

PhD Thesis

**Non-Traditional Security in
Contemporary Chinese
International Relations
Thought**

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Abstract¹

'Security' has been undergoing a process of re-conceptualisation since the Cold War. Realism's dominance meant that security concerned the survival of the nation-state in the face of military aggression. This clear-cut 'traditional security' has been contested since the 1970s, when 'non-traditional security' (NTS) covering non-military threats began to be discussed.

Security Studies now encompasses varying approaches and interpretations. The concept of security is evolving substantially, but the debate is mostly limited to Western voices. Yet NTS has sparked a lively discourse in the PRC.

The thesis establishes Chinese International Relations (IR) scholars' understanding of NTS, based on the close textual analysis of academic publications and on interviews conducted with authors and other IR-specialists in China. It enquires into what these scholars mean when discussing NTS, and whether their conceptions differ from the mainstream, mainly Western, IR discourse.

It then investigates the ten issues generally deemed NTS in the Chinese debate: culture and information security; terrorism and transnational crime; economic security and migration; energy and environmental security; and health and food security, analysing their conceptualisations, assigned importance, causes for variance within the debate, emerging political meanings and implications, and possible normative implications.

The study shows that the scholarly NTS debate in China is diverse, ranging from a more statist expansion of national security to non-military threats to a theoretically deeper discourse which embraces individual security. Although the debate encompasses political purposes of vindicating state securitisation and advocating state management, some scholars' arguments have normative

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implications of moving towards a people-centric view of security encouraging a change in global politics. The debate in China is still in flux, without universally accepted definitions, but a normative turn is evident which means that Chinese IR theory overall moves beyond descriptive theory.

The study contributes to the wider research by adding to our understanding of how China 'sees' the world, and to the debate on NTS by critically examining the Chinese thought vis-à-vis the mainstream literature.

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List of Abbreviations

CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CPG	Central People's Government, PRC
ERIDs	Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
IR	International Relations (discipline)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC
NOCs	National Oil Companies, PRC
NTS	Non-Traditional Security
SASS	Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
TS	Traditional Security

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Chapter One: Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to analyse and understand the conceptualisation of non-traditional security (NTS) of International Relations' scholars in the People's Republic of China today. It fills a gap in the literature on China, which is very thin in the discussion of Chinese IR scholarship in general and almost non-existent in the analysis of the PRC NTS debate in particular. This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the PRC debate is vibrant and may add to our general understanding of NTS. Secondly, given that China's rise is a defining development of the century, the thoughts and conceptualisations of PRC scholars on pressing non-military threats for China and the world and on how these threats should be dealt with have scholarly and political importance. By understanding what the scholars, who are both influenced by and have influence on PRC politics and the public debate, consider threats to security, how important they regard these threats to be, and what political and normative implications are contained in the debate, general trends of thinking about security, China, and the world in the PRC today will be mapped, enabling a better understanding of the PRC today and its political, societal, and foreign policy and IR theory directions in the future.

In the following, I introduce the thesis by first explaining the concepts of non-traditional security (NTS) and traditional security (TS). This is followed by a review of the literature, highlighting where the contribution of the thesis is situated. I then set out my research questions and research, and the methodology and methods I used to arrive at my conclusions.

Concepts: Traditional Security and Non-Traditional Security

Traditional and non-traditional security are vague concepts. 'Traditional' security is linked to the neorealist concept of 'national security' prevalent in the post-war USA. Criticism of its narrowness and military focus led to a widening and deepening of security studies (see Ullman, 1983; Tuchman Mathews, 1989). It was

‘broadened’ by investigating ‘non-military security threats’ including terrorism, nationalism, disease, ‘overpopulation’, environmental problems, ‘mass-refugee movements’, and ‘nuclear catastrophe’, and ‘deepened’ as scholars, politicians, and civil society began to regard individuals and groups as possible referent objects of security (Paris, 2001:97).

NTS is generally regarded as concerning non-military threats to the state and other referent objects (Collins, 2009:495). This vagueness makes NTS liable to become an umbrella-term for various issues: while environmental and health matters, transnational crime, migration and economic issues are generally acknowledged to be NTS-issues, terrorism, energy security, arms proliferation or humanitarian intervention are contested (see Collins, 2009:9; Terriff et al., 2006; Kurlantzick, 2007:68).

Increasing globalisation is a crucial empirical influence on the transformation of NTS-issues in this century. What happens in one country/region affects other states/regions and people more (quickly) than before, such as “9/11”, SARS, or the 2008 financial crisis. Chapter Two provides a deeper analysis of the conceptualisation of NTS in the globally dominant Western debate.

International Relations as a Discipline in China

International Relations (IR) in China developed only recently. While IR is not inherently Western, it is a Western-dominated discipline, with its theories drawing on Western historical experience, due to a Gramscian hegemony favouring Western thought (Acharya and Buzan, 2010:1f.,6). Non-Western IR-scholarship tends to limit itself to testing Western, mostly Anglo-Saxon, theories in non-Western settings (Acharya and Buzan, 2010:5). Yet thriving non-English IR-communities in Japan, Germany, and France render possible the existence of other IR-thinking absent from the English debate due to language-barriers (Acharya and Buzan, 2010:18f.).

Similarly, PRC IR is heavily influenced by Western IR and the notions of internationalness and sovereign equality were absent from traditional Chinese thought, whose civilised/barbarian

dichotomy echoed that of Ancient Greece (Qin, 2010:35ff.,45f.). Still, the collapse of the traditional Chinese worldview following the nineteenth-century Western onslaught meant that when China started to think about international relations, it did so in Western terms (Qin , 2010:37ff.).

As an academic discipline, IR outside of party/state institutions is generally seen to have started in the 1980s in connection with Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening-Up (Noesselt, 2010:52; Shambaugh and Wang, 1984:763; Song, 2001:63-65). Consequently, politicians and academics called for IR-theory 'with Chinese characteristics' with interpretations eclectically drawing on PRC foreign policy principles, Chinese history and Western theories, although most, and especially younger Western-trained Chinese scholars, saw such an endeavour as too political and unscientific, lacking universality (Ren, 2008:293; Song and Chan, 2000:16,20ff.).

While initially mainstream IR-theory (mostly realism) was rejected as bourgeois and useless, with mistranslations increasing misunderstanding, elements deemed potential influences for Chinese IR-theory, such as Confucian and Daoist pacifism, virtue and benevolence and Legalism's negative view of human nature, mirror those of idealism and realism in Western IR (Song and Chan, 2000:24,26f.). The debate over a theory with Chinese characteristics yielded to a search for a 'Chinese School of IR', terminologically possible given the existence of the 'English School' (see Ren, 2008:297). This search widens the disciplinary focus from Chinese foreign policy to international politics (Wang Jisi, 2002:10f.; Johnston, 2005:34; Song, 2001:68f.; Noesselt, 2010:16). Nevertheless, this endeavour seems less motivated by an urge to amend shortcomings of existing theories than by a parochial, non-universalist understanding of theory, and by prestige, with China as a major power and an ancient civilisation needing and deserving an indigenous theory (Ren, 2008; see Qin, 2010:26). Potential sources are traditional Chinese culture and philosophy including the Tianxia-天下 worldview and the Datong-大同 ideal, and China's

revolutionary and reformist history (Ren, 2008:299,304ff.; Qin, 2010:41-45; Zhao Tingyang, 2011:21-36). Despite a felt empirical need among academics and politicians to address questions related to China's global rise, there is also a scholarly desire to become knowledge-producers (Noesselt, 2010:16; Ren, 2008:293,298f.).

Operating in an authoritarian state, PRC IR is constrained in ways unknown to Western IR scholars. State control of IR-teaching continues and IR still serves politics: scholars' quest for adding Chinese concepts to the construction of new IR-models reflects a desire to induce incremental change of the theoretical foundations of international structures of interaction, despite China's official acceptance of the international system (Song and Chan, 2000:16,29ff.; Noesselt, 2010:17). Yet PRC IR is characterised by rivalling tendencies and creations of schools; there is 'no common central perspective of 'the' Chinese IR-scholars' (Noesselt, 2010:51).

The Literature on the Discipline of IR in China and the Chinese NTS-Discourse

The literature has progressed from regarding IR in China as merely following the party-line to recognising it as a non-monolithic discipline composed of different views and even politically dissenting voices (Callahan, 2011:3,249). In the most detailed synopsis of the development of the IR-discipline in China so far, Song and Chan classify Chinese IR-scholars as falling into three categories: researchers working in institutes connected to government agencies, focusing on policy-justifications and policy reports for the government; university researchers and professors working on theoretical and general international studies; and CASS- and provincial level academies of social science-researchers who do both (Song and Chan, 2000:16f.).

Chan (1999) and Noesselt (2010) provide the only two extensive Western analyses of IR-perceptions of Chinese academics so far. Chan attests a waning importance of the historically novel Marxism

in Chinese thinking and considers power and culture as more influential (Chan, 1999:xf.,48-53). Chan's assertion regarding PRC IR-scholars' need to vindicate the party-line and low academic standard due to limited interaction with Western academia should be less applicable now, after two leadership-transitions, with increasing Sino-Western academic interaction, and growing numbers of Western-trained PRC IR-scholars (Chan, 1999:89,162,168).

Noesselt regards IR-discourses in China on alternative world-order models as a way to understand Chinese foreign policy, noting the PRC's active attempts to influence foreign perceptions of China to demolish the China-threat theory, with successes including the adoption of 'peaceful rise' and 'harmonious world' in international discourse (Noesselt, 2010:17f.,311).

Although Chinese academics and politicians are looking for alternative world-order models, Noesselt argues that they shy away from creating a definitive alternative to the Western models as China shuns a Cold War-style ideological confrontation with the West (Noesselt, 2010:315f.). An integrative, universal theory is sought (Noesselt, 2010:316,330).

Noesselt sees a core question in current Chinese IR-debates as that surrounding the possibility of a peaceful change of the international system, based on the redistribution of power (Noesselt, 2010:315). This theme might present itself in the writings and thoughts on NTS. However, in contrast to my study, which is interested in the thoughts and concepts of a particular IR-issue, Noesselt is looking less at the content of the debates than at the dynamics within the IR-community (Noesselt, 2010:19,44). She employs Bourdieu's logic of the political field to look at power struggles between competing experts aimed at creating a theory which will then become the 'orthodox' model of explanation for the direction and analysis of the international system in the coming years (Noesselt, 2010:19). What Noesselt describes is a politicised IR-academia mostly aimed at aiding foreign policy (Noesselt,

2010:17). This starkly contrasts with the Western separation of IR-theory and politics (Acharya and Buzan, 2010:20).

Chinese IR research is very self-reflective, as the search for a Chinese IR theory above indicates. There are discussions of the NTS debate, such as by Zhang, Chen, and Biao (2013), or at the start of one of the major edited volumes on NTS by Zhao and Zhu, 2011. Yet, these analyses are written with the aim of mapping the discourse so far and criticising it for various shortcomings, mostly in terms of not being theoretical enough. Given that these articles and chapters are written by scholars within the debate in China, I treat them as part of the debate with vested, institutional interests of their own, rather than seeing them as an outsider's analysis of this particular discourse, as this thesis aims at.

Although NTS-research has flourished in the West and in China since the 1990s, the Chinese discourse has not been extensively researched. Craig's 2007 study on 'Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security' included academic views, but her focus was on the 'motives and decisions of China's leadership', and therefore differs from my study (Craig, 2007:vii). Breslin's 2015 article focuses on human security in the Chinese IR with the finding that this is still a very statist debate (Breslin, 2015: 243). The focus is therefore very different from that of this thesis, as Breslin's article is focused on a part of the security debate in China which deals with a concept created by the UN, with his aim being to find out whether the Chinese debate is changing in a more liberal direction (Breslin, 2015: 243). Breslin's findings are similar to those of Zhang 2007 and 2008, although he does also note a more liberal strand of researchers embracing Human Security (Breslin, 2015: 243). However, Breslin's treatment of NTS, which he suggests is a broadening of security towards non-military existential threats and at times the inclusion of individual security, lacks theoretical depth by failing to problematise the vague term NTS (Breslin, 2015:245). Moreover, he omits key works, such as Yu et al.'s textbook and Li Kaisheng's work on individual security, the latter of which would have changed his argument. In contrast,

my thesis analyses a much wider scope of the NTS debate in China to better understand this specific discourse in its own right. While human security is at times taken up in the Chinese debate, it is only a small fraction of the discussion, whereas the vague term NTS comprises a much larger debate and allows the scholars to fill it with their own thoughts and reasoning since – in contrast to the UN-defined term “human security” – NTS does not have a universally agreed upon definition.

Two chapters of the Chinese IR-discourse by Zhang Yongjin in 2007 and 2008 touch on NTS. While regarding the NTS-discourse as an important development in the Chinese foreign policy-discourse, he also notes that it is heavily politicised (Zhang, 2008:156). The criticism of IR in China as highly ideological and too tightly linked to politics is often made, but Callahan and Noesselt note that academic research and politics in Western centres of power are also connected (Callahan, 2001:79; Noesselt, 2010:327).

Rather than triggered by the mainstream NTS-debate or a reconsideration of security, Zhang suggests that the emergence of the academic NTS-discourse in China was prompted by real events – domestic and international crises – and the concurrent recognition in political circles of the diversification of China’s security interest (Zhang, 2007:176; Zhang, 2008:156,158). “9/11” is seen as a turning point, catalysing a redefinition of China’s NTS agenda, with separatism and terrorism regarded as the greatest NTS-challenges, evidenced in the 2002 Defence White Paper, the 2002 Declaration on Cooperation on NTS Issues of China and ASEAN and the pre-“9/11” 2001 SCO cooperation pledge to fight terrorism, separatism and extremism, the ‘three evil forces’ (Zhang, 2008:156). The 2003 SARS crisis finally firmly legitimated non-military threats’ placement on China’s security agenda (Zhang, 2008:157). As of 2008, the Chinese NTS-discourse had become more prominent as a distinct discourse as issues including drug trafficking, people smuggling and environmental degradation came

to be seen as security issues by policymakers and academics (Zhang, 2008:156f.).

Zhang's 2007 study finds that the Chinese security-discourse is too closely tied to politics - reflected in necessarily policy-relevant research, the political setting of parameters of IR-debates and of key analytical questions - for a 'critical turn' aimed at the empowerment of civil society and individuals (Zhang, 2007:167,177f.). The closeness of academia to politics and the contentment of Chinese scholars with the hegemony of realism and orthodox security studies render even seemingly "alternative" readings of security...discourses of, and for, the powerful' (Zhang, 2007:168,180). The NTS-discourse, for Zhang, is primarily a political project aimed at legitimating new security policies including regional cooperation, and complements China's quest for energy security, sustainable development, social stability and territorial integrity (Zhang, 2007:178; Zhang, 2008:157).

The TS-NTS dichotomy does not threaten TS's importance and assumptions, such as the centrality of military security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the intertwined character of threats allows them all to be enveloped in 'national security' (Zhang, 2008:157). This, and the absorption of human security into NTS, preserves the state's centrality as referent object and key actor (Zhang, 2008:157). The term 'NTS' can further legitimate concerns previously deemed traditional security issues such as secessionist movements and even Taiwan (Zhang, 2008:157f.). Indeed, NTS is regarded as less contentious than the concurrent Chinese discourse on multipolarity (Zhang, 2008:156).

Zhang's work is limited to fleeting descriptions of the general NTS-debate, and it is not clear why he regards the NTS-discourse as 'less contentious' than others. Despite discussing the Chinese NTS debate, he does not offer a detailed analysis of Chinese publications on NTS. Additionally, many more works have been written and published since 2007 and 2008, and the Chinese foreign policy debate has changed (see Shambaugh, 2011). As the review of the mainstream literature highlights in Chapter Two, it is

epistemologically and ontologically problematic to expand a statist security concept to include non-military issues and human security. Hence, I examine whether, and if so how, Chinese IR-scholars really attempt to do this throughout the thesis. Given the attested diversity of PRC IR, and given Zhang's own attestation of the vibrancy of the Chinese NTS-discourse, it is questionable whether not more is 'going on' in the debate than just politically expedient research. An in-depth analysis of the Chinese NTS-debate is needed, and my study provides it.

According to the forewords of the Blue Books of Non-Traditional Security, scholars, who are already producing a great volume of NTS research, regard - or are at least encouraged to do so by senior academics - NTS as a research field in which they can have real impact as they are in an advantageous/dominant position to research NTS phenomena (Wang Yizhou, 2012:002). This is evidently not due to institutional or theoretical advantages, but rather due to the sheer (geographical and population) size of China, which means that a wide variety of NTS issues are occurring there whereas - the argument would suggest - scholars based in other countries would be aware of certain NTS issues only through hearsay (Wang Yizhou, 2012:001). Nevertheless, scholars are also asked to increase quality and improve methodological shortcomings, and to create research which can be a 'common tool' used and judged by both Chinese and foreign researchers (Wang Yizhou, 2012:003; Wang Yizhou, 2013:002). This leads to two expectations. Firstly, methodological flaws in the texts under investigation are possible. Secondly, the scholars' attested self-awareness should also promise thought-provoking discussions on the definition of NTS in the Chinese literature.

Overall Political Context

The immediate political context of the PRC scholarly NTS debate is the regime's changing view of security since the end of the Cold War, which has increasingly expanded and includes both NTS and TS. Western security scholars live and work in wealthy states which enjoy a strong security alliance including today's sole

superpower. Conversely, the PRC scholars live in what is often considered a rising economic, political, and military power, ideologically and culturally different from the West, while also facing a completely different geopolitical situation. This different situation, and the PRC regime's reading of it, means that PRC foreign policy tended to be 'part of a search for security' (Nathan and Scobell, 2012:xv). The Cold War's end and the Soviet Union's dissolution meant that military threats to China diminished. Still, as the last major Leninist state which had just militarily suppressed its own democracy movement in the Tiananmen massacre, the PRC regime was internationally isolated and concerned about a Western plot to encourage democratisation ('peaceful evolution').

At the CCP's 16th Congress in 2002, Jiang Zemin officially incorporated NTS, by then a term already used in scholarly circles, into the regime's understanding of state security. In the same year, the PRC government set out its 'New Security Concept' in its 'Position Paper on the New Security Concept' (MFA, 31/07/2002). The paper follows Deng Xiaoping's idea of this being the Era of Peace and Development, supposing a popular rejection of the old, military security concept and arguing that a new security concept is necessary. Rather than the existing unilateral, weapons-based security, the new security concept is centred on cooperation based on common security of mutual benefit (MFA, 31/07/2002). The regime holds this move towards a new security concept as congruent with historical progress, since post-Cold War international relations focused on economics and hence security became 'a comprehensive concept' beyond a military and political focus to also embrace science and technology, culture, the environment, and the economy (MFA, 31/07/2002).

To gain security, the regime considers cooperation, pluralisation, and dialogue key (MFA, 31/07/2002). The regime considers moves towards new security concepts an international trend, arguing that increasingly many countries create security concepts based on the UN charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (MFA, 31/07/2002). Apart from signalling a friendlier foreign policy to

dispel the feared 'China threat theory', the emphasis on peace and cooperation also signalled the comparative weakness of China vis-à-vis the West.

NTS is part of this new security concept, which focuses also on fighting terrorism and transnational crime, which are seen as NTS, while also preventing invasion and protecting TS (MFA, 31/07/2002). China's New Security Concept focuses on cooperation, equality, and mutual benefit and trust (MFA, 31/07/2002). The regime argues that it is implementing the concept through 'peaceful negotiation' of border problems, supporting 'economic exchange and cooperation', promoting the construction of regional security dialogues, cooperation mechanisms including the SCO – which the regime sees as the successful realisation of the New Security Concept – and ASEAN – whose regional forum focused more on NTS issues post-"9/11" (MFA, 31/07/2002).

A key government document on NTS is the May 2002 'Position Paper on Strengthening NTS Field Cooperation', which argues that 'NTS issues are increasingly prominent' (MFA, May 2002). While reiterating the notion of the Era of Peace and Development, the Paper also highlights imbalanced global development, increasing wealth divides and increasing differences between the global North and South, and resource, religious, territorial, and ethnic problems (MFA, May 2002).

Regarding the "9/11" attacks as representative of increasingly severe NTS problems, including AIDS, illegal migration, drugs, information security, piracy, and environmental security, the Paper holds that NTS issues, considered predominantly transregional and transnational, increasingly impact on international and regional security as they affect the stability of all states (MFA, May 2002). The paper discusses China's management of NTS issues, highlighting its domestic actions 'adopting all sorts of measures' and capacity building and participating in international and regional cooperation (MFA, May 2002). The document then gives an insight into the PRC government's understanding of NTS as 'very complicated' issues which are caused by, for example, political,

ethnic, religious, and economic contradictions, as well as social inequality, including development gaps and poverty (MFA, May 2002).

Given the emphasis on transnational NTS issues, the regime stresses the protection of regional security. The PRC government notes several elements important for NTS cooperation which clearly waver between a desire to manage transnational NTS issues and ensuring China's (and other states') sovereignty (MFA, May 2002). The Paper argues that 'transnational problems require transnational cooperation', including 'comprehensive use of political, economic, diplomatic, legal, science and technology measures', emphasising prevention and the establishment of a 'fair [and] reasonable international new order', and that 'NTS issues and TS issues are mutually interwoven, mutually transforming' with solving TS problems promoting NTS (MFA, May 2002). However, the Paper, echoing the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, also affirms that sovereignty and mutual non-interference must be respected within NTS cooperation (MFA, May 2002).

Comprehensive national power (CNP) (*zonghe guoli*-综合国力) is a concept in use in the PRC since the 1980s to rank the power of different states, including 'the combined overall conditions and strengths of a country in numerous areas' (Pillsbury, 2000). Whereas the key element during the Cold War was military might, after the Cold War strength is measured more in science, technology, and economics as this is influential in the world now (Pillsbury, 2000). CNP is 'the aggregate' of, for example, natural resources, territory, economic and military might, foreign policy and influence, social issues, and government at home (Pillsbury, 2000, referring to Deng Xiaoping quoted in Huang Shuofeng, On CNP, 1992).

The vague 2015 National Security Law continues to embrace NTS as a major issue area, stating that 'state security work should plan internal security and external security as a whole, the country's territorial security and citizens' security, traditional security and non-traditional security, and its own security and common security'

(gov.cn, 01/07/2015). The law evidently merges the state, regime, and people together with the clear aim of preserving the CCP's position and its understanding of the interests of China and its people (gov.cn, 01/07/2015). National security for that law means that the following are not internally or externally threatened: the state's territorial integrity, sovereignty, unity, and regime, as well as its sustainable social and economic development, popular welfare, and 'other major interests' (gov.cn, 01/07/2015).

The second section of the law deals with protecting national security and items 19-34 concern issues that the NTS scholars identify as NTS: the economy, finance, energy resources, food security (supply and quality), culture, cyber and information security, minorities, religion, including evil cults, terrorism and extremism, societal contradictions, ecological environment, nuclear energy, outer space and international waters, overseas Chinese citizens, economic and social development interests (gov.cn, 01/07/2015). The law and its focus on NTS are clearly meant to preserve CCP supremacy, emphasised in the new law's general principles. The new law merges the CCP regime, the economy, the Chinese people, and culture into one monolithic 'China'. It defines national security much wider than before, affecting almost all areas of public life, while the law's unclearness means that strikes, minorities demanding more rights, or religious meetings can be national security threats and persecuted, and academic freedom may be further restricted (F.A.Z, 02/07/2015; F.A.Z., 13/07/2015). As the law is so wide, all-encompassing and unclear as to what constitutes a threat and why, and since it effectively regards all those not actively working towards its notion of national security as potential traitors, all those not agreeing with this version of 'China' are effectively excluded from belonging to the state, its people, and culture.

Research Questions and Contribution to the Literature

This doctoral thesis investigates the concept of NTS in Chinese IR-thinking today. My research seeks to establish the understanding

of NTS of mainland Chinese IR scholars. It attempts to answer the following research questions:

- 1) How do Chinese International Relations scholars conceptualise Non-Traditional Security and how do they evaluate its significance?
- 2) What accounts for the variance in how Chinese scholars conceptualise NTS and assess its significance?
- 3) What are the political implications of the emergence of NTS scholarship in China: what political meanings and political purposes does this scholarship reveal and seek to attain?
- 4) What are the normative implications that emerge from an analysis of Chinese NTS theory: is there evidence of a normative turn in Chinese IR scholarship and what does this tell us about the development of Chinese International Relations theory overall?

The research questions are directly tested against the evidence provided from the literature and the interviews in chapters Three to Eight. Chapter Three investigates the overall conceptualisation of NTS by the PRC scholars. Chapters Four to Eight test the research questions against the issues the debate considers most important: culture and information security, terrorism and transnational crime, economic security and migration, health and food security, and environmental and energy security. The outcome of this evaluation is summarised at the end of each chapter. Chapter Nine draws these evaluations and discussions together.

My study's contribution lies in the critical evaluation of the Chinese part of a global debate on a novel understanding and re-evaluation of security. The thesis produces new knowledge by drawing on insights from over 30 interviews with leading PRC NTS scholars. This adds to the literature on the evolution and current state of Chinese IR by looking in-depth at one particular discourse. Additionally, studying one of the major debates on Chinese IR with a strong policy connection grants insights into the background for PRC policy development on NTS. By comparing the Chinese scholarly view – or rather views – on NTS to the mainstream debate, a deeper understanding of what 'security' entails is created. The study's contribution lies not in finding a definite understanding or

conception of security. Instead, by adding the Chinese views to the debate, the meaning of security gains even more complexity, and a further understanding of the many ways in which security can be seen and constructed is advanced.

Methodology

The thesis is based on textual analysis of primary sources, namely scholarly publications, and interviews with the authors. Since my study endeavours to comprehend the thought of Chinese thinkers and focuses on a few individuals' understanding of the world, the research takes a qualitative approach.

I investigated Chinese academic publications on NTS, mainly monographs, edited books, and journal articles and conducted interviews with PRC NTS scholars. For this, I used analysis based on that employed in the History of Political Thought. As the purpose is to understand Chinese scholars' views as expressed in their writing and speech, I conducted close textual analysis of the texts and interviews to comprehend what is being said and how it is being said, the chain of reasoning, and the argument's logic. This provided an overall understanding of what the scholars appear to be saying through their speech and texts and where their expressed views do and do not fit into the mainstream literature.

My interpretation of the scholars' communication through the interviews and their texts on NTS is one among a variety of possible interpretations. While I have been careful to present a detailed and logical interpretation of the interviews and texts, the claim that there can be a definitive, universally accepted and applicable interpretation must be rejected, since interpretation starts once the researcher paraphrases the material (Skinner, 2002:16). All interpretation, perhaps especially in political thought and philosophy, reflects the various interests of the researcher in the text and can never be 'normatively neutral or value free' (Ball, 1995:9f.; Edwards and Townshend, 2002:46). Rivalling interpretations are what constitutes political theory (Ball, 1995:22). Yet to fully grasp the meaning of the communication, something

apart from close textual analysis must be performed. Firstly, the author's intentions in writing and the context of the text's creation must be examined, and secondly, the reception of the text analysed.

The History of Political Thought approach follows mostly that advanced by Skinner and the so-called Cambridge School. Skinner focuses on authorial intentions in writing and on the contextualisation of the text. I supplement this approach with Ball's focus on the readers' reception of a text. These two approaches combined help gain understanding of the meaning of the communication in the interviews and texts by inquiring into what the interviewee and author intended to say about NTS and what this communication means to the readers. The methodology is based on the following principles:

Meaning

As a text in political thought is an intended item of communication, its meaning is discoverable (Skinner, 2002:86). In writing (and speaking), the author of a political text (and interviewee during an interview) is bound to two 'desiderata', those of 'intelligibility and legitimacy' to persuade the relevant audience to accept the argument, as failure to consider the 'audience's standards' risks that the writer's action is regarded illegitimate and unintelligible (Ball, 1995:18). The 'audience's standards' here are the general Chinese worldview and official rhetoric. Regarding the interviews, I as a Western, junior researcher, was the audience. It is irrelevant for Skinner whether what the authors of the texts say and believe is 'true'; what is important is whether it is rational for them to say what they are saying, based on their circumstances and logical coherence of their argument, which shows that their beliefs came about through an 'accredited process of reasoning' (Skinner, 2002:28f.,31).

Authorial Intentions

Analysing a piece of communication in political thought cannot be limited to the dictionary 'meaning' of the words as using words is an intended, in this case political, action (Skinner, 2002:2). The

uses of the words and the functions they can perform in various language games, in relation to other words and to wider belief-networks are to be studied (Skinner, 2002:2,4). Skinner advocates 'to see things their way', i.e., trying to understand what the authors attempted to do in writing (Skinner, 2002:3).

Skinner compares political thought to a battlefield with different actors using language to have their argument recognised and made legitimate (Skinner, 2002:6f.). While language serves as a constraint on agency and shapes humans as a form of social power, as a resource it allows agents to 'shape' their world (Skinner, 2002:6f.). Language is not rigid; political authors may, to serve their argument, change language and meanings (Ball, 1995:19).

The inquiry into intentions starts by looking at what could conventionally have been performed in terms of communication at the time through the given utterance (Skinner, 2002:87). Comprehending the social context including contemporary notions of rationality is vital to prevent considering utterances irrational and incoherent where the immediate audience would not have (Skinner, 2002:38). Skinner therefore advocates to start by taking everything, even if it appears 'bizarre', as much as possible and to make the agents accept these 'bizarre' beliefs appear 'as rational as possible' by providing the intellectual context of the utterance supporting the belief (Skinner, 2002:40f.).

To understand thinkers, the researcher should understand their concepts, distinctions, and 'chains of reasoning' used for comprehending their world (Skinner, 2002:47). One must not place into the mouth of thinkers concepts they could not have expressed, while conversely, often terms from another language cannot be translated due to lacking counterparts (Skinner, 2002:46,49). Interviewing PRC NTS scholars and reading and analysing multiple Chinese NTS texts helped me comprehend these concepts and the linguistic possibilities and constraints faced by contemporary Chinese scholars when discussing NTS, as well as recognise utterances breaking out of the linguistic conventions thus established.

Contextualisation

The 'ultimate framework' for establishing 'what conventionally recognizable meanings' a writer could have intended to communicate is the social context of the text's creation (Skinner, 2002:87). Intention and context of an utterance are crucial for its meaning, for texts or statements are not created in a vacuum, but embody specific times and address specific problems (Skinner, 2002:88).

I have contextualised the individual Chinese NTS texts within the study in terms of their placement and comparison to mainstream NTS-debates and the other Chinese texts studied, and by elaborating the socio-political context. I do not compare the meaning and reception of the PRC and Western debate, since the contextualisation and comparison of the two debates serves the purpose of establishing the meaning of the Chinese debate. Regarding reception, this solely concerns the Chinese debate.

Examining various Chinese interviews and texts on NTS brings the advantage of establishing the linguistic conventions of writing and speaking about NTS in China today. Not only do my interviews add new knowledge to the thesis, but they further enhanced my comprehension of the context of the creation of the text. Both allowed me to increase my understanding of what, given the linguistic possibilities and conventions, Chinese authors are and are not able to do in writing about NTS, forestalling the danger of comparing the text too closely linguistically with the non-Chinese texts while illuminating the intended audience's probable understanding of the text (see Edwards and Townshend, 2002:5).

Reception

While the author's intention in writing and the text's contextualisation are important for comprehension, readers' reactions are also significant in assessing meaning. Once written, a text is not static and unchanging, but constitutes a communication the reader receives, and its meaning is partially the result of a 'negotiation' between author and reader (Ball, 1995:14).

For my research of the PRC NTS concept, I have employed authorial intent, contextualisation, and the reception-approach simultaneously to gain the most holistic picture of the Chinese scholarly view on NTS. I have endeavoured to, when possible and appropriate, place a text within both composition and reception context (Ball, 1995:31f.). The reception of publications in this thesis refers to the reception of a specific work by the author's peer community which constitutes the readers within the debate.

Data Collection

The publications investigated are in the public domain, rendering them openly accessible, and gatekeeper authorisation unnecessary. The publications this thesis investigates are by Chinese IR scholars working on NTS. I selected the publications based on their importance in the Chinese debate. I established this by searching online bookshops (including amazon.cn, chinabooks.com, Xinhua.cn) using the search term 'non-traditional security/feichuantong anquan/非传统安全', which gave an initial idea of the books in circulation, and which, due to their availability, were generally considered important or sought after. I used the same search term with the online library catalogues of major PRC universities, including Peking University, Fudan, Tsinghua, Zhejiang University, and Renmin University, and made a list of all the publications listed in these shops and libraries, noting which publications were held by which libraries and the related importance and relevance. I considered the ones that all libraries held as the most important. Within these publications, I checked which other works on NTS were referred to and which authors were talked about and how, further adding to my understanding of the relationship and importance of the individual publications and authors in the PRC debate. I also consulted more general works such as PRC IR and security textbooks by established IR-scholars like Yan Xuetong and noted whom they cited.

Regarding journal articles, I used cnki.cn, google.com, and baidu.cn using again 'feichuantong anquan-非传统安全'. This search term engenders thousands of results. I filtered these by

looking at renowned journals, including *World Economics and Politics* (世界经济与政治) or *Journal of International Security Studies* (国际安全研究), author affiliation and background. I did the same with specific sub-categories of NTS, such as food or economic security, using these terms on their own or together with 'NTS' as the search terms. Another major source for NTS articles is the sole specific PRC NTS journal, Zhejiang University's 'Non-traditional Security Research-非传统安全研究', which has three volumes to date.

The result of my book searches was the following. The first book published in China on NTS is the 2003 *On Non-traditional Security* (feichuantong anquan lun-非传统安全论), edited by Lu Zhongwei and published by University of International Relations (guojiguanxi xueyuan- 国际关系学院), a research institute affiliated to the Ministry of State Security, and thus not considered a scholarly publication in this thesis, but taken to represent the semi-official discourse. In 2006, Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe, and Wang Jiangli, members of Zhejiang University's NTS Research Centre, published the first university textbook on NTS, *Introduction to NTS* (feichuantong anquan gailun- 非传统安全概论), signalling the institutionalisation of NTS in PRC universities. Zha Daojiong, then at Renmin and now at Peking University, edited a 2007 book on *Views from China: NTS* (zhongguo xuezhe kan shijie: feichuantong anquan juan- 中国学者看世界: 非传统安全卷), including essays on various NTS problems by both leading and more specialist scholars. This is followed by Fu Yong's 2007 *NTS and China* (feichuantong anquan yu zhongguo 非传统安全与中国). Zhejiang University's NTS Centre by now is the heart of publication activities on NTS in China, publishing two book series on NTS, 'NTS and China' and 'NTS Capacity Building', the latter practice-oriented. Both series are edited by Yu Xiaofeng, the head of the centre, and the individual books are written by experts on particular issues, not necessarily IR experts. Nevertheless, given that these non-IR scholars are evidently accepted in the Chinese NTS debate, I

include them in this study. Yu Xiaofeng further edits the annual, more policy-oriented 'Blue Books on Non-Traditional Security' (so far 2011-2015), assembling experts from various fields to report on different issues of NTS. Wang Yizhou's (previously CASS, now Peking University) editorship of *World Economics and Politics* (世界经济与政治) in the early 2000s is also regarded as opening the doors to NTS articles in China.

Interviews

My fieldwork took place in China between 15 February and 26 April 2014. During the first six weeks, I interviewed scholars in Shanghai and Hangzhou. In April, I interviewed scholars in Beijing. In total, I interviewed 33 scholars, granting me crucial insights into their research and into the Chinese NTS debate. While I tailored my interview questions to the specific publications of the authors, the general outline and questions of my interviews were the same. The questions covered the conceptualisation of NTS, and also issues of the context of creation, including why the author then worked on NTS, who the intended audience was/is, how/whether their own views have changed since publication, how they see the Chinese debate evolve and whom they regard as key figures in the debate. I have attached a general question list in the Appendix.

Ethics

I obtained ethics clearing before my fieldwork.

Although the topic of NTS in Chinese IR-thought is not highly sensitive, since researching politics in China entails special ethical considerations, I paid the utmost attention to ethical concerns to protect the rights and welfare of everyone involved in the research (Carlson et al., 2010:7; Tsai, 2010: 246,250). Prior to the interviews, I informed the interviewees about both their content and my research, and sought their written or oral consent, depending on their preference (see Silverman, 2010:163,169). I explained the nature of my research to my interviewees, gave them the plain language statement to read and talked about it with them before the interviews started. All of my interviewees gave me their oral

consent to the interview. Most of the interviewees accepted being recorded but some preferred to not be recorded and I complied with their wishes.

In order to protect the anonymity of my interviewees, I have assigned them individual code names. These code names hide the interviewees' identities while also showing some of their specific traits in order to differentiate between the various interviewees and their responses and to aid analysis. I differentiate between University affiliated scholars (U for university) and those affiliated to other research institutes (O for other), including social science academies or think tanks, and between Beijing-based scholars (B) and non-Beijing based scholars (NB). The individual code names look as follows: UB7 would be a scholar working at a university in Beijing, while ONB8 a scholar at a non-Beijing research institute. The numbers are randomly assigned.

Throughout the thesis, I am treating all interviewees anonymously. This is because while the scholars were happy to be interviewed in 2014 and talked about a variety of issues ranging from the (then) more politically sensitive to the less sensitive, the political situation in China may change, rendering the publication of the names and responses of my interviewees possibly harmful to them.

NTS Issues Investigated

The scholarly PRC NTS debate contains a plethora of NTS issues, as highlighted by Wang Yizhou, noting that the first volume 'On NTS' counted 17 issues, and the first NTS conference in China by CASS contained thirty types of NTS issues (Wang, 2008:193f.). This thesis focuses on ten issues, which are those appearing most frequently in the literature and were most frequently named by my interviewees. During my interviews, I specifically asked which issues the interviewees thought were NTS issues. Depending on the interviewee, I gave them a list of issues often seen in the NTS literature in China asking them whether they considered them NTS.

Chapter Outline

Chapter Two investigates the globally dominant, Western and mostly English, debate on NTS, setting the scene for the Chinese debate. It also elaborates my working definition of NTS, based on the various NTS definitions offered by the globally dominant discourse, creating the reference frame for the PRC debate and the analysis thereof.

Chapter Three analyses the definition of NTS in the scholarly PRC debate. Addressing the research questions for the overall debate of NTS, the chapter examines how Chinese IR scholars define and conceptualise NTS, the assigned importance, the reasons for variance, and the political meaning and purpose of the debate, and possible normative implications. Differences and similarities to the globally dominant discourse are set out.

Chapters Four to Eight study specific NTS issues in the PRC debate. All chapters set out the PRC context for the issues and investigate the specific debates according to my research questions of conceptualisation and importance, variance, political meaning and purpose, and possible normative implications. Chapter Four enquires into culture security and information security, Chapter Five into terrorism and transnational crime, Chapter Six into economic security and migration, Chapter Seven into health and food security, and Chapter Eight into energy security and environment security. The pairings of issues of the individual chapters reflects their complementarity.

Chapter Nine draws on the different analyses throughout the thesis to offer a final analysis of the meaning and implication of the NTS debate in contemporary PRC IR thought. It elaborates on the knowledge gained about the PRC NTS discourse through this study. It shows that the PRC debate, rather than being monolithic and inherently statist, is diverse and fluid. While some scholars in the debate indeed seek to merely expand the field of security issues for national security, others move away from the state to highlight the importance of people and individuals both as referent

objects and actors to manage NTS problems, and some scholars even suggest a holistic view of security, or a positive view of security which overcomes previous historical enmity through NTS cooperation. The debate clearly contains political purposes which are sometimes aligned with CCP policy. Nonetheless, more insightful and critical parts of the debate also evidence a normative turn advocating that the status quo should be improved to resemble a more advantageous type of existence. These normative turns tend to go beyond CCP objectives and can even oppose them, indicating that parts of Chinese IR theory are moving towards theory-creation and away from being a mostly descriptive guide to reality.

The study thus contributes to the wider debate by showing that thinking about non-military threats in China is highly diverse, enabling both a larger and more powerful state, and more involvement and appreciation of society and the individual. The scholarly NTS debate in China further shows how different scholars see China's position in the world. Whereas scholars who are more marginally involved in the debate are more conservative, calling for a better global system favouring China and developing states, others display a worldview of China and the West constituting a 'civilised' world either vis-à-vis a dangerous 'rest' or without any reference to the non-Chinese, non-Western people and states.

Chapter Two: NTS in the 'Western' Discourse and Framework of Analysis

This chapter provides a frame of reference for the scholarly PRC NTS debate and constructs the analytical framework for the thesis. It discusses the globally dominant debate – mostly Anglo-Saxon scholarship – since the key to properly understanding the Chinese debate is to comprehend the globally dominant debate in light of which the debate in China is developing in various stages of self-awareness.

The chapter problematises both NTS and thinking about security, which is what the Chinese IR scholars looked at in the thesis engage in. Considering security, and especially the broadening and deepening of security, is not a straightforward exercise but entails serious ontological, epistemological and normative considerations which may or may not have been realised by the scholars and which concern what security is and whose security is to be protected.

In the absence of a universally agreed definition of NTS, I supply my own definition based on the discussion of NTS in the globally dominant debate. My definition acts as the framework for analysis in the study of the concept of NTS in the PRC IR debate in this thesis.

This chapter first discusses the concept of security itself, noting that the concept is complex and has been interpreted as a positive and a negative concept, as an objective reality and as a subjective construct. I then contrast the traditional, neorealist security concept, characterised by militarism and state-centrism, dominant in the Cold War when International Security Studies became a discipline in its own right, to non-traditional approaches seeking to broaden and deepen security to include non-military NTS issues and non-state referent objects. From this, my working definition of NTS is drawn to be used as the framework for analysis.

Security: A Contested Concept?

Security is a concept strongly debated in the academic discipline of IR and indeed has its own subfield, International Security Studies (ISS). Although a term in constant academic, political, and everyday use, the meaning of the term security is subject to debate. Participants in the debate approach the topic from various and often mutually exclusive angles, displaying different ontological and epistemological positions.

Orthodox security studies, dominant during the Cold War and still very influential today, have a persuasively simple neorealist understanding of security. Neorealism is a positivist theory: the state is both the chief actor and referent object of security. Acting in an anarchical self-help system, the state seeks to protect its own survival against the aggression of other states. From this springs the security-dilemma: as states try to protect themselves through armament, other states feel threatened and arm in turn, rendering both states (and others) increasingly insecure. Security becomes a zero-sum game as states arm against each other. Security in orthodox security studies is national security and international relations are really inter-state relations. While argument is persuasive as states are undoubtedly the most important international actors today and as war is generally considered a threat to security, its simplistic elegance fails to account for different ideas of insecurity. Insecurities of individuals or groups within a state are silenced. Orthodox security studies could argue that a state enjoys security while civil war, state-sanctioned mass-murder, famine, or environmental disasters rage within.

Cold War Security Studies was a problem-solving exercise (Booth 2007:47f.,242f.). Its positivist epistemology holding that an objective reality could be understood by scientific enquiry, the discipline during the Cold War considered its purpose to be to *explain* the world (Smith, 2000:73f.77). Conversely, non-orthodox approaches arising in opposition to Cold War security studies intend to *understand* the world (Booth, 2007:47f.,242f.). As the dominance of neorealism, military security, and statism wanes,

Security Studies may look equally at poverty related deaths and war related deaths (Smith, 2000:73f.,77).

In contrast to neorealism, security can be conceived as not an external material reality but as socially constructed. The 'Copenhagen School' of Buzan, Waever and de Wilde adopts a constructivist stance and enquires into how issues come to be seen as security issues. Buzan et al. look at 'securitisation' to understand security today. Buzan et al.'s is a constructivist approach; it is the social act of 'securitisation' that creates security issues (Buzan et al., 1998:204). This security-construction occurs through political 'speech acts' and the acceptance of a relevant audience which then allows 'extraordinary defensive moves' (Buzan et al., 1998:204,211). Buzan et al. emphasise that securitisation is a deliberate act, instead of security issues being objective facts (Buzan et al., 1998:211). Buzan et al. are wary of 'security', favouring desecuritisation (Buzan et al., 1998:29). Judging the correctness of individual cases of securitisation is difficult as securitisation is 'an...intersubjective process' and since there is no 'objective measure of security' (Buzan et al., 1998:30). Attempting to define 'real security' abstractly is therefore unhelpful since security, as part of politics, is intersubjective (Buzan et al., 1998:31, referring to Arendt 1958, 1959; Waever 1990; Huysmans 1996).

Contrariwise, a poststructuralist approach to security looks into the different meanings of security. To understand the meaning of security, a genealogical approach can be adopted revealing contradictory meanings of the term throughout history. Der Derian questions the current understanding of security arguing that we follow an inherited '*ontotheology* of security', i.e. 'an *a priori* argument' which supports a single type of security which is supported by a ubiquitous and 'metaphysical belief' (Der Derian, 1995:25). Noting the post-Cold War fear of insecurity of policy-makers, and the orthodox Security Studies' wariness of broadening, Der Derian asks to reconsider security beyond an insecure 'desire

for mastery' and to recognise 'the world as it is' (Der Derian, 1995:25f.).

Der Derian's genealogy of security demonstrates that it historically denoted both protection, safety, and freedom from danger, which is the meaning that remained in modern great power diplomacy, but also a faulty trust in 'one's position', and 'a pledge, a bond, a surety' (Der Derian, 1995:26). The state of nature in Hobbes' Leviathan then becomes 'the ontotheological foundations of an epistemic realism' for which sovereignty-based order and security is a necessity to avoid the evil chaos of natural anarchy, rendering its understanding of security metaphysical (Der Derian, 1995:30). Yet, for Der Derian, the state of nature and 'a purely "self-interested man"' are fictitious; instead, humans seek solidarity for security (Der Derian, 1995:30).

Der Derian advocates what he considers Nietzsche's embrace of insecurity as security would be a sovereignty- and reason-based intolerance of difference and otherness eradicating 'ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox – all that makes a free life worthwhile' (Der Derian, 1995:33,36). In the early post-Cold War era, then, Der Derian recommends to follow Nietzsche to embrace disconcerting difference and insecurity (Der Derian, 1995:42). Following the idea of security being a negative value as it means false confidence and a belief in something that seems unachievable, Der Derian supports the recognition of insecurity as a human condition.

While Der Derian explores interesting questions about the different senses of security, his ultimate embrace of insecurity is marred as he actually only discusses the thoughts and situations of a minority of humankind, that of Western educated, well to-do, and privileged men for whom physical insecurity was and is less immediate than for their female peers or non-Western people (see Booth, 2007:178). As Booth criticises, this is an 'indulgence [of]...the secure to think about celebrating insecurity' (Booth, 2007:178).

Contrarily, critical approaches seek a radical redefinition of security based on the emancipation of humans. Critical theory, in contrast

to 'problem-solving theory' such as orthodox security studies, does not merely replicate society, but is politically and analytically oriented towards change (Booth, 2007:48). Booth, arguing from a perspective of 'emancipatory realism', seeks to create 'a critical theory of security' to remove world security from its self-other differentiating 'nationalist and statist orthodoxies' and towards an understanding of reciprocal security (Booth, 2007:xii,2). Rather than being content with the realist equation of survival and security, Booth argues that 'security implies *survival plus*' (Booth, 2007:39). Booth demands more of security than other theories do (see Booth, 2007:107).

For Booth, security and insecurity exist in material reality and can be defined based on the views and experiences of people enduring insecurity (Booth, 2007:98). Booth's theorising strongly contrasts with the Copenhagen School as it is very action-oriented and avowedly normative; for him, security can and should be achieved (see Booth, 2007:99).

Against Buzan's contention that security is 'essentially contested', Booth argues that the fundamentals of security are not contested whereas the various political theories which create 'layers of meaning' are contested (Booth, 2007:100).

An important issue for the understanding of security is the referent object, that which is to be protected. For Buzan et al., security discourses can be studied to understand which referent objects are concerned, and the outcome of this discourse show which referent objects is seen to have legitimacy enough to garner support to when it is said to be threatened (Buzan et al., 1998:39).

Booth holds that the definition of security as 'the absence of threats' implies a referent object who or which is threatened, existing or threatening danger, and a wish to avoid harm (Booth, 2007:100). The complexity of security is due to its political layers which entail the questions on the possible referent object, the prioritisation of military or other threats, ways of avoiding threats (Booth, 2007:100f.). Security, therefore is 'an instrumental value', it is

relative and “for someone and for some purpose” (Booth, 2007:107f., referring to Robert Cox). According to Booth, defining security is not difficult; participating in ‘the politics of its meaning’ is (Booth, 2007:107f.). For Booth, this is the redefinition of security in cosmopolitan terms based on Enlightenment values, solidarity and equality (Booth, 2007).

Given these debates over security, Steve Smith, reviewing two decades of debate within ISS, argues that ‘security is now genuinely a contested concept’ (Smith, 2000:96). However, while the underlying assumptions of ISS have importantly been questioned, ISS is still very statist and military-focused (Smith, 2000:96). The difference between traditional Security Studies and the new thinking is the novel questioning of the referent object, the different meanings of security, and the way to achieve it (Smith, 2000:97). The difference between TS and NTS approaches lies in their understanding of the referent object of security, the management of security threats, and the conceptualisation of security.

Security is not only an extremely complex concept, but it also entails vastly different ontological and epistemological positions. This renders different schools of thought and different arguments completely incompatible since they are actually looking at a different reality when talking about ‘security’.

Traditional Security and Non-Traditional Security

Cold War (Anglo-Saxon) neorealist orthodoxy was challenged by Peace Research and notions such as structural violence, which promoted a normative agenda and a change of view away from war to everyday insecurity of people, including the marginalised in the global South. The challenge to neorealist dominance became more effective towards the 1970s and 1980s, when a broadening of security was advocated without questioning the referent object (the state) and the importance of national security. Instead of limiting the study of security to war, the broadeners contested that security was not just about weapons.

One of the first threats to strategic studies' narrow focus on military national security was Ullman's 1983 article 'Redefining Security' questioning the prevalent idea that national security was endangered only by external, military threats (Ullman, 1983:131ff.). For Ullman, a definition of national security in mostly military language distorts reality (Ullman, 1983:129). This is 'misleading and dangerous', as it leads states to overlook possibly greater dangers in favour of military threats, reducing states' 'total security' and contributing militarised international relations which heighten 'global insecurity' (Ullman, 1983:129). The non-military dimension of security is, however, hard to measure (Ullman, 1983:151f.).

Similarly, Tuchman Mathews promoted a broadening of (US) national security, arguing that following the inclusion of international economics into national security in the 1970s, 'global developments' necessitated a wider national security concept encompassing demographics, the environment, and resources, as environmental trans-border issues started to dismantle national sovereignty boundaries which had already been permeated by finance, information, and communication flows (Tuchman Mathews, 1989:162).

As Krause and Williams point out, early widening attempts such as Ullman's and Mathews's faced the problem that contemporary national security was a neorealist construction, which, arguing that it followed scientific standards, held the primacy of states – seen as rational actors – and the inter-state use of force, to be objective facts (Krause and Williams, 1996:232ff.). Hence, as Krause and Williams highlight, Tuchman Mathews problematically called for a redefinition of national security as the reality of the world had changed, thus accepting the neorealist view of security as ultimately objective threats and referent objects (Krause and Williams, 1996:233).

That non-military issues such as environmental degradation could threaten state security would be incoherent with neorealism's epistemological claims (Krause and Williams, 1996:233). The

problem of seeing security as concerned with objective facts is that 'each side appeals to "security" as something with an objective referent and source without acknowledging that its position rests on prior commitments that are rarely discussed' (Krause and Williams, 1996:234).

Supporters of the neorealist paradigm rejected endeavours to broaden security, ostensibly fearing for the coherence of the discipline. Paris' wariness of the term human security as meaning nothing if it means everything reflects neo-realist parsimony (Paris, 2001:93). This scholarly parsimony shows that even in liberal democracies, state-centrism and support for and focus on those invested with political and social power is frequent and eschews the very notion on which liberal democracy is built: the protection and liberty of all individuals.

Given the various and differing understandings of 'security' analysed in the above section, the broadeners and deepeners also developed into different schools.

