <https://wikileaks.org/plusd/pdf/?df=38606>.

"Faith and Belonging: One-Day Workshops for Diversity and Inclusion Champions." *Canadian Race Relations Foundation*. Accessed: 26 July 2017. <http://www.crrf-fcrr.ca/en/our-canada/cross-canada-workshops>.

"Global Terrorism Database." *University of Maryland*. Accessed: 16 July 2017. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>.

"Home." *Paradise Forever*. Accessed: 27 July 2017. <http://thep4e.com/>.

"Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity in Canada." *Statistics Canada*. 2011. Accessed: 28 July 2016. <http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-010-x/99-010-x2011001-eng.pdf>.

"Many Minority Groups Were Victims of Hate Crimes After 9/11." *Bell State University*. 9 October 2003. Accessed: 25 September 2017. <https://web.archive.org/web/20081211050839/http://www.bsu.edu/news/article/0%2C1370%2C-1019-12850%2C00.html>.

"Multiculturalism." *The Canadian Encylopedia*. 10 September 2014. Accessed: 3 February 2018. <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/multiculturalism/>.

"Puerto Rico – History and Heritage." *Smithsonian*. 6 November 2007. Accessed: 20 September 2017. <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/puerto-rico-history-and-heritage-13990189/>.

"Quick Facts." *United States Census Bureau*. Accessed: 27 June 2017. <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/RHI125216#qf-headnote-a>.

"Religions." *Pew Research Center*. Accessed: 29 June 2017. <http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/>.

"Transcription of FBI Interview Notes with Tamerlan Tsarnaev." *The Investigative Project*. 23 April 2011. Accessed: 23 September 2017. <https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/3286.pdf>.

Bush, George W. "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11." *Presidency Project*. 20 September 2001. Accessed: 27 June 2017. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=64731>.

Hill, Eleanor. "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement: Hearing on the Intelligence Community's Response to Past Terrorism Attacks Against the United States from February 1993 to September 2001." *Federation of American Scientists*. 8 October 2002. Accessed: 3 April 2017. <https://fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/100802hill.html>.

Iannacci, Nicandro. "Katz v. United States: The Fourth Amendment Adapts to New Technology." *National Constitution Center*. 18 December 2015. Accessed: 27 June 2016. <https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/katz-v-united-states-the-fourth-amendment-adapts-to-new-technology/>.

Miscellaneous - Other

Adler, Leo. Interview with Author. 21 September 2017. Telephone.

Shakur, Assata. *Assata: An Autobiography*. Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1987.

Secondary Sources

Agrell, Wilhelm. "The Next 100 Years? Reflections on the Future of Intelligence?" *Intelligence and National Security* 27. No. 1 (2012): 118-132.

Aid, Matthew M. "The Time of Troubles: The US National Security Agency in the Twenty-First Century." *Intelligence and National Security* 15. No. 3 (2000): 1-32.

Aldrich, Richard. "Beyond the Vigilant State: Globalisation and Intelligence." *Review of International Studies* 35. No. 4 (2009): 889-902.

Aldrich, Richard J. "Global Intelligence Co-Operation Versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem." *Intelligence and National Security* 24. No. 1 (2009): 26-56.

Ali, Farhana. "Rethinking US Counter-Terrorism Strategies: A Muslim Perspective." *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 2. No. 2 (2007): 30-47.

Aust, Stefan. *Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the R.A.F.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Baker, Jeffrey L. "Domestic and National Security Wiretaps: A Fourth Amendment Perspective." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 12. No. 1 (1999): 1-17.

Barber, Benjamin. "Jihad vs. McWorld." *The Atlantic*. No. 3 (1992). <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1992/03/jihad-vs-mcworld/303882/>

Bean, Hamilton. "Rhetorical and Critical/Cultural Intelligence Studies." *Intelligence and National Security* 28. No. 4 (2013): 495-519.

Becker, Jillian. *Hitler's Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang*. Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2014.

Bellaby, Ross. "What's the Harm? The Ethics of Intelligence Collection." *Intelligence and National Security* 27. No. 1 (2012): 93-117.

Bergen, Peter. *The United States of Jihad: Who Are America's Homegrown Terrorists and How Do We Stop Them?* New York: Broadway Books, 2016.

Best Jr., Richard A. "Intelligence and U.S. National Security Policy." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 28. No. 3 (2015): 449-467.

Blakeley, Ruth. *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*. London: Routledge, 2009.

Bolan, Kim. *Loss of Faith: How the Air India Bombers Got Away with Murder*. Toronto: McClelland and Steward, Ltd., 2005.