Although NTS is widely talked about in both politics and academia, the literature has not yet constructed a clear, generally accepted definition. While NTS is terminologically juxtaposed to TS, its negative prefix merely denotes what it is not, instead of shedding light on what it is. Crucially, the term non-traditional security is not only vague, but is rarely used outside of textbooks, although the above definition holds true for issues discussed under different labels. Roland Paris argues that human security, a concept whose vagueness he deplores, could be 'a label' for a variety of security studies research focussed on non-military threats to individuals and groups of people, as opposed to traditional security studies approaches looking at the protection of states against foreign threats (Paris, 2001:87-102).

Walt's famous ISS definition of security studies mostly focusing on 'the phenomenon of war', made in opposition to the endeavours to broaden security, is a definition of traditional ISS (Walt, 1991:212). Since, for Walt, security studies considers inter-state conflict as

always possible, and the employment of military force as having had strong impact on societies and states, ISS is 'the study of the threat, use, and control of military force' (Walt, 1991, referring to Bull, 1968; Martin, 1980; Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988). ISS, for Walt, inquire into the circumstances that facilitate the use of force, the impact of the use of force on societies, individuals, and states, as well as state policies of war preparation, prevention and engagement (Walt, 1991:212).

While the focus of traditional ISS is military power, Walt notes that other issues, including diplomacy and arms control are also included in security studies as they relate to war (Walt, 1991:213).

Walt, referring to Buzan (1983) and Brown (1989), notes the attempts to broaden 'security' to embrace issues like AIDS, the environment, poverty or drug abuse since 'well-being' is not assured through military might but warns against an 'excessive' expansion of security studies since including, for example, child abuse, disease, and economic issues as this would eradicate security studies' 'intellectual coherence' while also obstructing the management of these problems (Walt, 1991:213). However, for Walt, since the end of the Cold War order engenders novel research and policy problems, security studies' remit increases and the discipline will actively continue (Walt, 1991:222). Given ISS' focus on war and '*cumulative knowledge* about the role of military force', ISS, for Walt, has to be scientific, including in being terminologically consistent and careful (Walt, 1991: 212,222,231).

Indeed, ISS is expanding, if in the directions Walt warned against. Hence in the 1990s, scholars increasingly looked at different ways to view security. Kolodziej's important critique of Walt's argument was based around the idea that Walt's state-centrism excludes, as it does not discuss, threats to people by states and issues including civil war which occur outside the international arena but threaten people's security (Kolodziej, 1992:422ff.,432).

Buzan et al. supplement Walt's warning that a widening of security would entail intellectual incoherence by arguing that by branding

something a security issue, it will be taken out of the normal realm of politics and allow for measures otherwise not deemed legitimate (Buzan et al., 1998:4). Arguing that 'desecuritisation', returning issues into the political sphere should be aimed for, Buzan et al. warn that the wideners tend 'often unthinkingly' to portray security as something all-good and desirable (Buzan et al., 1998:4).

Other scholars are less concerned about the implications of broadening security and more with the terminology involved as they already accept that security is broader than orthodoxly understood. Booth problematises the term 'non-traditional', arguing that the notion that issues on a "non-traditional" security agenda' are now dealt with by international society is an 'orthodox' viewpoint and is part of 'statist feel-good rhetoric', rendering the 'discourse of broadening...merely tactical' (Booth, 2007:172). Thus, issues, including famine, human rights abuses, and 'patriarchal violence', now taken up by orthodox ISS and governments as 'non-traditional' are '*all too traditional*' for those suffering them in political silence (Booth, 2007:172).

Given Booth's contention, a key point in an investigation into 'non-traditional security' is that those who engage in NTS research *choose* what they want to see. The question is what the Chinese scholars decide to see. If the PRC scholars regard NTS issues as new, they wittingly or unwittingly support the orthodox discourse and situate themselves more in the realist side of the debate.

The lack of definition and terminological unclearness means that security has been broadened in terms of issues and threats to go beyond military violence. However, the implications of this are unclear. If national security remains the referent object, is it ontologically feasible to broaden security? Or does such as move merely increase the reach of the state? Instead, it is also possible that only human security or another non-state security can be in congruence with non-traditional security.

The actual term 'non-traditional security' is more widely used in the Chinese literature than in mainstream IR, where it is mostly

employed in university textbooks instead of in monographs or journal articles. Even these textbooks generally define NTS briefly as, for example, a 'category of security studies [which] focuses on non-military challenges to security' which includes state- and non-state referents (Collins, 2009:495). Some NTS issues stem from a conversion of previously 'low politics' issues such as economic and health issues into 'high politics', causing problems for traditional international security views (Smith, 2010:2).

NTS in the mainstream literature easily embraces a plethora of concerns such as child soldiers, climate change, drug trafficking, economic instability, environmental issues, ethnic conflict, financial security, health (infectious diseases), human rights and civil liberties, hunger, information security, maritime security, migration and especially illegal migration, transnational crime, natural disasters, natural resources, unorganized violence, a state as threatening its own population, people-smuggling and trafficking, poverty, separatism, terrorism and weapons proliferation and arms smuggling (Caballero-Anthony and Emmers, 2006:1f.; Collins, 2009:10; Hoadley and Rüland, 2006; Schmidt and Heilmann, 2012:56; Thakur and Newman, 2004:2).

Terriff et al. (2006), who are frequently referred to in the PRC literature, use 'NTS'. For Terriff et al., NTS-issues apparently are novel issues in terms of scale, such as mass-migration, or recent appearance, such as environmental degradation, rather than 'old' issues which are only now classed as threats, including ethnic conflict and weapons-proliferation (Terriff et al., 2006:115). Some common features of NTS-issues can be a tendency to emanate from sub- or trans-state actors, dangers which are 'diffuse, multidimensional and multidirectional' lacking a specific geographical location, an importance of non-military management, and various (state and non-state) referent objects (Terriff et al., 2006:115f.). These non-traditional challenges are inherently different from past challenges, necessitating a re-conception of security, not just a rethinking of security threats, as they shift the referent away from the state (Terriff et al., 2006:115f.). Conversely,

Caballero-Anthony and Emmers argue that the highlighting of different referent objects leads to the discussion of different security issues and threats (Caballero-Anthony and Emmers, 2006:1).

Explicit NTS research is more prevalent in Asia, including Singapore and India. Baral from the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Studies does not offer a succinct NTS definition, suggesting that NTS is a flexible concept (Baral, 2006:16). He considers 'inclusive democracy, freedom and social justice as the key elements of [NTS]' related to South Asian problems of nation-state building, as well as 'human security, individual security, economic security, political security, environmental security or what we call "comprehensive security"' (Baral, 2006:16). Baral appears to focus on preventive measures rather than NTS issues, stressing the importance and interconnection of democracy and freedom in NTS (Baral, 2006:17f.,25).

Since traditional national security derives from neorealism, which – regarding the world as consisting of objective facts – focuses on states as rational actors and interstate use of force, it is epistemologically and ontologically problematic to include NTS or non-military issues in traditional national security (Krause and Williams, 1996:232,247). Arguing that non-military issues such as environmental degradation could threaten state security undermines neorealism's epistemological claims, while regarding security as concerned with objective facts thwarts discussion on broadening security, as the ideational factors behind the different stances are seldom discussed (Krause and Williams, 1996:233f.; Walt, 1991:212f.,222,231). Critical and constructivist approaches reject any objectivity of 'security' and security threats; security, particularly national security, is a group of historic practices and discourses resting on 'institutionally shared understanding', and what is important is how the referent object and security issues are socially constructed (Krause and Williams, 1996:242f.).

The Copenhagen School (CS) strongly influences the contemporary conceptualisation of security through its discursive

concept of securitisation. CS looks at different sectors – the military, the political, the economic, the societal, and the environmental – to analyse how agents construct ‘existential threats’ with regards to related referent objects (Buzan et al., 1998:22). Securitising actors need to convince an audience that a given issue is a security issue, which may then be taken out of the normal realm of politics, entailing negotiation, and into the security realm, allowing for extraordinary counter-measures (Buzan et al., 1998:21, 25). Problematically, CS holds that any issue can be securitised; what matters is the discursive construction of the threat, not its actual existence (Buzan et al., 1998:24). CS provides a useful tool for analysing securitisation-speech acts in the political sphere, but yields no insights into motivations or reasons for securitisation. By regarding everything as discursively constructed and favouring desecuritisation, CS neither allows for normative criticism of securitisation nor for securitisation-calls (Buzan et al., 1998:4).

Hansen justly criticised this failure to account for ‘silent security dilemmas’, such as when women’s gendered identity means that voicing their security concerns would heighten their insecurity (Hansen, 2000:285,287). Contrariwise, Buzan et al. argue that an error in Critical Security Studies is that despite its constructivist views, when this approach refers to security is frequently not very constructivist, frequently trying to portray some security problems, including poverty and unemployment, as more threatening and significant, and finally recreating objectivist and traditional security concepts as real threats and as the scholar can judge the reality of a security problem (Buzan et al., 1997:204)

For Buzan et al., the referent object depends on the security sector. The military sector’s referent object tends to be the state, but not all military issues are, as traditional security studies would see it, security cases with the armed forces in an ‘advanced democracy’ being assigned roles not concerned with the defence of the state (Buzan et al., 1998:22).

Hence, the theoretical debate of the widening and deepening of security is vibrant, but its very nature of including opposition to

orthodox security studies and the related hegemony of defining what is security and what is not means that there is no universally accepted definition of non-orthodox/non-traditional security. I therefore proceed to analyse the debate on specific issues to highlight certain commonalities which I take up in my working definition below.

Particular NTS Issues

The focus on the discursive constitution of security by Buzan et al. helps explain why the literature on various empirical NTS-issues is vast and rapidly increasing, with a plethora of new issues constantly being added. While the issues considered NTS range from anthropogenic to non-anthropogenic, from challenges including intended harm to unintentional threats, the literature shows how issues are constructed as NTS depending on the theoretical lens adopted and the chosen referent object.

Many NTS-issues are portrayed as threatening the international order. Migrants may transport domestic problems into the international sphere, straining relations between sending-, receiving- and transit-countries (Hoadley, 2006:108; Weiner, 1992). Since “9/11”, control of global migration has been linked to military security, complicating the internal-external security dichotomy (Rudolph, 2003:615).

NTS-issues are also sometimes seen as challenging civilisation or society. The effects of a mass influx of civilisational ‘foreigners’ and the potentially destabilising effects of climate change and environmental degradation are seen as threatening (Western) civilisation regarding liberal democracy, rule of law, culture and society (Dupont, 2008:108; Mazo, 2010:9,12; Price-Smith, 1999:436). The state remains the key actor for dealing with NTS due to its coercive and legislative power, but market- and civil society-engagement is also necessary (Giddens, 2009:5). International cooperation tends to be advocated to deal with NTS, while the military will be increasingly engaged in rescue and relief operation under climate change (Dupont, 2008:40; Brundtland,

2003:418f.; Price-Smith, 1999:442). International resource- and territorial competition may also arise from NTS-issues such as climate change, fuelling the (re-)emerging rivalry between liberalism and autocracy or Islamism (Giddens, 2009:14,203,208f.).

Despite the problems of including NTS in national security, it is often done. The effects of climate change can be seen in narrow national security terms, as physically threatening territory, citizens, and infrastructure, as endangering the state's monopoly of violence and governmental legitimacy, and as triggering resource-wars (Busby, 2008:468).

Migrants are perceivable as threatening the state's stability and survival, and, in the case of illegal migrants, as undermining the Westphalian state's sovereignty by demonstrating its ineffective border-control (Doty, 1999:72,73; Weiner, 1992:97,109f.114; Hoadley, 2006:258). State security is existentially threatened by potentially criminal, disease-carrying and/or terrorism-supporting migrants, igniting social tensions, unsettling the demographic balance, straining public services and undermining law enforcement (Hoadley, 2006:251,257; Weiner, 1992:109-117). Wæver's concept of societal security is reflected in the perceived threat to the receiving country's cultural identity (Wæver, 1993:23; Doty, 1999:74).

Relative poverty may threaten a state by triggering civil unrest, civil war or terrorism (Scudder, 2010:15). Unrest and riots undermining political and economic stability can arise from increasing food and water scarcity due to climate change (Dupont, 2008:32f.; Herman and Treverton, 2009:137).

Attempts to re-conceptualise security itself accompany the discussion on new security threats. Branded as humankind's greatest threats – evidenced in their war-eclipsing lethality – hunger and disease have become part of security, which is effectively re-conceptualised based on death-tolls (Shaw, 2007:x,xiif.; Price-Smith, 1999:427). The global character of a threat like disease, an old scourge, adds to its 'security credibility',

especially when its lethality has increased as emerging and re-emerging diseases have since 1973 (Price-Smith, 1999:426f.,432f.).

A marked change in the perception of security occurs when a human security-lens is employed, with the referent object being individuals. Migrants' or the poor's security may be seen as threatened and hence to be protected (Lohrmann, 2000:6; Eadie, 2005:1). This dismantles the self-other dichotomy of traditional security (see Doty, 1999:74).

While Lohrman notes a possible rethinking of security by turning the non-human environment into the referent object, threatened by climate change and other NTS-issues, Dalby argues that the increasingly artificial biosphere renders the duality of security separating humans from the environment obsolete (Lohrman, 2000:12; Dalby, 2009:8,171). For Dalby, rather than the fossil-fuelled status quo, what is to be safeguarded is human life itself, and Giddens notes that since a 'return to nature' is impossible, a positive model of a low carbon future is needed, preserving or enhancing a decent way of life (Dalby, 2009:3; Giddens, 2009:3).

There is an element of Western-centrism in the mainstream NTS-literature. McInnes and Lee criticise this in the health-as-security discourse, arguing that instead of portraying developing countries as a threat to the West, intrastate health-related stability should be emphasised (McInnes and Lee, 2006:23). Poverty eradication can be depicted as dangerous with the (non-Western) previously poor chasing an unsustainable Western lifestyle (Scudder, 2010:30ff.). Migration was first securitised in Asia and most migration occurs within the developing world (Hoadley, 2006:251; Lohrmann, 2000:10f.). Problematically, solutions offered to NTS-issues tend to be Western-centric again, relating to liberal-intuitionalist ideas such as trade liberalisation and democratic institutions (see Lohrmann, 2000:19).

The following section proposes a working definition of the concept of NTS based on the Western Security Studies debate, mindful that 'a concept is a general notion or idea with a particular although contestable meaning' (Barnett, 2001:6). A working definition of the concept of NTS is not fixed, but is meant to hold true for most cases while inviting improvement.

NTS is 'non-traditional' as it – catalysed by the processes of globalisation including increased global interdependence and interaction – poses a threat to, or questions, almost all the aspects traditional IR-theory is built on: the strength of the sovereign state, the domestic-foreign dichotomy, the state as responsible only for its own citizens, and security as mostly military (see Scheuerman, 2010).

The Copenhagen School holds that theoretically anything could become a security issue if it is successfully securitised (Buzan et al., 1998:23f.). However, from what the literature suggests NTS-issues to be, there clearly exists a limiting factor. Only those issues which can be managed, contained or cured can be NTS-issues or -threats. In the case of health, for example, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS or SARS are regarded as security issues, but cancer or cardiovascular diseases – leading causes of death worldwide – are not. This is because the former are transmittable viruses whereas the latter are malfunctions of the body which are not transmittable. So while cancer and cardiovascular diseases are more lethal in terms of numbers, it would be nonsensical to call them a security threat as their nature prevents containment through vaccination, quarantine or antibiotics in the way that virus- or bacteria-induced diseases can spread quickly and extensively and can be managed. In more grotesque terms, to claim that death as such is a security issue is nonsensical. Any academic statement portraying something as an NTS-issue must therefore entail a tenable proposal of how to deal with this issue/threat. To merely state that some non-military issue is detrimental to human life (as the Copenhagen School would allow for) is insufficient. What is

needed is a plausible argument that certain measures may be taken to effectively deal with the issue. Hence, even a grand-scale global threat like climate change, whose consequences can but be imagined, can only be seen as an NTS-issue if there is a possibility of alleviating the threat.

For the purpose of this project, NTS-issues are anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic issues which have the potential to destroy or seriously harm material entities such as the state, the body politic², the individual human being or the environment. Harm here denotes a physical or legal violation of the referent object. NTS-threats are threats which – unlike military menaces threatening the extinction of another state through extreme use of force – threaten the body politic, the structure of the state, the smooth-running of civil life and the political and physical safety of its citizens, in a less blunt yet more insidious manner, undermining domestic sovereignty, the law, citizens' health and nutrition. NTS-threats may undermine the existence of a functioning body politic in the long-term. Such a well-functioning body politic and state can be taken as either the goal – in the case of failing states where NTS-issues such as rampant poverty or lack of nutritious food are not a threat but a reality – or as a reality – in the case of prosperous, stable liberal democracies whose status quo may be threatened by, for example, global Islamist terrorism. The non-traditional aspect is that the threat penetrates state boundaries so as to attack the citizens within the domestic sphere, inviting the supposed lawlessness of the international/foreign sphere inside the polity.

NTS-issues are interdependent, possibly engendering and reinforcing one another. Accordingly, while Hough holds that there are some threats to human security such as poverty which pose much more of a definite threat than 'potential threats' like climate change, he also notes that 25 to 33 per cent of global deaths due to disease are caused by environmental problems (Hough, 2004:134, referring to Smith et al., 1999:573). One could even

² 'Body politic' is fittingly employed by the disease-as-NTS-discourse (see Price-Smith, 2009:1).

argue that this interdependence demands a new ontology with regards to security in that NTS entails a holistic view of the world which needs to take all aspects of political life into account and cannot treat them as isolated from each other. However, at a stage when the issues of NTS are not clearly set out, this might be difficult. In this case, the notion of prevention appears plausible in terms of advancing sustainable human development which can help alleviate some of the accepted issues of NTS such as poverty or transnational crime (see Coker, 2002:53f.).

Conclusion

The above analysis of NTS in the globally dominant discussion has shown that security is a complex and problematic concept which is far from universally agreed upon even among scholars working within the same time, politics and languages. Whereas more orthodox, realist security scholars have a simplistically equated security with the survival of the state, more recent scholarly enquiries have come to question and problematise the concept of security. This re-conceptualisation of security as a negative value used in speech acts to allow for extraordinary measures, as entailing an embrace of insecurity, or as an emancipatory form of world-security reveals a huge variety of different ontological and epistemological stances allowed by the single term 'security'. The evocation of the term 'security' in scholarship and practice thus is (no longer) simply the attachment of importance to an issue; rather, it reveals the underlying worldview of the evoker.

This complexity of security entails the broadening and deepening in Security Studies towards the end of the Cold War, and thus the adding to the agenda of security of 'non-traditional issues'. However, broadening and deepening consists not just of issues added, but also of adds new layers of complexity to the question of what security is, and how it should be looked at, whose security is of key concern, and what constitutes a threat to security.

The working definition of NTS I have created in the absence of a universally agreed definition bears in mind these complexities while

endeavouring to keep 'non-traditional security' as a workable academic concept. My working definition forms the framework with which I analyse the Chinese debate in the remainder of the thesis. In short, I define NTS as challenging the pillars of traditional IR-theory (state sovereignty, domestic-foreign dichotomy, state as only responsible for own citizens, military security), and as its threats as anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic, often interdependent issues which can harm and even destroy the state, the body politic, individuals and the environment. While NTS threats attack citizens within the domestic sphere of the body politic, NTS issues can be managed.

Chapter Three: The Chinese Debate - Definition and Conceptualisation of NTS

The previous chapter showed a vibrant and intricate debate about security generally and about TS and NTS particularly. This chapter demonstrates that the PRC NTS debate is also multi-faceted. Different from the Western debate, the PRC debate also entails deep theoretical considerations. Contrary to the Western debate which does not embrace the term NTS wholeheartedly, there exists a wide and increasing self-declared PRC NTS literature.

The following is a more in-depth analysis of the conceptualisation of NTS in the PRC literature. I order different scholarly definitions according to three themes emerging from my reading and analysis of the selected texts and my interviews. Not all of the themes are taken verbatim from the literature, but are based on my interpretation, connected to my methodology which holds that the meaning of a text lies between the author and the reader (Chapter One). Some texts fall under several themes in terms of the definitions they offer. While my themes still apply, this shows that the scholarly debate in China encompasses theoretical width which sometimes creates ontological problems.

The three different themes analysed here are: NTS as new threats and sudden crises, NTS as the opposite of TS, and NTS as ideational change. Within these definitions, I analyse contrasting understandings within the PRC debate and their implications. These three themes are significant as they constitute fundamentally different NTS understandings. The understanding of NTS as new threats and crises is theoretically the shallowest, overlooking the antiquity of NTS issues such as health. However, this reading accords with the regime's rhetoric, which has only recently started to look at NTS. It is also closest to the term NTS which, as Booth notes, sees these issues as only of recent importance (Booth, 2007:172; Chapter Two). Ideational change implies a more international outlook, tying the Chinese discourse to the global discourse. The focus is not on the novelty of threats

but recent international attention. The theme of NTS as the opposite of TS is the easiest argument, but focuses solely on the terminology. However, it also accords with my working definition (Chapter Two).

The analysis of this chapter shows that there are fundamentally different understandings of NTS in the PRC debate, at times even in an argument by a single scholar, ranging from NTS as new issues in material reality to a highlighting of the change of focus in politics and scholarship, demonstrating political motivation, investigated in my third research question. It demonstrates that significant parts of the debate shift the focus of security from the state to humans and even individuals, constituting a normative change as investigated in my fourth research question. This is in stark contrast to Zhang's and Breslin's findings (Chapter One).

Characteristics

Despite the apparent prevalence of the term NTS, several scholars point out the lack of an authoritative definition, and Xu Huabing argues that this is due to the difference in every country's situation and development (Xu Huabing, 2011:12ff.).

The first national scholarly conference on NTS in China held at CASS in 2003 agreed the following characteristics, which, despite widely diverse scholarly views on how to look at NTS, can be seen as a general guideline of NTS followed by later PRC scholars (see Liu Xuecheng, 2004:33f.):

- 1) its 'background' is globalisation and the end of the Cold War
- 2) 'diversity of actors and the issue of the security relationships between diverse actors'
- 3) 'the transnational nature of NTS issues'
- 4) 'the uncertainty and variety of NTS issues'
- 5) 'the non-military nature of security'
- 6) 'the international cooperative and consultative nature of solving issues'

- 7) 'the connectedness between all issue fields'
- 8) 'there must be new thinking about the concept of security' (He Zhongyi, 2004:48f.).

New Threats and Sudden Crises

Since the Chinese term *feichuantong anquan*-非传统安全 for NTS is identical with the English, the implication that NTS issues are novel issues since they are *non*-traditional affects the PRC debate. Some PRC scholars argue that NTS issues are completely novel, others that NTS comprises both new and old issues, and some regard NTS as issues which are not new at all but merely studied now (see Fu Yong, 2007:005,006).

Important parts of the debate in China regard NTS as really new threats. UB4 saw NTS as novel and significant global problems, in contrast to Cold War focus on 'high politics problems', which can affect 'state security', seen as integrity, sovereignty, power, and authority. NTS is often introduced as arriving on the scene of thought and reality as a sudden crisis, notably the 9/11 terror attacks or the 2003 SARS pandemic. Over ten years after the pandemic, my interviewees still saw it as a turning point. SARS sparked ONB1's interest, whose initial interest in categorising SARS turned into an interest in NTS and security. UB3 agreed, arguing that 'everyone's interest' was piqued by the SARS crisis. The implication is that the issues occur suddenly and then the term NTS is applied to them. Hence, objective, external crises which differ from 'traditional' threats or crises trigger the need for a concept of NTS. Interviewee UB2 argued that NTS issues really were new issues, with some arising with the information age. In a 2003 Renmin Ribao article, regarded as influential in the PRC debate and which starts by mentioning SARS as a trigger to review security threats, Wang Yizhou defines NTS as threats 'human society never encountered or rarely saw....threats away from the battlefield which in recent years gradually become prominent' (Wang Yizhou, 21/05/2003). Wang argues that "9/11" changed the world' with non-state transnational organisations attacking the state, threats being unpredictable, having a psychological aspect,

military measures being futile, and globalisation being important (Wang Yizhou, 2005:170f.,193).

Other parts of the PRC NTS debate, however, see NTS issues as more mixed between old and new. Although, Ma Zhenchao regards NTS issues such as “9/11” and SARS as objective reality emerging with the ‘novel’ situation after the end of Cold War bipolarity, his addition that states focused more on internal problems after the Cold War as ‘foreign security threats were dissolved’, suggesting that these domestic, non-military issues existed previously and what is ‘new’ is merely the state’s increased attention (Ma Zhenchao, 2011:95f.). What is new, moreover, is that these ‘new’ issues are no longer only the problems of individual countries, but became ‘common problems’ (gongtong wenti- 共同问题), encompassing several fields, including society, politics, culture, and the environment, threatening social stability, people’s lives, and national development (Ma Zhenchao, 2011:97). Many states therefore lift these issues to ‘national security’ level, adapt their national development strategy, and attach importance to and raise national comprehensive power and the ability to protect security (Ma Zhenchao, 2011:97). The rise of NTS can also be seen as coming in the wake of (economic) globalisation. Rather than seeing these issues as completely novel, UNB3 considered them ‘more outstanding’ since globalisation. Again, objective events and changes in the global (economic) environment are emphasised. SASS’ Xue Chen, for example, argues that the NTS concept became increasingly apparent in the 1990s due to economic globalisation (Xue Chen, 2009:62).

Conversely, some PRC scholars deny any novelty of NTS. What is new is that these issues are now being looked at or that they have recently deteriorated. For UNB5, the novelty of NTS lay in the securitisation of issues, such as environmental problems which became security issues when they became more ‘widespread’, threatened states or many people, and captured the government’s attention. UB7, UNB8, UB1 and UNB13 all argued that NTS issues were not novel. Referring to the Copenhagen School’s concept of

Securitisation, UNB8 noted that although old, the importance of NTS issues was 'suddenly more outstanding' and were now seen as security issues. Zhang Yunling argues that NTS issues existed before and that they are not new: 'they became a comprehensive security category because they have "common characteristics", and because their impact meant that they must be greatly focused on' (Zhang Yunling, 2012:001).

Although evidently open-minded about what NTS is, Zhang rejects the Cold War dividing line, arguing that TS continues to be important, too (Zhang Yunling, 2012:001). Similarly, Lu Zhongwei, representing the semi-official debate as a member of the International Relations University and editor of 'On NTS', regards NTS as mostly old issues aggravated by globalisation and which now threatened state security (Lu, 2003:3). This is politically important as Lu's views are close to and influence the PRC government. Yan Xuetong and Yang Yuan also highlight the novel focus on NTS, but not any inherent newness of NTS issues themselves (Yan and Yang, 2013:140). For Yan and Yang, NTS issues are now looked at due to the decline of both TS threats and 'civil wars', and the increase of Western influence: 'since the threat of war decreased, people's interest in non-war security problems increased, and hence the concept of "NTS" appeared' (Yan and Yang, 2013:139f.).

A theoretically deeper analysis of why 'old' NTS issues are looked at now is Xu Huabing's discussion. Contrary to Wang Yizhou, Xu Huabing argues that NTS issues existed in antiquity but that the emergence of independent, sealed-off states meant NTS issues were overlooked, especially as war and military might became important with the advent of nation-states and capitalism (Xu Huabin, 2011:9). This situation was changed by post-Cold War globalisation (Xu Huabing, 2011:10). Xu's argument implies that the nature of the state – rigidly isolated or porous to outside influence – is crucial to whether issues are considered (non-traditional) security issues and whether they are noted at all. Yet NTS issues clearly exist regardless of someone noticing them. Xu's

highlighting of more porous states and the role of globalisation for the rise of NTS aligns with my working definition (Chapter Two).

This divergence between those regarding NTS as novel issues and those rejecting this idea and highlighting the new act of focusing on NTS instead indicates a significant ontological divide within the PRC NTS debate. Given Booth's warning (Chapter Two), that 'NTS' as looking at new issues was statist and ignorant of the plight of those suffering, the assertion of novelty by some scholars such as Wang Yizhou seems naively statist, since SARS, for example, has precedents (Booth, 2007:172). Conversely, the acknowledgement that it is the act of focusing on NTS issues now since other dangers are less threatening is more theoretically sound, but lacks a normative discussion on whether NTS issues should not have been managed previously.

The Opposite of TS

Given the term *non-traditional* security, NTS is often juxtaposed to traditional security/*chuantong anquan*-传统安全. Both Yu et al. and Wang Yizhou highlight the juxtaposition of NTS and TS (Yu et al., 2006:34,41f.; Wang, 2005:193). Single-sentence definitions of NTS tend to focus on the non-military nature of non-traditional security (Yu and Wang, 2006:57; Zhang Yunling, 2012:001). UB3 and ONB8 both contrasted NTS and TS with the latter seen to encompass national security issues such as sovereignty and military threats. NTS, by contrast, for ONB8, transcended this type of security to also embrace humans and other threats. Similarly, Yu et al. argue that a view of TS as military and political security entails a view of NTS as including non-military issues which are global and transnational and which tend to require international cooperation, including refugees, migrants, terrorism, drug trafficking, and the 'ecological-environment' (Yu et al., 2006:41).

Conversely, ONB7 focused on threateners and state interest as differing between TS and NTS, with the latter focusing on non-state actors, and with that to be safeguarded including the people's welfare, ideology, and national development. Yu Xiaofeng and Lin

Guozhi similarly juxtapose NTS and TS arguing that TS focuses on (military) power and war and involves the protection of freedom from the threat of war, whereas NTS is the freedom from non-war existential threats (Yu Xiaofeng and Lin Guozhi, 2006:105). Nevertheless, Yu and Lin also note that TS and NTS 'often overlap' (Yu Xiaofeng and Lin Guozhi, 2006:105).

Others in the PRC debate problematically portray NTS as an expansion of TS regarding the security field and subject (Fu Yong, 2007:024). Fu's argument is problematic as she also states that NTS is a non-military concept, and it is thus not clear how it should have expanded from military TS (Fu Yong, 2008:91; Fu Yong, 2007:013). Yet Xu Huabing also argues that most NTS issues evolved from TS and then became new issues (Xu, 2011:15ff).

Conversely, CASS' Li Dongyan suggests linking TS and NTS to a country's developmental stage; TS is a prerequisite of NTS and there is a historical evolution from TS to NTS rather than a clear-cut delineation (Li Dongyan, 2004:54).

A broader understanding is embraced by Liu Xuecheng, arguing that NTS blurs the boundaries of national security and societal security, and of national security and human security (Liu Xuecheng, 2004:35). Societal security, for Liu, is the foundation of national stability which in turn is the foundation for international cooperation, and human security is the core of both TS and NTS (Liu Xuecheng, 2004:35). This broader understanding of NTS is closer to the more holistic understanding of security my working definition anticipates (Chapter Two).

Contrariwise, UB5 suggested that issues could shift between TS and NTS depending on the situation. Similarly, UNB5 noted that NTS was not a static concept but that issues could move from being non-traditional to traditional.

The expansion of TS to NTS is different from the account of the widening and deepening of security in the Western debate, elaborated by Paris, which Yu Xiaofeng and Lin Guozhi subscribe to (Paris, 2001:97; Yu and Lin, 2006:106). This broadening is of

security generally as opposed to a broadening of TS, which cannot really be done since TS is limited to 'traditional' issues'.

Ideational Change

A different reading of the rise of NTS recounts its ideational history, emphasising the increasing awareness of NTS. The PRC scholars may regard themselves as recounting facts, considering the authors of the 1972 *Limits of Growth* and similar reports as noticing what was really happening. Nevertheless, the scholars' focus is on the circulation of ideas rather than on events and they are effectively engaging in an ideational approach.

Some scholars highlight the global change of view on security. OB1 argued that the concept of NTS was learnt from sources outside of China, as the term was created by foreign scholars and learnt by PRC scholars at international conferences. Wang Yizhou and Li Dongyan employ the ideational narrative, tracing the origin of the notion of NTS to the Club of Rome and the *Limits of Growth*, which first raised the idea of sustainable development, warning that humankind would in the future face non-military calamities such as those triggered by ecological degeneration (Wang Yizhou, 21/05/2003; Li Dongyan, 2004:50). For Li Dongyan, 'the UN completed a change from a "traditional security concept" to a "non-traditional security concept" or a "new security concept" including common security, human security, and global security' (Li, 2004:49). The novelty of the UN's new security concept, for Li, consists of being a global security concept directed against global threats, and of being a 'people's security concept' (renmin anquan guan-人民安全观) targeted at 'security threats against individuals' (geren anquan weixie-个人安全威胁) with individual security becoming a new issue (Li Dongyan, 2004:52).

Moreover, Xu Huabing defines NTS as 'not just a word, but a new point of view, a new thinking, and a new purpose' (Xu Huabing, 2011:15). Xu adopts an evolutionary stages model to explain the rise of NTS, connecting 'real' events and ideational changes, such as the 1970s oil crisis and *Limits of Growth*, the end of the Cold

War and increasing attention on non-military threats, and “9/11” and NTS awareness (Xu Huabing, 2011:10ff.). This is reminiscent of Noesselt’s statement that the history of PRC IR is often described in terms of eras by Chinese scholars (Noesselt, 2010:51). PRC scholars pick up the change in the official PRC discourse, linking NTS to the official goals of a ‘harmonious world’, ‘harmonious society’, or ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘development’, and a ‘moderately prosperous society’ (Ma Zhenchao, 2011; Xu Huabing, 2011:6). Arguing from the perspective of historical materialism, Xu Huabing states that the current era is one of ‘peace and development’, highlighting especially the close connection of NTS to ‘peace and development’ (Xu Huabing, 2011:23,26). This argument cannot be followed unless one accepts historical materialism as plausible. Nonetheless, Xu Huabing’s highlighting of ‘peace and development’ as the goal and the apparent emphasis on people rather than states accord with the UN’s human security concept, as does Xu’s notion of a non-zero sum game in international relations (Xu Huabing, 2011:18). For Yu Xiaofeng and Lin Guozhi, NTS concerns “‘harmonious development’ issues’ with states having to uphold “‘human security” and “societal security”” (Yu and Lin, 2006:106). Hence, Yu and Lin argue, ‘if continued peaceful and benign development is the starting point and final destination of security, then human society can reach the harmonious condition of real security’ (Yu Xiaofeng and Lin Guozhi, 2006:106). Yu and Lin blend together IR and official Chinese rhetoric, which in a longer, more detailed piece of writing would mar the coherence of the argument.

Some scholars focus more on NTS theory. For SASS’ Li Kaisheng, NTS is a theory and he analyses which theories, including the Copenhagen School, human security, or feminism, is an NTS theory, depending on their stance on whose security is to be protected, which security value is to be upheld, the source of the threat, who protects security, and how to realise security (Li Kaisheng, 2012:4f.). An NTS theory, for Li, would move away from the state. This contrast between NTS as a theory or as issues

highlights the lack of agreement on the meaning of 'NTS' in the PRC debate.

Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe, and Wang Jiangli advance their own theory to deal with NTS: 'peace corporatism-hehezhuyi-和合主义' (Yu et al., 2006:31). This theory is conceptually flawed as endeavours to fuse realism, liberalism, constructivism, and 'Chinese theory' while also being a fusion of Chinese research and peace research to create a global NTS theory (Yu et al., 2006:31). Yu et al. definitely see their scholarship as part of global scholarship, but this move is problematic as it lacks appreciation of the ontological impossibility of simply mixing contradictory theories.

Given these contrasting views about theory, I asked my interviewees whether NTS necessitated a new theory. UNB10 considered a new IR theory 'necessary', specifically one which included more responsibility at individual and society level. Whereas UB2 argued that NTS entailed 'theoretical implications of real events', UB7 thought that NTS issues were 'real' and hence there was no theory-based debate.

Other interviewees offered more ontologically complex views. UNB3 argued that NTS changed the logic of security away from conflict towards a positive value.

Continuing State-Centrism and Nascent Human-Centrism

The focus on non-military security issues tends to entail a critical reappraisal of the state as the referent object of security and a move towards seeing humans, including the individual, as the proper referent object. While the scholarly PRC debate entails strong statism, as Zhang Yongjin noted in 2007 and 2008 (Chapter One), there are moves towards deepening security to embrace humans as referent objects. These two sides constitute an important tension in the PRC discourse.

For Yan Xuetong and Yang Yuan the focus changed away from threats to life towards other threats, such as internet and environmental security, with security and development increasingly merged (Yan Xuetong and Yang Yuan, 2013:139). These NTS

threats do not emanate from sovereign states but from 'natural or international forces' (Yan Xuetong and Yang Yuan, 2013:139). Wang Yizhou allows for various referent objects, including states as well as individuals and society (Wang Yizhou, 21/05/2003). For Fu Yong, statism and people-focus is connected as she considers NTS to be non-military threats by non- state actors to the state's interest and sovereignty, as well as to the development and existence of individuals and humankind (Fu Yong, 2007:024; Fu Yong, 2008:86).

The above scholars overlook a tension in their argument as they suggest an equal importance of the state and humanity. While an emphasis on humans in Critical Security Studies leads to a stressing of the importance of individuals vis-à-vis a possibly repressive state, Fu problematically excludes the idea of states threatening humans: 'NTS refers to non-military threats from non-state actors' (Fu Yong, 2008:86). Fu's argument prevents IR securitising possible abuses of power by states against their own citizens, negating the UN's Responsibility to Protect norm. This definition of NTS is wider than my working definition, as Fu Yong, and Yan Xuetong and Yang Yuan take both state interest and all of humanity's existence as the key of NTS, while my definition centres on the body politic. The divergence of Fu Yong's approach from my narrower working definition of NTS shows that Fu's approach is too wide and too politically uncritical to constitute a rigorous, universally applicable approach. Negating a tension between the state and society or individuals and using NTS to expand national security to include non-military issues means falling into the trap Booth, 2007 warns against (Chapter Two).

Conversely, important PRC NTS scholars highlight a change in focus towards humans. UNB5 noted that NTS challenged previous state-individual and state-society relations, as there were now actors apart from the state, and people started to use 'governance' or 'management' rather than 'rule' for state actions. UNB3 argued that NTS meant that people and states had to cooperate. Zhou Yuanyuan similarly notes that the security concept changed from

state-centrism to human-centrism following globalisation, with the state being a crucial *means* to protect security, but possibly no longer being the *end* of security protection (Zhou Yuanyuan, 2004:17,22). Instead, for Zhou, the new security concept highlights the protection of individuals' rights, emphasising that people should not be threatened by terrorism, racial or ethnic conflict, social crime, hunger, thirst, environmental problems, and autocracy (Zhou Yuanyuan, 2004:22). Similarly, Yu et al. and Wang Yizhou hold that the key of NTS are humans and society (Yu et al., 2006:5f.,30; Wang Yizhou 2012:213). Yu et al. ask how security ought to be re-thought when human security was prioritised (Yu et al., 2006:6). For Wang Yizhou, all states and international society had to look more at societal security and human security due to the rise of NTS issues (Wang Yizhou, 2012:213).

The strongest move towards increasing the position of humans and especially the individual in the PRC NTS debate is made by Li Kaisheng. Li's 2012 *Human, State and Security Governance*, part of Zhejiang University's NTS Capacity Building series, is the only monograph devoted to the relationship of humans and the state. Li regards TS and NTS as theories, their difference lying in their respective reference object and security value; NTS concerns non-state actors and non-military and non-political security issues, whereas TS sees the state as the referent object and the military and political sector as major values (Li Kaisheng, 2012:8,122). Arguing that the definition of NTS in much of Chinese research is actually very much TS due to an emphasis on the sovereign state, Li holds that NTS is human-centric as 'security work' must aim at 'human security' (Li Kaisheng, 2012:9,115,135). For Li, the NTS referent object is clearly the individual as he argues that 'the ultimate subject' and 'ultimate value goal' has to be an indivisible and an ethical actor, which, for him, are only individuals as all ethical value derives from and refers to living beings (Li Kaisheng, 2012:135,137f.). The state and society are simply aggregates which must support human security (Li Kaisheng, 2012:137f.).

However, Li focuses on the 'majority of people', not the 'abstract' human (Li Kaisheng, 2012:152).

Uniquely in the Chinese debate, Li discusses the issue of states harming citizens: 'every NTS theory recognises that the state often...can no longer assume the role of security protector, but that it constitutes a threat to the security of its citizens' (Li Kaisheng, 2012:116). Moreover, for Li, state security 'is worth being doubted' if it is invoked for 'domestic massacres...and savage campaigns abroad' (Li Kaisheng, 2012:138). Li notes that NTS research involves the tension between state security and human security and therefore connects to the political philosophy conundrum of state-human relations (Li Kaisheng, 2012:135). In an article with Xue Li, Li Kaisheng also argues that a question for NTS theory research is how to manage the contradictory relations of human security and national security (Li and Xue, 2012:107). Li notes that within the state human rights violations occur daily although he gives no PRC examples and refers to Rummel's study that more people died through their own state in the twentieth century than in war (Li Kaisheng, 2012:146). The possibility of human rights abuses by the state is connected to the state system; in a dictatorship, the people exercise no oversight or control of the state and the government (Li Kaisheng, 2012:147). Given China's long-standing territorial disputes with neighbouring countries, it is noteworthy that Li argues that the emphasis on territorial integrity in state interest is often contrary to the interest of its citizens, as state interest means that human security may be sacrificed as two states go to war over contested territory. Li clearly considers such conflict as nonsensical.

Li is critical of the state, holding that it was conceived as a tool to ensure the security of its constituent units – individuals – but that due to international anarchy, the state wrongly became a goal and 'a living thing' with its own interests, especially concerning sovereignty, possibly contrary to the interests of its citizens (Li Kaisheng, 2012:139,145).

To temper the state, Li advocates democracy arguing that there is a connection between the level of democracy in a state and the level of the security of the majority of people in that state (Li Kaisheng, 2012:152). He argues that the state has to serve human security with the people overseeing and participating in the government and with the leaders being replaced according to the law (Li Kaisheng, 2012:152). Although this appears as a criticism of the authoritarian PRC, Li Kaisheng is evidently allowed to publish his views as his discussion is theoretical and does not mention China's situation or particular, politically sensitive issues. Nevertheless, Li's argument constitutes a normative shift as it calls for a realisation of a human-centric security concept contrary to the one propagated by the CCP.

Still, Li also notes the question of the security of minorities in democracies, pragmatically arguing that states can be improved not perfected, and that the state's effectiveness and justice are crucial (Li Kaisheng, 2012:147-152). Li's evident knowledge of Western political thought suggests that he must know the argument for liberal democracy as ensuring the liberty and security of the individual within the rule of the many. However, China's authoritarian system and the CCP's wariness of 'peaceful evolution' render it unsurprising that Li does not mention or advocate liberal democracy. Not even mentioning liberal democracy makes Li's argument more straightforward as he can juxtapose democratic and repressive regimes without going into detail. Despite this omission, Li's argument adds sophistication to the NTS debate in China by adding theoretical depth. Although Li's approach and views differ from the PRC mainstream scholarly debate, he writes in one of the major NTS series, rendering his views important and influential. While Li's statement about the impossibility of a perfect state and the importance of efficiency and justice align with the CCP's Consultative Leninism, his advocacy of democracy, including popular control of the state, goes further than what the PRC Leninist system is willing to give (see Tsang, 2009a:869ff.). Given his work, scholars now have to engage with the question of

whether NTS is really just issues or not actually a theory and whether the state is actually harming the security of the people.

Publications by PRC scholars who are moving away from a purely statist view of NTS and towards one focusing on humans do so within the boundaries set by the regime; the scholars do not openly oppose the government. Li Kaisheng, Li Dongyan, and Pan Yihe, for example, ground their support for the importance of individuals in official PRC rhetoric, referring to the CCP notion of 'humans as the foundation'- yirenweiben-以人为本. Co-opting state rhetoric allows scholars to advance different and more liberal positions contrary to the more state-centric ones of, for example, Yan Xuetong and Yang Yuan. However, to expect these scholars, who grew up and successfully work in an authoritarian state which strongly controls their education and studies, to start making the same arguments as some more critical Western colleagues is unrealistic. Understanding some of the scholars' stress of human-centric security and the individual as the core of security as a liberal democratic agenda congruent with Western liberal opinion is fallacious. As evident in Chapter Two, important voices in Western Security Studies promote a very conservative, state-centric understanding of security. The PRC debate should be understood as noteworthy because of the intricate differences within it that show both different points of view within a tightly controlled system and how much that system's boundaries can be pushed.

Conversely, other PRC scholars are wary of an abuse of humanitarian intervention for NTS issues. Zhang argues that 'humanitarian intervention is often abused...becoming an excuse or tool to realise some goal' (Zhang Yunling, 2012:002). This aligns with the CPG's worry over a Western plot to establish liberal democracy in China (Chapter One).

Changing State-Society Dynamics

Most of my interviewees thought that NTS impacted on state-society relations. Nonetheless, their explanations ranged from a

view that the state simply had to help people more to more liberal views that societal actors were becoming more important.

In some analyses state-society dynamics shifted as NTS incidents meant that the state had to support people more (UNB2, UNB3). Hence, ONB5 argued that state and society relations were changed by NTS as the state cared for people after natural disasters. This change is not an empowerment of society but simply means that the state has to look more after society.

A key way in which NTS is seen to affect state and society relations in favour of society is that the state is forced to react to NTS issues due to popular pressure. ONB1 argued that the state had to deal with NTS issues due to popular discontent. Similarly, for UNB8, the PRC's local and central government had to take environmental protection measures to prevent societal opposition as the people demanded it. UNB8's views are similar to the CCP's social management idea but are also different in that UNB8 sees the people themselves as proactive with the state having to accommodate their views.

UB5 also argued that NTS was bottom-up, with the focus now being on all people and human security, asking whether, if part of humanity was unsafe, the other half or states could be safe. Whereas state-society relations were often described as harmonious, UB4 added a more critical angle highlighting that NTS involved the international society's responsibility to protect people from massacres or conflict. Relatedly, UNB6 argued that NTS affected state-society relations, as it encompassed a limitation of state actions as the state must not 'interfere with individual rights'.

Conversely, UNB12 saw NTS as deteriorating state-society relations since people were asking why these new threats were increasingly endangering them and the state. Echoing Buzan et al.'s wariness of excessive securitisation (Chapter Two), ONB3 suggested that NTS gave the state more excuses for interference, with some states labelling protestors 'terrorists' (Buzan et al., 1998:29).

Connected to the rise in importance of society is the notion that NGOs are more important in NTS management. For UNB9, the increase of NGOs, seen as 'part of civil society', was connected to NTS as these organisations' capacities differed from the state's. UNB3 argued that NGOs were at times more important than the state in disaster management. Conversely, ONB9 saw state and society as identical, adding that this could be a 'Chinese' conceptualisation as opposed to a 'Western' view.

Political Purpose

The scholarly NTS debate in China entails a variety of management proposals, at times mutually exclusive, aimed at advising the state. The proposed management ranges from more straightforward, if ontologically questionable proposals for the state to deal with NTS in a similar way to TS through the military, to international cooperation, as noted in the New Security Concept (Chapter One) and the 2003 CASS conference, to a rejection of military solutions, to people-to-people diplomacy. In all these proposals, theoretical and political motivations are important.

Much of the literature sees the state as the actor to deal with NTS issues, often vindicating existing state policy. Outright criticism of the Chinese state seems, unsurprisingly, non-existent, and the need to change state behaviour or people's lifestyles, as some in the English literature advise, is not evident. Some of my interviewees argued that to deal with NTS, law needed to be strengthened domestically (UNB5) and that if an NTS issue had no international dimension, international management was not necessary (ONB10). This overt and tacit support and lack of overt criticism of state policy implies that this constitutes the state-set boundary of the PRC NTS debate. Critical voices have to be very careful of how they phrase their ideas to not antagonise the state. While this indicates the proximity of the state and academia in China, the PRC literature also tries to promote the importance of NTS and the need for the state to do more, to enhance its NTS capacity (see Yu Xiaofeng and Li Jia, 2008:89). This is uncontroversial in the PRC context of a strong state. Parts of the

Chinese NTS debate willingly securitise issues not previously on the PRC security agenda, but they do so using positive vocabulary – all that seems to be needed to deal with NTS is for the state to enhance its capacity – with the silent implication that less attention needs to be given to TS institutions, such as the PLA (see Yu Xiaofeng and Li Jia, 2008:96).

Focusing on the state as the main security provider leads to the question of how to reconcile NTS and TS. Pan Zhongqi regards NTS threats as strongly intertwined with TS threats, hence the ‘explanatory power’ of TS theory continued and solutions to security problems ‘must respect state sovereignty and borders as the prerequisite’ (Pan Zhongqi, 2004:1). Moreover, for Pan, it is only when not impacting on or when aiding the solution of TS that managing NTS could be prioritised in national security strategies (Pan Zhongqi, 2004:6).

NTS military management is also seen as containing a possibility for abuse. Fu Yong argues that NTS issues must not serve as a ground for military intervention (Fu Yong, 2007). This highlights the tension of NTS and the issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity and is clearly directed against US-led interventions, notably the 2003 Iraq war. Fu seems unaware of the incongruity of her argument in both highlighting the importance of NTS and in holding on to Westphalian sovereignty and territorial integrity. This suggests that Fu is insufficiently rigorous here and evidently follows a state-centric agenda, which is not surprising as she works at SASS. She effectively inflates national security to encompass other non-military threats rather than moving away from state-centrism.

Some scholars reject military solutions to NTS issues on theoretical grounds. Li Kaisheng, implying that a focus on state sovereignty cannot be part of NTS, argues that for NTS non-state actors and non-military and non-political security issues are important, since in NTS theory the state is no longer the only provider of security (Li Kaisheng, 2012:8f.,116,118). Li Kaisheng evidently rejects the idea of dealing with NTS issues through TS means as he understands TS and NTS as theoretically juxtaposed (Li Kaisheng, 2012:8).

Similarly, ONB8, ONB9, and UNB6 reject military solutions since the fundamentally different nature of NTS issues and TS issues require different solutions.

The most commonly proposed management of NTS as stated in the PRC debate is through international cooperation (see Li Kaisheng, 2012:118). Many of my interviewees highlighted cooperation when I asked them how NTS should be dealt with. ONB5 argued that since no one state could deal with NTS alone, there had to be cooperation between states. This truism is sometimes criticised within the PRC debate. UB1 emphasised that cooperation entailed fair-burden sharing.

However, the discourse is deeper than just this. While most scholars advocate cooperation without going into detail, some, like Guo Xuetang, Wang Yong, and Cui Shunji have an end beyond the mere solution of NTS issues in mind and are starting a normative shift. Indeed, the summary of the 2003 CASS NTS conference advised the PRC to view NTS as a diplomatic opportunity to increase cooperation, establish its international position and reputation as a responsible great power, as well as proliferate its new security concept (He Zhongyi, 2004:55). UNB1 considered NTS a chance for cooperation. Guo Xuetang similarly argues that NTS-cooperation can help dispel the so-called 'China threat theory' and thus advance China's 'peaceful rise' (Guo Xuetang, 2010:97). CASS' and Guo Xuetang's arguments are policy-oriented as Guo uses CCP-vocabulary and as both promote the NTS agenda by tying it to the government aims. Wang Yong, too, advances cooperation with the clear aim of dispelling distrust of China, arguing that NTS is an opportunity for cooperation in East Asia 'to help reduce suspicion caused by the rise and fall of powers, and serve the interest of all the sides' (Wang Yong, 2004). Although Guo Xuetang's and Wang Yong's proposals seem opportunistic, co-opting NTS threats for Chinese state goals, they also promote the NTS cooperation agenda by raising it to a key state interest.

Going beyond the state, Cui Shunji more uniquely argues that civilian cooperation on NTS between China, Japan, and South

Korea can help end their historic enmity: 'NTS issues can avoid sensitive areas' and NTS cooperation has turned people-to-people relations in a more prominent and conciliatory direction' (Cui Shunji, 2013:869,886). While Cui's article was published in a Western journal, I asked my interviewees specifically about Cui's idea and whether they agreed that NTS cooperation could improve bilateral relations. According to UNB1, people-to-people relations were good whereas intergovernmental ones were not. For ONB1, cooperation of NTS was beneficial for both sides. ONB1 qualified this statement, implying that NTS cooperation was only possible/likely to help bilateral relations when it concerned acute disasters with one side needing help and the other side delivering that help. In contrast, UNB3 argued for the possibility to make NTS cooperation last beyond acute crises by emphasising human security. This notion inadvertently echoes the official PRC demands to end 'Cold War thinking' in international relations. It problematically leads to an encouragement of securitisation. Pan Yihe argues that there is a positive value of securitisation when it enables cross-cultural dialogue (Pan Yihe, 2011:322). This misreading of Buzan et al.'s concept of securitisation was also evident in my interviews. UNB1 argued that securitisation helped to mobilise resources in developing countries. UNB8 suggested that securitising issues to become NTS aided cooperation and the solution of these problems. These answers reverse Buzan et al.'s argument and reveal, rather than theoretical innovation, a lack of understanding of the original theory. Moreover, apart from the (mis-)use of the term securitisation (anquanhua-安全化), Western security theory evidently does not have a forming impact on the PRC scholars who seek to influence the state.

Causes of Variance

Geographical location, affiliation and internal factors of analytical rigour, critical thinking, pursuit of theory-creation or policy-advocacy are crucial for the variance in conceptualisation and assessment of significance of NTS.

Neither geographic location nor affiliation account for the ontological divide I have shown in the PRC debate, namely between those considering NTS to be entirely new, those regarding it as an old-new hybrid, and those who consider it not novel at all. ONB1 from a non-Beijing research institution and Peking University's Wang Yizhou consider NTS as novel whereas UNB5 from a non-Beijing university and UB3 from a Beijing University argues that NTS is mixed, whereas interviewees from Beijing and Non-Beijing universities, and state-affiliated Beijing-based Zhang Yunling, Wenzhou University professor Xu Huabing, state-affiliated Beijing-based Lu Zhongwei and Fudan's Yan Xuetong and Yang Yuan regarded NTS as not novel at all.

More internal factors account for this variance. For those claiming that NTS is not new, the state is generally central to their thinking and state security is merely expanded to take in further issues not previously considered threats. Moreover, these scholars do not primarily focus on NTS. Conversely, those arguing that NTS is novel have a strong academic focus on NTS and highlight 'sudden shocks', such as SARS. The mixed old-new argument similarly tries to deal with sudden crises but relativises the novelty in order to arrive at a more balanced assessment.

The lack of importance of location and affiliation on the variance is also evident in the question of whether NTS is the opposite of TS. Whereas the majority of authors and interviewees, regardless of location and affiliation, simply contrast NTS and TS rather than problematise this relationship, Beijing-based university scholar UB5 and non-Beijing-based university scholar UNB5 argued that NTS could morph into TS depending on how the issues were treated. Here again internal factors of thinking critically are crucial. Conversely, Li Kaisheng's and Yu et al.'s more unique and critical review of the theoretical implications of NTS suggest that their location away from Beijing (Shanghai and Hangzhou) connects with their inclinations to look beyond Beijing-based OB1's, Wang Yizhou's, and Li Dongyan's focus on the ideational narrative of

increasing awareness of NTS. In this case, internal and external factors combine as contributors to variance.

Finally, the variety in the debate encompassing state-centrism and nascent human-centrism is accounted for mostly by different ontologies. Whereas Fu Yong, Xu Huabing, Yang Xuetong and Yang Yuan pursue gradations of realist thinking considering the state as the main referent object, UNB5, UNB3, Zhou Yuanyuan, Yu et al., Wang Yihzou and Li Kaisheng focus on individuals.

Conclusion

The above analysis demonstrates the complexity of the NTS debate in China and its internal differences. The literature on NTS in China generally agrees that there is not yet an authoritative definition of NTS, and this leads to a variety of discussions of definitional issues. My discussion shows that there are fundamentally different views on what NTS is among Chinese scholars engaging in this debate. Some evidently see it as an extension of TS and others see it in opposition to TS, some highlight its lethality while others warn against overemphasising NTS threats to the detriment of responding to more pressing threats.

This chapter shows that in contrast to the English debate, the PRC academic literature contains a self-proclaimed NTS discourse. Yet despite the evident NTS discourse, it is still not clear what NTS is. The themes in the literature, the understanding of NTS as new and sudden threats, as in opposition to TS, and as an ideational change, are all contested within the debate. Indeed, some key thinkers, such as Wang Yizhou and Yu Xiaofeng, embrace several of the themes, which means that there is a tension within the understanding of NTS within the thought of individual thinkers, too.

Similar to the mainstream debate, these controversial views within the NTS debate in China are due to the different perspectives the scholars adopt when looking at security and/or NTS. The scholars see different versions of 'reality' and 'security'. The lack of

agreement on the relationship between TS and NTS implies that neither concept is clear or universally understood in the same way. This implies that the terminology of NTS and TS is arbitrary. However, the widespread use of 'NTS' as a term and the existence of the NTS debate means that the term itself is not contested. Given that the term NTS is also used in government publications and that major IR scholars, such as Wang Yizhou and Yan Xuotong use it, the term is generally validated and legitimised. This general embrace of the term NTS is in contrast to Booth's wariness of the term, highlighted in Chapter One, based on the Booth's contention that for the afflicted their insecurity is not 'non-traditional'.

The PRC scholars are therefore in the curious position of dealing with a concept which is terminologically accepted but whose meaning and content is disputed, rendering the term 'NTS' rich and hollow at the same time. This lack of an accepted definition but terminological acceptance shows a PRC debate seemingly unified under an umbrella term but which actually houses tensions of mutual opposition, both among scholars and within the argument of individual scholars. NTS can therefore be elaborated and changed regarding content in the future, although the term is likely to remain the same.

The nascent human-centrism in the debate shows the depth and breadth of the concept of NTS in the debate in China and a normative shift. Both the scholars who pursue a more statist argument and those who deepen security to include humans and even the individual as referent objects are included within the NTS debate. This is important as it shows that NTS in the debate in China can be taken to increase state security or state capacity and scope in the case of Fu Yong's argument, and, in Li Kaisheng's case, to deepen security and to warn against excessive use and an excessive increase of state security. 'NTS' thus becomes as controversial in the debate in China as 'security' in the Western debate. Due to the inherent lack of scholarly and political definition of NTS, the NTS debate creates a space for scholars in China to engage in more controversy about what security is, allowing for

more freedom of individual thought on the matter, anticipating a normative turn as scholars consider what security ought to be.

The conceptualisations of NTS in the debate in China further entail differing views on the impact of NTS on state-society relations, revealing political meaning. While some scholars move more away from the state as referent object and actor dealing with security threats, other scholars embrace NGOs and more societal actions. This latter move is significant given the PRC's overbearing state, suggesting a more liberal side to the debate.

Overall, NTS is seen as manageable, and thus the scholars' definitions accord with my working definition. While there is a strong emphasis on international cooperation as the preferred management method, other methods, such as people-to-people diplomacy show that the debate entails more original and controversial views which tacitly question the notion that the state is necessarily the best actor to deal with NTS threats.

Chapter Four: Culture and Information Security

Culture security and information security are treated as stand-alone issues in the PRC NTS debate, but are closely connected: both concern a security of preserving identity. Unlike the other issues this thesis discusses, both are terminologically problematic. Energy, the environment, migration, the economy, transnational crime, and even terrorism have generally accepted, empirically-based meanings. Culture and information are intangible. Culture – in English and Chinese – is an imprecise notion, possibly covering behavioural codes, the fine arts, and religion, or a civilisational subgroup. Information, too, is elusive. It could refer to any piece of knowledge, although this definition says nothing about whether information has to be true and how its truth is decided, if more than the most factual of statements is concerned. ‘Culture’ and ‘information’ are liable to be determined by the powerful who can turn their own views into orthodoxy.

Again unlike the other issues in this thesis, culture security and information security have no direct equivalents in the Western Security Studies debate. Information security touches upon but is wider than ‘cyber security’. Culture security is connected to Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ discourse, but also overlaps with Buzan et al.’s ‘societal security’.

This chapter investigates the PRC scholarly debate on culture security and information security against the research questions. I first analyse the PRC scholarly conceptualisation of culture and information security and establish how the scholars evaluate their significance. I then inquire into what accounts for the variance of conceptualisations and assigned significance. This is followed by an analysis of the political meanings and purposes this scholarship reveals and seeks to attain. Finally, I test the PRC culture and information security debates for possible normative implications.

Context

The context of culture and information security is China's twenty-first century global position and its history. While Pye famously argued that 'China is a civilization pretending to be a state', historically, 'China' and 'being Chinese' are not nation/nationality-based concepts (Pye, 1990; Schmidt-Glintzer, 2008:133; see Ong, 2005:7). Regarding itself as civilised contrasted to external barbarians, Chinese civilisation throughout history comprised various languages, religions, and customs (Glintzer-Schmidt, 2008:133; Cohen, 1994:89).

The nineteenth-century Western onslaught severely shook the traditional Chinese worldview, questioning Chinese cultural superiority. A period of elite-division over whether to reform followed, culminating in the iconoclastic, nationalistic 1919 May Fourth movement (Cohen, 1994:101f.). The two major political forces shaping Chinese post-WWI history – the Guomindang and the CCP – sought to 'modernise' China through nationalism and neo-Confucianism, and communism respectively.

The CCP recast Chinese history in a Marxist, and hence European, narrative, seeking to destroy traditional 'feudalism' and to establish a proletarian dictatorship in a non-industrialised country. After 1949, political campaigns against 'feudal' elites and 'bourgeois' tendencies sought to strengthen the CCP's (and Mao's) rule and to eradicate traditional culture, culminating in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Formal education mostly ceased and students, including many of today's scholars, were 'sent to the countryside' to work as peasants.

The post-1978 Reform and Opening-Up under Deng Xiaoping brought Western ideas and commercialism, and the CCP lost its information hegemony previously ensured through totalitarian media-control. Whereas Eastern Europe's peaceful revolutions changed the world order, the CCP-leadership suppressed the Tiananmen protesters and endeavoured to bolster its rule through nationalism, aimed against a Western-orchestrated 'peaceful

evolution' to democracy (Tsang, 2009a:866). The CCP's embrace of nationalism for legitimacy means that in the PRC today, 'Chineseness' is not an objective identity but decided by the Party (Tsang, 2009a:866,875).

Since the 2000s, the regime stresses traditional culture and the ancient nature of Chinese civilisation in its global self-portrayal, including during the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the creation of 'Confucius Institutes'. This is reflected in popular books such as Zhao Tingyang's *Tianxia* system of ordering the world. These nationalist narratives contradict the early CCP's violent iconoclasm and China's cultural diversity.

The CCP's nationalist narrative portrays itself as leading a great, ancient, and unified China victimised by Western imperialism in the 'century of humiliation' since 1839 towards its global re-emergence (Tsang, 2009a:876). This narrative is problematically Han-centric, considering alternative historical narratives or national identities traitorous (Tsang, 2009a:876). The narrative's xenophobic aspects vilify Japan and juxtapose the PRC to a West which begrudges China's unity and rise, rendering China unique and unable to adopt Western liberal democracy (Tsang, 2009a:876). The recent grand narratives of the CCP leadership – Hu and Wen's 'harmonious society' and Xi's 'Chinese dream' – focus more on China than on Marxism, and are culturally hollow given the earlier iconoclasm. Culture security is closely intertwined with regime security as controlling 'Chineseness' is key for the CCP to legitimate its rule.

The regime tries to preserve and increase its control over 'information', involving cyber-security and the censorship of online, print, and broadcast news and information. While the state monitors social media and blocks foreign websites via 'the Great Firewall', the prevalence of pirated software lacking legal updates means that cyber-attacks from various sources are common (Singer and Friedman, 2014:153). China and the USA blame each other for cyberattacks and prepare for a possible 'cyber war', with incidents such as the NSA's hacking of Tsinghua University's

website exemplifying the immediacy of this cyber animosity (Singer and Friedman, 2014:154).

The 2015 National Security Law increased the position of culture security and information security within national security. The law encompasses the protection of the socialist system, CCP rule, and socialist values against Western values (gov.cn, 01/07/2015). Given the campaign against Western influence on China's education system prior to this new legislation, Chinese and foreign critics fear further limitations of academic freedom (F.A.Z., 02/07/2015). Following the Snowden revelations, China made cyber-security one of the key elements of national security, and the national security law encompasses the need to make systems and networks 'secure and controllable' (F.A.Z., 02/07/2015).

The context of the scholarly culture and information security debate is one where culture is fragile and poorly defined; whether culture is 'Chinese' or 'communist' is not clear given the latter's dominance over China, making 'culture security' for the regime equivalent to regime security. Information, too, is an important issue positing China against the West, and directly concerns CCP rule.

The Literature

The 2003 semi-official 'On NTS' edited by Lu Zhongwei entails a chapter on culture security by Xu Tao. Yu et al.'s *Introduction to NTS* devotes a chapter to culture security and Pan Yihe published a monograph on 'cultural security' in Zhejiang University's NTS series. Scholars writing on culture security from non-IR disciplines also attest that culture security is NTS (Liu Ben, 2008:1). Pan Yihe is evidently the leading culture security scholar in the PRC NTS discourse, and Liu Xiaoyan's article on culture security treats her as the single authority on the definition of culture security in the PRC debate (Liu Xiaoyan, 2014:104). The 2007 *Views from China* does not mention culture security.

In the 2003 semi-official *On NTS*, Tang Lan writes a chapter on information security. Yu et al. devote an entire chapter to information security, marking it as a crucial NTS issue. The three

NTS blue books all contain chapters on information security. The 2013-14 volume contains a chapter by Ren Lin on 'NTS governing/managing 'the global commons' – with the examples of internet and space security', and a chapter by Fu Rongxiao and Ma Xinmin on 'the government's information security problems (2013-2014) under the vision field of national information security'. The 2012-13 Blue Book contains a chapter by Fu Rongxiao on 'government information security issues in an informationised environment'. In the 2011-2012 Blue Book, Fu Rongxiao and Luo Luan write on 'research on government information security in the environment of e-government'. Neither Zha's *Views from China* nor Zhao and Zhu's *Non Traditional Security and China's New Foreign Strategy* focus on information security.

Conceptualisation

Culture

The scholarly PRC debate does not clearly define culture. The semi-official debate, exemplified by Xu Tao, argues that definitions of culture differ between scholars of different countries due to different value systems, noting that culture has two elements: the 'material form of culture' is 'the accumulation of achievements of humankind's naturally practiced activities and also a materialised embodiment of humankind's spiritual development', whereas the 'spiritual form of culture' is 'the summary of achievements of human society's practised activities; it is the sublimation of the understanding of the material world' (Xu Tao, 2003:327f.). This obscure definition reflects important NTS scholars' refusal to clearly define culture, enabling them to include almost anything in 'culture security'. Hence, SASS's Fu Yong allows the regime to define culture, turning 'culture security' into a vague umbrella term covering the state's freedom from foreign interference in terms of ideology, values, lifestyle, 'national character', and customs (Fu Yong, 2003:060). Key PRC scholars' failure to define culture clearly indicates the government's leadership over key definitions in the NTS debate.

However, the non-NTS Chinese IR literature defines culture according to Western understandings. Qinghua's Yan Xuetong and Yang Yuan discuss the Latin etymology of culture, from cultivating the earth to cultivating people, despite writing in Chinese using the term 文化-*wenhua*, not *cultura* (Yan and Yang, 2013:242). This indicates the Western impact on the PRC debate. For Yan and Yang, culture is ideational, behavioural, and material in terms of shared, constructed aspects which all humans share as opposed to animals, and narrowly in terms of acquired immaterial behaviours and concepts unique to different groups (Yan and Yang, 2013:242ff.). Yan and Yang's definition refers to overall human civilisation and particular culture and is clearer than those of the NTS scholars due to its emphasis on shared and particular values, behaviours, and symbols.

Rather than following the regime's narrative of CCP-led Chinese culture, UNB4 noted an understanding of Chinese 'traditional' culture as variously referring to the Confucian history, socialist 'new China', and the economy-driven Reform and Opening-Up Period. UNB4, unlike the literature, freely acknowledged contradictions between these three strands of Chinese culture. However, for UNB4, people could choose their favourite Chinese culture.

The PRC debate generally omits problematising 'culture' as parts of the English debate do. Booth stresses that 'culture' is a recent tool for differentiating between people (Booth, 2007:355). Booth's argument against artificially ascribing a single identity to individuals highlights the dangers of the culture security debate, namely failing to accept people as multifaceted (Booth, 2007:356-8). Such a critical stance is absent from the PRC debate as it would question the regime's emphasis on culture. Similar to nationality, culture serves as a lens through which to classify the world into distinct groups, into self and other.

Conversely, culture security in the PRC literature is highly politicised. Yu et al. define it as a subjective view that one's state or nation's 'cultural characteristics' are not in danger of changing for the negative or disappearing in globalisation (Yu et al.,

2006:195). In her 2007 monograph, Pan Yihe tweaked this definition: ‘for today’s China, “culture security” mostly refers to the “security feeling” of people that their “state – nation’s” “fundamental values” and “cultural characteristics” cannot gradually vanish or degenerate during globalisation’ (Pan Yihe, 2007:028).

Regarding the components of culture security, Yu et al.’s definition evidently evolves into Pan’s definition, as the latter includes religious security and ideology, too. Yu et al. argue that this subjective culture security involves social management, the existence and development of culture, as well as the security of information, the education system, language, and political culture (Yu et al., 2006:195-215). Pan Yihe similarly emphasises political culture security, including (the PRC’s) political system and social management system, citizens’ education system and reform, the spread of information and the security of language, but adds ‘family education and social education’, ‘religious security’, and ‘national ideology security’ (Pan Yihe, 2007:028). Hence both Yu et al. and Pan link culture security strongly to political culture, but Pan goes further and focuses more on China.

Similarly, Fu Yong’s definition of culture security as the absence of external interference in a state’s culture is clearly the security of the CCP-regime which defines culture and ideology, which Fu regards as part of culture (Fu Yong, 2007:060). The state’s culture-monopoly excludes the possibility of a minority’s culture security vis-à-vis a majority culture within the same state, suggesting – in line with the CCP narrative – that China’s official 55 minorities cannot claim individual culture security and that the majority Han culture is China’s national culture.

Although UNB4 thought that culture security concerned education and values, UNB4’s understanding of culture is more subtle than this focus on the education system implies. UNB4 focuses on language, worrying that Chinese students learn English and only imitate Western culture through ‘language and information’ without being creative themselves. UNB4 acknowledged a tension within this argument over the importance of the state as human security

was crucial but people depended on their state's protection. In contrast to other parts of the PRC debate, however, the state here is important solely in its role as legal protector of its citizens.

Another issue UNB4 saw as threatening culture security is US-style 'consumerism', which was 'now actually quite scary' and contrary to tradition when people went shopping to ease unhappiness. For UNB4, this is a security problem as it entailed a change in the value system as consumerism was pure self-centredness and on the rise, creating insecurity. Relatedly, UNB4 considers a thoughtless emphasis on rights as threatening as some people in China, who lacked understanding of the philosophical background of Western rights, started to focus only on their own interests and rights, rather than also thinking of other people's rights. UNB4 is not opposed to ideational change and does not suggest that human rights are inherently incompatible with China. What worries UNB4 are hollow adoptions of other values and legal concepts which are not anchored and supported in society and are neither understood nor can be realised.

Information Security

'*Xinxi anquan*-信息安全, translated as 'information security' in the PRC debate, also means 'news security'. The overwhelming use of *xinxi anquan*-信息安全-information security in the PRC literature contrasts to the Western focus on 'cyber security'. "Cyber security" in the PRC debate is unclear. Whereas UB7 used 'information security' interchangeably with the term 'cyber security' (网络安全 *wanglu anquan*), Yu et al. consider 'cyber security' a sub-category of information security concerning governmental IT, and thus is purely government-focused (Yu et al., 2006:229,246). This unclearness is reflected in the PRC debate's wide-ranging definitions.

For Tang, Fu, and Yu et al., information security concerns the content and technological element of 'information'. Tang of the semi-official debate defines it generally as 'the security of the network infrastructure' and 'the security of information content on

the web' (Tang Lan, 2003:383). Yu et al. similarly advance a broad, unclear definition entailing no 'information risk and danger' and safeguarding the good operation of the IT system in terms of data, as well as soft- and hard-ware, including resilience of the network and uncorrupted and usable information (Yu et al., 2006:229,246). For Tang and Yu et al., information security is clearly mostly internet-related security.

Fu Yong's definition is openly flexible, holding that 'information security' is 'constantly developing', from information being uncorrupted, usable, and secret to information security now involving politics, the military, society, culture, the economy, and technology (Fu Yong, 2007:63). This is similar to Tang Lan's argument that the increasing influence of information technology means that 'every field', including those Fu refers to, is affected by information security, 'including individual rights and interests' (Tang Lan, 2003:383). For Tang, Information security is crucial, for its absence means the de facto absence of political and national security (Tang Lan, 2003:383). While evidently regarding information security as extremely important, Fu Yong's and Tang Lan's definitions do not clarify information security, or what level of risk is unacceptable or poses a 'threat'.

This conceptual broadness means that key PRC works emphasise the NTS characteristics of information security, suggesting that its NTS categorisation is not uncontroversial. Chen and Zuo's 2007 monograph sees these 'NTS characteristics' as the 'pluralised threats', the 'asymmetry of attack and defence', 'broadness of the impact', 'gravity of the effects', and the 'suddenness...of the incidents' (Chen and Zuo, 2007:21-59). Hence the threateners could be states and non-state actors. Yu et al. similarly refer to the ease of attack, a transnational aspect, the technological impact, the side-effects of attacks, dependence on other states, and asymmetrical threats from non-state actors (Yu et al., 2006:235f.). Chen and Zuo's, and Yu et al.'s characteristics are all closely related to cyber-security, but could relate to military TS.

Emphases on military security problematise information security's NTS credentials. Yu et al. stress information security's connection to military defence, while Wang Jun divides 'cyber war' into TS aspects – the use of the internet by the military – and NTS aspects including cyber-terrorism, hacker-attacks, and 'social network war' (Yu et al., 2006:240; Wang Jun, 2012:80,90ff.). Although the sense of increasing importance of military 'informatisation' in China is mentioned in the Western debate, Yu et al. fail to explain how information security can be NTS when connected to military defence (Singer and Friedman, 2014:157). This confusion underlines the frequent theoretical vagueness and a tendency to include too many issues in NTS in the PRC debate. Conversely, UB4 clearly divided cyber security from military security arguing that hackers attack via the internet rather than through military assaults.

Statist Threats

The West – especially the USA – is a major - and the only state-based - threatener in the semi-official and the scholarly PRC culture and information security debates. For both, the USA tries to expand its power through cultural and information hegemony. This accords with official PRC concerns about Western-instigated 'peaceful evolution' to liberal democracy. The semi-official debate accuses the USA of forcing its political values on other states, while the scholarly debate is less antagonistic and focuses more on the Westernisation of popular culture.

Humanitarian intervention, pressure to adopt Western-style democracy, human rights, and 'cultural hegemony' are, for Xu Tao, Western tools to ensure overall hegemony, and contain China (Xu, 2003:332-4). Xu regards human rights as in tension with culture, and that 'culture', even though clearly ideological, overrides political and legal concerns. Resulting cultural insecurity, for Xu, severely impacts on state and society and possibly unravels the state's ideology, altering the path of national development (Xu Tao, 2003:327). This suggests an existential threat to state, society, and the nation.

In the scholarly debate, Western popular culture hegemony eroding indigenous culture is emphasised. The political impact of 'Westernisation' and cultural hegemony is also feared as entailing political change, threatening the political system, and advocating human rights (Yu et al., 2006:208).

Similarly, Fu Yong warns of cultural hegemony of some states leading to the abandonment of other states' indigenous cultures and accepting the hegemon's ideology (Fu Yong, 2007:62). The hegemon can influence the entire world and the 'domestic development' of states which adopt its values (Fu Yong, 2007:62). Post-Cold War culture hegemony, for Fu, is strong as the hegemon's popular culture enters all states through language, sports, TV, and movies and the USA is the main threat due to the ubiquity of English (Fu Yong, 2007:62). Abandoning the developed-developing state dichotomy, Fu argues that France and Canada, too, fear US culture, legitimising China's worries (Fu Yong, 2007:62). UNB4, too, regarded the USA as the main cyber security threat.

Yu et al.'s chapter reveals an underlying antagonistic statism through the allegation that news agencies in liberal democracies as state-dominated and are used to steer information in developing states (Yu et al., 2006:198,211). Rather than 'fake news', incorrect news that is problematic, cultural factors are crucial, with Yu et al. asking whether such international news affect one's verbal communications and ways of thinking, including one's worldview (Yu et al., 2006:198,211). Yu et al.'s concerns are supported by UNB4 arguing that worldviews and language were linked and that translating a point of view changed it, with Chinese focusing on the big picture and then zooming in on the individual level. Hence UNB4 considers it crucial for individual security and for being oneself to understand one's native language for else one merely follows others. UNB4's concerns are, similar to the above over not having the background of rights, that people superficially adopt a new language without the education or understanding of the cultural background in which they linguistically act. The result is a

limitation of these individuals' awareness of reality, leaving them exposed to misunderstanding and unravelling society. The resulting insidious threat is the undermining of the CCP-led worldview but also language and indigenous styles of communication.

In contrast to the focus on inter-state threats in the literature, UNB4 acknowledged that culture hegemony occurs within states, too.

Non-Statist Threats

Non-statist threats encompass both intentional and unintentional ones. UNB4 argued that the key threat to culture security to the Chinese emanated from 'cultural globalisation'. 'Cultural globalisation', for UNB4 was 'problematic' since difference was a source of people's pride and since security did not entail uniformity of thought. The threat here is not statist cultural hegemony but homogenised thought and behaviour. For UNB4, difference must be safeguarded for its own sake.

In the PRC debate, an intentional threat to information and culture security emanates from terrorism. Regarding culture security, terrorists are briefly mentioned by Fu Yong and Yu et al., with the latter seeing terrorism as catalysed by the post-Cold War 'ideological chaos' (Yu et al., 2006:200). In information security, as the internet increases terrorists' 'asymmetric superiority' and influence, terrorists can use it for real-world and online attacks, for propaganda, 'fake news', and threats, creating a 'terror atmosphere' (Yu et al., 2006:233f.,238f.; Fu Yong, 2007:65). Culture is the cause and information technology the tool of terrorism.

Novelty

The PRC literature regards information security as new, indicating a focus on technology. Conversely, the scholarly and semi-official debates see culture security as ancient, with Xu arguing that there were civilisational 'clashes in antiquity involving the Egyptians, Romans and Greeks, and UNB4 that culture security is 'very ancient', referring to the Spartan-Persian conflict (Xu Tao,

2003:345f.). Pan Yihe evidently regards security as multi-faceted with different aspects prominent at different times, and with cultural security issues coming to the fore during globalisation (Pan, 2007:021). Conversely, Fu Yong agrees more with Huntington, arguing that cultural differences became important as ideological confrontation waned after the Cold War (Fu Yong, 2007:061). Fu's argument is flawed since she, as noted above, like Xu Tao, holds that ideology is part of culture security.

Some scholars also see modernity and globalisation as triggering cultural security problems. Supporting the narrative that modernity and globalisation alienate people, causing them to seek religious solace, Fu Yong argues that religious fundamentalism is reverted to if the world is very uncertain (Fu Yong, 2007:062). Hence cultural hegemony threats involve the powerful, notably states, using 'culture' to extend their power. By contrast, for the weak and disaffected, evidently individuals and groups rather than states, culture constitutes solace for the disempowered, but rather than creating security, this cultural turn breeds conflict.

The PRC literature sees information security as new, rising with technological development and use (Tang Lan, 2003:381,384; Fu Yong, 2007:62). Rather than her own reasons, Fu Yong refers to major states' adoption of information security as an explanation why information security is a new NTS issue, with the internet allowing information and military, political, economic, and cultural activities to transcend borders (Fu Yong, 2007:62f.,65).

My interviews revealed a more nuanced view. UB8 historically relativised the overall novelty of information security. UB8 noted that the state could use the internet for surveillance. UB8's view of state-interference as ubiquitous and portrayal of states, including China, as using information technology for surveillance is not evident in PRC publications, highlighting their boundaries. However, UB8 legitimises authoritarian practices by equating them with those of democracies: the surveillance state is normalised.

Significance

The significance PRC scholars assign to culture and information security is based on linkages to Western theory and to political, i.e. regime, importance. Rather than intrinsic non-statist NTS theoretical lenses according importance, state-centric concerns do.

Huntington's 1993 *Clash of Civilizations* is ubiquitous in the PRC literature, triggering and legitimating the PRC debate (Pan, 2007:039; Yu et al., 2006:213; Xu, 2003:338-346). Part of the post-Cold War scholarly interest to predict the era's defining feature, and rather than joining Fukuyama's belief in the liberal triumph, Huntington believes in continuing conflict, albeit 'inter-civilisational' (Huntington, 1993:22). Like the subsequent PRC debate, Huntington's use of 'civilisation' and 'culture' is unclear. Civilisation is the ultimate identity: 'a civilization is...the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species' (Huntington, 1993:24). Dividing humanity into 'Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization', Huntington highlights the importance and agency of non-Western civilisations, while clearly defining them as inimical 'Others' (Huntington, 1993:25).

Huntington increases the importance attached to cultural security in the PRC NTS debate. Scholars both genuinely share his views and esteem culture security now more due to his argument's fame. Fu Yong does both, and Xu Tao of the semi-official debate sees Huntington as a new theory for US/Western hegemonism (Fu Yong, 2007:61; Xu Tao, 2003:346). UNB4 admired Huntington for his understanding of real issues although the solutions he proposed differed from UNB4's thinking. PRC research clearly takes Huntington's work as a catalyst, but his arguments also serve to distinguish China from the West and other 'civilisations'. Moreover, Huntington's theory connects to the CCP's emphasis on Confucian culture, linking the official PRC-line with international IR-scholarship for the PRC scholars.

The PRC debate attaches strong political importance to culture and information security. For Xu Tao, culture security issues connect to 'a state's superstructure' and may affect 'the rise and fall of nation-states' (Xu Tao, 2003:327). Culture is of existential significance.

The scholarly debate, too, underlines the importance of culture security by emphasising political linkages. Information security is similarly often linked to national security to underline its importance (Fu and Ma, 2014:238; Fu Yong, 2007:64f.; Yu et al., 2006:229; Tang Lan, 2003:382,384). Yu et al. hold that information security is crucial to national security and to the security of societies (Yu et al., 2006:229). This echoes Tang's argument that information security was now central to national security, and is reflected by Fu Rongxiao and Ma Xinmin: 'in NTS...national information security is the state's core security' (Tang Lan, 2003:382; Fu and Ma, 2014:238). Fu Yong elaborates that competition today is about information and technology power with 'Comprehensive National Power' being influenced by 'the level of informatisation' (Fu Yong, 2007:62). Arguing that information security is the core of security for state and society assigns it utmost importance, despite contradicting Yu et al.'s prioritisation of environment security (Chapter Eight). The scholars do not regard information security through a new theoretical lens, but merely include it into traditional international-adversarial thinking.

Similarly, and despite the attested novelty of information security, the academic and semi-official debate envelope information security in traditional politics. Hence, 'information sovereignty', with the state controlling information within its physical and virtual borders is seen by Yu et al. as of increasing significance (Yu et al., 2006:231,234). Yu et al.'s understanding of the information network as a governable, almost physical space normalises information technology and the internet as simply another area of state-control. By looking at information security through a traditional statist, sovereignty- and control-based lens, the scholars fail to create a new theoretical lens for this 'non-traditional' issue.

The recent Blue Books break with this traditional framework, considering information security as highly important, but focus less on states. Fu Rongxiao and Luo Luan simply look at 'government information security [as]...having profound, long-lasting impact on the government to better fulfil its functions', rather than focusing on control or international competition (Fu and Luo, 2012:277). In further contrast to Tang Lan, Fu Yong, and Yu et al., Ren Lin regards the internet as part of 'the global commons', a common area of international society along with the arctic, space, and oceans (Ren, 2014:100). Ren and Fu and Luo adopt completely different theoretical lenses, moving away from totalitarian control-obsession.

Increasing Importance

The significance of culture and information security is seen as increasing by scholars (and the state) as globalisation increasingly links states and people.

Increasing information technology increases vulnerabilities. According to Fu, information technology enables non-state actors to access previously state-only levels of influence and capability (Fu Yong, 2007:64f.). Fu Yong notes that hackers are becoming more organised and politicised, with, for example, ideology, 'patriotism', and 'nationalism' increasingly motivating hacker-attacks on states, government networks and businesses, endangering societal stability, international relations, and international order (Fu Yong, 2007:64). UB2 argued that information is closely connected to the overall rise of NTS as it gave new methods to terrorists and criminals. For UB2, the threat of terrorism was now 'severe' and depended on the proliferation of communication with information flows thus creating threats. Information security, for UB2, then is not just important per se, but because of its catalysing nature. UB2's argument is logical as it shows the information technology as a tool.

Reasons for Variance

Factors accounting for the above-established variance of conceptualisation and assigned significance are the different scholars' location and affiliation, and scholarly interest.

A notable variance concerns the existential significance assigned to culture and information security. The spectrum of significance stretches from those closer connected to the state, who regard culture and information security as key pillars of the rise and fall of nations to those further away from state interest who regard it as less significant for the state. The semi-official scholars, Xu Tao and Tang Lan, due to their affiliation to the International Relations University regard both issues as severely important. This is followed by Fu Yong whose SASS-affiliation is closer to the state than to university-scholars. Fu is similar to the semi-official debate regarding her extreme assessment and state-centrism of the two issues. University-affiliated scholars, such as Yu Xiaofeng, Wang Jiangli, and Pan Yihe, and Ren Lin are less emphatic about existential threats from culture and information security.

There is no clear connection between the scholars' location and their conceptualisation and evaluation of the significance of culture and information security. Whereas the semi-official 'On NTS' discusses both, as do Fu Yong and Yu et al., other monographs and edited volumes (*Views from China*) do not necessarily discuss either issue. As mentioned above, Pan Yihe of Zhejiang University is the leading scholar on culture security in the PRC NTS debate, suggesting that scholars' personal interest rather than location is important in choosing research topics. Hence variance is mostly due to research interest. UNB4 thought was clearly deepest, but UB8's relativism is similarly removed from CCP statism. Both arrive at different conclusions due to their overall interest. For UNB4, this is culture as linguistic and ideational societal norms of behaviour enabling meaningful social life, whereas UB8 focuses on a continuous struggle of control and freedom between individuals and the state.

Political Implications

The emergence of culture and information security as PRC NTS scholarship has significant political implications. The semi-official and the scholarly published debate mostly vindicate the state but my interviews suggest divergent views.

The debate frequently follows the state's securitisation. Xu problematically conflates ideology with culture security, arguing that ideology works for the national interest, here the survival of culture (Xu, 2003:328f.). Xu actually talks about political culture and the regime's security, portraying CCP-ideology as benign; the CCP becomes the guardian and arbiter of culture. More removed from the political centre, Yu et al. focus mostly on political culture, vindicating rather than challenging the state's securitisation of the two issues. Pan Yihe's equation of politics with culture accords with the CCP's nationalist and xenophobic narrative of a rising China surrounded by powers who wish it to remain weak, eagerly criticising China for any mistake within its borders.

The focus on state security and regime security by the PRC culture security debate demonstrates the contrast to the Western societal security debate. For Buzan et al. the referent object here is some big group to which people are sufficiently loyal that they will react to arguments that 'its identity' is endangered (Buzan et al., 1998:123). Given the importance of the regime in PRC-culture security, Buzan et al.'s societal security with its rejection of the regime as the judge over what is culture and identity is inconceivable in the PRC debate.

The portrayal of developed states' technological superiority as statist threats to China's information security in the scholarly debate reveals political motivations seeking to protect the CCP's information monopoly. For Yu et al., there is a danger of 'information hegemony' or 'e-colonialism' in developing states' dependence on developed states' IT (Yu et al., 2006:231). 'Hegemony' and 'colonialism' imply illegitimate and intentional foreign impositions seeking to subdue China, similar to Xu Tao's

fear of containment. The danger of foreign information for Yu et al. is 'smokeless "information war"', evidently especially dangerous to authoritarian states as the authors imply that (uncensored) information destroyed the Soviet Union (Yu et al., 2006:233). The antagonists in such an 'information war' are not named, but the Soviet Union reference implies the West. The CCP's domestic hegemony over what may be known is threatened. For Yu et al., the internet threatens the regime's information monopoly, highlighting the authors' adherence to the CCP-line. Information security here means that unfiltered, foreign information is harmful.

The blurring of political culture and general 'culture' or civilisation problematises the discussion of 'traditional' culture. Yu et al. and Pan Yihe place 'traditional culture security' under culture security, including China's (traditional) virtues and values and the security of 'material and immaterial cultural heritage', and, for Pan, 'the passing-on of multi-ethnic culture' (Yu et al., 2006:192; Pan, 2007:135-141). Yu et al. and Pan Yihe's silence on the tension between CCP-led iconoclastic political culture and 'traditional' Chinese culture reveals that: the scholars are politically obliged to merge these apparent opposites. There is no evidence in the texts or the interviews that this tension is recognised. Such recognition would constitute a politically problematic rejection of the CCP's ideological hegemony. By not questioning the idea of a harmonious whole of 'Chinese' culture encompassing traditional and political culture, the scholarship supports the state-led narrative.

The frequent statist underpinnings of the PRC information and culture security debate, positing foreign states as threateners, are glaring due to the absence of a discussion of the possibility of states threatening culture or information *within* their territories, highlighting the state-decreed borders of the debate. The PRC information security debate fails to discuss the possibility of authoritarian (or non-authoritarian) regimes abusing the internet for their purposes, explored in the Western debate (Dannreuther, 2013:268f.). Although Yu et al. argue that 'cultural hegemony' and 'culture violence' can occur within states and between cultural

groups, they give no examples, and clearly exclude state-led campaigns to eradicate cultures as they do not mention any (Yu et al., 2006:208,212). A critical discussion of the Cultural Revolution could entail negative political consequences, yet Yu et al. overlook Nazi- or Taliban-state-led iconoclasm. The state and the regime are clearly coterminous; the given regime's ideology and actions *are* culture and 'culture' is the political culture of the day.

Political purpose is also evident in the treatment of non-state internet action, as the actual concern of Yu, Pan, and Wang and Fu Yong is the rejection of an uncontrolled internet, vindicating the CCP's quest for total internet-control. Statist and non-statist hackers are generally seen as threatening information security (Fu Yong, 2007:64; Tang Lan, 2003:389-392). Omitting China's own 'patriotic' hackers, Fu Yong notes hacker-attacks between India and Pakistan, and that there are legal hacker collectives in the West without giving examples, possibly confusing legal computer clubs with hacker organisations (Fu Yong, 2007:64). Moreover, Yu et al. see threats to information security emerging through political activity online, due to the anarchy and liberalism of 'internet culture' (Yu et al., 2006:236). Referring to online political activities such as protests and petitions in the USA, the authors see online non-state actor movements as challenging the state and even international society (Yu et al., 2006:237). This highlights the authoritarian context of Fu's and Yu et al.'s work. They do not recognise that such online political participation is legal and legitimate in liberal democracies.

Bridging culture and information security, Xu Tao sees a danger in globalisation and informatisation allowing PRC 'separatist forces' - one of the 'three evils' - 'trying to create a culture and history' to impact on international relations (Xu Tao, 2003:348f.). Xu's worry clearly is that non-orthodox ideologies turn cultural discourses and (constructed) identities into resistance against established states. Similarly, regarding information security, Chen and Zuo see 'risk factors facing China's national security' in 'the creation of challenging ideologies', 'the mobilisation of web politics',

‘rumours ...and malicious (media) spins’, and ‘culture invasion and culture subversion’ (Chen and Zuo, 2007:97-117). Rather than pure cyber-security concerns as in the Western debate over hacker-, terrorist-, and virus-attacks, Xu and Chen’s and Zuo’s worries concern threats to the CCP’s unchallenged rule: ideologies, web-politics, and rumours all threaten the CCP’s position and information-control. The internet as a communication tool outside of state control is inherently suspicious for repressive regimes. The PRC (and other authoritarian states) rejects an uncontrolled web as threatening stability, and surveillance-avoidance tools as cyber threats (Singer and Friedman, 2014:107). To legitimise their aims, authoritarian states frame their desire to control the internet in security language, and, in the case of some PRC scholars, are vindicated by politically-motivated scholarship. Conversely, the Western debate, note that the internet, as a tool for spreading civil unrest, can be seen as a security issue, suggesting cyberspace as a liberating force, if more a means than a cause of political revolutions (Dannreuther, 2013:270).

Xu Tao’s semi-official publication is most explicitly political in its advocacy of cooperation. Warning against hegemonism, Xu recognises the necessity of interaction to ensure the coexistence of civilisations to allow for ‘common security’ (Xu Tao, 2003:347f.,352-353). The mutual acceptance Xu calls for clearly means accepting each other’s political system. Xu vindicates the PRC ideals of peaceful coexistence and non-interference, coexistence of nationalities, and ostracism of separatism. Mutual acceptance bolsters the CCP’s sovereign control over ‘Chinese’ civilisation.

The advocacy of cooperation for culture and information security is significant as interstate/inter-cultural conflict and tension is highlighted as threatening. Rather than accepting confrontation and advising a hostile course, scholars advise cooperation to diminish conflict-potential. Instead of a belief in the intrinsic merit of cooperation found in liberalism, given the emphasis on both conflict potential and Western ‘hegemonism’, the stress on

cooperation suggests a pragmatic acceptance that the relatively weak China cannot directly counter statist 'threats'. Emphasising cooperation aligns with official rhetoric, notably peaceful coexistence and NTS Position Papers (Chapter One). To advocate hostility and zero-sum thinking is further contrary to the definition of NTS as non-zero sum, non-inter-state conflict, prevalent in the PRC scholarly NTS debate (Chapter Three). Yet by stressing beneficial cooperation rather than focusing on more theoretical innovative management measures, the scholars clearly serve a political purpose.

Conversely, recent texts advocate neutralising Western influence. Obstacles to cooperation – continuing zero-sum thinking of great powers – are recognised by Ren Lin, advocating a non-state mediator such as 'neutral international organisations, [and] conventions' to enable shared management of the global commons (Ren, 2014:100). Such neutral management benefits China. Similarly, for UB4, the UN should manage the internet as all states are represented there. The evolution of the debate from Xu Tao's call for coexistence to this balancing against Western influence constitutes a growing boldness and belief in China's international power, rather than deeper theoretical engagement.

The lack of alarmism and greater clarity in parts of the Western debate further highlights the political purpose of the Chinese debate. Since both Western and Chinese society and government are hacker- and virus- targets, the clarity and stronger neutrality in parts of the Western debate implies differences in threat perception between liberal democracies and authoritarian states. Whereas Singer and Friedman advise to disentangle the notions of threat and vulnerability, and that threats ought to be evaluated through comprehending the intended actions and reasons for these actions of 'potentially bad actors', PRC alarmism allows more state repression (Singer and Friedman, 2014:37ff.). A more neutral threat appraisal would restrict state actions and encourage a critical stance towards the severe PRC cyber-security laws and mass-cyberspace surveillance. By highlighting the severity of

information security threats, the debate in China promotes its own research and purpose of existence but also adds support for the regime's excessive internet control, cementing rather than challenging the status quo.

Culture-strengthening arguments contain political purpose. Xu advises both 'modernisation' and 'strengthening of common (Chinese) culture', and 'opposing' single culture-nationalism and chauvinism and 'all separatism' within China and protecting the vigour and 'formidable cohesion of the Chinese nations' culture' (Xu Tao, 2003:356f.). The 'nationalism' Xu rejects is clearly not Han-Confucian nationalism but that of minorities, especially Tibetans and Uighurs, given his reference to 'separatism'. Xu seeks to protect culture security defined by the CCP. Fu similarly advocates the protection of national customs, and Yu et al. favour a counter-movement of popularising non-Western cultures domestically and internationally (Fu Yong, 2007:60; Yu et al., 2006:201).

Clear political purpose is evident in both the information and culture security debates the actor providing security remains the state. The state cooperates with other states to establish cultural coexistence and international protection against non-state information security threats while increasing its own legislative and executive capacities to deal with information security, whereas non-state actors, despite their possible roles in both types of security, are not discussed. Conversely, UNB4 argued that people-to-people relations are key in culture security.

The political implications in the scholarly PRC debate on culture and information security are clear. Both debates broadly follow the CCP's understanding of the issues rather than overcoming a state- and Party-based comprehension of these types of security. The difference of UNB4's understanding of culture security highlights the restrictions on political deviance placed on the scholars when publishing their thinking. Towing the party-line in writing, they can be more self-reflective when unhampered by official censorship.

Normative Implications

The above-noted frequent adherence to the CCP's line by the scholarly literature suggests little scope for a normative turn in the sense of advocacy of a different, supposedly better reality and usually a focus on humans. The information and culture security literature mostly remains wedded to the status-quo, with only some, non-Beijing, university scholars regarding individuals as possible referent objects. However, my interviews show a normative turn in culture security, focusing on individuals, inter-cultural understanding, and a negation of ethnic difference and the possibility of absolute security.

The lack of a normative turn in the published culture security debate is especially evident regarding the referent object. Whereas a normative turn would, as in UNB4's arguments, be evident if culture (security) was portrayed as empowering individuals, in key parts of the PRC debate it facilitates state suppression of individuals, as happening in the PRC.

The semi-official debate, represented by Xu Tao, and literature from the social science academies, including Fu Yong's, see the culture security referent object solely as the state, specifically the regime, with Xu talking about culture threats to 'national security interests' (Xu Tao, 2003:327). Similarly, culture, for Fu Yong, is part of state sovereignty, and the state has authority over culture (Fu Yong, 2007:62). Fu omits minority cultures or the possibility of domestic cultural hegemony, demonstrating her focus on regime security and lack of a normative turn. Moreover, Fu is not worried by US popular culture hegemony for society's sake, although she considers culture security part of the 'societal security NTS field' (Fu Yong, 2007:060). Instead, her professed focus on developed and developing states and state sovereignty proves her focus on the regime as the referent object. More recently, Li Xiaoyan moves even further away from a normative turn to protect the authoritarian status-quo, being concerned solely with the regime's freedom from

other states' interference over human rights (Li Xiaoyan, 2014:112). These scholars all protect the state's control of culture security, abnegating any scholarly right to question the status quo and to make normative suggestions of what culture and information security should be.

Similarly, the semi-official and social science academy scholars writing on information security are status-quo-oriented, preventing a normative turn, focusing on the state and the regime as the referent object. Although Tang Lan ostensibly tries to balance security and the merits of the internet, for her, freedom and security cannot be gained together, as the national interest takes precedent (Tang Lan, 2003:383f.). This is an adherence to the authoritarian ideal of an extremely powerful state completely controlling human life.

Contrary to this clear submission to the regime-decreed status quo, a normative turn of an increased focus on individuals is foreshadowed by Yu et al., who suggest individuals as referent objects, although ultimately as parts of the state. The individuals whose cultural rights are threatened during globalisation are portrayed by Yu et al. as in danger of losing themselves together with their understanding of their own culture and language when engaging with foreign cultures and especially when learning foreign languages (Yu et al., 2006:204f.). Rather than self-creating subjects capable of self-determined lives, individuals here are only fragments of their native culture – including language and politics - and need guidance. While this focus on individuals foreshadows a normative turn it perpetuates the authoritarian status quo: Yu et al.'s anti-individual stance reflects the influence of the CCP's nationalist narrative stressing an imagined monolithic culture over an understanding of culture as containing diversity and multiple interpretations. Culture here is not diversity or agency but passive unity supporting a regime-led endeavour. Similarly, although Pan Yihe states that NTS mostly concerns human security and social security, by noting that her work is 'people-as-the-basis/people oriented' (yi ren wei ben-以人为本), a notion from the CCP's

‘scientific development concept’, Pan accepts the CCP’s terminological power (Pan, 2007:003).

This strong support of the regime-led status-quo of the written culture security debate contrasts with the more theoretically sophisticated information security debate. Yu et al. evidently regard both the state and individuals as the referent object of information security. This is closer to the Western cyber-security debate which also focuses on states and individual internet users (see Singer and Friedman, 2014:39). In contrast to their chapter on culture, Yu et al. display concern for individuals as ends in themselves, initiating a normative turn. While worrying about some people using the potential of untraceable online actions for ‘evil’, Yu et al. also highlight individual privacy concerns and warn of violations of ‘individual privacy rights’ if such personal information is not limited (Yu et al., 2007:229). Yu et al.’s concerns are in stark contrast to the PRC state’s surveillance of its citizens and constitute a beginning normative turn as the scholars effectively argue for an improvement of reality focusing on individuals.

The difference between Yu et al.’s understanding of individuals in information and culture security – freestanding referent objects in information security and part of a larger whole in culture security – is due to Yu et al.’s different understanding of culture and information. Culture is larger than individuals and beyond their choosing. Cultures cannot simply be taken on or cast off, for else the individual would not be ‘lost’ when learning a new language. Conversely, information and cyberspace enable individuals to choose; individuals here are much more self-governed, deciding actions and identities without losing themselves even though the virtual nature of the internet might allow for a loss of reality. Culture binds people together whereas the internet liberates them. Yu et al. do not regard this aspect of culture as negative, but as a fact.

Whereas theory-creation in the culture security literature is not very normative, my interviews revealed a starting normative turn in PRC scholarly culture security research. In keeping with the emphasis on people-people exchanges noted above, UNB4 argued that the

way to become culturally secure was for individuals of different cultures to interact and that the state was secure when all people are secure. UNB4 upturns the more frequent PRC scholarly assertion that once the state is safe, individuals are safe. For UNB4, any approach to culture security must focus on people and their mutual understanding as self-righteousness borne from ignorance turns deadly when it entices people to force their beliefs on others.

According to UNB4, individual people's ignorance is what creates culture security threats and there is a clear normative turn in UNB4's argument that the solution of culture security is mutual understanding on an individual level. For UNB4, in culture security, that which is to be protected are 'people...individuals', as the people generally was an abstraction. The normative implications in UNB4's responses are the absolute focus on individuals, and the need for people-to-people exchange to overcome prejudice.

Moreover, UNB4 moves the NTS debate away from a need for absolute security, constituting a normative turn as partial insecurity, in contrast to the CCP's emphasis on total security, is embraced as ensuring cultural vitality. For UNB4, there is no absolute culture security as cultural superiority breeds jealousy. UNB4 also acknowledged that one country's strength was attractive to others and that challenges to countries' culture also kept them vigorous, hence cultural isolation, for UNB4, was not helpful for culture security. However, UNB4's evident normative turn is not reflected in the PRC culture security literature, suggesting the impact of censorship.

There is a budding normative turn in parts of the PRC culture and information debate diverging from the status quo by focusing on humans and embracing partial insecurity. The implication for the PRC scholarly NTS debate and Chinese IR generally is that while the topics of the debate may be set by the state, there is some leeway for publications to suggest value-based rather than facts- or status-quo-based theories. UNB4's clear normative turn towards humans and the negation of absolute security indicate that greater

depth of scholarly theorising would be possible if censorship was weakened.

Conclusion

My discussion shows that the scholarly PRC information and culture security debates are complex and encompass different, opposing voices.

Regarding the conceptualisation and assigned significance, I demonstrated that there is no clear definition of culture in the written debate, rendering it liable to be defined by the state, and that culture security is strongly politicised focusing almost solely on the state and the regime. My interviews, however, revealed divergence from this state-decreed narrative, with UNB4's emphasis on people to people relations marking a contrast to the written debate. Information security concerns mostly information content and technology, but the perceived need of some scholars to emphasise its NTS characteristics and its evident connection to military security suggest that information security bridges the asserted TS-NTS divide. Both statist and non-statist threats are discussed in the debate. The semi-official culture security debate highlights threats to the political system while the scholarly debate focuses on threats to indigenous cultures from culture hegemony. In information and culture security, the USA is seen as a threat. However, the culture and information security debates are silent on potential domestic culture hegemony. Apart from terrorism noted in the written debate, my interviews highlighted globalisation as a threat to culture security. Divergence exists over the novelty of culture security. Fu's arguments further reveal that culture means power for states and solace and threat for weak individuals. Whereas the written debate generally regards information security as novel, interviewees highlighted similarities to previous technological innovation and that information was not merely a liberating force but also lends itself to creating new chains. The significance assigned to the two issues in the PRC debate is not intrinsic, but due to the Western theories and the importance attached by the regime. Huntington's theory makes culture security

significant and the written debate highlights the importance of both issues by arguing that they are of existential political importance and the core of national security. Whereas Yu et al. and Chen and Zuo treat information security with a traditional political lens, the Blue Books move away from this statism towards a more global outlook. Information security is generally seen as increasing in significance as it increases the asymmetric threat to the state.