Brooks, Risa A. "Muslim Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the Threat?" *International Security* 36. No. 2 (2011): 7-47.

Burrough, Bryan. *Days of Rage: America's Radical Underground, the FBI, and the Forgotten Age of Revolutionary Violence*. New York: Penguin Press, 2015.

Byman, Daniel. “The Intelligence War on Terrorism.” *Intelligence and National Security* 29. No. 6 (2014): 837-863.

Callum, Robert. “The Case for Cultural Diversity in the Intelligence Community.” *International Journal of Intelligence of CounterIntelligence* 14. No. 1 (2001): 25-48.

Chalk, Peter and William Rosenau. *Confronting the Enemy Within: Security Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004.

Charles, Douglas M. “American, British and Canadian Intelligence Links: A Critical Annotated Bibliography.” *Intelligence and National Security* 15. No. 2 (2000): 259-269.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Laura Dugan. “The Canadian Way of Counterterrorism: Introducing the GATE: Canada Data Set.” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 22. No. 3 (2016): 316-330.

Churchill, Ward, and Jim Vander Wall. *The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI’s Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2002.

Cleroux, Richard. *Official Secrets: The Inside Story of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1991.

Courtney, Peter C. “To Render or Intern: Counterterrorism Methods of the FBI, SIS and CIA.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 26. No. 3 (2013): 482-506.

Coyle, John William and Peter Bell. “Strategic Intelligence in Law Enforcement: A Review.” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 6. No. 1 (2011): 23-39.

Crenshaw, Martha. “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century.” *Political Psychology* 21. No. 2 (2000): 405-420.

De Vault, Carole and William Johnson. *The Informer: Confessions of an Ex-Terrorist*. Toronto: Fleet Books, 1982.Dupont, Alan. “Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century.” *Intelligence and National Security* 18, No. 4 (2003): 15-39.

Dutter, Lee E. “Why Don’t Dogs Bark (or Bomb) in the Night? Explaining the Non-Development of Political Violence or Terrorism: The Case of Quebec Separatism.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35. No. 1 (2012): 59-75.

Duyvesteyn, Isabelle. “Hearts and Minds, Cultural Awareness and Good Intelligence: The Blueprint for Successful Counter-Insurgency?” *Intelligence and National Security* 26. No. 4 (2011): 445-459.

English, Richard. *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*. London: Pan Books, 2003.

Erskine, Toni. “‘As Rays of Light to the Human Soul?’ Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering.” *Intelligence and National Security* 19. No. 2 (2004): 359-381.

Etzioni, Amitai. "NSA: National Security vs. Individual Rights." *Intelligence and National Security* 30. No. 1 (2015): 100-136.

Farson, Stuart. "Is Canadian Intelligence Being Re-Invented?" *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 6. No. 2 (1999): 49-86.

Farson, Stuart, and Nancy Teeple. "Increasing Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capability: Is It a Dead Issue?" *Intelligence and National Security* 30. No. 1 (2015): 47-76.

Forcese, Craig and Kent Roach, *False Security: The Radicalization of Canadian Anti-Terrorism*. Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015.

Gabaccia, Donna R. *Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Gaskew, Tony. "Peacemaking Criminology and Counterterrorism: Muslim Americans and the War on Terror." *Contemporary Justice Review* 12. No. 3 (2009): 345-366.

Gill, Peter. "Security Intelligence and Human Rights: Illuminating the 'Heart of Darkness'?" *Intelligence and National Security* 24. No. 1 (2009): 78-102.

González-Cruz, Michael, Alberto Marquez Sola and Lorena Terando. "Puerto Rican Revolutionary Nationalism: Filiberto Ojeda Ríos and the Macheteros." *Latin American Perspectives* 25. No. 6 (2008): 151-165.

Gurr, Ted Robert. "Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social and Political Bases." In *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, edited by Walter Reich, 86-102. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998.

Haglund, David G. and Dru Lauzon. ""Homegrowns" in North America: The Changing Face of Radical Islamism, and its Implications for Canada-United States Relations." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 20. No. 3 (2014): 305-319.

Hale, Geoffrey E. "Sharing A Continent: Security, Insecurity, and the Politics of "Intermesticity." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 12. No. 3 (2006): 31-43.

Hamilton, Dwight, ed. *Inside Canadian Intelligence: Exposing the New Realities of Espionage and International Terrorism*. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2011.

Harber, Justin R. "Unconventional Spies: The Counterintelligence Threat from Non-State Actors." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 22. No. 2 (2009): 221-236.

Hasan, Mushirul. "September 11th and its Aftermath." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 10. No. 1 (2002): 157-165.