On Research Question Two, affiliation and location were investigated. Variance over the existential significance attached to the two issues is connected to affiliation; the semi-official debate regards culture and information security as crucial to state survival, followed by the social science academy scholar Fu Yong, whereas university-scholars stress the existential threat potential least. Conversely, location does not seem to account strongly for the variance as parts of the Beijing-based NTS debate (*Views from China*) do not discuss either issue while the leading culture security scholar, Pan Yihe, is based at Zhejiang University. Personal interest, not location, appear decisive in choosing research topics.

Regarding political implications of the debate, the scholars mostly have the political purpose of vindicating the regime's narrative. The information security debate's fear of Western technological superiority and information monopoly shows the political agenda feeding into more traditional interstate rivalry ideas, rendering information security an extension of TS rather than developing new theoretical lenses. Moreover, the political purpose of seeking to bolster the regime is clear in the debate's fear of an uncontrolled web and counter-hegemonic ideologies. The advocated management further shows political purpose as cooperation over culture security and anti-Western balancing frames culture security in a statist, antagonist manner while the strengthening of Chinese culture is Han-centric, vindicating state policy. In both the information and culture security debate, the provider of security is the state, the political purpose of the debate being to bolster the state's position as the scholars could also have found more theoretically innovative management solutions. The written debate

is in contrast to UNB4's ideas of managing culture security through people-to-people interaction, the political implication being the widening of the actors in culture security and the empowering of individuals, which is contrary to the state's narrative.

On the normative implications emerging from my analysis and a possible normative turn, my investigation shows that whereas the more state-connected debate does not contain a normative turn, some parts of the university-scholars start it, while my interviews clearly show a normative turn in thinking. The semi-official debate and Fu Yong (SASS) strictly support the status quo in culture and information security, effectively negating scholarly responsibility of inquiry into and suggestion of better alternatives. Conversely, Yu et al.'s and Pan Yihe's focus on individuals constitutes a beginning normative turn, although in culture security, the individual is a disempowered member of state-led culture. UNB4's responses clearly show a normative turn, as the focus on people-to-people relations and of absolute security as impossible is in stark contrast to and diminishes the role of the state.

Chapter Five: Transnational Crime and Terrorism

More than the other issues investigated in this thesis, terrorism and transnational crime are subjective or legal constructs: unlike military violence, both are forms of violence ostracised by international society. While the term 'terrorism' has been ubiquitous since "9/11", transnational crime was an important 'new' topic on national security agendas in the 1990s. The term 'War on Terror' highlights the theoretical and defence conundrum of terrorism: conducted by non-state actors, terrorism seems to easily classify as NTS, as it is a non-statist threat (see Chapters Two and Three). The use of weapons and military responses, however, suggest a linkage to TS. Transnational crime, by contrast, is a much less obvious security issue. The question is: what makes this type of crime so special that rather than being a policing issue, it becomes a security threat?

Terrorism and transnational crime are at times linked in the PRC literature, but are discussed in their own individual texts. The close conceptual connections between transnational crime and terrorism warrant a joint analysis. Both concern illegitimate violence and interference with people and property. The difference between them concerns the alleged motives: whereas profit motivates transnational crime, political considerations motivate terrorism (see Berdal and Serrano, 2002:201). Hence the classification as 'terrorism' renders an issue more news-worthy, more terrifying than 'crime' and adds perverse prestige to the perpetrators who are regarded as driven by more than selfish profit. The branding of 'terrorist' further equals political and moral ostracism in a way that 'transnational criminal' is unlikely to do, although the acts committed may be identical.

This chapter investigates the PRC scholarly debate on terrorism and transnational crime against the four research questions. I first enquire into the PRC scholarly conceptualisation of terrorism and transnational crime and set out how the scholars evaluate the significance of both. I then analyse the causes for the variance in how the PRC scholars conceptualise these two NTS-issues and

assess their significance. I subsequently investigate what political meanings and political purposes this scholarship reveals and seeks to attain. Finally, I analyse the PRC culture and information security debates on the normative implications emerging from an analysis of PRC NTS theory and possible normative turn.

Context

Terrorism

Originating in the “Great Terror” of the French Revolution, ‘terrorism’ has been used by various groups, although most ‘terroristic violence’ has been employed by states (Townshend, 2011:24,37). Fundamentalist religious (notably Islamist) terrorism emerged globally in the 1990s, its professed aim being the intimidation of its perceived enemy, non-Muslims and Muslims who do not subscribe to their ideology, and the retreat of the West, including Israel, from perceived ‘Muslim territory’ (see Townshend, 2011:97).

Both domestic and international terrorism concerns China. The government considers terrorism an NTS issue affecting national and international security (MFA, 31/07/2002). Despite its previous military support for groups using terrorism including in sub-Saharan Africa, since the 1990s China portrays itself increasingly as a victim of Uighur-terrorism (Gill, 2007:132,141; gov.cn, 2002).

Relations between Beijing and Xinjiang’s Muslim Uighur minority are marred by state-oppression and some Uighurs’ violent aspirations for independence, including ‘riots and occasional assassinations and terror bombings’ (Gill, 2007:126,135f.; Nathan and Scobell, 2012:206). While the government blames al-Qaida-backed separatists and terrorists, whether these incidents encompassed organised religious terrorism is unclear (Nathan and Scobell, 2012:206 referring to Millward, 2004). Beijing violently suppressed Uighur dissidence and began to brand it terrorism in the mid-1990s, unprecedentedly admitting a problem rather than censoring news on Xinjiang, highlighting the transnational

dimension of the issue needing international action (Gill, 2007:135f.; Nathan and Scobell, 2012:206).

China sought regional and international partners against terrorism, aiding domestic and international regime security. The SCO, founded in 2001, institutionalised China's cooperation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia, and stabilised China's relations with its near-abroad, preventing anti-CCP havens (Nathan and Scobell, 2012:86). By focusing on the transnational 'three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism', the SCO boosts its members' regime security against disobedient minorities (Nathan and Scobell, 2012:86,165). The SCO's definition of terrorism focusses on the 'purpose' of the acts as 'to intimidate a population, violate public security or to compel public authorities or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act' (SCO, 15/06/2001).

While the USA and China differed over anti-terror strategies and China frequently advocates UN leadership in anti-terrorism, China overall supported the 'War on Terror', voting for the use of force in Afghanistan at the UN despite its usually stern views on sovereignty and non-intervention (Gill, 2007:137; Xinhua, 04/10/2001; Xinhua 09/10/2001; Xinhua, 30/11/2001). Notwithstanding the implication of radical Islam by the 'three evils' attested by Nathan and Scobell, China warned not to link terrorism to 'particular religions and nationalities' (Xinhua, 13/11/2001; gov.cn, 2002; Nathan and Scobell, 2012:86).

China portrays itself internationally as part of the victims of terrorism and seeks cooperation, but it has only been partially successful in gaining international support against domestic 'terrorists', notably the 'East Turkestan Independence Movement' ('*Dongtu*'-东突) by employing the fashionable term 'international terrorism' (gov.cn, 2002; Xinhua, 09/10/2001, 04/10/2001, 13/11/2001,14/11/2001,18/12/2001). Hence a previously domestic or regional problem was turned into an international one, threatening not only China's territorial integrity, but the security of all states and civilisation itself. By linking its own concerns with

international and, importantly, Western concerns, the leadership portrayed itself as part of 'civilised' international society and made it easier to aggressively deal with 'Dongtu', repression in Xinjiang increasing after 2001 (Nathan and Scobell, 2012:206f.). While SCO members further restricted exiled Uighur groups' activities, NATO states did not (Nathan and Scobell, 2012:207). In the scope of closer Sino-US anti-terror cooperation after 9/11, the USA, as PRC scholars highlight, termed the 'East Turkestan Islamic Movement' a terrorist group, but also granted asylum to Uighur activists and did not extradite Chinese Guantanamo-inmates (Gill, 2007:125; Zhang and Zheng, 2012:629; Nathan and Scobell, 2012:207).

The threat of terrorism persists in official rhetoric with 'ISIL'-terrorism termed 'the greatest enemy of humankind' (people.cn, 27/08/2014). Chinese citizens have become victims of international terrorism and the threat in China is considered to be severe (Xinhua, 28/06/2004; Xinhua, 30/08/2005; Xinhua, 28/08/2006; military.cn, 11/01/2012). Yet PRC media designations of violence by Muslims and Uighurs as terrorism are in contrast to the measure of popular understanding for murderous Han Chinese violence against officials and state institutions (F.A.Z., 08/11/2013).

Transnational Crime

China's authoritarian system and powerful law enforcement mean that the PRC is theoretically very capable of dealing with transnational crime. Nevertheless, China's vast territory, long land borders and corruption render transnational crime a severe problem.

Drugs are historically a problematic issue and usage and trafficking is rising. Prohibition of drug-use occurred earlier in China than in the West, with the British sale of narcotics to China sparking the Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860), officially seen as starting the 'hundred years of humiliation'. Today, China is a heroin-transit point from the 'Golden Triangle' between Thailand, Burma, and Laos, and despite severe anti-drugs legislation, domestic consumption of synthetic drugs and heroin is rising (CIA, 2015).

Drug possession is punishable by death and the PRC convicts and executes more people for drug issues than any other state (CIA, 2015).

Maritime piracy in international waterways affects China's export-driven economy. China engages in international anti-piracy operations off the Somalian coast, constituting the first defence of Chinese interests by a Chinese fleet beyond territorial waters in centuries (Smith, 2010:199, referring to Germond and Smith, 2009).

Triads of mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese origin engage in various types of organised crime. Human trafficking is both a domestic and a transnational problem in China, with Chinese and foreign citizens trafficked within and via China (CIA, 2015). According to the CIA, China is endeavouring to eliminate trafficking according to international standards but the government's 2013 fusion of various crimes with human trafficking makes the evaluation of investigation and prosecution according to international law more difficult (CIA, 2015).

The background to the scholarly debate in China hence is one where terrorism and transnational crime have been successfully securitised by the Chinese government and the international community.

The Literature

The semi-official *On NTS* contains a chapter on terrorism by Sun Bo. Terrorism is discussed as a major issue in the key scholarly works on NTS, such as Yu et al.'s 2006 textbook *Introduction to Non-traditional Security* and Fu Yong's 2007 *Non-traditional Security and China*. Important works on terrorism are *The Origins of Terrorism* (2010), edited by Wang Yizhou, and Zhang Jiadong's 2012 *Terrorism and Anti-Terror: History, Theory and Practice*. The 2007 *Views from China: NTS* does not discuss terrorism, as it is dealt with in another volume of the series. The 2012-13, 2013-14, and 2014-15 Blue Books contain chapters by Fan Shouzheng on global and regional terrorism. The Zhejiang University NTS journal contains related articles by Yu Xiaofeng and Xu Lili (2010) on

'border security', Gao Yongjiu (2010) on NTS problems in Xinjiang, and Gao Yongjiu (2014) on 'Dongtu'.

On NTS has no specific transnational crime section, but several of its chapters deal with it: Gao Ying writes on drug trafficking, Shi Gang on piracy, Zhang Yuncheng on money laundering, and Ouyang Liping on weapons-proliferation. Yu et al. (2006) do not grant transnational crime its own chapter, but include it in a chapter on international public security. The 2007 *Views from China: NTS* has a part on trans-border crime, containing three chapters: Abulaiti and Tursun on 'Central Asian trans-border crime', Liu Zhi on Sino-ASEAN anti-drugs cooperation, and Zhou and Wang on illegal migration from Fujian, discussed in Chapter Five. The Blue Books contain several chapters related to transnational crime: Chen Kai (2011-12) on 'NTS challenges on the China-Burma border', Shen Hongsheng (2012-13) on 'Military Response to NTS', Wei Zhijian (2012-13) on 'China-Japan-ROK-NTS cooperation', Chen Hongmei, Yu Lifan and Zhang Weishi (2013-14) on 'Mekong River Valley law enforcement security cooperation', Chen Kai (2013-14) on maritime piracy, and Chen Fang (2014-15) on 'global security governance on transnational crime'. The 2010 volume of Zhejiang University's NTS journal contains a related article by Li Chuanxun on 'Sino-Russian border-region NTS field cooperation'.

Conceptualisation

Terrorism

The English term 'terrorism' is value-laden, and the terminology in the Chinese debate is also problematic. The term kongbuzhuyi-恐怖主义-terrorism tends to be used for all acts; terror-kongbu-恐怖 is not used on its own. The ending -ism/zhuyi-主义 implies an ideology. The PRC scholars refer to 'state terrorism'-guojia kongbuzhuyi-国家恐怖主义, or even 'terrorism state'- kongbuzhuyi guojia-恐怖主义国家 rather than 'state terror' (Yu et al., 2006:110; Wang, 2010a:11). 'Kongbu guojia-恐怖国家-terror state' was used by interviewee UNB12 when I asked about states using terrorist

means, and this, UNB12 said, was connected to national security and was part of TS ('traditional national security').

Attacks are considered terrorism if they have specific subjective and objective characteristics. For Yu et al., terrorist acts are dangerous, organised, political, non-state-actor-led, arbitrary, sudden, intimidating, religious, and transnational (Yu et al., 2006:110). A political goal turns a violent act into terrorism (Yu et al., 2006:110).

Scholarly emphases diverge over the influence of religious fanaticism and cultural factors. Yu et al. see religious extremism as a background factor of terrorism (Yu et al., 2006:111). For Sun Bo, recent 'sects' are also dangerous (Sun Bo, 2003:307). Fu Yong and Zhang Jiadong highlight religious extremism as a novel feature of terrorism, with Zhang concluding that the 'major trend of contemporary terrorism is that religious extremism is...becoming more widespread', and considering all states as their enemies while intending to create their own and able to proliferate locally (Fu, 2007:154; Zhang, 2012:53,55,57). While the PRC NTS debate - in contrast to parts of the Western debate - previously shied away from inquiring into the relationship of Islam and terrorism given the official reiteration that no culture or religion is to blame, religion is becoming a more significant NTS topic (Booth and Dunne, 2011:162-5). Zhang Fuxin and Zhang Yun consider Islam a problem for Xinjiang and offer a solution in a CCP-supported recasting of religion, 'harmonious religion' (hexie zongjiao - 和谐宗教) (Zhang Fuxin and Zhang Yun, 2014:158). This suggests that there is a world community which the Chinese are part of, attacked by outside terrorists, even if they may come from within.

The debate is unclear on whether terrorism is purely NTS or also TS. Fu Yong considers terrorism 'representative of NTS' and my interviewees generally regarded terrorism as NTS (Fu, 2007:153f.,182f.). Conversely, UNB2 held that whether terrorism was TS or NTS depended on the situation and state response.

Similarly conceptually problematic, Wang Yizhou also regards international terrorism as both TS and NTS: 'international terrorism shows the unclear division between TS and NTS; TS and NTS can morph into each other at any time' (Wang, 2012:18). Contrarily, and unique in the debate, UNB8 regarded terrorism primarily as a crime, but stated that its difference lay in its political motive. This is similar to Laqueur's argument that a key difference 'between international crime and terrorism' is that the former does not want to topple governments or debilitate societies (Laqueur, 1996:25).

Transnational Crime

The terminology of transnational crime in the PRC debate is less complicated; 'transnational crime – kuaguo fanzui-跨国犯罪' is generally used. The ubiquitous use of '*transnational* crime' in the PRC debate contrasts to the more self-reflexive Western debate's wavering between *transnational* crime and *international* crime or *global* crime (see Serrano, 2002:14). Transnationalness is clearly the key factor rendering transnational crime an NTS issue in the PRC debate. Nevertheless, some scholars imply that transnational crime can trigger TS, with Ouyang seeing a 'danger of zero-sum relations and security dilemma leading to an arms race' as 'enlarged' due to weapons proliferation (Ouyang, 2003:376).

Transnational crime is difficult to conceptualise and the PRC debate lacks a succinct definition. Legality and legitimacy are key issues in the Western debate, whereas the PRC NTS debate does not problematise the notion of crime, leaving the government to define it. Abulaiti and Tursun argue that 'the fundamental characteristic is that the plotting of the crime and the criminal action by criminal organisations, criminals, or law-breakers must have a trans-border character' (Abulaiti and Tursun, 2007:261). This definition hints at the UN's as 'any criminal activity that is conducted in more than one state, planned in one state but perpetrated in another, or committed in one state where there are spill-over effects into neighbouring jurisdictions' (Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2010:430). However, some Western scholars problematise the concept of transnational crime as state law decides what

constitutes crime, and since the most powerful states set the international agenda on transnational crime (Serrano, 2002:13,15,251; Smith, 2010:178,186f.199).

Transnational crime in the scholarly PRC debate includes organised crime, drug production and trafficking, human trafficking, goods smuggling, piracy, and – contrary to the Western debate (see Chapter Five) – illegal migration (Fu Yong, 2007:058; Li Bin, 2004:47; Chen, 2014:186f.; Liu, 2006:278f.; Yu et al., 2006:257). Fu supplies an answer to the resulting question of why transnational crime implies security rather than policing; it undermines the state (Fu Yong, 2007:057f.).

Home-grown Terrorism

Significant scholars focus on China's domestic terrorism threat, notably 'Dongtu' and multiple transnational Xinjiang independence groups. Xinjiang separatists are portrayed as 'severely' threatening 'Xinjiang's peace and stability' and China's 'harmonious' and 'peaceful' development, territorial integrity, and national security, and 'Xinjiang's ethnic unity [and] societal stability' (Yu et al., 2006:118; Fu Yong, 2007:182; Xie Guping, 2015:143). Emphasising fundamentalist cruelty, Fu Yong sees 'Dongtu' as propagating religious hatred and ethnic separatism, encouraging bomb-attacks in China (Fu, 2007:182). Similarly, Wang Yizhou describes 'new threats rising in the West' including the 'three evils' for which China is ill-prepared due to its military's focus on the East, arguing that since the Western Afghanistan- and Iraq-interventions, extremist and terror organisations have become very active in China, receiving foreign support and making political demands (Wang, 2010a:19f.). Wang's assertion emphasises the increasing threat of terrorism in China, but also suggests that PRC countermeasures have not been working well since 2001.

'Dongtu' is clearly seen as transnational and its danger amplified – and PRC countermeasures justified - by emphasising an al-Qaeda connection. Sun Bo and Yu et al. link Xinjiang nationalist groups to al-Qaeda, highlight their (alleged) embrace of Islamist violence and that Dongtu-leaders met Bin Laden in 1999, with Sun Bo

arguing that Dongtu is both supported by and ‘an important constituent part of Bin Laden’s terror force....and “Dongtu” terrorists actively participate in “Jihad” everywhere in the world’ (Sun Bo, 2003:310,321; Yu et al., 2006:118). This is very close to the official line, and, given that Xinjiang is a politically sensitive topic, it is not surprising that this is reiterated in Yu et al.’s undergraduate textbook. Yu et al.’s reproduction and perpetuation of the government narrative shows that the scholarly discourse here clearly has to follow the official discourse, and deviance is not accepted. Fu Yong moreover argues that ‘Dongtu’ not only trains in Central Asian terrorist camps, but also that it conducts attacks in Asia (Fu, 2007:182). Xie Guiping, too, states that “‘Dongtu’ commits separatist destruction and terror-violence within and without China’s borders for the political aim of separating Xinjiang from China’ (Xie Guiping, 2014:143). Hence ‘Dongtu’ is not just a violent threat to China, but to its neighbours, too.

The scholarly and semi-official transnational crime debate focuses strongly on drugs and drug-related crimes. For Yu et al. drug abuse harms the user as well as the societies of drug-producing areas (Yu et al., 2006:256f.). Yu et al. tap into official rhetoric when arguing that the populations’ ‘quality (suzhi- 素质)’ and ‘the existence of some ethnicities’ is endangered by an inability to manage the drug problem (Yu et al., 2006:257).

A connection of drugs to other crime is frequently stressed. According to Gao as drug users turn to crime to obtain money, crime increases (Gao, 2003:473). Conversely, Fu Yong focuses on the threat from drug trafficking, with transnational cartels supporting ‘other organised crime, such as terrorism and...human trafficking’ (Fu Yong, 2007:58). While Gao, like Yu et al. above, stresses the AIDS-drug-use link, the key threats emanating from drug-smuggling are evidently mostly the assault on the state’s laws and strength by the international drug trade (Gao, 2003:451,472). Gao, like Yu et al., describes the increase of drug-related crime with an apparent degree of concern for drug users, rather than

demonising them as a scourge to society, suggesting the importance of curing the addicts and returning them into society.

Novelty

The PRC NTS literature generally regards terrorism as an old problem. Yet works on terrorism by IR scholars have appeared mostly since 2001 (see He, 2006:408). This is due to the separation in PRC academia between domestic and international issues, with 'international' terrorism only being recognised since the founding of the SCO and since the global focus on terrorism since 9/11. Previous terrorism concerning China was domestic terrorism and hence was not considered IR. Given the dominance of terrorism in the international arena and China in the 2000s, PRC scholarly silence would have been strange. Moreover, the PRC scholars attest certain novel features of terrorism today.

Globalisation and the information age are generally seen as aiding today's terrorism. For Wang, 'calling current international terrorism "new type terrorism" is due to this special characteristic of the information era, it is completely different from the previous isolated era, and cannot be compared with a solitary terror act by some anti-social madman' (Wang, 2010a:3).

Similarly Fu Yong holds that transnational organised crime now threatens international society due to economic globalisation and differences between states in terms of legal systems and development, 'political chaos... in some regions' but also due to 'the speedy development of modern science and technology' (Fu Yong, 2007:58).

Focusing on maritime piracy, Shi Gang argues that since the Cold War, it increased due to more global transport, lacking security measures, the Asian financial crisis, international legal limits, lacking cooperation of some states, the downsides of modernisation, and the post-9/11 focus on terrorism (Shi Gang, 2003:504-7). The negation of novelty of transnational crime and the focus on material global economic and political changes is also present in the Western debate which, however, also at times

highlights that crime is only perceived to be rising due to a change of awareness (Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2010:429,433; Smith, 2010:183; Hough, 2008; Serrano, 2012:39). This ideational aspect is not marked in the PRC debate, highlighting the state's authority over what NTS issues are.

Significance

The PRC debate evaluates the significance of terrorism as NTS mostly regarding its threat for China and the world. International Islamist terrorism is among the most constant features in the debate. 9/11 is often seen as catalysing NTS research, and the perceived linkages between al-Qaeda and the 'Dongtu' threat and the threat of ISIL are discussed. Hence, Fan Shouzheng argued in 2015 that 'in 2014, the terror influence of the "Islamic State" organisation exceeded that of the "al-Qaeda" organisation and of the Taliban' (Fan Shouzheng, 2015:078).

Like Zhang Jiadong, who notes that 'after "9/11", world terrorism again entered a new phase', Wang Yizhou argues that 9/11 changed the world and started a new era of terrorism against nation-states, with unpredictable attacks and psychological trouble for international society (Zhang Jiadong, 2012:53f.; Wang Yizhou, 2013:170). Overlooking previous terrorist bomb-plots against the World Trade Centre, Wang argues that 'before 9/11 no one could imagine the destructiveness and cruelty of terrorism' (Wang, 2010b:1).

Key scholars' eschewing neutral and sober assessments of terrorism in favour of portraying terrorism as dangerous and terrifying indicates the high significance they attach to it. Yu et al. alarmingly argue that terrorist incidents have recently increased and become more deadly and cruel (Yu et al., 2006:112-115). Suggesting that all Muslims are potential enemies, Yu et al. argue that "al-Qaida" could use the support of many Muslim groups against the West and add the concern that its asymmetric nature makes terrorism increasingly common, and that it can turn into "ultra-terrorism" employing the internet and WMDs (Yu et al.,

2006:112-115). Similarly emphasising the growing threats to states, and focusing on the internet as a catalyst, interviewee UNB12 thought that 'internet terrorist guerrilla forces' recently emerged.

To ensure unquestioned importance of terrorism, key scholars grant it the military capabilities of a Cold War superpower. For Fan Shouzheng, 'one of the most severe dangers to national security are chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terror threats. For many years, the "al-Qaeda" organisation has been trying to gain weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons' (Fan Shouzheng, 2015:078f.). Similarly, Yu et al. equate the danger of terrorism to that of Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany arguing that terrorism now was in its 'world war' stage (Yu et al., 2006:112). For Wang Yizhou, terrorism has state-like propaganda power as the images of terrorist atrocities are transmitted globally (Wang, 2010a:3). Terrorists are presented as having the intentions and capabilities of WWII-hostile states regarding armaments, ability to wage war and propaganda reach. The scholars do not substantiate their claims with any evidence, but make these extreme assertions to ensure the unquestioned importance of terrorism.

However, terrorism's importance is also explained in connection to lessening TS threats. Wang Yizhou claims that TS issues in the east and south-east, namely Taiwan and the South China Sea disputes, are under control, although not solved through cooperation whereas in 'China's West...anti-US armed forces like "al-Qaeda" and the Taleban are rising' (Wang, 2010a:19).

The PRC debate diverges over the significance of transnational crime, but generally evaluates it in terms of threats to the state and supposed terrorist links. Parts of the scholarly and semi-official debate regard transnational crime as a crucial NTS issue, implying international loss of control (Fu Yong, 2007:57; Li Bin, 2004:47; Gao, 2003:451). The importance of terrorism boosts that of transnational crime as the scholars link transnational crime in Central Asia to Islamist terrorism and the 'three evils'. Abulaiti and Tursun consider the 'three evils' as linked to transnational crime (Abulaiti and Tursun, 2007:262). The link between the 'three evils'

and transnational crime is problematised in the Western debate, for, as Giraldo and Trinkunas argue, the two are not inherently connected (Abulaiti and Tursun, 2007:262ff.; Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2010:436f.). Conversely, Yu et al. do not regard transnational crime as a key NTS threat, but discuss transnational drug-smuggling briefly in their section on international public security, with its importance due to the impact on health security (Yu et al., 2006:257f.).

Reasons for Variance

The above noted variance of conceptualisations and assigned significance of terrorism and transnational crime in the PRC debate is due to several factors, including location, affiliation, and overall reasoning of the scholars.

Affiliation partly accounts for the variance in the transnational crime and terrorism debate. Scholars affiliated to social science academies and state-research institutions, such as Fu Yong (SASS), Gao (International Relations University) and Shi Gang (International Relations University) are less critical of the securitisation of terrorism and transnational crime and simplistically emphasise threats to the state. Conversely, Zhejiang University's Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe and Wang Jiangli, Fudan's Zhang Jiadong, and Peking University's Wang Yizhou's conceptualisation and significance assessments are more theory-related and deeper.

Geographic location by contrast does not appear to cause variety, as both Shanghai-based Fu Yong and the Beijing-based semi-official scholars are similar in the conceptualisation and assigned significance of terrorism and transnational crime. Conversely, Hangzhou-based Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe, and Wang Jiangli and Beijing-based Wang Yizhou offer more critical conceptualisations of terrorism, moving beyond the destructiveness of infamous terrorist attacks and looking more into deeper, individual causes of terrorism as well as moving away from simply demonising terrorists. An exception to this is Abulaiti and Tursun's location in Xinjiang, far away from the political centre. Their focus on Central Asian

transnational crime, which is not further discussed in the debate, is connected to their proximity to the region.

Ideational factors, especially the scholars' overall focus, accounts for the majority of variance in the terrorism and transnational crime debate. Fu Yong's overall focus on 'NTS and China' is evident in her conceptualisation of terrorism and transnational crime and the significance she attaches to both. Both issues, for Fu, are conceptualised in terms of their threat to the state and state control and their significance weighed accordingly. Unsurprisingly, the semi-official debate follows this reasoning, too. Conversely, Yu et al. and Wang Yizhou's terrorism discussions focus more on humans as the centre of security and are more critical and analytical. While looking into religious causes and noting the 'Dongtu'-threat, Yu et al. as shown below move beyond the mere threat to state control and life conceptualisations and highlight the human-dimension of both victims and attackers, underlining their more theoretical approach to the NTS debate. UNB8 went even further away from state securitisation with the argument that terrorism was primarily a crime, suggesting a problematisation of the official view, which, however, could not be voiced in the literature. Yu et al.'s vague treatment of transnational crime is not antithetical to this focus on humans but actually supports their overall depth of analysis, since their brief discussion focuses again on the harm to people rather than to laws as the semi-official debate does and demonstrates that they regard transnational crime as a simple issue securitised by the state and thus part of NTS, but not necessitating further analysis. Conversely, Fu Yong and Gao focus on supposed threats to the state due to transnational crime, crucially suggesting diminishing state control of borders. For Zhang Jiadong, who regards terrorism mostly as a dangerous ideology, analysis rather than mere focus on state security is the key, as he tries to categorise historical stages of terrorism so as to understand what lies beneath.

Political Implications

Strong, but divergent, political implications emerge from the discussion over a possible legitimacy of terrorism in the PRC debate. Yu et al. launch an absolute attack on terrorism as the targeting of ‘innocents’ by government or non-government actors who follow various ideologies including religious extremism, nationalism, or communism, with the relative weakness or strength of terrorist and victim not being an issue (Yu et al., 2006:103f.). Rather than relativising terrorism through this notion that anyone could use terrorism, Yu et al. denounce it absolutely on ethical, intellectual, and legal grounds, allowing for no vindication as they consider it a crime against humanity and reason (Yu et al., 2006:103f.). The cause of this unconditional rejection is that terrorists murders innocent people (Yu et al., 2006:103f.). Hence, for Yu et al., all terrorism has to be fought against and must be rejected due to its opposition to civilisation, ethics, and humanity (Yu et al., 2006:103f.). Yu et al.’s very clear condemnation of any kind of terrorism is important; although similar to Chinese official condemnations, it is unique in the scholarly literature. Portraying terrorism as ‘abnormal revenge of indiscriminate slaughter’ of ‘innocents’ and hence as a ‘crime against reason [and] humanity’, Yu et al. leave no option to their student readers but to denounce and reject terrorism (Yu et al., 2006:103f.). The political purpose is to ensure that PRC undergraduates completely reject any vindication or understanding of terrorism – some of which is orchestrated by their compatriots – and thus not to engage in critical thinking about the legitimacy of violence generally and the notion of ‘innocence’. Any critical questioning of the PRC’s anti-terrorist stance and its counter-measures is made very difficult. Yu et al.’s political purpose here is to support PRC policy.

Different but similarly clear political implications are evident in scholarly reference to systemic causes of terrorism, linking international worry over terrorism to a CCP-critique of the Western-led international structure and politics. For Wang Yizhou, international terrorism is a ‘crime against humanity’ but also reflects

current international relations, and the contradictions and power structures within them (Wang, 2010a:11). Whereas this statement suggests structural causes, in a different text Wang blames US and Israeli politics for 'creating terrorism hotbeds' (Wang, 2010b:2). The difference in political meaning between this quote and Yu *et al.*'s above is stark: whereas Yu *et al.*'s condemnation highlights the notion that terrorism involves choice, Wang's portrayal appears deterministic, reducing the terrorists' culpability. The political purpose of Wang's scholarship here is clearly to criticise Western foreign policy, suggesting that the inherently flawed Western system triggers terrorism. However, the blaming of US and Western hegemony in the PRC debate is in contrast to the lack of a critical look at PRC counterterrorism. This lack is due to the political danger of criticising sensitive CCP policy, which can mean imprisonment, evidenced by the 2014 life-sentence for separatism of Beijing Minzu University's Ilham Tohti, an economist of Uighur ancestry, for his criticism of state actions in Xinjiang (F.A.Z., 24/09/2014). Since Wang does not blame PRC politics for Dongtu terrorism the political purpose of Wang's work as vindicating PRC politics is evident.

Political implications also emerge from Wang Yizhou's flawed understanding of Western theories on terrorism as defining terrorism in terms of relatively weak non-state actors against strong states and violence of the weak against the powerful and thereby 'excluding the possibility of...state terrorism...[which] amounts to absolving states which collude with, support and even directly participate in terrorism' (Wang, 2010b:4). Wang omits critical self-reflection of PRC actions, and sees a potential for Chinese scholars to create a better definition given the PRC's 'unique' character as a socialist, sovereign, developing, and independent state which both has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and has been a victim of terrorism (Wang, 2010b:6). A unique state under threat, China must both improve the world order and prevent terrorism, and steps to create 'an anti-terrorism theory and doctrine with Chinese characteristics are definitely worthwhile and

meaningful' (Wang, 2010b:6). Wang Yizhou's criticism serves to push Chinese NTS-research, which he has done since his 2003 article, linked with the endeavour to create a 'Chinese School of International Relations'. The political purpose and implications are to demarcate Western and PRC politics and research highlighting the importance of nationality above universalist scholarship and suggesting that PRC research will be beneficial to the PRC. Wang's purpose here is clearly political as his characterisation of current Western scholarship is clearly flawed, given that state terrorism is frequently discussed in major Western publications on terrorism. His call for a Chinese-led global restructuring is a political statement calling for the PRC to be more active internationally and to forge a new world in its image.

CCP-friendly political purposes within the PRC terrorism debate focusing on the direct threat to people in China and abroad is underlined when contrasted to the argument in the theoretically deeper parts of the Western debate that a significant threat stems from draconian counter-terrorism, endangering liberal democracy (Townshend, 2011:117-144; Tsang, 2009b:5,7,8; Gearty, 2013:115). The Chinese scholars completely overlook the dangers of counterterrorism to state-society cohesion and regime stability. Moreover, repressive counter-terrorism occurs in Xinjiang, far away from where the scholars are located. The absence of free media hinders non-Xinjiang-based scholars to be aware of the full extent of repression. The PRC scholars' omission to provide a clear definition of transnational crime reveals the political purpose of leaving the state a large space for wide-ranging criminalisation and securitisation, legitimising its excessive power. The absence of problematising transnational crime in the PRC debate means that the 'reality' portrayed by the PRC regime is accepted and its securitisation of crime not questioned. The Chinese scholars limit their research to analysing activities securitised by the state rather than questioning said securitisation.

The strong emphasis on the severe challenge to law-enforcement by transnational crime highlights a strong political purpose focusing

on state control and efficiency. For Abulaiti and Tursun, 'the international drug problem' causes instability in Central Asia, as the post-Soviet relaxation of Russia's control of Central Asia meant that international drug cartels started to grow and trade drugs from Central Asia (Abulaiti and Tursun, 2007:264ff.). Apart from weak law enforcement, Abulaiti and Tursun blame official complicity in drug crime in Central Asia (Abulaiti and Tursun, 2007:264ff.). Abulaiti and Tursun clearly regard drug-smuggling as threatening the state. Similarly, for Giraldo and Trinkunas, transnational crime may undermine state authority in 'grey areas' where rule of law cannot be exercised and in 'ungoverned areas' where state control cannot be asserted (Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2010:435). However, Andreas argues that portraying transnational crime as a threat to sovereignty tends to inflate the state's previous control over covert trans-border actions, and disregards 'the inherent limitations of law enforcement' and the demand-side part of transnational crime (Andreas, 2002:50). Moreover, Andreas suggests that a misrepresentation of threats instead can lead to politically popular, but ineffective, anti-crime measures (Andreas, 2002:50). The absence of these cautions in the PRC debate highlight the ostensive belief in the PRC state's capacity to deal with crime, and the overt zero-tolerance to crime advanced by the CCP and re-enacted by the scholars.

The PRC terrorism debate shows the fragile political meaning of non-state violence in terms of the war-time CCP. Some Chinese scholars feel obliged to highlight the difference between terrorists and guerrillas to demarcate terrorists from the early CCP. Wang Yizhou stresses that 'terrorists are...absolutely not "guerrillas" or "martyrs fighting against violent oppression"' (Wang Yizhou, 2010a:5f.). Similarly, Yu et al. emphasise the difference between 'freedom fighters and terrorists' as the latter injuring innocents (Yu et al., 2006:101f.). The clearly political reason for Yu et al.'s and Wang Yizhou's differentiation between guerrillas and terrorists is to prevent an accusation of terrorism against the CCP. Far from being terrorists, Wang claims, guerrilla fighters like the CCP or the

Vietcong were 'heroes', and, 'loved after death', are completely different from terrorists, who are hated posthumously (Wang, 2010a:6f.). Terrorists, for Wang and the scholarly PRC debate generally, are other, evil people. However, the CCP's 'liberation' and revolution has been described as 'a history of calculated terror and systematic violence', involving the murder of two million people (Dikötter, 2013:ixf.). To say that the CCP as guerrillas never killed innocent people is problematic, but demonstrates a clear political purpose of vindicating the Party.

A further political purpose aimed at demystifying terrorists and showing their vulnerability is evident in the PRC debate. Yu et al.'s analysis is eager not to demonise or dehumanise terrorists, noting that they were not 'born' that way (Yu et al., 2006:5f.). Wang Yizhou stresses that a Russian 'black widow' was not 'a cold-blooded animal like a snake' but experienced love and other human emotions, too, and was driven to suicide-bombing by Russian politics (Wang, 2010a:6). This is patriarchal language portraying female violence as an oddity. Yet, given the way terrorists have been portrayed and treated in China and the West, including torture and prison without trial, and by scholars like Zhang Jiadong, who simply regards them as incomprehensible religious fanatics, who 'think they are the only true followers of God', like Yu et al.'s attempts to prevent a dehumanisation of terrorists are important (Zhang Jiadong, 2012:53). Wang's argument shows an idea of modern women as non-violent, contrasting modernity and civilisation against primitive, pre-modern, and uncivilised terrorism, as already found in Yu et al.. However, Wang pities and infantilises rather than dehumanises these 'primitive' people as they are clearly not acting within reason, and are ultimately not fully responsible for their actions, as the global structure creates these problems. Wang thus problematically vindicates terrorists. Although it is not clear whether this empathy extends to terrorists from Xinjiang or is reserved for faraway terrorists, Wang's ostentatiously understanding attitude places him on the liberal side of the debate.

Despite claiming humanity for the terrorists, the scholars also regard them as super-villains. Wang Yizhou argues that international terrorist leaders who discern human weaknesses and can instil a feeling of helplessness in armies and officials, manipulate emotions and the media to engender 'an atmosphere of unsafety' (Wang, 2010a:3-6). Terrorists are also unimaginable and alien, for Wang Yizhou, who mentions 'brainwashing' in refugee camps, recounts his own meeting with Palestinians, and argues that their world is different from ours politically and psychologically (Wang, 2010a:5). It seems, for Wang, questionable whether 'we' can really understand terrorists by using 'normal thinking', and hence there is an 'asymmetry' of terrorists understanding states and states not understanding terrorists (Wang, 2010a:5). The political implication here is that the PRC's extreme counter-terror is right, as China faces a formidable and incomprehensible enemy.

CCP-friendly political purpose is evident in the PRC discussion of state terrorism as it carefully avoids mentioning the PRC. The PRC debate, like the Western debate, allows for the idea of states using terrorism. Yu et al. see state terrorism in US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, arguing that state terrorism are actions directed against 'innocent common people' (Yu et al., 2006:110). However, PRC scholars avoid discussing the Chinese state's use of violence against its own citizens, including the Uighurs, as possible state terrorism. Instead of a critical stance against all state violence, the PRC scholars refer only to Western states. Hence Wang Yizhou's examples of state terrorism omit Stalin's Russia and Mao's China, which both killed millions of their own citizens during land reforms, the PRC's Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution (Wang, 2010a:9). Given Wang's previous insistence that the CCP guerrillas were not terrorists, it is strange that he does not also argue that the PRC never committed terrorism against its own or other states' citizens. This omission suggests that the topic is completely taboo, but also leaves readers to make the link themselves. This limitation of the debate turns it into a criticism of

the West but not of other states. Portraying Western states as employing state terrorism against other people during a self-proclaimed fight against terrorism implies Western hypocrisy while also advancing an image of the West victimising others and juxtaposing developed states against developing states, clearly a political motivation rather than objective scholarship.

While the restrictive global system is seen as giving rise to terrorism, post-Cold War lack of regulation is seen to engender transnational crime, revealing the political purpose of vindicating strong states. Abulaiti and Tursun see the end of the Cold War as catalysing transnational crime. The cause for transnational crime in Central Asia now is the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ensuing problems of weak and corrupt state-institutions, economic problems, an ideological 'vacuum', and foreign interference as well as Islamic extremism (Abulaiti and Tursun, 2007:267ff.). Similarly, Zhang Yuncheng notes several underlying reasons for international money laundering, including fiscal liberalisation and deregulation, 'the globalisation of economic crime', poor fiscal oversight, 'businessmen intentionally or unintentionally helping money laundering' as well as communication and traffic technology (Zhang Yuncheng, 2003:530-535). Abulaiti and Tursun's and Zhang Yuncheng's arguments are clearly warning against financial political and liberalisation in the PRC. The PRC debate overlooks high profit, noted within the Western debate as an important driver of transnational crime (Andreas, 2002:40). Since high profit suggests demand and a shift of the focus towards consumers, in the PRC case, this would mean recognising that parts of society collude with the criminals; China and its citizens would no longer be merely victims of foreigners.

Since the PRC transnational crime debate does not question the link between crime and security made by the political elites, it cannot, as the Western debate does, inquire into whether the security communities portray transnational crime as increasing to preserve their own importance after the Cold War (Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2010:433). Apart from linking transnational crime to

general globalisation and the expansion of illicit markets and service sectors, the PRC debate does not note the rise of the BRICS and free trade areas, and thus the inability to check all containers, transportation and people travelling around the globe as another reason for the increase in transnational crime (Smith, 2010:204). This omission is due to the scholars' avoidance of implicating China's economic rise in the rise of transnational crime. Instead, in the PRC debate, transnational crime is due to outside chaos coming into China, a politically motivated argument.

Advocacy of using Chinese philosophy against terrorism is politically motivated as it fuses the CCP state with the very culture it sought to destroy to rally support for the PRC. An and Gao advocate using Confucianism and Daoism to fight domestic NTS threats, including the 'three evils' and transnational crime (An Xiaoping and Gao Rudong, 2014:132). Evidently unaware of equating Chinese culture with a small part of Han Chinese history and philosophy and thus marginalising the Uighurs' Muslim heritage, An and Gao also recast Confucianism and Daoism to align them with CCP-policy, including 'humans as the foundation' and 'the "harmony" ideal' (An Xiaoping and Gao Rudong, 2014:132). The political purpose is ideological warfare against terrorism and 'non-Chinese' philosophy with the state defining 'Chineseness'.

Cooperation on prosecution of transnational crime, as with other NTS issues, is advocated by many in the semi-official and the scholarly debate in China on transnational crime. Shi Gang argues that China needs to increase its 'active participation in all types of international cooperation' to overcome piracy (Shi Gang, 2003:516f.). The PRC debate does not entail the Western debate's critical stance towards cooperation, highlighting that cooperation is problematic even when conducted through Interpol, due to unilateral military actions against transnational crime, such as by the USA in Panama (Hough, 2008; Smith, 2010:199; see Andreas, 2002:50). Such unilateral US-intervention in the name of an NTS threat is usually something the NTS debate in China rejects

strongly, and the absence of a discussion of such intervention indicates that the scholars are mostly following the CCP's lead in promoting cooperation.

Rather than problematise legal measures for dealing with transnational crime, as the Western debate does, the PRC debate often advocates them, suggesting that a strong state can manage crime. Whereas Shi Gang and Yu et al. promote domestic and international legal measures against transnational crime, Andreas highlights the frequently ignored issue that law enforcement is inherently limited, evidenced in the inability to check all containers shipped around the world, and the frequent intertwining of illegal and legal economies (Shi, 2003:516f.; Yu et al., 2006:257f.; Andreas, 2002:39,40). The PRC debate does not leave the state-centric view of reality.

Political considerations weigh into the debate on the use of the military against terrorism and transnational crime. Shen Hongsheng notes the possibility of using the PLA and armed police to strike against transnational crime since 'only relying on the police cannot solve these challenges' and as 'not all NTS threats suit a response with military strength, but the army can with complete competence undertake the mission of responding to most NTS threats' (Shen, 2013:293,300). Whereas Shen implies complete trust in the military's abilities, Shi Gang's suggests an unresolved question of responsibility for dealing with piracy among China's government departments, arguing that China's military has to deal with maritime pirates since China's maritime police lacks the necessary power to do so (Shi, 2003:516f.).

Conversely, the use of the military against terrorism is considered ineffective. For Wang Yizhou, military measures cannot eradicate terrorism, but can even endanger 'innocents' and fuel terrorism (Wang Yizhou, 2010a:15f.). Wang Yizhou fails to note that repressive non-military counterterrorism can also violate the rights of innocents and stoke resentment. Fu Yong similarly holds that the US war on terror engendered more terror as anti-terror and terrorism fuel each other (Fu Yong, 2007:157). UNB8, too, argued

that the US campaigns were ineffective as ‘the enemy was not a state’. However, Fu Yong and Wang Yizhou who laud SCO successes in weakening the social basis of terrorists and promote ‘comprehensive governance’ respectively, omit the possible difference between responding to terrorism at home and transnationally or abroad (Fu Yong, 2007:157). Conversely, and clearly in the light of the 2014 Kunming attacks and other alleged Xinjiang-related terrorist attacks in recent years, Xie Guiping supports the use of military measures as part of a ‘comprehensive management’ including political and diplomatic measures, to ‘contain Dongtu from spreading within and without China’s borders’ (Xie Guiping, 2014:143). The scholars’ conundrum is the NTS debate’s general rejection of military solutions combined with China’s increasing military capabilities and the supposedly increasing threat of transnational terrorism.

Contrariwise, the PRC debate discusses using non-state actors to fight transnational crime and terrorism, advocating it as long as the regime is not threatened. Although Chen’s discussion is rare in the Chinese debate on NTS as he highlights the possibility and necessity of non-state, private actors to deal with NTS problems, his advocacy of Chinese shipping companies employing Chinese security firms ostensibly for ease of communication serves to limit sovereignty problems as all actors are Chinese subjects (Chen, 2014:187). Conversely, Wang Yizhou calls for ‘the participation of society’ (Wang Yizhou, 2012:120). In both cases, using non-state actors and mobilising the public poses no threat or competition to the regime, as the problems securitised by the regime are dealt with within state-set parameters. The political purpose of safeguarding the state is evident.

Normative Implications

Although the scholarly terrorism debate deepens security by looking at referent objects beyond the state to embrace ‘innocent’ people in general, there is not necessarily a normative shift as it aligns with the CCP’s condemnation of terrorism generally.

A normative shift in terms of a re-conceptualisation and more sober assessment of transnational crime and terrorism is not evident in the scholarly PRC debate. Wang Yizhou promotes a change of thinking on terrorism, including considering victims' and terrorists' views (Wang Yizhou, 2010a:17). However, the PRC debate does not – as parts of the Western debates do – encompass normative advocacy of seeing reality differently in terms of scaling down the importance of terrorism due to statistical insignificance, recasting it as transnational crime, or crime as part of prosperity (Townshend, 2011:118; Browning, 2013:113; Tsang, 2009b; Andreas, 2002:50f.). While Tsang advocates a treatment of terrorism as organised crime, enabling Muslims and Islamic states to cooperate, the emphasis should be on winning the ideational battle through rule of law and liberal democratic values (Tsang, 2009b:1-17). Similarly, parts of the Western transnational crime debate suggest seeing transnational crime not as social disintegration but as a side-effect of prosperity and freedom (Andreas, 2002:50f., referring to Cohen and Felson). Still, both of these responses would be difficult for the PRC scholars to embrace as they oppose the regime's strict rejection of terrorism and transnational crime. This indicates that the PRC scholars must support and not go beyond the management measures already employed by the state, preventing an ideational normative change.

None of the measures advocated in the PRC debate are markedly different to what the state is doing. The absence of an advocacy of a re-conceptualisation of terrorism and transnational crime demonstrates that both are accepted as threats, having been securitised by the state. That the state's securitisation prevents the PRC scholars from probing into advocating a 'de-securitisation' of the two shows the impact of the political context in which they work.

Important parts of both the PRC and Western terrorism debates are markedly value-laden in the discussion of the referent object, with the former highlighting innocent people and the latter the liberal democratic order. Yu et al. argue that the targets of various types of terrorism are innocents, rendering terrorism a crime

against humanity (Yu et al., 2006:99). 'Innocent' is a difficult term. Zhang Jiadong implies that 'innocence' excludes those in power as he argues that nineteenth-century Russian anarchists 'generally didn't kill innocents' but that their attacks were 'directed against special people', tsarist officials and nobility (Zhang, 2012:48). Zhang effectively legitimises some forms of terrorism, including IRA attacks against British politicians. The definition of 'innocence' therefore lies with the perpetrators of terrorist actions. Moreover, the binary truism of innocent victims-evil terrorist does not offer an alternative to the status quo in which the CCP follows the same narrative.

Zhang further notes a widening of the target area of terrorism. Unlike previously, terrorism now is targeted 'not against former colonisers and developed countries' but against the entire international society (Zhang, 2012:52). This widens the referent object to all people globally but remains within the CCP narrative. Conversely, a normative shift was anticipated in my interviews as two of my interviewees also argued that society, but not the state, was the referent object with regards to terrorism and transnational crime (ONB2 and ONB3). While the CCP regards itself as representing the Chinese people, 'the people' here is not to be a veiled reference to regime security as ONB2 and ONB3 separated state and society (Lieberthal, 2004:385).

The transnational crime debate, too, does not anticipate a normative shift and mostly looks at the state as the referent object. While Yu et al. and Gao show concern for drug users and societies weakened by drugs, other scholars focus on the state, its capacity harmed by transnational crime, and regime security, with Li Bin focusing on 'societal stability' and economic development, both considered key to CCP legitimacy (Yu et al., 2006:256; Gao, 2003:471ff.; Abulaiti and Tursun, 2007:266f.; Fu Yong, 2007:58; Li Bin, 2004:47). Although such statism is prevalent in the Western debate, too, Giraldo and Trinkunas argue that extreme state and popular reactions against transnational crime may endanger the state by triggering authoritarian revivals or democratic revolutions

and the use of 'more draconian' measures against criminals (Smith, 2010:181; Hough, 2008; Giraldo and Trinkunas, 2010:439,444). This argument is very similar to the highlighting of the dangers of counterterrorism in the Western debate. Similarly, this aspect is not taken up in the PRC debate, underlining the latter's political limitations and lacking normative shift.

Conclusion

This chapter tested my four research questions against the discussion on terrorism and transnational crime in the PRC NTS debate, revealing both insights into these debates and into the wider NTS debate.

First, this chapter revealed several insights into the conceptualisation of NTS and the evaluation of its significance. In the PRC debate, terrorism is generally seen to have a political goal and religious background in the PRC debate. Whereas all scholars implicitly or explicitly highlight Islam as a background to terrorism, the recent debate even suggests targeting religion directly to align it with state goals. I also showed that the debate is unclear whether terrorism is purely NTS or a mixture of NTS and TS, partially due to military responses to terrorism. The terrorism case study therefore highlights a conundrum for the overall NTS conceptualisation in whether issues are rigidly NTS or TS, or whether there is a conceptual fluidity depending on state responses. If the latter, the question arises and remains unanswered in the debate as to the usefulness of the concept of NTS. In contrast to the terrorism debate, this chapter found that the conceptualisation of transnational crime is more simplistic. Transnationalism is presented as the reason why transnational crime is NTS rather than a non-security issue. The PRC debate offers no succinct conceptualisation or problematisation of transnational crime, suggesting that its security-categorisation is unquestioned. However, the debate does not regard terrorism simply as a physical threat, but underlines the danger of terror by emphasising its pervasiveness as an ideology. Conversely, the transnational crime debate highlights the undermining of the state,

the negative impact on society, and crimes catalysing other crimes as the main threat due to transnational crime. Transnational domestic terrorism by 'Dongtu' is focused on strongly by the written debate, with the threat emphasised as endangering peaceful development and targeting children.

Regarding novelty, the chapter showed that "9/11" clearly triggered the NTS literature on terrorism although the debate generally sees terrorism as an old phenomenon. What is regarded as new, by, for example, Wang Yizhou, is that the information age has granted terrorism new tools to increase its reach. The supposed novelty or non-traditionalness of transnational crime is less clear in the PRC debate, with globalisation and development discussed as causes. This is contrary to the Western debate and the general conceptualisation debate in Chapter Three, which both highlight ideational shifts as leading to the securitisation of transnational crime and NTS respectively.

In terms of assigned significance, the chapter demonstrated that terrorism is seen as a severe threat due to its supposed increasing lethality, rise in attacks, the danger of terrorists attaining WMDs, and, for Wang Yizhou, the power of terrorist propaganda. The importance assigned to transnational crime by contrast is constructed through portraying it as a threat to the state and as linked to terrorism. However, the chapter also showed that leading scholars, such as Yu et al. spend little space on transnational crime and therefore do not regard it as strongly dangerous.

Second, my discussion revealed that several factors accounted for the variance in the PRC scholars' conceptualisation of terrorism and transnational crime NTS and assessment of its significance. In contrast to lacking effect of location, whether a scholar is affiliated to a university or a more state-connected institution has an impact on their transnational crime and terrorism discussion, with scholars from the International Relations University and social science academies simply focusing on threats to the state without critically investigating either issues. Conversely, university-affiliated scholars including Zhang Jiadong, Yu Xiaofeng, Wang Jiangli,

Wang Yizhou, and Pan Yihe's discussions are more critical and add more unique and theoretical thinking to the debate.

The key cause of variance are ideational factors and research focus. Scholars focusing on state security, such as Fu Yong and the semi-official debate follow their overall state-centrism in the terrorism and transnational crime debate. Conversely, scholars interested in theory-creation and humans as the focus point of NTS, including Wang Yizhou and Yu et al., produce a more complex and critical discussion as well as superficial discussion of a law-focused issue such as transnational crime. My interviews showed that a problematisation of the securitisation of terrorism is evident but that it cannot be voiced in the written debate.

Third, this chapter discussed various political meanings and purposes within the terrorism and transnational crime debate. Political meaning and differencing implications are contained in the two debates given their focus on the legitimacy of violence and actions against the state. Yu et al.'s firm rejection of terrorism as crimes against humanity due attacks on 'innocents' is in keeping with their focus on humans as well as with political orthodox. Wang Yizhou's theorising about the systemic causes of terrorism similarly combines his theoretical interest in the causes of terrorism with a CCP-related critique of Western international politics and the Western-led system. Political purpose is also evident in the absence of a critical discussion of the sensitive topic of PRC anti-terrorism, which has previously led to the incarceration of scholars. Wang's advocacy of a Chinese-led global restructuring and theory-creation contain political meaning in that he both reveals state-based thinking and considers theory as country-specific rather than universal and objective, as well as a nationalist, messianic agenda of China harmonising the world. Conversely, more critical views expressed by Zhang Jiadong point to the relativity of the legitimacy of terrorism but also emphasise that terrorism now is no longer used by states. The political purpose of not discussing Xinjiang-related terrorism was evidenced in UNB1's argument that terrorism there was TS due to its impact on sovereignty.

Political purpose was also evident in the transnational crime debate where the lack of a succinct definition and demarcation of transitional crime allowed for excessive state securitisation and response. Fu's discussion of China's increasing opening-up to the world as endangering it to become a target for terrorists showed the political purpose to deflect blame from China's Xinjiang policy as well as portraying the outside world as a dangerous place China nevertheless had to become part of. Any blame of the CCP is deflected. Conversely, the focus on law enforcement in the transitional crime debate has the political purpose of emphasising the need for a strong state and border controls as well as the dangers of regime change with the Central Asian states and Russia portrayed as unable to manage their countries after the Cold War.

The need by the scholars to emphasise the difference between early CCP guerrillas and terrorists serves the political purpose of vindicating the political regime despite the terror used by the CCP to create its reign. At times the political purposes of attacking terrorists are at odds. Thus Wang Yizhou's demystification of terrorists as humans is contrary to his portrayal of them as supervillains. The political purpose of both the terrorism and transnational crime debate is to show terrorists and criminals as petty-minded and defeatable in contrast to the strong PRC state which was founded and led by righteous CCP martyrs and guerrillas. The failure to critically investigate PRC anti-terrorism and possible state terrorism despite highlighting other state's state terrorism means that the PRC puts political purpose above scholarly objectivity.

The influence of politics is also shown in that neither the terrorism nor transnational crime debates consider other management measures than those the state already uses; the scholars are accepting the state's lead on determining what is to be done rather than re-conceptualising threat and response. However, my interviews showed that not all were following the state blindly, as people began to question the PRC-state's capacity as terror acts did occur.

Fourth, this chapter showed that there were miniscule normative implications emerge from the debates on transnational crime and terrorism. The normative shift away from state-centrism by ONB2 and ONB3, who regard the people generally as the referent object of transnational crime and terrorism, is in contrast to the subscription of state-centrism by the literature in both debates which support the state in what it does rather than problematising it. This shows both a lacking normative theory as well as the political sensitivity of terrorism, considered a key NTS issue and transnational crime.

Chapter Six: Economic Security and Migration

Economic security and migration are considered security issues in the Western and Chinese debates. While economic security comprises a vast issue area, variously including the global economic and financial system, national economies, and people's livelihoods, migration is a more specific, if no less problematic area. Both issues are politically important in the West and China.

The West generally saw itself secure in the expanding global capitalist market system it had created and dominated until the 2008/09 crisis. The PRC, however, is adopting many features of a market economy and is increasingly tied into a global economic system which ensures its recent prosperity and economic rise, but fundamentally contradicts China's official ideology. Moreover, China witnessed the volatility and dangers of the capitalist system in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis which shattered many of its newly industrialised neighbours' economies.

Migration is part of globalisation: people – and goods and services – move. Migration discussed in the security literature is notably not that of 'brain drain' or the exchange of highly skilled personnel. Rather, less skilled, poorer, irregular migrants are seen as a security issue in the West and China. Whereas North America and Europe are destinations for migrants and refugees, China has far less immigrants and asylum-seekers, and instead is a country of origin for both.

This chapter investigates the PRC scholarly debate on migration and economic security along my four research questions. I first enquire into the PRC scholarly conceptualisations, setting out how the scholars evaluate the significance of both. I then analyse the causes for the variance in how the PRC scholars conceptualise these two NTS-issues and assess their significance. The political meanings and political purposes this scholarship reveals and seeks to attain are then investigated. Finally, I analyse the PRC migration and economic security debates regarding the normative implications and possible normative turn.

Context

The Reform and Opening-Up project launched by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s started to reform the PRC economy away from the socialist planned economy. Instead of collectivisation, entrepreneurialism was embraced and 'corporate capitalism and investment' increased (Benewick and Donald, 2009:35). In contrast to the Maoist system, and in spite of hundreds of millions coming out of poverty since the start of the reforms, severe inequality is evident in China with an income Gini coefficient of 42.1, and with severe wealth and development gaps between the cities and the countryside (Steinfeld, 2010:9; UNDP, 2015; Benewick and Donald, 2009:32). In 1992, the leadership announced the goal of reforms to be a 'socialist market economy', entailing the reform of the State-owned Enterprises and the emergence of private and foreign-invested firms (Steinfeld, 2010:57f.).

Through economic, social and political changes in the 1990s, pushed by globalisation, and the entry into the WTO in 2001, China is now firmly linked to the global economy in which globalisation entails 'a new form of production' spread over several firms and countries (Steinfeld, 2010:17). In contrast to its isolation until the 1970s, the fast-growing China is now the world's major exporter, second largest importer and one of the key recipients and sources of international capital (Schmidt and Heilmann, 2010:63). Foreign direct investment, especially from North America, Europe and the Asia-Pacific in China is growing and China's large labour force, high growth, and stock market draws in overseas companies, especially after the entry into the WTO as it allowed for partnerships of Chinese and foreign firms (Benewick and Donald, 2009:16). Foreign investment focuses on manufacturing, but also on services, including retail, communications, and real estate, but problems remain over faulty regulatory framework over quality controls, including issues of copyright protection (Benewick and Donald, 2009:16). Stronger engagement with the global economy means that the regime can claim successes while blaming overseas problems for any failures, with the global market failure

in 2008 considered a case of Western anti-China action in the year that China hosted the Olympics (Benewick and Donald, 2009:35).

China's fast economic growth and economic modernisation is highly dependent on trade (Benewick and Donald, 2009:14). PRC direct investment in Africa, USA and Australia is significant to the global economy, but entails political problems (Benewick and Donald, 2009:16). China's engagement with the global economy is at times regarded with suspicion, especially regarding currency and trade surplus (Schmidt and Heilmann, 2010:65). Due to the Asian Financial Crisis, the CPG does not allow a complete conversion of the net capital movement, keeping capital controls 'to ward off' financial speculation (Schmidt and Heilmann, 2010:68).

Economic growth and development are central to the CCP's regime security, which embraces 'eudaemonic legitimacy', i.e. the regime's rule is justified 'by successful economic performance and effective provision of economic benefits to individuals in society' (Chen Feng, 1997:423). As millions of Chinese are still waiting to become 'rich', the government needs to ensure sustainable growth during a time of global economic recession, with estimates holding that China needs 7 per cent or above annual growth to sustain domestic finances, and more to continue rural development, agricultural expansion and education reforms (Benewick and Donald, 2009:35).

Owing to China's large population and scarcity of arable land, domestic migration and emigration to neighbouring states and further afield has a long history. Nevertheless, these trends have amplified in recent decades due to the socio-economic changes in the PRC and easier international travel in the globalisation age. The PRC today faces the largest internal population movement the world has ever seen, mostly that of 'peasants' from the countryside moving to the cities in search of work and better living standards (Benewick and Donald, 2009:54). This domestic migration is problematic due to the Hukou system, which binds urban and rural residents in China to a specific place by linking their right to social welfare to specific locations (Benewick and Donald, 2009:54).

There is a large Chinese diaspora overseas and in neighbouring countries due to historical migration, amounting to over 30 million people (Benewick and Donald, 2009:106). Regarding international migration, China does provide refuge: 301,052 refugees, mostly from Vietnam, live in China, as well as 467 asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2014). 210,730 PRC citizens are refugees abroad, among them political dissidents such as Tiananmen student protest leaders, as well as people fearing religious persecution, such as Falun Gong members, and the UN estimates that there are 47,337 PRC asylum seekers globally (UNHCR, 2014). The issue of migration for China also must include exiles such as the Dalai Lama and his supporters, the welcome of whom by foreign leaders or cultural events incurs Beijing's displeasure.

The Literature

Economic security is given significantly more space in the Chinese NTS literature than migration, taking a special place in the Chinese scholarly NTS debate: 'NTS' was used for the first time by Peking University's Wang Yong in a 1994 article on economic interdependence.

The semi-official 2003 *On NTS* contains a discussion of economic security by Chen Fengying and Jiang Yong. Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe, and Wang Jiangli (2006) see economic security as a 'hotspot' of NTS and give it its own chapter. Fu Yong's 2007 monograph also treats economic security as a major issue. The edited volume *Views from China* (2007) entails a section on economic security, including chapters by Wang Zhengyi on 'Understanding China's Transformation', Yu Genqian on 'National Economic Security Targets', Fu Junwen on foreign trade dependence, and Zhuang Rui on 'Raw and Processed Materials Imports'. Zhang Ming's chapter in Zhao and Zhu's 2011 *Non-traditional Security and China's New Foreign Strategy* deals specifically with the effects of the global financial crisis on China's economic security. The NTS Blue Books have several related chapters: Tan Rong (2011-12) on 'China's soil resources security', Li Jinshan and Hu Fengqiao (2012-13) on 'the European debt crisis', Gan Junxian (2014-15) on 'International

Trade', and An Shaoping and Xie Guiping (2014-15) on the 'One Belt One Road' construction. Zhejiang University's 2014 NTS Journal has two articles on economic security, Wang Yiman on 'trade war', and Qiu Yue's 'The Diaoyu dispute may trigger a Sino-Japanese trade war'.

Illegal migration is given its own chapter by Wu Xingzuo in the 2003 *On NTS*. Yu et al. (2006), meanwhile, place illegal migration in their 'International Public Security' chapter, notably in a section entitled 'transnational drug trafficking and illegal migration', underlining the illegal and even criminal nature attributed to this type of migration (Yu et al., 2006:256-264). Similarly, Fu Yong (2007) discusses migration only very briefly. The 2007 *Views from China: NTS*, like Yu et al., places its only chapter on 'Contemporary China's Illegal Migration Activities' by Zhou and Wang under 'Trans-Border Crime'. The Blue Books contain two chapters on migration: Li Xiaomin (2012-13) on 'the protection of overseas Chinese citizens', and Zhang Yadi (2014-15) on 'China's Migration Security Issues'. Zhejiang University's NTS Journal has one article on migration, Dong He (2014) on 'Illegal migration in China's North-Eastern border area.'

The 'outnumbering' of migration by economic security suggests that economic security is deemed more important. While this is in contrast to China's enormous internal migration, China's 'floating population' is omitted in the NTS debate, as is discussed below, explaining the lack of literature on migration. Migration is also a 'single issue' area whereas economic security encompasses various subfields, sometimes including energy security.

Conceptualisation

Economic Security

A key division in the PRC debate concerns the conceptualisation of economic security as pure NTS or as a TS-NTS hybrid. Some scholars regard economic security as security due to its military and political security connection, hence rather TS. Others highlight its NTS 'characteristics' including the deepening to incorporate

individual referent objects. Whether economic security is purely NTS was contested in my interviews. For ONB4, economic security events such as financial crises as such are NTS, but when they implicate societal stability and the regime they are TS, indicating the proximity of TS and NTS. Moving beyond TS and NTS, interviewee UNB9 even argued that economic crises were no longer NTS issues, but instead a background for NTS issues such as terrorism.

Scholars regarding economic security as solely NTS, notably Yu et al., emphasise the widening of security beyond narrow military security. For Yu et al., the NTS characteristics of economic security are that there are various security 'subjects' as well as that economic security problems are unpredictable and could happen at any time (Yu et al., 2006:172). The actors, individual people, the state, businesses, and social classes, are more interconnected in international economics (Yu et al., 2006:172). Similarly all-encompassing is Yu et al.'s understanding of national economic security in NTS as the state's economic development being 'optimised' or 'guarded against risk', including the absence of poverty and threats, and instead the existence of sustainable growth (Yu et al., 2006:166f.). Domestic economic security, for Yu et al., includes the absence of ecological disasters, large-scale poverty, inflation, and unemployment (Yu et al., 2006:167). International economic security for Yu et al. refers to the state's global economic interest not being endangered, the stability and sustainability of the foreign markets and investment related to the state's economy, and that there are no unanticipated shocks such as strong price fluctuations or supply suspensions (Yu et al., 2006:167). Yu et al. hence seek near-impossible stability and safety in a fast-changing global capitalist system. UB4, too, emphasised globalisation and interdependence as the catalyst of turning the economy into a security issue.

More practically-oriented scholars offer more concise justifications of why economics concerns NTS. Yu Genqian considers 'two innate characteristics of national economic security problems',

firstly that an issue “can create huge economic damage for a country”, severely influencing people’s lives, deteriorating the economy, and obstructing economic development’ and secondly ‘the suddenness of this huge damage’ (Yu Genqian, 2007:57). It is evidently the contradiction of the CCP’s economic development imperative aimed at wealth and (political) stability based on a seemingly fickle, uncontrollable capitalist system that drives Yu Genqian’s reasoning.

Fu Yong considers economic security as both TS and NTS since it was included in Cold War military security (Fu, 2007:53). Fu elaborates the difference in that TS economic security concerns the development and survival of the state and thus differentiates between state and world security, whereas NTS economic security concerns economic globalisation and unification related challenges and crises and looks at world security (Fu, 2007:053). Economic interconnectedness and loss of national economic control are the threat to the national economy (Fu, 2007:053).

Conversely, influential parts of the Western debate are wary of economic security generally. Buzan et al. consider economic insecurity a part of the capitalist economic order (Buzan et al., 1998:95,105). Only threats to that liberal economic order can be economic security issues (Buzan et al., 1998:116). UNB9 similarly argued that economic crises could catalyse NTS issues, such as terrorism, but were not NTS issues themselves as they only concerned people’s living standards. UNB9’s view contrasts with the general PRC NTS literature by refusing, like Buzan et al., to regard ‘people’s living standards’ as a security issue (see Buzan et al., 1998:103f.). For UNB9, people’s deliberate actions and responses to events can constitute security threats, not the causes or systemic factors. UNB9 strongly limits security to something more manageable. The general absence of such wariness in the PRC literature – despite the frequently voiced importance of Buzan for PRC security research (e.g. ONB1, UNB5) – shows that the PRC scholars employ a country-specific perspective and do not completely support the capitalist economic order, but see it as

creating both threats and wealth. Since none of the scholars advocates changing the capitalist order - which the CCP is trying to join as a market economy – they ultimately resign to the continuation of threats.

A Multi-Field Issue

The PRC scholars overall avoid a succinct conceptualisation of economic security. Chen and Jiang's semi-official text does not clearly define economic security, highlighting that international variety of economic situations means that 'there is not yet a single understanding of the meaning of economic security' and even that 'there are...different definitions within the same state at different times' (Chen and Jiang, 2003:100). Chen and Jiang's refusal to create a definition leaves economic security a fluid concept.

Key PRC NTS scholars obscure the concept further by dissecting it without explaining how its subfields are linked. For Yu et al., economic security includes:

- 1) 'energy problems, including oil crises'
- 2) 'resource problems, including the safeguarding of goods and materials'
- 3) 'industry problems including high new technology'
- 4) 'market problems, including international trade'
- 5) 'stability problems, including infrastructure'
- 6) 'population problems, including social security' (Yu et al., 2006:172).

Fu Yong's is even wider. Lacking one single definition and being a complex concept, economic security for Fu divides into:

- 1) 'financial security'
- 2) 'energy security'
- 3) 'food security'
- 4) 'information security'

5) 'resource security' (Fu, 2007:053).

Economic security is turned into an umbrella term which, in Fu's case of including food security, takes in issues which other PRC scholars regard as distinct NTS issues (Chapter Seven). Such categorisation seems scientific as the threat appears logically analysed, suggesting that it can be more easily sustained. However, it is difficult to see how the containment of a threat in one sub-category could lead to overall economic security since the global economic system is generally seen as giving rise to these threats. The scholars seek a false sense of security rather than tackling the global order itself.

Migration

The migration debate is not clear on why migration is a security issue. A frequent argument highlights migration numbers. For Tian He, 'large-scale population movements can constitute regional security challenges as they may cause foreign political and military threats and domestic political, social, and economic disputes' (Tian He, 2001:34). Moreover, the societal security of states, as defined by Tian, is threatened by migration since it endangers the state's endeavour to 'protect the unity of its nation and societal culture' as the 'we' of society is threatened (Tian He, 2001:37). Similarly, according to Fu Yong, 'the migration wave', notably illegal migration, caused social and military conflicts and thus became an NTS issue (Fu Yong, 2007:56). International movement is securitised if many people participate.

A key element of Tian and Fu's arguments is evidently that societies cannot absorb more people. Similarly, the semi-official debate notes that state populations cannot really welcome more foreigners due to growing populations and related employment and social issues (Wu, 2003:478). Tian, Fu, and Wu all tacitly reject a notion of international responsibility to look after displaced people and refugees. Uncontrolled movement of alleged masses is a security issue as it is symptomatic of national border control weaknesses and creates interstate and domestic disorder.

Conversely, Yu et al. are concerned about the impact of PRC emigration, discussing 'the phenomenon of China's illegal emigrants' (Yu et al., 2006:262). Emigration here is security as people abandon some regions, apparently causing economic problems in those areas (Yu et al., 2006:264). Nevertheless, given that Yu et al. also hold that migrants leave for economic reasons, the notion that their departure creates economic problems makes Yu et al.'s argument contradictory as emigration could ease domestic labour-market pressures. The PRC NTS debate focuses on illegal migration, especially on foreigners illegally entering and staying in another state and people illegally leaving their country, differing over the degree of rejection of this migration. On the strongly rejectionist side of the debate, Li Bin conflates illegal migration with transnational crime (Li Bin, 2004:47). For Wu, illegal migration is 'migration through irregular channels [which is] not recognised and allowed by the receiving country' (Wu Xingzuo, 2003:479). As this concerns the law, Wu notes that states' definition of illegal migration differ (Wu, 2003:479). While the emphasis on inter-state difference is a frequent device used in the PRC debate to prevent a universal definition of NTS (issues) and to retain a broad and flexible definition, in the case of irregular migration, the Western literature also notes that there are regional differences regarding the application of the term irregular migration (Koser, 2007:56f.).

Whereas most of the written PRC debate discussed migration more as an overall international problem, my interviewees differentiated between states, often arguing that migration was less of a problem for China. ONB2, who like ONB3 considered 'migrants/migration and asylum seekers' both to be part of NTS since they were a transnational phenomenon as well as the referent object, thought that they were not a problem in the PRC. UNB9's understanding of why Europeans regard illegal migration as NTS and security was derived from the English literature and Western anti-illegal migration policies. Similarly, ONB9 considered migration to be a problem for some nation-states, notably Russia

and European states. By contrast, ONB9 implied that China was sufficiently self-assured in its culture's ability to absorb newcomers to manage increasing immigration. While this suggests that ethnicities do not matter in China as all consider themselves Chinese, ONB9 subscribed to the CCP's Han-centric narrative, arguing that there was a strong 'genetic' 'feeling' of being Han. This belief in Han strength allowed ONB9 to suggest that migration was instead a problem for European states. ONB9's assessment here is very understanding, and suggests that is natural for nation-states to be weary of migration. This mixture of ideology and Han nationalism, even racism, indicates a belief in the CCP's Han-centric, xenophobic nationalism (Tsang, 2009a:875ff.). ONB9 suggested that the 'genes' and 'melting-pot' status of these European states are weaker, whereas ethnicity-based nationalism protects China against immigration dangers.

This variety of conceptualisations shows a schism of how human-centric issues are perceived and of whether a global view or a China-specific view is taken. The more removed, international, and global the perspective, as in Tian He and Fu Yong's cases, the more migration is vilified as illegitimate movement of people who should remain passively within their home states. The migrants, rather than push- and pull-factors, are problematised, constituting their dehumanisation since their freedom of movement and individual reasons for migration are overlooked. Conversely, the differentiating view evident in my interviews suggests a much more thorough migration analysis in various areas, although the conclusions can be racist and unsound.

Widening Economic Disparities

Increasing wealth disparities are seen as international and domestic economic security threats in the PRC semi-official and scholarly debates, rather than as normal results of economic development. Yu et al. worry about growing poverty and uneven distribution since the Reform Era in China with its Gini coefficient exceeding that of developed and major developing states (Yu et al., 2006:185f.). Yu et al. see China's increasing rich-poor divide as

‘dangerous’ and in need of ‘more conscientious management’ and speedy solution to avoid threats to state security and stability (Yu et al., 2006:185f.). Fu similarly moves away from the development-based division of the world, arguing that economic globalisation had led to increasing wealth gaps in all, including developed, states (Yu et al., 2006:169f.; Fu, 2007:054). The focus on domestic and international wealth disparities is significant as the NTS scholars rarely look at domestic issues. While severe inequality is generally problematic, the PRC scholars’ concern links to the relative novelty of inequality in China which severely threatens the regime and its communist ideology.

Significance

Economic security is regarded as especially important compared to the other NTS issues in this thesis, with the scholars linking it to national security. For UB6, economic security was the key NTS issue, arguing that a weak economy weakened China, too. A key measure of importance is to emphasise comprehensive national strength (Chapter One). Chen and Jiang subscribe to ‘national comprehensive strength’, with economic competition replacing military competition after the Cold War (Chen and Jiang, 2003:96,100). ONB2 considered economic security as the key NTS issue for China. Yu et al. state that ‘economic capacity is the symbol of national strength’, with economic security impacting on both political stability and state sovereignty, while in current international relations, strategy centred on economic interest, hence impacting on issues such as competition, cooperation and war and conflict (Yu et al., 2006:166). Similarly, Wang Zhengyi implies the significance of economic security for China’s international strength (Wang Zhengyi, 2006:41-56). The reason for this competition is globalisation. For Chen and Jiang, faster economic globalisation intensified competition for markets and resources, and international interdependence increased due to financial interconnectedness, increasing national economic security risks and rendering international relations ‘more complex’ (Chen and Jiang, 2003:96,99). Fu similarly argues that economic

globalisation challenges the economic sovereignty of all states in terms of 'the alienation of economic sovereignty,....and...[the impact of] transnational companies', while states' financial security is threatened by international idle funds (Fu Yong, 2007:052f.).

The importance attached to economic security by the semi-official and scholarly debate is in contrast to Buzan et al., who do not attest an inherent, special importance to economic security. The PRC scholars' stance reflects their political context. Apart from the influence of the CCP's linking of economic security to comprehensive national power, both Yu et al.'s and Fu's books were written during a period of fast economic growth and within ten years of the Asian Financial Crisis. The threat of economic crisis and its manifold effects loomed larger over the PRC-authors than over Europe-based Buzan et al. while the official line further emphasised the importance of economic security.

Conversely, my interviews showed that some scholars based their analysis of the significance of economic security on their own analysis. UB4, who considered economic security, in terms of overseas resource supply and global risks affecting China, as one of the severest NTS issues next to internet security, argued that the world changed somewhat after the Cold War in terms of greater mutual interdependence while acknowledging that it was still anarchical. For UB4, analysing real events rather than the CCP narrative renders economic security important.

UB7 similarly considered economic security the key NTS issue. Rather than globalisation, for UB7, this was clearly due to China's economic transition from a socialist economy to a market economy while remaining a communist state.

The importance of migration as an NTS issue is evaluated in the PRC debate based on its alleged increase and its linkage with economic inequality and transnational crime. Both the semi-official and the scholarly debate suggest that migration pressure and illegal migration is increasing. According to Yu et al., illegal migration continues despite Western states' anti-illegal migration

laws and actions (Yu et al., 2006:260f.). The frequent link of illegal migration to transnational crime, another NTS issue, and the undermining of the asylum system adds to the importance of illegal migration (Yu et al., 2006:261). Implying a link to terrorism and thus boosting the importance of NTS, Zhou and Wang argue that 'since the 1990s, especially since 9/11, illegal migration as an NTS factor...[is] formidable and increasingly focused on by international society' (Zhou and Wang, 2006:283).

There is diversity of opinion in the PRC scholarly debate on whether illegal immigration is important for China. Fu Yong does not refer to China in her discussion of migration, suggesting that refugees and migrants are only a problem in Africa and Europe (Fu Yong, 2007:56f.). UNB9 considered the securitisation of illegal migration a European measure. Conversely, UNB9 noted that the Hukou system made illegal migration virtually impossible in the PRC whereas in the future, North Koreans illegally migrating to China could constitute an NTS issue. Conversely, Western scholars note that migration is generally lower than often perceived, but that the political impact in receiving states is more important (Dannreuther, 2013:184; Koser, 2007:57). Since the PRC debate does not entail an objective analysis, the scholars create a sense of a considerable security threat without supporting it with academically acceptable data. This is in strong contrast to the PRC-debate's subscription to the law-based, supposedly facts-based migration definition.

Causes for Variance

Affiliation accounts for some of the variety within the debates, with scholars closer to the state following a more China-centric argument. SASS's Fu Yong sacrifices intellectual coherence by arguing that economic security is both TS and NTS to create a very wide field of security controlled by the CCP-state. Similarly, ONB4 of a non-Beijing research institution overlooked the usual strict division between TS and NTS to highlight the threat to regimes and political power due to economic security which was both TS and NTS. Conversely, Zhejiang University's Yu et al. follow the

widening-deepening argument and consider economic security as purely NTS. Yu et al.'s distance from state institutions grants greater scholarly freedom for theoretical coherence. However, the various categorisations of economic security into subfields highlight a tendency to shy away from clear, parsimonious analysis in favour of a fluid concept which can encompass anything the state wishes. The migration debate, too, shows a demarcation between those closer affiliated to the state and those working at universities with less strong state-ties. Tian He (CASS), Fu Yong (SASS), and Wu (International Relations University) are the most rejecting of illegal migration, focusing on state security and using derisive language towards people who might have legitimate migration reasons. Conversely, Yu et al. focus more on the economic causes and results of PRC emigration, and do so only in part of a larger chapter on societal security.

Contending forces of adherence to state narrative and theory-pursuit account for some of the variety of assessment of significance of economic security. The CCP's comprehensive national strength idea is taken up by scholars irrespective of location and affiliation; Beijing-based Chen and Jiang (International Relations University), Zhejiang-University's Yu et al., SASS's Fu Yong, and Beijing University's Wang Zhengyi all use it to emphasise the significance of economic security. Contrarily, UB4's and UB7's assessment of economic security as a key NTS threat to China was based on the analysis of perceived real world phenomena (post-Cold War changes and China's integration into the global economy) and interest in economic theory, revealing critical academic inquiry rather than political orthodoxy as key to their analyses.

Variety in the migration debate is also due to research focus. Those with greater research experience in migration are less alarmist than scholars like Fu Yong who discuss migration as one of many NTS issues. UNB9's study of migration as a security issue due to its securitisation in Europe and detached analysis of the effect of EU policies is in contrast to Fu Yong and Tian He's alarmist 'refugee

waves' and 'societal security' language. ONB9's calmer assessment of the securitisation of migration in Russia and Europe, too, was drawn from a research focus on these issues. UNB9's and ONB9's responses demonstrate confidence that their research needed no validation through extreme language; real world phenomena in themselves are worth studying for UNB9 and ONB9.

Political Implications

The economic security and migration debates contain political meaning and implications. UB4 admitted that political influence was intended and that scholars tried to publish in prestigious journals that were read by officials in politics and the army as well as fellow academics. This is clearly a demonstration of self-confidence but it also shows scholarly belief in their right to influence and the political elite's willingness to be influenced.

Yu et al. encourage their undergraduate readers to use a politicised reading of economic security, describing the economy, politics, the military, and the international system as 'an indivisible whole' with political and economic motivations causing political interventions or military threats and military and political goals causing economic sanctions (Yu et al., 2006:168). Economic security is employed and affected for political reasons and the logical conclusion is to use it as such. Yu et al.'s implicit allegation of hypocrisy against western states in their interventions in oil-rich Iraq and politically-motivated economic sanctions reflect the CCP's 'peaceful evolution' worries and the ongoing anti-PRC sanctions.

The frequent PRC scholarly portrayal of illegal migration as a crime reveals political purposes, aligning with PRC orthodoxy rather than adding conceptual clarity. Yu et al.'s securitisation follows the state's: 'the Chinese government's attitude towards illegal migration is clear: the crime of illegal migration is like a pestilence' as it harms the economic development of the left behind area, is connected to crime, breaks border control laws, and endangers 'China's international image and reputation' (Yu et al., 2006:264). Yu et al. here clearly reject conducting a neutral scholarly analysis

of the effects of illegal migration on migrants and societies in favour of embracing an extreme, dehumanising rhetoric of likening human activity to disease. The political implication is clear: if something is determined by the state as 'pestilence' it is harmful and must be destroyed. Yu et al. give the state carte blanche in its interpretation and actions against illegal migration since the scholars do not challenge the state's understanding and extreme views.

My interviews showed a more reflective understanding of illegal migration which nonetheless involved the political motivation of supporting state control and power over individual freedom of movement. For UNB12, illegal migration concerns national security as the identity of illegal immigrants was unknown. States have to be in control of everyone within their territory. The political implication of this argument is that a strongly authoritarian understanding of the state is advanced even in a globalised world of increased movement of goods and people. While discussing NTS, which, as noted above, tends to be seen as post-Cold War security, UNB12 idealises a Cold War soviet-style authoritarian system of state control.

The absence of a discussion of China's own huge rural-urban internal migration is clearly politically motivated. While acknowledging that domestic migration can occur, including mass-resettling due to the Three Gorges Dam, Wu Xingzuo explains this omission as due to academic convention as illegal migration generally means 'inter-state people flows, and this is also the foundation of this text' (Wu Xingzuo, 2003:480f.). This focus on international phenomena highlights the prevalent understanding in the PRC debate of NTS as international or transnational issues. Including internal PRC migration in NTS would be politically sensitive – the regime does not refer to the 'floating population' as an NTS problem. Terming internal migration an NTS issue would turn millions of PRC citizens into a security issue and threat, implying that the state would have to treat them as such.

There is a confusion over refugees and illegal migration within PRC NTS scholarship which has political implications. Despite their

strictly legal definition of migration, some key scholars are clearly critical and even reject the notion of refugees. Hence, Yu et al.'s suggestions of increasing abuses of the asylum system by illegal migrants accuse the idea of refugees of being unclear (Yu et al., 2006:261). Whereas this must be read in light of PRC citizens, including dissidents, seeking asylum in the West, more extreme parts of the scholarly debate see both refugees and illegal migrants as NTS issues as they trigger inter-state tensions or are a burden to the host state and society (Fu Yong, 2007:56f.). Fu Yong even wrongly suggests that poverty creates refugees, despite the general definition of refugees as fleeing persecution 'for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion', not poverty (Fu Yong, 2007:56; UNHCR, 2015). The political purpose of conflating or confusing refugees with irregular migrants is to discredit the former, including PRC dissidents.

More extreme political implications arise from the allegation by some in the PRC debate that refugees and migrants can cause interstate conflict. Whereas interviewees ONB2 and ONB3 regarded both refugees and illegal migrants as NTS as they 'cross borders', according to Tian He, accepting refugees increases interstate tensions: 'refugees, which are a type of migration wave, increase a feeling of hostility [between states], since accepting refugees is actually a criticism and condemnation of the [sending] state's government, policies, [and]...moral foundations' (Tian He, 2001:35). This, for Tian, is because 'political refugees' oppose their own state's government (Tian He, 2001:35). For Tian, embracing extremely anti-humanitarian views, refugees are clearly a dangerous political threat.

The PRC economic security debate contains clear political purposes, especially when 'comprehensive national strength' is emphasised (Chen and Jiang, 2003:96). The focus on interstate competition starkly contrasts with the political motivations of UB4's understanding of NTS, and notably economic security, as part of post-Cold War international interdependence. UB4 rejects the

comparative national strength dichotomy for a unified, collegiate world that should tackle common global problems together, urging cooperation and a feeling of international unity rather than opposition.

Parts of the migration debate have a clear political aim of deflecting any blame from sending regimes, including China, by accusing international systemic and economic shortfalls and, by implication, western states. For Yu et al., uneven global development caused refugee and migrant movements with poverty causing people to move to richer states (Yu et al., 2006:261f.). Yu et al. partially blame Western states for refugees and illegal migration, arguing that not only problematic international interventions, regional conflict, and 'racial contradictions' cause high refugee numbers, but also 'self-contradictory' policies and poor governance in developed states (Yu et al., 2006:261f.). Fighting migration push-and pull-factors is internationalised as immigration bans will trigger illegal immigration, according to Yu et al. (Yu et al., 2006:261f.). Sending states are absolved from any blame: rich states have to help them and accept more migrants.

Wu and Yu et al. further advocate a return to stronger nation-states. For Wu, and Yu et al. who use his passage, 'information, traffic and communication integration created a closer exchange between all countries, causing the desalinisation of people's understanding of traditional geographical and consanguinity relations, raising the inherent motivational power of illegal migration' (Wu Xingzuo, 2003:485; Yu et al., 2006:261). The political implication of Wu Xingzuo's and Yu et al.'s texts are clear: reminiscent of nineteenth-century European nationalism, it is a subscription to a geographically and ethnically cohesive nation-state which demands natural loyalty. Neither Wu nor Yu et al. problematise the nation-state, but regard it and related obedience as natural.

Political motivation is also evident in the threats the PRC economic security debate discusses, which tend towards perceived threats to the state. The semi-official and scholarly debates see financial crises as caused by systemic problems, international idle funds,

international capital flows, and more domestic problems, including corruption, wrong political decisions, bad debt of state-owned banks (Yu et al., 2006:169,176,186; Chen and Jiang, 2003:123; Fu Yong, 2007:057f.). For Yu et al., economic globalisation caused extraordinarily fast growth, but it also brought external and economic and financial risk into states (Yu et al., 2006:169,176,186). The effects of financial crises which the semi-official and scholarly debates note are superficially economic and social but mostly concern regime security. Hence, Fu Yong notes political problems including ethnic clashes, societal upheaval, and the replacement of regimes, Yu et al. count 'political unrest' among the results of financial crises, and Zhang Ming warns of 'the washing away of the people's wealth to the point of damaging the legitimacy of the government' (Fu Yong, 2007:055; Yu et al., 2006:175; Zhang Ming, 2011:184). The global movement of finance here threatens the regime. Similarly, Yu et al.'s discussion of pollution transfer from developed to developing states is politically motivated, arguing that developing states are treated as "rubbish tips" and that their sustainable development is harmed (Yu et al., 2006:169f.). This is severe criticism of multinational companies and developed states. Nonetheless, rather than nationalist and anti-Western, the political implication is also to criticise the weakness of the PRC to not safeguard its state and people.

The varying evaluation of economic interdependence is strongly political. Import and export dependence is considered a threat to China's economic security by some scholars and includes the political message of advocating autarky. Fu Junwen sees China's foreign trade dependence as a risk, given the focus on some products and trading partners, and the dependence on the import of key materials and resources (Fu, 2007:63-75). Similarly, Zhuang Rui regards raw material import, including steel and iron ore, as an issue for China's economic security (Zhuang, 2007:76-90). The semi-official debate, too, is concerned about the security implications of international trade. Chen and Jiang argue that

trends towards trade protectionism due to global economic problems threatened China, with 'US hawks' wanting to slow China's economic development (Chen and Jiang, 2003:126f.). By contrast, Wang Zhengyi sees economic globalisation as helping 'China's reform and opening-up' and in the completion of its 'transformation from a traditional agricultural society to an industrial society, from a centrally planned economy to a market economy and from a non-WTO state to a WTO state' (Wang, 2007:54f.). The variety of the above threats, either stemming from free capital flow and the free market or international antagonism highlights the disquiet of many PRC scholars over China's entry into the global economic system where the CPG is no longer fully controls China's economy.

The PRC economic security and migration debates contain tension about the current situation in the PRC and other states. Important is the impact of globalisation, i.e. the global flow of finance, goods, and people across borders and its impact on countries, societies, firms, and individuals. None of the scholars wants to reverse globalisation – they are clearly aware of the impossibility of such an endeavour. Instead the uncontrolled and unintended effects on states turn issues of economic security and illegal migration into security issues. Actions of some for their own benefit – multinational companies and banks which ruin local businesses, transnational money-flows wreaking havoc, or illegal migrants contravening sovereign states' rules and harming their home countries' reputation – are seen as harming everyone. The overall political message is advocacy of state-control of the movement of goods and people.

Normative Implications

In economic security, UB4 suggested a slight normative turn in that not only the state or states are responsible for ensuing security, but also businesses, suggesting a more liberal and capitalist shift in thinking. UB4's arguments mark a normative turn as they allow a greater space for society, business, and individuals in an authoritarian state, without arguing that the state's reason and

interest should prevail. This marks a beginning normative shift as society and individuals are given a greater space vis-à-vis the state.

There are some beginning normative turns within the discussion of the referent object of economic security and migration in the PRC scholarly debate. Nonetheless, parts of the debate continue to embrace the state as the ultimate referent object, hindering a normative turn. The focus on legality rather than on reinterpreting migration in the majority of the PRC debate prevents a normative turn since the status-quo is not questioned. By focusing solely on law, PRC scholars create an unchallengeable argument for why irregular migration is a problem: it is breaking a state's laws.

The written PRC migration debate lacks a normative turn as it is very statist and regime-centric. The lack of discussion of the security issues of refugees and migrants shows an extreme statism rejecting international law and human security. Tian He clearly equals security to state security, even when talking about 'societal security' as 'the continuity of language, culture, religion, ethnic identity and customs under the circumstances of acceptable development' (Tian He, 2001:32). Similarly, Fu Yong's discussion of both refugees and illegal migrants is solely concerned with the security and internal stability of states, and indeed, regime security. While Wu Xingzuo does not clearly articulate his 'referent object', his discussion is mostly focused on states, given his focus on legality and as he mentions dead Chinese immigrants in reference to China's international image, rather than as shocking in themselves. Wu's focus is border security and domestic security with the sovereign state being able to decide who enters, leaves, and resides within its territory.

Conversely, my interviews revealed a budding normative shift within the PRC migration debate. A normative turn in the migration debate would entail a strong and benevolent focus on the migrants themselves and stronger criticism of sending states, including China. ONB2 saw migrants themselves as the referent object. Although migration lends itself to a normative turn by focusing on the migrants, ONB9's argument that the state and the state's

people were the referent object although state interest took precedent, shows the dilemma of ongoing statism in the PRC debate. Similarly, parts of the Western debate focus on the migrants themselves as referent objects with Koser highlighting the threat to the 'human security of the migrants themselves' (Koser, 2007:62).

Whereas China is to strengthen its system against risk and threats from integration into the global market on its own, all states are to manage Chinese emigrants: 'every country must conscientiously handle this NTS threat' (Wu Xingzuo, 2003:478). Given that migration, for Wu, is driven by the increasing global wealth gap, the global economic order must ultimately be changed (Wu, 2003:486). Yu, Pan, and Wang share this view, calling for higher PRC immigration quotas in developed states and for states to jointly settle the international illegal migration issue (Yu et al., 2006:264). This constitutes a rejection of responsibility by a state for its citizens migrating to other countries, and implies that China, a powerful authoritarian state, cannot manage the issue of emigration on its own or control its citizen's movements. The normative turn is here for Western states to enact a more benign policy.

My interviews suggest a starting normative theory on economic security, advocating a different future. UB7 argued that in terms of how to deal with NTS, economic and environmental issues had to be considered to ensure sustainable development. Moreover, UB7 noted that internationally, China had benefitted from globalisation and had to be responsible internationally. UB7 hence enters the PRC debate triggered by Robert Zoellick's call for China to become a responsible great power, suggesting that China needs to change its behaviour and engage more internationally.

The economic security debate clearly encompasses normative elements when criticising wealth inequality. Rather than embracing Buzan et al.'s minimalist view of economic security as focusing on the liberal economic order and granting individuals only a modicum of security, Yu et al. clearly see both the state and individuals as referent objects, as economic security includes large scale poverty,

unemployment, and health and welfare problems (Yu et al., 2006:167). Yu et al.'s discussion here is not linked to regime security but sees people as ends in themselves. Yu et al.'s debate is more normative and wider than that of Buzan et al. who are wary of extending individual economic security beyond basic human needs to sustain life, including education as other issues such as unemployment do not concern survival (Buzan et al., 1998:103f.). This indicates a pressing concern for economic security in the PRC debate and lacking belief in the global (and national) economic system, which China joined only recently.

Regarding the advocated management of economic security, the PRC debate entails normative shifts. The PRC economic security debate divides over whether China should integrate more globally or whether it should focus on its own resilience, displaying normative assertions and reflecting the economic crossroads China faced in the early 2000s.

The semi-official debate, exemplified by Chen and Jiang, implies that because domestic and foreign aspects are intertwined in economic security, legal measures, strong leadership, good crisis response, 'the capacity to withstand threats', and strategic reserves are necessary for developing countries (Chen and Jiang, 2003:114-116). Internationally, Chen and Jiang advocate using diplomacy to protect economic security and the national interest (Chen and Jiang, 2003:117). Conversely, Fu Junwen advises to ease China's high dependence on foreign trade by connecting China further to the global system, including encouraging foreign investment, transferring industry abroad, and diversifying import, export, and trade partners to avoid dependence (Fu Junwen, 2007:73f.). Fu's argument directly contrasts with the above view of interdependence as threatening, and aligns with Wang Zhengyi's idea that globalisation helps China's transformation (Wang Zhengyi, 2007). The increased engagement with overseas production and diversification of supply is an argument also made in the energy debate (Chapter Eight).

There is both criticism and support for CPG policy in the PRC scholarly debate, with the criticism tending more towards a normative turn, suggesting an alternative way forward. Zhang Ming is critical of the government's measure of postponing or cancelling part of the 'structural adjustment policy' due to the 2008/9 financial crisis, as 'this perhaps damages the Chinese economy's future sustainable growth' (Zhang, 2011:184). Conversely, An Shaoping and Xie Guiping support the government's 'one belt, one road' initiative of a land and sea 'silk-road' to Europe, encouraging stronger, more proactive engagement with the global economy on China's terms to 'protect China's national economic security' (An Shaoping and Xie Guiping, 2015:185). An and Xie also regard the 'one belt, one road' initiative as directed against the USA: 'the "one belt, one road" construction can...dispel US besiegement, containment, and hegemony' (An Shaoping and Xie Guiping, 2015:185). An and Xie's antagonistic view of the world is not normative as it continues what the PRC scholars usually regard as Cold War thinking of pitching China against the West, rather than proposing an ideal reality.

Conclusion

The above chapter tested the PRC NTS debate on economic security and migration against the four research questions.

The chapter revealed a variety of conceptualisations and assigned significance of economic security and migration. The categorisation of purely NTS or also TS is contested in the debate. My interviews revealed that some scholars do not consider economic issues part of security at all but to merely fuel actual security issues. This unclarity continues with the frequent, but always different, subdivision of economic security into supposed constituent factors, turning economic security into an unwieldy all-encompassing concept, leaving it unclear how to achieve security.

Conceptualisations of migration focus on either international migration or emigration from China. Again, my interviews created deeper insights highlighting greater differentiation between

countries and more empathy for the migrants. A key factor in the economic security debate is the focus on international and domestic inequality. This links to the connection drawn by most scholars between national security and economic security. Here, interviewees and literature align in repeating the CCP narrative of the importance of comprehensive national strength. This notion of strong states competing with each other is at odds with the other frequent assertion of economic globalisation creating economic insecurity by decreasing the importance of states. Conversely, my interviews again revealed deeper insights beyond the following of the state narrative and superficial globalisation scepticism with UB4 and UB7's responses showing that theoretical analyses of international political economy and economics caused their assessment of the importance of economic security. The importance of migration is assessed mostly in numerical terms of with the image of 'waves' of people moving from the South to the North, and in terms of its supposed connection to transnational crime and the undermining of recipient states' legal systems. Migration was crucially not seen as important as other issues in the literature. Conversely, my interviews revealed that some scholars regarded it as crucial for other states. Although migration is generally considered as less important for China which is portrayed as a strong Han-centric multi-ethnic state, my interviews also suggested growing unease about PRC immigration following increased global connectedness.

Variety of conceptualisation and assigned significance is due to several factors. My analysis showed that affiliation is an important factor accounting for the debates' variety. Scholars closer to the state, such as those working in the social science academies or the International Relations University, focus so much on the state in economic security that intellectual coherence in their argument is sacrificed, blurring the usual TS-NTS division. University-affiliated scholars by contrast follow the theoretical binary and consider economic security as purely NTS, suggesting that they have greater academic freedom to be theoretically coherent in their

conceptualisation. The migration debate also contains this state-proximity – university division. Social science academy and International Relations University scholars are severely critical of irregular migration and migrants, seeing them mostly as undesirable and threatening. Conversely, university-affiliated scholars focus far less on migration and if so consider mostly the economic causes of emigration.

Contending forces of adherence to state narrative and theory-pursuit account for some of the variety of assessment of significance of economic security. The CCP's comprehensive national strength idea is taken up by scholars irrespective of location and affiliation; Beijing-based Chen and Jiang (International Relations University), Zhejiang-University's Yu et al., SASS's Fu Yong, and Beijing University's Wang Zhengyi all use the comprehensive national strength buzz-word to emphasise the significance of economic security. By contrast, interview UB4's and UB7's assessment of economic security as a key NTS threat to China was based on their analysis of perceived real world phenomena (post-Cold War changes and China's integration into the global economy) as well as their interest in theory (international and domestic economics), showing that their critical academic inquiry rather than political orthodoxy was key to their analysis. Variety in the migration debate is also due to scholarly research focus, revealing that those with greater research experience in migration are far less alarmist than scholars like Fu Yong who treat migration as one of many NTS issues in her book. Hence, UNB9's admission to studying migration as a security issue because Europe securitised it, and the detached analyses of the effect of EU policies, contrasts with Fu Yong and Tian He's alarmist language of 'refugee waves' and 'societal security'. ONB9's calmer assessment of the securitisation of migration in Russia and Europe was drawn from research. UNB9 and ONB9 responses revealed a confidence that their research needed no validation through extreme language; a real world phenomenon in itself was worth studying.

Both debates contain political purpose and meaning. My interviews showed that scholars do want to and believe they can influence the government through their economic security writings. Economic security is seen as political in that Western states are implicitly criticised for using military interventions for economic gain and economic sanctions for political leverage. Moreover, the frequent subscription to the CCP notion of comprehensive national strength in the economic security debate contains the political meaning of focusing on the state and regarding the international situation as one of competition. Conversely, the more liberal UB4's support of interdependence focused on cooperation. Although parts of the economic security debate fear political instability due to financial crises, the implicit criticism by others of the PRC as failing safeguard its citizens against ongoing toxic waste transfer from the West shows the political purpose of altering state behaviour. My analysis showed different political purposes in the debates on economic interdependence connected to scholarly nervousness over China's entry into the global economic system; whereas Fu Junwen, Zhuang Rui, and Chen and Jian clearly favour protectionism, Peking University's Wang Zhengyi considers globalisation as aiding China's development.

The written migration debate is heavily politicised with a strong focus on criminalising illegal migration following the PRC state's view rather than clarifying the academic topic. This following of state orthodoxy is connected to the vilification of illegal migration by the state as a 'pestilence', leaving the scholars room to recast the issue in a more neutral way. Although also very supportive of the state's authoritarian need to know exactly who is in its borders, my interviewees were more reflective.

The rejection of a discussion of PRC domestic migration through the excuse, brought by Wu Xingzuo, that the scholarly discussion only discusses international illegal migration was shown to be politically motivated since discussing PRC internal migration would securitise millions of Chinese. That this reason is a political ploy is further evident since many scholars, including Wu, Yu et al. and Fu

Yong, intentionally mix-up refugees and illegal migrants, two separate concepts in international law and scholarship. Instead, the scholars are able to discredit refugees, including PRC dissidents in Western states, culminating in Tian He's argument that refugees can cause interstate war, clearly placing state interest above that of individuals. Similarly, Yu et al.'s blaming of the international system and receiving states rather than sending states including China for illegal migration and Wu's argument that (Western-led) globalisation severs people's 'natural' national ties are politically motivated rejections of any investigation of the sending states' roles in illegal migration advocating the nation-state. Despite the diversity of political meaning my analysis revealed, the overall PRC debate evidently advocates state-control of the movement of goods and people in a globalised world.

My analysis revealed some normative implications in both debates. Whereas the focus by much of the written migration debate prevents a normative turn due to its emphasis on crime and the state as the referent object, my interviews anticipated a normative turn as migrants and refugees were considered referent objects in themselves. Conversely, rather than calling on the RPC to take action, the written debate claims that Western states should allow for more PRC immigration.

A normative turn in economic security was revealed through interviewee UB7's advocacy of increased international economic responsibility by the PRC and Yu et al.'s criticism of wealth inequality. The scholars here move beyond Buzan et al., whom they regard as their inspiration, in deepening economic security to include individuals as the referent object, constituting a normative shift. The advocacy of further integration of the PRC into the global economic system, and a continuation of its halted structural adjustment policy constitute a normative shift as the scholars here advocate a different course of action to that of the PRC leading to an optimal state.

Chapter Seven: Health Security and Food Security

This chapter analyses the PRC NTS debate on health and food security. Food and health issues concern the fundamental physical existence of humans. Perhaps more so than any other issue, health and food are originally non-anthropogenic; ill health and food insecurities may exist without human input due to, for example, disease or drought. Analysing why these issues are now seen as NTS is important as it reveals whether the PRC scholars think that food and health are now security issues due to some external event, such as negative human input, or whether the scholars are advancing an ideational reconceptualisation of security to focus on issues that pertain to the individual human body.

The notions of health and food security suggest a strong focus on individuals; 'the nation' or 'the state' are only abstractly affected by ill health and food problems by claiming to represent the aggregate of all individuals within their borders. It is the body of the individual human being that is physically affected and threatened by food and health problems. Hence health and food security present an entry-point for a focus on individual security and human security in the NTS debate. The management of health and food security meanwhile affects regime legitimacy and survival. Whether or not the Chinese debate highlights the individual human dimension of health and food security or the question of regime legitimacy and survival is investigated below.

This chapter investigates the PRC scholarly debate on health and food security along my four research questions. I first enquire into the PRC scholarly conceptualisations and set out how the scholars evaluate the significance of both. I then analyse the causes for the variance in how the PRC scholars conceptualise these two NTS-issues and assess their significance. I subsequently investigate what political meanings and political purposes this scholarship reveals and seeks to attain. Finally, I analyse the PRC health and food security debates on possible normative implications.