Heindl, Brett S. "Transnational Activism in Ethnic Diasporas: Insights from Cuban Exiles, American Jews and Irish Americans." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39. No. 3 (2013): 463-482.

Hensler, Alistair. "Canadian Intelligence: An Insider's Perspective." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 6. No. 3 (1999): 127-132.

Herman, Michael. “Counter-Terrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change.” *Intelligence and National Security* 18. No. 4 (2003): 40-58.

Herman, Michael. ‘Ethics and Intelligence After September 2001.” *Intelligence and National Security* 19. No. 2 (2004): 342-358

Hewitt, Steve. “Cold War Counter-Terrorism: The Evolution of International Counter-Terrorism in the RCMP Security Service, 1972-1984.” *Intelligence and National Security* (2017): 1-17.

Hewitt, Steve. “Royal Canadian Mounted Spy: The Secret Life of John Leopold/Jack Esselwein.” *Intelligence and National Security* 15. No. 1 (2000): 144-168.

Hitz, Frederick P., and Brian J. Weiss. “Helping the CIA and FBI Connect the Dots in the War on Terror.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 17. No. 4 (2004): 1-41.

Hlatky, Stéfanie von, and H. Christian Breede. “The Cultural Variable in Foreign and Defence Policy.” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 22. No. 2 (2016): 103-107.

Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

Horgan, John. *Divided We Stand: The Strategy and Psychology of Ireland’s Dissident Terrorists*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Hulnick, Arthur S. “Home Time: A New Paradigm for Domestic Intelligence.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 22. No. 4 (2009): 569-585.

Hulnick, Arthur S. “Intelligence and Law Enforcement: The “Spies are Not Cops” Problem.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 10. No. 3 (1997): 269-286.

Hulnick, Arthur S. “What’s Wrong with The Intelligence Cycle?” *Intelligence and National Security* 21. No. 6 (2006): 959-979.

Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations.” *Foreign Affairs* 72. No. 3 (1993): 22-49.

Hussain, Imtiaz. “Post-9/11 Canada-US Security Integration: Of the Butcher, the Baker, and the Intelligence-Policy Maker.” *American Review of Canadian Studies* 39. No. 1 (2009): 38-51.

Irwin, Nathan. “The Complexity of Responding to Home-Grown Terrorism: Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation and Disengagement.” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 10. No. 2 (2015): 166-175.

Jackson, Richard. and Samuel Justin Sinclair. *Contemporary Debates on Terrorism*. London: Routledge, 2012.

Jacoby, Tami Amanda. “Terrorism versus Liberal Democracy: Canadian Democracy and the Campaign Against Global Terrorism.” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 11. No. 3 (2004): 65-79.

Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. *The FBI: A History*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.

Johnson, Loch. “Spymaster Richard Helms: An Interview with the Former US Director of Central Intelligence.” *Intelligence and National Security* 18. No. 3 (2003): 24-44.

Jordán, Javier, Manuel R. Torres and Nicola Horsburgh. “The Intelligence Services’ Struggle Against al-Qaeda Propaganda.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 18. No. 1 (2005): 31-49.

Kashmeri, Zuhair, and Brian McAndrew. *Soft Target: How the Indian Intelligence Service Penetrated Canada*. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1989.

Kassam, Karim-Aly S, ed. *Understanding Terror: Perspectives for Canadians*. Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press, 2010.

Kaur, Loveleen. “The Tear in the Fabric of Multiculturalism.” *Sikh Formations* 10. No. 1 (2014): 69-84.

Keeble, Edna. “Defining Canadian Security: Continuities and Discontinuities.” *American Review of Canadian Studies* 35. No. 1 (2005): 1-23.

Kellett, Anthony, Bruce Beanlands and James Deacon, *Terrorism, 1960-1989*. Ottawa: Solicitor General Canada, Ministry Secretariat, 1991.

Kessler, Ronald. *In the President’s Secret Service: Behind the Scenes with Agents in the Line of Fire and the Presidents They Protect*. New York: Random House, 2009.

Kitchen, Veronica, and Karthika Sasikumar. “Canada (En)Counters Terrorism: U.S.-Canada Relations and Counter-Terrorism Policy.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21. No. 1 (2009): 155-173.

Kruglanski, Arie W., Xiaoyan Chen and Agnieszka Golec. “Individual Motivations, The Group Process and Organisation Strategies in Suicide Terrorism.” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 3. No. 1 (2008) 70-84.

Lauret, Maria. “Americanization Now and Then: The “Nation of Immigrants” in the Early Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries.” *Journal of American Studies* 50. No. 2 (2016): 419-447.