Context

China's health system underwent rapid changes in the twentieth century. The PRC's early introduction of widespread health care, including so-called 'barefoot doctors' in the countryside, triggered a massive improvement of general health (Benewick and Donald, 2009:120). The Reform and Opening-Up period affected the healthcare system, which, although still managed by the state, became increasingly commercialised (Benewick and Donald, 2009:80). In stark contrast to Western regimes, the PRC assumes much greater physical rule over the bodies of its citizens, as shown by the "one child policy".

The spread and containment of infectious diseases are important parts of a state's health situation. Apart from smoking, which annually kills more than one million people in China, health threats in China emanate from HIV/AIDS, with around one million HIV-positive mainlanders, while tuberculosis is also increasing (BBC, 01/06/2015; Benewick and Donald, 2009:80,121). The government only started to react to HIV/AIDS in the early 2000s, including through the harmonisation of government action, the prevention of mother-to-child transmission, and education campaigns (Benewick and Donald, 2009:80). The 2003 SARS epidemic emerged in southern China in late 2002, and its global spread infected 8,096 people, killing 744 (BBC, 20/03/2015). The initial response under the outgoing Jiang Zemin administration was 'traditional' in that it worked against the epidemic but publicly downplayed its extent and threat (Lieberthal, 2004:156). The incoming Hu and Wen administration changed this into 'full transparency' and employed strict measures to control the outbreak, while also allowing the leadership to cement its own position publicly and in the party by disempowering Jiang's supporters, including the health minister (Lieberthal, 2004:156). SARS further demonstrated the need to improve the rural health system, especially given the relations of urban and rural health due to migrant workers (Lieberthal, 2004:325). Due to insufficient medical insurance and pensions,

China's ageing population is further seen as an imminent threat to health security (Benewick and Donald, 2009:80).

Food security concerns have a long history in China. Food insecurity and lack of safety have both political and non-human causes. While China's limited amount of arable land has been a concern throughout history, government failure caused the 1960-1 Great Famine (Yang Jisheng, 2013:15). The context of the Chinese scholarly debate on food security and safety as NTS issues differs strongly from that of the Western scholarly debate. Scholars growing up in the post-war West know food security concerns mostly as second-hand information, from history or reports of far-away famine. Most PRC scholars experienced food scarcity. This ranges from living through the Great Famine of the Great Leap Forward (1959-1962), which killed 36-45 million people and included 'thousands of cases of cannibalism', to food ration cards until the 1980s (Yang Jisheng, 2013:10,12; Dikötter, 2011:xii; Fu Ying, 2014). Although the Great Famine is largely omitted in the PRC food security debate, it is the immediate backdrop of the PRC discussion.

Accompanying the Reform and Opening-Up period since 1978, China's food supply improved, and diets diversified towards more protein consumption (Benewick and Donald, 2009:78). Main concerns now are food safety, i.e. the safety of food items, and food security, the stable, sufficient supply of food for the huge PRC population, including the difference between China's own production and import reliance (Benewick and Donald, 2009:120). Safety scandals, such as the 2008 milk contamination scandal, made consumers wary of food standards while highlighting producers' unscrupulousness and faulty official oversight and corruption (Benewick and Donald, 2009:78,120).

Food security concerns and questions of grain self-sufficiency which the leadership aimed for, meanwhile, have received international attention with Lester Brown famously asking 'who will feed China?', arguing that rising demand was not met by global or domestic supply, threatening supply globally (Brown, 1994). Brown

warned of related 'social stress,' the reintroduction of food rationing, and the slowing or stopping of economic growth, catalysing a debate in China (Brown, 2014; Boland, 2000:56). To ensure food supply and grain-self-sufficiency, the PRC now buys grain and arable land abroad, such as in Ukraine, Latin America, and Africa. China's status as a major grain importer is highly politicised with the government arguing that grain import reliance is low and that China is not responsible for global food price fluctuations (Brown, 2014; Benewick and Donald, 2009:120).

Food production changes, including the use of pesticide, economic changes, the emerging entrepreneurial state, rising incomes, population movements, and water-intensive vegetable and fruit production affect both the food situation and the environment and decrease the availability of fertile land for grain (Benewick and Donald, 2009:120). While increasing vegetable and fruit production attracts FDI, grain price and availability remain crucial for China's large and mostly rural population (Benewick and Donald, 2009:120).

The PRC NTS scholars are therefore working in an environment where health and food issues are inherently severe and changing with China's overall transformation, and where both affect politics.

The Literature

The space devoted to health security and food security in the PRC NTS literature varies between publications. The semi-official *On NTS* (2003) has a chapter by Shang Qianhong on 'transmittable disease'. Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe, and Wang Jiangli's 2006 textbook spends only five pages of its 'International Public Security' chapter on 'International Public Health and Defensive Measures Against Epidemic Diseases'. Zhejiang University's 'NTS and Real China' series contains a 2007 monograph by Chen Kun on 'Public Health Security'. The 2007 *Views from China* includes a small section on 'Public Health', containing only two chapters: Liu Shuangyuan and Li Huan on 'the public health crisis and the attainability of medicine', and Wang Huhua, Ding Chengyao, and Lu Chunlin's 'On

international infectious disease control and the state's duty to international law'. Both chapters focus on health security management, either through medical treatment or the control of disease through states and international cooperation.

Fu Yong, both in her 2007 monograph and her chapter in *Non-traditional Security and China's New Foreign Policy Strategy* (2011) discusses 'The Challenge of Prevalent Epidemic Diseases and other Public Health Issues' as 'major NTS threats facing China'. The NTS Blue Books so far, apart from the discussion of smog in 2013-2014, do not feature any issues on health or epidemic disease.

The semi-official *On NTS* does not contain a chapter on food security. This is noteworthy given that the book contains 17 chapters on different NTS issues. Yu et al.'s textbook similarly does not discuss food security. Conversely, the 2007 *Views from China: NTS* contains a chapter entitled 'Food Security and Poverty', although food and poverty are treated separately. I only analyse the two chapters on food security here: Xian Zude and Sheng Laiyun's on 'food security evaluation' and Liu Jianwen's 'trade globalisation and China's food security'. Zhejiang University's 'NTS and China (NTS issues)' series has two related monographs, Lu and Wang (2007) and Jin and Peng's (2008), the difference is explained below. The 2011 *Non-traditional Security and China's New Foreign Strategy* includes two food-related chapters by Tian He, and Jiang Tong and Wei Gao. The authors writing about food come from different disciplines, and do not necessarily have an IR background, evident in their varying definitions of food security. The Blue Books have some chapters on food security: Zhou Jiehong (2011-12) on 'the problems and trend of China's food security', Zhou Zhanggui (2011-12) on 'water security and food security', and Zhou Jiehong (2012-13) on 'Chinese food security'.

Conceptualisation

Health: Narrow or Broad

Beyond the emphasis on health problems as threatening people's lives, definitions of health security depend on the threat they focus on, either using narrow definitions focusing only on epidemics, or broader definitions including all ill-health. The narrow definition is used by important parts of the Chinese scholarly and semi-official debate, notably by Yu, Pan, and Wang, and Shang Qianhong. This conceptualisation was clearly sparked by the 2003 SARS crisis, seen as crucial to the NTS debate in China. ONB1 noted that interest in NTS began with the SARS outbreak in 2003, raising the question of how to define the crisis and whether it constituted a 'societal problem'. Similarly, UB3 argued that the SARS crisis made 'everyone' interested in NTS.

Hence, PRC scholars, similarly to Chinese and foreign politicians but in contrast to Elbe's more theoretical discussion, mostly view epidemics as very real security threats (He, 2006:407; Elbe, 2010:421). ONB2 and ONB3 manifested this view, arguing that the referent object of transmittable disease as a form of NTS was society.

There are differences between the semi-official debate and the scholarly debate on whether all transmittable diseases are NTS. Representing the semi-official view, Shang Qianhong argues that only SARS and AIDS are NTS issues, whereas Li and Li, and Wang Yizhou, of the scholarly debate, also note respiratory infections, malaria, tuberculosis, and Ebola as acute NTS problems (Shang, 2003:403; Li and Li, 2007:293; Wang Yizhou, 21/05/2003). Although Yu et al. employ parts of Shang's arguments, their argument differs, implying that any epidemic disease is a security threat during globalisation (Yu et al., 2006:250,252). Li Bin, too, evidently regards all transmittable diseases as NTS threats to public health (Li Bin, 2004:47). Similarly, ONB6 regarded disease as an NTS issue since AIDS needed a strong response and could stop national development.

In contrast to most of the PRC and Western debate, Chen Kun advocates the securitisation of all ailments, or all psychological and physiological phenomena differing from the accepted norm and which hinder the afflicted from participating in the workforce, evidently because they decrease 'quality' (suzhi- 素质) of the people rather than the quality of life of individuals (Chen, 2007:006,042). Hence, Chen is especially concerned about the effect on economic development (Chen, 2007:042). Chen's view of non-communicable diseases is not only singular in the PRC debate, but does not have a counterpart in the Western debate, either (Hough, 2008:166f.,173). Moreover, the Western debate does not concern people's 'quality', which is a CCP term referring to the regime's 'shift from quantity to quality' in its population management (Anagnost, 2004:190). Instead, more critical voices in the Western debate argue that a 'broader agenda' in health security should encompass more conceptual clarity, namely clarifying 'whose health', 'whose security', and 'what issues' (McInnes and Lee, 2006:23). Broadeners of health security both in the Western debate and the Chinese debate are in a minority.

Why disease is now security is unclear. While Shang implies that only today, when medicine can treat it, is disease given high-level attention and regarded as part of national security, he contradicts himself by also arguing that only extremely lethal or very shocking transmittable diseases can be deemed NTS issues (Shang, 2003:403). Conversely, Price-Smith argues that since the 1970s, 'old' diseases are re-merging and human ability to contain them is decreasing (Price-Smith, 1999). The conundrum the health security debate presents is illustrated here. To accurately judge the existence of an epidemic threat requires medical expertise which IR experts do not usually possess. Since medical science is fallible, too, simply following medical assessments is also fallacious. Instead, IR scholars take some medical evidence and present it according to their view of security.

The food security debate's differences are illustrated by the lack of agreed terminology. The scholarly debate translates both *liangshi anquan*-粮食安全 and *shipin anquan*-食品安全 as 'food security'. The two are not completely interchangeable, since Zhejiang University's 'NTS and China Series' published a monograph on each (Lu and Wang, 2007; Jin and Peng, 2008). Linguistically, 'liangshi anquan-粮食安全' refers to food security in terms of crop availability whereas 'shipin anquan-食品安全' concerns the safety of finished food products. This indicates that the debate in China has adapted to the PRC situation of food safety concerns and lack of arable land. However, Jin and Peng's monograph on 'shipin anquan-食品安全' discusses food security in terms of the *quality and safety* of food rather than its *availability* (Jin and Peng, 2008). Zhou similarly contends that 'the focus point of contemporary China's food security (*shipin anquan*-食品安全) problem has already moved from quantity security to quality security' (Zhou, 2012:254). Additionally, Zhou notes that 'in current research, most scholars tend to divide food security into two levels: food quantity security [*shipin shuliang anquan*-食品数量安全] (Food Security) and food quality security [*shipin zhiliang anquan*-食品质量安全] (Food Safety)' (Zhou, 2008:254). This is similar to ideas in the Western debate that food security also concerns food quality, as food security for many 'high-income countries' means 'having a high-quality food supply to maintain the existing high standard of living' (Chern et al., 2000:3). While Zhou translates 'food quantity security' (*shipin shuliang anquan*-食品数量安全) as 'food security' and 'food quality security' (*shipin zhiliang anquan*-食品质量安全) as 'food safety', most scholars in the Chinese debate simply translate both 'shipin anquan-食品安全' and 'liangshi anquan-粮食安全' as 'food security'. This shows a lack of understanding of the difference in English and even of the term generally, adding conceptual flaws to the debate. Nevertheless, the PRC IR-literature

frequently adds an English term to publications for international flair and importance rather than depth.

These terminological differences highlight divisions within the PRC debate between those discussing food safety and those focusing on food security as supply and accessibility. On the food safety side, Jin and Peng use the WHO's changing explanations of food security to show that definitions are now more elaborate as 'food security', the protection of consumers, and 'food hygiene', the health of the entire food chain, are no longer the same concept (Jin and Peng, 2008:007f.). Jin and Peng imply a synthesis of consumers and producers' different demands advancing 'human understanding of food security', thus moving the focus on food security from unhealthy and unhygienic food spreading transmittable disease to a 'latent threat' to the health of consumers due to chemical pollution (Jin and Peng, 2008:002f.,008). This is actually a move from food *security* to food *safety* and suggests the attainment of food security.

Food security including supply, continues to be a serious concern for China. Tian He emphasises the poor's situation, arguing that 'food security is the most fundamental right of humankind, it is the most important and indisputable right' and that 'poverty is a major cause of food insecurity' (Tian, 2011:291). Rather than an individual plight, poverty is politically incendiary, threatening state stability, legitimacy and world peace (Tian, 2011:291). Hence Tian argues that on the individual level the FAO definition means that individuals 'can obtain nutritious, sufficient and safe food' and do so 'through socially recognised ways (excluding food aid [and] theft...)' (Tian, 2011:286). For states and societies, according to Tian, the FAO definition is still central to food security, and interpreted to mean that import and domestic production enable a state to obtain quality food and that household within in the state can obtain food and protect nutrition levels, as well as 'effective use of food' (Tian, 2011:286). Food security, for Tian, means that all people have sufficient food.

Whether food security means food self-sufficiency divides the PRC debate. Xian Zude and Sheng Laiyun regard a state's food self-sufficiency of supply and demand as equalling food security (Xian and Sheng, 2007:89f.). Xian and Sheng's chapter is evidently strongly influenced by Lester Brown's 'Who Will Feed China', discussed above, which highlights the increasing grain demand per person. The statist, self-sufficiency imperative is in contrast to Yu, Pan, and Wang's discussion of food security, which is international from the outset, since Yu et al. look at 'international public security'. Yu et al., like Tian He, stress and are more in line with the FAO's definition: 'food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life' (FAO, 2015). The evident definitional authority the UN command in the PRC debate means that Yu et al. exempt themselves from probing more deeply into the difference between the reality and the FAO ideal. The FAO's definition does not refer to self-sufficiency; dietary needs could certainly be met by a global market.

Threats and Threateners

Non-Anthropogenic Health Threats

Shang's statism means that for him only diseases threatening the state's functioning are NTS. Conversely, the more scholarly debate of Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe, and Wang Jiangli and Li and Li, and important members of the Western debate like Price-Smith, are more concerned about general health, and look at various diseases.

In the semi-official debate, Shang sees AIDS and SARS as the only health security threats, with AIDS the more severe threat due to its novelty, lethality, contagiousness, and current incurability, whereas the 'actual threat' of SARS is 'relatively limited' (Shang, 2003:403,407,409). The scholarly and the semi-official debate see SARS, a key catalyst for the NTS debate in China³, as a threat mostly due to its shock value rather than its lethality (Shang,

³ Breslin, 2015 makes a similar point.

2003:408). Yu et al., similar to Shang, regard SARS more as an indirect, constructed threat, with its impact partially due to global (media) attention (Yu et al., 2006:251). For Yu et al., SARS was an urgent threat as it was the first epidemic in the new century, was very contagious, created panic everywhere, and triggered a diplomatic, political, and societal crisis (Yu et al., 2006:251). 'Panic' suggests that the SARS threat was partially socially constructed. In a more post-modern vein, Shang adds that SARS became a threat due to excessive belief or 'superstition' in science and technology leaving people psychologically, and the state institutionally, unprepared (Shang, 2003:408). By contrast, Fu Yong regards SARS more as a real threat to the world and to China, highlighting the thousands of reported cases and 349 deaths in the PRC (Fu, 2011:144f.).

Parts of the scholarly debate see other, new and persisting diseases as threats, too. While Li Bin considers diseases after SARS as public health security threats, too, Yu et al. see Bird Flu as more of a 'real' threat, referring to warnings from the UN of possibly high death tolls (Li Bin, 2004:47; Yu et al., 2006:251ff.). In contrast to Shang and Yu et al., Fu Yong also sees China as potentially threatened by older transmittable diseases including the West Nile Fever and Ebola (Fu, 2011:144). Fu's concern is reflected in an important idea in the Western debate on the increasing threat of Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases (ERIDs) since 1973 (Price-Smith, 1999:432). Triggered by climate change, the misuse of antibiotics, war, environmental degradation, changes of human transport, natural disasters, global trade, and famine, ERIDs erode state capacity (Price-Smith, 1999:440ff.). The discussion of these health threats in the PRC debate is not so much based on objective reality than on the previous securitisation of the diseases by domestic and international political actors. The Western debate, by contrast, regards epidemic disease more generally as direct and indirect security threats, as they affect human security, implicating the

health, economic, and food security of the afflicted (Elbe, 2010:415f.; Brundtland, 2003).

Conversely, ONB1 considered preparedness crucial, as NTS required 'long-term management', including transnational management and national policy. ONB1 argued that SARS was more shocking than Bird Flu as people did not know how to react but the SARS experience meant that another transmittable disease, Bird Flu, was less scary. Whereas TS threats could be solved through military measures, ONB1 suggested that NTS could only be contained through cooperation but not overcome. People and the state have to prepare but also accept risk.

Anthropogenic Health and Food Threats

Unlike Shang, Yu et al., and Fu, other scholars in the PRC debate highlight anthropogenic threats to health and food security, notably capitalism. Li and Li regard the politics and economic interests related to the availability of drugs as the key problem with the price of HIV/AIDS treatment being the greatest hindrance for recuperation (Li and Li, 2007:293f.). More in line with Critical Security Studies, Li and Li see the problem to drug availability in pharmaceutical companies making a profit whereas ill people in developing countries die (Li and Li, 2007:293).

Tian's threats to food security, apart from natural disasters, similarly are all anthropogenic, including the state losing control over domestic food production due to free trade and the power of multi-nationals, population pressure, poverty, the impact of GM food, and growing biofuel crops instead of food (Tian, 2011:297). The threat Tian sees clearly is not that of foreign states bent on destroying China, as some of the authors in the semi-official *On NTS* (see previous chapters) do, but that of non-state capitalist forces pursuing profit over the welfare of people (Tian, 2011:297). Tian is particularly worried that after the WTO transition period is over in 2008 - indicating that her text was written earlier - transnationals may enter China's grain circulation field, and that 'if China loses grain pricing rights, this can hugely influence food security' (Tian, 2011:298). This is because, according to Tian, free

trade, notably due to the increasing prominence of transnational companies, can both bring famine and poverty as well as improve lives (Tian, 2011:292).

Instead of supporting 'progress' as the PRC NTS debate often does, Tian worries about the use of food crops as an oil-replacement for energy and environment security (Tian, 2011:299). While also noting biofuel health warnings and that biofuel cannot satisfy energy demands, the rhetorical question for Tian is a choice between either enabling more people to eat sufficiently or enabling more people to drive cars (Tian, 2011:294). Hence, rather than development being solely positive, technological development increases food insecurity in Tian's reading, aggravated by the market-dominance of unaccountable multinationals. Tian He's and Li and Li's criticism of capitalism and the market due to its negative impact on poor people rather than on states situates them in the more left-wing area of the spectrum of PRC NTS scholarship.

The scholarly NTS debate also entails concerns about food safety, reflective of the context of food safety scandals in China. The food threats Jin and Peng focus on are mostly contamination through microbes, through chemical substances, and food additives, since unhealthy food and drink causes 'hundreds of diseases', including embryonic mutations, changes in the genotype, cancer, diabetes, and obesity: 'following China's urban and rural economic development, food quality and variety increased, ...various farm chemicals, veterinary medicine and additives were used widely in food production...and China's food quality and safety problems became increasingly prominent' (Jin and Peng, 2008:001,012,038-094,095-162,163-182). Contrary to much of the PRC NTS debate, but similar to Tian He's argument, economic and agricultural development and progress here encompass rather than solve threats (Jin and Peng, 2008:001,012). Jin and Peng evidently reject the PRC's official belief in progress, adopting a more post-modern mind-set.

Highly resistant GM food, which could be a solution to food security problems, is problematised in the PRC debate. Wang Jiaojiao asks

whether GM food is an ‘angel or a demon’ due to safety concerns since ‘gene modification technology is a type of gene weapon, [and] using gene modification technology can trigger a gene war, hence GM food threats belong to “multi-source” NTS threats’ (Wang Jiaojiao, 2014:249). Similarly, while noting its benefits for food security, Tian He is opposed to GM food due to possible underlying dangers for human health and ‘possibly unknown and irreversible’ impacts on the environment (Tian He, 2011:295ff.). Similar to critical Western charities and journalists, Tian worries about the dominance of the GM food market by a few multinationals upon whom farmers depend for GM seed-replacements due to ‘terminator seeds’, and the role of foreign capital on the poor’s food security and China’s grain security (Tian, 2011:295ff.). Tian is further wary of the connection of the global expansion of GM food to US government policy, and of the ‘terminator seed’ technology – a ‘food weapon’ – possibly depriving states of ‘food sovereignty’ (Tian, 2011:296). Tian He is also concerned about the Chinese government’s investment in GM food technology in order to ‘gain intellectual property rights’, as Tian worries about the limited patent protection in China and the potential health impacts (Tian, 2011:295f.,299f.). Tian He, and, to a lesser extent, Wang Jiaojiao, show themselves critical both of the international system and of the PRC government. This marks them as unique in the PRC debate as the CPG’s actions tend to be lauded. The focus of the scholarly debate in China on the securitisation of objective events rather than on a critical questioning of such securitisation demonstrates a lack of epistemological rigour; rather than asking whether regarding health as a security issue is warranted, most PRC scholars take it as a given, following the SARS scare and official thinking.

Significance

While SARS is regarded as crucial to the rise of the NTS debate and awareness in China as noted above, the attention towards health security in the debate in China since 2003 is decreasing, evidenced in the declining literature on the topic. Shang’s chapter appeared in the year of the SARS outbreak, and Li Bin in 2004 saw

public health security as one of the major NTS threats facing China. Nonetheless, in Yu et al.'s 2006 textbook SARS has faded in importance so that health and disease does not have its own chapter. Fu Yong's NTS monograph focuses more on institutional failings during the SARS crisis, while Chen Kun's 2007 work on 'Public Health' has broadened health security to involve all illness. Later diseases, including Bird Flu and H1N1, which did not reach crisis level clearly did not impact much on the PRC debate, but are treated sparingly.

In contrast to other NTS issues, not many PRC IR/NTS scholars focus on food security. My interviewees generally regarded food security as NTS. ONB2 and ONB3 both considered food security part of NTS with the referent object being the state rather than society, although a possible tension between the two over food security was attested. However, my interviews also suggested that there was usually only one academic per university focusing on an aspect of food security. The decline in literature and thus interest in health security is echoed by the response of my interviewees who suggested an ebbing of interest in epidemic disease after the initial shock of SARS. ONB1 regarded SARS as triggering their interest in NTS, yet there had clearly been a change in their thinking – albeit unacknowledged during the interview – since they no longer noted health issues as key within NTS, but instead considered environmental issues, notably pollution and climate change as the key NTS threats, as well as societal issues, including religious problems. ONB1 suggested that people focused on NTS only when an NTS issue burst on to the national or international scene.

This acclimatisation to health threats partially explains the waning attention towards health security in the literature, too. Once SARS became a memory and China was perceived as working better with the international community to prevent and cure other illnesses, health threats were given less importance by Yu, Pan, and Wang and other scholars. Similar to other non-University scholars

including ONB1, ONB6 suggested an academic trend away from NTS towards other pressing issues.

This evidently declining importance shows the NTS debate here to be reactive to 'real' events rather than anticipating threats or reconceptualising reality. As noted above, this waning interest is in contrast to parts of the Western debate that see the danger of transmittable disease rising since 1973 (Price-Smith, 1999:432).

Conversely, more liberal scholars see the importance of health security manifested in the global death toll of AIDS. Looking at the real danger of death posed by AIDS around the world, Li and Li highlight that AIDS is the fourth biggest killer worldwide and the prime cause of death in Sub-Saharan Africa (Li and Li, 2006:293). Chen Kun also sees low life expectancy in African countries caused by AIDS as 'a devastating attack [for a state]' (Chen, 2007:042).

The waning health security discussion contrasts with the portrayal of food security as fundamental to 'human (social) existence and development' (Jin and Peng, 2008:001; Jiang and Wei, 2011:264). Moreover, according to Jiang and Wei food (liangshi 粮食) is fundamental to a state's economic development and security strategy, touching on economic, political and strategic issues (Jiang and Wei, 2011:264). Shaw similarly highlights the importance of food security, arguing that more deaths are caused annually by malnutrition and hunger than by tuberculosis, AIDS, and Malaria together and by war and also links it to 'equitable and sustainable economic and social development, and to world peace' (Shaw, 2007:x). Agricultural changes, increased pollution and new methods to discover toxins in food, combined with rising living standards and demand for quality, add to the importance of food security for Jin and Peng: 'the key problem has moved from food being non-hygienic and spreading transmittable disease...to the latent threat to consumer health of certain chemicals polluting food' (Jin and Peng, 2008:002f.). Food security here evolves with human society.

Food *supply* security is seen as important in the PRC debate. Tian's concern about the 'serious' situation of 'China's food supply security' is mostly based on the notion that China's current grain supply self-sufficiency has reached its peak and she warns of the continued existence of 'hidden security dangers in China's grain and food supply' which ought not to be ignored (Tian He, 2011:297). Jiang and Wei similarly suggest that China's situation is serious, given China's population size and lack of arable land and water supply: 'China's development must properly deal with the food (liangshi-粮食) security issue' (Jiang and Wei, 2011:264). Hence the importance attached to health and food security in the PRC debate differs in that health security is mostly important only in specific cases of spreadable ill health whereas food security has a more continuing importance, rather than focusing on similar extreme events such as famine.

Causes for Variance

More so than with the other issues discussed in this thesis, different geographical location and affiliation do not explain the variety of conceptualisations and assigned significance of health and food security. Whereas the semi-official debate elsewhere offers wide and fluid definitions of NTS issues to enlarge state security as much as possible, Shang's text limits what can be considered health security to the barest minimum: lethal, incurable, new pandemics, whereas Zhejiang University's Chen Kun advocates the securitisation of all health issues.

Rather than external factors, conceptions of reality, training, and research interest are key for the variance within the debate. Hence Shang's focus on state security makes him focus solely on health issues of the scale of the Justinian plague. Since to predict such a pandemic would be to sow fear and undermine stability, he merely advocates a less blind belief in science, with the clear aim to deflect blame from the state should disaster strike again. Other NTS scholars' focus on SARS as one of the triggers of their interest in NTS and subsequent loss of interest in health issues again highlights different research interests; for scholars trained in IR and

therefore trained to look for anthropogenic threat sources, a dormant non-anthropogenic issue loses attractiveness. Conversely, Tian He, Li and Li, Chen Kun, and Chen and Peng who do not focus on NTS in general are evidently pursuing health and food security research for its own sake. These scholars vary so strongly from the general NTS debate because they strongly advocate focusing on issues that are not clearly IR issues, such as the cost of HIV/Aids treatment, food security of the poorest, food contamination, and overall health. The force with which Li and Li and Tian He pursue their arguments decrying unjust treatment of the poor is unique in the PRC NTS debate, while the existence and publication of such voices shows that health and food security are topics which can be more freely discussed in the PRC debate. In contrast to, for example, the terrorism debate whose various voices are fairly similar and generally follow the state despite the ubiquity of the spectre of terrorism globally and hence the possibility for varying views, the discourse on health and food security is clearly less tightly controlled and allows for more scholarly uniqueness and advocacy.

Political Implications

My interviewees clearly had a political impact in mind when writing about NTS. UNB11 noted that the intended readership for publications on food security were other academics and the government.

The argument by some in the PRC debate that epidemics are now seen as security because governments treat them as such and because of a misguided belief in science has political implications. Despite his acknowledgment of the historical threat of diseases, Shang Qianhong does not acknowledge pre-1990s diseases as security threats, let alone NTS as they were not securitised. Shang argues that in recent, mostly Western, history, disease was either not treated as security issues, or was overlooked due to exuberant, 'superstitious' belief in science, and that this confidence in science meant that SARS was such a shock (Shang, 2003:406,408). Shang (and Yu et al. who use his argument) base this claim on how

states have treated transmittable diseases, rather than retrospectively securitising previous epidemics, with Shang considering the categorisation of transmittable diseases as NTS ‘a post-Cold War phenomenon’ since although such diseases had harassed humans throughout history, they were not considered national security threats due to ‘the limits of historical conditions’ (Shang, 2003:403-6; Yu et al., 2006:252). Shang and Yu et al. hence follow the Cold War dividing line in the PRC debate elaborated in Chapter Three. However, this consistency with the temporal division is problematic as HIV/AIDS, seen as the key threat, emerged prior to the end of the Cold War. Hence the scholars are only following the 1990s securitisation of disease by governments rather than the actual emergence of diseases. The focus of the health security-as-NTS-debate in the Chinese discourse refers mostly to epidemics, and thus fits into the novel and sudden crises definition of NTS discussed in Chapter Three. Here it is the suddenness and extremeness of particular health threats which has political consequences and plays on people’s fears rather than non-contagious health issues such as pollution or smoking which constantly kill more people and could be – in the case of smoking – contained very easily. The result of Shang and Yu et al.’s reasoning is twofold. First, a false security of scientific advancement makes people unprepared for disease. Second, it is the state, made up of people with the above faulty assumption and itself mistakenly believing that it can manage plagues, which turn a disease into a security issue. The political implication is clear: the state needs to be more reasonable in its securitisation while also being prepared against sudden diseases. This is contradictory but ultimately requests a state that is both vigilant against disease while also aware that it cannot ultimately beat them; insecurity is to be accepted.

The PRC debate also contains arguments with a political message of blaming the state, suggesting that health security is novel as domestic institutional failings turn health issues into threats. Fu Yong focuses on structural changes rather than specific diseases

as a reason for why public health issues are now a problem for China (Fu, 2011:144). While Fu Yong highlights that according to estimates, many newly emerging diseases globally were discovered in China, the problem is not new pathogens emerging, but rather the deterioration of China's health system during the economic reform era (Fu, 2011:144f.). Criticising state policy in the reform era at least until the SARS crisis, Fu Yong argues that whereas China used to be considered an exemplary of public health by developing states, the development of PRC health institutions was considered less important than GDP growth, turning the country's public health system into the 'weak spot' of its sustainable development and development of a middle class society (Fu, 2011:145). The political intention of Fu's argument is clear as her focus on healthcare over economic growth is aligned with the ostentatious focus on people by the Hu and Wen administration. Fu locates herself more on the left-wing side of the political and scholarly spectrum and sides with the then leadership. As this focus on political problems is absent from other works, such as from Li Bin's 2004 article, which focuses on the ferocious nature of SARS rather than criticising poor political management of the crisis, criticism of Jiang Zemin's SARS management evidently became more acceptable well into the Hu and Wen administration when Fu was writing (Li Bin, 2004:47).

A strong political implication is contained in the view of some scholars of food security as a more political problem concerning human rights rather than a purely economic one. Similar to Booth's argument that NTS issues are not new security issues for those facing them, Tian He highlights the connection of human rights and food security, arguing that 'food security (shipin anquan-食品安全) is...actually a fundamental human right' (Booth, 2007:172; Tian He, 2011:288). Acknowledging that different states have different food security issues, such as supply or quality, Tian notes that development has not eradicated food insecurity in either developing or developed countries, with the former concerned about food supply and the latter about food quality and freedom

from contamination, meaning that technological progress had not eradicated security problems in terms of food supply and wealth inequality (Tian, 2011:288). Hence, for Tian, food security is both an economic and a 'new global political problem' (Tian, 2011:288). The political implication is that neither economic globalisation, nor the free market, nor development solve the old problem of food security. Still, this is not an inevitable situation since Tian sees food security as a human right; hence both developing and developed states are failing to uphold human rights when people do not enjoy food security. The implication is that the current economic system of developing and developed states is not working as it should. Tian effectively calls for global economic reorganisation to ensure food security.

The frequent focus on national strength in the NTS debate occurs in the health security debate, too, and has the political implication of connecting to the CCP narrative. Parts of the PRC semi-official and scholarly debate regard health as highly important for national strength, which is similar to Price-Smith who regards ERIDs as more dangerous than war - having historically destroyed empires, while also triggering intra-state threats by creating failed states (Price-Smith, 1999:434-440). Both Chen Kun, who advances a very broad and statist argument, and Li and Li, who are more left-wing and critical, note the importance of health security for state stability and economic development (Chen Kun, 2007:041; Li and Li, 2006:306). Yu, Pan, and Wang, despite the little attention they give to health security, note that 'Europe's [military and economic] strength' since the eighteenth century was due to the establishment of a public health system based on 'prevention and cure' (Yu et al., 2006:254). Rather than lauding the humanitarian aspect, Yu et al. focus on state benefit, arguing that that European health policy was key to enhanced European strength and that it aided military expansion and economic development (Yu et al., 2006:254). This ostensibly serves to bolster the importance of health security by highlighting its impact on national power and actually links the NTS discourse to the nineteenth century Chinese

intellectuals' 'search for wealth and power' vis-a-vis the West (see K'ang Yu-Wei, 1958:145). Moreover, it connects to Chen Kun's broad 'public security', where birth defects impact on China's population security as they are 'severe public health problems, [and] impact on population quality' (Chen, 2007:041). Yu et al.'s excursion into national strength is contrary to their book's overall claim to embrace a 'global perspective' and focus on humans, rendering their overall health security argument theoretically unsound (Yu et al., 2006:30). Nevertheless, the political implication of the health security debate here is that the health of individuals is important as it ensures the strength of the state, rather than being valuable in itself.

The advocacy of prevention against epidemic diseases and public health crises supports the UN's authority, and aligns with CCP policy (Chen Kun, 2007:042; Shang, 2003:418; Yu et al., 2006:253f.). Prevention is connected to the UN in the PRC debate, with Shang arguing that international institutions often discussed the UNDP concept of human security in relation to AIDS-related security issues and the need for 'preventative action' (Shang, 2003:407f.; Yu et al., 2006:253f.). This focus on prevention highlights the authority the UN enjoys in the PRC debate, but also means that the scholars reject deeper investigation. Advocating prevention also does not solve the problem of institutional and psychological 'unpreparedness' which Shang sees as causing the SARS crisis and is contrary to his disdain over an excessive belief in science (Shang, 2003:408). Instead of heeding Shang's warning against an excessive trust in science, the later scholarly debate embraces the CCP's belief in modern scientific development. While Li Bin advocates socio-economic development and increasing the level of science and development for ultimately solving public health security problems, Yu et al. suggest that China should follow the example of nineteenth century Europe's public health systems to increase national strength (Li Bin, 2004:47; Yu et al., 2006:253f.).

Moreover, while Yu et al. approve of the PRC's new 2004 Epidemic Disease Law, they follow their nineteenth century public health

narrative in arguing for the need to stop 'backward unhygienic habits' to stop the transmission of diseases – although Yu et al. do not explain what these habits are (Yu et al., 2006:253). The lack of explanation of these habits demonstrates lack of rigour, leaving readers, here undergraduates, guessing. Either the authors do not know themselves what they mean, or what they refer to is so evident that it does not need to be elaborated, or that the government has not provided a definition. Still, the resulting narrative suggests a juxtaposition of a healthy West against a China which is 'sick' through self-inflicted illnesses, reminiscent of nineteenth-century discourses and effectively supporting the notion that the Chinese need to be led to health by the CCP. This exaggerated belief in scientific progress is problematised in parts of the Western debate, where the 'optimism' of an imminent triumph over disease eroded in the 1970s as ERIDs become more threatening (Hough, 2008:166). Instead, the scholarly PRC debate clearly follows the CCP's professed belief in scientific development. The political meaning here is that the scholars support the CCP in what it does without problematising or questioning state policy.

Although cooperation is advocated as elsewhere in the NTS debate, there are some reservations, suggesting a suspicion of the outside world. Shang, of the semi-official debate, advocates learning from other states' 'prevention and cure tactics' and also criticises self-interested and insufficient Western support to developing states battling with AIDS (Shang, 2003:406,418). Chen Kun of the scholarly debate is even more critical of the West and is wary of malicious foreign 'interference' during health crises (Chen, 2007:041). Such suspicion of other states' intentions are noted in the Western debate as obstacles for international medical action (McInnes and Lee, 2006:23). The political meaning of Shang and Chen's arguments is that the West cannot be trusted. Whereas Shang sees the West as having to support others, Chen effectively rejects this support as he sees it marred by ulterior motives. For Chen, the state should clearly fend for itself to avoid foreign interference. The political implication is that in health terms,

national isolation is to be preferred. Chen is strangely unaware that this is what the PRC tried (and failed) to do at the start of the SARS crisis, and that it was this isolationist and non-transparent stance that in the eyes of other scholars, notably Fu Yong, is what exacerbated the crisis.

By contrast, and clearly based on the SARS experience, Yu, Pan, and Wang, as well as Fu Yong advocate transnational cooperation, the political implication being that disease affects all and should be managed by all. For Yu et al., since epidemics threaten all people, there need to be global defence measures (Yu et al., 2006:352ff.; Fu, 2011:146). Fu Yong contrasts the PRC's early uncooperative and secretive handling of the SARS crisis with its later close engagement with the UN due to 'foreign pressure' (Fu, 2011:146). Fu contrasts the Jiang administration's SARS management with that of Hu and Wen by praising the Hu and Wen government for its post-SARS actions internationally which showed a capable and cooperative government and 'established an image of a responsible great power' (Fu, 2011:146). Fu's arguments imply that the government's standing rather than the containment of epidemics - through medical advances - is key. Fu's understanding of a 'responsible great power', a reference designed to attract political attention, entails working with the international system as a partner, sharing information, and advising but clearly not leading, and not being a revolutionary rising great power endeavouring to change the system (Fu Yong, 2011:146). Similarly, Wang, Ding, and Li, who focus solely on health management advocate closer international cooperation under existing rules and the improvement of the international system (Wang, Ding, and Li, 2006:316f.). The emphasis on cooperation and international rule-following means that NTS for Fu, and for Wang et al., while affecting national security, internationalises and globalises security. Although this strong advocacy of international cooperation is echoed in the Western debate, the Chinese debate does not entail an advocacy of an involvement of NGOs which the Western debate does (Brundtland, 2003:421; Price-Smith, 1999). The political

implication is that the key actor in health security remains the state which must be a responsible and cooperative member of the international society.

Normative Implications

Although parts of both the health and food security debates do not move towards a change of the status-quo, some scholars anticipate a normative turn. Both food and health security suggest – more than other NTS issues – individuals as the referent object. The PRC debate reflects this, as the state-centrism frequent to other areas is weaker here although the debate does range from a purely statist referent object to mixed views involving both statist and human referent objects, to purely human referent objects.

My interviews suggested a normative shift towards a greater importance of society and individuals. For ONB4, society was the referent object. UNB11 suggested that food security affected state-individual relations.

Fu Yong's connection of regime security and human security within health security makes a budding normative shift. Emphasising human security within health security, Fu makes an ontologically questionable move, arguing for the practical fusion of state security and human security (Fu Yong, 2007:146,159; Fu, 2011:144ff.). Fu's use of 'human security' is less that of Security Studies and more a move to increase state security to include the health of its citizens as components of that state. Fu's understanding widens security, but a normative shift is forestalled as state security remains key.

Parts of the debate actively prevent a normative turn by reemphasising a drastic focus on the state. Chen Kun holds that there has been a progress from individual security to public security, which ultimately serves the state (Chen, 2007:036f.). For Chen, 'public health security' is a key NTS issue since health crises 'uniquely challenge every field of national security', namely political, economic, and population security (Chen, 2007:041f.). The political security Chen refers to is actually regime security encompassing

the government not being threatened by societal upheaval and panic, and 'people's despair towards the future', or the threat of another state's interference, which could 'disintegrate the state' and the nation (Chen, 2007:041).

Others in the scholarly and the semi-official literature suggest a normative change as they see both the regime and people for their own sake as referent objects. While Shang, exemplifying the semi-official debate, mostly focuses on national security, he also suggests that humans, such as AIDS orphans, are possible referent objects: 'the effect of AIDS on children's lives is crueller than war' (Shang, 2003:407f.). Shang's argument here is free from any statist considerations. It is clearly only the devastation AIDS creates in human lives, and notably not among his fellow PRC citizens, that Shang discusses within a text on security. The emotive phrase 'the effect of AIDS on children's lives is crueller than war' underlines this normative change as the focus here shifts on the most vulnerable individuals and the effect, 'cruelty', is not one connected to the state's wellbeing but solely to the individual's psychology. Clearly what *should* be reality for Shang is that children's lives are cruelty-free. This would be a truism in any general text, but in a semi-official text on security in an authoritarian state, it suggests a normative move towards a human-centric view of security.

However, a normative shift is evident among other leading PRC scholars who focus solely on humans, albeit varying sections of humankind, as the referent object. Yu et al.'s definition of 'international public security' refers to 'international level "societal security" and "the security of the public"', while national public security would refer to 'the security of the life, health, and public and private property of the majority of people' (Yu et al., 2006:275). The referent object evidently is international society, here the majority of the world's people, rather than states or individuals. Yet, there are also parts in both the PRC health and food security debates that see the individual as the referent object. For Jin and Peng, the referent object in food security is mostly consumers,

regardless of nationality, rather than, for example, highlighting ‘the health of the nation’ (Jin and Peng, 2008:001,007f.). Since Jin and Peng talk about ‘consumers’, they are not talking about all people in the world. Instead, Jin and Peng are concerned with people who live in affluent societies, including China, who do not need to worry about food availability and accessibility. This excludes the very poor in all countries and developing countries generally.

Conversely, a more radical normative shift is evident for Zhou Jiehong, who is not an IR specialist, who considers the referent object of food security as evidently all humans, arguing that ‘the core of NTS is human security’ and that what is being looked at are issues directly threatening ‘human security in real societies’ (Zhou, 2012:255). Regarding food security as ‘the most fundamental right of humankind’, Tian’s discussion similarly is human-centric, and throughout her text she shows strongest concern for the poor, arguing that ‘being poor is a major cause for food insecurity’ (Tian, 2011:291). Tian’s arguments display a belief in dignity and equality of all humans. Her stance against Malthusian thinking, outlined below, as well as biofuel and GM food shows a belief in the equal worth and rights of all humans. This is rare in the Chinese debate as the concern for the poor are not linked to the regime, but evidently really means human rights, constituting a normative shift as a different reality is advocated.

This concern for all individuals is shared by Li and Li who discuss individuals’ access to medicine (Li and Li, 2006:293). Such a concern for ill people is similar to Brundtland’s, although Brundtland, connected to her engagement in practical global politics, is pushing the debate beyond pure access to medicine to structural causes asking who is infected and why (Brundtland, 2003:417). In contrast to Brundtland, Li and Li appeal to regime security, arguing that preventing and curing transmittable diseases in China is crucial for an ‘economically speedily developing great power’ and for the creation of a middle-class society. Nevertheless, this use of CCP-rhetoric serves to advance Li and Li’s concern for

people's access to medicine rather than bolstering regime security, and their argument still constitutes a normative turn.

The systemic and cognitive changes advocated in parts of the health and food security debates also contain normative implications. Li and Li effectively promote a change in the capitalist system arguing that producing new medicine only makes sense if the buying power of people in developing states is increased (Li and Li, 2007:293). In light of developed countries' protection of their pharmaceutical industries, Li and Li advance changes in the international intellectual property rights system to make medicine affordable and advise China and other developing countries to promote these changes and to produce medicine themselves (Li and Li, 2007:293f.,306). This is a normative change as the current system is radically questioned and a new one proposed.

Similarly radical is Tian He's rejection of Malthus's argument that population pressure may cause violence and societal disintegration in the food security debate (Tian, 2011:289). This rejection of Malthusian thinking positions Tian in opposition to the CCP's ongoing belief in population control, but she manages to conform to CCP orthodoxy by referring to Marx's emphasis on fair distribution, not scarcity, arguing that 'grain security is not a production problem but a distribution issue' and uses the case of China's large population being fed despite its lack of arable land as an example (Tian, 2011:289). Hence, for Tian, 'revolution and change are the key' (Tian, 2011:289). To increase the validity of her argument among PRC readers and ensure buy-in for her normative statements, Tian not only employs Marx but also CCP-rhetoric, arguing for an economic model based on humans, using the CCP term *yi ren wei ben*-以人为本 ('human as the basis') to deal with poverty (Tian, 2011:291). Although Tian's use of CCP rhetoric here implies an advocacy of China's model, her use of this phrase serves more to support her argument of focusing on people for their own sake rather than adding a regime-centric angle to her article. Tian advocates a normative shift in thinking about food

security, albeit one that heavily draws on Marx and thus formally aligns with CCP orthodoxy.

A different normative shift is advanced by Jin and Peng who effectively advocate a rethinking of food safety arguing that risk is normal and that it had to be found out how much risk was acceptable to consumers (Jin and Peng, 2008:010). The notion of becoming comfortable with risk also constitutes a call for limiting NTS to not include every issue. This is a normative shift as it questions and even rejects over-securitisation common in authoritarian regimes.

Health and food security therefore entail a normative shift in the PRC NTS debate. This is certainly due to the inherent importance of food and health to individuals; humans can survive in a poor economy, with scarce energy, or amongst transnational crime, but health and food are essential to physical survival. However, as parts of the debate show, it is possible to overlook the human dimension and focus solely on national strength based on a healthy, well-fed mass of anonymous citizens. The fact that many PRC scholars do not and instead focus on individual maladies including African AIDS orphans and the dangers of food insecurity to the poor means that they are advancing a more human-centric, broadened and deepened view of security, constituting a beginning normative shift away from CCP orthodoxy.

Conclusion

This chapter tested my four research questions in the PRC health and food security debates.

First, my analysis revealed a variety of conceptualisations and assigned significance in the health and food security debates. The health security debate contains two sets of divisions. One is between those who define health security narrowly in terms of disease, with the semi-official debate being the most parsimonious only securitising new pandemics, and those advocating a very broad securitisation with every health issue considered security. The other divide is between those who focus their

conceptualisation on anthropogenic 'real' threats, notably SARS, and those focusing on anthropogenic health threats, securitising the inequality in access to medicine. This division informs how the scholars assess the importance of health security. Whereas those focusing on anthropogenic threats highlight the lethality and suddenness of specific pandemics, those focusing on the accessibility of medicine highlight the extent and carnage wreaked by AIDS despite the existence of anti-viral drugs. The food security debate similarly divides into several groups of conceptualisation, focusing on the different interpretation of the term food security. Hence, some scholars focus on food security in terms of availability, some on distribution, and others on food safety. In all cases, food security is assigned a huge significance not so much in the general debate's tendency to link a security issue to national security but due to the fact that food is essential to human existence. Crucially, all sides of the debate consider food security highly important now. Some highlight increasing scarcity of supply and increasing demand, while others emphasise the dangers of twentieth-century food production, including on the one hand the role of multi-nationals in food production, the biofuel crop production instead of food crop production, and the dangers of GM crops, and on the other hand the dangers of microbe and other pollution of food. Both the health and food security debates are unique in the PRC debate in that the leading NTS scholars, Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe, Wang Jiangli, Wang Yizhou, and Fu Yong are not the most critical in their thinking, and instead scholars not focusing on general IR are advancing the most insightful conceptualisations and reasons for the importance of the two issues, showing that there is a lively debate on both issues in the PRC.

Second, regarding the reasons for variety in conceptualisation and assessed significance, internal factors, notably conceptions of reality, training, and research interest are crucial and affiliation or location unimportant. In the health debate, the semi-official discourse is the most parsimonious on what can be securitised,

whereas University scholar Chen Kun wants all health issues to be securitised.

Ontological leanings, such as a focus on state security lead some scholars to limit health security threats to extremely lethal incurable pandemics. The IR training and consequent focus on anthropogenic threats of others meant that they focused on SARS when it was a pandemic, but lost interest when it was controlled. Conversely, the scholars with the most critical and theoretically sound arguments do not focus on NTS in general but focus on health and food security. The force of their normative arguments is unique in the PRC debate but their written output shows that the health and food security discourse is less severely controlled.

Third, my testing of the debate showed that there are various political meanings and purposes in the health and food security debate. Shang and Yu et al.'s limitation of health security to lethal pandemics implies politically that states have to be both vigilant against new plagues as complete security is impossible while also not securitising every health issue. However, there is a discrepancy between Shang's warning to not blindly trust in science and other scholars' subscription to the CCP's belief in scientific progress is politically meaningful as it marks a difference between a more post-modern and a more classically communist worldview. The political meaning of Fu Yong's SARS discussion more directly is a criticism of the Jiang Zemin administration's failure to respond efficiently and a praise of the Hu and Wen government's increased transparency. Conversely, Chen Kun's excessive securitisation of health includes the fear of creeping intervention by foreign powers implying that China would be safer in isolation. Yet, Yu et al., Fu Yong, and Wang, Ding, and Li are in line with Hu and Wen's international cooperation on SARS advance further cooperation on diseases and therefore an internationalisation of security. As Yu et al.'s nineteenth century-style connection of individual health to a country's power show, the main actor for most of the PRC debate remains the state albeit as a responsible and cooperative member of international society.

The food security debate contains strong political implications. Tian He's invocation of human rights mean that she considers both developing and developed states as failing to uphold human rights when some people lack food security.

Fourth, my analysis showed that some scholars in the health and food security debates move toward a normative turn. My interviews showed that health security is considered to focus on society as the referent object rather than the state and that food security means a change in state-individual relations. Whereas Chen Kun's extreme statism encompasses an explicit move from human security to state security in terms of health, both the scholarly and semi-official debate suggest a normative shift as health security is seen to focus on both the regime and people as referent objects. However, I have shown that Fu Yong's normative shift is ontologically faulty as she fuses human security and state security, with the latter remaining paramount in health security.

Free from this conundrum, Jin and Peng, and more forcefully Zhou Jiehong and Tian He advance a normative shift in the food security debate as they focus solely on humans. Zhou and Tian push the debate towards greater normative through the respective arguments that NTS is human security and that food security is a human right. Tian's rejection of Malthusianism in favour of redistribution is explicitly normative and at odds with the CCP's population control albeit softened through the use of CCP orthodox language. Similarly, Li and Li's fervent arguments for universally affordable medical supplies are confident normative statements sketching an ideal of what the world ought to be in contrast to PRC and global capitalist reality. Jin and Peng advance a very different but no less radical normative shift as they argue for the acceptance of insecurity in terms of food safety, effectively rejecting the authoritarian over-securitisation.

Chapter Eight: Energy Security and Environmental Security

This chapter analyses the PRC energy security and environment security debate. Energy and the environment share certain features. Both connect human society to its external, geographic surroundings. Both are ubiquitous in everyday politics, news, and even popular culture and both fundamentally relate to modernity. Energy and the environment are often considered interlinked: energy resources are part of the environment, fossil fuel accidents and use can cause environmental disasters.

Terminologically, environmental security could simply expand traditional, statist and militarist security to encompass environmental threats, it could deepen security to embrace other referent objects, or it could re-conceptualise human-nature relations. Conversely, energy security could be regarded as closer to TS, and more statist than environmental security.

This chapter investigates the PRC scholarly debate on energy and environmental security along my research questions. I first enquire into the PRC scholarly conceptualisations and set out how the scholars evaluate the significance of both. I then analyse the causes for the variance in how the PRC scholars conceptualise and assess the significance of these two NTS-issues. I subsequently investigate what political meanings and political purposes this scholarship reveals and seeks to attain. Finally, I analyse the PRC energy and environmental security debates on the normative implications and a possible evidence of a normative turn.

Context

Since becoming a net importer of crude oil in 1993, China worries about its energy security, as access to sufficient oil is fundamental to its goal of a 'peaceful development' (IEA/OECD, 2000:10; Downs, 2006:6; Salameh, 2010:21). Energy is a crucial factor for

the Chinese state's survival, both in terms of domestic security regarding regime legitimacy and power by ensuring economic growth and popular contentment, and in terms of its international security, as energy is crucial for military power (Andrews-Speed et al., 2002:10,13). Worries exist over possible threats to supplies, as key waterways are controlled by other countries, over foreign suspicion of China, namely about its oil companies, and the impact of energy import policies on other aspects of Chinese foreign policy (Dannreuther, 2011:1346). China seeks to heighten its energy security both through domestic oil and gas development, investment in overseas production, political links with exporters, including aid and investment, strategic reserves, and the diversification of oil exporters (IEA/OECD, 2000:7,45f.; Andrews-Speed et al., 2002:42f.).