Lefebvre, Stéphane. “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 16. No. 4 (2003): 527-542.

Leuprecht, Christian, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko and Clark Mccauley. “Containing the Narrative: Strategy and Tactics in Countering the Storyline of Global Jihad.” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 5. No. 1 (2010): 42-57.

Mackey, Eva. *The House of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identity in Canada*. London: Routledge, 1999.

Maddrell, Paul. “Failing Intelligence: U.S. Intelligence in the Age of Transnational Threats.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 22. No. 2 (2009): 195-220.

McCoy, John, and W. Andy Knight. “Homegrown Terrorism in Canada: Local Patterns, Global Trends.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 38. No. 4 (2015): 253-274.

Monaghan, Jeffrey, and Kevin Walby. “Making Up ‘Terror Identities’: Security Intelligence, Canada’s Integrated Threat Assessment Centre and Social Movement Suppression.” *Policing and Society* 22. No. 2 (2012): 133-151.

Nacos, Brigitte L. *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*. New York: Routledge, 2016.

Neumann, Peter. *Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2016.

Nomikos, John M. and Aya Burweila. “Another Frontier to Fight: International Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism in North Africa.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 22. No. 1 (2008): 50-88.

O’Brien, Kevin A. “Managing National Security and Law Enforcement Intelligence in a Globalised World.” *Review of International Affairs* 35. No. 4 (2009): 903-915.

Omand, Sir David, Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller. “Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT).” *Intelligence and National Security* 27. No. 6 (2012): 801-823.

Post, Jerrold M., Farhana Ali, Schuyler W. Henderson, Steven Shanfield, Jeff Victoroff and Stevan Weine. “The Psychology of Suicide Terrorism.’ *Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes* 72. No. 1 (2009): 13-31.

Raine, Robert. “Reflections on Security at the 2012 Olympics.” *Intelligence and National Security* 30. No. 4 (2015): 422-433.

Rempel, Roy. “Canada’s Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 17. No. 4 (2004): 634-654.

Renfer, Marc A. and Henriette S. Haas. “Systematic Analysis in Counterterrorism: Messages on an Islamist Internet-Forum.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 21. No. 2 (2008): 314-336.

Richards, Julian. “Intelligence Dilemma? Contemporary Counter-Terrorism in a Liberal Democracy.” *Intelligence and National Security* 27. No. 5 (2012): 761-780.

Robinson, Kirk Ward, and Christopher Eaton, eds. *Founding Character: The Words and Documents that Forged a Nation*. Los Angeles: Roan Alder, 2003.

Roach, Kent. *The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Roach, Kent. *September 11: Consequences for Canada*. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2003.

Rosen, Philip. *The Canadian Security Intelligence Service*. Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2000.

Rosen, Philip. *The Communications Security Establishment – Canada’s Most Secret Intelligence Service*. Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 1993.

Rosenau, William. ""Our Backs Are Against the Wall": The Black Liberation Army and Domestic Terrorism in 1970s America." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36. No. 2 (2013): 176-192.

Roussy, Daniel. "Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and the Courts: Canadian and International Experience." *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 2. No. 2 (2007): 62-80.

Rovner, Joshua. "Intelligence in the Twitter Age." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 26. No. 2 (2013): 260-271.

Rudner, Martin. "Canada's Communications Security Establishment, Signals Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism." *Intelligence and National Security* 22. No. 4 (2007): 473-490.

Rudner, Martin. "Canada's Communication's Security Establishment from Cold War to Globalization." *Intelligence and National Security* 16. No. 1 (2001): 97-128.

Rudner, Martin. "Challenge and Response: Canada's Intelligence Community and the War on Terrorism." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 11. No. 2 (2004): 17-39.

Rudner, Martin. "The Future of Canada's Defence Intelligence." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 15. No. 4 (2002): 540-564.

Rudner, Martin. "The Historical Evolution of Canada's Foreign Intelligence Capability: Cold War SIGINT Strategy and its Legacy." *Journal of Intelligence History* 6. No. 1 (2006): 67-83.

Rudner, Martin. "Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 17. No. 2 (2004): 193-230.

Rudner, Martin. "Using Financial Intelligence Against the Funding of Terrorism." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 19. No. 1 (2006): 32-58.

Sageman, Marc. *Leaderless Jihad.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2008.

Sageman, Marc. "The Next Generation of Terror." *Foreign Policy*. No. 165 (2008): 36-42.

Sageman, Marc. 'The Stagnation in Terrorism Research." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26. No. 4 (2014): 565-580.

Sallot, Jeff. *Nobody Said No: The Real Story of How the Mounties Always Get their Man*. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1979.

Sanchez, Sergio E. "Spider Web: Al-Qaeda's Link to the Intelligence Agencies of the Major Powers." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 28. No. 3 (2015): 428-448.

Scott, Len. "Sources and Methods in the Study of Intelligence: A British View." *Intelligence and National Security* 22. No. 2 (2007): 185-205.

Scott, Len and R. Gerald Hughes. “Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Change and Continuity or Crisis and Transformation?” *Intelligence and National Security* 24. No. 1 (2009): 6-25.

Shore, Jacques J.M. “Intelligence Review and Oversight in Post-9/11 Canada.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 19. No. 3 (2006): 456-479.

Shpiro, Shlomo. “The Media Strategies of Intelligence Services.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 14. No. 4 (2001): 485-502.

Sims, Jennifer. “Intelligence to Counter Terror: The Importance of All-Source Fusion.” *Intelligence and National Security* 22. No. 1 (2007): 38-56.

Soufan, Ali H. *The Black Banners: Inside the Hunt for Al Qaeda*. London: Penguin Books, 2011.

Steele, Robert David. “Crafting Intelligence in the Aftermath of Disaster.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 15. No. 2 (2002): 161-178.

Striegher, Jason-Leigh. “Early Detection of the Lone Wolf: Advancement of Counter-Terrorism Investigations with an Absence or Abundance of Information and Intelligence.” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 8. No. 1 (2013): 35-53.

Studeman, Martin W. “Strengthening the Shield: U.S. Homeland Security Intelligence.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 20. No. 2 (2007): 195-216.

Sullivan, John P. and James J. Wirtz. “Terrorism Early Warning and Counterterrorism Intelligence.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 21. No. 1 (2007): 13-25.

Svendsen, Adam D. M. “Developing International Intelligence Liaison Against Islamic State: Approaching “One for All and All for One”?” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 29. No. 2 (2016): 260-277.

Svendsen, Adam D.M. “Re-fashioning Risk: Comparing UK, US and Canadian Security and Intelligence Efforts Against Terrorism.” *Defence Studies* 1. No. 3 (2010): 307-335.

Svendsen, Adam D.M. “The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Change: Addressing US Domestic Counter-Terrorism Intelligence.” *Intelligence and National Security* 27. No. 3 (2010): 371-397.

Svendsen, Adam D. M. “The Globalization of Intelligence Since 9/11: The Optimization of Intelligence Liaison Arrangements.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 21. No. 4 (2008): 661-678.

Tetley, William. *The October Crisis: An Insider’s View*. Quebec: McGill-Queens University Press, 2007.

Torrance, Judy. *Public Violence in Canada, 1867-1982*. Kingston, ON: McGill-Queens University Press, 1986.

Treverton, Gregory F. “Terrorism, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Learning the Right Lessons.” *Intelligence and National Security* 18. No. 4 (2003): 121-140.

Valla, Edward J., and Gregory Comcowich. “Domestic Terrorism: Forgotten, But Not Gone.” In *Armed Groups: Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency*, edited by Jeffrey H. Norwitz, 173-188. Newport, RI: US Naval War College Press, 2008.

Vidino, Lorenzo. “Homegrown *Jihadist* Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32. No. 1 (2009): 1-17.

Vucetic, Srdjan. “American Images of Canada: Canadian Muslims in US Newspapers, 1999-2014.” *American Review of Canadian Studies* 46. No. 1: 16-32.

Wagner, Abraham. “Intelligence for Counter-Terrorism: Technology and Methods.” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 2. No. 2 (2007): 48-61.

Weller, Geoffrey R. “The Internal Modernization of Western Intelligence Agencies.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 14. No. 3 (2001): 299-322.

Wettering, Frederick L. “The Internet and the Spy Business.” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 14. No. 3 (2001): 342-365.

Whitaker, Reg. “Apprehended Insurrection? RCMP Intelligence and the October Crisis.” *Queen’s Quarterly* 100. No. 2 (1993): 383-406.

Whitaker, Reg. “Spies Who Might Have Been: Canada and the Myth of Cold War Counterintelligence.” *Intelligence and National Security* 12. No. 4 (1997): 25-43.

Whitaker, Reg, Gregory S. Kealey and Andrew Parnaby, *Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada from the Fenians to Fortress America*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.

Winterbotham, Emily, and Elizabeth Pearson. “Different Cities, Shared Stories.” *The RUSI Journal* 161. No. 5 (2016): 54-65.