China is now engaging more in cooperation with other importing states and the IEA (Dannreuther, 2011:1350f.; Kennedy, 2010:141). Nevertheless, Sino-Western cooperation faces constraints due to structural, ideological and foreign policy differences, resulting in mutual 'fundamental distrust' (Dannreuther, 2011:1351f.). Worried about the safety of seaborne energy imports, due to potential US-led disruptions, China engages in gas and oil pipeline-projects with Russia and Central Asian states (Downs, 2004:36).

Like environmental issues, energy security has triggered a domestic debate in China (Kennedy, 2010:139). The debate includes discussions on the salience of the NOC's 'going out strategy', the relative security of pipelines vis-à-vis sea-transport, possible PRC IEA-membership, China's blue water presence and the protection of its maritime interests (Kennedy, 2010:140f.). The government has broadened its energy security concept from import (external) dependence to include internal issues (Kennedy, 2010:137f.). At the 2006 G8 summit, Hu Jintao discussed a broader 'new energy security concept' seeking 'greater international cooperation to increase oil and gas supplies', 'sustainable development of human security' and 'to control

domestic demand' (Kennedy, 2010:145f.). As of 2015, China is the biggest user of renewable energies globally, with about one third of generated electricity coming from renewable sources, and the use of clean energy being part of Xi Jinping's 'Chinese dream' (Kennedy, 2010:146f.; Spiegel, 21/02/2015).

China's increasing energy consumption entails environmental costs. Environmental problems are not new in China, with its huge population and relatively small amount of arable land (Benewick and Donald, 2009:53; Economy, 2004:32f.). PRC scholars live and work in a visibly polluted environment and they are – through their own sensory experience and domestic and international news – aware of environmental degradation.

Air pollution and smog increase due to rising car ownership and industrial expansion and annually cause some 400,000 deaths (Benewick and Donald, 2009:58f.; Xu, 2014). The sites of my interviews suffer from severe air pollution, which reached dangerous levels during my fieldwork. China's water problems are serious, with increasing scarcity, pollution, depletion, and glacial melting (Benewick and Donald, 2009:60; Xu, 2014). Climate change intensifies desertification and flooding, affecting hundreds of millions of people in China (Benewick and Donald, 2009:60; Dow and Downing, 2011:23; Xu, 2014).

Institutionalised since 1972, PRC environmental protection implementation is flawed, and is connected to the scale of the problem and political decentralisation; in 2009 about 10 per cent of environmental regulations and laws were enforced (Xu, 2014; Benewick and Donald, 2009:53,58). Despite the government's ostensible commitment to environmental protection, with Xi Jinping placing environmental pollution on the same level as his anti-corruption campaign in 2015, the government does not pursue environmental protection as vigorously as it fights corruption (F.A.Z., 09/03/2015). The government's push is certainly connected to increasing popular disquiet and protest over environmental problems, illustrated by the popularity of Cai Jing's

2015 documentary 'Under the Dome' (Benewick and Donald, 2009:58; F.A.Z, 09/03/2015).

The Literature

The PRC NTS literature treats 'energy security' with varying degrees of depth. Whereas the semi-official 2003 *On NTS* entails a chapter by Feng Yujun, the 2007 *Views from China* places the only related chapter by Zha Daojiong on oil-supply security in its 'resource security' section. While Zhejiang University's *Non-traditional Security in China* series contains a monograph on energy security by Ni Jianmin and Guo Yuntao (2009), Yu et al. (2006) discuss energy security in their economic security chapter. Zhao and Zhu's 2011 *Nontraditional Security and China's New Foreign Strategy*, however, contains a chapter by Zhang Wenmu which includes oil security. The Blue Books contain two chapters on energy security: Qian Xuming and Ni Shixiong (2011-12) and Zhou Yun and Yu Jiahao (2014-15). Zhejiang University's 2014 NTS Journal has one article by Huang Biao on 'oil war'.

Conversely, environmental security is ubiquitous in the NTS texts. The semi-official 2003 *On NTS* contains a chapter by Huang Ying on 'Environmental Security'. Yu, Pan, and Wang (2006) give 'ecological security' its own chapter. The 'ecological security' section in the 2007 *Views from China: NTS* contains four chapters: Li Yanfang's 'China's Ecological Security and Legal Protection', Cui Cheng's 'Clean Development Mechanism', Shen Muzhu's 'International Trade and National Environment Security Legislation', and Zhang Haibin's 'China's Position in International Climate Change Negotiations'. Zhejiang University's more practically oriented *NTS Capacity Building Series* includes two books related to the environment: Gan Junxian's 2013 'A Study of China's Climate Diplomacy and its Capacity Building' and Mi Hong, Zhou Wei, and Ma Pengyuan's 2012 'Climate Change and Population Security'. Zhao and Zhu's (2011) *Nontraditional Security and China's New Foreign Strategy* contains a chapter by Zhuang Guiyang on international climate management. Another relevant monograph, although not claiming to be part of the NTS discourse,

is Zhang Haibin's 2010 'Climate Change and China's National Security'. The Blue Books have several chapters on environmental security: Tan Rong (2011-12) on 'China's soil resources security', Zhang Gui (2011-12) on 'China's water resource security', Gan Junxian (2012-13) on 'international negotiations on climate change in 2012', Guo Yanjun (2013-2014) on 'international river water resources development', Li Zhifei (2013-2014) on 'water problems and dam politics', Chen Hongmei, Yu Lifen, and Zhang Weishi (2013-2014) on 'Mekong River area law enforcement cooperation', Yuan Huarong (2013-2014) on 'extreme weather', Ma Zhenchao (2013-2014) on 'suddenly occurring problems', and Wei Zhijiang and Xie Jinfeng (2014-15) on 'the smog pollution problem in the ASEAN environment'. Zhejiang University's NTS Journal has one related article, Gan Junxian and Mao Yan (2012) on 'China's NTS cooperation and diplomatic capacity building'.

Conceptualisation

The PRC NTS debate uses several, mostly interchangeable terms for 'environmental security': *huanjing anquan*-环境安全-environmental security, *shengtai huanjing anquan*-生态环境安全-ecological-environment security, and *shengtai anquan*-生态安全-ecological security (Huang, 2003; Yu et al., 2006; Fu Yong, 2007:45; Zha Daojiong, 2007). Yu et al. alone explain their terminology, arguing that 'ecological security' is popular in China and that the term 'the environment' (*huanjing*-环境) can refer to geopolitics and the 'military environment', whereas 'ecological security' is more suitable, with ecology being a more relational concept (Yu et al., 2006:129f.).

The terminological variety in the Chinese debate suggests that the debate is in flux and that its parameters are not yet set politically or academically. The Western debate also discusses terminological issues, although 'environmental security' is ubiquitous (Barnett, 2001:2). Conversely, 'energy security' (*nengyuan anquan*-能源安全), is the only term used in the Chinese debate, indicating a more clear-cut debate.

A key division within the energy security debate is between those conceptualising it as a real threat humans became aware of and those considering it as politically constructed. Ni and Guo suggest that energy security is a real, objective issue, with international society becoming aware of it since the 1973 oil crisis, focusing on stable oil supply and prices, while increasing globalisation and worries about environmental problems in the 1980s broadened energy security to incorporate ecological-environmental concerns and sustainable development (Ni and Guo, 2009:049f.). Still, for Ni and Guo, Chinese society only began focusing on energy security in the 2000s, due to China's fast economic development, increasing oil import dependence and strained coal, electricity and transport (Ni and Guo, 2009:050). Ni and Guo omit that the CPG's prioritising led to a focus on energy security.

Yu et al. also do not problematise energy security but subscribe to energy *scarcity*, warning that oil and gas will be depleted by 2060 (Yu et al., 2006:179). This deterioration appears unstoppable and dangerous, creating conflict and war (Yu et al., 2006:179).

Conversely, some of my interviewees did not fully accept the securitisation of energy. ONB8 suggested that depletion concerns were misplaced as more resources were found and thus the problem was constructed with Western media wrongly criticising China over its consumption. Regarding energy security as constructed allows scholars to highlight alternative energy sources, including, for ONB8 and ONB7, non-renewables.

The 'Malacca Dilemma' of the dangers of transportation for China was rejected by some of my interviewees, though perhaps because the 'Malacca dilemma' was raised as an issue by Hu Jintao, the Chinese-language NTS literature does not voice my interviewees' doubts. However, writing in the Western journal *Survival*, Zha Daojiong rejects the notion of the danger of seaborne imports and instead highlights the combination of increasing consumption with energy inefficiency as a threat (Zha, 2006:187).

Divergence from a strict separation of NTS and TS generally and notably regarding energy security occurred in my interviews. UB5 argued that security issues often blended NTS and TS aspects and that when energy security was connected to war preparations, it was TS.

Novelty

While the debate generally considers environmental security as real and not constructed, the question of why it is a non-traditional security threat is discussed.

ONB2 and ONB3 both considered 'resource security' as an NTS issue, and ONB2 argued that resource security sometimes was also TS such as when states went to war over it. Both ONB2 and ONB3 thought that the referent object of resource security was the state. ONB4 considered environmental issues part of NTS, as NTS included non-political and non-military aspects of security as well as non-state objects as referent objects.

Both the semi-official and the PRC scholarly debate regard environmental security as novel, if for different reasons. Huang's semi-official text regards 'environment security' as novel in its difference to TS, arguing that "environment security" is a relatively new concept' without an agreed upon definition' (Huang, 2003:191ff.). Huang suggests that environmental security was recognised as an issue after the Second World War, as people recognised the threat to states by global-scale, non-military problems (Huang, 2003:194). Similarly, the scholarly debate emphasises the novelty of environmental security. Ignoring pre-industrial human interference with nature such as ancient China's river-regulations and Elvin's reference to China's environmental history as '3000 years of unsustainable growth', Yu, Pan, and Wang argue that industrialisation progressively eliminated 'the rather harmonious relationship' between the environment and humans (Yu et al., 2006:126; Elvin, 1993). By drawing on supposed ancient Chinese roots of ecological awareness, Yu et al. sinicise and thereby legitimise the potentially alien concept of

ecology, overlooking the frequent religious and ideological emphases on man's domination of nature (Yu et al., 2006:132). Conversely, Fu Yong sees globalisation as the cause as it turned 'eco-environmental problems' into global ones threatening all states and becoming the focus of international society (Fu Yong, 2007:45).

The supposed novelty asserted by the semi-official and the scholarly environmental security debate contrasts with the frequent linking of environmental security and not-too-recent, if modern, developments such as industrialisation, globalisation and population- and consumption-increase (Huang, 2003:201; Yu et al., 2006:126; Li Yanfang, 2007:179f.). Conversely, the Western environmental security debate is less clear about the novelty of environmental security, highlighting the importance of both scholarship and (Western) civil society for the politicisation of environmental change, rather than actual increased environmental degradation (Matthew, 1999:1f.; Hough, 2008:145-149).

The evident confusion in the Chinese debate over the novelty of environmental security issues highlights the problems of using the end of the Cold War as the TS-NTS dividing line. The scholars must be aware that China's and the world's anthropogenic environmental problems predate 1989. Hence, the scholars clearly regard awareness and securitisation as novel, but not environmental threats themselves.

(Changing) Characteristics

The Chinese debate's major works regard energy security as now more concerned with domestic energy *use*, in contrast to the Western debate focusing more on *supply* safety. In the 1970s, energy *supply* was key and connected to states' import dependence, with Yu et al. noting that initially, energy security meant that the energy needs of a state were met and Fu that energy security is important to national security and that the state's defence and economy is threatened and weakened by strategic

energy supply interruptions (Yu et al., 2006:179; Fu, 2007:055). After the 1980s, for Yu et al., the content of energy security increased to refer to secure energy for a national economy, energy supply security, and energy use security, as the notion of sustainable development was promoted and embraced (Yu et al., 2006:179). Feng similarly argues that the notion of energy security is an invention of the 1950s, and that its meaning, evidently within popular usage and national strategies, moved from supply security toward including energy use security since the mid-1980s following an increased understanding of the necessity of environmental protection and a reconsideration by developed states of their energy security (Feng, 2003:164ff.). For Fu, similarly, the meaning of energy security changed over time and since the 1980s, it had widened and now includes not only economic issues, but is also entwined with military, political, and diplomatic issues, impacting on stability, peace, and sustainable development (Fu, 2007:055). Yu et al.'s, Feng's and Fu's definition contrasts with the often quoted IEA definition of energy security as 'the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price' and mostly safe energy supply 'in line with economic developments and environmental needs' and 'the ability of the energy system to react promptly to sudden changes in the supply-demand balance' (IEA, 2015; see Klare, 2012:540f.).

The environmental security debate advances broader conceptualisations. Huang's semi-official text regards environmental security as characterised by 'transnationalism', 'wholeness' of environmental and related threats, 'irreversibility', and 'depletion' of non-renewables', and, in contrast to military TS threats, as needing cooperation as they are not zero-sum, antagonistic situations (Huang, 2003:198f.). Similarly, Yu et al. argue that ecological security is more global, widespread, and directly intertwined with human existence than other NTS issues and TS, and that since the destruction of the eco-system would be the dangerous to humankind, 'eco-security is the number one necessity of humankind's existence and development' (Yu et al.,

2006:133f.). Therefore, for Yu et al., the absence of ecological security means not actually having any security (Yu et al., 2006:133f.). Hence, for Yu et al., ecological security is shared security, with all either winning security or all losing, which meant that all states were wanting to cooperate (Yu et al., 2006:133f.).

Despite this drive for cooperation, Yu et al. also note a potential for environment-related inter-state conflict and war due to environmental degradation, and resource competition (Yu et al., 2006:133f.). This threat scenario means that humankind must now decide whether to continue to destroy nature through its unfettered development or whether to change its thoughts and actions to ensure that humans of the future would be able to exist, too (Yu et al., 2006:133f.). For Yu et al., humankind has to mend its ways for its children's sake as the effect of environmental degradation takes generations to manifest themselves (Yu et al., 2006:133f.).

State-Centric Energy Security and Holistic Environmental Security
In contrast to the multi-field understanding of energy security, parts of the PRC NTS debate understand environmental security as a holistic concept transgressing borders.

Fu Yong and Yu et al., representatives of both more policy-oriented (SASS) and more purely academic and provincial institutions (Zhejiang University) discuss energy security as part of economic security (Fu Yong, 2007; Yu et al., 2006). Nonetheless, according to Fu, energy security is not purely economic, but includes political, military, and diplomatic issues, too, and affects the stability, peace and sustainable development of states as 'a strategic problem' (Fu, 2007:053,055). Similarly, Ni and Guo regard energy security not solely as an issue of economic supply and resources, but also as encompassing national and international security strategies (Ni and Guo, 2009:050).

Conversely, Yu et al. define 'ecological security' holistically, enriching the theoretical side of the PRC NTS debate. Embracing a 'globalism perspective', Yu et al. define ecological security as 'the security of the biosphere' - entailing the absence of biosphere

crises and instead a balanced and harmonious biosphere, as well as sustainable development (Yu et al., 2006:131,164). An upset of the ecological balance is dangerous, as chain reactions can cause the biosphere's and the world's eco-system's collapse (Yu et al., 2006:131). ONB5 similarly considered climate change as threatening human existence, rendering environmental problems a case of human security.

Threats and Threateners

Energy security threats are more indirect, human-related threats, which are not intrinsic to energy security, while environmental security threats are more direct, concrete environmental problems. The PRC debate's omission of the tension between energy and environmental security (since energy security based on non-renewable resources degrades environmental security) demonstrates the politically motivated avoidance of controversy in the debate, as the scholars knew the government's commitment to economic development fuelled by non-renewable energy in the 2000s.

Whereas Feng of the semi-official debate and Yu et al. argue that import dependence, a worry of the PRC government, is especially severe for developed states, in a Chinese article, Zha Daojiong argues that: 'import itself is not only not a problem, but is a normal phenomenon occurring in the development of the interdependence of the Chinese economy and the world economy' (Feng, 2003:165; Yu et al., 2006:179; Zha, 2006:179; Zha, 2007:158).

Water degradation is highlighted by Yu et al. as a problem due to shortage and pollution affecting China's eco-balance (Yu et al., 2006:142; Huang, 2003:212f.). Similarly, Fu Yong, and Wu Hongying of the semi-official debate regard water shortage as triggering TS threats of inter-state competition and conflict (Fu Yong, 2007:051; Wu Hongying, 2003:218).

Declining species diversity, is seen by Yu et al. as an existential threat to life as forests are key for clean air supply, connecting a state's forest coverage directly to its level of civilisation (Yu et al.,

2006:144). Although Yu et al. and Huang note the threat to the balance of China's eco-system, with Yu et al. noting that China's level of endangered animals and plants is higher than the world average, their silence on China's actions or even Chinese NGO successes in species protection highlights both the PRC state's inefficiency, and that the position of NGOs (Yu et al., 2006:144f.; Huang, 2003:213).

Yu et al. further regard population growth, which they see as connected to other NTS issues, such as epidemics, drugs, and even terrorism, as threatening ecological security, as the earth's carrying capacity has been reached (Yu et al., 2006:135ff.). Although there is a Malthusian strand in the Western debate, too, it is more theoretical whereas for the PRC scholars ignoring 'population pressure' is politically problematic as it is CCP-orthodoxy. By contrast, calling for population control would appear authoritarian in the Western debate.

Both the PRC and the Western environmental security literature consider climate change as a real, 'self-imposed' threat (Yu et al., 2006:139; Fu Yong, 2007:050; Zhang Haibin, 2010:2; Giddens, 2009:1; Dalby, 2009:2). Beyond the existential threat to human life, including the faster spread of transmittable diseases, Zhang Haibin, Fu Yong, and parts of the Western debate worry about political consequences, including threats to small island states due to rising sea-levels (Fu Yong, 2007:050; Zhang Haibin, 2010:61f.,69-96,97-179; Podesta and Ogden, 2007-8:115; Mazo, 2010:12,141f.). For Zhang Haibin, climate change threatens China's territorial quality and integrity, 'the Chinese people's livelihood', including water, food, property, and quality of life, PRC sovereignty due to international obligations, and 'China's major strategic and defence projects and building of the armed forces' (Zhang, 2010:61f.,69-96,97-179). This is a mixture of concern for people's physical survival and very Westphalian, state-centrism.

Parts of the Western debate note similar threats, including ones to territorial integrity, although a more global outlook tends to be embraced (Podesta and Ogden, 2007-8:115; Mazo, 2010:12,141f.).

States threatened by instability, internal conflict, and state failure are non-Western, 'fragile and failing states' endangering global security (Mazo, 2010:13). The result of this debate is either the securitisation of multitudes of desperate (and innocent) Southerners moving to the North, or an appeal to the North to help the South (Podesta and Ogden, 2007-8:134; Dalby, 2009:3; Giddens, 2009:214f.).

Significance

Both PRC and Western discussions regard energy – especially oil – and environmental security as of great, even rising importance for the state and for humanity. In the energy security debate, this importance is sometimes evoked with great pathos in both semi-official and scholarly debates. Feng's semi-official text links 'energy exploitation' to 'the development of human civilisation', and Ni and Guo's scholarly text sees energy as 'the lifeblood of economic development' (Ni and Guo, 2009:049; Feng, 2003:164). Yu et al. argue alarmingly that oil depletion threatens human existence and hence states focus increasingly on oil security (Yu et al., 2006:183). This is similar to Klare's argument that 'energy is central to all human endeavours' (Klare, 2012:536). This is pathos as many NTS issues – including clean air, food, and health – are also 'central to all human endeavours', human existence, and economic development. Since energy sources, production, and use may all be changed through human ingenuity, the pathos of some analysts pushes the agenda of energy security rather than engages in a neutral debate about its nature.

The environmental debate uses less emotional language but is equally convinced of the existential importance of environmental security. My interviewees, regardless of affiliation or location, saw the environment as important: UNB12 stated that both the local and central government regarded environmental problems as important NTS issues, while ONB1 argued that the environment, including environmental pollution and climate change, was the most important NTS issue at the moment, encompassing the most severe NTS threats. UB6 further noted that smog concerned

politics and suggested that NTS, notably including the environment, was now more serious for China than TS. Moreover, China was seen as very much affected by climate change, which was seen as both 'urgent' and 'long-term' in relation to energy security (ONB8).

The importance of ecological security further lies in the irreversibility of environmental destruction and as opposed to 'TS and other NTS issues', its global spread and direct relation to humanity's existence (Yu et al., 2006:133). Similarly, Zhang Haibin regards climate change as the world's key environmental problem which shapes international politics in this century as it is a key conundrum for international society during globalisation (Zhang, 2010:1,207). Although the pathos of the PRC debate exists in the Western debate too, the PRC debate does not follow parts of the Western debate, which points out that environmental threats are deadlier than terrorism (Mazo, 2010:12; Hough, 1999:144). Asserting extreme danger allows the PRC scholars to advance and legitimise their research agenda. Additionally, the visibility of environmental degradation in China adds credibility to the scholars' strong concern. Environmental security also affects CCP-regime survival, as severe pollution, water scarcity, and other environmental problems trigger popular protests and resentment. Importantly, the danger to humankind deepens environmental security as the scholars worry about *all* people, not just those of particular states, suggesting a global outlook.

The importance accorded to environmental security is in tension with that attached to energy security since the use of fossil fuel, which is what the PRC energy security debate seeks to ensure, is an insecurity factor for environmental security. There are no clear commitments in the Chinese debate to either environmental or energy security taking precedence. Nevertheless, Yu et al.'s reference to ecological security as crucial to human existence means that they prioritise ecological security over energy security.

Parts of both the environment and energy debates focus on threats to national security. Using almost identical language, Feng and Yu et al. see energy security as a key national economic security factor

which directly affects societal stability, national security, and sustainable development (Feng, 2003:164f.; Yu et al., 2006:179). The emphasis here is on the importance of energy as a tool enabling economic development rather than as an issue in its own right. This argument is more related to TS than NTS.

Causes for Variance

Location and affiliation again is not a reason for variance of conceptualisation and assigned significance in the energy and environmental security debates. The key cause for difference are research interest and academic reasoning, including the political situation and what can be said.

The divergence over the reality of energy security evidences the impact of the CCP narrative on the scholarly one. Hence the non-state affiliated scholars Ni and Guo and Yu et al. nevertheless follow the state narrative that energy security arose during the 1970s and is a real threat. Conversely, Peking University's Zha Daojiong highlights energy efficiency, and implicitly criticises the state for its inefficient energy management while state affiliated ONB8 and ONB7 considered energy not to be a security issue. UB8's notion that energy can be part of NTS or TS depending on how it is treated, again is due to UB8's view of reality and theoretical leaning towards problematising constructed reality. This contrast is also evident in the supposed characteristics on energy security, with both Yu et al. and Feng of the semi-official debate arguing that the focus was now on energy use, whereas Zha Daojiong more narrowly focuses on supply disruptions and shortage.

The connection between fossil fuel and environmental degradation allows for the comparison of the conceptualisation of energy and environmental security, as it shows different ontological leanings. Hence, the energy security debate focuses narrowly on energy security whereas the environmental debate considering the environment as all-encompassing has a far more holistic view. This variety within the thought of the same scholars in Yu et al.'s case

arises from the tendency of looking at NTS issues in isolation rather than formulating an overarching theory.

The difference in assessment of novelty of energy security is due to different views of the world. Feng's statism and distrust of other states leads him to focus on energy supply and Yu et al. regard import dependence as a threat whereas Zha Daojiong and Ni and Guo focus on international cooperation, and Zha regards import dependence as normal. Similarly, Huang's statism means that he regards environmental security as important only after Cold War military threats abated whereas Yu et al.'s holistic view, evidenced in their discussion of various environmental problems, means that they push the start of environmental problems to the industrial revolution.

Political Implications

Both the environment and energy security debates involve political implications. The subscription of parts of the scholarly debate to the contradictory argument of blaming current pollution on Western industrialisation while also claiming a right for the same polluting development for the PRC tied to the notion that resulting environmental damage is reversible once development is attained shows a political implication of the scholars siding with the CCP. This argument is created through a dichotomy, emphasised, for example by Fu Yong, of developed and developing states as facing different challenges in the same NTS field. Fu Yong problematically argues that Western developed states have already 'fundamentally solved their domestic environmental problems' whereas international society is environmentally threatened by population increase in developing states, the costs of speedy economic growth, and resource depletion, as developing states focus on development over environmental protection (Fu Yong, 2007:049). Fu both blames developing states for environmental degradation while also suggesting that it is simply a reversible side-effect of development. However, her emphasis on the counterargument by developing states, blaming developed states on previous environmental degradation contradicts her above argument, since

the specific problems she recounts, the greenhouse effect, declining species diversity, acid rain, and the depletion of the ozone layer, are irreversible (Fu Yong, 2007:049).

The crucial argument for blaming the West, such as Fu's statement that the transfer of polluting industry to developing states by developed states constituted 'eco-colonialism' shows the problem of regarding the world in terms of sealed-off nation-states (Fu Yong, 2007:049). Since Fu here follows the CCP-regime's narrative that economic development inevitably causes environmental degradation which can, as developed states show, be dealt with once completed, and that developed states are more to blame than developing states, she fails to add that developing states' development paths are not 'sustainable' or that some environmental degradation is irreversible and that development can and needs to be rethought.

Political motivation is evident in the treatment of unequal global energy consumption. Yu et al. highlight unfairness in the imbalance of global energy consumption with most energy being consumed in the West instead of in non-Western states where most of the world's population is located (Yu et al., 2006:178f.). This emphasis on the energy consumption of other countries in both PRC and Western debates vindicates their own state's respective consumption and suggests entitlement to environmentally-problematic energy. In China's case, it justifies rising consumption as part of a 'right to development'. Both sides of the argument regard energy security as antagonistic and very statist, which is actually in opposition to the PRC idea of NTS (Chapter Three).

Despite the frequent protests in China over environmental issues, the political aim to recast environmental problems and resulting protests as a cathartic bonding of state and society was evident in my interviews. UNB8 argued that NTS affected state-society and state-individual relations as people demanded good air quality from the government. UNB8 considered that the government had to, and did, agree to improve environmental protection due to this popular discontent. Instead of seeing this cycle of popular demand and

governmental reaction as negative, UNB8 saw this as a positive effect of NTS on state-society and state-individual relations, including in China with the government having to listen to the people. However, UNB8 noted that the influence of NTS could create international problems. UNB8's political message is clear: the state and society are on the same side in environmental questions. Yet, it is not the state dictating what should be thought and done; society's disquiet and demands force state action. In return for environmental protection policies, society is happy to curb polluting habits. This is clearly an idealistic picture of a far more complex and contentious relationship, as it portrays both sides as enlightened actors acting rationally within their own sphere for the overall benefit. Although political reality in China (and elsewhere) is messier, by showing an ideal case, the political implication of UNB8's argument is revealed as suggesting that this is how state-society relations should work.

The PRC discussion of international cooperation on environmental issues often contains the political implication of wariness against criticism of China by developed states. As UNB8 noted, developed and developing states argue over responsibility, creating problems in climate change talks. Given UNB8's argument that cooperation was difficult to establish, I asked about possible solutions, and UNB8 highlighted the argument of the 'right to development' and that a way to overcome these developed-developing states' negotiation conundrums was to increase the representation of developing states in international fora. UNB8's differing view of the domestic and international situation of dealing with environmental problems – with harmony and enlightened action dominating domestically and blame-games marring international cooperation – is clearly political as China's state and citizens are described as exemplary whereas states amongst themselves are not finding solutions.

The estimation of the likelihood of energy-related conflict in the PRC debate has strong political implications as it is connected to Beijing's anxiety over energy import security and Sino-Western

distrust. NTS is still considered as connected to military (traditional) security and that the world is not necessarily united in the face of NTS but that instead other states may not be trusted. Fu Yong envisions a bellicose future of conflict between and among oil-producing and -consuming states (Fu Yong, 2007:056). Yu et al. focus on economic security and oil crises, arguing that previously, the state which controlled oil had the best international strategic position (Yu et al., 2006:180). Feng of the semi-official debate also links energy import security to (military) national security arguing that not only was strong foreign dependence economically problematic, but that it could also threaten national security, as national security depended on energy security (Feng, 2003:165). The political implication here is clearly support for the Hu and Wen administration's worry over import dependence encapsulated in the 'Malacca dilemma'. Since both Fu and Feng suggest that these problems will increase, they vindicate the leadership's fears rather than suggesting to alleviate the problems through alternative energy, increased development of unexploited oil sites, or greater consumer-cooperation.

The environmental security debate, too, includes warnings of conflict, containing again the political meaning that other states and nations cannot be trusted and that international relations remain fundamentally antagonistic. Huang argues that environmental problems impact on national security by eroding "healthy state soil", retarding the socio-economic level, while trans-border environmental problems could create 'international conflict', with examples being intra-Western disputes over acid rain and South Korean and Japanese allegations of 'resource wars' with China (Huang, 2003:200f.). These arguments can also be found in the Western debate (Matthew, 1999:291). For Yu et al., international war and conflict can be caused by water resource crises which will intensify due to population growth (Yu et al., 2006:143f.). The connection between population pressure and water conflict has political meaning as it connects the PRC's birth control agenda with resource scarcity, vindicating the former. Nonetheless, the notion

that conflict will be more likely is in contrast to the truism in the PRC debate that NTS issues rose in the post-Cold War period since war was less likely.

Despite the political implications of a vindication of the PRC worldview throughout the debate, scholars are often silent on sensitive China-specific problems. When discussing ecological security, Yu et al. focus on the world and address issues in a general manner, rather than mentioning issues closer to and involving China. This would include the PRC South-North water diversion project and China's diversion of Himalayan river-water to the detriment of South East Asian states. This omission, like others in the textbook, shows that Yu et al. want to train their students in NTS generally, but not in specific, politically sensitive, PRC issues.

Conversely, other PRC scholars do not see energy- or environment-related conflict as likely. For Zhang Haibin, there is a strong great power competition over the response to climate change and energy as the state which can 'save the planet will have the biggest international influence' (Zhang, 2010:11). Zhang Haibin and the PRC NTS debate miss the possibility, noted in the Western debate, of a militarisation of climate change, with Zhang Haibin's management competition being clearly done through peaceful means (Giddens, 2009:203). Zha Daojiong similarly argues in his English article that rather than threatened by other states including a transportation embargo, China's energy security depends on its own actions and it must adapt to living in an interdependent world (Zha, 2006:181f.). The English literature also regards climate change as affecting the international order; Mazo argues that ultimately no one will win (Mazo, 2010:139). This is contrary to Zhang Haibin's argument, and underlines that Zhang effectively turns climate change management into a means rather than an end, with the end being increasing the PRC regime's international leverage. The political implication of the PRC arguments is to steer away from conflict and to seek cooperative solutions instead.

The lack of problematisation of energy and environmental security has political implications as the state's securitisation is followed. Conversely, the Western debate questions energy security. Whereas Ciuta highlights ontological problems of combining energy, something normal, and security, something exceptional, Dannreuther stresses that politics and perception, not real physical scarcity, create the importance of oil security, leading to people often connecting oil with war and conflict (Ciuta, 2010:123f.,126,139; Dannreuther, 2013:167,170). This problematisation of energy security is absent from the scholarly PRC debate, as it would question the CCP regime's judgement in securitising energy.

The PRC debate tends not to problematise 'environmental security', but sees it as an external reality 'discovered' by humans as (real) 'ecological threats' increased, with Yu et al. arguing that the industrial revolution destroyed 'the rather harmonious human-environment relationship', and that people became increasingly aware of the dangers and threats of environmental degradation in the twentieth century, culminating in environmental issues becoming an international security issue in the 1980s (Yu et al., 2006:126ff.). Fu similarly argues that scholars and the public began to focus on environmental problems in the 1960s, as these problems 'attracted [their]...attention' (Fu Yong, 2007:46f.). Huang, exemplifying the semi-official debate, deterministically considers environmental problems civilisational by-products (Huang, 2003:195). The scholarly acceptance of environmental threats is not sheer following of state rhetoric, but reflects the scholars' own experience of severe pollution throughout the PRC. Absent problematisation means an acceptance of the existence of environmental threats but the view of them as inevitable effects of necessary progress suggests that they are manageable in time; they are not huge problems. This incongruity reflects the scholars' political dilemma of trying to connect two opposing views held by the Party. That the scholars do not display more critical thinking and inquire into the reality of environmental security issues and

whether a radical rethinking of development is necessary, shows the political motivation and limitations in their work.

The Western debate contains the argument that conflict is due to state-fragmentation or authoritarianism triggered by environmental scarcity causing mass-emigration and authoritarian military aggression (Homer-Dixon, 1994:39f.). The warning against authoritarianism is, of course, absent from the PRC debate, but the warning of state-fragmentation due to environmental problems could be picked up by the PRC scholars given the severe regional environmental problems and related severe domestic conflict potential. The PRC scholars, however, do not engage with this in writing, creating the impression that environmental security is less antagonistic. The PRC debate does not contain the Western literature's worries about the ideological and political consequences of environmental problems. Regarding climate change, there are notably threats to liberal democracy and a re-emergence of authoritarianism, in reference to China and Russia, and a struggle of modernity against radical Islam (Mazo, 2010:13; Giddens, 2010:208). While Zhang argues that the current global governance model is failing over climate change, the English literature generally seeks to preserve the liberal order, threatened by climate change-induced political and societal issues which could threaten the existence of 'industrial civilisation' (Mazo, 2010:137). In parts of both the Western and PRC debate, then, climate change is turned from an environmental problem into a problem for and of governance, with both sides wanting their preferred ideology and system to be preserved or advanced.

Normative Implications

The statism of the energy security debate prevents normative implications as the status-quo is described. Yu et al.'s referent object for energy security is mostly statist, focusing on China's energy security as threatened by international enmity and conflict (Yu et al., 2006:183-187). This is the same for Fu Yong, whose book focuses on 'NTS and China' and Zha who focuses on China's situation (Fu Yong, 2007; Zha Daojiong, 2006, 2007). The PRC

energy security debate does not – like parts of the Western debate – move towards focusing on the global energy system, or towards recognising a human security dimension of energy security including the resource curse and environmental ‘security implications’, as governments in oil-rich states do not depend on taxes and can embrace ‘non-democratic governance’ (Verrastro and Ladislaw, 2007:95; Raphael and Stokes, 2010:379,385,392, referring to Stiglitz, 2003; Dannreuther, 2013:160,177). The absence of this critical perspective from the PRC debate suggests that criticism of authoritarianism is politically dangerous. The focus on the state, and crucially the PRC, as the referent object in the PRC scholarly debate shows that the scholars mostly follow the regime’s understanding of energy security and have to remain within the frame set by the state.

Conversely, the PRC environmental security debate allows for a variety of referent objects and contains related normative implications. Interviewees ONB1 and ONB2 noted that nature as well as society were referent objects. Seeing nature as the referent object situates them more on the extreme environmentalist side. UNB4 considered humans as key referent objects, and even allowed for the planet to be the referent object, with environmental security being human security. The published scholarly debate, too, focuses more on human-related referent objects, while the non-NTS literature, represented by Zhang Haibin, focuses on state security. Hence, Yu et al.’s definition of ‘ecological security’ solely concerns humans rather than the environment itself (Yu et al., 2006:130). Fu Yong does not clearly state the referent object, but she is clearly more concerned with humans here than elsewhere in her discussion, noting the human-environment connection as the environment affects all of human life (Fu Yong, 2007:45). Nonetheless, her concern is ultimately for states and regimes as shown by her division of countries into developed and developing states and her focus on potential interstate conflict (Fu Yong, 2007:49f.).

In contrast to the PRC debate, the Western re-conceptualisation of security also entails the question of what kind of existence of the referent object is to be protected. Whereas Dalby suggests a move away from consumerism, Giddens argues for the maintenance or increase of 'a decent way of life for human beings' (Giddens, 2009:6).

The Western and PRC debates are hence similar in terms of the referent object of environmental security, deepening security to include non-state referent objects and advancing a normative shift away from the statist status-quo.

The focus on humans rather than the environment as the referent object in parts of the PRC debate shows that the NTS debate in China in terms of deepening security regarding the referent object is still human-centric; a security issue has to have an individual or a human collective (including the state) as the referent object.

UNB4's responses suggested a normative change from national/state-focused security to human security highlighting the importance of cooperation on environmental issues.

The energy security debate contains normative implications in their advocacy of cooperation and embrace of interdependence (Feng, 2003:168). For his English-speaking audience, Zha Daojiong, dispelling international suspicion surrounding China's overseas pursuit of energy imports, advocates international cooperation mostly in the form of other states helping China improve its energy consumption efficiency (Zha, 2006:182,188). Contrary to the Chinese government's insistence on non-intervention in domestic issues, Zha advocates that international collaboration on China's energy efficiency ought to entail cooperation on improving China's energy governance (Zha, 2006:188). Zha portrays a resulting win-win situation as improved PRC energy efficiency means China's increasing oil and gas demand was 'managed', as well as increasing interdependence and decreasing the possibility of clashes between China and industrialised states (Zha, 2006:188). Similarly, the Western debate notes interdependence as a reality.

While energy independence may seem ideal, interdependence is real for all countries (Verrastro and Ladislaw, 2007:97ff.).

Similarly, the environmental security debate is normative as further cooperation is advanced. Regarding cooperation, Yu et al. advocate 'global' 'protection work' to deal with the decrease of forests and species, and international cooperation on soil degradation (Yu et al., 2006:144,146). Huang, too, calls for all the world's people to work together to combat environmental degradation, such as on global trans-state waterways to prevent conflict (Huang, 2003:198,201). This echoes Tuchman Mathews' seminal 1989 article advocating novel institutions and diplomacy to manage global 'environmental interdependence' (Tuchman Mathews, 1989:174). Indeed, Western scholars often note that many environmental threats, such as those global in nature, require 'globally coordinated' responses (Hough, 2008:144). In both the PRC and Western debate, controversy is often eschewed by not mentioning the need to deal with domestic environmental degradation. By talking about global threats, the responsibility of single states is overlooked in favour of encouraging general international cooperation.

Conversely, some interviewees focused on the domestic management of environmental security, suggesting a normative turn. For UNB5, NTS necessitates a different IR theory, including a focus on cooperation, while within states, people and the government were key. Whereas, for UNB5, the government was responsible for dealing with, for example, smog, the people also had to adapt their way of life to decrease the problem. Individual actions and lifestyle changes for UNB5 were important for dealing with environmental issues, as was cooperation internationally. Assessing the state-led status-quo as insufficient, UNB3 advances a normative argument for more non-state actor involvement in environmental crises, including individuals, societal actors, and NGOs. For UNB3, civil society cooperation became more important, such as in Asia, with NGOs doing important work. This emphasis

on individual contribution encourages an empowered citizenry and starts a normative shift.

Parts of the scholarly and semi-official debate in China agree that China's environmental governance needs change and improvement, but differ over the depth of these changes. Some changes are very practical, with Li Yanfang's scholarly text and Huang's semi-official text advocating improvement of legislation and implementation, with Huang noting increasing citizens' environmental awareness and overview role (Li, 2007:186-189; Huang, 2003:213-7). Other changes are more political, with Zhang Haibin arguing that climate change should be placed within national security (Zhang, 2010:295). This is similar to Mazo who considers climate change as falling within the remit of national defence and security (Mazo, 2010:141).

Similar to the Western debate, the more idealistic parts of the PRC scholarly debate argue for a change of human self-awareness to deal with environmental security, constituting a normative shift. In line with their holistic understanding of ecological security, Yu et al. regard human awareness and protection of ecological security as crucial to avert disaster (Yu et al., 2006:132). Yu et al. want humans to live harmoniously with nature, for else disaster is imminent (Yu et al., 2006:133). This is a curious notion given Yu et al.'s own omission of environmental degradation in China. It also encourages readers to look at environmental degradation around them and improve the status quo. There is evidently a limit to what can be said in the NTS debate in China which chooses to refrain from naming and shaming particular instances of domestic environmental degradation.

Yu et al. seem to be the only scholars proposing a change of thinking in the PRC debate. While this indicates that the Chinese debate lacks theoretical depths, it nonetheless shows that inroads have been made into a serious re-consideration of security and human-environment relations, constituting a normative shift.

Yu et al.'s strongly normative holistic, universalist thinking is unique in the environmental security-as-NTS debate in China. Despite being a textbook, it is here theoretically deeper than other works. While this indicates the shallowness of other parts of the debate, this depth situates Yu et al.'s text more in the general global debate by looking at the world as a whole rather than being self-consciously Sinocentric. In the Western debate, the 'deepeners' of security similarly suggest a rethinking of the human-environment relationship, advocating instead the notion that we live in a new geological age, the Anthropocene, where the biosphere is increasingly artificial, rejecting the modern value of human dominance over nature and advocating a re-conceptualisation of security from preservation to life-sustaining change (Dalby, 2009:4,7ff.,161,168f.). Yu et al.'s arguments are similar to Barnett's, who follows a critical stance and Green theory, the latter seeing environmental change as anthropogenic and subscribing to a rather holistic view of the interconnection of all things (Barnett, 2001:1). This means that Yu et al. are moving more towards normative theory creation and away from descriptive IR.

Nevertheless, Yu et al.'s book is constrained by its nature as a textbook having to cover several NTS issues and political context. The implications, such as a recognition that the usual state-centrism of IR is inadequate, are not investigated more deeply (Hough, 2008:161). Such a move would also position Yu et al. in opposition to the CCP's state-centrism. Yet Yu et al.'s emphasis on energy security touching on many fields and the holistic nature of environmental security accords with my holistic definition of NTS; security in NTS has to be viewed holistically as all issues are interconnected.

Conclusion

This chapter tested my research questions against the PRC energy and environmental security debate.

First, my analysis revealed varying and competing conceptualisations of energy and environmental security and

assessments of their significance. There is a division in the energy debate between those considering energy scarcity to be a real threat, and those regarding this threat as constructed and not real. The latter scepticism was revealed especially through my interviews. By contrast, the environmental security debate is more united in focusing on a holistic security threatened by unsustainable development practices. This, as my analysis showed, is in contrast to the energy security debate which focuses on state security. The significance of both environmental and energy security is assessed in existential terms; threats in either security discourse are described as endangering the existence of humanity. There are evident ontological problems in the work of scholars who consider both energy and environmental security as existential. Yet my analysis showed that in these cases environmental security clearly takes precedence.

Secondly, the variance of conceptualisation and assessed significance is due to research interest and academic reasoning, encompassing the political orthodoxy of what can be said. Although some university-affiliated scholars follow the state's narrative on the reality of dangers to energy security, Peking University's Zha Daojiong and some of my interviewees instead questioned this narrative of energy scarcity.

Different ontologies cause different assessment of the novelty of energy security, with statist scholars focusing on energy supply or regarding environmental security as arising after the Cold War, and internationalist scholars focusing on international cooperation and holistically-inclined scholars considering environmental degradation to be a much older problem.

Third, my analysis showed various political meanings and purposes within the environmental and energy security debates. In Fu Yong's case, the intention to vindicate the CCP-led polluting development path means that she has double standards as she also criticises developed states for historic pollution. Rather than focusing on blame, my interviews revealed a political purpose of allying state and society to fight environmental degradation,

advancing an ideal scenario of involved citizens steering a listening government with the intention to convince me, as the Western audience, that the PRC system was more open and consultative than usually understood. By contrast, although the scholars advocate international cooperation, some considered it marred by an international blame-game between developed and developing states. Moreover, international enmity is implied in both the energy and environmental security debate as Fu Yong, Yu et al. and Feng envision a future of energy scarcity and resource wars, implying that the Chinese state should be wary of energy dependence and prepare for increasing international competition. Political purpose of warning the state is clear as the scholars here go against their own rules of NTS not entailing military threats and generally occurring in a post-military conflict world. However, the actual use of the military is not advocated in the PRC debate since it would be at odds with the debate's general rule that NTS cannot be solved through military means. Hence the only time military responses are discussed are in reference to what the PLA is already doing. Conversely, Zhang Haibin and Zha Daojiong advocate international cooperation with the clear political intention to steer away from military-conflict thinking.

Political sensitivity means there is a lack of discussion of more controversial PRC environmental problems, including the South-North water diversion. The absence of a written discussion of political implications of environmental pollution, as set out in the Western debate, creates the faulty notion that environmental security is a more harmonious field again revealing the political sensitivity of steering clear from incendiary issues. Rather than problematising energy and environmental security, the PRC literature unquestioningly follows the state's securitisation rather than critically reconsidering the state's version of reality.

Political purpose is further evident in the highlighting of excessive energy consumption by the West in the PRC debate and by India and China in the Western debate with both sides suggesting a very statist and antagonistic view of energy security. Although climate

change is portrayed as a danger to all states and people, Zhang Haibin's argument contains political purpose as he suggests that the resulting change of the international order could shift power to China. Conversely, Feng of the semi-official debate implies that the state should do less on energy security which he thinks will be balanced by technology and the global market while Zha Daojiong criticises the PRC government's inefficient energy conservation policies.

Fourth, there are strong normative implications in both debates. UNB4 advanced a normative shift towards multi-layered international governance models to deal with environmental issues while Yu et al. advance a normative and holistic reconsideration of human and nature's interconnectedness moving the scholars closer to parts of the Western normative environmental debate. Conversely, the PRC energy security literature mostly does not contain normative implications as it generally follows the CCP narrative of scarcity and focuses on state security. The environmental security literature and my interviews, advances a variety of referent objects, including human individuals and humanity, with the normative implication of moving away from state-centric security. In contrast to parts of the Western debate, the PRC scholars do not suggest that the environment should be the referent object; that which is to be protected must be individuals or a group of humans. Normative implications are also evident in the discussion of best management of energy and environmental security, mostly suggesting other methods than those already employed. Feng therefore advances global integration and Zha Daojiong increasing interdependence and solving domestic problems with international partners to solve energy security issues. Li Yanfang and Huang similarly advocate an improvement of China's environmental legislation. Yu et al., Huang, and UNB4 moreover, advocate stronger global and people-to-people cooperation as well as stronger civilian initiatives on environmental issues.

Chapter Nine: NTS with Chinese Characteristics?

This chapter draws the findings and analyses of the six preceding chapters together, establishing what NTS scholarship with ‘Chinese characteristics’ is, and its political and normative implications. It also answers the second part of Research Question Four on what the normative implications and possible normative turn means in reference to the development of Chinese IR theory. I demonstrate that through the normative turns in the NTS debate, especially those advanced by leading scholars, there is space which scholars have claimed to push beyond a merely descriptive theory as a guide to reality towards an IR theory that is confident in making a case for what the world should be like. This normative element inevitably means that more diverse theories are to be expected within IR theory as different scholars advance their notion of how the world ought to be.

The increasing institutionalisation of NTS research in China adds to the relevance of this thesis, as NTS is becoming a solid part of IR scholarship in the PRC. I then discuss the implications of the thesis for the understanding of China today, arguing that the appreciation and analysis of how influential intellectuals in China regard security and what they see as threats is significant because China’s growing importance in global politics necessitates a better understanding of different worldviews inside China.

Conceptualising NTS

The PRC scholarly debate entails conceptual variety, as shown in Chapters Three to Eight. Its major themes are whether NTS issues are new and sudden crises, whether NTS constitutes an ideational change in terms of a different awareness of security, or whether NTS is simply the opposite of TS.

A frequent, theoretically problematic, delineation between NTS and TS by the PRC scholars is to see the Cold War as the dividing line between TS and NTS, with NTS rising in importance after the end

of the Cold War, as military security (TS) became less pressing. The narrative is that after the Cold War increasing globalisation, interconnectedness, and the information age triggered new crises and threats. This delineation is problematic as some issues, especially health and food security, have existed for millennia.

The NTS-TS juxtaposition highlights the military character of TS, and hence the non-military nature of NTS. Moreover, TS is seen as concerning state security threatened by other states, whereas NTS is regarded as related to non-state actors threatening various referent objects, which can be above or below the state.

Scholars following the idea that NTS is an ideational change look at the increasing international focus on NTS since the 1970s. NTS here concerns the same issues as the focus on new crises and the TS-NTS juxtaposition, but is seen more as a theoretical shift in awareness and research rather than seeing NTS as something inherently new or necessarily juxtaposed to TS. Rather than emphasising NTS issues as external realities, this part of the PRC debate focuses on a change in subjective focus; the emphasis is on the act of looking at other security issues and referent objects regardless of whether these issues objectively existed previously.

While my discussion shows that the PRC debate does not provide straightforward definitions of the individual issues, some issues are more tightly defined than others, revealing more analytical rigour. Additionally, the more defined issues are those which terminologically focus on specific threats. Hence, whereas terrorism does have a tight general definition as politically motivated violent attacks on innocent people and migration being very clearly illegal international migration, the definitions of culture, information, health, and food security are very wide and, especially in the case of culture, could encompass almost all of societal life. A major theoretical weakness noted throughout is the lack of problematisation of the individual issues. A questioning of whether individual issues should really be seen as security issues or rather as policing issues, does not occur in the scholarly PRC debate. This is most evident in the debate on transnational crime (Chapter

Six) and migration (Chapter Five), and is in contrast to parts of the Western debate which problematise the securitisation of both issues. This means that the debate lacks strong arguments for why specific issues are security and specifically NTS issues. Instead, the PRC scholars do not question why the PRC state or other states now regard certain issues as security issues; state securitisation is accepted and not criticised in the published debate.

Apart from the CPG's securitisation of specific issues, an important influence are securitisations by Western states as well as Western scholarly arguments. Hence, illegal immigration is discussed at length in the PRC debate due to its treatment in the Western debate and in Western politics, rather than its threat to China (Chapter Five). Similarly, NTS publications on terrorism only appeared after 2001, with 9/11, rather than China's domestic terrorism since the 1990s (Chapter Six), as the trigger. Western scholarly arguments are also influential for the PRC debate, most notably in the case of Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* and Lester Brown's *Who Will Feed China?* (Chapter Six, Chapter Eight). These Western inputs both inspire the PRC debate and vindicate its existence and the securitisation of specific issues.

The Importance of NTS

Throughout the thesis, I have analysed the importance assigned to NTS with regards to how the scholars discuss the specific issues and how much space is accorded to them in texts that discuss several issues. The list of the literature at the start of each issues chapter shows the general importance attached to each issue with regards to the amount of publications on the issue.

I also measure assigned importance in whether or not the scholars argue that a specific issue affects national security, as this suggests supreme importance in an authoritarian context. Accordingly, the issues deemed most important are terrorism, economic security – which often includes energy security – and information security. Less important, based on the smaller attention

paid to them by the main NTS scholars, are migration, health security, food security, and transnational crime.

NTS is evidently regarded as highly important in the scholarly security debate in China, just as it is by the PRC government, as evidenced in the governmental papers and the 2015 National Security Law, discussed in Chapter One. The continuing institutionalisation of scholarly NTS research in China, especially by Zhejiang University's NTS Centre, as discussed below, is a sign of the importance of NTS in the scholarly debate, as it means that NTS research is becoming a constant part of IR scholarship in China.

The issues considered important for China and the world are the same as those in the Western scholarly debate, manifesting the influence of the hegemonic Western, especially Anglo-Saxon IR on its PRC counterpart. Yet culture security and information security are more unique to the PRC debate and highlight the impact of the location in terms of political system and geopolitics of the scholars. The PRC scholars are evidently affected by the political and geopolitical location in which they live and work, discussing these two issues which clearly concern the regime's endeavour to maintain its grip over 'Chineseness' and information within its realm.

The perceived importance of NTS vis-à-vis Traditional Security varies between the PRC scholars. Nevertheless, key NTS scholars, such as Wang Yizhou and Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe, and Wang Jiangli clearly regard NTS as of equal or even greater importance than TS, bolstering their own research area.

While at this stage NTS research in China is flourishing and expanding in terms of issues and theory-creation, the fact that some scholars who were part of the initial debate, including Fu Yong and Xu Huabing, have since changed their research focus towards other issues, evidently following China's changing international environment, means that the NTS debate may change in the future and perhaps become more limited and have fewer voices and views. Future research will have to investigate whether

the PRC NTS debate will continue to be diverse or whether interest in NTS will wane for reasons to be established.

Accounting for Variance

The discussion of the conceptualisation of NTS in the debate in China in this thesis has shown that there is a variety of views among the scholars. Given the location of the scholars in a tightly controlled system, as noted above, it is problematic to speak of rival schools of thought. Rather, the debate may be seen as a spectrum, ranging from the more statist view that NTS threats are merely added to the state's security to the more cosmopolitan views of granting more importance to society and embracing humans as the referent object.

My research has not found clear institutional or geographical differences and trends; the debate is evidently more atomistic with different scholars having different ideas at different institutions in different cities. The overall findings of the thesis do *not* suggest that particular institutions or locations are more prone to be statist and others more liberal.

What I have referred to as the semi-official debate, composed of scholars of the University of International Relations, associated with the Ministry of State Security, is unsurprisingly state-centric in the discussion of various NTS issues. Throughout the thesis, the semi-official debate has served as a contextualisation and comparison tool for the scholarly PRC debate, helping to show where the scholars diverge from the more official line.

Membership of the National and Provincial Academies of Social Sciences does not mean similar views or particularly state-centric views. Thus, scholars at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, such as Fu Yong and Li Kaisheng and scholars at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, such as Li Dongyan or Xue Li have differing views on NTS. While Fu Yong has been identified in this thesis as more statist, Li Kaisheng and Xue Li highlight the individual as the referent object and note a tension between state and human security. Indeed, my interviews further revealed that

within CASS and SASS, there are strong differences in views of NTS, suggesting there is no clear departmental 'line' but that scholars make up their own minds. These scholars are not necessarily more statist or more liberal than scholars at universities. My research has not shown stark differences between scholars working at SASS or CASS to those working at universities. The more liberal side of the spectrum encompasses Li Kaisheng and Xue Li, from SASS and CASS respectively, given their emphasis on individuals, as well as Wang Yizhou from Peking University, previously CASS, due to his move beyond the state to focus more on society and individuals, as well as Yu Xiaofeng, Wang Jiangli, Pan Yihe, and Cui Shunji from Zhejiang University due to their reconceptualisation of security and move towards creating a new IR theory based on a focus on the world. The more statist side, meanwhile, encompasses Fu Yong from SASS and Zha Daojiong from Peking University. This finding, too, indicates a debate in flux and a flow of ideas between different types of institutions. Moreover, some of my interviewees working at universities were and considered themselves much more influential to state policy and public opinion setting than researchers at the academies, as they directly advise the government.

Geographic location closer to or further away from the political centre does not bear on the views of the scholars. It could be expected that scholars working in Beijing in close proximity to the government would have more state-centric views and views closely aligned to the official rhetoric, whereas scholars further away from the political centre would be more liberal. Still, this is not the case according to my findings. Instead, there are scholars in Beijing including UB2 who are much more critical of state-centrism than, for example, ONB10 working in Shanghai. While the most idealist and non-statist views and endeavours to find truly new NTS or security theories are found at Zhejiang University, the distance to Beijing does not seem as important here as the fact that these scholars' prime focus is NTS since they are working in the 'Center for Non-Traditional Security and Peaceful Development Studies'.

Hence, this unique focus on NTS means that these scholars want to create a theory and see themselves as the avant-garde of NTS-thinking in China.

There is no clear point of view pertaining to single institutions. Both the literature and my interviews show that there are multiple and often incompatible views about NTS at the same institutions. My interviews at, for example, Fudan, showed that different scholars writing on NTS had very different ideas of what NTS was and what should be done about it. Similarly, interviewees at Peking University and at Zhejiang University had divergent ideas among themselves. Nevertheless, this does not mean that scholars do not debate among themselves or that cross-fertilisation of ideas does not happen, as it is especially evident at the NTS Centre at Zhejiang University, with frequent book and journal article collaborations by Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe, and Wang Jiangli, and with Cui Shunji, or between the national and provincial Academies of Social Sciences, with, for example, Xue Li (CASS) and Li Kaisheng (SASS) co-authoring an article.

Nonetheless, some scholarly connections and cooperation indicate similar leanings. The more liberal part of the spectrum, such as Yu Xiaofeng, Li Kaisheng and Wang Yizhou are connected through studies and collaboration. Moreover, Zhejiang University's NTS Centre led by Yu Xiaofeng is a crucial nodal point of the institutionalisation of NTS research in China. Most literature on NTS is published through the two series by Zhejiang University, and the Centre also publishes a journal (three volumes so far), while Yu also edits the annual 'Blue Books of Non-traditional Security' (so far 2011-15). Zhejiang University, and mostly Yu Xiaofeng, has further translated and published various English-language writings on non-military security studies, notably Buzan and Hansen's 'Evolution of Security Studies', and works by Amitav Acharya. Wang Yizhou is involved in writing the forewords and encourages more theoretical research while Yu Xiaofeng is clearly the key gatekeeper for the dissemination of NTS research in China. Hence, the influence of the more liberal, ideational side of the

spectrum is set to continue and become more important through the institutionalisation of NTS research which it advances.

All of the above chapters instead found that the key factors explaining variance of conceptualisation and assigned importance are ideational: ontological and epistemological differences manifested in different research interest. For most of their seminal textbook, Yu et al. focus on security of humans and non-military threats. Their discussions on culture, information, and ecological security are the most intellectually coherent and academically insightful in their depth and uniqueness. Their migration and transnational crime discussions conversely are shallow and fail to show why the scholars consider these issues important, implying that Yu et al. mostly discuss migration and transnational crime as both are part of the state's NTS narrative. Fu Yong's focus on 'China and NTS' is the common thread of her book; all issues are assessed with reference to China's current situation, and theoretical boundaries such as between state and human security are dispensed with if it serves her reasoning of protecting the state. Wang Yizhou's panoramic investigation of terrorism from all sides, too, shows scholarly interest in theory creation and understanding rather than other factors to be crucial as he encourages further questioning rather than resigning to platitudes vilifying terrorists. Li Kaisheng's focus on human security, Li's and Li's critical call for equal access to medicine, and Tian He's declaration of food security as a human right display fervent scholarly commitment to particular topics leading their research even though their reasoning appears at odds with the state's. That the key factor for variance is intellectual interest and worldview shows the PRC debate as a scholarly field which within its boundaries allows scholars space to relatively freely pursue their intellectual curiosities as long as they do not radically go against the state.

Political Implications

A major political implication of the emergence of NTS scholarship in China is a warning of an increased vulnerability of the PRC body politic because of increased interaction with the world during

globalisation. This is evident as the ten issues investigated here as the issues generally seen as NTS all share the transnational nature of the issues. While domestic NTS issues are possible, such as food scandals (Chapter Eight) or 'Dongtu' (Chapter Six), the PRC debate links all issues to transnational phenomena, with the suggestion that the threats mostly come from without, such as import dependence and 'Dongtu's' linkage to al-Qaeda, permeating the PRC's borders to wreak havoc within. This allows the scholars to steer clear from more sensitive domestic issues, such as internal PRC migration, which could involve a questioning of the regime's policies. This notion of transnational problems coming into the state aligns with my working definition based on the Western debate (Chapter Two). The political purpose is to make state and society aware that despite the supposed ebbing of military threats, China is not safe. Yet the scholars do not advocate isolation. As shown throughout the thesis, cooperation is the main handling strategy. Opening-up brings dangers but also their solutions.

The presentation of NTS issues as manageable is an important part of my working definition of NTS based on the Western debate, as only issues which can plausibly be controlled and dealt with can seriously be seen as security issues (Chapter Two). The PRC scholars' discussions of the various NTS issues analysed in this thesis fulfil this criterion. In line with official rhetoric (Chapter One), the most frequent and general advocacy is for international cooperation. Although this is at times no more than an uncontroversial reiteration of the government's line without going into detail what such cooperation may involve and whether there are potential problems, at other times scholars go deeper. However, overall recommendation of cooperation is vague on detail, leaving the CPG to do as it pleases without criticism. This emphasis on cooperation is especially noteworthy given the transnational nature of most threats, with the idea being that threats seep into China from the outside. By advocating cooperation, the scholars do not see a renewed isolation of China as the answer but rather embrace

the idea of combating transnational threats through (albeit unclear) international means.

This support for international cooperation is partly the case as the scholars see China as still too weak to deal with some issues on its own, but it is also due to a strong support for the UN in the debate. Many of the NTS scholars clearly regard the UN as a moral authority and as the natural leader in any fight against NTS, such as in the case of terrorism. This trust in the UN is sanctioned by the PRC government which, as highlighted in the case of terrorism, wants more UN leadership (Chapter Six). It is also due to the fact that China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has its greatest international leverage in the UN. Moreover, the representation of most states in the UN, and the lessened influence of Western developed states due to their numerical minority and because of Russia's and China's veto-power means that the UN is more trustworthy to the scholars who are frequently suspicious of Western motives.

Another recurrent recommendation underlines the frequent state-centrism in the debate by advocating a strengthening of the PRC's capacities against NTS. Although this suggests vulnerability of the PRC, the scholars here also call for an increase in the state's power and reach into societal life.

The use of the military, especially against terrorism, is highly controversial in the debate, as the asserted non-military nature of NTS which for most scholars extends to the measures against NTS threats. Indeed, as interviewee UNB2 argued, the use of military countermeasures turns NTS issues into TS issues. Although this argument is theoretically problematic, as it means that the management measures employed by those threatened determine what kind of security the threat is, rather than the threat in and of itself constituting either TS and NTS, it aligns with the PRC debate's general belief that this is the era of Peace and Development where military conflict is receding. Moreover, most scholars regard military measures against NTS, especially terrorism, as futile, as evidenced in the USA's protracted 'War on

Terror' and possibly because China would not be able to project such great military power abroad.

Overall, the recommendations do not encompass any measures which seriously contradict what the regime is willing to do and are often so wide that they can be interpreted very widely. Rather than overtly criticising the PRC state – apart from in the case of the initial management of SARS by the Jiang Zemin administration (which bolsters Hu and Wen's subsequent actions) – the scholarly debate in China at times criticises actions by Western states. This highlights an underlying suspicion of the West as led by selfish motives in many parts of the debate which is in tension to the frequently reiterated call for cooperation, as it is clearly the West the scholars want China to cooperate with. The political purpose of the NTS scholars clearly is to encourage the PRC state to cooperate internationally on NTS issues and not to engage militarily. Given the view that NTS is not military security, this rejection of military countermeasures is set to continue despite ongoing military strengthening.

Another recurring political implication of the NTS debate is the increasing importance of society and individuals. Whereas TS concerns only the state, a political purpose revealed in the NTS debate is to focus on people. All issues, as presented in the PRC debate, directly affect society and individual people, in contrast to TS, which predominantly affects the state (although, as discussed below, the state is often the ultimate referent object). Terrorism targets innocent civilians, Western culture and information hegemony harm people's identities, transnational crime and migration harm people's social lives, health, the environment, and food affect people's physical well-being, and energy and economic security their wealth. This linkage to people also means that all the NTS issues could create societal discontent challenging regime security. Security is reconceptualised to focus on civilians whose political standing rises.

A Normative Turn?

My analysis shows that NTS is important for the normative theoretical development of the PRC International Relations debate. NTS grants scholars more intellectual space to redefine security and to engage in a more fundamentally normative debate about what and who is to be secured and how this should be done, even if the regime's views are very influential. The new research area offers more opportunities for the scholars to look into 'new' issues compared to TS as NTS is a developing subject, allowing the scholars to find their own niche. Statist and militarist TS is very limited and impossible to be liberally and normatively reconceptualised as it allegedly pertains to the 'national interest', interpreted by the state. NTS is such a loose term and has not been clearly defined by the state that it grants more interpretive freedom to the scholars. For PRC IR, NTS must be seen as important simply as a less-limited space for scholars to explore, create and criticise new ideas about what security – and international relations – is, could, and should be. I have shown throughout the thesis that some scholars, notably Li Kaisheng who regards NTS as purely human-centric, and Cui Shunji focusing on people-to-people relations, do embrace this space to think more uniquely and widely about security and start to create a normative theory. Still, the frequent reiteration of state rhetoric demonstrates that many of the scholars choose not to use that space but rather limit themselves to applying more orthodox readings to a new field of study.

A key normative question in security debates concerns the referent object to be protected. As highlighted in Chapter Two, the global debate on the redefinition of security, especially towards the end of the Cold War, began not only to *broaden* security in terms of the issues and threats looked at, but also to *deepen* security by looking at referent objects above or below the state, including the individual. Hence, the deepening was in stark contrast to the statist outlook of orthodox security studies, mostly neorealism. Parts of the Western debate point out that an inclusion of non-military security threats and issues render a non-statist referent object ontologically

necessary. The question this raises for the scholarly NTS debate in China is how scholars working in an authoritarian state can treat state-society, and state-individual relations when discussing NTS, and whether they are indeed, as many PRC scholars claim (Chapter Three), deepening security to move closer towards a society-centric or individual-centric understanding of security. The question is what the scholarly NTS debate in China means for society and individuals.

Despite the frequent reiteration in the scholarly NTS debate in China that NTS encompassed various referent objects, I have highlighted in my consideration of the specific issues that there is a frequent adherence to the state, and actually the regime, as the referent object of NTS. This is (perhaps unsurprisingly) the case in the semi-official debate, but the discussions of Fu Yong from SASS, Zhang Haibin from Peking University and others also often ultimately entail the state and the regime as the referent object. In these cases NTS issues may threaten society and individuals, such as in the case of environmental security, but it is ultimately not society or individual security which is to be safeguarded, but that of the regime. The ultimate concern for regime security is evident in explicit references to popular discontent and political instability, and in more implicit discussions in which the individual and society are clearly seen only as props of the state. This part of the debate shies away from a normative turn as security is merely widened to encompass more threats but in its essential state-centrism it remains stagnant and unwilling to challenge the status quo.

A normative turn has begun through the increasing importance attached to society. Given the widening of security in terms of issues and deepening in terms of the referent object which a re-conceptualisation of security entails in the Western debate, the meaning of the NTS debate in China for state and society relations is significant due to the state's repression of society. However, my thesis has shown that the NTS debate in China is starting to add more importance to society. For the more statist scholars, this means increased securitisation of life in society. Chen Kun's

discourse on 'public health', and discussions of culture security and information security, where society is to be protected from foreign cultures and foreign and unorthodox information show that the medical and ideological control of society is becoming a subject of security. This is, as I emphasised throughout the thesis, often ultimately due to a desire to protect the CCP regime rather than due to a view of society as inherently important. Instead, society here is the subject of CCP rule. Society is to be kept free from disease and what are considered harmful foreign influences so that it will not become unstable and challenge its rulers. Protecting society against NTS threats, for very statist scholars actually means protecting the regime against society. Some statist scholars (ONB10) even go so far as to say that in China 'the state and society are the same'.

This view of society continues in the terrorism debate as the discussion of terrorism in Xinjiang, notably by 'Dongtu', means that small parts of Chinese society have become threateners to the security of all. By contrast, the huge number of internal migrants in China is not discussed as an NTS issue, evidently as it is not transnational and is not seen as an NTS issue by the regime. Even in the case of 'Dongtu', portrayed as influenced by al-Qaeda, society is being threatened or is threatening to become unstable because of outside forces coming into China due to globalisation – a view that accords with my working definition of NTS (Chapter Two). Hence, the view of transnational crime as security entails drugs coming into China from the outside world, while the view of migration as security means that the composition of people within state borders are securitised, and those who leave or enter become a threat to security, as they impact on the relations between states.

More liberal parts of the debate render society more important in its own right and portray it more as a significant actor in NTS advancing a normative shift. This is especially evident in the people-to-people NTS cooperation advocated by Cui Shunji to overcome mutual animosity (Chapter Three). Moreover, in the

environment security debate, my interviewees argued that societal pressure was forcing the government to do more against pollution, especially smog. The cause for the government to act is again regime security as it fears societal instability and dissatisfaction as a challenge to its rule. Yet the focus of the scholars is *not* on regime security but on the positive and actual influence of society on the government, portraying society as an actor which, albeit not as powerful as in liberal democratic states, can force the state to act. A normative shift is evident as these views include a normative reassessment of the players within security discourses.

Significant normative implications emerge from the importance attached to the individual, starting a normative turn. Many of the issues discussed regard the individual as the referent object of NTS. Only energy security is *purely* statist (Chapter Seven). Conversely, the PRC scholarly debates on economic, health, food, information, culture, transnational crime, terrorism, and environmental security specifically focus on individuals. Nevertheless, there are differences in terms of whether the individual is seen as an end in itself or whether the individual is looked at because of its relation to the state.

When looking at my findings across Chapters Three to Eight, it becomes evident that these different views regarding the individual are not just between different scholars, but within the texts of the *same* scholars. Yu et al.'s discussion of economic security and information security sees both the state and the individual as possible referent objects in their own right, but their chapter on culture security implies that individual security was actually meant to bolster the security of the state as the cultural hegemon. The praxis-orientation in some texts where authors usually focus on individual security embrace statist security to follow state orthodoxy hinders a complete normative shift.

Some PRC scholars, such as Fu Yong, point out the importance of human security within NTS. Yet the notion of human security is often concerned with existential issues, rather than political rights as it is in the West (see Breslin, 2015). Some scholars, notably Pan

Yihe and Tian Wei, see NTS research as 'yi ren wei ben-以人为本' or 'human-oriented' (see Chapters Four and Five). But while these scholars argue that human-oriented means that the individual can be the referent object, it seems that the individual looked at here is the human as a member of a state rather than the human as an individual. The vocabulary used by many scholars in the PRC debate is taken from the state's vocabulary, and this particular notion of 'human-oriented' is connected to the state agenda of 'scientific and technological development', used by the party-state since 2003 to ultimately keep the CCP in power. The use of such vocabulary by the scholars helps them to support their research agenda by tying it to prominent state discourses, thus showing their political correctness and gaining the interest of politicians, but it also serves to perpetuate the linguistic hegemony of the state by spreading it through academic publications.

The discussion of the referent object might lead to the belief that the PRC debate is unaware of a tension between state/national security and human security, but this is not the case. Two influential scholars, Li Kaisheng and Xue Li argue that one of the issues or problems facing NTS theory research is how to manage the contradictory relationships of human security and national security (Li Kaisheng and Xue Li, 2012:107). The tension, then, is recognised and has entered into the PRC debate. This means that it is now more difficult to argue that national security encompasses human security as a normative change has begun. It therefore seems likely that the debate will deepen, and possibly come to mirror the mainstream, Western NTS debate more. This constitutes a move towards an ideational normative change in state-society relations.

This fundamental importance attached to the individual by Li Kaisheng and other leading PRC NTS scholars is significant given their political and cultural location, as well as for the implications this has for Chinese politics and society. In terms of politics and cultural or historical importance, the background and location of the scholars must be emphasised again, as encouraged by Skinner's

and Ball's approach from the History of Political Thought. Historically, culturally, politically and ideologically, the scholars live and work in an environment which is not as focused on the individual as the modern West is. Scholars in the West live and work in countries that place strong emphasis on the individual since the Enlightenment at the latest, with individuals being accorded inalienable rights against other individuals and the state, and with the liberal democratic system (ideally) protecting individuals against undue state and societal interference and the tyranny of the majority.

Conversely, the Confucian worldview of imperial China focused on the family and society rather than on individuals, and the understanding of law was not based on individual rights (see Breslin, 2015:254). The PRC today is a Leninist Party regime where 'the masses' are led by the vanguard party and the individual has to subordinate him/herself to this larger fabric. Given the strong influence of Western thinking and power internationally and in academia, educated people in China, and especially leading scholars, are aware of Western thinking on the individual, even though they may regard it as hypocritical, flawed, or culturally and ideologically alien. Nevertheless, the understanding and lived experience of the appreciation and importance of the individual are vastly different between the Western and Chinese scholars. Hence, the increasing appreciation of the individual among some of the leading NTS scholars – notably Li Kaisheng, Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe, Wang Jiangli, Wang Yizhou, Cui Shunji – constitutes an important ideational shift towards a raising of the importance attached to individuals more generally.

The Development of Chinese IR Theory

As shown above, there are parts in the PRC debate that are actively redefining security via the NTS discourse (most prominently Li Kaisheng), while most remain (either implicitly or explicitly) more statist. As shown in Chapter Three and variously throughout the thesis, a common assertion of the PRC scholars is that there is a difference between security today and that of the

Cold War. Cold War security is characterised by states standing against each other and possibly going to war (or working together to avoid war), hence military and statist security. This understanding aligns with China's official New Security Concept and the, again frequently reiterated, idea of Deng Xiaoping that we are now living in the era of Peace and Development. It also connects to the context of China opening-up and integrating more into the global economy. Nonetheless, the official rhetoric can be seen as a way to dispel the 'China threat theory' considered prevalent among the PRC's neighbours as well as among some US officials. Indeed, the PRC's actions are frequently at odds with this peaceful rhetoric, such as in the military threat it poses to Taiwan, its military upgrading, intention to create a Blue Water Navy, and its behaviour in territorial disputes with, for example, Japan, which are not marked by cooperation.

It is in this context that the scholarly NTS discourse and Chinese IR is situated and in which the NTS discourse discusses non-military threats while the Chinese state is strong and getting stronger. As highlighted in Chapter One, the inclusion of NTS issues into statist, military, and thus neorealist, security is theoretically flawed, yet some scholars, such as Fu Yong and some of my interviewees, remain wedded to a statist understanding of security. For them, national security is key and NTS threats are merely new threats to the state. In a sense, this redefines security in a problematic way; by adding NTS, non-military security threats and concerns to already existing military ones, the scope of state security is widened extremely, such as in the case of information security and culture security. Moreover, given that there is no clear boundary to what is and what is not an NTS issue, creating many potential future securitisations, state security may be widened indefinitely. This means that the area in which the state may legitimately intervene is also widened and may be increased indefinitely: every part of human life, socially, politically, economically, physically and psychologically, as well as every part

of the non-human environment is, in this thinking, a legitimate area of state control.

Moreover, this reading further blurs the distinction between TS and NTS, as both are concerned with state security and dealt with by the state. Rather than reducing the scope of TS and deal with NTS issues through vastly different measures, overall national security simply becomes more complex. Bearing in mind Buzan et al.'s notion that securitisation allows for the use of extraordinary measures, all of these aspects may thus become subject of severe state interference. Such a type of security is much larger and more repressive than pure military security. However, this statist approach to NTS also renders security absurd, as it inflates national security to include virtually everything within the state and everything affecting it, rendering national security so wide that it cannot possibly be achieved, especially as the nature of NTS means that the state needs to be constantly on the look-out for new and sudden threats. This bloated security concept is also closely akin to the security and total control of twentieth-century totalitarian states where everything was meant to be under the control of the state. What this type of NTS thinking does, then, is, rather than being 'non-traditional', return to a previous extreme idea of security seeking to preserve a very repressive, all-encompassing, and totalitarian idea of the state.

Other parts of the debate, particularly those continuing to focus on NTS even after the initial flourishing phase of the early 2000s, are evidently reconceptualising security away from state-centrism advancing a normative turn. The consideration of other referent objects apart from the state, and even at times non-human referent objects means that there are tentative but significant moves within the scholarly debate that create normative understandings of security completely different to neorealist, statist security. By looking at non-state referent objects, the lens through which security is assessed changes completely, and, as some in the debate note, possibly stops being a zero-sum equation. Moreover, as parts of the debate, such as Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe, and Wang

Jiangli in the case of ecological security (Chapter Seven), move beyond a statist view of the world by going beyond state-borders to embrace all of humanity regardless of nationality as the referent object, a normative reconceptualisation of security is advanced that is in stark contrast to the PRC's state-centrism. While the argument could be made that such humanity-centric advances are just paying lip-service to ideals such as human security and are as hollow as the notion of the era of Peace and Development, there is no clear reason why the scholars should state such ideas which side-line the PRC state unless it is due to their own convictions.

Another important normative reconceptualisation is that put forward by Cui Shunji (Chapter Three), an authoritative scholar at Zhejiang University, holding that NTS renders security a positive value rather than a negative concept as seen by the Copenhagen School, which is in favour of desecuritisation (Chapter Two). Cui Shunji's idea that NTS cooperation can lead to better people-to-people relations actually turns NTS and thus security into an instrument to achieve such improved people-to-people relations. Security threats no longer are something destructive of relations between people and security ceases to be something to be jealously guarded against others. Instead, NTS is something to be tackled together and security is created by people, rather than states, working together. This again highlights the importance attached to cooperation in parts of the Chinese debate, but in this case, cooperation is the end and not just the means of security. NTS management becomes a normative endeavour with the aim to improve relations between people.

The starting normative turn in the PRC NTS theory illuminates the development of Chinese IR theory overall. A key implication is that Chinese IR theory is not as highly ideological and tightly linked to politics as Zhang Yongjin suggests (Zhang, 2008:156, see Chapter One). Neither is Chinese IR theory solely triggered by real events, as Zhang alleges, but importantly by the scholars' own reconceptualisation of security and referent objects (see Zhang, 2007:176; Zhang, 2008:156,158). Instead of Zhang's 'discourses

of, and for, the powerful', through the NTS normative turn, security studies in the PRC begin to look at the least powerful, the poor, the ill, and the starving while excessive power is criticised (see Zhang, 2007:168,180).

In contrast to Noesselt's reading of Chinese IR discourses as alternative world-order models and as a way to understand PRC foreign policy, the normative implications of the NTS debate actually do not entail different models or world-order but rather alternative conceptualisations of world security, through the emphasis on the individual. These are alternatives not in the sense of contrast to the West but in contrast to TS conceptualisation. The normative implications evident in my analysis connect parts of the PRC debate to parts of the Western debate; it is not a unique theory with Chinese characteristics that is emerging but locally influential branch of a human-centric global security theory in an authoritarian non-Western state. Through the normative turn in the PRC debate, Chinese IR theory is shown to have space for critical thinking and for a greater space for the individual regardless of nationality. Albeit strongly influenced by its native PRC location regarding topics, the NTS debate links to a global debate and moves Chinese IR theory beyond its particular location.

NTS scholarship: East versus West?

One of the most intriguing aspects of the study of the contemporary debate on NTS is that this debate is held in vastly different political, cultural, and geographic locations by scholars whose socio-political experiences and academic training vary strongly. Indeed, scholars from places other than the West or China certainly also engage in their own debate on NTS or on non-military security. However, this thesis focuses on the globally dominant, Western debate and the debate in China given my own geopolitical situation as well as the importance of Sino-Western relations in the twenty-first century due to China's increasing importance in the international arena. Although the topic of discussion of both Western and PRC scholars is nominally the same, the 'ivory tower' of academia both in the West and in China is located within cultural and political

circumstances which by necessity impact on security scholarship in terms of issues focused on as well as cultural or political restrictions and motivations about what can and should be studied. This context is important, as I have noted throughout the thesis with, for example, the PRC scholars generally following the initial securitisation of certain issues rather than problematising or even criticising this securitisation, as well as being influenced by the Western debate in terms of which issues to discuss. Nonetheless, as the discussion and analysis throughout the thesis have also shown, the PRC scholarship is not simply following the state-led discourse in China but also voices and promotes its own understandings of NTS.

Some studies, notably Zhang Yongjin (2007, 2008) and Breslin (2015), enquire into whether the debate in China is arriving at the same conclusions or theoretical standpoints as that in the West. Based on the outlook of this thesis taken from Skinner's emphasis on the contextualisation of texts in Political Thought within their own historical reference frames to establish their meaning, such an endeavour and indeed expectation seems flawed, as it suggests that the ends of political enquiries are given, and are necessarily those found by (some) Western scholars. Moreover, such an endeavour belittles the impact of the historical context on scholarly work.

Instead, a comparison of Western and PRC scholarship on NTS, as conducted in this thesis, can be made and grants valuable insights into how security can be conceptualised and how much the specific context in which scholars work bears upon their work. Western scholars enjoy academic freedom without state interference, whereas research institutions and universities in China are closely tied to the authoritarian state which demands the upholding of its official ideology – as evinced by Xi Jinping's emphasis on spreading Marxism and containing Western ideology at universities (Reuters, 29/12/2014). Hence, the study of the scholarly NTS discourse in China enables a glimpse of some of the restraints – either explicit or implicit – on Chinese scholars by the

PRC system. Still, an undue contrasting of supposed shortcomings of the PRC scholarly debate to alleged Western scholarly superiority should be rejected as it inevitably says more about the Western debate than the debate in China, while also parochialising the PRC debate. The approach of the History of Political Thought adopted by this thesis, holding that the meaning of a text and piece of verbal communication (interview) is revealed through close textual analysis, historical contextualisation, and the readership's reaction, forestalls this problem by contextualising the Chinese debate, and by elaborating the socio-political situation and background of the PRC debate.

The PRC scholarly debate, as much as the Western debate, is rooted in its particular background. It would indeed be surprising if the PRC scholars followed the same discourse as the Western debate. An important aspect here is that of state-centrism over human-centrism. Given the scholars' location in a non-Western, Consultative Leninist regime whose system, ideology, and historical and cultural heritage, places the state and the people as a whole over the individual human being, an ardent support for individual security in the debate in China would be very surprising. Moreover, the debate in the West is also not united in the support for the individual as the referent object, but, as noted in Chapter One, encompasses strong advocates of statism. Instead, the emphasis on individual security as the basis of state security by Li Kaisheng, and Li Kaisheng and Xue Li's statement that state and individual security may be in opposition to each other and interviewee UB2's argument that individuals must not be sacrificed for the state, as well as Yu et al.'s emphasis on holistic ecological security and human centric security must be seen as very liberal stances in a restrictive regime and beginning normative turn. The PRC NTS entails an opening towards a greater emphasis on humans, rendering it difficult to argue that NTS can merely be absorbed by statist security.

It is important to note here, that what I have been discussing is a scholarly debate. A change within this debate and certain trains of

thought moving away from state-centrism do not necessarily reflect or instigate a change within the views or opinions of policy-makers. Many of these scholars are connected to policy-makers and some feel that they have an impact on policies, with some of their writing aimed at influencing policy-makers, including by drawing their attention to certain issues.

The terrorism discussion in the Chinese debate notably reveals a view of China and the Chinese people as a part of a world community. In terms of the history of terrorism, the events mentioned are set in Ancient Rome, Greece, Israel, and China followed by the French Revolution and terrorism in the nineteenth century. This is linked to terrorism in the twentieth-century in the West or against Western (including Israeli and Japanese) targets, and then the Islamist terrorism directed against the West, Russia, and China. It is noteworthy that no other regions or countries in the world are named, apart from perhaps Wang Yizhou's reference to North-South relations. By giving a combined Western-and Sino-centric view of history, the scholars manifestly combine China and the West as the civilisations possessing recorded history. This means that the rest of the world is seen as the unimportant periphery, whereas the West is the benchmark historically and intellectually. Additionally, discussing Western issues, such as 9/11 and its consequences, does not involve space for a potential criticism of China, rendering this discussion relatively safe in a repressive environment.

This is similar to the English literature which assumes a global, universal perspective but is actually applicable and addressed only to a minority of humankind. The scholars in China, meanwhile, show a strong self-awareness as Chinese scholars writing about international relations. Yet with regards to terrorism, instead of trying to open up the debate to include a broader vision of the world as made up of more than just Western and Chinese voices and experiences, the Chinese scholars appear to only add China to the Western-centric cosmos. This is connected to the academic hegemony of the West, especially the Anglo-Saxon hegemony of

IR, and the linguistic hegemony of English as the language of academia. If the scholars speak a foreign language, it tends to be English, limiting their reading of non-translated foreign works to those with a Western, Anglo-Saxon focus. The PRC scholars here associate themselves with Western scholarship as they see it as leading at the moment and aspire to lead themselves. Other scholarship is peripheral for the PRC scholars and therefore not influential in the debate.

This emerging image of China and the West as history-bearing areas suggests a self-other distinction excluding other countries and regions in the world. As this distinction appears to be based on recorded history, it may be seen as a civilisation-barbarism distinction, too, especially as the topic at hand is that of the delivery of violence upon 'innocents'. Despite Wang's calls for a theory with Chinese characteristics, then, China and the Chinese are not seen as 'special' in the debate but as part of a wider global community, sharing the fate of their fellow (Western) humans. This is underlined by the overall focus on al-Qaida-type terrorism, which has not targeted China, and the linking of this global phenomenon with the more domestic Dongtu threat.

However, this view is in contrast to what other discussions of specific issues reveal about scholarly views on the position of China. The discussion of the environment (Chapter Seven) showed Yu et al.'s holistic, global understanding of security in this particular instance. Here, the entire world or 'global village' is looked at, rather than merely the West and China, although the focus of environmental degradation is clearly the West and China.

Conclusion

This thesis has shown that the scholarly NTS debate in China is diverse, encompassing differing and at times mutually exclusive ideas, both the political purpose of supporting overall CCP policy and advancing a normative shift with implications on wider IR theory creation in China. This shift incorporates a tentative move away from the state with regards to both the actor who provides security and the referent object of security. The comparison to the Western debate demonstrated that there are differences and similarities, despite the scholars' different locations and regimes.

The methodology I adopted from the History of Political Thought emphasising the contextualisation of texts informed the epistemological outlook of the thesis. I endeavoured to find the meaning of the PRC scholarly texts and my interviews not just within the individual texts and transcripts themselves but through their contextualisation by establishing their meaning for their authors and readers through the interviews, by comparing the Chinese texts with each other, and with their Western peers' texts. This way, my analysis and interpretation have created a holistic picture of the meaning of the written and verbal scholarly communications.

Chapter Two set out the Western, mostly Anglo-Saxon debate on security and NTS, highlighting the widening and deepening of security mostly towards the end of the Cold War. Rather than creating a unified understanding of security, various scholars reconceptualise security according to their own ontological leanings. However, while the old orthodox hegemony of neorealism was ostensibly broken, a new hegemony has not materialised. Moreover, the term NTS has been problematised in the Western debate, notably by Booth, as it suggests a state-centric, orthodox position that is only now turning towards security issues which, for those encountering them, are not as recent as the term 'non-traditional' suggests. Given the lack of a universally accepted definition of NTS, I set out my own based on the Western debate. It asserts that 'NTS' threatens every aspect of traditional IR-theory,

namely state sovereignty, the domestic-foreign dichotomy, and the state as only responsible for its own citizens. Moreover, issues can only be seen as NTS threats if portrayed as manageable or curable. NTS are anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic issues with the potential to destroy or seriously harm the state, the body politic, individuals and the environment. They pose an insidious threat to the real or ideal well-functioning body politic, attacking citizens within the domestic sphere, hence taking the lawlessness of the international sphere into the polity. Finally, different NTS issues are interdependent, catalysing and generating each other.

Chapter Three then analysed the conceptualisation of NTS in China's scholarly debate. It showed the debate's diversity, ranging from more state-centric, more orthodox approaches that merely inflate state security to embrace more threats to theoretically more intricate and ontologically sounder moves to deepen security to hold the individual as the key referent object or to regard NTS as a positive value by turning cooperation on NTS issues into a means to dissolve historical animosities.

Chapters Four to Eight focused on five sets of two issues, the most generally accepted NTS issues in the PRC debate. All chapters followed the same broad outline, connected with my NTS definition and my research questions. The literature was investigated with regards to how scholars conceptualise and assess the significance of the respective issues, what accounts for the variety in conceptualisation and assigned significance, the political implication and purpose, and any normative implications.

Chapter Four discussed cultural security and information security. Both issues are more unique to the debate in China, and reflect a state-, regime- and nation-centric view of security. My enquiry into research question one revealed that the written debate lacks a clear conceptualisation. The PRC literature leaves the state to define culture and consequently mostly focuses on state security. However, interviewee UNB4 revealed that when not constrained by censorship, a focus on people is possible and exists. While information security was shown to be conceptualised as mostly

about content and technology, its NTS credentials are evidently less clear and its connection with military security means that it straddles the NTS-TS divide. Whereas both information and culture security debates focus on threats from other states, they omit domestic cultural and information threats from the state. Variety in the debate mostly concerns the assigned novelty with some arguing that Huntington's theory gave rise to the discourse and that information security is novel, whereas my interviews suggest more historically relativist views. Crucially, my analysis demonstrates that information and culture are regarded as important due to Western theories and the regime's views rather than intrinsic aspects.

Affiliation and the scholars' personal interests account for the variance of conceptualisation and assigned significance. While scholars of state-affiliated institutions focus on state survival and regime security, the lead cultural security scholar Pan Yihe focuses on cultural security due to personal research interest.

The test of Research Question Three showed a predominating political purpose of vindicating the regime's narrative in both debates. The information security literature mostly focuses on TS-style interstate rivalry rather than theoretical innovation and regime-support against counter-hegemonial ideology and an uncontrolled web. The literature advocates management that further has the political purpose of vindicating state policy of cooperation and guarding against Western influence. Conversely, my interviews found divergent voices implying a need to move away from state-centrism towards a people-focus. Regarding Research Question Four, a normative turn is begun by university scholars, evidenced in my interviews. Whereas state-affiliated scholars support the status-quo, Yu et al. focus on individuals and reconsider security. UNB4's focus on people-to-people relations diminishes the role of the state and forms the strongest move towards a normative shift.

Chapter Five investigated the debate on terrorism and transnational crime. Although similar issues in the sense that both

focus on offences, the terrorism and transnational crime discussions differ in depth. Terrorism conceptualisations mostly follow the state's securitisation. Terrorism is mostly conceptualised as current Islamist terrorism with a political goal. I demonstrated that the debate increasingly openly targets Islam as a background factor. The conceptual fluidity of terrorism which is seen as NTS and TS by different scholars problematises the overall concept of NTS. Lack of thorough conceptualisation beyond the reiteration of the state's securitisation of transnational crime makes the debate conceptually hollow; the only key feature is transnationalness. It is unclear why this crime should be securitised. Conversely, the terrorism debate conjures the pervasive threat of terrorist ideology and the wantonly cruel 'Dongtu' terrorists, signalling a clear and present danger. The scholars assign great significance to terrorism by employing superlative to underline its alleged lethality, increase of attacks, likelihood of attaining WMDs, and effective and pervasive propaganda. Key NTS scholars spend little space on transnational crime, and clearly do not see it as severely dangerous, whereas others emphasise its importance by linking it to state security and terrorism.

The above investigation demonstrated that university or semi-state affiliation was respectively connected to the critical investigation or following of state securitisation.

My analysis revealed that ideational factors and research factors are the key cause of variance. While state-focused scholars pursue their overall state-centrism in the terrorism and transnational crime debate, those pursuing theory-creation and focus on humans create complex and critical discussions. My interviews added the crucial insight that there is a problematisation of the securitisation of terrorism which cannot be voiced in the written debate.

Strong political purpose of vindicating the state's views and actions are evident. Yu et al.'s absolute condemnation of terrorist crimes against innocents and Wang Yizhou's blaming of international structures align with the CCP narrative. The political implication of the lacking clear definition of transnational crime is that excessive

state securitisation and response is vindicated. Blame is deflected from the CCP through the notion that China's necessary opening-up inevitably makes it a target for evil outside terrorists. The transnational crime debate suggests that a strong state protecting its people and territory against outside lawlessness is possible and desirable, vindicating a strong CCP-led PRC. Clear political purpose was revealed in the scholars' eagerness to highlight the difference between terrorists and early CCP guerrillas. Terrorist and transnational criminals are portrayed as mean-spirited egoists against the 'noble' CCP fighters. Political purpose overrides scholarly objectivity in the failure to critically engage with PRC anti-terrorism and possible state terrorism, leaving the state to define and deal with terrorism and transnational crime as it pleases. Yet my interviews revealed underlying critical thinking including questions on why a strong PRC cannot protect itself against terrorism.

Only small normative implications arise from the transnational crime and terrorism debates. The normative shift away from state-centrism by my interviewees who consider people generally as the referent object of transnational crime and terrorism contrasts to the literature's state-centrism which vindicates state action. This reveals the political sensitivity of terrorism and transnational crime.

Chapter Six analysed the issues of economic security and migration. The context of both differs strongly between China and the West.

I demonstrated that there is a variety of conceptualisation and assigned significance of economic security and migration. Differences exist over the classification of economic security as NTS, TS, or security. These unclear conceptualisations form a spectrum spanning from my interviewees' doubts that economic issues are security, to some writers' subdivision of economic security into multitudinous issues, thereby turning it into an almost meaningless umbrella term. Conceptualisations of migration concern international migration and refugee movements, or emigration from China. My interviews revealed a more complex

debate including greater differentiation between countries and more empathy for the migrants. Conceptualisations of economic security focus on international and domestic inequality, linked to national security and economic security through the CCP notion of comprehensive national strength. This image of strong nation-states competing economically contrast with other frequent analyses in the debate that globalisation and the waning clout of states trigger economic insecurity. Indeed, my interviews moved beyond the openly contradictory melting of the state narrative and general globalisation fears. UB4's and UB7's theoretical economic analyses led them to their conceptualisation of economic security. Conceptualisations of migration as security threats focus on the alleged movements of Southerners to the global North, breaking international law by moving without permit, tainting their home state's international reputation, abusing the host's asylum system and causing right-wing backlashes. The cause of flight and the migrants' plight is, unlike in the Western debate, not securitised. The assigned importance differed between the literature and my interviews. My interviews revealed increasing unease over immigration into China. My analysis demonstrated that the variety of conceptualisation and assigned significance is mostly due to affiliation and ideational focus. State-institution affiliated scholars emphasise the state to the detriment of intellectual coherence in their economic security argument, blurring the usual TS-NTS division and conceptualising irregular migration as a threat and migrants as undesirables. University-affiliated scholars adhere to the TS-NTS dichotomy and consider economic security as purely NTS, displaying greater academic freedom to be theoretically coherent, and look mostly at the economic causes of emigration.

Adherence to state narrative and theory-pursuit further account for variety of assessment of significance of economic security. Scholars of various locations and affiliations take up the CCP's 'comprehensive national strength' terminology to underline the significance of economic security. Conversely, UB4's and UB7's assessment of economic security as a key NTS threat was based

on their analysis of perceived real-world phenomena and interest in theory, revealing critical academic inquiry instead of political orthodoxy as key to their analysis. Scholarly research focus also creates variety in the migration debate, revealing that those with greater research experience in migration are far less alarmist than scholars like Fu Yong who treats migration as one of many NTS issues in her book and refers to 'refugee waves' and 'societal security'. UNB9's and ONB9's calmer assessment of the securitisation of migration in Europe came from their sustained analysis of migration, their response showing a confidence that their research needed no validation through extreme language.

Political purpose and meaning is abundant in the economic security and migration debates, and my interviews evidenced that scholars want to - and believe they can - influence the government through their economic security writings, which is considered as strongly political. Western states are implicitly criticised for the use of military interventions for economic gain and of economic sanctions for political leverage. The employment of 'comprehensive national strength' in the economic security debate implied a focus on the state and a view of the international situation as one of competition, not cooperation, unlike the more liberal UB4's support of interdependence. Yet the PRC is implicitly criticised for allowing Western states to dump its toxic waste in China. The debates on economic interdependence showed different political purposes connected to scholarly concerns over China's entry into the global economic system; whereas Fu Junwen, Zhuang Rui, Chen and Jian clearly favour protectionism, Wang Zhengyi considers globalisation as aiding China's development and Yu et al. see protectionism as threatening economic security.

The rejection of a discussion of PRC domestic migration as a non-IR topic is politically motivated as a discussion of the 'floating population' would securitise millions of Chinese. Political meaning is evident in many scholars' placement of state interest over that of individuals in need through the mix-up of refugees and illegal

migrants, discrediting refugees, including PRC dissidents in Western states to the point of alleging that they trigger wars and xenophobia. The bemoaning of waning national ties contains the political purpose of recreating strong nation-states in control of the movement of goods and people. Normative shifts are evident in both debates. The migration literature mostly prevents a normative turn by focusing on crime and the state as the referent object, rather than delving deeper into the theoretical implications of migration. My interviews showed a budding normative shift with migrants themselves seen as referent objects. Key normative shifts are within UB7's advocacy for a change of the status quo for China to embrace international economic responsibility, and Yu et al.'s strong criticism of inequality, implying that reality should be different. The PRC debate moves beyond their scholarly role models, Buzan et al., by including individuals as legitimate referent objects of economic security. Advocacy of increased global economic integration also has normative implication as the CCP's current policy is criticised.

Chapter Seven evaluated the debate on health security and food security. Whereas a health issue, namely SARS, was one of the triggers of the initial flourishing of the scholarly NTS debate in China, the health security debate has since receded in the scholarly PRC debate. Contrariwise, the food security debate is among the most diverse within the NTS debate. The health and food security debates contain a variety of conceptualisations and assessments of significance. The health security debate is twice divided. Firstly it divides between those defining health security narrowly as disease, and those advocating the securitisation of all health issues, and secondly between those focusing on non-anthropogenic 'real' threats, and those focusing on anthropogenic health threats. These divisions inform the scholars' assessment of the importance of health security. The non-anthropogenic threat debate highlights the lethality and suddenness of specific pandemics. The anthropogenic debate focuses on the accessibility of medicine highlight the destructiveness of AIDS. The food

security debate similarly divides into those analysing food security in terms of availability, those focusing on distribution, and others investigating food safety. Food security is assigned huge significance by all since food is essential to human existence, rather than by linking it to national security. Food security is considered crucial now; its significance is underlined by increasing scarcity of supply and increasing demand, food production risks, including the role of multi-nationals in food production, the biofuel crop production instead of food crop production, the dangers of GM crops, or food-pollution. The health and food security debates are unique in the PRC debate as the leading NTS scholars, Yu Xiaofeng, Pan Yihe, Wang Jiangli, Wang Yizhou, and Fu Yong are not the most critical in their thinking. Instead scholars not focusing on general IR advance the most insightful conceptualisations and reasons for the importance of the two issues, revealing a lively debate on both issues in the PRC.

Internal factors, notably conceptions of reality, training, and research interest are crucial reasons for variety in conceptualisation and assessed significance. Affiliation or location are unimportant, with the semi-official discourse being the most parsimonious regarding the securitisation of health issues, whereas university scholar Chen Kun wants to securitise all health issues.

Ontological leanings, including state security focus, lead some scholars to limit health security threats to extremely lethal incurable pandemics. Others' IR training and consequent focus on anthropogenic threats makes them focus on SARS only when it was a pandemic. Conversely, the scholars with the most critical and theoretically sound arguments focus on health and food security and not NTS generally. Their vehemently normative arguments are unique in the PRC debate and their writings evidence that the health and food security discourse is less severely controlled.

The health and food security debates contain various political meanings and purposes. Shang's warning against a false sense of

security and other scholars' subscription to the CCP's belief in scientific progress mark a difference between a more post-modern and a more classically communist worldview. The underlying question of international cooperation on health security is politically meaningful as it encompasses a criticism of the Jiang Zemin administration's uncooperative attitude during the SARS crisis, as well as an ongoing fear of foreign intervention, and a nineteenth-century linkage of public health to state power. The state mostly remains the key actor and focus point of health security. Conversely, strong political implications in the food security debate go against this state-centrism and focus on food security as a human right, effectively accusing states of human rights abuses should their citizens not enjoy food security. A normative turn is suggested in food and health security. Both debates encompass a strong focus on individual human security and calls for greater protection of individuals, advancing views of a reality that individuals should be able to have access to medicine and food in contrast to current PRC and global capitalist reality. Moreover, Jin and Peng's advocacy of embracing risk rejects authoritarian over-securitisation.

Chapter Eight analysed energy security and environmental security. My analysis revealed varying and competing conceptualisations of energy and environmental security and assessments of their significance. The energy debate divides over whether energy scarcity is real or constructed, as my interviews showed. In contrast to the statist energy security debate, environmental security is generally conceptualised as a holistic security threatened by unsustainable development practices. Environmental and energy security are deemed existentially significant, causing ontological problems for scholars who also consider fossil-fuelled energy security as endangering environmental security.

Research interest and academic reasoning encompassing political orthodoxy causes variance of conceptualisation and assessed significance. Ontological difference means that the novelty of environmental and energy security is assessed differently. Statist

scholars regard environmental security as post-Cold War phenomena, whereas holistically-inclined scholars consider environmental degradation to be much older.

Various political meanings and purposes are evident in the environmental and energy security debates. Fu blames Western pollution but supports Chinese development along the same path. UNB8 regarded this international blame-game as marring necessary cooperation. Conversely, Fu, Yu et al. and Feng envision an inimical future of resource wars showing that the need to follow the state narrative on scarcity leads to an abandonment of academic rigour as the same scholars see NTS as non-military or post-military security. The absence of a discussion of controversial PRC environmental problems is politically motivated and in contrast to the energy debate's emphasis on Western over-consumption. Climate change is turned into a political opportunity by Zhang Haibin who envisions a resulting change in the international order in China's favour. The energy and environmental security debates contain strong normative implications. Normative shifts occur with UNB3's advance of multi-layered international governance models for environmental issues and Yu et al.'s normative and holistic reconsideration of human and nature's interconnectedness. Whereas the environmental debate moves towards non-state referent objects, the energy security literature mostly does not contain normative implications but follows the CCP narrative and focuses on state security. Both energy and environmental security debates advocate handling strategy changes, encompassing normative change by advancing cooperation on domestic problems, and embracing interdependence and civilian initiatives.

Drawing on my investigations and findings, Chapter Nine established what PRC NTS scholarship is including its political and normative implications. The normative turns in the NTS debate shown in my thesis mean that diverse strands are to be expected within the overall Chinese IR theory development as scholars can and do move beyond merely descriptive theory to an IR theory

confidently asserting what the world should be like, at times in contrast to CCP aims. NTS is not only important for the PRC scholars as the issues are seen as increasingly influencing China, its people, and the world, but also because it grants the scholars more space to think about security than TS did. Regarding the referent object and security actors, while there still is a strong statist in the debate in China, more liberal parts of the debate are deepening security to focus more on the individual and society as referent objects, and there are moves to increase the importance of society as an actor to manage NTS. Indeed, parts of the debate note a tension between individual security and state security, a significant move in an authoritarian state. There are, as of yet, no specific PRC NTS Schools of Thought. The debate is evolving, although some institutionalisation occurs via Zhejiang University's NTS centre. Neither location in or away from Beijing or affiliation to universities or social science academies are clear influences on the variance of state-, society-, or individual-centric positions of the NTS scholars.

This thesis has shown that the scholarly PRC NTS debate is diverse and entails both the widening of security to include non-military issues and its deepening to encompass non-state referent objects. Political purposes of vindicating state securitisation and influencing the state are evident throughout and highlight both the limitations on scholarship in authoritarian regimes as well as the scholars' confidence that their views can influence decision-makers. The debate is still in flux, with no authoritative definition of NTS or specific issues existing, but with tentative but significant moves to create NTS theories focusing more on humans and global security, constituting a normative turn. The differences to the Western debate are not only due to the political restrictions on the PRC debate by the regime, but also due to the PRC scholars' vastly different geopolitical and historical location.

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Appendix: General Interview Questions

- 1) 根据您的了解，非传统安全是什么，包括那些问题？-What do you consider non-traditional security to be, and what issues does it include?
- 2) Does NTS have an impact on state-society/state-individual relations? 非传统安全对国家-社会/国家-个人关系有何影响？
- 3) 在传统安全和非传统安全之间，哪一个更加严重的危险？以中国来论，哪一种是最严重的？With regards to traditional and non-traditional security threats, which pose the more serious danger? Which are more serious for China?
- 4) 应该如何处理非传统安全问题？How should non-traditional security issues be dealt with?
- 5) How do you see the Chinese NTS debate at the moment? 您认为中国的非传统安全辩论的情况如何？
- 6) What was your **motivation** for starting to work on NTS? 您为何研究非传统安全？
- 7) Has your **opinion changed** since publishing the book/article? 出版书/文章以后，您 对非传统安全的想法 发生改变了吗？
- 8) Who is/was your **intended audience**? 您写书/文章的时候，您的目标读者是谁？ /
Who do you consider to be the intended audience of Chinese NTS works? Who is the real audience? 您认为中国学者的非传统安全书和文章的目标读者是谁？事实上，读者是谁？(Depending on whether the interviewee has written on NTS)
- 9) What do you consider to be the most important books/articles on NTS in China and abroad?
您认为关于非传统安全最有影响/重要的中文/外文书或文章是哪些？
- 10) Who, in your opinion, are the key Chinese scholars in the field of NTS? 根据您的看法，最有影响的研究非传统安全的中国学者是哪位？